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HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1056 68

3/JWH/ds

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19 Feb 1968

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 4th Mar ltr 3/WRM/pad over 3100 Ser: 003A35667
dtd 17 Dec 1967

From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation GRANITE)

Ref: (b) MACV Dir 355-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (b).
2. The desirability of maintaining heliteam integrity is recognized, however, the limited availability of helicopters, coupled with their varied lift capacities, may sometimes preclude attainment of the ideal. Detailed pre-operational planning and coordination is required in order to obtain the optimum unit integrity within the lift capability.


A. L. MICHAUX JR.
By direction

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
TAB-~~X~~

4TH MAR -

A/ARPT (OPN GRANITE)

26 OCT-4 Nov 1967

HEADQUARTERS
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
PFO, San Francisco 96602



3/WRM/pab
3100
17 Dec 1967
Serial 003A35667

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

782667

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.D

Encl: (1) 1st Bn 4th Mar After Action Report
(2) BTL 1/3 After Action Report
(3) 3d Bn 12th Mar After Action Report
(4) 4th Marines OpOrd 50-67 w/Ch #1
(5) 4th Marines Frag Ord 52-67
(6) 4th Marines Frag Ord 53-67
(7) Operation Map

1. Code Name: Operation GRANITE (Search and Destroy).
2. Dates of Operation: 251610H October 1967 to 061700H November 1967.
3. Location: PHONG-DIEN District, THUA-THIEN Province. Boundaries of the area are described in paragraph 6.c (Intelligence).
4. Task Organization:

4th Marines (-) (Rein)

Hq Co (-)

1st Bn 4th Mar

BTL 1/3

1st Bn 3d Mar

Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar

1st Plat Co A 3d Recon Bn

1st Plat Co A 3d Engr Bn

Col Wm. L. DICK

Capt J. P. WILLIAMS

LtCol E. A. DEPTULA

LtCol A. I. THOMAS

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2d Plat Co A 3d MT Bn

2d Bn (-) 1st Mar (26 to 30 Oct 67)

LtCol A. VANWINKLE

Co B 1st Bn 1st Mar

Co H 2d Bn 1st Mar

Co I (Rein) 3d Bn 24th Mar

Capt M. R. [REDACTED]

5. Supporting Forces:

a. Units

- (1) 1st MAW
- (2) 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Mar
- (3) F-4E-1
- (4) Co A 3d Med Bn
- (5) Co A (-) 3d SF Bn
- (6) Co B 3d Engr Bn
- (7) Co B 3d MT Bn
- (8) Det 24th Psyops Co (USA) (4th Tn)

b. Detailed discussion of the support provided is as follows:

- (1) Artillery support - see paragraph (2).

(2) Air support: During Operation [REDACTED] various types of aircraft were utilized, to include fixed wing attack aircraft, flareships, helicopter gunships, fixed wing gunships and observation aircraft in support of the infantry battalions. Medevac and resupply helicopters performed a commendable job entering difficult landing zones to hoist out wounded and to lower supplies. A total of 201, 419 lbs of supplies were lifted in for resupply of the battalions.

(3) Civic action/psychological operations: In support of Operation GRASS there were five [REDACTED] leaflets and an hour of broadcasts conducted, [REDACTED] leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts were variations of the [REDACTED] theme.

- (4) For detailed discussion of the support provided see Paragraph 11.

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6. Intelligence:a. Enemy situation(1) Disposition and strength

(a) Intelligence acquired prior to Operation GRANITE indicated that the below listed units were utilizing Base Area-114 for an operating, supply and training area.

TRI-THIEN Military Region

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Headquarters Element	150
C-11 Intelligence Company	150
C-12 Sapper Company	100
C-13 Communications Company	150
C-14 Engineer Company	140
C-15 Anti-Aircraft Company	80
C-16 Mortar Company	70
C-17 Recoiless Rifle Company	90
TOTAL STRENGTH	930

6th NVA Regiment

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Regimental Headquarters	300
800th Battalion	300
802d Battalion	300
806th Battalion	300
TOTAL STRENGTH	1200

(b) While it was believed the above units were using Base Area-114 as their logistical focal point, it was felt a substantial portion of these forces would be deployed outside the limits of Base Area-114 on resupply missions.

(c) The 810th Main Force Battalion was located within reinforcing distance of 48 hours forced march.

(2) Mission. The enemy's mission during the period immediately prior to Operation GRANITE appeared to be the acquisition and the storage of rice and other comestibles to last through the winter monsoon season. As secondary missions the enemy was to continue attempts to interdict

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friendly lines of communication, and disrupt RD programs and government control in THUA-THIEN Province.

b. Enemy activity during the period

(1) Prior to Operation GRANITE intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had been building defensive positions, bunkers, training areas, and storage facilities in Base Area-114.

(2) During Operation GRANITE, attacking marine units ran into well-constructed and camouflaged defensive complexes comprised of log bunkers with connecting tunnels and communication trenches. Also encountered were several well-camouflaged tree platforms commanding excellent observation and fields of fire covering approaches into the operating area. It is estimated that marine forces made contact with at least two enemy companies of approximately 200 NVA.

(3) Through documents taken from the enemy dead and found in huts and bunkers it was determined that elements of the 800th Battalion, 802d Battalion and the G-15 Anti-Aircraft Company were among those forces encountered.

c. Description of the Areas of Operation

(1) The area of operation was bounded on the north by east-west gridline 24, on the east by north-south gridline 63, on the south by east-west gridline 13 and on the west by north-south gridline 44.

(2) Cover and concealment. Concealment was excellent throughout the operating area. The operation was conducted in dense jungle with a canopy from 50 to 90 feet high. The jungle canopy, coupled with the bunker systems emplaced on the key terrain, afforded the enemy excellent cover.

(3) Key terrain. Key terrain was the ridgelines and hill complexes extending throughout most of the operating area.

(4) Observation and fields of fire

(a) Observation was extremely limited throughout the operating area due to the canopy and heavy undergrowth. Aerial observation was poor to non-existent in most of the operating area except for the areas along streamlines and the few cleared areas used for LZ's.

(b) Fields of fire were poor for all weapons.

(5) Avenues of approach. The primary avenues of approach were the extensive trail networks found throughout the area.

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(6) Weather. Temperatures ranged from a high of 88 degrees during the day, to a low of 68 degrees at night. Scattered showers were experienced the first three days of the operation. For the remainder of the operation the weather was sunny and mild.

(7) Civilian population. There were no indigenous personnel encountered in the operating area.

7. Mission: The 4th Marine Regiment was assigned the mission of conducting a combat operation in cooperation/coordination with elements of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) in the VC/NVA Base Area-114 vicinity Hill 674 (YD 5121) to capture/destroy logistics caches, installations, and equipment; obtain intelligence; and to kill or capture enemy encountered.

8. Concept of Operation:

a. While the 4th Marines was to conduct a search and destroy mission with two battalions in the vicinity of Hill 674, a 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Task Force would perform a similar operation east of Hill 674 with three battalions.

b. The 4th Marines' scheme of maneuver was to move the 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar (command group and three companies) into an assembly area north of Hill 674 during the night of D-1. Early on D-Day the 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar would then commence search and destroy operations south while BLT 1/3 conducted a helicopterborne assault into the area west of Hill 674 to search and destroy south then east. Concurrently the 2d Bn (-) 1st Mar was to have moved into an operating area northwest of Camp EVANS and west of MY-CHAMH to conduct search and destroy operations along known exfiltration routes from Base Area-114. A forward artillery base was established between Camp EVANS and Hill 674 where 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Mar could better support the operating forces.

9. Execution:

a. On 25 October 1967 the 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar moved with Co's C and D from Camp EVANS under cover of darkness to an assembly area which had been previously secured by Co B. After arriving at the assembly area the battalion consolidated its forces and prepared for the following day's operations.

b. On 26 October the 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar commenced search and destroy operations south towards its initial objectives at 0615 with Co C on the right, Co B on the left followed by the battalion Cnd Grp and Co D. Co A had been tasked with the mission of providing security for the forward artillery position along with a platoon each of tanks from Co C 3d Tk Bn and ontos from Co B 3d AT Bn. At 1115, after a delay due to weather, BLT 1/3

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commenced its heliborne assault into Hill 144. Following a thorough fixed wing and artillery preparation of the area, the helilift was completed with no problems or enemy opposition. A temporary check fire was imposed on the artillery supporting the 1st Bn 4th Mar during the troop lift due to helicopter activity. At 1400 the 2d Bn (-) 1st Mar (command group and Co H) and Co D 1st Bn 1st Mar commenced search and destroy operations west of MY-CHANH chopping OPCON to the 4th Marines at 1400. There was only scattered contact with the enemy on the 26th with Co D 1st Bn 4th Mar taking seven FR/WIA (Medevac).

c. On 27 October BIT 1/3 and the 2d Bn (-) 1st Mar continued search and destroy operations with only minor contact. The major contact of the day and of the operation occurred in the 1st Bn 4th Mar zone of action. Moving south with Co B on the left, Co C on the right, the battalion command group and Co D following in trace, the battalion met increasingly heavy delaying actions by small groups of enemy armed with semi-automatic weapons. Co B was advancing up a draw towards a saddle between Hill 674 and 300 with Co C moving towards Hill 300 as its objective when at 1120 Co B made the first contact. As Co B pushed up the draw, the enemy sniper and small arms fire intensified during a series of small contacts which resulted in one NVA/KIA and a captured AK-47. Co C on the right met small groups of enemy employing grenades and small arms fire on the steep slope leading to the crest of Hill 300. At 1445 Co B came under intense automatic weapons, small arms (including sniper) and anti-tank rocket (B-40) fires from well fortified bunkers on their flanks and to their front. Over the course of the next several hours Co B fought valiantly to remove the dead and wounded under support of machine gun, artillery and helicopter gunships fire. Two platoons of Co D were committed to assist Co B to withdraw after darkness under artillery illumination. Helicopters were called in to extract the critically wounded. Due to the lack of adequate LZ's and the inability of the H-34 to hover, the majority of the wounded had to be moved approximately 1000 meters to the battalion CP where there was an aid station and a prepared LZ. Co C consolidated in a perimeter halfway up Hill 300 while the remainder of the battalion assisted Co D. Losses for the days action were five FR/KIA, four FR/WIA and 31 FR/WIA.

d. On 28 October the 1st Bn 4th Mar evacuated the remaining dead and wounded and called in artillery and fixed wing air strikes on the saddle where Co B had made contact with an estimated NVA company. Co A was helilifted to reinforce the 1st Bn 4th Mar while Co C continued to advance cautiously up Hill 300 reaching the crest that afternoon. BIT 1/3 ran into scattered groups of NVA while continuing to search and destroy in its assigned zone of action.

e. On the 29th, the 1st Bn 4th Mar resumed its advance on the NVA bunker complex in the saddle between Hills 674 and 300. The movement was a closely controlled ground attack coordinated with a heavy volume of artillery and fixed wing air support. Immediately Co D and A received well-

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aimed small arms fire from snipers located in concealed tree platforms and bunkers. Having taken eight KIA and 16 WIA, Co A held their ground on the slope of Hill 674 while Co's C and D moved in through the bunker complex. At 1730 Co D made contact with Co A and searched the area where Co B had been heavily engaged two days previously. All the missing bodies and equipment of Co B were found, recovered and evacuated. The 20-30 enemy bunkers discovered had been pulverized by the heavy artillery fires and air ordnance delivered in the area - leaving only traces of evidence of enemy presence. BLT 1/3's search and destroy operation during the day resulted in seven FR/WIA and two NVA/KIA (CONF) in scattered minor contacts.

f. The 1st Bn 4th Mar, having taken its initial objective, commenced search and destroy operations south around Hill 674's western slopes finding only scattered bamboo huts and campsites. BLT 1/3's contacts with the enemy increased as the companies moved slowly through the thick vegetation in small unit actions, receiving small arms and 60-mm mortar fires. A Co B patrol made contact with an undetermined size NVA unit resulting in four NVA/KIA (CONF) and three captured AK-47's.

g. Continuing its advance on a ridgeline (YD 4822) elements of BLT 1/3 found convincing evidence of an extensive NVA defensive position in depth on 1 November 1967. 1st Bn 4th Mar continued to search out the enemy installations, finding tunnels containing assorted equipment. Scattered contact was made by both battalions during the day.

h. On 2 and 3 November, both battalions turned north to move out of the mountainous canopy in preparation for return to Camp EVANS. Co D 1st Bn 4th Mar took four FR/WIA in a minor contact with 8-10 NVA firing small arms and anti-tank rockets. BLT 1/3 moved north along the trace of the SONG-REU-CAO River with Co's A and D and the battalion command group leading, Co C on the left flank and Co B left behind to ambush any enemy moving into a deserted LZ at (YD 486240). The plan was quite successful as Co D caught an NVA platoon in the open killing 10 NVA (CONF) and 15 NVA (PROB) with well coordinated machine gun, mortar and artillery fires.

i. On the 4th of November both the 1st Bn 4th Mar and BLT 1/3 cleared the mountains and swept north across the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley arriving at Camp EVANS by nightfall. The forward artillery position manned by elements of the 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Mar closed station and moved to Camp EVANS with security provided by Co I 3d Bn 26th Mar.

j. On 5 November two companies of the 1st Bn 4th Mar occupied blocking positions in the vicinity of MY-CHANH in conjunction with a short 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) operation. On 6 November BLT 1/3 moved by truck from Camp EVANS to CAMP LIC chopping OPCON to the 9th Marines. At 1900 Operation GRANITE was terminated.

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10. Results:

a. The following friendly casualties were incurred during the period 25 October to 6 November 1967.

(1) KIA (Hostile)	25
(2) WIA (Medevac)	88
(3) WIA (Minor)	22

b. Enemy personnel losses:

(1) NVA KIA (CONF)	34
(2) NVA KIA (PROB)	47

c. Enemy weapons and equipment losses:

(1) Weapons	
(a) Individual weapons	7
(b) Crew served weapons	1

11. Administrative matters:

a. Supply. The primary source of supply for Operation GRANITE was FLSG-A at PHU-BAI. Supply point distribution from the LSA at Camp EVANS was utilized. A shortage of 105-mm and 155-mm HE and illum fuzes did occur; however, immediate action was taken and requisite stocks were procured.

(1) Major issues during Operation GRANITE:

MCI	15,823 rations
Sundry packs	132
AVGAS	6,067 gallons
JP-4	9,892 gallons

b. Resupply. The 1st Plat Co A 3d SF Bn directed helicopter re-supply to the infantry battalions from the LSA at Camp EVANS. Minor problems were encountered by battalions sending their requests for resupply via the Tactical Air Request Net instead of the Helicopter Support Team Net and not cancelling resupply requests in time to prevent untimely delivery.

(1) Resupply data

UNIT	TOTAL WE	NO OF LIETS	NO OF EMERG'S	CANCELLATIONS
1/4	20,800	93	2	6
1/3	55,735	46	7	4

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(2) Maintenance - N/A

c. Evacuation and hospitalization. Casualties were evacuated by helicopter either directly to Co A 3d Med Bn in PHU-PAI or temporarily evacuated to the Regimental Aid Station for immediate medical attention.

(1) Evacuation Data

Total Medevacs	137
KIA	25
DOA	2
WIA	110
Processed by RAS	31

(2) The lights in the regimental LSA LZ were used on two occasions for Medevacs.

d. Transportation. The 3d Plat Co A 3d MT Bn and the motor transport platoon attached to BLT 1/3 provided necessary vehicles for routine logistical runs and tactical moves.

30 October 1967 - Transported 2d Bn (-) 1st Mar from MY-CHANH to LA-VANG and Co D 1st Bn 1st Mar from Camp EVANS to QUANG-TRI.

4 November 1967 - Transported 1st Bn 4th Mar/Co I 3d Bn 26th Mar from FFSSB to Camp EVANS.

e. Engineer. Co B 3d Engr Bn provided general combat support for Operation GRANITE. The engineers swept the road to the FFSSB daily, cleared LZ's for resupply and medevacs and destroyed enemy ordnance, supplies and positions.

f. Routine communications were maintained during the operation. A manual retransmission facility was established on Hill 674 and operated throughout the operation with effective results. A Radio Relay Link was established as a backup communication capability from 3d Bn 12th Mar to the forward artillery position.

12. Special equipment and techniques: None.

13. Commander's Analysis:

a. Movement along trails and cleared routes of advance was sure to invite accurate small arms and mortar fires from a well-equipped and mobile enemy thoroughly familiar with the terrain. BLT 1/3's movement was characterized by a day's advance in column followed by a day's patrolling ahead, behind and to the flanks. This method produced a firm intelligence picture and reduced the number of casualties incurred.

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b. Operation GRANITE confirmed the presence of elements subordinate to the TRI-THIEN or Northern Front Headquarters. The enemy employed delaying tactics utilizing the terrain and vegetation to his advantage. The system of bunkers discovered by BLT 1/3 to the southwest of Hill 674 indicated a defended strong point possibly guarding enemy installations located deeper in the mountains to the south.

c. In order not to encumber the progress of an advancing unit with its wounded or extra supplies, it is necessary to utilize helicopters extensively for medical evacuation and resupply purposes. Units must, therefore, always have the capability to expeditiously establish an LZ in the thick canopy. To establish, maintain and secure the LZ detracts from forces available to seek and destroy the enemy. Therefore, procedures and plans for LZ preparation and functioning must be firmly established prior to any operation in mountainous canopy.

14. Recommendation: That, in order to ensure integrity and a controlled build-up of forces in an LZ, a standard sized helibeam should be employed throughout the helicopterborne assault. During Operation GRANITE, BLT 1/3 experienced some confusion in the loading zone due to the varied capacities of helicopters which shifted personnel from the planned flow of five-man helitons. Had there been opposition to the landing in LZ Mallard this confusion could have multiplied the seriousness of the situation.

Wm. L. Dick
Wm. L. DICK

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Copy No. 1 of 30 Copies
 4th Marines (-) (Reinf)
 Camp EVANS (YD 524316), RVN
 210800H October 1967

Operation Order 50-67 (Operation GRANITE)

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6441 I and 6442 II.
 (b) 4th Mar OPORD 100-67
 (c) 4th Mar ADMIN ORD 100-67
 (d) Divo P2000.2E (COL)
 (e) Divo P2000.4C (COMMSOP)

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATION4th Marines (-) (Reinf)

Col DICK

Hq Co (-)1st Bn (-) 4th Mar

LtCol DEPTULA

BLT 1/3 (-)

LtCol THOMAS

1st Bn (-) 3d Mar
 Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 1st Plat, Co A, 3d Recon Bn
 1st Plat, Co A, 3d Engr Bn
 2d Plat, Co A, 3d MT Bn

Regtl Reserve

Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Mar

Capt OSGOOD

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy forces

- (1) Current INTSUMS and PERTINTREPS
- (2) Intelligence Estimate (PASEP)

b. Friendly forces

(1) 3d Marine Division continues operations in assigned TAOs to destroy VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces.

(2) 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) elements will participate in similar operations in adjacent areas

4TH MARINES (REIN)
SAC FILES
00634-67
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(3) 3d Bn (-) (Reinf) 12th Mar DS 4th Mar; on D-Day will displace one 105-mm battery and one 155-mm battery and establish forward artillery position (vic YD 493293).

(4) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides fixed wing and helicopter support.

(5) 3d Reconnaissance Battalion in GS 3d Mar Div with priority of effort to 4th Marines during Operation GRANITE.

(6) 2d Plat (-) (Reinf) Btry D, 1st Bn, 44th Arty (USA)

(a) M-42s	DS 3d Bn 26th Mar (Operation FREMONT)
(b) M-55s	DS 4th Mar

(7) Co B (-) 3d AT Bn. DS 1st Bn 4th Mar

(8) Co C 3d TK Bn.

(a) Co (-) DS 3d Bn 26th Mar (Operation FREMONT)

(b) Plat DS 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar.

(9) Co B, 3d Engr Bn, DS 4th Mar.

(a) Provide normal support for road clearance to 3d Bn 26th Mar (Operation FREMONT).

(b) Provide Plat (-) DS 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar

(c) Provide LZ clearing team to 1st Inf Div (ARVN).

(d) Maintain LZ clearing team on 30 minute standby commencing L-Hour, D-Day.

c. Attachments and detachments. None

2. Mission. 4th Marines, while continuing assigned missions, commencing at H and L Hours, D-Day, in cooperation/coordination with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) forces, will conduct combat operations in the VC/NVA Base Area 114-vicinity HILL 674 (YD 5121)-to capture/destroy logistics caches, installations, and equipment; obtain intelligence; and to kill or capture enemy encountered.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. 4th Marines will conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of HILL 674 with two battalions. Concurrently,

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1st Infantry Division (ARVN) will conduct similar operations to the east of HILL 674 with three battalions.

(1) Maneuver On the night of D-1, one battalion will move under cover of darkness from Camp EVANS to an assembly area north of HILL 674; and at H-Hour, D-Day conduct search and destroy operations to the south of HILL 674. At L-Hour, D-Day one battalion will be helilifted into the objective area to secure the landing zone and conduct search and destroy operations to the east. Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) Fire Support. B-52 and AN/APQ-10 radar-controlled air strikes will be conducted deep in the operating area early on D-Day. Pre H-Hour and pre L-Hour preparation of landing zones and initial objectives will be accomplished by pre-planned air strikes and artillery fires. Annex B (Fire Support).

b. 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines.

(1) On D-1 under cover of darkness move by foot from Camp EVANS along ROUTE OF ADVANCE ALFA to an assembly area vicinity YD 520450.

(2) At H-Hour, D-Day advance south along AXIS OF ADVANCE to conduct search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE A (vic YD 510210).

(3) On D-Day provide a minimum of one company (-) with a tank platoon and one ONTOS section as security for forward artillery position (vic YD 501289).

(4) On order, continue search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE C (vic YD 526230).

c. BLT 1/3 (-)

(1) On D-1 provide one reinforced company as regimental reserve.

(2) At L-Hour, D-Day conduct a helicopter borne assault to seize and secure LANDING ZONE BUZZARD (vic YD 465217). Upon reorganization, conduct search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE B (vic YD 485218).

(3) On order, conduct search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE D.

(4) Locate Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Mar at forward artillery position (vic YD 501289) on D-Day; security to be provided by 1st Bn, 4th Mar.

d. Regimental reserve. Company C (Reinf), 1st Bn (-) 3d Mar. Commencing H-Hour, D-Day be prepared (on 30 minute alert) for employment in either battalion zone of action.

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e. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Unclassified code name: GRANITE
- (2) D-Day: 24 October 1967
- (3) H-Hour: 0630H
- (4) L-Hour: 0730H
- (5) RCA utilization authorized
- (6) Maximum use of supporting arms preparation fires, with emphasis on observed fire and preparation fires in valleys and along streams.
- (7) Psychological warfare operations will be conducted and coordinated by this Headquarters.
- (8) Absolute maximum dispersion of personnel at all times. Maintain no more than visual/audible contact between individuals when moving in canopy or close terrain where possibility of ambush greatly increased. Flank security ~~ministry~~ whenever possible. Recon by artillery/mortar fire along flanks of routes of advance in particularly heavy canopy to provide moving envelope in which troops can advance and from which they can attack. Night positions employ maximum LP⁰U; minimum illumination.
- (9) Reports in accordance with reference (b).
- (10) Thrust points effective:

QUEBEC	YD 5327
ROMEO	YD 4925
SIERRA	YD 5423
TANGO	YD 5826
UNIFORM	YD 4622
VICTOR	YD 5218
WHISKEY	YD 5821
- (11) Reference (b).
- (12) This order effective for planning upon receipt and execution on order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. In accordance with reference (b) and the following.

a. Supply

- (1) The following Class II items are available:

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Mosquito Repellent
Salt Tablets
Foot Powder
Comm Wire WD 1/TT

Chap Stick
BA 30
BA 386 (limited supply)
Halizone Tablets (limited supply)

(2) All critical Class II shortages will be reported to the Regimental S-4.

(3) Prescribed loads. As prescribed by unit commanders to include:

(a) Minimum two days Class I and V. Insure that adequate quantities of salt and halizone tablets are carried by all hands.

(b) 60 ft length of climbing rope per rifle squad.

(h) Control and distribution.

(a) Sundry Packs will be issued on the basis of one per hundred men/per day commencing D+2.

b. Resupply

(1) All resupply requests will be submitted to the LSA no later than 0930 the morning prior to resupply.

(2) Due to the nature of the terrain it is necessary for requesting units to give a full description of the IZ and surrounding terrain, including the height of canopy. The LSA has several methods of delivering supplies and the appropriate choice can be made only after the topography of the area is ascertained.

(3) Emergency IZ clearing teams will remain on standby and be equipped with two power saws and demolitions.

(4) Resupply of the forward artillery position will be accomplished utilizing organic artillery vehicles with augmentation from the motor transport platoon attached to 4th Marines, when required. 3d Bn. 12th Marines will be responsible for consolidating and coordinating all resupply for units located at the forward artillery position.

c. Hospitalisation and evacuation.

(1) 1st Bn. 4th Marines' heat casualties will be evacuated to the Regimental Aid Station. If possible all HLT 1/3 casualties will be hospitalized aboard USS OKINAWA.

(2) All other Marine casualties will be hospitalized at Co A 3d Medical Bn. PHU BAI. The Regimental Aid Station will be prepared to

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treat critical cases where expeditious handling to rearward medical facilities is considered not essential. Hemorrhaging casualties or head wounds will not be evacuated to the Regimental Aid Station.

(3) Civilians, prisoners and casualties will be brought to the Regimental CP for interrogation. After initial treatment civilians will be evacuated to the HUE Hospital.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. References (d) and (e); 4th Marines COI (issued separately).

b. Radio

(1) Activate radio retransmission stations on HILL 674 (YD 516219) at H-Hour, D-Day as follows:

<u>NET</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>UNIT PROVIDING</u>
Regtl Tac	68.30/40.15	Hq, 4th Mar
Regtl TACP	36.20	Hq, 4th Mar
HST Log	33.10	Co A, 3d SP Bn
1/3 Arty C of F	37.25	3d Bn, 12th Mar
1/4 Arty C of F	31.20	3d Bn, 12th Mar
U.S. Advisors Net	39.80/56.75	U.S. Advisors

(2) Radio retransmission station call sign is the call sign of the net control station plus the word "RELAY".

(3) Units will maintain UHF ground-to-air radio capability.

(4) TACP Local Radio Net will be utilized in addition to 4th Marines TACP Local; 1st Bn 4th Mar, BLT 1/3 and 4th Mar will maintain stations on this net.

c. Crypto.

- (1) Numeral Code - KAC-QX 10 effective day.
- (2) Authentication - KAC-QX 10 effective day.
- (3) Gravity Code - KAC-PX 1B effective day.

d. Visual

- (1) Pyrotechnic signals in accordance with reference (d).
- (2) Smoke

(a) White = marking of enemy positions.

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SECRET

- (b) Red = "Area not secure; not safe to land"
- (c) Violet/green = "Area secure/safe to land or drop supplies"
- (d) Yellow = marking of friendly positions.

e. Command posts

- (1) 1st Infantry Div TF (ARVN) Camp EVANS (YD 534316)
- (2) 4th Marines Camp EVANS (YD 534316)
- (3) Report CP locations when established and closed.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL DICK

[Signature]
 M. H. POLE
 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

ANNEXES:

- A-Operation Overlay
- B-Fire Support (to be issued)

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3d Mar Div	(h)
CG 1st Inf Div (ARVN)	(h)
1st Bn 4th Mar	(2)
BLT 1/3	(2)
3d Bn 26th Mar	(2)
3d Recon Bn	(2)
File	(h)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

304 - 32 - 30408
 304 - 32 - 30408 (Noting)
 Camp EVANS YL 504316, RVN
 291400Z October 1967

• Major Vocabularies • GRANTIES

Page 10 of 10

1-1-67, page 2A

Aircraft Wing

Air Command USAF

2. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b*

Division TF Artillery (ARVN)

2 Battery (-)	155 How
1 Battery	105 How

3) in to (inf) 12th Marines

1st Prov (upn)	105	How
2d Prov (upn)	105	How
1st Prov (upn)	155	How
2d Prov (upn)	155	How

4TH MARINES (REIN)
SAC FILES
00647-67
COPY 14 OF 60 COPIES

(c) Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines

is under tactical and technical control of 3/12 FDC

2. ARTILLERY Provide fire support for US and ARVN forces to include close support of troops; interdiction and destruction of enemy rear areas and active counter battery/mortar fires.

4. EXECUTION

Concept of Close Support - B-52 and AN TFG-10 radar controlled air strikes will be conducted deep in the operating area early on D-Day. Pro

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H-Hour and pre L-Hour preparation of landing zone and initial objective will be accomplished by pre-planned air strikes and artillery fires. On call artillery and close air support will be available for the duration of the operation.

b. Air

(1) Strategic Air Command provides B-52 strikes early on D-Day against large area targets deep in the operating area. Targets to be announced.

(2) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides:

(a) AN/TPQ-10 radar controlled air strikes early on D-Day against small area targets deep in the operating area. Targets to be announced.

(b) 2 hr preparation of LZ MALLARD commencing at L-2 hrs. Ordnance to include 500 lb "Daisy Cutters" to clear trees from LZ.

(c) Protection of helilift into LZ MALLARD with fixed wing attack aircraft on station and helicopter gunships as escort aircraft.

(d) Attack aircraft on strip alert to provide on call air support for duration of operation.

c. Artillery

(1) 3d Bn (-) (Reinf) 12th Marines Direct Support 4th Marine Regiment. Reinforcing fires provided to 1st Infantry Division TF Artillery (ARVN) upon request.

(2) Fire 1 hr pre H-Hour prep (commencing L-Hour-4 hrs and 10 minutes) to support ground attack by 1st Bn 4th Marines.

(3) Fire 1 hr prep on LZ MALLARD (commencing L-Hour-8 hrs and 10 minutes). End of prep will be signalled by one shell WP. Emphasis will be placed against potential antiaircraft portion overlooking LZ.

(4) Artillery Fire Plan - see Appendix 1.

d. Coordination Instructions

ref (b) (1) Fire Support Coordination will be accomplished in accordance with and (c).

(2) SAVE-A-PLANES issued by 4th Marines FSCC in accordance with ref (b).

(3) All US fires delivered in support of ARVN forces will be coordinated at 4th Marines FSCC.

(4) Maximum effort must be made by Infantry Battalion Air InO and

ARTILLERY

Artillery is to coordinate air support and artillery fires in their battalion zone of action. This applies in particular to coordination of close air support and artillery with use of MEDEVAC, aerial resupply and air observers.

(5) Forward Observers make maximum use of air observers to assist in calling for fires, orientation on the ground, and target acquisition.

(6) Use of preplanned targets as soon as possible.

(7) No Fire Line for D-Day is indicated in Annex A (Operations Overlay) and Appendix 1 Artillery Fire Plan.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS

a. See para 4 OPORD 50-67 (Operation GRANITE)

b. ASRs

105 How 61.9 rds/tube/day
155 How 47.5 rds/tube/day

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS

a. Communications, See para 5 OPORD 50-67 (Operation GRANITE)

b. 4th Marines FSCC located in COC Camp EVANS.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL DICK

J. M. McGEE
J. M. McGEE

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIX

1-Artillery Fire Plan (to be issued)

DISTRIBUTION

CG 3d Mar Div	(4)
Cg 1st Inf Div (ARVN)	(4)
1st Bn 4th Mar	(2)
BLT 1/3	(2)
3d Bn 26th Mar	(2)
3d Recon Bn	(2)
File	(4)

~~SECRET~~OPORD 50-67
CH 1.

P 241400Z OCT 67

FM FOURTH MAR

TO FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR

BLT ONE SLANT THREE

SECOND BN FIRST MAR

CO B THIRD AT BN

CO B THIRD ENGR BN

CO C THIRD TK BN

CO A THIRD SP BN

SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)

ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB

FIRST MAR

BT

SECRET

CHANGE ONE TO 4TH MAR OPORD 50-67 (OPERATION GRANITE)

1. PAGE ONE, UNDER TASK ORGANIZATION:

A. CHANGE "BLT 1/3(-)" TO READ "BLT 1/3"

B. CHANGE "1ST BN(-) 3D MAR" TO READ "1ST BN 3D MAR"

C. DELETE "REGTL RESERVE CO C, 1ST BN 3D MAR CAP OSGOOD"

D. TO TASK ORGANIZATION ADD: "2D BN (-) 1ST MAR LTCOL VAN WINKLE"

2. PAGE TWO, NO CHANGE

3. PAGE THREE, PAR 3A (1) LINE SIX: DELETE "EAST" SUBSTITUTE "SOUTH".

4. PAGE THREE, DELETE PAR 3C AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFORE:

"C. BLT 1/3"

(1) AT L-HOUR, D-DAY CONDUCT A HELICOPTERBORNE ASSAULT TO SEIZE AND SECURE LANDING ZONE MALLARD (YD 470235). UPON REORGANIZATION CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD OBJECTIVE B (VIC YD 465217) AND RECONNOITER 2000 METERS SOUTH OF OBJECTIVE B.

(2) ON ORDER, CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD OBJECTIVE D (VIC YD 485218).

(3) ON ORDER, CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD OBJECTIVE E (VIC YD 469244).

(4) LOCATE BTRY A, 1ST BN 12TH MAR AT FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION (VIC YD 501289) ON D-DAY; SECURITY TO BE PROVIDED BY 1ST BN 4TH MAR."

5. PAGE THREE, DELETE PAR D AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFORE:

"C. 2D BN(-) 1ST MAR.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

(1) ON D-DAY, MOVE BY TRUCK CONVOY FROM PRESENT LOCATION SOUTH ALONG NATL ROUTE ONE. MOVE BY FOOT TO ASSIGNED PORTION OF 4TH MAR OA AND CONDUCT BLOKING/AMBUSH AND SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ALONG ENEMY INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION ROUTES. ARRIVE IN ASSIGNED PORTION OF OA NLT 1600H ON D-DAY. SEE INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION OVERLAY (PASEP) (NOTAL).

(2) MAINTAIN ONE COMPANY ON 60 MINUTE ALERT TO BE EMPLOYED AS REGIMENTAL RESERVE/REACTION FORCE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN EITHER ASSAULT BATTALION'S ZONE OF ACTION.

6. PAGE FOUR, PAR 3 E (2) CHANGE '24 OCTOBER 1967' TO READ '26 OCTOBER 1967.'

7. PAGE FOUR, PAR 3 E (4) CHANGE '0730H' TO READ '0900H.'

8. PAGE FOUR, PAR 3 E(10) ADD FOLLOWING THRUST POINTS:

XRAY YD 4537

YANKEE YD 4140

ZULU YD 4235

9. REPLACE PRESENT ANNEX A OPERATION OVERLAY WITH ANNEX A OPERATION OVERLAY CH. NO1 (PASEP).

10. DESTROY RESIDUE BY BURNING.

CP-4

BT

TOD- 242258/1634

SECRET

SECRET

P 030825Z NOV67

FROM: FOURTH MARINES
 TO: BLT ONE SLANT THREE
 FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
 CO I THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR

INFO: CG THIRD MANDIV
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN
 CO C THIRD TX BN
 CO A THIRD SP BN
 FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)

BT
 SECRET

FRAG ORD 53-67 (OP GRANITE)

A. 4TH MAR OPORD 50-67 (GRANITE)

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATION. REF (A)

A. 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) CONDUCTS GROUND OPERATIONS IN ZONE TO LOCATE AND DEFEAT VC/NVA FORCES, DESTROY INSTALLATIONS AND CAPTURE ENEMY SUPPLIES.

B. ARTILLERY. THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR D/S AND PROVIDES LNO TO ARVN TF ARTY; 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) TF ARTY PROVIDES REINFORCING FIRES UPON REQUEST.

2. MISSION. ON D+10 (5 NOV 67) FOURTH MAR ESTABLISHES BLOCKING FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OPERATION LAN SON 140 PHASE II IN "STREET WITHOUT JOY" AREA.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A), ON 5 NOV 67 FOURTH MAR PROVIDES ONE BATTALION (-) (TWO RIFLE COMPANIES) TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS WEST OF 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OA, VICINITY MY CHANH (YD 4640). SEE OP OVERLAY.

B. 1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR

(1) AFTER ENGINEER ROAD SWEEP OF NAT'L ROUTE ONE ON 5 NOV 67, COMMENCE MOTOR MOVEMENT NORTH FROM CAMP EVANS TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION ANVIL (YD 4641) AND FORGE (YD 4639) WITH ONE RIFLE COMPANY EACH.

(2) BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THRUST POINT: KILO 4440

(2) DIBLAUTH

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF (A).

5. COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC.

A. REF A.

B. REPORT WHEN IN POSITION.

ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)

GP-4

BT

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DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JDB/pab
11 November 1967

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
602867

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (SC-3)

Subj: Critique of Operation GRANITE

Encl: (1) Notes from Operation GRANITE Critique

1. A critique of Operation GRANITE was held at 1430, 4 Nov 67. Commanders and Staffs of the participating units and the Regimental Staff were present.
2. Enclosure (1) summarizes the subject critique.


Wm. L. DICK

Copy to:
3d Marine Division G-3 Files

4TH MARINES (REIN)
SEC FILES
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TAB E
OPD GRANITE
Nov 1967

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NOTES FROM OPERATION GRANITE CRITIQUE

Place: Headquarters, 4th Marines (-) (Rein), Camp EVANS

Date: 4 November 1967

Time: 1430H

Participants: Commanders and Staffs of: Headquarters, 4th Marines
 BLT 1/3
 1st Bn 4th Mar
 3d Bn (-) 26th Mar
 3d Bn (-) 12th Mar
 Co B 3d Engr Bn

Note: LtCol J. H. McGEE, XO 4th Marines, presided in Col W. L. DICK's absence

I. Regimental Staff

A. C-1 No problem encountered in casualty reporting or other administrative areas.

B. C-2 Operation GRANITE produced significant intelligence in confirming the presence of C-15 Company, believed to be a subordinate unit of the Northern Front Headquarters, the 800th Battalion and 802nd Battalion. The 800th Battalion was not identified.

C. Problem Area: Some captured documents and materials of probable intelligence value were not received at 4th Marines Headquarters. Materials were placed on helicopters and lost as a result of mishandling.

Recommendation: That in future operations, one person, preferably a staff NCO, be designated to pick up captured material from units in order to insure all captured material reaches the proper destination.

D. C-3 General critique of the operation. No significant problem areas encountered. Some reports not submitted on time. One unit departed an objective without notifying higher and adjacent headquarters.

E. C-4 Initial logistics planning proved adequate. Resupply accomplished as scheduled in most cases. Some interference to normal resupply procedures caused by Battalion Air Liaison Officer working directly with the Regimental Air Liaison Officer for resupply of units instead of working through normal S-4 channels. It was also noted that one unit misused the priority "PRIORITY" in requesting Class I supplies.

F. Communications Officer: Both battalions maintained good communications with subordinate units in spite of difficult jungle terrain. 1st Battalion 4th Marines experienced frequent interference on their 81-mm conduct of fire net. Establishment of radio relay on Hill 674 proved a valuable asset in maintaining over-all communications.

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 ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

F. Air Liaison Officer: Units must be ready for resupply according to Regimental Logistic SOP, i.e., at 1600-1800. If not possible, must advise soonest.

G. Medical Officer: Augmentation to regimental aid insufficient to handle number of casualties received. In future operations of comparable size, regiment should be augmented by at least two medical doctors and five or six additional corpsmen if casualties are to be evacuated to regiment. *Med*

II. 3d Battalion 12th Marines: Many instances in which fire support missions were delayed or could not be delivered due to check fires and aircraft interference. Numerous times aircraft caused unnecessary fire support delays and check fires by not following planned air routes and by not checking in on proper radio net on arrival in area. The commanding officer, artillery battalion and both infantry battalion commanding officers believe that the unnecessary fire support delays and check fires caused by aircraft during the operation was to a degree sufficient to warrant command attention. This is not concurred in by the Regimental Commander. *Air*

III. BLT 1/3: No significant problems. One minor point was that fluctuation in capacities of the CH-34 from plane to plane due to the varied fuel loads and engine performance caused some difficulty. The BLT ALO proposed a standard heli team consisting of five troops. For larger aircraft the basic five man team would be employed in multiples to fill the aircraft. The Commanding Officer BLT 1/3 felt that the number of aircraft was too great to be efficiently utilized in the long, narrow landing zone and the planes became so dispersed on landing that it was difficult to reorganize into effective units.

IV. 1st Battalion 4th Marines: No major problem area other than fire support as discussed by 3d Battalion 12th Marines. Battalion commanding officer believes that overland march into objective area tired troops. Recommended that troops be helilifted into objective area or that more time be allowed for troop rest prior to continuation of operation.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

14:LTF:dch
21 Nov 1967

MEMORANDUM

From: Division Air Officer
To: G-3

Subj: Comments on Granite Critique

1. Following items review with proposed action indicated:

a. Loss of Materials Evacuated by Helicopter -

(1) Comment - This comment frequently appears, usually with medevac flights where gear and medevacs are mixed on the same flight.

Past investigation reveals items generally are lost because no point is designated by the operations commander to which all materials or supplies evacuated are to be taken. Also at this point a responsible receiver representing the command should be available.

(2) Recommendation - Add the above to administrative planning instructions for future operations - helicopters take loads to where the HST directs them.

b. Fire Support - This is a repeated comment replete with generalities which are not capable of corrective research. Frequently C & C aircraft don't stay in helo lanes because their mission is not in helo lanes. However they are in contact with control agencies thus are cleared into the area in which they are operating. I agree there are unnecessary delays that occur but frequently the delays are established by inexperienced personnel calling check fires that are not necessary.

I will try to find out more specifics from the personnel involved. I cannot make recommendations on the inadequate information on hand.

L. T. Frey
L. T. FREY

SECRET

TAB/M

OPN COVE

FM: 170900

TO 21/800 20067

Cumulative Losses

FR: 1 KIA

1 UC (C)

13 EVAC

5 UC (P)

TAB-N


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T. FOURTH MARINES FORWARD

DRAFTED BY MSGT E.J. HOLCANY

RELEASED BY *J. Beans*O R 180700 Z NOV 67FM: FOURTH MAR
TO: CG THIRD MAR DIV

INFO: ADC THIRD MAR DIV DHCN
 FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
 CO A THIRD SP BN
 CO B THIRD SP BN
 CO C THIRD SP BN
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

BT
CONFIDENTIALOPERATION COVE SITREP OL, ^{170900H} ~~171100H~~ 181200H NOV 671. UNIT LOCATIONS.

1 MAR	SG 055155 VD 876138
CP/A/1/A	2C 05 135975
B/1/A	2C 133970
B/1/A	2C 135974
B/2/26	2D 108011
F/2/26	2C 062996
G/3/12	2D 125012
CP/3/12	2D 056006

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 171000H G/3/12 CMD GRP DISPLACE FWD ARTY PSN

(2D 225012). 171300H 1/A(-) CMD GRP DISPLACED TO PHU BAI. 171400H FOURTH

MAR CMD GRP DISPLACED TO PHU BAI. 180800H COMMENCED HELILIFT OF 105MM

HOW (2D 125012). 180840H A/S PRIP WAS CONDUCTED ON LZ FALCON VIC

2C 138970. 1/A(-) FIRST WAVE TOUCHED DOWN 180917H. 180955H G/3/12 IN POSITION

PREPARED FOR FIRING. 181048H 1/A(-) HELILIFTED COMPLETED. 181048H F/2/26

ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITION (2D 108011).

3. CONTACTS. NONE.4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. 171200H CHOP ORDN 2/26 TO FOURTH MAR. 171619H

COMMENCED OPERATION COVE IAW CG THIRD MAR DIV 170819Z NOV 67.

TAB-O-ENCLY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. PLANS. 1/4(-) AND 2/26(-) WILL CONTINUE MISSION IAW OPERATION COVE. OPORD 55-67.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 0

EN. 0

CP-4
BT

+OR/18/0655/NOV67/H45/417

A-3/COC

CEO

colony

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
CONFIDENTIAL

J. FOURTH MARINES FORWARD

DRAFTED BY 1ST LT W E KASCIANOWSKI

RELEASED BY *DB*OR 181625 2 NOV 67FM: FOURTH MARINES
TO: G3 THIRD ARDIV

INFO: SEC THIRD ARDIV HQ
 FIVE BN FOURTH MAR
 SECOND PT TWENTY SIXTH AR
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 FOURTH BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 OF A THIRD OF THE
 OF THE TWO BATTALIONS
 OF THE TWO BATTALIONS
 FIRST BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR (ISA)



IN
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIVE GIVE SCLAS FOR, MASON-182400Z NOV 67

1. THE LOCATION TO CHANGE INTO
2. SECURITY OF OPERATIONS (MASON) CONSOLIDATED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS FOR THE WEST. 1/2/66 MAINTAINED BLOCKED POSITION. 2/2/66 MAINTAINED SECURITY FOR THE COMBAT ARTILLERY POSITION.
3. OPERATIVE FIVE.
4. SECURITY FIVE. WORK.
5. PLAN 1/2/66 WILL MAINTAIN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. 2/2/66 WILL MAINTAIN BLOCKED POSITION. 2/2/66 WILL MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR THE FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION.

6. OPERATIVE FIVE.

FM. 1 NOV (MASON)

FM. 2 NOV.

GP-4
INTOA: 194254/NOV/67 /03/000 R[#]437

A-G3/kcc

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TAB-D-ENCL-3

26

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DRAFT BY 1ST LT F. MASCIANGELO

RELEASED BY *Beane*OR 18 22 50 2 NOV 67FM: FOURTH MAR
TO: CO THIRD M/R DIV

INFO: ADC THIRD M/R DIV INCT
FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
SEVENTH BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
CO A THIRD BN IN
CO B THIRD BN IN
CO C THIRD BN IN
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)



BT
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION: GIVE SITREP 020, 190000H-190600H NOV 67

1. SIT LOCATI 3. NO CHANGE
2. REPORT OF GUNFIRE. 1A(-) REMAINED TN NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION.
F/2/26 REMAINED IN BLOCKING POSITION. E/2/26 ^{provided} ~~REMAINED~~ IN REAR SECURITY FOR
FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION.
3. CONTACTS. NONE.
4. SIGHTING REPORT. 180000H: F/2/26 (XD 082995) WEST SECTOR SAW MOVEMENT
APPROX 25 METERS IMMEDIATELY THERE ON. FIRED TWO BURST OF S/A FIRE AND FIRED
ILLUM. SMOKE/POW FROM W/END REPORTS.
5. PLANS. 1A(-) WILL CONTINUE SMO MMISSION IAW OPERATION COVE. F/2/26
WILL REMAIN IN BLOCKING POSITION. E/2/26 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY
FOR FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION.
6. UNPLATT'S LOCATIONS.

FR. 1 WEA (MISER)

RW. NONE.

CP 4
BT

TOR: 190500H / NOV 67 / 03 / 000R 441

A-3/0018

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
celebr 50
TAB-O
Encl. 4

AT- FOURTH MARINE

CONFIDENTIALRELEASED BY *J. Davis*O R 190540 Z NOV 67FM FOURTH MAR
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO ADC THIRD MARDIV DECB
 FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
 CO A THIRD SP BN
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN
 CO C THIRD TK BN
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

3
cc



BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPERATION COVE SITREP 05, 190601H-191200H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS NO CHANGES EXCEPT

A/1/4 ZC 119971
 B/1/4 ZC 122968
 CP & D/1/4 ZC 120970

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATION. 0655H A/1/4, CP AND D/1/4 COMMENCED MOVEMENT TOWARD OBJ A. B/1/4 COMMENCED MOVEMENT FORWARD OBJ C. F/2/26 MAINTAINED BLOCKING POSITIONS AND E/2/26 MAINTAINED SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION.

3. CONTACTS. 0935H A/1/4 RECEIVED 25 ROUNDS S/A FIRE AND TWO GREN FROM TWO VC VIC ZC 118972 RESULTING IN TWO WIA (MEDEVAC). RETURNED FIRE WITH S/A, M60 AND M-79. AREA CHECKED WITH NEG RESULTS. ARTY FIRE CALLED ON VC ESCAPE ROUTE.

4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. 0840H 2/A/1/4 (ZC 120968) FOUND FIVE HUTS WITH BUNKERS UNDERNEATH. CHECKED HUTS WITH NEG RESULTS. HUTS DESTROYED.

5. PLANS. 1/4(-) WILL CONTINUE S&D MISSION, F/2/26 WILL MAINTAIN BLOCKING POSITION AND E/2/26 WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION IAW OPO 55-67 OPERATION COVE.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 2 WIA (MEDEVAC)
 1 WIA (MINOR)

EN. 8

GP-4
BT

Tor: 191340H/Nov 67/fm/cow 447

A/1/4
1900

05

40

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TAB-D-ENCL-5

CONFIDENTIAL

EN. NOE.


TMS MP
3
1

RESULTS
NEG
NEG

12/13/67/12400/NOV/67/12400/463/100

CEO B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDRAFTED BY **LT W R MASCIANGELO**RELEASED BY *[Signature]*DPMEDIA ROUTINE **191612Z NOV 67**FM: **FORT MARINES**
TO: **CG THIRD MAR DIV**INFO: **FIRST BN FOURTH MAR**
SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR
FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
FOURTH MARINES (REAR)
CO A THIRD SP BN
CO B THIRD INGR BN
CO C THIRD TX BN
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)BT
CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION OVER STRENGTH 407, 191800H-192400H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.
2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1/4(-) ESTABLISHED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH EXTENSIVE LP'S. 2/1/2 SEARCHED OBJ "C" THEN MOVED TO NIGHT POSITION (2C 124962). 7/2/26 MAINTAINED BLOCKING POSITION. 8/2/26 CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION.
3. CONTACTS. NONE.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. NONE.
5. PLANS. 1/4(-) WILL MAINTAIN DEFENSIVE POSITION WITH EXTENSIVE LP'S. 7/2/26 WILL REMAIN IN BLOCKING POSITION. 8/2/26 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION.
6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 2 WIA (MEDVAC)
1 WIA (MINE)

EN. NONE.


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10A/19/10/77 NOV 67/ 10/20/09 191612Z NOV 67 TAB-D-ENCL-7

#7



ANY CCCCC
 O R 192235Z NOV 57
 FM FOURTH MARINES
 TO CG THIRD MANDIV
 INFO ADC THIRD MANDIV SHO B
 FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
 CO A THIRD SP BN
 CO B THIRD EN BN
 CO C THIRD TR BN
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARMY (USA)
 BT

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CONFIDENTIAL
 OPERATION ONE SITREP 93, 200001H-200600H NOV 57
 1. UNIT LOCATION. NO CHANGE.

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PAGE TWO P37L CONFIDENTIAL
 2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1/4(-) MAINTAINED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POS-
 IITIONS WITH LBS. F/2/25 REMAINED IN BLOCKING POSITION.
 E/2/25 MAINTAINED SECURITY
 FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION.
 3. CONTACT. NONE.
 4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: NONE.
 5. PLANS. 1/4(-) WILL CONTINUE ASSIGNED SB MISSION IAW WITH
 OPERATION COME MOVING TOWARDS REEL OBJ "B". F/2/25 WILL REMAIN
 IN BLOCKING POSITION.
 E/2/25 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY
 POSITION.
 6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.
 FR. 2 MIA (DECEJAC) EN. NONE
 1 MIA (MINOR)
 SP-4
 BT

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
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TAB-O-ENCL-8

DRAFTED BY MSGT E.J. MOLCANYRELEASED BY J. BeaneIMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 200752 2 NOV 67FM FOURTH MAR (REF A) (P)
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO ADC THIRD MARDIV DEHQ
FOURTH MAR DEHQ
FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
FOURTH BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
OO A THIRD SF BN
OO B THIRD SF BN
OO C THIRD SF BN
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)



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OPERATION COVE STEEP #9, 200600H-201200H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS, NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

A/1/A 20 12075
B/1/A 20 12075
CP & D/1/A 20 12075

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 0800H 1/A(-) COMMENCED MOVEMENT ON ASSIGNED S&D MISSION. F/2/26 MAINTAINED BLOCKING POSITIONS AND E/2/26 MAINTAINED SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION.

3. CONTACTS. 1000H 1/A/2/26 AND 1/A/3/12 RECEIVED APPROX 40 INCOMING 82MM ROUNDS FROM VIC 2D 2000H. ARTY RETURNED FIRE WITH 122 HE ROUNDS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. REACTION TIME 15 MINUTES. 1/A/2/26 RETURNED FIRE WITH 50 CAL. RESULTS UNKNOWN. REACTION TIME 15 MINUTES. NO FT CASUALTIES, SLIGHT DAMAGE TO ANTENNAS. 1000H 1/A/1/26 RECEIVED APPROX 25 ROUNDS 82MM AND 6 ROUNDS 60MM FIRE VIC 2C 118966 FROM UNIDENTIFIED NUMBER OF VC RESULTING IN 1 FT WIA MEDEVACS. RETURNED FIRE WITH 82MM AND CALLED ARTY. ASSAULTED POSITION WITH NEG RESULTS.

4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. 1100H 1/A/1/26 FOUND ONE BUNKER 3'X4'X3' AND ONE 105MM DUD. BUNKER OLD AND NOT USED RECENTLY. DESTROYED BUNKER AND 105MM DUD.

5. PLANS. 1/A(-) WILL CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION IAW OPC 56-57. F/2/26 WILL MAINTAIN BLOCKING POSITION AND E/2/26 WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FP. 13 WIA (MEDVAC)
1 WIA (MOR)

EN. 0

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Cmth #12

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
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TAB 5-6-69

DRAFTED BY MSGT E J MOLCANYRELEASED BY [Signature]IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 201237

NOV 67

FM: FOURTH MARINES
TO: CG THIRD MARDIVINFO: ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB
FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)
SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES
FOURTH MARINES (REAB)
CO A THIRD SP BN
CO B THIRD ENGR BN
CO C THIRD TK BN3
cc

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CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION COVE SITREP #15, 201800H-201800H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE, EXCEPT;A/1/4 ZC 103976
B/1/4 ZC 115976
CP & D/1/4 ZC 1179732. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1/4(-) CONTINUED MOVEMENT ON ASSIGNED S&D MISSION AND ARE PRESENTLY CONSOLIDATING IN THEIR NIGHT POSITIONS. E/2/26 MAINTAINED SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION. F/2/26 MAINTAINED ASSIGNED BLOCKING POSITIONS.

(LATE ENTRY) 201055H-201100H

3. CONTACTS. AO OBS 3 SAMPANS ZD 158022 ~~AND~~ 7 AT ZD 161019, AND 1 CAMOUFLAGED SAMPAN ZD 159025. CAMOUFLAGED SAMPAN BELIEVED TO BE MORTARING HILL AT ZD 161021. A/S DAMAGED 11 SAMPANS WITH 8,000 RDS 762, AND 25 ROCKETS. OBSERVED 10 VC WALKING DOWN STREAM. SUSPECTS BELIEVED TO BE SAME CREW THAT MORTARED HILL. RESULTS 1 VC KIA (CONF) AND 5 VC KIA (PROB). 1245H: D/1/4 REC'D APPROX 60 RDS S/A FIRE FROM EST TWO VC VIC ZC 119966. RET'D FIRE WITH 150 S/A RDS AND 1 M-79 RDS. ENEMY BROKE CONTACT. CHECKED AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. SECURITY ELEMENT FROM 2/D/1/4 EXCHANGED FIRE WITH AN EST ONE VC. 1/D/1/4 (ZC 119966) REC'D 10 RDS 60MM AND 1 RPG RD. RET'D FIRE WITH S/A M-79 AND ARTY INTO SUSPECTED MORTAR

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21

12

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TAB-D-End 10

POSITION (ZC 110666) CHEC AREA WITH NEUTRALITY REQUIRE.

4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. NONE.

5. PLANS. 1/1(-) WILL CONSOLIDATE NIGHT DEFENSES WITH EXTENSIVE USE OF IP'S AND AMBUSHES. 1/2/26 WILL MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR PWD ARTILLERY POSITION.

7/2/26 WILL MAINTAIN BLOCKING POSITION.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 13 WIA (MEDEVAC)
1 WIA (MINOR)

EN. 1 VC KIA (C NF)
5 VC KIA (PROB)

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT
COMMAND GROUP/OP

A. 1/1(-)
B. 2/26(-)

NO TMS

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TMS IMP

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RESULTS

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TOR: 202040H/NOV 67/pm/coww 488

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CONFIDENTIALDRAFTED BY LT W R MASCIANGERSIMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 201600Z NOV 67FM: FOURTH MARINES
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO: ADC THIRD MARDIV INCH
 FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARMY (USA)
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES (REAR)
 CO A THIRD SF BN
 CO B THIRD ENGINE BN
 CO C THIRD TK BN

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OPERATION COVE SITREP #11, 201801H-202400H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.
2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1/4(-) MAINTAINED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH IP'S POSITION AND AMBUSHES. E/2/26 CONTINUED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION. F/2/26 MAINTAINED BLOCKING POSITION.
3. CONTACTS. NONE.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. NONE.
5. PLANS. 1/4(-) WILL MAINTAIN NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH IP'S AND AMBUSHES. E/2/26 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION. F/2/26 WILL MAINTAIN BLOCKING POSITION.
6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 13 WIA (MEDEVAC)
 1 WIA (MINOR)

EN. 1 VC KIA (CONF)
 5 VC KIA (PROB)

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TOR: 201600Z/NOV/67 COWRICK/493/WB

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#11


TAB-O-Encl 11

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DRAFTED BY LT W R MASCIANGELO

RELEASED BY JEBIMMEDIATE/MOTIVE 202235Z NOV 67FM: FOURTH MARINES
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO: ADE THIRD MARDIV INCB
 FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES
 FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (SA)
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES
 FOURTH MARINES (REAR)
 CO A THIRD SP BN
 CO B THIRD INGR BN
 CO C THIRD TK BN

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CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION COVE SITREP #12, 210000H-210600H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE.
2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1A(-) MAINTAINED NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH LP'S AND AMBUSHES. B/2/26 PROVIDED SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION. F/2/26 REMAINED IN BLOCKING POSITION.
3. CONTACTS. NONE.
4. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS. NONE.
5. PLANS. 1A(-) WILL CONTINUE S&D MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATION COVE AND MOVE TO BLOCKING POSITION. B/2/26 WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION. F/2/26 WILL REMAIN IN BLOCKING POSITION.
6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 13 WIA (DEBRVAC)
 1 WIA (MINOR)

EN.

1 VC KIA (CONF)
 5 VC KIA (PROB)

GP-4
BT

TOR 210630 #16/11/1024 / COMSEC / 499 / (B)
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#12 20
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CONFIDENTIALDRAFTED BY MSGT E.J. MOLCANYRELEASED BY JT BeansIMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 210536 2 NOV 67FM FOURTH MAR (REAR)
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO ADC THIRD MARDIV INCB
FOURTH MAR
FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
FOURTH BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR
CO A THIRD SP BN
CO B THIRD INCB BN
CO C THIRD INCB BN
FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

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CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATION COVE SI REP 13, 210600H-211200H NOV 67

1. UNIT LOCATIONS. NO CHANGE EXCEPT:

A/1/A	2C 098989
B/1/A	2C 109982
CP & D/1/A	2C 109982

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. 1/A(-) COMMENCED MOVEMENT TOWARD BLOCKING POSITIONS
ESTABLISHED BY F/2/26. B/2/26 PROVIDED SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION.

3. CONTACTS. NONE4. REMARKABLE EVENTS. NONE

5. PLANS. 1/A(-) WILL CONTINUE MOVEMENT TOWARD F/2/26 BLOCKING POSITION. B/2/26
WILL MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR FWD ARTY POSITION.

6. CUMULATIVE LOSSES.

FR. 13 KIA (RESEVAC)
1 KIA (RESEVAC)

EN. 1 KIA VC (CONF)
5 KIA VC (PROB)

CP-4

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TOR 21/1335H NOV 67/TAS Com# 504

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
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DRAFTED BY MSGT E J MORGAN

RELEASED BY *[Signature]*SUBJECT: ACTIES 2112452 NOV 67

TO: FOURTH MARINES
 TO: 3D MARDIV

INFO: ALL THING MARCH 1968
 FIRST IN FOURTH MARINES
 SECOND IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRD IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FOURTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FIFTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 SIXTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 SEVENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 EIGHTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 NINTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 TENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 ELEVENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 TWELFTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 THIRTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FOURTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FIFTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 SIXTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 SEVENTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 EIGHTEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 NINETEENTH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 TWENTIETH IN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES
 FIRST IN FOURTH ARTY (USA)



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OPERATION CONFIDENTIAL, 211200H-211800H NOV 67 ("FINAL")

1. THE FOLLOWING TO COMBAT, EXCEPT;

2.4.1) TO COMBAT

2. **REMARKS:** 2.4.1) MOVED TOWARD BLOCKING POSITION ESTABLISHED
 ON 2/26. 2.4.2) FORTIFIED POSITION FOR FWD ARTILLERY POSITION.

3. **REMARKS:** 2.4.2 (NO 12976) REAR ELEMENTS REC'D 30-40 RDS A/W FIRE.
 2.4.3) FWD ELEMENTS 2.4.2, 2.4.3 AND FWD ARTILLERY MISSION. RESULTS 1 FR KIA, 2 WIA
 (KIA).

4. **REMARKS:** 2.4.4 (NO 097983) FOUND 10 FIGHTING HOLES 3'X4'
 2.4.5) CHOPPED AREA USED FOR 2.4.5. 1800H: CHOPPED OPCON 2/26 TO 3D MARDIV.

5. **REMARKS:** CHOPPED AREA USED FOR 2.4.5 AND 2.4.6 TO 3D MARDIV. 1800H TERMINATED
 CHOPPED AREA USED FOR 2.4.5 AND 2.4.6 TO 3D MARDIV MSG 201615Z NOV 67.

6. **REMARKS:** TO COMBAT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

7. **REMARKS:**

2.4.1
 2.4.2
 2.4.3
 2.4.4
 2.4.5
 2.4.6

EN. 1 FR KIA (CONF)
 5 FR KIA (PROB)

2.4.1
 2.4.2
 2.4.3
 2.4.4
 2.4.5
 2.4.6

NO T-4

TMS EMP

RESULTS

NEG

NEG

CONFIDENTIAL

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