


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III Marine Amphibious Force and Naval Component Command Military Assistance Command, Vietnam o/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96601

> ForBul 5060 6P/EHG:jem 13 Aug 1965

#### FORCE BULLETIN 5060

Commanding General Froms To: Distribution List

Subj: Visit By Lt General Victor H. KRULAK, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific to III MAF Area 18-21 August 1965.

(a) ForO 5060.3A Ref:

Encl: (1) Schedule of Events

1. Purpose. To promulgate instructions and to publish a schedule of events for the subject visit in accordance with reference (a).

#### 2. General.

a. The Official Party will consist of: Lt Gen V. H. KRULAK, USMC Col J. A. FEELEY, USMC Col H. J. WOESSNER, USMC Col J. P. LANIGAN, USMC Capt C. T. DOUGAN, USN Capt J. W. MARK, USMC Capt E. F. TOWNLEY, JR. USMC SSgt J. R. BIMBO, USMC

- The Project Officer will be: Maj E. H. GRAHAM, USMC
- 3. Action. The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF (Fwd) and Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (Adv) are requested to provide assistance as necessary to support enclosure (1).
- 4. Self-cancellation. 22 August 1965.

Fullan

Chief of Staff

нСи + 500 DISTRIBUTION:

<b>\</b>	Fo.	$^{\circ}$ Ref.	5060
	13	Aug	1969

# SCHEDULE OF EVENTS FOR LT. GENERAL VICTOR H. KRULAK, CG FMFPAC

	COMPOUND OF PARKING FOR II	RESPONSIBLE STAFF	D. W. W. THOU CO. TO BE SEEN THE SECOND OF T
DATE/TIME 18Aug65	EVENT	SECTION/COMMANDER	REMARKS
1040-1045	Arrive/deplane at Danang AF Ops	Protocol	Mot by CG III MAF, Deputy CG III MAF, Protocol Off. Aide to arrange for baggage pickup.
1045~1100	Enrouts Quarters	Protocol	By sedan for 3dMarDivMD
1100-1130	Discussion of Schedule and perusal of infor- mation folder	CG III MAF	
1130-1230	Luncheon w/CG III MAF, Even THI, Mayor and others by invitation	Aide	
1230-1240	Enroute MarAirFrt	Protocol	By seden fr 3dMarDivMP
1240-1310	Extrouse HOE PHU BAI	CG lstMAW	By Coll? Aircraft. CG istMAW provides aircraft.
1310-1315	Avrive & deplane	CG lstMAW	Met by CO RIM 3/4
1315-1340	Tour BLF 3/4 position	со выт 3/4	By feep or walk as appropriate. CO REC 3/4 furnish transports. tion for all HOE PHO PAI visits.
1340-1400	Speak to Officers and SNCO's (all units)	AC/S G.1 HII MAF	EM Cirel
1400-1410	Tour Ha 4/12	CO 4/12	By jeep or walk as appropriete
1410-1430	Tour LSV	co rea	By jeep or walk as appropriate
1430-1500	Tour EMM-161 & UPS-1 Det	CO RMM-1.61	By jesp or walk as appropriate
1500-1530	Encouse Danang MarAir Fro	CG lstMAW	Py Colly Aimmatt
1530-1540	Envoute FLS?	Probool.	By modern for 3: MarDivMI
1540-1740	Briefing & tour FLSG	CO FLSG	Places progress and problem areas. Visit all functional elements to show supply, storage, salvage, data processing and maintenance. On site briefings of successes and problems, in-cluding AN/TPS 21. Show need for fixed garrision type installations. Show new compound and plans for occupation.
		2.	Eaclosure (1)

**DECLASSIFIED** 

ForBul 506			
DATE/TIME		RESPONSIBLE STAFF SECTION/COMMANDER Protocol	REMARKS By reden for 3dMarDivMT -
1750-1815	Free time in qtrs	Aide	
1813-1900	Cooktails with Staff NII MAF, 3dDiv,lstWing	Aide	By invitation
1,900-2000	Dinner in CG's Mess	Aide	By invitation
2000-2130	Briefing on personnel, matters and civic action	ac/s G-l III Mar	Personnel problems of MAF Staff, Division and Wing to include intra-theater exchange of units, and rotation. Discussion of R&R programs and prospects. Current familities for PX's, Clubs and Messes, and plans for future. Current operations in Civic Action and plans for future.
19 <u>Aug 65</u> 0600-0700	Breakfast in CG's Mass	Aide	
0700-0710	Execute MarAinFrt	Protocol	By sedan fr 3dMarDioMF
073.0-0735	Visit HMM-261, 361 and VMO-2	CG lstMAW	09 letMAW coordinate schedule
0735-0745	Enroute AF Ops	Protocol	By sedan fr 3dMarDivMT
0745-0610	Visit VMCJ-1, VMFA-542 and 513	CG lstMAV	CG letMAW Coordinate schedule
0810-0815	Emplane C-117 at AF Ops	CG letMAW	CG latMAW furmish C-117
0815-0845	Exercute CHU LAI	CG latMAW	By G-117
0845-0950	Arrive & deplene	CG letMAW	By C-117. Land at MAG-12
0850-0920	Four MAG-12	ADC 3dMarDiv	By jeep - observe runway const., flight line and maintenance areas to include Op of LOX Plant, transport parking. RMK project for new jet Sqdn. Troops fr VMA-225 and H&MS Sqdn on Flight Line.
0920-0930	Enroute 7thMar CP	ADC 3dMarDiv	By jesp
		3	Exclosure (1)

Fo:	rBul	5060
13	Aug	1965

			13 Aug 1965
DATE/TIME		RESPONSIBLE STAFF SECTION/COMMANDER ADC 36MarDIV	•
1000-1005	Enplane Helo	ADC 36MarDiv	
1005-1025	Helo tour MLR	ADG 3dMarDiv	By helo fly over all installations to include Bulk Fuel Farm, Amno Dump, RMK Camp and Land at 2/4 position.
1025-1055	Visit BLT 2/4	ADC 3dMerDiv	Talk to as many Marines as time will permit
1055-1105	Emplane and empoute to C&C Co Relo Pad	ADC 3dMarDiv	By helo
1105-1155	Tour Facilities ISU	CO LSU	Include visit with Co."B' C&C and talk to as many patients as time permits
1155-1205	Enroute to 4thMar	ADC 3dMarDiv	By jeep
1205-1245	Lunch with 4thMar	00 4thMar	
1245-1255	Emplane C-117 and	CG lstMAW	CG letMAW furmish C-11.7
1255-1325	Enroute DaNang Mar AirFrt	CG lstMAW	Land at MarkirFrt and emplane in helo.
1325-1335	Enrouse Dallang East	CG 1stMAW	By helo. CG istMAW furnish helo
1335~1345	Briefing on const. plans & progress of Airfield & Airfield Familities	Force Engr.	CO 30th NCR assist as necessary. CO 30th NCR erect fly tent, provide seats and liquid refreshment for guests. Leave in place and have sufficient refreshments for 1510-1535 briefing by CG 1st MAW.
1345-1410	Tour Airfield and MAG-16 site Danaug East	Force Engr.	Tour by jeap
1410-1420	Enroute Hospital site	PCO, USNH	Travel by jeep
1420-1440	Briefing on Medical Aspects of USNH	PCO, USNH	
		4	Emplosure (1)

ForBul	5060
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13Aug65		RESPONSIBLE STAFF	
<u>DATE/TIME</u> 1440-1500		SECTION/COMMANIER CO 30th NCR	REMARKS Tour by jeep if necessary
1500-1510	Emroute DaNang East Airfield Site	CG 1stMAW	Ву језр
1510-1535	Briefing on operational aspects of DaNang East	CG lstMAW	Discuss plans for move, tenancy, and operational use of DaNang East
1535~1555	Enroute Monkey Mt.	CG latMAW	By helo. Tour wis China Beach, 2d ARVN Div GP and 4th ARVN Regt GP
1555~1645	Monkey Mt. tour and briefing	CO 30th NCR	Brisfings by CO 50th NCR on const. and CO let LAAM He on cooupation and operation. Tour to include jeep wrip down road and return.
1645-1715	Enroute III MAF Helo Pad	CG 1stMAW	Helo Harbor town including low level view of Them She Ramp and Red Beach One with emphasis on current officading of ships; note trace of POL line including portion being buried and to be buried; general view of harbor to include close look at Museum Ramp and Causeway intrausit storage area - small boat namp.
1715-1745	Free time in qtrs	Aide	
	Cooktail Party with Marine Advisors to I Corps	SrMarAdv., I Corps AdvGrp	MAG-16 SNCO Club, Maj. GRAY is Project Officer
1845-2000	Dinner with Marine Advisors to I Corps	SrMarAdw., I Corps AdvGrp	HqBn. SNCO Mess
2030-2130	Discussion of Opera- tional matters	AC/S G-3 III MAF/CG lst MAW	G-3 III MAF. Working with and training of RF & PF. Future forces, who, where, when and planned use. Change in LOI to include expanded operations and advisory effort. Ainfield defense plans and organization. GF letMAM

5

Fo	rBul	5060
		1965

DATE/FIME	EVENT	RESPONSIBLE STAFF SECTION/COMMANDER	REMARKS Fixed wing sortic rates and leads, considering competitive factors which influence them.
20 <b>A</b> ugó5 0500-0545	Breakfast in CG's Mass	Aide	
0545-0555	Enroute MarAirFrt	Protocol	By sedan fr 3dMarDivMP
0555-0715	Enroute QUI NHON		By CG FMFPAC Aimraft
0715-0930	Inspect facilities QUI NYON and visit BMT 2/7	CG TaskForce Alpha	By transportation furnished by CG TaskForce Alpha
0930-	Depart for SAIGON		By CG FMFPAC Aircraft
1040-	Arrive SAIGON		
1045-1100	As scheduled by Col. STEINKRAUS	SrMarLnOff to	
1100-1125	Enroute MACV I		By sedsm
1130-	Call on MajCen ROSSON, D Chief of Staff MACV	eputy	
1145	Call on Gen. WESTMORELAN		
1.200-1.300	Lunch	1	
1300-1445	Briefing at MACV I	J-2, J-3	
1445-1505	Enroute MACV II		by sedan
1505-1610	Briefing at MACV II	J-4	
1610-1625	Erroute TSN Airport		Ry sedan
1630-1800	Depart SAIGON and enroute DaNang Markir	Protocol	Met by CG III MAF, Deputy CG III MAF & Protocol Off.

6

CG 3dMarDiv

Frt

1805-1845 Tour Airfield Defenses

Enclosure (1)

Visit BLT 3/9 & defensive positions enroute III MAF CP

by seden fr 3dMarDiaMF

For	Bal	5060	
1.3	Arg	1965	,

2.7 aug 2.70		RESPONSIBLE STAFF	
<u> 1845-1915</u>	Free time in Qtre	SECTION/COMMANUER	REMARKS
1915-2000	Dinner in CO's Mess	Aide	
2000-2100	Friefing by ISO & CommO	**************************************	In Wing 6-2 Briefing Room
<u>21<b>4</b>0665</u> 063040730	Braakfast in CG's Mess	<b>∆</b> 3 <b>4</b> •	
0730-0735	Emporto III MAF Helo Pad	Protocol	Walk fr 00's Mass. 06 lst MAW furmish Lelo.
0735-0745	Enscute Dalo3	GG 3dMarDiv	By holo provided by CC letMAN
0745-0815	Visit with D-1-3	CC 3dMarDiv	Valk through CP - talk with as many man as time permits.
0815-0825	Emroute III MAF Helo Pad	CG 3dMarDiv	By helo provided by CG letMAW
0825-0830	Emporte III MAF Hq	Protocol.	Walk fr III MAF Belo Pad
0830-0830	Awarda Ceremony at III MAF Eq	AC/S G-1 III MAF	Arrange ceremony w/36MarDiv Band present.
0850-0950	Press Conference	GIB	Coffee & Conf. in CG's Mess
0950-1000	Enroute MarAirFrt	Protocol	By seden in 3dMerDivMT. Aide to errange for plak-up of baggage and delivery to eircraft.
1000-1005	Emplane & depart DeMang		By CG FMFPAC Aircraft

#### LOGISTICS

1. 4th Marines (-) (Rein) are composed of the following units:

HqCo, 4th Marines
1st Bn, 4th Marines
2d Bn, 4th Marines
3d Bn, 3d Marines
Co. A, 1st AmTracBn
Co. B, 3d Recon Bn
Co. B, 3d Anti-Tank Bn
Co. B, 3d Engr Bn
Co. C, 3d Tank Bn

2. 3dMarDiv Operation Order 327-65 established the Artillery Battalion Group and removed 3d Bn, 12th Marines from the task organization of 4th Marines.

## SUMMARY OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

#### 1. 1 August 1965.

- a. Logistical support to the 4th Marines (-) (Rein) is provided by Force Logistics Support Unit #1.
- b. All Tactical Equipment Repair orders with a priority of 2 and 5 are being submitted through this Headquarters for approval prior to being turned in to FLSU //1.

#### 2. 2 August.

a. FMFPac Engine generator contact team instructed fourteen Marines in operation, maintenance and record keeping of generators.

### 3. 3 August.

a. Critical shortage of BA279 for conduct of operations. FISU #1 advises that shipment will arrive 4 August.

#### 4. 6 August.

- a. CO 4th Marines, First Endorsement 4:AWW:cwb, 4400 of 6Aug65 on CO, Co. A, lstAmTracBn ltr PMH:egb 4400 of 28Jul65 forwarded to CO, lst AmTracBn setting forth the deterioration of LVT track suspension system which is attributed to lack of supply support of these items.
- b. Submitted periodic logistics report, setting forth the status and logistical problem areas. These problem areas include the non-availability of Class IV, refrigeration, and lack of response to requisitions for repair parts for communications, motor transport, engineer and tracked vehicles. 466 requisitions with a priority designator of 2 are outstanding.

- c. CG, 3dVarDiv 061340Z set forth the amounts of ammunition to be held on position as follows:
  - (1) Basic allowance of all Class V, except those items listed below.
  - (2) 81mm Mortar 5 DOA
  - (3) 105mm Illum 10 DOA
  - (4) 3.5" Rocket Launcher 4 DOA
  - (5) 106mm RR 4 DOA
- (6) Artillery batteries will maintain 5 DOA on position except as noted above for 105mm illumination.

## 5. 8 August.

a. Experiencing difficulty in obtaining motor transport support. Only about 65% of requirements are being met.

## 6. 12 August.

a. CO 4th Marines 1st Endorsement 4:AWW:jab, 4000 of 12Aug65, forwarded CO 3/3 1tr 6/JEM/bg, 3000 of 25Jul65 to CG 3dMarDiv requesting that patrol boat be made available for use in patrolling the SONG TRA BONG River and VUNG DUNG QUAT Bay.

## 7. 13 August.

- a. Submitted periodic logistics report setting forth:
- (1) The Class IV, refrigeration and repair parts problem previously reported. 474 requisitions with a priority designator of 2 are outstanding.
  - (2) Critical shortage of GAA-3, SAE-10, 30, 50 and GO 90.
- (3) Deterioration in motor transport support available from FISU #1. Only about 65% of requirements are being fulfilled.

## 8. 14 August.

- a. A camp clean up in accordance with III MAF 120810 Aug was conducted. CO 4th Marines ltr 4:AWW:cwb, 4000 of 21Aug65 reported results as largely ineffective from the viewpoint of material salvaged.
- b. CO 4th Marines, 1st Endorsement 4:AWW:cwb, 8000 of 14Aug65 on CO 1/4 ltr 1:RJP:lek, 8093 of 11Aug65 forwarded letter to 3dMarDiv with enclosure of AP Wirephoto showing an M-79 with an apparent modification which permits semi-automatic or automatic fire of up to 3 rounds and and requesting that it be provided to infantry Bn. Second Endorsement by CG

3dMarDiv indicated that correspondence had been originated to Headquarters Marine Corps requesting that modified launchers be made available to this Division.

c. CO 4th Marines ltr 4:AWW:jab, 4000 of 14Aug65 to CG 3dMarDiv requested material to erect one reinforced five float raft (M4T6) and two 25 horsepower outboard engines or one bridge erection boat. This requirement was generated by the inability of existing bridges to support tanks engaged in tactical operations to the North and South of the regimental TOAR. The subject float raft would permit tanks to be moved across the SONG TRA BONG and AN TAN rivers.

#### 9. 15 August to 22 August.

a. Motor Transport contact instruction team from FMFPac visited all regimental units and instructed on maintenance procedures.

#### 10. 25 August.

- a. Submitted Logistics summary to CG 3dMarDiv. Significant items included:
- (1) "A" rations. Received in very limited quantity and on a sporadic basis and have consisted of bread, eggs and fresh meat. Apples and oranges were available on three occasions. No fresh vegetables other than potatoes have been received.
- (2) Lack of repair parts for communications, engineer, motor transport and tracked vehicles continue to deteriorate the material readiness of this command.

#### 11. <u>27 August</u>.

a. CO 4th Marines ltr 21:BDC:cwb, 4400 of 27Aug65 advised CG 3dMarDiv of status of 60mm Mortars. 2d Bn, 4th Marines has eight complete mortars. 1stBn, 4th Marines and 3d Bn, 3d Marines, each have five incomplete mortars.

#### 12. <u>28 August</u>.

a. Base Loading Report submitted 28 August. Personnel in units:

183 officers, 4630 enlisted. Reported following percentages of rations fed by type: MCI - 25% "B" - 67%; "A" - 8%, which consisted of bread, eggs, fresh meat, and one serving of grapefruit. No fresh vegetables other than potatoes have been received to date.

#### 13. 29 August.

a. Combat Essential Equipment Report submitted. The following precentages of major essential combat equipment are on involuntary deadline.

(1) Communications 18%

(2) Motor Transport 28%

(3) Engineer 38%

(4) Ordnance 12%

#### 14. 31 August.

a. CO 4th Marines ltr 4:AWW:jab, 4490 of 31Aug65 advised CG 3dMarDiv of present outstanding requisitions for Class IV material to include bunker and modular shelter requirements. The following additional requirements were indicated.

- (1) Concertina wire 1200 ea.
- (2) Bag, Burlap 338,000 ea.
- (3) Staples 10,000 ea.



LOH MARTINES - (-) (REIN) OHU LAI, VIETNAM 18 AUG 65

REF: (A) MAPS, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS, L701, SHEETS 675711, 4757111, 6757IV, 6756IV.

(B) 3D MAR DIV (-) (REIN) OP ORDER 321A-65

(C) 3D MAR DIV (-) (REIN) OF ORDER 327-65 (D) 3D MAR DIV (-) (REIN) OP ORDER 328-65 (E) 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) FRAG ORDER 6-65 (F) 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) FRAG ORDER 7-65 (G) 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) FRAG ORDER 10-45

TIME ZONE: H

#### 1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES: SEE CURRENT ISUMS.

#### B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

- (1) SEE REFERENCE (G)
- (2) HQ COMPANY (~) 7TH MARINES, PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUPPLIES IN CLASS V AND CLASS V-A DUMPS, SOUTHEAST OF THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD.
- (3) FLSU #1, PROVIDE 204 PERSONNEL TO CO, 4TH MARINES TO ASSIST IN MANNING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD.

### C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.

- (1) 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) AND 3D BN, 3D MARINES (-) (REIN) DETACHED TO CO 7TH MARINES, EFFECTIVE 171800H.
- (2) 1ST BN 7TH MARINES (-) (REIN) ATTACHED TO CO. ATH MARINES. EFFECTIVE 171800H.
- (3) COMPANY H, 9TH MARINES, COMPANY L, 4TH MARINES AND COMPANY A 3D RECON BN ATTACHED TO 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN), EFFECTIVE 171600H.
- (4) COMPANY C, 1ST BN, 7TH MARINES (-) (REIN) ATTACHED TO 1ST BN. 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) EFFECTIVE 1808OOH.

#### D. ASSUMPTIONS.

- (1) THAT THE VO HAVE THE CARABILITY TO ATTACK, THE CHU LAI ENCLAVE IN STRENGTH UP TO EIGHT BATTALIONS,
- (2) THAT IF THE VC ATTACK, THEY WILL ATTACK DURING THE PERIOD 18-25 AUGUST IN COMMEMORATION OF THE RELEASE OF VIET NAM FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION,
- (3) THAT IF THE VC ATTACK, THEY WILL ATTACK THE CHU LAI AREA IN SIGNIFICANT STRUCKER TO SELZE MO DESIRED THE ALBERT DECEMBER.

CRET

(4) THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE ATTACK WILL BE THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ITS SUPPORTING FACILITIES.

UNCLASSIFIED 2. MISSION. ATH MARINES (-) (REIN) CONTINUE TO DEFEND AIRFIELD AND MOULARY FACILITIES CONTINUE TO OCCUPY AND DEFEND ALONG TRACE OF THE MLR IN THE REGIDENTAL TAOR, CONDUCT GOUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE COMPANY IN A REFLEX STATUS (ONE HOUR) FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN THE DIVISION AREA

#### 3. EXECUTION:

#### A. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION.

- (1) ATH MARINES (-) (REIN) CONTINUES TO DEFEND THE CHU LAI TAOR BY DEFENDING ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR AROUND THE AIRFIELD AND SUPPORTING FACILITIES, BY MANNING AN AIRFIELD DIFFISE PERIMETER AROUND THE FIELD, INSIDE THE MLR, AND BY CONDUCTING AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING AND MOBILE OUTPOST AS WELL AS MANNING COMBAT OUTPOSTS.
- (2) DURING THIS PERIOD, 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (\_) (REIN) AND 3D BN, 3D MARINES (\_) (REIN) WILL BE ABSENT FROM THE TAOR WHILE PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION "STARLIGHT". SEE REF (D).

## B. 1ST BN. ATH MARINES (-) (REIN)

- (1) CONTINUE TO OCCUPY AND DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF THE REGIMENTAL TAOR, REINFORCED WITH 1 COMPANY FROM 1ST BN. 7TH MARINES.
- (2) MAINTAIN OPLR WITHIN SECTOR.
- (3) MAINTAIN AN INCREASED DEFENSIVE POSTURE DURING THIS PERIOD.

## C. 2D BN. ATH MARINES (-) (REIN)

- (1) CONTINUE TO DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN THE CENTER PORTION OF THE REGIMENTAL TAOR REINFORCED WITH COMPANY L 3D BN. 4TH MARINES, COMPANY H 2D BN, 3D MARINES AND COMPANY A 3D RECON BN.
- (2) MAINTAIN OPLR WITHIN SECTOR.
- (3) CONDUCT RECOMMAISSANCE PATROLLING FORWARD OF THE MLR, AND UP TO THE LIMIT OF THE REGIMENTAL RAOR.
- (A) MAINTAIN AN INCREASED DEFENSIVE POSTURE DURING THIS PERIOD.

#### D. 1ST BN. 7TH MARINES.

- (1) CONTINUE TO OCCUPY AND DEFEND IN PRESENT POSITION ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
- (2) MAINTAIN OPLR WITHIN SECTOR.
- (3) MAINTAIN TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT TO CHECK AND CONTROL MOVEMENT



OF CIVILIANS AND VEHICLES THROUGH SECTOR.

COMDUCT AND M INTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF SEAWARD APPROACHES WITHIN SECTOR TO REPEL OVERT LANDINGS AND PROHIBIT INFILTRATION.


- (5) HATHTAIN AN INCREASED DEFENSIVE POSTURE DURING THIS PERIOD.
- (6) DETACH 1 COMPANY TO 1ST BN. ATH MARINES DURING THIS PERIOD.
- E. 3D BN. 12TH MARINES. NO CHANGE.

#### F. COLPANY C. 3D TANK BATTALION.

- (1) PROVIDE 1 PLATOON IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE 1 HEAVY SECTION IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (3) PROVIDE 1 LIGHT FLAME SECTION IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (...) (REIN).
- (4) PREPARE DETAILED PLAN FOR TIMEDIATE REACTION IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERATTACK OPERATIONS, UTILIZING HEADQUARTERS SECTION TANKS.
- (5) PROVIDE ONE (1) TANK FROM HEADQUARTERS SECTION TO MAG 12 FOR BEACH DEFENSE.

#### H. COMPANY B (-) (REIN). 3D AT BN.

- (1) PROVIDE 1 PLATOON IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE 1 LIGHT SECTION IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 2D BN, 4TH MARINES (...) (REIN).
- (3) ON ORDER PROVIDE 1 HEAVY SECTION FROM PLATOON IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO 19T BN, ATH MARINES TO REINFORCE REGIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY.



#### SECRET

I. 4 CO ( ) (RHIN), 1ST AVIRAC BN

-tra constant

NO CHANGE

J. CO B (REIN), 3D ENG BN

NO CHANGE

#### K. REGIMENTAL RESERVE

- (1) COMPANY B (REIN), 3D RECON BN
  - (a) OCCUPY POSITIONS OF THE RESERVE COMPANY AROUND THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD.
  - (b) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE ANYWHERE WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR. AS DIRECTED BY CO LTH MARINES.
  - (c) BE PREPARED FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT AS A HELICOPTER-BORNE ASSULT FORCE.
  - (d) BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE REGIMENTAL COUNTERATTACK TO LIMIT ANY ENEMY PENETRATION, OR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN ENEMY WEAKPOINT.
  - (e) MAINTAIN A REFLEX STATUS (1 HOUR) FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN THE DIVISION AREA.

#### L. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE DURING THE PERIOD 18-25 AUGUST ONLY.
- (2) ALL PATROLLING WILL BE COORDINATED WITH ADJACENT UNITS.
- (3) ALL DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WILL BE ORGANIZED. IN DEPTH MINEYER POSSIBLE, AND WILL PROVIDE FOR ALL AROUND SECURITY UTILIZING TERRAIN TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.
- (4) ALL UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWLEDGE OF DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS AS PER MY FRAG ORDER 7-65.
- (5) ALL UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNTER-ATTACK PLAN AS PER MY FRAG ORDER 7-65.
- (6) BLACKOUT CONDITIONS WILL EXIST DURING THIS PERIOD.
- (7) ALL UNITS WILL MAINTAIN AN INCREASED DEFENSIVE POSTURE WITH AT LEAST 50% ALERT AT ALL TIMES DURING THE PERIOD.
- (8) ANY ENEMY PENETRATION WITHIN THE MIR WILL BE REPORTED BY FLASH MESSAGE.

SECRET

#### SECRET.

- (9) ALL UNITS IN THE REGIMENTAL REAR AREAS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY.
- (10) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, REMAIN THE SAME.
- (11) 1ST BN, 7TH MARINES WILL BE FURNISHED ALL NECESSARY DOCUMENTS REFERENCED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE PERIOD THIS ORDER IS IN EFFECT.
- (12) REPORT ANY CONFLICT TO CO, ATH MARINES (-) (REIN)
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE.
- 5. COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS. NO CHANGE.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

JAMES F. MC CLANAHAN
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING

#### ANNEXES:

A. DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX A (DISTRIBUTION)

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4TH ARINES (\_) (REIN) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 003/20-65 18 AUG 65

## ANNEX A (DISTRIBUTION) TO FRAG ORDER 11-65

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CO, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES	5
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DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX A (DISTRIBUTION) TO FRAG ORDER 11-65

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R. L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC
S-3

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# HEADQUARTERS 4th Marines (\*) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FAF c/e FFO San Francisco, 96601

13 August 1965

From: CO, Lth Harines (-) (Rein)
To: OG, 3d Harine Division (FWD)

Subj: 4th Marines After Action Report 2-65, "Operation Thunderbolt".

- Hef: (a) 3d Harine Division Operation Phan 321A-65
  - (b) 4th Marines Operation Plan 304-65
- Encl: (1) Identification of units involved and strengths
  - (2) Casualties
  - (3) Narrative ascount of action
  - (4) Summary overlay of action
  - (5) Problems encountered and lessons learned
  - (6) Areas requiring additional training or attention
  - (7) 3d Bm, 3d Harines Operation Plan 10-65 w/sh #1
  - (8) 3d Bn, 3d Marines After Action Report
  - (9) ARVN Operation Plan # C-703 musery
  - (10) ARVN Operation Overlay
  - (11) 3d Bm, 12th Marines, problems encountered and lessons learned muss my
- 1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.
- 2. Operation "THUNDERBORF", Seference (b) was a combined search and clear operation with the 4th Marines, Gommand Group, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (Rein), UBMC, the 3d Battalion, 51st Regiment, Marine Division, ARVN, and the 3d Marine Battalion, Victnamese Marine Corps. Narrative Summary ( See Encl 3).
- 3. The combined operation took place between O60430H and O71500H August 1965.

  USMC advance elements were in position by O51645H. Advance elements of the

  ARVN Forces were in position at O60645H. ARVN units departed the area at

  O71215H, while the last USMC units departed O71500H.

- 4. The search and clear operation was conducted in the Quang Ngai Province, Binh Son District. The area swept is bounded by coordinates BT 500885, South to BT 500840, Northeast to BT 626876 Northwest to BT 597926, and Southwest to BT 500885. See Encl (4) for details of the area.
- 5. Minor casualities were received by both USMC personnel and ARVN personnel. Enemy casualities were likewise minor. See Encl (2).
- 6. Approximately 1965 personnel took part in the combined operation. See Encl (1).

W. E. MELBY Executive Officer

#### IDENTIFICATION OF UNITS AND STRENGHTS

		OFFICERS	ENLISTED
A,	Det, Hq Co, 4th Marines	10	87
B.	3d Bn, 3d Marines	34	476
C.	C Co, 3d Tank Bn	1	18
D.	3d Bn, 12th Marines	10	114
E.	Det, Hq. 51st Regt, ARVN	n	21
F.	3d Bn, 5let Regt, ARVN	6	522
G,	3d Bm, Vietnamese Marine Corps	7	450
H.	U.S.A. Advisors	3	1
I.	U.S.A. HU-LB Personnel	4	4
J.	MAG-12	102	84_
K.	Total	168	1777

## CASUALITIES

#### A. Friendly.

			USNC	3/51 ARYN	34 Marines ARVN
	1.	KIA	O	o	o
	2.	MIA	2	0	o
	3.	Heat Casuality	52	O	o
	4.	VN National wounded	0	0	1
,	5.	Weapons captured	0	0	O
B.	Ene	my (Viet Cong)			
	1.	Killed	٥	0	4
	2.	Wounded	1	0	o
	3.	VC captured	0	0	O
	4.	VCS	5	4	O
	5.	Weapons captured	2#	0	<b>34</b> *

<sup>2</sup> M-1 Carbines

ENGLOSURE (2)

<sup>1</sup> M-1 Carbine

<sup>1</sup> Czech LMG 1 Thompson sub MG

#### NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ACTION

Advance elements of the 4th Narines Command Group which included the Communications Officer and 15 enlisted, traveled to the village of Binh Sen at 051645H. Regimental CP communications were established by 052030H in the ARVN compound in Binh Son. The second element of the advance party of the 4th Marines CP group departed Cha Lai enclave, at 060430H by armor supported truck convoy. The convey arrived at 060635H at the Binh Son District Headquarters compound (BT 595918), and the internal functions of the CP, were established by 060645H (Item 1, Encl 4). Simultaneously, the ARVN CP was co-located, and USMC counterparts were located there in. This was necessary to assure close liaison throughout the combined operation.

Between 060650H & 060700H K Battery 3d Bn 12th Marines fired the artillery preparation for the 3d Hattalion, 51st Regiment, 2d Division, ARVN (3/51st). ( Item 2, Enol4). At 060703H, the 4th Marines Command Group arrived at the CP via helicopter. The first of three helicopter waves carrying elements of the 3/5lat under the protective cover of 2 armed HU-1B helicopters touched do'wn in 12 FOX at 060705H. By 060735H, all elements of the 3/51st had landed and moved into a blocking position at (BE 557874). Meanwhile, elements of Marine Air Group 12 (MAG-12) commenced an air prep on landing some WOLF (BT 523854) and landing zone REAR (BT 504869) ( Item 3 and 4 ). Upon completion of the air prep, at 060749H, the let wave of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines (3/3), touched down. The 1st elements of the 3d Battalion RVN Marines (3d Bn RVN HAR) landed in LZ BEAR twenty minutes later. First contact was made by members by Company I, when they apprehended naked and unarmed a-VCS beneath the surface of the water in a rice patty. (Item 4, Encl 4). He was discovered when he was forced to surface for air. By 060905H, all heliborne units had touched down and were moving northeast in their assigned

sectors. First impoming small arms fire was received at 060905H from the village of Tra Binh (BT 535858). Company I sent a pairol to investigate and found nothing (Item 5 knol 4). Klements of the 3/51st reported within 15 minutes that they had observed a VC platoon move from (BT 543858) to (BT 548858) (Item 6 & 7 Encl 4). However, this unit was never reported again throughout the remainder of the operation. At 060940H, one of the ARVN A0's reported one or two VC platoons moving in column at (BT510875) (Item 8 Enol 4). However 3d Bn. RVN MAR operating in that vicinity could not confirm the sighting. It is believed that the AO may have mistaken friendly units as VO elements. The second contact was once again made by Company I when one of its patrols discovered 4 VCS and 3 VC packs hidden in the brush at (BT 533857/(Item 9 Encl 4). The packs contained both civilian and uniform articles of clothing, medicine, cooking utensils, rice bags, cinnamon logs, VN National ID sards, and letters to parents and samethearts. The contents and information pertaining thereto were turned over to CI personnel. Between 060940H and 061000H two reports of a VC company moving NB and parallel to the river at (BT 515857) were received. However USA HU-1B's sent to investigate could not confirm the reports (Item 10 Encl 4). Objective #1 was reached by 3d Bn, RVN MAR at 061015H and 3/3 reached Obj A 15 minutes later. The first on eall artillery mission by K Battery took place at 061050H at (BT \$49862) after the FO with Company M reported a suspected VC platoon in that area. (Item 11 Engl 4). No surveillance of the mission available. The next action of the day was reported when 3d Bm. RVN MAR requested a medical evacuation at (BT 532887). On reaching Obj 2 the CO of the 3d Bn, RVN MAR had ordered oncof the Vietnamese porters to hurry off the road. The porter moved too slowly and the CO attempted to scare him by firing one shot from his carbine at

the ground next to the porters feet. However, unknown to the CO, the carbine was on full automatic, and the weapon crapt upwards with the initial burst of fire. This resulted in the porter getting hit in the groin with one round. (Item 12 Enel 4). At O61100H, The ARVH artillery began prep fires on the 3d Bn RVN, MAR Obj 3, (BT 550890). By this time, 3/3. USMO, had reached (BT 547854) with out establishing enemy contact. Fifteen minutes later a member of B Company, 3d Engineer Battalion, attached to 3/3 USMC, found one US Carbine and 5 magazines at (BT 552861) (Item 13 Enol 4). At 061200H, the front lines were as indicated on Enolosure 4. A second earbine was found at (BT 534857) (Item 14 Encl 4) near a VC with one of his lags severed, presumably as a result of the air prop fires on LZ WOLF. Through one of the interpreters, it was related that this particular VO had reported into the Binh Son District the previous evening. He was turned over to the Counter Intelligence personnel. By O61222H, the 3d Bn RVN, Marines had reached Obj 3 with no contact. From Obj 3 they reported VCS moving South to North at (BT 555905) (Item 17 Enel 4). ARVN artillery was called in and adjusted (Item 18 Enel 1). No casualities were confirmed. A few moments later, Company I received approximately 12 rounds of small arms fire at (BT 532865). A search patrol was dispatched to the area but did not make contact. (Item 15 Encl 4). However at the same time. Company L reported finding 6 bounding type anti-personnel mimes at (BT 51:7856). Engineers attached to the company destroyed the minesin place (Item 16 Encl 4). By 061301H, 3/3, USMO, had reached Phase Line Alpha (PL-A), and as yet had sustained no casualities. At O613kOH, the Regimental CP received theffollowing message from CO of 3/3: "Termain is rigorous, movement slow, heat oppressive. Companies holding on PL-A". Twenty minutes later, the 3d RVN Marines and 3/51 ARVN began moving to objectives 3 and

B respectively. (See Encl 10). Upon movement by the 3d Bn RVN Marines, a report was received that approximately 600 civilians were following behind the last elements of the unit on the road paralleling the Song Tra Bong River. The refugees were fleeing from VC terrorist the axis of advance under the protection of RVN Marines. 3/3 held on PLA for 12 hour due to the obpressive heat. At the same time, lst elements of the 3d Bn, RVN Harines were reported on Obi 3. Forty five minutes later, the 3/51st reported they were on Obj B (BT 565880). As 3/3 continued to move they reported that their total heat easualities now numbered 39. As the 3d Bn RVN Harines approached Obj i, they requested an artillery mission against VO on a sand island in the Song Tra Bong River (BE 571911). (Item 19 Encl 4). 155mm Howltsers bombarded the sand island, and the RVN Marines reported that the VC had been dispersed. During this same period, USA HU-1B helicopters conducted an air strike against VC's in holes and ditches around a dike in the vicinity of (BT 558903). (Item 20 Encl 4). The mission was reported as being successful. From Obj 4, the 3d Bn, RVN Marines ordered a pa trol into the village of An Diem (7) at (BT 568905) to search and elear, the area prior to establishing their might defensive positions. By late afternoon, 061620H, the 3d Bn, RVN Marines made the third VO contest of the operation at (BT 565897). At this location elements of the Battalian received incoming hand grenades. Moving shead about 300 meters, they shot and killed one VO and captured historians (Item 21 Encl 4). By 061645H, 3/3 USMC had reached PL B and prepared for resupply and assumption of their might defensive positions. 2 Helicopters began moving in Howters to assist the Battalien in its defensive fires. The Howters were in place and ready to fire by 061900H. Upon completion of the Howter emplement, K battery 3/12 displaced back to their initial positions without the Chu Lai area.

At 061750H, the 3d Bn RVN Marines decided to move to PL C. While moving forward, they became engaged in a small fire fight with a reported W platoon, at (BT 567904). A Osechoslovakian LMG was captured (Item 22 Encl 4). No casualities were reported on either side. At 061735H, the 3d Bn RVN Marines called for an air strake. Forty-five minutes later, two Phantom jets arrived and commenced a run on the target located at (Bf 561916)(Item 23 Encl 4). VC troops were reported to be in a building in that area. Results of the strike were negative. By 061750H, the Idualt of Advance (LOA) for D-Day was established as follows; 3d Bn RVN Harines (BT 570904). 3/51st ARVN (BT 574880), and 3/3 USMC (BT 578860). (See Enel 4). Another air strike utilizing HU-1B's was called by 3d BnRVN Mar against VC moving at (BT 570910) (Item 24 Encl 4). A patrol in the area, upon completion of the strike, found three VC dead and one Thompson sub machine gun. During the consolidation of the defensive positions, 3/3 USHC sustained its first and second casualities. At 061845H at occrdinates (BT 572850) (Item 25 Enol 4) two Marines were wounded slightly after one of them had activated a mine. The mine was of pressure type, non-fragmentation and low explosive content. One Marine was evacuated to 3/3 Battalion Aid Station while the second was treated by the Company Corpsman and returned to his unit. At 061850H, the 3/51st ARVH reported having received small arms fire from (BT 578888) (Item 25 Enel 4). A HU-1B strike was called for, but the aircraft were unable to locate the enemy and returned. Upon completion of resupply, howter emplement and Hal registration, 3/3 USMC assumed its night defensive positions. At 062345H, 3/51 reported incoming 61mm morter shells, about 1200 meters to their rear, Rounds had come from 3/3 USMO as they were firing H&Is. Further investigation reveiled that the H&I rounds were falling within 3/3's defensive sector. The remainder of the every was uneventful. Ammunition expended during the night for H&I fires totaled

155 HE and 3 WP rounds from HOWTAR (107mm) and 32 HE from the 81 mm mortars.

at 070650H, and upon initiation of HOWFAR retraction, 3/3 USMC began moving toward PL C Company I on the North and Company M on the South. By 070805H, the Battalion reserve elements completed the HOWTAR retraction and began moving forward. At 070820H, the 3d Bn RVN Marines began moving and the 3/51st moved out at 070860H. There was no VC contect that morning. Howing forward, 3/3 USMC found 1 Chi Com fragmentation grenade at (BT 581866) (Item 27 Encl 4) which was blown in place by engineer personnel. The grenade was found along a trail upon which the 107 mm mortars had fired H&I during the evening. At 071025H ARVN S-3 reported about 1000 refuges entering the village of Binh Song behind the 3d Bn RVN Marines. At 071059H companies I and M crossed PL-F and began securing the landing site for retraction operations (Item 28 Encl 4). At approximately 071100H, an intersive small arms fire fight was heard at (BT 588913). The 51st Regimental Sempany reported the 3d Bn RVM engaging a platoon of VC. However, later reports indicated that the CO of the 3d RVN Marines had ordered one of his companies to conduct a live fire problem on the hill at the above mentioned coordinates. In actuality no VC's were seen, and the firing was an "in the field practice" of a platoon in the assult. By 071126H the 2 ARVN Battalions had resched their LOA for D+1 and were arranging for their motor servey back to Quang Ngai. At 071215H the ARVN CP closed and departed the compound. By 071300H all 3/3 USAC units had reached PL-F and were ready for helicopter retraction. the movement took place without incident and the CP displaced back to the Ohu Lai area at 071425H. The operation was considered a success. The minimum contact made was handled effectively.

## PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED & LESSONS LEARNED.

#### 1. AIR

## A. PROBLEMS."

1. Marine Air Group 12 (MAG-12) assigned to support the operation unilaterally, changed the landing plan. The operation, order provided for the use of 30 Helicopters, as follows: All 30 to pick up the 3/51st from Quang Ngai and land them at LZ FOI. Continue on to LZ LOOM and pick up 3/3 USMC for delivery to LZ MOLF. Instead of 30 Helicopters, the Group made 1/2 available and assinged them missions as follows: 12 to Quang Ngai to pick up the 3/51st, and 27 to LZ LOOM to pick 3/3 USMC.

As a result, Regiment was unaware of the change in plans and noted that all of the 3/51st had not yet landed when the 1st elements of 3/3 USEC began landing. The Regimental Commander was not informed of such plans, and accordingly was forced to initiate many messages to become aware of what was taking place.

2. The operation order stated that "at a time designated by CO 3/3 afternoon of D-Day, is tubes of (HOWTAR), 107 mm, will be feli-lifted into a night defensive position within the some of action." However, at approximately 1600H the supporting helicopter squadron, began lifting the HOWTARS to 3/3's position. 3/3 however, was not at their evening defensive location at that time and was, unable to receive the artillery. The helicopters were told to return to Chu Lai by the Battalion Commander. Approximately 35 minutes later, 3/3 was in position and ready to receive the HOWTARS, thus, a second lift was required.

-13"

ENCOLSURE (5)

#### B. LESSONS LEARNED.

Supporting units cannot, and must not change operation plans. If plans do not develop as initially set forth, appropriate recommendations must be submitted for consideration and action coordinated by the CO of the supported organization.

#### 2. ARTILLERY

#### A. PROBLEM.

The TAC Officer furnished by the Division for this operation, required the Regiment to change the frequencies, from those specified in the operation plan. The change was ordered the night proceeding D-Day. Two PO teams and two FAC teams had already been dispatched to Quang Ngai to corrdinate with the units they were to support during the operation.

(3/51st and 3d Bn RVN Marines) As a result it was necessary to transmit the frequency changes in the clear over the radio nets.

#### B. LESSON LEARNED.

Utilize TAC personnel organic to the supporting unit of the Regiment.

There are a sufficient number of these qualified personnel familiar with
the terasin and acquainted with the operations of the Regiment.

#### C. PROBLEM

The ARVN Forces do not have a FSCC as the US Marine Corps knows it. Some confusion was caused when 4th Marines desired to employ ARVN articlery and when RVN Forces requested use of our supporting arms. Interpreter type liaison Officers helped overcome the problem of supporting arms usage between units.

#### D. LESSON LEARNED.

Although the ARVN do not have a sophisticated FOSS, close liaison was maintained with ARVN artillery personnel throughout the operation.

Future combined eperations enhance the cross-education of forces involved ENGLOSURE (5)

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and should close in the gaps of Language barrier and tectics and techniques.

## 3. COMMUNICATIONS.

#### A. PROBLEMS

Long distances and rough terasin between the CP and subordinate element, made Command communications very difficult on the previous operation.

( Lein Keit # 4)

## B. LESSON LEARNED.

An airborne relay station was established for Regiment (FM TAC MET). The relay operated from dawn to dusk without difficulty. A highly skilled sideband (PRC-LT) team was attached to the Sattalion for use on the Regimental (SSB) TAC net. Set up and breakdown time was less than two minuste. Reports flowed without difficulty using this this method. This proved that PRC-LT's can be used very effectively in a fact moving situation.

## C. PROBLEM

A requirement exists to maintain a minimum of five telephone circles from Gr forward positions to the GP rear. ( Located in Chu Lai)

# D. LERSON LEADNED.

This problem was solved by the use of the AM/TRC-27, radio relay. This method worked adequately with only minor equipment difficulty ever a distance of 11 miles. It is felt that this is an excellent means of front to rear communications.

## E. PROBLEM

A requirement existed to maintain radio circles to Division Forward and Regimental Rear throughout the entire operation.

### F. LESSON LEARNED.

This problem was met by the employment of two(2) single sideband (8SB) radios and omr. Findlet at the Binh Son compound. This procedure worked well throughout the operation.

#### G. PROBLEM.

The close premimity of assigned radio frequencies between the Regimental FM tactical net and the armed HU-18's, caused much confusion and transmission interference. Frequency changes to alternate nets failed to alleviate the unfavorable situation. It is to be noted that the tactical arrangement of the Command Poet, at Binh Son, revetments, bunkers and trenshes, dictated the location of equipment.

#### H. LESSON LEARNED.

Tac Nets and HU-LB Air Nets must be at least five megacycles apart in lieu of a few tenths as used in this operation. So preclude interference between the air and ground nets.

#### I. PROBLEA.

Due to the routine turnover of personnel, several newly school trained operators were utilised during the operation. Their initial school training was imadequate for handling fast operational tactical nets in the field.

#### J. LESSON LEARNED.

Additional training in rapid field radio voice procedure through OJT or actual field operation work is necessary, and will be undertaken by the Regiment.

4. Problems encountered and lessons learned by the 3d Bm, 3d Marines (-) (Rein), See Emelosure 8, 3/3 After Action Report.


5. Provious encountered and lessons learned by the 3d in, 12 Harines, (See Enclosur 11).

-5-

## AREAS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL TRAINING OR ATTENTION

1. Additional on the job training continues throughout the Regiment, in Guerrilla warfare, and operations in high temperature, high humidity areas. Patrolling and ambush operations are conducted daily, and each day more lessons are learned. Problem areas brought forth as a result of the operation have received Command attention, and solutions have or are being reached. Belations with the ARVN Forces continue to grow stronger with each combined operation, in-

-1-



3d (vin) 3d Marines CHU LAI, VIETNAM 031200H August 1965

3D BN, 3D MARINES

Operation Order 10-65

S&C # 057-65 COPY -20-08 -66-

Ref: (a) 4th Marines Operation Order 304-65

(b) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 675711,6757111 67561, 67561V

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).

### 1. BITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)

#### b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 4th Marines(-) (Rein) continues to defend CHU LAI airfield and in conjunction with elements of the 51st Regiment, 2d ARVN Division will conduct combined search and destroy operations South of the TAOR.
- (2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides CAS and helicopter support as required.
- (3) 3/51 ARVN conducts search and destroy operation in zone to left (North)

#### (4) Artillery

- (a) One Platoon, "K" Btry, 4th Bn. 12th Marines, direct support during D-Day and D+1.
- (b) 107mm Howtar Btry and one (1) 8" Howitzer direct support night of D-Day.
- (c) 1st Plat. 8" Howitzer Btry FMF direct support on D+1.
- (5) 3d Plat., (Rein) Company "A", 3d Tank Bn., direct support. Prepares for commitment in 3/3 zone on order. Reinforced with flame section, blade tank and retriever.
- 2. MISSION. 3d Bn. 3d Marines lands by helicopter in handing Zone WOLF and conducts search and destroy operations in assigned zone.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Concept of Operation)

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# b. Company "I"

- (1) Commencing L-Hour on D-Day land by helicopter in LZ WOLF.
- (2) Secure Landing Zone.
- (3) On order, attack eastward to sieze and occupy left (East) half Battalion Objective Λ.
- (4) Search hamlet of TRA BINH (BS 532860) for Viet Cong personnel, equipment, weapons and supplies.
- (5) Be prepared to continue the attack to Battalion Objective B on order.

# c. Company "L"

- (1) Land in LZ WOLF in accordance with Appendix (1) (Sequence of Events) to Annex & (Concept of Operations) to Op Order 10-65.
- (2) Seize and occupy high ground vicinity (BS 538865).
- (3) Maintain visual contact with Company "I".
- (4) Be prepared to continue the attack to seize that portion of Battalion Objective B in zone.

#### d. Company "M"

- (1) Land in LZ WOLF in accordance with Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events), to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Op Order 10-65.
- (2) Seize and occupy right (West) half of Battalion Objective A
- (3) Maintain visual contact with Company "I".
- (4) Be prepared to continue attack on order.

# e. 81mm Mortar Plat., H&S Company

- (1) Land two (2) sections in LZ WOLF in accordance with Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events) to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Op Order 10-65.
- (2) Occupy firing positions vicinity of LZ WOLF.
- (3) General Support
- (4) Be prepared to employ remainder of platoon for defense on night of D+1.

\*\*9

CONSTRUCTION

# f. Battalion Reserve. Company "K"

- (1) Land in LZ WOLF in accordance with Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events) to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 10-65.
- (2) Move to Battalion Objective A.
- (3) Provide security for Bn Command Group.
- (4) Be prepared for employment anywhere in Battalion Zone.

## g. Coordination Instructions

- (1) L-Hour to be announced.
- (2) D-Day 5 August 1965.
- (3) LOD is LOC
- (4) Contact center
- (5) Companies will report crossing phase lines
- (6) Exercise caution for mines and booby traps.
- . (7) Artillery and mortar smoke by authority of this headquarters only.
  - (8) Enemy will not be bypassed.
  - (9) Spot reports on contact.
  - (10) Annex D (Operations Overlay).
  - (11) Annex F (Fire Support).
  - (12) Annex G (Air Support)

# 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Supply

- (1) General. Unit commanders will obtain initial supplies as needed and directed. The S-4 will be responsible for resupply on D-Day and Delay
- (2) Supplies and Equipment available
  - (a) Class I. Each many will draw one (1) MCI prior to loading This meal will be carried by the individual and consumed for the noon meal on D Day. Helicopter resupply of MCI's will be made as scheduled in subparagraph (4) or on call.

- (b) Class II. Units will turn in shovels, picks and one axe per platoon to the Battalion Supply Officer prior to 1700 4 August 1965. These will be delivered on position prior to darkness on D-Day.
- (c) Class III. Organic vehicles will not be taken.
- (d) Class IV. Fortification material will not be taken.
- (e) Class V. See Annex H (Ammunition Availability Table) to Op Order 10-65 for listing of ammunition availability.
- (f) <u>Water</u>. Each individual will **carry** two (2) full canteens. Water resupply, in five (5) gallon cans will be effected by helicopter as scheduled in subparagraph (4) or on call.

# (3) Control and Distribution

# (a) Class V

- Leach rifleman will carry one hundred (100) rounds of ammunition.
- Each automatic rifleman will carry one hundred and forty (140) rounds of ammunition.
- 3. Each machine gun team will carry eight (8) belts of ammunition.
- 4. Each grenadier will carry twenty-five (25) M-79 rounds.
- 5. Each 3.5 rocket team will carry four (4) 3.5 rockets.
- 6. Grenades and other munitions will be carried at the direction of unit commanders.
- b. Water Cans. All companies deliver fifty (50) water cans to the battalion S-4 prior to 1700 4 August 1965.
- (4) Resupply. Resupply is the responsibility of the S.4. All resupply will be by helicopter and requests must provide adequate lead time. Be specific as to time, coordinates and type and amounts of resupply required. Helicopter resupply is prescheduled as follows:

DATE	TIME	COORDINATES	TYPE OF RESUPPLY
05	1630	BS 573865	Ammunition as requested. One hundred twenty-five (125) full water cans, sufficient MCI's for three (3) meals perman (to be used for evening meal on 5Aug,

06	As Requested		As Requested	
06	0630	BS 573865	One hundred twenty-five (125) full water cans, pick up engineer tools, deliver ammunition as requested.	
05	1800	BS 573865	Pick up empty water cans; deliver additional ammunition as requested.	
			breakfast on 6 Aug and carried as the noon meal on 6 Aug) engineer tools, 81mm Mortars and ammunition. Comm wire as requested.	
DATE	TIME	COORDINATES	TYPE OF RESUPPLY	

Additional helicoper resupply on call. The command group will direct a shift in prescheduled times and coordinates should the existing situation dictate such a change.

- (5) Captured Material. Captured material to be evacuated upon withdrawal. If evacuation is not possible, obtain all pertinent information and items of intelligence value and destroy the remainder.
- (6) Salvage. All inoperative equipment will be salvaged and evacuated.
- b. Evacuation and Hospitalization. All casualties will be evacuated on foot, for evaluation by the battalion surgeon who will be in vicinity of the CP group. After evaluation, casualties will be further evacuated by helicopter as determined by the attending medical officer. All KIA's and less serious casualties will be evacuated by helicopter to the Battalion Aid Station for further processing and treatment. Serious casualties may be helicopter evacuated directly to "B" Medical Company at the discretion of the evaluating medical officer.
- 6. Transportation! No organic transportation will be taken.

# d. Parsonnel

- (1) Strengths. Administrative and support personnel from all companies will remain in the battalion area.
- (2) Prisoners of War. After processing by the Battalion S-2 section. all POW's will be forwarded to the Regimental Collection Point.
- (3) Graves Registration.
  - (a) KIA's will be properly tagged by the unit corpsman, and evacuated to BAS as soon as it is operationally feasible.

- (b) Immediately after processing of a KIA by BAS, the cognizant administrative section will initiate action to close out the man's record book and conduct a thorough inventory of his personal effects.
- (c) KIAMS will be evacuated to Company "B", 3d Medical Battalion, as soon as possible.
- (4) <u>Civil Affairs Military government</u>. There will be no wanton destruction of public or personal property by any member of this organization.
- (5) Interior management. The absence of the Rifle Companies, and selected units from H&S Company, will necessitate a rearrangement of the CP defensive posture for the period of the operation. The meanrangement will be affected by the H&S Company ommander prior the commencement of the operation.

# e. Miscellaneous.

- (1) Individual weapons and equipment of casualties will be tagged and evacuated with the casualty for recovery at the battalion aid station or Co. "B" 3d Medical Bn. in the case of those casualties not evacuated through the battalion aid station. Persons accompany—

  100 evacuees must take positive steps to ensure that weapons and equipment are tagged and recovered.
- (2) Normal arms and equipment with helmet, green side out. Body armor upper torso, optional according to individual choice.
- (3) Property NCO's of units participating will report to the S-4 in the loading zone prior to 0600H on D-Day. These NCO's will assist in the staging and loading of helicopter resupplies and will accompany supplies aboard helicopters to the landing zone where they will supervise and assist in the distribution of such supplies. These NCO's will return to the CP area by subsequent flights where they will continue to effect logistic liaison and exercise supervision and control over helicopter resupply missions for their respective units.
- (4) All personnel take two (2) salt tablets prior to L-Hour. Individual carry an additional ter (10) salt tablets.
- (5) Emphasize control of water cans.
- (6) Report by telephone upon return to the battalion area ammunition expended during the operation.
- (7) The battalion supply officer is the HST commander and will coordinate activities in the loading zone.

- (8) Prior to L-Hour on D-Day the S-1 will furnish the S-4 with strengths of participating units, to include PF and any attachments.
- (9) Unit commanders will insure that all personns under their immediate command have the following items on their person prior to their departure from the battalion area:
  - (a) a complete set of dog tags
  - (b) Geneva Convention Card
  - (c) Identification Card

# 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

- a. Guard radio nets commencing 050530H Aug 65.
- b. Command Posts
  - (1) Command Group initially airborne. When established ashore, CP vicinity (BS540854).
  - (2) Companies report CP locations as established.
- e. Axis of Communications. (BS 540854)(BS 548857) (BS563858) (BS 57086s).
- d. Pyrotechnics
  - (1) Ground to air see Annex G (Air Support) to Op Order 10-65.
  - (2) Red Star Cluster (1) encircled or attacked by the enemy.
  - (3) Red Star Cluster (Continuous fire of three (3) or more signals), request emergency illumination.
  - (4) Green Star Parachute, request ammunition.
  - (5) Green Star (hand held), request evacuation.
  - (6) Red Star Parachute, (hand held), we are withdrawing from this position.
  - (7) Green Smoke, inform us of enemy direction or position.
  - (8) Red Smoke, marking of enemy position.

JOSEPH E. MUIR
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

7

#### ANNEXES

- A Task Organization
- B Intelligence
- C Concept of Operation
- D Operation Overlay
- E Not Used.
- F Fire Support
- @ Air Support
- H Listing of Available of Class V

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3d Bn (Marines CHU LAI, VIETNAM 031200H August 1965

Annex A (Task Organization to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

All attachments effective 050600H August 1965

# 3d Bn 3d Marines

LtCol MUIR

.Det., H&S Co. 3/3
Det., Comm Plat., Hq Co., 4th Mar
Artillery In Sec, Btry "C", 1st Bn, 12th Mar.
Det., Co "B" 3d Engr Bn.
Det., 3d Plat Co "B"., 3d AT Bn

# Company "I"

Capt. WEBB

Co "I"
FO Tm. 81mm Mortar Plat
FO Tm. Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Mar
FAC Tm

## Company "L"

Capt. MC DAVID

Co "L"

FO Tm 81mm Mortar Plat

FO Tm. Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Mar

#### Company "M"

Capt. MORRIS

Co "M"

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat

FO Tm. Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Mar.

# 81 mm Mortar Plat (-) H&S Co

H. GIBSON

Battalion Reserve, (Company "K")

Capt. DOUB

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Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

**A-3**.

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

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3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines CHU LAI, VIETNAM 030900H August 1965

Annex B (Intelligence ) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6757 II, 6757 III, 6756 I and 6756 IV.

Time Zone: H

#### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See enemy situation overlay.
- b. See ourrent Isums and Summaries as issued.

#### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if VC opposition will be encountered during or subsequent to the landing, if so, in what strength?
- b. Do VC forces occupy high ground coord BS 516856 or coord BS 540855 so as to obstruct the landing, and if so, will they defend these areas?
- c. Will the VC be reinforced, if so, when, where, in what strength and by what means?
- d. Determine the identity, strength, composition and disposition of enemy forces located in area of operations. Particular attention to mortar and artillery units.
- e. Determine VC sources of support, supply and routes of infiltration.
- f. Determine if local civilian population will support our forces actively or be passive in their reaction while supporting the VC by covert means.

# 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

#### a. Orders to subordinate units

#### (1) All Companies

- (a) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance missions as directed.
- (b) Particular attention to southern flank of battalion zone of action.

# b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units

# (1) 4th Marines

- (a) Provide information on enemy strength, disposition, and capabilities.
- (b) Provide current information on enemy disposition after operation commences.

## c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Companies will notify this Headquarters (S-2) of evacuation of all VG/VGS, deptured documents and materials including weapons, and any other pertinent intelligence information.
- (2) All evacuation will be through the Battalion Command Post, either forward or rear.

## 4. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

- a. Request following assistance be provided or arranged for by the 4th Marines.
  - (1). Composition of villages within area of operation to include village leaders and/or significant personalities.
  - (2) Provide minimum of two English speaking ARVN interpreters to assist with matters pertaining to intelligence and security.

# 5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIALS

## a. Prisoners

- (1) All VCS will be interrogated by Detachment CI Team at the Battalion Collection Point at coordinates BT 568043 as soon as possible after capture.
- (2) All VCS will be tagged with the standard POW/Equipment Tag. Tags will be filled out as completely as possible.
- (3) Companies will interrogate prisoners for information of immediate tactical information only.

#### b. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

- (1) All captured documents will be tagged with, time, coordinates where found, capturing unit, and description.
- (2) Documents will be evacuated with prisoners and turned over to POW guards at the Battalion Collection Point as soon after capture as possible.

#### C. CAPTURED MATERIAL

- (1) All naterial, except documents and weapons; found on VC and VGS will be left on the individual until he is delivered to the Battalion Collection Point.
- (2) All weapons will be removed from prisoners by the capturing unit, tagged with completed tags, and turned in to Battalion Collection Point as soon after capture as possible.

# 6. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. In accordance with BnO 3800.1C.
- b. Reference (a) is designated as the standard tactical map, employing the UTM grid system.

#### 7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. See section VIII of BnO 3800.1C.

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Executive Officer

#### APPENDIX:

1 - Energy Situation Overlay

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First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps

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
3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines 880 Data VISENAV 838980H August 1985

Appendix I (Therry Siduation Overlay) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Maps: VINTNAM, 1450,000 AMS Certies 14701, Sheets 6757 II, 6757 III, 6756 I and 6756 IV.

Time Zone: H

1. ENEMY SITUATION CV-RGAY



- 1. 80 forholes on sides of road; L-Shaped trench line 1400 feet long south side of rost.
- 2. Possible Aw position on hill top.
- 3. Trench line
- 4. 60 foot trench line
- 5. 60 foxholes
- 6. possible Aw positions (9) along north side of road.
- 7. 3 possitive AW positions
- 8. Underground bunkers.
- 9. Trench line AW position on east end
- 10. AW position
- 11. 2 buildings surrounded by ditch 8 feet wide
- 12. Fortified village centered at BS 528847
- 13. 28 Foxholes
- 14. 32 Foxholes along sides of road
- 15. Fortified village centered at BS 565914
- 16. Helicopter landing area marked with H.
- 17. Extensive trench lines
- 18. Fortified village centered at BS 574839
- 19. L-Shaped trench line
- 20. Fortified village centered at BS 574822
- 21. Possible OP at BS 557823

22. Strong Point centered at BS 555815, AW positions, 4 Mortar positions, armo pit, 19 foxholes along side of road. ARVN type camp centered at BS 554817 with 32 foxholes from BS 554818 to BS 522820 along both sides of road.

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- 23. 25 Foxholes surrounding U/I building 28 feet by 16 feet.
- 24. Trench line centered at BS 544833.
- 25. Two possible AW positions.
- 26. Trench line 925 feet long running NE-SW.
- 27. Possible U/O AA position at BS 568888.

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3d Dn (Rein) 3. Jarines CHU DAN, VIEWNAM 051200H August 1965

Annex C (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Map: VIFTNAM: 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6757II, 6757 XII

Time Zona: H

1. Mission. See Basic Order.

#### 2. Concept

- a. Commencing at L hour on D day, 3/3 lands in a column of companies in LE WOLF.
- b. The initial assault company will secure the landing zone in order to facilitate the rapid entry of the remainder of the battalion.
- o. The second assault company will land, proceed along a direction of attack and seize the right (West) portion of Battalion Obj. A.
- d. The third asscult company will land and proceed along a direction of attack to the high ground vicinity (BS 538865).
- e. The Battalion Reserve will land and occupy positions west of Battalion Obj. A.
- f. Upon completion of the landing the initial assault company will proceed on an exis of advence through the hamlet of TRA BINH and seize the left (East) portion of Battalion Obj. A.
- g. After seizure of Battalion abjective A the battalion will continue the attack on three parallel axes. One company will seize the high ground at (BS 549862); One company will seize the high ground at (BS 559850) followed by battalion reserve.
- h. Two companies attack to the left (North) half of Battalion Objective. R and two companies attack to the right (South) half of the objective.
- i. Upon securing Battalion Objective B three companies will attack on order.
- j. Annex D (Operation Overlay).

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A. G. COMER Major, U. S. Marine Corps Executive Officer

APPENDIX:

1 - Sequence of Events

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Appendix 1 (Sequence of Eve ) to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. The below listed events will occur in the sequence indicated on D-Day:

L - 21 Hours

Reveille

L - 2 Hours

Guard all Madio nets

L - 1 Hour

Assemble Vicinity IZ LOON

L - 1 Hour

Loading zone prepared to Load

L - 15 Min

Load Co. "I"

L - 15 Min'

Artillery c'ommence LZ preparation

L - 1 Min

Artillery ceases preparation

L - Hour

Co. "I" lands in LZ WOLF and secures LZ

L - Hour

Air strike vicinity (BS 536854) to (BS 545855)

L + 15 Min

Co. "M" and Battalion Cmd Gp Load from LZ LOON

L + 30 Min

Co. "M" and Battalion Cmd Gp land in LZ WOLF

L + 45 Min

Co. "L" loads from LZ LOON

L + 1 Hour

Co "L" I ands in LZ WOLF and commences attack

L + 1 Hour

Artillery preps high ground vic (BS 538865)

L + 1 Hours

Co "K" Lands in LZ WOLF

L + 12 Hours

Co. "I" dommences attack

2. L - Hour in this order is touch-down of leading ellements of 3/3 in Landing Zone WOLF.

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
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Annex F (Fire Support Plan) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000 AMS L701 Sheets 6756I, 6757II, 6757III

Time Zone: H

- 1. SITUATION. See basic order.
- 2. MISSION. 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 3d Marines conducts search and destroy operation south of the SONG TRA BONG.

#### 3. EXECUTION.

#### a. Elmm Mortan Platoon

... ......

- (1) General Support
- (2) Land two (2) sections in LZ WOLF and move with CP Group providing on call fire support to rifle companies.
- (3) Carry sufficient rounds to support operation for D\_Day. Resupply by helicopter on evening of D\_Day.
- (4) Embark remaining mortars and personnel with evening resupply on D. Pay.

# b. One Plat. Btry "K", 4th Bn, 12th Marines

- (1) Occupies forward firing positions prior to L-Hour on D-Day and pravidor direct support to 3d Bn 3d Marines.
- (2) Prepares LZ WOLF with Shell HE Fuze VT from L-15 to L-Hour.
- (3) Return to position behind MLR, on order, the evening of D-Day and rescupy a forward firing position to continue in direct support of 3d Bn. 3d Marines on the morning of DHL.
- (4) Pre-Manned concentration for on-call fires (Appendix 1).

# c. 1st 8"Howitzer Plat., 1st 8" Howitzer Btry, FMFPAC

- (1) General Support
- (2) Occupies forward firing positions with "K" Btry kth Bn 12th Mar. on DaDay and provides fire support for Operation Order 10-65.
- (3) Prepare LZ WOLF with Shell HE Fuze VT from L-15 to L-Hour

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- (4) Continues fire support from forward firing position until D+1, on order return to position behind MLR.
- (5) Pre-Planned concentrations for on call fires (Appendix 1)
- d. 107mm Howtar Btry, 3d Bn., 12th Marines
  - (1) Lands in designated LZ on evening of D\_Day.
  - (2) Provides direct support to 3d En 3d Marines on evening of D-Day.
  - (3) On order the morning of D+1, Btry helilifted out of designated LZ and back to position within MLR.
- e. Coordination of supporting arms through4th Marines FSCC.

# 4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- a. FSCC will move with CP group.
- b. Communications. Artillery conduct of fire

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## APPENDIX

1 - On Call Fires

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3d Bn (Reim) 3d Namines CHU LAI, VIETNAM 031200H August 1965

Appendix 1 (On Call Fires) (Arty) to Annex F (Fire Support) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Map; VJMTNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6757II, 6757III, 6756I, 6756W

Time Zone: H

CONCENTRATION #	COORDINATES	TARGET
CC 800	538865	Hill
CC 801	549861	Possible Ambush Area
00 802	553847	Hill
CC 803	559850	Trail
CC 804	569845	Critical Terrain
CC 805	569854	Critical Terrain
<b>0</b> 0 806	57885 <b>8</b>	Critical Terrain
CC 807	562858	Critical Terrain
<b>0</b> 0 808	568861	Critical Terrain
CC 809	<b>5</b> 6886 <b>5</b>	Critical Terrain
CC 810	573868	Critical Terrain
CC 811	548856	Critical Terrain
CC 812	540855	Possible Ambush Area
CC 813	552836	Critical Terrain

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Annex G (Air Support) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 67561, 67561V, 675711, 6 757111

Time Zone: H

#### 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B(Intelligence)

# b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Escort Aircraft, close air support, and helicopters will be furnished by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as required.
- (2) Coordination of all aircraft in area of operations will be by 4th Marines Headquarters.

#### 2. PROCEDURES

- a. Coordination of Supporting Fires. See ref (a) and Annex P
- b. Universal Transverse Mercator (JTM) Grid Reference System Will be used for target location.
- c. Alert Status of Aircraft. All close air support aircraft will be on . thirty (30) minute standby due to condition of SATS at CHU LAI.

#### d. Ordnance

- (1) Bombs M81,250lbs; M82, 500lbs; M83, 750lbs; and napalm.
- (2) Rockets Aero 7D 19 Shot Packs, 2.75"
- (3) Other 20mm Cannon

#### e. Helo Escort

- (1) Helo\_escort will be utilized during landing of troops in LZ FOX, WOLF, and BEAR.
- (2) Helo escort will be utilized during retraction operations on D+1
- f. Suppressive Fires. Suppressive fires will be conducted by escort air-craft, with the first wave into each LZ.
- g. Close Air Support will be on station from L-Hour to L+2.
- h. Marking of Friendly Positions. Display panels or mark with yellow smoke closest friendly unit prior to execution of close air strikes.

# Helicopter Landing Zone Preparation.

- (1) Prior to L-Hour in each helicopter landing zone the zone will be preped utilizing support aircraft.
- (2) Thirty (30) minutes after LZ WOLF is preped hill mass at (BS 538854) will be preped.
- J. Fast Reaction Force. At completion of the helilift of 3d Bn 3d Marines and the ARVN Forces, helicopters will be available for lift of reserve forces into designated LZ.
- k. Airborne Observer. There will be a battalion observer and radio relay aircraft Lab on station during daylight hours. Two (2) radio operators will be furnished from the communication platoon as part of the flight crews.

## Helicopter Landing Zones

- 1. Primary. WOLF 3d Bn 3d Marines (US) (BS 523857)
- 2. Alternate. DOG 3d Bn 3d Marines (US) (BS 512862)
- n. Helicopter Pickup Zone. 3d Bn 3d Marines (BT 512862)
- means available and will include the following information:
  - (1) Number of personnel to be evacuated
  - (2) Nature of injury
  - (3) Pickup coordinates and how zone will be marked
  - (4) LZ secured or not secured commensurate with the situation.
- casualties. All minor casualties of 3d Bn 3d Marines will be taken to the Battalion Aid Station 3d Bn 3d Marines. All serious casualties of 3d Bn 3d Marines will be taken to Company "B" 3d Medical Bn. The color RED on the casualty tag will designate casualties to be transported to Co "B" 3d Medical Bn. BLACK on casualty tag will designate casualties for BAS 3d Bn 3d Marines. The BAS LZ is BCBCAT A.
- Marines serment post (coordinates to be announced) during daylight hours.
- q. Resupply. All resupply requests by helicopter will be submitted to the battalion S-4 who will in turn submit helo requests to the ALO.

Request will include:

- (1) Load to include description, weight, and cube.
- (2) Pickup coordinates (probably BOBCAT), date time group resupply is desired and destination coordinates.
- (3) How LZ will be marked.
- (4) Whether or not unit being resupplied will be up on LZ dontrol frequency.

# 3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS

- a. All 3d Bn 3d Marines nots will be manned on appropriate frequencies.
- b. Location of Control Agencies
  - (1) All Bn control agencies will be foot mobile with the Bn Command Group.
  - (2) 4th Marines control agencies will be located with the 4th Marines Forward Command Group.

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
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Annex H = (Ideting of Available Class V) to accompany Operation . Order 10-65

# Time Zonet H

# 1. The ammunition listed below is available for distribution.

DOD	NOMENCIATURE	NO. ROUNDS
A 124	7.62 tracer	2,000
A 127	7.62 linked	50,400
A 130	7.62 5rd olip	113,400
A 182	Cal30 carbine	4,700
<b>A</b> 209	Cal., 30 linked M-1	6 <b>,250</b>
<b>△</b> 475	Cal50 spotter tracer	728
A 574	Cal50 linked	2,000
B 568	HE 40mm M407	730
C 222	81mm HE M362	204
0 225	81mm HE M43A1	370
C 226	81mm Illum	138
C 230	81mm smk WP	161
0 650	106 RR HEAT	<b>6</b> 0 .
C 651	106 RR HEP_T	64
G 800	Adapter gren proj.	96
G 839	7.62mm otg. rifle gren	.516
G 890	Gren hand Frag	357
G 895	Gren hand illum	62
G 900	Gren hand incendiary	32
G 935	Gran hand smk WP	109
G 940	Gren hand smk Green	49
<b>9</b> 950	Gren hand smk Red	110
G 970	Gren rifle HEAT	40
H 030	Gren rifle smk WP	50
н 600	3.5 HEAT	63
H 602	3.5 smk WP	43
K 134	Claymore mine M18A1	167

H.3.

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DOD	NOMENCLATURE	NO. ROUNDS
K 910	Thickener incendiary oil (51/41b)	18 cens
L 275	Signal smk illum (hand held)AN	120
L 311	Signal illum Red star para	102
L 324	Signal illum Graen star para	27
L 314	Signal illum green star cluster	144
L 315	Signal illum Red star para	140
L 326	Rifla_gran Red Star para	27
L 495	Trip flare M49	<b>3</b> 0
M 026	Demo kit bangalore	1 08
M 032	Charge demo TNT 1-1b	50 lbs
M 130	Cap blasting electric	383
M 131	Cap non-electric blasting	230
M 455	Det cord	1,500 ft.
M 680	Ignition oyl flamethrower	200 ea
M 766	Igniter blasting fuse	200 ев
M 756	Charge assembly demo kit M37	46 ea

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A. G. COMER
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer


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A. G. COMPR Major, V. S. Marine Comps Executive Officer

D-3.

3d Bm (Rein) 3d Marines CHU LAI, VIETNAM 041800H August 1965

Change No. 1 to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

3D BN, 3D MARINES

Time Zone: H

5&C # 05E

1. Make the following pen changes in Uperation

Order 10-65

#### a. Basic Order.

- (1)Paragraph 1.b.(5). Delete .
- Peragraph 3.b. title line. Add "(Rein)".
- (3)Paragraph 3.c. Delete.
- (4)Renumber subparagraphs. 3.d through 3.g. to read 3.c through 3f.
- (5) Paragraph 3.c title line. Add "(Rein)".
- (6) Paragraph 3.e title line. Delete "Company K".
- (7)Paragraph 3.f. (2). Change to read "D-day 6 August 1965".
- (8)Paragraph 3.f. (4). Change to read "Contact left to right".
- Paragraph 4.a. (3)(b). Change "... 1700, 4 August ..." to read "... 1600, 5 August..."
- Paragraph 4.a. (4). Substitute "6 nugust" for "5 nugust" and "7 nugust" for "6 nugust" whenever they appear in the sub-sub-(10)paragraph.
- Paragraph 4.e. Add "(10) Individuals take iodine tablets for water purification."

#### Annex F.

- (1) Page F-1, paragraph 3.b.(2). Delete.
- Page F-1, paragraph 3.b. Renumber sub-subparagraph (3) and (4) to read (2) and (3).
- (3) Page F-1, paragraph 3.c. (3). Delete.
- (4) Page F-1, paragraph 3.c. Renumber sub-subparagraphs (4) and (5) to read (3) and (4).

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

#### CONFIDENTIAL

- c. Annex G.
  - (1) Page G-2, paragraph 2.1. (1). Change "(BS 523857)" to read "(BS 528857)."
- 2. Substitute the following new pages, attached hereto, for the original pages, destroying the replaced pages and reporting destruction to this headquarters:
  - a. Annex A. Pege A-1.
  - b. Annex C. Page C-1.
  - c. Annex C. Appendix 1. Page C-1-1.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUIR

A. G. COMER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Special

3d I Rein 3d Marines CHU LAI, VINTNAM 041800H August 1965 ir dilli.l.

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

All attachments effective 060600H August 1965

#### 3d Bn (-) 3d Marines

LtCol MUIR

Det., H&S Co. 3/3
Det., Comm Plat., Hq Co., 4th Mar
Artillery In Sec, Btry "C", 1st Bn, 12th Mar
Det., Co "B" 3d Engr Bn
Det., 3d Flat Co "B"., 3d AT Bn

Company "I"

Capt. WEBB

Co "I"

. FO Tn. 81nn Mortar Plat

. FO The Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th More

· FAC Tm

Company "M"

Capt. MORRIS

Co "M"

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plat

FO Tm, Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Mar.

81mm Mortar Plat (-) H&S Co

Lt. GIBSON

Battalion Reserve

Lt. BEDNAR

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUIR

A. G. COMER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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D. A. RAMSEY

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

**A-1** 

3d Bn (Pein) 3d Marines CHU LA VIET M 041800 August 1965

Annex C (Concept of Operation) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM: 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6757II, 6757III, 6756IV

Time Zone: H

1. Mission. See Basic Order.

# 2. Concept

- a. Commencing at L hour on D day, 3/3 lands in three increments in LZ WOLF.
- b. The first increment will secure the landing zone in order to facilitate the rapid entry of the remainder of the battalion.
- c. The second increment will land, proceed along a direction of attack and seize the right (West) portion of Battalion Obj. A.
- d. The third increment will land and proceed along a direction of attack to the high ground vicinity (BS 538865).
- e. Upon completion of the landing the first increment will proceed on an axis of advance through the hamlet of TRA BINH and seize the left (East) portion of Battalion Obj. A.
- f. After seizure of Battalion Objective A the battalion will continue the attack on three parallel axes. One company on the left (North), one company on the right (South), and the Battalion Command Group in the center.
- g. Annex D (Operation Overlay).

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Executive Officer

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Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

Bn, 3d Merines LAU LAI, VIETNAM 041800H August 1965

Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events) to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. The below listed events will occur in the sequence indicated on D-Day:

L - 2 Hours

Reveille

L - 2 Hours

Guard all radio nets

L - 1 Hour

Assemble Vicinity IZ LOON

L - 1 Hour

Loading zone prepared to load

L = 15 Min

Load First Increment

L - 15 Min

Air Preparation of IZ

L - Hour

First Increment lands in LZ WOLF and

secures LZ

L - Hour

air Strike Vicinity (BS 536854) to

(BS 545855)

L + 15 Min

Second Increment and Battalion Cmd Gp

Load from LZ LOON

L + 30 Min

Second Increment and Battalion Cmd Gp

lend in LZ WOLF

L + 45 Min

Third Increment loads from LZ LOON

L + 1 Hour

Third Increment lands in LZ WOLF

2. L - Hour in this order is touch-down of leading elements of 3/3 in Landing Zone WOLF.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUIR

A. G. COMER Major, U. S. Marine Corps Executive Officer

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D. A. RAMSEY

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

C-1-1

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines CHU LAI, VIETNAM: 080930H Augus 5 1965

#### COMPLICION TIAL

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines After-ActionReport #31

Unit: 3d Ba, Salinnines (-) (Rein), 31 MarDiv (Rein) FMF.

53 Officers, 466 Enlisted, 6 PF's, 1 APVN Officer, 4 ARVN - Strength: Interpreturs

060550m to 071515H Migust 1965

Place: Area assignificated in 3d Bu. 3d Marines Operation Order 10-65 also, see apperded overlay

Casualties: Two (2) WIA

Nature of Action: Search and Destroy

2. General. The battelion (-) (Rein) conducted a search and destroy operation in an area as indicated on appended overlay. The entire battalion (-) (Rein) was helilifted to and from the gan of operations.

a. At 060706H the hautalion (-) barrded helicopters at LZ LOON (BT 568022) and moved to LZ WOLF (appended overlay). At 050810H the entire battalion(-) was landed and executing 3/3 Operation Order 10-65. At 060823H Company-"I" found one (1) VC hiding in a stream (BS 529854). At 060823H Company "M" began receiving small arms fire from TRA BINH (BS 553858). The company quickly returned fire and briefly had the VC pinned down at (BS 540860); however, the enemy finally filtered into the done undergrowth that characterized the terrain. At 060930H, Company "I" record on to The BINH and found several packs containing clothes, medicine, VC uniforms; food, cooking utensils and toilet articles at (BS 533857); four (4) VC3 were apprehended in the vicinity of the packs. At 061120H Company "I" found one (1) wounded VC at (BS 534887) and evacuated him (DOA) back to the Er. 3P. At 061200H three (3) more packs with clothing and food along with one (1) carbine and five (5) magazines were found in the vicinity (BS 552861). At 061300F a second carbine was found while searching the immediate vicinity of the wounded VC previously mentioned: At 061230H Company "I" received several rounds of small arms fire (BS 532865). Fire was returned with me visible results. At 061241H Company "M" found eight (8) land mines (BS 547856); four (4) of them antipersonnel bounding type and four (4) home made mines. All were destroyed in place by Engineers. The battalion moved on to the night defensive positions vicinity (BS 570864) without further incident arriving at 061640H. At 061700H the resupply and Howtar's for the night defense, arrived. During the preparation of the night defense, Company "I" received two (2) WIA's at 061712H fro a pressure type mine vicinity (BS 572858). One man was evacuated, while the other Marine incurred only superficial wounds and was returned to duty. Throughout the night, the battalion conducted H&I fires expending 158 Howter rounds and thirty-two (32) 81mm rounds. No contact was made with the enemy during the night. At 070730H, the battalion moved onward to Phase Line FOXTROT (appended overlay) arriving at 071325H. The entire movement from the night defensive positions to the conclusion of the operation was conducted without incident, ENCL (8)

At 071337H the battalion began helilifting back to the MLR. The retraction was completed by 071515H.


#### 3. Remarks

- a. The some of action assigned for this operation was toolarge for the battalion to adequately cover. The terrain and vegetation was such that two (2) companies were unable to conduct a thorough search in the time allowed.
- b. HOWTLRS were to be brought into the night defensive positions at a time to be designated. They were brought in early and before the battalion was ready to receive them. This resulted in confusion and congestion of air traffic in the landing zone.
- c. Auxiliary water cans should be kept on helicopters that are used for succustions. When a Marine succumbs to heat exhaustion his companions use all their water to cool him off and give him comfort; consequently, several Marines are leftwithout water and they become potential heat casualties. This becomes a vicious circle. If water cans were carried on the helicopters men could refill their canteens on the spot. Provisions would have to be made for recovery of water cans.
- d. Communications maintenance is essential. During this operation '; six (6) AN/PRC-10's ceased to function for a variety of reasons. Three (3) of these were put back into action by a technician in the field. This is a desireable practice and is recommended for future operations. Only a small quantity of tools must be carried for quick field repair.
- e. Merial photographs were invaluable for planning. It is recommended that photos of the area of operation be made available to company commenders in the amount of two (2) copies per company.
- f. One interpreter per company is inadequate for offensive operations over a wide zone of action. He is just not there when needed, because he is involved with some other platoon. One (1) interpreter per platoon is considered satisfactory.
- g. Helicopter availability was changed at the last moment and the battalion was not notified. This necessitated a change of the landing plan at the loading zone.
- h. While representatives from various news media are always welcome, it is felt that the battalion should be advised as to how many are expected to appear. Heliteams are planned shead of time and unexpected riders merely confuse the issue.


J. E. MUIR

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding



i. :



OPERATION PLAN 304-65

DOWNER DED AT 3 LANG.
INTERVALS, DECLASSIVED AFTER
12 TEARS.

LITH MA ARS (-) (REIN)

OHU LAI, VISTRAM

OS/19-65

3 AUG 1965

## OPERATION PLAN 304-65

- REF: (A) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS, L701, SHEETS 6757II, 6757III, 6756I, 6756II, 6756IV.
  - (B) FM 8-2 (OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS).
  - (C) FM 31-16 (COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS).
  - (D) REGIMENTAL OPERATION ORDER 302-65.

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).

## 1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES: SEE CURRENT ISUNS.

## B. FRIENDLY FORCES:

- (1) 3D MARINE DIVISION DEFENDS THREE WIDELY SEPERATED ENCLAVES AT CHU LAI, DA NANG AND HUE PHU BAI.
- (2) 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION, ARVN FORCES OPERATE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE LITH MARINES TAOR.
- (3) THAN PROVIDES CAS MD HELICOPTER SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
- (b) 51st regiment, 2nd infantry division, arvn in cooperation with 4th marines conducts search and clear operations in their sector on the 4th marines left flank by landing two battalions in L2 for and bear beginning at L-hour on D-Day, conduct search and clear operations to the east in assigned zone up to their limit of advance for the first day. Both battalions will assume a defensive posture for the night and on order on DAI continue search and clear operations in assigned sector. See annex B (operation overial).
- (5) ARVN ARTILLERY (4 1099 HOWITZERS) PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE SIST REGIMENT.
- C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).

## D. ASSUMPTIONS:

- (1) THAT THERE WILL BE SUPPICIENT HELICOPTERS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE HELILIPTS OF ONE US MARINE BATTALION AND TWO ARVN BATTALIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THIS OPERATION.
- (2) THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT HELICOPTERS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE HELILIFTING OF THE RESERVE ELEMENT, THE 11TH RANGER BN, FROM QUANG NGAI AIR FIELD TO THE AREA OF OPERATION.

- (3) THAT THERE WILL BE SUPPRIENT HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE FOR THE HELILIFTING OF THE 107MM BTRY FROM THE LITH MARINES TAOR TO THE 3/3 AREA OF OPERATION DURING THE AFTERNOON OF D-DAY.
- (4) THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT H ELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE FOR THE HELILIFTING OF 107MM BTRY FROM THE 3/3 POSITIONS BACK TO THE 1TH MARINES TAOR ON THE MORNING OF D41.
- (5) THAT THE LTH MARINES WILL BE REINFORCED BY AT LEAST ONE RIFLE COMPANY FROM ELEMENTS OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION TO INSURE ADEQUATE MANNING OF THE LTH MARINES MLR DURING THE CONDUCT OF THIS OPERATION.
- 2. MISSION. LTH MARINES (-) (REIN), CONTINUES TO DEFEND CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND IN COJUNCTION WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 51ST REGIMENT, 2ND DIVISION ARVN WILL CONDUCT COMBINED SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA SOUTH OF THE LTH MARINES TAOR AS SHOWN IN ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).

#### 3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. WITH MARINES (-) (REIN), CONTINUE TO DEFEND CHU
LAI AIRFIELD AND IN COLEAR OPERATION WITH THE SIST REGT ARVN, CONDUCTS
COMBINED SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS BY LANDING ONE BATTALION BY
HELICOPTERECRNE ASSAULT IN LZ WOLF AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY, CONDUCT SEARCH
AND CLEAR OPERATION IN ZONES ASSIGNED UP TO THE LIMIT OF ADVANCE FOR
THE FIRST DAY. THE SIST REGT ARVN LANDS TWO BATTALIONS BY HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT IN LZ FOX AND BEAR BEGINNING AT L-HOUR, D-DAY CONDUCTS
SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN THEIR ASSIGNED ZONE UP TO THE LIMIT OF
THEIR ADVANCE FOR THE FIRST DAY. ALL UNITS WILL ASSUME A DEFENSIVE
POSTURE FOR THE NIGHT. ON DAY LITH MARINE ELEMENTS AND THE ELEMENTS
OF THE SIST REGT ARVN ON ORDER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS WILL
CONTINUE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED ZONE UP TO THE LIMIT
OF ADVANCE. SEE ANNEX B (OPERATION OVERLAY).

## B. 3D BN (-) (REIN), 3D MARINES.

- (1) LAND AT L-HOUR BY HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT IN LANDING ZONE WOLF OR IN ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE DOG.
- (2) CONDUCT SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED ZONE UP TO THE LIMIT OF ADVANCE PHASE LINE BRAVO.
- (3) UPON REACHING LIMIT OF ADVANCE ASSUME A NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSTURE.
- (h) ON ORDER CONTINUE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS UP TO THE LIMIT OF ADVANCE FOR THE SECOND DAY, PHASE LINE FOXTROT.
- (5) UPON REACHING PHASE LINE FOITROY AND UPON TERMINATION OF THE OPERATION BE PREPARED TO BE HELILIFTED BACK TO BATTALION POSITIONS.
- (6) UPON RETURN, OCCUPY AND DEFEND ASSIGNED POSITIONS ON THE MIR.

# C. 3D BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MARINES.

(1) CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF THE LTH MARINES (-) (REIN).

CONFIDENTIAL

- (2) PLACE ONE (1) PLATOON (3 HOWITZERS) BTRY K L/12 IN POSITION TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE 3D BATTALION (-) (REIN), 3D MARINES ON D-DAY.
- (3) PLACE ONE SECTION, 8" HOWITZER BTRY FMF IN POSITION TO PROVIDE GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE LTH MARINES (-) (REIN) AND THE SIST REGT ARVN ON D-DAY.
- (4) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY 107MM HOSTAR BIRY INTO POSITION TO BE HELILIFTED INTO 3D BATTALION (\*) (REIN), 3D MARINES PERIMETER ON THE AFTERNOON OF D-DAY FOR DIRECT SUPPORT.
- (5) PLACE CME SECTION, BTRY K, 1/12 AND THE 1ST PLATOCN, 8" HOWITZE?"
  BTRY FMF IN POSITION TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO 3/3 AND IN
  GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE 51ST REGT ARVN ON THE MORNING OF Dal.
- (6) PROVIDE ONE FO TEAM TO EACH OF THE TWO ARVN BN'S CONDUCTING THE SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATION. FO TEAMS ARE TO REQUEST AND CONTROL GENERAL SUPPORT FIRE FOR THE ARVN BN'S. THE FO TEAMS WILL RETURN TO THEIR PARENT TOTAL ON DAL, UPON ORDER OF THE CO, LITH MARINES.
- D. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, hith MARINES. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE CP SECURITY FOR ATH MARINES.
- E. COB (-) (REIN), 3D AT BN.
  - (1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE HEAVY SECTION OF ONTOS TO 3/12 FOR CONVOY SECURITY.
  - (2) BE PREPARED TO AUGMENT HEADQUARTERS COMPANY IN PROVIDING CP SECURITY FOR LITH MARINES.
- F. RESERVE. (11TH RANGER BATTALION, ARVN).
  - (1) 11TH RANGER BATTALION WILL CONSTITUTE THE RESERVE FOR THIS OPERATIO
  - (2) COMMITTARY I OF THE RESERVE IN THE 4TH MARINES ZONE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UPON REQUEST BY CO, 4TH MARINES AND APPROVAL BY DIVISION COMMANDER, 2ND ARVN DIVISION.
  - (3) 11TH RANGER DATTALION WILL PREPARE FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT AS A RELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT FORCE.
- G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
  - (1) THIS PLAN EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.
  - (2) DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN SUBORDINATE UNITS WITH NORMAL COUNTERPARTS IS AUTHORIZED. KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS INFORMED OF SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH PLAN.
  - (3) SUEMIT SITUATION REPORTS UPON LANDING AND EVERY 30 MINUTES THEREAFTER.
  - (4) SUBMIT SPOT REPORTS AS THEY OCCUR.

- (5) PURSUIT OF VIET CONG OR SUSPECTED VIET CONG INTO ADJACENT ZONES OF ACTION MUST BE COORDINATED THROUGH THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- (6) CO, LITH MARINES WILL COORDINATE THE OPERATION OF THE LITH MARINES AND 51ST REGT COMBINED FSCC.
- (7) DESIGNATIONS OF DAY AND HOUR OF LANDING.
  - (A) D-DAY IS THE DAY OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED.
  - (B) DATE OF D-DAY WILL BE ANNOUNCED.
  - (C) L-HOUR IS THE TIME OF LANDING THE FIRST HELICOPTER IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
  - (D) L-HOUR WILL BE ANNOUNCED.
- (8) THE UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE THUNDER.
- (9) THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REMAIN THE SAME.
- (10) ONE FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TEAM WILL BE ATTACHED TO EACH OF THE TWO RVN BATTALIONS.
- (11) ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).
- (12) ANNEX C (ARTILLERY).
- (13) ANNEX D (ATR SUPPORT),
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
  - A. CASUALITY REPORTS. TO THIS READQUARTERS . IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 30h0-2
  - B. LOGISTICS.
    - (1) NORMAL.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS—ELECTRONICS.
  - A. SEE ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS).
  - B. COMMAND POST.
    - (1) Lth Marines (-) (Rein) and 51st regt, arvn will establish a co-located command post at

(2) SUBORDINATE UNITS REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED.

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

James 3 997 : Claraha

L R R.L

JAMES F. MC CLANAHAN
COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING

#### ANNEXES:

- A. TASK CRGANIZATION
- B. OPERATION OVERLAY
- C. ARTILLERY
- D. AIR SUPPORT
- E. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
- F. BLANK
- G. BLANK
- H\_ BLANK
- I. BLANK
- J. DESTRUCTION

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX J (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

LTH MARINES (\_) (REIN) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 03/19-65 3 AUG 1965

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65

REF: NONE

TIME ZONE: H

(ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE ON ORDER)

LTH MARINES (\_) (REIN) DET. HO CO. LTH MARLIES

CO B. 3D APT. TANK BM

3D BB () (BCD). 3D MARLIES

1 CO. FOPULAR FORCES DET, CO B, 3D ENGR EN DET, COMM PLAT, HQ CO 4TH MARINES DET. COLL PLAT, CO B, 3D MED BN IN AND TO SECT, BTRY G, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES

LT COL PAGE

COL MC CLAMAHAN

LT BAER LT ROSKI LT COL MUIR

aD BM (\_) (REIN), 12TH MARLINES

107PM HOWTAR BTRY, 3D EN, (\_) (REIN), 12TH MARINES 1ST PLAT, 1ST 8" SP HOW BTRY, FMF ONE PLAT BTRY K, 4TH BN, 12TH MARINES

RESERVE (11TH RANGER EN. (REIM)

11TH RANGER EN. (REIM)
DET, MILITARY ADVISORY ASSISTANCE GROUP

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLAMAHAN

W. E. MELBY LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX J (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

OFFICIAL:

RIMANA R. L. TREVINO MAJOR, USMC S\_3

4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) CHU 1, VIETNAM 03/19-65 3 AUG 1965

ANNEX C (ARTILLERY) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65

REF: (A) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L701, SHEETS 6757II, 6757III, 6756I, 6756II, 6756IV.

(B) 3D BN, 12TH MARTINES ORDER 3000.3A (SOP FOR OPERATION).

TIME ZONE: H

## 1. SITUATION.

- A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT ISUMS.
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) OF PLAN 304-65.
- C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.
  - (1) ATTACHMENTS: NONE,
  - (2) FOLLOWING DETACHMENTS EFFECTIVE ON ORDER:
    - (A) 3D MARINE BN, RVN. F. O. TEAM, 3D BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MARINES
    - (B) 3D BN, 51ST REGT, 2D DIV, ARVN. F. O. TEAM, 3D BN (-) (REIN)
- 2. MISSION. 3D BN (-) (REIN), 12TH MARINES CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE OPERAT OF THE 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).

#### 3. EXECUTION.

# A. CONCEPT OF ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT.

- (1) ONE PLATOON (3 HOWITZERS), BTRY K, 1/12 WILL OCCUPY FIRING POSITION PRIOR TO L HOUR ON D-DAY AND PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO 3D BN, (-)(REIN), 3D MARINES, THE PLATOON WILL RETURN TO ITS POSITION WITHIN THE MLR, ON ORDER, THE EVENING OF D-DAY AND REOCCUPY A FIRING POSITION TO CONTINUE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF 3/3, ON THE MORNING OF D/1.
- (2) ONE SECTION, 8" HOW BTRY, FMF WILL BE IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE LTH MARINES (-) (REIN) AND THE 51ST REGT (-) (REIN) ARVN. THIS SECTION WILL OCCUPY POSITION WITH THE PLT OF BTRY K ON D-DAY AND RETURN WITHIN THE MLR ON THE EVENING OF D-DAY. IT WILL REOCCUPY A FIRING POSITION WITH PLT, BTRY K ON THE MORNING OF D-1 AND CONTINUE IN GENERAL SUPPORT.
- (3) THE 107mm MORTAR BTRY (TOWED), 3/12, WILL BE HELL-LIFTED FROM A DESIGNATED LZ INTO 3D BN (-) (REIN), 3D MARINES POSITION ON THE AFTERNOON OF D-DAY. THE BATTERY WILL PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR 3D BN (-) (REIN), 3D MARINES DURING THE NIGHT OF D-DAY UNTIL THE MORNING OF DAY. ON THE MORNING OF DAY. THE BATTERY WILL HE HELL LIFTED OUT OF 3/3's POSITION AND BACK TO A DESIGNATIVE.

- B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
  - (1) D-DAY. TO BE ANNOUNCED.
  - (2) L-HOUR. TO BE ANNOUNCED.
  - (3) POSITION AREAS & FIRE CAPABILITIES.
    - (A) D-DAY PLT, BTRY K COORDINATES 568978, AZ OF FIRE 3200 MILS.
    - (B) D-DAY ONE SECTION, 8" HOW BTRY COORDINATES 568978, AZ OF FIRE 3200 MILS.
    - (C) EVENING OF D-DAY LO7mm MORTARS BTRY, COORDINATES AND AZ OF FIRE, TO BE ANNOUNCED.
    - (D) DAI PLT, BTRY K AND ONE SECTION, 8" HOW BTRY COORDINATES 568978, AZ OF FIRE 3200 MILS.
  - (4) FIRING CHART. PERNECE (A).
  - (5) REGISTRATION. NONE. METRO / VE GFT.
  - (6) SURVEY. FIRING POSITIONS EXCEPTING THAT FOR THE 107 MORTAR BTRY, WILL BE SURVEYED IN PRIOR TO D-DAY.
  - (7) AMMUNITION RESTRATIONS. BTRY'S WILL NOT EXPEND MORE THAN 80% OF ON HAND AMMUNITION WITHOUT APPROVAL.
  - (8) AIR OBSERVATION. 3/12 WILL PROVIDE 1 A/O TO ADJUST ARTILLERY FIRE AND REPORT TARGET INTELLIGENCE. SEE ANNEX D (AIR SUPPORT).
  - (9) NO FIRE LINES. NO ARTILLERY OR MORTAR MISSIONS WILL BE FIRED ACROSS THE BOUNDARIES OF INDIVIDUAL BATTALION'S ZONES OF ACTION OR LIMITS OF ADVANCE WITHOUT THE EXPRESS APPROVAL OF THE LITH MARINES FSCC.
  - (10) THE 2 FO TEAMS WITH THE RVN BATTALIONS WILL REMAIN WITH THEM UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1600H ON DAI. THE PLT OF BTRY K AND THE SECTION OF 8" HOW BTRY WILL REMAIN IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1600H ON DAI.

# 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

1

- (A) 4TH MARINES OP PLAN 304-65.
- (B) PLT, BTRY K WILL CARRY 300 ROUNDS, MOBILE LOADED, FOR THIS OPERATION.
- (C) ONE SECTION, 8" HOW BTRY WILL CARRY 60 ROUNDS, MOBILE LOADED, FOR THIS OPERATION.
- (D) logmm mortar btry will carry 450 rounds, to be heli-lifted with the battery for this operation.

- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNITATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
  - (A) ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS).
  - (B) REFERENCE (B).
  - (C) 3/12 WILL PROVIDE ONE COMMUNICATOR TO OPERATE AS AIRBORNE RADIO RELAY FOR THE ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE NET. PICK UP LOCATIONS TO BE DISIGNATED. SEE ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS—ELECTRONICS).
  - (D) COMMAND POSTS. REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. METBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

APPENDIX:

1 - FIRE PLAN

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX J (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

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R. L. TREVINO MAJOR, USMC

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4TH RINES (\_) (REIN) CHU TAI, VIETNAM 03/19-65 3 AUG 1965

ANNEX D (AIR SUPPORT) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65

REF: (A) 4TH MARINES OPERATION PIAN 304-65
(B) MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000AMS 1701, SHEETS 6756I, 6756II, 6756III, 6756IV.

TIME ZONE: H

#### 1. SITUATION.

- A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT ISUMS.
- B. COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES. SEE ANNEX H TO REFERENCE (A).
- C. DISPLAY PANELS AND MARK WITH YELLOW OR GREEN SMOKE CLOSEST FRIENDLY UNIT PRIOR TO EXECUTIVE CLOSE AIR STRIKES.
- D. THE UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR (UTM) GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM WILL BE USED FOR TARGET LOCATION.
- E. MISSION REQUEST PROCEDURES. STANDARD PROCEDURES WILL BE USED.
- F. ALERT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT. ALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON 30 MINUTE STANDBY DUE TO CONDITION OF SATS AT CHU LAI.
- G. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT. ARMAMENT AVAILABLE AS FOLLOWS:
  - (1) BOMBS \_ MK81, MK82, MK83, NAPALM
  - (2) ROCKETS \_ HERO 7D
  - (3) OTHER \_ 20MM CANNON

#### H. HELO ESCORT.

- (1) HELO ESCORT WILL BE UTILIZED DURING LANDING OF TROOPS IN HIZ FOX, WOLF, AND BEAR.
- (2) HELO ESCORT WILL BE UTILIZED DURING RETRACTION OPERATIONS ON D+1
- I. HLZ PREPARATION. PRIOR TO L HOUR IN EACH HLZ THE ZONES WILL BE PREPED UTILIZING SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.
- J. SUPPERSSIVE FIRES. SUPPERSSIVE FIRES WILL BE CONDUCTED BY ESCORT AIRCRAFT. WITH THE FIRST WAVE IN TO EACH HLZ.
- K. FAST REACTION FORCE. AT COMPLETION OF THE HELILIFT OF 3D BN. 3D MARINES AND THE RVN FORCES, HELOS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR LIFT OF RESERVE FORCES INTO LZ TO BE DESIGNATED.
- L. AIRBORNE OBSERVER. THERE WILL BE AN AIRBORNE OBSERVER AND RADIO RELAY AIRCRAFT ON STATION DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

D\_1

# M. HELICOPTER PICK UP ZONES.

- (1) 3D BN, 3D MARINES \_ BT 568022
- (2) RVN FORCES \_ QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD
- N. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES.
  - (1) PRIMARY.
  - ? (A) FOX \_ 3D BN, 51ST REGT, (ARVN) \_ BS 553873
    - (B) WOLF \_ 3D BN, 3D MARINES (US) \_ BS 523957
    - (C) BEAR \_ 3D BN, MARINES (RVN) \_ BS 505073
  - (2) ALTERNATE.
    - (A) CAT \_ 3D BN, 51ST REGT (ARVN) \_ BS 552882
    - (B) DOG \_ 3D BN, 3D MARINES (US) \_ BS 512862
    - (C) RABBIT \_ 3D BN, MARINES (RVN) \_ BS 523973
- O. EMERGENCY EVACUATION. REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HELD EVACUATION WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE AIR LIAISON OFFICER, 4TH MARINES, BY THE MOST EXPERITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE AND WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.
  - (1) NO. OF PERSONNEL TO BE EVACUATED.
  - (2) NATURE OF INJURY.
  - (3) PICK UP COORDINATES, AND HOW MARKED.
  - (4) HLZ SECURED OR NOT SECURED COMMENSARATE WITH THE SITURTION RVN EVACS WILL BE TAKEN TO QUANG NOAI AIRFIELD AND U. S. MARINES WILL BE TAKEN TO B MED.
- P. COMMAND HELICOPTER. A COMMAND HELICOPTER WILL BE LOCATED AT THE 4TH MARINES COMMAND POST (COORDINATES TBA) DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.
- Q. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS. AT A DESIGNATED TIME ON THE AFTERNOON OF D-DAY (PICK UP TIME AND COORDINATES AND HLZ COORDINATES TEA) A 107MM BATTERY WILL BE HELILIFTED INTO A NIGHT POSITION WITHIN THE ZONE OF ACTION. THIS UNIT WILL BE EXTRACTED AT FIRST LIGHT ON D+1. STAND. BY HELICOPTERS WILL BE UTILIZED FOR THIS LIFT.
- 3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS \_ ELECTRONICS.
  - A. SEE ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS \_ ELECTRONICS) TO OPERATION PLAN 304\_65.

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B. LOCATION OF CONTROL AGENCIES. TO BE ANNOUNCED.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX J (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

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R. L. TREVINO MAJOR, USMC

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LTH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LAS VIETNAM
03/19-03
3 AUG 1965

ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

MEF: (A) 3D MAR DIV OP ORDER 321A-65.

TIME ZONE: H

## 1. SITUATION

## A. ENEMY FORCES

- (1) VC ELEMENTS HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF EMPLOYING EXTENSIVE IMITATIVE DECEPTION.
- (2) VC ELEMENTS ARE CAPABLE OF JAMMING BUT HAVE USED IT LITTLE UP TO THIS DATE.
- (3) WIRE TAPPING CAN BE EXPECTED ON LONG TRUNKS. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ARE NOT SECURE

## B. FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) SEE OF ORDER 304-65.
- (2) COMMAND POST
  - (A) ATH MARINES (FORWARD) TO BE ANNOUNCED.
  - (B) 3/3 REPORTS EACH MOVEMENT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.
  - (C) RVN UNITS REPORT EACH MOVEMENT THRU THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND.
- 2. MISSION. 4TH MARINES COMMUNICATION ELEMENTS ESTABLISH FORWARD COMMAND POST COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ANNEX.

#### 3. EXECUTION.

- A. DETACHMENT, REGIMENTAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON.
  - (1) RADIO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STATIONS ON REGT TAC NET # 1 AND # 2 AT FORWARD CP.
    - (A) BE PREPARED TO ACTIVATE STATION OR DIVISION TAC NET ON ORDER.
    - (B) ATTACH A TWO (2) MAN SSB RADIO TEAM TO 3/3 FOR REGT TAC MET #1.
    - (C) BE PREPARED TO SEND ONE OP WITH CO/S=3 TO OPERATE ARC=444 IN HELO.

#### (2) WIRE

- (A) TWO TROUBLE SHOOTERS WILL BE LOCATED AT REGT CP (FORWARD).
- (B) ASSIST RVN WITH INTERNAL OF WIRE.

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- (C) PRE-INSTAL ALL TELEPHONES AND WIRE IN FOURTH OP REFORE OPERATION IF POSSIBLE.
- (3) RADIO RELAY. ESTABLISH CIRCUITS BETWEEN REGT, FORWARD AND REAR CP'S NORMAL CHANNELIZATION FOR S-2, S-3, AND FSCC HOT LINE AND TWO COMMON USERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED.

## B. 30 BN LTH MARINES

- (1) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A STATION ON REGT TAC NET # 2, TAR, TAD,

  K BTRY CONDUCT OF FIRE NET.
- (2) PROVIEW RADIO OPERATOR FOR L-19 ALRBORNE RELAY. COORDINATE A PICKU AND CHULLAI ATRFIELD WITH REGIMENTAL ALO. THIS OPERATION WILL RUMAN AND NECESSARY TRAFFIC AS REGT TAC NET # 2 DURING DAYLIGHT HOW

## C. PYM BARTALIONS

- (1) ADVISOR ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STATIONS ON REGT TAC NET # 2.
- (2) AUR LIAISON OFFICER ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STATION ON THE TAR AND TAD NETS AS REQUIRED.
- (3) ARTHUERY OFFICERS ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STATION ON K BTRY

## D. ARTUBLET COMMUNICATIONS

- (1) TOURS ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN K BTRY CONDUCT OF FIRE NET BETWEEN SYST FO'S WITH RVN UNITS, REGT, CP (FORWARD) AND K BTRY FDC: IN ADDITION, ESTABLISH THE ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTION NET BETWEEN REGIMENTAL CP (FORWARD), K BTRY FDC AND 3/12 FDC:
  - A. PROVIDE RADIO CPERATION FOR L-19 AIRBORNE CONDUCT OF FIRE RELAY. ECONDINATE PICKUP AT CHU LAI AIRFIELD WITH REGIMENTAL ALO.
- (2) WIRE/RADIO RELAY FECC HOT LINE FROM REGIMENTAL CP (FORWARD) TO CP (REAR).

## E. AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.

- (1) RADIO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE TAR AND TAD NETS BETWEEN 3/3, EVN BATTALIONS, REGT CP (FORWARD) AND REGT (REAR).
- (2) WIRE/RADIO RELAY. FSCC HOT LINE FROM REGT CP (FORWARD) TO CP (REAR).
- (3) REGT ALC COORDINATE PICK UP OF A ATRIBORNE RELAY OPERATORS AT CHU LAI AIRFIELD.

#### F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1)	RADIO NET	FREQ	DESIG
` '	REGT TAC NET #1	P. 1344 (USB) S. 9827 (USB)	D-30
	REGT TAC NET #2	s. 9827 (USB)	D <b>-69</b>
	REGT TAC NET #2	P. 40.1	D-182

RADIO NET	FREQ.	DESIG
REGT TAC NET #2	5.46.5	D-206
TAR#1	P.2196	D <del></del> 88
TAR#1	S.7995	D-87
TAD#3 (PURPLE)	P.285.8	D-303
TAD#2 (GREEN)	5.325.0	D-307
BTRY CO F ARTY FIRE DIRECTION	enne get ûset ji timparitê	
DIVISION TAC NET	P. 9254 (USB)	D-65
BN TAC NET	5.2244 (USB)	Das 3

## (2) CALL SIGNS

LTH MARINES (FORWARD)	THICK SKINNED
ATH MARINES (REAR)	THICK SKINNED REAR
SIST ARVN REGT (MAJ SCHOOL)	62 RIVERMUD
3D BN 51ST ARVN REST (CAPT HOEH)	66 RIVERMUD
3D BN RVN MARINES (CAPT SLACK)	68 RIVERMUD
RVN RANGERS (CAPT GEZZY)	67 RIVERMUD
LTH MARINES (COLLECTIVE)	CADAVER
ALH WENTURD (COURSOLIAND)	V2222

## (3) VISUAL

HELICOPTER LZ ARTY FIRE ON THIS TARGET	GERNADE n	HAND	SMOKE	OREEN HC
FRIENDLY UNIT POSITION	11	tt"	, u	YELLOW
THEMY DOSTITAN	<b>11</b>	Ħ	Ħ	RED

(4) JUNCTURE COORDINATION RADIO AND VISUAL MEANS TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UP BY RVN AND US MARINE COMMANDERS PRIOR TO BEING EXECUTED.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ALL PARTICIPATING UNITS CARRY SUFFICIENT BATTERIES AND SPARE PARTS FOR 72 HOURS OF OPERATION.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLAHAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: J (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION PLAN 304-65.

OFFICIAL:

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MAJOR, USMC
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hth arines (-) (rein) Chu lai, vietnam 03/19-65 3 Aug 1965

ANNEX J	(DISTRIBUTION)	TO OPERATION	PLAN 304-65-
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REF: NONE

TIME ZONE: H

UNIT OR ACTIVITY		COPIES
CMC		2
OG, FMF PAC		1
CG, III MAF		1
CG, 3D MAR DIV (FWD)		1
CO, 3D MARINES		1
co, 4th marines		12
CO, 9TH MARINES		1
CO, DHAN		5
CO, 1ST BN, LTH MARINES		1
CO, 2ND BN, LITH MARINES		1
CO, 3D BN, 3D MARINES		5
CO, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES		5
CO, MACS-9		1
CO, CO B 3D RECON B N		1
CO, CO B, 3D ENGR BN		2
CO, CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BN		3
CO, CO B, 3D MED BN		2
CG, 2ND DIV, ARVN		2
CO, SIST RECT, 2ND DIV, ARVN		1
CO, 3D BN, 51ST REGT, 2ND DIV	, ARVN	2
CO, 3D MARINE BN, ARVN		2 ,
CO, 11TH RANGER BN, 2ND DIV,	ARVN	2
, a extended the state of the	<b>J-3</b>	CONFIDENTIAL

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# CONFIDENTIAL UNIT OR ACTIVITY SENIOR U. S. ADVISOR, SIST REGT, 2ND DIV, ARVN SENIOR U. S. ADVISOR, 3D MARINE BN, RVN SENIOR U. S. ADVISOR, 11TH RANGER BN, 2ND DIV, ARVN TOTAL NO. COPIES

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Command Diary

3d MAR DIV (+ WD) S+C = 460-65

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200.10

SECDET:

ATH MARINES (REIN) S&C FILES 650413 Spy 49 of 56 copies SECRET

OPERATION

ORDER 305-65

ATH MARINES (-) (REIN) 6H AI, VIETNAM 8 SEPT 65 003/21-65

OPERATION ORDER 305-65

- REF: (A) MAPS: VIETPAM, 1: 50,000 L701 SHEETS 6756I, 6756II, 6756III, 6757III, 6757III, 6757IV.
  - (B) 3D MAR DIV OF ORDER 327-65
  - (C) 3D MAR DIV OF ORDER 3218 C

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATIOM: SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).

- 1. SITUATION.
  - A. ENERY FORCES.
    - (1) SEE AUNEX D (INTELLIGENCE).
    - (2) SHE CURRENT ISUM'S AND PIR'S.
  - B. FRUELCHY FORCES.
    - (1) THIRD MARINE DIVISION DEFENDS AIRFIELDS AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES AT CHU LAI, DA NANG, AND HUE PHU BAI.
    - (2) FMAW PROVIDES HEL COPTERS, OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, AIR DEFENSE AND MAINTAINS DASC IN THE CHU LAI AREA.
    - (3) 7TH FLEET AND VIETNAMESE NAVY MAINTAIN COUNTER-INFILTRATION SCREEN ALONG RVN GOAST.
    - (4) CTG 71.8 POVIDES NGF SUPPORT.
    - (5) 2D INFARTRY DIVISION, ARWN PRERATES ADJACENT TO THE TAOR.
    - (6) 7TH MARINES CONTINUE TO THE THEIR TAOR TO THE SOUTH OF THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
    - (7) ADC COMMAND GROUP.
      - (A) COORDINATES OVER-ALL SECURITY AND ALLOCATION OF UNITS, CHU LAI.
      - (B) COORDINATES BASE TYPE ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS, RESOLVES ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATION KERPING MATTERS, ESTABLISHES LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PRIORITIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMON USE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
    - (8) ARTILLERY BATTALION GROUP.

-l-

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

## SECRET

- (A) PROVIDES DIRECT AND GENERAL ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO THE 4TH MARINES.
- (B) RESPONSIBLE FOR FUNCTIONING OF THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC AS ESTABLISHED WITHIN 4TH MARINES AND CONDUCTS THE OVER-ALL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF FIRES WITHIN CHU LAI TAOR.
- (C) FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, AND AS A FUNCTION OF THE DIVISIO FSCC, COORDINATES SUPPORTING ARMS FIRES WITH LOCAL RVHAF COMMANDERS:
- (9) NMCD-10 CONTINUES GUISTRUCTION OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND FACILITY AND OCCUPIES FUMAL FOSITIONS AROUND THE AIRFIELD.
- (10) FLSU #1 PROVIDES LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND DEFENDS SEAWARD APPROACHE IN THEIR AREA.
- MISSION. THE MARINES (-) (PUIM) DEFENDS CHO LAI AIRFIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES: PROVIDES LOUD. PEEUSE OF CHO LAI AIRFIELD WITH ONE INFANTRY BY HIGH AND AUTHOUNT OF THE TARRY COMPANIES; CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESCRIPTIONS AND AGGREGATIVE PATROLLING WITHIN THE TARR; ON ORDER CONDUCTS GOSTRINED OFFRATION OF THE RVNAF BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TARRY MATRICES A COMPANY LAW METHER STATUS (ONE-HOUR) FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWERDS TO THE DIVISION APPLY OF RESPONSIBILITY. AND PREPARES TO CONDUCT COUNTERATTACKS TO REPEL ANY ENEMY PENETRATION OF THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AREAS.

## 3. EXECUTION.

- A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. SEE JUNEX C (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS).
- B. 1ST BN. ATH MARINES.
  - (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
  - (2) MAINTAIN COPE WEITHIN TAGE.
  - (3) CONDUCT AND MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF SEAWARD APPROACHES WITHIN SECTOR TO REPEL LANDINGS AND PROHIBIT INFILTRATION.
  - (4) PROVIDE LIAISC PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH PROVINCE CHIEF, TANGLE.
  - (5) COMDUCT AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN TAOR.
  - (6) BE PREPARED TO COMPLCT OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND/OR DILATERALLY WITH RV MAF OUTSIDE THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
- C. 2D BN, 414 FARINES,

- (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TELL F THE MIR IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
- (2) MAINTAIN COPL WITHIN MARAR.

## SF RET

- (3) MAINTAL 4 ROADBLOCK, TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT ALONG ROUTE #1 IN VIGINITY OF (BT 550093).
- (4) PROVIDE CLIAISON PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH DISTRICT CHIEF, BIRE SOR.
- (5) CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE CORPORATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN ASSIGNED TWO
- (6) DE PREPARED. TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND/OR BILATERALLY WITH RVNAF OUTSIDE THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.

## D. 3D BN. PD MARINES.

- (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MEET IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
- (2) MAINTAIN COPL WITHIN TAOR.
- (3) MAINTAIN OUTFOST FOR DEVENUE OF BRIDGE AT (BT 498067) AND CONTING A ROLDCLOCK/TRATEIC CONTROL POINT TO CHECK ENTRY AND EXIT OF ALL, TRATEIC INTO RECLIMENTAL TAOR ON ROUTE #1.
- (A) IPRIMED TERRORDERSONMEN TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH DESCRIPTION CHEEF, BY TEN.
- (5) COME TO ACCRES THE OPERATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN ASSIGNED TAGE.
- (6) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND OR BILATERALLY WITH RVNAF OUTSIDE THE REGIFERITAL TAOR.
- (7) PROVIDE BATTALION HELDQUARTERS AND TWO RIFLE COMPANIES FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF CHE LAI ATRFIELD.
- (8) CONSTRUCT FIELD FOR THE ATTOMS FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF CHU LAI ATTRIBUD.
- (9) DESEGNATE ONE COMPANY ROBATED ON LOCAL AIRFIELD DEFENSE AS RECLIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (10) UPON COMMUNITATION OF THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY, WHE REMAINING COMPANY IN THE DIMEDIATE AREA OF THE AIRFIELD WILL BECOME THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

# E. CO B (REIN), 3D RECON BY.

- (1) GERERAL SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) COMDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE TAOR AS DIRECTED.
- (3) ON CROER CONDUCT AERIAL AND GROUND-RECONNAISSANCE AND ESTABL-LITH OBSERVATION AND LISTENING POSTS ON MAJOR AVENUES OF APPROACTION TO THE RESTMENTAL TAOR.
- F. COC (REIN), 3D TAKE HAPPALION.

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT OF 4TH MERINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON OF TANKS IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO EACH OF THE INFARTRY BATTALIONS.
- (3) CONTINUE TO COORDINATE PREPARATION OF FIRING POSITIONS ALONG MAJOR AVENUES OF APPROACH.
- (4) PREPART DETAILED TLANS FOR TAMEDIATE REACTION TO SUPPORT COUNTERATTACK OFERATIONS. SEE ANNEX G (GOUNTERATTACK PLAN).
- (5) BE IMPPARED TO PROVIDE FLAME TANKS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ANY OPENATION,
- G. CO B. 3D AFTHATTAL
  - (1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON OF OWESS IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO EACH OF THE INFANTRY BATTALLOWS,
  - (2) PREFILE TO DIALLEY TELS FOR IMPEDIATE REACTION TO SUPPORT COUNTERATTACK PLAN). SEE ARREX & COUNTERATTACK PLAN).
  - (3) OF CAMER FRECIOE ONE OFFICE PLATOON TO REINFORCE THE REGIMENTAL WASHING COMPANY.
- H. CO A (NEW), 13T AMTRAC B. LICH.
  - (1) DIRECT SUPPORT OF ATH MARINES (-) (REIN).
  - (2) PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR MACH INFANTRY DATTALION ON ORDER.
  - (3) PREPARE, IN DETAIL, PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE REACTION IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERATTACK OPERATIONS. SEE ANNEX G (COUNTERATTACK PLAN).
  - (4) PROVIDE LYT'S FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE REGIMENT THROUGHOUT THE TAGE.
  - I. CO B (MCIN), 3D ENGI. BATTALION.
    - (1) GIN RAL SUPPORT OF ATH MARINES (-) (REIN).
    - (2) PROVIDE ENGINE NAME OF THE SUPPORT MITHIN CAPABLITIES TO SUPPORT REGIMENTAL OF NAME OF NAM
    - (3) CONTINUE TO PRODUCT DESCRIPTION SUPPORT TO INFANTRY BLTT. LIONS.
    - (4) CONSTRUCT PERALEMENT PUSTALLATIONS FOR BASE CAMPS TO INCLUDE GALLIERS SICKBANS, LEVING QUARTERS AND OTHER ACCOMPDATIONS AS DEED HATED.
    - (5) BE TREE AND, ON ORDER, TO ATTACH ONE ENGINEER PLATCON PER INFANTRY BATTALION FOR OPERATIONS ANY HERE WITHIN THE DIVISIONS AREAS OF A RESIDILITY.
    - (6) MAINTAIN THE DERM LISS WITH PARBED WIRE FENCING AND APPROPRIATE "KEEP OUT"SIGNS ARTUND THE PURCHASED AREA WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.

## J. REGIMENTAL RESERVE CUMPANY.

- (1) RESERVE COMPANY WATER BE DESIGNATED BY CO, 3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES.
- (2) THE REGIMENTAL REST OF WILL NOT BE QUARTITED WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERHISSION OF REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.
- (3) DE PREPARED ON ORDIO, OR RAPID DEPLOYMENT AS A HELICOPTERABOPHE ASSAULT FORCE.
- (4) BE PREPARED, IN A ONE HOUR REACTION POSTURE, FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN THE DIVISIONS TREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
- (5) BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ANY THERE WITHIN THE TAOR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COUNTERATTACK PLAN. ANNEX G (COUNTERATTACK PLAN).

## K. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) THIS ORDER CANCELS ALL PREVIOUS OPERATION PLANS AND FRAG ORDERS.
- (2) REPORTS. SEE ANNEX & (REPORTS).
- (3) RULES OF ENGAGEMENTA
  - (A) ROUNDS WILL NOT BE INSERTED IN THE CHAMBER OF INDIVIDUAL VEAPONS UNLESS AN ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY IS OBVIOUS, AND IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SENIOR MARINE PRESENT, THIS MEASURE MUST BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE THE LIVES OF USMC PERSONNEL.
  - (B) DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS THE SEQUENCE OF ENGAGEMENT WILL BE:
    - 1. CHALLENGE.
    - 2. IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE, OR IF THE RESPONSE IS INCORRECT, THE IMMEDIATE AREA WILL BE ILLUMINATED.
    - 3. IF THE PERSON CHALLENGED MAKES AN OVERT ATTEMPT TO AVOID APPARISON, -OPENS FIRE, OR COMMITS ANY OTHER HOSTILE ACT, THEREBY ENDANGERING THE LIFE OF THE CHALLENGER, THE CHALLENGER MAY LOAD AND FIRE.
  - (C) MAGAZINES WILL NOT BE INSERTED IN WEAPONS IN A CAMP AREA DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS UNLESS UNDER ATTACK.
  - (D) SUPPORTING ARMS.
    - 1. USE OF ALL SUPPORTING ARMS WILL BE CLEARED BY THE APPROPRIATE FSCC.
    - 2. NO SOMPORTING ARMS WILL BE FIRED INTO ANY POPULATED

AREA EXCEPT WHEN THE INFINITY COMMANDER ON THE GROUND PERSONALLY DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE MARINE LIVES, AND THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION.

- 3. COMBAT SUPPORT WHITS WILL COOPERATE TO THE UTHOST WITH SUPPORTED UNIT'S MISSION.
- 4. EVERY EFFORT HILL BE MADE TO PRESERVE INTACT RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, ASSIGNAL AND PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS FROM DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION FOR LINY WEAFON OR SUPPORTING ARM.
- (4) OPER WITHERRAUS ONLY UP IN GROER OF GO 4TH MARINES.
- (5) ALL DATTALIONS MAINTAIN COUNTERATTACK PLANS FOR ASSIGNED TACK.
- (6) ALL UNITS IN RECEMENTAL REAR AREAS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR LOCAL SECURITY
- (7) COMMAND ATTENTION IS DEQUIRED WAY PREVENT UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY.
- (8) ENFORCE CIVILIAN CURI W WITHIN REGIMENTAL TAOR BETWEEN 2000-0600 DAILY.
- (9) SUBORDINATE UNITS WILL SUPMIT ONE COPY OF ALL PLANS IN SUPPORT OF THIS ORDER TO THIS CLAROPARTERS BY 25 SEPTEMBER 1965.
- (10) COORDINATE ALL PATROLS WILL COPL AND ADJACENT UNITS.
- (11) MARIER PLAN (TO BE ISSUED).
- THE COPL WILL BE ORGANIZED IN A COMBINATION OF MOBILE AND COMBAT OUTPOSTS ALONG THE GENERAL TRACE OF THE OUTPOST LINE COORDINATING POINTS.UTILIZING THE TERRAIN TO BEST ADVANTAGE. THE COMBAT OUTPOSTS WILL PROVIDE FOR ALL AROUND SECURITY, BE HEAVILY FORTIFIED UTILIZING MINES, WIRE, AND OVERHEAD COVER TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FROM APPLILERY FIRE.
- (13) 4TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE LIAISON PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH 2ND ARVN DIVISION AT QUANG NGAL.
- (14) BATTALION COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE WITH ALL REAR AREA UNITS WITHIN THEIR PAGE REGARDING REAR AREA DEFENSE POSITIONS.

CECRET

JAMES F.M. CLAMBIAN

COMMANDING TO CORPS

## ANNEXUS:

- A. TASK BARRATIZATION
- B. INTELLIGRACI
- C. C.NCHET OF OPERATION
- D. OPERATION OVERLAY
- E. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
- F. AIR SUPPORT
- G. COUNTERATUACK PEACH
- H. REAR ATEA DEFENSE
- I. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL DEFENSE (TO BE ISSUED)
- J. COMUNICATIONS\_FLECT: NICS.
- K\_ REPORTS
- L. NOT USED
- M. NOT USED
- N. NOT USED
- C. DISTRUDUTION

DISTRIBUTION ADDEX O ( ISTRIBUTION)

SDEAGI

WIH MATTIMES (\_) (REIN) CHU E, VIETNAM 003/21-65

ANNEX . (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (4) DIV OF ORDER 327-55

TIME ZONE: H

4TH PARINES (\_) (REIN)

COL MC CLANARAN

L CO

DLI, HQ BN, 30 MAR DIV

DET, 7TH CIT, FMF

DET, 1ST ITT, FM

DET COMM CO, FMF

DET, 1ST RADIO BN, FMF

1ST BN (REIN),4TH MARINES

LN SECT, BTRY H, 3D BN, 12TH LARINES

2D BN. (REIN) 4TH MARINES 2D BN, 4TH MARINES

LN SECT, BTRY G, 3D BN, 12TH MARLINES DET, COMM PLAT, HQ CO, 4TH MARINES

3D BN. (REIN), 3D MARINES

3D BN, 3D MARINES LN SECT, BTRY C, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES

DET, COMM PLAT, HQ CO, 4TH MARINES

CO B (REIN) 3D RECON BN

CC C (-) (REIN), 3D TANK BN CO B, 3D AT BN

CO A. (REIN), 1ST AMTRAC BN COB(-), 3D ENGR BN

LT COL PARRICH

LT COL FISHER

LT COL MUIR

CAPT COMPTON CAPT SANDERS

1ST LT ROSKI

MAJ HELSHER

CAPT COMER

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTI / TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICIAL:

R. L. TREVINO MAJOR, USMC S-3

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4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
8. SEPT 1965
003/21-55

APPLEX C (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-45

REF: (a) MAPS: TETHAN, L: .000, AIS L701, SHEETS 6756I, 6756II, 6757II, 6757II, 6757II, 6757IV.

TIME ZONE: H

## 1. MISSION.

ATH HARTHES (-) (REIN) DEFENDS THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ANCILLERY FACILITIES; MAINIAINS LOCAL DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD WITH ONE IMPANTRY BN. HQ AND A MINIMUM CV TWO IMPANTRY COMPANIES. SEE ANDIEX D-(OPERATION OVERLAY) TO CREERATION ORDER 305-65. CONDUCT UNITATERAL OPERATIONS OF DATTALION SIZE AND SMALLER AND AGGRESS-IVE COMBAT/RECONMATSANGE PATROLS WITHIN THE TAOR. PROVIDE ON ORDER, CHE COMPANT TO BE DEPLOYED WITHIN AN HOURS NOTICE TO ANY AREAS WITHIN THE DIVISIONS RESPONSIBILITY. PREPARE TO CONDUCT, ON ORDER, UNITATERAL OR COMBINED OFERATIONS WITH RYMAF OUTSIDE TAOR BOUNDRY. PREPARE TO CONDUCT COUNTERATTACKS TO REPEL ANY PRINTERALTION OF THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD DEFENSE AREA.

## 2. CONCEPT.

- A: ATH MARIMES CONTUNUE TO DEFEND THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND SUPPORTING LOGISTICAL FACILITIES AND CONDUCT COUNTERS: GUERRILLA OPERATIONS OF BATTALION SIZE AND SMALLER WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE TAOR. CONTINUE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED WITH RVNAF.
- B. 1ST AND 2D BATTALIONS 4TH MARINES, CONTINUE TO DEFEND. ALONG THE MLR AND OPLR ESTABLISHED IN THEIR ASSIGNED TAORS. 3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES DEFEND ALONG THE MLR AND OPLR TO BE ESTABLISHED DI THEIR ASSIGNED TAOR. (SEE ANNEX D (OPERATION OVERLAY) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.
- C. 3D BATTALION, 3D MARIE , DESIGNATES TWO COMPANIES AS LOCAL DEFENSE FOR CHU LAI AIRE DAND DEFENDS IN PREPARED POSITIONS AROUND THE NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST SIDES OF THE AIRFIELD.

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- D. PEGIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ANY WHERE WITHIN THE TAOR AS A HELICOPTER ASSULT FORCE ON CODER FROM CO, 4TH MARINES.
- F. ALL BATTALIOUS CONTINUE AGGRESSIVE COMBAT/RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING WITHIN AND OUTSIDE ON THEIR ASSIGNED CLORER AND DE PREPARED ON ORDER TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITH THE RUNAF.

BH COMPLEO OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTEMANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: AMMEN O (DESTRUBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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SDO

LTH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
8. SETT 1965
003/23.-65

ANNEX E (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS LYOL, SHEETS 67561, 675611, 6756111, 675711, 6757111, 67571V.

(F) 3D MARDIV OPERATION ORDER 321A-65

(6) 30 MARDIN OF WRATION ORDER 327-65

( 1) MIEM 7-3.

TIME CONF: U

TASE ORGANIZATION: ANNEW 4 (TASE ORGANIZATION)

## 1. JITUATION.

- A. ENERY FORCES. AT THE R (INTELLIGENCE) AND CURRENT ISUMS.
- B. FRIMINE CES. OPERATION OF DER 305-65.
- 2. LEGIONS. THE ATH MARINES THE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (FSCC) WILL EXERCISE CARRALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING THE CONJUNCTIONAL FIRES SUPPORTING THE ELEMENTS OF THE REGIMENTAL IN ADDITION, AS THE CHU LAI THOR FSCC, IT WILL CONDUCT THE OVERALL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF MIFTS WITHIN THE CHU LAI TAOR AND BURFSPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING SOFFORTING ARMS FIRES OUTSIDE THE CHULAI TAOR WITH THE LOCAL RUNAF COMMANDERS.
- 3. EXECUTION. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES (B), (C) AND (D).
- 4. TARGET INFORMATION
  - A. TARGET LIST. THE TARGET LIST WILL BE MAINTAINED BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDAR. SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN THAT PORTION OF THE TARGET LIST THAT APPLIES TO THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
  - B. RESTRICTED TARGETS.

    (1) NO SUPPORTING ARM WILL BE FIRED INTO ANY POPULATED AREA EXCEPT WHEN THE INFANTRY COMMANDER ON THE GROUND PERSONALLY DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE MARINE LIVES, AND THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION. SUCH MISSIONS MUST BE CLEARED WITH THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCO.

SHORET

- (2) EVERY EFFORT WILL HE TAKE TO PRESERVE INTACT RELIGIOUS GULTURAL, MEDICAL AND PHBLIC INSTALLATIONS FROM DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION BY AND PAPON OR SUPPORTING ARM.
- (3) LEGITMATE TARGETS WITHIN A SPECIFIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY MAY BE ENGAGED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDER OF THAT TAGE, WITHOUT FURTHER CLICARANCE. ILLUMINATION MISSIONS, WHICH MIGHT EFFECT ADJACENT UNITS, SHOULD BE CLEARED BY THE NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
- (4) LEGITIMATE TARGETS OUTSIDE A REGIMENTS TAOR OR THE CHU LAI TAOR WILL NOT BE ATTACKED UNTIL CLEARANCE TO FIRE HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT CHIEF AND/OR THE CHU LAI TAOR ESCC. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE IS WHEN A FRIENDLY UNIT IS RECEIVING FIRE FROM SUCH A TARGET THEY MAY IMMEDIATELY RETURN FIRE WITHOUT CLEARANCE. THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC SHOULD BE NOTIFIED OF THIS FACT WHEN REQUESTING THE FIRE MISSION.

## 5. ATROBART SAFETY.

## A. AIR SEMTRIES AND MACHINE.

- (1) AIR SENTRIES WIDE BE POSTED AT ARTILLERY FIRING UNITS AND ON NAVAL CUMFIRE SUPPORT SHIPS, AND WILL "CHECK FIRE" WHEN FRIENDLY ATRORAGE ARE OBSERVED APPROACHING DANGER AREAS.
- (2) ARTILLE X FORWARD COSERVERS AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SPOTTERS WILL CHECK FIRS WHEN IT APPEARS THAT THE TRAJECTORIES OF ARTILLERY AND SUPPORT SHIPS WILL ENDANGER FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT.
- (3) UNLESS SPICIAL COORDINATION MEASURES ARE PRESCRIBED, FIRES ON HELICOPTER ROULES IN USE ARE RESTRICTED TO OBSERVED FIRES WHERE THE OBSERVED ALL IS CAPABLE OF INSURING THE SAFETY OF THE HELICOPTERS USING THE ROUTE.
- (4) INFORMATION ON ALL ARTILLERY AND NAVAL CUNFIRE MISSIONS WILL BE POSTED TO ALL HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT CONTROL AGENCIES. FOR THIS PURPOSE, A "SAVA PLANE" REPORT WILL BE USED. THIS REPORT WILL INCLUDE THE COORDINATES, OF THE FIRING UNITS, THE TARGET COORDINATES, THE TIME PERIOD INVOLVED AND THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE OF THE PROJECTILE.

EXAMPLE: SAVA PLANE 20-AXA-5404XB-4897XC-0900D-1100X E-5000 FT.

INDIVIDUAL BN FSCC'S WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PASSING "SAVA PLANE" REPORTS TO THE REGIMENTAL FSCC. THE REGIMENT, IN TURN, WILL DISSEMINATE THE REPORTS TO DASC AND OTHER AIR CONTROL AGRICIES AS REQUIRED.

E-2

- B. RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLANS.
  - (1) WHEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MASSED ARTILLERY AND/OR NAVAL CUNFIRE EXISTS AND WHEN SUCH MASSING MAY ENDANGER A SIMULTANEOUS AIR MISSION, A RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN WILL BE EMPLOYED. THE ECHELON REQUESTING THE AIR SUPPORTS MISSION WILL RECOMMEND THE RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN IF ONE IS REQUIRED. THE PROMPT AND ACCURATE DISSEMINATION OF ALL SAVA PLANE REPORTS BY THE RESPONSIBLE MASSING THE CAREFUL OBSERVANCE OF THESE REPORTS BY ALL HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING AIR CRAFT, SHOULD REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN TO THE MINIMUN.
- 6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE USE OF TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) PROVIDE THAT ALL FIRES WITHIN, INTO OR OUT OF A TAOR MUST BE UNDER THE POSITIVE CONTROL OF THE TAOR COMMANDER. THE BOUNDALLES, THEREFOR, OF THE TAOR ARE TO FACT NO FIRE LINES AND BOMB LINE. AS SUCH, THEY INSURE THE NECESSARY SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES.
- 7. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ADMINISTRATION ORDER 305-65.
- 8. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS L. CTRONIOS.
  - A. ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS)
  - B. THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC (LTH MARINES) WILL BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH 3D MARDIV FSCC ON D-84. COORDINATE USE OF NAVAL CUNFIRE SPOTTING FREQUENCIES AND TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION FREQUENCIES WITH 3D MARDIV ESCC.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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ATH\_MARINES (\_) (REIN) CHAI, VIETHAM 8 S.PT 65 003/21-65

ANNEX F (AIR SUPPORT) TO OPERATION PLAN 305-65

REF:

(A) 3D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER 321-A-65
(B) 3D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER 327-65 W/CH/1

(C) MAP: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS L701, SHEETS 675711, 6757111,

TIME ZONE: H

## 1. SITUATION.

- A. ENIMY FORCES.
  - (1) REFERENCE (A) AND (B).
  - (2) ANNEX B ( INTELLIGENCE).
  - (3) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE OPERATION PLAN 305-65.
- 2. PROCEDURES. PROCEDURES TO DE FOLLOWED ARE AS DETAILED IN REFERENCE (A) AHD (D).
  - A. ALL AIR STRIKES WITHIN THE TAOR WILL BE UNDER POSITIVE CONTROL.
  - B. COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES. SEE ANNEX & (FIRE SUPPORT COOR-DINATION).
  - C. FRIENDLY UNITS WILL BE MARKED BY DISPLAY PANELS PRIOR TO CALLING FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.
  - D. THE UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR UTM MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM WILL DE USED FOR TARGET LOCATION.
  - E. MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST WILL BE FORWARDED DIRECTLY TO THE DASC (-) AT CHU LAI. REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO 0900 THE DAY PRIOR TO THE DAY FOR WHICH IT IS DESIRED. THE REGIMENTAL ALO WILL CONSOLIDATE ALL REQUEST AND FORWARD THEM TO DIVISION AIR PRIOR TO 1000 DAILY. STANDARD MISSION REQUEST PROCESURES AND FORMS WILL BE USED.
  - F. ALERT STATUS OF ON-CALL AIRCRAFT.

CONDITION 1 - 2 MINUTES

CONDITION 2 - 5 MINUTES

CONDITION 3 - 15 MINUTES

CONDITION 4 - 30 HINUTES

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CONDITION 5 - ALECRAFT AND PILOT NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL TIME IS SPECIFIED.

- G. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT. APPENDIX 1.
- H. AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES. APPENDIX 2.
- 3. CO SAAND AND COMMUNICATION\_ELECTRONICS.
  - A. ANNEX J (COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONICS).
  - B. LOCATION OF CONTROL AGENCIES.
    - (1) REGIMENTAL AGENCIES SHALL BE LOCATED AS ANNOUNCED.
    - (2) DASC (-) (CHU LAI) WITH BE LOCATED WITHIN CP, 4TH MARINES.
  - C. FSCC 4TH MARINES WILL ACT AS FSCC, CHU LAI, FOR COORDINATION OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE ATT MARINE TAOR AND IN DEFENSE OF THE ENTIRE CHU LAI TAOR.

D. AIR ATTACK WARNING SIGNALS.

	SIGNAL	MEANING	HOW DISSEMINATED	remarks
	WARNING	AIR ATTACK	FLASH MESSAGE,	NO SIREN WILL
	RED	IMMINENT OR	SHORT REPEATED	BE USED FOR
		TAKING PLACE	DLAST ON SIREN,	ANY OTHER SIGNAL
		•	WORD OF MOUTH	
	WARNING	AIR ATTACK	MESSAGE. WORD	
	YELLOW	Possible	of mouth	
	WARNING	AIR ATTACK	MESSAGE, WORD	
	WHITE	IMPRODABLE	OF MOUTH	

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

## APPENDIXES:

1- AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

2- AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES (TO BE ISSUED)

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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ACE MARINES (\_) (REIN)
COLLAI, VIETHAM
8 SECT 65
005/21-65

APPENDIX 1 (AIRCRAFT ARMEMENT) : ATRIEX F (AIR SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

REF: LONE

TIME ZOHE: H

# 1. STANDARD AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT CODES.

CODE NAME	NO/TYPE ORDANCE	FUZING NOSE	TAIL
DODGE	6 AERO 7D (HE) 6 AERO 6A (HEAT) 2 NAPALM	INST. INST. WHITE PHOSPHORUS	
FORD	12 260 #FRAG 2 NAPALM	VT WHITE PHOSPHORUS	ins <b>t.</b>
CHEVROLET	8 500 #GP 4 250 #GP 2 1000 #GP	VT VT VT	.01 .01 .01
PLYNOUTH	S 500 #GP	4 VT 4 INST.	,01
	4 IVAR 2 1000 #GP	inst. Vt	.01
DESOTO	12 CLUSTER DOMBS (M29A1) 4 CLUSTER BOIDS (M28A2)		
, Luigela	12 HVAR OF FFAR (ME) 2 LAU 10 (GP)	INST.	
PACKARD	12 250 #GP	VT	.01
INDSON	2 LAU 10 (GP) AERO 7D (HE)	INST.	
NASH	2 NAPAI,M	INST.	
TUCKER	2 DULLPUP	INST.	
PONTAIC	12 250 #GP 2 BULLPUP	VT INST.	.01
OLDSINDILE	12 250 #GP 2 500 #GP	VT VT	.01
CADILLAC	4 LAU 10 (GP) (AERO 7D (HE))	INST.	

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CCL NAME NO/

NO/TY. OR .. NOT.

FUZING TOOM

TAIL

STUDEBAKER

4 BULLFUR

REF.

DUIUK

2 PPO 14A SHORE TANKS

DART

3 AREO 10D

CODE.

SIDEWINDER

BARRACUDA

STARROW

BY COINAID OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNE: O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LAI IETNAM
8 SEPT 55
003/21-65

ANNEX G (COUNTERATTACK PLAN) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (A) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1: 50,000, AMS 1701, SHEET 6757III

TIME ZONE: H

#### 1. SITUATION.

## A. ENEMY FORCES.

- (1) SEE ANNEX B(INTELLIGENCE).
- (2) SEE CURRENT ISUMS. .

## B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

- (1) SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).
- (2) 4TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE CHU LAI AIR FIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES.
- (3) FMAW CONTINUE TO PROVIDE CAS AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR THE 4TH MARINES.
- (4) ARTILLERY BATTALION GROUP IN GENERAL/DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 4TH MARINES.
- (5) 7TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DEFEND THEIR TAOR TO THE SOUTH OF THE 4TH MARINES.

## C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.

- (1) SEE APPENDIX 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION).
- (2) ALL ATTACHMENTS BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN.

#### D. ASSUMPTIONS.

- (1) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF LAUNCHING A FULL SCALE ATTACK AGAINST THE CHU LAI ENCLAVE IN STRENGTH, OF BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER, WITH SUPPORTING ARMS.
- (2) THAT IF THE VC ATTACK, THEY WILL ATTACK THE CHU LAI AREA IN SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH TO STREET AND DESTROY THE AIR FIRED COMPLEX.

- (3) THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE ATTACK WILL BE THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ITS SUPPORTING FACILITIES.
- (4) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT RAIDS OF SQUAD SIZE OR LARGER AGAINST THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD OR AGAINST ANY SECTOR WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
- 2. MISSION. THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE CONDUCTS COUNTERATTACKS AS DIRECTED BY CO, LITH MARINES TO DESTROY THE ENEMY WITHIN THE PENETRATION AND RESTORD REGIMENTAL INTERRITY.

### 3. EXECUTION

- (A) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE MAINTAINS A READINESS POSTURE TO BE IMMEDIATELY EMPLOYED AS A HELICOPTER-BORNE. FAST REACTION FORCE OR AS THE MAIN BODY OF AN ARMORED FORCE, TO BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR AS DIRECTED BY THE CO. 4TH MARINES.
- (B) CO C, 3D TANK BATTALION. ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACK 1 SECTION OF TANKS TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (C) CO B, 3D AT BATTALION. ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACH 1 SECTION OF ONTOS TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (D) CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION. ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACH 1 SECTION OF LYT'S TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (E) ARTILLERY BN GROUP. PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO REGIMENTAL RESERVE. DEVELOP COORDINATED FIRE PLANS TO SUPPORT PLANNED BLOCKING POSITIONS. ANNEX D (CREATION OVERLAW)

# (F) RECIMENTAL RESERVE.

- (1) COMPANY, 3D BN 3D MAR (-) (REIN).
  - (A) CONDUCT ROUTH RECONNAISSANCE AND NECESSARY REHEARSALS
    TO UNSURE READINESS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT BY HELICOPTER
    OR AS THE MAIN BODY OF AN ARMORED FORCE.
  - (B) BE PREPARED TO ASSEMBLE AND ORGANIZE FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT UPON NOTIFICATION OF DEFENSE REACTION CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT.
  - (C) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FORCES TO AUGMENT REGIMENTAL CP SECURITY.
  - (D) BE PREPARED TO MOVE INTO BLOCKING POSITIONS. ANNEX D

G-2

(E) BE PREPARE TO RECEIVE ONE SECTION OF TANKS, ONE SECTION OF ONTOS AND ONE SECTION OF AMTRACS, UPON NOTIFICATION OF DEFENSE REACTION CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT.

# (G) COORDINATING INSTRUCT S.

- (1) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTERATTACK. SEE APPENDIX 2 (OPERATION OVERLAY).
- (2) DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS. SEE APPENDIX 3 (DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS).
- (3) BLOCKING POSITIONS. SEE APPENDIX 2 (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).
- (1) ALL SUPPORTING UNITS GUARD THE REGIMENTAL DEFENSE NET DAILY FROM 1900 TO 0500. SEE ANNEX K (COMMUNICATION-LECTRONICS ANNEX).
- (F) ANY ENEMY PENETRATION WITHIN THE MLR WILL BE REPORTED BY FIRSH HESSAGE.
- (6) ALL UNITS OF THE REGIMENTAL REAR AREAS WILL BE RESPON-SIBLE FOR THE SECURITY.
- (7) THIS ANNEX IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY FOR PLANNING AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER. OF THE CO, LITH MARINES.
- (8) CC, 31: DM. MARINES.(-) (REIN) UADN...
  CO.MI'MENT OF LIE REGIMENTAL RESERVE, BE PREPARED TO
  BY THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

# 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGT 3

(A) ADMINISTRATION. SEE ADMINISTRATION ORDER 305-65.

# (B) LOGISTICS

- (1) REGIMENTAL RESERVE DEPLOYS WITH THE BASIC ALLOWANCE OF CLASS V SUPPLY.
- (2) ALL PERSONNEL WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE MCI AND TWO CANTEENS OF WATER PRIOR TO COMMITMENT.
- (3) MOBILE ATTACHMENTS UPON REPORTING OF CON TO REGIMENTAL RESERVE WILL HAVE FULL FUEL TANKS AND PRESCRIBED AMMUNITUM LOADS.
- (4) RESUPFLY AFTER COMMITMENT WILL BE BY THE UNIT TO WHICH THE RESERVE WAS COMMITTED.

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### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS—ELECTRONICS

- (A) THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE WILL NOT BE COMMUTED WITHOUT THE EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THE SEMENTAL COMMANDER.
- (B) THE REGIMENTAL PESERVE COMMANDER IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON WITH ATTACHMENT COMMANDERS FOR PLANNING AND REHEAR. SAL PURPOSES.
- (C) UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT, ATTACHMENTS BECOME EFFECTIVE.
- (D) COMMUNICATIONS
  - (1) DEFENSE PRESENCIES AS PRESCRIBED IN ANNEX J (COMMUNICA-TITONS).
  - (2) CALL STORE ELECTION UNCHANGED.
  - (3) ALL SUPPOSITION OF THE CHECK INTO THE DEFENSE NET AT 1900
- (E) REPORT CHANGES IN C FOCATIONS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

EY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. 2. MELBY
IMPORTANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

### APPENDIXE

- 1. PASK ORGANIZATION
- . 2. CRERATIONS OVERLAY
- 3. DETENSE, BEACTION CONDITIONS

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX, & (THISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

### OFFICIAL:

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APPENDIX 3 (TASE OFFENIZATION) TO ANNEX G (COUNTERATIVEDE FLAX )

REF: NORE

TIME ZONES H

REGIMENTAL RESERVE

COMPANY (\*\*) (PEIN), IN, MARINES COMPANY COMMANDER

SECTION PLATOON CO 0,3D TAIN IN

SECTION FLATOON CO B,3D AT EN

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELEY
I SUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATEON ORDER 305-65.

SECUTION FILES M CO. A, J.ST AMTRAC BN

OFFICIAL:

RL TREVING
MAJOR, USMC
8-3

S. T

MTH Madiros (a) (REIN)
CHU LAF, SIETNAM
8 887 651
0027.3-65

AND EX H ( AUTHOR AND MUTAR ARMA DEFINEE) TO OPERATION PRAIN 305-65.

REF: (A) MADS: WIETNAM 1450. O AMS 1701 SHELTS 6757II, 6757III, 6757IV.

TRUE SONE: H

- l. Truation.
  - A. NEWY FURCES.
    (I) SET ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)
    - (2) SEW CURRENT LISTERS AND PARTY.
  - P. FRUNDLY FORCES.
    - (A) SHE AMMEN A (TASK ORGANIZATION)
    - DEFENDE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

### ASSUTE PROVE.

- (3.) THAT THE VO HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO LAUNCH A WATERBORNE ATTACK IN EXCLOSIVE PLATOON STRENGTH AGAINST THE REGEMENTS LOCASTICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IN THE REAR.
- (2) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT RAIDS FROM THE SEA IN SCHAD SIZE OR LARGER AGAINST LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IN THE REAR.
- (3) THAT THE VC HOVE TO CAPABILITIES TO INFILTRATE OUR MIR AND ATTACK THE REGION TAL REAR AREAS.
- (4) THAT THE VC HAVE TO CAPALILITY OF LAUNCHING A FULL SCALE ATTACK, IN SUFFICE CAPACITY OF SEIZE AND DESTROY THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD CO. T. K.
- (5) THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET WILL BE THE CHU LAI ALRELELD AND IT'S SUPPORTING FACILITIES.
- (6) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CANALYTICES TO CONDUCT RAIDS OF SQUAD SIZE OR LARGER AGAINST THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD OR AGAINST ANY SECTOR WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
- 2. MISSICN. THE 4TH MARINES EXERCISES FOSITIVE MEASURES BY UTILIZING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF, AND PREVENT DESTRUCTION TO THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD, THE REAR AREA CP'S AND THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES AND AREAS IN THE REAR.

### EXECUTION.

- (A) THE ATH MARINES UTILIZING SUPPORTING LOGISTICAL UNITS, DEFENDS THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD, REAR AREA CP'S, AUD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FACULITIES TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONTINUITY OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, BY TAKING THOSE MEASURES AND/OR ACTIONS TO PREVENT, NEUTRALIZE OR DESTROY LOGALIZED ENEMY THREATS TO UNITS, ACTIVITIES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE REAR.
- (B) SEE ANNEX D (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (C) 1ST BN. ATH MARINES.
  - (1) BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR'S. SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATION OVERLAY)
  - (2) INSURE CLOSE LIAISON OF THE VIETNAMESE BEATHBOCKING AREA BETWEEN HO CO. ATH MARINES TO THE HORTH AND SCUADION 225 OF MAG-12 TO THE SOUTHEAST TO INSURE COMPLEX COVERAGE OF THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN THAT AREA.
  - (3) COORDINATE WITH MACS- AS ADJACENT UNIT TO THE NORTH-EAST TO ENSURE POSITIVE DEFENSE OF THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN WHAT AREA.

### (D) 2D BN. 4TH MARINES.

(1) BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

### (E) 3D BN. 3D MERINES.

(1) BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR. SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATION OVERLAY)

### (F) CO C (-) (REIN) 3D TANK BN.

(1) BE PREPARED, ON CALL, TO ASSIGN ONE SECTION OF TANKS TO ANY REAR AREA FACILITY TO ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF THAT AREA.

## (G) CO B, 3D AT BN.

(1) BE PREPARED, ON CALL, TO ASSIGN ONE SECTION OF ONTOS TO . TANY! REAR AREA FACILITY TO ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF THAT AREA.

### (II) MACS-9.

(1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

Ti-2

RFT

(2) COORDINATE AND ADJAC HT UNITS TO THE NORTH SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE BANK AREA.

## ((I) FLSU #1

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INTO THE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA
- (3) CONDUCT MOBILE OUTPOSTS ON THE BEACH AREA BETWEEN CO C, 3D MT BN SOUTHERN BOUNDRY AND HQ CO, 4TH MARINES NORTHERN BOUNDRY TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.
- (4) INSURE PROPER COORDINATION WITH ADJACENT UNITS AND DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREAS WITHIN THE BOUNDRIES OF BULK FUEL AREA.

## (J) CO C.3D MT BN.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH OR SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO ENSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

## (K) HO CO ATH MARINES.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPRINDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.
- (3) PROVIDE INTERNAL PERIMITER SECURITY FOR THE REGIMENTAL CP AREA, AND ADC GROUP.

## (41) MG-12

- (1) DEFEND THE AIRSTRIP AND SEAVARD APPROACH AREAS WITH THOSE SUBORDINATE UNITS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) INSURE SUBORDINATE UNITS COORDINATE WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST TO INSURE CAMPLETE PERIMETER. DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD AND REAR AREAS.

### SECRET

### 10 1101 -10.

- (1) DETERM THE SHAWARD APPROADED IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1, (CONCEPT OF SPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SCUTHEAST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

### (M) CO B, 3D ENGINEER BN.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

## (O) CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BN.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (A) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNIT TO THE NORTHWEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DAFFINGE OF THE REAR AREA.

### (P) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) LOCAL INDIGENIOUS PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHIN COMMAND POST AREAS OR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AREAS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- (2) COMMANDERS WILL EXCERISE SCHTINUOUS AND PERSONNAL SUPERVISION TO MAINTAIN SECURITY DISCIPLINE AT ALL TIMES.
- (3) MAXIMUM USE WILL BE MADE OF DEFENSIVE OBSTACLES, TO INCLUDE BARBED WE WIRE, TRIP FLARES ETC.
- (4) ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN PERIMETER SECURITY WITH-OUT EXPRESS PERMISSIONNEROM THE HEADQUARTERS.
- (5) INSURE THAT ALL MEASURES ARE TAKEN TO PREVENT MILITARY/CIVILIAN INCIDENTS WHICH WILL NEGATIVELY INFLUENCE OUR CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM.
- (6) NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.
- (7) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REMAIN THE SAME.
- (8) REAR AREA UNITS COORDINATE W/BN COMMANDERS PERTAINING TO REAR AREA DEFENSE WITHIN BN TAOR'S.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN 305-65.

Bak

5. COMEND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS. SEE ANNEX K (COMM & ELEC)

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAM

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION)

OFFICIAL:

R. L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC

LTH MARINES (~) (REIN)
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
S SEPT 65
003/21-65

ALPENDIX 3 (DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX & (COUNTERATTACK PLAN)

EF: NONE

FIME ZOME: I

- 1. THIS APPENDED ESTABLISH I VARIOUS DEFENSIVE CONDITIONS AND SETS FORTH THE DECIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITS.
- 2. THIS HEADCHARTERS WILL A LISH THE DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS COMMENSURATE WITH THE EXAMPLE SITUATIONS.
- S. IMPENSE PLACTION CONDITIONS.
  - A. CONDICTOR GREEN. NO IMMEDIATE LARGE SCALE ENEMY THREAT.
    RECIPIENTAL RESERVE CONDUCTS NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.
    RECIMENTAL RESERVE IS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE BATTALION WITHOUT
    TO BE THE PROBLEM CO., WITH WAR. PLANNED ATTACHMENTS CONTINUE
    NORMAL OF ERATIONS UNDER PARENT UNIT CONTROL.
  - PLANNED ATTACHMENTS CONDUCT NORMAL OPERATIONS BUT ARED FOR RAPID DETLOYMENT.
  - C. CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT. DEFINITE LARGE SCALE ENEMY THREAT TO THE REGIMENT. REGIMENTAL RESERVE ASSEMBLES AND ORGANIZES FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT. ATTACHMENTS ARE EFFECTED AND PHYSICALLY REPORT TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
  - D. CONDITION RED. ENEMY ACTIVITY NECESSITATES THE IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT OF THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE. THIS HEADOUARTERS CO., LTH FORTMES INSULANDED NECESSARY FRAG ORDERS TO COMMIT THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

SECRET

4. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL ESTABLISH THE DEFUNDE WEADTION CONDITIONS AND PROMULGATE THE PRESCRIBED COMPUTIONS ON THE COMMON DEFENSE RADIO NET OR BY LAND LINE.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTEVE OFFICER

I STRIBUTION: ANNEX OF (DIST HUTLON) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICEAT.

R. L. Transper MAJON, 179% SECR T

4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) O CHU LAI TETNAM 8 SEPT 1.965 003/21-65

ANNEX J (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRON : 3

OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (A) 3D MARINE DIVISION OFFER A GROER 3214-65

(B) REGIMENTAL ORDER 2000.1A

TIME ZONE: H

### 1. SITUATION.

A. THE VIET CONG CAN BE EXPECTED TO EMPLOY IMITATIVE DECEPTION AND JAMMING. HE ALSO MONITORS A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FM RADIO NETS. WIRE LINES ARE BEING OUT AND TAPPED RREQUENTLY DURING THE HOURS OF DARDYESS.

## B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) SEE OPERATION ORDER 305-65

(2)	COMMAND POST	•
	4TH MARINES	528048
	1ST BN, LTH MARINES	527088
	2D BN, LITH MARINES	528040
	3D BN, 3D MARINES	535075
	3D BN, 12TH MARINES	551048
	"B" CO, 3D RECON BN	528042
	"B" CO, 3D AT BN	528042
	"C" CO, 3D TANK BN	528042
	"B" CO, 3D ENGINEER BN	556052
	"A" CO, 1ST AMTRAC BN	55 <b>9050</b> 0

REPORT ANY RELOCATION OF CLASTO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

2. MISSION. LITH MARINES (REIN) COMMUNICATION ELEMENTS PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SUPPORT TO PARENT AND ATTACHED ORGANIZATIONS FOR OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

### 3. EXECUTION.

# A. COMMUNICATION PLATOON, HQ LITH MARINES.

(1) INSTALL AND OPERATE HQ, 4TH MARINES COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE AND ATTACHED UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF (A), (B) AND THIS ANNEX.

B. 1/h. 2/h, 3/3.

INSTALL AND OPETATE COMMUNICATION FACTUTIES TO SUBORDINATE AND ATTACHED UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN REF (A), THIS ANNEX, OR AS SPECIFICALLY SET FORM IN ORDERS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

- C. "A" CO, 1ST AMTRAC BN: "B" GO, 3 RD AT BN: "B" CO, 3RD RECON BN
  AND "C" CO, 3RD TANK BN.
  - (1) SEE HEF (A) AND THIS ANNEX.
- D. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (1) SEE ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO BEER ATMON ORDER 305-65
- E. AIR SSUPPORT COMMUNICATION S.
  - (1) SEE ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65
- F. COORDINATING INSULUCTIONS.
  - (1) SEE REF (A) AED (B).
  - (2) MESSENGER SERVICE. SCHEDULED CR NON-SCHEDUISD AS REQUIRED.
  - (3) RADIO.
    - (A) ALL UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED NETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX 1
      (RADIO PLAN) UNITS WISHING TO ENTER AN UNASSIGNED NET WILL
      REQUEST TRAMISSION FROM NET CONTROL.
    - (B) RADIO CALL SIUNS SEE REF (A).
    - (C) RADIO FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT SEE REF (A).

NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS (COMM. O) IN REGARD TO INTERFERENCE ON AN PARTICULAR FREQUENCY.

- (4) TIRE.
  - (A) MAXIMUM EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY ALL UNITS OF LITH MARINES (REIN) TO INSTALL WIRE WITHIN THEIR TAOR'S. WIRE WILL BE USED AS THE PRIMARY MEANS, WHEN INSTALLED, TO PASS ALL UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC.
  - (B) SWITHCHOARD CODE NAMES SEE REF (A).
- (5) MESSAGE CENTER.
  - (A) ALL UNITS OF BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER WILL MAINTAIN

PROMET

A 24 HOUR MESSAGE CENT.

- (B) COMPANY SIZE UNITS WILL BE PREPARED TO HANDLE MESSAGE TRAFFIC IN AN EXPEDITIOUS MANNER AS REQUIRED.
- (6) RADIO RELAY SEE APPENDIX 2 (RADIO RELAY PLAN).
- (7) CHYPTOGRAPHIC.
  - (A) SEE REF (A)
  - B) THE 4TH MARINES (REIN) WILL PROVIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC HUARD FOR ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS. IN ADDITION, GUARD WILL BE PROVIDED FOR MOBIO AND FLOT #1.
- (8) WARNING, VISUAL, SOUND AND PYROTECHNICS.
  - (A) SEC REF (A).
  - (B) REF (A) MAY BE MODIFIED FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS HEADQUARTERS ONLY.
- A. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

ALL APPLICABLE MARINE CORPS AND DIVISION ORDERS WILL BE FOLLOWED OR AS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED FROM TIME TO TIME BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE COMPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICIALI

R. L. TREVENO
MAJOR, USMC


### APP ENDIXES

1. RADIO

2. RADIO RELAY PLAN.

APPENDIX 1 (RADIO PLAN) TO NNEX J (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRACES)
TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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4th Marines (-) (Rein) Chu Lai, Yieinan 8 Sept 1965

Annex & (Reports) to Operation Order 303465

Ref: (a) RegtC 3800.1D (B) MCO 3430.1 (c) 3d MarDiv(EMD) 0 5100.1 (d) Div CF Order 321-65 (e) KAG - 10

Time Zone: H

Title of Report	Salumithed by	Submitted to	Frequency	Period	1.00	
			rroquoncy	Commedia	When Due	Remarks
Remain Cally	All Units		Daily	JUL 1-2400	1200 Following Dow	Use Chargeable
Personnel Status	In Sentery Bas	The second secon		Amirk yestü	S Disconsider Date	
	and Hq Co	S-1	Semi-Monthly	1-15th of	1200 16th Use	Chargeable Plus on
Rotation Rank and Mos		2.1	Monthly	Trout on	ith of Mo	d Strenght
Estation Name	ere	S-1	Monda y	Mon th	Preceeding Rota 15 of Mo	
Periodic remonnel Reports	All Units	<b>S</b> -1	Weekly	0001 Frida	Preceeding Hota 1200 Friday	tion of the second seco
Chvil Affairs Spot Report	All Units	S-1	Daily	N/A	ursday 1200	Submit as Original
Casual by Report	All Units	2-1	As Occurs	18 N/	ASAP	and 2 Copies
Rongency Reports (a) Flash (b) Energency (c) Operational	Sighting Units	S-2/S-3	A3 Necessary	N/A	As Occur	Send by most Expedit-
Immediate			K-1	and the second s	SECRET	

Title of Report	Submitted by	Submitted to	Frequency	Period Covered	d When Due	Remarks .
intelligence Summary	All Units	S-2	Once Daily	0800 to 0800	ASAP NLT 0930	Sent by most Expeditous Means.
Shell Rep Nort Rep Domb Rep	Sighting or Receiving Unit	FSCC S-2	As occur	N/A	ASAP	Sent by most Expeditous Means.
larget Information	Artillery Unit FSCC	S-2	As occur	N/A	ASAP	Ħ
intellig <b>ence</b> Specialist Team Report	Counterintelligence Fhoto Imagery, Interpretation Technical, Intelligence Interrogation at Translation	nđ	Once Deily	1800 to 1800	NLT 2000	See Reference(a)
O Report	Unit Performing the mission	ing Mission		N/A	ASAP	See Reference (a)
Petroa Route and	Performing Unit		As Occur	N/2,	ASAP	See Reference (a)
F Location Repor	rt Unit	S-2	When Applicable	N/A	ASAP	These Reports should be sent prior to departure of patrol or
Report .	BLT's and Battalions	Comm (o)	Upon Violation	N/A	ASAP	establishment of OF's Submit in accordance
(1)	*All Units	§-3	Daily	ABCCH to	1300H Daily	Ref Divo 3100.1 Submit
Command Disty	Inf, Ens Hq, 4th Mar	S-3	Monthly	lst of Mo to 30th of Mo.	6th Day of each Mo.	Divo 3100.1 Submit Original plus
<pre>pot Report (2) *</pre>		S-3	As they Occur	Duration of courance	ASAP	Divo 3100,1 Who, What,
200 SitRep	All Units	S-3	Daily	1200H to	2200H	Where, When, How Regt. C.O. Negative
umary of Nights ctivities	inf, hs	S-3	Daily	0001H to	Daily 0600H Daily	reports required Negative reports
		**	7-4-2		MALLY	required Regt, C.O.

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Coctation Submitted By S (Setation Subserve Over 10)	ubmitted To	Weekly	Period Covered 1200H to 1200H Saturday	1300H	Remarks Div0 3100.1 G-3 Verbal instructions Original overlay	
Wash Report All Units	** <b>S.</b> -3	As They Occur	N/A as 6	ASAP	3d Div OP Order 321-65 Contact with enemy fonces' of Platoon size or larger, incoming Artillery or Mortar Fire, and/or Air or Armored Attack	energene
After Action **Air on 135 Roport (L)	S-3	As They Occur	Pariod covered	24 Hours after action	3d MarDiv OP order 321-65 Original and two Copies on all Company or Larger operations even when no contact	Province Season
Operation Flam Intentry Bus Concept of Operation Overlay	* \$ \bullet	As They Occur	M/A	72 Hours prior to operation	Div OP Order 321-65 Original and three copies with OPS overlay, Helicopters and TAR Forms	المنافقة ا
( Long tial All Units equipment Report	S-12	B1 A. D. Ny	weeks	1200 on the 14th & 29th	DivO 4000.53 Original and three copies.	+
Weekly Periodic All Units	<b>k</b> 25.0	eekly.	1200 \thursday	1600 each Thursday	Original and two copies	1.
Logistics Reflected All Units  Linkburg	54	That UTOA	1st to 30t.	inen of No.	Div	
Norwally codating All Units of Scleoned Items Inventory	Self.	Montany	LES 50 SCOR .	15th of Mo.	120 Lilijo, 19	<b>?</b>
Engarization School All Units Trained for sound	5.1	bi-londay	As of End of Jan, Mor, May, Jul. Sept, Nov	Apr, Jun, v.Aug, Oct, D	Original and one copy	, <b>k</b> .
Heberring Datu	A ST.	iani. Amo	as of 30 Jun & 30 Dec	5th of July & Jan	Divide Local Original and Three Copies to Include Company Level Submissions	1.
The second secon					ARAD III	•

Tible of Report	Submitted By	Submitted To	Frequency	Period Covered	When Due	Remarks	
Equiptment	All Units	S-4	Monthly	Previous	1200 on	Div(FWD)	0 4000.1
Density				Month	1st of Mc	• Submit	Changes only

### \* NOTE S:

- 1. SEMEPS will be accompanied by one patrol overlay for all patrols (except company size and larger) to this Headquarters 48 hours prior to scheduled time of execution.
- 2. SPOT REPORTS are required on actions wherein U.S. personnel are wounded or killed and/or enemy casualties, regardless of the cause. The capture of VCC or VCS. The discovery of supply/ weapons caches. Incidents detrimental to USMC/ARVN relationships. Incidents likely to result in immediate wide spread news coverage. Significant VC initiated acts against friendly forces and installations. Units will notify this headquarters when a company sized operation commences and ones.
- 3. OPETATIONAC SUMMARY will include below listed items:
  - A. Friendly or enemy casualties.
  - B. Capture of VCC or VCS.
  - O. Dispovery of supply/weapons caches.
  - D. Geneact with VC.
    - astrikes in or near respective TAOR's.
  - F. Location of boobytraps encountered.
  - G. Incidents detrimental to USMC/ARVN relations.

### 4. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

- A. Identification of units involved, strengths, date, time, place, casualties (enemy and friendly), nature of action, (i.e. ambush, patrol, raid, search and destroy, attack).
- B. Narrative account of action. Include sketech or overlay for clarity.
- C. Lessons learned, problems or difficulties encountered, areas or matters requiring additional training or attention, and suggestions for operations.
- D. Reports will be numbered consecutively for each calendar year.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W.E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE COLPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: Annex C (Dsitribution) to Operation Order 305-65.

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ANNEX O (DESTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION OF JET 305-65.

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OFFICIAL:

R.L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC
S-3

4th Mines (-) (Rein)
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
080800H Sept 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65 3d MARDIV (FWD)

Ref: (a) Maps:

(1) Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I and IV, 6757 II, III and IV

(2) Vietnam, 1:250,000 AMS Series L509, Sheets NE 48-4, NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 49-5 and ND 48-8

(3) ONC, 1:1,000,000 Sheets J-11 and K-10

(b) 3rd MarDiv Operation Order 321A-65

(c) 3rd MarDiv Operation Order 327-65

(c) 3rd MarDiv Ope (d) DivO P3800.1E

(e) RegtO 3800.1D

Time Zone: H

## 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
- b. See Special Intelligence Reports and Summaries as issued.

## 2. Essential Elements of Information

- a. Determine if the VC will attack Chu Lai. If so, when and in what strength?
- b. Determine the location of VC camps, Hq's, supply caches in the Chu Lai area.
- c. Determine the type defenses the VC will employ around their combat hamlets. Special attention to weak points, secret exits, hiding places for personnel and material and tunnel patterns.
- d. Determine the location of main supply and infiltration water and trail routes into the Chu Lai area.
- e. Determine the VC modus operanda and living habits. Special attention to their methods of avoiding friendly forces.
- f. Determine the type and employment of VC communications. Secial attention to signals used for warning purposes, for breaking contact and for opening fire.
- g. Determine the roads, trails and waterways that constitute approaches to the VC controlled areas in the Chu Lai area.

h. Determine the location of helicopter landing sites in VC areas adjacent to Chu Lai.

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- i. Determine the road and bridge camabilities in the Chu Lai area. At # 1 north to Tam Ky and south to Quang Ngal.
- in the Chu hai area. How is the attitude reflected in areas defined as pacified, under pacification, cleared, neither ARVN nor VC centralled? What factors effect the selattitudes?
- k. Determine the location and disposition of VC hospitals and way stations.
- 1. Determine the location, disposition and availability of VC units with gas masks.
- m. Determine significant signs that VC use on trails for ambush or booby traps.
- n. Determine location, area covered and density of anti-helo punji stakes.
- o. my information that may lead to the recovery of detection of U.S. personnel held by the VC.
- p. Determine the capabilities of the VC to conduct propaganda efforts against our forces and in what manner.

## 3. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.

## a. Orders to Subordinate Units.

## (1) Bn's

- (a) Utilize AM/TPS-21 ground surveillance Radar and Seismic Intrusion Detectors in conjunction with patrols, observation posts and listening posts during periods of reduced visibility to exploit all means of reconnaissance and surveillance.
- (b) Conduct reconnaissance as required within TaOR. Be prepared to conduct additional reconnassance missions as directed.
- (c) Maintain strict surveillance of all major roads leading int your TAOR.

## (2) Co B 3rd Recon Bn

(a) Be prepared to conduct recommaissance and establish observation posts in and ajacent to the fact.

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# b. dequests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

## (1) 3rd Marine Division

- (a) Provide current weather data twice daily for 12 hour periods.
- (b) Provide information on enemy strength, disposition and sapabilities.

## (2) Others

(a) Provide information on enemy strength, disposition and capabilities as they become available.

## c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Normal reconnaissance and observation will be carried out by all units as prescribed in reference (e).
- (2) Subordinate units submit patrol overlays to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2) 48 hours prior to commencement of petrol.

  Observation and listening posts will be submitted as established.
- (3) All relationships between ARVN and Civil Authority will be closely coordinated to prevent incidents that will or might possibly alienate these units and local populas.
- (4) The capture and early interogation of VGC or VCS is of great importance due to lack of information on location, composition and methods of operations of VC forces.
- (5) Report information as obtained on the following:
  - (a) attitude of civilians in areas of operation.
  - (b) Location, activities and attitudes of any groups of local inhabitants in or near TAOR.
  - (c) Indications of sabotage or infiltration of rear areas, by hostile elements.
  - (d) Information on EEI's.

- 4. Intelligence support requirements.
  - a. Request following assistance be provided or arranged for by 3rd Marine Division:
    - (1) Continuous personnel augmentation to include aerial observers, counterintelligence and interrogator-translater personnel.
    - (2) Provide English speaking ARVN Liaison Officers to assist with matters pertaining to intelligence and security.
- 5. Measures for handling VCC, VCS, Ceptured Pocuments and Captured Material.
  - a. In accordance with reference (a).
- 6. Maps and Photographs.
  - a. In accordance with reference (6).
  - b. Reference (a) (1) is designated as the standard tactical map, employing the UTM grid system.
  - c. Distribution of photographs will be made as available. Requests for aerial photography will be submitted to this Headquarters.
- 7. Counterintelligence.
  - a. See Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence).
- 8. Target information.
  - a. Target lists will be updated by target ballentins issued by this Headquarters.
  - b. Subordinate unit commanders will submit target nominations to this Headquarters as targets are uncovered to include description and UTM coordinates in six digits.
- 9. Reports and Distribution.
  - a. See Annex K (deports)
  - b. ISUM's will be submitted to this Headquarters on a 24 hour basis as of 0800 daily by the most expeditious means available.

BY COMMAND OF COLONAL MC CLANAHAM

W. E. MELBY Identenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Executive Officer

B-4

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## AP. ENDIXES:

1 - Intelligence Estimate

2 - Tactical Study of Weather, Terrain and Hydrography

3 - Counterintelligence

4 - Target information (To be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL

C. N. WARNER Major, U.S. Marine Corps

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4th Marines (\*) (\* in) CHULLAI, VINTEM 08080 Sept 1965

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65

Ref: (a) Maps:
(1) VIETHAL, 1:250,000 MAS Series L509, Sheets No 48-4, A
NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 49-5 AND ND 48-8

(2) VIDTNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I, 6756 IV, 6757 II, III and IV

lime Zone: H

- 1. MISSIOM. 4th Marines (-) (deln) defends the Lai Airfield and ancillary facilities, provides local defense of the Lai Airfield with one intentry En Hq and minimum of two infantry to's, corders search and destroy perations and aggressive patrolling within the TAOR; on order conducts combined operations with RVN F beyond the boundaries of the TAOR; maintains a to in a reflex status (one hour) for employment anywhere in the Division areas of responsibility and prepare to conduct counterattacks to repel any enemy penetr. On of the the Lai Airfield areas.
- 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OFERATIONS. See Appendix ? (faction Study of Weather and Torrain)
  - Politics. The guerrilla warfare which has spread over all Allin recent years began in 1954 when the country was divided into two parts by the Geneva accords. The President, sighted in 1955, served until 1963 when he was killed by militant groups during a coup. Since that time, the AVN government has been shaken by one upheaval after another. The situation remains extremely fluid to date and experience has shown that U.S. Forces in AVN will have to continue to consider in their thinking the ever changing political situation, and various pressure groups within the government. There are eight major political parties and four primary pressure groups which have acted, in various ways to maintain the unstable situation.
  - deconomics. The AVN economy rests on an agricultural basis with approximately 85% of the population involved in agricultural pursuits. Rice and rubber are the mainstays supplemented by wood products and some light industry.
  - c. Sociology. AVN is inhabited predominately by people who are related to the Chinese. Some minority groups, primarily Chinese have settled in the large urban areas such as Saigon. Others,

including the Chams, Moi, nontagnards and some ethnic Cambodians populate rural areas. The primary European oclony is located in Stigon. Approximately 75% of the total population is middhis and about 15% are Catholic. There are many different Vietnamere dialects used. Some Vietnamere understand French while others understand English.

## 3. ENELY SITUATION

# a. Composition

- (1) The typical Viet Cong Battalion consists of sight, reconaissance and training elements (usually of plateon size), three infentry companies and theavy weapons company. The strength of the battalian varies considerably and depends on geographical location, the availability of local supplies and food, in addition of the density and athnic origin of the local populace. The degree of control exercised by the Viet Cong over an surrounding territory.
- (2) The typical Viet Cong company consists of three rifle plate as and a weapons plateon. However, the organization of the companies varies widely depending on subordination (military region battalion, separate provincial companies, di rict companies), location and availability of food and cruit.
- b. Strength and Combat efficiency. The Viet Cong combat efficiency can only be measured by past experience where the Viet Cong have shown outstanding still and endurance against adVN forces and on several occasions against our own forces. Their operations against us show that they follow a rehearsed and well planned operation or pattern. They are well trained in many cases and with no doubt are use to physical hardship. Loyalty is assured through a cohesive and disciplined organization, imposed by tight party control, and capable landership. After the crushing defeat during Operation starlight it can only by guessed that the Viet Cong morale has dropped somewhat and at the same time their image in the eyes of the local populace has been erased, but even so it is estimated that their morale is still stable due to their leaders never ending devotion to the party and belief in the revolution. It is well known that the Viet Cong benifit from the belief that their cause as a popular one, supported by the people and undertaken in their behalf.
- c. Dispositions. The following is the strength and dispositions of Viet Cong units within a kilometer radius of Chu Lai irfield:

UNIT	A. A. SINGTH	LOCATION
1st degiment 2nd degiment	1,000	ь <b>\$ 5</b> 597 Ва <b>5</b> 590

#### SICRIT

M2/7th Volunteer Regt	1.00	<b>1</b> 3396
108 Acgiment	**************************************	БТ <b>35</b> 05
52nd Bettalion	270	B \$ 7583
40th Battalion	450	RS 1776
aka		
80th battalion		
45th Bastalion		BS 6784
60th Bautalion	400	BS 1.776
90th Bartalion	700	E <b>S</b> :3001
20th Battalion	368	нз 4076
105th Buttalion		BS 5384
aka		
104/3d Betvalion		
94th Battalion		BT 3606
aka	•	
350th Battalion		
U/I Bottalion (Poss 54th)		BT 3203
U/I Battalion (Poss 504 aka 109th)	the day and but	BS 5684
U/I Battalier		BT 3416
400th Myy Wons Battalion	200	Unlocated
T <sub>z</sub> 18 Company	50	в <b>s</b> 686?
T-19 Company	<b>12</b> 0	,BS 5392
A-11: Company	-	BT 2223
A-16 Company		BT 2314
19 (D-23) Company	-	BT 3910
A-21 (75th) Company	200	BT 333.6
special mission Company (Pham)		B <b>S</b> 5793
ricdical Company (Poss H810)	Marie and Selection	BS 4791

### d. .rms and .rmanent

(1) In past and recent contactations against the Viet Cong, weapons of various manufactur have been captured. In the past, normally capture of tither French or U.S. weapons was quite common, but in recent months more and more ordnance of Sino Soviet orgin have been captured. Procurement of these weapons ammunition and explosives is known to be through infiltration cooridors which continue to be effectively operated regardless of the actions taken to contain them. It is also quite probable that infiltration by surface ship and even submarine of ordnance to Viet Cong units comes directly from North Vietnam. During a company sweep and destroy operation of the southern part of the Table a Soviet REG-2 rocket launcher was captured. Aso during operation Starlight another RPG-2 was captured. Evidence of further introd-. uction of CHICOM weapons into the Vict Cong inventory was cobtained in Ba Xuyen Province advarly as 27 Dec 1966, when LRVN forces captured a CHICOH copy of the Soviet RPG-2 recoilless anti-tank weapon and nine projectiles of

1963 CHICOM manufacture. The MrG-2 launcher is a copy of the German "rangerfoust" developed just before World War II.

The weapon is light in weight with an effective range of aloo to 150 meters and capable of penetrating up to seven inches of armor at zero degrees obliquity. The caliber of the projectile is 82mm and the weight is 3.3 pounds.

Acquisition of significant numbers of this weapon would represent a considerable increase in Viet Tong capability to comput armored vehicles.

- (1) In earlier operations as stated above, most captured weapons were of French or U.S. manufacture. The U.S. manufactured weapons included 30 cal M-1 rifles, 30 cal M-1 and M-2 carbines, 45 cal Thompson submachine g ms; 30 cal Browning automatic rifles, and the newer 40mm M-79 and 6.52 M-14 rifles. Various makes of hand weapons of U.S. manufacture also have been captured. A number of French weapons of older vintage have been captured which include the MAS-36 rifle, MAS-47 submachine gum, and others of various cakes and models. In addition to these weapons the Viet Cong have employed the 60mm and sham mortar and the 57mm and 75mm recoliless rifles. There has been unconfirmed reports of 120mm mortars in the possession of a few Viet Cong units.
- (3) Mines and explosives are used extensively by the Var Cong as well as hand grenades of all makes. The employment of booby traps and pull and pressure type AP mines, has been discovered throughout the Table. The Viet Cong have been using the 60mm mortar round quite extensively as a mine or booby trap.
- (4) Ordnance captured of Sino-coviet manufacture include 7.62 mossin Nagant model 53, carbines, AK-47 assault submachine guns, K50/FPSH 41 modified submachine guns, hand grenades of various make and the NPG-2 recoilless rocket launcher.
- (5) The introduction of Sino-Soviet ordnance indicates not only that the fire power of the Viet Cong is being submanded but it also means that it is probable that steps are being taken to standardize equipment.

# Recent and present activities

(1) The overrunning of the Junk Fleet Headquarters on 9 July was one of the most recent major actions taking place in the northern flank of the TAOR. The Junk Fleet Headquarters was completely wiped out except for those who were on patiol at the time of the Viet Gung attack. Elements of the 1s. En, 4th marines were sentents a reaction force in response to the attack. It is felt at this action was not perpetrated to

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enhance Vict Cong s. infiltration in the area. In fact such an action drags attention to Vict Cong activity in the given area and the Vict Cong modus operandi has been to be inconspicious in this respect. It is believed that the Vict Cong moded a weakness or lapse in the security of the area, possibly attributive to the Junk Fleets proximity to the Marines and decided to capitalize on it.

- (2) The Viet Cong continue their use of Truong Giang River in Eastern Quang Tin for the transport of men and supplies.
- (3) With the exception of minor probing incidents and the Vict Cong overrunning the Junk Fleet Headquarters the tempo of activity in the northern area has declined, although, recent reports indicate a massing of the TAOR and indications reveal a possible attack of points along Route #1 and possibly hill 159.
- ments in the Chu hai area. Although these reports are not confirmed, it is reasonable to assume that the Viet Commare active in this area and are conducting surveillance of the area. A successful Viet Congraid similar to the Danong Airfield action or the overrunning of even a small U.S. harine outpost would be of immense propagated and psychological value to the Viet Congrafter their latter loss in Operation Starlight.
  - (5) Several reports have recently been received of Vict Cong Special Mission Units in the vicinity of the TAOR with specialized equipment. The various types of booby traps discovered within the TAOR are indications that Vict Cong personnel are being trained in this type warfare.
- (6) The major Viet Cong offensive in Quang Ngai was the overrunning of the Ba Gia outpost on 5 July 1965. In this action
  Vict Cong units overrun and captured two 105 howitzers,
  which are still inaccounted for. Many reports have been
  received allegedly indicating their location but not have
  resulted in their recovery. The guns have been reported
  west of the city of Quang Ngai, but at the same time, as
  far north as the T-60 A ekshop (BT 2707) west of our TAGA.
  Apecial recommaissance has responded to reports of their
  locations with negative results.
- (7) The most significant action involving the Viet Cong, was the Marine Operation Starlight, which took place mortheast of Binh Son during 18-20 Aug 1965. This action inflicted heavy casualities to the Vict Cong and the 1st Viet Cong anguagnant. The operation started out as a routine search and destroy.

cpcration, but escalated into an offensive operation by the Marines. The total Vict Cong killed were approximately 600 with numerous wounded. The remaining elements of the 1st VC Regiment have been reported to have reorganized and to have joined the ranks of the 2nd Vict Cong Regiment located in the vicinity of BS 5791 and BS 5489. Other reports indicate that they are licking their wounds in the vicinity of Ba Gia. Still other reports say that elements of the 1st VC Regiment are located northwest of our TaOa. The 90th Battalien, which is subordinate to the 1st VC Regiment has been reported on many occaisions in the same operational area as the A/21 Company (BT 3615 - BT 3614).

f. Time and Space. Road descent for the below listed locations are figured from the has at all an Tan- (19 499057):

TAM	COURDING TALL	DISTANCS	TLE
Daning Tam Ky Ly Tin Dinh Son Quang Ngai	BT 0407 BT 31424.1 BT 470079 BS 602918 BS 645728	55 miles 13 miles 2 miles 11 miles 25 miles	22 hrs 546 hrs 45 min 4.2 hrs 10 hrs

## g. Logistical Considerations

- (1) The Viet Cong rely heavily on human porters for merchant of supplies, but there has been reports of them using buffalo and elephants in some of the more remote areas. They are very quick to take advantage of any mode of transportation if it will conform with security of the unit.
- (2) The Viet Cong needs for POL is almost non-existent except for generators and manufacturing installations. Fol ean readily be precured through local sources.
- (3) The VC logistic requirements are simple and they are almost entirely self-sufficient. They practice supply economy and enforce rigid supply discipline.
- (4) The current Viet Cong tactic of combining a Main Force unit with a Local Force whit probably is designed to ease their logistical burden.
- (5) Recently a heavy drain has been inflicted upon the Viet Cong supply system due to their extensive offense in the Binh Dinh Kontum erga, the uncovering and destruction of their rice caches by ARVN and Marines, and the artillery and cir strikes of their sup ly installations.

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(6) The increased pressure and attacks on Tra Bong were directed at restricting friendly activity in the area to enhance the Viet Cong freedom of movement in the area. It appears that the Viet Cong have been utilizing the trail from Tra My to Tra Bong for the movement of man and supplies between Quang Hgai and Quang Tin.

# h: Personnel Considerations.

- (1) The ded High Command in North Vietnam has coordinated training of infiltrators with the buildup of new VC armament. These trained infiltrators are the backbans or cadre of the Viet Cong units. Training of infiltrators is continuous and a smalle unit may be trained for special assignments or missions.
- (2) The Viet Cong rectall or draft young men from hemle's by means of evereion and threats of bodily harm to members of his family or relations. In Viet Cong hamlets the young men engerly joings, ranks as it is their belief that it is their duty to serve in the ranks of the revolution of the people.
- (3) Several reports have recently been received of Viet Gong units in the vicinity of the TAOR with specialize countract, such as satchel charges, anti-tank mines are maked detectors. Also these reports have linked personalities with these units who have been known to have operated in in this area in the past.

# 4. FRELY CAPABILITIES

### a. Enumaration

- (1) Capability 1. The Vict Cong has the capability to continua his build up around the periphery of the TAOH by limited drafting of SVN youths and continuing to introduce DAV youths and PAVN elements into the area.
- (2) Capability 2. The Vist Cong can attack Chu Lai with a force of 3 or 4 Regiments (11-14 Battalians) supported by local forces and parrilles while interdicting At # 1 to the north and so the
- (3) Capability 3. Constitute to conduct small probes and occasional large so the attacks, terrorism, assessmentions, substage, propaganda, population and resources control, and extension of the chandestine infrastructure to gather intelligence in preparation of an attack to extend the Vict Cong effort.

(4) Capability 4. The Viet Cong can escalate their setivity during the monsoon conson commensurate with the severe effect on aerial and around observation that prevails with the monsoon.

## b. Analysis and discussion

- (1) The Vict Cong can replace his losses or increase his forces by infiltration of trained units from North Vietnam and forced recruiting of the local populace or captives of past operations. During this build up he can impose taxation on the local populace to sustain his forces.
- (2) Enemy forces committed in the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai area number 10 battalions in three regiments (one of which is unidentified). The other regiments are the confirmed 1st VO Regiment and the possible 106th Regiment. There are two local force battalions in Quang Tin Province, two confirmed and possibly three. One local force battalion in Quang Tin Province and two Local force battalions in Quang Ngai Province. One main force battalion directly subordinate to MR5 is located in Quang Tin Province. A massing of all these forces for a single attack is possible but not probable. Additionally, two transportation battalions are located along the main infiltration corridors with the mission of manning infiltration stations along the may.
- (3) As amply demonstrated, the Vict Cong has been implementing the capabilities described in 4a(3) for sometime. Is a consequence of their actions, the economic and military resources of the GVN have been severally strained.
- (4) September and Octobel is a period of heavy rainfall throughout the country. Operations become severally restricted in the coast area as well as the mountains when typhoons or tropical storms move into the Gulf of Tonkin. During this period, heavy rains and flooding as well as damaging storms, take place along the seast, severally restricting movement. During November and December, aerial and ground observation is severally restricted by low ceilings and numerous showers in the north and central mountains and the north coast. During these periods of limited observation and air capability the Vict Cong push their offense.

# 5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities. It is considered most probable the Vict Cong will adopt capabilities 1, 3 and 4 in that order and only resort to capability 2 as a last measure. The prospect of heavy losses may deter a major attack

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on Chu Lai, but the Viet Cong might be willing to to do the losses for a significant psychological victory. In attack against Chu Lai, while possibly not a tactical success, would demonstrate to the world the growing stangeth of the Viet Cong and the determination of the Viet Cong to resist American combat power and act as a strong psychological bool to extend their efforts.

b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the commanders mission. Capabilities I through 4 will not effect the accomplishment of the commanders mission.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELIX
Licutement Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL:

TIMI WE THE

C. N. WARNER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

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hth Marines (-) (Rein) CHU LAT, VIETNAM 080800H Sept 1965

Appendix 2 (Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65

Ref: (a) Maps, VI\_TNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I, 6756 IV, 6757 III, 6757 II, 6757 IV

Time Zene: H

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS. The purpose of this study is to determine the affects of weather, terrain, and hydrography on military operations within the Chu Lai area.

# 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

- a. Climate. The climate of South Vietnam is Monsocnal in nature and is characterized by two major seasons: The South West Monsoon (april to October) and the North East Monsoon (October to April). In the Northern area, the North East Lonsoon is the period of maximum precipitation.
  - (1) Mean daily minimum and maximum temperature (F)

Jan Apr Jul Oct 64(74) 72(87) 77(94) 72(83)

- (2) Winds. During the period, april to October the wind will be from the South West quadrant. Sustained wind speeds exceeding 16 knots are infrequent and winds exceeding 27 knots are rare except during thunderstorms. In this latter case, winds exceeding 50 knots are not unusual. Conditions of calm are reported by major weather stations in the northern area from 10% to 30% of the time during June, July, August and 11% to 19% during December, January, February. Calm conditions are observed most frequently during the night and early morning.
- (1) Precipitation. The annual rainfall varies from 70 to 82 inches from place to place with the heaviest rainfall over the coastlands. The coastlands receive most of their rainfall (72%) during the period eptember December.

Mean Monthly Precipitation (inches)

Jan Apr Jul Oct 2.8 23.3

# (4) Storms

- (a) Tropical Storms. Although many typhoons are originated in, or pass through the South China Sea, few effect South Vietnam seriously. During the period July to September, two or more tropical storms are rarely observed.
- (b) Thunder Storms. During the spring transition from North East Monsoon to South East Monsoon (April) thunderstorms are an important climatic feature. The storms occurring this time of the year are usually quite violent and carry hail stones up to two inches in diameter. These storms usually occur during the afternoon and early evening.
- Generally speaking, the South West Monsoon and the Clouds. autumn transition (October) are the cloudiest periods. However, over the Northern Coast Lands, the Northern Monsoon transition (October) is the cloudiest periods. Throughout the area the most prominent sky condition is a partly cloudy sky. The mean annual cover observed over South Vietnam as a whole is 65%. A special weather phenomenon called the "CRACHIN" (a period of wide spread fog and firizzle or light rain) affects the coastlands. Each "CRACHIN" period usually lasts from two to five days followed by periods of dry weather. It is characterized by visibility of less than two miles (frequently less than one half mile). Although the "CRACHIN" may appear as early as October, it does not become common until Late November. It is most frequent during December and disappears by late April.

Mean Cloudness (%)

 Jan
 Apr
 Jul
 Oot

 67
 50
 65
 71

Relief and Brainage. The regiments zone of action comprises mostly lowlands with the maximum elevation being 410 meters (Coordinates 480999) being in the hill complex that runs generally east to west in the southwest area of the zone of action. The average elevation in this hill mass is 250 meters. The drainage in this area is provided by many streams which are to provide the level of action of the level of the level

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เลขายนายเทา เพล่น (ค.ศ. 1951) - การหมาย มูนาก เข้าเกษา**นายใหม่**ใหม่ใหม่ใหม่ใหม่ใ

. .

(2) Vegetation. The lowlands are devoted to sultivation consisting mostly of rice paddies and sparse grass, bamboo and scrub brush. The most prevalent vegetation consists of rain forests and open forests. The former consisting of thick stands of evergreens with dense underbrush and numerous vines providing excellent concealment and makes prostration difficult.

# (3) Surface Material

- (a) In the lowlands the soil runs from sand to sandy clay. Trafficability is poor in the wet and the to the plastic nature of the soil but becomes good during the dry season.
- (b) In the beach area there is a sandy strip approximately three miles wide. Trafficability is poor for wheeled vehicles in areas off the semi improved road network maintained by Marine units.
- (c) Due to the rain forests and dense underbrush in the high lands trafficability is poor and restricted to roads and trails which are scattered and do not traverse the entire area.
- (d) Trafficability for vehicles in the lowlands during the wet season (June December) is restricted to the roadway due to flooding of rice pad ies. Streams probably cannot be forded during the wet seasons requiring the construction of temporary bridges.

# (4) Cultural Features

- (a) All land capable of cultivation is utilized. Rice paddies and orchards are found throughout the area.
- The road net through this area consists of one main road (Route #1) running North and South and one semi-improved dirt road running from Rt #1 east to the beach and then parallel to the beach throughout the Regimental area. Route #1 is an all weather road approximately 13 feet wide and composed of asphalt and gravel. The semi-improved road in the Regimental area is approximately 12 feet wide and composed of hard packed dirt. Within the Regimental sone of action there are two bridges which are of the composed of the constitution of constitutions. If from the area will accommodate foot twafficult are not suitable for hacavy vehicles.

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- (c) There are no large towns or built up areas in the Regimental zone of action. There are numerous small hamlets and villages. The two main villages being Ly Tin located at (BT472078) and An Tan at (BT500067).
- (3) Railroad. There is a railroad that runs parallel to doute who on the west side. It is narrow (1 Meter) gauge track and is in poor condition.

# A TENTALY ARECT OF THE AREA

- a. Observation and fields of fire.
  - (1) The lowlands is fairly level terrain, and affords excellent observation and fields of fire. Due to the many streams and rice paddies, movement is channelized to the advantage of the defender.
  - (2) The following critical terrain will provide observation into the surrounding low land:

Hill 51 528110 Hill 49 490036 Hill 410 480999 Hill 385 495002 Hill 237 511994

# . Cover and Concealment.

- (1) Cover from flat trajectory fire is provided by gullies and canyons throughout the high ground. Constalment from ground observation is excellent in the high ground due to the heavy vegetation.
- (2) Concealment and cover in the low areas is provided by rice paddies, dikes, road beds and streams. Growing props orchards and clumps of trees royide some concealment.

#### c, Obstacles

- (1) The three mile wide strip of sand located between the beach and Route #1 poses a minor obstacle to movem nt inland.

  The semi-improved dirt road grants ready exit from the beach to Route #1, but any movement by vehicles off of this route will be slowed by sand.
- (2) On the high ground vehicular traffic will be restricted to the existing trails due to the heavy vegetation.

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- (3) In the area of dense forests all vehicular traffic will probably by curtailed.
- d. venues of Approach. There are no well defined avenues of approach for foot troops. Avenues of approach for vehicular movement will be restricted to the existing roads.

# 4. TACTICAL AFFECT OF THE AREA

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- a. The terrain favors the defense of the area. The high hill mass southwest of the beach affords the defender excellent observation of the beach, the villages and routes leading inland. Vehicular account will be confined to existing roads. This forces channel-ization of movement and affords excellent op ortunities for ambush, interdiction and harassment of an advancing unit.
- b. EFFECT ON FRIENDLY FORCES. Troop movement will be slow and tiresome. High temperatures and high relative humidity ranges over long periods of time will have a deteriorating effect on troops. Air operations, including close air support, a rial observation, and aerial photo-reconnaissance will be adversely affected to some extent by reduced visibility during the monsoon season.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CHANAHAN

W. D. MELBY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL

C. N. WARNER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps.

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Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation -- Orden 305465

Ref: (a) 3rdwardiv Operation Order 3214-65 (b) 3rdwardiv Operation Order 527-65 (c) Regto 3800.13

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# l. Ganaral

- The following conditions can be expected which will effect the sccurity actions of all commands:
  - (1) Hostile activity by unfriendly indigenous elements and/or enclay agents with missions of capianages

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- (2) Involvement with civilians in populated areas, including scourity problems generated by refugees.
- the first of the second section in the contraction of the second section in the second section of the second section is a second section of the section of th (3) Possi le defection of members of the present friendly government in the objective area.
- This appendix amplifies references (a) and (b) by setting forth basic counterintelligence procedures and practices to be employed within the Regiment.

#### MILITARY SOURITY

# a. Security of Military Information

(1) Commanders are directly responsible for the military security training of their units and for the safeguarding of all classified matter in their commends. Classified information will be safeguarded and handled in accordance with OFNAVINST 5510.1B, and supplementary directives issued by this Headquarters.

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(2) No classified material will be taken forward of BLT command post's except as absolutely required in the sonduct of operations. Similarly, classified naterial will not be oarried in aircraft flights over enemy or unfriendly territory.

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- (3) Access to classified information and material will be limited to U.S. personnel. In addition, the following measures will be taken:
  - (a) Surveillance of known or suspected guerrilla agents.
  - (b) Consorship or suspension of civil communications when directed by higher authority.
  - · (c) Control of vivilian movements as required.
    - (d) Checks on internal security of all installations.
    - (c) Security alassification and control of plans, orders, and reports.
- (4) Units will thoroughly police command posts upon displacement to insure that no documents or objects of possible value to the enemy have been left behind.
- (5) Personnel will not carry personal documents with exception of I.D. cands, dog tags and Geneva Convention Cards on their person which would be of value to the enemy in case of capture or loss.
- (6) Written plans for the emergency destruction of classified material, documents and equipment in the field will be prepared by all units, and expeditiously implemented if papture is imminent.

# b. Communication Security

- (1) Communications security will be in accordance with Regimental Communications SDr, Chapter II (Communications Electronics) and other pertinent regulations of higher authority.
- (2) An imergency Destruction rlan for crypto material will be prepared in accordance with current directives.

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- (3) Commanders will establish procedures to protect against transmission of classified information over telephones and unclassified teletype circuits, and improper handling of
  - classified material received over communications channels.

    Report communications security violations to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2).

#### c. Press Releases.

(1) All press releases to the public will be governed by the

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- contents of MCO P5720 series, OrNAVIMST 5530 series and any separate directives from this or higher headquarters which may be i sued later.
- (2) Publicity in connection with personnel escaped or recovered from the enemy is prohibited.
- (3) All units will report to this Headquarters immediately the names and organizations of all press personnel with their units.
- d. Onde of Conduct. All personnel will be instructed in the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces.
- c. Scurity, Discipline and Training
  - (1) Personnel will be instructed on security of military information, personnel censorship and proper use of challenges and passwords.
    - (2) Personnel will be instructed as to what articles may not be corried into combat. Prohibited items include unit leader notebooks, personal radios, and personal cameras.
    - (3) Personal records and diaries will not be maintained by members of this command.
- f. Photography. Only official photography and/or photography by accredited news media personnel will be permitted in the area of operations.
- g. Counter-subversion. Attempts at subversion of friendly forces through use of propaganda by the enemy will be reported to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2).
- h. Visitor Centrol. All units will be prepared to provide escorts for official visitors within their areas. This Headquarters will be notified immediately when official visitors or public information media representatives are in the area.
- i. Classification. Operation plans will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL" or higher if warranted.
- J. Restricted area. All communications facilities, operation centers, and wer redus will be safeguarded and access defiled to personnel who are not properly cleared and authorized.

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- k. Counterintelligence Targets. To be issued separately as a special Intelligence Report.
- 1. Challenge and Password. To be issued by CG, III MAF.
- m. Black, white, and Gray Lists. To be issued separately as a special Intelligence Report.

# 3. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

# a. Campuflage.

- (1) Camouflage discipline will be continuous in the objective area.
- (2) Vehicle and tent nets will be utilized at all times when in a static situation. Vehicle windshields will be covered to reduce sun reflection.
- (3) Vehicular and helicopter traffic will be kept to a minimum during hours of darkness.
- (4) all units will institute black out, dim out, and oursew in accordance with the tactical situation.

# 4. CIVIL SECURITY

# a. Refugec Control

(1) All units will ensure that refugees moving in the rear pass along and through established routes and check points.
Refugee columns must be kept under control and off of critical supply routes.

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- (2) Notify this Headquarters immediately of any large group of refugees moving to rear areas.
- (3) Large groups of refugees will be see shed/sheeked for concealed weapons and for infiltrating snemy troops, insurgents and for agents at refugee control points when established.

# b. Civil Leaders

- (1) Friendly civilian leaders will be treated with due respect and efforded such protestion as necessary. Names and incidents will be reported to this Headquarters.
- (2) All civilian leaders claiming to be friendly will be considered as "gray personalities" until their names and loyalties

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can be verified by this Headquarters. They will not be treated as prisoners during verification, but will be closely watched.

c. Alien Diplomatic Personnel. Hostil alien diplomatic personnel will be subdued, protected and brought to this Headquarters without delay.

# d. Givil Untet.

- (1) This Headquarters will be notified immediately of any incident relative to deterioration of friendly relations between the civilian populace and 4th Marines.
- (2) This Headquarters will be notified of any demonstrations, strikes, riots or any other assembly of large groups of of indigenous personnel.
- e. Hiring of Indigenous Personnel. No indigenous personnel will be hired or permitted in military installations, except properly accredited officials or those having the permission of this Headquarters and a proper pass.
- f. Aliens Claiming to be Refugees or Defectors. Aliens claiming to be refugees or defectors recovered by units of this Command will be held in isolation. This Headquarters (Attn: S-2) will be notified immediately and will provide instructions reguarding their disposition.
- g. Restricted Areas. All civilian establishments and residences are "Off Limits" unless official duties require entrance therein.

# 5. CENSONSHIP

a. Consorship may be established in accordance with ONNAVINST 5530.1B, CINCPROFICTIONST 5530.1A and FAFPAGO 05530.1.

# 6. SPECIAL OPPRATIONS

# a. Clandestine Listening Devices

- (1) Only counterintelligence specialists will conduct technical inspections to determine if such devices are present. This does not preclude visual inspection to determine if such devices are present.
- (2) In the event a listing device is suspected, contact this Headquarters (Attn: S-2) immediately. Do not attempt to remove the device or make oral reference to the device within its functional area.

# 7. MISCELLANEUTS

- a. In the event that information is shtained indicating subversive activities or inclinations by any member of this Command, inform this Haadquarters immediately. Local counter-measures involved this Haadquarters immediately. Local counter-measures involved should not arouse the suspicion of the person or persons consermed.
  - b. Counterintelligence personnel are issued credentials by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Commanders will insure recognition of these credentials and will render assistance as necessary for the accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission.
  - c. The fact that the Marine Corps has counterintelligence personnel is not classified, however, the names and numbers will not be released without approval from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
  - d. Each unit will indoctrinate personnel on the proper techniques to be used in the scizure and protection of counterintelligence targets.

BY COLLIAND OF COLONEL AC CLENARAN

W. E. MELBY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL:

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OPERATION

ORDER 305-65

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#### OPERATION ORDER 305-65

- REF: (A) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1: 50,000 L701 SHEETS 6756I, 6756II, 6756III, 6757III. 6757IV.
  - (B) 3D MAR DIV OP ORDER 321-65
  - (C) 3D MAR DIV OF ORDER 321- -65

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATIOM: SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).

#### 1. SITUATION.

- A. ENLINY FORCES.
  - (1) SEE ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE).
  - (2) SEE CURRENT ISUM'S AND PIR'S.
- B. FRIELDLY FORCES.
  - (1) THIRD MARINE DIVISION DEFENDS ATRETELDS AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES AT CHU LAI, DA NANG, AND HUE PHU BAI.
  - (2) FMAW PROVIDES HELECOPTERS, OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, AIR DEFENSE AND MAINTAINS A DASC IN THE CHU LAI AREA.
  - (3) 7TH FLEET AND VIETNAMESE NAVY MAINTAIN COUNTER-INFILTRATION SCREEN ALONG RVN GCASE.
  - (4) CTG 71.8 PROVIDES NGF SUPPORT.
  - (5) 2D INFANTRY DIVISION, ARVN OPERATES ADJACENT TO THE TAOR.
  - (6) 7TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DEFEND THEIR TAOR TO THE SOUTH OF THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
    - (7) ADC COMMAND GROUP.
      - (A) COORDINATES OVER-ALL SECURITY AND ALLOCATION OF UNITS, CHU LAI.
      - (B) COORDINATES BASE TYPE ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS, RESOLVES ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATION KEEPING MATTERS, ESTABLISHES LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PRIORITIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF COMMON USE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
    - (8) AUTILLERY DATTALION GROUP.

- (A) PROVIDES DIRECT AND GENERAL ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO THE 4TH MARRIES.
- (B) RESPONSIBLE FOR FUNCTIONING OF THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC AS ESTABLISHED WITHIN 4TH MARINES AND CONDUCTS THE OVER-ALL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF FIRES WITHIN CHU LAI TAOR.
- (C) FOR THE GOUNDING GENERAL, AND AS A FUNCTION OF THE DIVISION FSCC, COORDINATED SUPPORTING ARMS FIRES WITH LOCAL RVHAF COMMANDERS.
- (9) NMCD-10 CONTINUES CONSTRUCTION OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND FACILITIE.
  AND COUPLES FINAL POSITIONS AROUND THE AIRFIELD.
- (10) FLSU #3 PROVIDES LOGASTICAL SUPPORT AND DEFENDS SEAWARD APPROACHE IN THEM AREA.
- 2. MISSION. ATM MARINES (-) DEFENDS CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ANCILLARY FACTALITIES; PROVIDES LOCAL USE OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD WITH ONE INFANTRY AN HQ AND MINIMUM OF TWO AMANTRY COMPANIES; CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS AND AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING WITHIN THE TAOR; ON ORDER CONDUCTS COMBINED OTHERATIONS WITH RVNAF BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TAOR; MATERIALIS A COMPANY IN A REFLEX STATUS (ONE-HOUR) FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYWHERE IN THE DIVISION AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY; AND PREPARES TO CONDUCT COUNTERATTACKS TO REPEL ANY ENEMY PENETRATION OF THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AREAS.

## 3. EXECUTION.

- A. COUCEPT OF OPERATION. SEE ANNEX C (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS).
- B. 1ST BN. ATH MARINES.
  - (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
  - (2) MAINTAIN COPL MAINTAIN TAOR.
  - (3) CONDUCT AND MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF SEAWARD APPROACHES WITHIN SECTOR TO REPUBLISHED LANDINGS AND PROHIBIT INFILTRATION.
  - (4) PROVIDE LIAISON PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH PROVIDED CHIEF, TANKY.
  - (5) CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN TAOR.
  - (6) BE PREPARED TO COND TO OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND/OR DILATERALLY WITH NAME OUTSIDE TO DESCRIBE TAKEN.
- C. 2D BN. ATH MARINES.
  - (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MLR IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
  - (2) MAINTAIN COPL WITHIN TAOR.

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- (3) MAINTALA ROADBLOCK. RAFFIC CONTROL POINT ALONG ROUTE #1 IN VICINIAN OF (BT 530033).
- (4) PROVIDE LIAISON PER TOTAL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH DISTRICT CHIEF, BIRL GO.
- (5) CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN ASSIGNED TAC
- (6) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND/OR BILATERALL WITH RVNAF OUTSIDE THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.

# D. 3D BN. PD MIRRIES.

- (1) DEFEND ALONG THE TRACE OF THE MIR IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
- (2) MAINTAIN COPL WITHIN TAOR.
- (3) MAINTAIN OUTPOST FOR DEFEASE OF BRIDGE AT (BT 498067) AND CONTIM A ROADBLOCK/TRAFFIC CONTROL POINT TO CHECK ENTRY AND EXIT OF ALL TRAFFIC LUTO REGIMENTAL TAOR ON ROUTE #1.
- (A) TRANSPER FLANDS PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH DESCRICT CHARGES IN TRANS
- (5) COMECCI ACGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AND PATROLLING WITHIN ASSIGNED TAGE.
- (6) BE PROPARED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS UNILATERALLY AND OR BILATERALLY AND OR BILATERAL BROWN AND OR BROWN AN
- (7) PROVIDE CATTALION BEARQUARTERS AND TWO RIFLE COMPANIES FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF CHU LAI AIRFIELD.
- (8) CONSTRUCT FIELD FORMUL ICATIONS FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF CHU LAI ATRIFICAD.
- (9) DY-SECHATE ONE COMPANY LOCATED ON LOCAL AIRFIELD DEFENSE AS RECEMENTAL RESERVE.
- (10) UPON COMMITMENT. OF THE RECLAIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY, THE REMAINING COMPANY IN THE IMPEDIATE AREA OF THE AIRFIELD WILL BROOMS THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

## E. CO B (REIN), 3D RECON BN.

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINES (...) (REIN).
- (2) CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE TAOR AS DIRECTED.
- (3) ON CROER CONDUCT AERIAL AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND ESTAB-LISH OBSERVATION AND LISTENING POSTS ON MAJOR AVENUES OF APPROACTION TO THE REGISSERVAL TAOR.
- F. CO C (REIN). 3D TANK MATTALION.

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON OF TANKS IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO MACH OF THE INFARITAL BATTALIOFS.
- (3) CONTINUE TO COCHETATE PREPARATION OF FIRING POSITIONS ALONG MAJOR AVENUES OF TREE DACH.

- (4) PREPARE DETAILS TO IS FOR IMMEDIATE REACTION TO SUPPORT COUNTERATIACK OFFICE AND SEE ANNEX G (COUNTERATINGK PLAN).
- (5) BE FIGURED TO PROVIDE FLAME TANKS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ANY OPENATOR.

## G. CO D. 3D AT LATTALION.

- (1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON ( MIN'S IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO EACH OF THE INFANTRY DATELIONS.
- (2) PRETIRE, IN DOTALL, CARROL FOR EMPEDIATE REACTION TO SUPPORT COUNTERATTACK OPERATIONS. SEE ANNEX 43 COUNTERATTACK PLAN).
- (3) ON ORDER PROVIDE ONE ONTOS FLATOCH TO REINFORCE THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY.

# H. CO A (REIN), 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION.

- (1) DIRECT SUPPORT OF 4TH MARINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR EACH INFANTRY DATTALION ON ORDER.
- (3) PREPARE, IN DETAIL, PLANS FOR INTEDIATE REACTION IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERATTACK OPERATIONS. SEE ANNEX & (COUNTERATTACK PLAN).
- (4) PROVIDE LVT'S 100 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE REGIMENT THROUGHOUT THE TAOR.

#### I. CO B (REIN). 3D ENGR LATTALION.

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT OF ALM MERINES (-) (REIN).
- (2) PROVIDE ENGINEERING SUPPORT WITHIN CAPABLITIES TO SUPPORT REGIMENTAL OPERATIONS.
- (3) CONTINUE TO PROVIEW DLITTON SUPPORT TO INFANTRY BATTALIONS.
- (4) CONSTRUCT PERMANENT LLATIONS FOR BASE CAMPS TO INCLUDE GALLEYS, SICKBAYS, FOR HIS QUARTERS AND OTHER ACCOMPONATIONS AS DESIGNATED.
- (5) BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO ATTACH ONE ENGINEER PLATCON PER INFANTRY BATTALION FOR CENSATIONS ANYWHERE WITHIN THE DIVISIONS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
- (6) MAINTAIN THE BERM LINE WITH PARBED WIRE FENCING AND APPROPRIATE "KEEP OUT" SIGNS AROUND THE PURCHASED AREA WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.

- J. REGIMENTAL RESERVE COMPANY.
  - (1) RESERVE COMPANY WILL BE DESIGNATED BY CO, 3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES.
  - (2) THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE WILL NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER.
  - (3) BE PREPARED COMMAN, FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT AS A HELICOPTER-BORNE ASSAULA AGREE.
  - (4) DE PREPARED, IN A ONE HOUR REACTION POSTURE, FOR EMPLOYMENT ANYMHERE IN THE DIVISIONS AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
  - (5) BE PREPARED TO DECRY ANY THERE WITHIN THE TAOR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COUNTERACTION PLAN. ANNEX G (COUNTERATTACK PLAN).

# K. COCRDINATING INSTRUCT (S.

- (1) THIS ORDER CANCELS AND PREVIOUS OPERATION PLANS AND FRAG
- (2) REPORTS. SEE ANNEX & (REPORTS).
- (3) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
  - (A) ROUNDS WILL NOT BE INSERTED IN THE CHAMBER OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS UNLESS AN ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY IS OBVIOUS, AND IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SENIOR MARINE PRESENT, THIS MEASURE MUST BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE THE LIVES OF USMC PERSONNEL.
  - (B) DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS THE SEQUENCE OF ENGAGEMENT WILL BE:
    - 1. CHALLENGE.
    - 2. IF CHARRE IS NO RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE, OR IF THE RESPONSE IS INCORRECT, THE IMMEDIATE AREA WILL DE ILLUMINATED.
    - 2. IF THE PERSON CHALLENGED MAKES AN OVERT ATTEMPT TO AVOID APPLY BENSION, OPENS FIRE, OR COMMITS ANY OTHER HOSCILE ACT, THEREDY ENDANGERING THE LIFE OF THE CHALLENGER, THE CHALLENGER MAY LOAD AND FIRE.
  - (C) MAGAZINES WILL NOT BE INSERTED IN VEAPONS IN A CAMPAREA DURING DA STENT HOURS UNLESS UNDER ATTACK.
  - (D) SUPPORTING ARMS.
    - 1. USE OF ALL SUPPORTING ARMS WILL BE CLEARED BY THE APPROPRIATE FSCC.
    - 2. NO SUPPORTING ARMS WILL BE FIRED INTO ANY POPULATED

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AREA EXCEPT WHEN ARE INFANTRY COMMANDER OF THE GROUND PERSCHALLY DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE MARINE LITTLE, AND THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO GOOD A COURSE OF DECION.

- 3. COPPAT SUPPORT UNITS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SUPPORTED UNIT'S USSION.
- 4. EVERY REPORT WILL BE MUDE TO PRESERVE INTACT RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, MEDICAL AND PUBLIC UNSTALEATIONS FROM DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION BY INV WEAPON OR SUPPORTING ARM.
- (4) OPER MITHERAMS ONLY OF M CREEK OF CO 4TH MARINES.
- (5) ALL PATTALIONS MAINTAIN COUNTERATTLES PLANS FOR ASSIGNED TACK.
- (6) ALL UNITS IN REGIMENTAL WEAR AREAS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR LOCAL SECURITY.
- (7) COMMAND ATTENTION IS REQUIRED A TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN LIFE LED PROPERTY.
- (8) ENFORCE CIVILIAN CURFIN WITHIN REGIDENTAL TAOR DETWEEN 2000-0600 DAILY.
- (9) SUBORDINATE UNITS WILL SUBMIT ONE COPY OF ALL PLANS IN SUPPORT OF THIS ORDER TO THIS MEADQUARTERS BY 25 SEPTEMBER 1965.
- (10) COORDINATE ALL PAIRCLE WITH COPL AND ADJACENT UNITS.
- (11) DARRIER PLAN (TO DE 10 100).
- (12) THE COPL WILL BE ORGAN. IN A COMBINATION OF MOBILE AND COMBAT OUTPOSTS ALONG THE GENERAL TRACE OF THE CUTPOST LINE COORDINATING POINTS.UTILIZING THE TERRAIN TO BEST ADVANTAGE. THE CRIBAT OUTPOSTS WILL PROVIDE FOR ALL AROUND SECURITY, BE HEAVILY, FORTIFIED UTILIZING MINES, WHRE AND OVERHEAD COVER TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FROM ARTHLERY FIRE.
- (13) 4TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE LIAISON PERSONNEL TO EFFECT POSITIVE COORDINATION WITH 2ND ARVN DIVISION AT QUANG NGAL.
- (14) BATTALION COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE WITH ALL REAR AREA UNITS WITHIN THEIR TWOR REGARDING REAR AREA DEFENSE POSITIONS.

CRET

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JAMES F.MC CLANAHAN

COMMEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDENO

## ANVEXES:

- A. TASK BROAT ZATION
- B. INTENTIONSON
- C. C.NOMPT OF OPERATION
- D. OPERATION OVERLAY
- E. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
- F. AIR SUPPORT
- G. COUNTERATIVE IN FLAM
- H. REAR AREA DEFENSE
- I. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEATCAL DEFENSE (TO BE ISSUED)
- J. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECT. MICS.
- K. REPURTS
- L. NOT USED
- M. NOT USED
- N. NOT USED
- G. PISTADRUTICA

DISTRIBUTION: ADDEX: C ( TSTRIBUTION)

SECHIT

4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHUEL, VIETNAM 8 475 3 003/21-65

ANNEED A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (A) DIV OP ORDER 327.65

TIME ZONE: H

4TH MARINES (-) (PROM) HQ CO

COL MC CLANARAN

DET, HQ BN, 31 MAR DIV DET, 7TH CIT, MAF

DET 1ST TTT, FMF DET, COMM CO, FMF

DLT, 1ST RADIO BN, FMF

1ST BN (REIN) ATH MARINES

LT COL PARRICH

LN SECT, BTRY H, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES

2D BN. (REJN) 4TH MARINES 2D BN, ATH MARINES

LT COL FISHER

LN SECT, BIRY G, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES DET, COMM PLAT, HQ CO, 4TH MARINES

3D BN, (REIN), 3D MARINES

LT COL MUIR

3D BN, 3D MARINES

LN SECT, BTRY C, 3D BN, 12TH MARINES DET, COMM PLAT, HQ CO, 4TH MARINES

CO B ( IN) 3D RECON BN
CO C ( ) (REIN), 3D TANK BN
CO 3, 3D AT BN
CO (REIN), 1ST AMTRAC BN

(-). 3D ENGR BN

CAPT COMPTON CAPT SANDERS

1ST LT ROSKI MAJ HELSHER

CAPT COMER

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTIC TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICIAL:

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1. 1.1

ATH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LAI, VIETHAM
8. SEPT 3.965
003/21-65

APPLEX C (CONCEPT OF OPLICATIONS) TO OPERATION ONDER 305-45

REF: (a) MAPS: METHAN, A: 1000, ANS 1701, SHEETS 67561, 675711, 6757111, 6757111, 6757111, 6757111.

THE ZONE: H

## 1. MISSION.

ATT HERTHES (4) (REIN) DEFENDS THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ANCILLERY FACILITIES; MAINTAINS LOCAL DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD WITH ONE INFANTRY BHOWHO A MINIMUM OF TWO INFANTRY COMPANIES. SEE AND ALLER AND A COMPANIES OF BATTALION SIZE AND SMALLER AND AGGRESSIVE COMBAT/RECOMMATSANGE PATROLS WITHIN THE TAOR. PROVIDE ON ORDER, OTHER COMPANY TO BE DEPLOYED WITHIN AN HOURS NOTICE TO ANY AREAS WITHIN THE DIVISIONS RESPONSIBILITY. PREPARE TO CONDUCT, ON ORDER, UNIXATERAL OR COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH RYMAF OUTSIDE TAOR BOUNDRY. PREPARE TO CONDUCT COUNTERATTACKS TO REPEL ANY PENETRALIUM OF THE CBJ LAX AIPFIELD DEFENSE AREA.

## 2. CONCEPT.

1

- AJ 4TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DIFFERD THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND SUPPORTING LOGISTICAL FACILITIES AND CONDUCT COUNTERS GUERRILLA OPERATIONS OF BATTALION SIZE AND SMALLER WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE TAOR. CONTINUE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED WITH RVNAF.
- B. 1ST AND 2D BATTALIONS ATH MARINES, CONTINUE TO DEFEND. ALONG THE MAR AND OPER ESTABLISHED IN THEIR ASSIGNED TAORS. 3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES DEFEND ALONG THE MAR AND OPER TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THEIR ASSIGNED TAOR. (SEE ANNEX D (OPERATION OVERLAY) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.
- C. 3D BATTALION, 3D MARIELD, DESIGNATES TWO COMPANIES AS LOCAL BURNES. DEFENSE FOR CHU LAI ATICATUD AND DEFENDS IN PREPARED POSITIONS AROUND THE NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST SIDES OF THE AIRFIELD.

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- D. I TIMENTAL RESERVE COMPLEY BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ANY WHERE WITHIN USE TAOR AS A HERICOPTER ASSULT FORCE ON ORDER FROM CO. 4TH MARINES.
- F. ALL BATTALICHS OF THEME ANGROUNDEVE COMBAT/RECONNAUSSANCE PATROLLING WITHIN AND OUTSIDE ON THEME AND SECRETARY AND SECRETARY OF CONDUCT OFFICE WITH THE FUNAF.

I COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

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ECUTIVE OFFICER

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LITH MARINES (-) (REIN) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 8. SET 1965 003/21.-65

ANNEX E (STREET COORDINATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65

(A) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L701, SHEETS 67561, 6756II, REF 67561.11, 67561V, 675711, 6757111, 67571V.

(F) 3D MARDIV OPERATION ORDER 321A-65 (C) 3D MARDIV OPERATION OF DER 327-65

(I) EMFM 7-1.

TIM' ZONE: H

TAST ORGANIZATION: ANNEX A (TASE ORGANIZATION)

# 1. SITUATION.

- ERREIT FURCES. ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) AND CURRENT ISUMS.
- FPT MEDIX COS. OPERATO ``DER 305-65.
- 1-33ICMS, THE ATH MARINES FILE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (FSCC) WILL EXERCE SE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING THE CONJUNCTIONAL FIRES SUPPORTING THE ELEMENTS OF THE REGIMENTA. IN ADDITION, AS THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC, IT WILL CONDUCT THE OVERALL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF FIRES WITHIN THE CHU LAI TAOR AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING SUPPORTING ALMS FIRES OUTSIDE THE CHI LAI TAOR WITH THE LOCAL RVNAF COMMANDERS.
- EXECUTION. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES (B), (C) AND (D).
- TARGET INFORMATION
  - TARGET LUST. THE TARGET LIST WILL BE MAINTAINED BY REGIMENTAL COMMANDER. SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS WILL BE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN THAT PORTION OF THE TARGET LIST THAT APPLIES TO THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
  - RESTRICTED TARGETS. (1) NO SUPPORTING ARM WILL BE FIRED INTO ANY POPULATED AREA EXCEPT WHEN THE INFANTRY COMMANDER ON THE GROUND PERSONALLY DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO SAVE MARINE LIVES, AND THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION. SUCH MISSIONS MUST BE CLEARED WITH THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC.

**Ullinail** 

- (2) EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO PRESERVE THACT RELIGIOUS CULTURAL, MEDICAL AND PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS FROM DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION BY ANY WEAPON OR SUPPORTING ARM,
- (3) LEGITMATE TARGETS WITHIN A SPECIFIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY MAY BE ENGAGED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDER OF THAT FACE, VITTE'S FURTHER CLEARANCE, TILLUMINATION MISSIONS, WHICH MIGHT REFERST ADJACENT UNITS, SHOULD BE CLEARED BY THE NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
- (4) LEGITIMATE TARGETS OUTSIDE A REGIMENTS TAOR OR THE CHU LAI TAOR WILL NOT DE ATTACKED UNTIL CLEARANCE TO FIRE HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE EMSPECTIVE DISTRICT CHIEF AND/OR THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC. THE CHU EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE IS WHEN A FRIENDLY UPIT IS RECEIVED THE FROM SUCH A TARGET THEY MAY IMMEDIATELY RETURN FIRE WETCOUT CLEARANCE. THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC SHOULD BE NOTIFIED OF THIS FACT WHEN REQUESTING THE FIRE MISSION.

# 5. ATROBANT SATELLY

## A. AIR SENTRIES AND LOOKOUNG.

- (1) ALE SENTENCES WILL BE THEFED AT ARTILLERY FIRING UNITS AND ON MAVAL CUMPIRE SUPPORT SHIPS, AND WILL "CHECK FIRE" WHEN FRIENDLY ATRORAFT ARE OBSERVED AT PROACHING DANGER AREAS.
- (2) ARTILLERY FORWARD OBSERVERS AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SPOTTERS WILL TCHECK FIRE: WHEN IT APPEARS THAT THE TRAJECTORIES OF ARTILLERY AND SUPPORT SHIPS WILL ENDANGER FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT.
- (3) UNLESS SPECIAL COORDINATION MEASURES ARE PRESCRIBED, FIRES ON HELICOPTER ROULES IN USE ARE RESTRICTED TO OBSERVED FIRES WHERE THE OBSERVE ALL IS CAPABLE OF INSURING THE SAFETY OF THE HELICOPTERS USTILL THE ROUTE.
- (4) INFORMATION ON ALL ARTILLERY AND NAVAL CUNFIRE MISSIONS WILL BE POSTED TO ALL HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT CONTROL AGENCIES. FOR THIS PURPOSE, A "SAVA PLANE" REPORT WILL BE USED. THIS REPORT WILL INCLUDE THE COORDINATES, OF THE FIRING UNITS, THE TARGET COORDINATES, THE TIME PERIOD INVOLVE: AND THE MAXIMUM ORDINATE OF THE PROJECTILE.

EXAMPLE: SAVA PLANE 20-AXA-5404XB-4897XC-0900D-1100X E-5000 FT.

INDIVIDUAL BN FSCC'S WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PASSING "SAVA PLANE" REPORTS TO THE REGIMENTAL FSCC. THE REGIMENT, IN TURN, WILL DISSESSMATE THE REPORTS TO DASC AND OTHER AIR CONTROL AGENCIES AS REQUIRED.

- B. RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLANS.
  - (1) WHEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MASSED ARTILLERY AND/OR NAVAL GRAFIRE EXISTS AND WHEN SUCH MASSING MAY ENDANGER A SIMULTANEOUS AIR MISSION, A RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN WILL BE EMPLOYED. THE ECHELON REQUESTING THE AIR SUPPORT; MISSION WILL RECOMMEND THE RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN IF ONE IS RECOIRED. THE PROMPT AND ACCURATE DISSEMINATION OF ALL SAVA PLANE REPORTS BY THE RESPONSIBLE THE PLAN TO THE CAREFUL OBSERVANCE OF THESE REPORTS BY ALL HELICOPTERS AND FIXED WING AIR CRAFT, SHOULD REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN TO THE MINIMUN.
- 6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE USE OF TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) PROVIDE THAT ALL FIRES WITHIN, INTO OR OUT OF A TAOR MUST BE UNDER THE POSITIVE CONTROL OF THE TAOR COMMANDER. THE BOUNDARIES, THEREFOR, OF THE TAOR ARE TO FACT NO FIRE LINES AND BOMB LINES! AS SUCH, THEY INSURE THE NECESSARY SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES.
- 7. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ADMINISTRATION ORDER 305-65.
- 8. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS CTRONICS.
  - A. ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS & LOCTRONICS)
  - B. THE CHU LAI TAOR FSCC (4TH MARINES) WILL BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH 3D MARDIV FSCC ON D-84. COORDINATE USE OF NAVAL CUNFIRE SPOTTING FREQUENCESS AND TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION FREQUENCIES WITH 3D MARDIV ESCC.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX 6 (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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4TH MARINES (\_) (REIN) CHAI, VIETNAM 8 SEPT 65 003/21-65

ANNEX F (AIR SUPPORT) TO OPERATION PLAN 305-65

REF: (A) 3D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER 321-A-65

(B) 3D MAR DIV OPERATION ORDER 327-65 W/CH/1

(C) MAP: VIETNAM 1:50,000, ANS L701, SHEETS 675711, 6757111, 67571V.

THE ZONE. H

# 1. SITUATION.

# A. ENMY FORCES.

- (1) REFERENCE (A) AND (B).
- (2) ANNEX B ( INTELLIGRACE).
- (3) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES.
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE OPERATION PLAN 305-65.
- 2. PROCEDURES. PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED ARE AS DETAILED IN REFERENCE (A) AND (D).
  - A. ALL AIR STRIKES WITHIN THE TAOR WILL BE UNDER POSITIVE CONTROL.
  - B. COORDINATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES. SEE ANNEX & (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION).
  - C. FRIENDLY UNITS WILL DE MARKED BY DISPLAY PANELS PRIOR TO CALLING FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.
  - D. THE UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR UTM MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM WILL BE USED FOR TARGET LOCATION.
  - E. MEDICAL EVACUATION REQUEST WILL DE FORWARDED DIRECTLY TO THE DASC (\_) AT CHU LAI. REQUEST FOR AIR SUPPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO 0900 THE DAY PRIOR TO THE DAY FOR WHICH IT IS DESIRED. THE REGIMENTAL ALO WILL CONSOLIDATE ALL REQUEST AND FORWARD THEM TO DIVISION AIR PRIOR TO 1000 DAILY. STANDARD MISSION REQUEST PROCEDURES AND FORMS WILL DE USED.

# F. ALERT STATUS OF ON\_CALL AIRCRAFT.

CONDITION 1 - 2 MINUTES

CONDITION 2 - 5 MINUTES

CONDITION 3 - 15 MINUTES

CONDITION 4 - 30 IMMUTES

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CONDITION 5 - AIRCRAFT AND PILOT NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL TIME IS SPECIFIED.

- G. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT. APPENDING.
- H. AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES. APPENDIX 2.
- 3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION\_ELECTRONICS.
  - A. ANNEX J (COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONICS).
  - B. LOCATION OF CONTROL AGENCIES.
    - (1) REGITENTAL AGENCIES SHALL BE LOCATED AS ANNOUNCED.
    - (2) DASC (-) (CHU LAI) WILL BE LOCATED WITHIN CP, 4TH MARINES.
  - C. FSCC 4TH MARINES WILL ACT AS FSCC, CHU LAI, FOR COORDINATION OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE 4TH MARINE TAOR AND IN DEFENSE OF THE ENTIRE CHU LAI TAOR.

D. AIR ATTACK WARNING SIGNALS.

REMARKS
NO SIREN WILL
BE USED FOR
ANY OTHER SIGNAL

LIX COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

# APPENDIXES:

1- AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

2- AIRCRAFT SCHEDULES (TO BE ISSUED)

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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SHORES

ATHLEARTHES (-) (REIN)
CHECKE, AI, VIETHAM
8 SEPT 65
003/21-65

APPENDIX 1 (AIRCRAFT ARMERICAT) TO ANNEX F (AIR SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

REF: NONE

TIME ZONE: H

# 1. STANDARD ATRORAFT ARMAMENT GOES.

CODE HAME	NO/TYPE ORDANCE	FUZING NOSE	TAIL
DODGE	6 AERO 7D (HE) 6 AERO 6A (HEAT) 2 NAPALM	INST. INST. WHITE PHOSPHORUS	
FORD	12 250 ∦FRAG 2 NAPALM	VT WHITE <b>PH</b> OSPHORUS	ins <b>t.</b>
CHEVROLET	8 500 #GP 4 250 #GP 2 1000 #GP	VT VT	.01 .01
PLYHOUTH	s 500 #GP	4 VT 4 INST.	,01
	4 IVAR 2 1000 #GP	inst. VT	.01
DESCIO	12 CLUSTER BOMBS (M29A1) 4 CLUSTER BOMBS (M28A2)		
Firen	12 HVAR OF FFAR (LE) 2 LAU 10 (GP)	INST.	
PACKARD	12 250 #GP	VT	.01
HUDSON	2 LAU 10 (GP) AFRO 7D (HE)	INST.	
NASH	2 NAPALM	INST.	
TUCKER	2 DULLPUP	INST.	
PONTAIC	12 250 #GP 2 BULLPUP	VT INST.	.01
OLDSMODILE	12 250 #GP 2 500 #GP	VT VT	.01
CADILLAC	4 LAU 10 (GP) (AERO 7D (HE))	inst.	

B-1-1

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CC NAME

NO TYL ORDANGE

FUZING SOT

TATL

STUDEDAKER

4 DOLLEUP

INST.

DUIGH

2 AERO 144 SHOKE WANKS

DART

2 AREO 10D

CODR

SIDEWINDER

DARRACUDA

SPARROW

BY COMMID OF COLONEL MC CLANAMAN

V. E. MELDY LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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MAJOR, -USMC

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4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)
CHU LA VIETNAM
8 SEPT 65
003/21-65

ANNEX G (COUNTERATTACK PLAN) 2 OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (A) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1: 50,000, AMS L701, SHEET 6757III

TIME ZONE: H

## 1. SITUATION.

#### A. ENEMY FORCES.

- (1) SEE ANNEX B(INTELLIGENCE).
- (2) SEE CURRENT ISUMS. .

# B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

- (1) SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).
- (2) 4TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE CHU LAI AIR FIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES.
- (3) FMAW CONTINUE TO PROVIDE CAS AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR THE 4TH MARINES.
- (4) ARTILLERY BATTALION GROUP IN GENERAL/DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 4TH MARINES.
- (5) 7TH MARINES CONTINUE TO DEFEND THEIR TAOR TO THE SOUTH OF THE ATH MARINES.

#### C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.

- (1) SEE APPENDIX 1 (TASK ORGANIZATION).
- (2) ALL ATTACHMENTS BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN.

# D. ASSUMPTIONS.

- (1) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF LAUNCHING A FULL SCALE ATTACK AGAINST THE CHU LAI ENCLAVE IN STRENGTH, OF BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER. WITH SUPPORTING ARMS.
- (2) THAT IF THE VC ATTACK, THEY WILL ATTACK THE CHU LAI AREA IN SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH TO COMPLEX.

- (3) THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE ATTACK WILL BE THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND ITS SUPPORTING FACILITIES.
- (4) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT RAIDS OF SQUAD SIZE OR LARGER AGAINST THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD OR AGAINST ANY SECTOR WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
- 2. MISSION. THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE CONDUCTS COUNTERATTACKS AS DIRECTED BY CO, 4TH MARINES TO DESTROY THE ENEMY WITHIN THE PENETRATION AND RESTORE REGIMENTAL INTERRITY.

# 3. EXECUTION

- (A) CONCEL® OF OPERATION: THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE MAINTAINS A READINESS POSTURE OF BE IMMEDIATELY EMPLOYED AS A HELICOPTER-BORNE. FAST REACTION FORCE OR AS THE MAIN BODY OF AN ARMORED FORCE, TO BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR AS DIRECTED BY THE CO. 4TH MARINES.
- (B) CO C, 3D TANK BATTALL... ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACK 1 SECTION OF TANKS TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (C) CO B, 3D AT BATTALION. ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACH 1 SECTION OR ONTOS TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (D) CO A, 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION. ON ORDER, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS, ATTACH 1 SECTION OF LVT'S TO THE REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
- (E) ARTILLERY BN GROUP. PROVIDE ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO REGIMENTAL RESERVE. DEVELOP COORDINATED FIRE PLANS TO SUPPORT PLANNED BLOCKING POSITIONS. ANNEX D (OPERATION OVERLAY)

#### (F) REGIMENTAL RESERVE.

- (1) COMPANY, 3D BN,-3D MAR (-) (REIN).
  - (A) CONDUCT ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND NECESSARY REHEARSALS
    TO INSURE READINESS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT BY HELICOPTER
    OR AS THE MAIN BODY OF AN ARMORED FORCE.
  - (B) BE PREPARED TO ASSEMBLE AND ORGANIZE FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLOYMENT: ON NOTIFICATION OF DEFENSE REACTION CONDITION YEAR BRIGHT.
  - (C) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FORCES TO AUGMENT REGIMENTAL CP SECURITY.
  - (D) BE PREPARED TO MOVE INTO BLOCKING POSITIONS. ANNEX D

(E) BE PREPARED DECEIVE ONE SECTION OF TANKS, ONE DECTION OF AND ONE SECTION OF AMTRACS, UPON NOTIFICATION DEFENSE REACTION CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT.

# (G) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTERATTACK. SEE APPENDIX 2 (OPERATION OVERLAY).
- (2) DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS. SEE APPENDIX 3 (DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS).
- (3) BLOCKING POSITIONS. SEE APPENDIX 2 (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).
- (1:) ALL SUPPORTING UNITS GUARD THE REGIMENTAL DEFENSE NET DATLY FROM 1900 TO 0600. SEE ANNEX K (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS ANNEX).
- (F) ANY ENEMY ATION WITHIN THE MLR WILL BE REPORTED BY FIASH 1
- (6) ALL UNITS IN THE REGIMENTAL REAR AREAS WILL BE RESPON-SIBLE FOR 100AL SECURITY.
- (7) This annex is defective immediately for planning and for execution of order. of the co, 4th marines.
- (8) CO, 3D BN, W MARINES (-) (REIN) UNDON ...

  COMMITMENT OF A PROMENTAL RESERVE, BE PREPARED TO EXCLUSIVE THE FEDIMENTAL RESERVE.

# 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

(A) ADMINISTRATION. SEE ADMINISTRATION ORDER 305-65.

# (B) LOGISTICS

- (1) REGIMENTAL RESERVE DEPLOYS WITH THE BASIC ALLOWANCE OF CLASS V SUPPLY.
- (2) ALL PERSONNEL WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF DIE MCI AND TWO CANTEENS OF WATER PRIOR TO COMMITMENT.
- (3) MOBILE ATTACHMENTS UPON REPORTING OF CON TO REGIMENTAL RESERVE WILL HAVE FULL FUEL TANKS AND PRESCRIBED AMMUNITOR LOADS.
- (4) RESUPPLY OF THE COMMITMENT WILL BE BY THE UNIT TO WHICH THE RESERVE WAS COMMITTED.

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# COMMAND AND COMMERCULATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- (A) THE RECOMENTAL REQUERVE WILL NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT THE EXPRESSION APPROVAL OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER,
- (B) THE REMOVENTAL RESIDUE COMMANDER IS AUTHORIZED DIRECT LIAISON WITH ATTACHWING COMMANDERS FOR PLANNING AND REHEAR. SAL HURPOSES.
- (C) UPON ASTABLISHMENT COMPONITION YELLOW BRIGHT, ATTACHMENTS BECOME EFFECTIVE.
- (D) COMMUNICATIONS
  - (7.) DEFENSE PREQUETICIES AS PRESCRIBED IN ANNEX J (COMMUNICA-TIONS).
  - (2) CALL STORS REPAIR UNCHANGED.
  - (3) ALL SUPPORTING UNITS CHECK INTO THE DEFENSE NET AT 1.900 Later.
- (E) REPORT CHANGES IN CP LOCATIONS TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

EX COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

V. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT CCIONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

#### APPENDIXES:

- . TASK ORF LE ATION
- OPERATIONS OVERLAY
- 3. 3. DETENSE, REACTION CONDITIONS

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# OFFICIAL:

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hem marines (-) (rein) chu lai, vietnam S #D#Vig#5 003/24-65

APPENDIX I (TARE CHRANICATERE) TO ANNEX G (COUNTERATERE HAR)

REF: NONE

TIME ZONE: H

REGIMENTAL PROMES

COMPANY (--) (REIN), EN, MARINES COMPANY COMMANDER

SECTION PLATFOON CO C, 3D TANK IN

SECTION PLATFOON CO E, DO AT EN

THE COMMAND OF COLONFIL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
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SKORET

LTH MARINES (~) (REIN)
CHO LAI, VIETNAM
S SEPT 65
003/21-65

APPENDIX 3 (DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS) TO ANNEX & (COUNTERATTACK

NONE

T (E ZONE: H

- THIS, APPRIDIX ESTABLISHES VARIOUS DEFENSIVE CONDITIONS AND SETS FORTH THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITS.
- THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL ESTABLISH THE DEFENSE REACTION CONDITIONS COMMENSURATE WITH THE EXISTING SITUATIONS.
- S. DEFENSE REACKION CONDITIONS.
  - A. CONDUCTOR GREEN, NO CHARLOTATE LARGE SCALE ENEMY THREAT.

    REGIMENTAL RESERVE CONDUCTS NORMAL OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

    REGIMENTAL RESERVE IS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE BATTALION WITHOUT

    FORMAL OF ENATIONS UNDER FURENT UNIT CONTROL.
  - B. CONDITION YELLOW. POSSIBLE LARGE SCALE ENEMY THREAT TO THE REGIMENT. REGIMENTAL RESERVE CONTINUES NORMAL OPERATIONS BUTOLS ALERTED AND PLANS FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT WITHIN 24 HOURS. PLANNED ATTACHMENTS CONDUCT NORMAL OPERATIONS BUT ARE PREPARED FOR RAPID DETLOYMENT.
  - C. CONDITION YELLOW BRIGHT. DEFINITE LARGE SCALE ENEMY THREAT TO THE REGIMENT. REGIMENTAL RESERVE ASSEMBLES AND ORGANIZES FOR IMMEDIATE DEPLOYMENT. ATTACHMENTS ARE EFFECTED AND PHYSICALLY REPORT TO OFERATIONAL CONTROL OF REGIMENTAL RESERVE.
  - D. CONDITION RED. ENEMY ACTIVITY NECESSITATES THE IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT OF THE RECIMENTAL RESERVE. THIS HEADQUARTERS CO. LITH THATINES THESES NECESSARY FRAC ORDERS TO COMMIT THE RECIMENTAL RESERVE.

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4. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL ESTABLISH THE DEFINIS SAA TION CONDITIONS AND PROMULGATE THE PRESCRIBED CONDITIONS ON THE COMMON DEFENSE RADIO NOT OR BY LAND LINE.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELEY
LIFUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O' / DISSER BUTTOM) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICIAL:

R. L. THAMED MAJOR, BANG

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ANNEX H (ACCOUNT AD REAR AREA - INSE) TO OPERATION PLAN 305-65.

REF: (A) MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS L701 SHEETS 675711, 6757111, 67571V.

TIME ZONE: H

### L. SIMMITON.

- A. INEXY FORCES.
  (U) SET ANNEX B (INTRILIGENCE)
  - (2) SET CURRENT ISSUS AND PUR'S.

### TRIENDLY FORCES.

- (A) STR AMMEY A (BEST CADANIZATION)
- C. AT that is like the transform and S. NONE
- PASSINE PROME
  - (I) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO LAUNCH A WATERBOWNE ATTACK IN EXCESS OF PLATOON STRENGTH AGAINST THE REGIMENTS ICCLSTICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IN THE REAR.
  - (2) THAT THE VC HAVE TO COPABILITIES TO CONDUCT RAIDS FROM THE SEA ON SQUAD SOCIAL OR LARGER AGAINST LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES IN THE ROOT
  - (3) THAT THE VOLUME THE CAPABILITIES TO INFILTRATE OUR MLR AND ATTACK THE REGIMENTAL REAR AREAS.
  - (4) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPALILITY OF LAUNCHING A FULL SCALE ATTACK, IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO SETZE AND DESTROY THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD COMPLEX.
  - (5) THAT THE PRIMARY TARGET WILL BE THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD AND IT'S SUPPORTING FACILATIES.
  - (6) THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITIES TO CONDUCT RAIDS OF SQUAD SIZE OR LARGER AGAINST THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD OR AGAINST ANY SECTOR WITHIN THE REGIMENTAL TAOR.
  - MISSION. THE LITH MARINES EXERCISES FOSITIVE MEASURES BY UTILIZING LOGISTICAL SUFFORT PERSONNEL TO INSURE THE SECURITY OF, AND PREVENT DESTRUCTION TO THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD, THE REAR AREA CF'S AND THE LOGISTICAL SUFFORT FACILITIES AND AREAS IN THE REAR.

#### EXECUTION

- (A) THE ATH MARIUMS UTILIZING SUPPORTING LOGISTICAL UNITS, DEFENDS THE OUT LAW AIRFEELD, REAR AREA CP'S.AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FACULITIES TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONTINUITY OF COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT, BY TAKING THOSE MEASURES AND/OR ACTIONS TO PREVENT, NEUTRALIZE OR DESTROY LOCALIZED ENEMY THREATS TO UNITS, ACTIVITIES AND INSTAULATIONS IN THE REAR.
- (B) SHE ANNEX D (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (C) 1ST BN ATH MARINES.
  - (1) BE PREPARED TO ACCUST IN THE DEFENSE OF REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR'S. SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATION OVERLAY)
  - (2) INSURE CLOSE LIAISON OF THE VIETNAMESE BEATHBOCKING AREA BETWEEN HQ CO, 4TH INTINES TO THE NORTH AND SQUADRON 225 OF MAG-12 TO THE SOUTHEAST TO INSURE COMPLEX COVERAGE OF THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN THAT AREA.
  - (3) COORDINATE WITH MACS-Q AS ADJACENT UNIT TO THE NORTH-EAST TO ENSURE, POSITIVE DEFENSE OF THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN THAT AREA.

### (D) 2D BN. ATH MARINES.

(1) BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

#### (E) 3D BN. 3D MARTHES.

(1) BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF REAR AREAS WITHIN ASSIGNED TAOR. SEE APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATION OVERLAY)

### (F) CO C (-) (REIN) 3D F M BN.

(1) BE PREPARED, OF MEL, TO ASSIGN ONE SECTION OF TANKS
TO ANY REAR AREA FACILITY TO ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF THAT
AREA.

#### (G) CO B, 3D AT BN.

(1) BE PREPARED, ON CALL, TO ASSIGN ONE SECTION OF ONTOS
TO . TANY! REAR AREA FACILITY TO ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF THAT
AREA.

### (II) MACS-9.

(1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

H-2

#### LORE

(2) COORDINATE THE ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE PHAD AREA.

### ((I) FLSU #1

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1 (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA
- (3) CONDUCT MOBILE OUTPOSTS ON THE BEACH AREA BETWEEN CO C, 3D MT BN SOUTHERN BOUNDRY AND HQ CO, 4TH MARINES NORTHERN BOUNDRY TO INCORE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.
- (4) INSURE PROPER COORDINATION WITH ADJACENT UNITS AND DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREAS WITHIN THE BOUNDRIES OF BULK FUEL AREA.

### (J) CO C. 3D MT BN.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAMARY .PPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCERT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJ. WIT UNITS TO THE NORTH OR SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO ENSUR. MPIKTE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

### (K) HQ CO ATH MARINES.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR AREA AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.
- (3) PROVIDE IMPRINAL PERIMITER SECURITY FOR THE REGIMENTAL CP AREA, AND ADC GROUP.

### (XE) MG-12.

- (1) DEFEND THE AIRSTRIP AND SEAWARD APPROACH AREAS WITH THOSE SUBORDINATE UNITS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) INSURE SUBORDINATE UNITS COORDINATE WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST TO LISTEL CAMPLETE PERIMETER: DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD AND REAR AREAS.

CECRE

### (M) "ICB-10.

- (1) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1, (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

#### (N) CO B, 30 ENGINEER BN.

- () DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENT UNITS TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO ATSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

#### (O) C) A. 1ST AMTRAC BN.

- (L) DEFEND THE SEAWARD APPROACHES IN YOUR SECTOR AS INDICATED ON APPENDIX 1. (CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) COORDINATE WITH ADJACENL UNIT TO THE NORTHWEST OF YOUR SECTOR TO INSURE COMPLETE DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA.

### (P) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) LOCAL INDIGENIOUS PERSONNEL VILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHIN COMMAND POST AREAS OR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AREAS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.
- (2) COMMANDERS WILL EXCERISE CONTINUOUS AND PERSONNAL SUPERVISION TO MAINTAIN SECURITY DISCIPLINE AT ALL TIMES.
- (3) MAXIMUM USE WILL BE MADE OF DEFENSIVE OBSTACLES, TO INCLUDE BARBED WIRE. TRIP FLARES ETC.
- (4) ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN PERIMETER SECURITY WITH-OUT EXTRESS PERMISSION/FROM THE HEADQUARTERS.
- ( INSURE THAT ALL MEASURES ARE TAKEN TO PREVENT MILITARY/CIVILIAN INCIDENTS WHICH WILL NEGATIVELY INFLUENCE OUR CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM.
- (6) NEEDLESS DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY WILL NOT BE TOLERATED.
- (1) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REMAIN THE SAME.
- (3) REAR AREA U. ITS COORDINATE W/BN COMMANDERS PERTAINING TO REAR AREA DIFFENSE WITH IN BN TAOR S.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN 305-65.

Marie.

SEC

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS A POTRONICS. SEE AWNEX K (COMM & FLEC)

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAM

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (DISTRIBUTION)

CTHICIAL:

R. L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC
S-3

SECR T

THE MARINES (...) (REIN) O CHU LAI LETNAM 8 SEPT 1965 003/21-65

ANNEX J (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRON to OPERATION ORDER 305-65

REF: (A) 3D MARINE DIVISION OFF ON ORDER 321465

(B) REGIMENTAL ORDER 2000

TIME ZONE: H

### 1. SITUATION.

A. THE VIET CONG CAN BE EXPECTED TO EMPLOY IMITATIVE DECEPTION AND JAMMING. HE ALSO MONITORS A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FM RADIO NETS. WIRE LINES ARE BEING OUT AND TAPPED RREQUENTLY DURING THE HOURS OF DARDNE SS.

### B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) SEE OPERATION ORDER 305-65

(2)	COMMAND POST	•
	4TH MARINES	528048
	1ST BN, 4TH MARINES	527088
	2D BN, LITH MARINES	528040
	3D BN, 3D MARINES	535075
	3D BN, 12TH MARINES	551048
	"B" CO, 3D RECON BN	528042
	"B" CO, 3D AT BN	528042
	"C" CO, 3D TANK BN	528042
	"B" CO, 3L ENGINEER BN	555052
	"A" CO, 1Sr AMTRAC BN	5590 <b>50</b> 0
		• • •

REPORT ANY RELOCATION OF CP'S TO THIS HEADQUARTER S.

2. MISSION. LITH MARINES (REIN) COM COTTCATION ELEMENTS PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SUPPORT TO PARENT AND ATTACHED ORGANIZATIONS FOR OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

### 3. EXECUTION.

## A. COMMUNICATION PLATOON, HQ 4TH MARINES.

(1) INSTALL AND OPERATE HQ, LITH MARINES COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND PROVIDE COMMUNICATION SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE AND ATTACHED UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REF (A), (B) AND THIS ANNEX.

(ECL)

### B. 1/4, 2/4, 3/3.

INSTALL AND OPERATE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES TO SUBORDINATE AND ATTROHED UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN REF (A), THE ANNEX, OR AS SPECIFICALLY TO FORTH IN ORDERS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

- C. "A" CO, 150 AMTHAC BN: "B" CO, 3 AT BN: "B" CO, 3RD RECON BN AND "C" CO, 3 AD TANK BN.
  - (1) STE REF (A) AND THIS ANNEX.
- D. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (1) SEE ANNEX E (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65
- E. AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (1) SEE ANNEX F (FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65
- F. CORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
  - (1) SEE REF (A) AND (B).
  - (2) MESSENGER CERVICE. CHEDULED OR NON-SCHEDULED AS REQUIRED.
  - (3) RADIO.
    - (A) ALL UNITS GUARD ASSIGNED NETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX 1 (RADIO PLAN). UNITS WISHING TO ENTER AN UNASSIGNED NET WILL REQUEST FORMAL SSION FROM UTT CONTROL.
    - (B) RADIO CALL SIGNS SEE 2 4 (A).
    - (C) RADIO FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT SEE REF (A).

NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS (COMM. O) IN REGARD TO INTERFERENCE ON AND PARTICULAR FREQUENCY.

- (4) VIRE.
  - (A) MAXIMUM EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY ALL UNITS OF 4TH MARINES (REIN) TO INSTALL WIRE WITHIN THEIR TAOR'S. WIRE WILL BE USED AS THE PRIMARY MEANS, WHEN INSTALLED, TO PASS ALL UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC.
  - (B) SWITHCHOARD CODE NAMES SEE REF (A).
- (5) MESSAGE CENTER.
  - (A) ALL UNITS OF BATTALION SIZE AND LARGER WILL MAINTAIN

J-2

EEGLET

A 24 HOUR MESSAGE CENTER.

- (B) COMPANY SIZE UNITS WILL BE PREPARED TO HANDLE LESSAGE TRAFFIC IN AN EXPEDITIOUS MANNER AS REQUIRED.
- (6) RADIO RELAY SEE APPENDIX 2 (RADIO RELAY PLAN).
- 7) COPPEGRAPHIC.
  - (A) SEE REF (A)
  - (B) THE 4TH MARLINES (REIN) WILL PROVIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC GUARD FOR ALL SUBORDINATE UNITS. IN ADDITION, GUARD WILL BE PROVIDED FOR MUBBLE AND FLOT #1.
- (8) WARNING VISUAL SOUND AD FYROTECHNICS.
  - (A) SEL REF (A).

1.08 . W.

- (B) REF (A) MAY BE MODIFIED FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS HEADQUARTERS ONLY.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

ALL APPLICABLE MARINE CORPS AND DIVISION ORDERS WILL BE FOLLOWED OR AS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED FROM TIME TO TIME BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL MC CLANAHAN

W. E. MELBY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX o (DISTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

OFFICIAL:


R. L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC

### APPENDIXES

- 1. RADIO
  - 2. RADIO RELAY PLAN.

APPENDIX 1 (RADIO FLAN) 1 ANNEX (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTROCS) TO OPERATION ORDER 305.65.

						4
LEGEND:  C - NET COM  X - GUARD  O - WHEN DIX  R - AS REQUI  N - GUARD EN  1900H: AN  (EUTHER  OR TAC	RECTED CRED CTWEEN DO 0500H ROCT TAO	* CIRCUIT TITLE REGT. TRE # 1 REGT. TRE # 2 REGT. CMD.	198# 1 198# 2 100#5 3550)	NOF CONTROL		
<b>E</b> ATSSION		3.6.3	3035	10 10		
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4th Marines (-) (Rein) Chu Lai, Yestnan 8 Sept 1965

Amer & (Reports) to Operation Order 305-65

Ref: (a) RegtO 3800.1D (B) MCO 3480.1 (c) 3d MarDiv(EVD) O 3100.1 (a) Div OF Order 321-65 (c) KAG - 10

Time Zone: H

Title of Report	Submittea 🦙	Easmitted to	Frequency	Period Covered	When Due	Remarks
Personnel baily Commar,	Jaibs		Da <b>Lly</b>	0001-2400	Iz C F sing Da	Use Chargeable y Strength
Personnel Status	Indentry Bas and Hq Co	S-1	Semi-Wombhly	1-15th of Honth 16-3	1200 16th	Use Chargeable Plus on
Retation Rank and Mos		02	Monthly	Month	7th of Mo	Hand Strenght
otation Take	-	Sal	Monthly	Month	Preceeding Re	
eriodic Personnel sports	All Units	8.3.	Weekly	0001 Frida	Preceeding Roy 1200 Friday	otation
ivil Affairs oot Report	All Units	S-1	Daily	to 2400 Th	1200	Submit as Original
asualty Raport	All Units	5-1	When occurring	N/A	Following Day	and 2 Copies
a) Flash b) Energency c) Operational	Sighting Units	S-2/S=3	A3 Necessary	N/A	As Occur	Send by most Expedit- ious Means.
Immediate			K-1		SECRET	

Title of Report	Submitted by	Submitted to	Frequency	Period Covered	When Due	Remarks
Intelligence Summary	All Units	S-2	Once Daily	0800 to 0800	ASAP NLT 0930	Sent by most Expeditous Means.
Shell Rep fort Rep Bomb Rep	Sighting or Receiving Unit	FSCC S-2	As occur	N/A	ASAP	Sent by most Expeditous Means.
larget Information	Artillery Unit FSCC	S-2	As occur	N/A	ASAP	n
Intelligence Specialist Team Report	Counterintelligence Fhoto Imagery, Interpretation Technical, Intelligence Interrogation a Translation	nđ	Once Daily	1800 to 1800	NLT 2000	See Reference(a)
AO Report	Unit Performing the mission	ing Mission		N/A	ASAP	See Reference (a)
Lerol Report	rming Unit		As Occur	N/A	1.1.	See Reference (a)
Pation Route and OF Location Repor	t Unit	5-2	When Applicable	N/A	ASAP	These Reports should be sent prior to departure of patrol or establishment of OF's
Crypto Violation Report	<b>Battalions</b>	Comm (o)	Upon Violation	N/A	ASAP	Submit in accordance with reference (d)
Daily Situp (1)		S-3	Daily	RECOR	1300H Daily	Ref Divo 3100.1 Smint original plus 1 copy
Command Day	Inf, Bos Hq, 4th Mar	S-3	Monthly	1st of Mo to 30th of Mo.	oth Day of each Mo.	Ref; MCO 3480.1 Div0 3100.1 Submit Original plus 5 Copies
Spot Report (2) *		<b>S-3</b>	As they Coour	Diration of occurance	ASAP	Div0 3100.1 Who, What, Where, When, How
2200 SitRep	All Units	S-3	Daily	1200H to 2200H	2200H Daily	Regt. C.O. Negative
Summary of Nights Activities	Inf, his	S-3	Daily	0600H to	0600H Daily	Negetive reports required Regt, C.O.
			~~ <b>X-</b> 2			

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	(3) Overlay (3) *		Weekly	1200H to 1200H Saturday	1300H Saturday	DivC 3100.1 G-3 Verbal instructions Original everlay
	Ariash Reports - Ail University of the Control of t		As They Occur	N/A	ASAP	3d Div OP Order 321-65 Contact with enemy forces' of Platoon size or larger, incoming Artillery or Mortar Fire, and/or Air or Armored Attack
	After 200 Lon Report (b) and the second seco	S)	As They Occur	Period covered	24 Hours after action	3d MarDiv OP order 321-65 Original and two Copies on all Company or Larger operations even when no contact
	Operation law in factor Bris Concert of Operation Overlay	<b>S</b> -3	As Fney Contr	ASSENTATION OF THE STATE OF THE	72 Hours prior to operation	Div OP Order 321-65 Original and three copies with OPS overlay, This opters
	Comba <b>t Essential</b> all Units equi <sub>limits</sub> Report	•	B <b>i-</b> Æekly	Previous two weeks	1200 on the 14th & 29th	Criginal and three
-	Weekly Periodic All Chars Logistics	ini:	weenly	inthursday	1000 each Thursday	Original and two copies
	Report of Selected All Units*		Monthly	1st to 30%		D3.48 01000
	ectally epdating LAI toits of Selected Atems Lavendory	<b>5-4</b>	Monthly	: 1 <b>5: :</b> : 30 th le		
	Levarisation chool Ail Unites Tradinad Sersonnal	S.g	bi-Weth	y As of End of S Jan, Men, May, Jul, Sept. Nov	Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct, De	Original and one copy
•	Embouring Satu		Semi-Arm,	As 02 30 Jun & 30 Dec	Sthof July & Jan	DivO P 4090.1 Original and Three Copies to Include Company Level

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**K-**3

Equiptment All Units S-4 Monthly Previous 1200 on Div(FWD) 0 4000-1
Density Monthly Previous 1st of Mo. Submit Changes only

#### \* NOTE S:

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- 1. SETHEPS will be accompanied by one patrol overlay for all patrols (except company size and larger) to this Headquarters 48 hours prior to scheduled time of execution.
- 2. SPOT REPORTS are required on actions wherein U.S. personnel are wounded or killed and/or enemy casualties, regardless of the cause. The capture of VCC or VCS. The discovery of supply/ weapons caches. Incidents detrimental to USMC/ARVN relationships. Incidents likely to result in immediate wide spread news coverage. Significant VC initiated acts against friendly forces and installations. Units will notify this headquarters when a company sized operation commences and ones.

OPETATIONAC SUMMARY - will include below listed items:

- A. Friendly or enemy casualties.
- B. Capture of VCC or VCS.
- C. Discovery of supply/weapons caches.
- D. Contact with VC.
- B. dirstrike in or car respective TAOR's.
- F. Location of poobytraps encountered.
- G. Incidents detrimental to USYC/ARVN relations.

#### 4. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

- A. Identification of units involved, strengths, date, time, place, casualties (enemy and friendly), nature of action, (i.e. ambush, patrol, raid, search and destroy, obtack),
- B. Narrative account of action. Include sketech or overlay for clarity.
- C. Lessons learned, problems or difficulties encountered, areas or matters requiring additional training or attention, and suggestions for operations.
- D. Reports will be numbered consecutively for each calendar year.

BY COMMUND OF COLONEL MC CLINAHAN

W.E. MELBY LIEUTENANT COLONER, U.S. MARINE COLOS EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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ATH MARINES (-) (HEIN)
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
8 SEPT 65
003/21-67

ANNEX O (DESTRIBUTION) TO OPERATION ORDER 305-65.

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IT OR ACTIVITY	COLLES
MC G, BM F PAC G, BD MAR DIV G, III MAF LO, 3D MARINER CO, 7TH MARINES CO, 9TH MARINES CO, 1ST EN, ACH MARINES CO, 2D EN, ATH MARINES CO, 3D EN, 3D MARINES CO, 3D EN, 129 MARINES CO, 3D EN, 129 MARINES CO, CO B, 3D MECON IN CO, CO C, 3D MANE EN CO, CO B, 3D MIGR EN CO, CO B, 3D MED EN CO, CO B, 3D MED EN CO, MAG-12 CO, MAC-29 GO, MAG-36	221011515555511111111111111111111111111
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EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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OFFICIAL:

R.L. TREVINO
MAJOR, USMC
S-3

4th Menes (-) (Rein) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 080800H Sept 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65

3d MARDIV /FWD

Ref: (a) Maps:

(1) Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I and IV,

6757 II, III and IV (2) Vietnam, 1:250,000 AMS Series L509, Seets NE 48-4, NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 49-5 and ND 48-8

(3) ONC, 1:1,000,000 Sheets J-11 and K-10

3rd MarDiv Operation Order 321A-65

(c) 3rd MarDiv Operation Order 327-65 (d) DivO P3800.1E

Regt0 3800.1D (e)

Time Zone: H

### Summary of the Enemy Situation

- See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
- See Special Intelligence Reports and Summaries as issued.

### 2. Essential Elements of Information

- Determine if the VC will attack Chu Lai. If so, when and in what strength?
- b. Determine the location of VC camps, Hq's, supply caches in the Chu Lai area.
- c. Determine the type defenses the VC will employ around their compat hamlets. Special attention to weak points, secret exits, hiding places for personnel and material and tunnel patterns.
- Determine the location of main supply and infiltration water and trail routes into the Chu Lai area.
- Determine the VC modus operanda and living habits. Special attention to their methods of avoiding friendly forces.
- Determine the type and employment of VC communications. Secial attention to signals used for warning purposes, for breaking contact and for opening fire.
- g. Determine the roads, trails and waterways that constitute approaches to the VC controlled areas in the Ohu Lai area.
- h. Determine the location of helicopter landing sites in VC areas adjacent to Chu Lai. .

B-1	4TH MARINES (REIN) S&C FILES	
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- i. Determine the road and bridge capabilities in the Chu Lai area. at # 1 north to Tam Ky and south to Quang Ngai.
- j. Determine the attitude of the local populas towards harine units in the Chu Lai area. How is the attitude reflected in areas defined as pacified, under pacification, cleared, neither ARVN nor VO controlled? What factors effect these attitudes?
- k. Determine the location and disposition of VC hospitals and way stations.
- 1. Determine the location, disposition and availability of VC units with gas masks.
- m. Determine significant signs that VC use on trails for ambush or booby traps.
- n. Determine location, area covered and density of anti-helo punji stakes.
- o. Many information that may lead to the recovery of detection of U.S. personnel held by the VC.
- p. Determine the capabilities of the VC to conduct propaganda efforts against our forces and in what manner.

### 3. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.

### a. Orders to Subordinate Units.

### (1) Bn's

- (a) Utilize AN/TPS-21 ground surveillance Radar and Seismic Intrusion Detectors in conjunction with patrols, observation posts and listening posts during periods of reduced visibility to exploit all means of reconnaissance and surveillance.
- (b) Conduct reconnaissance as required within TAOR. Be propared to conduct additional reconnassance missions as directed.
- (c) Maintain strict surveillance of all major roads leading into your TAOR.

### (2) Co B 3rd Recon Bn

(a) Re prepared to conduct reconnaissance and establish observation posts in and ajacent to the 1.02.

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# dequests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

### (1) 3rd Marine Division

- (a) Provide current weather data twice daily for 12 hour periods.
- (b) Provide information on enemy strength, disposition and capabilities.

### (2) Others.

(a) Provide information on enemy strength, disposition and capabilities as they become available.

### c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Normal reconnaissance and observation will be carried out by all units as prescribed in reference (e).
- (2) Subordinate units submit patrol overlays to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2) 48 hours prior to commencement of patrol.

  Observation and listening posts will be submitted as established.
- (3) All relationships between ARVN and Civil Muthority will be closely coordinated to prevent incidents that will or might possibly alienate these units and local populas.
- (4) The capture and early interogation of VOC or VCS is of great importance due to lack of information on location, composition and methods of operations of VC forces.
- (5) Report information as obtained on the following:
  - (a) Attitude of civilians in areas of operation.
  - (b) Location, activities and attitudes of any groups of local inhabitants in or near TAOR.
  - (c) Indications of sabotage or infiltration of rear areas, by hostile elements.
  - (d) Information on EEI's.

- 4. Intelligence support requirements.
  - a. Request following assistance be provided or arranged for by 3rd Marine Division:
    - (1) Continuous personnel augmentation to include aerial observers, counterintelligence and interrogator-translater personnel.
    - (2) Provide English speaking anVN Liaison Officers to assist with matters pertaining to intelligence and security.
- 5. Measures for handling VCC, VCS, Captured Documents and Captured Material,
  - a. In accordance with reference (a).
- 6. Maps and Photographs.
  - a. In accordance with reference (e).
  - b. Reference (a) (1) is designated as the standard tactical map, employing the UTM grid system.
  - c. Distribution of photographs will be made as available. Acquests for aerial photography will be submitted to this Headquarters.
- 7. Counterintelligence.
  - a. See Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence).
- 8. Target information.
  - a. Target lists will be updated by target billentins issued by this Headquarters.
  - b. Subordinate unit commanders will submit target nominations to this Headquarters as targets are uncovered to include description and UTM coordinates in six digits.
- 9. Reports and Distribution.
  - a. See Annex K (Reports)
  - b. ISUN's will be submitted to this Headquarters on a 24 hour basis as of 0800 daily by the most expeditious means available.

BY COMMAND OF COLONAL MC CLANAHAM

W. E. MELBY Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Executive Officer

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### AP ENDIXES:

1 - Intelligence Estimate

2 - Tactical Study of Weather, Terrain and Hydrography

3 - Counterintelligence

4 - Target information (To be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL

C. N. WARNER Major, U.S. Harine Corps

B-5

4th Marines (-) (Fin) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 080800H Sept 1965

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65

Ref: (a) Maps: (1) VIETIA., 1:250,000 AIS Series L509, Sheets N. 48-4, N. 48-16, N. 49-13, ND 49-5 AND ND 48-8

(2) VINTNAI, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets (1) 1, 6756 IV, 6757 II, III and IV

\_ime Zone: H

- 1. MISSION. 4th Marines (-) (Read) defends the Lai Airfield and ancillary facilities, provide total defense of the Lai Airfield with one infentry Bn Hq and the Latter of two infantry Co's, conducts search and destroy operations and aggressive patrolling within the TAOR; on order conducts combined operations with RVNAF beyond the boundaries of the TAOR; maintains a Co in a reflex status (one hour) for employment anywhere in the Division areas of responsibility and prepare to conduct counterattacks to repel any enemy penetration of the Chu Lai Airfield areas.
- 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. See appendix 2 (ractical Study of Weather and Porcaia)
  - Politics. The guerrilla warfare which has spread over all AVN in recent years began in 1954 when the country was divided into two parts by the Geneva Accords. The President, elected in 1955, served until 1963 when he was killed by militant groups during a coup. Since that time, the RVN government has been showen by one upheaval after another. The situation remains extremely fluid to date and experience has shown that U.S. Forces in AVN will have to continue to consider in their thinking the ever changing political situation, and various pressure groups within the government. There are eight major political parties and four primary pressure groups which have acted, in various cays to maintain the unstable situation.
  - approximately 85% of the population involved in agricultural pursuits. Rice and rubber are the mainstays supplemented by wood products and some light is lastry.
  - c. Sociology. RVN is inhabited predominately by people who are related to the Chinese. Some minority groups, primarily Timese have settled in the large urban areas such as Saigon. Others,

including the Chams, Moi, .ohtagnards and some ethnic Cambodians populate rural areas. The primary European delony is located in Saigon. Approximately 75% of the total population is auddhish and about 15% are Catholic. There are many different Vietnamese dialects used. Some Vietnamese understand French while others understand English.

### 3. ENELY SETUATION

#### a. Composition

- (1) The typical Viet Cong Battalion consists of signal, reconnaissance and training elements (usually on platoon size), three infentry companies and theory ke poins company. The strength of the battalion varies considerably and depends on geographical location, the availability of local supplies and food, in addition to the density and ethnic origin of the local populace, and the degree of control exercised by the Viet Cong over the surrounding territory.
- (2) The typical Viet Cong company consists of three wifle plateons and a weapons plateon. However, the organization of the companies varies widely depending on subordination (military region battalion, separate provincial companies, direct companies), location and availability of feed and cruit.
- Strength and Combat efficiency. The Viet Cong combat efficiency can only be measured by post experience where the Viet Cong have shown outstanding skill and endurance against adVN forces and on several occasions against our own forces. Their operations against us show that they follow a rehearsed and well planned operation or pattern. They are well trained in many cases and with no doubt are use to physical hardship. Loyalty is assured through a cohesive and disciplined organization, imposed by tight party control, and capable leadership. After the brushing defeat during Operation starlight it can only by guessed that the Wiet Cong morale has dropied somewhat and at the same time their image in the eyes of the local populace has been grased, but even so it is estimated that their morale is still stable due to their headers never ending devotion to the party and belief in the revolution. It is well known that the Viet Cong benifit from the belief that their cause is a popular one, supported by the people and undertaken in their behalf.
- c. Dispositions. The following is the strength and dispositions of Viet Cong units within a 40 kilometer radius of Chu Lai wiriald:

UNIT	•	1,	Strength	,	LOC.TION
1st degiment	1		,0 <b>00</b>		LS 5597
2nd Regiment					B 3 5590

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<b>.</b>	i sit	
12/7th Volunteer Regs	1,000	BS 3398
108 Regiment		BT 3505
52nd Battalion	270	B <b>S</b> 7583
40th Battalion	450	BS 4776
aka		
80th battalion		
45th Bastalion		BS 6984
60th Bastalion	400	BS 1:776
90th Battalion	(O)	ES 3001
20th Battalion	<b>36</b> 8	BS 4073
105th Buttalion		BS 5384
cke.	•	
104/3d Batualion		
94th Battalion	an He and an	BT 3606
aka	•	
350th Battalion		
U/I Bettalion (Poss 54th)		BT 3203
U/I Bottalion (Poss 50h	-	B <b>S</b> 5684
aka 109th)		
U/I Battalien	and the same	BT 3416
400th Hty Wons Battalion	200 "	Unlocated
T-18 Company	<b>5</b> 0	B\$ 6887
T-19 Company	<b>12</b> 0	BS 5392
A-11 Company		BT 2223
A-16 Company	ed #8 PP.PH	BT 3314
1-19 (D-23) Company		BT 3910
A-21 (75th) Company	200	BT 3316
Special Mission Company (Pham)		₽\$ 5793
Medical Company (Poss H810)		BS 4791

#### d. Arms and armament

In past and recent operations against the Viet Cong, weapons of various manufacture have been captured. In the past, normally capture of either French or U.S. weapons was quilt? common, but in recent months more and more ordnance of Sino Soviet orgin have been captured. Procurement of these weapons ammunition and explosives is known to be through infiltration cooridors which continue to be effectively operated regardless of the actions taken to contain them. It is also quite probable that infilt. Sion by surface ship and even Submerine of ordnance to liet Cong units comes directly from North Vietnam. During a commany sweep and destroy operation of the southern part of the T.OR, a Soviet REG-2 rocket launcher was captured. Also during Operation Starlight another RPG-2 was captured. Evidence of further introduction of CHICOM weapons into the Viet Cong inventory was obtained in Ba Xuyen Province as early as 27 Dec 1966, when LRVN forces captured a CHICOH copy of the Soviet RPG-2 recoilless anti-tank weapon and nine projectiles of

1963 CHICOM manufacture. The MrG-2 launcher is a copy of the German "Panzerfor to developed just before World War II. The weapon is light in weight with an effective range of 100 to 150 meters and capable of penetrating up to seven inches of armor at zero degrees obliquity. The caliber of the projectile is 82mm and the weight is 3.3 pounds. Acquisition of significant numbers of this weapon would represent a considerable increase in Viet Cong capability to combat armored vehicles.

- (1) In earlier operations as stated above, most captured measures of French or U.S. manufacture. The U.S. manufactured weepons included 30 cal M-1 rifles, 30 cal M-1 and M-2 and carbines, 45 cal Thompson submachine g ms, 30 cal Browning automatic rifles, and the newer homm m-79 and 7.62 M-14, rifles. Various makes of hand weapons of U.S. manufacture also have been captured. A number of French weapons of older vintage have been captured which include the MAS-36 rifle, MAS-47 submachine gun, and others of various cakes and models. In addition to these weapons the Viet Cong have employed the 60mm and 61mm mortar and the 57mm and 75mm recoliless rifles. There has been unconfirmed reports of 120mm mortars in the possession of a few Viet Cong units.
- (3) Mines and explosives are used extensively by the Vart Compass well as hand grenades of all makes. The employment of booby traps and pull and pressure type AP mines has been discovered throughout the TAOM. The Viet Cong have been using the 60mm morter round quite extensively as a mine or booby trap.
- (4) Ordnance captured of Ano-coviet manufacture include 7.62 mossin Nagant model 53, carbines, AK-47 assault submachine guns, K50/PPSH 41 modified submachine guns, hand granades of various make and the RPG-2 recoilless rocket launcher.
- (5) The introduction of Sino-Soviet ordnance indicates not only that the fire power of the Viet Cong is being enhanced but it also means that it is probable that steps are being taken to standardize equipment.

### . Recent and present activities

(1) The overrunning of the Junk Fleet Headquarters on 9 July was one of the most recent major actions taking place in the northern flank of the TAOR. The Junk Fleet Headquarters was completely wiped out except for those who were on patrol at the time of the Wict Cong attack. Elements of the less En. 4th marines were sent as a reaction force in response to the attack. It is felt that this action was not perpetrated to

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enhance Vict Cong sea infiltration in the area. In fact such an action draws attention to Vict Cong activity in the given area and the Vict Cong modus operands has been to be inconspicious in this respect. It is believed that the Vict Cong noted a weakness or lapse in the security of the area, possibly attributive to the Junk Filets proximity to the Marines and decided to capitalize on it.

- (2) The Viet Cong contiles their use of Truong Giang River in Eastern Quang Tin for the transport of men and supplies.
- (3) With the exception of minor probing incidents and the Vict Cong overrunning the Junk Fleet Headquarters the tempo of activity in the northern area has declined, although, recent reports indicate a massing of croops northwest of the TAOR and indications reveal a possible attack of prints along Route #1 and possibly hill 159.
- (4) There have been numerous reports of battalion sized movements in the Chu Lai area. Although these reports are not confirmed, it is reasonable to assume that the Viet Cong are active in this area and are conducting surveillance of the area. A successful Viet Cong raid similiar to the Danang Airfield action or the overrunding of even a small U.S. harine outpost would be of immense propagand and psychological value to the Viet Cong after their latter loss in Operation Starlight.
- (5) Several reports have recently been received of Viet Cong Special mission Units in the vicinity of the ThOR with specialized equipment. The various types of books traps discovered within the ThOR are indications that Viet Cong personnel are being trained in this type warfors.
- (6) The major Viet Cong effensive in Quang Ngai was the overrunning of the Ba Gin outpost on 5 July 1965. In this action
  Vict Cong units over an and captured two 105 howitzers,
  which are still unrecounted for. many reports have been
  received allegedly addicating their location but not have
  resulted in their recovery. The guns have been reported
  west of the city on guang Ngai, but at the same time, as
  far north as the Tambarkshop (ET 2707) west of our Tambarkshop actions with negative results.
- (7) The most significant action involving the Viet Cong, was the Marine Operation Starlight, which took place northeast of Birth Son during 18-20 Aug 1965. This action inflicted heavy casualities to the Vict Cong and the 1st Viet Cong augment. The operation started out as a routine search and destroy

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cocration, but escalated into an offensive operation by the Marines. The total Vict Cong killed were approximately 600 with numerous wounded. The remaining elements of the 1st VC Regiment have been reported to have reorganized and to have joined the ranks of the 2nd Viet Cong Regiment located in the vicinity of BS 5791 and dS 5489. Other reports indicate that they are licking their wounds in the vicinity of Ba Gia. Still other reports say that elements of the 1st VC Regiment are located northwest of our Thom. The 90th Battalien, which is subordinate to the 1st VC Regiment has been reported on many occasions in the same operational area as the A/21 Company (BT 3615 - BT 3614).

f. Time and Space. Road distance for the below listed locations are figured from the hardet of an Tan (198 499067)

11A 5.5	COURD IN 1943	DISTANCE	TIme
Daning Tam Ky Ly Tin Dinh Son Quong Ngoi	BT 0407 BT 3142 BT 47007 BS 602918 BS 645723	55 miles 13 miles 2 miles 11 mileh 25 miles	22 hrs 5.0 h.s 45 min 4.2 hrs 10 hrs

### g. Logistical Considerations

- (1) The Viet Cong rely heavily on human perters for merement of supplies, but there has been reports of them using buffalo and elephants in some of the more remote areas. They are very quick to take advantage of any mode of transportation if it will conform with security of the unit.
- (2) The Viet Cong needs for POL is almost non-existent except for generators and manufacturing installations. FOL can readily be precured through local sources.
- (3) The VC logistic requirements are simple and they are almost entirely self-sufficient. They practice supply accomy and enforce rigid supply discipline.
- (4) The current Viet Cong tectic of combining a b in force mit with a Local Force unit probably is designed to ease their logistical burden.
- (5) Recently a heavy drain has been inflicted upon the Vict Cong supply system due to their extensive offense in the Binh Dinh Kontum and, the uncovering and destruction of their rice eaches by ARVN and Marines, and the amtillary and air strikes of mair supply installations.

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(6) The increased pressure and attacks on Tra Bong were directed at restricting friendly activity in the area to enhance the Viet Cong freedom of movement in the area. It appears that the Viet Cong have been utilizing the trail from Tra My to Tra Bong for the movement of men and supplies between guang ligal and Quang Tin.

### h. Personnel Considerations.

- (1) The accelling Command in North Vietnam has coordinated training of infiltrators with the buildup of new VC against These trained infiltrators are the backbans or cadre of the Viet Cong units. Training of infiltrators is continuous and a whole unit may be trained for special assignments or missions.
- (2) The Viet Cong recorded or draft young men from hemless by means of evercion and threats of bodily harm to members of his family or relatives. In Viet Cong hamlets the young men engerly join the ranks as it is their belief that it is their duty, to serve in the ranks of the revolution of the people.
- (3) Several reports have recently been received of Viet Gong units in the vicinity of the TAOR with specialize equipment, such as sateled charges, anti-tank mines are mine detectors. Also these reports have linked personalities with these units who have been known to have operated in in this area in the past.

#### 4. FMENY CAPADILITIES

### a. Enumeration

- (1) Capability 1. The Vict Cong has the capability to continua his build up around the periphery of the TAOM by limited drafting of SVN youths and continuing to introduce DRV youths and PAVN elements into the area.
- (2) Capability 2. The Viet Cong can attack the hold with a force of 3 or 4 negiments (11-14 Battalians) supported by local forces and guerrillas while interdicting At # 1 to the north and south.
- (1) Capability 3. Constitue to conduct small probes and cocasional large so de attacks, terrorism, assessinations, sabotage, propaganda, population and resources control, and extension of the clandestine infrastructure to gother intelligence in propagation of an attack to extend the Vict Cong effort.

(4) Capability 4. The Viet Cong can escalate their activity during the monsoon season commensurate with the severe effect on aerial and ground observation that prevails with the monsoon.

### b. Analysis and discussion

- (1) The Vict Geng can replace his losses or increase his forces by infiltration of trained units from North Victnam and forced recruiting of the local populace or captives of past operations. During this build up he can impose taxation on the local populace to sustain his forces.
- (2) Enemy forces committee in the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai area number 10 battalions in the regiments (one of which is unidentified). The other regiments of the confirmed 1st VC Regiment and the possible 108th Regiment in the confirmed and possibly three. One in Quang Tin Proving, two confirmed and possibly three. One local force battalians in Quang Tin Province and two Local force battalions in Quang Tigai Province. One main force battalion directly subordinate to AR5 is located in Quang Tin Province. A massing of all these forces for a single attack is possible but not probable. Additionally, two transportation battalions are located along the main infiltration corridors which the mission of manning infiltration systions along the may.
- (3) As amply demonstrated, the Vict Cong has been implementing the capabilities described in 4a(3) for sometime. As a consequence of their actions, the economic and military resources of the GVN have been severally strained.
- (4) September and October is a period of heavy rainfall throughout the country. Operations become severally restricted in the coast area as well as the mountains when typhoens or tropical storms move into the Gulf of Tonkin. During this period, heavy rains and flooding as well as demaging storms, take place along the coast, severally restricting movement. During November and December, acrial and ground abservation is severally restricted by low ceilings and numerous showers in the north and central mountains and the north coast. During these periods of limited observation and air capability the Vict Cong push their flanse.

### 5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities. To is considered most probable the Vict Cong will adopt capabilities 1, 3 and 4 in that order and only resort to capability 2 as a last measure. The prospect of heavy losses may deter a major attack

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on Chu Lai, but the Viet Cong might be willing to trade the losses for a significant psychological victory. In attack against Chu Lai, while possibly not a tactical success, would demonstrate to the world the growing strength of the Vict Cong and the determination of the Viet Cong to resist American combat power and act as a strong psychological tool to extend their efforts.

b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the commanders mission. Capabilities I through h will not effect the accomplishment of the commanders missin.

BY COMPIAND OF COLONEL MC GLANAHAN

W. E. MELLY La atenant Colonel, U.S. Marrine Corps Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL:

Wanter C. N. WHENER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

4th Marines (-) (Mein) CHU LAI, VIETNAM 080800H Sept 1965

Appendix 2 (Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 305-65

Ref: (a) Maps, VI TNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I, 6756 IV, 6757 III, 6757 II, 6757 IV.

Time Zene: H

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS. The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of weather, terrain, and hydrography on military operations within the Chu Lai area.

### 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

- a. Climate. The climate of South Vietnam is Monsoonal in nature and is characterized by two major seasons: The South West Monsoon (april to October) and the North East Monsoon (October to April). In the Northern area, the North East Lonsoon is the period of maximum precipitation.
  - (1) Mean daily minimum and maximum temperature (F)

Jan Apr Jul Oct 72(87) 77(94) 72(83)

- winds. During the period, April to October the wind will be from the South West quadrant. Sustained wind speeds exceeding 16 knots are infrequent and winds exceeding 27 knots are rare except during thunderstorms. In this latter case, winds exceeding 50 knots are not unusual. Conditions of calm are reported by major weather stations in the northern area from 10% to 30% of the time during June, July, August and 14% to 19% during December, January, February. Calm conditions are observed most frequently during the night and early morning.
- (3) Precipitation. The annual rainfall varies from 70 to 82 inches from place to place with the heaviest rainfall over the coastlands. The coastlands receive most of their rainfall (72%) during the period eptember December.

Mean Monthly Precipitation (inches)

 Jan
 Apr
 Jul
 Oct

 4.2
 1.3
 2.8
 23.3

- (4) 3torms
  - (a) Tropical Storms. Although many typhoons are originated in, or pass through the South China sea, few effect South Vietnam seriously. During the period July to September, two or more tropical storms are rarely observed.
  - (b) Thunder Storms. During the spring transition from North East Honsoon to South East Honsoon (April) thunderstorms are an important climatic feature. The storms occurring this time of the year are usually quite violent and carry hail stones up to two inches in diameter. These storms usually occur during the afternoon and early evening.
- Clouds. Generally speaking, the South West Monsoon and the autumn transition (October) are the cloudiest periods. However, over the Northern Coast Lands, the Northern Monsoon transition (October) is the cloudiest periods. Throughout the area the most prominent sky condition is a partly cloudy sky. The mean annual cover observed over South Vietnam as a whole is 65%. A special weather phenomenon called the "CRACHIN" (a period of wide spread fog and drizzle or light rain) affects the coastlands. Each "CRACHIN" period usually lasts from two to five days followed by periods of dry weather. It is characterized by visibility of less than two miles (frequently less than one half mile). Although the "CRACHIA" way appear as early as October, it does not become common until late November. It is most frequent during December and disappears by late .pril.

Mean Cloudness (%)

Jan Apr Jul Oct

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Relief and Prainage. The Regiments zone of action comprises mostly lowlands with the maximum elevation being 410 meters (Coordinates 480999) being in the hill complex that runs generally east to west in the southwest area of the zone of action. The average elevation in this hill mass is 250 meters. The drainage in this area is provided by many streams which flow north-northeasterly. Drainage in the lewlands is fair to poor with flooding in the rainy season.

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(2) Vegetation. The lowlands are devoted to cultivation consisting mostly of rice paddies and sparse grass, bamboo and scrub brush. The most prevalent vegetation consists of rain forests and open forests. The former consisting of thick stands of evergreens with dense underbrush and numerous vines providing excellent concealment and makes popularition difficult.

### (3) Surface Material

- (a) In the lowlands the soil runs from sand to sandy clay. Trafficability is poor in the wet accorded to the plastic nature of the soil but becomes good during the dry season.
- (b) In the beach area there is a sandy strip approximately three miles wide. Trafficability is poor for wheeled vehicles in areas off the semi improved road network maintained by Marine units.
- (c) Due to the rain forests and dense underbrush in the high lands trafficability is poor and restricted to roads and trails which are scattered and do not traverse the entire area.
- (d) Trafficability for vehicles in the lowlands during the wet season (June December) is restricted to the roadway due to flooding of rice pad ies. Streams probably cannot be forded during the wet seasons requiring the construction of temporary bridges.

### (4) Cultural Features

- (a) All land capable of cultivation is utilized. Rice paddies and orchards are found throughout the area.
- The road net through this area consists of one main road (doute #1) running North and South and one semi-improved dirt road running from Rt #1 east to the beach and then parallel to the beach throughout the Regimental area. Route #1 is an all weather road approximately 13 fe t wide and composed of asphalt and gravel. The semi-improved road in the Regimental area is approximately 12 feet wide and composed of hard packed dirt. Within the Regimental zone of action there are two bridges which are of the concrete beam type of construction, 12 feet wide and having a capacity of 9 tons. Trails throughout the area will accommodate foot traffic but are not suitable for heavy vehicles.

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- Regimental zone of action. There are numerous and hamlets and villages. The two main villages being ly Tin located at (BT472078) and An Tan at (BT500067).
- (3) Railroad. There is a railroad that runs parallel to Routs will on the west side. It is narrow (1 laster) gauge track and is in poor condition.

# S. ATLIPARY ASSECT OF THE AREA

- a. Observation and fields of fire.
  - (1) The lowlands is fairly level terrain, and affords excellent observation and fields of fire. Due to the many streams and rice paddies, movement is channelized to the advantage of the defender.
  - (2) The following critical terrain will provide observation into the surrounding low land:

Hill 51 528110 Hill 49 490036 Hill 410 480999 Hill 385 495002 Hill 237 511994

### . Cover and Concealment.

- (1) Cover from flat trajectory fire is provided by gullies and canyons throughout the high ground. Conqualment from ground observation is excellent in the high ground due to the heavy vegetation.
- (2) Concealment and cover in the low areas is provided by rice paddies, dikes, road beds and streams. Growing orops orchards and clumps of trees rovide some concealment.

# c, Obstacles

- (1) The three mile wide strip of sand located between the beach and Route #1 poses a minor obstacle to movem nt inland. The semi-improved dirt road grants ready exit from the beach to Route #1, but any movement by vehicles off of this route will be slowed by sand.
- (2) On the high ground vehicular traffic will be restricted to the existing trails due to the heavy vegetation.

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- (3) In the area of dense forests all vehicular traffic will probably by purtailed.
- d. Evenues of approach. There are no well defined avenues of approach for root troops. Avenues of a proach for vehicular movement will be restricted to the existing roads.

# 4. TACTICAL SESSOT OF THE AREA

- a. The terrain favors the defense of the area. The high hill mass southwest of the beach affords the defender excellent observation of the beach, the villages and routes leading inland. Vehicular movement will be confined to existing roads. This forces channelization of movement and affords excellent op ortunities for ambush, interdiction and harassment of an advancing unit.
- b. FFROT ON FRIENDLY FORCES. Troop movement will be slow and tiresome. High temperatures and high relative humidity ranges over long perhods of time will have a deteriorating effect on troops. Air operations, including close air support, a rial observation, and aerial photo-reconnaissance will be adversely affected to some extent by reduced visibility during the monsoon season.

BY COM AND OF COLONEL MC CLAN HAN

W. D. MELBY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL.

C. N. WARNER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

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வரு ்கில் Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation
Order 305-05

Ref: (a) Brdwardiv Operation Order 31 465

(b) 3rd lar liv Operation Order \$27.05
(c) Regto 3800.11)

Time Zone: H

- GENERAL TO LA PRINT OF A LOCK OF THE ACTION OF A SERVICE A ACTION OF THE a. The following conditions can be expected which will effect the sccurity actions of all commands:
- (1) Hostile activity by munificantly indigenous elements and/or energy agents with missions of tespionege.
- (2) Involvement with circulture in populated areas; including scourtty problems generated by refugeed.
  - างเอายุลเรียกน้ำ สไข้ดา อย่าง 30 ad ไปในเหติสองกระบาลินิยา (3) Possi le defection of membars of the present friendly government in the objective area.
- of within plane too the converse, not both ettern of it is b. This appendix amplifies references (a) and (b) by setting forth basic counterintelligence procedures and practices to be employed • da red within the Regiment.

#### 2. MILITARY SOURITY

e. Security of Military Information while the side of the section where the side of the section where the side of the section where the se

(1) Commanders are directly me sponsible for the military security training of their units and for the safeguarding of all classified matter in their commands Classified information will . be safeguarded and handledoin accordence with Ornavinsi 5>10.1B, and supplementary directives issued by this Heador so quarter symbologic de l'indication de l'establisse de l' Les elve collègement el flightende de mallemante

virginia mole, marchine

(2) No chassified material will be taken forward of BLT command post's except as absolutely required in the conduct of operations, Similarly collassified natorial will not be carried in aircraft flights over enemy corpunfriendly territory. 

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- (3) access to elessified information and material will be limited to U.S. personnel. In addition, the following measures will be takent
  - (a) Surveillance of known of suspected guerrilla agents.
  - (b) Consorable on suspension of civil communications when directed by higher authority.
  - (a) Control of divilian movements as required.
  - (d) Checke on internal security of all installations.
  - (c) Security Massification and control of plans, orders, and records
- (L) Units will thoroughly police sermand posts upon displacement to drauge that no documents or pojects of possible value to the enemy have been left behind.
- (5) Personnel will not carry personal documents with execution of I,0, cards, doc tags and denson Convention Cards on their person which would be of value to the enemy in case of capture or loss.
- (6) Whitten plans for the emergency destruction of classified material, dopuments and equipment in the field will be prepared by all units, and expeditionally implemented if each unit as dissipant.

## b. Communication Sourity

- (1) Communications security will be in accordance with Regimental Communications for, Chapter II (Communications electronies) and other pertirent regulations of higher sutherity.
- (2) in imagency destruction risk for eropto material will be prepared in accordance with current directives.
- (3) Commanders will establish problems to protest against transmission of classified information over telephones and unclassified telephone given its, and improper handling of classified meterial received over communications channels. According munications security violations to this Head-aurters (Attn: 6-2).

## o. Press Roleases,

(1) All press releases to the public will be governed by the



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- contents of MOO, P5720 series, OrNAVIMSE 5530 series and any separate directives from this or higher headquarters which may be i sued later.
- (2) Publicity in connection with personnel escaped or recovered from the enemy is prohibited.
- (3) All units will report to this Headquarters immediately the names and organizations of all press personnel with their units.
- d. Ocde of Conduct. All personnel will be instructed in the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces.
- e. Scurity, Discipline and Taining
- (1) Person of Will be instructed on security of military information, personnel censorship and proper use of challenges and passwords.
  - (2) Personnel will be instructed as to what articles may not be carried into combat. Prohibited items include unit leader notebooks, personal radius, and personal cameras.
  - (3) Personal records and diaries will not be maintained by members of this command.
- f. Photography. Only official photography and/or photography by accredited news media personnel will be permitted in the area of operations.
- g. Counter-subversion. Attempts at subversion of friendly forces through use of propaganda by the enemy will be reported to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2).
- h. Visitor Centrol. All units will be prepared to provide escorts for official visitors within their areas. This Headquarters will be notified dimediately when official visitors or public information media representatives are in the area.
- i. Classification. Operation plans will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL" or higher if warranted.
- J. Restricted area. All communications facilities, operation centers, and wer rooms will be safeguarded and access denied to personnel who are not properly cleared and authorized.

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- k. Counterintelligence Targets. To be liqued esparately as a special Intelligence Reports
- 1) Challenge and Password. To be Lesued by CG. III wird
- m. Black, White, and Gray Lists. To be tasued asparately as a special Intelligence Reports

## 3. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

- as Cambufloge.
  - (1) Compuflage discipline will be continuous in the objective area,
  - (2) Vehicle and tent nets will be utilised at all times when in a static situation. Vehicle windshields will be covered so reduce sun reflection.
  - (3) Vehicular and helicopter traffic will be kept to a minimum during hours of darkness.
  - (4) all units will institute black out dim put and ourses in accordance with the tectical situation.

## CIVIL SECURITY

- a. Refugec Control
  - (1) All units will ensure that refugees mying in the read pais along and through established routes and check points. Refugee columns must be kept under control and off of critical supply routes.
  - (2) Notify this Headquarters immediately of any large group of refugees naving to rear areas.
  - (3) Large groups of refugees will be an ahed/sheeked for conscaled weapons and for infiltrating enemy troops. Insurgents and for agents at refugee powers points then established.

# b. Civil Leaders

- (1) Friendly civilian leaders will be treated with due respect and afforded such protection as necessary. Names and incidents will be reported to this Headquisters.
- (2) All civilian leaders claiming to be friendly will be considered as "gray personalities" until their names and loyaltics

B+3+4



SECRET

can be verified by this Headquarters. They will not be treated as prisoners during verification, but will be closely watched.

will be subdued, protected and brought to this Headquarters without delay.

### d. Civil Unrest.

- (1) This Headquarters will be notified immediately of any incident relative to deterioration of friendly relations between the civilian populace and 4th Marines.
- (2) This Headquarters will be notified of any demonstrations, strikes, riots or any other assembly of large groups of of indigenous personnel.
- e. Hiring of Indigenous Personnel. No indigenous personnel will be hired or permitted in military installations, except properly accredited officials or those having the permission of this Headquarters and a proper pass.
- f. Aliens Claiming to be Refugees or Defectors. Aliens claiming to be refugees or defectors recovered by units of this Command will be held in isolation. This Headquarters (Attn: S-2) will be notified immediately and will provide instructions reguarding their disposition.
- g. Restricted Areas. All civilian establishments and residences are "Off Limits" unless official duties require entrance therein.

## 5. CENSOR SHIP

Part Comment

a. Consorship may be established in accordance with ONNAVINST 5530.1B, CINCPACTITINST 5530.1A and FMFPACO 05530.1.

# 6. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

- a. Clandestine Listening Devices
  - (1) Only counterintelligence specialists will conduct technical inspections to determine if such devices are present. This does not preclude visual inspection to determine if such devices are present.
  - (1) In the event a listing device is suspected, contact this Headquarters (Attn: \$2) immediately. Do not attempt to remove the device or make oral reference to the device within its functional area.

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## 7. MISCETTANEUTS

- a. In the event that information is potoined indicating subversive activities or implinations by any member of this Command, inform this Headquarters immediately. Local opunter-measures involved should not arouse the suspicion of the person or persons conserned.
- b. Counterintelligence personnel are issued credentials by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. Commanders will insure recognition of those oredentials and will repair assistance as necessary for the accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission.
- c. The fact that the Marine Corps has counterintelligence personnel is not classified, however, the names and numbers will not be released without approval from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
- d. Each unit will indoctrinate personnel on the proper techniques to be used in the science and protection of counterintelligence targets.

BY COLUMN OF COLONAL MC CLANARAN

M. E. MAPY
Incorporate Colonel, U.S. No. the Comps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: MUNIX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 305-65

OFFICIAL:

C. N. WARNER

Majer. U.S. Marine Corps

Sus



# HEADQUARTERS 4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FFF c/o FFO, San Francisco 96601

3:RLT:fjs 7 August 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General 3D Mar Div (Fwd)

Subj: Weekly operation Overlay; period 3112000H July to 071200H August 1965.

Ref: (a) Verbal instructions your Hq. of 22 July Same Subject.

Encl: (1) Record of Events
(2) Operation Overlay

1. In accordance with ref (a) Enclosures 1 and 2 are submitted.

R. L. TREVINO By direction

#### RECORD OF EVENTS

- 1. Oll200H. Squad combat patrol from Company B (-) (Rein) working from patrol base at (BT 419079), sighted several small groups of Vq. vicinity (BT 3909). In one contact, an unarmed male of military age was sighted at (BT 399089). Man immediately fled, was ordered to halt, continued to flee, and was shot. As patrol pursued, man orayled into undergrowth and escaped. Search of surrounding terrain revealed area suitable for observation post and a small hut containing clothes, carbine, and knife. Patrol was later fired upon vicinity (BT 393087) by four VC wearing helmets. Fire was returned and contact broken. Patrol returned to patrol base at Oll430H.
- 2. 031850H. On MIR positions one casualty was sustained when a VC threw a grenade into foxhole in Company B's area at (BT 528082). Han, in critical condition, was heli-evacuated, died the following morning.
- 3. Ohohoom-Ohosoom. Eight boats with thirty-two local nationals were apprehended by INTs, vicinity (BT 513113), for violating curfew regulations. Boats were searched and identification of persons was checked. Four men had no identification. All thirty-two were turned into the regimental collection point. During early morning of 5 August, in same vicinity, waterborne patrol apprehended seven boats with thirty-nine curfew viclators.
- 4. 051230H. First plateon (Rein), Company D, on combat patrol on peninsula centered (BT 4410), apprehended one VCS fleeing from house vicinity (BT 447103). Patrol also shot and killed a water buffalo when it charged their formation at (BT 447113).
- 5. 060855H-061433H. First platoon (Rein), Company B, while on combat patrol on Ky Xuan Island (centered BT 4809) and small island centered (BT 4712), apprehended total of twelve VCS. Several did not have proper identification and were captured after flesing from patrol.
- 6. O71000H. Company D (-) (Rein), on extended combat patrol, received sniper fire vicinity (ET h06118). Two men were seen hiding in brush. Men ran when members of patrol shouted at them. Warning shots were fired and ignored. One man was shot and the other captured. Wounded VC did enroute to 1/4 CP in helicopter. Other VCS was sent to regimental collection point.
- 7. Ol204CH. Company F received 2 rounds carbine fire at vicinity (BT 520041). Fire was not returned, no casualties.
- 8. 021805H. Company F while on Company (-) operation encountered a group of armed Vietnamese personnel at (BT 482048). Word was received from 4th Marines to apprehend all personnel, collect meapons and return to Civilain Collection Point. Capt TIOK, District Chief LY TIN District, sent word he would send liaison officer to collection point to identify personnel.

- 9. Oh1615H. Company H. vicinity (BT 509023), received 15 rounds carbine fire from vicinity (BT 515020). A fireteas was sent out to check area, with negative results.
- 10. 0317154. Three Vietnamese venders were apprehended by Company L at (RT 559015). They were taken to the regimental collection point.
- 11. 02202hH. Two men dressed in black and carrying rifles were observed vie (BS 62h986) by 1st Force Recon team.
- 12. 030010H. Seven men in black unloading boats vic (BT 622022) were observed by 1st Force Recon team.
- 13. 031706H. Four VCS dressed in black and carring rifels were observed vic (626002) by, let Force Recon team. At 031725H, same coordinates, five more man in camouflage uniforms, some with packs, were sighted.
- 11. 031920H. Twenty-three armed VC sighted vic (EF 625003) by 1st Force Recon team.
- 15. 031920H. Recon requested evacution from vic (ET 623002). Two plateons from Company E dispatched to carry out mission.
- 16. 032005. Recon evacuated from vic (BS 628975). Helicopter received small erm fire, no damage.
- 17. Olizzhon. Company I heard a woman screaming vic (BT 558014).
- 18. 051830H. H &S Company observed six to eight VOS unloading large boxes and supplies from boats at (BT 644052). Artillery fire was requested and 36 rounds were fired. Effect on target good but results not observed.
- 19. 062330H. One Marine from Company K was wounded by a stray round from a PF fire fight vio (BS 565994).

ENCLOSURE (1)

Ath Marines (-) (Roin), 3d Marine Division (Rein), F F o/o FFO, San Francisco 96601

3:111.Tjourn
14 August 1.965

From: Community Officer
To: Community General, 3d Nor Div (FW)

Subj: Wookly operation Overlay; period 071200H August to 141200H August 1975.

Roft (a) Verbal instituctions your liq. of 22 July Seno Subject.

Encl: (1) Record of Events (2) Operation Overlay

1. In accordance with ref (a) Enclosures 1 and 2 are submitted.

R. L. TREVISIO By direction

#### MCCOLD OF EACH

- 1. Company D (-) (Rein) on combat pairol 071200H. As company (-) moved to vicinity of Runs Rgoc (2) Hardet (BT 398112), fire was received simultaneously from vicinity (BT 393113), (BT 400106), and (BT 407106). One HDA was sustained vicinity (BT 402116). Artillary was called on estimated 10-15 VC, with negative offect on target. Plateons deployed, forcing VC to withdraw from contact, and subsequently found pools of blood at (BT 393113) and (BT 400100).
- 2. Shiper fire the received from estimated 1-2 VC (BT 393103). Backy withdress from contact.

3. Salper fire was received from estimated 3-3 VC (81 392097). Promy withdrew from confect.

4. Four aroad VC vana aported by point fire team in electing at (No 395095) and wore taken under fire. One VC was hit as four fiel cart.

5. Shiper fire was received from estimated L=2 V6 (BY 397066). Becay withdrew from contact.

6. Shipor fire was received from estimated 1-2 VO (BT 400084). Themy withdrew from contact.

- 7. Order fire was received from entirated 2-3 VC (BT 435076). Promy withdress from contact.
- 6.7 Company D (-) (Ref.) on combat patrol 080745H-031120H.
  6. At 080745H helicoptor resupplying company at (RT 4250M) received enony ground fire from (RT 420089). Infantry returned fire, Phony withdrew from contact.

9. At Octivel helicopter lifting elements of Corpory D from landing gone at (BT 434089) received energy pround fire from (BT 442082). Endpers withdress from contact.

- Incident involving local children OS1330%. Three Vietnemone children were injunctablen they picked up or explosive device on the beach vicinity (BT 53/110). One of the children three the device, believed to be an 1879 round, quainst a rock and detenated it. Children were taken to B-Med. Parents and village chief were notified. Two children were returned to homes. Third was sent to hespital at Guang Ngai for further treatment.
- 11-13 Company B (-) (Rein) on combat patrol 081440N-081600N.
  11-12. Three W were observed vicinity (BT 423090) at 081440N and three more were observed vicinity (BT 417089) at 081450N.

  In each case the energy was taken under fire at long range and artillory was called, with negative results.

  13 Eight W were spected vicinity (BT 405075) at 081600N. Art-

illery fire mission had poor results because of the delay.

No VC camplities were observed.

RECLOSURE 1

14-21 Company B (-) (Rein) and Company c (-) (Rein) on search and clear 090600H-091605H.

14. At 090600H eleven WIA's were substained when third platoon, Company C moved off trail at (BT 452052) to establish LZ perimeter and activated bouncing type fragmentation device.

15. At 090935H lst platoon, Company B, sighted eleven VC at (BT 414034) and directed artillery five mission against same. Three VC KIA's were observed.

16. At 091000H, as 1st platoon, Company B, moved closer to escape route vicinity (BT 438043), point observed group of VC at (BT 422036) and took them under fire, wounding two.

and took them under fire, wounding two.

17. First platoon, Company C, will taken under fire by estimated three VC vicinity (BT 434044). As platoon waneuvered to envelop enemy, a pressure-type explosive device was detonated at (BT 437043), resulting in two WIA's. Fire fight with VC ensued in which two VC were killed. Two weapons, a Thompson sub-machine gun and a MASS-36 rifle, were captured.

18. At 091045H 3d platoon, Company B, observed one armed WC leaving hardet at (BT 434056) as 3d platoon, Company C, swept through village from the east. WC was taken under fire and killed.

19. At 091100H seven more VC were seen fleeing across paddies vicinity (BT 433050). 36 plateon, Company B took them under fine at long range, killing one and wounding one.

20. At 091400H artillery was called to silence eniper fire received from vicinity (BT 425046) during return of two companions to landing mone (BT 442051).

21. At 091605H 1st platoon, company C spotted two VC at (BT 447062).

VC fled and escaped as they were taken under fire.

- Sightings of individuals vicinity (BT 4406) at 111500H. 3d platoon, Company C, on OP #1 (BT 468068), reported groups of 4-5 individuals on Hill 51 (BT 445067) and hills at (BT 438072) and (BT 434079), possibly in process of setting booby traps. Artillery and 81mm mortar fire were derected against Hill 51, and OP #1 was directed to provide platoon (-) for surveillance. Search of Hill 51 produced negative results.
- Drowning of Marine 112130H. 3d platoon, Company D, commenced combat patrol on Ky Xuan Island after landing by LVT's vicinity (BT 513093), and reported that a Marine had drowned in attempting to cross channel in that vicinity. Additional LVT's were sent to the area to assist in search which continued all night with negative results.
- 24-25 2d platoon, Company B, on combet patrol 120900H-121336H.
  24. Platoon apprehended two VOS hiding in a hole under paddy dike vicinity (BT 446105) at 120900H. Platoon linked up with PF platoon which identified two VOS as VOC.

25. Same patrol later apprehended five more VCS vicinity (BT 4510) for lack of proper identification.

26. Body of Marine found 190745H. Body of Marine missing since 112130H was found vicinity (BT 515093) by local villagers. Battalion personnel were sent to claim the body.

ENCLOSURE 1

- 27. Company A (-) (Rein) on combat patrol 131020H. Platoon patrol received snipper fire vicinity (BT 395087). Enemy withdrew from contact. Patrol was unable to accortain direction of origin of fire.
- 28. VC roadblock on Highway #1 131800H. At 131815H by Ly Tin District Head-quarters reported a VC roadblock of platoon size at (BT 451087). VC were reported taking people of buses at that location. Upon request of Ly Tin, Marine artillery was directed against roadblock. At 131850H Ly Tin reported that artillery had dispersed roadblock. At dispatche d to the area could observe no further targets.
- 29-31 Three-company sweep operation 140715-141100H.
  29. At 140715H an air strake was directed by company A FAC on group of approximately ten VC vicinity (BT 417085). Two squads were sent to search area upon completion of axi air strike, with negative results.
  - 30. Prisoner handling team with ITT personnel established collection point at (BT 431094). Team processed total of 163 civilians, twenty-two of which were adult males. Of these, three were detained as VCS. Remainder were released.
  - 31. At 141040H eniper fire was received by Company A from across river vicinity (BT 419093). Fire was returned. Enemy fire ceased.

- 32. 102330H Company G recieved one fragmentation grenade vicinity (BT 509048) one man was seen running away, 4 rounds small arms fired with negative results.
- 33. 092245H OP#1 (BS 561997) recieved small arms fire from (BS 567996) 81 mm mortar illumination was fired. The volume of fire increased and then became sporadic for approximately forty minutes. One VC was observed and Milled by return small arms fire no weapons recovered.
- 34. 110830H The scouts of H&S Company apprehended two Vietnamese males (BT 563063) they were sent to the Regimental Collection Point.
- 35. 111615H Company I observed ten VC, two of which appeared wounded, moving east at (BT 643003). They were pursued with negative results.
- 36. 111630H One H&S Company scout was slightly wounded while with Company I (BT 623004). Estimated two snipers fired.
- 37. 111650H Two Marines from I Company were WIA slightly. Fire was recieved from two positions (BS 635995) and (BS 630992). Fire was returned with negative results.
- 38. 111645H Company I recieved fire, rounds of 60mm mortar at (BS 634994). No casualties 36 rounds artillery fire were called on suspected mortar position (BS 639994).
- 39. 111800H A helicopter, on an evening supply run, recieved small arms fire from (BS 629992) no damage.

- 32. 102330H Company G recieved one fragmentation granade vicinity (BT 509048) one man was seen running away, 4 rounds small arms fired with negative results.
- 33. 092245H OP#1 (BS 561997) recieved small arms fire from (BS 567996) 81 mm morter illumination was fired. The volume of fire increased and then became sporadic for approximately forty minutes. One VC was observed and Hilled by return small arms fire no weapons recovered.
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- 37. 111650H Two Marines from I Company were WIA slightly. Fire was recieved from two positions (BS 635995) and (BS 630992). Fire was returned with negative results.
- 38. 111645H Company I recieved fire, rounds of 60mm morter at (BS 634994). No casualties 36 rounds artillery fire were called on suspected morter position (BS 639994).
- 39. 111800H A helicopter, on an evening supply rum, recieved small arms fire from (BS 629992) no damage.

- 32. 102330H Company G recieved one fragmentation grenade vicinity (BT 5090L8) one man was seen running away, h rounds small arms fired with negative results.
- 33. 092245H 0P#1 (BS 561997) recieved small arms fire from (BS 567996) 81 mm mortar illumination was fired. The volume of fire increased and then became sporadic for approximately forty minutes. One VC was observed and Milled by return small arms fire no weapons recovered.
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- 39. 111800H A helicopter, on an evening supply rum, recieved small arms fire from (BS 629992) no damage.

HEADQUARTERS

Ath Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FFF c/o FPO, Sen Francisco, 96601

3:Riverde 21 August 1965

Tous Communiting Officer
Tos Corrunding General, 30 Mar Div (PMD)

Subj. Wookly Operations Overlay, Portod 141200H August to 211200H August 1965

Not: (a) Vorbal instructions your 1kg of 22 July 65, some subject

Encl. (1) Record of events (2) Operation evenlsy

6-4-C

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures 1 and 2 are subsitted.

R. L. TEVINO By direction

#### RECORD OF EVENTS

- 1. 150905H, First platoon (rein), Company B, on combat patrol in western portion of TAOR, received eniper fire vicinity (BT 121093), from hill 22 (BT 125091) and vicinity (BT 119084). M-79 fire was returned on hill 22. Enemy fire ceased.
- 2. 150800H. Third platbon (rain), Company C, on combat patrol, received three sniper rounds vicinity (BT 452071) from vicinity (BT 448072). One local national was apprehended in same vicinity for lack of proper identification. Sent to Regimental Collection Point.
- 3. 160530H. Company B sighted a man to their rear vicinity (BT 51709h), challenged him, and fired a warning shot when man fled. Searchoff area produced negative results.
- 4. 161100H. One essualty was sustained by Company A squad outpost at (BT 527129) by incoming sniper fire. Sweep was conducted by AT personnel and H&S personnel in the area, resulting in apprehension of three VCS. Sent to Regimential Collection Point.
- 5. 161820H. One VGS apprehended by Company B vicinity (NT 526097). Individual attempted to escape and had to be physically apprehended. Sent to Regimential Collection Point.
- 6. 1708454. A civil disturbence was initiated near Vietnamese Junk Division 15 headquarters when Seabee bulldoper, upon request of junk commander, began clearing trees vicinity (BT 518116). Civilians obstructed movement of bulldozer and began demonstrating. Warning shots fired in air by junk force personnel dispersed growd of approximately 100 local nationals. No Marines involved.
- 7. 17130H. District headquarters (BT 478075) reported a VC plateon at (BT 456084) and (BT 446084), and requested mortar fire. Plateon was reported to disperse into tree line when 81mm mortars on Hill 69 (BT 468068) were fired. PF surveillance promised by district headquarters failed to materialize.
- 6. 1714
- 8. 171420H. Platoon on Hill 69 heard automatic fire vicinity (BT 460077). Squad sent to check area received sniper fire, them apprehended one VCS hiding in hole vicinity (BT 455079). Bent to Regimental Collection Point.
- 9. 192125H. Company 0, 1/7, sighted five VCS who Left boat and swam to vicinity (BT 498072). Illumination was fired with negative results.
- 10. 200900H. Two males were apprehended by 3d platoon, Company B, on Ky Kuan Island vicinity (DT 480098). The two VCS were sent to the Regimental collection point.
- 11. 201430H. Two persons were observed by personnel of Company B moving in brush vicinity (BT 503086). One warning shot was fired at one fleeing VCS after he had been ordered to halt. Both VCS escaped.

- 11. 201130H. Two persons were observed by personnel of Company B moving in brush vicinity (BT 503086). One warning shot was fired at one fleeing VOS after he had been ordered to halt. Both VOS escaped.
- 12. 202015H to 202200H. Night waterborne patrol apprehended three VCS vicinity (BT 5013). One male VCS attempted to escape to shore in a boat. LVT pursued and found man hiding under a boat. VCS, when apprehended, attempted to escape. All three were sent to the Ragimental Collection Point.
- 13. 21030H, 2d platoon, Company A, while on combat patrol on Ky Kuan Island, apprehended five male individuals vicinity (BT 180213). Of these, I.T.T. personnel determined one to be VCC, 3 to be VCS. The fifth individual was released.
- 14. 210500H. 3d platoon, Company D, observed three boats vicinity (HT 509087). Artillery illumination was called and warning shots were fired across bow of boats. Rifle fire and AR fire were delivered on two boats which continued in water, resulting in wounding of one female national. Girl was treated by Company B corpsman and sent to 1/4 BAS, later to B-Med.
- 15. 151945H. Five Vietnamese were reported moving towards Ostfish 1 vic (BT 505020). Eight rounds of 81 mm HE were fired with negative results.
- 16. 181930H. The 2/4 Givil Affairs officer was shot at vic (RT \$15031). He had just been told by villagers that no VC were present in area. The officer was not wounded.
- 17. 182016H. 2/4 OP via (NT 515031) received one round of sniper fire from villinge to the South West.
- 19. 200288H. S-1 officer reported one round sniper fire coming from vio (BT 531049) by civil construction site.
- 18. 190445H, 2/4 OF reported illumination was set off and two rounds smiper fire were received by 0 Company from vicinity of Route#1 (BT 515049)
- 20. 210500H. A patrol from A 60 Recom, while moving from ambush site vie (BT 198021) to vie (BT 193022), found they were being followed by two men. Co A threw one W.P. grenade between the two men but it was a dud. The two men started running. Co A fired small arms with negative results. This took place vie (BF 195024).

- 21. 140855H. Company h reported ten WC with peeks and weapons on hill (BT 650004). Took t en under fire with negative results.
- 22. 146930H. Company M received small arms fire from (BS 666986). No casualties.
- 23. 140950H to 141020H. We sighted at following coordinates 23 (BS 655995) 23-A (91 650005) 23-B (BS 661991) and 23-C (BS 663993). Company H was taken under SA fire from last three coordinates, but maintained contact and continued to pursue. No easualties.
- 24. 141155H. Company M found a large mock-up map drawn on the side of a building at coord (BS 660992). Pictures were taken of the mapping building destroyed.
- 25. 141300H three WC sighted at coord (BS 666996). All had weapons. No contest made with Company M.
- 26. 1/1315H. Company K requested artillery mission on suspected mortar position coord (BS 664984). Position destroyed.
- 27. 1/1320H. Company " found one VC dead at (BS 655999). VC had a Russian HB Ret launcher with two rounds.
- 26. 1/14/05H. Company M reported another WC dead vic (BT 45/4001). His equipment included weapons cleaning goar, amo, cartridge belt, and three granades. We weapon was on body.
- 29. 1/1745H. Company to Corner ded twelve VCS to 3/3 colection point. VCS were taken at coord (BS 663993).
- 30. 1/2220H. The Bn CP received one round of carbine fire from south on loft flank. No cascalties. Coord (BT 563043).
- 31. 1522/5E. Company L received 3A fire from vic (BT 553013) and returned fire at two VI males nowing through the brush. Negative results and no cascalties.
- 32. 160320H. Company I received gos granade at (BT 549013). No casualties and negative results from returnal fire.

headquarters
hth Marinos (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
o/o FPO, San Francisco, 96601

3:RLT:fjs 28 August 1965

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 3d Mar Div (FWD)

Subj: Weekly Operations Overlay; Period 211200H August to 281200H August 1965

Ref: (a) Verbal instructions your Hq of 22 July 65, same subject

Encl: (1) Record of events (2) Operation overlay

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures 1 and 2 are submitted.

R. L. TREVINO By direction

#### RECORD OF EVENTS

- 1. Air strike was conducted vicinity (BT 421039) at 221100H on suspected VC supply point. No personnel were observed in target area.
- 2. Company C squad patrol apprehended one VCS vicinity (BT 517107) at 221500H. Man was sent to regimental collection point.
- 3. Air strike was conducted on western slope of Hill 270 (BT 4104) at 222200H. Secondary explosions were observed, and target area continued to burn until morning.
- 4. Company D squad night patrol spotted three persons vicinity (BT 510084) at 232245H. Patrol illuminated, whereupon one of the three individuals fired one round. All three filed and escaped.
- 5. Second platoon, Company B conducted daylight combat patrol on Ky Xuan Island vicinity (BT 185103) commencing 210930H, and with the aid of a local informat apprehended two VCC and one VCS. All three were sent to division 0-2 for interrogation.
- 6. Third platoon, Company A, upon completion of combat patrol, commenced return heli-lift from IZ vicinity (BT 437081) at 251205H. At same time 3d platoon, Company C landed in same IZ. Helicopters and troops received sniper fire from vicinity Hill 22 (BT 425090) and vicinity (BT 443083). Third platoon, Company C deployed upon reaching IZ and returned fire on snipers. Enemy fire ceased.
- 7. Third platoon, Company C, received more sniper fire vicinity (BT 130093) at 251315H. Squad was deployed to area and apprehended four male VCS. Sniper fire ceased.
- 8. Helicopters commenced lift to pick up four VCS from (BT 431096) at 251400H. Heavy small arms fire was received from vicinity (BT 428092). Two VCS were picked up in helicopters and two escaped during lift. Platoon returned fire with small arms and 3.5's, and called artillery fire mission, which was followed by CAS strafing runs. Platoon formed on line and searched village (BT 428092) and brush (BT 427090) with negative results. One bouncing type mine was discovered at (BT 431091), and engineer team was heli-lifted in to destroy it.
- 9. Company D apprehended one VOS vicinity (BT 509078) at 251605H. Man had no ID card and was taken to regimental collection point.
- 10. At 260015H Company C squad patrol from Hill 69 outpost (BT 468068) heard movement from their rear vicinity (BT 469072) and set up an immediate ambush, whereupom 4-5 persons were seen coming up trail. Patrol challenged and illuminated, then opened fire. Two rounds 81mm mortar illumination were subsequently expended. Search of area produced no observed results.

-1-

ENGLOSURE (1)

- 11. At 260430H Company A personnel near water's edge heard noises near fence at (BT 517110). Marine challenged, threw illumination granade, saw a person stoop down quickly near his position, and fired two rounds. Area was checked out at first light, with no observed results.
- 12. At 261445H Company D apprehended three VCS vicinity (BT 523057) with no ID cards. VCS were sent to regimental collection point.
- 13. At 270415H one VC was spotted at (BT 527083). Marines challenged and threw illumination grenade, whereupon VC darted into brush and fired one round. Marines returned fire. Two rounds 81mm morter illumination were fired but no further movement was observed.
- 14. At 281000H let platoon, Company D, on combat patrol at (BT 442061), received sniper fire from vicinity (BT 440055). A squad was sent in pursuit, but enemy withdrew from contact.
- 15. At 232114H Oo F observed 3 men on the defensive wire (BT 506032) fired 6 rounds small arms and threw one fragmenation grenade. Negative results.
- 16. At 2h20h5H Co H observed 2 men on the defensive wire vicinity (BT 533028). Tank fired machine gum with negative results.
- 17. At 260150H Co F reported a man ran tweard their positions vicinity (BT 5080h7) and fired burst from automatic fifts. Co F returned fire, negative results.
- 18. At 270035H Go F reported receiving 5 incoming sniper rounds from vicinity (BT 509049) returned fire with negative execults.
- 19. At 222313H Co L sustained 1 WIA when an incoming mortar round was received at vic (BT 564011). The WIA was evacuated with no further incidents.
- 20. At 250830H Co L received one round of incoming sniper fire from (BT 573017). No casualties received.
- 21. At 252140H Co K received one round of sniper fire from (BT 555001). Upon illumenation of the area, nothing was seen. No further action taken.
- 22. At 260030H Co Mis patrol encountered 3 rounds of incoming sniper fire. The patrol moved forward but observed nothing.

HEADQUARTERS
Lith Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Harine Division (Rein), EMF
0/6 FVO, San Francisco, 96601

3:RLT:fjs 4 September 1965

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 3d Nar Div (PWD)

Subj: Weekly Operations Overlay; Period 281200H August to O41200H September 1965

Ref: (a) Verbal instructions your Hq of 22 July 65, same subject

Enol: (1) Record of events

(2) Operation overlay

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures 1 and 2 are submitted.

R. I. TREVINO By direction

#### RECORD OF EVENTS

- 1. 281920H. By Tin Matrict Hoadquarters requested fire missions on VC platsoms at (BT 135096) and (BT 138105). Eurveillance given following morning by district intelligence officer reported two VC killed and 8-10 VC wounded.
- 2. 292150H. Two persons were spotted crouching near barbed wire in front of 1/4 OP (BT 526090). Earines illuminated and fired four rounds with unobserved results.
- 3. 301200H. Second platoon, Company A combat patrol received fire from visinity (BT 146076). Fire was returned, and platoon searched area and Khuong Tho (1) Hamlet, with negative results.
- 4. 301610H. 3d platoom, Company B, on Ky Hoa Island, received report from village Chief of Ky Hoa, of 125 VC vicinity (BT 4316). Artillary was directed against VC. No surveillance was given.
- 5. 310710H. Second platoen, Company D. combat patrol in western portion of WACR received eniper fire from (RT 136091) and again from (RT 127087). In each case the enemy withdrew from contect when fire was returned and elements were sent in pursuit with negative results.
- 6. 311010H. Four WIA's and two KIA's were sustained by 2d plateon, Company D when an M-49 type AP mine was detonated at (BT 12008h). Plateon was ordered to return to Highway #1 for pickup by trucks, while some artillery fire was directed against vicinity (BT 1108-1208). One secondary explosion was observed.
- 7. Ol1725H. Company A (-) (rein), on combat patrol west of TAOR, apprehended three male VOS at (BT 106086). They were sent to the regimental collection point.
- 8. 012255H. One man was sighted by Company B at (BT 522096). Marines challenged and man hit the deck. Warning shot was fired and man run twward village. Element dispatched to apprehend man sighted him again and fired two rounds, with unobserved results.
- 9gl2. Company A (-) (rein) conducting combat patrol in western portion of TACE. The during morning of 2 September.
- 19. 020925H. Squad patrol apprehended one male VOS with no ID card at (HT 107073). Sent to regimental collection point.
- 10. 020955H. Same patrolreceived sniper fire from vicinity (BT 413085). As patrol deployed, enemy withdress from contact.
- 11. O210b0H. Sniper fire was again received from (BT 397087). Squad investigated with negative results.
- 12. O21105H. Another squad patrol received fire from five individuals vicinity (BT 415083). Squad pursued and apprehended four VOS at (BT 413085) with movements. Fifth individual escaped. Four VOS sent to Regimental Collection Point.

- 13. 020300H. Let Platom, Company B reported they had been receiving personal entper fire from vicinity (BT 517119). Squad patrol in that area could not capture individual. More firing was reported at 020540H, but again emiper could not be located.
- 14. O21420H. A vietnamese civilian was shot by 3d platoon, Company D, when attempting to resist apprehension at (BT 518120). The man was taken to B-Med for treatment.
- 15. 022100H. 2d plateon, Company D heard noises in front of their position at (BT 528079). Illumination granade was thrown and two VO were sighted near defensive wire. VC dropped to the ground and fired approximately 15 rounds carbine fire toward former machine gun position, Sham mortar illuminations was utilized, and marines returned fire on VC fleeing west across paddy. Area was checked out with unobserved results.
- 16. 030835H. Pirst platoon, Company B, on two-company search and destroy operation, found and destroyed a small cache of rice, approximately 50 lbs, vicinity (BT 419033).
- 17. O31105H. Same platoon received small arms fire from vicinity (BT 128018). Fire was returned and platoon moved towards area of firing. Point encountered 3-5 VC at (BT 127017). VC threw two grandes, and platoon returned small arms fire, coordinated with 6-7 rounds 60mm morter fire. One marine was slightly wounded (non-even) by VC grande.
- 18. 031330H. Squad patrel from 3d platoon, Company A, checking out stream bod at (BT 123055), encountered two VO, killing one. Other VC escapedd Patrol continued to (BT 122052) and found one more VOK with shrapnel wounds, presumably killed by Company Bis mortar attack 031105H.
- 19. 031515H. Two men wore injured when element of Company A tripped M-26 granade balby trap at (BT 135056). Booby trap was activated by chest high vine.
- 20. 031750H. Second platoon, Company B. in brush at (BT 110056), observed eight armed VC entering Ky Long (1) (BT 116053). Fo called artillry fire mission on hamlet, and two VC were subsequently seen leaving hamlet. Platoon took VC under fire, killing one and wounding one. One French rifle was captured.
- 21. Oh0330H. By Tin Distinct Headquarters reported a VC platoon at (BT 455078) and (BT 458073). Platoon was reported to disperse when Sime morter illumination was fired. No further target was observed by By Tin.
- 22. Oh0735H. Ly Tin District Headquarters reported estimated VC squad or more vicinity (BT 460050) and (BT 467079). Hill 69 fired observed Slam mortar mission, causing VC to disperse.
- 23. Oh0830H. 3d platown, Company B received sniper fire from (BT 450053). Area was investigated with negative results.
- 24. Oh0900H. Same platoen observed eight VC vicinity (BT hh6064) and took then under fire at long range. Contact was broken at Oh0910H with no casualties on either side.

- 25. 291800H. Company & platoon sized patrol observed two alephants at (BS 495983), moving southeast. Fired artillary in target area with undetermined results.
- 26. 300152H. Company G observed one man near defensive wire vicinity (BT 521018). Fired one round small arms with undetermined results.
- 27. 300210H. Company d observed one man near defensive wire vicinity (BT 505031). One frag grande was thrown with undetermined results.
- 28. Oll335H. Company H reported 1 round small arms fire hit reilroad embandment vicinity (BT 530033), came from vicinity (BT 535040). One squad sent to investigate, brought back fourteen Vietnamese with no weapons. All turned over to ITT at collection point.
- 29. O21745H. Company II patrol located violatty (BT 493000) reported receiving incoming small arms fire vicinity (BT 491001). Fire was returned with undetermined results. Patrol checked cave at first light, with negative results.
- 30. O220MH. Company F reported seeing one man on defensive wire vicinity (ME 5070M6). Fired one round small arms with undetermined results.
- 31. 030530H. Company F reported seeing one man on defensive wire vicinity (MT 5130h7). Man three one granade, Tank fired several 30 cal rounds with negative results. No casualties.
- 32. 022345H. M-26 granade was thrown into the 106RR plateon position (BT 522023). No ossualties. A patrol was dispatched to search the area. Negative result s.
- 33. O311:35H. K company spotted five VC (BS 569957). A plateon was sent to intercept. Negative results.

		an.
1	312400H OX SECURITY REP STOLEN JEEP	SF
2	010007H SW NEG SIT REP	SF
3	010000H TINGE SIT REP	SF
4	010015H IMP B POS REMAISS THE SAME	SF
5	010020H BX SPOTTED VEH MOVING DOWN MLR	SF
6	010105H IMP B CO REMAINS THE SAME	SF
7	O10109H M CO NEG SIT REP	SF
8	O10120H BX LOST CONTACT WITH E CO PATROL	SF
G.	010145H A2 RETURNED AT2300H	SF
10		SF
11	010010H AG 6 CADVER STOLEN JEEP	SF
1 🤈	010226H LOST CONTACT WITH E CO AT 0145	SF
13	010330H I CO AMBUSH PAT. RETURNED	SF
14	010338H M CO NEC SIT REP	SF
15	010339H E CO STILL IN HARBOR SITE	S.F
16	010415H M CO NEC SIT REP	SF CF
17	010424H IMP WATERBORNE PAIROL HIS 1 TRACKERSOWN	SF
18	010430H C CO REMAINS IN HARBOR SITE	S F
19	010450H D 3 HAS RETURNED	SF So
20	010510H IMP BSIT REMAINS THE BAME	S F
21	010050H IMP B SIT ROMAINS THE SAME	SF
23	010632H BX NIGHT ACTIVITY NEG	SF
23	000735H 1 P E CO PATROL BOZO LOC	SF CF
24	010740H TINGE SUMMARY ON MISS	SF
25	000755HGEN KARCH AT CP 1030H	SF
25	010810H LVTS ON WAY TO BEACH TO PICK OF M CO	SF
5.5	010907H 2 LVTS RETURNING FROM RIVER PETROL	SF
28	011000F L CO DONE TEST FIRING	SF
∘9	O11000H E CO ROZO PATROL BACK	SF
	000920 SEREP ON INFILITRATIONS	SF
31	010954H SW M CO B CK FROM PATRIL.	\$F
	O11954H ST L PATR L JUSTEDPARTED	SF
	011010H 4TML R CO TR B.CV	TR TR
34	O11010E IMP B CO IS BACK	SF
<u> </u>	O11100M M CO IS IN REGT RES	SF
35	011117H SW L & 1 COS PATROLS CO AREA	SF
	234567891011:34567891011:345678921223456289313333455	2 610007H SW NEG SIT REP 3 010009H TINGE SIT REP 4 010015H IMP B POS REMAINS THE SAME 5 010020H BX SPOTTED VEH MOVING DOWN MLR 6 010105H IMP B CO REMAINS THE SAME 7 010109H M CO NEG SIT REP 8 010120H BX IOST CONTACT WITH E CO PATROL 9 010145H A2 RETURNED AT2300H 10 010200H BX MIS SIGNG VEH FOUND 11 010010H AG 6 CADVER STOLEN JEEP 12 010226H L'ST CONTACT WITH E CO AT 0145 13 010330H I CO AMBUSH PAT. RETURNED 14 010330H E CO STILL IN HARBOR SITE 15 010330H E CO STILL IN HARBOR SITE 16 010415H M CO NEG SIT REP 17 010424H IMP WATERBORNE PATROL H S 1 TRACKERSOWN 18 010433H C CO REMAINS IN HARBOR SITE 19 010450H D 3 HAS RETURNED 20 01050H IMP BSIT REMAINS THE SAME 21 010050H IMP BSIT REMAINS THE SAME 22 010632H BX NIGHT ACTIVITY NEG 23 000735H IMP E CO PATROL BOZO LOC 24 010740H TINGE SUMMARY ON MISS 25 000755HGEN KARCH AT CP 1030H 26 010819H LVTS ON WAY TO BEACH TO PICK UP M CO 27 010907H 2 LVTS RETURNING FROM RIVER PSTROL 28 011000H I CO DONE TEST FIRING 29 011000H E CO BOZO PATROL BACK 30 010920N SH REP ON INFILLTRATIONS* 31 01095H SW M CO B'CK FROM PATROL 32 011010H IMP B CO IS BACK 33 011010H IMP B CO IS BACK 34 011010H IMP B CO IS BACK

1130	37	O11115H IMP RAN INTO PATROL F/81'2 RPT GIV CHASED	SF
1130	<b>3</b> 8	O11118H 1MP BCO RECD CARBINE FIRE COORDS	SF
1130	<b>3</b> 9	010245H SD 24 REQ RETURNED OF PRO 10	<b>F</b> 8
1135	40	O1NDTG IMP2/ ARVN OF LY TIN	SF
<b>2</b> 210	41	010945H WH24 REP MAJ WH ARNER ACC TO DA NANG	SF
<b>1</b> 210	42	011200H IMP REP 2CIV RUNNING A 1/4 area	SF SF
1212	43	01121 OH L CO PATROL RETURNED 1200H	
1215	144	O11208H VALVE REP VN FISHING FLT IN MARK AREA	SF
1220	45	O1121/H IMP /GENT ROP 22VC COORDS	SF SF
<b>1</b> 400	46	011304H B GO NEG	
1400	4 <b>7</b> **	011355H ITT VN MAN STATED MAN STOLE 10 DUCK	SF
1400	<b>4</b> 9	011310H K 2 PATROL DEPARTED	SF
1400	50	011 312H IMP SWEEPING PENNSULA F/ INFILLATRATERS	<b>S</b> F
1400	51	011137 BX CHANGE TO SIT REP	SF
1400	5?	01 332H IMP 2&3 PATROLS RETURNED	S <sup>T</sup>
1400	<i>5</i> 3	011300H IMP CO CONTRIDICTION RPT 03	SF
1400	54	011325H IMP D SEVDING 1MAN TO AG	SP CO
1500	55	011/458 A CO ENGRS W/ BLOWING CAVES	SE
1 500	56	011454H IMP PICK UP VR TEEN COORDS	SF ST
1 530	57	01150 H IMP REP B TRAP 60mm MORTAR	5 <sup>11</sup>
1 530	58	011510H GIANT KILLER MISSIONS	SF
1.530	50	011445 BX OP PLAN 15665 CanCEIED	SF
1530	60	011530H FSCC INFORMED SA NO CHOPPRES TOMARROW	SF
1532	<b>61</b>	O11537H K CO PICK UP MALE ON VILLAGE SEARCH	SF.
1542	62	011542H CO B3 PATROL AT VIC	SF
1650	6 <b>3</b>	011645H 10 MARINES IN VILLAGE VIC	SF
1551	54	011645H N°G SIT REP	SF
1717	65	011650H 37 ARMED MEN AT COORDS	SF
1722	66	011720H 3/3 TO DETONATE CLAYMORE AS DEMOSTRATION	SF
1723	67	011720H OXWOOD TO HAVE ALERT 011945H	SSF
1752	68	011745H CO G JESTDEPARTED CO AREA	SF
1805	69	011803H SW 3AMERICANS WIA AT INDIA OP	SF
1835	70	011834H IMP 24 CHECKING OUT OF WET	SF
18/0	71	011815H BX & PATROL CALLED OFF	SF
18/15	<b>7</b> 3	011835H IMP OP1 SPODTE D FLAG VIC	SF
1847	73	011841H AC APPROVED H&I FIRES	S <sup>₽</sup>
1005	7/!	011001H IMP CHANGE IN CO PATROLS	SF
1050	75	011945H BX CO G(_) PATROL LOC	<u>SP</u>
2005	76	012004H BX RETURNED TO CO	SF
2007	7703	012007H IMP D3 HAS DEPARTED	SF
2009	78	0120°0H SW COORDD ON FAC FOR OP	SF
2031	70	012020H SW TRIFFIC REP	SF
<b>3300,3</b> ≥	80	012030H A CO TO BE TEST FIREING	SF
2035	81	012011H IMP VEH TRAFFIC REP	SF

2055	82	01205011	IMP C- ON FLARE IN CP AREA	SF
2110	83	012105H	BX 2040 - C CO REC 2 RDS	SF
2135	84	•	BX 3 CO C (-) NO CONTACT	SF
2130	85	011230Н	MONROE CONFIRMED INFO ON 3105H	SF
2130	86	012108H	PP B - 2 UNITS MOVING TO RED	SF
2132	87	012130H	SW 3 SW 1 &K PAT LEFT	SF
2200	88	012145H	SW K 1ST P1T LAYOUT PAT LEFT	SF
2201	89		BX G (-) 500 RDS SETTING OUT AMBUSHES	SF
2206	90	012205H	IMP PP A SIT SAME	SF
221.5	-	-	SD 24 SIT REP ON 2 PLTS VC	SF
	91	011255H	PP B 2 UNITS IN AMBUSH	SF
2216	92			
2214	93	012218H	DELTH 182 DEPARTED 2200	SF
2220	94	O12220H	ARVN 744TH LOC	SF
2240	95	012230H	SW KC NEGATIVE	SF
2240	96	012240Н	SW K 3RD PLT PATROL LEFT	SF
2245	97		L CO PATROL 3A IN AMBUSH	SF
2250		012240H	IMP SITUATION REMAINS SAME	SF
2335	99	012245H	IMP A-2 PATROL HAS JUST DEPARTED	SF
23 <b>3</b> 5	100	012335Н	BX REPORTS CO PATROL WHEEL	SF
0010	102	01	TINGE AMO EXPENDITURE REPORT	SF
0020	102	02 <b>0</b> 020H	IMP NEG ATIVE ON BLINKING RED LIGHT	SF
0020	103	020020H	BX REPORT FROM CO PRIROL WHEEL	SF
<b>00</b> 30	104	020030Н	SW- NEG SIT REP CONT ON ALL, COMPANYS	SF
0115		020055Н	IMP - D 1 BLUE RETURNED TO CP	SF
0115	106	021000Н	D - LOST RADIO CONTACT DELTA - 2	SF
0115	107	020105H	BX REPORT FR CO PATROL NO CONTACT	SF
0220	108	020105H	D-2 PATROL HAS RETURNED TO CP 0105	SF
0320	109	020200H	NEG SIT REP FROM IMP B	SF
0321		020305H	DELTA -3 RETURNED 0252H	SF
0322	111	020120Н	PATROL WHEEL ALL SECURED NO CONTACT	SF
0345	112	020320H	TANKS SEDURDD FIRING AT 0300	SF
0346	113	020330H	A-2 PATROL RETURNED 0320	SF
0359	114	020340H	15 BOATS OBSERVED AT APPROX 2400 IN SHORE BY PPA	SF
		020355H	WATERBORNE PLT STOPPED 3 BOATS AT GC 518116	SF
0400	115		WHALE PATROL NO CONTACT SIT REMAINS SAME	SF
0435	116	020430H		SF
0436	117	020431H	WATERBORNE PTL STOPPED 3 MORE MATS AT GC 518116	SF
0600	118	020558H	ALL QUIET NEG SIT REP ALL CO'S	
0602	119	020559Н	NEG SIT REP WATERBORNE PTL RETURNING TO OF	SF
0630	120	020600Н	NEG SIT REP ALL UNITS	SF
0622	121	020620Н	IMP LOST CONTACT WITH IMP B	SF
0631	122	020630Н	BX PATROL WHEEL NEG	SF
0632	123	020631Н	IMP SIT REP BRAVO	SF'
0650	124	020640 <b>m</b>	IMP NIGHT ACTEVITY NEG	SF
0735	125	020600Н	TINGE SIT REP	SF
0800	126	020800Н	IMP B CO TO BE PICKED UP TRUCKS	SF
0810	127	020800H	TINGE PICK UP TWO VN	SF
0820	128	022100H	IMP REQ FOR ARTY MISSION	SF
0900	129	020835Н	IMP ON CONVOY	S)·
0905	130	020905Н	IMP A CO TO TEST FIRE S/A	SF
0909	131	020908Н	SHOVE 2 REQUEST FOR 1 3/3 PERCON	SF
1005	132	020908Н	IMP CO 1/4 TEQ AG NOTIFY CADANE OP PLAN 214	SF

1010	132	0209 <b>3</b> 5H	SW LOCXXL CO PATROL LEFT 0900H	SF
1010	134	020940H	B CO IS BACK	SF
1919	135		CO G LOC 511003 NO CONTACT	SF
1050	135		CO 1/4 to EXCUTE OP DIAL	SF
1150	137	, , ,	CO G PATROL NEG CONTACT	SF
1115	138		SHOVE ABOUT DESTROY CP	S.F
1116	139	021100H	SW L HAS RETURNED	SF
1117	110	030930H	FOR OP KING	SF
	145 141	020250Z	AG REQ FOR PHOTS	SF
1145	142	021105H	B CO SET OFF EXPLOSIVE 425085	SF
1	145 143	02 <b>110</b> 5H	AG 1/4 SW CHOP ER PICK UP ON 05 AUG	Sir
<b>13</b> 00	144	02 <b>1</b> 235H	CO G (_) PATROL LOC	SF
1301	145	02 <b>1</b> 130H	TS 24 NEED CODE SHEET FOR AUG	SF
1318	146	02 <b>11</b> 45H	TS 24 CAN T HAVE OP UNTIL FRIDAY	SF
1330	147	021326H	CO G (_) LOC 535011 NO CONTACT	SF
1430	148	021345 <sup>H</sup>	G"2 SITREP	SF
1431	149	02 <b>1</b> 425 <sup>H</sup>	SWI LEFT FOR PENNINSUAL	SF
1505	1 50	021500 <sup>H</sup>	G CO PATROL HAS RETURNED	SF
1605	151	021 502H	MESSAGE ON HELO ARRIVAL TIME	SF
1620	152	021615H	DEBREIF CO B PATROL	SF
1635	153	021650H	CO SIZE PATROL LEAVING	SF
1650	154	03 <b>163</b> 5H	AIR STRICK FOR BX CANCELLED	SF
1800	155	021745H	PERMISSION TO FIRE	SF
1801	156	021746H	SHOVE LTCOL FISHER WILL RETURN 03 AUG	SF
1830	157	021822H	A_6 SITREP	SF
1838	<b>1</b> 58	021835 <sup>H</sup>	BX F CO HAVE TWO VN	SF
1900	159	021850H	IMP PF AMBUSH SITES	SF
2000	160	021945H	SW VEH TRAFFIC REPORT	SF
2010	161	022005H	SW M AMBUSH LOC	S <sup>rp</sup>
2011 2011	162 163	022000H	IMP A_3 LEFT IMP ON PF CAPTURE	SF
2017		032000H	SW ABOAT LOST WALLET	SF
2030	165 165	0220 <b>1</b> 5 <sup>H</sup> 022025 <sup>H</sup>	SW L CO 1_A PATROL LEFT	St
204 <b>0</b>	166	022010H	SW I CORETRACK	SF
2042	167	022010H	IMP SITREP	SF
2043	158		SW ACCIDENTAL FIRING FLARE	SF
20115	160	022045H	BX REPORT ON PF TROOPS	SF CD
2050 1	170	022020H	G BATTERY ONSTAR CLUSTER	SF
2051	171	022051H	SW VEH TRAFFIC REPORT	SF SF
2052	172	022050H	3/YEXTEXTXERX 3/12 TEST FIRING	SF SF
2101	123	032100H	IMP SBA SITREP	SF
2200	174	OZNDTG	FIRE MISSION	
2210	175	022145H	IDENITFIED AS PF	SF SF
2230	176	022215H	BX REPORT FROM PF VC COORD 440022	S.F
2230	177	022215H	B_2PATROL HAS RETURNED	SF
5,3,	178	022232	IMP B_1 BLUE JUST DEPARTED	S.F
2248	179	022237H	AG 34 report long shot fired vic shower	SF
2245	180	0222 <b>3</b> 9H	D CO RECEIVED ONE S/A INCOMING RD	SF

2250	181 022248H	B CO REP RED STARCLUSTER	SF
2302	182 022300H	D RECD 3S/A RETURNED 6 RDSNEG RESULTS	SF
2305	183 022 306H	A 1 AND A3 NO CONTACT	SF
2310	184 022335H'	D CO PATROLS HAS RETURNED	SE
S3/10	185 022337H	E SIT REP	SF
0010	186 022345H	A PATROL H'S RETURNED	SF
0025	182 030011 <u>H</u>	D1 HAS RETURNED	SF CF
2005	138 0300°0H	B1 PATROL HAS RETURNED	SF
0130	189 030 <b>1</b> 15H	0056 CB15 ESCAPED PRISONER RECP TURED	SF
0217	190 030 <b>1</b> 50 <sup>H</sup>	A2 HAS RETURNED	SF
0212	191_030213H	SW PAT REP	SF
0.534	192203031 <sup>5H</sup>	I, PAT RETURNED	SF
0.534	193 030325H	SW M PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
0535	1 <b>9</b> 4 030450H	SWAIN I PATROL RETURNED	SF
0536	195 030502H	B_1, B_2 PATROL RETURNED	SF
0540	196 030 <i>5</i> 40 <sup>H</sup>	C_1 RETURNED 0530H	SF
0.549	197 031315	LIAISON OFFICER CHECK IN TIMES	SF
0612	198 03 <b>0611</b> H	TINGE SIT REP	SF
0805	199 030640 <sup>H</sup>	BX WHEELED & RIVER PATROLS BACK	SF
0806	200 0 <b>30</b> 720H	IMP NIGHT ACTIVITY REPORT	SF
0807	201 03072 <b>0</b> H	AG_5 TO CALL SHOVE 10 OR 3	SF
0825		BX SIT REP	SF
0835	so3 030830H	SWAIN M CO PATROL LEFT	SF
0855	204 030825H	BX OKYED FIRE MISSION	SF
0905	205 <b>030900</b> H	81'S REGISITRATIONS	SF
0906	206 030825H	FIRE MISSION COORD.	SF
0910	207 030908H	IMP REQ TO FIRE S/A	SF
0925	208 <b>030919</b> H	DREAM ALPHA TRACTOR R EC 2 MORTAR RDS	SF
0935	209 0 <b>30935<sup>H</sup></b>	IMP JET dropped OBJ COURDS	SF
0942	210 <b>030920H</b>	A REP CIV LEAVING TAGT AREA	SF
0946	211 030945H	IMP SIT REP	SF
1000	212 039500H	SW TO TEST FIRE S/A	SF
1015	213 031012H	PERS RPT MUST BE MADE TO ARVN	SF
TOPO		SW SQD SIZE PATROL LEFT AT 917H	ώ¥ O 2
<b>1</b> 040	215 03 <b>103</b> 5H	IMP FOUND BOMB AT 521087	SF out
1150	216 03 <b>11</b> 40H	SW K HAS RETURNED	SF co
	217 0306252	LAND MINE WAR FARE REQ TO BNS	SF Ca
1405	218 03 <b>13</b> LOH	L PATROL DEPARTED 131335H	SF CW
1743	219 03 <b>172</b> 5H	A PATROL DEPARTING CP	Sir
1800	220 030905Н	REP QUANG TIN	SF
1800	221 031750Н	REQ INFO ON LAND MINEWAR FARE	Sa'
1801	222 031805H	A CO HAS DISMOUNTED	Sr <sup>a</sup>
1800	223 03 <b>181</b> 5H	INP SIT REP A CO	SF en
1902	221, 03 <b>183</b> 0H	BX REP ON RATROL BAMB	SF
1805	225 03 <b>1</b> 855H	SW ON 22 VC NEAR RECON	SF Sa
1906	226 031900H	SW LYTSON WAY TO RECON	5₽ ©#
<b>1</b> 910	227 03 <b>1930</b> H	PP 214 REQ LOC OF PF MAMBUSHES	SF en
1932	228 0 <b>3193</b> 0H	BX G CO LOC	S# 977
1935	229 03 <b>191</b> 0H	THE B CO EVAC OWN WAY	SF SF
1940	2BO 031925H	INP A REG SNIPER FIRE	SF
1941	231. 03 <b>19</b> 05H	THE DET 10D1 OIL AO	O <sub>L</sub> <sup>7</sup>

			•	
201.0	232	03 <b>1</b> 935H	THE BCO CONDUCTING SWEEP	SF
1942		()3 <b>1</b> 950H	THE ONTOS RETURNED	ಟಿಗೆ'
1943		031905H	SW RECON REQ ON EVAC OF CATEURD	SP,
1945			WI CMD GP TOUCHED DOWNQ	SF
1955		~	WA BT PROCEEDING TO SONG TRA DONG	SF
1958	-	0 <b>31915</b> H	PP 6 ON GRENADE INCIDENT	SF
2002		03 <b>1</b> 955H	SW VEH TRAFFIC REPORT	SF
2015		032010H	SW VEH TRAFFIC REPORT	SF
2030		03 <b>1.91</b> 5H	WA BT RETRACTING TO SONG TRA BONG	SF'
2035			WIG CATBIRD RECOVERED	SF
2038	$2l_1$	03 <b>1</b> 955H	IMP SIT REP ON PATROLS	SF
20140	2113	0320 <b>1</b> 8H	OX -2 ON AIR STRIKE	
2014		032030H	THP PF AMBUSH SITES & SIT REP	SF Con
2045		0320 <b>1</b> 0H	SW HELOS REC S/A FIRE	SF
2047		032030Н		36
2047		032015Н	IMP-2 ON GRENADE INCIDENT	SF
2047			PP 28 PF AWOUSH SITES	SF
		032015H	WI 6 H CO INSIDE MLR	SF
2047	5110	031955H		SF
50/18		02122211		SF
2100	250	0320 <b>1</b> 5H <b>032100</b> H	SW M CO ON MLR	SF
2102	とりて	OSETOOU	IMP A-1 & 2 PATROLS LOC	SF
2110	252	O3NDTG	IMP WILL TEST FIRE S/A	SF
2116	253	032106H	TWA MITTIES LIKE NA	SF
2117	254	03 5110	B-2 PATROL LEFT	SF
2118	255	032115H	A=3 100	SF
2150	256	032130Н	IMP A-3 LOC NO CONTACT	SF
2152		032 <b>146</b> H		
2158	258	032 <b>1</b> 55H	BX SIT REP	SF
2200	259	032156H	D-1 PATROL IEFT	SF
2220	260	032115H	BT UNCLAS 31 JULY, DIST B/2	SF
2225		032220H	IMP-B-1 PATROL HAS RETURNED	SF
2230		032225H		SF
2235	263	032235Н		SF
2240	26/	032240Н		SF
2245		032250Н	and the second s	SF
2305		032305H		SF
		032300H		SF
2305		032310H		SF
2310				SF
2320		032315H	SW-K FIRST PLT PATROL IS LEAVING NOW	SF
2320	270	032305H		SF
2340	271			SF
2350	272	032350Н		SF
2 <b>3</b> 50	273	032340H		SF
2350	274	032345H		SF
0045	275	040045H		
0045	276	04004 <i>5</i> H		SF
0045	277	042358H		SF
0045	278	040020H	CH-2 ALFA PATROL RETURNED	SF
0045	279	040030H	IMP A-1 PATROL RETURNED	SF
0050	280	040010H	SD 2/4 SECTOR 56 IN 23 JULY VC	SF
0050	281	040020H	SD 2/4 PF PLATOON COORD	SF
0100	282	040055H		SF
0115	283	040100H	SW M-2 PATROL JUST LEFT	SF
0115	284	040110H		SF
0115	285	040110H		SF
0145	286	040153H		SF

0203	28			SF
0215	28		H NEG REPORT ON PATROL BAMBOO	SF
02]	•		H REQ TO KNOW INFO ON 105 HOW	SF
0218	29	• •	4 A-3 PATROL AT 457073	SF
0330	29		H M-3 RETURNED 0230H- NO ENEMY CONTACT	SF
0331	29		1 CHARLLE- 2 BRAVO HAS RETURNED AT 0303	010
0332	29		MEN APPROCHING LINES 2 illum greands throug No resu	il SF
0333	29		I MEG REPORT ON PATROL BAMBOO	SF
0334	29			SF
040 <b>2</b> 0403	29			SF
0420	29	7 0404001	The second of the second secon	SF
0459	29 29		1 I CO PATROL #3 HAS RETURNED	$s_{ m F}$
0500	30		D-3 PATROL HAS RETURNED NO ENEMY CONTACT	sf
0510	30		PP-A IS AT GC 459084 NO ENEMY CONTACT	SF
0522	30	2 040518H	3 BOATS PICKED UP AT 514113 14 MALES 2 CHILDREN	SF
0550	30			SF
0635	30.			$\mathbf{SF}$
0650	30			SF
0651	30			SF
0658	30			SF
0730	30		SW L CO PAT LEFT AT O710H	SF
0731	309		IMP A &C CO POS REMAIN SAME	SF
0732	310			SF
0735	31:	L 040735H	IMP WATERBORE HAS APPREH 32 VCS	SF
0735	312	? 040730H	SUMMARY OF NIGHT MISSIONS & (TINGE)	SF
0845	313	9 Q40845H	CO A JUST RETURNE) TO THIER CP	SF SF
0910	31/		SW TEST FIRRING MG	SF
0911	315			$\mathbf{S}_{x^c}$
0912	316	040930H		SF
	317			SF
	318			SF
	319			Sř'
09 <b>4</b> 8 1010	320 32 <b>1</b>			SF
1015		040925H	SW PICK UP 2 GROUP OR VN	SF
1020	323			SF
1040	324		CO G (-) PATROL RETURNED PP244.VC STOLD " SMG AND 1 PLSTOL	$\mathbf{S}\mathbb{P}$
1105	325		IMP REPORT 60 PLOPIE IN BLACK	SF
1110	326		PAYABLE HOTEL 3 REPORTS	$\mathbf{SF}$
1140	327		SHOVE 2 ROAD PPEN FROM DA NANG TO CHU LAI	SP
1220	328		PP 24 1 VC CO AT 456048	SF
1300	329		TS 2 RECEIVED INFO	SF
1300	330	041245H	IMP SECURITY CHIEF B/2 OF KY HA	SF
1300	331	041250H	IMP SPOTTED 3 MEN WITH RIFLE	SF
1310	332	041302H	BX HILL 66 at 1730 will be a ATR STRIK	SF
1310	333	041300Н	IMP NO ADDITINAL WORD ON FIRE	SF
1410	334	041 <b>41</b> 0H	PP 24 COUNDECT SWEEP AT LY TIN	SF Sw
1414	335	O41414Ha	SHOVE MES ON OP ORDER 321-A	SF
1442	336	041442H	SHOVE 2 NEGROS, O4 CAUS AS POW JOB FOR HEGOR	SF
1445	337	04144511	K CO PATROL AT CP# 1	SF
1500	338	U41500H	HELO RECON REPORT OF CAVES WITH MANY PEOPLE AROUND	SF
1540	339	04124011	B CO FOUND 13 SPIRED TRAPS	SF
1540 1545	340 341	0405452	PASS TO R/MUD 62 I HAVE BROUGHT A POMPKIN	SF
1605	ابمار	040850Н	COORD BT 450114=450148 REFERS TO EARLIER MESSAGE	SF

1605	342	041600H	REPORT ON VC LOCATIONS (TS 24)		SF
1625	343	041626H	PERCH 3 508023 RECEEVED 15RDS S/A IN COMING		SF
1630	3/1/1	041630H	K CO PÁRRÓL RETURNED 1610		SF
1705	345	0/1705H	B CO CAPTUREED 1MAN AT VIC 525083		SF
1720	346	041720H	LOCATION OF VE AND CAVES		SF
1730	347	041710H	5 SIGNAL FIRES 5189 AND 5693		SF
1740	348	041740H	PF NIGHT POSITIONS		SF
1745		041745H	INFORMED SWAIN K TO BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFULL		SF
1800	350	041800H	F CO. LOCATION		SF
1845	351	041025H	DELTA 3 AND ALPHA 2 DEPARTED		SF
1900	352	041900H	BX 2 ON 1 NEGRO AND 1 CAUS.		SF
2000	353	041940H	IMP PF AMBUSH LOCATIONS		SF
2002	354	04 <b>1</b> 940H	BX REPORT PEOPLE AT COORD.		SF
2011	355	042010 <sup>H</sup>	IMP DELTA 1 &2 B 3 DEPARTED		SF
2012	356	M000240	SWAIN VEH REPORT		SF
2013	357	045000H	IMP WATERBORNE HAS LEFT		SF
2015	358	0412202	CO, 4th MARINES REPORTS		SF
2030	359	042030H	BX CO F AMBUSHES		SF
2031	360	042030H	IMP TRAFFIC REPORT		SF
2 <b>13</b> 5	361	042 <b>11</b> 2H	B CO REPORT ENCOUNTER W PF		SF
2 <b>13</b> 6	352	042 <b>105</b> H	BX S REPORT ON VC UNIT		SF
2 <b>13</b> 7	363	042115H	PP_B_1 ALPHA READ AS WE ARE ON THE WAY		SF
2 <b>13</b> 8	364	042 <b>135</b> H	IMP SIT REP ON SEARCHS		SF
2140 344	365	040930H	IMP FIRED THREE RDS ILLUM		SF SF
2145	<b>3</b> 56	045030H	8024 SIT REP		SF
2146	367	0412135H	IMP INCOMING FIRE AND RETURNED FIRE		SF
2203	358	043200H	BX REPORT VC UNIT KILO SQUAD SIZED PATROL DEPARTED		SF
2215	369	042205H	SW OP #1 REP A/WPNS FIRM		SF
2230	370	042225H	BX CO SIZE PATROL F CO A/O COTACT		SF
23/t0	391	0/133 <b>40</b> H	BX REPORT D ON LINE'	SF	SF
2245	372	0422 <b>37</b> H 04224 <b>7</b> H	I CO REPORTS SCREAMING F/HOA LAN	0.	SF
2245	373	042247H	DISTRICT FIREING 105 AT VC SUPPLY		SF
23 <b>3</b> 0	<b>3</b> 75	042350H	TINGE SIT REP		SF
0100 0100	326	050100 <sup>H</sup>	F CO PATROD NEG CONTACT		SF
0100	327	050130H	C 2 PATROL RETURNED		SF
0210	378	050135H	B 1 RETURNING TS CP		SF
0215	379	050200H	CO M SQD SIZED PATROL DEPARTED		SF
0330	330	050300H	FORE ATDANANG FUEL FARM		SF
0330	331	^50310H	FIRING HEARD AT HILL 50 OP		SF
0440	332	050400H	81 MORTAR RDS FALLDING IN LY TIN		SF
0.555	383	050515H	BX FO ON PERCH1 RPTS FIRE VIC LY TIN'		SF
0537	331	050535H	SW M PAT #4 RETURNED		SE
0405	38r	050600H	SBA1 HAS 6 BOATS & 2" PEOPLE AT SPASH POINT		S F
0<12	385	05051.0H	A1 PAT RETURNED		SE
0415	335	050615 <sup>H</sup>	PAT BIRCH PULLING BACK		SP
0440	388	05062 <b>0</b> H	TINGE FIRE MISSIONS REPORT		SF
0725	389	050725H	A2 JUST REPORTED IN NO CONTACT		SF or
0725	390	050645H	IMP FOLLOW UP REPORT ON STOLEN WEAPONS DISTRICT FROM DISTRICT CKIEF TO FIRE ARTY		SF
0800	391	050800H	CO F RETURNED_NO CONTACT		SF SF
0808	302	050808H	SPOOTED SEVERAL GROUPS OF PEOPLE		or AS
0818	993	050818H	DIOMING DEADING OR OLD OF LEGINE		OI.

08/15	304	050845H	I P SUMMARY OF NIGHT ACTIVITY		SF
0000	305	050900H			SF
0030	306	05NDTG	BETWEEN CP & MLR 50 CAL MOWILL TEST FIRE		SF
1015	<b>3</b> 0 7	051014H	2VC SQD BS 533747 SF		SF
1020	308	050937H	SD24 REF TO MY 05001 5H2VC		्य प्र
1120	<b>3</b> 00	05091 cH	SD24 PF PLT REPORT 3VC		ST
			B2 COORDS 480109		
1020	7:00 1:01	0510 <b>0</b> 5H	IMP SIT REP NO CONTACT		SF
1020	401	051020 <sup>H</sup>	H&S PATROI ROUTES		SF
1025	1:02	051030H			SF
1120	403	05 <b>1</b> 105H	K3 PATROL RETURNED		SF
1120	404		SD2! REP 1VC CO COORDS		SF
1015	405	051105H	REP OF VC HARRING TRAFFIRE		SF
1215	106	051155H	B2 &B1 PATROL LOC		SF
1225	407	051225 <sup>H</sup>	SD21 PF (RRESTED 3VC COORDS		SF
1 734	408	151234H	MEM PALIMINO REQ MED HELO EVAC		SF
1255	71/00	051255H	B2 AT 480004 NO CONTACT		SF
1300	410	051300H	SW TEST FIREING M14 M70 548011		$\mathtt{SF}$
1305	411	-051305H1	D1 AT 1147113 HAVE KILLED WATERBUFFLO		SF
1337	41?	051337 <sup>H</sup>	B1 AT434117 WAITING FOR TRANS		${ t SF}$
1340	413	05NDTG	REP FROM CLYDEDALE		SF
1600	414	051 <b>10</b> 8H	FR WH24 IS EVERYTHING SET		SF
1600	415	051355H	B2 LOC 489110 NO CONTACT		SF
1605	415	051430H	B <sub>2</sub> IN POS AT 496095		SF
1605	*41?	051430H	D1 HAS RETURNED		SF
1905	*417	051905H	BEACHBOY APD 123 COMPLETED OP		SF
1005	* 413	051720H	TS24 HAVE ONE VN ELECTRITION		SF
1010	* / 199	051735H	TS24 05 AUG LY TIN APA C/5		SF
1010	421	051845H	NGF FIRED ONE MISSION TODÁY		SF
1010	422	051905H	D2 HAS DEPARTED	SF	sf
2022	4.23	051730H	2/4 AG SIT REP		SF
2023	424	051720H	TS24X SIT REP		SF
2024	425	051750H	AG2 ON VN OF ELOADING SUPPLIES		SF
2025	1126	05NDIG	REP FR CLYDESDALE ON PINTO & SORREL		SF
2004	1.27	0513/17 <sup>H</sup>	FIRE MISSIONS		SF
\$0.55	428	05190811	REP FR LOCAL AGENT ON OVC		SF
2027	429	052005II	BX REP LARGEFIRE		SF
2027	130	052005H	D3 D@PARTED		SF
2022		0.52006H	CLDS AMBUSHES SET		SF
272 <sup>0</sup>	432	052150H	SW TRAFFIC REC		SF
2023	1123	051055H	FR CLDS AT SUGAR COORDS		S <sub>P</sub>
<b>3</b> 030	434	0510351	BANGO SQD SIZE PATHLOS		SF
2020	1125	051045H	SW 3/3 TO FIRE ARTY		SF
2030	Ųa€	051940H	BX HIGHTIDE AT COORDS		SF
S∪51	ું ૩૦	05NDTG	F PASSED SMSG		SF
5035	1128	052008H	IMP POB1 LEFT		<b>S</b> F
5033	1130	052008H	BX6 REQREP ON ABBSENCE OF BOATS		F
2033	400	052020H	SW 31RDS 105mm EXPEND		SF
SUNO	441	051328	IMPTRAFTIČ		SF
SU(1)	14115	052037H	IMP PF AMBUSHES		SF
2110	41.3	052110H	BX E CO AT LOC		SF
2111	444	052045H	BX TO SET OFF FUGAS		SF

				OTP
0900	770	05745 <b>0</b> H	IMP CO B ARRIVED AT SPLASH POINT	SF SF
0815	730	050810 <sup>H</sup>	1ST WAVE 3/3 in LZ WOLF	SF
0820	281	0508 <b>1</b> 7 <sup>!!</sup>	B <sub>1</sub> PATROL ALNDED 4691252	SF
0920	782	060820H	CO E AT 548970	SF
0835	283	050830H	A2 HAS RECHEARD 509137	SF
0200	28/1	040 <b>827<sup>H</sup></b>	SH RED 29 ON WAY 3/3 IN LZ	SF
0000	795	0<0845H	D ON PATROL W/ SQD SIZE PAT VIC	SF
0200	736	060845H	RECON TEST FORING	5 <u>r</u> S <b>r</b>
0.0 -0	787	060653H	I CO & CP ARRIVED IZ WOLF	SF
0905	788	050855H	IMP PATROL VIC BAUBA SPOTTED VC	SF
0015	<b>ካ</b> ዷባ	050907 <sup>H</sup>	B1 REQ TRANS TO PICK UP VC	SF
0010	აიც	060917 <sup>H</sup>	B1 LANDED 412118	SF
0040	701	0<0120H	TS TO TS24 PROVIDE TIME TEACHING	SF
0950	カック	050940 <sup>H</sup>	RG FWD F CO HAS 1VCS	SF
0150	മറദ	060940H	AG FWD M CO RECD S/A FIRE	SF
0955	201	060945H3	AG FND SIT REP	SF
<u>0043</u>	705	^609 <i>5</i> 0 <sup>H</sup>	A2 IS AT 511161	SF
1035	706	061005H	B1 IS NOW AT 468104	SF
10/10	مارال	$061000^{\mathrm{H}}$	AG FWD VC CO FORMING	SF
1 050	703	051001 <u>H</u>	SW TEST FIREING 503003	SF
1040	200	o≤ <b>101</b> 5 <sup>H</sup>	LARGE ARVN CONVOY SOUTH	SF
1115	800	051000 <sup>H</sup>	AG FWD SIT REP	SF
1115	801	051010H	3/51 OBJS	F
1115	80?	−061_030 <sup>H</sup>	WH I SEARCHING VILLAGE	SF
1115	303	061 <b>095</b> H	B2 HAS 14 VCS	SF
1115	304	061035 <sup>H</sup>	REP OF ARTY AT 415125	SF
1120	805	_051035 <sup>H</sup> _	PACK WAS FOUND 533857	SF
1120	806	051 240H	AG FWD REP VC COMING 502881	SF
1120	807	06 <b>1100</b> H	A1 IOC 501147	SF
1120	808	061100 <sup>H</sup>	F CO HAS RETURNED	SF
1120	<b>80</b> 9	06 <b>1101</b> H	AO REPS NEG ON CO AT 502891	SF
1120	810	061120 <sup>H</sup>	3/51 AT558875 RO FIRE MISSIONS ON VCS PLT	SF
1130	811	OKNDTG	10 ag warmen and	SF
1137	812	051100 <sup>H</sup>	AG END SIT REP 3/3SITREP AS OF 1100H	SF
1137	813		3/3SITREP AS OF 1100H MAN SHOT IN LEG BY HIS CO ARVV	SF
1145	814	061127H	Bi PICK UP 1VCS 492091	Sÿ
1210	81	5 061154H	TARBUSH RED 2VC 408075	SF
1210		051205H	SW CP 400mmCPSR	SF
1235	817		B1 AT 493089 NO CONTACT	SF
1232	318		AG FWD LEATHERNECKS	SF
12/10	419		TS FRONT LINE POSITIONS	SF
1240	42 <b>(</b> )	1 161150H	AG FUD ARVN ARTY FIRING	SF
1240	#1 #22		AG(FWD) 3D MARINES RVN MOVING	SF
1240	かっさ 行っる	4	AG FWD ARTY WILL FIRE 555005	SF
1252	423		3/3 WIA RECD S/A FIRE 12RDS	SF.
1255	しいし		TMP 3B1 AT LOKOSS	SF
1310	426 426		3/3 CP WAS MOTED BEHIND I CO	SF
1350	420	) (JJO ) (U-V	21 '	

				~ =
1350	427	660325H	AGF ORSERVE D 25 PERSONS	SF
1350	428	051235 <sup>H</sup>	SV M CO ON PHASE LINE	SF
1355	429	061355 <sup>H</sup>	IMP B1 AT 409000 N ENEMY CONTACT	SF
	400	0/201011		CID.
1400	430	061.340H	3/3 AG2 FWD 1 HEAT CASULTY	SF
1405	427	06131511	3RO ARVN MAR DIV TO FIRE	SF SF
1405	432	051320H	AGF 3/3 REC FIRING INCOMING	
1405	4 <b>3</b> 3	071700II	WHO REPORTS REGORDUS TERRAIN	SF
1405	434	061355H	AGE WI AT 1340 TERRAN	SF SF
1425	435	061412H	A2 LOC COORDS	SF
1430	436	061410H	AG SIT REP	SF
1,430	437	0 <b>6</b> 1410H	B1 HAS ATOTAL OF 12 VCS	SF
1445	438	06143511	ET. LANE APPOX. 30 VN	of SF
1.450	439	061.44.211	AG TOOK MIL READING SOUTH OF BIN SON	SF SF
1455	440	061450H	PAYABLE 8 OBS 3RDS HE	SF
1530	441	06 <b>150</b> 5H	SIT REP AGF	S <b>F</b>
1640	142	061555H	PAYABLE FIRE MISSION	SF
1.740	443	061.555H	BP PROCEEDING TO SPLASH PT.	SF
1741	1.1.1.	061.607H	A2 COORDS TOTAL HEAT CAS. 39	SF
1742	415	06 <u>1</u> 608H	WHG BIT REP	SF
1741	446	06153011	AGF SIT REP	SF
174 <b>k</b>	1,1,7	0/1530H	AGF SIT REP	$\mathbf{g}_{\mathrm{F}}$
1743	448	0/161011	WIG NEG SIT REP	SF
1744	449	063.60011	WHE RECON PARTY AT COORDS	SF
1745	450	061 (1) H	ON PLANS 2168:212 APPROVED	SF
1745	457	OKNDTG		SF
1848	852	0/1/42H	F CO PAT LEFT CP	SF
1849	853	061642H	l vo kia l capy wpn sit rep lvo kia l capt wpn	SF
1850	854	061640H		SIF
1.852	855	0617101	OP#2 TRAFFIC R PORT	SF
1,853	855	061.65211	ARCN VC 1 PLT K FIRSTIGHT	SF
1 34	857	051730H	F CO LOC ARVN NOW FIGHTING 3 DIF VC PLTS	SF
1855	858	061708H		SF
185	859	0617251	ARVN CAPT 15 US MSGS.	SF
1858	840	06174511	PL B MAKE LOC OF ALL UNITS	SF
1859	8/1.	06174511	SOTTED 50T075 PEOPLE COORDS	SF
1859	862	061845H	D3 LEFT	SP
1.900	863	061800H	PF A BUSH SITE A RVN CALLED AIR STRIKE	SF
<b>1</b> 910	854	051755H	AT 1700 3RD ARVN MAP 1 CHECZ WPN	SF
1911	866	061755H	RECON WILL TESE FIRE S/A 1000	SF
<b>J</b> 912	867	060845H	The state of the s	$\mathtt{SF}$
1913	868	0 1 8 3 0 HJ	TW CAPIDD DIDG CAM DED	$\mathtt{SF}$
1914	<b>86</b> 9	061815H	AG 3 FWD NEG SIT REP	SF
1915		061800H	NAVAL GUNFIRE MISSIONS	SF
1916		061850H	3/51 REC'D S/A	SF
<b>1</b> 91 (		061.84011	1855 REQ FOR WATER	SF
1916		061835H	WH ISSUING CHOW & WATER	SF
1916		061835H	D2 LEFT	<b>A</b> F
1917		051845H	OPEN AL BOLDWAY	SIP
1917				SF
1977				SF
1918	: 878	0/1840H	3/3 REPS ON VIA	-

-1	deso	MOVE TO	3/3 REPS ON WIA	SF
1918	879		ATZLOO WILL DET FUGAS	SF
<b>19</b> 19	830		LAST HOWTAR IN W. CP	SF
1920	881.	061920H	IMP WATERBORNE PAT.	$\mathbb{SF}$
1935	882	061930H	RECON EC'D ONE WIA	SF
1938	883	061937H	DIST CHIEF RPT 1 VC BN VIC 558917	SF
1945	884	061908Н	DIST UNITE MIGGION	SF .
1945	885	061850H	RECON FIRE MISSION	SF
1945	886	061845H	AG (FWD) NIGHT DEF FIRE	SF
1955	887	061955H	B MED CASUALTY REPORT	SF
1955	888	061950H	A-2 IS DEPARTING	SF
2115	889	062010H	D HAS DEPARTED	SF
2015	890	062006H	co F (-) Loc 529989	SF
2025	891.	062006H	J CO 3/3 COORD	SF
2025	892	062004.H	SW 17 HEAT CAS READY FOR DUTY	SF
2025	ક્રે∋3(	052004H	I CO WIA 1845	SF
2040	\$ 9/	0'2 09H	WHO CONSODIDATE DEFENSE POS	SF
2040 2040	89 <b>5</b>	062000H	IDST CHIEF REP 1 VC BN COOEDS	SF
2040			PF AMBUSHES IMP	<b>B</b> F
	-897	4 471	OSCAR 2 TRAFFIC REP	SF
204.0			THE CAPT TO MEN	SF
2040			CO TE ( MAYTIAM AMBITSH POST)	SF
2050		/ a.a. a. m/Tf	B/TRAPS THAT CAUSED WIA IN I OU	S <b>r</b> w
21.10	900	4 77	INP APPREHENED 7VN	SF
21.10	901		WH SIT REP	SF
21.20	902		AGFWD NEG SIT REP	SF
2140	903	4	E CO STE TO E SAME	SF
21/40	901		COL BEO RELAY MSGFTO B RECON	SF
21.47	90!			SF
2225	909	4 071	B1 DEPARTED 1845H	SF
<b>2</b> 22 <b>5</b>	90'		STONEWALL PG 4- MIKE	SF
22 <b>25</b>	90		······································	SF
2230	90			
<b>234</b> 5	91		AC TRUD INSER YOUR 62200H	SF W
2345	91			SF 🐙
2355	91			SF .
0010			a cu pro robem k co at op	SF
001.0	91		(- 0,00 0/2 CTP RRP NUit	SF
0010	91		H/L 2200 3/3 SIT RM HAVE COMPLETE OP PLAN  AG (FWD) WILL HAVE COMPLETE OP PLAN	SF
01.13	93			SF
01.24	, 91	L7 0700011	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	SF T
0120		L8 062355I		S.F
01.20		19 07001.0I	A TO A SECULO DE	SF
0.1.25		20 0622 <b>3</b> 01		SF
0210		21 070032		SF
0200	_	22 070050	H IMP D-2 HAS RETURNED	$\mathtt{SF}$
0200		23 070043	H FO ON PERCH 1. REPORTED	SF
	_		H NEGATIVE SIT REPORT	SF
0200	• .		H NEG SIT REPORT	SF
020	_		H SW NEG SIT REPORT W/BARBED WIRE	SF
030	•		H D PAROL FOUND CONGRESS WY BILLIAM	SF
030	•		- ATOM OTH DEP	SF
030		28 070200	DATROL MAYTAG-NEG SIT RELOID	SF
030		929 070210 930 <b>07</b> 0310		
045	, T	930 070310	<del></del>	

				am
0451	931	070330H	AG3 NEG SIT REPORT	SF
		070400Н	PATROL MAYTAG-NO CONTACT	${\tt SF}$
		070400Н	AG3(FWD) NEG SIT REPORT	SF
		070600Н	PATROL SWIM NEG SIT REP	SF
0/15	935	07060011	IMP NEG SIT REPORT	SF
			SW NEG SIT REPORT	BF
0515	936	070600H		SF
0638	937	070 35H	HOWTARS TO MOVE BEFORE 0730H	SF
0645	938	070615H	PATROL MAYTAG AT CH PT C	
0720	939	070655H	AG3(FWD) TO MOVE TO PL C	SF
0721	940	070650H	WH REPORTS QUIET NIGHT	SF
0721	941	070646H	TINGE NIGHT REPORT	$_{ m SF}$
0722	942	070705H	ARVN REPORT 9 VC KILLED	SF
	943	070716H	WH-DON'T SEND YESTERDAYS HEAT CASUALITIES	SF
0725		070716H	REQ HELOS P CK UP WATER CANS	SF
0726	944		REPORT 50 VN WITH BLACH PAJAMAS	SF
0727	945	070716Н		SF
0728	946	070715H	ARVN REPORT 9 VC KI LED	SF
0729	947	070724H	HOWTAR AND 81MM AMMO EXPENDITURE	
0730	948	070735H	PPD SPLASHING AT 0720H	SF
0731	949	070730H	Al PATROL IN AT 0710-B2-3 IN AT 0715H	SF
0830	950	NIDIG	SP MOUNTING OUT	$\mathfrak{B}\mathrm{F}$
0831.	951	070800H	CO E LOCATION	SF
		070820H	D (-) ABOARD LVTS COORDS	SF
o835	952		SIT REP	SF
0836	953	070820H		SF
0845	954	0700 <b>1</b> 0Z	TINGE ISUN# 89	Slr
<b>0</b> 8 <b>5</b> 0	955	07082 <b>0H</b>	WH CP LOC 150mm WEST OF CH. PT. 22	SF
0850	956	070 ° 20H	LW 3 UNITS MOVING FAST 0515	
0851	957	07082°H	AGFUD SIT REP	SF
0855	958	070\\\55H	H CO DISREGARD	SF
0905	959	070857H	AGFWD SIT REP	$\operatorname{\mathtt{SF}}$
	910	07091.2H	IMP 2 PLTS PF LOC	SF
0915		O7NDTG	K 1 CAS ACTIVITY FRIENDLY	SF
0916	951		WI M ON PL D	ÐF
0917	962	070905H		SF
0918	9/3	070900H	VALVE REQ ILLUM	SE
0920	964	070908 <b>H</b>	WILL FOUND DUDS	SF
0930	965	07 <b>0</b> 925H	D (-) AT 408117	SF
0931	946	0 <b>70</b> 27H	40 CIV COORDS	SF
0948	967	0709 <b>47</b> H	ARVN CONTACT 5VC	
1000	968	071020H	F CO HAS RECEIRNED	SF
1.0 <b>3</b> 0	9 9		3/51 HAVE 4 VCS	SF
			HAVE MED EVAC	SF
1031	970		REQ SAME MED EVAC	$\mathbf{S}_{\mathbb{F}}$
1045	971		WH I&M TO PE E	SF
1046	972		2ND D I REQ 1 LST	SF
1050	973			SF
1.100	977		VC WIA DOA	S <sup>rs</sup>
11.02	978	071050H	AGFWD SIT REP	SF
1.104	<b>9</b> 79	071045H	AGFWD SITREP	SF
1.105	980	071.035II	1 CHI COM FRAG GRENADE	SF
1.1.55-98			IMP D CO REQ FIRE MISSION	SF
1155	982		FIRE MISSION FROM PH 4	
	983		WH REAR HEAT EVAC	SF
1.200			MCG ON NON BATTLE CAS	SF
1207	984		WH SIT REP	SF
1210	985			SF
1.230	986			SF
1250	987			SF
1 51	988	3 07122511		SF
1255	989			SF
1255	990	0 0712451		SF SF
1300	- <sup>(</sup> -):		FIRE MISSION	101.
-/				

1.301	9 <b>9</b> 2	0 71.145H	FIRE MISSION		SF
1307	993	071250H	ALL QUIET A T LZ		S) <sup>r</sup>
1308	994	071.3 <b>90</b> H	AG3 LOC OF CONVOY		$\operatorname{SF}$
1330	995	071,320Н	AG6 ON WAY BACK TO CP		$\mathbf{SF}$
1.345	996	071335H	IMP FIRE MISSION RESULTS		SF
1350	997	071340H	EOD HAVE FIN ON IMP RANGE		SF
1351	998	07 <b>1255</b> H	HELOS ARRIVED COMM RETRACKTIONS		SF
1400	999	071355H	D CO AT LOC		SF
1750	1.	071420H	WH24 REQ HELO PICK UP AFFIRM		SF
1500	2	071405H	WH6 RETURNED , ALL TROOPS IN		SF
1504	3	071509H	D PATROLS LOC 393095 MOVING SE		SF
1.524	4	071520H	SW BN ALL BACK		SF SF
1805	5	071655H			SF
1804	6	071655H			SF
1.007	7	07].700H			SF SF
1608	8	07171711	ALL D CO UNITS LDC D CO LOC AT COORDS		SF
1809	9	07173911		* •	SF SF
1810	10	071755H 070805H	BX 6 REP INCOMING SHELL		SF
1630	11. 12	070803h 071840H	D CO BIT REP		SF
1930	1.3	0718 <u>15</u> H	ARVN CONVOY NORTH		SF
1930 1931	14	071.045 <b>Z</b>	S2 INFO		SF
1932	15	0710492 071922H	S2 ON VN INFO		SF
1955	16	071932H	PF AMBUSII SITES		SF
2029	17	072020H	VEH TRAFFIC REP		<b>9</b> P
2030	18	07201.5H	RAT BUSHROD AT COORDS 468038		SF
2 31	19	072030H	XX D CO AT LOC 418084		SF
2130	20	07211211	D POS SAME		SF
223 <b>0</b>	21	072107H	PF AMBUSH LOC 467087		$\mathfrak{S}_{\mathbb{F}}$
2231	22	072055H	IMP 6 ON VEH REP - WHY		SF
2231	23	07205011	CB15 ON TANK MOVEMENT		SF
2231	24	072155H	BUSHROD CO SIZE PAT LOC		$\mathbf{S}_{\mathbb{F}}$
2300	25	0721.55H	BX TWO ADD, SQ SIZE EXXX AMBUSHES		ST
2300	26	072].48H	IMP C2 HAS DEPARTED		SF
2305	27	07220 <b>5</b> H	BX BUSHROD AT 458037 NO CONTACT		ST
2330	28	OTNOTG	IMP A2 HAS DEPARTED		SF
23 <b>3</b> 0	29	071200H	PP SAME AGENT THAT REP, 4 VC		SF
0005	<b>3</b> 0	O7 NDTG	IMP B1 HAS DEPARTED		SF
0005	31.	072347H	SW L PAT BACK IN , NO CONTACT		SF SF
001.0	<b>3</b> 2	0 <b>8</b> 00 <b>10</b> H	BX PATROL BUSHROD BACK AT CO H LOC		or S⊮
0100	33	080025H	TINGE AMMO EXPEND		SF
O0.EO	34	080052H	SW NEG SIT REP		SF
0215	35	080112H	SW K SQD DIZE PAT NOW DEPARTING		SF
0216	36	080140H	CO H (-) AT 45803'6		SF
0217	37	08145H	LT FOX - HQCO REP ACOUPLE S/A RDS		SF
,0218	<b>3</b> 8	080215H	ONTOS WILL FIRE S/A TODAY AT531105		SP
0/15	<b>3</b> 9	080230H	A2 HAS RETURNED		SF
0420	40	080233H	COH LOC 452031 C2 HAS RETURNED TO POS		SF
0757	4].	080255H			SF
04.22	42	080345H	PAT BUSHROD NEG SIT REP		SF
0423	43	080 <b>355H</b>	BX SIT REP		SF
n0600	44	080520H 0805 <b>30</b> H	D CO AMBUSTES ALLBACK		SF
0880	45	080535H	PAT BUSHROD NO CONTACT		SF
0880	46	00073711	A AND AND MARKET THE CONTRACT OF		

0.607	4 84	0.0000 211	DIV MIN O THROM COMPT DUE	OT)
0821	47	080705H	BX6 HELO RECON COMPLETE	SF
0822	48	089730H	TINGE NIGHTLY REPORT	SF
0900	49	080830H	FIRE REPORT FROM HELO	SF SF
0940	50	080843H	IMP NEG SIT REP	
0 941	51.	080844H	SW NOG SIT REP	SIP
0945	52 53	080845H	BX LOC COORDS. AWAITING TRACKTORS BX 'AT BUSHROD LOC. HAS RETURNED	SF SF
0946 0048	53	0 0930H		SF
0958	54	080950H	SW I CO PAT RAXX LEFT SAP	sf SF
1000	55	OSNDTG		SF
1020	56	081015H		
1130	5 <b>7</b>	081130H		SF SF
1130	59	081050H	Al SQD IS SET UP ARO UND LVT'S TINGE REP ON 2 SUSPECTS	SF
11.34	<b>5</b> 9	081045H		or SF
1135		0 <b>9</b> 0250H	ALERT R/B ON LOOKOUT FOR 2 CAUCASIONS	
1138	6 <u>1</u>	OSNDTG	BX EOD REP 81 - DUD	SF
1.1.40	62	H <b>0001</b> 80	SW PAT I CO BACK	SE SF
1235	63	081235H	HELO SINTED 5 BOATS MANY PEOPLE 6386	SF
1285	64	081255H	B1 TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY6TO7 VC 416092	or SF
1300	65	081300H	ONTOS WILLFIRE S/A COORDS 531105 AT1330	SF SF
1305	66	081250H	7VC OBS BY B CO PAT REQ ARTY FIRE	
1500	67	081.340H	B1 LOC 415081 B3 LOC 423087	SF
1500	68	081412H	IMO REP AVN CHILDREN	SF SF
1500	69	HOO7180	FSCC NO FIRE LINE	
1500	70	081455H	B-3 REMAIN IN SAME POSITION	SF
1500	71	081456H	K SQD PATROL DEPARTED	SF
1620	72	081620H	SWAIN K PATROL RETURNED	SF
1645	73	081645H	AT'S HAVE COMPLETED FIRING S/A AT RANGE	SF
1755	74	081620H	SAP SCOUT	SF
1766	75	081745H	B-1 AND B-3 LOCATION	SF
18 <b>1</b> 0	76	<b>681</b> 800H	B_1 AND B_3 SAME	SF
1821	77	081820H	G CO LAOATION	SF
1900	<b>7</b> 8	081900H	PF AMBUSH LOCATION	SF
201.0	79	082005H	BX E CO AMBUSH LOCATION	SF
2011	80	081445H	BX CO G AT LOCATION	SF
2015		082017H	IMP CG. JEEP DRIVING AROUND CP	SF
2017	82	082015H	IMP B-1 AND 3 LOCATION THE SAME	SF
2020 <del>2</del>	83	O&NDTG	C6 SIT REP	SF
2035	84.	082030H	IMP VEH TRAFFIC REP	SF
2035	85	0816 <b>50</b> H	SIT REP ON VC BN	SF
2100	86	082045H	IMP B2 LEFT	SF
<b>23.0</b> 0	87	082050H	Al&2 &D1 HAVE LEFT	SF
21.01	88	0820301	H&I FIRES NOT APPROVED	SF
2115	89	082 <b>11</b> 0H	SW VEH REP	SF
<b>201</b> 0	90_	082110H	IMP WATERBORNE PAT DELAYED	SF
2110	915	082110Н	IMP B CO MOVING TO POS	SF
22 <b>0</b> 0	92	082150H	BX PA T SHELBY	SF
2205	93	0821. <b>5</b> 0H	IMP B2 HAS RETURNED	SF
2230	94	08223 <b>0</b> H	OP#1 OBS DOG & S/A FIRE	SF
2250	95	082250H	SW M PAT RETURNED	SF
001.1.	96	082255H	DELTA 3 BLUE LEFT	SF
003.7.	97	082305H	M CO PAT HAVE RETURNED	SSF
001.1	98	0823 <b>05</b> H	BX REP SHELBY GOLF LOC 426032	SF
0011	99	OSNDTG	A2 ETURNED	SP C F
0030	100	082330H	K CO SQD DIZE PAT DEPARTED	SF
0030	10.		BX NEG XXXX SIT ROP	SF
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0030	1.02	082400H	TINGE SIT REP	SF
0030	103	0 <b>9</b> 0010H	IMP NO CONTACT WITH BL	SF
00 <b>3</b> 0	1.04	090030H	2250 LAST RADIO WITH B CO	SF
0110	105	090100Н	D 1 RETURNED	$\mathtt{SF}$
01.30	10	090100Н	G GO PAT NO CONTACT	SF
0200	107	0001.35H	RR SHOVE HAT LINE FREQ. BREAKY	SF
0937	1.08	090152H	TMP D3 HAS RETURNED	SF
0340	109	090205H	BX G CO PPAT NO CONTACT	SF
0 341	110	09021411	SW NEG SIT REP	SF
04.20	3.3.1	09041511	SW NEG SIT REP	SF
0/,55	11.2	090450H	BX SHELBY NEG SIT REP	$\mathtt{SF}$
<b>95</b> 05	11.3	090500Н	INP WATERBORNE SPOTTED 1 PERSON	SF
0600	114	090540H	IMP CO C3 HIT BOOBYTRAP	SF
0530	115	090615H	SW ALL QUIET NEG REP	$_{ m SF}$
0 635	116	090620H	COC 10 WIA'S 2SERIOUS	SF
0540	11.7	0905 <b>3</b> 0H	TINGE NIGHT REPORT	SF
0/41	113	090640H	CO B SIT REP	SF
0550	119	090640Н	CO B ON WIA'S EVAC	SF
0720	1.20	0906 <b>50</b> H	MAJOR WOUNDS APPOX, k 1 FOOT OFF DECK	SF
0740	1,21,	090 <b>730</b> H	PP ON GROUND	SF
<b>682</b> 1.	122	0907 <b>30</b> H	PP B A? BKICKUNG POS	SF
-0841	123	0907 <b>37</b> H	DEVASTATE 1/4 TO DO BOMBING 🖟	SF
0842	124	<b>0</b> 90720H	BX NEG ACTIVITY REP	SF
08Å7	125	090 <b>740</b> ዝ	IMP 6 SIT REP B/ TRAP	SP
0940	1.26	090740H	TARBUSH 2 15 VC AT44,0065	SF
0941	1.27	090815H	PPB IN POS	SF
0941	128	090750Н	PPC LANDING COMPLETED	SF
09/1	129	0908 <b>15</b> H	C3 REC'D 1 STIPER RD	ST Ge
0942	130	090900 <b>H</b>	AO HATO SPOTTED 13 VC	SF
0943	131	090905H	ARTY FIRE ON 13 VC	SF
0944	132	0909 <b>27</b> H	PPB PPC1 REC SNIPER FIRE	SF SF
<b>094</b> 0	133	090902H	C CO HAS 2VCS	SF SF
0950	134	090950H	M CO ALFA PAT LEFT	SF
0951	1.35		11 VC CARRING 3WIA	SF
0952	136		CO G RETURNED	SF
0953	137		B1 SIGHTED 11 VC	SF
1020	138		B3 VC FLEEING KY LONG	SF
1.020	139		B1 REP 11 VC	SF
1030	140	0 J030H	PP 32 INAMBUSH BLOCK IS TAKING	SF
1045	1/2		SHELL REP FRO M IMP TARRBUSH 2AT 1015 PILOT SPOTTED ENEMY	SF
1.045	142		TARRESON EAT 1019 FIRST BIOTIES EATED	SF
1.045	143		INP REQ AO CHECK OUT	SF
1055	144		IMP AMBUSH FOR TONIGHT	S
1.045	145	091055H	SD 24 DIST REQ CLEARANCE TO FIRE	SF
11.00	1.46		TO THE PARTY AND THE TENTON	SF
1115	147		AO REP ABOUT 70 PEOPLE	SF
<b>322</b> 0	148		BX 1 PLAT FROM AT 402998	SF
1.210	149		SURVAILLENCE OF MISSIONOFIRE	SF
1215	150		BX 6 REP 10 PEOPLE	SF
1230	151		NO CONTACE WITH BZ	QTP
12 <b>3</b> 0 1304	157 15			SF S F
1.300	1.5			SF
2.500				ŊĬ,

1305	155 091305Н	IMP REP ON C1,C3,B1	SF
1317	<b>1</b> 56 091.31 <i>5</i> H	SW K T. SON STOR DAM I FORM	<b>**</b>
1535	1.57 09 <b>15</b> 35H	IMP ALL UNITS HAVE FROM FIELD EXCEPT CI	SF
1535	158 09134311	SNIPER FIRE CEASED RDS ON TARET IMP	SF
1550	150 0915 <b>5</b> 0H	SW K PAT RETURNED AT 1445 NO CONTACT	SF
1555	160 09155 <b>5</b> H	C1 MOVING TOWARDS HARBOR SITE	SF SF
1.800	161 091720Н	C 1 PAT SET IN	SF
3.800	162 091730H		SF SF
1801	163 091745H		SF
1810	164 091650H		SF
1.840	165 09181 <i>5</i> H	PF X NIGHT AMBUSHE S	SF SF
1855	166 091830H		SF
1856	167 091830H		
2000	168 09 <b>1955</b> H	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SF
2000	149 091955H		SF
201.0	1.70 09 <b>1</b> 730H		SF
2011	171 0911282	_	SF
2100	172 09204011		SF
2101	173 0920 <b>3</b> 0H		SF
21.02	174 092055H		SF
21.04	175 092050H		SF
21.50	176 092105H		SF
21.52	177 0921JOH		SF
2200	178 092150H		SF
2204	179 092203H	B4 RETURNED	SF
221.5	180 092215H	·	SF
221.6	181 092215H	1 VC BN LOC	SF
221.7	182 092225H	MESG 726 ON VC VOL REG T	SF
2218	183 092220H	THE C SES OF A C A C	SF
2239	184 092230H	MESG 383 C2/2 , C/3 ITT ON PERSONAL LETTER	SF
2320	185 092255H		SF
2320		SW OP#1 RECEIVED 14-15 S/A RDS	SIF
2325		BX H CO PAT NO CONTACE SHOVE MAP BOARD OF BLOW AREA	SF
			SF
2325	188 09230/H	TMP PAT DEPARTED	SF
2325	1.89 092310H	PINCHHITTER MP'S NEEDED TO BLOCK MSP	SF
2325	190 09222511	SD24 DIST INFORMED C/2 2VC	SF
0030	191 092343H	IMP D2 AT CP X-RAY BT278103	SF
0030	192 <b>1000001</b> H	SW FIRED 3 FIRES FOR EFFECT	SF
0030	193 09231.5H	SD24 DESTRICT CHIEF REPS	SF
0030	194 1.0001011	BX ALLOF CO SIZE PAT IN POS	SF
0030	196 100005 <b>H</b>	TINGE AMMO EXPEND	SF
0035	196 1.00005H	IMP D CO 2 PAT HAS LEFT	SF
00°6	197 100001H	IMP HAS SECURED ANBUSH	SF
01.1.5	198 1.0010511	SW THEY HEAD A VOLUME OF FIRE	SF
01.15	199 100104H	BX PAT NO CONTACT	SF CR
01.1.5	200 1.00055H	IMP ALFA PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
01.45	201 100204H	BX PAT NO CHANGE	SF
01.58	2028 100158H	IMP 2 PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
0301	203 1.002 <b>6</b> 0H	4 TANKS&3 LVES MOVING SOUTH DOWN REACH	SF
0310	204 10025711		SF ea
0330	205 100310H		\$3 <b>9</b> 77
0331	206 1.0031 <i>5</i> H	TALLIANS OFT USE WEIGHTHO THE SALE	SF

0335	207	100320H	OP#2 FIRED 5 RDS 466068 AT SUPECTE D ENEMY	SF
0351	208	10036011	TANKS & LVTS HAVE RETURNED NEG RESULTS	SF
04.50	209	10040011	D3 PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
0655	21.0	10065511	TINGE NIGHE REP	SF
0705	21.1	10065°H	H CO LEAVING POS	SF
0850	21.2	1007 <b>30</b> H	DEADLOCK SIT REP	SF
0852	21.3	100815H	POST CL SAME	SF
0853	214	1.00755H	H CO AT LOC	SF
0854	215	100816H	AT 0500XXH LP1 SAW PEOPLE	S)?
0354	21.6	100930H	TANKS 21 WIA 2 KIA	SF
03 <b>55</b>	21.7	1.00 <b>930</b> H	AHOVE C1 RESUPPLY COMPLETE	SF
0956	218	LONDIG	H CO PAT AT LOC	SF
0957	29	100915H	Cl in <b>u</b> ic	SF
3.000	2 <b>9</b> 0	10092 <b>0</b> H	100 TROOPS	$\mathtt{SF}$
1045	221	1 1025H	PAT PIKE RETURNED NO CONTACT	SF
1.04.5	222	10 <b>1</b> 040H	AO REP NEG ON 100 TROOPS VIC 5797	SF
1215	223	101215H	CO I TO THAT FERE M-60 M-79 3.5SAT1245	SF
1442	224	1011.30H	GEN DUPREY WILLNOT BE AT DANANG TODAY	$\mathtt{SF}$
1442	225	102222H	C2 IS DEPARTING	SF
1443	225	10 <b>13</b> 45H	TS24 NEW ADVISOR REQ TO HAVE MEET WITH AG6	$\mathtt{SF}$
1443	227	101346H	TS24 REQ DATLY COPY OF ISUM	$\operatorname{SF}$
1445	228	101350Н	TS24, VC UNIT POS REP	SF
1445	229	101700H	IMP PAT C1 RETURNED	$s_{\mathrm{F}}$
1745	230	10142511	IMP C2 PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
1500	<b>3</b> 31.	101500H	INTELL ROP FROM SD24	SF
1655	<b>3</b> 32	10165 <b>5</b> H	NOTED ABSENCE OF BOATS IN BEACH AREA CO A AMTRACK	
1705	<b>3</b> 33	10NBTG	TS24INFO AG 3 COORDS OF SCHOOL 325215	SF
1830	<b>3</b> 34	101815H	B2& D3 JUST LEFT	SF
1 35	<b>2</b> 35	101745H	TS24 REQ TO KNOW ABOUT C RATS	SF
2030	336	<b>DOL9</b> 35II	D CO MAPTURED 1 VCS	SF
2030	337	102005H	K CO FOUND AN 81mm DUD? SW VEH REP	SF SF
2031 03 <b>1</b>	3 <b>3</b> 8	101950H 10200 <b>5</b> H	IMP VEH REP	SF
2230	339 <b>34</b> 0	102003H	F CO RECEIVED ONE RD (105mm) 508999	SF
2235	341	102230Н	BX CO G& E PATROL S/A FIRE	SF
2240	342	102236H	SW K PATROL RETURNED	SF
2240	343		IMP ABOUT FIRING REPORTED BY BX	SP
0300	344	102345H	BX GERNADE THROWN	SF
0302	345	110012H	TINGE NIGHT ACTIVITY RPT	SF
030 <b>3</b>	346	102353H	BX CO G AT COORD	SF
0555	347	110535H	SW L CO PATROL #1 BACK IN AREA	$\mathtt{SF}$
0556	348	11031511	BX G CO VANDORN NEG SIT REP	SF
0615	349	1106 <b>15</b> H	HELD DOWN THE DAWN SWEEP	SF
0650	3 <b>5</b> 0	1.1.061 <b>0H</b>	IP B2 PARROL RETURNED	SF
0657	351	110630Н	IMP OP #1 HEARD SCATTERED SHOTS	SF
0652	352	110635H	TINGE SIT REP	SF
0700	353	11.0655H	0130-2 V/I PEOPLE SPORTED B Y FLSU	SF
<b>0</b> 945 1145	354 355	110945H 111 05H	TO BNC ABOUT CIVAL AFFAIR REPORTS SIT REP SW	SF S <b>F</b>
1145	354	1117.0511	IMP DTI REP	SF
1145	357	<b>111106</b> 5	BX SIT R	SF
1145	<b>3</b> 53	111105H	SU ONE 8" DUD AT650005	$\mathtt{SF}$
1145	<b>3</b> 59	111130H	I CO RECD S/A 655002	SF
1.1.45	360	111130H	SW H&S APPREHEND 2 VN	SF
1230	36]	1112 30h	IMP A CO WILL TEST FIRE 8/A	SF

1330	362	111230H IMP HCO WILL TEST FIRE S/A	SF
1330		101815H WH24 PICK UP UNUSED POWER BAGS	$\mathbb{S}\mathbf{F}$
1345	3/4	111342H A2 RETURNED NO CONTACT	SF
1350	3 <b>5</b> 5	111350H ITT REP ON VCC	SF
1450	316	NDTG I CO LOC 660900 SEARCHING VILL & HILL	SF
1500	3/17	111450H PAYABLE REP OF VN WOMEN AND CHILD	SF
1510	968	1.11.51.011 IMP REP OF PEOPLE AT44.5067-440073	SB
1515	<b>3</b> 69	NDTG OP#1 HILL69 SPOTTED 3/4 VN AT COORDS 447067	SF
1558	370	111558H CO I RECIEVING SNIPER FIRE 641999 PURSUING PAT	SF
		111600H C RATS WILL DEPART THIS POS 1605 (TS24)	SF
171		111714H TO TS 24 CHOPPERS W/C RATS TO ARRIVE YOUR POS TOMARROW	$\mathtt{SF}$
1802		117459H A CO TO TEST FIRE S/A	SF
1802	374	111519H I CO LOC 645005	SF
1804		111636H CO I REC S/A FIRE	SF
1 04		INDIG SAP	SF
1805	377	лллон S A Р	SF
1806	37	111650H I CO REC 60mm RDS	SF
3.806	379	111.707H C3 AT HILL 351	SF
1807		111645H I CO REP 2 SLIGHTLY WOUNDED MARINES	SF
1807	-	1.11650H ABOUT FAKE MINE FIELD	SF
1808		MIDITG SWAIN RECIEVED 2 M60mm MORTAR RDS	SF
1809 <u>2</u>	383	111800H PF NIGHT AMBUSH LOCATIONS	SF
1830	384		SF
1905=		TTT/ON IN COTAL ON LAWRENCE AND	SF
1907	386	TETOTOR WILL AND THE TOWN	SF
190		TIMDIO ON MOODE OF THE PROPERTY	SF
1938		111/0/11/11/24 2011/2 2011	SF
2102		TITOON DA ANT ANT.	SF
2105		TICOTOR STILL PRIVATE OF THE ROY	sf Sf
2106	391	TITOOM: 1TT mile and a see	SF
2110	392	TTCOTON OO 1 OO () 1 111 HILLIOON	SF
2120	393	11174711 1 00 200 1: 00 200	SF
	394	TICITINI OI DIIMII IMI C ESSENCE	SF
2132	395	112105H IMP REF TO 111853H 112100H IMP RECD FIRE MISSION	SF
	396	1121500A TMP RECO FIRE MEDICAL 112151H MISSION ON SUSPECTED MOTOR POS	SF
2205	397	11211th IMP D2 HAS DISEMBARKED AND MOVING OUT	SF
2230	398		SF
2235	399	111745H TS 3 CHOPPERS WITH C RATS WILL ARRIVE	SE
2240 2245	400 401	112205H TINGE FIRED 10 RDS ON SUSPECTED VC	SF
2245	402	112135H BX CO (-) PAT CO F EXECUTED FIRE	SF
2245	402	111915H SB24 TWO CO ARVN AFBUSH TONIGHE	SF
2245 2 <b>2</b> 50	ر ارمار	111930H TS24 REW PERMISSION TO SWEEP	SF
2250	404 ルロビ	THOUSE THE DI THEFT LEFT	SF
2330	1100	11NDTG F CO (-) PAT SIT REMAINS THE SAME	SF
2335	407	112315H IMP B2 PAT HAS LEFT	SF
0005	1.08	120008H TINGE SIT REP	SF

MEG. 1			The same of the sa	SF
0428	409		SW DEPARTING & BEAVING	SF
0427	410		IMP PATS DEPARTING & LEAVING	
0430	411		BX PATS DEPARTING & LEAVING	SF
0433	412		SEARCH PLT CEASED UNTIL FIRST LIGHT HELO SEARCH THEN	SF
0522	413		1 VC DIST FORCE AT 688886	SF
0525	434	120415н	CO PAT SIT REP SAMA AS NO CHANGE	SF
0607	415		PAT HANDCOCK REMAIN THE SAME	SF
<b>0</b> 649-	416	12 <b>0</b> 648н	TINGE SIT RHP	SF
0785	417	120733H	CO'S ABO&D REMAINS THE SAME	SF
0745	418	120737H I	CO AT 637997	SF
0752	419	120750Н	C COMBAT PAT LIFT AT 0745H	SF
<b>08</b> 05	420	120750н	SW FIRES 18 RDS FOR HELO LANDING	SF
0806	421		OP CAMEL DELAYED 24 HOURS	SF
0832	422	<b>1</b> 208 <b>31</b> H	CO F(-) PAT HANDCOCK HAS RETURNED	SF
0833	423	1208 <b>07</b> H	IMP A TO TEST FIRE S/A Z1300H	SF
1110	424	120930H	IMP 2 VCS FOUND HIDING	SF
1110	425	<b>12</b> 09 <b>10</b> H	TS 24 NEW PROVIDENCE SR ADV & D/ ADV	SF
1110	426	<b>10</b> 134 <b>5</b> H	TS 24E S CHOOL COORDS 325215	SF
1110	427	<b>120930</b> H	IMP B CO FOUND 2VCS 446106	SF
1 <b>11</b> 0	428	120 <b>91</b> 0H	IMP RECAP ON MIA	SF
1110	429	<b>12100</b> 5H	SW CO I PAT RETURNED	SF
1110	430		SHOVE 6 WILL BE IN AREA	SF
1115	431	12 <b>1</b> 055H	F/6 SOURCE INDICATES MORTOR AT KY XUAN TRUNG	3 <b>F</b>
1118	432		BX CO E PAT WILL BE 1500m F/3/3 POS	<b>SF</b>
1120	433		B2 HAS A DUD 437107	SF
1135	434		SD25 ONE VC MED CO 435918	SF
1200	<b>43</b> 5		TS 24 PLAN ATTACKK ON CHU LAT AUG	SF
1200	436	12 NDTG	INFO ON ONTOS	SF
1200	437	<b>12114</b> 5H	IMP OP SIERRA OBS WHAT RPPEARS TO BE BODY	SF
1200	438	<b>121030</b> H	TS ALL UNITS SUBMIT DEFENSE PLANS PLEASE	SF
1905	439	121130H	MORAY DEFENCE PLAN TO BE PUBLISHED	SF
<b>12</b> 15	<b>1,140</b>	<b>121209</b> H	IMP CHECKED OUT BEDYFOUND NOTHING	SF
1255		1 <b>21</b> 230H	TS ALL UNITS SUBMIT DEFENSE PLANS PLEASE MORAY DEFENCE PLAN TO BE PUBLISHED IMP CHECKED OUT BEDYFOUND NOTHING TO HOMESTEADER 249 I G G2 VISIT SD21 REP VC PLAN TO ATK CHU LAI ARTY FUERE MISSION	SF
1357	442	<b>121245</b> H	SD24 REP VC PLAN TO ATK CHU LAI	SF
1805	443	12200011	ALLI I IIII IIIO	SF
1835	444		CO G Q-) AT551959 NEG	SF
1845	445	12NDIG	LY TIN POLICE CHIEF REP 1 VC CO	SF
2000	446	<b>121915</b> H	YC REP AN GATHERING	SF
2000	447	121925H	PF AMBUSHES SHOVE MSG	SF
200 <b>2</b>	448		<b>co G (-4)</b> 544967	SF
2020	449		D2 DEPARTED	S
2021	450	121945H	ARVN ACTIVITY TONIGHE	SF
2022	按		HELO RECON OBS 20-30 PEOPLE	SF
2045	452	122010H	IMP VEH REP	SF SF
2215	妈3	122100H 122015H	SD21 CHANGE TO DISTRICT FORCE SIT OVERLAY IMP B3 HAS DEPARTED	SF
<b>22</b> 25	4,74	TUCTOTOR	the same and a same a	

<b>2</b> 225	H55 122206H	BX 10C OF CO G	SF'
2225	456 TSSS10H	IMP MR CHOUNG LETTER SENT TO IMP2	SF
	157 1222 <b>20</b> H	TMP LVT DIWN AT 498101	SF
2340	158 1223 <b>35</b> H	SW K RETURNED NO CONTACT	SF
0030	159 13HDTG	IMP PAT SIT REP	SF
0030	160 1223 LH	SW HEG SIT REP	SF
0030	461. 1.3002 <b>0</b> H	G CO SOZE PAT LEFT	Si
0030	462 130025H	D3 HAS LUFT	SF
0030	463 130025H	TINGE UPDATE SIT REP	SF
03.1.5	1,61, 1.3 DTG	IMP MR COUNG LETTER SENT TO IMP2 IMP LVT DIWN AT 498101 SW K RETURNED NO CONTACT IMP PAT SIT REP SW NEG SIT REP G CO SOZE PAT LEFT D3 HAS LEFT TINGE UPDATE SIT REP E1 PAT LOC 483125 D2 RETURNED A1 HAS RETURNED B1 AWAITING PICKUP	SF
	165 130135H	D RETURNED	SF
	1,66 13mb 'G	AT HAS RETURNED	Ĩľ
ดโร่8		BL AWAITING PICKUP	SF
	1 6		SF
0215	140 130223H	RI HAS RETURNED	នាំ
0635	משימה בשנים ליאו	CI DAM HAS SECURIORIES	<b>S</b> ?
0637	านการของกุรุ่ม	DAT LITTING MEGICALIST	SF
0638	147 130/401	DEALERACE DO CIGO VMADSCR	SF
0639	743 130630H	CAN ALL ALL COME WALLEROW	SF
0640	147) 130630H	THOSE WIGHT BUP	SF
0048	175 130638н	BX G CO PAT SIT REP B1 HAS RETURNED C1 PAT HAS RETURNED PAT WILSON NEG RETIEVER TO GET AMTRACK SW MUG NIGHT SIT REP TINGE NIGHT REP NEG SIT REP	SF
0656	174 13065011	NO INFO MY CONTACT	SIF
0700	130700H	PAT WILSON G(-) AT553986	3 F
0754	178 130750H	NEG SIT REP  NO INFO MY CONTACT  PAT WILSON G(-) AT553986  PF PLAT COMDE REP OF FINDING BODY OF MARINE  22 CIT DEP ON UC SITTING	SF
0904	110000011 675	S2 SIT REP ON VC SITING	SF
0910	747 130010H	WW K DEPARTING RETU RNED APPOX 1030H A CO (-) A BUSH NO CONTACT IMP BODY OF MISSING ATEN Al recd smiper fire 395087 A2 PA T LOC 105060 A CO SIT REP BX INVESTIGATING A 195035 BX REP ONE NEGRO & ONE CAUCASION A CO POS REMAIN THE SAME	SF
1020	1.63 1.200/ <b>cu</b>	V CO Q" V DITAN THE COMMY COM	SF
1020	TOP TOWARDII	TWO DOIN OF MICCING ANDRES	SF
11115	75 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	AT DRAD WITHOUT BITTE SOKOST	SF
11155	1.01 1.011 <b>20</b> 0	AD THE TOO LOCOSO	S <sup>™</sup>
1205	1.00 1.000 1.000 1.	A CO CTO DED	SF
1205	TOO TO TOO THE SET OF	A OU DI LEET  OVER THE CONTROL A LOCASE	SF
1250	1/02 124028H	DV DUD ONE MEMBER & ONE CATTCACTON	SF
1250	71- 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	A AA TAC DAMATH WING CAMA	SF
1326	1,00 1,31,320H	A CO POS REMAIN THE SAME NO CONTACT	SF
1)40	はこう エンエンはつロ	CO G (-) PAT WILSON HAS RETURNED	SF
	一つグロールグロログロガ	SHEPHERD SIT THE SAME	SF
1/10/4			SF
1514 1504	492 13151 <b>3</b> 4	WOLFHOUND AT LEOSPRUCE NO CONTACT	SF
152lı		2 LVTS LHAVING CP WILLARRIVE SUPPLY PT 10 MIN.	Sr Sp
1.655		WOLFIGUND PICKUP IN LZ	
1.655	195 <b>131630</b> H	BY THE AMBUSH THAT WAS CONFLICTED	SF
1700	190 131055H	BX REP OF WP GRANADE	SF
1705	197 131555日	TWA D CO COME ALKING	SF
1800	190 131742H	AL MATING CHOW	SF
1801	1/99 131 <b>730H</b>	POUDLE SIT KE	\$ <del>?</del>
1802	500 T3T/30H	HUSKY REQ FIRE MISSION	SF
1835	501 131025H	IMP REP VC ROAD BLOCK	SF
1848	502 131840H	REGARDS VC HOAD BLOCK	SP
1905	503 131845 <b>H</b>	BX THE AMBUSH THAT WAS CONFLICTED  BX REP OF MP GRENADE  IMP D CO COMP FIRING  A1 EATING CHOW  PRODLE SIT REP  HUSKY REQ FIRE MISSION  IMP REP VC ROAD BLOCK  REQARDS VC ROAD BLOCK  REJLEF OF 40 AT BIHN SON  ON VCS APPREHENDED  REO ARTY	SF
19 <b>06</b> 19 <b>08</b>	50l 13MDTG 65 131 <b>703</b> H	ON VCS APPREHENDED REQ ARTY	SF
2700	CO MAINTINA	THUR CREEK	SF

1917	506	131915H	CO A(-) AMBUSHES		SF
1920	507	O -/ '	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH		$\mathbf{S}^{\mathbb{R}^*}$
1.940		131.91.5H	TMP IN REF TO 1845H		SF
1948		131 45H	PF AMBUSH SITES IMP IN REF TO 1845H IMP 2 SIT REP CO A(-) REP POS SAME CO E(-) NEG		SF
2200		132100H	CO A(-) REP POS SAME		SF
2201	(។ ។	1321 <b>0</b> 0H	OO N(-) NEG		SF
2202	フルル ば <b>しつ</b>	13017EH	DI PAT LEFT A CO Y-Y SAME BX I CO SIT REP		S
2204	E(1.3	1333300	BY I OO SIT REP		Se
2 <b>2</b> 45	chi.	732 <b>33</b> 44	CO E 502021 NO CONTACT		SF
		- 00000	AND AND DESCRIPTION OF ARTHUR DAY THE BOTH BOTH AND A STORY		SF
		1322l <sub>1</sub> 7H	MAJOR ANGELO CALLED IN REF TO PF & REMAJOR ANGELO CALLED  NO ENEMY CONTACE  IMP NEG SIT REP  CO E SIZE PAT NEG RESULTS  DI RETURNED NO CONTACT  SW REP NEG SIT REP  TOTAL AMO EXERNDED		SF
	517	132305H	MAD OF MICHAEL CONTINUES		SF.
2330 2340		エンタンプロ	TWO MILES CITE DIED		SP
		132330H	OO B STAR DAW ARD DEGILMS		SF
2352		1323 <b>3</b> 5Н 1323ЦОН	CO TO 2177 LATE INTO TUTO TO TO		SF
0010		126240E	SW REP NEG SIT REP	S.	SF.
0011		1.52550H	DM UPL NEG STI VEL	C)	SF
0012		132400H	TOTAL ANNO MAINING DATA OF A GOOD TACOMOU	υ,	SF
ooth		13221,5H	OF HAVE BEEN MULDING CHASSIS FOR DASKI INCHIN		SF
0106	52lı	THOTOOH	VC HAVE BEEN HOLDING CLASSES FOR LASRT MONTH OF#3 REP15 PERSONS IN FRONT OF POS 150m IMP A NEG SIT REP		SF
0220	525	11/01/55	IMP A NEG SIT REP		SF
0557	526	140030Н	BX3 REPS HEG NIGHT AUTIMITY		
opizo	127	140102H	MP A NEG SIT REF  BX3 REPS HEG NIGHT ACTIVETY  SW PAT RETURNED  D3 HAS REYURIED		3F
05/10	528	11:0230H	D3 HAS REYUNIED		SF
0550	č50	- Шо5 <b>30Н</b>	NIFA CO HAS BEEN TAKEN UNDER FIRE		23.81
0 <b>60</b> 0	530	J40500H	BX3 CO SIZE PAT SIT REP		34
0700	531.	зую6уюн	TINGE SIT REP		31,
0702	532	T/10620H	MIFA CO HAS BEEN TAKEN UNDER FURE BX3 CO SIZE PAT SIT REP TINGE SIT REP BX PAT KILPATRICK NES IMP A3 MOVING OUT SW OLOOH NEG SIT REP IMP CO A 10-16VCS WITH WPNS IMP APLT SWEEP DM CI MOVINGMUIT		<b>3</b> )
0704	(03	J.1:06 <b>3</b> 511	DAP AS MOVING OUT		ន
1706	104	HOOllolf	SW 0400H MEG SIT REP		SP
0755-	500	1.h0650H	TMP CO A 10-16VCS WITH WPNS		37
0756	536	<u> Лю720Н</u>	IMP APLT SWEEP		<b>3</b> 3
0758	537	<u>д До</u> 700Н	IMP APLT SWEEP  IM C1 MOVINGWOUT  PPA -FPB -PPC COORDS  A CC SXXE STILL BLOCKING  1ST WAVE M CO LANDED  C CO LEFT FLANK BCO TO VILL  PRO COORDS		$\mathbf{S}_{\mathbb{R}^n}$
0830	538	Lindig	PPA -FPB -PPC COORDS		ST
0°25	1/29	л/ю <b>сто</b> н	A CO SXXE STILL BLOCKING		الدئ
0900	Sho	14,08454	1ST WAVE M CO LANDED		SF
09 <b>0</b> 5	57,7	11h08h511	C CO LEST FLANK BOO TO VILL		'لاِ ت
0910	14.6	$-\mathbf{J}UUUUUU$	rro coords		$\mathfrak{S}\mathbb{F}$
0911	12:3	MoSlign	M CO SPOTTED 10 VC		$\Sigma \omega'$
0912	$-g_{\rm th}$	1.0033Z	CONVOY YOUR AREA 131300H		ٽآل <sup>ا</sup>
0914	17,15	1109 <b>10</b> H	1 B PLT FOUND BOOBY TRAP FOUND LARGE FUNKER		<b>3</b> 3
0925	5116	1/10920H	FOUND LARGE FUNKER		SB
0928	Shiza	. alar <b>di</b> g	PPA PFB AT COORDS		SIF
0930	918	140905H	LOVC GOORDS		3F
0950	والز	11/093511	CO M 9 WIA		$\mathcal{S}_{\ell}$
1.000	550	Thoshon	6ARMED VC COORDS		ಚು
1002	Ŋ.	1/1000H	LOVE GOORDS CO M 9 WIA 6ARMED VC COORDS WIA'S MEG NOW BATTLE BAUS. SIT REP 1/1		S.F
1050	)[f/2	1/102511	SIT REP 1/4		ΰJ.
1050	513	1/1030	M CO RECD STIPER FIRE 418093		<b>S</b> 5'
1105	554	119TDTG	PP REQ TO KNOW WHY TROOP LIFT COUNDING BE CHANGED		اللذ
1223	555	170100Н			الل في
1213	556	ារាជាឧ៩ម	M CO TOC AT OPOS		5)F
رابا <u>لا</u> 12	17.7	אייינון און	PTREO TO KHOW WHY TROOPS COUNDING BE LIFTED BOY WAS WOUNDED AT 660902		SP SV
12/15	ijsh	11,123911	POY WAS WOUNDED AT 660902		ĴV
** * * <b>*</b> * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *					

1245	550	1412241	PP SIT THE SAME	71
1211	5	11,1.21,511	ALL ROUNDS ON TARGET SV	SF
1315	ŷ'n.	л/д 300Н	SW K HAS ASQUISTZE PAT NOW DEATING	ဒ္မ
1350	562		SW 1 VC KILLED 1 CHIERESE COMM ROCKET	SF
1406	563		SW 1 VC 654001 WAVE HIS GRAR	SF
1420	564	110011	THE HAME HELL CONTION	S
1425	565	kliklisOH	C CO BACK THUCK CONVOY BACK 1 ONTOS LY TIN	SF
1500	566	14MDTG	A CO TB RACK TMP	SF
1505	567	191700H	C CO BACK TRUCK CONVOY BACK 1 ONTOS LY TIN A CO IS BACK IMP SCHEDULE FROM WH24 A CO FINISHED SHOVE/SFIRISHED B1 PAT CANCELLED REQ ON ISUM IMP ONTOS BACK IN CP SW MAS 12 VCS	SF
1 <b>51</b> 5	568	1/15151	A CO FINISHED	SF
1.800	569	1415551	SHOVEGETHISHED	SF
1801	570	11,1610н	BI PAT CANCELLED	SF
1802	57 <b>2</b>	llndig	PEO ON TSIM	SF
1805	572	1),171 KH	IMP ONTOS BACK IN CP	SF
1820	573	1/,1815H	SW MAS 12 VCS	SF
1847	574	11,181,511	PF AMBUSHES	SF
1900	214 ピクピ	1 tromu	CAD	SF
5000	575 576	10101011	AO RECON	SE
2001	577	11174011	D2 DEPARTED	SF
2001	578	1018000	OUACUTED MOO	SF
<b>20</b> 03	579	17.18001	SHACKLED MSG STACKLED MSG WH24	SF
2003	580	lhidtg	FIRE MISSION	SF
2003	581		FIRE MISSION FOR A CO	SF
2005 2 <b>200</b>			AL DEPARTED	SF
	583			SF
2017	20 584		REGARDING YOUR 131700H	SF
2037	- 785 - 785	11.2010II	ROCKET LAUNCUER CAPTURED BY3/3	SF
	586			3); 3);
2037 2230	ラCO ず <b>?7</b>	142035H	NEG SIT REP	SF
2230	588	1/12035H	IMP WE SAW 10 PEOPLE VIC 522114	SF
2230	589		OP/1 HEARD S/A FIRE BINH SON	SF
22110	590		C 1 DEPARTED	Si
2240	591	1/2220H	SW RECD 1 RD CARBINE SW CP	ŠF
2240	592	14222011 142 <b>131</b> H	IMP 2 VC OBTATNED SUPPLIES 468099	SF
2240 2250	593	コルション・ハロ	TINGE 8'' OBS 2MEN INSIDE THIER D/WIRE	Sir
2350	5911	11/23074	SW K SOD SIZE PAT - LAYOUT	SF
2350	595	1)23071	H CO (-) IOC 519981	SF
<b>235</b> 5	506	1) HOTG		SF
2355	597		A 1 AT SPLASH POINT	SF
2355	598		H CO (-) AMBUSHES SITES	SF
24 <b>0</b> 0	599	142320H	IMP 2 INTELL. REP	SF
2400 2400	600	1.li2320H		SF
2400	601.	14235511		SF
21100	605	1423 7H	IMP RAT SIT RAP	SF
	603	150030H	IMP C3 HAS RETURNED NO CONTACT	SF
0100 0215	60h	150215H		SF:
		150230H	IMP D3 HAS RETURNED NO CONTACT	SF
0230	605 606	150104H		SF
0304		150130H		SF
030h	607 608			SF
0305	608 609	150305H 150307H	IMP B 3 PAT HAS RETURN DO NO CONTACT	SF
030 <b>7</b>	6 <b>1</b> .0	150430H		SF
0430	U <b>J</b> .3 1	エノウはプロコ	Approximate the second control of the control of th	

			·	
0350	613.	1503 <b>50</b> H	BX OP PAT AT 544983 NO CONTACT	SF
0430	612		SW M HAS NEG SIT REP	SF
0510	613	1505101	BX PAT MCCLULLAN REPS NO CONTACT	SV
0530	61/1	1.505 <b>30</b> H	SW M CO NEG SIT REP	S F
0608	6 <b>1</b> 5	15055 <b>5</b> H	CO SIZE PAT MCCLEILAN NO CONTACT	S.
		1,500000	CO B TO STAY IN AMBUSHS	Sir
0727	61.6			SP
0728	617		MEC SIT ROP FROM BX CO (-) PAT	
0755	618		C3 TAKEN 3RDS SNIPER FIRE	SF
0900	6 <b>1</b> .9		S2 SIT REP	SF
0902	620		TINGE NIGHE REP	SF
090li	621	<b>1.5</b> 08 <b>20</b> 4	BX CO H(Q) PAT BACK	35,
0905	622	1.50830H	SAP	S F
0907	623	1509 <b>00</b> H	SAP	SF
0925	6211	15/1011	IMP BCO LOC	SF
0926	625		IMP2 B CO REP SNIPER FIRE	SF
1040	6 <b>2</b> 6		REP ARVN CONVOY W/15 VEH 389 PERSO NS GOING SOUTH	
				F
10/15	627		ONTOS & 6x6'S POCKED UP BRAVO AND ON WAY BACK	
1145	628	15 DTG	TS24 1 HBLO DOWN ENGINE TROUBLE	SF
1335	629		N CO JS BACK ON MLR	SF
1340	630		7 MAR OF ORDER WILL BE READY 16TH	S F
1350	631.		WH24 REQ PER TO BOMB 646946	SF
1415	632	151345	TARBUSU RECD 2 RD3 S/A	SF
1420	<b>63</b> 3		SW K SQD SIZE P R GOING OUT	SF
1425	6311		10C OF VC UNITS FR WH24	SF
1552	635		CO HAD TRIP FLARE COOK OFF IN PLT AMMO DUMP	$\mathtt{SF}$
1.620	636	151620H		S⊮'
1625	637		ARVN CONVOY MOVING NORTH RLP BY BX	SF
	63E		ARVN WITH 56 VEH 604 PERS	SF
1725			PF AMBUSHED	S#
2016	639			SIT
2/16	Gli		HEIOS PICKUP PLTS STERPERD& HUSKY	
2016	Cha	1510300	IMP PLAN FOR THE NIGHT	SF
2016	6lis	1,51730⊞	AO REP	SF
2017	643		5 VN MOUING DOWN OUT OF MOUTAINS	SF
2017	6 <u>1</u> ,1		FRIENDLY AMPUSH POS	SF
20HO	645	111945 <b>K</b>	INTELL HOO TO SONG TRA BONG SW	3
2011	646	152010H	SEND TANKS TO SONG TRA BOING SW	SF
201,1	6l <sub>1</sub> 7	1520 <b>30</b> H	IMP VEH RIP	SF
50lili	61		BX SPOTTED 5 MEN AT CATFISH 1	SF
2100	61.9	1520551	H CO(-) 10 C COORDS 493040	SF
2100	6 <b>50</b>		IMP A ESTABLISHED"PAT BASE	SF
2210	651		PF AMBUSH IOC 512105 C CO INFORMED	SF
				SF
2220	652	1522159		SF
2200	653	152225Н		
2300	65h	12300Н	BX SIT PEP	SF
<b>a</b> 303	655		D CO 1/7 IS FIRING HILLIM	SF
2305	656		3/3 CO 1, FIRED S/A AT2 PEOPLE RECO FIRE BACK	SF
2 <b>3</b> 43	657	1523110H		SF
0052	658	1.600C1H		SF
0053	<b>6</b> 50	152350H	TINGE REP	SF
0115	600	1.6002 <b>0</b> H	SHOVE2 FIND OUT INFO AT BEEN SON	SF
0116	601.	160 12H	CO SIZE PAT NOW AT POS MO CONTACT	SF
0330	602		IMP ONE S/A RD REP	SF
0330	663	1.60205H	BX CO SIZE PAT NO CONTACT	${\tt SF}$
0625	66ls	<b>1</b> 604 <b>00</b> н	PAT GRANT NEG SIT REP	<b>B</b>
-	•	•		

0647	665	1606l <sub>1</sub> 5H	TINGE NICHE REP	SF'
0815	666		SUMMARY OF NIGHE ACTIVITIES BX	SF
0815	667		AO REP NEW CUTS ON ROAD AT 547886	S.
0850	668		STOVE REQ CO S2 S3 S4 ALO TO EMBARKED TO DIV CE	
	669	1609 <b>1.</b> 0H	SHACKLED MSG TO IMP BX SW	SF
0916	670	1608 <b>30</b> н	CO H RETURNED NEG CONTACT	SP
0945	671	<b>1</b> 60950H	UNUSUAL LARGE NO. OF CIV MORTH ON RT 2	$\mathbf{S}\mathbb{F}$
1030	672	160950н	SD24 REQ TO FIRE ARTY	SF
1030	673	1609 <b>1</b> 0H	ARVN TANK IN TAOR 161500H	SF
3030	67L	1610 <b>1</b> 5H	3 PLOPIE STGHTED 517033	S⊮
1125	675	<b>1</b> .60955H	SD24 REP ON REQ IMENT 102 LOC	$\mathbf{S} \mathbb{F}$
	5 676	161 <b>0</b> 45H	TS2 REP CLARIFICATION OF LO2d REGT	SF
1215	677	161155H	IMP SWEEP BY RANGE DELTA MET 3VCS	S∵
1215	67		C1 IANDED AT 517119	SF
1225	67 9		IMP REP VC RF 39 BN	S F
1315	680	1.6125311	ARVN CONVOY HEADING SOUTH	SF
1340	681	1613251	ARVN COMPON SOUTH TEHT PERS 595	ST
1/125	6.2	<b>J</b> (J)\S \f	EOD WILL, USE OU RRANGE T ODAY AT1630H	SFS
11 <u>1</u> 25	683	161752H	IMP HEN SIT REP	SF.
1607	68L		IMP FLAME THOWER ACCIDENT CO C 2 MEN BURNED	SF
1740	685	16174он	IMP 24 PF AMBUSHED	SF
1815	686	1618 <b>1</b> 0н	ADD, PF AMPUSHES	S
1.82lı	687	161821H	OSCAR #2 ON ARVN CONVOY	SE
1980	680	1619 <b>03</b> H	IVCS PICKED UP BY BX	SF
1935	689	161927Н	B3 SQD PAT LEFT	SF
1.947	690		1930 2 SARDINES HAVE SPLASHED	SF
1949	691	161.91.511	REQ FOR ARTY	S.
1951	692	162015H		
			AD). PF AMBUSHED	SF
503fi	693	162035H	MP B SPOTTED 1 PER	SF
21.05	694	162100H	IMP OP#2 VEH REP	SF
21.06	695	162100H	IMP C SPOTTED MOVEMENT	SF
2107	696	16503 <b>0</b> н	FORD PICKED UP ON RT #1	SF
2107	697	1650/1 <b>9</b> 11	REQ FOR FIREMISSION	SF
5108	<b>69</b> 8		ON FRESNOLY AMBUSHED	SF
2109	699	1620h <b>e</b> h	REP AIRCRAFT ON STRIKE	SF
2135	700		AG2 REP ON 1105mm ARCY PIECE	SF
2208	701	162 <b>2</b> 07H	TINGE ON VC IANDING	SF
2250	702	162158H	IMP OP RPT BOATS WITH LIGHTS N. OF BRIDGE	SF
2255	703		SD-24 FRIENDLY OPERATIONS 584950	SF
2312	70 <b>5</b>	16NDTG	VALVE REG ILL 537108	
2335	705	162300H	VALVE REQ IIL 537108 E CO FIRED AUTO WPN AT 517040	SF SF
2335	706	16230 <b>0</b> H	VALVE REQ ILLUM 537108	SF
2355	707	162345H	BX SIT REP	SF
0020	708	162400H	TINGE SIT REP	SF
0020	709	180017H	IMP REP 15 BOATS 511111	SF
0122	710	170120H	C 3 DEARTED 2300H	SF
0540	711	170520H	IMP 2 REP A TOTAL 6 VCS	SF
0700	712	170 <b>70</b> 0H	TINGE MORNING REP	SF
		170655H	SD24 DIST CHIEF REQ TO SHOOT 5691	SF
0700	713		TINGE SIT REP	SF
0\$17	714	170700H	IMP2 REP OF DEMONSTRATION GL 518116	SF
0900	715	170900H		SF
0915 0949	716 7 <b>17</b>	170915H+	INP REP RIOT IS QUIEED SOWN	S <b>F</b>
094 <b>9</b>	( <b>±</b> (	170944Н	THE UP TO TO GOTTON SOM	o.

<b>103</b> 5	718-	171035H	IMP REP OF RIOT INVOLVING SEABEE BULLDOZER	SF
1040	719	171005H	(FROM) B CO SET IN WH LIMA A CO SET IN WH M	SF
1040	<b>72</b> 0	171048H	WH3 HAS REQ FAC TEAM	SF
1102	721	17 <b>1112</b> H	(PROM) CO D NOW SET IN WH I CO	SF
1150	722	171150H	SH3 REQ BY 4TH MAR FOR LSD LST APPROVED	SF
1255	723	171255H	ENGRS HAVE COMMINICED FIRING 3.5 ON RMGE	SF
1340	724	171340H	IMP VC PLT LOC 454084&446084 FIRING 81'S	SF
1420	725	171420H	IMP VC LOC	SF
1434	726	171434H	IMP AUTO FIRE FROM 460077	SF
	727	171505H	SW M CO RECD 2 RDS SNIPER FIRE 677988	SF
1508	7 <b>28</b>	171508H	JUNK DIV HAS STOPPED ALL TRAFFIC	SF
1510	729	17NDTG	AE SUPPLY TO HAVE CQ DRILL TO NIGHE	SF
1530	730	17 <b>1</b> 530H	PF AMBUSH SITES LOC HARBOR SITE	SF
	731	171620H	PLT FROM HILL69 NEW RESULTS	SF
1630	732	171555H	1 USMC WIA BOOBY TRAP	SF
1632	733	171555H	COD 100% LANDED	SF
1635	734	171610H	CIV WORKER ON AIRSTRIF END	SF
1646	735	171646H	SURVEYORS WILL BE WORKING IN 1/4 AREA TOMMROW	<b>8</b> F
		171715H	IMP2 PICKEDUP 1VCE S 171615H	SF
1715	736	17NDTG	BX 6 REQ FOR FORCE RECON AFFIRM	SF
1802	737	171800H	D CO COORDS	SF
2035	7 <b>3</b> 8		PF AMBUSHES	SF
2036	739	171830H	CHECK CAPT TICK	SF
2045		172000H	ON PF ANBUSHES	SF
2045	741	172025H		SF
2047	742	172015H	PF AMBUSH SIME	SF
2047	743	171958H	REQ FM ARTY TO SHOT	SF
2048	744	172026H	IMP VEH REP	SF
<b>20</b> 1 <sub>1</sub> 8	745	172005H	S2 SIT REP	SF
2049	746	172005H	BOOTHE 2 SIT REP	SF
2049	747	172000H	INFO FM JUBK FLEET	SF
2100	748	172055Н	INP LAT SIT REP	SF
210h	749	172100H	B2 LEFT 2050H	SF SF
2247	750	172200H	NICHT DEFENSIVE FIRES SAME AS SW PAT	SF
0035	751	172109H	6VC REP VIC 492069	SF
0036	752	<b>18</b> 0010H	BX NEG NIGHT ACTIVITY OF UNTIL NOW	SF
0037	753	180 <b>012</b> H	TIME MISSIONS FIRED	
0038	754	1800 <b>15</b> H	IMP ALA QUIET	SF SF
0039	755	172330H	BOOTHE COB & D REP 1 VCS COORDS 555015	SF SF
<b>о</b> о4о	756	1 <b>8</b> 0025H	IMP D AMBUSHES NEG REP	SF SF
0115	75 <b>7</b>	180105н	PPDE REP SIT REP THE SAME	
0300	75 <b>8</b>	180145н	IMP PF AMBUSIES	SF SF
<b>03</b> 00	759	180210Н	IMP ALL QUIET	
0300	760	180242H	BX ALLSECURED HERE	SF
0300	761	180145н	IMP C CO PAT HAS RETURNED	SF
0կ10	762	18035 <b>0</b> H	BX NEG SIT REP	SF
0500	76 <b>3</b>	18000, Н	BX3 REP PLT & SQD NO CONTACT	SF
<b>063</b> 0	764	18 <b>0615</b> Н	TINGE NIGHT BEE	SF
0634	765	<b>1\$</b> 2048H	ON TWO HUEYS	SF
0750	766	<b>190707</b> Н	IR REP	SF
0751	767	<b>1</b> 807 <b>21</b> H	IMP SUMMARY OF NIGHT ACTIVITY	SF
0810	768	18nd <b>te</b>	IMP 3RD WAVE HAS LANDED	SF
0811	769	<b>18080</b> 0H	D(-) NO CONTACT POS SAME	SF
0850	770	180835H	RECON FOUND MINE	SF

0900	771	180823H	REQ FOR ARTY	SF
0905	772	18mpto	D CO AT COORDS NEG	SF
0935	773	<b>180202</b> 0H	LVN TO COLL PT	SF
0937	774	180/28H	1 MAT WIA PILOT HELO	SF
0940	775	180934н	SD REC 60mm COORDS	SF
1010	776	181005H	D CO AT 414080	SF
1045	777	181045н	D CO SAME POS	SF
11.00	778	181045н	M CO FIREING ARTY S/A AT 20 VC	SF
1105	779	18 <b>11</b> 05H	BOOTHE TANK KNOCKED OUT	SF
1105	7 <b>8</b> 0	181105H	7 WOMEN PICKEBUP TURNED OVER TO COLL PT	SF
1130	781	181130H	STBD WANTS TO ALERT FORCE RECON TO MOVE LZ WHITE	SF
1200	782	181145н	D CO STILL LOC AT 414080 NO CONTACT	Si
1201	783	181200H	STBD ALERT TO RECON	SF
1203	784	18120 <b>3</b> H	JUCTION OF BLTS EFFECTED AT 1040H	SF
1220	785	18NDTQ	WH REQ RESUPPLY HAVE THEY BEEN RESUPPLIED	SF
1235	786	18NDTG	WE ARE TOTHE NORTH OF THE LZ BLUE SB	SF
1236	787	18NDTG	TWO VC KIA SB	SF
1300	788	181235H	IMP RAO DROPPED 1VCS AT HELO PAD	SF
1300	789	181235H	BX RECIEVING SAA 532045 1234H	SF
1300	790	181340H	SB24 RECEIVING HE ARTY, MORTOR FIRE	SF
1300	791	181255H	2/4 REC MORTOR FIRE 672948	SF
1300	792	18 <b>11</b> 45H	SD1/4 REQ HELO	SF
1300	793	181250H	BX S/A & AUTO FIRE REPD 515056	SF
1307	794	181300H	SH2 1VC BN 100 4909	SF
1310	795	18 <b>1301</b> H	D CO LOC 800m WEST OF CP	SF
1330	796		ITT REP3 VCS WIA	SF
1340	797	181330H		SF
1345	798	18NDTG		SF
1350	799	181345H	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SF
可00	800	18NDTG		SF
1415	801	181405H	IMP D AT 448082 NO CONTACT	SF
11,20	802		HELO FIRED RKS ON TROOPS	SF
1434	803	181435H	SLF READY TO LAND AWAITING APP SHOVE	SF
1500	804	181455H	D CO LOC 453088 AWAITING PRICKUP	SF
1515	805	18151 <b>5</b> H	D CO ON WAY BACK	SF
1610	806-		D CO NO CONTAGE	SF
1610	807	18NDTG	TS24 INTELL KOO ON ATTACK ON CHU LAI	SF
1610	808	18NDTG	BOOTHE HAS 23 WIA 1 KIA	SF
1612	809	<b>1</b> 8165 <b>5</b> H	BX HEARD 1RD S/A FIRE FROM VIC 500035	SF
1635	810	181655H	KX IMP D CO HAS RETURNED	SB
1700	811.	181 <b>2</b> 00H	PF AMBUSH LOC	SF
1720	812	181716Н	SD REQ RESUPPLY 24 CANS WATER	SF
1730	813	18NDTG	TS CORRECTION ON FLARE PLANE	SF
1908	814	181755H	VC CO ON RIDGE LOC	SF
1909	815	18NDTG	HEOO REP	SF
1910	816	18NDTG	REQ FOR ARTY	SF
1910	817	18NDTG	REF YOUR MISSION	SF
1911	818	181102Z	B RECON IN LZ	SF
1911	819	18NDTG	PF AMBUSHES	SF
1912	820	1 <b>8</b> 1814H	A3LANDED KY HOA	SF
1912	821	181750H	CO G BLOCKING CAS REP	SF
1977	822	18NDTG	ON PATS	SF

		i	
	1914 823 1810442	MSG TO SD	SF
1915	821, 181850H	BX 1 PLAT TO VILL	SF
1915	825 <b>1819</b> 04H		SF
1/1/	1916 826 18NDTG	LAND I CO AT SLF	SF
1937	827 181937H		SF
1940	828 181930H	IMP2 SIT REP	SF
1944	829 181939H		SF
1944 191,6	830 <b>181925</b> H		SF
1950	831 181925H	ON VC CO	SF
	832 1819554		SF
1958	833-181921H		SF
2045	834 182020H	ADD PF AMBUSHES	SF
2047		SD3 CON B RECON I CO	SF
<b>20</b> 48	835 181205Z	IMP2 OP SIERRA SIT REP	SF
2048	836 182030H		SF
2048	837 18NDTO	ON ROVING PAT	SF
2049	838 18NDTG	IMP VEH REP	SF
2050	839 18NDTG		SF
2105	840 182100H		BF
2118	841 <b>182100</b> H	820N REP	SF
2120	842 182115н	IMP ILLUM FIRED AT COORDS	SF
2149	843 18214OH		SF
2150	844 182 <b>1</b> 45H		SF
2208	845 <b>182200</b> H		SF
2220	846 1822 <b>1</b> 0H	IMP PTE REPS SEEING ABOUT 100 TROOPS ENTERING VILL	1G 1G
2310	8147 18NDTG	B2 PTL SENT TO CHECK INTO 80-100 PEOPLE IN VILL	SF
2328	848 182 <b>315</b> H	BOOTHE SUMMARY BROM 1205-2147H	SF
2340	849 18NDTG	CIVIL AFF SHOT AT 515031 WHEN RETURNING FROM VILL	SF
2342	850 182000H	REF YOUR CURRENT OP DISTRIC INTERIGATING TEAM	SF
0003	851 182 <b>355</b> H	RS O LEOLITE INTERTOSTED IN ALTER	
0007	852 182350H	TOTAL AMMO EXPANDITORE TINGR	SF
0027	853 190023H	RETURNED TOSO% ALERT 8 VILLAGERS INTERIGATED	<b>SF</b> SF
סמירס	854 190019 <sup>H</sup>	2400 TPS/21 REPD VEH IN MOVEMENT ON HELL AT D CO	SF
0130	855 190001H	AT OGOO RE! TACA W/ARTY SPOT RELIEF ON SIBILOR	SF
0140	855 190005H	AMBIN DAGG TO MANGAR & BESAS REULK	SF
01/13	857 190007H	TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY	SF
6145	858 190140H	ILLUM RD STARTED FIRE 404084 FIRE UNDER CONTROL	SF
0200	3r2 190150H	POT TN VILL NEG	SF
0.000	860 190006H	GEN WALT, WILL LEAVE FROM RIS C PAT	SS
	A/H 3 AAAA F	TMP HATCE A BOAT WITH MAN & BOY	SE
0305	* / - = 0 0 0 0 mU	TIMES THE ROATS OBS EALIER NOW DEFT	SF
0335	- 4	BY THE REM DADY & DIGHTED ONE WAY	SF
いりひょ		FOUND AXILLARY GAS TANK BX F	SF
0725		TINGE FIRE MISSIONS	
925.6	-//	REP TOTAL CAS EVAC	S <b>F</b>
0244	oca nomico M	SB REP ON RADIO	S∓ or
0350	o co a onidage	Oldes SIT REP (CCO)	SF
0921	$\Delta T = \Delta T $	SB NEED acc GAL OF MOGAS	SF S
رقار	0 mg 2 000l r	A TOTAL A TOTAL OF THE COURT OF	SSF
<b>U</b> 354	970 190745H	*** *** **** **** **** ****	SF)
باع در		- AND TATAL	SF
0850			SF
085	373 <b>1</b> 90835	1 111 1 AND CAR ASSOCIATION OF THE PROPERTY OF	

	0355	874 190850H H BRTY TO TEST FIRE S/A	ន <b>ছ</b>
	0.10 6.00	375 100005H REQ FOR HELD	SF
	(1) J	376 190910H E CO ON PL BANANA	SF
	0014	877 190330H MSG TO MONROE LAISON OF F	SF
	0014	378 100010H D CO PAT AN TAN QUITT	SF
<	การ	320 190910H SD24 ON CIV AFF OFF	SF
,	0225	330 190920H B MED ON 6 PFS	SF
	0030	881 190900H AG 14 HELDS RECS S/A FIRE	SF
	ODVIO	332 19093 H SRG6 REQ TO GO TO7th CP AFF	SF
	1050	833 190034H BOOTHE TO BLOW TREES	SF
	1031	894 191000H REQ ARTY 8"mm	SF
	1025	885 101000H REF TO 100845H	SF
	2077	836 190025H TEST FIRING WPNS	SF
	1137	887 191055H CAPTIVESSTATES 1 VC CO C2 LOC VIC 667908	SF
	11.50	333 101105H PAYABLE H CO HAS COMPLETED FIRING ON THE RANGE	SF
	1151	389 101110H RIFLE COS ON MLR WILL DO SOMETHING TODAY	SF
	1150	800 19NDIG SHCACKLED MSG FROM SB	SF
	1155	801 191144H SW22 REP 1VC ON 490100	SF
	1155	822 191130H SECONDARY EXPLOSION	SF
	1.200	803 191055H TS REQ CLEARANCE FOR AIR TARGETS	SF
)	1.700	304 19NDTG REQ CONFERENCE W/SHOVE 5	SF
	7210	305 101120H BOOTHE REP 2 MALES AT R/B	SF
	1215	906 JOJJOH ITT POSSIBLE CONCERN 26HSQS MOBN	<sub>S</sub> f Sf
	ر <b>ت</b> ود ا	892 191110H 1/7 REP OF COOK AT 2400 NIGHTLY	SF
	1217	828 191145H ITT 8-9 VC KIA 718252	SF
	1217	890 191135H BH5 WOUNDED PREGNANT WOMEN 603019	SF
	J.20	000 191220H ITT 2 CO LOC 638978	SF
	1420	001 101340H ITT SPOT NO PARAMENTAL	SF
	1420	202 191411H BX E CO ON PL CHERRY	S "
	1405	203 191355H ITT REP OF INTERROGATOR OF VCS	SF
	7 508	904 191508H BOOTHE REP OF VC LOC	SF
	1515	905 191345H TS 202FWD NEG RESULTS SO FAR REQ INSTR.	SF
	1515	TO THE REPORT OF COURT MACHINET	SF
	1,600	THE PARTY OF THE P	SF
	1500	The second secon	SF
	1755	The state of the s	SF
	1825	AU I TOMO TO TOTAL TO A MO A CO	SF
	1840	11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	SF
	1.844	TO THE STATE OF THE PROPERTY O	SF
0	7.000		SF
	<b>J</b> 000	AND THE PARTY AND THE PARTY TO	SF
	1900	917 191047.	SF
	Joüj	TO T 400	SF
	1982	72/ 1/2/20 "	SF
	10 cO	918 191943H OP#1 SIT REP 919 191955H NO LCUS AVAILABLE	SF
	2100	UIU IVINAMI AND ACCOUNTS	

2101	920	192010H OP#2 VEH REP
21.03	92]	192000H ON FRIENDLY TEAMS COORDS
2109	922	191905H SD24 ON FF WIA & KIA
2105	923	191200Z REF 191905H
2106	924	
2107	925	192050H NIGHT DEFENSIVE POS.
2130	926	the state of the s
2134	927	
21.37	928	and the state of t
2138	929	
0030	930	192300H FLARE SHIP FIRED ON
0030	931	192335H BX6 REQ NO MORE NGW
0030	932	100000U DOOMUE 2 NEG SIT REP
0030	933	192345H BX 3 NEG SIT REB
0030	934	1924OOH TINGE NIGHE REP
	924	200009H DEVISTATE A REPS 4 TRIP FLARES
0030	936	
0030	930 9 <b>37</b>	
0100		200045H BX3 REPS HEREING FIRING VIC LY TIN
,0100	938	200040H REQ NAMES FROM 8 PF AT B-MED
0100	939	THE PART OF THE PARTY AND THE TOTAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTY
0510	940	200445H ARTY DUD NEAR CATFISH #2
0515	941	200445H ARTI DOD NEAR CRITISH #2 200725H HELO AO REP SWEEP OF AREA
0725	942	200725H HELD AN REF SWEET OF ARTHUR PICK UP OF RETRIEVER
0730	943	200800H BOOTHES CO D REQ AUTHERIZED
0835	944	200810H AIR LAISON A/C RECD S/A FIRE
0835	945	2008ION AIR DAGADDS MO DEMOTEVED DA FILE
0836	946	200635H IN REGARDS TO RETRIEVER
0836	947	200630H D CO AMBUSH BACK NEG RESULTS
0 <b>94</b> 0	948	200915H G3/12 COMMENCED FIRING
0941	949	200950H TS24 REQ SHCACKLE SHEET AFTER 20 AUG
0941	950	200900H SD24 1 VC CO LOC
0942	951	200900H EMBAD STBD REQ LVT RETRIEVER
1138	952	2009000 EMARINES RAN INTO BUSHES 1CAU&1NEGRO AT 527100
1140	953	190159Z REF YOUR 200900H PERTAINS
1141	954	200155Z PF KIA BE BROUGHT BIHN SON
1142	9 <b>5</b> 5	2001112 PF AMBUSES SET UP ON ROUTE #1
1145	956	20NDTG CAS EVAC TO CROSSWALK KIAS WIARO
1146	957	200907H EXECUTE MY FRAG ORDER 3-65 ASAP
1147	958	201100H INT TS6 IF MONROE FRAG 3-65 IS PLAN
1149	959	20112H UNABLE TO KEEP LUNCH BATE WITH ILLOSION
1150	960	20NDTG GEN LAM WILL VISIT AUG 1200-1300 10DAI
1210	961	CORRORY ODGI FOI VC RM SIRROHNDON
1245	962	201135H SHOVE 3a ASKED IF THIER WERE ANY QUESTIONS ON FRAG
1250	963	201233H TWO CO OF VC MOVED FROM \$688922 TO 641099
1251	964	CONTINUE CORP. MCC. ON PROM C
	32596 <b>5</b>	201305H BH5 REW TO KNOW WHEN BH CAN EXECUT BOOTHE
	330966	OOLOLEU THEREAGATORY STATUS OF
1333		ODINESH ALO REBS AO FOUND RD BLOCK AT 500884
1334		N CONTROL ADMIRAT, HOOPER DUE IN 15 MIN
1345		AND AND THE OR THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY ADDRESS OF T
1350		THE PART CONTROL OF THE MATTER SUPPLIES TO THE PROPERTY OF THE
1351		
1.355		S SOURCE CONTROLL REPS AND VOLVENING WENT THE DIVIDED
1400		

		化二甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基甲基
<b>1</b> /.0 <b>5</b>	975	201400H ITT REP OF TUNNEL AT 703974
1405	976	201400H STBD REAR TOSTBD FWD REQ INFO ON NEEDED SUPPLIES
1410	97 <b>7</b>	201408H STBD REGARDS TO MSG 201305H
1410	978	201410H WH6 REQ MAX NUMBER OF LVTS
1420	979	201414H IMP OP#1 OBS APPROX 50 PEOPLE 485035
1420	980	201419H IMP ABOUT 200 PEOPLE AT 485035 FISHING
1425	981	201425H SW M ON WAY TO MLR
1.430	982	201430H APPROVED REQ FOR LVES SW
1515	983	20NDTG SHCACKLED MSG FROM TS4 INFO TO STBD 5
1515	984	201500H ITT REP OF VC INTERAGATION
1520	985	20NDTG SCAT BROVE ATTACHED TO PP 201500H
	0986	201430H FM TS TO TS4 DISPLACE LIASON TEAM TO TS CP
1520	987	201505H D 1/7 LIFTING OUT OF3/3 SECTOR AT THIS TIME
1520	988	201510H DEADLOCK 6-0 REPS NO ACT IN CAVES 698975
1530	989	201514H ITT REP DISPOSITION OF INCOMING VCS
1530	990	201530H IMP PAT A3, B3 HAVE RETURNED
1.800	99 <b>1</b>	20NDTG ETA OF 3/3 AT BEACH
	992	201755H SD24 REGT TO REIN
1800		201755H BX CO E AND CO G BACK IN
1805	99 <b>3</b>	20NDTG TS6 BY 1909 HOPEFULLY
1.805	994	201715H SH6 ARRIVED THIS POS
1805	995	201436H STND NAVAL GUNFIRE INTEND
1810	996	201.825H SW REQ WH M LZ SMOKED
1820	997	201825H SW REQ WH M LZ SMORED 201812H IMP 2ALTA CO AT OP#2
1921	998	201920H IMP CO C1/7 LIFT FINISHED
1921	999	
1930	1000	201900H IMP PF AMBUSHED
1931	1	201910H OX SIT REP ON LT THOMAS
<b>193</b> 2	2	201911H WH M HAS RETURNED
1933	3	201900H SD24 REQ TO FIRE ARTY
19 <b>3</b> 3	4	201906H SD24 FRIENDLY AMBUSHES
1934	5	201017H REQ BIS CHIEF ON FF WIA KIA
<b>193</b> 4	, 6	201925H COB 3RD PLT PICK UP 2VES
191		201945H AG3 ANS TO 201917H
19 <b>5</b> 5	8	201950H B2 SIT REP
2000	9	201955H MONITORED MSG
2000	10	20NDTG MONITORED MSG
2000	11	20NSTG MONTOORED MSG
2000	12	201935H " "
2000	13	201935H " "
2000	14	201935H " "
2000	15	201935H " "
2000	1.6	21935H X " "
202 <del>0</del>	17	202015H B-ENG SIT REP
2021	18	201745H AO REP
2045	19	200005E IMP2 PP24 LY TIN AGENT
2046	20	202005H PP2/ NCO TOPF PET LUR
2047-		202025H IMP VEH REP PF AMBUSHES
2200	22	202112H TINGE C BRTY INCIDENT
2200	23	2022C3H TINGE SIT REP
2 <b>2</b> 01	24	2021 30H IMP2 HAVE 1VCS SP. PT.
	24 25	202220H TMP PICK UP 2 PEUPLE
2255 23	_	2-2315H AG2 REQ PERMISSION TO HIT VC 325044
23 <b>4</b> 0	ງ∪ ∵າ 27	OHNETG WH IN POS ON MLR
	F4 /	202345H TINGE UPDATED SIT REP

			SF
0030	29	210030H BRTT K AT 605015 RECD S/A FIRE	SF
0030	30	210011H MAC V SENDING HOLMBERS ON LW	SF
01.30	31.	202235H STND REP LVTS HIT BY 57mm ROCKET	SF
0200	32	2] 0045H PAYABLE FWD RECD AUTO WPNS FURE	SF
0 <b>21</b> 1	33	210011H THIS MORNING MAC V IS SENDING H.H.	SF
0214	34	210214H STBD SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY FOR PER. 191000H	SF
0305	<b>3</b> 5	210305H HQ COMM REP SUSPECTED INFILTRATORS	SF
0330	<b>3</b> 6	210330H A2 AT CH PT 548011 HAVE 4VCC 1VCS	SF
0339	37	210339H SIT REMAINAS THE SAME	SF
0350	38	210350H ADMISSIONS 210333H BT AT RPPROX 0333 READ INCOMINE S/A	SF
0333	<b>3</b> 9	210333H BT AT REPROX 0333 REGO INCOMING SAME	SF
0555	40	210555H CO D FIRED AT TWO BOATS	SF
0600	41	210600H D1 D2 HAVE DEPARTED FOR MLR	SF
0801	42	STOPOON ON WEG OIL UM	SP
0801.	43		SF
0805	44		$\mathtt{SF}$
0807	45		SF
8080	46		SF
0809	47		$\mathtt{SF}$
0810	48	A COLUMN TOUR TOUR TOUR TOUR TOUR TOUR TOUR TOUR	SF
0812	49	210725H TINGE SIT REP	SF
081.5	50	210804H ON HOO CAPT WPNS	SF
0.16	51	OLOGICU DEP ON VC KTA WTA CAPTA	SF
0817	52	one my o tittitytemm vour tip at 2117000	SF <b>X</b>
1045	53	ON A A COLD TO THE OFFICE ARCHITICAL ARCHITI	SF
1135	54 55	27 COORS NEG HELO NECSSARRY FOR SENIOR ADVISOR	
11.35 1140	56	CANA TANGONIODEL VIII GMAR III TORID	SF SF
1200	57	OSSS FOR CON MASOMORRIAND TO ARRIVE DEINEED 14100 1410.	SF
1207	58	OF BOOKE A CO. TO COMMENCING HIS KIRUS ON CANOD	SF
1.210	59	OTATIVER CO A TO FIRE COMM MUNITUR ON STATIANUE	SF
1212	60	ON TOOM MEET CEN WESTMORELAND AT UNU LAI	SF
250	61	OLICON TWO A HAS GEASED FIR E ON THE GARGE	SF
1335	62	AND AGOIT CROATINING ON NO. VO 03/403	SF
1345	63	AND A COUNTY PROPERT ISONO WENT THROUGH DAME NA	SF
1345	64	OF BOD MIT TOWN DED TOOMS: I.K.K.I. KIND DOMING	$\mathtt{SF}$
1345	65	222 SEOR TOWN HELD POLOT OF POLO TOOK I TOTOLES	SF
1345	66	211245H SS 24 FO TEAM ARRIVED 211245H SS 24 FO TEAM ARRIVED AT 687922	SF
1345	67	211245H SS 24 FO THAM ALL STREET AT 687922 211337H S-SADDLE 1000 VC SIGHTED AT 687922 NDTG CONTACT NGF AND PAYABLE CEASE FIRE	SF
1400	68	NDTG CONTACT NGF AND PAYABLE GEASE FIRE GC 665920 210543Z SIDE SAEDLE 22 REQ CEASE FIRE GC 665920	SF
1405	69	ADD AT OR ON' VC INNERO	SF
1500	70	210543Z SD24LOC OF VC UNITS 211540H INP REP OF COLUMNS OF SMOKE 423023	SF
1540	71	211540H INF REF OF OFFICE SW 211605H NEG SIT REP FROM SW	SF
1605	<b>7</b> 2	AT A ATT COOL DIET CHIEF REW SO MEN THOM TO THE	SF
1610	73		SF SF
1645	74	ON TOO STRIP REAR SUUS ELVO ENTOUTE TO	SF SF
17 <b>8</b> 0	75	211812H IMP PF AMBUSHES	SF
1816	<b>7</b> 6	AMDIN FIRE LINE THE ADDITION OUT -	SF
1816		211730H STBB 5VCS 1VC 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	SF
1817		211800H SW 100 REAT RESERVED	
1840	<b>7</b> 9	CLLINATION WILLIAM WILLIAM WILLIAM WILLIAM WILLIAM	
እት የአብገጥ	מסים פלית	AND NOW AWATLARIE WILL PUT IN WHEN TOOKS	SF
	٦.	12 DULY ZAR OF WILLE I THE ACCOUNT TO THE	SF SF SI
0825 0825	10	220724H SW WILL FIRE BLANKS SERVISION 220743H BX SUMMARY OF NIGHT ACTIVITY 220746H IMP SUMMARY OF NIGHT ACTIVITY	51
0025 0026	์ קר	05 220746H IMP SUMMARIT OF 12	

0827	106	22NDTG	SPEC INTELL REP	SF.
0827	107	212130H	IMP SIT REP	SF
0830	108	2208 <b>30</b> H	ALO REP OBSPLANE FIRED ON	<b>3</b> F
<b>090</b> 0	109	220900H	ALO REP OBS PLANE FIRED ON GV ARRIVE 22093OH PH MAJ CORIA TO RLT 7 S)24 REQ 6 FF EXCHANGE	SF ~
1000	110	220915H	PH MAJ CORIA TO RLT 7	SF C
1002	111	220940H	S)24 REQ 6 FF EXEMANGE	SF ≃
1020	าาว	221010H	AG PRO PERMI SSION FOR ALK SERIKE 424030	SF.
102	7 113	2210 <b>1</b> 6H	AG 220900H KOO REGT POS	æ
1145	114	22 <b>103</b> 5H	STBD TOTAL WPNS SHOULD BE 98	<b>SF</b>
1200	0 1 <b>15</b>	221146Н	TS CO B 3 RECON BN ATTACHED TS	SF.
1220	116	221200H	AG 220900H KOD REGT POS STED TOTAL WPNS SHOULD BE 98 TS CO B 3 RECON EN ATTACHED TS B CO WILL FIRE \$\frac{1}{2}\text{A} AT 1230H  ARMY HUIE SPOTTED 50 VC 10 MILES SOUTH OF CHU LAI REP OF HUEY PIOLOT HAD ENGINE TROUBLE REP. OF ENEMY CAPT STED NEO CREWSERVED WPNS CAPT IMP PF AMBUSHES PH FRON C SECURED OBJ COORDS SW VEH REP BX PAT HARDY LEFT IMP ADD PF AMBUSHES IMP 1 VCS PICKED UP B3 SPOTTED MAN W/BAR NEO IMP VEH REP ON HUGE FIRE SD24 IN REGARDS TO TODAYS OP SD24 PF AMBUSHES AG ABOUT 8 VCS TO DANANG VC CO AT COORDS REQ ARTY BX E CO (-) AT 498020 neg BX E CO (-) LOC DEV ALFA REP SECONDARY EXPLOSION	SF ~
功50	117	221420H	ARMY HUTE SPOTTED 50 VC 10 MILES SOUTH OF CHU LAI	SF ∼
1515	118	22 <b>1</b> 51 <b>5</b> H	REP OF HUEY PIOLOT HAD ENGINE TROUBLE	Œ
1650	119	221410H	REP. OF ENEMY CAPT	<b>F</b>
1650	120-	22132hH	STBD NEO CREWSERVED WAN'S CAPT	SF -
1825	121	<b>2</b> 21805H	IMP PF AMBUSIES	SF.
1826	122	55170TH	PH FROM C SECURED OBJ COORDS	SP
<b>2</b> 005	123	222002H	SW VEH REP	<b>SF</b>
2006	124	222000H	BX PAT HARDY LEFT	SF.
2010	125	222000H	IMP ADD PF AMBUSIES	Ŧ
<b>201</b> 1	126	221950H	IMP 1 VCS PICKED UP	æ
2011	127	222000H	B3 SPOTTED MAN W/BAR NEG	æ
2012	128	222008H	IMP VEH REP	SF
2045	129	221926H	ON HUGE FIRE	F
2046	130	221200Z	SD24 IN REGARDS TO TODAYS OP	æ
2050	131	2212h0Z	SD24 PF AMBUSHES	Ŧ
2200	132	222030H	AG ABOUT 8 VCS TO DANANG	SP
2200	133	222128H	VC CO AT COORD'S REQ ARTY	Ŧ
2200	134	222145H	BX E CO (-) AT 198020 neg BX E CO (-) LOC DEV ALFA REP SECONDARY EXPLOSION WH21 REP 21 RANGER IN POS K BEP DOG WITH PACK SOUTH END AIR STRIP SW L REP 1 WIA BELIEVED FROM 60mm MORTOR PAYABLE REP L CO RECD 60mm MORTOR	Œ
2235	135	222210H	BX E CO (-) LOC	Ŧ
2250	136	222230H	DEV ALFA REP SECONDARY EXPLOSION	æ
2250	136 137	222105H	WH2L REP 21 RANGER IN POS	F
2300	138	222255H	K REP DOG WITH PACK SOUTH END AIR STRIP	SF.
2340	139	222 <b>327H</b>	SW L REP 1 WIA BELIEVED FROM 60mm MORTOR	<b>S</b>
2340	140	222333H	PAYABLE REP L CO RECD 60mm MORTOR	æ
2340	141	222335H	BX NEG SLT REP	$\mathfrak{S}$
0020	1/12	2223509	TINGE SIT REP	F
0020	143	222345H	SW WILL BE ABLE TO TELL IF 60mm MORTOR IN MORNING	SF.
0025	بأبلا	222357H	RECOVERED FRAG F/WIA APPEAR TO BE M-79	SF
0030	145	230023H	AG REQ SOT PETER'S REPORT AG CP A SAP	æ
0130	146	222400H	STBD SIT REP 221800H - 222400H	æ
0200	147	230200H	E CO 1RD 81 ILLUM NEG RESULTS	SF
0235	11 <sup>8</sup>	230235H	D2 RECEIVING S/A FIRE F/VIC 528078	SF
0325	149	230325H	BX E CO (-) PAT NEC RESULTS	¥
0350	150	230350H	IMP CO AROUND AIR FIELD FIRED A RD INTO D CO	JBS .
0455	151	230455H	CO (-) PAT POSREMA INS SAME	F
0542	152	230542H	BX CALLED REQ TO FIRE AT SUSPECTED ENEMY	æ
0600	153	230600H	BX SIT REP HARDY SIT SAME	F
0610	154	230605H	STBD 222400H A THRU F SAME	SF.
0720	155	230729H	TINGE SIT REP	F
0735	156	230735H	AO SHEEP REPS LARGE GROUPS OF MEN GATHERING AT 653977	æ
0900	157	23NDTG+	AGE REO VERIFICATION OF COORDS	Œ
1038	158	231000H	Annual Annual Annual International Annual Company Company	SF.
1200	159	231055H		æ
TLOU	-21	-///		

1200	160	231055H	INSPECTING TEAM FROM I CORPS	SF
1400	161	23134 <b>5</b> H	3 VC COS LOC	SF
<b>3</b> 401	162	23 <b>133</b> 1H	DISTRICT CHIEF REG ARTY 554908 & 543892 AT 1500H	SF
1450	143	23NDTG	LOC OF PAYABLE GOLF-3-3A-2	SF
1450	164	231445H	MAJ FLEIGH REQ FREQUENCIES FOR PP7/8	SF
1450	165	23;4 <b>3</b> 0H	SW DESIRE TO KNOW IF TANK PLAT WILL BE DETAINED	SF
1/00	1.64	231410H	FROM MON CONCERNING OP STARLITE	$\mathtt{SF}$
1610	167	23NDTG	ITT REP LOC OF VC	SF
1610	148	231516Н	SD24 REP OF VC LOC	SF
1615	169	231610H	MSG FFOM PH CONCERNING MP PLT CHU LAI	SF
1630	170	23162 <b>8</b> H	IMP PAT CHANGES	SF
1630	171	231600Н	SW REQ 7 LVTS 1LVT (c) AND 1LVTE	$s_{\mathrm{F}}$
1630	<b>17</b> 2	23 <b>1640H</b>	SW LOC OF PAT L CO	SF
1640	173	23 <b>164</b> 0H	BINH NGHIA VILL CHIEF R Q	SF
1/450	174	231.650Н	REP OF 20 MEN PAT TO SD24	SF
1745	175	231730H	30 PEOPLE AT 575972 EAST OF HIGHWAY	SF
1800	176	231730Н	A/c FIRED AN 30R4 PEOPLE	SF
1823	177	231735H	BH ON POSSOBLE ATTACK	SF
19 <b>3</b> 5	178	231730H	WH24 REQ ARTY POS	SF
1940	<b>17</b> 9	231840Н	LY TIN VISIT REP	$\mathtt{SF}$
1940	<b>18</b> 0	231.840H	LY TIN VISIT REP	sf
1.940	1.81	231840H	LY TIN VISIT REP	$\mathtt{SF}$
1941	182	231840H	DO-THE-CHAP	$\mathtt{SF}$
1942	183	231.840 <b>H</b>	AGENT SOURCE C-3	sf
1950	184	23 11 <b>5Z</b>	FUM ALL POSTS MANNED	SF
2020	185	231930H	PF AMBUSHES	SF
2025	186	23ND <b>T</b> G	PP24 CO B 1MAN, 1BOY	SF
2026	187	231925H	PE AMBUSHES	SF
2035	188	232010Н	BX AO REP	SF
2105	189		IMP VEH REP	SF
2106	190	232100H	PAYABLE FWD REC FIRE	SF
2108	191	232050H	BW TO FIRE FUGAS	SF
2110	192	232056Н	SD24 PF FORCES LOC	SF
2255	193		VC KIA & WIA & WEAPONS CAPT	SF
2256	194		RICE DELIVERED TO VAN TUONG	SF
2258	195		SPEC TNT REP AS OF 231200H	SF
2259	196		REQ CLEARANCE FOR FIRE MASSIONS	SF
2300	197			SF
2301	193	2312 <b>15Z</b>	SPECIAL INTELL REP	SF
2337	199	2323 <b>1</b> 9H	SIT REP FROM SD24 NOTHIGN UNUSUAL	SF
2340		232245H	IMP SAW 31 INDIVIDUALS	SF
2343		0000100	CLI DITO DIPO NEC	SF
0010		2323 <b>30</b> H	ON OVE RLAY USE # TO DENOTE AMBUSHES	SF
0013	203	232345H	REF MSG 232245H	SF
0015	214			SF
0019	205	232 <b>330H</b>	IMP BELIEVE LINE TAPPED	. SF
0110	206		D PAT SENT TO INVESTIGATE 3 INDIVIDUALS	SF
0445	207	240415H	IMP PPD OBS A MAN	SF
0445	208	MONION	BX NEE SIT REP	sF
0/35		240 <sup>35</sup> H	IMP OP 1&2 CANO HEAR SHOOTITN	SF
0655	21.0	24054 <b>0</b> H	ABOUT PAT W/SECTOR	SF
0700	211	24.0550H	IMP OP 1&2 CANQ HEAR SHOOTITN ABOUT PAT W/SECTOR TINGE NIGHT REP	$\operatorname{SF}$
0705	21.2	2406 <b>35</b> H	IMP OP 1&2 HEAR SHOOTING COORDS	SF
0730	213	240000	BH REQ TO ON LT EDGE	SF
0732	274	246705H	MP B REPS 2 SHOTS AT 517084	$s_{\mathrm{F}}$

<b>073</b> 8	215	240735H	VATVE	SF
0800	216	SYNDIG	REQ RELIEF OF PAYABLE 2&5	SF
0 05	21.7	240740II	IMP SUMMERY NIGHE REP	SF
0807	23.8	240805H	OX SEARCH TEST FIRE \$/a	SF
0905	23.9	240905H	ARUN 2ND DIV REQ TO KNOW IF VC GO SURRENDER TO US	SF
0015	220	2409 <b>1</b> 5H	RESULTS OF FIRE MISSIONS	SF
1110	221	240905H	7 VC REP AT HOA AN 485103	SF
1112	222	241015H	EMBED ASSIONED DSS AS FOLLOWING	SF
1115	223	241005H	DISTRICT CHIEF REQ TO KNOW WHERE MARINES ARE	SF SF
1145	224	2433.05H	A YOUR 240950H STBD REQ TWO FSS	SF
1240	225	2/J.220H	12 SAIL & 1MORTOR JUNK WILL MOVE SAND 6 RETAGN OP UNTIL COMPLETE	SF
1340	226	2/1 <b>2</b> 10H	BX WILL DETONATE SMALL EXPLOSION NEAR CP	SF
1430	227	241/30II	BX PAT CHANGES	SF
1500	228	241500H	BT UNCLAS BE ADVISED FRIE DLY	SF
1550	229	241430H	SW THE ACTRACS HAVE ARRIVED	SF
1740	2 <b>3</b> 0	2/17/15/1	STBD ON VC WIA	SF
<b>1</b> .950	231	2/1.64511	FUT ALL POSTS MANED	SF
1951	232	2411342 241900H	D2 LEFT 1900H	SF
1951	233	2/1900H	ALF A 3-1 LEFT	SF
1952	234		HELO FIRED ON VILL	SF
1.952	235	243.945H	IMP B2 APPREHENNED	SF
2000	236	241945H	SV VEH REP	SF
2001.	237	242005H	STBD ONVC WIA	SF
2002	238	241645H	AO REPVIC	SF
2006	239	242004H	IMP A-22 LEFT	SF
2008	240	241955H	PLT (#) B 60 /AT 451054	SF
2020	2/1	2420 <b>1</b> 6!	1/7 HAS RETURNED	SF
2745	242	242025H	TWO TANKS TO CP	${\tt SF}$
2048	24 <b>3</b>	24NDTG	CO D3-B FIRED ACROSS BOW OF BOAT	${\tt SF}$
2050	244	24ND <b>TG</b>	BX AT 2300H WILL FIRE FLAME TANK	sf
2052	245	2420 <b>30H</b> 242048H	IMP VEH REP	${\tt SF}$
2055	246	24NDTG	PH ON A_ RATS	${\tt SF}$
21.00	247	242100II	B 1-1,102,1-3, LEFT	SF
2100	248	242110H	A3-3, LEFT	$\mathbb{S}\mathbf{F}$
21.15	27.9	24211011	IMP STUCK LVT FREE	$\mathtt{SF}$
2118	250	2/2100H <sub>J</sub>	ILLUM ARVN POS	SF
2200	251	2 2 2 1 0 0 1 E H	PF AMBUSHES LOC 472077	SF
2200	252 272	24:21.3H	LVT HAVE RETURNE TO SPLASH PT	SF
2230	253	275570H	BX FI ED 81 ILLUM 2300-24 0	$_{ m SF}$
2310	25/ <sub>2</sub>	242230H	ARVN POS	$S^{\oplus}$
01.30	255 277	242400H	TINGE REP	${f SF}$
0130	256	2/2330H	CO D DEPARTED	SF
0130	57 250	2500201	D2 RECD INCOMING S/A RD	SF
0130	258 250	24233LH	BX NEG SIT REP	SF
01.30	259	2501 34H	C2 RETURNED	$S^{n}$
01.70	260 261	250450II	C6 FIRED 15 RDS S/A FIRE ATSUSPEC	SF
0450 0000	262	250 <b>725</b> H	AO REP VIC	SF
0690	26 <b>3</b>	250740H	IMP NIGHT REP	SF
0003	25%	250740H	IM SIT REP	SF
08 <b>03</b>	265	250800II	SW COM COLBAT PA T LEFT	SF
08 <b>0</b> 4 0806	266	250805II	IMP DAWN PAT SPOTTED 8-10 MEN	SF
0806 0825	267		IMP D3 RETURNED	SF
18 <b>30</b>	268		ADMIRAL BROW ETA CHU LAI 0835H	SF

05/1 <b>0</b>	270	) 2509 <b>24</b> Н	SH3 ON DIV OP ORDER 327-65	23.0
0241	271	: 250845 <b>H</b>	SD24 ON J. VC BY	SI.
0942	272			اد ئا
1125	273		LY TIN SCIT AGENT C/4 VC BN W/30-60mm MORTO &	5# 3#
1126	271	2511 <b>15H</b>	LX TIN -C/U 2 LFT UNITS ARMED W/1_40-htc price	O 6130
1128	27!		DI TUU DULT AGENT C// EST 300VC RED APARED もげっこ	J J‼ Silestes I W
1130	27(		- AL JIN DOLT AGENT C/A EST 200VC MOVEN 中台 3700で	imror
1131	277	25111 <b>5H</b>	LY TIN TOTA C/1-C/1 VC UNIT MOVED TO 375108	U 577
1.21:0			A3 & C3 RECD STUPER FIRE	رر آون
1240	570	ร2ุาร38ม	A3 RETURNED TO OP NO CAS.	3F
1240	550		TS211 REQ TO KNOW HO OF CIV TREATED	3F
1340			VADVE 6 ON LEAVING PROPLE AT ATROTRE	SI
1.31 <sub>1</sub> "	<b>2</b> 88		C3 RECD. 2 RDS S/A FIRE 1,30093	3₽
1435	203		IMP REP PAT 03 RECIEVING S/A FTRE	Sir
1455 1525	281. 285	25145511	IMP REP PAR C3 CALLING FIRE MISSION	Si
	20) 0 <b>2</b> 86		SW REP OF ARVINOP SOUTH OF TAOR	SF
12/12	0 200 287		REQ INFO OF FOS WITH 2nd ARVN OF	33
7,000	288		IMP C3 CALLED ARTH MISSION	37
1630	200 200	251600H 251615H	IMP 03 RAF ON E HINE 431091	$\mathbb{S}\mathbb{F}$
1630 1700			IMP D RAP UP 1VCS	$\mathfrak{I}^p$
1706	207	2月6 <b>月</b> 年	JUNK FLE VC BU & 2 PLTS	'الذي
1705	200	251.70LH	IMP C3 FAT UNABLE DISCLOSE MINE	OF.
1730	563	251738H	IMP C3 TAVE NOT COMPLETED SWEEP	$\mathfrak{S}_{F}$
1705 1705 1705 1730 1800	29/1	5208/12II	C3 AREA HAS BE N SWEPT NO VC FOUND AMBUSHES SITES	SP
1915	295	521820H	IMP 2 lvcs	Sh'
1.930	20%	27 <b>1</b> .900H	IMP PF ANBUSTES	SI.
2015	207		OUND 300 PODIES	ეე'
203Š	298	251745 <b>H</b>	FIRE MISSION RECON	$\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{U}}$
2036	299		VET REP	SF
2037	300		PAT B-3-1 LEFT ALL 3 PATS D LEFT	S
2538	301	2519hoH	AG3 OP OLD GOLD FIRE MISSION	SF
20/12	302	25124 <b>0</b> Z	SD NO ADIVISORS COUNTED	SF
2130	303	SEM DIG	ON BODIES	Si
	301	252030Н	SD24 ON BODIES	Se
2132	30i,	25?ОН <b>О</b> Н	IMP PF AMBUSHES	ائين د
23.33	306	52502OH	SW VEH RIP	SF
	307	25210 <b>0</b> H	IMP PAT 3-3 LIFT 2100H	3.º
5370		252150Н	SW OP/L RECD S/A RDS	3F
		5237fOH	BH3 O'PLANING FOR REILIEF	SF
2155		25215 <b>2</b> 4	Cl-1 PAT LEFT	37
2235	311	25220611	BX HAD RADIO STATION TRY TO CONTACT OUR STATION	ST
23 <b>0</b> b		252300H	SB-A-2) APPREHENDED 2 VCS AT COORDS 51617/	SP
2355		252320H	MO PATS AT THE AT COOR DS	SF
21 <sub>0</sub> 00	314	25233911	DISTRIC CHIEF REQ ARTY AT BS 577975	Si
000 <b>1</b> 000 <b>3</b>	315 216	25 <b>1</b> 5057	BE ADVIDED FRIDIDLY UNITS 580976	Sir
000lj	316 317	252355H	BX REPS FLAME TANKE BEING USE TO BURN BRUSH	$S\mathbb{R}$
0027	3 <b>1</b> 8	252353H 2 <b>5</b> 0001H	AMMO EXPEND FROM TINGE	Sir
00/12	3 <b>1</b> 9	260037H	DISTRIC CHIEF REQ TO FIRE ARTY AT 576975	SF
0115	320	260050H	VC HAVE WITHDIAWN FROM AREA- AR Y UNNECESSARY	$\mathbf{S}\mathbf{r}$
-	321		C 1 PLT HEARD MOCEMENT FROM REAR VIC 469072	SF
6336	-	260315H	BX 1 MAN RAN TOWARD F CO LEFT FLANK THE ILLES FIRED THOUGHT THEY HER RO FOISE	SF.
	146	LOUDING	THE THIRD LITTER THOOGHT THEY HIM TO LATOR	· 16"

0740	323 26062 <b>5</b> H	OX WEATHER REP	SF
0745	324 260741H	IMP NIGHT SIT RMP	
			SF
07/16	325 260711H	TINGE REP	SF
0950	326 260 LOH	SH3 ON LACK OF AGGRESSIVNESS	$S_{\mathbb{Z}}$
052 <b>T</b>	327 26082 <b>0</b> Н	SW LCO LEFT	$\mathbf{S}^{n}$
	<b>3</b> 28 <b>2</b> 608564	IMP EOD TO BLOW DUDS	SE
J.OljO	329 26 <b>1</b> 035H	ETA OF COL WYCKOFF AT AG CP IS 1430H	SF
	330 261100н	2 TROOPS MOVING TO 431952 UNK Alloo & W/RIFL'S	SF
	331. 2611.30Н	OP#1 REPS ABOUT 20% OF S BOUND TRAFFIC AS USUAL	SF
	332 261125н	3 TROOPS MOVING EAST AT 447952	
	333 261230Н		SF
		C3 IS AT PUCK UP PT TRUCKS ONTOS HAVE DEPARTED	SF
	334 26NDTG	IMP VMA 214 WILLIA FIRE S/A ON MA 617 RANGE	SF
	335 261445н	IMP A GROUP OF 40 WOMEN	SF
	336 261510н	SW L CO RETRACKTED BACK IN POS	SF
1515	337 26ndtg	SH3 STORM WARRING	$\Im F$
1520	338 26NDT <b>g</b>	SE24 VC LOC	SF
1600	339 261555Н	IMP WILL TEST FIRE 60mm MORROR 1600H	SF
1.600	3110 26160011	IMP REP OF VCS TRIPING TRIP FLARE	SF
1.600	341 261545H	D1 REOD 2 RDS SNIPER FIRE VIC 517063	SF
1600-		BX 2 COPM & LOFF REP BRIDGE WAS BROWN	
1630	343 261630н		SF
170l;	201020H	SD24 ON CONFERENCED BODY COUNT	S
1700	344 261704н	T S2 INTELL REP	$\mathbf{SF}$
1/20	315 261720н	OX ON AIRCRAFT TAKE OFF	$\Im \mathbb{F}$
1735	31,6 261725H	IMP YOUR ESG CONCERING VC	$\Im F$
3.74O	347 261720Н	BX ASKED IT 3/3 WAS MOVING	SF
	3կ8 2617կ5н	OX NOTFILE OX	SF
1750	3h9 26 <b>1</b> 715H	SW DIRECTED TO PLACE ADDITIONAL MEN	SF
105	350 2609152	SD24 INREF TO DIST CHIEF VC EN	SP
1820		BX 6 WHO IS IN MY AREA	Sir
1825	352 261715H	SD24 ADV CONFIRM D 50 BODIES	54. S#
1848	853 261.845H	IMP PF AMBUSHES	
1849	35h 2618h5H	SH REQ ON 2FO TEAMS ANSWERD	$\mathbf{S}\mathbf{F}$
1955	355 <b>261915</b> H		SF
		SD24 1 VC PLT LOC	SF
1956	356 2 <b>613352</b>	SD24 ON VC KIA. KIA BY S/A SHRAPNEL	S.
5000	357 261915H	SD24 FRIEMBLY UPITS LOC	3F
2001	358 261915H	SW VEH REP	SF
2005	359 ZOZUUUH	PP24 IN THE TO CAPT ROCHE	$\mathbf{S}^{m}$
2006	360 <b>26</b> 1855H	IMP D2-2,D203,D2-2,B2-1,B2-3, LEFT	SF
2015	361 262000H	IMP AGENT REP	Sir
2016	362 2618li5H	MONROE SIT REP INTELL	SF
2130	363 262008н	A2-3 LEFT -VEH REP	SF
2138	364 261750H	WH24 VC BLEV BRIDGE 577964	SF
	365 262217H	SD25 IN RUF TO 262010H	
	366 26NDTG	SN OP FIRED ILIUM	SF
			SF
	367 264 DTG	SW WILL RELIEVE BY BOOTHS 2708004	SF
	368 2620 <b>10</b> H	AG DEF SD24 261745H	SF
	369 262320H	BX REP INCOMICN ARTY 16 RDS	ST
	370 SENDIG	3RDS LANDED BETWEEN 506039&24 CP	$\mathfrak{S} \mathfrak{F}$
0145	371 26NDIG	SWITCH TO ALT SIGN & COUNTER	\$33
のから	372 2 <b>\$</b> 0055H	TINGE NIGHT REP	SF
6145		AG3 TO S'ORE ON INCOMIGN	SF
0145	371 270030H	SWITCH	Sir
0233	375 270230Н	GRANTED PER TO HAVE LIGHTS IN MESS	SF
0233	376 26235511	BX 6 1 INCOMING ARTY RD VIC OLD REGT	SF
		A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF T	_

	0416	37l	270h15H	IMP D CO SAW MOVEMENT TO FRONT	C) TO
	01/10	37 %		T. HOUR TO DOOD	SF
07	0705	376	270700H	THE CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACT	SF
•	0740	377	2707357	TMD BTAIN CHECKADY	SF
	0742		270710H	PV UNTO DEGOT DED	SF
	0.050			DA TITLO TOUCH AND ON COMPANY	SF
	0925	<b>3</b> 80		TWO ON THE ABOUT TODAY	SF
	0926	381	270917H	THE ON IZ ACT PROP	SF
	0920	382		DDO! ON NOT DELCOMED WE THAN	SF
	1000	383	270930H	TEXT OF TOLL PRISONER MR. HONG	SF
	1030	384	271020H	HO2 DEC OF WAR HOD TO THE	$\mathbf{S}\mathrm{F}$
	1040	385	2710201	L HOUR IS 0900 TING SIT REP IMP NIGHE SUMMARY BX HELO RECON REP SW ON I FO RECD ON CONTACT IMP ON IZ ARTY PREP IMP DI DU IZ PP24 ON FOL PRISONER MR. HONG IMP C CO TO TEST FIRE TS3 REQ CLEARANGE TO FIRE	SH
	1225	386	271030H 271205H	THE REP ON SPEALING ON LOUD SPEAKER	S.º
	1255	387	271205H	DA PAT PULLER CANCALLED	SF
	1454		2711. 21	IN FW TO BX DAMAGED BRIDGE 577964	SF
	1.835	389	27 <b>1</b> 45hH	D CO NO FIRE S/A ON 1/4 RANGE	Sit
	1.035 1.935		271735年	INP PF AMBUSHES	$\mathbf{S}\mathbb{F}$
	1323		271713Н	IMP SIT RED VC PLTS	SP
	2025	391	27 2000	IMP B CO REQ ILIUM NEG	SF
	2030		272028H	IMP VEH REP	SF
	2035	393	272005H	IMP ON NEW MAN TRAP	${f SF}$
	2036	394	271917Н	IMP OF#2 SIT REP	SF
	50f0	395	5,50000.1	PP24 ON FOL PRISONER MR. HONG IMP C CO TO TEST FIRE? TS3 REQ CLEARANGE TO FIRE IMP REP VN SPEAUING ON LOUD SPEAKER BX PAT FUILER CAMCELED INFO TO BX DAMAGED BRIDGE 577964 D CO BO FIRE S/A ON 1/4 RANGE IMP PF AMBUSHED IMP SIT RED VC PLTS IMP B CO REQ ILIUM NEG IMP VEH REP IMP ON NEW MAN TRAP IMP OF#2 SIT REP TINGE WIRETEAM RECD 1 RD ALL SAFE IMP D3-3 HAS LEFT	$\mathbf{S}F$
	21.00	396	2721.00H	IMP D3-3 HAS IEFT	SF
	2115	397	-2 <b>7</b> 2055H	TINGE WIRETEAM RECD 1 RD ALL SAFE JMP D3-3 HAS JEFT BX REP ON PAT TINGE ONVC SMIPER TINGE G BTRY 1RD ISCOMING IMP ON UNKNOWN R1 WISON HL IMP REF TO 272123H SD24 2VC CO 55909 AG NEG SIT MEP+ TO SHOVE TIMGE REP	Sz
	21.30		2720h0H	TINGE ONVC SMIPER	SF
	2 <b>1</b> 3년		~720h0H	TINGE G BIRY IRD INCOMING	SF
	21,36		272123	IMP OH UNKNOWN RI WUSON HL	SF
	57/10	1:01	272 <b>1</b> 35H	IMP REF TO 272123H	SF
	2300	1105	272230H	SD24 2VC 00 519909	SF
	<i>51</i> 100	l <sub>l</sub> o3	272315H	AG NEG SIT REP+ TO SHOVE	SF
	0015	hoh	27231151	TIMGE REP	SF
	0035		2723454	IMP 1 RD HILUM	SF
	0015	406	2 <b>8</b> 0006Н	C3-1 RETURNED	SF
	01.15	407	280100H	OX NEG NIGHT REP	SF
	0725	Ji68	Stande	KX IMP REP BURST OF AUTO WPN FIRE	SF
	0725	409	280425H	SW NEG SIT REPORT	SF
	0726	1410	280120H	OPERATION CANCILLED FOR AT LEAST 24 HOURS	SF
	0800	411	200700Н	TINGE SIT REPORT	SF
	0800		<b>2</b> 80735H	IMP NIGHT SIR REPORT	SF
	0950	413	280 <b>93</b> 5H	ON PE COMPANY	SF
	0951	414	280847н	4TH MARINES ON NEW MANTRAP	SF
	1030	415	2809 <b>3</b> 5н	LTH MARINES ON NEW MANTRAP TS REQ FOR AIR STRIKE IN RECEIVED SNIPER FIRE D-1 NEG RESULT ON SNIPER AFFIRMATIVE REPLY TO MESSAGE	SF
	1030	416	201015н	DL RECETVED SNIPER FIRE	SF
	1040		281037Н	D-1 NEG RESULT ON SNIPER	SF
	1050		281045н	AFFIRMATIVE REPLY TO MESSAGE	SF
,	1215		28113511	PF AMEUSHES	SF
	1.235		281225H	SUB-CONTRACTOR VISITED LY-TIN REQ SECURITY	SF
	1410	421	281410н	D PLATOON SIZED PATROL RETURNED TO CO	
	1615	422	201.615н	DIST POLICE CHIEF IN TIN REPORTS 2000 VC	SF
	1820	423	281730H	VC PLATOON AND VC SQUAD LOCATIONS	SF
		1,24	28171юн	DUSK PATROL REPORT	SF
		425	201713н	LOCAL AGENT REPORT	SF <b>S</b> F
		1126	2 <b>8</b> 1745H	FRIENDLY UNIT LOCATIONS	SF
	•	,		The second section 1 of 1 to 1 to 1 to 1 to 1 to 2 of 1 to 1	QI.

1825	427 NDTG	FRIENDLY UNITS LOCATION	SF
1826	428 281818H	SN L TO BE COMMITTED TO AIRFIELD DEFENSE	SF
1942		RECON FLIGHT RECEIVED S/A FIRE	SF
2022		PF AMBUSH SITES	SF
2023		FIRED TWO ARTY MISSIONS	SF
201 <sub>1</sub> 5		BX DESIRES POLICY CONCERNING VEHICLE TRAFFIC	SF
2015		DIP VEHICLE TRAFFIC REPORT	SF
2055	101 00m POTE	THE PART OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE	SF
2101	1.2¢ 2020 2011	D-2-3 JUST DEPARTED	SF
	1.26 NIDOO	D-2-3 JUST DEPARTED ALL FLSU SECURITY PERSONNEL POSTED	SF
2101	136 NDTG	WIE LINO DECOUNTY LINOUMAN LOOTED	SF
2215	1,37 282205H	A-2-1 HAS DEPARTED	SF
2225	138 282030H	IX TIN REPORTS 1500 TO 2000 VC 456007 BX HAVE POSITION 479000 OP #1 REPORTS A/W FIRE VIC HILL 26	SF
2310	1439 28 <b>2250H</b>	DA HAVE PUBLICAL AFFECTE UTC UTT OF	SF
2330	140 282255H	I OO TO THE ANTHON OTHER VIO BLUE ZO	SE
2 <b>3</b> 35	141 28 <b>2335</b> H	H CO IS IN AMPUSH SITE	SF
231,0	1142 202340H	OP #1 DEPONDED ARTI ON AZIMUTO DODO	SF
2340	111 20233UH	DIOM CHIEF DEC ADMY	SF
2340	1111 505512H	DIST CHIEF REQ ARTI	SF
2345	145 202340H	H CO IS IN AMFUSH SITE OP #1 OBSERVED ARTY ON AZIMUTH 3650 OP #1 REPORTS SEEING FLASH DIST CHIEF REQ ARTY OP #1 OBSERVED AIR STRIKE OP #1 OBSERVED AIR STRIKE AT 2330H	SF
2345	11.7 0802 CT	OF AT OBSERVED AIR SIRING AI 2000	SF
2H00	山7 28 <b>2355H</b>	OP #1 OBSERVED ONE RD ARTY	SF
0010	148 282400H	C-2-1 DEPARTED 2358H OP #1 OBSERVED TWO LIGHTS OP #1 OBSERVED AIR STRIKE	SF
0012	1419 290001H	The Character and Capter and Capt	SF
0045	150 290025H	OF #I OBSERVED WIN STRIVE	SF
00/12	151 NDTG		SF
0055		OP #1 OBSERVED ALR STRIKE	SF
01 /iO	1453 290 <b>130</b> H	H CO PATROL SITUATION SAME	SF
0200		81 ILLUMINATION FIRED AT 536104	SF
0330	455 290230H	AT 3660 MILS FROM OP #1	SF
0 <b>3</b> 35	456 290330H	BX NEG CONTACT DAP OP SIERRA REPORTS TWO EXPLOSIONS	SF
0414	457 2904144		SF
0430	458 29 <b>0</b> 430H	DMP RUPORTS AIR STRIKE PATROL C-2-1 HAS RETURNED	SF
0540	459 290 <b>5</b> 25H	LY WON C-S-T UND USIONALD	SF
05/11	1,60 290 <b>5</b> 1,0H	C-1-3 HAS RETURNED	
0600	461 290600H	D-2-1 HAS RETURNED	SF SF
0605		BX PATROL IS 500 METERS FROM CH PT REF YOUR 281730H	SF
0830			SF
0831	164 290809H	COORD ARE 614026 and 619023	SF
0950		LVT DOWN AT DROP-OFF POINT	SF
1005	1,66 29 <b>100</b> 0H	BX PATROL CHANGES	SF
1140	467 291130H	TARGET SURVEILLANCE	
12h5		IMP REPORTS SPEED BOAT IN CHANNEL	SF SF
1309	469 291245H	TINGE -5 VN SPOTTED 1140H	SF
1320	170 NDTG		SF
1525		C-3 PLATOON HAS RETURNED FROM PATROL	SF
1715	472 29 <b>1605</b> Н	TWO VC COMPANIES LOCATED SIGHTED 50 PE PLE ON TRAILS	SF
1718	1:73 291703H	TITE TO DAME OF STOOL #1.45	SF
1720		LVT IS BACK- SEE MSG #465 DPP PF AMBUSHES BX OBSERVED TWO ELEPHANTS SD 24 ON FRIENDLY UNITS OR AT CARPINE SDIASUNG	SF
1805	175 291805H	DIP PF AMBUSHES	SF
1840	476 291825H	DA UDDERVED THU EDECTRINES	SF
2010	477 29 <b>1.945H</b>	BX OBSERVED TWO ELEPHANTS SD 21; ON FRIENDLY UNITS SB ALSARDINE SPLASHING	SF
2015	178 292010H	SB ALSANDINE SPLASHING  IMP B-142, C-1-1, C-1-2, D-1-1, B-1#3 DEPARTED	SF
20 <b>2</b> 0		MP VIH REPORT	SF
2020		THE VIEW WENT OFF	
21.10	1481 292020H	DP D-1-2 and D-1-3 DEPARTE D	SF

			547.1
	LO - DOCODIT T	EX CO F(-) AT521015  DP ON FIRSHISSION  DP C-3 MAD LEFT  P ON US PERSONNEL IN VILLAGE  P HEPT MLT OFF LOADING  A. G. SUOT MEARD ON BEACH  A-2-1 DEPARTED  CO(-) PATROL AT522008  DEP FIRE & RDS 52609-  SBA-28RPT 2RDS FIRED 518118  THECO RETORT  F CO (0) PATROL SITUATION SAME  F CO HEN SUTEF  SHOVE RPT PMY ACTIVITY  WH-21 SPAR REPORT  SN PPT SOUND OF RIFL FIRE  SN 31 REPORT  BOOTH PATROL SINT OUT TO CHECK  IX PATROL MULL R REPORT NEG CONTACT  IXP C-1 PATROL HAS RETURNED  B2 AND B3 HAS RETURNED  ENGE NIGHT REPORT  LANGH HIGHT REPORT  EX TO FIRE ON LANGE  FRUINDLY TROCP MOVEMENT  SPAR REPORT  UNKNOWN NOWBER OF MEN DIGGING CAVES  MARUNE LAUNDRY BEING WASHEE IN AN TAN  PATROL FULLER RETURNE TO CP  DISTRIC CHIEF RIP  IMT APPOX 1 WOMEN APPREHENDED  AURSTRIKE 31 AUG  1/4 WODIFIED FAT FLAN  A2RECD AUTO WP NS FIRE  OP TANGO A CO WILL SURVEY BEACH  BH REP ON 1 COLORED 1 WHITE MAN	400) 1730
<b>53</b> 00	765 555050B	TO THE PERSON	3 <i>1</i>
2120	483 292025H	TO OF TAND TERM	SF
<b>2</b> 1.25	1,81, 29 <b>20</b> В2Н .	THE C -3 HAD LIMIT IN WITH AGE	SF
27.35	485 292032H J	P O US P ASSUMING IN VILLED	$\mathfrak{S}\mathbb{F}$
2220	166 292205H 1	H EDI RIT OFF, TOWNING	<b>ವಿ</b> ಪ್
2230	167 2921254 .	A. G. SHOT HEARD ON BEACH	SF
2220	1.80 292125H	A-2-1 DEPARTED	97
2335	100 000000 H	m(-) PATROL AT522008	ଦ୍ୱର
22HO	TOT OUGGER	TO HTRE 10 RDS 52609-	CATH.
5540	11/2 53555311	ADA ORDET ORDS FTRED 518118	D.:
2300	F0S 5055TOH	20HmSoft : Sitto Isiaaa San	<b>5</b>
0005	1193 292110011	THE TANK THE OUT SAME	SE
0015	[18] 505HOUA	L (X) (6) LWIMIL DITIONATION PROPERTY.	\$7
01.30	495 <b>3007.20</b> H	F CO HEL SITH T	SE
0130	496 300035H	SHOVE RPT MY ACTIVITE	<b>S</b> E!
ดาโฮเ	1,97 292330H	WIL-21 SPAR RIPORT	S)/
0330	198 300230H	SN APT SOUND OF RIPL FIRE	87
ひとし	1,00 3002154	SV 3h RIPORT	ŠY:
0320	500 300350H	POOTH PATROL SHIT OUT TO CHECK	O 1
V222	700 200225H	DY PATROL WILL R REPORT NEG CONTACT	G.,
OHOU	200 20075211	TUD C-1 PATROL HAS RETURNED	Q# G
0530	502 300500H	DO AND PR HAS RETURNED	5.1
0900	503 300650H	BS WILD DY INO HELONGER	8.7
0901	50A 300650H	THICK NECESTATION DEPONDS	S
0901	505 <b>300650</b> H	LANGE MARIE REPORT	Sf
0901	506 30000 <b>0H</b>	BX W FIRE OF WORD	<b>5</b> #
0905	5 <b>0</b> 7 300745H	FRIEIDLY TROOP MOVEMENT	S⊮'
กอกรั	508 HDIG	SPAR RAPORT	S
Anon	109 3007 58H	B3LANDED COORD474137	Sir
0200	410 3008/12H	INVOVOMM NORBER OF MEN DIGGING CAVES	Q = 1
0900	510 200042H	MARTHE TAUNDRY BEING WASHEE IN AN TAN	6.7 D.
0910	211 200 200 20 EA	PAUDOT, BULLER RETURNES, TO CP	D.F
0926	512 3009201	DIMETA AUTUR DED	SF
$\mathbf{O}\delta \mathcal{H}_{O}$	513 300920H	DISTRIC CRIEF AIR ADDRIENDED	<b>B</b> 1°
1200	711 30 <b>0</b> 030H	IMI, WELLY T MONTH W. LUTHINGTON	0.0
150	00 212 3005/12H	AIRSTRIKE 31. AUG  1/4 MODIFIED FAT PLAN  A2RECD AUTO WP NS FIRE  OP TANGO A CO WILL SURVEY BEACH	St
T550	516 301214H	1/4 MODIFIED PAT PLAN	SF
1230	517 3012 <b>26</b> H	AZRECD ANDO WE NS FIRE	S.F
1305	F18 301247H	OP TANGO A CO WILL SURVEY BEACH	3 <b>T</b>
1310	519 30125011	BH REP ON 1 COLORED & 1 WHITE MAN	SF
1330	て20、301つによれ	RHO RHP ON CV OP KOOOOK	SF
13	30 521 301230H	AGI/4 ROP 40 PEOPLE 622911	SF
13	30 522 30N TG	AGI/4 ROP 40 PEOPLE 622911 TS3 TO SD24 IS PAT GS6291 A2 SHARHCING VILL 4407 LST ENTERING STEAM IN IMP SECTOR	3F
1400	523 3013 <b>35</b> H	A2 SEARHOTHO VIII. 10107	s.f
1400	Kol. 301 33KH	TUP RAPERTAG CHEAN IN THE CECTOR	SF
1420	1,5 2 3 1 1 3 0 11	PATROL A-2 RETURNED	SF
142V	ער בעל אריים איני אריים. העט בעל איני איני	TATION W-C MAINTONIA	SF
7.620	150 520 301 <b>450</b> 0	AG 10 Mar 3 DW DI ONDER OF GO	
7030	52/ 301025H	PATROL A-2 RETURNED  AG TO IMP, SW BY ORDER OF CO  IMP CONTINUES SECURITY MISSION  B-3 REPORTS APPROX 125 VC  B3 CHUNG REPS APPROX 25 VC 431169  ESTRELISHED SECURITY APPLIES DAMP	SF
1035	250 301010H	B-3 REPORTS APPROX 125 VC	SF
1725	529 3016 <b>10</b> H	BJ CHULIG RIPS APPROX 25 VC 431169	SF
1726	53° 3016 <b>50</b> H	ESTEBLISHED SECURITY ARD LST RAMP	$\mathtt{SF}$
1901	531 3018 <b>35</b> H	ALL SET IN AROUND SHIP	\$7
1903	532 301840Н	METRO DATA	\$7
190li	533 301800Н	PT MMBUSHES	SF
2011	53) 301920H	OBS 15 PEOPLE	SF
2011	134 3010 <b>50</b> H	ALL SET IN AROUND SHIP METRO DATA PE MANEUSHES OBS 15 PEOPLE CO C MAS A RUN-AWAY MO FRIENDLY UNITS LOC	SF
5U.	12 536 3019ligh	FRIENDLY HEITES INC	SF SF
a.C.	10 JU1/4/11	a graduate region (1994), and anti-	J.

2013	537	30195511	CTR MITT COME ACTIONS AND TRANSPORT TOME		
2011	100	30 <b>1955</b> H			SF
	アンマ	301.905H			$\mathbb{SF}$
ないより われまで	- <u>13</u> 9	2019051		÷.	317
2115	57(O	3020107	DIST CUM F REGION CALL ARTY		SF
4411 0117	- 2円.人 でした	3021054	CROVD ON THE OF KY HOA DISPERSED		3)(
27.17	- 23名 で1.5	302100H	B2 BLUE HAS DE ARTED		S1#
5151	ラはず	30575211	CO H (-) SHET RE'		$\Im \Gamma$
さまうと のまだの	기대	302130H	Al MAT DEFARTED	- 14 1	SF
2150	414	302055H	SPAR RW		SF
2202	5/10	3021051 30212511 30212511 302130H 302055H 302200H	CO H(-) SIT REP		3F
2225	247	عالمات في الماليان فر	DE THE DESTURY ED		الدر.
2330	しなし	3023 <b>0</b> 5H	D-2& EL LEFT		$\Im i^{\mu}$
2330	549	302250H	SD24 ATR OBS SETTERAL VC 519915		SF
2330	550	302230H	FIARE FER D BY AG PET.		$\mathbb{S}F$
2330	ולכ")	3023 <b>3</b> 5H	AT'S FIRED FLARE TINGE SAIGHED TO DELAY FUSE		SP
23 <b>30</b>	∵:2	3023 <b>30</b> H	TINGE SAUCHED TO DELAY FUSE	7	SF
					SF
0105	201	3 <u>4</u> 0100H	H CO(-) LOC 500m NORTH OF 580988		SF
01.20	<b>5</b> 55	3 <b>1</b> 000 <b>10</b> H	D2 DEPARTED		SF
0215	556	3102104	BX CO (-) PAT LOC 520976		3)⊬
0 <b>21</b> 5	557	31012 <b>0</b> H	H CO(-) LOC 500m NORTH OF 580988  D2 DEPARTED  BX CO (-) PAT LCC 520976  OUT POST AT 466872 HIT BY TWO BN VO		3F
(300	558	3102 <b>30</b> H	IMP EL PAT HAS RETURNED		SF
レンプロ	ランゴ	31.0315н	IMP PP24 LISTAMATED ONE CO VC		or SF
6330	ŝĉo		R Q ANY DIFO YOU HAVE		SF SE
0330	501		DL PAT HAS REMINED		SF
0405	5.2	310401H	BX 3 PAT HOTOL SIT REP	w.	
0525 0527 0658 0632	17/3		TRUCK STOPPED OF HIGHWAY #1		3¥ an
0527	$\widetilde{G}(\widetilde{J})$	310525#	CO (*) PAT JUSK LHAVING CH PT	1,	SP
0658	हिटेह	37.06304	I CORP TOC SPOTTED BOATS	•	SF
⊝^32	666	3107154	SQ HAS DEPARTED		317 013
06 <b>32</b>	567	310730Н	LOU 1621, HOLL AT LIST DOCK	n a	SF
0833	568	31073011	TINGE TIGHT REP	,	SF
683I <sub>4</sub>	1,70	3108000	D2 AT DISCULT PT		37
0835	576	310025H	D PH RUCD SHIFTER FIRE	. • .	SF
0250	$\tilde{\epsilon}\gamma\dot{\gamma}$	3108/121	IMP D2 RECD SHIPER FIRE COOLUS		314
0955	672	31000271	H BTRY WILL PIRE	, å	SF.
0956	573	31.09 <b>1</b> 0H	IMP 24 RUPS 2 PF PLAT 100	•	$\mathbf{S}^{\mathrm{e}}$
1100	574	31.1023+	D2 HIT DOODY TRAP 5 WIA		3
1110		31.7.034н	IMP BOOBY TRAP BURIED 428084		SF
1150		31NDTG	TS 24 REP ON ATK ON BA BAY	. 1	31
1125		311000A	CTOL APPET OF TAXABLE CANCER FOR		31
1125	578	311120H	SD24 ARTY CLARANCH CANCELED	. ** - ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	3F
1121	579		D2 FAT LEURNED MLG CONTACT	•	SF
1145	550	311120H	AGS REP ON VC LOC 514915		SF
1145	200 200	311030H	REQ ANY INFO YOU HAVE ON ATK		SF
		311030H	TO TO SDAL REQ INFO ON BA BAU	1	SF
1145	ige δ - ige δ	31.0830H	WH24 REP OP OVER RUN 465873	a"	SF
1300	583 601	31123511	B-MED REP 2KIA 3WIA	•	SF
1320	201	311300H	IMP CAS FROM F CO (-) OP IOC 1/72012		3F
1330	26.0	311300H			SF
1540	586	31150011	BT I' REF YOUR 311400H DISTRIC CHIEF RI	₽.	$\mathfrak{I}^{\mathbb{F}}$
1605	557	311605H	DMP TO PP OF #1 PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ARM	IY TEAG	SF SF
1730	58E	3177104	G2/S2 A CONF ERANCE OF ALL UNITS		SF
				197	

		_	그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그 그	
1730	580	3117 <b>1</b> 5H	ON PASSICRD-COUNTER SIGNS	31
1505	i(o.	3117554	B3 FICKED UP BY LVTS	Sh
15 <b>10</b>	591	311905н		SF
191,1		31.1846н		SI
2000	503	33.3 SOOH	BX H CO OF ONTOS ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE	SF
5000	13911	311.8484	IMP B3 RETURNED B1 AT KY 10 I	Si
200		3118h5H	SH MSG TO WIE SO	31
2006	596	311900Н		SI
3008	507	311955H		SF
2009	ぱつい	31.18 <b>35</b> 11	CHIOL ON BOARSTEE TO THE	SF
20 <b>10</b>	599	311958H	IMP AL SOD PAT LEFT	Sh
2011	600	311904H	LMP MARUNOS ARXX WIA - SCIVILLANS	SF
2012	$Q_{U,1}$	311555H	TS2 ON PASSMORD	SI
2015	CO2	3 MOTG	SH3 ON FIRE HISS ON THE HEAD OF THE HEAD	SF
2020	603	3 <b>J</b> S000H	BX6 ON CANCELED OPERATION	ŞF
2030	604	315050A	BX TO FIRE ILLIM	SF
2031	605	3111DTG		
2032	6060	311935H	DUS ON THE THE WOLLD THE	SF
2035	607	3120304	IMP VEH REP	SF
2036	608	31202511	IMP 2 AIR RECON REQ	SF
2108	609	315108Й	HQ 7TH MAR (6) ON VC TROOP PUTED UP	SF
2790	610	<b>シエミエエン</b> は	TMA OW AG TOC	गट
2:39	611	312137H	IMP AL BACK MEG CONTACT	SF
2140	612	31 <b>12</b> 35 <b>ZV</b>	C LOC SW OF TAOR	SF
2210	613	312200H	FISU REQ 81 TILLUM	SF
2300	614	37.2225H	RECON REQ	SF
2300	615	31.55/ <sup>5</sup> H	IMP REPORTS THAT VALVE REQ ILLUM EVERY 3-5 MIN	SF
2300	616	31225 <b>3</b> H	LOCO LITHING TITION FOR OXMOOD	SF
2320	617	31.5300H	LCU 813 HAS DEPARTED	SF
2350	618	312328н	PAYABLE ROUND NEAR HILL 69	SF
2355	61.9	31234 <b>5</b> H	B-2, B-3, and C-1 HAVE DEPARTED	SF
			THE PART OF THE PA	SF