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(1 of 4 pgs)

32 MAB

Command Chronology
(Tab F, C.G.'s Information Notebook)
1st Mar Div / 32 MAB

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COMMANDING GENERALS COMMAND INFORMATION NOTEBOOK FOR APRIL 1971
(1st Mar Div, 1-13 Apr; 5th MAB, 14-30 Apr)

Enclosure (1)

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INTRODUCTION

April 1971 was a month of final transition for Marine forces in the Republic of Vietnam. The 1st Marine Division departed the country on 14 April, as did the headquarters elements of III Marine Amphibious Force and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. In their place, the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade was activated to control the units remaining in-country, including, among others, 1st Marines, Marine Aircraft Groups 11 and 16, Force Logistic Command, 2d Combined Action Group, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and 1st Military Police Battalion. Although the mission of the Brigade includes tactical control of combat operations (until such time as all combat operations terminate in May, the ground role ending on 7 May), the primary reason for its existence is to provide for the orderly and timely withdrawal of the remaining forces from Vietnam. During the month, the 196th Brigade of the 23d Infantry Division (U.S.A.) continued to assume responsibility for larger portions of the former Division AO, while it appeared that even the enemy was cooperating in the efforts of the Division and the Brigade to redeploy. Virtually the only manifestation of his presence during April was a continued moderate expenditure of rockets and a sharply increased output of ammunition in mortar attacks.

Although the end of the month witnessed the completion of Keystone Robin Charlie redeployments and Keystone Oriole Alpha (Increment VII) did not officially begin until 1 May, Phase VII actually began with the standdown of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on 13 April and continued a week later with the standdown of VMA(AW)-225. In addition, detachments of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and 2d Combined Action Group also stood down in April to prepare for deployment (or, in the case of 2d CAG, deactivation). Division strength declined slowly during the first half of the month and stood at some 6,800 upon departure of the Division colors on 14 April, although before the end of the month, the components of the Division remaining with the Brigade had drawn down to below an authorized strength of some 5,200. The Brigade also began existence overstrength, but a program of personnel departures had reduced Brigade strength from over 15,000 Marines (and an excess of almost 2,000) to less than 12,000 (and a deficit of more than 1,500) before the month was out.

Although redeployment was in the vanguard of Division and Brigade activity during April, daily operations continued, but generally followed the gradually decreasing trends established over the previous months. Thus, trials for crimes of violence, with only nine taking place during the month, continued a steady decline, as did the average number of men confined (down from 49 in January 1971 to 46 in February, 37 in March and 25 in April). The number of administrative discharges processed during the month decreased somewhat from the average for the first three months of the year (down from an average of 40 a month to less than 30) and only three punitive discharges were awarded in April. Even the number of arrests made and citations awarded by Division/Brigade Military Policemen continued to decline in April, although this decline may have been influenced by the reductions in MP personnel and, consequently, MP patrolling in preparation for redeployment.

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In the area of ground safety, 33 non-hostile casualties were recorded during the month (eight for the Division, 25 for the Brigade), but a somewhat larger population base in April served to reduce the non-battle casualty rate from 109 casualties per million man-days in March to 96 casualties per million man-days in April. A significant fact about April's 33 casualties was that while casualties caused by weapons decreased from eleven in March to eight in April (reflecting, in a sense, lessening combat activity), casualties from non-battle-related accidents increased from 17 to 25. Significant also was the total lack of casualties from motor vehicle accidents (U. S. casualties), marking April as the first month in the last twenty-eight in which this phenomenon occurred. Of course, this favorable reduction may have been influenced by a reduction in the number of Marine Corps vehicles on the road because of redeployment, although this advantage may very well have been offset by a general decrease in the quality of the vehicles left in country (in general, vehicles in good condition have already been retrograded).

Enemy activity increased but slightly from March to April, the number of his soldiers sighted rising from 384 to 437 and his expenditure of ammunition in standoff attacks by fire increasing from 58 rounds to 137. However, he lost 71 men killed in action and 24 individual weapons captured during the month. These losses compare to only two Marines killed (in an OV-10 downed by enemy ground fire) and 71 wounded, the 73 casualties representing a decrease of ten from the five Division Marines killed and the seventy-eight wounded in March. The counter-SFD (surprise firing device) program of the Division and the Brigade continued to bear fruit during April. Thirty-nine of these infernal devices were found and rendered harmless by Division/Brigade personnel during the month, while only thirteen were detonated with resulting casualties, producing a find to detonation ratio of 3.00:1 (equal to March's ratio and, consequently, increasing the annual ratio for 1971 to 2.70:1, which far exceeds 1970's 1.96:1 and 1969's 1.83:1). Twenty-seven Division/Brigade personnel fell victim to such devices (none were killed), which was a slight increase over March's total of 25 for the Division. However, April figures included 2d CAG, which operated in some of the most heavily booby-trapped sections of the Brigade AO. Nevertheless, April's increased population base served to cut the SFD casualty rate from 2.6 casualties per thousand personnel in March to 2.4 casualties per thousand in April. The remaining four Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) teams were disestablished at the middle of the month and CUPP totals of zero in all categories were generated.

All supporting arms and helicopter support indicators fell sharply in April, reflecting the steady decline (over the past several months) in combat activity. Less than 9,000 artillery rounds were expended and no naval gunfire was employed (down from over 11,000 artillery rounds and 100 rounds of naval gunfire ammunition in March), while the number of fixed wing sorties dropped from 225 in March to 124 in April. Wing/Brigade helicopters flew a total of less than 2,600 hours in support of Division/Brigade ground units in April (down from more than 3,500 in March), during which time some 9,900 passengers and 600 tons of cargo were carried (down from over 21,000 passengers and 1,300 tons in March). Such support will

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decrease even more in May, as combat operations cease and almost all combat support units stand down during the month.

The Division completed its stay in the Republic of Vietnam in a full combat-ready status, maintaining its FORSTAT rating at C-1 and its percentage of combat essential equipment maintained operationally ready at a very high 96%. Although the Brigade's percentage fell to 89% (an inevitable decrease, given the Brigade's extensive preparations for redeployment), this figure was still well in excess of the Marine Corps standard of 85%, and the Brigade remained in a FORSTAT combat readiness status of C-1. Project 805, the DoD-sponsored program for the transfer of equipment to the Vietnamese armed forces, continued in a most favorable manner for the Division and the Brigade during April. Since February, every single one of the 874 items offered have been accepted, a 100% acceptance rate compared to 93.8% for the same program during Phase IV redeployments.

Keystone Oriole Alpha redeployments are now in full swing, all ground combat operations having terminated on 7 May, and most of the Brigade's combat and combat support units are in the process of standing down. The only exceptions to the statement above are HMH-463, which stands down on 18 May, HMI-167 and HMI-367, which stand down on 26 May, and 1st MP Battalion, tasked to provide security for Force Logistic Command. The Division/Brigade Land Mine Warfare School was turned over to the 196th Brigade during the first week in May, as were the Brigade's sensor assets. To indicate the paucity of combat activity so far in May, the only totals generated prior to the cessation of ground combat activity on 7 May were 225 artillery rounds expended and a single Marine wounded in action. No enemy were sighted during the first week in May, and only 22 rounds of enemy rockets and mortar ammunition were expended. All indicators can reasonably be expected to remain in the vicinity of zero for the remainder of the Brigade's stay in Vietnam. All Marines, except those chargeable to MACV, are expected to be out of the Republic by the end of June 1971, bringing to a close a long chapter in Marine Corps history, during which the 1st Marine Division and the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade have played vital roles.

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G-1 OVERVIEW

Personnel management within the Division, during approximately the first half of April 1971, and within the Brigade, during the remainder of the month, has kept pace with the force structure reductions of the past fifteen months. The Division, prior to its departure on 14 April, was continuously in combat readiness category C-1, and the Brigade remains in that admirable position. Further evidence of the efficiency of Brigade personnel management is the smooth functioning of the program of planned personnel departures under criteria of Keystone Oriole Alpha redeployments.

In the other administrative areas (involving such subjects as morale, discipline and personnel services), as well as in personnel management, appropriate norms of effectiveness have been well maintained. In the paragraphs below are presented abstracts of the discussions contained in this section of the Command Information Notebook. Since this edition contains material concerning both the Division (1 - 13 April) and the Brigade (14 - 30 April), the rates discussed herein for single Commands (Division or Brigade) (incidents, casualties, etc. per thousand of average strength) have been adjusted to reflect rates that would have accrued had the frequency of the indicators occurred uniformly throughout the month in its entirety. In addition, combined rates referring to the aggregate totals for both the Division and the Brigade during April are often mentioned. These rates are straightforward, the aggregate accounting for the whole month.

a. The average strength of the Division for the period 1 - 13 April was 7,063, a decrease of 2,685 from March 1971. The Brigade's average strength for the period 14 - 30 April was 14,322. The Division USMC strength, which peaked at over 31,000 in November 1969 and dropped sharply during phases III and IV of redeployment, continued to fall during Phase VI and levelled out at the authorized strength of 5,215 Division and 13,604 Brigade spaces in April (See Tabs 1-1 and 1-1-1). USMC strength will decline to zero by the end of June, excepting certain personnel chargeable to MACV (See Tabs 1-1-2 and 1-1-3).

b. The April 1st Term Reenlistment rate for the Division (23%) was an increase from February's 10% and March's 21%, while the Brigade rate of 15% for April was less than March's Division percentage. A factor which may continue to affect the overall reenlistment rate is the preference of many individuals to continue formal education or civilian pursuits (See Tab 1-2).

c. The volume of Congressional and special interest correspondence received during April by the Brigade Adjutant (the totals for the Division are unavailable) totalled 49 pieces (registering 50 complaints, all of which concerned personnel chargeable to the Brigade), compared to March's Division total of 46 (registering 52 complaints). This represented an adjusted rate of 6.0 Brigade pieces per thousand personnel compared to Division rates of 4.3/1,000 for January, 3.1/1,000 for February and 4.9/1,000 for March. The number of pieces received continues to parallel fairly closely the trends established in the preceding years (See Tab 1-3).

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d. During April 1971, Purple Hearts Medals were awarded to Brigade personnel (figures for the Division not being available) at an adjusted rate of 4.6 per thousand, compared to March's Division rate of 4.5/1,000. April's rate was significantly lower than the average Division rate for the previous three months and reflected a decrease in combat activity. Recommendations for heroic/meritorious end-of-tour awards for Brigade personnel was computed at an adjusted rate of 42.0 per thousand during April, compared to a Division rate of 103.1/1,000 in March. The sharp decrease may be attributed to the previous submission of recommendations for the deserving personnel of redeploying units. This is a repeat of the patterns experienced prior to the end of the two redeployment increments in 1970 (See Tab 1-4).

e. The adjusted Division rate of trials for crimes of violence in April was 0.9 per thousand personnel, while that of the Brigade was 0.7/1,000. The combined rate (Division/Brigade) was 0.8 per thousand, lower by 60% than the Division average of 1.3/1,000 for the first quarter of 1971 (See Tab 1-5a).

f. The 19 unauthorized absences (Division/Brigade) in April represented an increase of twelve over the seven Division absences recorded in March. The adjusted rate for the Division (14 absences) was 4.6/1,000, while that for the Brigade (five absences) was 0.6/1,000 (See Tab 1-5b).

g. The average number of Division Marines in confinement during the period 1 - 13 April was 24, whereas, during the period 14 - 30 April, the average number of Brigade personnel confined was 25. The combined average of 25 was a decrease from Division averages for January, February and March (49, 46 and 37, respectively). The total brig population rate has decreased from March's 3.8/1,000 to April's 2.2/1,000 (See Tab 1-5c).

h. During April, three punitive discharges were awarded (combined), well below the Division totals of 13 in March and 14 in February, causing the rate to show an adjustment down from March's Division rate of 1.4/1,000 to April's combined rate of 0.3/1,000. This trend can be expected to continue due to an expected reduction in the case load (See Tab 1-5d).

i. April 1971 saw the processing of 29 administrative discharges, a decrease from the Division's 48 in March. The April rate (combined) of 2.7 per 1,000 should increase during the month of May, since 33 cases are currently being processed (See Tab 1-5e).

j. The number of judicial and investigatory actions concerning drug abuse decreased during the period 1 - 13 April (from 39 in March to eight in the first thirteen days of April). The adjusted rate of 4.2 actions taken/1,000 during the first part of the month represented a decrease from the 6.5 actions/1,000 during March. The Brigade's investigatory, administrative and judicial actions for the remainder of the month showed a Brigade rate of 4.6 actions/1,000. The tempo of the processing of administrative dis-

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charges continues to fluctuate, however the monthly number of such actions should decrease rather steadily over the next two months as redeployments continue (See Tab 1-5f).

k. There were no reported racial incidents for the 1st Marine Division during January, February, March and April 1971. One incident was reported by the Brigade for an adjusted incident rate of 0.1/1,000. Four months in the past sixteen have been incident-free. Because of continued command attention, the present exceptionally low rate of such incidents should continue in the future (See Tab 1-5g).

l. For three consecutive months there were no "fraggings" in the Division. This trend was disrupted during April with one such felonious incident reported. However, no casualties resulted from this "fragging", thus April was the fifth consecutive month in which no casualties occurred from such incidents. The Brigade had no incidents (See Tab 1-5h).

m. The three categories of offenses committed by Division/Brigade personnel and processed by the Military Police Section showed a decrease from March to April. Major offenses (felonies) decreased from 33 to 29 and established a ratio of 2.4 offenses/1,000. From 1 - 13 April, the Division processed 13 major offenses for an adjusted rate of 3.9/1,000. The Brigade adjusted felonious offense rate was 1.7/1,000 for 14 - 30 April 1971. Violent crimes continued at the low level experienced since February. Marijuana violations decreased from 1.0/1,000 in March to 0.9/1,000 in April. In addition, hard narcotics violations decreased from 1.3/1,000 in March to 0.7/1,000 in April 71. Vehicle/traffic offenses decreased by 75% from the preceding month. Miscellaneous offenses decreased during the period from March's ratio of 7.0/1,000 to April's ratio of 3.3/1,000 (See Tabs 1-5i, 1-5j, and 1-5k).

n. Ground safety is the general category embracing not only the subject of battle and non-battle casualties, but also treating, individually, incidents involving friendly supporting arms, individual weapons (outside a cantonment), accidental discharges, explosive ordnance. Motor vehicle accidents and operational/occupational incidents (See Tab 1-6).

(1) The battle rate (considering those casualties resulting in deaths or medical evacuations) decreased in April 1971, to the lowest level in the past 28 months. The Division non-battle casualty rate for 1 - 13 April was 80 casualties per million man-days, while the Brigade had a rate of 103 per million man-days (14 - 30 April). Both rates were decreases from March's rate of 109 casualties per million man-days.

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(2) An analysis of the major categories of non-battle casualties reveals the following changes:

<u>TYPE INCIDENT</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>		<u>% CHANGE</u>	<u>MARCH and APRIL</u> <u>RATIO of CHANGE</u>
	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>BRIGADE</u>		
Friendly Fire	0	1	None	0.1 to 0.1
Explosive Ord.	0	1	Decrease of 71%	0.7 to 0.2
Accidental Disch.	3	2	Increase of 33%	0.3 to 0.4
Mf Accidents	0	0	Decrease of 100%	0.5 to 0.0
Oper/Occupational	0	3	Increase of 29%	1.7 to 2.2

o. Participation in the Savings Bond Program during April 1971 increased over the rate experienced in March (62.5% vs 46.6%) and participation in the Savings Deposit Program increased 3.1% in April vs 2.8% in March (See Tab 1-7).

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DIVISION/BRIGADE STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The average strength of the 1st Marine Division during the period 1 - 13 April 1971 was 7,657 (7,063 Marines, 594 Navy), while the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade averaged 14,322 personnel (13,724 Marines, 598 Navy) during the period 14 - 30 April. Total Division strength, during the former period, decreased quite slowly, falling from 7,865 on 1 April to 7,374 on 13 April, whereas Brigade strength declined much more rapidly, falling from 16,231 on 14 April to 12,429 on 30 April. However, a sizable portion of the Brigade decrease was caused by the departure of remaining Division units. The rest of the decrease was due to the departure of personnel from 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 2d Combined Action Group, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and Marine Attack Squadron 225, as well as personnel declared excess from other units (See Tabs 1-1-1 and 1-1-2).

Division strength in the Republic of Vietnam thus dropped from a peak of more than 31,000 Marines in November 1969 to less than 7,000 Marines when it officially departed, while the force structure of the Division fell from twelve infantry battalions, five artillery battalions and numerous other combat support and combat service support units to two infantry battalions, four firing batteries and few supporting units. Brigade strength is falling rapidly and will do so even faster during May (all ground combat operations terminate on 7 May), when the majority of its units stand down (See Tab 1-1-3).

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), DIVISION STRENGTH AND FORCE STRUCTURE,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

END-OF-MONTH STRENGTH (USMC) 1969 ----- 1970 ----- 1971 -----

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
* MAN LVL	23207	23207	23344	22596	22596	22582	22522	21736	21684	27732	27833	27833	
§ ON ROLLS	23948	24224	24263	23899	23694	23469	23440	22734	24285	30306	30899	29476	
# AVG STR	25.1	25.4	25.7	25.4	25.1	24.9	24.8	24.3	24.8	28.3	31.9	31.9	26.5
INF BNS	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	12	12	12	
BATTERIES	27	25	24	22	22	22	22	22	22	24	24	24	
1970													
* MAN LVL	27868	27868	27868	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	22018	12511	12511	12511	
§ ON ROLLS	27490	26672	23405	21808	21805	20998	21442	19744	16400	12425	12530	12571	
# AVG STR	30.6	29.2	26.3	23.7	23.0	22.6	22.4	21.1	19.0	15.2	13.1	13.1	21.5
INF BNS	12	12	9	9	9	9	9	9	8	6	6	6	
BATTERIES	24	24	19	19	19	19	19	17	11	11	11	11	
* MAN LVL	12511	12511	5275	5500	12936								
§ ON ROLLS	12623	10440	7427	6805	11939								
# AVG STR	13.3	12.4	9.8	7.7	14.3								
INF BNS	6	5	3	3	2								
BATTERIES	11	8	5	5	4								
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	

* USMC ONLY § END-OF-MONTH USMC ONLY # AVG USMC + USN

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DIVISION STRENGTH VS EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL (USMC), INCREMENT VI

On 13 April 1971, the USMC strength of the Division stood at 6,805 or approximately 1,256 more than the effective manning level (about 5,549) for that date, effective manning level determined by using as a basis the assigned Division manning level for 31 December 1970 and reducing that manning level by the T/O USMC strength of each unit as it stands down. Although the excess of 1,256 seems high, the majority of troops in units standing down on that date departed within the next two weeks and the excess was eliminated.

The following Division units departed Vietnam during Increment VI:

- 5th Marines (-)
- 11th Marines (-)
- 1st Engineer Battalion (-)
- 1st Motor Transport Battalion (-)
- 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-)
- Detachment, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
- Headquarters Battalion (-)
- 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
- 11th Motor Transport Battalion (deactivated)
- 1st Medical Battalion (-)
- 2d Special Security Communications Team
- 7th Interpretion Team
- 13th Interrogator-Translator Team

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION, DIVISION STRENGTH VS EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL

INCREMENT VI

DIVISION USMC STRENGTH ----- EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL =====



EFFECTIVE MANNING LEVEL

31 Dec 1970	12,511	6 Mar 1971	8,382
15 Feb 1971	10,989	14 Mar 1971	8,150
28 Feb 1971	10,460	24 Mar 1971	5,549
3 Mar 1971	8,519		

DIVISION USMC STRENGTH

31 Dec 1970	12,571	27 Feb 1971	10,451
2 Jan 1971	12,450	28 Feb 1971	10,440
9 Jan 1971	12,345	6 Mar 1971	10,133
16 Jan 1971	12,643	13 Mar 1971	9,238
23 Jan 1971	12,504	20 Mar 1971	8,839
30 Jan 1971	12,658	27 Mar 1971	7,907
31 Jan 1971	12,623	31 Mar 1971	7,427
6 Feb 1971	12,495	3 Apr 1971	7,212
13 Feb 1971	12,086	10 Apr 1971	6,935
20 Feb 1971	11,360	13 Apr 1971	6,805

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PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL PERSONNEL DEPARTURES, APRIL - JUNE 1971

Increment VII redeployments, which are scheduled for the period 15 April through 30 June 1971, provide for the orderly movement of 15,263 USMC personnel from Vietnam to other locations in WestPac and CONUS. Planned personnel redeployments, by month, are as follows:

April	3,213
May (Projected)	7,590
June (Projected)	4,460

The Brigade will draw down to zero strength by 28 June.

Generally, redeploying ground units will join the active structure of the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton. Since the Brigade formed on 14 April, over 3,000 Marines have departed Vietnam by air and surface means. Approximately 4,900 ground Marines will leave during May for CONUS (including about 100 for 29 Palms with the 3d 8" Howitzer Battery and Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion), of which some 4,000 will move by air and 9,000 by ship.


Approximately 700 aviation Marines will redeploy to Quantico and New River (some 600 by air and 100 by ship), 2,300 to El Toro and Santa Ana (over 2,200 by air and over 200 by ship), and 1,300 Marines of various ground and aviation units to WestPac and MidPac. In addition, Headquarters, 3d MAB, 2d CAG and FLC are scheduled to deactivate in-country.

Established standdown and redeployment schedules have provided for the orderly and timely movement of personnel and units. As a result, personnel are being redeployed at a generally uniform rate (See opposite and Tab 1-1-3). No major problems have arisen to date and none are envisioned for the remainder of Increment VII.


30 APR 71
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SECRET

3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL PERSONNEL DEPARTURES
15 - 30 APRIL



1 MAY - 27 JUNE



RVN CEILING ——— PLANNED STRENGTH - - - - - ACTUAL STRENGTH

SECRET

Col 1-2

SECRET

STAND DOWN/DEPARTURE SCHEDULE, APRIL - JUNE 1971

The current redeployment increment, "Keystone Oriole Alpha", involving the forces of the Brigade, actually began on 13 April with the standdown of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and detachments of 2d Combined Action Group and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and continued with the standdown of Marine Attack Squadron 225 on 20 April. During this phase of redeployment, over 13,000 Brigade spaces will be eliminated, thus accounting for all Marines in the Republic of Vietnam, except those controlled by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.


By 1 June, all the remaining USMC combat units (except 1st Military Police Battalion, tasked to provide security for Camp Books) and most of the remaining USMC combat support units will have departed Vietnam. Thirty-three spaces, chargeable to MACV, will remain in Vietnam at the end of June. These spaces will consist of a thirteen man logistic liaison team to provide continued logistic support to the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Corps Brigade and twenty men to provide interface between the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy Tactical Air Direction Control Systems.

30 APR 71
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G-1-1-3

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INCREMENT VII
STAND DOWN/DEPARTURE SCHEDULE



13 [██████████] 1 1ST BN, 1ST MAR
 13 [██████████] 1 DET, 2D CAG
 13 [.....] 1 DET, 1ST BN, 11TH MAR
 20 [.....] 1 VMA(AW)-225

XX [] YY [] YY
 XX = Stand down date
 YY = Load date(s)

1 [██████████] 12 3D BN, 1ST MAR
 1 [██████████] 12 HQ CO, 1ST MAR
 1 [██████████] 12 DET, 2D CAG
 1 [.....] 12 [.....] 19 HMM-263
 1 [.....] 24 3D 8" HOW BTRY
 1 [.....] 12 [.....] 1
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [] 12
 7 [] 12
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [.....] 12
 7 [.....] 12 [.....] 19
 7 [.....] 21
 7 [.....] 21
 7 [██████████] 1
 7 [██████████] 1
 8 [.....] 21
 8 [.....] 26
 8 [] 1

DET, 1ST BN, 11TH MAR
 1ST BN (-), 11TH MAR
 DET, 1ST RADIO BN
 DET, HQ BN, 1ST MAR DIV
 1ST IT
 DET, HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR
 CO A (REIN), 1ST RECON
 HMM-262
 3D ITT
 3D CIT
 2D BN, 1ST MAR
 2D CAG (-)
 VMA-311
 DET, VMO-6
 MASS-3

DET, FLC
 HMM-463
 H&MS-11
 MABS-11
 HML-167
 HML-367
 MATCU-68
 H&MS-16
 MABS-16

CO A (REIN), 1ST ENGR BN
 CO A (REIN), 1ST MT BN
 CO C, 1ST SP BN
 CO A (REIN), 7TH ENGR BN
 HQ, 3D MAB
 CO A (REIN), 1ST MED BN
 COMM SPT CO, 7TH COMM BN
 DET, 11TH DENT CO
 1ST MP BN
 FLC (-)
 DET, VMGR-152
 5TH CIT

18 [.....] 26 [.....] 6
 19 [] 6
 19 [] 6
 26 [.....] 6
 26 [.....] 15
 26 [] 15
 26 [] 20
 26 [] 22
 27 [] 22
 27 [] 22
 27 [] 22
 27 [] 25
 7 [] 15
 7 [] 25
 7 [] 20 25
 7 [] 27
 7 [██████████] 28
 10 [] 28
 17 [.....] 27
 22 [] 25

Stand down for ASRT
 Quang Tri 7 May
 Da Nang 7 May
 Birmingham 30 May

LEGEND: [██████████] Combat [.....] Combat Support [] Combat Service Support

30 APR 71
 SECRET

FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The first term reenlistment rate for the first 18 days of April for the 1st Marine Division was 28.5% (four Marines reenlisted of fourteen eligible). This compares with a 21.4% rate for March and a 9.8% rate for the month of February. However, before the Division officially departed, three Marines of thirteen eligible reenlisted for a rate of 23.1%.

The factors below were stated as reasons for personnel not reenlisting in the United States Marine Corps:

Desire for further education - - 60%
Discontent with the military - - 30%
Civilian pursuits - - - - - 10%

The first term reenlistment rate for 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade for April was 15% with 13 Marines reenlisting of 87 recommended and eligible.

30 APR 71

62-1-2

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEARS


1969/1970/1971

1969 RATE

1970 RATE

1971 RATE

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
ELIG/REC	188	132	137	107	125	159	176	167	183	65	63	56	1,558
REENLIST	63	63	60	53	56	98	116	109	131	27	36	32	884
% REENL	35.0	47.7	43.8	49.5	44.8	61.6	65.9	65.2	71.6	41.5	57.1	57.1	54.1
1970													
ELIG/REC	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36	34	32	760
REENLIST	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10	14	10	301
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8	41.1	31.3	39.6
1971													
ELIG/REC				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)						
REENLIST	68	92	28	13	87								
% REENL	6.8	9.8	21.4	23.1	14.9								

30 APR 71

6-1-2

FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The first term reenlistment rate for the first 18 days of April for the 1st Marine Division was 28.5% (four Marines reenlisted of fourteen eligible). This compares with a 21.4% rate for March and a 9.8% rate for the month of February. However, before the Division officially departed, three Marines of thirteen eligible reenlisted for a rate of 23.1%.

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30 APR 71

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT RATES, CALENDAR YEARS


1969/1970/1971

1969 RATE

1970 RATE

1971 RATE

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
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1970													
ELIG/REC	45	65	88	57	89	86	97	83	48	36	34	32	760
REENLIST	24	30	29	41	48	26	32	18	19	10	14	10	301
% REENL	53.3	46.1	33.0	72.0	55.0	30.2	33.0	21.7	39.7	27.8	41.1	31.3	39.6
1971													
ELIG/REC				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)						
REENLIST	68	92	28	13	87								
% REENL	8.8	9.8	21.4	23.1	14.9								

30 APR 71

CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

Congressional/ Special Interest correspondence received during the period 15 - 30 April 1971 totalled 49 pieces, converting to an adjusted monthly rate of 6.0 pieces per 1,000 personnel. Due to administrative error, records for the Division during the first thirteen days of the month are not available. Since the period covered is the first two weeks of activity for the Brigade, no speculation can be made to predict either an increase or decrease in future months at this time. The 49 inquiries received registered 50 complaints. Below is a breakdown of the complaints contained in the correspondence.

Welfare Reports	24
Confinement/Discipline	11
Medical	1
Mail	0
Hardship/Humanitarian Transfer	2
Rotation Tour Date	0
Basic Allowance for Quarters/Pay	2
MOS Changes/Reassignments	2
Personal Effects	0
Administrative Discharges	1
Emergency Leave	0
Overseas Extension	0
Leave	1
Performance and Promotion Status	0
Miscellaneous	6
	<hr/>
TOTAL	50

30 APR 71

CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST CORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

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MOS Changes/Reassignments	2
Personal Effects	0
Administrative Discharges	1
Emergency Leave	0
Overseas Extension	0
Leave	1
Performance and Promotion Status	0
Miscellaneous	6
TOTAL	50


30 APR 71

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CONGRESSIONAL/SPECIAL INTEREST

CORRESPONDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PIECES OF CORRESPONDENCE 1969 ———— 1970 - - - - - 1971

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PIECES	82	90	123	111	138	110	103	120	91	130	145	124	1,367
% CMD	.33	.35	.48	.44	.55	.44	.42	.49	.37	.46	.45	.39	.43
1970													
PIECES	136	143	136	122	108	92	98	99	80	84	74	71	1,243
% CMD	.44	.49	.52	.51	.47	.41	.44	.47	.42	.55	.50	.54	.48
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
PIECES	57	38	46	49									
% C	.43	.31	.47	.60									

31 MARCH 71

DECLASSIFIED

DECORATIONS AND PURPLE HEART MEDALS PROCESSED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During the period 14 April to 30 April 1971, the Brigade Awards Board processed 371 award recommendations. This total reflects the continuing stand-down and deployment of Brigade units. The rate of submission by Brigade units is reflected in the following normalized statistics (adjusted to a monthly basis):

AWARDS PER 1,000 PERSONNEL 42.0

It should be emphasized that while the statistic above reflects submission for an average of 14,322 personnel, many persons had been recommended for awards previously, in accordance with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific deployment policies. The Brigade Awards Office anticipates processing approximately 900 to 1,000 additional recommendations prior to its disestablishment. All submissions will terminate on 31 May 1971.

The Awards Office is presently awaiting authorization from CINCPACFLT to award Strike/Flight Air Medals and impact awards to seriously injured Marines and Vietnamese Nationals. Upon receipt of this authority, the Brigade will begin to award up to approximately 5,000 Strike/Flight Air Medals.

Thirty-seven Purple Heart Medals were awarded between 14 and 30 April 1971. This rate reflected in the statistic below and almost equalling March's Division rate, was caused primarily by a large number of 2d CAG Marines being wounded and can be expected to decrease with the cessation of all ground combat operations of 7 May:

PURPLE HEART MEDALS PER 1,000 PERSONNEL (ADJUSTED) 4.6

In brief, the submission of American Awards should continue at a slightly higher rate throughout the month of May, as all units make their final submissions, while Purple Heart Medals should decrease steadily. Pending authorization, no Strike/Flight Air Medals will be awarded, but up to 5,000 are expected to be awarded when and if such authority is granted.

Due to an administrative error, records of the Division for the period 1 - 13 April are not available. However, 25 Marines were wounded in action during this thirteen day period (compared to 44 awards of the Purple Heart during the 31 days of May) so that a slightly higher monthly rate could have been expected.

30 APR 71

G-1-4


DECLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) RATIO OF DECORATIONS (HEROIC AND MERITORIOUS)

PROCESSED TO PURPLE HEART MEDALS AWARDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

RATIO 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 ~~-----~~

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PHM	693	644	1209	819	1197	921	486	1130	866	406	413	381	9,165
% CMD	2.78	2.54	4.70	3.22	4.77	3.70	1.96	4.65	3.49	1.44	1.29	1.19	2.89
OTHER DEC	924	672	1200	1057	965	995	903	941	927	766	647	596	10,593
% CMD	3.68	2.65	4.67	4.16	3.84	4.00	3.64	3.87	3.74	2.71	2.03	1.87	3.34
RATIO	1.33	1.04	.99	1.29	.81	1.08	1.85	.83	1.07	1.89	1.56	1.57	1.15
1970													
PHM	444	454	428	410	388	348	272	279	197	134	102	126	3,582
% CMD	1.45	1.55	1.68	1.73	1.69	1.54	1.21	1.32	1.04	.88	.78	.96	1.39
OTHER DEC	344	624	809	403	462	678	782	916	810	701	363	352	7,244
% CMD	1.12	2.14	3.08	1.70	2.01	3.00	3.49	4.34	4.26	4.61	2.77	2.69	2.81
RATIO	.77	1.38	1.89	.98	1.19	1.95	2.88	3.29	4.11	5.13	3.56	2.80	2.02
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	
PHM	127	132	44		37								
% D	.95	1.06	.45		.46								
OTHER DEC	418	585	1011		341								
% CMD	3.14	4.71	10.31		4.20								
RATIO	3.29	4.43	22.98		9.22								

31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

6-1-4

LAW AND DISCIPLINE

Although the beginning of calendar year 1971 showed a marked increase in judicial and disciplinary proceedings, the decrease for the month of April 1971 is indicative of the trend expected for the months of May and June due to redeployment of the Brigade personnel in Keystone Oriole Alpha. The rise in courts-martial earlier in the year relating to crimes of violence (a greater than 10% rise from the average rate for the last three months of 1970 to the first three months of 1971) does not necessarily mean that such crimes increased in number, but rather that they were being investigated and prosecuted with more thoroughness.

The substantial decrease in the confinee strength as compared to the average brig population for January, February, and March (an average of 25 men confined during April compared to averages of 37 in March, 46 in February, and 49 in January) is a strong indication of an expected trend through the months of May and June, all due to redeployment of Brigade personnel in Keystone Oriole Alpha.

The decrease in punitive discharges from the January, February, and March rates (only three Marines received such judgements in April) is attributed to the reduction of the case load of courts-martial due to redeployment of the Division personnel in Keystone Robin Charlie and the Brigade personnel with Keystone Oriole Alpha. This trend is expected through the months of May and June.

In view of the rapid decrease in the Brigade strength expected through the months of May and June, the value of indicators in all areas of law and discipline should decrease substantially, although the use of rates based on average strength should yield fair indications of any discernible trends.

30 APR 71

G-15

TRIALS INVOLVING CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During the period 1 - 13 April 1971, there were three trials involving crimes of violence for an adjusted monthly rate of crimes of violence per Division strength of 0.9 per 1,000. During the period, 14 through 30 April 1971, there were six trials involving crimes of violence for an adjusted Brigaderate of 0.7 per 1,000. The combined total for the month of April of nine trials involving crimes of violence is a substantial decrease from the Division's March 1971 figure of thirteen such trials, and the corresponding rate (0.8/1,000) a significant decrease from the average rate for the first quarter of 1971 (1.3/1,000).

The supposition that a high trial rate indicates an high violence rate for that month (and vice-versa) is not demonstrable. This is because the number of trials in any given month is no indication of the amount of violence in the Brigade. There are occasions where a serious crime takes a considerable length of time to investigate. The case finally comes to trial two to three months and sometimes longer after the incident occurred. Thus the total for the month may balloon to what appears to be an abnormally high total.

30 APR 71

G-1-5a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF COMMAND TRIED FOR

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TRIALS	15	11	14	9	15	15	19	7	6	16	19	23	169
% CMD	.06	.04	.05	.04	.06	.06	.08	.03	.02	.06	.06	.07	.05
1970													
TRIALS	29	20	16	19	18	25	9	15	10	7	11	13	192
% CMD	.09	.07	.06	.08	.08	.11	.04	.07	.05	.05	.08	.10	.07
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
TRIALS	19	15	13	3	6								
% D	.14	.12	.13	.09	.07								

31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

6-1-5a

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT

During the period 1 - 13 April 1971, the 1st Marine Division had a total of 14 personnel in an unauthorized absence status for an adjusted monthly rate of 4.6 absences per thousand personnel, the highest rate recorded in 22 months. The Brigade had a total of 5 Marines in an unauthorized absence status during the period 14 - 30 April for an adjusted rate of 0.6/1,000. The combined total of 19 absences and a rate of 1.7/1,000 almost equal the averages of corresponding numbers in the first quarter of 1970, although they also were significant increase over the figures for March.

30 APR 71

G-1-5d


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE REPORT, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

ABSENCES 1969 ----- 1970 ----- 1971 -----

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
# ABSENCES							27	19	28	40	31	35	180*
# % CMD							.11	.08	.12	.15	.10	.12	.11
\$ AVG STR	23.7	24.1	24.3	24.1	23.8	23.6	23.5	23.1	23.5	27.3	30.6	30.2	25.2
1970													
# ABSENCES	23	17	36	12	17	42	24	17	17	12	16	21	254
# % CMD	.08	.06	.14	.05	.08	.20	.11	.08	.09	.08	.13	.17	.10
\$ AVG STR	28.5	27.1	25.0	22.6	21.8	21.4	21.2	20.6	18.1	14.4	12.5	12.5	20.6
1971													
# ABSENCES				(APR) 14	(MAY) 5	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
# % CMD				.46	.06								
\$ AVG STR	12.7	11.7	9.1	7.1	13.7								

* TOTAL SHOWN IS FOR LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1969 # MARINES ONLY 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71
 \$ MARINE STRENGTH ONLY - APPLICABLE ALSO TO PUNITIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES
 AVG STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED

6-1-56

CONFINED MARINES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During the period 1 - 13 April 1971, an average of 24 Men were confined from the Division for an adjusted monthly rate of 7.2 prisoners per thousand personnel, while for the period 14 - 30 April 1971, the Brigade had an average of 25 men confined for an adjusted rate of 3.1 per 1,000. As expected, the total brig population has decreased to 25 for the month at a rate of 2.2/1,000 down from March's rate of 3.8 per 1,000. The one factor attributing to the decrease was the redeployment of Division personnel with Keystone Robin.

Persons suspected of crimes of violence are, in most cases, placed in pre-trial confinement since they are considered to present a threat to personnel. Also, convicted offenders of crimes of violence, for the most part, receive confinement as part of their sentence and seldom have the confinement portion of the sentence suspended by the convening authority.

The application of a liberal administrative separation policy, by ridding the Brigade of potential offenders, is alleviating the brig population problem, although it is impossible to establish a direct correlation.

The continuing effort to decrease the total number of Brigade personnel confined at the United States Army Vietnam Installation Stockade (USARVIS), is an established policy, and as a direct result is the implementation of the policy whereby Marines receiving more than 60 days confinement at hard labor are transferred to the Correctional Center, Camp Pendleton upon sentencing or as soon after trial as possible. The number of confinees are steadily decreasing with the decrease in Brigade strength and will continue to do so.


30 APR 71

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS OF COMMAND CONFINED.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE 1969 ----- 1970 ----- 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PRETRIAL	29	22	18	21	29	19	18	16	19	24	21	33	
POSTTRIAL	29	26	24	30	28	31	44	29	37	44	44	76	
TOTAL	58	48	42	51	57	50	62	45	56	68	65	109	
% CMD	.23	.19	.16	.20	.23	.20	.25	.19	.23	.24	.20	.34	.22
1970													
PRETRIAL	44	42	48	47	44	55	48	38	33	21	39	42	
POSTTRIAL	69	58	59	58	74	71	73	40	24	21	14	18	
TOTAL	113	100	107	105	118	126	121	78	57	42	53	60	
% CMD	.37	.34	.41	.44	.51	.56	.54	.37	.30	.28	.40	.46	.42
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
PRETRIAL	27	24	14	10	13								
P. TRIAL	22	22	23	14	12								
TOTAL	49	46	37	24	25								
% CMD	.37	.37	.38	.72	.31								

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BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Considering cases tried by courts-martial where either a bad conduct or a dishonorable discharge was part of the sentence, the Division, during the period 1 - 13 April 1971, awarded one punitive discharge for an adjusted monthly rate of 0.3 discharges per thousand personnel, while the Brigade, during the period 14 - 30 April 1971, awarded two punitive discharges for a similar adjusted rate of 0.3/1,000. The combined total for April of three discharges, and the corresponding rate of 0.3/1,000 were substantial decreases from March's 13 discharges and a rate of 1.4/1,000. A causative factor of the decrease was the reduction of the case load of courts-martial due to redeployment of the Division personnel with Keystone Robin Charlie and the Brigade personnel with Keystone Oriole Alpha.

Any predictions of future rates would be speculative, at best, because of the expected continuing reduction in the case load involving personnel redeploying with Keystone Oriole Alpha, as well as the steady reduction in the population base.

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
G-15d

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BAD CONDUCT AND DISHONORABLE DISCHARGES,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

DISCHARGES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BCD/DD*	15	14	16	16	11	12	13	16	13	11	16	18	171
% CMD *	.06	.06	.07	.07	.05	.05	.06	.07	.06	.04	.05	.06	.06
1970													
BCD/DD*	16	10	19	14	16	10	12	10	8	5	3	8	131
% CMD *	.06	.04	.08	.06	.07	.05	.06	.05	.04	.03	.02	.06	.05
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
BCD/DD*	8	14	13	1	2								
% CMD *	.06	.12	.14	.03	.03								

* MARINES ONLY

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0-1-52

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

During the period 1 - 13 April, the 1st Marine Division approved nine administrative separations for an adjusted monthly rate of 2.9 discharges per thousand personnel, while during the period 14 - 30 April 1971 there were 20 administrative separations within the Brigade for an adjusted rate of 2.6 per 1,000 personnel. Thus the combined total of 29 separations (and a rate of 2.7/1,000) compared to a total of 48 for March (and a rate of 5.3/1,000). The percent rate is expected to increase significantly during May as there are currently 33 cases pending, and an expectation that the population base will again be reduced drastically.

30 APR 71


6-1-52

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES PROCESSED,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

DISCHARGES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1969 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	(DEC)	
C of G*	--	--	NONE PROCESSED DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1969										0
UD *	4	8	6	7	6	1	7	9	15	15	8	4	90
UNSUIT*	4	1	5	1	1	4	5	3	2	1	1	3	31
TOTAL *	8	9	11	8	7	5	12	12	17	16	9	7	121
% CMD *	.03	.04	.05	.03	.03	.02	.05	.05	.07	.06	.03	.02	.04
1970													
C of G*	1	9	28	32	65	63	69	32	23	22	9	19	372
UD *	12	10	37	18	35	41	57	28	24	28	31	20	341
UNSUIT*	5	6	13	11	20	11	14	4	4	4	2	2	96
TOTAL *	18	25	78	61	120	115	140	64	51	54	42	41	809
% CMD *	.06	.09	.31	.28	.55	.54	.66	.31	.28	.38	.34	.33	.33
1971				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
C of G*	4	0	9										
UD *	43	22	36										
UNSUIT*	1	3	3										
TOTAL *	48	25	48	9	20								
% CMD *	.38	.21	.53	.29	.26								

* MARINES ONLY

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6-1-50

ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION RELATING TO DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Administrative and judicial actions relating to drug abuse decreased during April 1971 for the 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 1971), both in absolute numbers and rate per 1,000. The 4.2 investigatory, administrative, and judicial actions per thousand personnel (adjusted to a monthly basis) taken during April represented a decrease of 35% from the 6.5 similar actions per thousand the previous month. The Brigade (14 Apr to 30 Apr 1971) showed a rate of 4.8 actions per thousand, yielding a combined monthly total of 53 actions for a rate of 4.6/1,000. Programs and instructional techniques employed during April 1971 were:

- a. A Division drug abuse lecture by a new lecturer was prepared, with four lectures given to 200 personnel during 1 April to 13 April 1971.
- b. A Brigade drug abuse lecture by a new lecturer was prepared, with eight lectures given to 159 personnel during 14 April to 30 April 1971.
- c. The Drug Information Contact Team conducted a seminar for a group of twenty junior officers and Staff NCO's on 27 April 1971.


30 APR 71

6-1-5f

**1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS CONCERNING
DRUG ABUSE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971**

ACTIONS 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 NJP	2	7	4	2	8	3	1	1	0	3	8	4	43
INVTGNTN	20	6	4	17	16	35	12	8	9	25	26	26	204
COURTS	14	8	11	12	9	17	15	11	5	15	19	21	157
ADMN DIS	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	0	1	1	2	13
TOTAL	36	21	19	32	34	57	30	23	14	44	54	53	417
ACT/1000	1.4	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.4	2.3	1.2	0.9	0.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3
1970 NJP	2	7	3	3	1	5	4	6	11	3	2	5	52
INVTGNTN	31	26	33	38	44	32	26	45	42	34	40	35	426
COURTS	21	13	12	18	12	18	11	7	18	6	5	1	142
ADMN DIS	10	4	20	16	23	23	36	18	20	10	19	12	211
TOTAL	64	50	68	75	80	78	77	76	91	53	66	53	831
ACT/1000	2.1	1.7	2.6	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.6	4.8	3.5	5.0	4.0	3.2
1971 NJP	8	11	9	0	0								
INVTGNTN	36	34	28	6	34								
C TS	2	3	2	2	1								
ADMN DIS	30	12	25	6	4								
TOTAL	76	60	64	14	39								
ACT/1000	5.7	4.8	6.5	4.2	4.8								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

6-1-58

RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971


A racial incident is a disagreement, disobedience and/or act of violence perpetrated between or by individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a probable cause.

As was the case during the first three months of 1971, there were no racial incidents for the 1st Marine Division in April (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71). However, there was one racial incident for the Brigade (14 Apr to 30 Apr 71), converting to an adjusted monthly rate of 0.1 incident per thousand personnel.

The continuing standdown of Brigade units could present increased opportunity for individuals to attempt to influence others, or to be influenced about real or imagined racial issues. However, the apparent substantial success of the Brigade in preventing these occurrences can, in large measure, be attributed to the intensive interest on all levels of command and should serve to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RACIAL INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970													
INCIDNTS	8	5	5	2	3	6	2	0	1	1	3	1	37
INC/1000	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
1971													
INCIDNTS	0	0	0	0									
INC/1000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0									
1971 MAB				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	(DEC)	
INCIDNTS				1									
INC/1000				0.1									

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G-1-5g

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FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71) had one felonious "fragging" incident, producing an adjusted monthly rate of 0.3 incidents per thousand personnel. There were no casualties or damage. This incident was thoroughly investigated by agencies of the deployed Division and is now being investigated by the Brigade Inspector. Results of their joint investigation as of this date have not turned up any new leads as to the intended victim(s) or the offender(s). Operation Freeze was used during which several suspects were developed but subsequently cleared and the investigation continues. The Brigade (14 Apr to 30 Apr 71) had no felonious "fragging" incidents. The Division incident was the first one of this type (using a fragmentation grenade [M-26] during 1971, and April was the fifth consecutive month during which there were no casualties recorded.

A fragging is defined as a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a booby trap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another. During 1970, such incidents occurred at a rate of 3.9 per month with a relatively wide variation (assuming a normal distribution, a standard deviation of 1.6 obtained). Similarly, casualties from fragging incidents occurred at a rate of 3.2 per month with an even wider variation (a standard deviation of 2.6). In absolute terms, the number of incidents per month ranged from two in July and December to seven in February 1970, and casualties from none in December to eight in April. Although 26 of these acts were committed in the first half of the year and 21 in the last half, conversion to rates per 1,000 (Division strength) show that the rates for the two halves of the year were virtually equal (at approximately 0.2 per 1,000). However, only 14 casualties resulted from such acts during the last half of the year (versus 28 in the first half), converting to a rate of 0.15 per 1,000 (versus 0.20 per 1,000). Five of the 47 incidents involved the use of CS (riot gas) grenades, including four in the last two months of the year (and the single incident occurring in February 1971).

Of the 47 incidents in 1970, 22 were solved from which 37 suspects/offenders were identified through investigation. However, markedly better results were obtained as the year progressed. During the first half of the year, 10 acts of the 26 acts were solved (38%). During the following three month period, 5 of 10 were solved (50%), while during the last three months of the year, 7 of 11 were solved (64%). Much of this progress may be attributed to the implementation of Force Order 3120.4 (setting forth the provisions of "Operation Freeze, the swift isolation of a unit in which an act of violence has occurred, and the immediate and thorough investigation of the act), Division Bulletin 5830, and Division Order 5830.1. Division Order 5830.2 of 19 December 1970 has further aided in the solution of such crimes, in that it provides for the protection of informants. The effect of this order in one particular case was that four persons thus protected gave information resulting in the conviction of four of the five suspects (the fifth having already received a Bad Conduct Discharge for other reasons). In another

(continued on ~~preceding~~ page)

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case happening on 6 December 1970, the force of all the directives above provided for the solution of a fragging (through informants and the subsequent confession of the two offenders) in a single day.

In general, of the 47 incidents during 1970, 29 (or 62%) occurred in relatively secure areas (cantonments in or near the Danang/Division CP area), while the remaining 18 (or 38%) occurred in forward areas (Combat Bases, Fire Support Bases, Infantry Battalion CPs). They happened primarily in living areas or in the vicinity of Clubs. The 37 identified suspects/offenders received 6 General Courts-Martial, 15 Special Courts-Martial, 1 Non-Judicial Punishment and 5 Administrative Discharges. The remaining charges were dropped primarily because of insufficient evidence. Neither of the incidents in 1971 have thus far been solved.

Following is a list, by rank, of identified offenders, casualties and known intended victims:

<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFENDERS</u>	<u>CASUALTY</u>	<u>INTENDED</u>
Maj	0	0	1
Capt	0	1	1
1stLt	0	5	1
2dLt	0	1	0
CWO-4	0	1	0
CWO-2	0	1	0
SgtMaj/MGySgt	0	0	1
GySgt	0	3	3
SSgt	0	6	4
Sgt	4	5*	4
Cpl	4	4	1
LCpl	14	11	0
PFC	9	4	0

* one killed.

Both incidents and casualties resulting therefrom should continue at the present low level because of three factors:

1. The emphatic implementation of the directives discussed above (and that knowledge by potential assailants),
2. The continued reduction in MAB strength, and
3. The knowledge (based on past experience) that few, if any, such incidents will occur in the units standing down.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FRAGGING INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	(DEC)	TOTAL
70 INCID	3	7	10	14	19	24	28	32	37	41	44	47	47
INC/1000	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2
KILLED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
WOUNDED	4	7	10	14	19	24	28	32	37	41	44	47	41
TOTAL CAS	4	7	10	14	19	24	28	32	37	41	44	47	42
% CMD CAS	.01	.02	.02	.03	.01	.01	.01	.01	.04	.03	.01	.00	.02
71 INCID	0	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
INC/1000	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3									
KILLED	0	0	0	0									
WOUNDED	0	0	0	0									
TOTAL CAS	0	0	0	0									
% CMD CAS	.00	.00	.00	.00									
71 INCID				0									
INC/1000				0.0									
KILLED				0									
WOUNDED				0									
TOTAL CAS				0									
% CMD CAS				.00									

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) (OCT) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71
CONFIDENTIAL

6-1-52

MAJOR OFFENSES FOR THE CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

In April 1971, the Division/Brigade Military Police Section processed 27 major felonious offenses committed by Division/Brigade personnel for an offense rate of 2.4/1,000 personnel, both the total and the rate representing decreases from a total of 33 offenses and an offense rate of 3.4/1,000 in March 1971. April's figures do compare favorably with the monthly averages for 1970, just over 65 offenses per month and an offense rate of 3.0/1,000 per month. Between 1 - 13 April the Division Military Police Section processed 13 major felonious offenses for an adjusted offense rate of 3.9/1,000. During the latter portion of the month (14 - 30 April) the Brigade Military Police Section processed 14 major felonious offenses for an adjusted offense rate of 1.7/1,000. Crimes of violence (actual and attempted murder/homicide, assault and aggravated assault, rape, unlawful ordnance detonation, communicating a threat, and armed robbery) increased slightly. The Division experienced one such incident during the first two weeks of the month for a total of 3 crimes of violence for April. The Division had two such incidents in March, the same number as recorded for February and January of this year.

Marijuana violations in April equalled the number committed in March. Narcotics violations decreased from 13 such offenses in March to 8 offenses in April. Offenses involving dangerous drugs (amphetamines, barbiturates, etc.) decreased from 2 offenses in March to 1 in April. The offense rate per thousand of marijuana violations decreased from 1.0/1,000 in March to 0.9/1,000 in April, while cases involving hard narcotics also decreased from 1.3/1,000 in March to 0.7/1,000 in April. Cases involving dangerous drugs decreased from 0.2/1,000 in March to 0.1/1,000 in April. April was the first month since January which showed a decrease in all drug and marijuana violations. The decrease could be a result of added vigilance on the unit level.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, MAJOR OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971
(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	2	1	11
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	3	2	0	1	0	0	2	2	2	1	1	0	14
ASSAULT	2	6	10	1	8	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	33
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	4	4	3	2	22
RAPE	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	4
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	1	0	1	0	3	4	0	1	4	1	4	1	20
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	34	37	39	30	36	34	30	32	24	24	19	17	356
COMMN A THREAT(MAJOR)	2	3	6	5	4	3	0	1	1	1	2	0	28
NARCOTICS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CURRENCY VIOLATION	10	2	1	0	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	27
LARCENY	2	0	5	0	7	12	6	15	19	14	5	8	93
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	19	16	24	13	22	18	6	7	8	15	5	9	162
ARMED ROBBERY	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	5
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	73	66	86	50	86	78	54	66	67	64	44	43	777
OFFENSES FOR 1971 (APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV)													
MURDER/HOMICIDE	0	0	0	0	0								
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	0	1	1	1	0								
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	0								
ATTEMPTED MURDR/HOMCD	1	0	0	0	0								
RAPE	0	0	0	0	0								
UNLAWFL ORDNANC DETON	0	0	0	0	2								
MARIJUANA VIOLATION	17	8	10	6	4								
COMMN A THREAT(MAJOR)	0	0	1	0	0								
NARCOTICS	2	7	13	2	6								
CURRENCY VIOLATION	1	0	1	0	0								
LARCENY	6	3	5	4	1								
DANGEROUS DRUG ABUSE	7	6	2	0	1								
ARMED ROBBERY	0	1	0	0	0								
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0								
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	35	26	33	13	14								
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	AVG
1970	2.4	2.3	3.3	2.1	3.7	3.5	2.4	3.1	3.5	4.2	3.4	3.3	3.0
1971	2.6	2.1	3.4	3.9	1.7								

(APR)(MAY)(JUN)(JUL)(AUG)(SEP)(OCT)(NOV)

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VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

There were 27 vehicle/traffic offenses committed by Division/Brigade personnel and processed by the Division/Brigade Military Police Section during the month of April 1971. This was a decrease of approximately 75% from the preceding month. The offense rate decreased from 8.9/1,000 in March to 2.4/1,000 in April. Almost all of the decrease occurred in citations for speeding (down from 71 in March to 19 April). Division personnel were cited for 18 vehicle/traffic offenses during the first two weeks of April for an offense rate of 5.4/1,000. The Brigade had nine such offenses during the latter two weeks of April for an offense rate of 1.1/1,000. One must bear in mind that the number of citations during a period of time may bear no relation to the number of offenses committed (in the area of traffic regulation enforcement), since a decrease in citations from one month to the next may be attributed to light patrolling or a less "hard nosed" attitude towards offenders (i.e. lectures issued rather than citations issued). The most probable reasons for the decrease in vehicle/traffic citations were a decrease in the number of Division/Brigade vehicles on the road and a decrease in motorized patrols, both caused by preparation for redeployment.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION VEHICLE/TRAFFIC OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971
 (3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
SPEEDING	184	49	42	22	198	102	84	63	66	19	41	44	914
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	8	6	7	4	4	2	2	1	5	1	0	0	40
RECKLESS DRIVING	5	3	3	1	4	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	23
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	1	3	3	0	3	3	8	1	26	0	0	0	48
IMPROPER BACKING	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	11	3	7	1	2	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	34
IMPROPER TURNING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	9	3	7	3	2	3	2	2	1	0	0	1	33
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	0	0	18	6	11	7	1	3	4	1	0	0	51
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
INATTENTION	0	0	18	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	21
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0	0	12	1	14	11	3	0	0	0	0	0	41
HIT AND RUN	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE USE	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	8
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	220	67	117	39	243	136	105	79	105	22	41	45	1219
OFFENSES FOR 1971 (APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV)													
SPEEDING	96	32	71	11	8								
IMPROP/NO TRIP TICKET	1	1	0	1	0								
RECKLESS DRIVING	0	0	0	0	0								
FAILURE TO STOP/YIELD	4	2	0	1	1								
IMPROPER BACKING	0	0	1	0	0								
INVALID/NO DRIVER LIC	1	2	1	1	0								
IMPROPER TURNING	0	0	0	0	0								
MISAPPROP GOVT VEHICL	0	0	1	0	0								
OVERLOADED VEHICLE	17	6	10	1	0								
LEAVING SCENE OF ACDT	0	0	0	0	0								
INATTENTION	1	0	1	1	0								
ILLEGAL TRANSPORTAT'N	0	0	0	0	0								
HIT AND RUN	0	0	0	0	0								
IMPROP PASS'G/LANE USE	2	0	2	1	0								
OTHER	0	0	0	1	0								
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	122	43	87	18	9								
OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	AVG
1970	7.2	2.3	4.5	1.6	10.6	6.0	4.7	3.7	5.5	1.4	3.1	3.4	4.7
1971	9.2	3.5	8.9	5.4	1.1								

(APR)(MAY)(JUN)(JUL)(AUG)(SEP)(OCT)(NOV)

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MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEAR 1970/1971

Miscellaneous offenses, encompassing all violations not covered by the major and vehicle/traffic offenses categories and consisting largely of military offenses, totalled 38 during the month of April 1971. This represents a sizable decrease in such offenses from the 69 recorded in February. This is approximately 20% lower than the monthly average of 48 during the last quarter of 1970 and well below the average of 213 offenses per month registered for the year 1970. The Division experienced 26 such offenses during the first two weeks of April and the Brigade had 12 such incidents during the latter two weeks of April. When rates are computed to take in account the change from the Division to the Brigade structure, April's rate of 3.3 offenses/1,000 was appreciably lower than March's 7.0/1,000. April's decrease of miscellaneous offenses may bear little relation to the number actually committed, since a decreased vigilance may have produced the smaller number of offenses processed. It may be noted that there was a significant decrease in off-limits violations. This decrease could be a result of the reduction of military police patrolling because of preparation for redeployment.

30 APR 71

G-1-58

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1ST MARINE DIVISION MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OFFENSES FOR 1970													
OFF LIMITS	110	96	153	74	127	143	88	82	69	26	23	15	1006
CURFEW VIOLATIONS	50	36	47	8	32	27	19	30	0	2	1	0	252
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	28	27	32	13	18	31	12	15	0	0	0	3	179
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	30	13	46	19	39	51	38	23	6	32	18	8	323
DESERTING	4	6	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13
DISRESPECT	2	4	12	4	5	14	7	6	3	1	0	0	58
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	6	4	4	2	10	10	7	7	0	2	0	0	52
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	1	1	5	3	4	10	3	7	5	5	0	4	48
UNDER INFLUENCE	0	1	1	0	2	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	10
OUT OF UNIFORM	12	8	12	4	10	16	6	12	0	0	0	0	80
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DISOBEYING ORDER	1	0	0	0	2	2	5	4	0	0	0	0	14
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	0	0	13	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	18
WEAPONS VIOLATION	58	44	77	25	62	100	71	59	4	2	0	0	502
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OFFENSES 1970	302	240	404	152	312	407	258	249	87	71	42	32	2556

OFFENSES FOR 1971													
	(JAN)	(FEB)	(MAR)	(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	(DEC)	TOTAL
OFF LIMITS	46	70	44	15	3								
CURFEW VIOLATIONS	0	0	0	0	0								
I.D. CARD/ORDERS VIOL	2	6	7	4	1								
UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE	2	1	0	0	0								
DESERTING	0	0	0	0	0								
DISRESPECT	2	4	1	0	0								
RESISTING APPREHENS'N	0	0	0	0	0								
DRUNK/DISORDERLY	2	12	5	2	7								
UNDER INFLUENCE	0	0	0	0	0								
OUT OF UNIFORM	0	1	1	0	0								
DESTRUC GOVT PROPERTY	0	0	0	1	0								
DISOBEYING ORDER	0	0	0	0	0								
INTERFERE W/MP DUTIES	1	0	2	0	0								
WEAPONS VIOLATION	20	2	1	1	1								
OTHER	0	9	8	3	0								
TOTAL OFFENSES 1971	75	105	69	26	12								

OFFENSE RATE PER 1,000	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	AVG
1970	9.9	8.2	15.4	6.4	13.6	18.0	11.5	11.8	4.6	4.7	3.2	2.4	9.9
1971	5.6	8.5	7.0	7.8	1.5								

(APR)(MAY)(JUN)(JUL)(AUG)(SEP)(OCT)(NOV)

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GROUND SAFETY

The month of April 1971 produced once again rather disappointing statistics in the area of Ground Safety. For purposes of the Command Information Notebook the month was split into two parts, 1 April to 13 April 1971 reported under the 1st Marine Division Ground Safety Program, 14 April to 30 April 1971 under the 3d MAB Ground Safety Program. 46 incidents were reported to this office (Division/Brigade Inspector) during April, claiming 33 Division/Brigade casualties and 8 Vietnamese casualties. Of these incidents and casualties, the Division recorded 12 incidents with 8 U. S. and 2 VN casualties, the Brigade recorded 34 incidents with 25 U. S. casualties (including one death from drowning) and 6 VN casualties.

The non-battle casualty rate for the Division for the first 13 days of April was 80 casualties per one million man-days, while the Brigade's rate was 103 casualties per one million man-days. For the entire month of April, the combined figures for the Division/Brigade were 96 casualties per million man-days.

The biggest casualty producer was occupational/operational incidents. The Division had only four incidents producing four casualties, but the Brigade had 21 incidents producing 21 casualties. As for the remaining categories, the following numbers were reported:

Motor vehicle accidents, the Division, two incidents, one VN casualty, the Brigade, six incidents, three VN casualties; Explosive ordnance, the Division, one incident, one VN casualty, the Brigade one incident, one Marine casualty; Supporting arms, the Division, none, the Brigade, one incident, three VN casualties; Accidental Discharges, the Division, three incidents, three casualties (U.S.), the Brigade, two incidents, two casualties (U.S.).

The Brigade Ground Safety Program will continue until departure of all troops and should, in general, continue to reduce the non-battle casualty rate in the coming weeks due to deployment of units.

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BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

The Division battle casualty rate for 1 - 13 April was 130 per million man-days (13 casualties) and the Brigade rate for 14 - 30 April was 99 (24 casualties) for a combined April rate of 108 (37 casualties). This was a significant decrease from the March rate of 152 (46 casualties).

The Division non-battle casualty rate for 1 - 13 April was 80 casualties per million man-days (8 casualties) and the Brigade rate for 14 - 30 April was 103 (25 casualties) for a combined April rate of 96 (33 casualties). This represents a decrease from the March rate of 109 (33 casualties).

Regarding the non-battle casualty rate, a comparison of March and April reveals the following (rates listed are in terms of casualties per 1,000 personnel):

	<u>NUMBER of CASUALTIES</u>		
	<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>BRIGADE</u>	
(1) Friendly Fire Rate:	0	1	remained same (0.1 to 0.1)
(2) Explosive Ordnance:	1	1	decreased 71% (0.7 to 0.2)
(3) Accidental Discharges:	3	2	increased 33% (0.3 to 0.4)
(4) Motor Vehicle Accidents:	0	0	decreased 100% (0.5 to 0.0)
(5) Operational/Occupational:	4	21	increased 29% (1.7 to 2.2)

Due to the continuing process of units moving into standdown, the number of battle casualties is expected to be low. With continuing emphasis on safety, the non-battle casualty rate should decrease.

The term battle casualty is defined by MCO P3040.4 as "any person lost to his organization because of death, wounds, missing [sic], capture or internment providing such loss is incurred in action. 'In action' characterizes the casualty status as having been the direct result of combat; or sustained going to or returning from a combat mission provided that the occurrence was directly related to combat or, through misadventure, friendly action. However, injuries due to the elements (weather) or to self-inflicted wounds are not to be considered as sustained in action and are thereby not to be interpreted as battle casualties. Examples of injuries not to be interpreted as battle casualties are: frostbite, battle fatigue, sunstroke, heat exhaustion and diseases not verified as cases of biological warfare. Minor injuries or wounds neither requiring admission to a medical facility nor involving loss

(continued on preceding page)

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of personnel are also considered battle casualties for reporting purposes, if otherwise classified a battle casualty as defined above."

For the purposes of this report the statistics on battle casualties don't include those personnel receiving wounds who are treated and returned to duty without being admitted to a hospital. Regarding non-battle casualties only those injuries requiring hospitalization for a period of four days or more are calculated. The specific incidents involved are those resulting from friendly fire, explosive ordnance, accidental discharges, motor vehicle accidents, and operational/occupational incidents.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), BATTLE VERSUS NON-BATTLE CASUALTY RATES,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
Note 1	.777	.710	.802	.763	.778	.747	.767	.754	.742	.879	.957	.988	9.665
BTL CAS*	530	629	554	558	798	639	411	793	494	236	304	313	6,289
BTL RATE	683	886	698	771	1026	855	536	1052	666	268	318	317	651
NBTL CAS	136	173	135	161	156	163	170	248	171	234	206	210	2,163
NBTL RATE	176	244	168	211	201	218	222	329	230	266	215	213	224
1970													
Note 1	.950	.817	.816	.711	.711	.677	.694	.655	.571	.471	.392	.409	7.874
BTL CAS*	378	323	328	284	242	271	187	226	156	91	88	83	2,657
BTL RATE	398	395	402	399	340	400	269	345	273	193	224	203	338
NBTL CAS	228	171	200	162	156	140	148	171	116	67	74	65	1,698
NBTL RATE	240	209	245	228	219	207	213	261	203	142	189	159	216
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	(3D MAB)
Note 1	.414	.349	.302	.100	.243								
BTL CAS*	115	134	46	13	24								
BTL RATE	278	384	152	130	99								
NBTL CAS	30	24	33	8	25								
NBTL RATE	72	69	109	80	103								

Note 1: MILLION MAN-DAYS (N TIMES 10⁶)
 *: EXCLUDES WIA (NOT EVAC) SINCE NOT LOST TO UNIT
 CASUALTY RATES = CASUALTIES PER MILLION MAN-DAYS

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CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEAR 1971

During the period 1 - 13 April, the Division recorded eight non-battle casualties and from 14 - 30 April the Brigade recorded 25 non-battle casualties for an April total of 33, thus exactly equalling March's total of 33. However, April's population base was more than 1,500 larger than the Division's in March. Consequently, April's rate of 2.9 casualties per thousand personnel was a moderate decrease from March's 3.4 casualties per thousand.

Command attention continues to be exerted on the problem of non-battle casualties. It is anticipated that the rate will continue to decline during the month of May, especially since two categories of incident, supporting arms and individual weapons, should not occur after combat operations terminate on 7 May.


30 APR 71
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

YEAR 1971

FRIENDLY FIRE -----
 ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE =====
 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE -----
 MOTOR VEHICLE =====
 OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL -----



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OPER/OCC	10	12	17	4	21								
FR FIRE	3	1	1	0	1								
EXPL ORD	2	5	7	1	1								
ACTL DIS	8	5	3	3	2								
MTR VEH	7	1	5	0	0								
TOTAL	30	24	33	8	25								
Cumulative Distribution:													
OPER/OCC	10	22	39	43	21								
FR FIRE	3	4	5	5	1								
EXPL ORD	2	7	14	15	1								
ACTL DIS	8	13	16	19	2								
MTR VEH	7	8	13	13	0								

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)


30 APR 71

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES, CALENDAR

YEAR 1969

FRIENDLY FIRE ————— EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE - - - - -
 ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE = = = = = MOTOR VEHICLE = = = = =
 OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
OPER/OCC	59	69	51	75	98	92	88	111	59	170	102	97	1,071
FR FIRE	45	58	34	24	15	20	24	59	53	32	36	19	419
EXPL ORD	10	18	24	37	11	27	26	27	16	8	39	64	307
ACTL DIS	19	26	21	16	20	15	17	18	28	17	19	18	234
MTR VEH	3	2	5	9	12	9	15	33	15	7	10	12	132
TOTAL	136	173	135	161	156	163	170	248	171	234	206	210	2,163
Cumulative Distribution:													
OPER/OCC	59	128	179	254	352	444	532	643	702	872	974	1071	
FR FIRE	45	103	137	161	176	196	220	279	332	364	400	419	
EXPL ORD	10	28	52	89	100	127	153	180	196	204	243	307	
ACTL DIS	19	45	66	82	102	117	134	152	180	197	216	234	
MTR VEH	3	5	10	19	31	40	55	88	103	110	120	132	

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SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were no supporting arms friendly fire incidents for the 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71), although there was one Brigade incident with three Vietnamese casualties (no deaths), but no Brigade casualties. The Brigade adjusted monthly incident and casualty rates for April were 0.1 incidents and 0.0 casualties (U.S.) per 1,000 personnel.

The category of incidents includes not only air and artillery, but crew-served weapons as well. The number of incidents per month should remain in the vicinity of zero incidents because the stringent control and clearance measures which have influenced favorably both the incident and casualty rates remain in effect. In addition, all combat operations cease on 7 May. After that date, no such incidents should occur. However, the prediction of casualties is much more uncertain, because a single supporting arms incident can produce a large number of casualties. For example six such incidents occurred in May 1970, yet only three persons were injured, while five incidents in August 1970 produced four deaths and twenty-nine injuries.

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
G-1-6c

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE SUPPORTING ARMS INCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ----- 1970 ----- 1971 -----

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 INCID	18	20	11	11	8	9	12	20	15	11	9	7	151
INC/1000	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.5
KILLED	12	14	4	4	4	1	3	8	1	0	4	2	57
WOUNDED	29	32	17	15	6	12	15	50	35	23	21	10	265
TOTAL CAS	41	46	21	19	10	13	18	58	36	23	25	12	322
% CMD CAS	.16	.18	.08	.07	.04	.05	.07	.24	.15	.08	.08	.04	.10
70 INCID	7	8	7	4	6	1	6	5	7	5	2	1	59
INC/1000	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.04	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2
KILLED	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	10
WOUNDED	26	17	41	9	3	0	13	29	10	3	3	3	157
TOTAL CAS	26	19	42	9	3	0	13	33	10	3	6	3	167
% CMD CAS	.08	.07	.16	.04	.01	.00	.06	.16	.05	.02	.05	.02	.06
71 INCID	0	0	0	0	1								
INC/1000	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1								
KILLED	0	0	0	0	0								
WOUNDED	0	0	0	0	0								
TOTAL CAS	0	0	0	0	0								
% CMD CAS	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

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INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There were no incidents for the 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71), although the Brigade (14 Apr to 30 Apr 71) had one incident with one Marine casualty. Both of these figures (one incident, one casualty) were the lowest recorded in the 28 months considered herein, producing an adjusted monthly Brigade and April rates of 0.1 incidents and 0.1 casualties per 1,000 personnel. These reductions reflect the decreasing strength and activity of the Division/Brigade, but also reflect the continuing command attention at all levels. All combat operations cease on 7 May, after which no individual weapons incidents should occur.

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
Q-1-6d

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS INCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 INCID	7	13	12	5	11	5	5	4	16	11	20	11	120
INC/1000	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.4
KILLED	1	5	1	0	3	1	2	1	5	1	4	1	25
WOUNDED	3	7	12	5	2	6	4	0	12	8	7	6	72
TOTAL CAS	4	12	13	5	5	7	6	1	17	9	11	7	97
% CMD CAS	.02	.05	.05	.02	.02	.03	.02	.0+	.07	.03	.05	.02	.03
70 INCID	7	8	10	7	13	14	6	15	6	4	2	4	96
INC/1000	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4
KILLED	0	1	2	3	0	4	1	6	2	0	1	0	20
WOUNDED	9	5	17	6	8	19	2	16	2	2	0	3	89
TOTAL CAS	9	6	19	9	8	23	3	22	4	2	1	3	109
% CMD CAS	.03	.02	.07	.04	.03	.10	.01	.10	.02	.01	.01	.02	.04
71 INCID	3	5	3	0	1								
INC/1000	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.1								
KILLED	0	0	0	0	0								
WOUNDED	3	1	1	0	1								
TOTAL CAS	3	1	1	0	1								
% CMD CAS	.02	.01	.01	.00	.01								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

a-1-6d

ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Accidental discharges continued, in April 71, to be a nettlesome problem of the Ground Safety Program. The 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71) had three incidents with three casualties (no deaths), producing adjusted monthly rates of 0.9 incidents and 0.9 casualties per 1,000. The Brigade (14 Apr to 30 Apr 71) had two incidents with two casualties (no deaths), producing adjusted rates of 0.2 incidents and 0.2 casualties per 1,000. The combined April rates of 0.4 incidents and 0.4 casualties were a slight increase over comparable rates for March (0.3/1,000 in each case). This subject is particularly emphasized during Ground Safety lectures; however, carelessness and negligent handling of firearms by troops continue to cause these tragedies.

The continuing standdown of units and reduced operational commitments should reduce the incident rate since, in the units standing down, the handling of weapons will be reduced to a minimum. However, continued emphasis must be placed on the safe handling of weapons.

30 APR 71


C-1-6e

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 INCID	17	19	17	16	20	15	17	18	27	17	20	17	220
INC/1000	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7
KILLED	1	5	4	1	2	0	3	2	3	1	4	3	29
WOUNDED	18	21	17	15	18	15	14	16	25	16	15	15	205
TOTAL CAS	19	26	21	16	20	15	17	18	28	17	19	18	234
% CMD CAS	.08	.10	.08	.06	.08	.06	.07	.07	.11	.06	.06	.06	.07
70 INCID	16	12	10	16	9	16	11	11	8	8	2	5	124
INC/1000	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.5
KILLED	3	2	0	3	0	1	0	3	2	1	1	1	17
WOUNDED	13	10	11	13	7	14	11	8	5	6	2	4	104
TOTAL CAS	16	12	11	16	7	15	11	11	7	7	3	5	121
% CMD CAS	.05	.04	.04	.07	.03	.07	.05	.05	.04	.05	.02	.04	.05
71 INCID	9	4	3	3	2								
INC/1000	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.9	0.2								
KILLED	0	1	0	0	0								
WOUNDED	8	4	3	3	2								
TOTAL CAS	8	5	3	3	2								
% CMD CAS	.06	.04	.03	.09	.02								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The Division (1 - 13 Apr) recorded the same number of incidents within this category as were recorded in March (one incident). Although the number of incidents remained at one, the adjusted monthly rate increased to 0.3 incidents per thousand personnel. However, casualties decreased from seven to one and the adjusted casualty rate decreased, from 0.7/1,000 in March to 0.3/1,000 in April. The single casualty stemmed from the detonation of an M-26 fragmentation grenade. The Brigade (14 - 30 April) also had one incident in this category. The adjusted incident and the casualty rates were both 0.1/1,000. This incident was caused when an explosive device detonated from the heat generated by burning weeds.

There appears to be no definite trend established in either incidents or casualties due to explosive devices. The number of incidents per month continues to fluctuate and, as in the case with supporting arms incidents, a certain number of detonations can produce few or many casualties. Nevertheless, with the cessation of combat operations on 7 May, there should be little cause for handling explosive devices and, therefore, the number of such incidents may reasonably be expected to fall to zero.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE INCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971
CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 INCID	7	9	15	19	8	14	17	20	11	8	16	30	174
INC/1000	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.5
KILLED	3	1	6	7	3	1	2	1	1	1	2	6	34
WOUNDED	7	17	18	30	8	26	24	26	15	7	37	58	273
TOTAL CAS	10	18	24	37	11	27	26	27	16	8	39	64	307
% CMD CAS	.04	.07	.09	.15	.04	.11	.10	.11	.06	.03	.12	.20	.10
70 INCID	36	22	15	14	15	13	10	14	14	4	7	9	173
INC/1000	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.7
KILLED	3	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	4	1	1	1	16
WOUNDED	36	23	22	16	17	9	7	19	19	4	22	15	209
TOTAL CAS	39	24	24	17	17	10	7	20	23	5	23	16	225
% CMD CAS	.12	.08	.09	.07	.07	.04	.03	.09	.12	.03	.18	.12	.09
71 INCID	2	4	1	1	1								
INC/1000	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1								
KILLED	0	3	1	0	0								
WOUNDED	2	2	6	1	1								
TOTAL CAS	2	5	7	1	1								
% CMD CAS	.02	.04	.07	.03	.01								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The 1st Marine Division (1 Apr to 13 Apr 71) had 2 incidents occurring in April 1971. This was a decrease from the average for 1970, even considering only 13 days were considered in April. The Division thus recorded an adjusted incident rate of 0.6/1,000 during the month which was a decrease from March, when there were 1.0 incidents/1,000. Division casualties from motor vehicle accidents for April decreased to zero, producing a casualty rate of zero compared to 0.5/1,000 for March. The accidents and injuries which have occurred in the past 28 months were primarily due to the influx of lightweight vehicular traffic prevalent on all lines of communication and the almost non-existent traffic control by Vietnamese authorities.

The Brigade had six incidents occurring from 14 - 30 April 1971, producing an incident rate of 0.7/1,000. With the continuing stand down and deployments the rates should continue a downward trend. There were no Brigade casualties from vehicle accidents for April. Division/Brigade motor vehicle operators have been and are being constantly schooled in strict obedience to traffic regulations and also in the art of defensive driving. A majority of the accidents in which Marine vehicles have been involved recently have not been the result of negligence or carelessness on the part of Marines.

30 APR 71


G-1-69

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS AND

CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 ACCID	14	14	14	15	20	22	21	31	26	18	20	21	236
ACC/1000	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7
* U.S. K/I	0/3	0/2	1/4	1/8	2/10	2/7	3/12	2/31	1/14	0/7	0/10	0/12	12/120
TOTAL CAS	3	2	5	9	12	9	15	33	15	7	10	12	132
% CMD CAS	.01	.01	.02	.04	.05	.04	.06	.14	.06	.02	.03	.04	.04
* V.N. K/I	4/16	5/9	2/16	1/9	4/6	1/9	2/5	2/4	11/12	4/12	0/15	9/13	45/126
70 ACCID	16	16	20	11	10	16	11	16	7	10	7	4	144
ACC/1000	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.6
* U.S. K/I	0/30	0/9	1/8	0/1	0/3	0/2	0/6	2/23	0/3	0/6	0/1	0/2	3/94
TOTAL CAS	30	9	9	1	3	2	6	25	3	6	1	2	97
% CMD CAS	.10	.03	.03	.04	.01	.01	.03	.12	.02	.04	.01	.02	.04
* V.N. K/I	9/5	2/11	6/10	6/4	6/6	3/13	4/16	1/13	2/3	4/6	0/11	1/3	44/101
71 ACCID	12	6	10	2	6								
ACC/1000	0.9	0.5	1.0	0.6	0.7								
* U.S. K/I	0/7	0/1	0/5	0/0	0/0								
TOTAL CAS	7	1	5	0	0								
% CMD CAS	.05	.01	.05	.00	.00								
* V.N. K/I	4/7	1/4	1/5	0/1	0/3								

* KILLED/INJURED

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

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OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During the period 1 - 13 April there were four operational/occupational incidents in the Division (those incidents resulting in death or requiring at least four or more days hospitalization which do not fall within the purview of the other categories of the Ground Safety Program, including, inter alia, falls, burns and drownings) which produced four casualties (no deaths) and adjusted month rates of 1.2 incidents and 1.2 casualties per thousand personnel. Both were the third lowest rates in their respective classifications in the past 28 months. Close attention at all levels of command during the last five-and-one-half months appears to have generated a downward trend in both incidents and casualties.

During the period 14 - 30 April there were 21 Brigade incidents and 21 casualties (including a death by drowning), producing adjusted rates of 2.6 incidents and 2.6 casualties per 1,000 personnel. Keystone Oriole activity seems to have produced an increase of operational/occupational incidents and casualties. With close command attention and supervision, this figure should be greatly reduced in the coming month, but one must bear in mind that much heavy work will be undertaken, exposing many personnel to the danger of occupational accidents. Both incidents and casualties were notably reduced from any monthly total experienced in 1969 or 1970, but were significantly larger than any other month in 1971.

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
G-1-68

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL INCIDENTS

AND CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENTS/CASUALTIES 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 INCID	59	55	46	75	98	92	88	104	52	152	102	97	1,020
INC/1000	2.4	2.2	1.8	3.0	3.9	3.7	3.6	4.3	2.1	5.4	3.2	3.0	3.2
KILLED	1	5	3	2	3	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	21
INJURED	58	64	48	73	95	92	88	109	59	165	102	97	1,050
TOTAL CAS	59	69	51	75	98	92	88	111	59	170	102	97	1,071
% CMD CAS	.24	.27	.20	.30	.39	.37	.36	.46	.24	.60	.32	.30	.34
70 INCID	108	96	96	107	114	86	108	62	61	44	39	36	957
INC/1000	3.5	3.3	3.7	4.5	5.0	3.8	4.8	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.0	2.7	3.7
KILLED	0	1	3	1	2	3	7	1	2	0	1	0	21
INJURED	108	100	93	109	116	87	101	61	67	44	39	36	961
TOTAL CAS	108	101	96	110	118	90	108	62	69	44	40	36	982
% CMD CAS	.35	.35	.37	.46	.51	.40	.48	.29	.36	.29	.31	.27	.38
71 INCID	7	12	18	4	21								
INC/1000	0.5	1.0	1.8	1.2	2.6								
KILLED	1	0	1	0	1								
INJURED	9	12	16	4	20								
TOTAL CAS	10	12	17	4	21								
% CMD CAS	.08	.10	.17	.12	.26								

(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71

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SAVINGS BOND/SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

On 1 April 1971, the 3d MAB disbursing office commenced operations. In order to better service all units of the 3d MAB, pay records were transferred within the four deputy offices, regardless of where the units were attached. Therefore, comparisons can reasonably be made with the March figures for the 1st Marine Division.

Participation in the Savings Bond Program for the month of April 1971 was 62.5% (8,294 persons out of the 13,270 on board participating) compared to 46.6% (4,522 persons out of the 9,750 on board participating) for the 1st Marine Division during March 1971, an increase from March to April 1971. This figure established a new high for 1971. The previous high was 61.7% established during January 1971. Participation in the Savings Deposit Program for the month of April was 3.1% (411 persons out of 13,270 on board participating) compared with 2.8% (272 persons out of 9,750 on board participating) in March 1971. This increase in participation does not equal February 1971 when the 1st Marine Division had 3.6% participation. It is anticipated that participation will decline during Increment VII as personnel choose to draw cash in preparation for departure.

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
C-1-7

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PARTICIPATION IN SAVINGS BOND AND SAVINGS

DEPOSIT PROGRAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

BOND OR DEPOSIT PROGRAM 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
BOND PROG	18236	17933	17167	17196	16574	16780	16755	16346	16558	21497	22812	20788	18,220
% CMD	72.6	70.7	66.8	67.8	66.0	67.4	70.8	67.3	66.7	76.0	71.5	65.1	69.0
DEP PROG	480	620	517	1290	884	756	857	933	949	1047	1037	1038	867
% CMD	1.9	2.4	2.0	5.1	3.5	3.0	3.5	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.3	3.3	3.3
1970													
BOND PROG	19285	16894	16186	16473	15831	14924	15113	12792	10548	8710	9094	9309	13,910
% CMD	63.0	57.9	61.5	69.5	68.9	66.1	67.5	60.6	55.5	57.3	69.4	71.1	64.7
DEP PROG	970	1062	981	924	887	942	865	701	630	573	642	641	818
% CMD	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.2	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.8	4.9	4.9	3.8
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	
BOND PROG	8203	6930	4552	8294									
% CMD	61.7	55.9	46.6	62.5									
D. PROG	635	443	272	411									
% CMD	4.8	3.6	2.8	3.1									

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G-2 OVERVIEW

The enemy continued in April 1971 to concentrate his efforts against GVN forces and functions. Therefore, his overt presence in the lowlands within the Division/Brigade TAOR continued to decline. However, for the first time since mid-1970, March saw the employment of NVA infantry units in an offensive role, with the enemy presenting himself in force as he commenced his K850 campaign. This high point continued into the first week of April, at which time he commenced his preparation phase for Phase II, K850. During this period the enemy remained in the lowlands without withdrawing to base areas as practiced in his more recent offensive surges. Also significantly, he established a functional supply corridor and resupplied his forces in the field. However, Phase II, K850 did not reach the levels planned due to coordination and logistic problems, resulting in a low level of activity throughout the province. There were only 437 enemy sighted during the month (a slight increase from March's 384), 100 mortar rounds expended and 37 rockets employed within the Division/Brigade AO.

April reflected a continuation of the steady decline in enemy activity evidenced during 1970. The most striking evidence of this decline is reflected in a monthly comparison of enemy sighted/enemy attacks by fire during the past fifteen months. Total enemy sighted dropped from 4,425 (January 1970) to a low of 576 (November) with an increase to 1,331 (December), 1,394 (January 1971), and a slight decrease to 1,146 in February 1971 before a relatively steep drop to 384 in March. The slight reduction during February, followed by a sizable reduction in March, can be attributed to the redeployment of 1st Marine Division units and the enemy's direction of his primary offensive efforts towards GVN forces and functions. Total enemy attacks by fire (rockets, mortar rounds, lob bombs) similarly declined. Six hundred fifty-eight rounds were received in January 1970 alone as compared to a cumulative figure of 335 rounds received during the past four months (1 January through 30 April 71). This is again a result of the enemy's primary concentration on GVN forces and functions. However, the overall reduction in enemy activity can be attributed largely to the attritional losses sustained by units subordinate to Front 4 and to the resultant decision by the enemy to revert to guerrilla warfare techniques in order to conserve his depleted forces.

Overall enemy strength in the province, once estimated as high as 17,200 (Dec 1967), diminished to an estimated 7,556 (April 1971). Infiltration of replacements from North Vietnam has been minimal. The enemy's inability to recruit from the manpower base of indigenous South Vietnamese has resulted in the necessity to assign many NVA personnel to augment traditionally VC Main Force, Local Force, and Guerrilla Units. A further illustration of the enemy's declining combat effectiveness is evidenced by his need to realign his organizational structure. Throughout 1969 and during early 1970, Front 4 commanded four NVA Regiments, but at present it appears that the 38th NVA Regiment is the only active regimental unit in the province. The disbanding of units, reduction of unit strengths, and realignment of operational control resulted in an extensive reorganization of units as well as command and control relationships; the "Wing" concept of decentralized command and control is now apparently defunct. Unless an intense effort is

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made by the enemy to introduce sizable reinforcements into the province during 1971, it is anticipated that his present force levels will continue to deteriorate. Confronted with FWMAF/ARVN preemptive operations, reduced manpower, and supply shortages, enemy forces will be capable of conducting only the harassing activities that have characterized their efforts in recent months, and some limited offensive surges in the southern lowland areas. In the populated lowlands, main efforts will be channeled towards rebuilding the depleted VC military and political structure at the hamlet and village level. NVA forces in the lowlands are expected to withdraw to the base areas. They are, for the most part, expected to be engaged in refitting, reindoctrination and reconsolidation for possibly another offensive surge in the latter part of May.

Until 14 April 1971, 16 reconnaissance teams were maintained by the Division. On that date, the Division stood down, and operational control of the 12 remaining teams passed to the 1st Marine Regiment. Throughout April, an average of eight teams was available for field employment on any given day. This represented a reduction of five teams available in comparison with March's total and a reduction of six teams from the total for February. An average of five teams was deployed each day throughout April, for an average employment of 35.7%. Reconnaissance efforts were primarily directed at preempting the enemy's infiltration of rockets into the forward area of the Division/Brigade. The last deployed reconnaissance team was extracted on 28 April. Company "A", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion is scheduled to standdown on 7 May.

Unattended ground sensors again were employed to monitor enemy activity on positions recently vacated by redeployed Marine units during April 1971. A total of 31 sensors were deactivated, with 34 new sensors employed. This left a total of 120 active Radio Frequency sensors at the end of April.

The continued increase in sensor use each month is a result of two factors. As Marine units redeploy, sensors are used to cover areas infantry units once controlled, and there has been an increase in the understanding and appreciation of sensor capabilities by unit commanders, resulting in additional sensor requests.

The G-2 Air Task is coordinated with the Aviation Reports Section, G-3 and encompasses any anti-air activity directed against 3d MAB aircraft and enemy losses obtained from bomb damage assessments.

In-country, anti-air activity continued at about the same level experienced since January 1971, while out-of-country anti-air incidents sharply decreased following the standdown of VMA-225 on 19 April. There were no aircraft hit out-of-country, and four were hit in-country resulting in one aircraft (OV-10A) destroyed.

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All G-2 operational functions cease on 7 May 1971, as the 196th Brigade, 23d Infantry Division assumes responsibility for all of the former Division/Brigade A0. The Sensor Control and Management Platoon will turn over all its assets to the 196th on 1 May.

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ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Enemy strength in Quang Nam Province during April 1971 showed a total estimated reduction of 90 from 7,646 in March 1971 to 7,556. The total of 7,556 included North Vietnamese Army (NVA), Main Force (MF), and Local Force (LF) units as well as village/hamlet guerrillas. Unless substantial replacements are received from outside the province, enemy strength levels will probably continue to decrease in 1971.

In reviewing total enemy strength in Quang Nam Province over the past two years, two distinct periods of reduction are evident. In 1969, overall strength declined from a high of 16,800 (May) to a level of approximately 11,000 - 13,000 for the remainder of the year and into early 1970. Enemy force levels fluctuated within this range until July 1970, when another steady decline commenced. By April 1971, enemy strength in the province was estimated at 7,556, thereby representing nearly a 50% reduction from the mid-1969 force level.

While it appears that the enemy has the capability to introduce infiltration groups to replace some of these losses, he does not appear inclined at this time to increase infiltration to a level that would reconstitute former force levels. Recruitment of indigenous South Vietnamese does not presently play a significant part in overall manpower procurement, as evidenced by the necessity to utilize NVA personnel in traditionally VC roles. On - hand personnel assets will probably continue to be redistributed as appropriate; more NVA troops will be used to fill the ranks of MF and LF units; NVA, MF, and LF personnel will also be used to rebuild the depleted guerrilla organization within the province.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH, QUANG NAM PROVINCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 EST. STRENGTH 1970 EST. STRENGTH - - - -

1971 EST. STRENGTH



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EST STR	15500	15750	16100	14540	16800	13700	12200	12840	12170	12770	11820	12400	N/A
1970													
EST STR	11200	12430	12300	12900	12020	11700	12500	11300	10900	9475	8655	8560	N/A
1971													
EST STR	8325	7710	7646	7556									

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DEPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Until 14 April 1971, 16 reconnaissance teams were maintained by the Division. On that date, the Division stood down and operational control of the remaining teams was passed to the 1st Marine Regiment. Throughout April, an average of eight teams was available for field employment on any given day. This represents a reduction of five teams available from March's total and a reduction of six teams from February. An average of five teams was deployed each day throughout April for an average employment of 35.7%. Reconnaissance efforts were primarily directed at preempting the enemy's infiltration of rockets into the forward area of the Division/Brigade TAOR.

Division assets prior to September 1970 included the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. During this period, deployed teams included those providing security for four Division observation posts. A major reorganization of the Division reconnaissance effort was effected in September 1970 as a result of the redeployment in Increment IV of two companies of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (less one platoon detachment). Division Reconnaissance Battalion was relieved of the security responsibility for three of the four Division observation posts and given the objective of maintaining a minimum of 24 operational teams, with the capability to deploy and support 12 of these teams at any given time. This figure remained constant until 24 March, when Increment VI redeployment decreased the number of teams to 16 and the Force Reconnaissance detachment terminated operations. Deployed teams are now defined as only those operating in the field on assigned reconnaissance missions.


As of 28 April, there were no reconnaissance teams deployed, the last two having been extracted on that date from Dong Dien. Company "A", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion is scheduled to standdown on 7 May.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

DEPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

% DEPLOYED ON RECON MISSIONS 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 = = = =
 % DEPLOYED ON ALL MISSIONS (JUL 1969 - OCT 1970)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TMS AVAIL							49	48	50	46	45	38	
ALL MSNS							27	27	27	27	24	19	*
% DEPL							55.1	56.3	54.0	58.7	53.3	50.0	*
RCN MSNS							19	19	19	19	16	11	**
% RECON							38.8	39.6	38.0	41.3	35.5	28.9	**
1970													
TMS AVAIL	38	50	57	54	56	54	48	42	28	24	24	24	
ALL MSNS	22	25	29	31	31	28	27	26	12	8	11	10	*
% DEPL	57.9	50.0	50.9	57.4	55.4	51.8	56.2	62.0	42.9	33.3	45.8	41.6	*
RCN MSNS	14	17	21	23	23	20	19	18	10	8	11	10	**
% RECON	36.8	34.0	36.9	42.6	41.0	37.0	39.6	42.8	35.7	33.3	45.8	41.6	**
1971													
TMS AVAIL	24	24	22	14									
ALL MSNS	8	9	8	5									*
% DEPL	33.3	37.5	36.4	35.7									*
RCN MSNS	8	9	8	5									**
% RECON	33.3	37.5	36.4	35.7									**

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SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During April 1971, there were five air delivered strings and one hand implantable string available for utilization. As friendly units redeployed, there were fewer units available to provide security for hand implant teams, and emphasis was placed on air implants. Adsid III strings were implanted from a UH-1 helicopter in Mortar Valley and Charlie Ridge. A hand implant was made on Fire Support Base Dagger for target acquisition and detection of enemy use of this position. This field consisted of an acoustic sensor (Minisid III with an audio add-on unit) and an Arfbouy III with 500 noiseless button bomb-lets. There was also a hand implant east of Hill 190. This string consisted of four Microsids, one Magid T-4, and one audio add-on unit. A total of 31 sensors were deactivated, with 34 new sensors employed. This left a total of 120 active Radio Frequency sensors at the end of April. As Marine units re-deploy, sensors are used to cover areas which infantry units once controlled. There has been an increase in the understanding and appreciation of sensor capabilities by unit commanders resulting in additional sensor requests.


Major changes in emphasis on employment of sensors within the Division occurred in 1970. Sensor utilization, which had increased steadily during 1969 and the first half of 1970, decreased significantly thereafter, commencing in July with the deactivation of the DAISS (Danang Anti-Infiltration Surveillance system). Due to the "barrier" nature of these line sensors, the enemy has been more apt to traverse the string than to follow its axis. Therefore, although fewer activations resulted from this arrangement, any such activations were considered intrusions and were targeted (see Tab 2-4). However, since a pattern or rate of movement was difficult to ascertain, there was a greater chance of firing on nontargetable activations. Air emplaced sensors were also frequently used during this period of time, being delivered into rear base areas and logistic routes used by the enemy forces. Neither means afforded adequate opportunity for bomb damage assessment, because the line sensors were not adequately observed and the air delivered sensors were remotely located. Consequently, as can be seen in (Tab 2-4), bomb damage assessment was low despite the number of activations and subsequent fire missions.

Sensor utilization increased with Increment V, VI and VII redeployments. Air delivery was used more in April than in January because of the lack of friendly units to provide security for ground implant teams. As the enemy's spring offensive continued, more sensors were requested by ground units to meet the enemy threat. Air delivery of sensors became SCAMP's primary means of implant during April 1971. With increased coordination, the same pilot was utilized for all implants. The team of SCAMP personnel and pilot experienced in sensor air delivery produced a high degree of accuracy in emplacement.

On 1 May, all SCAMP assets will be transferred to the control of the 196th Infantry Brigade. On 7 May, SCAMP will be transferred to the control of its parent unit (Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division) and will be redeployed to Camp Pendleton.

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 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) SENSORS EMPLOYED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 SENSORS													
RF	46	63	14	26	26	40	61	61	112	87	51	41	
LINE	14	14	49	80	106	106	132	132	159	165	165	188	
TOTAL	60	77	63	106	132	146	193	193	271	252	216	229	
70 SENSORS													
RF	67	74	95	139	230	238	247	211	125	107	76	82	
LINE	183	200	187	189	191	141	115	7	7	5	0	0	
TOTAL	250	274	283	328	421	379	362	218	132	112	76	82	
71 SENSORS													
RF	99	117	117	120									
LINE	0	0	0	0									
TOTAL	99	117	117	120									

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TARGETABLE SENSOR ACTIVATIONS, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

During April 1971, there was a total of 17 targetable activations resulting in three fire missions. These totals compare with 41 targets detected in March and two fire missions utilized, a decrease in April of 24 targets with an increase in fire missions by one. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) for April was 14 KIA probable. An aerial observer was utilized on one occasion.

When the Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) was organized in early 1970, sensor equipment was used primarily for target acquisition. The practice of firing on all sensor activations resulted in compromise of the locations of sensor strings, and, by avoiding sensor seeded areas, the enemy neutralized the effectiveness of this equipment. However, as the year progressed and experience was gained in sensor utilization, emphasis was shifted from target acquisition to collecting information on enemy movements.

As Marine units redeployed, the role of sensors as a source of intelligence and target acquisition increased. The first trend was the use of sensors in the "stay behind" role. As units left fire bases and observation posts, sensors were implanted to detect the enemy returning to the former positions. These sensor fields were primarily used for target acquisition. Redeployment also left fewer infantry units available to provide security for hand implants. SCAMP used air delivery as its primary means of implanting sensors. Close coordination with pilots enabled accurate delivery of sensors by UH-1E aircraft.

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PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Precipitation in Quang Nam Province for the month of April 1971 totalled .05 inches, a decrease of 1.40 inches from the previous month. Seasonal precipitation in Quang Nam Province is associated with the Northeast Monsoon which prevails from September through January. The rainy season drew to a close in January with a 0.85 inches, followed by 0.53 inches in February, 1.45 inches in March and .05 inches in April, totalling 2.88 inches for the four months, a significant decrease from the comparable period in 1969 (6.25 inches) and 1970 (7.18 inches).

Monthly rainfall totals during 1969 varied sharply from the mean only during the peak accumulation in October when 39.97 inches of rain were recorded. Monthly rainfall during 1970 corresponded closely to mean monthly totals. Cumulative precipitation for the year was approximately five inches below the norm.

During the monsoon season, frequent occurrences of rain, fog and low visibility allow the enemy an opportunity to move with a greater degree of freedom from friendly air and ground observation. Conversely, wet weather has a detrimental effect on enemy movement due to swollen streams and inundated lowlands. Deterioration of food, ordnance, and other supply caches during the 1970 monsoon season contributed significantly to the difficulties encountered by enemy forces in the province. The enemy has increased and may be expected to continue to increase his logistic activities in an endeavor to recoup the losses to his supply base.


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), PRECIPITATION, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PRECIPITATION IN INCHES: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 ———
 27 YEAR MONTHLY MEAN (INCHES): ▽ (MEAN LOCATED AT LOWER VERTEX)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INCHES	5.52	0.04	0.12	0.57	2.32	2.98	6.04	TRACE	12.80	39.97	10.09	3.97	84.42
1970													
INCHES	3.82	0.88	0.03	2.45	1.92	4.74	1.13	4.70	12.92	24.61	10.27	11.23	78.70
1971													
INCHES	0.85	0.53	1.45	0.05									
27 YEAR MONTHLY MEAN													
INCHES	4.2	1.8	0.9	1.3	2.6	2.8	2.8	4.7	15.7	23.3	15.1	8.7	83.9

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ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE DIVISION/BRIGADE TAOR, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The general trend of enemy activity continued to remain at a low level in April 1971, although limited increases in certain indicators were observed. The number of enemy sighted during the month increased slightly to 437 from the 384 sighted during the previous month. The monthly average for 1970 was 2,568 (See Tab 2-6b). The enemy fired 100 mortar rounds and 37 rockets within the Division/Brigade TAOR during the month. The increase in rockets and mortar rounds received can be attributed to the high points in activity associated with Phases I and II of the K850 campaign. Decreases over the long run can be attributed to the enemy's forced reversion to the guerrilla warfare tactics which were prevalent prior to the large scale commitment of North Vietnamese Army Forces in 1965. The enemy continued in April 1971 to concentrate his efforts against GVN forces and functions. Therefore, his overt presence in the lowlands within the Division/Brigade TAOR continued to decline significantly. For the first time since September - October 1970, March saw the employment of NVA infantry units, with the 38th Regiment being active against GVN forces in Duc Duc District. Also significant is the fact that the K850 campaign, when compared to the enemy's more recent offensive surges, has been unique in several respects:

- a. The enemy has remained in the lowlands for an extended period, without withdrawing to base areas between offensive phases.
- b. He has established a functional supply corridor and is resupplying his forces in the field.
- c. He is employing a major command echelon in the lowlands, co-located with the deployed units.
- d. He has conducted repeated attacks against the same targets, and has conducted daytime ground assaults.

Phase II of K850 began on the night of 25-26 April, with a period of continuous activity scheduled to follow for about five to seven days. This period was to consist of scattered harassing mortar attacks with limited ground and sapper attacks, and the employment of rockets against the Danang vital area, Hoi An, An Hoa, Hill 55 and surrounding areas. The enemy's offensive surge did not reach the levels planned due to coordination and logistic problems, resulting in a low level of activity throughout the province.

The number of enemy sighted steadily dropped throughout 1970, as illustrated by comparison of the high of 4,425 enemy observed in January to the 2,785 sighted during the entire last quarter of the year (October, November, December). This reflects the enemy's overall strength decline in the province (See Tab 2-1) and also reveals his reluctance to jeopardize his remaining forces. Sightings remained relatively constant during January and February, followed by a significant decrease in March. This could be attributed to the redeployment of 1st Marine Division units and the preparation periods spent by the enemy preceding his high points of activity. Sightings in Quang Nam Province are almost certain to increase, but are not expected to reach the levels observed in 1969 or early 1970 (See Tab 2-6b).

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Enemy efficiency in the employment of mortars has deteriorated, as evidenced by the inaccurate fire reported by units in the 1st Marine Division TAOR during recent months. His mortars have been used primarily as a harassing weapon, since the enemy has not elected to commit sizeable forces in an offensive role.

As is true of rocket attacks, mortar attacks are timed to coincide with general offensive surges. The monthly average of mortar rounds received during 1970 was 85 rounds per month. The current average for 1971 is 58 rounds per month. This is in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity and the direction of his efforts against GVN forces and functions.

The use of lob bombs is almost entirely for the purpose of harassment. The round, composed of a crudely fuzed artillery round or aerial bomb lofted in the general direction of a target with a charge of explosive, may travel as far as 600 meters. It is a grossly inaccurate system and the round is often a dud (See Tab 2-6a).

In order for him to implement his strategy of guerrilla warfare, the enemy has continued to employ rockets against area targets, a tactic which serves as an excellent psychological weapon. Since he has neither the logistical system nor the combat capability to employ rockets as a medium of close combat support, the enemy has used rockets to intimidate the civilian population and, to a lesser degree, FWMAF. The pattern of rocket attacks conforms closely to surges and ebbs of the enemy's campaigns. (During the month of January, the months of April and May, and the period August through October 1970, the enemy attempted to increase his offensive activity. Consequently, of the 228 rockets launched during 1970, 185 were fired during these three periods). In April 1971, the enemy launched 37 rockets. There is no evidence that the effectiveness of enemy rocket units will improve in 1971 (See Tab 2-6a).

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ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, AND LOB BOMBS RECEIVED, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

The employment of rockets, mortars and lob bombs by the enemy increased somewhat in April 1971 compared to the relatively low levels experienced during the preceding five months. One hundred mortar rounds were fired in stand-off attacks on friendly positions (an increase of 79 over the previous month), thirty-seven rockets were fired (36 were fired in March 1971), and no lob bombs were employed (5 were employed the previous month) during April. The increase in number of enemy rockets expended and mortar rounds received can be laid to the high points in activity in connection with Phases I and II of K850, which were directed almost entirely against GVN forces and functions, with the exception of the employment of rockets against the Danang vital area.

Enemy employment of rockets during 1970 varied from a high during April, when 58 were expended, to two months (March and July) in which no rockets were fired in Quang Nam Province. Rocket attacks have been directed primarily against Danang and its environs, and while they frequently are planned for periods of low lunar illumination, the enemy's ability to launch such attacks is largely governed by his ability to avoid FWMAF/ARVN detection while attempting to establish launch sites. Preemptive small unit operations in the "Danang Rocket Belt" have contributed significantly toward denying the enemy sufficient opportunity to prepare multiple firing positions within range of lucrative targets. Rockets have also been employed recently against targets in the lowlands in Dai Loc, Duc Duc, and Dien Ban District. By virtue of occupying dominant terrain, the enemy has a higher degree of selectivity in choosing firing sites within this area. However, the inherent inaccuracy of this weapon renders it relatively ineffective when fired in small quantities.

When afforded the opportunity, the enemy will continue to fire rockets in small numbers, and employment in 1971 will probably continue to reflect a low level of intensity similar to that observed in 1970. Tab 2-6 also discusses enemy rocket employment.

Enemy employment of mortars during 1970 commenced with a high of 621 rounds, expended in January 1970, followed by a steady decline that resulted in a mere 25 and 41 rounds fired during November and December, of that year respectively. From January through December the average monthly expenditure was some 85 rounds per month. This was in consonance with the evidence of declining enemy activity throughout the province. Friendly small unit operations have denied the enemy opportunity to conduct sustained barrages without detection, consequently the mortar team must resort to short-duration employment and resultant ineffectiveness. Although local shortages of mortar rounds are apparent in some instances, this situation usually results from logistic interdiction by FWMAF/ARVN Forces

(continued on preceding page)

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and does not necessarily reflect a province-wide ordnance shortage. Mortar tubes, while sufficient in quantity, are considered too valuable to risk capture and therefore are employed sparingly. In the foreseeable future, the enemy can be expected to employ his mortars in a cautious fashion, choosing to jeopardize neither men nor weapons for the sake of limited results. Mortar rounds will continue to be, by far, the most popular medium of enemy firepower, but these mortar attacks are primarily harassing in nature and are rarely followed by infantry or sapper exploitation. Additional comments on enemy mortar employment are contained in Tab 2-6.

Employment of lob bombs during the past fifteen months has varied from a high during June 1970, when 27 were expended, to five months (February, April, December 1970, January and April 1971) in which no lob bombs were employed in Quang Nam Province. As portrayed by the graph, the only pattern in evidence is a usage that appears to vary in inverse proportion to the expenditure of rockets and mortar rounds, thereby superficially indicating a "gap filler" weapon encountered during periods when conventional stand-off attacks by fire have declined. Despite such a pattern, there is no amplifying evidence to support this trend, and it is generally concluded that lob bombs are employed in random fashion by guerrilla forces. Although this crude weapon lends little to the enemy's supporting arms capability, it will probably continue to be employed infrequently by guerrillas as a harassing technique. Tab 2-6 also addresses lob bomb employment.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVIS (REIN), ROCKETS, MORTAR ROUNDS, LOB BOMBS RECEIVED

DURING ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

ROUNDS RECEIVED: 1970 ————— 1971 - - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970													
MORT RDS	621	283	172	260	267	285	58	119	125	145	25	41	2,401
ROCKETS	23	9	0	58	36	20	0	25	25	18	7	7	228
LOB BOMBS	14	0	11	0	11	27	24	10	5	1	2	0	105
1971													
MORT RDS	46	69	17	100									
ROCKETS	0	21	36	37									
LOB BOMBS	0	4	5	0									

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ENEMY SIGHTED VS ENEMY KIA /ATTACKS BY FIRE, CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

Four hundred thirty-seven enemy were sighted in the Division/Brigade AO during April 1971, representing a slight increase over March's 384. This increase is commensurate with similar increases in the number of enemy killed in action by Division/Brigade troops during the month (71) and in the number of rockets, mortar rounds and lob bombs fired by the enemy at friendly positions (137, including 100 mortar rounds and 37 rockets).

As the monsoon season faded out in January 1971, sightings increased slightly (from 1,331 in December 1970 to 1,394), but immediately decreased somewhat in February (to 1,164), followed by a significant sharp decrease in March (to only 384) which seems to have carried over into April. A number of factors have contributed to this reduction in sightings. Among these are the retrograding of the Division's (and the Brigade's) integrated observations devices and the steady closing of most of the observation posts, which has reduced the means through which many of the enemy's troops have been sighted. Significant, too, is the gradual takeover of the Division/Brigade AO by the 196th Infantry Brigade, which has steadily reduced the area in which the enemy could be sighted by Division/Brigade units.

Each of the indicators considered herein (sightings, ordnance expenditures, and KIA) should be even lower in May than they were in April. The Brigade terminates all combat operations on 7 May and all G-2 functions will transfer to the 196th Brigade on that date. Therefore, May totals for the Brigade should include only those numbers accrued during the first seven days of the month.


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 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ENEMY SIGHTED/ENEMY KIA/ENEMY ORDNANCE

CALENDAR YEARS 1970/1971

1970 ENEMY SIGHTED ——— ENEMY KIA - - - - ENEMY ORDNANCE ———
 1971 ENEMY SIGHTED - - - - ENEMY KIA = = = = ENEMY ORDNANCE - - - -



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1970													
EN SGTD	4425	4423	3735	3790	3651	2390	2291	1955	1374	878	576	1331	30,819
EN ORDN	658	292	183	318	314	332	82	154	155	164	34	48	2,734
EN KIA	1022	723	473	615	604	511	414	283	150	154	115	162	5,225
1971													
EN SGTD	1394	1164	384	437									
EN ORDN	46	94	58	137									
EN KIA	211	139	98	71									

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G-2 AIR, 3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE, 14-30 APRIL 1971

Due to the limited scope of operations involving 3d MAB air assets and the control exercised by 7th Air Force, air intelligence functions within the Brigade consisted primarily of recording, evaluating, and reporting items of air intelligence interest to 7th Air Force, MAG-11, and MAG-16. This task was coordinated with the Aviation Reports Section, G-3 and encompassed any anti-air activity directed against 3d MAB aircraft and enemy losses obtained from bomb damage assessments.

In-country, anti-air activity continued at about the same level experienced since January 1971, with 40 AA incidents being reported during the period 14-30 April. Four aircraft sustained hits, and one aircraft (OV-10A) was destroyed with the loss of the pilot and the observer. Out-of-country, the level of AA incidents dramatically decreased following the standdown of VMA-225 on 19 April. Nine incidents were reported by this squadron between 14-19 April, with only five other incidents being reported for the entire period. No aircraft were hit out-of-country.

An electronic lock-up was received by an A6A while on a COMMANDO BOLT mission about 80 NM WNW of DANANG on 16 April. An evaluation of the electronic indications reported by the flight crew resulted in the incident being assessed as a probable friendly F-4 air intercept attempt. On 18 April, a significant lock-up was experienced by an A6A on a COMMANDO BOLT mission about 15 NM south of MU GIA Pass. An evaluation of the electronic indications resulted in an assessment that this was a probable SAM-associated, FAN SONG radar acquisition. This information, correlated with all-source data, enabled 7th Air Force to confirm the presence of a field-deployed SA-2 SAM site about 6 NM east of MU GIA Pass.

Enemy losses as a result of 3d MAB bomb damage assessments for the period 14-30 April 71 are listed below:

In-country: 24 KBMA, 5 trucks destroyed, 2x51 Cal. AAMG's destroyed, 1x60mm mortar destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 53 bunkers destroyed, 10 bunkers damaged, 4 secondary POL fires, 26 secondary fires, 57 secondary explosions, 15 road cuts, 14 road slides, and 2 ford cuts.

Out-of-country: 19 trucks destroyed, 4 trucks damaged, 1 bulldozer damaged, 26 secondary explosions, 22 secondary fires, 42 road cuts, 20 road slides, 1 ford cut, 4 structures destroyed, and 1 secondary POL fire.

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G-3 OVERVIEW

Enemy activity throughout the month of April continued to be characterized by standoff attacks by fire on the Da Nang Vital Area and environs. Division activities consisted largely of repositioning units to the north of Song Vu Gia prior to turning over the 5th Marines AO to the 196th Brigade, 23d Infantry Division, USA. The turnover on 13 April reduced the remaining AO to approximately half its original size. Successive transfers of area responsibility to the 196th Brigade, 1st Task Force and Quang Nam Province units by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade which became operational on 14 April in trace of the departing 1st Marine Division Headquarters reduced the 3d MAB AO to an area approximately following the trace of Hoa Vang District comprising the Da Nang environs by the end of April. 30 April also found the MAB operating with two maneuver battalions with 1/1 standing down on 15 April (3/1 scheduled to stand down on 1 May).

Changes in indicators and statistics continued to reinforce established trends in nearly all areas during April. With the exception of enemy KIA which nearly doubled those experienced in March (to 71 from March's 38), all other statistics remained nearly identical to those recorded during March. The continuation in trends depressed monthly 1971 averages for the Division to 8 friendly KIA and 106 friendly WIA and 126 enemy KIA, 50 individual and three crew-served weapons captured from the enemy. These averages compare to 34 Division KIA, 302 WIA, 434 enemy KIA, 107 individual weapons and nine crew-served weapons lost per month in 1970. From 14 April the Brigade suffered two KIA and 46 WIA while killing 22 of the enemy and capturing ten of his individual weapons. The 48 Brigade casualties may seem excessive when compared to the Division's 25, but the Division had an average strength of slightly over 7,000 from 1 April to 14 April, while the Brigade averaged over 13,000 personnel and casualty rates compute to about 3.5 casualties per 1,000 personnel for both commands.

Mines and booby traps continued to take their toll in April. Twenty-seven men were wounded by such devices in April (eight from the Division, 19 from the Brigade), exceeding slightly March's total of 25. The sum of such casualties for both March and April is less, however, than any single month total in the preceding twenty-six months. Twenty-seven casualties from the detonation of 13 surprise firing devices produced a casualty per detonation ratio of 2.1 (the Division, 1.6, the Brigade, 2.4), while the percentage of casualties caused by SFDs rose to 36.9% in April (the Division 32.0%, the Brigade 39.6%). The Division's personnel found 27 mines or booby traps during the first part of April while detonating only five, producing a high find to detonation ratio of 5.40:1 and thereby raising the annual ratio to 2.80:1. For the Brigade, twelve devices were found and eight detonated for a ratio of 1.50:1. These figures combined for the whole month of April yield 39 finds, 13 detonations and a ratio of 3.00:1, the same experienced in March.

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The remaining four CUPP teams were phased out on 15 April, ending the successful 18 month operation of the Combined Unit Pacification program. There were no contacts during the month; therefore, the casualties, prisoners and Hoi Chanhs fell to zero.

Supporting arms and helicopter support indicators continued to fall in April as the Division departed and the Brigade gradually reduced operations. Slightly over 8,400 artillery rounds were expended in April (the Division, 4,600, the Brigade, 3,800) from an average of 28 pieces, naval gunfire expenditures continued at zero, and fixed wing sorties fell to 124 from the 225 flown in March. Helicopter statistics again fell sharply, 2,598 hours of operation accounting for slightly over 9,900 passengers carried and 600 tons of cargo hauled, all great reductions from the already diminished numbers recorded in March.

Since all ground operations cease on 7 May, all numbers included in this section should fall toward zero for the month of May.

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FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

In April, two Marines were killed and 71 wounded in action compared to five killed and 78 wounded in March 1971, a decrease of 12%. April 1971 casualty statistics represent a decrease of 41% from the monthly average for the first three months of 1971. In addition, April 1971 casualty statistics represent decreases of 64% from the monthly average for the last half of 1970 and 84% from the first half of 1970. This gives an indication of the progressive nature of the reduction in casualties overall. However, mines and booby traps have claimed 42% of the total casualties during the first four months of 1971 (see section 3-2) as they did (without much variation) throughout 1970.

At present, it is difficult to predict the nature and frequency of future casualties. Losses could reasonably be expected to virtually terminate subsequent to the end of combat operations on 7 May, but the intensity of enemy activity is a variable which, of course, must be considered. If he were to increase his activity against base areas significantly, it is quite possible that significant friendly casualties could occur.

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

April 1971 saw two Brigade personnel killed in action, a decrease of three from the five Division personnel killed in March 1971, continuing to demonstrate that the trend of a decreasing number of friendly deaths established over the past two years remains valid. During 1970, an average of 34 Marines were killed per month, while the average for 1969 was 88 per month, both numbers significantly greater than the average thus far in 1971 (7.7 per month).

The two Marines killed in April died as a result of an OV-10 crash resulting from enemy fire compared to the five Division Marines who were killed in March (including one killed by a booby trap). There were no CUPP Marines killed during April (See Tab 3-4). This fact continued the trend established over the previous seven months, during which time period not more than one CUPP member was killed in any one month.

As discussed in Tab 3-2, casualties should plunge even further below the present low rates (especially considering that all ground combat operations cease on 7 May), but allowances must be made for the enemy's unpredictability.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC/USN KILLED IN ACTION,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE KIA 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
KIA	94	139	103	88	147	106	63	129	47	38	55	42	1,051
% CMD CAS	.36	.55	.40	.35	.59	.43	.25	.55	.19	.13	.17	.13	.33
1970													
KIA	53	61	50	44	24	51	19	33	20	18	19	11	403
% CMD CAS	.17	.21	.19	.19	.10	.23	.08	.16	.11	.12	.15	.08	.16
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
KIA	15	9	5	0	2								
% D CAS	.11	.07	.05	.00	.02								

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CUMULATIVE FRIENDLY WOUNDED IN ACTION CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In April 1971, 71 Division/Brigade (25 Division, 46 Brigade) personnel were wounded in action, a decrease of 7 from the 78 who were wounded in March 1971. As was the case with KIA's, this casualty rate was a decrease from the monthly average for the past 6 months (116) and for the 1970 (302) overall, which in turn, was a significant decline from the monthly average for 1969 (774). Therefore, the downward trend in battle casualties held true for the 1st Marine Division and continues to be valid for the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Approximately 37% of those men wounded in April 1971 became casualties as a result of surprise firing devices (SFD)(See Tab 3-2), while in March 30% of those wounded were the result of SFD. There were no CUPP members wounded in action during the month, compared to six the previous month.

Although casualties (both killed and wounded) depend largely on enemy activity and this is not completely predictable, casualties should virtually terminate with the cessation of combat operations by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade on 7 May.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE USMC/USN WOUNDED IN ACTION,

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE WIA 1969 ----- 1970 ----- 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	
1969														
WIA	763	894	963	842	1199	893	603	1204	809	309	395	412	9,286	
% CMD CAS	3.04	3.52	3.74	3.32	4.77	3.58	2.43	4.95	3.26	1.09	1.24	1.29	2.92	
1970														
WIA		505	440	446	404	392	350	267	274	192	129	101	125	3,625
% CMD CAS		1.65	1.51	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.55	1.19	1.30	1.01	.85	.77	.95	1.40
1971														
WIA				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)			
% D CAS				1.02	1.03	.80	.75	.57						

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MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

Mines and booby traps continue to claim a significant, although slightly decreasing proportion of friendly casualties. During April 1971, the Division suffered eight men wounded by SFD, while the Brigade suffered nineteen such casualties. Although these figures, on the surface, seem to indicate that the Brigade incurred SFD casualties at a rate much higher than that of the Division, it must be said that the Brigade included 2d Combined Action Group, which operated in the most heavily booby-trapped sectors of the Brigade AO. This fact almost certainly had a great impact on the number of surprise firing device casualties suffered by the Brigade.

The Division/Brigade suffered a total of 27 casualties from SFD during April from the detonation of 13 such devices (the Division, five, the Brigade, eight), yielding a casualty per detonation ratio of 2.1 (the Division, 1.6, the Brigade, 2.4). The 39 finds (27 for the Division, 12 for the Brigade) combined with the 13 detonations produced a find to detonation ratio of 3.00:1 (5.40:1 for the Division, raising the Division's annual ratio to 2.80:1, thus exceeding by far 1970's 1.96:1 and 1969's 1.83:1, and 1.50:1 for the Brigade) and thereby raised the combined Division/Brigade annual ratio to 2.70:1.

Mine and booby trap casualties accounted for 36.9% of the 73 casualties suffered by the Division/Brigade during April. This relatively low percentage served to further reduce the annual percentage to 40.2%, compared to 46.4% for 1970.

With the standdown of the remaining infantry battalions and the 2d CAG in early May (all ground combat operations will cease on 7 May), SFD casualties (and, therefore, the percentage of total casualties) should plunge toward zero. The more tangible components of the Division/Brigade's successful counter-SFD program, such as the Mine/Booby Trap Contact Team and the resident Mine Warfare School, will be transferred to the control of the 196th Brigade before combat operations for the Brigade end. However, command attention should still be applied to counter any last minute terror activities by the enemy.

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CASUALTIES FROM MINES/BOOBY TRAPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During April, the Division suffered eight casualties from surprise firing devices and the Brigade suffered 19, the total for April of 27 being the second lowest recorded in the past 28 months. However, the Brigade's figure included casualties suffered by 2d Combined Action Group, which has been operating in the most heavily booby trapped areas of the Division/Brigade AO and whose casualties have not been included in Division totals.

The slight increase in casualties notwithstanding, April produced the lowest number of detonations recorded for any month in the last twenty-eight. April's detonations yielded 2.1 casualties per detonation (the Division recording five detonations and eight casualties for a ratio of 1.6 to 1 and the Brigade, eight detonations and 19 casualties for 2.4 to 1), an increase from the monthly average of 1.8 to 1 for the first three months of 1971. However, the present yearly average (1.9 to 1) equals that of 1970.

The general reduction in activity presently being experienced and the cessation of all ground combat operations by the Brigade on 7 May should serve to reduce surprise firing device casualties to almost zero, if not zero, for May.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES BY MINES/BOOBY TRAPS

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE MINE/BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
KIA	9	4	9	11	22	17	13	17	15	14	16	19	166
WIA	108	46	74	211	202	242	191	236	174	114	133	227	1,958
TOTAL CAS	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
% CMD CAS	.47	.20	.32	.88	.89	1.04	.82	1.04	.76	.45	.47	.77	.67
CAS/DET	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	1.7	2.0	1.6
1970													
KIA	18	31	28	18	9	23	11	17	12	6	3	8	184
WIA	249	205	197	172	137	175	167	130	107	48	52	45	1,684
TOTAL CAS	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
% CMD CAS	.87	.81	.86	.80	.63	.88	.79	.70	.63	.36	.42	.40	.72
CAS/DET	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	
KIA	4	3	1	0	0								
W	68	60	24	8	19								
TOTAL CAS	72	63	25	8	19								
% CMD CAS	.54	.51	.26	.24	.23								
CAS/DET	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.6	2.4								

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PERCENTAGE OF MINE/BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES TO TOTAL CASUALTIES
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The 1st Marine Division suffered eight casualties from mines or booby traps from 1 - 14 April, while the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade suffered 19 casualties from such devices (Many of the Marines thus wounded being members of 2d CAG) from 15 - 30 April. The 27 personnel wounded by SFD thus represented 36.9% of the casualties suffered by the Division or the Brigade during April and served to further depress the annual percentage to 40.2%. This percentage compares to the 46.4% recorded in 1970.

Although the percentage of casualties caused by surprise firing devices varied little from 45% during 1970 and continued at this level during the first two months of 1970, both March and April produced percentages below 40%. Operations during the first week in May will be further reduced from the relatively low levels of April, since the remaining two infantry battalions of the 1st Marines and 2d CAG stand down during this period, all ground combat operations ceasing on 7 May. Therefore, casualties should be close to zero for May, and casualties from SFD could range from zero to 100% of the total. Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible to predict such a percentage for May.

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
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 1ST MARINE DIVIS (REIN), MINE AND BOOBY TRAP CASUALTIES EXPRESSED AS

A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE OF TOT CAS: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
TOT CAS	857	1033	1066	930	1346	999	666	1333	856	347	450	454	10,337
M/RT CAS	117	50	83	222	224	259	204	253	189	128	149	246	2,124
% M/RT	13.7	4.8	7.8	23.9	16.7	25.9	30.6	19.0	22.2	36.9	33.2	54.2	20.6
1970													
TOT CAS	558	501	496	448	416	401	285	307	212	147	120	136	4,028
M/RT CAS	267	236	225	190	146	198	178	147	119	54	55	53	1,868
% M/RT	47.6	47.1	45.4	42.4	35.1	49.4	62.2	47.9	56.1	36.8	45.8	39.0	46.4
1971													
TOT CAS	151	137	83	25	48								
M/RT CAS	72	63	25	8	19								
% M/RT	47.6	46.0	30.1	32.0	39.6								43.0

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COMPARISON OF MINES/BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TO THOSE DETONATED
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During April 1971, the number of surprise firing devices found and destroyed decreased from March's 48 to 39 (Division troops found 27, Brigade troops, 12), but the number of such devices detonated with resulting casualties decreased proportionately from 16 to 13 (five detonated by Division personnel, eight by Brigade Marines). Therefore, April's find to detonation ratio equalled March's 3.00:1 and served to increase the 1971 annual average to 2.70:1. The Division's April ratio of 5.40:1 was the highest recorded in 28 months and produced a 1971 annual ratio for the Division of 2.80:1, which far exceeded 1970's 1.96:1 and 1969's 1.83:1.

The continuing improvement above was a result of the successful Division counter-SFD program, including a week-long Mine Warfare School, a far-ranging contact team instructing individual Marines on the techniques of detection and avoidance of SFD, and the extensive use of mine detection dogs. The Brigade continued this program in April, but the contact team will terminate operations and the Mine Warfare School will be turned over to the control of the 196th Infantry Brigade in early May, thus marking the end of the program. However, combat operations for the Brigade will also cease during the first week in May, and both finds and detonations should be close to zero for the month.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), RATIO OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS FOUND TO

MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS DETONATED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

RATIO FOUND/DETONATED: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
FOUND	66	90	114	141	218	277	196	199	272	242	254	274	2,343
DETONATED	73	29	49	166	125	142	147	161	116	63	88	121	1,290
RATIO F/D	0.82	3.10	2.33	0.85	1.74	1.95	1.33	1.24	1.64	3.84	2.88	2.26	1.83
1970													
FOUND	294	284	170	153	162	170	119	144	120	76	103	112	1,907
DETONATED	135	119	117	89	103	100	98	77	51	27	29	28	973
RATIO F/D	2.18	2.38	1.45	1.56	1.57	1.70	1.21	1.87	2.35	2.82	3.55	4.00	1.96
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
FOUND	116	74	48	27	12								
DETONATED	37	33	16	5	8								
RATIO F/D	3.14	2.24	3.00	5.40	1.50								

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ENEMY LOSSES

In April 1971, Division and Brigade Marines killed 71 enemy and captured 24 of his individual weapons. April produced an increase of 87% in enemy KIA and an increase of 26% in individual weapons captured. However, both March and April represent a significant decrease by comparison to January and February and represent absolute lows in their respective categories over the past 28 months. In addition, April is the first month recorded since the beginning of 1969 during which time no crew-served weapons were captured.

In spite of the steady reduction of Division and Brigade unit activity in conjunction with standdown operations, including the disestablishment of all Combined Unit Pacification Program Units, enemy losses rose and friendly casualties remained virtually identical to those sustained during March. While April witnessed slightly more friendly casualties sustained than enemy deaths recorded, the relative loss ratio rose significantly by comparison to March. Considering present levels of both friendly and enemy activity, the ratio for May is difficult to predict, but all indicators in this area should be close to zero, especially since all combat operations cease on 7 May.

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The enemy lost 71 men killed in action during April 1971 (the Division killed 49, the Brigade, 22) compared to a total of 38 killed during March, an increase of 87%. Over the same period, friendly KIA decreased from five to two, a decrease of 60%. In terms of a "Kill Ratio", the figures convert to just over 35 enemy to each friendly KIA for April as compared to 7 to one for March. Considering the reduction in combat units available to the Division and Brigade, the ratio is indeed favorable.

Since all ground combat operations for the Brigade will cease on 7 May, it is extremely difficult to predict the number of enemy KIA for May, but it will probably be in the vicinity of zero.

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
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 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE ENEMY KILLED ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

ENEMY KIA: 1969 ————— 1970 - - - - - 1971 = = = = =

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969 EN KIA	802	1010	801	1010	974	723	394	810	507	503	1098	1011	9,643
1970 EN KIA	1022	723	472	615	604	511	414	283	150	154	115	162	5,225
1971 EN KIA	211	139	38	49	22	(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)				

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CUMULATIVE ENEMY INDIVIDUAL/CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In April 1971, the enemy lost 24 individual and no crew-served weapons compared to the 19 individual and 2 crew-served weapons captured in March, further reducing the monthly averages to 44 and three, respectively.

The enemy lost an average of 107 individual and 9 crew-served weapons monthly through 1970, compared to monthly averages of 190 and 20 in 1969, representing decreases of 44% and 56%, respectively. When these figures are compared to the reduction in enemy KIA of 36% (See Tab 3-3a), it is apparent that the enemy was more successful at conserving crew-served weapons than he was his soldiers' lives. This could indicate either the enemy's inability to equip properly his troops or his unwillingness to jeopardize precious weapons. Another possible explanation is that a number of the groups of enemy engaged in 1970 were resupply parties including a sizeable percentage of unarmed bearers.

Like enemy KIA, enemy individual and crew-served weapons captured should fall toward zero in May (See Tabs 3-3 and 3-3a).

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

INDIVIDUAL W/PAS CAPTURED: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN IWC	422	221	216	230	194	162	87	174	111	81	256	114	2,268
1970													
EN IWC	206	83	68	208	146	115	122	72	55	58	60	87	1,280
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
EN C	80	50	19	14	10								

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CREW-SERVED WPNS CAPTURED: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 = = = =

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
EN CSWC	8	41	29	47	30	19	5	17	11	6	19	2	234
1970													
EN CSWC	11	3	7	30	6	9	11	8	2	3	3	9	102
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
F 2SWC	6	2	2	0	0								

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COMBINED UNIT PACIFICATION PROGRAM

The 15 Apr disestablishment of Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) units 1-2-M, 2-2-M, 3-2-M, and 2-1-M in the Hill 55 area signaled the termination of Marine involvement in this highly successful pacification-oriented combat concept. There were no contacts involving CUPP units during April, thus, there were neither friendly nor enemy casualties to report for the month.

Since its inception in November 1969, CUPP brought an increased measure of security to over 31,000 Vietnamese people, providing an atmosphere for growth of GVN strength in heretofore VC-dominated regions. Composed of Marine infantry squads integrated with Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force Platoons, there were as many as 24 CUPPs performing their mission in a like number of hamlets. Initially assigned to marginally secure or insecure hamlets (rated C or below on the Hamlet Evaluation System scale), these CUPP units formed a viable screen behind which pacification and rural development flourishes at the grass roots of Vietnamese society. The results of this commitment to pacification-oriented combat operations were substantial; in 18 months of operation, CUPP units killed 402 NVA/VC and took another 230 as prisoners or as Hoi Chanh who rallied to the GVN cause. Consequently, while ferreting out the Viet Cong and the Viet Cong Infrastructure and providing local security to their hamlets and the lines of communications emanating therefrom, the Marine participation in the Combined Unit Pacification Program not only advanced the military proficiency of the CUPP RF and PF units but also stimulated economic and political growth in the hamlets. The price to CUPP over the 18 months was 47 Marines killed and 254 wounded.

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
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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN). HAMLET POPULATION UNDER CUPP INFLUENCE AND

INCREASE IN POPULATION IN SECURE HAMLETS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) _____ 1970 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) _____
 SCTY INCREASED (CUM) _____ SCTY INCREASED (CUM) _____
 1971 UNDER INFLUENCE (CUM) _____ 1971 SCTY INCREASED (CUM) _____



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
INFLUENCE											4016	5062	
SCTY INCR												1724	
CUM INCR												1724	
GR TOT INC												1724	
1970													
INFLUENCE	17904	18886	23081	24658	23067	24361	30148	30361	31411	28391	28559	31672	
SCTY INCR	1397		4235		5569				306	-852		3113	
CUM INCR	1397		5632		11201				11507	10655		13768	
GR TOT INC	3121		7356		12925				13231	12379		15492	
1971													
INFLUENCE	31342	31799	4150	0									
SCTY INCR		457											
CUM INCR		457											
GR TOT INC	15492	15949	15949	15949									

GR TOT INC = GRAND TOTAL INCREASE IN SECURE POPULATION

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP UNITS ESTABLISHED AND % OF CATEGORY C

OR BELOW HAMLETS COVERED BY CUPPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

1969 # OF CUPP UNITS

1970 # OF CUPP UNITS

1971 # OF CUPP UNITS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CUPP ESTE											3	5	8
TOT CUPPS											3	8	8
% COVRG											1.0	1.6	2.6
CUM %											1.0	2.6	
1970													
CUPP ESTE	11	3								-1		1	14
TOT CUPPS	19	22								21		22	
% COVRG	3.6	1.0								-0.3		0.3	4.6
CUM %	6.2	7.2								6.9		7.2	
1971													
CUPP ESTE	-1	-4	-13	-4									
TOT CUPPS	21	17	4	0									
% COVRG	-0.3	-1.3	-4.3	-1.3									
CUM %	6.9	5.6	1.3	0.0									


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUPP CASUALTIES VS ENEMY LOSSES TO CUPP.

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69CUPP KIA												3	3
CUPP WIA												13	13
TOTAL CUPP												16	16
EN KIA												20	20
PW/HOI												29	29
TOTAL EN												49	49
70CUPP KIA	3	5	3	8	7	8	2	3	1	1	0	1	42
CUPP WIA	35	25	5	15	19	31	16	14	10	9	7	9	195
TOTAL CUPP	38	30	8	23	26	39	18	17	11	10	7	10	237
EN KIA	25	23	27	20	34	23	11	12	19	17	15	54	280
PW/HOI	23	35	28	2	6	3	19	4	1	9	4	42	176
TOTAL EN	48	58	55	22	40	26	30	16	20	26	19	96	456
71CUPPKIA	0	1	1	0									
CUPPWIA	25	15	6	0									
TOTAL CUPP	25	16	7	0									
EN KIA	63	37	2	0									
PW/HOI	12	12	3	0									
TOTAL EN	75	49	5	0									

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SUPPORTING ARMS

The downward trend of the employment of supporting arms continued during the month of April 1971. Artillery ammunition expenditures decreased by more than 24% (from 11,158 rounds in March to 8,468 rounds in April), Naval gunfire utilization continued the downward trend established over the past two years with no ships providing support during April 1971, and the number of fixed wing fighter/attack sorties in support of Marine combat units continued to decrease.

While the number of enemy sightings increased (from 384 in March to 437 in April) the main contributing factors to the decrease in the employment of supporting arms are the shrinking of the size of the AO and the redeployment of combat units during the month.

The number of fixed wing sorties flown in support of the Division/Brigade continued to fall during April (from 225 in March to 124), while all helicopter indicators fell sharply. All of these numbers should fall toward zero in May as more units are redeployed and the U. S. Army and ARVN assume responsibility for more and more of the Division/Brigade AO and functions. All ground combat operations cease on 7 May.

30 APR 71
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C-3-5

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ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Expenditure of artillery rounds during April 1971 continued to fall, with only 8,468 rounds being expended during the month as compared with the previous low of 11,158 rounds in March 1971. Just over 4,600 of these rounds were expended before the Division departed, while some 3,800 were fired under Brigade control.

Even though the number of enemy sighted increased only slightly (from 384 in March to 437) and the average number of artillery tubes (28) available during the month reached a twenty-eight month low, the shrinking of the Division/Brigade AO and the redeployment of combat units are considered to be the main contributing factors to the reduction.

It is expected that artillery expenditures should fall to zero on 7 May when the last artillery battery is scheduled to stand down.

30 APR 71
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
G. S. 5a

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED AND ARTILLERY

PIECES AVAILABLE VS ENEMY SIGHTED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

AMMUNITION/PIECES/ENEMY 1969 ----- 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



(APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) (OCT) (NOV) (DEC)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
* 1969AMMO	178.2	189.8	158.3	151.7	156.9	184.1	187.1	186.4	132.4	159.4	169.6	163.6	2,017.7
\$ PCS 4.2"	30	26	24	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	
\$ 105/155	84/50	79/49	78/42	78/38	62/36	66/36	66/36	66/36	66/36	68/36	72/36	72/36	
\$ 8"/175	6/4	6/4	6/7	6/10	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	6/12	7/12	12/12	12/12	
\$ TOTAL PC	174	164	157	152	140	144	144	144	144	147	156	156	
# ENEMY													
* 1970AMMO	179.1	156.0	139.6	140.8	145.0	130.4	114.3	127.7	100.9	50.7	21.5	27.0	1,333.0
\$ PCS 4.2"	24	24	22	18	18	18	18	18	17	12	12	12	
\$ 105/155	72/36	72/36	64/33	54/30	54/26	54/26	54/26	54/26	52/23	36/20	36/20	36/20	
\$ 8"/175	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	12/12	9/11	6/4	6/0	6/0	6/0	
\$ TOTAL PC	156	156	143	126	122	122	122	118	102	74	74	74	
ENEMY	4425	4423	3735	3790	3651	2390	2291	1955	1374	878	576	1331	30,819
* 1971AMMO	35.4	31.4	11.2	4.6	3.8								
\$ PCS 4.2"	12	12	6	6	6								
\$ 105/155	36/20	30/18	18/8	12/4	12/4								
\$ 8"/175	6/0	6/0	6/0	6/0	6/0								
\$ TOTAL PC	74	66	38	28	28								
ENEMY	1394	1146	384	437									

* AMMO EXPENDED EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS TO NEAREST HUNDRED. 31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71
 \$ AVG # OF PIECES DURING A GIVEN MONTH # NOT AVAILABLE FOR 1969 CONFIDENTIAL
 (APR) (MAY) (JUN) (JUL) (AUG) (SEP) G-3-5a

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NAVAL GUNFIRE AMMUNITION EXPENDED VS SHIP-DAYS ON STATION,
CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

There was not a naval gunfire ship employed in support of the combat units during April 1971. The nature of current operations and the shrinking of the AO precludes the use of Naval Gunfire. Further, it is anticipated that Marine combat units will not require naval gunfire support before the termination of the Brigade's ground combat role on 7 May.


30 APR 71
CONFIDENTIAL

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) , NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIP-DAYS ON STATION VERSUS

ROUNDS EXPENDED, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
RDS EXP	3696	6368	8811	7304	8395	5363	5138	4973	3651	3228	5011	4070	66,008
SHIPDAYS	42	40	37	29	40	33	29	19	26	24	25	29	373
1970													
RDS EXP	5583	4153	3433	3712	2230	1248	2585	807	693	561	605	217	25,827
SHIPDAYS	37	30	33	23	12	13	23	13	9	7	5	4	209
1971					(APR)								
RDS EXP	295	0	114	0	0								
S. DAYS	3	0	1	0	0								

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)

31 MAR 71 30 APR 71
CONFIDENTIAL

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FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During April 1971, 124 fixed wing sorties were flown in support of the 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, a decrease of 101 (minus 45%) from the 225 flown in March, strongly supporting the gradual downward trend in such support established in 1970. Fighter/attack sorties in support of the Division/Brigade have decreased by more than 70% since November 1970, a direct result of decreased in-country activity because of out-of-country activity and the departure of VMFA-115 and VMA(AW)-225.

The precipitous decline in sorties flown during September and October 1969 (apparent on the graph opposite) was due largely to the withdrawal from Vietnam of VMFA-334 and VMA(AW)-553 and to adverse flying weather. However, a sizable portion of the reduction can be traced to the departure of the 3d Marine Division, the support for which was combined with that for 1st Marine Division and contributed to the very high totals for June, July and August 1970. The gradual trend downward began soon thereafter and should continue in the future as more units stand down. In particular, all Brigade ground combat operations terminate on 7 May and May totals will reflect only that fixed wing support provided during the first week of the month.


30 APR 71
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G-3-5c

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FIXED WING FIGHTER/ATTACK SORTIES, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						3071	2465	2701	1619	882	761	700	12199 *
1970	1058	775	992	992	994	812	723	566	497	365	455	333	8,562
1971	379	413	225	124									

* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE.

31 MAR 71 30 APR 71

CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-50

CONFIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

April 1971 recorded across-the-board decreases in helicopter support provided the Division/Brigade from the totals for March. During the month, 2,598 hours were flown (a decrease of almost 27%), during which time 9,902 passengers were carried and 603 tons of cargo hauled. Thus, both passengers and cargo declined by more than 50% from March's totals of 21,852 passengers and 1,301 tons of cargo.

Although the helicopter support data for 1969 combined the figures for both 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, 1970 data reflected only 1st Marine Division support and provided an accurate portrayal of Division activity, available air support assets and direct weather effects. For the past 15 months, the Division has received 70% of the helicopter flight time flown by 1st MAW, with the remaining 30% going to other units in MR-1, including 2d ROKMC Brigade, 111 MAF, XXIV Corps and I Corps.

Helicopter support during May, just as with other indicators in this notebook, should decline toward zero as the remaining units in the Brigade stand down (See Tab 3-5c).

30 APR 71
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A-5-6

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HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

In April 1971, helicopter flight time in support of the Division/Brigade declined almost 27% from March's 3,552 hours to 2,598, a drop of over 950 hours. This decrease was occasioned by the standdown of another infantry battalion and a general decrease in activity of the units remaining operational in the Brigade.

The peak months for Division activity, favorable flying weather and maximum asset availability were May, June and July 1970 (although a glance at the graph opposite reveals higher monthly totals in 1969, these totals included support provided 3d Marine Division). A pattern of diminishing flight time began in August 1970 with the departure of HMM-161 (21 CH-46D flying an average of 800 hours per month) and the establishment of the 1st MAW policy of limiting flight hours to reduce and realign helicopter use in consonance with CNO guidelines. The full impact of this policy was felt in September, in addition to the impact of the standdown of the 7th Marines and elements of the 11th Marines. However, reduced air support requirements brought on by the departure of the ground units above and six days of unflyable weather reduced flight time to a level at which 1st MAW utilization policy was no longer significant.

As units continue to stand down, the number of flight hours should continue to decrease. Thus, May 1971 should exhibit another significant decrease in helicopter flight time (See Tabs 3-5c and 3-6).

30 APR 71
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G-3.6a

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
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970 /1971

1969

1970

1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 HOURS						11553	9721	9089	7849	6659	5819	5826	56516 *
70 HOURS	6883	5903	6446	7112	8227	8520	8067	7081	5824	4532	4926	4941	78,462
71 HOURS	5431	5278	3552	2598									

31 MAR 71 30 APR 71
CONFIDENTIAL

*JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

G.S. 6a

CONFIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER PASSENGER TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of helicopter passengers carried during April 1971 fell by over 50% to 9,902, a drop of almost 12,000 from the 21,852 carried in March. This drop may be directly attributed to the redeployment activity discussed in Tabs 3-6 and 3-6a.

Passenger totals are indicative of a level of activity, but do not address the specific reason for movement. In addition, helicopter after action reporting duplicates passenger counts on subsequent sorties. Therefore, analysis of the data contained herein can yield only the observation that May, June and July 1970 were exceptionally active months for the Division supported by maximum helicopter flight time (See Tab 3-6a). The subsequent precipitous drop and levelling-off were directly related to reduced activity, assets and operating weather.


Redeployment and realignment of forces continues and will continue through May 1971. Therefore, the number of passengers carried in May should be well below the April total and will be well under 10,000 passengers.

30 APR 71
CONFIDENTIAL

G-3-6a

CONFIDENTIAL

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER PASSENGERS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
'69 PAX						43424	59907	59605	53609	52753	53518	50526	373342
'70 PAX	56113	55355	55019	59601	70755	68095	70752	54580	50327	31201	35485	35427	645,710
'71 PAX	37537	31925	21852	9902									

* JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1969 DATA UNAVAILABLE

31 MAR 71 30 APR 71

CONFIDENTIAL

0-3-6d

CONFIDENTIAL

HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The helicopter cargo total for April 1971 was 603 tons hauled, representing a decrease in three months (from January 1971) of over 1,600 tons. This significant decrease was occasioned by the standdown (and, in most cases, the departure) of four infantry battalions and approximately two battalions of artillery, as well as the departure of HMM-364.

Although monthly cargo totals may be remotely related to flight time, a more valid relationship exists between tonnage and the level of ground activity of Division units. Artillery resupply contributes greatly to the overall total and any decreases in cargo tonnage are, in large measure, due to the redeployment of artillery batteries and changes in targetting policy (See Tabs 3-5a and 3-5b).

As with the other helicopter support indicators, cargo tonnage should decrease to very low levels in May with the standdown of the remaining Brigade combat units during the first week in May.

30 APR 71
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
6-3-6e

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), HELICOPTER CARGO TOTALS, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

TONS OF CARGO: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969						9836	10471	8621	5629	4813	3280	3207	45,857
TONS													
1970	3963	3485	3962	4164	5937	5138	4000	3804	3867	2510	2283	1999	45,112
TONS													
1971	2259	2000	1301	603									
S													

30 APR 71
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G-36c

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G-4 OVERVIEW

Although the 1st Marine Division was fully prepared to accomplish its mission in combat on 14 April as evidenced by the logistics figures contained herein, it should be noted that other than units remaining as elements of 3d MAB, Division units still in country had stood down and were preparing to redeploy.

The 3d MAB is also fully prepared to accomplish its present mission in combat and the status of operational readiness for combat essential items reflected in the unit FORSTAT rating is excellent. All subordinate units are in a C-1 or C-2 status with the exception of H&MS-11 and HMH-463 which are C-3 in equipment readiness (HMH-463 is C-4 in equipment and supplies on hand). However, these units are fully capable of performing their assigned mission (See Tab 4-1). The overall percentage of the Division combat essential items of equipment maintained operationally ready remained at 96% on 14 April while that of 3d MAB stands at 89% at the end of the month. All commodity areas used to determine overall readiness are well above Marine Corps standards with the exception of the Engineer area. This commodity area is degraded primarily by the new 600/700 series generators, many of which are in a NORS status. The Department of Defense program to transfer selected items to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces was continued throughout Increment VI and a total of 283 items were offered and accepted during April. The totals for Increment VI were 874 items offered with a dollar value of \$950,763.97. One hundred percent of the items offered were accepted by the RVNAF.

Embarkation for Division and 3d MAB Increment VI was completed on schedule and without difficulty. Major Division units redeploying during April were 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; 11th Motor Transport Battalion; Headquarters Battalion (-), and 1st Medical Battalion (-).

The prevalence of malaria rose slightly in April 1971, with 36 cases being recorded for a case rate of 3.5/1000 men. The venereal disease case rate rose again, from March's rate of 13.7/1000 men to 15.2/1000 men.

30 APR 71
SECRET

G-4

SECRET

UNIT FORSTAT RATING

The FORSTAT rating for the Division remained at C-1 (fully combat ready) in both equipment/supplies on hand and equipment readiness until its departure on 14 April 1971. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was C-4 in both categories due to T/E deficiencies resulting from a turn over of much of the battalion's combat essential equipment to the RVNAF under project 805 and to 3d FSR to fill mount out/mount out augmentation requirements.

The Brigade FORSTAT rating as of 30 April 1971 was C-1 (fully combat ready) in both equipment/supplies on hand and equipment readiness. H&MS-11 is C-3 in equipment readiness. The squadron has 12 items of equipment out of country for repairs. As they have excess equipment in the deadlined items, their ability to perform their assigned mission is unaffected. HMM-163 is C-3 in equipment readiness and C-4 in equipment/supplies on hand. They are authorized only six reportable items and possess four of these items with no deadlines reported. This does not affect their ability to perform their assigned mission.

30 APR 1971
SECRET

G-4-1

SECRET

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN), UNIT FORSTAT RATINGS
(As of 14 April 1971)

UNIT	EQUIP/SUPPLIES ON HAND				EQUIP READINESS			
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
1ST MAR DIV (-) (REIN)	X				X			
HQ BN (-) (REIN)	X				X			
1ST MAR (REIN)	X				X			
HQ CO (REIN)	X				X			
1ST BN, 1ST MAR	X				X			
2D BN, 1ST MAR	X				X			
3D BN 1ST MAR	X				X			
1ST BN, 5TH MAR				X				X
1ST BN, 11TH MAR (REIN)	X				X			
3D 8" HOW BTRY	X				X			
1ST MED BN (-)		X				X		
11TH MT BN (-)	X				X			

30 April 71
SECRET

6-4-1

SECRET

3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE, UNIT FORSTAT RATINGS

UNIT	EQUIP/SUPPLIES ON HAND				EQUIPMENT READINESS			
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
3D MAR AMPHIB BGDE	X				X			
1ST MAR	X				X			
HQ CO	X				X			
1ST BN, 1ST MAR	X				X			
2D BN, 1ST MAR	X				X			
3D BN, 1ST MAR	X				X			
MAG-11	X					X		
H&MS-11		X					X	
M&BS-11	X				X			
VMA-225	X				X			
VMA-311		X			X			
MASS-3		X				X		
MAG-16	X					X		
H&MS-16	X				X			
M&BS-16	X					X		
MATCU-68	X					X		
HML-167	X				X			
HMM-262	X				X			
HMM-263	X				X			
HML-367	X				X			
HMH-463				X			X	
FORCE LOG CMD	X					X		
H&S BN	X					X		
SUP BN	X				X			
MAINT BN	X					X		
1ST BN, 11TH MAR	X				X			
3D 8" HOW BTRY	X				X			
1ST MP BN	X				X			
2D CAG	X				X			
COMM SPT CO	X				X			
3D CIT	X				X			
5TH CIT	X				X			
3D ITT	X				X			
A CO, 1ST MED BN*	X				X			
A CO, 1ST ENGR BN*	X				X			
A CO, 1ST MT BN*	X				X			
A CO, 1ST RECON BN*	X				X			
A CO, 7TH ENGR BN*	X				X			
C CO, 1ST SP BN*	X				X			
DET, 1ST RADIO BN*	X				X			

* For local use only. Parent unit reports MARES to CMC.

30 APR 71
SECRET

G-4-1

SECRET

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

The operationally ready status of all combat essential equipment in the 3d MAB stands at 89%. On 14 April the operationally ready status on the Division was 96%.

Condition coding of equipment by limited technical inspection teams continues in the Brigade. The purpose of these inspections is to identify equipment that will not meet established redeployment criteria. With minor exceptions, Ordnance, Engineer and Communication-Electronics equipment has been satisfactory for retrograde. The Motor Transport commodity area has had a significant quantity of equipment coded out as it was obsolete or unreparable/uneconomically repairable. However, it is considered that approximately 98% of motor transport items not meeting retrograde criteria have been identified and coded out.

Section M equipment has not been included in the overall readiness posture of the MAB nor has a chart been developed due to the small number of items involved (208), a lack of history file and the unique status of the equipment. However, the operational readiness status of Section M equipment at the end of April was 71%. The degraded status is caused in large measure by the long lead time involved in repair of deadlined equipment, the majority of which must be evacuated from country for maintenance support.

30 APR 71
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5-4-2


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) READINESS OF COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE: 1970 ----- 1971 (AND DEC 1969) -----

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											84	85	
% NORM											3	5	
% NORS											4	3	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											7	4	
1970													
% OR	86	87	90	91	89	90	92	94	92	92	93	94	
% NORM	4	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	
% NORS	4	4	2	2	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	
% IN/T	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
%	95	95	96	96	89								
% NORM	1	1	1	1	4								
% NORS	3	3	2	2	3								
% IN/T	1	1	1	1	1								
% DEFIC	0	0	0	0	3								

30 APR 71

G-4-2

SECRET

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS)

At the end of April 1971, the operationally ready status of 3d MAB Communication-Electronics equipment was 91%, compared to a 98% figure for the 1st Marine Division on 14 April 1971. There are no problem items within this commodity area.

30 APR 71
SECRET


G-4-2a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (COMMUNICATION-
ELECTRONICS), CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE: 1970 1971 (AND DEC 1969) -----

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											74	86	
% NORM											4	4	
% NORS											1	4	
% IN/T											2	3	
% DEFIC											19	3	
1970													
% OR	90	90	92	93	92	93	94	95	95	95	95	96	
% NORM	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	
% NORS	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	
% IN/T	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	
% DEFIC	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
%	96	97	97	98	91								
% NORM	0	0	0	0	4								
% NORS	2	2	2	1	2								
% IN/T	2	1	1	1	1								
% DEFIC	0	0	0	0	2								

30 APR 71

SECRET

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

At the end of April 1971, the operationally ready status of 3d MAB Motor Transport was 94%, while on 14 April the operationally ready status of the 1st Marine Division was 95%. There are no problem areas within this commodity area.

30 APR 71
SECRET

G-42b


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (MOTOR TRANSPORT)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE: 1970 ----- 1971 (AND DEC 1969) - - - - -

CNC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969											86	86	
% OR											5	5	
% NORM											3	4	
% NORS											2	2	
% IN/T											4	3	
% DEFIC													
1970													
% OR	85	88	93	92	90	90	91	93	94	93	93	92	
% NORM	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	
% NORS	4	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	
% IN/T	4	4	2	2	4	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	
% DEFIC	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
% OR	94	93	95	95	94								
% NORM	2	2	1	1	2								
% NORS	3	3	3	3	1								
% IN/T	1	2	1	1	1								
% DEFIC	0	0	0	0	2								

30 APR 71

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COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ORDNANCE)

At the end of April 1971, the operationally ready status of 3d MAB Ordnance equipment was 99%, one percent higher than the 98% recorded by the 1st Marine Division on 14 April. There are no problem items within this commodity area.

30 APR 71
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G-4-2c


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ORDNANCE)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE: 1970 ----- 1971 (AND DEC 1969) -----

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											92	92	
% NORM											2	3	
% NORS											2	2	
% IN/T											1	2	
% DEPIC											3	1	
1970													
% OR	91	92	95	97	96	95	96	96	95	94	96	98	
% NORM	2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	
% NORS	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	
% IN/T	3	4	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	
% DEPIC	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1971					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
% OR	98	98	98	98	99								
% NORM	1	0	0	0	0								
% NORS	1	1	1	1	0								
% IN/T	0	1	1	1	1								
% DEPIC	0	0	0	0	0								

30 APR 71

G-4-2c

SECRET

COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER)

The operational readiness status of 3d MAB Engineer equipment at the end of April 1971 was 78% while that of the 1st Marine Division was 88% on 14 April. As of the end of the month, thirty-two Engineer items are In-Transit with eleven of these being repaired at Philco Ford. There are forty-eight items in a NORS status. The majority of these items are generators awaiting second echelon parts. The new 600/700 series generators account for the majority of the equipment in a NORS status.

30 APR 71
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G-4-2d


1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), COMBAT ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (ENGINEER)

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PERCENTAGE: 1970 ----- 1971 (AND DEC 1969) - - - - -

CMC OPERATIONALLY READY OBJECTIVE = = = = =

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
% OR											58	60	
% NORM											8	10	
% NORS											7	7	
% IN/T											4	10	
% DEFIC											23	13	
1970													
% OR	63	66	68	66	59	63	74	83	73	76	78	84	
% NORM	6	3	6	7	6	7	6	5	5	8	4	3	
% NORS	5	7	4	5	7	6	5	4	7	8	9	10	
% IN/T	7	5	5	6	8	6	6	6	4	3	4	3	
% DEFIC	19	19	17	16	20	18	9	2	11	5	5	0	
1970					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)					
% OR	86	86	88	88	78								
% IN/T	3	3	3	3	3								
% NORS	5	7	4	4	8								
% IN/T	2	1	2	1	2								
% DEFIC	4	3	3	4	9								

30 APR 71

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INTER-OFFICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO R

Project 805 is a DOD-initiated program which transfers major items of equipment to the RVNAF in furtherance of the Vietnamization effort. During Increment IV (17 Aug - 9 Oct 1970), a total of 2,980 items were offered, of which 2,789 items with a total value of \$1,232,980 were accepted with an overall acceptance rate of 93.8%. During Increment VI, which began in February and terminated 30 April, the Division offered 874 items under the program. 100% of the items offered were accepted by the Vietnamese with a total value of \$950,763.97. The chart on the opposite page and the items/figures below reflect the detailed breakdown of the turnover as of the end of Increment VI (30 Apr 71). Turnover accomplished during the period 15 - 23 April 1971 involved only 1st Marine Division units and consequently represented the entire 3d MAB effort.

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QTY OFF</u>	<u>QTY ACC</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
PWR SUP PP-2953	6	6	3,060.00
TEL TA-312	91	91	17,674.00
LIGHT MARKER DISTRESS	100	100	1,100.00
CASE BC-5	24	24	274.56
ANTENNA RC-292	57	57	15,048.00
REEL UNIT RL-31	7	7	686.00
CABLE TEL WD-1/TT	17	17	1,048.00
CABLE TEL ON RL-159	27	27	1,674.00
RADIO AN/GRC-125	23	23	24,932.00
RADIO AN/PRC-25	280	280	243,040.00
TRLR M105A1	2	2	1,816.00
TRK M151A1	39	39	122,343.00
HOW 105MM	18	18	273,600.00
TRLR CGO M416	1	1	349.00
RKT LAUNCHER 3.5	30	30	3,030.00
GEN SIG AN/USM-44A	2	2	1,664.00
PA SET AN/PIG-5	15	15	1,875.00
TEST SET ELECT TUBE	6	6	966.00
MOUNT MG M-122	73	73	4,987.36
TEST SET BTRY	6	6	792.00
TERMINAL BOARD	11	11	215.60
106MM RR	6	6	21,000.00
TYPEWRITER AN/GGC-3	1	1	1,730.00
TRK AMBUL M718	2	2	8,210.00
TOOL KIT CARPEN	1	1	235.00
TRK DUMP M51	4	4	60,580.00
TRK TRAC M123	2	2	62,542.00
SHEEPSFOOT ROLLER	1	1	2,600.00
TRK WRECKER 5T	2	2	43,788.00
TOOL KIT COM NO 1	6	6	8,430.00
GEN SIG AN/URM-48	1	1	2,370.00
GEN SIG AN/URM-127	1	1	232.00
MOUNT TRIPOD M3	2	2	886.00
TRK WATER M-149	3	3	5,886.00
TRK M52A1	1	1	11,364.00
TEL TA-1/PT	5	5	167.45
PA SET AN/TIQ-2	1	1	800.00
TOTAL	874	874	\$950,763.97


30 APR 71
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G-4-3

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF
INCREMENTS IV (1970) AND VI (1971)

CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ITEMS TRANSFERRED: 1970 ——— 1971 - - - - -
 CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF ACCEPTANCE: 1970 ——— 1971 - - - - -



<u>DATES</u>	<u>OFFERED</u>	<u>ACCEPTED</u>	<u>CUM OFF</u>	<u>CUM ACC</u>	<u>CUM % ACC</u>
17-27 Aug 70	1203	1180	1203	1180	98.1
3-15 Sep 70	657	563	1860	1743	93.9
25-26 Sep 70	303	256	2163	2019	93.4
1- 9 Oct 70	817	779	2980	2798	93.8
21-28 Feb 71	243	243	243	243	100.0
3-15 Mar 71	254	254	497	497	100.0
16-25 Mar 71	94	94	591	591	100.0
7-14 Apr 71	101	101	692	692	100.0
15-23 Apr 71	182	182	874	874	100.0

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30 APR 71

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INTERSERVICE TRANSFER OF MATERIAL TO RVNAF

The chart on the opposite page reflects the current status of the turnover of major end items to the RVNAF, a Department of Defense initiated program. Portrayed is the high acceptance rate of equipment offered by Division units, a rate directly attributable to the efforts of the invoicing units to repair on the spot equipment initially questioned as to serviceability by RVNAF inspectors. As indicated below, a total of 2,980 items of Communications-Electronics, Ordnance and Motor Transport items were offered during the period 17 August through 9 October, of which 2,798 items with a total value of \$1,232,805.00 were accepted, an acceptance rate of 93.8%. The program is now inactive until the next phase of redeployment.


<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>QUANTITY ACCEPTED</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
RADIO SET PRC 25	317	312	\$270816.00
MINE DETECTORS	76	65	46865.00
GRENAD LAUNCHER M79	128	114	28728.00
MACHINE GUN MOUNT M122	112	111	7548.00
MACHINE GUN M-60	79	73	46428.00
RIFLE, M-16	1563	1501	204136.00
PISTOL, CAL 45	551	496	28272.00
SEMI TRLR 25T	3	0	
TRUCK M54	1	1	11878.00
TRUCK, DUMP, M51	10	8	121160.00
AMBULANCE, M718	4	3	12315.00
TRUCK, M37B1	12	5	23165.00
RADIO SET GRC 125	48	40	43360.00
PUBLIC ADDRESS SET PIQ-5	10	10	1250.00
WATER TRLR, M149	4	0	
TRUCK, M151	7	6	18822.00
TRLR, M105	3	1	905.00
NIGHT VISION SIGHT, AN/PVS-2	30	30	90000.00
HOWITZER, 105MM	18	18	273600.00
TELE-TYPE SET AN/GGC-3	1	1	1730.00
MACH GUN, CAL 50	3	3	1827.00
TOTALS	2980	2798	\$1,232,805.00

31 Oct 70

G-4-3

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1ST MARINE DIVIS (REIN). INTERSERVICE TRANSFER MATERIEL TO RVNAF



<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFERED</u>	<u>ACCEPTED</u>	<u>CUM OFFRD</u>	<u>CUM ACCTD</u>	<u>CUM % ACCTD</u>
17 Aug	686	670	686	670	97.6
26 Aug	494	489	1180	1159	98.2
27 Aug	23	21	1203	1180	98.1
3 Sep	152	141	1355	1321	98.1
10 Sep	4	4	1359	1325	98.1
14 Sep	492	409	1851	1734	93.9
15 Sep	9	9	1860	1743	93.9
25 Sep	268	244	2128	1987	93.4
26 Sep	35	32	2163	2019	93.4
1 Oct	1	1	2164	2020	93.4
2 Oct	15	15	2179	2035	93.4
3 Oct	89	84	2268	2119	93.4
5 Oct	291	262	2559	2381	93.4
6 Oct	260	256	2819	2637	93.6
8 Oct	2	2	2821	2639	93.6
9 Oct	159	159	2980	2798	93.8

31 OCT 70

G-4-3

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Despite the increase in the number of cases of falciparum malaria during April 1971, the prevalence of malaria remained low. There were 36 cases during the month for a case rate of 3.5 cases per 1,000 personnel, of which the Division recorded nine cases for an adjusted monthly rate of 2.9 cases per thousand and the Brigade had 27 cases for an adjusted rate of 3.6 cases per thousand. There was another increase in morbidity from venereal disease during April, with the majority of the cases occurring in the Da Nang area. One hundred fifty-seven cases were recorded during the month for a case rate of 15.2 per thousand (an increase from March's 13.7). Of this total, forty-six cases were recorded by the Division for an adjusted rate of 15.0 cases per thousand, while the Brigade had 111 cases for an adjusted rate of 14.8 cases per thousand.

Rabies prophylaxis for April accounted for the loss of 72 man-days of combat effectiveness, compared to 208 man-days lost in March. Loss of combat effectiveness from amebiasis, shingellosis, hepatitis and the gastro-intestinal diseases is still low but nevertheless significant.

30 APR 71

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MALARIA PREVALENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

April 1971 recorded 36 cases of malaria for a case rate of 3.5 cases per thousand personnel. Of these cases, nine were Division personnel for an adjusted case rate of 2.9 per thousand and 27 were Brigade personnel for an adjusted rate of 3.6 per thousand. The primary reasons for the continuing low rate of malaria incidence were the normal seasonal low for this disease and the fact that Division/Brigade personnel were no longer operating in areas in which malaria is a major problem.

30 APR 71


C-4-4a

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE MALARIA INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - - 1971 =====

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	247	121	160	91	85	152	141	232	679	396	437	159	2,900
RATE/1000	9.8	4.8	6.2	3.6	3.4	6.1	5.7	9.5	27.4	14.0	13.7	5.0	9.1
1970													
CASES	84	84	227	377	221	224	158	259	346	256	84	67	2,387
RATE/1000	2.7	2.9	8.6	15.9	9.6	9.9	7.1	12.3	18.2	16.8	6.4	5.1	9.2
1971													
				(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)		
CASES	32	25	23	9	27								
R/1000	2.4	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.3								

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0-4-4a

VENEREAL DISEASE PREVALENCE, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

The number of venereal infections in April 1971 increased noticeably from the number recorded in March (157 versus 134), as did the case rate (15.2 cases per thousand personnel versus 13.7 per thousand). Of the cases, Division personnel contracted 46 cases for a rate of 15.0/1,000, while Brigade personnel contracted 111 cases for a rate of 14.8/1,000. However, as was the case in March, certain units departed Vietnam without submitting feeder reports, so both the incidence of such disease and the rate could reasonably be expected to be higher than reported. Division units which did not report were 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (which spent a portion of the month as a component of the Brigade), and 11th Motor Transport Battalion.

30 APR 71

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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) VENEREAL DISEASE INCIDENCE, CALENDAR YEARS

1969/1970/1971

INCIDENCE 1969 - - - - - 1970 - - - - - 1971 - - - - -

(3D MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE FIGURES - MONTHS IN PARENTHESES)



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
CASES	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
RATE/1000	12.1	8.8	9.2	9.1	10.0	10.5	6.8	6.7	7.3	9.3	8.2	10.0	9.0
1970													
CASES	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
RATE/1000	9.1	7.9	8.5	10.0	12.5	11.0	11.6	9.6	9.9	10.1	11.2	11.5	10.1
1971													
					(APR)	(MAY)	(JUN)	(JUL)	(AUG)	(SEP)	(OCT)	(NOV)	
CASES	203	172	134	46	111								
RATE/1000	15.3	13.9	13.7	15.0	14.8								

31 MARCH 71 30 APR 71


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1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE VENEREAL DISEASE

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

CUMULATIVE INCIDENCE: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
69 SYPH	4	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	5	4	2	0	20
GONORRHEA	283	213	229	213	242	252	162	162	172	251	251	317	2,747
CHANCROID	16	9	5	17	7	10	4	2	4	7	7	1	89
I-G VENM	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
I-G ING	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL VD	304	224	236	230	250	262	168	164	181	263	260	318	2,860
70 SYPH	0	3	1	0	0	5	0	1	1	1	0	0	12
GONORRHEA	272	226	219	232	274	239	259	200	187	148	146	150	2,552
CHANCROID	5	3	4	5	9	3	0	2	1	2	1	0	35
I-G VENM	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
I-G ING	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL VD	278	232	224	238	283	248	259	203	189	153	147	150	2,604
71 SYPH	0	0	1	0									
GONORRHEA	196	170	131	153									
CHANCROID	6	2	2	3									
I-G VENM	1	0	0	0									
I-G ING	0	0	0	1									
TOTAL VD	203	172	134	157									

30 APR 71

G-4-42

1ST MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN) AND 3D MAB CURRENT AND PROJECTED
EMBARKATION PROGRESS, INCREMENT VI

Embarkation of all Increment VI personnel and cargo was successfully completed during April for all Division and 3d MAB units. The only significant change in the embarkation plan involved the early retrograde of excess engineer equipment belonging to Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion and Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion. This equipment was originally scheduled for retrograde during late June as a portion of Increment VII. Redistribution of Division assets to satisfy other WestPac needs (including mountout and mountout augmentation requirements) and interservice transfer of material to RVNAF, coupled with coding out of obsolete and unserviceable/uneconomically repairable equipment reduced shipping requirements from those previously planned. However, cargo from FLC available for retrograde was used to offset these reductions and to insure that ships embarking MAB units were fully loaded.

In addition to Division cargo loaded during April and reflected on the chart, other 3d MAB units also embarked a total of 78,135 square feet of vehicles and 564,578 cubic feet of cargo.


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30 APR 71

G-4-5

1ST MARINE DIVISION, CURRENT AND PROJECTED EMBARKATION PROGRESS
INCREMENT VI

PCT OF CUBIC FEET: PLANNED - - - - - COMPLETED _____
PCT OF SQUARE FEET: PLANNED = = = = = COMPLETED = = = = =



SCHEDULED

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CUFT</u>	<u>CUM CUFT</u>	<u>% TOTAL</u>	<u>SQFT</u>	<u>CUM SQFT</u>	<u>% TOTAL</u>
3 Mar	0	0	0	14,500	14,500	7.5
13 Mar	14,997	14,997	10.8	4,000	18,500	9.8
22 Mar	34,848	49,845	35.9	20,493	28,993	20.6
29 Mar	24,798	74,643	53.8	43,745	82,738	43.7
31 Mar	6,596	81,239	58.5	15,231	97,969	51.7
16 Apr	16,542	97,781	70.4	7,094	105,063	55.5
25 Apr	41,155	138,936	100.0	84,326	189,389	100.0

ACCOMPLISHED

3 Mar	0	0	0	8,271	8,271	5.0
13 Mar	8,907	8,907	7.0	1,698	9,969	6.0
25 Mar	10,325	19,232	18.0	16,560	26,529	15.0
31 Mar	12,167	31,399	35.0	27,668	54,197	37.0
15 Apr	18,635	50,034	55.0	5,990	60,187	42.0
23 Apr	60,949	110,983	100.0	43,318	103,505	100.0

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G-4-5

G-5 OVERVIEW

During April 1971, there were significant changes in the area of civic action due to the departure of the 1st Marine Division and the activation of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. Although the strength of the combined Division/Brigade was only slightly greater in April than the average strength of the Division alone in March (approximately 11,400 versus 9,800), the cost of civic action soared from \$VN 310,000 in March to \$VN 1,190,000 in April, and the number of Vietnamese patients treated under the MEDCAP/DENTCAP programs almost tripled from 3,608 in March to 9,925. On the other hand, the number of man-days of U. S. labor contributed to civic action projects fell from 387 to 190, while the percentage of Vietnamese labor on such projects remained at 90.0%.

A comparison of the monthly averages thus far in 1971 with those of the previous two years also produces mixed results. This year's average cost of civic action per month (1.11 million \$VN) is greater than 1969's monthly average (0.99 million \$VN), but less than 1970's (1.35 million \$VN). The average percentage of Vietnamese participation thus far in 1971 exceeds the monthly averages for both 1969 and 1970 (90.6% in 1971 versus 74.2% in 1969 and 86.7% in 1970), while the number of Vietnamese patients treated and the number of man-days of U. S. labor on civic action projects are well below averages for the previous two years. An average of only 7,386 patients has been treated per month in 1971 compared to 10,813 per month in 1969 and 10,454 in 1970, while 1971's average of 507 man-days per month is less than half 1969's average of 1,194 and approximately a third 1970's 1508.

The character of civic action underwent a significant and continuous change throughout 1970. In 1969 and the first few months of 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the senior U. S. Headquarters in Military Region 1, and there was a significant U. S. Navy presence. From December 1969 to March 1970, the 26th Marines, with a typical support package, was attached to the 1st Marine Division, while, in 1969, the Division had a Psyop/Civic Action AIF Fund allocation of \$VN 500,000 per month. All of these factors were important to the Division civic action program, and now significantly affect the Brigade program for the simple reason that none of them now exist.

III MAF, as the senior U. S. Headquarters in MR-1, was the recipient of considerable support through the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund. This support included funds and materials, with the Division sharing in the funds primarily by participating in the General Walt Scholarship Program, but also receiving a proportionate share of the civic action materials donated through this same program. In view of the continually decreasing support received, III MAF terminated the General Walt Scholarship program on 30 May 1970, and materials have been available in ever smaller quantities.

As the service manager for Project Handclasp, the U. S. Navy assured a considerable amount of Handclasp materials to U. S. military forces in Military Region 1 by its very presence in Da Nang. In addition, the Division had an

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arrangement with the Naval Support Activity wherein materials for civic action projects could be purchased with Civic Action AIK funds at about one-third the Vietnamese open market price.

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Shortly after XXIV Corps became the senior U. S. Headquarters in MR-1, there were three events which contributed directly to a substantial curtailment of the Marine civic action program. At that time, there was considerable planning for the reduction of Marine forces in the Republic of Vietnam to brigade size. This information, upon receipt in the United States, led the U. S. Navy to curtail the shipment of Project Handclasp supplies to the Marine forces in MR-1, thus depriving Marine units of many supplies which could have been used in furtherance of civic action programs. The pipeline of Project Handclasp supplies was not reopened until late 1970. Additionally, the Vietnamese Government approached, requesting changes in the end use of the civic action project known as the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital Fund. Since substantial work had to be done on this project, a determination was made to reserve money accruing to the III MAF from funds then available to be used primarily to complete this one large civic action project. The third factor was the decision of U. S. and GVN officials to emphasize Vietnamization and the procedures resulting therefrom, which inhibited the unilateral performance of civic action by Marine units. The new procedures required specific approval of proposed civic action projects be obtained through official GVN channels and concurrence be acquired from the Civil Operations for Rural Development Support (CORDS) agency and XXIV organizations before a project was initiated. In 1970, the Psyop/Civic Action AIK funds were halved each quarter beginning on 1 January (but the 1st Marine Division received the III MAF account on 1 April) with the result that the total monthly allocation of funds dropped from \$VN 500,000 in 1969 to \$VN 210,000 subsequent to 1 July 1970. The monthly allocation remains at \$VN 210,000 today, but such funds will be terminated in early May.

However, by measurable comparison, the total 1970 Marine civic action effort showed an increase over that of 1969. This increase resulted from the use in civic action projects of an excess in expendable non-combat-essential construction materials created by the evacuation of cantonments in connection with phased troop withdrawals, and by a significant engineer effort on Vietnamese resettlement projects.

Until the Brigade finally redeploys, civic actions programs will be maintained by materials declared in excess of operational needs and, in keeping with the policy of Vietnamization, will decline in scope and shift increasingly from material assistance to technical assistance until, inevitably, such programs cease to exist.

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30 APR 71

COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

April 1971 saw the cost of civic action undertaken by the Division/Brigade increase almost four-fold from the Division's \$VN 310,000 in March to \$1,190,000, in the process raising the average monthly cost from \$VN 1.08 million at the end of March to \$VN 1.11 million at the end of April. 1st Marine Division/3d Marine Amphibious Brigade projects are supported by the use of expendable non-combat-essential supplies, salvage, the expenditure of monies from the US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund, and voluntary contributions. During April, the three largest expenditure areas were: social welfare, \$VN 416,450; education, \$VN 348,850; and transportation, \$VN 343,750.

Salvage, is now, and will be until the Brigade redeploys, the single significant source of civic action materials. Excess expendable supplies have been exhausted until such time as more may be declared excess. Troop reductions have created excess cantonments and/or buildings which have been salvaged for civic action purposes.

As this remaining source of civic action materials is exhausted, the 3d MAB Civic Action Program will decrease in scope to one of technical assistance only, a not undesirable trend. It is in keeping with Vietnamization, wherein materials and funds are made available through GVN channels rather than U. S. military channels.


30 APR 71

6-5-1

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), CUMULATIVE COST OF CIVIC ACTION, CALENDAR

YEARS 1969/1970/1971

COST (MILLIONS OF \$VN): 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
MILL.\$VN	1.37	0.81	0.44	0.15	0.57	1.82	0.71	0.18	0.99	1.71	1.55	1.54	11.84
1970													
MILL.\$VN	1.37	0.68	0.97	1.32	0.60	1.45	2.23	1.65	1.41	1.30	0.92	2.25	16.15
1971													
MILL.\$VN	1.66	1.27	0.31	1.19									

30 APR 71

G-5-1

PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR) IN DIVISION/BRIGADE CIVIC
ACTION PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

Vietnamese provided 90.0% of the labor for Division/Brigade civic action projects during April 1971, thereby reducing the monthly average thus far in 1971 to 90.6%, compared to an average of 86.7% in 1970 and 74.2% in 1969. Because there were fewer projects during April, Division/Brigade personnel provided only 190 man-days of labor for such projects.

There is no goal or norm as such established for Vietnamese participation in Brigade civic action projects. However, a high degree of participation is desired, not only because it gives the Vietnamese individually and collectively an investment in their own development, but more importantly because it involves an identification with the Vietnamese government. All 3d MAB civic action projects are coordinated with and approved by the GVN at least up to and including Province level, and the projects are primarily attributed to the GVN. 3d MAB participation is limited to material, transportation, engineering and technical assistance not available through GVN channels.

The present high percentage of Vietnamese participation in 3d MAB civic actions projects represents a desirable norm which this command will endeavor to maintain until the Brigade deactivates. Emphasis in the Brigade civic action program is being given to the completion of existing projects and the orderly turnover of areas to other units and organizations. Except for the Child Care Center project in Quang Tri Province and minimal distribution of excess materials, 3d MAB units have completed all civic action projects and are preparing turnover reports to be provided relieving units.


30 APR 71

6-5-2

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) PERCENTAGE OF VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION (LABOR)

IN DIVISION AND BRIGADE CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

PCT OF PARTICIPATION: 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 =====



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
Note 1	1369	1030	1901	637	2298	1772	1353	1764	1188	1542	1649	1595	18,098
% VN PTC	59.3	66.0	83.0	89.0	88.0	85.0	75.0	81.0	75.0	69.0	53.0	67.0	74.2
1970													
Note 1	1546	1673	1680	1494	1220	1381	1160	1106	620	1296	610	545	14,331
% VN PTC	77.0	77.0	83.0	82.5	84.0	80.0	88.0	95.0	93.0	97.0	90.5	93.5	86.7
1971													
Note 1	684	767	387	190									
% VN PTC	90.5	92.0	90.0	90.0									

Note 1: MAN-DAYS OF U. S. LABOR

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G-5-2

VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP, CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

During April, 9,925 Vietnamese patients were treated, an increase of over 6,000 from March. The average number of patients treated per month in 1971 is therefore just over 7,300, compared to over 10,000 per month in each of 1969 and 1970.

In 1970, several organizations, the most significant being the 7th Marines and the 26th Marines, were redeployed from Vietnam. This represented a loss of MedCap/DentCap capability of approximately 25%, both in the number of medical teams and medical supplies available. Since February 1971, additional Division/Brigade units have stood down (including many that have departed), representing a loss of approximately 80% of the capability available in 1969 and early 1970.

In 1969 and early 1970, the primary source of medical supplies was Project Handclasp. A changed public attitude and the reduction of the U. S. Navy presence in MR-1 has resulted in the sharply reduced availability and dependability of procurement of Handclasp supplies. As a result, MedCaps and DentCaps are programmed for and directed to use expendable military medical/dental supplies primarily.

Brigade MedCaps and DentCaps will terminate in May, as no more units will be in a position to engage in these worthwhile civic action endeavors.


30 APR 71

G.S. 3

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN), VIETNAMESE TREATED BY MEDCAP/DENTCAP

CALENDAR YEARS 1969/1970/1971

THOUSANDS OF PATIENTS (CUM): 1969 ——— 1970 - - - - 1971 ———



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
1969													
PATIENTS	8486	7686	7794	11028	10325	10184	12156	6810	14706	14807	11820	13949	129,751
1970													
PATIENTS	14005	12020	11703	9910	8756	10891	11749	11612	10040	7818	8716	8224	125,444
1971													
PATIENTS	8306	7703	3608	9925									

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