

745767

HEADQUARTERS  
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/RVS/pab  
5750  
673373A0033  
14 Dec 1967

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(b) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) 4th Marine Regiment Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at three year intervals; declassified after 12 years in accordance with DOD instruction 5700.10.

*W. L. DICK*  
W. L. DICK

4TH MARINES (REIN)
SAC FILES
<u>00875-67</u>
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HEADQUARTERS  
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

INDEX

- PART I     - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II    - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III   - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV    - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

COMMANDER

4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

Col Wm. L. DICK

SUBORDINATE UNITS

- Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (1-6 Nov 67) LtCol A. I. THOMAS
- 1st Battalion 4th Marines (1-21 Nov 67) LtCol E. A. DIEPTULA
- 2d Battalion 26th Marines (17-21 Nov 67) LtCol D. D. CHAPLIN
- 1st Battalion 9th Marines (20-30 Nov 67) LtCol J. F. MITCHELL
- 3d Battalion 26th Marines (1-30 Nov 67) LtCol H. L. ALDERMAN

2. LOCATION

1-30 November 1967: Camp EVANS, PHONG-DIEN District, THUA-THIEN Province, Republic of VIET-NAM.

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol J. M. McGEE  
(1-21 Nov 67)

LtCol G. M. McCAIN  
(22-30 Nov 67)

S-1/Adjutant

2d Lt B. J. SHAHAN  
(1-11 Nov 67)

1st Lt J. L. CADY  
(12-30 Nov 67)

S-2

Major J. L. FOWLER

S-3

Major J. D. BEANS

S-4

Major D. L. MORRIS

Regimental Medical Officer

Lt S. J. FALKENSTEIN, MC, USNR

Regimental Chaplain

Cdr J. W. COHILL, CHC, USN

Communication Officer

Major F. J. REISINGER

Air Liaison Officer

LtCol J. RYAN, Jr  
(1-20 Nov 67)

Major F. S. BELL

(21-30 Nov 67)

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH (Hq Co, 4th Marines)

USMC		USN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
19	190	2	2

1-30 November 1967: Camp EVANS, PHONG-DIEN District, THUA-THIEN Province, Republic of VIET-NAM.

5. REMARKS

Enclosure (1)

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period Headquarters 4th Marines completed Operation GRANITE, commenced Operation NEOSHO and conducted Operation COVE. While detailed after action reports have been or will be submitted on each operation, the highlights of November's activities are as follows:

- 5 November 1967 - M/3/26 chopped OPCON to 2/26. L/3/26 chopped OPCON from 2/26 to 3/26.
- 6 November 1967 - 4th Marines chopped BLT 1/3 OPCON to 9th Marines.
- 7 November 1967 - MajGen B. A. HOCHMUTH visited Camp EVANS from 1600H to 1620H. MajGen R. L. MURRAY visited Camp EVANS from 1645H to 1705H.
- 11 November 1967 - MajGen B. A. HOCHMUTH visited Camp EVANS from 1135H to 1200H.
- 13 November 1967 - C/1/4 chopped OPCON from 1/4 to 2/26.
- 15 November 1967 - K/3/26 chopped OPCON from 3/26 to 3d AT Bn.
- 17 November 1967 - 2/26 chopped OPCON to 4th Marines
- 18 November 1967 - 4th Marines Cnd Grp "A" and 1/4(-) displaced to PHU-BAI to commence Operation COVE.
- 20 November 1967 - D/1/9 chopped OPCON from 1/9 to 3/26.
- 21 November 1967 - D/1/9 chopped OPCON from 3/26 to 1/9. K/3/26 chopped OPCON from 3d AT Bn to 3/26. 4th Marines chopped Det Co B 1st Amtrac Bn OPCON to 1st Amtrac Bn. Chopped 1/4 Cnd Grp "B", B/1/4 and D/1/4 OPCON to CG, 3d MarDiv. Terminated Operation COVE.
- 22 November 1967 - 4th Marines Cnd Grp "A" returned to Camp EVANS.
- 24 November 1967 - B/1/9 chopped OPCON from 1/9 to 2/26. M/3/26 chopped OPCON from 2/26 to 3/26. BrigGen L. NETZGER visited Camp EVANS from 1420H to 1435H. Congressman James POOL (D/Texas) visited Camp EVANS from 1440H to 1520H.

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## PART III

## SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. Combat Missions Assigned

1. In accordance with 3d Marine Division Operation Order 50-67 the combat missions assigned the 4th Marines for Operation NEOSHO were as follows:

- (a) To conduct search and destroy operations in the PHONG-DIEN District.
- (b) Conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications.
- (c) Conduct extensive psychological operations.
- (d) Maintain direct liaison with the PHONG-DIEN District Chief and 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces in adjacent areas.
- (e) Provide support as requested to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces conducting unilateral or combined operations in PHONG-DIEN District within capabilities.

2. For Operation GRANITE the missions assigned the 4th Marines were:

- (a) Conduct combat operations in VC/NVA Base Area-114.
- (b) Capture and destroy enemy logistics caches, installations and equipment.
- (c) Obtain intelligence, and kill or capture enemy encountered.

3. For Operation COVE the missions assigned the 4th Marines were:

- (a) Conduct multi-battalion search and destroy operations in PHU-LOC area.
- (b) Prevent enemy interdictions of the PHU-BAI Base Vital Area, PHU-LOC District Hq and Route One within OA.

4. 3d Marine Division Order 03300.4 requires unit commanders provide for the security and defense of installations and vital areas in their respective operating areas. The Commanding Officer, 4th Marines as Base Coordinator, Camp EVANS is, therefore, responsible for the security and defense of Camp EVANS to include personnel, equipment and installations located therein.

B. Significant Operations Conducted

(e) Provide support as requested to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces conducting unilateral or combined operations in PHONG-DIEN District within capabilities.

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2. For Operation GRANITE the missions assigned the 4th Marines were:

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1. Operation NEOSHO commenced on 1 Nov 67 as the 4th Marines' major effort in its operating area. Extensive small unit patrols and ambushes were a daily event designed to interdict enemy lines of communications and destroy VC/NVA forces. Search and destroy operations, in conjunction with several civic action projects were conducted during the month throughout the NEOSHO OA. Construction projects along National Route One were continued with the 4th Marines providing security. Daily patrols and night ambushes were conducted to provide close in security for Camp EVANS.

2. Operation GRANITE was completed on 6 Nov 67. Two Marine infantry battalions in conjunction with a 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Task Force conducted a major search and destroy operation in enemy Base Area-111. Results from the operation were 34 NVA KIA (Conf), 47 NVA KIA (Prob), one VC KIA (Prob) and seven IWC.

3. Operation COVE was conducted from 17-21 Nov 67 with 4th Marine forces consisting of 1st Bn 4th Mar and 2d Bn 26th Mar. Regimental Cmd Grp "A" displaced to PHU-BAI Combat Base to conduct the operation.

C. Casualties inflicted on the enemy by 4th Mar Regt:

<u>KIA (C)</u>	<u>KIA (P)</u>	<u>PW</u>
VC 14	VC 29	VC None
NVA 13	NVA 20	NVA None
		Detainees 14
		IWC 1

D. Casualties Sustained: Hostile and non-hostile casualties sustained by members of the 4th Marine Regimental Headquarters Company:

<u>HOSTILE</u>			<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0	0	0

E. New Techniques Employed: None.

F. Command Relations:

1. As Commanding Officer, 4th Marines, the Regimental Commander exercised command over those units assigned OPCON to and in support of the Regiment through normal channels. In order to provide better control of Operation COVE, 4th Marines Command Group "A" displaced to PHU-BAI Combat Base.

2. Assigned as Base Coordinator for Camp EVANS and the general area along Route One north of the SONG BO River and south of HAI-LANG, the Regimental Commander was responsible for establishing administrative and

14 (C)

33

22

ENCLOSURE (1)

VC 14

VC 29

VC None

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regulatory procedures for the establishment and control of normal base activities within the growing Camp EVANS area.

3. In matters concerning coordination with local civilian and military officials, the Regimental Commander maintained constant communications and liaison with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) units district chiefs from adjacent districts through their U.S. Advisors.

4. Contact with Division Headquarters and adjacent regimental command echelons was maintained through normal command/control communications channels and command/staff visits.

#### G. Equipment

1. The 4th Marines received a 50 foot observation tower on 7 November 1967 to be employed in perimeter security.

2. Three additional "otters" arrived on 8 November 1967 for emergency winter monsoon resupply requirements.

3. Received four multi-purpose 16 foot barges with outboard motors on 28 November 1967.

#### H. Logistics

1. Supply - Primary source of supply remained FLSG-A, PHU-BAI. There were no shortages during the period.

##### 2. Resupply

(a) Helicopter resupply for the month of November was routine for Operation NEOSHO. There were four emergency resupplies during the month in support of Operation GRANITE.

(b) See Tab (A) for helicopter resupply weights.

##### 3. Transportation

(a) 3d MI Bn provided truck support, including one platoon in general support, and trucks "as required" for supply from PHU-BAI. One platoon attached to BLT 1/3 was used in direct support from 1 through 6 November. 3d Bn, 12th Mar provided support on an "as required" basis, transporting 136 tons, 4,050 troops, for a total of 8,336 miles.

(b) 6 Nov - Transported BLT 1/3 to CAM-LO.

13 Nov - Transported one Company of 1/4 to PHU-BAI.

17 Nov - Transported remaining companies 1/4 to PHU-BAI.

18 Nov - Continued transporting 1/4 rear to PHU-BAI.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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- 18 Nov - Advance Party 1/9 arrived Camp EVANS.
- 19 Nov - Completed transporting 1/4 rear to PHU-BAI
- 19 Nov - Two companies and Cmd Grp 1/9 arrived Camp EVANS.
- 20 Nov - Remainder 1/9 arrived Camp EVANS.
- 23 Nov - First increment 1/9 rear arrived Camp EVANS.
- 25 Nov - Transported two companies and Cmd Grp 1/4 to DONG-HA.
- 27 Nov - Second increment 1/9 rear arrived Camp EVANS.

(c) Approximately 1,590,000 lbs of supplies were transported from PHU-BAI to Camp EVANS during November. The 3d Plat Co C 3d MT Bn in general support at Camp EVANS transported 475 tons, 6,715 passengers, for a total of 4,940 miles. The 2d Plat Co B 3d MT Bn in direct support transported 18 tons, 1,685 passengers, for a distance of 2,169 miles.

#### 4. Services

(a) 3d Engr Bn continued to maintain the Regimental water point producing a total of 512,000 gallons of potable water during November. Engineers continued to prepare roads for the monsoon season; a total of 1,835 tons of fill was distributed during the month. The engineers were responsible for conducting mine detection sweeps over approximately 12,776 meters of road daily with 27 explosive devices detected and destroyed during November.

(b) Maintenance contact teams have been provided by FLSG-A as follows:

- (1) Tent repair
- (2) Small arms
- (3) Welding

5. A 27 man detachment from MCB 121 commenced the second Camp EVANS contonment package with work completed to date being 37 huts.

#### 6. Hospitalization and Evaluation

##### (a) Medical

(1) Average daily patient visits	8
(2) Referrals to 3d Med Bn	15
(3) Acute diarrhea with gastroenteritis	13
(4) Emergency Medical Care	9
(5) Immunizations	367

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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## (b) Dental

(1) Average daily visits	20
(2) Referred to 3d Dental Company	4

I. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare

## 1. Civic Action

(a) Statistical summary. The following commodities were distributed by the Regiment:

Cooking oil	24 gals
Soap	48 bars
Milk	72 cans
School kits	2 cases
Wood, scrap	6 3/4 ton loads
Sewing kits	24 each

(b) Narrative summary. 24 gallons of cooking oil, 48 bars of soap, 72 cans of milk and 24 sewing kits were turned over to District Headquarters to be used in assisting widows of deceased Popular Forces personnel. Two cases of school kits were taken to the Catholic Hamlet upon request of Father JAMES to be used in the Catholic school.

(c) Medcap. 681 Vietnamese Nationals were treated for various infections and diseases.

2. Psychological warfare. During the month of November PSYOPS supported Medcaps, Operations COVE and NEOSHO. Utilizing the various media available in psychological warfare, a large target audience of VC, NVA and civilians was contacted.

(a) HB Team #4 from the 244th PSYOPS Company (USA) broadcasted specifically for Medcaps, visits in PHONG-DIEN District, S & D missions with 3d Bn 26th Mar and mine rewards at the regimental water point (YD 520349). In support of Operation COVE HB Team #4 broadcasted various CHIEU-HOI themes from a company size blocking position. A special tape was made, exploiting intelligence information about the enemy in the PHU-LOC area. The total broadcast time on COVE was 30 hours.

(b) Leaflet handouts were made by the PF and RF units in PHONG-DIEN with a propaganda theme of mine rewards. The 4th Marines have had continued success with Vietnamese civilians turning in ordnance at the regimental water point (YD 520349). During Operation COVE the 1st Bn 4th Mar distributed 5000 safe conduct passes along their axis of advance.

(c) Three bulletin boards were built and will be placed in the PHONG-DIEN District Headquarters for PSYOPS posters, newsletters and leaflets.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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(d) A special project to use artillery propaganda cartridges as another media to distribute leaflets has been undertaken. This will provide the 4th Marines with an all weather capability to distribute leaflets and to exploit immediately all enemy contacts and sightings.

(e) Leaflet drops. In support of Operation COVE: seven leaflet drops totaling 950,000 leaflets; in support of Operation NEOSHO: eight leaflet drops totaling 900,000 leaflets.

(f) Aerial broadcasts. In support of Operation COVE: nine aerial broadcasts: total one hr 40 min. In support of Operation NEOSHO: two aerial broadcasts; total 30 min.

J. ADMINISTRATION Functioning in accordance with Division Order 5450.1.

1. All administrative personnel received on-the-job training in the field during Operation FREMONT, GRANITE, NEOSHO and COVE. This training consisted of all phases of administration under combat conditions.

2. During the entire period of this report 50% of the personnel in the S-1/Adjutant Section were assigned as members of the Headquarters Company reaction platoon and 50% participated actively in the defense of Camp EVANS by supplementing the base security and perimeter defense. Inspections of personnel and equipment were held by each section head to ensure a high state of readiness.

3. Staff studies and estimates: None

4. Local newspaper: None

K. PERSONNEL

1. Summary

(a) There are critical personnel shortages in the following MOS's.

One - 0430	One - 1141
Two - 0141	Two - 3531
One - 0369	One - 3371
One - 2867	One - 8421
One - 2847	

2. Photographs: None

3. Discipline, Courts-Martial and NJP

(a) Courts-Martial: One summary court-martial

(b) NJP: Five

4. Morale, PX, Postal Affairs, Liberty and R & R

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(a) **Morale:** Morale is considered excellent.

(b) **PX:** Numerous post exchange items are currently stocked in the PX located at Camp EVANS by the PX main store in PHU-BAI. This has been a definite asset to the Marines returning from the field and a tremendous morale booster for all hands. A new Post Exchange building has been completed and is now in full operation with a large inventory of items.

(c) **Postal:** Unit #7 of the Third Marine Division Post Office is functioning to facilitate handling of all outgoing and incoming mail.

(d) **Liberty:** None

(e) **R & R:** Quotas for the month were adequate and sufficient for one of every 13 Marines on the rolls. R & R continues to contribute to high morale.

5. **Chaplain support and religious services:** Worship services were conducted in the field for those of the Catholic, Protestant and Mormon faiths. MCB-121 initiated construction on a new chapel.

#### L. INTELLIGENCE

1. There were no significant changes in the enemy order of battle in the 4th Marines OA during the reporting period.

2. Usually reliable sources reports indicated that the enemy was continuing his attempts to exfiltrate large size units from VC/NVA Base Area-114 east into the coastal plain. This was confirmed by extensive sightings in the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley and along the lower SONG-BO River. The largest sightings were on 10 November when a Recon Team sighted 250-300 VC/NVA and on 17 November when another Recon Team sighted 250 VC/NVA.

3. The enemy continued to use a wide variety of ordnance in mining along Vietnamese National Route One. Patrols operating in the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley found the area heavily planted with explosive devices. In all there were 51 mining incidents during this reporting period, showing an increase of 16 over the previous month.

4. Sightings and contacts along the Camp EVANS perimeter were at a low level during November. Sightings that were made appeared to be small groups transiting the area.

5. Significant intelligence information on Operation GRANITE and Operation COVE is contained in the after action reports on these operations.

#### M. TRAINING

1. Training for members of the Regimental Headquarters Company continued to stress individual skills utilizing OJT and specialist schools.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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Selected junior NCO's have attended either the weekly Regimental NCO School at Camp EVANS or the 3d Marine Division School on OKINAWA.

2. Small unit, battalion and regimental sized operations conducted during the reporting period have emphasized the critical necessity for thorough training of Marines in basic combat skills. Special command attention has been initiated at all echelons to underscore the importance for conducting "in the field" training and improving small unit leadership whenever time and the tactical situation permit.

N. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. Normal communications were maintained between this, senior and subordinate headquarters.

2. A manual retransmission facility was maintained on HILL 674 throughout the month with effective results.

3. A manual retransmission capability was established on HILL 130 (ZD 117014) and operated during Operation COVE. This increased the overall effectiveness of the Regimental Tactical Net.

4. The Regimental Communications Platoon relocated and re-established the Regimental Radio Relay link with Division Headquarters on 29 November 1967 from the old site adjacent to the CP to the 3d Bn 12th Mar area.

5. 1st Lt Albert W. PAYNE relieved 1st Lt Robert W. O'CONNOR on 23 November 1967 as Assistant Communication Officer, 4th Marines. Lt O'CONNOR was reassigned to the 11th Engineer Battalion.

6. The Command Communications network received 1632 messages and transmitted 414 messages with no security violations reported.

7. Lack of maintenance supply support still imposes a handicap on the communication capabilities of the headquarters.

## CRITICAL ITEMS ARE:

AN/TPS - 21	2 of 2	AN/GRC - 125	6 of 6
AN/TRC - 27	6 of 10	PU-422	2 of 2
AN/TGC - 14	1 of 2	KY-8	1 of 6
AN/PRC - 41	1 of 2	AN/GRA - 39	1 of 8
AN/ERC - 83	1 of 2	PU-181	2 of 2
AN/ERC - 87	1 of 2	AN/PRC - 25	9 of 9
AN/ERC - 110	1 of 2		

C. WEATHER Temperatures in the 4th Marines OA ranged from the low 80's during the day to the mid to low 70's at night. Winds were generally from the north/northeast from 5-15 knots. There were 15 days of rain with total rainfall for November of 22.3".

P. FIRE SUPPORT

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1. Significant events.

(a) During the month of November the 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Marines was in direct support of the 4th Marines during Operations GRANITE, NEOSHO and COVE.

(b) "W" Btry chopped OPCON from 3d Bn 12th Mar to 1st Bn 13th Mar on 9 November 1967.

2. Number of missions fired:

<u>NEOSHO</u>	<u>COVE</u>
2041	112

3. Type of missions:

	<u>NEOSHO</u>	<u>COVE</u>
(a) Unobserved	109	9
(b) Observed	236	35

4. Total number of rounds fired:

(a) NEOSHO	HE	WP	ILL	SMK	TOTAL
(1) 105-mm How	4864	213	221	0	5298
(2) 155-mm How	2490	204	507	0	3201
				TOTAL	8499
(3) 4.2" Mortars	68	18			886
				TOTAL	8585
(b) COVE					1213
(1) 105-mm How					0
(2) 155-mm How					1213
				TOTAL	1213
				GRAND TOTAL	18297

5. Results of missions:

	<u>NEOSHO</u>	<u>COVE</u>
(a) KIA (CONF)	25	0
(b) KIA (PWB)	41	0

Q. AIR SUPPORT

1. Helicopter Support

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>RESUP/LOG</u>	<u>MED-EVAC</u>
Regt	15	74	1,300	5
1/4	15	27	81,885	57

ENCLOSURE (1)  
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3/26	37	231	190,000	35
1/3	4	---	34,985	4
1/9	8	405	87,800	4
TOTALS	<u>108</u>	<u>737</u>	<u>398,870 #</u>	<u>105</u>

In addition to the missions listed above, it is noted that 22 missions that had been requested were cancelled due to bad weather or shortage of helicopters.

2. Close air support. During the month 28 flights of fixed wing air strikes were run on enemy targets. Types of ordnance used were:

D-1's	250 lb
D-2's	500 lb
D-5's	2.75 Rockets
D-9's	500 lb Napalm

In Operation COVE, 4 flights of fixed wing were used. Ordnance expended was 250 and 500 lb bombs. Also used to support units during the month were four flareships (C-130) and two "spookys" (AC-47). 33 AO's (Air Observers) were used in November.

R. ACTIVATIONS/DEACTIVATIONS/REDESIGNATIONS NONE.

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## PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ TAB A - Resupply weights for November 1967
  - ✓ TAB B - ~~Msg~~<sup>Opn</sup> Order 51-67 (Operation NEOSHO)
  - ✓ TAB C - Frag Order 52-67 (Operation GRANITE)
  - ✓ TAB D - Frag Order 53-67 (Operation GRANITE)
  - ✓ TAB E - Frag Order 54-67 (Operation NEOSHO)
  - ✓ TAB F - ~~Msg~~<sup>Opn</sup> Order 55-67 (Operation COVE)
  - ✓ TAB G - ~~Msg~~<sup>Opn</sup> Order 56-67 (Operation NEOSHO)
  - ✓ TAB H - Frag Order 57-67 (Operation NEOSHO)
  - ✓ Tab I - Msg 101145 Z Subj: S & D Operation in Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley,  
Operation Neosho
- \* TABS A through G enclosed on original copy only.
- ✓ Tab J - Combat After Action Report (Operation Cove), w 1 Encl, & 1 End
  - ✓ Tab K - Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation Granite), w/7 Encls, & 1st End
  - ✓ Tab L - Letter from CG, 4th Marines, dated 11 Nov 67, Subj: Critique of Operation Granite, w/1 Encl, Notes from Operation Granite Critique
  - ✓ Tab M - Memorandum, Division Air Officer, Subj: Comments on Granite Critique
  - Tab N - Operation Cove Casualty Statistics
  - Tab O - Encl 1 Msg 180700Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #01
  - Tab O - Encl 2 Msg 181120Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #02
  - Tab O - Encl 3 Msg 181626Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #03
  - Tab O - Encl 4 Msg 182250Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #04
  - Tab O - Encl 5. Msg 190540Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #05
  - Tab O - Encl 6 Msg 191237Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #06
  - Tab O - Encl 7 Msg 191612Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #07
  - Tab O - Encl 8 Msg 192235Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #08
  - Tab O - Encl 9 Msg 200752Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #09
  - Tab O - Encl 10 Msg 211237Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #10
  - Tab O - Encl 11 Msg 201600Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #11
  - Tab O - Encl 12 Msg 202235Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #12
  - Tab O - Encl 13 Msg 210536Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #13
  - Tab O - Encl 14 Msg 211245Z Subj: Operation Cove SITREP #14

SECRET

Resupply Weights for November 1967

<u>Date</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Weight</u>
1 Nov 67	9,100 lbs.	16 Nov 67	11,500 lbs.
2 Nov 67	32,485	17 Nov 67	4,500
3 Nov 67	3,962	18 Nov 67	None
4 Nov 67	None	19 Nov 67	None
5 Nov 67	4,250	20 Nov 67	9,100
6 Nov 67	None	21 Nov 67	None
7 Nov 67	None	22 Nov 67	None
8 Nov 67	3,700	23 Nov 67	None
9 Nov 67	5,680	24 Nov 67	17,300
10 Nov 67	7,600	25 Nov 67	None
11 Nov 67	None	26 Nov 67	44,304
12 Nov 67	10,300	27 Nov 67	None
13 Nov 67	None	28 Nov 67	34,300
14 Nov 67	None	29 Nov 67	57,400
15 Nov 67	7,000	30 Nov 67	28,400

TAB (A)  
SECRET

**SECRET**

PR 31 637Z OCT 67  
 FROM: FOURTH MARINES  
 TO: FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIX MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 CO A THIRD SF BN  
 SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)  
 CO B THIRD AT BN  
 CO C THIRD TK BN  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN

INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB  
 THIRD MT BN  
 FLSG ALFA  
 FIRST MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN

BT  
 S E C R E T

OPERATION ORDER 50-67 (NEDSHO)

A. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, AMS 17014, SHEETS 6142 II AND III, 6160  
 QOI

II AND III

- B. THIRD MARDIV OPOD 50-67
- C. DIV IOI 1-67
- D. DIVO P2000.2E (COI)
- E. E. DIVO 2000.2C (COMSOP)
- F. REGTO 2000.3 (COMSOP)
- G. FOURTH MARINES OPOD 100-67
- H. FOURTH MARINES ADMIN ORD 100-67
- I. FOURTH MARINES OPOD 101-67

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGAINESATION

HQ Col4th MARINES (-)  
 FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
 BLT 3/3  
 1ST BN 3D MAR  
 BTRY A, 1ST BN 12TH MAR  
 1ST PLAT CO A 3D RECON BN  
 1ST PLAT CO A 3D ENGR BN  
 2ND PLAT CO A 3D MT BN

COL DICK  
 LTCOL DEPTULA  
 LTCOL ALDERMAN  
 LTCOL THOMAS

**SECRET**

TAB B

**SECRET**

## 1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) 3D MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN TAOR TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES.
- (2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT.
- (3) 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) ELEMENTS CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COMBINED/COORDINATED OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 4TH MARINES.
- (4) 3D BN (-) (REIN) 12TH MARINES D/S 4TH MARINES.
- (5) 3D RECON BN. GS 3D MARDIV
- (6) CO C (REINF) 3D TK BN. D/S 3D BN 26TH MAR.
- (7) CO B (-) 3D AT BN. D/S 3D BN 26TH MAR.
- (8) 2D PLAT (REINF) BTRY D 1ST BN 44TH ARMY (USA)
- (A) M-42'S DS 3D BN 26TH MAR
- (B) M-55'S GS 4TH MAR

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. NONE

2. MISSION. COMMENCING ~~0100~~ 0100 11 NOV 67 4TH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN PHONG DIEN DISTRICT, LOCATES AND DESTROYS NVA/VC FORCES, INTERDICTS ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DENIES ENEMY ACCESS INTO POPULATED AND FOOD PRODUCING COASTAL LOWLANDS.

## 3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 4TH MARINES WITH ONE OR MORE INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND SUPPORTING FORCES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN PHONG DIEN DISTRICT, LOCATES AND DESTROYS ENEMY FORCES, INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DENY ACCESS INTO FOOD PRODUCING COASTAL LOWLANDS.

B. HQ CO. REFERENCE (G) AND (I).

C. 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR

- (1) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OPERATIONS AREA.
- (2) CONDUCT PATROL AND AMBUSH OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN OPERATING AREA.
- (3) CONDUCT MISSIONS AS ASSIGNED BY REFERENCES (G) AND (I).

D. 1ST BN 4TH MAR

- (1) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OPERATING AREA.
- (2) CONDUCT PATROL AND AMBUSH OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN OPERATING AREA.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME ANY OF THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED 3D BN (-) 26TH MARINES, ON ORDER.

E. BLT 1/3

- (1) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OPERATING AREA.
- (2) CONDUCT PATROL AND AMBUSH OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN OPERATING AREA.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(3) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME ANY OF THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR, ON ORDER.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE ~~010001H~~ NOV 67
- (2) OPERATION CODE NAME - NEOSID
- (3) AREA OF OPERATION-ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY) (PASEP)
- (4) REPORTS IAW REFERENCE (G)
- (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON
- (6) REFERENCE (C)
- (7) THRUST POINTS

ALFA	4140	ECHO	5231
BRAVO	4533	FOXTROT	5828
CHARLIE	4629	GOLF	5922
DELTA	5023	HOTEL	5126

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REFERENCE (E).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

A. REFERENCES (D), (E), (F), AND 4TH MAR COI.

B. MANUAL RETRANSMISSION STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON THE REGIMENTAL TACTICAL NET AND LOCATED ON HILL 674 (YD 516219) WHEN REQUIRED. THE SUFFIX "RELAY" WILL BE ADDED TO STATION/UNIT CALL SIGN.

C. REPORT CHANGES TO GP LOCATION.

ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY)(PASEP).

GP -4

BT

**SECRET**

PR 030825Z NOV 67

FROM: FOURTH MARINES

TO: BLT ONE SLANT THREE

FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES

THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES

INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV

THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MARINES

CO B THIRD ENGR BN

CO C THIRD TK BN

CO A THIRD SP BN

1ST INF DIV (ARVN)

BT

**S E C R E T**

FRAG ORDER 53-67 (OPGRANITE)

4th MAR OPOED 50-67 (GRANITE)

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATION. REF A

A. 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) CONDUCTS GROUND OPERATIONS IN ZONE TO LOCATE AND DEFEAT VC/NVA FORCES, DESTROY INSTALLATIONS AND CAPTURE ENEMY SUPPLIES.

B. ARTILLERY. THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR D/S AND PROVIDES LNO TO ARVN TF ARTY: 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) TF ARTY PROVIDES REINFORCING FIRES ON REQUEST.

2. MISSION. ON D PLUS 10 (5 NOV 67) FOURTH MAR ESTABLISHES BLOCKING FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OPERATION LAN SOM PHASE II "STREET WITH OUT JOY" AREA.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A) ON 5 NOV 67 FOURTH MAR PROVIDES ONE BN (-) (TWO RIFLE COMPANIES TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS WEST OF 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OA, VIC MY CHANG (YD 4641)). SEE OP OVERLAY.

B. 1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR

(1) AFTER ENGINEER ROAD SWEEP OF NAT'L ROUTE ONE ON 5 NOV 67, COMMENCE MOTOR MOVEMENT NORTH FROM CAMP SVANS TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION ANVIL (YD 4641) AND FORCE (YD 4639) WITH ONE RIFLE COMPANY EACH.

(2) BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THRUST POINT: KILO 4641

(2) DIRLAUTH

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF (A)

5. COMMAND COMM-ELEC.

A. REF (A)

B. REPORT WHEN IN POSITION

ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)

GP-4

BT

TAB D

071340Z NOV 67

FROM: FOURTH MARINES  
 TO: FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 CO C THIRD TK BN  
 CO B THIRD ~~ENGR~~ ENGR BN  
 THIRD RECON BN

INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB  
 FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)

BT  
 SECRET

FRAG ORD 51-67 (NEOSHO)

- A. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, AMS L 7014, SHEETS 6442 II AND III
- B. DIVO P 2000.2E (COI)
- C. DIVO P 2000.4C (COMMSOP)
- D. REGTO 2000.3 (COMMSOP)
- E. 4TH MAR OPOD 100-67
- F. 4TH MAR ADMIN ORD 100-67
- G. 4TH MAR OPOD 51-67

## TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES (-) (REIN) COL DICK  
 HQ CO  
 1ST BN 4TH MAR LTCOL DEPTUWA

## 1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES. AO SIGHTINGS 1-6 NOV INDICATE ENEMY SMALL BOAT ACTIVITY ON SONG BO RIVER INSOUTHEAST PORTION 4TH MAR OA. SEE ALSO CURRENT PERIMETERS AND INTSUMS.

## B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) REF G  
 (2) ARTILLERY. 3D BN (-) (REIN) 12TH MAR DISPLACES ONE 105-MM BTRY AND TWO 155-MM HOWITZERS TO FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION (YD 636250) DS 1ST BN 4TH MAR.

(3) DET 3D RECON DS 1ST BN 4TH MAR

## C. ATTACHMENTS: NONE

2. MISSION. COMMENCING L-HOUR D-DAY 4TH MARINES CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EASTERN SECTOR REGTL OA, TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS ALONG THE SONG BO RIVER.

## 3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. 4TH MARINES HELILIFTS ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (-) (COMMAND GROUP AND THREE RIFLE COMPANIES) INTO LANDING ZONES CRANE (YD 573178) AND PELICAN (YD 585182) AT L-HOUR D-DAY TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ALONG TRACE OF SONG BO RIVER TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION MEANS; COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED BY ENGINEERS AND SCUBA-EQUIPPED RECON FORCES. DS ARTILLERY WILL BE PREPOSITIONED AT FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION (YD 636250) ON D-1 WITH ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) AS SECURITY. DURATION OF TAB F

OPERATION ESTIMATED AS TWO DAYS (9-10 NOV 1967) WITH BATTALION (-) BEING EXTRACTED BY HELICOPTER.

B. HQ CO REF G

C. 1ST BN 4TH MAR

(1) ON D-1 PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) AS SECURITY FOR 3D BN 12TH MAR FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION (YD 636250).

(2) AT L-HOUR D-DAY CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO LANDING ZONES CRANE (YD 573178) AND PELICAN (YD 585182), CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD OBJECTIVES ALFA (YD 561187), BRAVO (YD 573175) AND CHARLIE (YD 577190) TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION MEANS.

(3) BE PREPARED TO BE EXTRACTED BY HELICOPTER ON ORDER FROM LZ GROUSE (YD 572192) NLT 1500H ON D PLUS 1.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) OPERATION CODE NAME- NEOSHO ALFA

(2) AREA OF OPERATION-BOUNDED BY GRIDS (YD 5323), (YD 6223), (YD 6216), (YD 5316).

(3) THRUST POINTS: LIMA 5620  
MIKE 6017

(4) ALTERNATE LZ: PENGUIN (YD 568187); EXTRACTION LZ GROUSE (YD 572191).

(5) RECON TEAM NFZ LOCATED: GRIDS (YD 5918), (YD 6218), (YD 5916), (YD 6216). DIRAULTH BETWEEN 1ST BN 4TH MAR AND RECON TM IS DIRECTED.

(6) L-HOUR-0800H; D-DAY - 9 NOV 1967

(7) E-HOUR (EXTRACTION) 1500H ON D PLUS 1.

(8) NOR FIRE LINE (NFL) IS SAME AS BATTALION OA BOUNDRY

(9) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECIEPT.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF F.

5. COMMAND/COMM-ELEC.

A. REFERENCES (B), (B), (D), AND (E).

B. RADIO RETRANSMISSION FACILITY AVAILABLE HILL 674.

C. VOICE RADIO NETS

NET	FREQ	NCS
(1) REGTL TAC	69.30	JOHN BROWN
(2) BN TAC	60.35	CHURCH VIEW
(3) BN ARMY COF	65.50	CHURCH VIEW
(4) RECON TAC	46.80	TEA JAW BREAKER

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

O R 163610Z NOV 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO FIRST BN FOURTH MAR  
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
 CO A THIRD SP BN  
 DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)  
 3D RECON BN  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV (HCB)  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 TWELFTH MAR  
 BT  
 S E C R E T SECTION I OF II SECTIONS  
 OP ORD 55-67 (OPERATION COVE)

*Copy 19 of 35*

A. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000 AMS SERIES L7014, SHEETS 6541 I, 6541 II, 6541 III, 6541 IV.  
 B. DIV FRAG ORD 31-67 (OP PHU-BAI TAOR)  
 C. DIVO P2222.2E (COI)  
 D. DIVO P2222.4C (COMMSOP)  
 E. CG 3D MARDIV 142152 NOV 67 (NOTAL)  
 F. 4TH MAR OPORD 122-67  
 G. 4TH MAR ADMIN ORD 122-67  
 TIME ZONE: H  
 TASK ORGANIZATION  
 4TH MAR (-) (REINF) COL DICK

HQ CO  
 1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR LTCOL DEPTULA  
 2D BN (REINF) 265 2-4 LTCOL CHAPLIN  
 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR LTCOL ALDERMAN

1. SITUATION.  
 A. ENEMY FORCES. INTELLIGENCE STUDY (PASEP) - CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.  
 B. FRIENDLY FORCES.  
 (1) 3D MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN TAOR TO LOCATE AND

**SECRET**

TAB F

**SECRET**

DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES.

(2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT.

(3) ARTILLERY.

(A) 3D BN 12TH MAR DS 4TH MAR.

(B) 4TH BN 12TH MAR GS/REINF

(4) NAVAL GUNFIRE. ONE DESTROYER (5 54) GS 4TH MAR.

(5) CO B 3D ENGR BN: DET DS 1ST BN 4TH MAR, DET DS 3D BN

20TH MAR.

(6) 3D RECON BN GS 3D MARDIV: SUPPORTS 4TH MAR BN  
CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE AND SCREENING OPERATIONS AS REQUESTED.C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. 1ST BN 4TH MAR CHOPS ONE  
RIFLE COMPANY OPCON TO 2D BN 20TH MAR FOR PHASE I.2. MISSION. COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT 18 NOV 1967, 4TH MAR (-) (REINF)  
CONDUCTS MULTI-BATTALION SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN DESIGNATED  
OA WITH PRIMARY EFFORT INITIALLY IN PHU-LOC AREA, TO CAPTURE/DESTROY  
ENEMY LOGISTICS CACHES, INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL. OBTAIN  
INTELLIGENCE, KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY PERSONNEL: AND TO PREVENT  
ENEMY INTERDICTION OF THE PHU-BAI BASE VITAL AREA. PHU-LOC  
DISTRICT HG, AND ROUTE ONE WITHIN OA.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) PHASE I. 4TH MAR WILL CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATION IN

VICINITY PHU-LOC (VIC 2D 285408) WITH ONE INF BN (-) BEING  
HELILIFTED INTO OA TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS NORTHWEST  
TOWARD ELEMENTS OF SECOND INF BN OCCUPYING BLOCKING POSITIONS  
SOUTHEAST OF PHU LOC. FIRE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY AIR, ARTILLERY AND  
NAVAL GUNFIRE. (ANNEX C FIRE SUPPORT).(2) PHASE II. 4TH MAR CONTINUES COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH FIRST  
INF BN ATTACKING, SEIZING AND OCCUPYING BLOCKING POSITIONS WEST OF  
PHU LOC. THIRD INF BN HELILIFTED INTO OA AND CONDUCTING SEARCH AND  
DESTROY OPERATIONS EAST. FIRE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY AIR, ARTILLERY AND  
NAVAL GUNFIRE. (ANNEX C FIRE SUPPORT).

(3) ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY).

E. B. 1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR.

GGQL AT L-HOUR, D-DAY CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO SEIZE  
AND SECURE L2 FALCON (VIC 2C 143997). UPON REORGANIZATION CONDUCT  
SEARCH AND DESTROY TOWARD OBJ ALFA (VIC 2C 117973) AND CHARLIE (VIC  
2C 123994).(2) ON ORDER, CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD OBJ  
BRAVO (VIC 2C 125909).

(3) BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS (PHASE II). ON ORDER.

C. 2D BN (REINF) 20TH MAR

(1) CONTINUE MISSIONS AS SET FORTH BY REF (B)

(2) ON D-1 PROVIDE RIFLE CO AS SECURITY FOR 3D BN 12TH MAR

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

ARTY POSIT (VIC ZC 126013) AND 4TH MAR RADIO RETRANSMISSION  
SITE (VIC ZC 115312).

(3) AT L-HOUR D-DAY ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS DELTA (VIC ZC 132028)  
3CHO (VIC ZC 092989) WITH ONE RIFLE CO.

(4) BE PREPARED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS AS ORDERED.

D. 3D BN 26TH MAR (PHASE II)

(1) UPON RELIEF OF PRESENT MISSIONS BY 1ST BN 2TH MAR BE  
PREPARED TO CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO SEIZE AND SECURITY LANDING  
ZONE HAWK (VIC YD 280013) AND CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS  
TOWARD OBJECTIVES PAPA (VIC YC 090994), QUEBEC (VIC D 000000),  
AND ROMEO (VIC ZC 033096).

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME: COVE.

(2) D-DAY

(A) PHASE I: 18 NOV 1967

(B) PHASE II: 23 NOV 1967 (TENTATIVE)

(3) L-HOUR

(A) PHASE I: 0900H

(B) PHASE II: 0900H (TENTATIVE)

(4) INCLEMENT WEATHER PLANS: IN CASE OF HELICOPTER NON-

AVAILABILITY DUE TO WEATHER AFTER 24HR POSTPONEMENT ASSAULT BATTALIONS  
WILL MOVE INTO VICINITY OF DESIGNATED L2 BY SURFACE MEANS (TRUCK AND  
FOOT) AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS PLANNED.

(5) RCA UTILIZATION AUTHORIZED.

(6) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. ANNEX B (PSYCHOLOGICAL  
OPERATIONS).

(7) GROUND COMBAT OPERATION WILL BE CHARACTERIZED BY  
LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS, AMBUSHES, COMBAT AND RECONNAISSANCE  
PATROLS.

(8) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (F). ENSURE  
REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS DO NOT CONTAIN UNIT-GENERATED  
CODE WORDS OR REFERENCE POINTS.

(9) REFERENCE (F).

(10) KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS INFORMED OF WEATHER CONDITIONS  
AND AVAILABILITY OF L2S.

(11) EFFECTIVE THRUST POINTS.

(A) ALFA ZC 0500

(B) BRAVO ZD 0101

(C) CHARLIE ZC 0908

(D) DELTA ZC 1300

(12) PHASE II OPERATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED BY SEPARATE  
FRAG ORDER.

(13) ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY)

(14) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT. BOUNDARIES FOR

GP-4  
BT

PHASE I EFFECTIVE L-Hour D-DAY

TOR: 161710H NOV 67

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(15) MAX USE OF PROBING DEVICES WILL BE MADE TO SEARCH FOR SPIDER TRAPS AND CACHES IN SUSPECT AREAS.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. IAW REF (G) WITH EXCEPTIONS AND ADDITIONS NOTED BELOW.

A. SUPPLY

(1) PRIMARY SOURCE OF SUPPLY: LSA, FLSG-A, PHU BAI.

(2) MEDICAL SUPPLIES-PRIMARY SOURCE-BAS. COORDINATE WITH 3D MED BN AND FLSG-- (MED SEC) FOR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

(3) PRESCRIBED LOADS-AS PRESCRIBED BY UNIT COMMANDERS BUT NOT LESS THAN TWO DAYS CLASS I AND V. INSURE THAT ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF SALT AND HALIOME TABLETS ARE CARRIED BY ALL HANDS. ONE NYLON STRETCHER PER SQUAD WILL BE CARRIED FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. SUFFICIENT ROPE FOR STREAM CROSSING AND PROBING DEVICES (THREE PER SQUAD) WILL BE CARRIED.

B. RESUPPLY

(1) DUE TO THE NATURE OF TERRAIN IT IS NECESSARY FOR REQUESTING UNITS TO GIVE A FULL DESCRIPTION OF LZ AND SURROUNDING TERRAIN, INCLUDING HEIGHT OF CANOPY.

(2) EMERGENCY LZ CLEARING TEAMS WILL REMAIN ON STANDBY.

EQUIPPED WITH POWER SAWS AND DEMOLITIONS.

(3) TUNNEL TEAMS WILL BE ON STANDBY AT LSA: REQUEST THROUGH TACTICAL NET.

(4) RESUPPLY OF ARTILLERY POSITIONS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UTILIZING ORGANIC ARTILLERY VEHICLES. 3D BN 12TH MAR WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND COORDINATING ALL RESUPPLY FOR UNITS LOCATED AT FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITIONS.

(5) SIX OTTERS WILL BE POSITIONED AT THE LSA FOR EMERGENCY RESUPPLY USE.

(6) DET CO A 3D SP BN WILL MAINTAIN THE LSA LZ AT PHU-BAI AIRFIELD (YD 881149).

C. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) ALL MILITARY CASUALTIES WILL BE EVACUATED TO CO A 3D MED BN.

(2) ALL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WILL BE EVACUATED TO HUE HOSPITAL.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

A. REFERENCES (C), (D) AND 4TH MAR COI (PASEP).

B. RADIO

(1) ACTIVATE MANUAL RADIO RETRANSMISSION STATION ON HILL 137 (2D 117314) AT L-HOUR, D-DAY AS FOLLOWS.

NET	FREQ	UNIT PROVIDING
REGTL TAC	68.37/43.15 MCS	HQ 4TH MAR

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

HST LOG 66.17 MCS CO A 3D SP BN

(2) RADIO RETRANSMISSION STATION WILL USE CALL SIGN OF NET CONTROL STATION PLUS WORD "RELAY".

(3) REGTL CMD NET (HF/VOICE) 4490 KCS (P)/4344 KCS (S) WILL BE ACTIVATED L-HOUR WITH STATIONS AT 4TH MAR, 1ST BN 4TH MAR, 3D BN 26TH MAR. 3D BN 26TH MAR WILL ACTIVATE A STATION ON NET UPON COMMENCEMENT PHASE II.

(4) RADIO VOICE CALL SIGN FOR 4TH MAR REAR (CAMP EVANS): JOHN BROWN REAR.

(5) BATTALIONS OPCON4TH MAINTAIN STATION ON REGTL TACP NET 42.87 MCS (M-171).

## C. CRYPTO

(1) NUMERAL CODE	KAC-QX 11	EFFECTIVE DAY
(2) AUTHENTICATION	KAC-QX 11	EFFECTIVE DAY
(3) BREVITY CODE	KAC-PX 21	EFFECTIVE DAY

## D. VISUAL

(1) PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C).

(2) SMOKE

(A) WHITE-MARKING ENEMY POSITIONS

(B) RED-"AREA NOT SECURE/NOT SAFE TO LAND".

(C) VIOLET/GREEN - "AREA SECURE/SAFE TO LAND OR DROP SUPPLIES".

(D) YELLOW-MARKING OF FREINDLY POSITIONS.

## E. COMMAND POSTS.

(1) 4TH MAR PHU - BAI (YD 882137)

(2) REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED AND CLOSED.

ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)

ANNEX B (PSYOPS) (PASEP)

ANNEX C (FIRE SUPPORT)

GP-4

BT

TOR: 161720H NOV 67

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

P R 161229Z NOV 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO FIRST BN FOURTH MAR  
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
 CO A THIRD SP BN  
 DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)

COPY 6A OF 13 COPIES

THIRD RECON BN  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 TWELFTH MAR  
 TWO FORTY FOURTH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CO USA  
 BT  
 S E C R E T

ANNEX B (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 55-67 (OPERATION COVE)

A. 4TH MAR OPORD 177-67 TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES

(1) SEE INTELLIGENCE STUDY (PASEP), CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

(2) PSYOP VULNERABILITIES OF VC/NVA.

(A) THE VC/NVA IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN HARASSED BY ARTILLERY, H2I'S AND RADAR CONTROLLED BOMBING.

(B) 2D BN 26TH MAR HAS INTERDEICTED ROUTES WHICH THE VC/NVA HAVE USED TO GATHER RICE THEREBY MAKING FOOD CRITICAL TO THE ENEMY.

(C) NO DIRECT INDICATIONS OF MORALE HAVE BEEN DETERMINED; HOWEVER, THE SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND SUPPLES SHOULD LOWER THE ENEMY'S WILL TO FIGHT, 2D BN 26TH MAR HAS HAMPERED VC/NVA SUPPLY ROUTES INT THE PHU BAI AREA CAUSING THE ENEMY TO MOVE THROUGH DIFFICULT TERRAIN SEEKING NEW ROUTES.

(D) CONDUCTING THIS OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN AN AREA WHICH VC/NVA CONSIDERED A HAVEN SHOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE DEGENERATION OF THE ENEMY'S AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS.

(3) CIVILIANS

(A) CIVILIAN SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM DURING THIS OPERATION.

**SECRET**

(B) CIVILIANS COULD BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA, BUT ARE PROBABLY BEING EMPLOYED BY VC/NVA TO CARRY SUPPLIES AND BUILD BUNKERS.

(C) CIVILIANS ENCOUNTERED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS VC AND PROCESSED THROUGH S-2 CHANNELS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE BASIC OPCORD 55-67.

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS

(1) DET (HB) 244TH PSYOPS CO (LOUDSPEAKER BROADCAST)

2. MISSION. THE MISSION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IS TO LOWER MORALE OF, CAUSE DISSATISFACTION WITHIN AND DESERTION FROM VC/NVA UNIT OPERATING WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATION.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED BY AERIAL LEAFLET DROPS AND BROADCASTS. DURING PHASE I A GROUND BROADCAST TEAM WILL BE LOCATED WITH THE BLOCKING FORCE AT (LC 795992). THESE TO BE EMPLOYED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) VC RETURN TO YOUR FAMILIES (CHIEU HOI)

(2) THE VC CAUSE IS FUTILE

(3) ARVN AND FREE WORLD FORCES ARE TOO STRONG

(4) VC CADRE HAS MISLED AND LIED TO VC SOLDIERS

(5) NVA TROOPS HAVE BEEN MISLED AND LIED TO ABOUT GVN

(6) ALLIED FIRE POWER WILL DESTROY NVA

(7) RETURN TO YOUR FAMILIES IN THE NORTH-THEY NEED YOU

(8) DIE WITH UNMARKED GRAVES

B. SPECIFIC DUTIES

(1) HB TEAM 4 MAKE LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS AS DIRECTED.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) REQUEST ALL LEAFLET DROPS AND AERIAL BROADCASTS THROUGH REGT. PSYOPS OFFICER.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

A. CHIEU HOI

(1) CHIEU HOI PERSONNEL WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH S-2 CHANNELS

(2) REWARDS FOR WEAPONS, ORDNANCE AND INFORMATION PAID

THROUGH S-2 CHANNELS.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. SEE PARAGRAPH 5 OF OPERATION ORDER.

GP-4

BT

*TOP 162240H*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

*Annex to  
Core Order.*

ZNY 010000  
 P R 010000 Z 01 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO ZEN/THIRD US MARINE MAR  
 SECOND US MARINE MAR  
 FIRST US MARINE MAR  
 FOURTH US MARINE MAR  
 ZEN/THIRD US MARINE MAR  
 ZEN/THIRD US MARINE MAR  
 ZEN/FOURTH US MARINE MAR  
 ZEN/FOURTH US MARINE MAR  
 ZEN/FOURTH US MARINE MAR  
 INFO US MARINE MAR  
 ADD THING AND  
 FIRST MAR  
 NINTH MAR  
 TWELFTH MAR

BT  
 S E C R E T  
 NUMBER: G 010000 Z 01 67 COORD 55-67 COOPERATION COVE)  
 A. MAPS: VICT MAR, 100, 302 AND 30202S 17014, SHEETS 3941 I, 3941 II

PAGE TWO OF...

B. 30 MARINE MAR... 1967  
 C. 4TH MARINE MAR...  
 TIME 2100

1. SITUATION  
 A. ENEMY...  
 B. FRIENDLY...  
 C. AIRBORNE...  
 D. HELICOPTER...  
 E. HELICOPTER...

1. 12TH MAR...  
 2. 12TH MAR...  
 3. 12TH MAR...  
 4. 12TH MAR...  
 5. 12TH MAR...  
 6. 12TH MAR...  
 7. 12TH MAR...  
 8. 12TH MAR...  
 9. 12TH MAR...  
 10. 12TH MAR...

2. SUPPORT FOR 4TH MAR TO INCLUDE CLOSE SUPPORT  
 OF... AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY REAR AREAS AND

...

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**SECRET**

TO BE USED FOR MAP OF LANDING ZONES BY PREPLANNED AIRSTRIKES.  
ARTY AND NGF FOR DURATION OF OPERATION.  
PROTECT... PROTECT... PROTECT...  
PROTECT... PROTECT... PROTECT...  
PROTECT... PROTECT... PROTECT...

12TH MAR US 4TH MAR; POSITION BTRY "G" 3D BN  
HOWS VIC ZED 129012, PRIORITY OF FIRES TO 1ST BN 4TH

12TH MAR GS/REINF 3D BN 12TH MAR; POSITION BTRY  
HOWS VIC (YD 99043) PHASE II.

1ST 155 GLN  
PROVIDES REINFORCING; PROVIDES  
REINFORCING FIRES ON REQUEST OF 3D BN 12TH MAR PHASE I AND II.

1ST 155 HOW SP) GS/REINF 3D BN  
PROVIDES REINFORCING FIRES ON  
REQUEST OF 12TH MAR PHASE I; 3D BN 12TH  
MAR ESTABLISH LAISON.

12TH MAR (8-105 HOW) PROVIDES  
REINFORCING FIRES UPON REQUEST OF 3D BN 12TH MAR.  
3D BN 12TH MAR ESTABLISH LAISON.

ONE CRUISER (G/759) GS 4TH MAR PHASE I.  
4TH MAR PHASE I. SPORT TEAM WITH  
AIR SPOTTER ON STATION  
DEFENSE AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY; NGF PHASE II TO BE  
MAINTAINED.

2. COORDINATE ALL INSTRUCTIONS.

**SECRET**

SUPPORT COORDINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A) AND (C).  
ISSUED BY 4TH MAR FSCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (B).

EFFORT REQUIRED BETWEEN INF EN AIR J&C AND ARTY  
ARTY AND NGF IN BN ZONE OF ACTION.

SUBMIT NO FIRE LINE RECOMMENDATION 1800 DAILY.

SERVES AS FIRE COORDINATION LINE BETWEEN 3D

12TH MAR PHASE II.

4. COORDINATE ALL LOGISTICS.

15-67 (OPERATION COVER)

ENDS/TUBE/DAY

ENDS/TUBE/DAY

9. COORDINATE ALL LOGISTICS-ELECTRONICS

OPERATION COVER)

PLANNING) IN 4TH MAR COC PHU BAI.

OPERATIONAL) LOCATED WITH G/3/12 VIC (ZD 129012).

TO 4TH MAR FSCC AND PHU LOC DISTRICT HQTRS.

4TH MAR FSCC PHU BAI- CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION IN SUPPORT  
PHU BAI OF... AREA. DIRLATH TO 3D MAR DIV FSCC.

CP-2

*Handwritten signature/initials*

*C-621000*

*CEO*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

P R 201210Z NOV 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 CO A THIRD SP BN  
 SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)  
 CO C THIRD TK BN  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
 /DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV (DHCB)  
 FLSG-ALFA  
 FIRST MARINES  
 NINTH MARINES  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 BT  
 S E C R E T  
 OPERATION ORDER 56-57 (NEOSHO)  
 A. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, SHEETS 6442 II AND III,

*Copy 34 as 35*

6462 II AND III  
 B. THIRD MARDIV OPORD 59-67 (NEOSHO) (NOTAL)  
 C. DIV LOI 1-67  
 D. DIVO P2000.2E (COI)  
 E. DIVO P2000.4C (COMMSOP)  
 F. REGTO 2000.3 (COMMSOP)  
 G. FOURTH MAR OPORD 100-67  
 H. FOURTH MAR ADMIN ORD 100-67  
 I. FOURTH MAR OPORD 101-67

TIME ZONE: H

## TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES(-)

COL DICK

HQ CO

THIRD BN(-) TWENTY SIXTH MAR

LTCOL ALDERMAN

FIRST BN NINTH MAR

LTCOL MITCHELL

## 1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) 3D MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN TAOR TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES.

**SECRET**

TAB G

**SECRET**

- (2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT.
- (3) 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) ELEMENTS CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COMBINED/COORDINATED OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 4TH MAR.
- (4) 3D BN (-) (REINF) 12TH MAR DS 4TH MAR
- (5) 3D RECON BN GS 3D MARDIV
- (6) CO C (REINF) 3D TK BN DS 1ST BN 9TH MAR
- (7) 2D PLAT (REINF) BTRY D 1ST BN 44TH ARTY (USA)
  - (A) M-42'S DS 1ST BN 9TH MAR
  - (B) M-55'S GS 4TH MAR

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. NONE

2. MISSION. 4TH MAR CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN PHONG-DIEN DISTRICT, LOCATES AND DESTROYS NVA/VC FORCES, INTERDICTS ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DENIES ENEMY ACCESS INTO POPULATED AND FOOD PRODUCING LOWLANDS.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. 4TH MAR WITH ONE OR MORE INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND SUPPORTING FORCES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN PHONG-DIEN DISTRICT TO LOCATE ENEMY FORCES, INTERDICT ENEMY LINES

*OF COMMUNICATIONS*

AND DENY HIM ACCESS INTO FOOD PRODUCING LOWLANDS.

B. HQ CO. REFERENCES (G) AND (I).

C. 1ST BN 9TH MAR

- (1) CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OPERATING AREA.
- (2) CONDUCT PATROL AND AMBUSH OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN OPERATING AREA.
- (3) BY 210800 H NOV 1967 RELIEVE 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR AND CONDUCT MISSIONS AS ASSIGNED BY REFERENCES (G) AND (I) WITH THREE RIFLE COMPANIES.

(4) COMMENCING 24 NOV 1967 CHOP ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REINF) TO 2D BN 26TH MAR FOR EMPLOYMENT AS SECURITY FOR MCB-3 ROCK CRUSHER / NAM-HOA BRIDGE COMPLEX IN RELIEF OF CO M 3D BN 26TH MAR.

D. 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR

- (1) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4TH MAR OPORD 51-67 (NEOSHO) UNTIL RELIEVED BY 1ST BN 9TH MAR.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4TH MAR OPORD 55-67 (COVE).

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
- (2) OPERATION CODE NAME- NEOSHO
- (3) AREA OF OPERATION - ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)
- (4) REPORTS IAW REF (G)
- (5) DIRLAUTH ALCON
- (6) REFERENCE (C)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(7) THRUST POINTS (EFFECTIVE 210901H NOV 67)

(A) ECHO	YD 4734
(B) FOXTROT	YD 5128
(C) GOLF	YD 5627
(D) HOTEL	YD 5234

(E) INDIA YD 4436

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REFERENCE (E).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

A. REFERENCES (D), (E), (F) AND 4TH MAR COI.

B. MANUAL RETRANSMISSION STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON THE REGTL TAC NET AND LOCATED ON HILL 674 (YD 516219) WHEN REQUIRED. THE SUFFIX 'ADVANCE' WILL BE ADDED TO THE STATION/UNIT CALL SIGN.

C. REPORT CHANGES TO CP LOCATION.

ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP).

GP-4

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TOD: 20 22 30 H NOV 67

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

U P 221646Z NOV 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO FIRST BN FOURTH MAR  
 FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 CO A THIRD SP BN  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
 CO C THIRD TK BN  
 SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)  
 DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)  
 INFO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ADC THIRD MARDIV DMCE  
 FLSG-ALFA  
 NINTH MAR  
 FIRST MAR  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 BT  
**S E C R E T**

*Copy of 35 Copies*

OP ORD 57-67 (NEOSH)  
 A. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, SHEETS 6442 I, II, III,  
 AND IV

B. FOURTH MAR OPORD 100-67  
 C. FOURTH MAR ADMIN ORD 100-67  
 D. FOURTH MAR OPORD 101-67

TIME ZONE: H  
 TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES

COL DICK

HQ CO

FIRST BN (-) FOURTH MAR

LTCOL DEPTULA

THIRD BN (-) TWENTY SIXTH MAR

LTCOL ALDERMAN

FIRST BN NINTH MAR

LTCOL MITCHELL

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. REF (B).

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. FIRST BN NINTH MAR CHOPS ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REINF) TO 2D BN 26TH MAR IN RELIEF OF CO M 3D BN 26TH MAR COMMENCING 24 NOV 67.

2. MISSION. 4TH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OA, LOCATES AND DESTROYS NVA/VC FORCES, INTERDICTS ENEMY LINES OF

**SECRET**

TAB #

COMMUNICATIONS AND DENIES ENEMY ACCESS INTO POPULATED AND FOOD PRODUCING LOWLANDS; AND PROVIDES SUPPORT TO 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) IN COMBINED OPERATIONS.

### 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. 4TH MAR WITH TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND SUPPORTING FORCES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OA TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND DENY ENEMY ACCESS INTO FOOD PRODUCING LOWLANDS. A THIRD INFANTRY BATTALION (-) WILL PROVIDE TWO BLOCKING POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OPERATION LAM SON 147. ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY)

#### B. 1ST BN 9TH MAR

(1) CONDUCT MISSIONS ASSIGNED BY REFERENCES (B) AND (D),

(2) COMMENCING 24 NOV 67 CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD TO NEUTRALIZE AND DENY ENEMY ACCESS TO XOM BO DIEN (VIC YD 570310).

(3) CONDUCT PATROLS AND AMBUSH OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN ASSIGNED SECTOR OF 4TH MAR OA.

(4) COMMENCING 24 NOV 67 PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY TO 2D BN 26TH MAR FOR EMPLOYMENT AS SECURITY FOR MCB-3 ROCK CRUSHER/NAM-HOA BRIDGE COMPLEX IN RELIEF OF CO M 3D BN 26TH MAR.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY OF CULVERTS AND BRIDGES DURING HOURS OF

DARKNESS ALONG NAT'L ROUTE ONE FROM (YD 549328) TO (YD 591308).

#### C. 3D BN (-) 26TH MAR

(1) COMMENCING 24 NOV 67 CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN (MY CHANH AREA) AND SOUTH EASTERN (VICINITY OF CO BI AND THANH TAN HAMLETS) PORTIONS OF OA WITH TWO RIFLE COMPANIES IN EACH AREA FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. CONCEPT IS TO UTILIZE BASE CAMPS TO BUILD UP SUPPLY DUMPS DURING FAVORABLE WEATHER AND CONDUCT MAXIMUM AMBUSHES AND PATROLS TO SATURATE AREA.

#### D. 1ST BN (-) 4TH MAR

(1) ON 23 NOV 67, NLT 1200, ESTABLISH COMPANY BLOCKING POSITIONS ANVIL (VIC YD 464418) AND FORGE (VIC YD 466398) IN SUPPORT OF 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OPERATION LAM SON 147.

(2) O/A 24 NOV 67 UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATION BE PREPARED TO MOVE TO DONG HA COMBAT BASE AND CHECK OPCON TO 9TH MAR ON ARRIVAL.

#### E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT.

(2) OPERATION CODE NAME-NEOSHO.

(3) AREAS OF OPERATION-ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP).

(4) REPORTS IAW REF (B).

(5) DIRLAUTH ALCON.

(6) REF (B) FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOPS SUPPORT.

**SECRET**

(7) THRUST POINTS (EFFECTIVE 230600H NOV 67).  
 (A) KILO YD 4437 (E) OSCAR YD 5829  
 (B) LIMA YD 4733 (F) PAPA YD 5128  
 (C) MIKE YD 4928 (G) QUEBEC YD 4339  
 (D) NOVEMBER YD 5427

(8) KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED OF WEATHER CONDITIONS AND LANDING ZONE AVAILABILITY.

(9) ORGANIZATIONS WILL PROGRAM AND CONDUCT ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE SMALL UNIT TRAINING AS AN INTEGRAL OBJECTIVE OF OPERATIONS NEOSHO IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- (A) FIRE AND MANEUVER.
- (B) PATROLLING AND AMBUSHES
- (C) LAND NAVIGATION (INCLUDES COMPASS AND BASIC MAP

READING)

(D) USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS

(E) FORMATIONS AND TACTICAL SECURITY (INCLUDES HAND AND ARM SIGNALS AND OTHER BASICS)

(F) ADDITIONAL BASIC GENERAL MILITARY SUBJECTS AS DETERMINED BY APPROPRIATE COMMANDER. INSTRUCTION FOR FT, SQD AND PLAT LEADERS WILL BE EMPHASIZED. BN COMMANDERS WILL SUBMIT BY 1 DEC 67 PROPOSED METHODS OF ACCOMPLISHING REQUIRED TRAINING. PROPER SCHEDULING AND UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES AND AVAILABLE TIME WILL PERMIT AN EFFECTIVE

TRAINING PROGRAM WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO UNITS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNED MISSION.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

A. REF (C).

B. SUBMIT RE/SUPPLY REQ TO REGT'L S-4 48 HRS IN ADVANCE.

5. COMMAND COMM-ELEC.

A. REF (B).

B. MANUAL RETRANSMISSION STATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON REGT'L TAC NET AND LOCATED ON HILL 674 (YD 516219) WHEN REQUIRED. THE SUFFIX "ADVANCE" WILL BE ADDED TO THE STATION/UNIT CALL SIGN.

ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP).

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CCW# 1615

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

*OPN*



ZNY 0800Z  
FM 1ST AF  
TO 1ST AF  
INFO 1ST AF  
BT

- 1. ON 10 NOV 62 IN THE TAN VALLEY - OPERATION NEOSHO
- 2. ON 10 NOV 62 APPROX 200-300 NVA (APPROX 200-300) WITH HEAVY (OR VARIOUS TYPES) MOVING WEST TO EAST
- 3. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY AND CAS BUT HEAVY ARTILLERY AND TP1 - 10
- 4. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY.
- 5. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY WITH TWO REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANIES
- 6. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY OF 10 NOV 62 IN TAN VALLEY. COMMENCE SIB ASAP ON
- 7. 10 NOV 62 (OR EARLIER DAYS) IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT PREVIOUS
- 8. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY (OR EARLIER DAYS).
- 9. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY AND REINFORCED CAMP EVANS AND 3/26 ON WITH 3/26.
- 10. CONTACTS HEAVY ARTILLERY AND REINFORCED CAMP EVANS AND 3/26 ON WITH 3/26.

BT

*1007, 11 Nov 62, 1100Z*

*10*

*1100/62*

*482*

**SECRET**

SECRET

32368

3/JWH/glp

3480

Ser: 003A02068

20 JAN 1968

SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO 4th Mar ltr 3/WRM/pab over 3100 Ser: 003A00268  
dtd 30 Dec 1967

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF

To: CCMUSMACV

Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation COVE)

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 335-8 dtd 2 Apr 1966

1. Forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. Contents noted, no action deemed necessary.



A. L. MICHAUX JR.

By direction

GRCUP-4  
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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TAB 3

42908

HEADQUARTERS  
 4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/WHM/pab  
 3100  
 30 Dec 1967  
 Ser No. 003A00268

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1D

Encl: (1) 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar After Action Report  
 (2) 2d Bn (Rein) 26th Mar After Action Report  
 (3) 3d Bn 12th Mar After Action Report  
 (4) Operation Overlays

4TH MARINES (REIN) S&C FILES 3012-68 COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES
--

1. Code Name: Operation COVE (Search and Destroy).
2. Dates of Operation: 171619H Nov 67 - 211800H Nov 67.
3. Location: PHU-LOC District, THUA-THIEN Province.
4. Task Organization:

4th Marines (-) (Rein)	Col Wm. L. DICK
Hq Co (-)	Capt J. P. WILLIAMS
1st Bn (-) 4th Mar	LtCol E. A. DEPTULA
2d Bn (Rein) 26th Mar	LtCol D. D. CHAPLIN
5. Supporting Forces:

a. Units

- (1) 1st MAW
- (2) 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Mar
  - Btry G 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Mar
  - Btry L 4th Bn 12th Mar
- 2 105-mm How PHU-LOC District Hqs Arty

SECRET

SECRET

- (3) Naval Gunfire
- (4) FLSG-A
- (5) Co A 3d Med Bn
- (6) Co A (-) 3d SP Bn
- (7) Co B (-) 3d Engr Bn

b. Detailed discussion of the support provided is as follows:

(1) Artillery support (See enclosure (3)).

(2) Air support. Aerial observers supported 1st Bn 4th Marines and 3d Bn 12th Mar during the operation directing artillery missions and observing enemy movement. UH-1E's were utilized against sampans suspected of transporting an enemy mortar crew with results of one VC/KIA (CONF), five VC/KIA (PROB) and 11 sampans destroyed. The only close air support provided was during the preparation of LZ FALCON.

(a) Helicopter support

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>TRPS</u>	<u>RESUP/LOG/ADMIN</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>
1/4	4	638	5500	6
3/12	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>33000</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	6	641	38500	6

(b) Close air support. The only close air support was two flights of fixed wing which dropped D-2A (500 lbs) in LZ FALCON.

(3) Psychological Operations. Psyops in support of Operation COVE was outstanding due to the good flying weather which enabled the aircraft to make various leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts. HB Team #4 broadcast 30 hours from 2d Bn 26th Mar company blocking position. Total leaflets dropped: 900,000; Total aerial broadcast - one hour 40 minutes; themes were CHIEU-HOI (Open Arms).

(4) Logistics. For detailed discussion of support provided see Paragraph 11 (Administrative Matters).

- (a) FLSG-A
- (b) Co A 3d Med Bn
- (c) Co A (-) 3d SP Bn

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6. Intelligence:

a. Enemy situation. During the first two weeks of November there was a noticeable increase in agent reports from PHU-LOC District and environs. On 1 November there was a report placing a VC company in the SONG-TROU Valley (YD 964021). The following day a similar source positioned a force of 750 VC at (ZC 082972) south of PHU-LOC District Headquarters. An agent report of the 10th of November located 95 VC in the vicinity of LOC-THUY (ZC 146991). Enemy presence within the area of interest was reported to consist of two main force battalions, a local force company and an engineer company. The composite available strength of these units approached 800 personnel. The 804th or K-4 Battalion had previously been engaged by 2d Bn 26th Mar and was believed to be operating in and along the eastern portion of the PHU-LOC area. The K-4B Battalion was also known to be operating in the PHU-LOC District and like the 804th it was organized into three infantry companies and a combat support company. The C-118 Local Force Company was known to have operated in PHU-LOC District previously.

b. Mission

(1) The enemy's supply efforts were aimed at transporting rice obtained north of National Route One back into mountain storage sites. Interdiction of National Route One, intimidation of the local populace and destruction of the Rural Development Program through initiation of small harassing attacks were illustrative of the type of operations launched by the enemy

c. Enemy activity during the operation.

(1) There were three instances where the enemy utilized 60-mm mortars to delay attacking elements of the 1st Bn (-) 4th Marines. In addition the Btry G 3d Bn 12th Mar artillery position received forty 82-mm mortar rounds with no friendly casualties incurred. The pattern of enemy reaction to Operation COVE was to harass and delay advancing units utilizing sniper teams, mortars and surprise explosive devices.

(2) The 82-mm mortar attack of Btry G 3d Bn 12th Mar was believed to have been initiated from a position along a river bank (ZD 150035), several sampans in that vicinity were taken under attack by Marine fixed wing aircraft and sunk.

(3) Numerous fighting holes and bunkers were encountered and destroyed within the area of operations.

d. Description of the area of operation.

(1) The PHU-LOC area is bounded on the north by National Route

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One, on the south by the TROUI mountains, on the west by the SONG-TROUI and on the east by the Lower SONG BU-LU River. Laterally, the SONG-TROUI and the lower SONG BU-LU define the major area of interest.

(2) Heavy canopy and mountainous terrain are characteristic of this vicinity. In the southern portion of PHU-LOC District BACH MA (4,640 feet) and TROUI mountain (3,860 feet) indicate the elevation encountered. Fields of fire were restricted within the canopy and excellent concealment was available. The terrain thus favored a defender utilizing prepared positions in chosen vantage points.

(3) The PHU-LOC valley and BU-LU lowlands provided the primary avenue of approach south into the mountains. The northeast monsoon was anticipated to be in effect during the operation but the weather remained fair throughout the major portion of the time that 4th Marine units were deployed.

7. Mission: Commencing on 17 Nov 1967, the 4th Marines (-) (Rein) was assigned the mission to conduct multi-battalion search and destroy operations in designated OA with primary effort initially in the PHU-LOC area, to capture/destroy enemy logistics caches, installations and material; obtain intelligence; kill or capture enemy personnel; and to prevent enemy interdiction of the PHU-BAI Base vital area, PHU-LOC District Hq and Route One within OA.

8. Concept of Operation:

a. Operation COVE was initially planned as a two phase operation. In the first phase elements of the 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar would be helilifted into an LZ and conduct a search and destroy operation northwest towards elements of 2d Bn 26th Mar occupying blocking positions southeast of PHU-LOC.

b. During the proposed second phase 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar would establish a blocking position southwest of PHU-LOC while elements of the 3d Bn 26th Mar would be helilifted into the OA and conduct search and destroy operation east towards the blocking position. A forward artillery base was established by 3d Bn 12th Mar near PHU-LOC (YD 135012) to provide fire support for the operating forces.

9. Execution:

a. On 17 November 1967 preparation for Operation COVE was as follows:

(1) Btry G 3d Bn 12th Mar displaced to forward position (ZD 135012).

(2) The 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar with companies A, B, D and battalion command group displaced to PHU-BAI.

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(3) 4th Marines command group Alfa displaced to PHU-BAI.

(4) Two companies from 2d Bn 26th Mar established a blocking position and provided security for the forward artillery position.

b. On 18 November 1967 three companies and a command group of 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar were helilifted into LZ FALCON. After securing the LZ, at 0917H, two companies (A and D) and the command group moved toward Regt Obj "A". Bravo Company commenced movement in a northerly direction toward Regt Obj "C".

c. After moving most of the day on the 19th in heavy canopy Bravo Company secured Obj "C" without contact at 1625H. Meanwhile, Alfa Company with the command group and Delta Company in trace continued their movement toward Obj "A". Prior to securing the Obj, Alfa Company had four minor contacts with small groups of VC. Results of the contacts were two FR/WIA.

d. On the 20th Delta Company 1st Bn 4th Mar with the command group continued search and destroy operations toward Regt Obj "A". Delta Company's lead elements received some S/A and 60-mm mortar fire resulting in 11 FR/WIA. Bravo Company, after spending the night on Obj "C", moved without incident to link up with Companies A and D and the battalion command group on Obj "A".

e. The major contact of the 20th and of the operation occurred when Btry G 3d Bn 12th Mar and Co E 2d Bn 26th Mar received 40 82-mm enemy mortar rounds. An AO was called on station to direct UH-1E gunships in destroying 11 sampans. After destroying the sampans the UH-1E's observed 10 VC in a stream. These VC were determined to be the mortar crew which had earlier shelled the forward artillery position. The gunships fired rockets and 7.62 machine guns and claimed one VC/KIA (CONF) and five VC/KIA (PROB).

f. On the morning of the 21st all of the wounded from Delta Company 1st Bn (-) 4th Mar were medevaced from Obj "A". After the medevacs, companies A, B, and D with the battalion command group commenced movement out of the canopy toward an entrucking point just south of PHU-LOC. While moving out of the OA Bravo Company received S/A fire which resulted in one FR/KIA and two FR/WIA.

g. 1st Bn (-) 4th Marines reached PHU-LOC and returned by truck to PHU-BAI. Companies B and D 1st Bn 4th Mar and 2d Bn 26th Mar were chopped OPCOM to 3d MarDiv at 1800H and Operation COVE terminated.

#### 10. Results:

a. The following casualties were incurred during Operation COVE:

SECRET

(1) KIA (Hostile) 1  
 (2) WIA (Medevac) 13  
 (3) WIA (Minor) 3  
 b. (1) KIA (CONF) 1 VC  
 (2) KIA (PROB) 5 VC

11. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply. Primary source of supply was FLSG-A at PHU-BAI. Supply point distribution from the temporary LSA at PHU-BAI was utilized.

(1) Issues

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
MCI	6 pallets	A475	4000
Heat	5 cases	A576	5400
Sundry packs	13 boxes	B568	72
Sand bags	8000	C444	1020
Concentina	3 sleeves	C454	180
5 ft stakes	222	G890	30
32 in stakes	384	L312	36
A066	12,320	L495	36
A127	4200	H555	5
A130	840	N319	160
A209	1000		

(2) Resupply. Helicopters were utilized for resupply from the temporary LSA. The 1st Platoon, Company A 3d Shore Party Battalion handled resupply.

<u>Total Weight</u>	<u>No of Lifts</u>
8000 lbs	8

b. Maintenance - N/A

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization.

(1) Medical evacuation was accomplished by helicopter. Casualties were evacuated to Company A 3d Medical Battalion.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
1	16 - 13 of which were medevaced

SECRET

d. Transportation. Resupply for the forward artillery position was provided by organic motor transport vehicles.

e. Communications. Routine communications were maintained during the operation. A manual retransmission capability was established on Hill 130 (ZD 117014). This relay site definitely increased the overall effectiveness of the Regimental Tactical Net. A manual retransmission site was also maintained on Hill 674 for positive communications between the Regimental Command Group at PHU-Bai and the Regimental Headquarters at Camp EVANS.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

13. Commanders Analysis: Operation COVE was characterized by slow movement through low to medium canopy with dense undergrowth. Flank security by the advancing unit was difficult to maintain thus, small enemy units could harass the marines with small arms and automatic weapons. The attacking battalion managed to advance off the trails which undoubtedly minimized the number of casualties. Coordination with HPT-362 prior to the operation contributed measurably to the smoothness of the successful heliborne assault.

14. Recommendation: Direct personal liaison with the supporting helicopter unit prior to an operation will enable an exchange of views and a discussion of details. This will minimize confusion in the landing and loading of troops and enhance the success of the operation.

*Wm. L. Dick*  
Wm. L. DICK