

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

30p/lwp  
00642 65

23 AUG 1965

~~SECRET~~ - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, Hq III MAB ltr 3:RCD:rek Ser 00437-65  
of 13Aug65

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03E)

Subj: Third Amphibious Brigade Command Diary

1. Forwarded.



H. S. HILL  
By direction

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

65 6485

HEADQUARTERS  
Third Marine Amphibious Brigade  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

UNCLASSIFIED

3:RCD:rek  
Ser: 00437-65  
13Aug65

~~SECRET~~  
From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3E)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Third Marine Amphibious Brigade Command Diary

Encl: (1) Command Diary

1. The Third Marine Amphibious Brigade was not directed to submit a command diary. However, in the interest of Marine Corps History the attached diary is submitted as a matter of information which may be of value in the overall evaluation of the CHU LAI Landing.

2. The attached diary was prepared after the Third MAB Staff for the CHU LAI Landing was dissolved and ashore. The extraordinary work load imposed on the small staff of eleven officers and eight enlisted Marines for this unique operation precluded the assignment of personnel for the specific purpose of preparing a command diary during the planning and execution of the landing. Complete records remained with Task Force 78 aboard ship and were not available for research, therefore the contents of the attached diary are a collection of notes and recollection of the principal staff officers assigned for the specific operation.

3. This letter is downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon the removal of enclosure (1).

*M. E. Carl*  
M. E. CARL

1st MAW SEC No. 1  
4488-65

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PART I  
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET  
THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE

MARION E. CARL  
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USMC, COMMANDING  
COMMAND DIARY, 23 APRIL THRU 12 MAY 1965  
SUBMITTED FROM THE COMMAND POST  
LOCATED ABOARD  
USS ESTES AGC 12  
COVERING SPECIFIC PERIOD FOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AT CHU LAI,  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

GROUP-4

*Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 12 years.*

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

## THIRD MAB STAFF

BGen M. E. CARL

Commanding General

Col N. R. NICKERSON

Chief of Staff

2dLt W. K. WILSMANN

G-1

Maj J. W. ANDREWS

G-2

LtCol R. C. DENNY JR

G-3

LtCol J. A. SCHIMMENTI

Asst G-3

Maj H. U. CARPENTER

Asst G-3

Maj J. G. BUCKMAN

G-4

Maj H. R. KELLY

CEO

1stLt T. U. MEYERS

Embark O

1stLt J. L. MCCLUNG

Aide-De-Camp

SgtMaj K. CHASE

Sgt Major

GySgt R. E. KELEHER

Operations Chief

Sgt C. R. GOODELL

Administrative Chief

Sgt W. D. PEACOCK

Logistics Chief

Sgt G. L. CARNICLE

Communications Chief

Cpl R. D. STUBBS

Communications Section

Cpl K. D. DOMINGO

Clerk

Cpl J. A. BARNHART

Operations Clerk

SECRET

SECRET

TASK ORGANIZATION RLT-4RLT-4

COL DUPEAS

HQCO, 4TH MAR  
 DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIV  
 DET, POSTAL UNIT, HQCO, 3D MARDIV  
 DET, DISB UNIT, HQCO, 3D MARDIV  
 ISO SEC, HQCO, 3D MARDIV  
 DET VMO  
 DET, 3D DENTAL CO, FMF  
 CO B (-)(REIN), 3D ENGR BN  
 DET, HQ BTRY, 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 DET, 1ST COMM CO, FMF  
 DET, CO B, 3D MT BN

BLT 1/4

LTCOL FREDRICKS

1ST BN, 4TH MAR  
 DET, 1ST COMM CO (PROV)  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D RECON BN  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BN  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO G, 3D TK BN  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D AT BN  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D ENGR BN  
 BTRY G, 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 107MM MORTAR BTRY, 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 DET, 3D SERV BN  
 DET, COLL PLAT, CO A, 3D MED BN  
 DET, 3D DENTAL CO, FMF

SECRET

2D PLAT, CO C, 3D MT BN  
 DET, COMM PLAT, HQCO, 4TH MAR  
 SHORE PARTY TEAM

SECRET

BLT 2/4

LTCOL FISHER

2D BN, 4TH MAR  
 DET, 1ST COMM CO (PROV)  
 2D PLAT (REIN), CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BN  
 2D PLAT (REIN), CO C, 3D TK BN  
 2D PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D AT BN  
 2D PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D RECON BN  
 2D PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D ENGR BN  
 BTRY H (REIN), 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 DET, HQ BTRY, 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 SFCP # 2

DET, COLL PLAT, CO B, 3D MED BN  
 DET, 3D DENTAL CO, FMF  
 1ST PLAT (REIN), CO B, 3D MT BN  
 DET, COMM PLAT, HQCO, 4TH MAR

REGT ARTILLERY GROUP

LTCOL SLACK

3D BN (-), 12TH MAR  
 HQ BTRY (-), 3D BN, 12TH MAR  
 BTRY K, 4TH BN, 12TH MAR  
 1ST PLAT, 1ST 8" HOW BTRY  
 DET, HQ BTRY, 12TH MAR (CMR SEC)  
3D RECON BN (-), 3D MARDIV  
CO C (-)(REIN), 3D TK BN

LTCOL BLANCHARD

CAPT SANDERS

SECRET

CO B (-)(REIN), 3D AT BN

CO A (-)(REIN), 1ST AMTRAC BN

SHORE PARTY GROUP

DET, SERV BN

CO B (-)(REIN), 3D SP BN

CO B (-)(REIN), 3D MED BN

CO C (-)(REIN), 3D MT BN

DET, CO B (-) (REIN), 3D ENGR BN

MP PLAT, 1ST MARBRIG

DET, BEACH MASTER GROUP

BLT 3/3 (MAB RESERVE)

HMM-161

CAPT MILLS

MAJ HELSHER

MAJ ELDER

SECRET

LTCOL HALL

LTCOL MORRISON

SECRET

THIRD MAB INITIAL SHIPPING

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>DEPARTED PORT/DATE</u>	<u>OFF-LOADED CHU LAI</u>	<u>MAJOR EMBARKEED UNIT</u>
ESTES (AGC-12)	SUBIC/2 MAY	N/A	THIRD MAB HQ
HEXAR (APA-237)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 10 MAY	BLT 1/4
UNION (AKA-106)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 12 MAY	BLT 2/4
WASHBURN (AKA-108)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 13 MAY COMP: 14 MAY	(SATS) NMCB-10
PRINCETON (LPH-5)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 10 MAY	HMM-161 BLT 1/4
GUNSTON HALL (LSD-5)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 8 MAY	NMCB-10
THOMASTON (LSD-28)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 8 MAY	3/12
WESTCHESTER (LST-1167)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 11 MAY	3/12
VERNON (LST-1161)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 9 MAY	NMCB-10
WASHTENAW (LST-1166)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 8 MAY	NMCB-10
WASHOE (LST-1165)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 9 MAY	AMTRACS
WINDHAM (LST-1170)	IWA/8 APR	COMM: 10 MAY *COMP:	MABS-12

THIRD MAB TURN AROUND SHIPPING

<u>DEPARTED PORT/DATE</u>	<u>OFF-LOADED CHU LAI</u>	<u>CARGO EMBARKEED</u>
RETURNED SUBIC 121300H MAY 1965		
OKI/15 MAY	COMM: 17 MAY COMP: 19 MAY	BLT 3/3
OKI/20 MAY	*COMM: 24 MAY COMP: 28 MAY	CTG 79.2 CL V(A)
OKI/20 MAY	*COMM: 26 MAY COMP: 30 MAY	SATS NMCB-10 CARGO
SAILED FOR CONUS 12 MAY, RELIEVED BY IWO JIMA		
OKI/14 MAY	COMM: 20 MAY COMP: 21 MAY	LSG & RLIT-4 TRACK VEH
OKI/14 MAY	COMM: 20 MAY COMP: 21 MAY	BLT 3/3
OKI/17 MAY	*COMM: 21 MAY COMP: 22 MAY	BULK FUEL
IWA/20 MAY	COMM: 25 MAY COMP: *	MAG-11
IWA/18 MAY	*COMPLETED	MABS-12
IWA/20 MAY	*COMM: 24 MAY COMP: 27 MAY	MAG-11
OKI/19 MAY	COMM: 23 MAY COMP: 23 MAY	LSG & RLIT-4 VEHICLES

SECRET

SECRET

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>DEPARTED PORT/DATE</u>	<u>OFF-LOADED CHU LAI</u>	<u>MAJOR EMBARKED UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTED PORT/DATE</u>	<u>OFF-LOADED CHU LAI</u>	<u>CARGO EMBARKED</u>
WHITFIELD (LST-1169)	OKI/27 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 8 MAY	3/12	DAMAGED BOW RAMP, TO SUBIC FOR REPAIRS		
HENRICO (APA-45)	OKI/30 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 12 MAY	2/4	OKI/17 MAY	DA NANG	DA NANG
COMSTOCK (LSD-19)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 7 MAY	3/12	IWA/16 MAY	*COMM: 24 MAY COMP: 27 MAY	MAG-11
LENAAWEE (APA-95)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 12 MAY	RLT-4	SAS/19 MAY	*COMM: 24 MAY COMP: 27 MAY	CL V
TOM GREEN (LST-1159)	OKI/29 APR	COMM: 7 MAY COMP: 11 MAY	NMGB-10	OKI/19 MAY	*COMM: 24 MAY COMP: 27 MAY	DET 3/12
OKANOGAN (APA-220)				SAS/13 MAY OKI/18 MAY	COMM: 22 MAY COMP: 25 MAY	CL V POL & RLT-4 RESU
NAVARRO (APA-215)				IWA/23 MAY SAS/27 MAY	*COMM: 1 JUN COMP: 4 JUN	MAG-12 CL V(A)
MERRICK (AKA-97)				OKI/12 MAY	COMM: 17 MAY COMP: 23 MAY	NMGB-11 SATS MATTING
BAYFIELD (APA-33)				SAS/26 MAY	COMM: 28 MAY COMP: 31 MAY	MAG-12
MATHEWS (AKA-96)				SAS/30 MAY	COMM: 1 JUN COMP: 5 JUN	CL V(A)
TALLEDEGA (APA-208)				SUB/25 MAY	SUBIC	CL V(A)
SNOHOMISH (LST-1126)				SUB/25 MAY	SUBIC	CL V(A)
IWO JIMA (LPH-2)				OKI/17 MAY	COMM: 11 MAY COMP: 13 MAY	BLT 3/3

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SHIP  
MERRICK  
(AKA-97)

1ST-47

DEPARTED  
PORT/DATE

UNK

OFF-LOADED CHU LAI

COMM: 11 MAY  
COMP: 17 MAY

MAJOR  
EMBARKED UNIT

SATS MATTING

DEPARTED  
PORT/DATE

SAS/30 MAY

OKI/UNK

OFF-LOADED  
CHU LAI

\*COMM: 3 JUN  
COMP: UNK

COMM: 22 MAY  
COMP: 24 MAY

CARGO  
EMBARKED

CL V(A)

LUMBER AND  
SPARE PARTS

SECRET

\* APPROXIMATELY DATES OR KNOWN TO HAVE COMPLETED BUT UNKNOWN DATE.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

## PART II

RESUME OF ACTIVITIES

BACKGROUND. Third Marine Amphibious Brigade (TF 78) is a permanently organized task organization assigned aboard the Flagship of Commander Amphibious Forces, Seventh Fleet. A small cadre of staff officers is permanently aboard the assigned Flagship and is augmented during periods of unusual activities. On 23 April 1965 two officers and one enlisted Marine comprised the cadre of Third MAB aboard USS ESTES AGC 12, Flagship of Commander Amphibious Squadron One/ Commander Amphibious Forces Seventh Fleet. This was the situation when on 23 April 1965, III MAF received a warning order to prepare to land additional forces into the Republic of VIETNAM. The III MAF, upon receipt of the warning order directed Brigadier General Marion E. CARL to form a small staff at CAMP HAUGE, OKINAWA, and as CG Third MAB and Landing Force Commander (TF 78) to plan for and execute the amphibious landing of the Third MAB over the beach at CHU LAI, VIETNAM.

MISSION. Third MAB comprising one reinforced infantry regiment of two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion (-) and required combat, combat support and service elements, together with one naval mobile construction battalion, one medium helicopter squadron, and supporting Marine air base and communications elements conducts an amphibious landing on D-day to occupy and defend the

SECRET

SECRET

terrain necessary to construct and defend an Expeditionary Airfield at CHU LAI, Republic of VIETNAM.

CHU LAI. Throughout this diary, CHU LAI will be referred to as that parcel of land located approximately at a point 108 degrees 46 minutes East Longitude and 15 degrees 26 minutes North Latitude contiguous to the Bay of "VUNG DUNG QUAT" on the Eastern Coast of central VIETNAM. It is astride the boundary dividing QUANG TIN and QUANG NGAI Provinces. National Route One, an all weather bituminous treated macadam road paralleling the coast, connects CHU LAI with DA NANG, 57 statute miles to the Northwest, and with QUANG NGAI City, 20 statute miles to the South. The coastal plain at this point is approximately two statute miles deep rising in the West to a ridge of the heavily forested and extremely rugged ANNAMITE Chain of mountains which cover all of the interior of the country at this latitude. National Intelligence Survey Beach # Nane (CHU LAI Beach) was selected as the Amphibious Objective Area, the center of which will be discussed in greater detail in the chronology of events. The beach, composed of extremely soft sand, extended some two to four statute miles inland with streams and ponds bordered by marsh and rice paddies and traversed by streams and rivers. Beach exits consist of a network of trails, few of which are suitable for wheeled vehicles. Routes of egress to National Route One, approximately two statute miles inland, were overland routes requiring

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

extensive preparation in order to be traversed by wheeled  
vehicles.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

## PART III

SECRET

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

23 April 1965. Third MAB Staff for CHU LAI Landing was organized and located at Building 400, CAMP HAUGE, OKINAWA. Entire day spent in internal arrangements, staff assignments, orientation and staff briefings. Original concept was for a large, fully tactical MAB Staff, however, as new concepts from higher authority were received a smaller staff was officially organized. The final staff was comprised of eleven officers and eight enlisted Marines, all of whom were from the 1st Marine Brigade with the exception of the Chief of Staff plus the cadre of two officers and one enlisted Marine aboard the ESTES, who were assigned from the 3d Marine Division. While this was a small staff, one advantage enjoyed by this arrangement was that the staff of the 1st Marine Brigade had just completed a comprehensive four month planning period with the Fourth Marines in preparation for Operation SILVER LANCE and the knowledge gained and prior staff coordination from this proved invaluable during the planning and execution of the CHU LAI Landing. The organization of the staff was along conventional lines, however, many specialists would have reduced the extra hours or research and planning for this unique operation. Additional officers in the medical, engineering, supply, fiscal and civil affairs fields would have been invaluable as assigned staff members were required to perform specialists work. The greatest deficiency on the staff was the lack of

SECRET

SECRET

clerical and communications personnel.

24 April 1965. The tempo of planning increased as coordinated and concurrent planning commenced. Coordinated planning was hindered due to the location of various headquarters. Third MAB at CAMP HAUGE, 4th Marines at CAMP SCHWAB, NMCB-10 at CAMP KINSER and TF 76 at SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES. Additionally, coordination with NMCB-10 was delayed as the N-3 was in VIETNAM and therefore not available to discuss the many problems in off-loading NMCB-10 at CHU LAI. 4th Marines began preparation of their operations order. Intelligence studies indicated that planning should recognize a large VC concentration in the CHU LAI area and that the landing would probably be opposed. 4th Marines commenced loading under supervision of 3d Marine Division.

25 April 1965. Beach studies and the magnitude of equipment and supplies to be moved over the CHU LAI beaches indicated the need for additional shore party equipment. Staff liaison with 3d Marine Division indicated that there were two shore party teams at DA NANG and one should be available for Third MAB. Accordingly, a request was made of the Ninth MAB to provide one shore party team for the landing. Ninth MAB subsequently approved this request and one officer, 38 enlisted Marines, one Bay City Crane, one M-51 dump truck, two 6000 lb. rough terrain fork lift, one TD-18 tractor and associated equipment were available on D-day. Loading of 4th Marines continued. Requests for photographic coverage

SECRET

SECRET

were released and continued efforts made to obtain recent beach studies of the CHU LAI beaches. Designation of beaches and location of causeways by coordinates were coordinated with III MAF, MABS-12, NMGB-10 and TF 76 by message. Center of beach agreed upon by TF 76 and Third MAB as BT 547063 with causeway to be located on left flank 500 yards from centerline where studies indicated the best location of a beach exit. CTG 76.2 (Phibron-One) and Commander Movement Group, designated BEACH RED ONE on the right and BEACH RED TWO on the left. Third MAB immediately recommended approved doctrine be used in beach numbering, (RED ONE on the left-RED TWO on the right) this turned out to be one of many unorthodox "confusers" and was not resolved in favor of approved doctrine until 1 May with TF 76 aboard ESTES at SUBIC.

26 April 1965. Staff studies indicated that additional command guidance and forces were required for the successful accomplishment of Third MAB mission. Enclosure (1) refers. It should be noted that higher headquarters provided answers to all questions raised in enclosure (1), that a LPH remained in support of CHU LAI landing, and subsequent operations ashore until 12 June 1965. The only requested forces not assigned were the I/T and C/I teams and ASRT which were not available. ARVN translators were furnished. Control of air became of major concern as it was not determined whether air support would be provided by TF 77

SECRET

SECRET

or in-country air. Also the control of air in the amphibious objective area was not resolved. This made it impossible to commence air support planning. Forward echelon consisting of one officer and one enlisted flew to CUBI POINT, PHILIPPINES to board USS ESTES and effect advance liaison with the staff of TF 76 and the small cadre of Third MAB permanently assigned.

27 April 1965. Submitted concept of landing by dispatch as requested by CINCPACFLT. At this time the detailed documents were in initial stages of preparation. Concept as published is attached as enclosure (2). Assigned task group designators as follows: TG 78.1-BLT-4; TG 78.2-HMM-161; TG 78.3-NMCB-10.

28 April 1965. Staff prepared to fly to PHILIPPINES to join CTF 76 aboard USS ESTES. Continued planning for forthcoming operation. N-3, NMCB-10 returned to OKINAWA and SATS construction conference held at Third MAB Headquarters.

29 April 1965. Third MAB Staff flew to CUBI in MAG-13 C-54 aircraft and joined CTF 76 and staff aboard USS ESTES. GVN officials bought and paid for private property of Vietnamese citizens in the CHU LAI area to clear the area for the proposed SATS and permanent airfield.

30 April 1965. Devoted to joint conferences aboard flagship. Resolution of problem areas, discussion of the landing plan and designation of landing beaches and selection of H-hour.

1 May 1965. General COLLINS, General FONTANA aboard flagship.

SECRET

SECRET

Briefed on concept of operations. COMUSMACV concerned over depth of our initial penetrations. General COLLINS to attend conference in Saigon and will advise if a new concept is required. CINCPACFLT asked COMUSMACV to obtain clearance for the CHU LAI landing. USS PRINCETON estimated that it would require 15.5 hours to off-load BLT 1/4 less Class V LFORM. Class V LFORM estimated to require 650 helo lifts. USS PRINCETON requested permission to conduct a simultaneous helo/surface off-load at anchor. This was subsequently approved by CATF 76.

2 May 1965. Decision made to utilize two eight section causeways on the left flank of the beach vice original plan of one 16 section causeway. This resulted from new hydrographic information and the advantage of more rapid off-loading accrued by utilizing two causeways. USS LENAWEE designated hospital ship. Ninth MAB honored Third MAB request to provide TAC(A) on D-day. Received I Corps operation plan on their pre-landing activities at CHU LAI. Advised all subordinate units that friendly Vietnamese civilians were scattered throughout the AOA in hamlets and villages and precluded the use of pre-planned beach and landing zone preps. CTF 76 would control all air through his TACC. CATF 76 issued Operation Order 315-65 (enclosure (3)). Air control and delineation of the amphibious objective area resolved. TF 77 would provide air support. F-4's were available in-country from VMFA-531 at DA NANG. Air control

SECRET

SECRET

was in accordance with approved doctrine for amphibious operations (FM 31-11). (As a matter of interest, CATF 76 was not allowed to control air in the DA NANG and PHU BAI landings in April.) USS ESTES sailed for CHU LAI 021500I.

3 May 1965. CTF 76 requested meeting to discuss a possible change in helo approach and retirement routes. Initial routes were unchanged at this conference, however, subsequent change in scheme-of-maneuver dictated changes. CO HMM-161 requested a stand down on D-one day for maintenance and received approval. Received confirmation on liaison teams as requested. Issued Third MAB message Operation Order 301-65 (enclosure (4)). Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Third MAB Operation Order 301-65 was issued (enclosure (4)). Received III MAF Operation Order 301-65. Received information from COMUSMACV that D-day would be 7 May vice original date of 5 May 1965. This was necessary in order to allow time for ARVN forces to clear the landing area of VC and insure an unopposed landing. CTF 76 issued Annex H (Air Operations) and Annex G (Naval Gunfire Support) to CTF 76 Operation Order 315-65. Third MAB Personnel and Logistics message plan 301-65 was issued.

4 May 1965. Planning for the landing was predicated on an opposed landing. However, the GVN, through COMUSMACV advised that ARVN would uncover the beach area and that the landing would be unopposed. This required some changes to the planning in progress, however, the general overall

SECRET

SECRET

concept remained unchanged. Air and naval gunfire would be planned, but to be on a on-call status. TF 76 rendezvoused off CHU LAI out of sight of land. Authority to land at CHU LAI on 7 May not received as of 0800H. Requested that LPH PRINCETON be designated hospital ship vice APA LENAWEE in as much as none of the amphibious ships had a helicopter platform, however, LENAWEE remained the hospital ship as designated by CTF 76. CTF 76 issued a message on safety which discussed, inter alia, the fact that the complete off-loading (LFORM) of an LPH would be a first in WESTPAC. COMUSMACV advised that coordinates for the permanent runway to be built by A. E. LYONS Corp was not available at this time. This information obviously required in order to finalize the location of the SATS. CINCPACFLT advised CTF 76 that it was mandatory for the causeways to remain in place at CHU LAI until permanent facilities could be installed.

5 May 1965. Based on results of 2 May SAIGON Conference and verbal directions from CG, III MAF aboard USS ESTES a new concept for the Third MAB CHU LAI landing was published (enclosure (5)). Joint CTF 76/78 Commanders Conference and briefings held aboard USS PRINCETON. CG, III MAF aboard flagship to brief on results of the SAIGON Conference. COMCBPAC advised CO, NMCB-10 that in absence of permanent runway coordinates from DOICC that CO NMCB-10 authorized to use his judgment as to location of SATS.

SECRET

SECRET

Minimum required separation between runways seven hundred feet. 6 May 1965. Issued change to Third MAB Operation Order 301-65 reflecting the concept issued on 5 May (enclosure (6)). CG, Third MAB and staff visited DA NANG for conference with CG, III MAF and staff. Ninth MAB confirmed that four F-4B aircraft will be on condition III, FAC(A) with Vietnamese Observer, two UH-1E with AO'S will be available for D-day and subsequent operations. Kilo Company, 3/9 directed to report to OPCON RLIT-4 as Third MAB Reserve. On 7 May issued orders to execute Operations Order 301-65. BLT 3/3 ordered to commence loading on USS IWO JIMA at OKINAWA 071300I. III MAF advises that ARVN Forces have reported the landing area clear of VC. Requested that TF 76 arrange for an LPH to remain in objective area for an indefinite period upon termination of the amphibious landing. TF 76 passed this request to COMSEVENTHFLT. This request was approved and an LPH (USS IWO JIMA) remained off CHU LAI until 12 June. Received official notice from CG, FMFPac to substitute "amphibious" for the word "expeditionary" in organizational title. D-day confirmed as 7 May - H-hour 0800H, L-hour 1000H. 7 May 1965. D-day for Third MAB landing at CHU LAI. TF 78 landing force embarked in TF 76 ships arrived in transport area at 0430H. Assault elements of BLT 1/4 and 2/4 crossed the Line of Departure on schedule in sixteen LVTP-5 in first wave and touched down at 0800H. Weather conditions favorable. Second wave touched down at 0803H, third wave at 0808H and

SECRET

SECRET

fourth and last scheduled wave at 0813H. L-hour confirmed as 1020H. First wave into LZ ROBIN executed on schedule. Temperature 86 degrees, humidity 80 percent. Trafficability on the beach extremely difficult. Sand at the beach exits loose and difficult to traverse. Two eight section causeways installed left flank Beach Red One. No enemy contact throughout the day. Four cases of heat prostration reported. CAS and helo escort aircraft (A-4)(A-1) were on station for initial landings. They were released prior to returning to TF 77 carrier for strikes controlled by ARVN outside Third MAB TAOR. Hm-161 flew 174.1 hours in support of Third MAB, lifting 761 troops, 21,040 pounds internally, 265,980 pounds externally and evacuated four casualties.

8 May 1965. COMSEVENTHFLT advised that USS PRINCETON would remain in objective area until relieved by USS IWO JIMA on 11 May. Two companies from 1/4 were helo lifted from LZ ROBIN to LZ HAWK commencing at 0800H. Lift completed at 1020H. BLT 2/4 continued to consolidate positions. General CARL, Colonel NICKERSON, Lt Colonel GOODE, Commander BANNISTER, Lt Colonel WILSON and Lt NEWCOMBE USN, made a reconnaissance of the proposed SATS site. It was commonly agreed that the SATS strip should be constructed nearer the ocean and along a ridge line of sand that would involve far less fill work. General CARL ordered that the SATS be constructed accordingly. Golf and Hotel Batteries 3/12 conducted registration fires. General WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, MGeneral COLLINS, CG III MAF and BGeneral McCUTCHEON, AWC First MAW boarded

SECRET

SECRET

flagship at 1345H for briefing on Third MAB operations. USS PRINCETON advised CATF that if present rate of flight operations continued for three days that PRINCETON would require AVGAS replenishment. Assigned BLT 3/3 Task Designator 78.6. UH-1E from VMO Det received small arms fire. USS THOMASTON arrived CHU LAI at 1400H with extra beach matting. HMM-161 flew 144 hours, lifting 541 troops, 132 tons externally and 28 tons internally plus evacuating 19 casualties and making 216 carrier and 450 field landings. Ground forces ashore encountered no enemy activity. USS IWO JIMA with BLT 3/3 sailed from OKINAWA.

9 May 1965. VC conducted isolated small probes throughout TAOR. Established liaison with local civilian officials to arrange transfer of household effects of 150 families in LY-TIN District. 19 cases of heat prostration reported. At 1100H commenced off-loading of matting for SATS runway. NMCB-10 completed survey for runway location. Naval gunfire support ships remained on station for possible on-call missions. Initial plan to off-load SATS matting via flatbeds embarked on LCU unsatisfactory. Initial lift was 68 tons and took five and one half hours. It was decided to break causeway, load on causeway sections directly and then move to new location about one mile North of Beach Red, coordinates 562083. Each section will carry 100 bundles. In addition, LCU 1482 and two LCM-6's were used to off-load matting. The new causeway location was closer to the construction site.

SECRET

SECRET

10 May 1965. Issued Frag Order 4-65 (enclosure (7)) for transfer of HMM-161 from PRINCETON to IWO JIMA on 11 May. USS WINDHAM CTY (LST) requested she be completely off-loaded by helicopter. This request was disapproved jointly by CTF 76/78. Third MarDiv provided an additional fifty bundles (2500 ft.) of badly needed beach matting. Loading aboard USS MERRICK (AKA) commenced at 1330I. CTF 76 released all naval gunfire support ships from on-call status, available for emergencies only. VC probes commenced shortly after darkness on night of 9-10 May and continued throughout the night. Two Marines WIA. During daylight hours Vietnamese civilians continued to remove personal belongings and farm products within and around the TAOR.

11 May 1965, MGen COLLINS, CG III MAF, BGen THI, CG ARVN I Corps and Col THANNELS, ARVN I Corps Advisor attended briefing aboard flagship. Issued Frag Order 5-65 (enclosure (8)) for the landing of BLT 3/3. CTF 76 estimated the AABFS (bottom lay) would be installed on 21 May and anticipated it to commence pumping fuel first light on 22 May. H-hour for BLT 3/3 confirmed as 0800H, 12 May. HMM-161 commenced transfer to IWO JIMA at 1030H. Alpha Det, MABS-12 began off-loading from LST WINDHAM CTY. Turn around time for one section of causeway loaded with 200 bundles of SATS matting averaging 18 hours. Movement over the beach continues slow because of loose sand. NMCB-10 reports excessive mechanical failures of tractors because of blowing sand. Tractor clutch has been initial part to fail.

SECRET

NMCB-10 further reports two hours maximum operator time without crew rest because of extreme heat and humidity. Using LVTP-5's for causeway anchors in order to free tractors for runway construction work. CTF 76 and CTF 78 received congratulatory message from Adm BLACKBURN, COMSEVENTHFLT, on the conduct of the landing. Landing force ashore conducting ambushes and aggressive patrols in TAOR and preparing defensive positions for hours of darkness.

12 May 1965. BLT 3/3 landed by helicopter in LZ CARDINAL, L-hour 0800H. BLT 1/4 apprehended seventeen VC suspects and an arms cache at a village via coordinates 497979. BLT 1/4 reports many tunnels in and around the village. Amphibious Operation terminated at 121200H. All units ashore chopped OPCON III MAF. BGen CARL and staff transferred to III MAF at DA NANG by helicopter. At 121200H submitted final Third MAB Situation Report for the amphibious landing over the beaches at CHU LAI, VIETNAM.

SECRET

SECRET

ENCLOSURE INDEX

<u>ENCLOSURE</u>	<u>DATE TIME GROUP</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
1	SPEEDLETTER	REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES IN CHU LAI RVN.
2	270830Z APR 1965	CONCEPT OF LANDING.
3	021440Z MAY 1965	CATF OPODER 315-65.
4	030028Z MAY 1965	THIRD MAB OPODER 301-65
5	051660Z MAY 1965	CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR CHU LAI LANDING.
6	060914Z MAY 1965	THIRD MAB OPODER CHANGE .
7	110016Z MAY 1965	FRAG ORDER 4-65.
8	110616Z MAY 1965	FRAG ORDER 5-65.
9	031112Z MAY 1965	ADMIN AND LOGISTIC PLAN TO THIRD MAB OPODER 301-65.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES IN CHU LAI RVN

A. MY 250440Z APRIL

1. THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ENEMY STRENGTH IN QUANG

TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES INDICATES THAT THE LANDING OF

THE FOURTH MARINES (-)(REIN) OVER THE BEACH AT CHU LAI

SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AS A FULLY SUPPORTED TACTICAL AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING TO INCLUDE NGF AND AIR SUPPORT ON STATION AND READY

FOR ACTIVE EMPLOYMENT IF THE SITUATION DICTATES.

2. BASED ON THE FOURTH MARINES MISSION OF SECURING THE

BEACH AND KEY TERRAIN FEATURES, BLOCKING ENEMY ROUTES OF

APPROACH AND PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE NMCB AND SATS

INSTALLATION AS WELL AS ESTABLISHING A III MAP ENCLAVE IN THE

CHU LAI AREA AND THE CURRENT ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA,

RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING UNITS BE ASSIGNED TO RLT-4:

A. ONE INTERROGATOR-TRANSLATOR TEAM.

B. ONE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUB-TEAM.

(1) THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE ABOVE TEAMS IS BASED ON CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTION WHERE THE PROBABILITY OF MANY FRIENDLY VIETNAMESE RESIDE ON THE FARMS AND IN THE SMALL VILLAGES CONTIGUOUS TO AND IMMEDIATELY IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA PLUS THE NECESSITY FOR ON-THE-SPOT INTERROGATION OF POW'S.

C. AIR SUPPORT RADAR TEAM TO PROVIDE THE FOURTH MARINES WITH CONTINUOUS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS AND LOW VISIBILITY.

D. DET VMO WITH AO'S AND HAND-HELD PHOTO CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND MESSAGE DELIVERY. IT IS ENVISIAGED THAT THE VMO DET WOULD CONSIST INITIALLY OF TWO

ENCLOSURE ( / )

SECRET

SECRET

HELOS AND FLY ABOARD LPH PRINCETON UNDER OPCON OF RLT-4  
ON D MINUS ONE DAY AND OPERATE FROM PRINCETON UNTIL  
OPERATING FACILITIES ARE ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

E. FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT ONE SHORE PARTY TEAM WITH  
EQUIPMENT BE EMBARKED IN LCU AT DA NANG AND RENDEZVOUS WITH  
TF 76 IN THE TRANSPORT AREA TO BE AVAILABLE ON D-DAY IN  
EARLY SCHEDULED WAVES. THIS REQUIREMENT IS BASED ON THE  
LIMITED SHORE CAPABILITY (ONE SHORE PARTY TEAM) EMBARKED  
WITH RLT-4 WHICH IS CONSIDERED INADEQUATE FOR A RLT (-)  
LANDING AS WELL AS THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT IMPOSED BY  
NMCB LANDING.

3. ADDITIONALLY, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AND COMMAND GUIDANCE  
IS REQUIRED FOR PRUDENT PLANNING AND FUTURE CONTINGENCIES  
AS THE COURSE OF EVENTS UNFOLD IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA:

- A. LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION U.S. FORCES.
- B. LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION RVN FORCES TO INCLUDE  
MILITARY, PARAMILITARY AND ANY OTHER RVN GOVERNMENTAL FORCES.
- C. EXPECTED ASSISTANCE, IF ANY FROM U.S. OR RVN FORCES  
IN AREA TO INCLUDE:
  - (1) AVAILABILITY OF LIAISON OFFICERS (LOCAL NATIONALS).
  - (2) AVAILABILITY OF INTERPRETERS (LOCAL NATIONALS).
- D. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
- E. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- F. OBJECTIVE AREA RESTRICTIONS.
- G. CIVIL AFFAIRS TO INCLUDE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, RESTRICTIONS  
AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING, OR RESTRICTIONS TO, RELOCATING

SECRET

LOCAL NATIONALS IN LANDING FORCE BEACHHEAD IF THIS BECOMES A MILITARY NECESSITY.

H. ANSWERS TO THE FOREGOING WILL HAVE A BEARING ON THE MISSION, STAFFING AND EQUIPMENT OF THIS HQ WHICH IS PRESENTLY UNDER STUDY.

4. WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF THE LPH (USS PRINCETON) PLAN TO UTILIZE HELOS TO THE MAXIMUM DURING BOTH THE ASSAULT LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT BUILD-UP ASHORE. HELOS WILL PROVIDE INVALUABLE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN AN AREA ALMOST COMPLETELY DEVOID OF A SATISFACTORY ROAD NETWORK. ALSO PLAN TO UTILIZE HELOS FOR CASUALTY EVACUATION, AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING RECOMMEND USS PRINCETON REMAIN IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA UNTIL THE SITUATION ASHORE IS STABILIZED. IN THE EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE DESIRE THAT A DET OF EIGHT UH-34 HELOS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OPERATE FROM BEACH AREA ASHORE. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THIS HQ IS NOT EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE POL TO THE HMM AND VMO DET ASHORE AND THIS SUPPORT WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY AN OUTSIDE AGENCY. AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO SURFACE OR HELO LIFT POL TO CHU LAI AND FLIGHT FERRY THE HELO DET ON A DAILY BASIS FROM DA NANG AND OPERATE IN THE CHU LAI AREA UNDER OPCON RLT-4.

5. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA CONTAINED IN REF A.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE( / )

SECRET

## CONCEPT OF LANDING

A. CG III MAF 260900Z NOTAL APRIL 65

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 241244Z APRIL 65

1. REF A DIRECTED THIS HQ TO SUBMIT CONCEPT OF LANDING PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B.

2. A DETAILED LANDING PLAN ANNEX WITH APPENDIXES IS BEING PREPARED FOR DISTRIBUTION AND WILL BE ISSUED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS ANNEX WILL SET FORTH DETAILED INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE FOURTH MARINES LANDING AT CHU LAI. THE PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE LANDING OF NMCB-10 WILL BE SUBMITTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. THE HELICOPTERBORNE LANDING PLANS WILL BE PREPARED JOINTLY BETWEEN THE HMM AND BLT 1/4 COMMANDING OFFICERS WHILE ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE ABOARD USS PRINCETON. THE PLAN WILL CALL FOR MAXIMUM HELO AVAILABILITY TO INSURE THE MAXIMUM BUILD-UP OF TROOPS IN THE MINIMUM TIME AND WILL FOLLOW CURRENT DOCTRINE FOR HELO VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT.

3. CONCEPT FOR LANDING.

A. THIS PLAN ENCOMPASSES THREE LANDING ENVIRONMENTS.

(1) AN ASSAULT LANDING OVER THE BEACH BY LVT, LCM AND LCVP.

(2) A TACTICAL HELICOPTERBORNE LANDING.

(3) AN ADMINISTRATIVE LANDING BY NMCB-10.

B. THIS PLAN PROVIDES FOR LANDING TWO BLTS ABREAST OVER NIS NR NINE. BLT 2/4 ON THE RIGHT, BLT 1/4 MINUS TWO COMPANIES ON THE LEFT. A LANDING BY HELO OF TWO COMPANIES AT L-HOUR (TENTATIVE L-HOUR IS H / THIRTY MINUTES) FROM BLT 1/4 IN LANDING ZONES TO BE DESIGNATED, BUT IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF GS 5101 WITH ALTERNATE LZ GS 5402. IN THE EVENT THAT A THIRD BATTALION WERE AVAILABLE IT IS ENVISAGED THAT THIS BATTALION TO BE IN RESERVE PREPARED FOR EMPLOYMENT BY SURFACE CRAFT, HELO OR MOST LIKELY A COMBINATION OF BOTH.

SECRET

1 ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET

## C. TENTATIVE ASSAULT SCHEDULE: READ IN FOUR COLUMNS:

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>CRAFT/VEH UNIT SERIAL</u>	<u>CRAFT/VEH UNIT SERIAL</u>
		<u>RED ONE</u>	<u>RED TWO</u>
ONE	H-HOUR	6 LVTP-5 ASSLT ELMS, CO A ASSLT ELMS, CO D 151, 153	10 LVTP-5 ASSLT ELMS, CO F (REIN) ASSLT ELMS, CO G (REIN) 280, 283
TWO	H / THREE	4 LVTP-5 ELMS, CO A ELMS, CO D 152, 154	2 LCM-8, 5 LCM-6 2D PLAT (-) CO C 3D TK BN 2D PLAT (-) CO B 3D AT BN 286, 287
THREE	H/EIGHT	3 LCVP 1ST PLAT CO D SP RECON TEAM 155, 195	5 LCVP ELMS, CO F ARTY RECON TEAM 281, 284
FOUR	H / THIRTEEN	2 LCM-8 1ST PLAT, CO C 3D TK BN 173	10 LCVP CO H (-)(REIN) CO E (-)(REIN) 288, 290
ON CALL	RPT PCS H-TWENTY	1 LCU SP TEAM ELMS, 1ST PLAT CO C, 3D TK BN 194	1 LCU BEACH MASTER GP 311
ON CALL	RPT PCS H-TEN	6 LCM-6 BTRY G (-), 3D BN 12TH MAR 204, 206	
ON CALL	RPT PCS H-FIVE		5 LCM-6 CO F VEH, CO G VEH CO E VEH 282, 285
ON CALL	RPT PCS H-HOUR		2 LVTP-5 FLOATING DUMPS 309, 314

SECRET

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>RED ONE</u>	<u>RED TWO</u>
ON CALL RPT PCS		3 LCVP ELMS, H&S CO DET, 3D SVC BN 156, 163	LST 1169
ON CALL RPT PCS		LST 1167 HQ BTRY (-)(REIN) 3D BN, 12TH MAR 326 LAND FIRST IF 326 AND 327 CANNOT BEACH SIMULTANEOUSLY	LST 1169 BTRY K (-), 4TH BN 12TH MAR, RLT-4, HQ (-) 327
ON CALL RPT PCS		LST 1161; CO C (-)(REIN); 3D TK BN; SP GP B (-); DET, 3D AT BN; DET, 3D MT BN; RLT-4 HQ (-) 512	
ON CALL RPT PCS		DET, 3D MED BN DET, 3D ENGR BN	
ON CALL RPT PCS		LST 1165 CO A (-), 1ST ANTRAC BN 3D RECON BN (-), RLT-4 HQ (-)	
FREE BOAT		1 LVTC BLT 1/4 CO GP 185	
FREE BOAT			1 LCVP BLT 2/4 CO GP 293
FREE BOAT			1 LCVP CMD GP (-) 294
FREE BOAT			1 LCVP 1ST PLAT, CO B 3D RECON BN 298

4. WAVE TWO SHOWS A MIX OF LVT, LCM-6 AND LCM-8. RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY IN CONTROL, HOWEVER, PHIBRON-ONE HAS TENTATIVELY AGREED TO THIS ARRANGEMENT AND THIS WAVE ORGANIZATION WAS DICTATED IN ORDER TO SUPPORT SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

SECRET  
ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET

5. CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE EVENT  
LANDING CRAFT AND LVT AVAILABILITY CHANGE AND AS NEW  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED WHICH MAY INFLUENCE THE  
SCHEME OF MANEUVER REQUIRING ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LANDING PLAN.

GP-4

ENCLOSURE (2)

4

SECRET

SECRET

CTF 76 OPODER 315-65

- A. COMSEVENTHFLT 300246Z APRIL NOTAL
- B. CTF 76 OPODER 306A-65
- C. COMSEVENTHFLT 241244Z APRIL NOTAL
- D. CTF 76 300710Z APRIL NOTAL
- E. MAPS: AMS SERIES L701

## TASK ORGANIZATION

- 1. TF 76 AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE RADM WULZEN
  - A. TF 78 LANDING FORCE BGEN CARL
  - B. TG 76.0 SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND  
COMMAND GROUP RADM WULZEN
    - (1) ESTES (AGC-12)
    - (2) TACRON-12
  - C. TG 76.1 ADV FORCE AND TRANSPORT  
AREA DEFENSE GROUP RADM MILLER
    - (1) CANBERRA CAG-2
    - (2) BUCK DD-761
    - (3) SOMERS DD-947
    - (4) COOK APD-130(WHEN ASSIGNED)
  - D. TG 76.2 MOVEMENT GROUP CAPT CLARK
  - E. TG 76.3 TRANSPORT GROUP CAPT CLARK
    - (1) HENRICO APA-45
    - (2) BEXAR APA-237
    - (3) LENAWEE APA-95
    - (4) PRINCETON LPH-5
    - (5) WHITFIELD CTY LST-1169
    - (6) VERNON CTY LST-1161
    - (7) UNION AKA-106
    - (8) WASHBURN AKA-108
    - (9) GUNSTON HALL LSD-59
    - (10) THOMASTON LSD-28
    - (11) COMSTOCK LSD-19
    - (12) COOK APD-130
    - (13) WINDHAM CTY LST-1170
    - (14) WESTCHESTER CTY LST-1167
    - (15) WASHOE CTY LST-1165
    - (16) TOM GREEN CTY LST-1159
    - (17) WASHTENHAW CTY LST-1166
    - (18) NBG ONE WESTPAC DET
  - F. TG 76.5 (LPH GROUP) CAPT KNAPP
    - (1) PRINCETON LPH-5
    - (2) THOMASTON LSD-28
    - (3) BEXAR APA-237

SECRET

ENCLOSURE(3)

SECRET

- G. TG 76.6 TASK GROUP
  - (1) LENAWEE APA-195
  - (2) COMSTOCK LSD-19
  - (3) WASHBURN AKA-108

CAPT LORENTSON

- H. TG 76.7 TASK GROUP (TG/BLT)
  - (1) HENRICO APA-45
  - (2) UNION AKA-106
  - (3) GUNSTON HALL LSD-5

CAPT CLARK

- I. TG 76.8 (ASSAULT SUPPORT GROUP)
  - (1) WHITFIELD CTY LST-1169
  - (2) WASHOE CTY LST-1165
  - (3) WASHENTAW CTY LST-1166
  - (4) TOM GREEN CTY LST-1159
  - (5) WESTCHESTER CTY LST-1167
  - (6) VERNON CTY LST-1161
  - (7) WINDHAM CTY LST-1170

CDR MILLER

2. SITUATION. THIS SKELETAL OPERATION ORDER PRESCRIBES  
EXECUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS IN THE CHU LAI AREA OF RVN.

A. ENEMY FORCES.

- (1) SEE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.
- (2) SEE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) COMUSMACV, COORDINATES IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS IN  
SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

(2) ARVN FORCES, WILL VERY PROBABLY BE IN OR NEAR  
THE AOA.

(3) ATTACK CARRIER STRIKE FORCE (TF 77) . CONDUCT  
AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THIS FORCE AS APPROVED BY  
COMSEVENTHFLT.

(4) CRUISER DESTROYER FORCE (TG 70.8). PROVIDE  
ADVANCE FORCE COMMANDER AND NGF SUPPORT AS REQUIRED AND  
APPROVED BY COMSEVENTHFLT.

SECRET

SECRET

(5) LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (TF 73). PROVIDE MOBILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT WHEN REQUIRED.

3. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, LAND MARINE COMBAT ELEMENTS BY SURFACE AND HELIBORNE ASSAULT IN ORDER TO SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND THE PROPOSED EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD SITE AND ACCESS THERETO.

4. EXECUTION. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. OPERATIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CATF 76 OPORDER 306A-65 AS MODIFIED BY THIS OPORDER. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR TG 76.3 WILL LAND ELEMENTS OF BLT 1/4 AND BLT 2/4 ABREAST OVER RED BEACH AND AT L-HOUR A HELIBORNE LANDING OF ELEMENTS OF BLT 1/4 INTO DESIGNATED LZ'S ON THE HIGH GROUND SW OF RED BEACH. UPON SECURING THE CRITICAL TERRAIN WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL AREA AND WHEN DIRECTED, TWO EIGHT SECTION CAUSEWAYS WILL BE EMPLACED ON THE LEFT FLANK OF RED BEACH TO EXPEDITE THE OFF-LOADING OF NMCB EQUIPMENT. AIR SUPPORT AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT WILL BE FURNISHED ON AN ON-CALL BASIS DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS OPERATION.

A. LANDING FORCE (TF 78)

(1) ON ORDER CATF 76, LAND RLT-4(-) OVER RED BEACH AND INTO DESIGNATED LZ'S, SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES.

(2) WHEN DIRECTED LAND NMCB-10 AND COMMENCE AIR-FIELD CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS.

B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMMAND GROUP (TG 76.0)

(1) FLAGSHIP UNIT (TU 76.0.1) OPERATE AS DIRECTED.

SECRET  
ENCLOSURE (3)

SECRET

## (2) TACTICAL AIR COMMAND UNIT (TU 76.0.2)

(A) ESTABLISH AND OPERATE A TACC IN FLAGSHIP AND  
A HDC IN LPH.

(B) CONTROL/COORDINATE ALL AIRCRAFT IN THE AOA.

(C) CONTROL HELICOPTERS IN THE SHIP-TO-SHORE  
MOVEMENT.

(D) CONTROL AND COORDINATE SAR ENROUTE TO AND  
WITHIN THE AOA.

## C. ADVANCE FORCE AND TRANSPORT AREA DEFENSIVE GROUP.

## (1) CONDUCT ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

ON D-DAY AT:

0001H - COOK ARRIVE AOA.

0100H - LAUNCH UDT PLAT FOR CLANDESTINE NIGHT  
PARALLEL RECON TO COMPLETE BY 0300H.

0430H - REPORT TO CTF 76 AND CTG 76.3 ANY  
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO BEACH AND SURF.

0545H - BOUY SAND BAR NEAR CENTER OF RED BEACH  
WITH 3 CONICAL BOUYS PAINTER RED WITH VERTICAL WHITE STRIPES.  
MARK FLANKS AND CENTER OF BEACH.

(2) PREVENT NATIVE CRAFT OR BOATS FROM ENTERING THE  
TRANSPORT AREA.

(3) PROTECT THE TRANSPORT GROUP AGAINST SURFACE,  
SUB-SURFACE AND AIR ATTACK.

(4) PROVIDE NGF SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

D. MOVEMENT GROUP (TG 76.2). SORTIE FROM PORTS OF  
EMBARKATION AND SAIL TO THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA.

E. TRANSPORT GROUP (TG 76.3).

(1) COMMENCING AT H AND L HOURS LAND THE LANDING  
FORCE OVER RED BEACH AND INTO DESIGNATED LZ'S.

SECRET

4 ENCLOSURE (3)

SECRET

(2) CONDUCT SURFACE AND HELICOPTERBORNE SHIP-TO-SHORE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

(3) EMPLACE TWO EIGHT SECTION CAUSEWAYS ON THE LEFT FLANK OF RED BEACH.

(4) CONDUCT ANTI SNEAK ATTACK AND ANTI SMALL BOAT OPERATIONS.

(5) ASSIGN ANCHORAGES FOR THE ATF.

F. TASK GROUP (TG 76.5)(LPH GROUP).

(1) COMMENCING AT H AND L HOUR ON D-DAY, AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.3, LAND THE LANDING FORCE BY SURFACE AND HELICOPTER, TO SECURE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES AS DIRECTED. SURFACE LANDED ELEMENTS WILL LAND OVER THE LEFT FLANK OF RED BEACH. (RED BEACH ONE).

(2) CHOP NBG-1 DET TO CTU 76.0.4 TO ASSIST BEACH OPERATIONS.

G. TASK GROUP (TG 76.6)(TG/BLT).

(1) OPERATE AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.3 TO LAND THE MEDICAL COMPANY, RECON BN, SATS, AND RLT HQ EQUIPMENT OVER RED BEACH.

(2) CHOP NBG-1 DET TO CTU 76.0.4 TO ASSIST BEACH OPERATIONS.

H. TASK GROUP (TG76.7)(TG/BLT).

(1) COMMENCING AT H AND L HOUR AS DIRECTED BY CTG 76.3 LAND THE LANDING FORCE OVER THE RIGHT FLANK OF RED BEACH (RED BEACH TWO). TO SECURE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES AS DIRECTED.

SECRET

5 ENCLOSURE(3)

SECRET

## I. ASSAULT SUPPORT GROUP (TG 76.8).

(1) LAND TROOPS, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OVER RED BEACH.

## X. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS OPERATION ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON R RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON SIGNAL FROM CTF 76.

(2) D-DAY IS TENTATIVELY SKED FOR 7 MAY 65.

(3) H AND L HOUR TO BE SIGNED BY CATF.

(4) RED BEACH IS 1000 YDS LANG CENTERED AT BT 547063. LEFT 500 YDS DESIGNATED RED ONE AND RIGHT 500 YDS DESIGNATED RED TWO.

(5) PRIMARY LZ IS LZ HAWK AT COORD BT 5402.

(6) AMPHIBIOUS OBJ AREA: CENTERED ON BT 5404 TO LANDWARD A 25 NAUTICAL MILE RADIUS CIRCLE AND TO SEAWARD A CIRCLE OF 50 NAUTICAL MILE RADIUS TO INCLUDE ALL SEA, LAND AND AIR SPACE LOCATED THEREIN.

(7) MAKE NO PUBLIC INFORMATION RELEASES.

(8) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT LAW CINCPAC 270425A APR 65.

(9) COMMANDERS ASSIGNED TASKS PROMULGATE SUPPORTING ORDERS AS REQUIRED WITH COPIES TO CTF 76.

(10) SUPPORT AIR REQUIREMENTS TO BE FURNISHED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE INFO ALCON.

(11) ON-CALL NAVAL GUNFIRE REQUIREMENTS TO BE FURNISHED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE INFO ALCON.

## 4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION IAW REF B.

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

## A. COMMAND:

(1) LANDING FORCE UNITS OF THIRD MAB PASS TO

SECRET

6 ENCLOSURE(3)

**SECRET**

OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF MACV AND ARE PLACED UNDER OPCON OF  
NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

(2) CTF 76 AND CTF 78 IN FLAGSHIP.

(3) SECOND IN COMMAND: CTG 76.3 IN HENRICO.

B. SIGNAL

(1) COMMAND AND MOVEMENT ANNEX NOVEMBER REF B EXCEPT:  
N-6 TM&W/CI (SEC), 3237 KCS.

(2) AIR COMMUNICATIONS - ANNEX H - REF B EXCEPT:

(A) AAW COMM TO BE DESIGNATED BY CTF 77.

(B) CHANGE FOLLOWING CIRCUITS TO READ AS INDICATED.

H-9 312.0 MCS TAD NR 1 (RED)  
H-10 325.0 MCS TAD NR 2 (GREEN)  
H-29 285.8 MCS TAD NR 3 (PURPLE)

(C) REQUEST NINTH MAB DASC DA NANG GUARD H-1

AND H-3.

(3) ASSAULT FREQ PLAN: ANNEX N REF B.

(A) N-14 385.8 MCS AMPHIB/CONTROL SHIP COMMON  
CTF 76 (NCS) ALL SHIPS GUARD.

(B) CTG 76.3 DESIGNATE UNITS TO GUARD CIRCUITS  
N-15 THRU N-22.

(4) YANKEE TEAM AREA COMM IN ACCORD WITH CTF 77  
100815Z FEB 65. CTF 76 WILL RESUME YT CIRCUIT GUARD WHEN  
PRESENT.

(5) RECOGNITION SIGNALS - COMUSMACV 190908Z APR.

GP-4

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

THIRD MAB MESSAGE OP ORDER 301-65 (EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD AT CHU LAI)

A. MAP: AMS SERIES L509 SHEETS ND 49-1 AND ND 49-13; 1:250,000

B. III MAF OP ORDER 301-65

C. CTF 76 OP ORDER 315-65

D. CINCPAC 240425Z APRIL PASEP

E. COMUSMACV 270813Z APRIL PASEP

F. CTF 78 300132Z APRIL NOTAL

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

THIRD MAB/TF 78

BGEN CARL

RLT-4/TG 78.1

COL DUPRAS

HMM-161/TG 78.2

LTCOL MORRISON

NMCB-10/TG 78.3

CDR BANNISTER

ALPHA DET, MABS-12/TG 78.4

1. SITUATION. HIGHER AUTHORITY HAS APPROVED THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL MARINE CORPS FORCES INTO RVN. A PRIMARY TASK OF THESE FORCES IS THE EARLY DEVELOPEMENT OF THE CHU LAI EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD AND ENVIRONS TO FACILITATE OFFENSIVE COMBAT BY GROUND AND AIR COMBAT UNITS.

## A. ENEMY FORCES

(1) SEE CURRENT INTSUMS

(2) ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION WITHIN THIRTY MILES OF CHU LAI. (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
(A) 1ST REGT/MB5(MF)	BT 2001	2540
(B) 60TH BN/1ST REGT (MF)	AT 9217	(400)
(C) 80TH BN/1ST REGT (MF)	BT 2510	(575)
(D) 90TH BN/1ST REGT (MF)	BT 3601	(450)

**SECRET**

SECRET

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
(E) 400TH WPNS BN/1ST REGT (LF)	BT 2001	(210)
(F) 70TH BN (LF)	BT 1545	(355)
(G) 52ND BN (LF)	BS 3881	(270)
(H) 3 TO 5 DISTRICT COMPANIES	UNK	(270-450)

(3) AN ADDITIONAL THREAT IS IMPOSED BY THE 93RD, 95TH, 97TH RIFLE BNS AND THE 300TH WEAPONS BN LOCATED IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THESE UNITS ARE UNDER CONTROL OF 2ND REGT (MF). 38TH BN (LF), 6-8 COMPANIES (LF) ALSO LOCATED NORTHERN QUANG NGAI.

(4) MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, MORTARS, RECOILLESS RIFLES AND, POSSIBILITY OF 75MM HOWITZERS.

(5) VC HAVE CONDUCTED EXTREMELY ACTIVE PROGRAMS OF HARRASSMENT AND TERRORIZATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN OBJECTIVE AREA. AN ESTIMATED 500 VC MILITIA LIVE IN VILLAGES AND HAMLETS VIC OBJECTIVE AREA.

(6) AOA MAY LAY ASTRIDE MAIN VC SUPPLY ROUTE FROM SEA TO DO XA BASE, LONG CONTROLLED BY VC.

(7) ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

(A) CAN MASS 2000 MAIN FORCE TROOPS IN 24 HOURS.

(B) CAN REINFORCE THE ABOVE WITH ANOTHER 2000 MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL FORCE TROOPS IN 72 HOURS.

(C) CAN HARRASS LANDING FORCE WITH SMALL UNIT ACTIONS, MORTAR ATTACKS, SABOTAGE, MINES AND AMBUSH.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) CTF 76 AS CATF PROVIDES AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AND CONTROLS AIR AND NGF SUPPORT.

(2) CTF 77 PROVIDES AIR SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

(3) CTG 70.8 PROVIDES ONE CAG AND TWO DDS FOR NGF SUPPORT.

SECRET

SECRET

## (4) CG NINTH MAB PROVIDES:

(A) ONE SP TEAM AT CHU LAI FOR PERIOD OF TEN DAYS COMMENCING D-DAY.

(B) PROVIDES VMO AND CAS A/C TO LANDING FORCE AS REQUIRED.

(C) ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND COORDINATION OF ASSIGNMENT OF ARVN

I CORPS LIAISON PERSONNEL TO BN/CO LEVELS OF LANDING FORCE.

(D) ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARVN COVERING FORCES IN CHU LAI AS PRACTICABLE.

(E) NINTH MAB LNO TO THIRD MAB.

(F) ONE REIN RIFLE CO AS FAST REACTION HELICOPTER-BORNE FORCE.

(5) ARVN I CORPS PROVIDES LIAISON PERS, COVERING AND SECURITY FORCES AS COORDINATED BY CG NINTH MAB.

2. MISSION. LAND RLT-4 BY SURFACE AND HELICOPTER-BORNE ASSAULT TO SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND TERRAIN NECESSARY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHU LAI EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD. LAND NMCB-10 ADMINISTRATIVELY OVER CHU LAI BEACHES TO COMMENCE SITE PREPARATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE SATS. LAND ADVANCE ELEMENTS OF MAG-12 TO ESTABLISH TACTICAL AIRFIELD. PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS.

## 3. EXECUTION

## A. CONCEPT

(1) RLT-4 LANDS H-HOUR D-DAY OVER RED BEACH BY SURFACE MEANS SEIZES, OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS ASSIGNED TAOR.

(2) HMM-161 LANDS DESIGNATED ELEMENTS OF RLT-4 BY HELICOPTER IN ASSIGNED LZ'S TO SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND ASSIGNED TAOR AND SUPPORTS THIRD MAB.

(3) WHEN TAOR SECURED RLT-4 PROVIDES DEFENSE OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ENVIRONS AND PREPARES TO CARRY OUT OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS ON ORDER.

(4) CONCOMITANTLY AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE ON D-DAY NMCB-10 LANDS

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)

SECRET

OVER CHU LAI BEACHES TO COMMENCE SITE PREPARATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE SATS.

(5) AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE ALPHA DET MABS-12 LANDS TO ESTABLISH TACTICAL AIRFIELD.

(6) UPON ESTABLISHMENT ASHORE AND ON ORDER ALL UNITS WILL BE CHOPPED TO SENIOR MARINE CORPS COMMANDER RVN. THIRD MAB HQ PREPARES TO MOVE TO A PLACE TO BE DESIGNATED.

B. RLT-4

(1) H-HOUR, D-DAY LAND BY SURFACE MEANS OVER RED BEACH ONE AND TWO AT L-HOUR, D-DAY LAND BY HELICOPTER IN LZ HAWK, SEIZE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND TAOR.

(2) PROVIDE SECURITY AND DEFENSE ELEMENTS FOR CHU LAI AIRFIELD SITE AND ENVIRONS.

(3) PREPARE FOR OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.

(4) ESTABLISH AND OPERATE TAC/LOG FOR THIRD MAB.

C. HMM-161

(1) L-HOUR, D-DAY LAND DESIGNATED ELEMENTS OF BLT 1/4 IN LZ HAWK.

(2) PROVIDE HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO THIRD MAB AS DIRECTED.

(3) PREPARE TO OPERATE FROM LPH, FOR DEPLOYMENT TO DA NANG AND/OR CHU LAI AS DIRECTED.

D. NMCB-10

(1) ON ORDER LAND OVER RED BEACH.

(2) COMMENCE IMMEDIATE SITE PREPARATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE SATS.

(3) PROVIDE ENGINEER SUPPORT WITHIN CAPABILITIES AND WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO PRIMARY MISSION AS REQUESTED.

E. DET ALPHA MABS-12

(1) LAND ON ORDER. PREPARE TO ESTABLISH TACTICAL AIRFIELD.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)

(2) PREPARE TO REVERT TO PARENT ORGANIZATION ON ORDER.

**SECRET**

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS PLAN EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.

(2) PLAN FOR OPPOSED LANDINGS. NGF WILL NOT BE FIRED ONLY IN EMERGENCY AND ON ORDER OF CATF/CLF.

(3) NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED UNLESS DIRECTED BY THIS HQ. NAPALM AND NON-TOXIC SMOKE AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS INCLUDED IN THIS CATEGORY.

(4) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REQUIRE MAXIMUM COMMAND ATTENTION AND INTERPRETATION. REFS D AND E CONTAIN DETAILED TREATMENT.

(5) RED BEACH LOCATED AT 551060 TO 545065. BEACH CENTER AT 547063.

(6) H-HOUR - TIME FIRST WAVE LANDS RED BEACH TENTATIVELY 0800H.  
L-HOUR - TIME HELICOPTERBORNE ELEMENTS LAND LZ HAWK - TO BE ANNOUNCED.

(7) D-DAY TENTATIVELY SEVEN MAY 1965.

(8) BE PREPARED FOR LANDING BEACH AND HLZ CHANGES. PREPARE BACK-LOAD CONTINGENCY PLAN.

(9) MAINTAIN HIGHEST ORDER OF HOST-GUEST RELATIONSHIPS. AVOID UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY. PLAN EMPHASIS ON CIVIL ACTION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS MATTERS.

(10) PROVIDE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO RVN MILITARY FORCES. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF RVN FORCES AND LOCAL RESOURCES PROVIDED.

(11) MOVREPS CLASSIFIED SECRET UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

(12) BE PREPARED TO ATTEND CONFERENCE ABOARD FLAGSHIP ON SIGNAL AFTER TRANSPORT GROUP RDVU TENTATIVELY FOUR MAY 1965.

(13) WILL DELIVER COPIES III MAF OP ORDER 301-65 AT RDVU CONFERENCE.

**SECRET**

SECRET

(14) SITREPS TO THIS HQ COMMENCING H-HOUR AND EVERY SIX HOURS THERE-AFTER. UNTIL DIRECTED OTHERWISE. NMCB-10 AND DET ALPHA MABS-12 BEGIN SITREPS WITH ACTUAL FIRST LANDING.

(15) CONDUCT SHIPBOARD TROOP TRAINING WITH EMPHASIS ON:

- (A) GENEVA CONVENTIONS
- (B) CODE OF CONDUCT
- (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIC ACTION
- (D) INTERNAL SECURITY
- (E) PHYSICAL CONDITIONING
- (F) CONDUCT OF THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE
- (G) TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
- (H) HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR
- (I) CENSORSHIP
- (J) CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS TABUS IN RVN.
- (K) FIRST AID AND WATER SAFETY

(16) TACTICAL TIPS - TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY; RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEWS-MEN - REF F.

(17) ANNEX A (AIR SUPPORT) - TO BE ISSUED.

(18) ANNEX B (NGF SUPPORT) - TO BE ISSUED.

(19) MAB TACLOG WILL NOT RPT NOT BE FORMED.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS - TO BE ISSUED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

(1) IAW PARA 270 FM 31-11/NWP-22(A).

(2) LANDING FORCE UNITS PASS TO OPCON MACV NAVAL COMPONENT CDR  
(SENIOR MARINE CORPS COMMANDER RVN) ON ORDER.

SECRET

6 ENCLOSURE (4)

SECRET

(3) THIRD MAB HQ DEPLOYS TO PLACE TO BE DESIGNATED (TENTATIVELY DA NANG) AFTER LANDING FORCE (MINUS THIRD MAB HQ) ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

B. COMMAND POSTS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

UNIT	AFLOAT	ASHORE
(1) THIRD MAB	AGC-12	AS DIRECTED REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED
(2) RLT-4 (-)	HENRICO	AS DIRECTED
(3) HMM-161	PRINCETON	REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED
(4) NMCB-10	GUNSTON HALL	REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED
(5) DET ALPHA MABS-12	WINDHAM CTY	

C. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS - ANNEX C (TO BE ISSUED).

6. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

M. E. CARL, BGEN, USMC

ANNEX A (AIR SUPPORT) - TO BE ISSUED

ANNEX B (NGF SUPPORT) - TO BE ISSUED

ANNEX C (COMM-ELECT) - TO BE ISSUED

GP-4

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX A (AIR SUPPORT) TO OP ORDER 301-65

- A. MAPS: AMS SER L701 SHEETS 6756 I-IV, 6757 II-IV
- B. COMUSMACV 030128Z NOTAL May 1965
- C. COMUSMACV 270813Z MAY PASEP
- D. CTF 76 306A-65
- E. CTF MSG 031456Z, ANNEX H TO OP ORDER 301-65

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

## 1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES - CURRENT INTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) AS SHOWN IN CTF 78 OP ORDER 301-65.

(2) CTF 76 PROVIDES FIXED WING SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.

(3) CTF 76 CONTROLS AIR DURING AFLOAT PHASE.

(4) CTG 79.4 PROVIDES:

(A) TAC(A)

(B) DET VMO (2 ACFT: 30 BS).

(C) HELOS FOR FAST REACTION FORCE.

(D) SCHEDULED AND ON-CALL CAS ACFT.

(E) RVNAF LIAISON TEAMS TO RLT-4; BLT 1/4; BLT 2/4;

RECON BN; TACC (AFLOAT); SACC/FSCC.

(F) USMC LIAISON TEAMS TO ARVN FORCES IN LANDING

AREA.

2. MISSION. AS CONTAINED IN BASIC ORDER.

## 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. THIRD MAB LANDING WILL BE SUPPORTED BY ON-STATION AND ON-CALL CAS. CATF (TF 76) CONTROLS ALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FROM THE TACC (AFLOAT) UNTIL CONTROL OF AIR PASSED ASHORE. VMO ACFT WILL BE ON STATION DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, OPERATION UNDER OPCON RLT-4. HELOS WILL BE UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM DURING SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT, FOR LOGISTICAL

ENCLOSURE (7)

**SECRET**

RESUPPLY, AND FOR SUBSEQUENT TACTICAL LIFTS ASHORE. WHEN CONTROL OF AIR IS PASSED ASHORE, III MAF DASC WILL CONTROL CAS IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. REFS A AND B REFER.

B. AIR OPERATIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANNEX H TO CTF 76 306A-65 (REF D) AND AS MODIFIED BY ANNEX H (AIR OPERATIONS ANNEX) REF E (CTF 76 031456Z MAY). THE PROVISIONS OF REF D AND E WHICH ARE OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE LANDING FORCE ARE INCLUDED IN THIS ANNEX.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) UTM MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM WILL BE USED.
- (2) RVNAF LIAISON TEAMS WITH EACH TACP.
- (3) CAS AVAILABILITY BUT USED IN EMERGENCIES ONLY.
- (4) RVNAF LIAISON OFFICERS WILL MARRY UP WITH TACPS AS THEY COME ASHORE.
- (5) REQUESTS FOR CAS DURING AFLOAT PHASE DIRECT TO TACC (AFLOAT).
- (6) WHEN CONTROL OF AIR PASSED ASHORE REQUESTS FOR CAS DIRECT TO III MEF DASC.
- (7) LANDING FORCE HAS THE INHERENT RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF WHEN FIRED ON. A GREAT DEGREE OF PRUDENCE MUST BE EXERCISED SO THAT ONLY THAT FORCE NECESSARY TO PROTECT TROOPS ASHORE WILL BE USED BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRING INTO ARVN AND FRIENDLY CIVILIANS, MAXIMUM USE OF AND POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH ARVNAF LIAISON TEAMS WILL BE REQUIRED OF TACP'S.
- (8) DAILY AIR SCHEDULE D-DAY AND SUBSEQUENT READ IN FIVE COLUMNS.

**SECRET****ENCLOSURE (4)**

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>TYPE/MISSION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>ON STATION</u>
100	4	VA/CAS	CTF 77	H-45 TO COMPLETION. REL ON STA
200	4	A1/HELO ESCORT	CTF 77	L-60 TO COMPLETION. REL ON STA
250	TBA	UH34/HELO LIFT	HMM 161	L-30 TO COMPLETION.
150	1	TBA/TAC(A)	CTG 79.4	H-30 TO COMPLETION. REL ON STA
151	1	VMO/TAO	CTG 78.1	SUNRISE TO SUNSET AS REQUIRED.
101	4	F-4/CAS	CTG 79.4	CONDITION III H-60 TO SUNSET.
102	4	VA/CAS	CTF 77	CONDITION III H-30 TO H PLUS 3 HOURS.
103	4	VA/NIGHT CAC AND ILLUMINATION	CTG 79.4	CONDITION IV SUNSET TO SUNRISE.
251	TBA	UH34/HELO	CTG 79.4	CONDITION III FROM H-60 TO SUNSET.

REACTION FORCE  
(9) EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT CODE FOR CHU LAI

LANDING FOLLOWS. READ IN COLUMNS.

#### BOMBS

2000 GP  
1000 GP  
500 GP  
250

225/260 FRAG  
SNAKEYE I (MK 81)  
SNAKEYE I (MK 82)  
SNAKEYE (GENERAL)  
MK 77 FIREBOMB  
MK 79 FIREBOMB

#### ROCKETS

2.75 FFAR (LAU 32A/A)  
2.75 FFAR (LAU 3A/A)  
ZUNI (LAU 10/A)  
ZUNI (LAU 33/35A)  
HVAR (GENERAL)  
HVAR GP  
HVAR HEAT  
HVAR SMOKE  
HVAR VT  
HVAR ASW

#### AMMO

20 MM (GENERAL)  
20 MM WARLOAD

TURKEY  
CHICKEN  
ROSTER  
DRAKE  
PEACOCK  
ROAD RUNNER ALFA  
ROAD RUNNER BRAVO  
ROAD RUNNER  
BUZZARD  
VULTURE

GROUSE  
PHEASANT  
WOODCHUCK  
DOVE  
BOBWHITE  
BOBWHITE ALFA  
BOBWHITE BRAVO  
BOBWHITE CHARLIE  
BOBWHITE DELTA  
BOBWHITE ECHO

SANDPIPER  
SANDPIPER ALFA

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)

**SECRET**

20 MM API  
20 MM HEI  
20 MM APT  
20 MM INC

SANDPIPER BRAVO  
SANDPIPER CHARLIE  
SANDPIPER DELTA  
SANDPIPER ECHO

ASM  
BULLPUP (GENERAL)  
BULLPUP A  
BULLPUP B  
STRIKE

WOODPECKER  
WOODPECKER ALFA  
WOODPECKER BRAVO  
FIREBIRD

AAM  
SPARROW  
SIDEWINDER  
MISCELLANEOUS

HAWK  
BALD EAGLE

CBU 1A/A  
CBU 2A/A  
AERO 14A SMOKE TANK  
AERO 14B SPRAY TANK  
MK 6 PARAFLEAME

ORIOLE  
PARAKEET  
MOCKINGBIRD  
REDBIRD  
ALBATROSS

MK 12 MOD 0 CHEMICAL TANK  
MK 13 SMOKE SIGNAL

BLUE JAY  
SEA GULL

PHOTOGRAPHIC CARTRIDGE  
MK 44 CLUSTER (LAZY DOG)  
MK 44 CLUSTER (BUTTERFLY)

COWBIRD  
SWALLOW  
CATBIRD

AERO 7E (LAZY DOG)

ROBIN

SADEYE

STORK

WALLEYE

FALCON

FUZZING. (TO FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE APPROPRIATE  
ORDNANCE CODE WORD, IF DESIRED)

INSTANTANEOUS

FOXTROT

DELAY (INDICATE)

GOLF

VT

HOTEL

ANTI DISTURBANCE

INDIA

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. CG THIRD MEB 031112Z WHICH  
IS PARA FOUR (LOGISTICS AND ADMIN) TO THIRD MEB OP ORDER 301-65.

#### 5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. ANNEX C (COMM-ELECT) TO THIRD MEB OP ORDER 301-65  
(031148Z).

B. COMMAND POSTS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS):

UNIT  
NINTH MEB  
HMM-161  
TACC  
DASC

AFLOAT  
PRINCETON  
USS ESTES

ASHORE  
DANANG  
AS ASSIGNED

DANANG

**SECRET****ENCLOSURE (4)**

ANNEX B (NAVAL GUNFIRE) TO CTF 78 OP ORDER 301-65 **SECRET**

A. MAP: AMS SER L701 SHEETS 6756 I-IV, 6757 II-IV

B. CTF 76 OP ORDER 315-65 (ANNEX G)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

#### TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.1 (FIRE SUPPORT GROUP)  
 CANBERRA (CAG-2)  
 BUCK (DD 761)  
 SOMERS (DD 947)

1. SITUATION. LANDINGS AT CHU LAI ARE EXPECTED TO BE COVERED BY ARVN SECURITY FORCES. NAVAL GUNFIRE IS PLANNED FOR ON-CALL EMERGENCY FIRE SUPPORT IF AND WHEN REQUIRED.

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. CTF 76 OP ORDER 301-65.

2. MISSION. FIRE SUPPORT GROUP (TG 76.1) SUPPORTS NGF LANDING AND OPERATIONS ASHORE WITH ON-CALL NGF SUPPORT.

#### 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. FIRE SUPPORT GROUP (TG 76.1) PROVIDES NGF SUPPORT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF RULES FOR ENGAGEMENT. NGF TO BE UTILIZED IN EMERGENCY AT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ENEMY TARGETS COMMENSURATE WITH FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITIES.

B. CANBERRA (CAG-2). G/S THIRD MEB UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT RLT-4 FSOC ASHORE THEN G/S RLT-4 (-).

C. SOMERS (DD 947). D/S BLT 1/4 FROM FSA I.

D. BUCK (DD 761). D/S BLT 2/4 FROM FSA II.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) FIRE SPT AREA I BOUNDED BY COORD BT 572051, 614090, 639063, 606032.

**SECRET**

(2) FIRE SPT AREA II BOUNDED BY COORD BT 536132,  
563157, 586133, 546096.

(3) ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRING SHIPS CORRESPOND  
TO TAOR OF SUPPORTED BLT.

(4) NO RPT NO SCHEDULED FIRES PLANNED TO BE FIRED.

(5) NO MEB TARGET LIST PLANNED.

(6) FIRING SHIPS ACTIVATE WITHOUT SIGNAL H-3 HOURS  
D-DAY.

	(7) CAPABILITIES			
	3"/50 MOUNTS	5"/38 MOUNTS	5"/54 MOUNTS	8"/55 TURRETS
CANBERRA	FOUR TWIN	FIVE TWIN	NONE	TWO THREE GUN
BUCK	TWO TWIN	NONE	TWO SINGLE	NA
SOMERS	NONE	THREE TWIN	NONE	NA

(8) RADAR BEACON EMPLOYED (IF AVAILABLE)-INSTRUCTIONS  
LATER.

(9) RESTRICTIONS

(A) SAFETY LIMITS-UNOBSERVED FIRES-NWIP 22-2.

(B) VT FUZES NOT TO BE USED OVER FRIENDLY TROOPS.

(C) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR RVN MANDATORY.

(10) VMO AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR AIR SPOT BEGINNING  
H-30 MIN.

(11) DIRLAUTH WITH CTG 76.1 EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT THIS  
ANNEX.

4. ADMIN AND LOG. LOADINGS AND AMMO REPLACEMENT NOT APPLICABLE  
IN VIEW OF EXPECTED TACTICAL SITUATION.

5. COMMAND AND COMM-ELECT.

A. ANNEX C (COMM-ELECT) TO CTF 78 OP ORDER 301-65.

B. STRICT ADHERENCE TO AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES AND  
AUTHENTICATORS MANDATORY.

**ENCLOSURE (4)****SECRET**

**SECRET**

ANNEX C (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS) TO THIRD MEB OP ORDER 301-65

- A. III MEF OPLAN 201-65
- B. THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65 (3D MAB 030028Z)
- C. NINTH MAB OPLAN 37D-65
- D. READY AMPHIB FORCES OPLAN 306A-65
- E. CTF 76 OP ORDER 315-65
- F. NINTH MAB 271256Z (NOTAL)
- G. THIRD MAB 271050Z (NOTAL)
- H. CTF 78 022114Z (NOTAL)

TIME ZONE: H (ON ARRIVAL IN OBJECTIVE AREA)

## 1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES - THE ENEMY HAS CAPABILITY TO MONITOR, JAM, AND PASS DECEPTIVE TRAFFIC ON FRIENDLY RADIO NETS. HE MAY BE EXPECTED TO BOOBY TRAP, TAP OR DESTROY TELEPHONE LINES. REPORT ALL ABANDONED OR CAPTURED ENEMY COMM-ELEC EQUIPMENT TO SENIOR HQ IN AREA.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES - SEE THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65

(1) AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CTF 76) PROVIDES COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD FOR THIRD MAB/TF 78 UNITS WHILE EMBARKED AND DURING MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

(2) COMMAND POST (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

(A) UNITS	AFLOAT	ASHORE
III MAF/CTF 79	TO BE ANNOUNCED	DANANG
NINTH MAB/CTG 79.4		DANANG
THIRD MAB/CTF 78	USS ESTES	TO BE ANNOUNCED
	(AGC-12)	
RLT-4/TG 78.1	USS HENRICO (APA-45)	VIC C HU LAI
HMM-161/TG 78.2	USS PRINCETON	TO BE ANNOUNCED
	(LPH-5)	

**SECRET**  
**ENCLOSURE (4)**

NMCB TEN/TG 78.3 USS GUNSTON HALL ~~SECRET~~  
 DET MABS 12/TG USS WINDHAM CTY VFC CHU LAI  
 78.4 (LST-1170)

(B) REPORT CP LOCATIONS ASHORE WHEN ESTABLISHED  
 AND CHANGES THERE OF TO THIS HQ BY PRIORITY MESSAGE.

2. MISSION - COMMENCING AT H-4 D-DAY THIRD MAB (TF 78) COMM-  
 ELEC ELEMENTS PROVIDE COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONIC SUPPORT  
 FOR THE LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

3. EXECUTION

A. CTF 76 - ACTIVATE FOLLOWING CIRCUITS AT H-4 D-DAY

(1) NINTH MAB COMMAND NET 1

EMISSION - 60 WPM SINGLE CHANNEL RATT

FREQUENCY - B-11 (P) 6229; B-12 (S) 29398 B-12

TO BE COVERED RATT KW-7 ORESTES 60 WPM

(2) NINTH MAB TAC 1

EMISSION - VOICE

FREQUENCY - B-15 (P) 38.5; B-16 (S) 43.1

(3) THIRD MAB COMMAND

EMISSION - VOICE - SSB

FREQUENCY - B-1 (P) 2603.5(2602); B-2 (S) 22723.5

(22725)

ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS ON B-2 (S) 22723.5  
 (22725). SWITCH TO SIMPLEX KW-7 ORESTES COVERED RATT ON  
 ORDER TO SWITCH TO B-1. THIS NET TO BE ACTIVATED ONLY IF  
 NINTH MAB COMMAND IS UNSATISFACTORY.

(4) THIRD MAB TACTICAL

EMISSION - VOICE

FREQUENCY - B-3 (P) 42.8; B-4 (S) 47.3 ~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

(5) RADIO RELAY BETWEEN THIRD MAB AND RLT-4 WHEN RLT ESTABLISHED ASHORE. CHANNELIZATION - 1 G-2/G-3 HOT LINE; 2 COMMON USER TTY SUPERIMPOSED 60 WPM KW-7 ORESTES COVERED; 3 G-4 HOT LINE; 4 COMMON USER TTY SUPERIMPOSED 60 WPM KW-7 ORESTES COVERED. THIRD MAB TRANSMIT 68.4; RLT-4 TRANSMIT 57.8. USE GROUND PLANE ANTENNA

B. RLT-4/TG 78.1

(1) COMMENCING AT H-4 D-DAY ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN STATIONS ON FOLLOWING NETS:

(A) NINTH MAB COMMAND 1 AND NINTH MAB TACTICAL 1 IAW REF (F).

(B) THIRD MAB COMMAND AND THIRD MAB TACTICAL IAW THIRD MAB FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS. ACTIVATE THIRD MAB COMMAND NET ONLY IN CASE NINTH MEB COMMAND NET IS UNSATISFACTORY.

(C) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD FOR CG THIRD MAB.

(D) ON ORDER SHIFT COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO NINTH MAB IAW REF (C).

(E) SHIFT COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD FOR TF 78 AFLOAT PRIOR TO DISPLACING RLT-4 ASHORE.

(F) PROVIDE COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO TF 78 UNITS ASHORE IN OBJECTIVE AREA.

(G) PROVIDE AND COORDINATE COMM SUPPORT TO TF 78 UNITS ASHORE WITHIN CAPABILITIES.

(H) ESTABLISH RADIO RELAY STATION ASHORE BETWEEN RLT-4 AND THIRD MAB IAW PARA 3.a.(3) ABOVE.

**SECRET**  
**ENCLOSURE (7)**

SECRET

## C. HMM-161/TG 78.2

(1) COMMENCING AT H-4 D-DAY OPERATE AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION AS DIRECTED BY RLT-4 AND IAW REF (D) AND (H).

(2) SHIFT COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO RLT-4 WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

## D. NMCB-10/TG 78.3

(1) SHIFT COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO RLT-4 WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

(2) OPERATE AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION IN RLT-4 COMM SYSTEM ASHORE AS DIRECTED.

## E. DET MABS 12/TG 78.4

(1) SHIFT COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO RLT-4 WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

(2) OPERATE AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION IN RLT-4 COMM SYSTEM ASHORE AS DIRECTED.

## F. NAVAL GUNFIRE COMMUNICATION - IAW REF (B), (D) AND (H).

## G. AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - IAW REF (B), (D), (E) AND (H).

## H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

## (1) JOINT OPERATION CODES

(A) KAC-132, EFFECTIVE EDITION, MAY BE UTILIZED FOR THE ENCRYPTION OF TACTICAL MESSAGES CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL OR LOWER (EFTO). HOWEVER THIS SYSTEM MAY BE UTILIZED FOR THE ENCRYPTION OF MESSAGES OF ANY CLASSIFICATION IN THE EVENT AN URGENT TACTICAL SITUATION ARISES, WHERE A MORE SECURE SYSTEM

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)

**SECRET**

IS NOT AVAILABLE. ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPED ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC MESSAGE WILL NOT BE ENCRYPTED IN THIS SYSTEM.

(B) AUTHENTICATION

-1- KAA-60, EFFECTIVE EDITION WILL BE USED FOR ALL PACOM JOINT AUTHENTICATION PURPOSES.

-2- KAA-38, EFFECTIVE EDITION, WILL BE USED FOR COMBINED (US/UK/NZ/AUST) AUTHENTICATION PURPOSES.

(C) NUMERICAL CODE - KAC-138, EFFECTIVE EDITION, WILL BE USED FOR THE ENCRYPTION OF NUMERAL IN PLAIN LANGUAGE MESSAGES.

(D) CRYPTO CHANNELS

-1- KW-7 ORESTES WILL BE COMMON ON-LINE TOP SECRET/SECRET CRYPTO SYSTEM FOR USE BETWEEN THIRD MAB HQ AND SENIOR/SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

-2- KAK-2643, EFFECTIVE EDITION, WILL BE THE TOP SECRET KEY LIST FOR USE BETWEEN THIRD MAB/RLT-4. THIS KEY LIST IS ALSO AUTHORIZED FOR USE BY RLT-4 BETWEEN RLT-4/III MAF/NINTH MAB.

-3- KAK-2641, EFFECTIVE EDITION, WILL BE THE SECRET ON-LINE KEY LIST FOR USE BETWEEN THIRD MAB HQ AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS. RLT-4 MAY UTILIZE THIS KEY LIST AS A COMMON ON-LINE CHANNEL TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

(E) ALLOWANCES - ALL UNITS CARRY TWO MONTHS ROB, IN ADDITION TO THE EFFECTIVE EDITIONS.

(2) MESSENGER SERVICE

**SECRET****ENCLOSURE (4)**

**SECRET**

(A) THIRD MAB WILL ESTABLISH SPECIAL HELICOPTER MESSENGER SERVICE AS REQUIRED.

(B) VEHICULAR AND OTHER MESSENGER SERVICE AS APPROPRIATE, WILL BE UTILIZED TO THE MAXIMUM BY ALL UNITS TO FACILITATE PROMPT DELIVERY OF TRAFFIC, AVOID OVERLOADING OF ELECTRICAL MEANS AND TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE ENEMY ECM ACTIVITIES.

(3) RADIO

(A) RADIO SILENCE UNTIL LIFTED BY THIS HQ OR UNTIL H-4 D-DAY.

(B) TACTICAL RADIO CALL SIGNS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A), (C), AND NINTH MEB 300640Z APR. (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

UNITS	VOICE	CW
HMM-161 (TG 78.2)	BARREL HOUSE	5R2H
NMCB-10 (TG 78.3)	SHAVE TAIL	NON ASSIGNED
TACRON (TACC/TADC)	ICEPACK	

(C) ALL RADIO CIRCUITS WILL BE PLACED IN STANDBY STATUS WHEN WIRE/RADIO RELAY COMMUNICATIONS IS ESTABLISHED.

(4) WIRE/RADIO RELAY - WILL BE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AFTER THE SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

(5) VISUAL AND SOUND - IAW REF (C).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS - IAW REF (B).

**ENCLOSURE (4)**

SECRET

## CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR CHU LAI LANDING

- A. COMUSMACV 030128Z MAY 1965
- B. CG III MAF 040939Z MAY 1965
- C. CTF 78 300924Z APRIL NOTAL
- D. CTF 78 270830Z APRIL PASEP

1. BASED ON DEVELOPMENTS OCCASIONED BY REF A, SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCES AND AS REQUESTED BY REF B THE FOLLOWING IS A REVISED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS CHU LAI LANDING. THIS REVISED CONCEPT PRIMARILY PROVIDES FOR THE GENERAL CHANGE RESULTING FROM THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A COVERED AND UNCOVERED AMPHIBIOUS LANDING.

2. THIS CONCEPT FULLY REALIZES THAT THE LANDING IS BEING MADE AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOVEREIGN NATION OF SVN AND THAT GVN WILL ESTABLISH PROTECTION FOR THE LANDING FORCE ENABLING THE LANDING FORCE TO MAKE AN UNOPPOSED LANDING. THE LF WILL, HOWEVER, BE TASK ORGANIZED TACTICALLY IN ASSAULT POSTURE IN ORDER TO MEET ANY CONTINGENCIES AND POSSESS THE FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED FOR AN IMMEDIATE SWITCH TO AN UNCOVERED, NOT-SECURED COMBAT SITUATION.

3. FOLLOWING PHASE LINES, OBJECTIVES, HELO LANDING ZONES, BEACH AND CAUSEWAY LOCATIONS WHEN PLOTTED WILL PROVIDE AN OPERATIONS OVERLAY FOR CHU LAI LANDING.

A. PHASE LINES INDICATE PLANNED LANDING FORCE BEACHHEAD AREA OCCUPIED BY RLT-FOUR:

(1) PHASE LINE A (BY END D-DAY)

FROM COORDS 5213 TO 4904, TO 5002, TO 5203, TO 5600, TO 5803.

(2) PHASE LINE B (APPROX D PLUS 1)

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (5)

SECRET

FROM COORDS 5213, TO 4904, TO 4999, TO 5199,  
TO 5300, TO 5600, TO 5803.

(3) PHASE LINE C (APPROX D PLUS 2)

FROM COORDS 5213, TO 4904, TO 4602, TO 4799, TO  
5098, TO 5498, TO 5499, TO 5600, TO 5803.

(4) PHASE LINE C IS RLT-FOUR TAOR.

B. BATTALION OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE TAOR, READ IN TWO  
COLUMNS:

<u>BN OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>COORD AT APPROX CENTER</u>
A	522042
B	500065
C	525074
D	504030
E	489037
BLT 1/4 (M)	560046
N	531003
O	509997
P	499999
Q	480999

C. HELO LANDING ZONES TO BE USED BY BLT 1/4. READ IN  
TWO COLUMNS:

<u>LANDING ZONE</u>	<u>COORD</u>
ROBIN (PRI LZ FOR D-DAY)	VIC 5302
HAWK (FOR SUBSEQUENT LANDINGS)	520995
CROW (ADMIN AND SUPPLY)	553048

D. LOCATION OF RED BEACH:

- (1) RED ONE - COORD 551060 TO 547063
- (2) RED TWO - COORD 545065 TO 547063

E. LOCATION OF CAUSEWAYS:

- (1) PRIMARY CAUSEWAY AT COORD 551060.
- (2) SECONDARY CAUSEWAY 150 YDS SOUTH OF PRIMARY  
CAUSEWAY.

4. CONCEPT. THE LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT SCHEME OF MANEUVER

SECRET  
ENCLOSURE (5)

**SECRET**

ASHORE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN FOUR PHASES. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THIS CONCEPT IS DESCRIBED IN PHASES THAT THE LANDING IS NOT ON A TIMETABLE. COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES PRIOR TO EXTENDING AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND PATTERNED TO COINCIDE WITH ARVN 2D DIV SCHEME-OF-MANEUVER IN CLEARING OBJECTIVE AREA.

A. PHASE ONE (D-1 DAY). THE PRE D-DAY POSITIONING OF A NINTH MAB REIN RIFLE COMPANY IN THE CHU LAI AREA. THIS CO WILL ESTABLISH CONTACT AND LIAISON WITH ARVN FORCES ASSIGNED TO CLEAR THE RLT TAOR AND WILL MEET FIRST ELEMENTS OF RLT FOUR AS THEY CROSS THE BEACH AND FURNISH LATEST INTELLIGENCE, CURRENT LOCATION OF FRIENDLY ARVN IN TAOR AND FACILITATE THE ADVANCE TO INITIAL OBJS PREVIOUSLY CLEARED BY ARVN FORCES.

(1) ADDITIONALLY ARVN LIAISON OFFICERS WILL HAVE BEEN PRE-POSITIONED AND ASSIGNED TO RLT FOUR AS FOLLOWS: READ IN THREE COLUMNS.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE LIAISON</u>	<u>NO. PERS</u>
RLT-4	COMMAND, TACP, NGF	3
BLT 1/4	COMMAND, TACP, NGF	3
BLT 2/4	COMMAND, TACP, NGF	3
RECON BN		1
SACC/PSCC		1
TOTAL PERS		11

THESE LIAISON OFFICERS WILL REMAIN WITH RLT FOUR UNTIL SERVICES NO LONGER REQUIRED.

B. PHASE TWO (D-DAY)

(1) BLT 2/4 LANDS OVER THE BEACH RED TWO BY LVT, LCM AND LCVP. ESTABLISHES IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE CONTACT WITH PREPOSITIONED USMC AND ARVN FORCES PRIOR TO FURTHER MOVEMENT

**ENCLOSURE (5)****SECRET**

SECRET

INLAND TO OBJECTIVES A, B, AND C AND THEN TO THE HIGH GROUND OBJECTIVES D AND E.

(2) BLT 1/4 LANDS TWO COMPANIES OVER THE BEACH RED ONE BY LVT, LCM AND LCVP. ESTABLISHES IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE CONTACT WITH PRE-POSITIONED USMC AND ARVN FORCES AND MOVES TO HLZ ROBIN BY FOOT AND LVT. UPON POSITIVE DETERMINATION THAT LZ ROBIN IS CLEAR THE REMAINING TWO COMPANIES WITH 107MM MORTAR BTRY ATTACHED LANDS BY HELO IN LZ ROBIN.

(3) COMBAT ELEMENTS OF RLT CONSOLIDATE POSITIONS WITHIN THE LINE DEMARKING D-DAY ZONE OF ACTION AND PREPARE FOR DEFENSE. NO MOVEMENT WILL BE MADE DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS. A CURFEW HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY ARVN ON ALL CIVILIAN AND ARVN FORCES IN AREA TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT CONTACT AND POSSIBLE CONFUSION AT NIGHT.

C. PHASE THREE (ABOUT D PLUS 1)

(1) BLT 2/4 CONTINUES TO IMPROVE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN ASSIGNED AREA AND SUPPORTS THE FURTHER MOVEMENT OF BLT 1/4 BY HELO FROM LZ ROBIN TO HAWK.

(2) BLT 1/4 MOVES TWO COMPANIES BY HELO FROM LZ ROBIN TO LZ HAWK WHEN ARVN FORCES HAVE CLEARED LZ HAWK. FOLLOWING HELO LANDING 1/4 PREPARES TO MOVE TO HIGH GROUND BN OBJ D AND E.

D. PHASE FOUR (ABOUT D PLUS 2 AND SUBSEQUENT)

(1) RLT FOUR CONSOLIDATES ALL POSITIONS IN TAOR PREPARED TO RELIEVE REMAINING ARVN FORCES AND ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN TAOR.

ENCLOSURE (5)

SECRET

SECRET

## E. CONCURRENT

(1) GROUND - RECONNAISSANCE BN LANDS ON-CALL D-DAY AT ABOUT H PLUS THREE HOURS, MOVES TO ASSEMBLY AREA VIC COORD 548047. PREPARE TO SCREEN LEFT FLANK TAOR AFTER POSITIVE CONTACT AND ARRANGEMENTS WITH ARVN FORCES.

(2) COMBAT SUPPORT - TANKS, ARTILLERY, ANTI-TANKS LAND IN SCHEDULED AND ON-CALL WAVES ON D-DAY. ONE TANK CO (-) AND ONE AT CO (-) ASSIGNED GENERAL SUPPORT RLIT AND PREPARED FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF BLT(S). THE REGIMENT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY TWO 105MM BTRYS, ONE 107MM MORTAR BTRY AND ONE 155MM HOW BTRY. AN 8" HOW BTRY PLAT WILL BE PROVIDED ON TURN-AROUND SHIPPING FROM OKINAWA.

(3) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT - SHORE PARTY RECON LANDS EARLY SCHEDULED WAVE. BULK OF SHORE PARTY EQUIPMENT LANDS ON-CALL. RLIT TASK ORGANIZED WITH MEDICAL, ENGR, LVT, SUPPLY, MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE UNITS WHICH WILL SUSTAIN OPERATIONS UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF A BLSG OR FLISG ON ABOUT D PLUS 5.

(4) AIR. LANDING WILL BE COVERED BY TF 77 ON-STATION AND ON-CALL CAS AND HELO ESCORT ACFT AVAILABLE FOR ANY EMERGENCY. NINTH MAB PROVIDES ON-CALL (COND THREE) F4 ACFT FOR CAS AND FOUR F4 FOR NIGHT CAS. MAXIMUM USE OF HELOS PLANNED FOR NIGHT CAS. MAXIMUM USE OF HELOS PLANNED FOR D-DAY LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT LIFT OF 1/4 FROM LZ ROBIN TO LZ HAWK. FAC(A) WITH RVNAF LIAISON OFFICER WILL BE ON STATION DURING DATLIGHT HOURS D-DAY. ARVNF LIAISON OFFICER WILL BE ASSIGNED EACH TACP TO PROVIDE COORDINATION WITH ARVN FORCES OPERATION

**SECRET**

IN ADJACENT TAOR. AIR SCHEDULE PROVIDES FOR ON-CALL FLARE ACFT AND CAS FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS IF REQUIRED.

(5) NAVAL GUNFIRE. FIRE SUPPORT GROUP OF ONE CAG AND TWO DD PROVIDES FOR EMERGENCY ON-CALL NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT BY COMUSMACV UNDER POSITIVE CONTROL OF CATF/CLF. CAG IN GENERAL SUPPORT THIRD MAB UNTIL RLT FOUR ESTABLISHED ASHORE THEN G/S RLT FOUR. DD'S IN DIRECT SUPPORT EACH BLT.

(6) ADMINISTRATIVE LANDINGS. NMCB-10 WILL BE OFF-LOADED OVER THE BEACH/CAUSEWAYS FOLLOWED BY ALPHA DET MABS-12. SEQUENCE OF OFF-LOADING NMCB-10 REF C. THE MSTs LST NO. FOUR SEVEN WILL BE THE LAST NMCB-10 SHIPPING FOR OFF-LOADING.

F. THE REIN RIFLE COMPANY PROVIDED BY NINTH MAB ON D-ONE DAY WILL CHOP OPCON THIRD MAB ON D-DAY AND BECOME THIRD MAB RESERVE.

5. ASSAULT SCHEDULE IN REF D REMAINS VALID. DETAILED LANDING PLAN DOCUMENTS TO SUPPORT THIS CONCEPT HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT TF 76 AND TF 78. HELO LANDING PLAN UNCHANGED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CHANGE FROM LZ HAWK TO ROBIN.

6. D-DAY SEVEN MAY H-HOUR 0800H WX PERMITTING L-HOUR, TIME FIRST HELO LANDS IN LANDING ZONE ROBIN ON D-DAY APPROX H PLUS TWO HOURS BUT NOT UNTIL ARVN AND USMC FORCES HAVE POSITIVELY ASCERTAINED THAT LZ ROBIN CLEAR, AND POSITIVE CONTROL OF HELO AND TROOPS CAN BE MAINTAINED.

GP-4

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## THIRD MAB OP ORDER CHANGES

- A. MY 030028Z MAY 1965
- B. MY 051606Z MAY 1965

1. MAKE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65  
ISSUED AS REF A.

A. CHANGE FIRST SENTENCE PARA TWO (MISSION TO READ "LAND RLT-4 ORGANIZED AND PREPARED FOR OFFENSIVE COMBAT BY SURFACE AND HELICOPTER MEANS AND IN COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH ARVN AND NINTH MAB FORCES ALREADY ASHORE, OCCUPY AND DEFEND TERRAIN NECESSARY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHU LAI EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD".

B. CHANGE PARA THREE A (1) TO READ "(1) RLT-4 LANDS H-HOUR D-DAY OVER RED BEACH BY SURFACE MEANS AND WITH CLOSE COORDINATION ESTABLISHED WITH ARVN AND NINTH MAB LIAISON OFFICERS BY CONTROLLED PHASES OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS ASSIGNED TAOR".

C. CHANGE PARA THREE B (1) TO READ "(1) H-HOUR, D-DAY LAND BY SURFACE MEANS OVER RED BEACH ONE AND TWO AT L-HOUR, D-DAY LAND BY HELICOPTER IN LZ ROBIN, ESTABLISH LIAISON AND COORDINATION ARVN AND NINTH MAB FORCES ASHORE, BY CONTROLLED PHASES OCCUPY AND DEFEND TAOR".

D. IN PARA THREE C (1) AND PARA THREE F (6) CHANGE "LZ HAWK" TO READ "LZ ROBIN".

E. CHANGE PARA THREE F (2) TO READ "(2) PLAN FOR UNOPPOSED LANDING, HOWEVER, BE READY TO ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ACTION, NGF WILL BE FIRED ONLY IN EMERGENCY AND ON EXPRESS ORDER OF CATF/CLP".

**ENCLOSURE (6)**

SECRET

F. ADD THE FOLLOWING AS PARA THREE F (20) "(20) MARINE UNITS WILL ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE POSITIONS BEFORE DARK AND WILL STAY IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT EACH NIGHT UNTIL ALL ARVN FORCES HAVE DEPARTED THE TAOR AND AREA IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE TAOR".

2. REF B CONTAINS THE REVISED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR CHU LAI LANDING AND IS EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON ORDER.

GP-4

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (6)

SECRET

FRAG ORDER 4-65

A. THIRD MAB MSG OP ORDER 301-65

1. SITUATION - USS IWO JIMA RELIEVES USS PRINCETON IN CHU LAI ON 11 MAY 1965, REQUIRING HMM-161 TO SHIFT LOCATION TO IWO JIMA.

A. ENEMY - CURRENT INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY

(1) REF A DEFERS.

2. MISSION - HMM-161 CONDUCTS ADMIN TRANSFER OF ALL PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES AND AIRCRAFT FROM PRINCETON TO IWO JIMA,

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT - AT TRANSFER HOUR ON 11 MAY 1965 HMM-161 TRANSFER FROM PRINCETON TO IWO JIMA BY HELO AND LCM. DURING TRANSFER OPERATIONS FIVE HELOS WILL BE ON CONDITION III TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS ASHORE.

B. HMM-161

(1) TRANSFER ENTIRE SQUADRON FROM PRINCETON TO IWO JIMA.

(2) INSURE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY SUFFICIENT TO EXPEDITIOUSLY TRANSFER SQUADRON AS WELL AS MAINTAIN FIVE ACFT ON CONDITION III STANDBY.

(3) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ACFT FOR EMERGENCY EVACS.

(4) AFTER TRANSFER, BE PREPARED, WHEN DIRECTED, TO HELO LIFT 3D BN, 3D MAR ASHORE.

C. RLT-4

(1) PLAN HELO REQUIREMENTS AND REQUESTS PRUDENTLY DURING HMM-161 TRANSFER.

ENCLOSURE (7)

SECRET

(2) BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE 3D BN, 3D MAR IN TAOR  
FOLLOWING HMM-161 TRANSFER.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) CTG 76.3 WILL PROVIDE LCMS.
- (2) IWO JIMA WILL BE ANCHORED 1000 YDS FROM PRINCETON.
- (3) EXECUTE TRANSFER ON ORDER CTF 76.5.
- (4) SUBMIT MOVREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH NWIP 10-1A.
- (5) ALL UNITS ASHORE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT HELO OPS  
WILL BE LIMITED DURING TRANSFER.
- (6) VMO DET TRANSFERS WITH HMM-161.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. N/A

5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. REF A REFERS.

B. COMMAND POSTS

- |                   |           |          |          |
|-------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| (1) THIRD MAB     | ESTES     |          |          |
| (2) HMM-161       | PRINCETON | SHIFT TO | IWO JIMA |
| (3) 3D BN, 3D MAR | IWO JIMA  | ASHORE   | TBA      |
| (4) FOURTH MAR    |           |          | 529042   |

C. CALL SIGNS

- |                      |             |
|----------------------|-------------|
| (1) HMM-161          | BARRELHOUSE |
| (2) 3D BN, 3D MAR    | SWAIN       |
| (3) IWO JIMA (LPH-2) | CROSSWALK   |
| (4) HDC IWO JIMA     | FAIRMONT    |

GP-4

SECRET  
ENCLOSURE (7)

FRAG ORDER 5-65

SECRET

A. THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65

B. MAPS: 1:50,000, AMS SER L701 SHEETS 6756 I-IV, 6757  
II-IV.

## 1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY - CURRENT INTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY - REF A REFERS.

2. MISSION. BLT 3/3 LANDS BY HELICOPTER AND SURFACE MEANS  
IN RLT-4 TAOR IN CHU LAI AREA ORGANIZED AND PREPARED FOR  
COMBAT OPERATIONS AND REPORTS OPCON COMMANDING OFFICER RLT-4  
UPON LANDING.

## 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT - BLT 3/3 AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY AS TASK ORGANIZED  
LANDS ADMINISTRATIVELY PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE  
VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT IN LANDING ZONE CARDINAL AND HEAVY  
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES BY SURFACE CRAFT OVER RED BEACH IN  
RLT-4 TAOR CHU LAI AREA. ON LANDING BE PREPARED FOR COMBAT  
OPERATIONS AND REPORT OPCON RLT-4.

B. RLT-4

(1) AT L-HOUR D-DAY ESTABLISH CONTACT BLT 3/3 LANDING  
BY HELICOPTER IN DESIGNATED LANDING ZONE AND SURFACE CRAFT  
OVER RED BEACH WITH SUCH STAFF, GUIDES AND LIAISON PERSONNEL  
AS DEEMED NECESSARY.

(2) UPON BLT 3/3 REPORTING OPCON RLT-4, ASSIGN BLT  
3/3 SUCH MISSION OR MISSIONS AS DEEMED NECESSARY TO ASSIST  
RLT-4 IN ITS MISSION OF DEFENDING THE CHU LAI EXPEDITIONARY  
AIRFIELD AND ENVIRONS.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (8)

SECRET

(3) PROVIDE BLT 3/3 ASSISTANCE AT LZ AND AT RED BEACH DURING LANDING AS NECESSARY.

C. BLT 3/3

(1) AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY AS TASK ORGANIZED LAND ADMINISTRATIVELY PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT IN LZ CARDINAL AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES OVER RED BEACH IN RLT-4 TAOR CHU LAI.

(2) ON LANDING REPORT OPCON OF RLT-4.

(3) BE PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(4) MAINTAIN MAXIMUM TACTICAL INTEGRITY DURING ADMINISTRATIVE LANDING CONSISTANT WITH PRESENT TASK ORGANIZATION TO FACILITATE EARLIEST ENTRY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS.

D. HMM-161

(1) AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY LAND BLT 3/3 IN LZ CARDINAL.

(2) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT TO RLT-4.

(3) CONTINUE FLIGHT OPERATIONS FROM IWO JIMA UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY III MAF.

(4) BE PREPARED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO DA NANG/CHU LAI/HUE PHU BAI.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.

(2) L-HOUR. TIME FIRST FLIGHT OF HELOS TOUCHES DOWN IN DESIGNATED LZ: 0800H.

(3) D-DAY 12 May 1965.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE(8)

**SECRET**

(4) LOCATION OF HELO LANDING ZONES AS FOLLOWS: REF B

(A) LZ CARDINAL (PRIMARY) 567024

(B) LZ SWALLOW (FIRST ALT) 563034

(C) LZ ROBIN (SECOND ALT) 538024

(5) LOCATION BEACH RED

(A) LEFT FLANK COORD 551060

(B) RIGHT FLANK COORD 545065

(C) BEACH CENTER 547063

(6) UPON DISOLUTION OF AOA AT 121200H REQUESTS FOR  
AIR SUPPORT DIRECT TO III MAB VIA DASC.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. ALL LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS BE SUBMITTED TO RLT-4  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RLT CURRENT OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS.

B. OFF-LOAD LFORM SUPPLIES AS DIRECTED BY RLT-4 SHORE  
PARTY.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. REF A - NINTH MAB OPPLAN 37D-65

REF B - READY AMPHIB FORCES OPPLAN 306A-65 ANNEX H

REF C - RLT-4 OPOORDER 202-65

(1) ESTABLISH COMM ON THE FOLLOWING CIRCUITS AT L-4  
D-DAY AS REQUIRED. (READ IN FIVE COLUMNS)

NET	DESIG	FREQ	EMISS	POWER
RLT-4 CMD 1 (P)	B-5	4006.5(4005)	3A3J/3A7J	180
	(S) B-6	9052.5(9051)	3A3J/3A7J	180
RLT-4 TAC (P)	B-9	41.2	36F3	16
	(S) B-10	43.9	36F3	

**SECRET****ENCLOSURE (8)**

SECRET

NET		DESIG	FREQ	EMISS	POWER
TAR/HR	(P)	H-5	2197.5(2196)	3A3J	100
	(S)	H-6	10332.5(10331)	3A3J	100
HD 1 (MAROON)		H-12	273.8	6A3	10
2 (YELLOW)		H-13	326.6	6A3	10
LZ CONTROL 1		H-22	49.6	36F3	1
2		H-23	51.2	36F3	1
SP CONTROL		B-72	49.9	36F3	16

(2) JOINT OP CODE - KAC-132 EFFECTIVE EDITION.

(3) AUTHENICATION

-A- KAA-60 EFFECTIVE EDITION FOR ALL PACOM  
JOINT AUTHENICATION.

-B- KAA-38 EFFECTIVE EDITION FOR COMBINED  
(US/UK/NZ/AUST) AUTHENICATION.

(4) NUMERICAL CODE - KAC-138 EFFECTIVE EDITION.

(5) CRYPTO CHANNELS

-A- KW-7 ORESTES FOR COMMON ON-LINE.

-B- KAK-2643, EFFECTIVE EDITION FOR TS.

-C- KAK-2641, EFFECTIVE EDITION FOR SECRET ON-  
LINE KEY LIST.

(6) ALLOWANCES - CARRY TWO MONTHS ROB IN ADDITION  
TO EFFECTIVE EDITIONS.

(7) CALL SIGNS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

UNIT	VOICE	CW
III MAB	YEAST CAKE	OY7W
RLT-4	AFTER GLOW	9QF7
HMM-161	BARREL HOUSE	5R2H

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (8)

SECRET

UNIT	VOICE	CW
BLT 3/3	SWAIN	HW10
SP	LUCKY BAG	

## B. CP LOCATIONS (READ IN THREE COLUMNS)

UNIT	AFLOAT	ASHORE
III MAB	USS ESTES (AGC-12)	
RLT-4		529042
HMM-161	USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)	
BLT 3/3	USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	REPORT CP WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE

## C. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE IN COORDINATION WITH AND

AS DIRECTED BY RLT-4.

D. PASS COMM AND CRYPTO GUARD TO RLT-4 PRIOR TO  
GOING ASHORE.

GP-4

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (8)

**SECRET**

(LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION) TO THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65

- A. THIRD MAB OP ORDER 301-65
- B. CG III MAF/CTF-79 OP ORDER 201-65
- C. MAP: RVN AXS SERIES L509 SHEETS ND 49-1 AND

TIME ZONE: HOTEL IN RVN

1. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

A. THE BASIS PRECEPT UPON WHICH LOGISTIC AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT IS BASED IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIRD MAB TO EFFECT A RAPID DEPLOYMENT INTO RVN OF COMBAT MARINES, AN NMCB AND ADDITIONAL, AVIATION AND LOGISTICAL FORCES REQUIRED TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE A TACTICAL AIRFIELD WITH ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPL LS TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS UNTIL SCHEDULED RESUPPLY IS ASSURED.

B. SINCE THERE IS NO SEAPORT AT CHU LAI, SHALLOW DRAFT VESSELS SUCH AS COASTAL TANKERS, LST'S LANDING CRAFT AND BARGES WILL BE NECESSARY: THEREFORE, BEACH NIS 9 ADJACENT TO CHU LAI WILL BE UTILIZED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT WITH CAUSEWAYS NECESSARY TO EXPEDITE UNLOADING.

C. THIRD MAB WILL EXERCISE CONTROL OF LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS THROUGH THE RLT-4 HEADQUARTERS. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE COORDINATION OF UNLOADING THIRD MAB ACROSS THE BEACH AT CHU LAI.

D. SEALIFTED UNITS WILL ARRIVE IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WITH A MINIMUM OF BLP DAYS SUPPLIES EMBARKED INCLUDING CLASS II REPAIR PARTS.

**SECRET**  
**ENCLOSURE (9)**

SECRET

## 2. SUPPLY

## A. PRESCRIBED LOADS

CLASS I	2 DAYS
CLASS II/II	
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL	
CLASS III 2 D	2 DAYS PACKAGED/DRUMMED VEHICLE
	TANKS 3/4 FULL
CLASS III(A)	LPH AIRCRAFT FUEL TANKS AT CAPY
CLASS IV/IV(A)	MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
CLASS V	BASIC ALLOWANCE PLUS 2 DAYS

## B. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT EMBARKED

CLASS I	30 DAYS
CLASS II/II(A)	30 DAYS
CLASS III	15 DAYS
CLASS IV/IV(A)	AS DETERMINED BY UNIT COMMANDERS
CLASS V	BA PLUS 30 DAYS
MEDICAL AND DENTAL	INITIAL SUPPLY BLOCKS/3BLT MOUNT
	OUT BLOCKS
WATER	2 CANTEENS PER INDIVIDUAL; 5 GALLON
	CANS; WATER TRAILORS FULL;
	INDIVIDUAL WITH 5 DAYS OF WATER
	PURIFICATION TABLETS.

## C. REPLENISHMENT

(1) APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS REPLENISHMENT PLUS 15 DAYS MOUNT-OUT AUGMENTATION NOT SHIPPED WITH DEPLOYED UNITS WILL BE EMBARKED IN FIRST AVAILABLE SHIPPING.

## D. CONTROL

(1) LANDING OF SUPPLIES INITIALLY UNDER CONTROL OF REGIMENTAL/BATTALION LANDING TEAMS SUBSEQUENTLY WILL REVERT TO SHORE PARTY GROUP BRAVO UPON ORDER OF RLT-4 (EXCEPT PRESCRIBED LOADS).

(2) REPLENISHMENT SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE UNLOADED UNTIL DIRECTED TO BY SHORE PARTY GROUP BRAVO

## E. DISTRIBUTION

(1) SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION INITIALLY.

(2) UNIT DISTRIBUTION ON ORDER RLT HQ.

SECRET

## F. RESUPPLY

- (1) FROM SHORE PARTY GROUP BRAVO INITIALLY.
- (2) BRIGADE LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP WHEN ESTABLISHED.

## G. CAPTURED MATERIAL

- (1) ITEMS OF CAPTURED MATERIAL HAVING INTELLIGENCE VALUE WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HQ. CAPTURED ITEMS WILL BE TURNED OVER TO IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

H. SALVAGE. REPORTED AND DISPATCHED INITIALLY TO SHORE PARTY GROUP BRAVO UNTIL BLSG IS ESTABLISHED.

## 3. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

## A. EVACUATION

- (1) CASUALTIES OCCURING IN THE SURFACE LANDED FORCES WILL BE EVACUATED TO A DESIGNATED HOSPITAL SHIP.
- (2) ALL CASUALTIES WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH COLLECTING AND CLEARING COMPANY WHEN ESTABLISHED.
- (3) IN UNSAFE AREAS, MILITARY AMBULANCES WILL BE PROVIDED AN ARMED ESCORT AND WILL MOVE IN CONVOY.
- (4) EVACUATION POLICY
  - (A) D-DAY TO D PLUS 34 - 10 DAYS
  - (B) D PLUS 35 TO D PLUS 70 - 30 DAYS
  - (C) AFTER D PLUS 70 TO BE ANNOUNCED.
- (5) TROOP MEDICAL PERSONNEL FOR MEDICAL SERVICE TO EMBARKED PERSONNEL WILL ASSIST SHIPS MEDICAL PERSONNEL.
- (6) PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO RAPID COLLECTION AND EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES TO RLT, C & C COMPANY AND SHIPS MEDICAL FACILITIES.

SECRET

SECRET

## B. HOSPITALIZATION

(1) DESIGNATED HOSPITAL SHIP MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL PROVIDE HOSPITALIZATION INITIALLY.

(2) C&C COMPANY WHEN ESTABLISHED. UNITS WILL BE ADVISED WHEN ESTABLISHED.

(3) III MAF HOSPITAL IN DA NANG.

(4) POW'S WILL BE PROVIDED HOSPITAL SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949.

## 4. TRANSPORTATION

## A. HIGHWAYS

## (1) COORDINATION CONTROL MEASURES

(A) BEACH SUPPORT AREA. INITIALLY BY SHORE PARTY GROUP BRAVO; BY BLSG UPON ESTABLISHMENT. COORDINATE WITH IN-COUNTRY FORCES PRESENT.

(B) ZONES OF ACTION. BY UNITS. COORDINATE WITH LOCAL IN-COUNTRY FORCES.

## B. CIRCULATION

(1) MARKING OF ROUTES AS DIRECTED OR REQUIRED BY OCCUPYING UNITS.

(2) AMBULANCES HAVE PRIORITY OF MOVEMENT.

(3) TRAFFIC MOVING INLAND HAS PRIORITY OVER TRAFFIC MOVING REARWARD.

(4) DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS ALL VEHICLES TRAVELLING THROUGH CP'S OR TROOP BIVOUAC AREAS WILL BE PRECEDED BY GROUND GUARD.

## C. AIR. UNITS MARK AND REPORT LOCATION OF HELO LANDING

SECRET

SITES TO THIS HQ WHEN ESTABLISHED.

SECRET

D. PIPELINES

(1) FUEL PIPELINES FOR THE 2 AAFS WILL BE INSTALLED BY BLSG BY D PLUS 18.

(2) FUEL PIPELINES FOR ONE TAFDS WILL BE INSTALLED BY MABS-12 BY D PLUS 18.

(3) LOCATION OF TERMINALS WILL BE ANNOUNCED.

5. SERVICE

A. FUNCTIONS

(1) CONSTRUCTION

(A) CONSTRUCTION LIMITED TO MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND FACILITIES ESSENTIAL TO COMBAT OPERATIONS. PROJECTS DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAM WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ.

(2) MAINTENANCE

(A) UNITS RESPONSIBLE FOR 1ST AND 2ND ECHELON MAINTENANCE.

(B) BLSG PROVIDES 3D ECHELON AND BACK-UP 2ND ECHELON MAINTENANCE SUPPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

(C) UNITS UTILIZE ORGANIC MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY TO MAXIMUM EXTENT.

(3) SALVAGE

(A) ALL UNITS ENSURE THAT SALVAGED MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED OR OTHERWISE RECOVERED ARE SAFEGUARDED TO PRECLUDE THEIR CAPTURE AND USE BY THE ENEMY.

B. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

SECRET

5 ENCLOSURE (9)

**SECRET**

(1) RLT-4 (-)

## (A) COMMAND POST

AFLOAT: USS HENRICO

ASHORE: COORDINATES TO BE REPORTED TO THIS HQ  
BY PRIORITY MSG WHEN ESTABLISHED.

## (B) PERFORM THE FOLLOWING COMBAT SERVICE FUNCTIONS:

1. CONDUCT OVER-THE-BEACH OPERATIONS AT CHU  
LAI AS NECESSARY TO UNLOAD THIRD MAB UNITS, SUPPLIES AND  
EQUIPMENT. 2. UPON ARRIVAL OF SEALIFTED UNITS OPERATE THE  
BSA.

3. PROVIDE SHIPS PLATOONS FOR INITIAL  
UNLOADING; SUBSEQUENTLY REPORT TO BSA/LSG TO ASSIST IN  
GENERAL UNLOADING.

4. ESTABLISH AND OPERATE A MEDICAL EVACUATION  
STATION IN THE BSA.

5. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN INTERIOR LOC.

6. ESTABLISH AND OPERATE MULTICLASS BEACH  
DUMPS; CONTROL AND MOVEMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES CARRYING  
SUPPLIES; AND MOVE THESE SUPPLIES TO ESTABLISH DUMPS.

7. MARK THE LIMITS OF THE BEACH LOADING AND  
UNLOADING POINTS.

8. PROVIDE MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENT,  
TEMPORARY HOSPITALIZATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND  
PERSONNEL TO ASSIST OTHER UNITS.

9. PREPARE BEACH EXIT ROADS AND MAKE PRO-  
VISIONS FOR MINE CLEARANCE. PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS ON SANIT-  
ATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE.

**SECRET**  
**ENCLOSURE (9)**

REQUIRE MAXIMUM SANITARY DISCIPLINE.

**SECRET**

10. ESTABLISH ADEQUATE WATER POINTS.

11. PROVIDE FOR EXPEDITIOUS UNLOADING LFORM  
CLASS V ABOARD PRINCETON.

12. ON ARRIVAL OF LST 47 (CONTRACT) PROVIDE  
FOR EXPEDITIOUS UNLOADING OF 1800 DRUMS ASPHALT AND 200  
BUNDLES OF PIERCED STEEL PLANK. COORDINATE WITH CO NMCB-10.

13. PROVIDE FOR EXPEDITIOUS OFF-LOADING OF  
ALL CONTRACT SHIPS CARRYING RESUPPLIES TO CHU LAI AREA.

14. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BLSG.

(2) MABS-12

(A) COMMAND POST

1. AFLOAT: USS WINDHAM CTY

2. ASHORE: COORDINATES TO BE REPORTED TO THIS  
HQ BY PRIORITY MESSAGE WHEN ESTABLISHED.

(B) PERFORM THE FOLLOWING SERVICE FUNCTIONS:

1. ESTABLISH A SATS AND OPERATING FACILITY AT  
CHU LAI AIRFIELD. COORDINATE INSTALLATION OF SATS WITH CO  
NMCB-10/

2. ESTABLISH ONE TAFDS BY D PLUS 18 AND TWO  
ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

(3) NMCB-10

(A) COMMAND POST

1. AFLOAT: USS GUNSTON HALL

2. ASHORE: COORDINATES TO BE REPORTED TO THIS  
HQ BY PRIORITY MESSAGE WHEN ESTABLISHED.

(B) PERFORM THE FOLLOWING SERVICE FUNCTIONS:

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

1. PROVIDE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FOR NAVY PECULIAR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD, RUNWAY AND TAXIWAYS.

2. SUBSEQUENT TO COMPLETION OF RUNWAYS AND TAXIWAYS PROVIDE IMPROVEMENT OF BEACH LOGISTICS FACILITIES AND ADVANCE BASE TYPE CONSTRUCTION AS NEEDED TO SUPPORT LONG TERM USE.

3. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHEN REQUESTED IN ESTABLISHING WATER POINTS.

4. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHEN REQUESTED IN OFF-LOADING OF SHIPS.

6. PERSONNEL. TO BE PUBLISHED

7. MISCELLANEOUS

A. REAR BOUNDRIES. TO BE REPORTED TO THIS HQ BY PRIORITY MESSAGE WHEN ESTABLISHED.

B. PROTECTION OF INSTALLATIONS.

(1) BSA - INITIALLY BY RLT.

(2) BSA/LSA - BLSG WHEN ESTABLISHED.

C. SANITATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE.

(1) CO RLT-4, CO NMCB-10 AND CO MABS-12 ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENFORCING FIELD SANITATION.

(2) TROOP COMMANDERS OF ALL ECHELONS WILL REQUIRE MAXIMUM SANITARY DISCIPLINE.

(3) WATER AND FOOD FROM APPROVED SOURCES ONLY, WATER WILL BE RENDERED POTABLE BY APPROVED METHODS.

(4) ALL PERSONNEL LANDED WILL BE IMMUNIZED AGAINST

~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE (9)

~~SECRET~~

SMALLPOX, TYPHOID, TYPHUS, TETANUS, DIPHTHERIA, PLAGUE AND  
CHOLERA

(5) MAXIMUM ANTI-MALARIA MEASURES WILL BE EFFECTED  
TO INCLUDE:

(A) CHEMOPROPHYLOXS PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE AREA  
AND CONTINUING AFTER ARRIVAL.

(B) INSECT REPELLENTS REQUIRED.

(C) MOSQUITO NETTING AND HOODS REQUIRED.

(D) WEARING OF COMPLETE UNIFORM AT ALL TIMES  
WHEN NOT OTHERWISE PROTECTED.

(E) HUMAN WASTE AND GARBAGE DISPOSAL WILL BE  
RIGIDLY CONTROLLED.

(F) ANTI-VENOM WILL BE CARRIED.

D. REPORTS

(1) PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY - NLT 1200 DAILY.

(2) PERIODIC PERSONNEL REPORT - NLT 2200 D PLUS ONE  
AND AS DIRECTED THEREAFTER.

(3) PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT - NLT 1200 DAILY.

(4) CASUALTY REPORTS - NLT 0800 DAILY FOR PREVIOUS DAY.

(5) DUMP STATUS - NLT 2200 DAILY.

(6) LOGISTIC STATUS - NLT 2200 DAILY.

E. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

(1) MARINE UNITS

(A) UTILITIES, NORMAL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. HELMET  
GREEN SIDE OUT.

(B) FIELD MARCHING PACK, GREEN SIDE OUT

(C) GAS MASKS.

ENCLOSURE (9)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(D) FIRST AID PACKET (COMPLETE).

F. SUPPLY INSTRUCTIONS. FORMAL PROPERTY ACCOUNT-  
ABILITY UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

GP-4

~~SECRET~~

10

ENCLOSURE (9)

DECLASSIFIED