

DECLASSIFIED

19508

HEADQUARTERS  
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco 96602

4TH MARINES (REIN) S&C FILES 0024-68 COPY - 1 OF 11 COPIES
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5750  
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6 Jan 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 December 1967 to 31 December 1967

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(b) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓(1) 4th Marine Regiment Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. Downgraded at three year intervals; declassified after 12 years in accordance with DOD instruction 5700.10.

*Wm. L. Dick*  
Wm. L. DICK

4TH MAR

31 DEC 1967

DEC 1967

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HEADQUARTERS  
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 December 1967 to 31 December 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)  
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## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)

Col Wm. L. DICK

SUBORDINATE UNITS

1st Battalion 9th Marines (1-31 Dec 67) LtCol J. F. MITCHELL

3d Battalion 26th Marines (1-13 Dec 67) LtCol H. L. ALDERMAN

2. LOCATION

1-31 December 1967: Camp EVANS, PHONG-DIEN District, THUA-THIEN Province, Republic of VIET-NAM.

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol G. M. McCAIN

S-1/Adjutant

1st Lt J. L. CADY

S-2

Major J. L. FOWLER

S-3

Major J. D. BEANS  
(1-6 Dec 67)  
Major D. L. MORRIS  
(7-31 Dec 67)

S-4

Major D. L. MORRIS  
(1-6 Dec 67)  
Major R. W. AUSTIN  
(7-31 Dec 67)

Regimental Medical Officer

Lt S. J. FALKENSTEIN, MC, USNR  
(1-4 Dec 67)  
Lt J. C. VIDOLOFF, MC, USNR  
(5-31 Dec 67)

Regimental Chaplain

Cdr J. W. COHILL, CHC, USN

Communication Officer

Major F. J. REISINGER

Air Liaison Officer

Major F. S. BELL

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4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH (Hq Co, 4th Marines)

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
21	223	2	3

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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period Headquarters 4th Marines continued Operation NEOSHO. While a detailed after action report will be submitted following the termination of Operation NEOSHO, the highlights of December's activities were as follows:

- 4 December 1967 - 0905H-0925H: BGen L. METGZER visited Camp EVANS.  
1030H-1140H: MajGen R. McC TOMPKINS visited Camp EVANS.
- 13 December 1967 - 4th Marines chopped OPCON 3/26 (-) to 9th Marines.
- 14 December 1967 - 4th Marines chopped OPCON I/3/26 to 26th Marines.
- 16 December 1967 - D/1/9 chopped OPCON to 2/26 and relieved B/1/9 of security of NAM-HOA Rock Crusher. B/1/9 chopped OPCON to 1/9.
- 20 December 1967 - 4th Marines chopped OPCON Det Hq Co (-) 4th Mar (two Scout-Sniper teams) to 1st AMTRAC Bn.
- 25 December 1967 - 4th Marines assumed OPCON of D/1/1.
- 27 December 1967 - MajGen R. McC TOMPKINS visited Camp EVANS from 1010H-1150H.
- 28 December 1967 - 4th Marines assumed OPCON of B/1/1 and chopped OPCON of B and D/1/1 to 1/9. MajGen R. McC TOMPKINS visited Camp EVANS from 1033H to 1135H and from 1444H to 1500H.
- 29 December 1967 - 4th Marines assumed and chopped OPCON of 81mm Plat (-) H & S Co 1/1 to 1/9.

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTSA. Combat Missions Assigned.

1. In accordance with 3d Marine Division Operation Order 50-67 the combat missions assigned the 4th Marines for Operation NEOSHO were as follows:

a. To conduct search and destroy operations in the PHONG-DIEN District.

b. Conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications.

c. Conduct extensive psychological operations.

d. Maintain direct liaison with the PHONG-DIEN District Chief and 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces in adjacent areas.

e. Provide support as requested to 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces conducting unilateral or combined operations in PHONG-DIEN District within capabilities.

2. 3d Marine Division Order 03300.4 requires unit commanders to provide for the security and defense of installations and vital areas in their respective operating areas. The Commanding Officer 4th Marines as Base Coordinator Camp EVANS is, therefore, responsible for the security and defense of Camp EVANS to include personnel, equipment and installations located therein.

B. Significant Operations Conducted.

1. Operation NEOSHO continued throughout the reporting period as the 4th Marines' major effort in its operating area. Extensive small unit patrols and ambushes were a daily event designed to interdict enemy lines of communications and destroy VC/NVA forces. Search and destroy operations in conjunction with several civic action projects were conducted during the month throughout the NEOSHO OA. Construction projects along National Route One were continued with the 4th Marines providing security. Daily patrols and night ambushes were conducted to provide close in security for Camp EVANS.

C. Casualties inflicted on the enemy by 4th Mar Regt.

KIA	PW	
VC 29	VC 5	DET 13
NVA 4	HC 5	VC/RET 1

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D. Casualties sustained. Hostile and non-hostile casualties sustained by members of the 4th Marine Regimental Headquarters Company:

<u>HOSTILE</u>			<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	1	0	0	0	0

E. New Techniques Employed.

1. An armored convoy comprised of seven "Otters" and 13 APC's from APC Troop PK-17 was dispatched into the "Street Without Joy" area as support of recovery of two rifle companies.

2. The APC's with their armored plating, two 30 caliber machine guns and turret mounted 50/twin 30's appears to afford adequate protection when used in conjunction with "Otters".

3. By being able to traverse inundated areas, heavy sands, mud and rice paddies, secondary roads, trails, possible ambush sites could be avoided.

4. Speed of movement was attested to in that approximately 2500 meters of difficult terrain was tactically maneuvered in approximately seven hours.

5. The APC can be used effectively in scrub brush, undulating terrain, and in a defensive perimeter while supporting infantry. The APC provides heavy automatic fire power, excellent vision and fields of fire, limited protection from small arms/mortars and ability to maneuver quickly.

F. Command Relations.

1. As Commanding Officer, 4th Marines, the Regimental Commander exercised command over those units assigned OPCON to and in support of the Regiment through normal channels.

2. Assigned as Base Coordinator for Camp EVANS and the general area along Route One north of the SONG-BO River and south of HAI-LANG (MY-CHANH), the Regimental Commander was responsible for establishing administrative and regulatory procedures for the establishment and control of normal base activities within the growing Camp EVANS area.

3. In matters concerning coordination with local civilian and military officials, the Regimental Commander maintained constant communications and liaison with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) units and district chiefs from adjacent districts through their U. S. Advisors.

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4. Contact with Division Headquarters and adjacent regimental command echelons was maintained through normal command/control communications channels and command/staff visits.

G. Equipment. Co B 3d Engr received one 150 KW generator on 22 Dec 67.

H. Logistics.

1. Supply. Primary source of supply remained FLSG-A, PHU-BAI. There were no shortages during the period.

2. Resupply

(a) Helicopter resupply for the month of December has been routine for units participating in Operation NEOSHO.

(b) See Tab (A) for helicopter resupply weights.

3. Transportation

(a) 3d MT Bn provided truck support, including one platoon in general support and trucks "as required" for supply from PHU-BAI. 3d Bn 12th Mar provided support on an "as required" basis, transporting 330 tons, 2,274 troops, for a total of 5,564 miles.

(b) 9 Dec - Last increment of 1/9's equipment arrived in Camp EVANS.

13 Dec - 46 trucks, 20 trailers - 1st increment of 3/26 to DONG-HA.

14 Dec - 39 trucks, 20 trailers - 2d increment 3/26 to DONG-HA.

16 Dec - Two trucks - 3/26 equipment to PHU-BAI.

18 Dec - Two multi-purpose barges w/35 HP motors were used by 1/9 in the MY-CHANH River.

20 Dec - 20 trucks, 19 trailers - last increment 3/26 to DONG-HA.

25 Dec - D/1/1 arrived Camp EVANS.

31 Dec - 20 trucks - D/1/1 and B/1/1 transported to LA-VANG.



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(c) Approximately 1,397,600 lbs of supplies were transported from PHU-BAI to Camp EVANS during December 1967. The 3d Plat Co B 3d MT Bn in general support at Camp EVANS transported 522 tons, 3,702 passengers for a distance of 7,320 miles.

4. Services.

(a) 3d Engr Bn personnel continued to maintain the Regimental water point producing a total of 423,000 gallons of potable water during December. The engineers were responsible for conducting mine detection sweeps over approximately 12,028 meters of road daily. Approximately six explosive devices were detected and destroyed during December.

(b) Contact teams have been provided by FISG-A as follows:

- (1) Tent repair
- (2) Comm Elec
- (3) EOD
- (4) Tank

5. Hospitalization and Evacuation

## (a) Medical

(1) Average daily patient visits	6
(2) Referrals to A Medical Co	13
(3) Acute diarrhea/gastroenteritis	4
(4) Emergency medical care	17
(5) Immunizations	215

## (b) Dental

(1) Average daily visits	18
(2) Referred to 3d Dental Co	16

I. Civil Action and Psychological Warfare

## 1. Civic action

## SECRET

(a) Statistical summary. The following commodities were distributed by the Regiment.

Cooking oil	120 gallons
Soap	58 bars
Cereal	100 boxes
Bulgar wheat	35 bags
Powdered milk	12 $4\frac{1}{2}$ pound boxes
Rolled oats	43 bags
Writing paper	29 pads
Shovel, garden	1
Shovel, spade	1
Cement	10 110 pound bags
Toys	1 assorted carton
Milk, condensed, canned	110 cans

(b) Narrative summary. On 7 December 1967, 48 gallons of cooking oil, 58 bars of soap and 100 boxes of cereal were given to the Popular Forces' widows of PHONG-DIEN District. One hundred and ten cans of condensed milk, unfit for human consumption, were given to these widows to help feed their domestic animals. Also 29 tablets of writing paper were distributed to these widows. Throughout December 1967, 72 gallons of cooking oil, 35 bags of bulgar wheat, 43 bags of rolled oats, and 12 four and one-half pound boxes of powdered milk were distributed to the refugees of CON-SAN Hamlet as payment for filling sand bags. These sand bags were used throughout Camp EVANS to enhance and improve defensive positions and shelters. Approximately 45,000 sand bags were filled. Presently, there are three wells under construction at the refugee hamlet, CON-SAN (YD 537336). In the construction of these wells, so far 10 - 110 pound bags of cement have been used. All labor has been furnished by the refugees in the hamlet. All of the commodities so far mentioned have been acquired by S-5, 4th Marines from the 3d Marine Division, G-5. In addition, toys donated by a private source in the United States were given to the PHONG-DIEN District Chief, who in turn distributed them to the hamlets TAN-NGUYEN, TRACH-TA and CON-SAN. The hamlet chiefs then distributed these toys to the children of their respective hamlets.

(c) MedCap. 1,139 Vietnamese Nationals were treated for various infections and diseases.

2. Psychological warfare. During the month of December Psyops supported Operation NEDSHO with leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts, ground broadcasts, hand distributions, movies and bulletin boards.

(a) 17 leaflet drops and nine aerial broadcasts accounted for 1,940,000 leaflets and three hours of tape broadcasts in the CO-BI

THANH-TAN, MY-CHANH and "Street Without Joy" areas.

(b) HB Team #4 continued to broadcast in support of ground operations. Hours broadcasted for December: 51.

(c) On 26 December the cultural drama team hand distributed 7000 newspapers, posters and magazines to the people in PHONG-DIEN.

(d) On 10 December four movies about health and agriculture were shown in PHONG-DIEN to the civilian populace.

(e) Three bulletin boards were erected on 10 Dec in PHONG-DIEN's market place and new refugee hamlet. The bulletin boards are for psychological and civil affairs use.

J. Administration. Functioning in accordance with Division Order 545041.

1. All administrative personnel received on-the-job training in the field during Operation NEOSHO. This training consisted of all phases of administration under combat conditions.

2. During the entire period of this report 50% of the personnel in the S-1/Adjutant section were members of the Headquarters Company reaction platoon. Inspection of personnel and equipment indicated both to be in a high state of readiness.

3. Staff Studies and estimates: See Tab (B).

4. Local newspaper: None.

K. Personnel.

1. Summary

(a) There are critical personnel shortages in the following MOS's.

One - 0430  
Two - 0141  
One - 0369  
One - 2861  
One - 2867

2. Photographs: See TABS H, I and J.

3. Discipline, Courts-Martial and NJP

(a) Courts-Martial: None

(b) NJP: None

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## 4. Morale, PX, Postal Affairs, Liberty and R&amp;R

(a) Morale: Morale is considered excellent.

(b) PX: Numerous Post Exchange items are currently stocked in the Camp EVANS PX by the PX Officer from PHU-BAI. This has been a definite asset to the Marines in the field and a tremendous morale booster for all hands.

(c) Postal: Unit #7 of the Third Marine Division Post Office is functioning to facilitate all outgoing and incoming mail in the operating area.

(d) Liberty: None.

(e) R&R: Quotas for the month were adequate and sufficient for one of each 13 Marines on the rolls. R&R continues to contribute to high morale.

5. Chaplain support and religious services: Worship services were conducted in the field for those of the Catholic and Protestant faiths. A chapel designed to accommodate approximately 75 worshippers was constructed at Camp EVANS. Building commenced on 17 Nov and was completed on 24 Dec by Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 121. Dedication took place on 25 Dec 1967. Several distinctive features in the design and construction of this building make it worthy of consideration as a prototype for future chapels in RVN. (See TABS I and J) Among these are:

(a) A 2-1 pitch in roof slope gives a true modern, yet classic look to the building. See TAB H.

(b) Roofing consists of monsoon cloth stretched over rafters and in turn overlaid by two thicknesses of grass thatching. Inside, the monsoon cloth is covered on the underside by bamboo matting giving a distinctly pleasing, worshipful tone to the building. This combination of materials lends itself both to quietness and coolness and is nominally priced. Vietnamese labor and materials for such a roof cost about 40,000 piasters.

(c) All 2" X 4" side and roof supports are enclosed in 1" X 6" frames giving an appearance of depth to the nave and chancel.

(d) Both sides of the nave are louvered and screened making for a considerable savings in lumber and adding to the cooling effect of the building during the tropical summer.

(e) Lights are recessed along both sides of the nave and give a subdued, quieting effect to the building.

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(f) Pews are hand made in bamboo by Vietnamese residents of PK-17. Cost - 400 piasters each.

(g) Office spaces for a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain are on either side of the chancel. Both offices have louvered sides.

(h) A front porch gives the building the appearance of being larger than it actually is.

(i) A large mahogany cross (about 10 feet high) is built above the front entrance of the chapel and gives it a striking appearance from both air and ground vantage points. This cross is also framed by narrow louvers that run the full height of the front panel of the building.

6. The following modifications are recommended for future chapels of like or similar design:

(a) Concrete instead of wooden deck.

(b) Louvers to replace the solid plywood wall in the back of the chancel.

#### L. Intelligence.

1. There was one significant change in the enemy order of battle in the 4th Marines area of operation during the reporting period. The 802d Bn of the 6th NVA Regiment moved to the PHU-LOC area from its prior location within Base Area 114.

2. The enemy continues to exfiltrate units from Base Area 114. This is substantiated by numerous sightings in the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley and along the western side of the SONG-BO River (YD 5924). The largest sightings were on 24 Dec when a reconnaissance team reported 440 VC/NVA during the first hour of the Christmas cease fire. On 26 Dec an additional sighting of 118 VC/NVA was made in the same area. During the last ten days of December 646 enemy were observed moving west to east in the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley towards the SONG-BO River. ARVN intelligence sources indicated the direction of movement turns north at the SONG-BO.

3. Enemy mining activity decreased along Vietnamese Route One. Patrols operating in the CO-BI THANH-TAN Valley, however, found numerous surprise explosive devices. There was a total of 28 mining/surprise explosive device incidents as compared with 51 the previous month.

4. Sightings and contacts along the Camp EVANS perimeter continued at a low level during December. Sightings made were small groups believed to be transiting the area.

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5. During this reporting period Operation NEOSHO was conducted in northern THUA-THIEN Province and southern QUANG-TRI Province. The intelligence summary will be included in the NEOSHO After Action Report.

M. Training.

1. Training for members of the Regimental Headquarters Company continued to stress individual skills utilizing OJT and specialist schools. Selected junior NCO's have attended either the weekly Regimental NCO School at Camp EVANS or the 3d Marine Division School on OKINAWA.

2. Small unit, battalion and regimental sized operations conducted during the reporting period have emphasized the critical necessity for thorough training of Marines in basic combat skills. Special command attention has been initiated at all echelons to underscore the importance for conducting "in the field" training and improving small unit leadership whenever time and the tactical situation permit.

N. Communications.

1. Normal communications were maintained between this, senior and subordinate headquarters.

2. A manual retransmission facility was maintained on Hill 674 throughout the month with effective results.

3. On 30 Dec 67 the AN/MRC-62 radio relay link responsibility between the 4th Marine Regiment and 3d Marine Division was assumed by a radio relay team from the 1st Marine Regiment.

4. A radio relay link was established between the 4th Marine Regiment and the 1st Marine Regiment on 30 Dec 67. Personnel and equipment are from the Radio Relay Construction Company, 7th Communication Bn.

5. The Command Communication Network received 2073 and transmitted 396 messages. There were no reported security violations.

6. Lack of supply and maintenance support still imposes a handicap on the communication capabilities of this headquarters.

Critical shortages are:	AN/TPS-21....2	PU-422.....2
	AN/TRC-27....1	KY-8.....1
	AN/TGC-14....2	AN/GRA-39...1
	AN/PRC-41....1	PU-181.....2
	AN/MRC-83....1	PU-278.....9
	AN/MRC-87....1	SB-86.....1
		AN/PRC-25...3

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O. Weather. Temperatures in the 4th Marines OA ranged from the low 80's during the day to the low 60's at night. Winds were generally from the northeast from 8-15 knots. There were 17 days during the month when rain was received. Total rainfall for December was 23.1 inches.

P. Fire support.

1. Significant events. During the month of December, 3d Bn (-) (Rein) 12th Marines was in direct support of the 4th Marines.

2. Number of missions fired: 2935

3. Types of missions

(a) Observed 233

(b) Unobserved 172

4. Total number of rounds fired

	HE	WP	ILLUM	SMK	TOTAL
(a) 105-mm	8328	235	26	1	
(b) 155-mm	4155	134	448		13,327

5. Results of missions:

(a) KIA 24

Q. Air support.

1. Helicopter support

UNIT	REQ	TROOPS	RESUP/LOG	MEDEVAC
Regt	24	51	28,050	8
1/9	58	550	203,550	36
3/26	31	160	87,400	30
1/1	3	0	0	3
3/12	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	117	769	319,000	77

2. Close air support

(a) During the month 22 flights of fixed wing air strikes were run on enemy targets. AO's controlled the majority of air strikes and

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gave a BDA of 22 KIA. Types of ordnance used were:

- (1) D-1's 250 lb
- (2) D-2's 500 lb
- (3) D-5's 2.75 rockets
- (4) D-9's 500 lb napalm
- (5) D-20's 20-mm ammunition

(b) AN/TPQ-10 Radar-controlled bombing support

- (1) Requested 522
- (2) Received 216
- (3) Tonnage dropped 490.75

(c) Other support units utilized during the month were:

- (1) Flareships - three C-130
- (2) Fixed wing gunships - one AC-47
- (3) Air observers - 57

R. Activations/Deactivations/Redesignations. None.



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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS\*

- ✓ TAB A - Resupply weights for December 1967
- ✓ TAB B - Staff Study: Infantry small unit training in combat
- ✓ TAB C - Training of personnel who call/coordinate artillery fires
- ✓ TAB D - Regimental Grade Officers School
- ✓ TAB E - Frag Order 58-67
- ✓ TAB F - Frag Order 59-67
- ✓ TAB G - Frag Order 60-67
- ✓ TAB H - Photograph
- ✓ TAB I - Photograph
- ✓ TAB J - Photograph

\* TAB B through J enclosed on original copy only.

- ✓ Tab K - Msg 031420 Z Subj: Combined Operation With RF/PF
- ✓ Tab L - Msg 270517 Z Subj: Operation Neosho
- ✓ Tab M - Mag 291500 Z Subj: Operation Neosho
- ✓ Tab N - Msg 300830 Z Subj: Operations Requiring Assignment of H/2/26 on  
2 Hour Alert as 4th Marines Regimental Reserve  
are Terminated

TAB A (Resupply weights for month of December 1967) to Enclosure (1)  
 (4th Mar. Command Chronology) to Command Chronology for period 1 Dec-  
 31 Dec 67.

Resupply Weights for the month of December 1967

<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
1 Dec 67	3,600	17 Dec 67	None
2 Dec 67	None	18 Dec 67	None
3 Dec 67	None	19 Dec 67	9,950
4 Dec 67	89,550	20 Dec 67	None
5 Dec 67	9,000	21 Dec 67	None
6 Dec 67	2,500	22 Dec 67	None
7 Dec 67	None	23 Dec 67	10,050
8 Dec 67	20,600	24 Dec 67	None
9 Dec 67	4,100	25 Dec 67	6,420
10 Dec 67	3,000	26 Dec 67	None
11 Dec 67	None	27 Dec 67	12,108
12 Dec 67	None	28 Dec 67	8,770
13 Dec 67	None	29 Dec 67	None
14 Dec 67	None	30 Dec 67	None
15 Dec 67	6,900	31 Dec 67	4,696
16 Dec 67	8,980		

4th Mar Regt  
3d Mar Div  
Camp EVANS, RVN  
3 December 1967

Subj: Infantry Small Unit Training in Combat

INTRODUCTION: The rapid expansion of the U. S. Marine Corps from a force of 190,000 in 1965 to its present size in excess of 275,000 has resulted in relatively inexperienced small unit leaders. This problem, compounded by the heavy commitment of 3d Marine Division units and the lack of continuity created by the 13 month personnel rotation policy, has made it extremely difficult for a command to conduct the effective training program required to maintain a unit at peak combat efficiency.

1. Problem. To determine the most suitable method of conducting small unit training for infantry units within the 3d Marine Division.

2. Assumptions.

a. That operations in VIET-NAM will continue for an extended period and that U. S. Marine Corps forces will be continually employed in active combat missions.

b. That the 3d Marine Division will remain actively engaged in combat operations of indefinite duration.

c. That the mission assigned the 3d Marine Division will require the commitment of all available infantry battalions to such an extent as to preclude their relief from combat duties on a rotational basis in order to conduct a complete and rigorous training program.

3. Method of Study.

a. The board of officers appointed to conduct this staff study gave a varied cross section of experiences in combat obtained in VIET-NAM. All officers had assignments which were directly related to the training of small units in a combat environment. Two officers had previously been company commanders, one officer a battalion executive officer. All were assigned at the time this study was conducted to either regimental or battalion S-3 sections. The members of the board had served in units assigned the full spectrum of combat missions throughout the entire 3d Marine Division operations area.

b. This study was chiefly conducted through a series of conferences of the board. Members of the board were assigned to study the effect and

RESULTS

TAB B

support that could be provided by various echelons of command, i.e., division, regiment, battalion or company in respect to training. This research was accomplished through interviews, observations and the study of current directives and reference material. The results of these studies were presented to the board for consideration.

c. The scope of the study was limited only by considerations of time available and the availability of personnel for interviews. It is considered that neither limitation derogates the validity of the conclusions or recommendations which follow.

#### 4. Facts bearing on the problem

a. It is difficult for the regimental headquarters to maintain control and supervision of infantry battalion training as these units continuously rotate through operational command of five regimental headquarters.

b. Attrition of experienced personnel due to normal rotation and combat losses contributes to the problem of small unit leadership.

c. Throughout the major portion of the 3d Marine Division's operations area, infantry units seek an elusive enemy force that seldom offers a definite target or continuous contact. This contributes to complacency among small unit leaders.

5. Discussion. A working hypothesis that training can be accomplished by infantry units while in a combat environment was the point of origin for this study. The feasibility as to which command echelon should conduct the training and what support each echelon should provide was examined in some detail in order to solve the basic problem. The discussion is broken into sections which consider the effect, support and the methods used by these various command echelons in regards to conducting a successful training program.

#### a. Divisional Level

(1) The Headquarters, 3d Marine Division can assist in and enhance the effectiveness of small unit training by emphasizing the importance of training as a viable and logical by-product of the combat mission for infantry units. There are several means available which can be employed by the commander in improving training. These means should be continued and made available to unit commander at all levels with the emphasis on COMMAND ATTENTION.

(a) Paragraph 1604 of Division Order P3000.1E (Standing Operating Procedures for Operations and Training) concerning training inspections should be given more emphasis by division general and special officers when conducting staff visits and inspections.

(b) Paragraph 1605 of Division Order P3000.1E cites several schools located in WestPac available (on a limited quota basis) to infantry unit commanders as a means for improving individual combat, combat support and combat service support skills to include a four week NCO Leadership School located on OKINAWA.

(c) Periodic courses of instruction conducted by Headquarters, 3d Marine Division are also available in the following subjects and skills:

1. M-16A1 Rifle/Starlight Scope
2. Landmine warfare, VC mines and booby traps and demolition training.
3. Field Fortification Training
4. Staff MCO Leadership

(d) The assistant Chief of Staff G-3/Training maintains a training aids library and has several types of pamphlets available to assist the small unit leader in conducting training.

(2) To attempt to increase or expand upon the course of instruction and schools available at division level, beyond individual and specialized skills, would not be the most efficient method to improve small unit training.

(a) Conducting formal unit training at division level means creation of a school establishment with an extensive command, instructional, administrative, and logistical overhead in terms of personnel, facilities and equipment. This would produce a reduction of personnel at the small unit echelon in order to provide the support necessary to maintain such a school.

(b) Personnel engaged in combat sometime volunteer for school in order to escape the rigors, danger and discomfort of combat. Enjoyment and relaxation are often the primary objectives of students sent to a secure rear area to attend a formal course of instruction.

(c) Formal courses of instruction conducted at the divisional level might fill the deficiencies in individual skills found in a particular unit but courses of training must be responsive to the training needs of each unit.

(3) The principal means by which the division staff can most readily improve training would be to provide the regimental and battalion commander with concrete guidance and objective criteria for reporting the training status of infantry units. Current means for reporting the training are insufficient and too subject to command interpretation to provide the commanding general and regimental commanders with objective data concerning the status of training of subordinate infantry units.

(a) The system of OPSTAT reporting utilized by Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPacO 3000.5A) establishes four categories of unit readiness according to training but these categories are applicable primarily to units deploying into a combat zone.

(b) Currently there is no intra-division system of reporting the training status of infantry battalions. With the constant shifting of infantry battalions between regiments there should be a method for the regimental commander passing operational command to report on the battalion's

training achievements and deficiencies with recommendations for improvement.

b. Regimental level.

(1) The infantry regimental headquarters is required to function chiefly in a supervisory role in regards to the training of subordinate infantry units. This is largely due to the normal, heavy operational commitments of the regimental headquarters and the limited number of personnel in an infantry regimental headquarters company. For example, the T/O allowance for Headquarters Company, Infantry Regiment is only four O369 Staff NCO's. Of assistance to the regimental commander in carrying out any type of training program is the combat support and combat service support elements in direct support of the regiment which are normally co-located with the headquarters. These units with their personnel of varied MOS's and special equipment make an excellent source of instructors and training aids, but their heavy commitments also limit their participation in a training program.

(2) The regimental headquarters can provide the following training support by utilizing the organic staff and experienced staff NCO's and officers as part time instructors.

(a) Key personnel can be utilized to conduct training of subordinate units by the contact team method as long as the training does not seriously interfere with the individual instructor's primary duties.

(b) The training of small unit leaders through officer and NCO schools represents another course of action. The 4th Marine Regiment is presently conducting a three day, weekly NCO leadership school which has proven to be of value to the subordinate battalions. This school stresses subjects required by small unit leaders in VIET-NAM with emphasis on practical application. A regimental officers' school with classes of short duration at frequent intervals is presently under consideration with attendance of course based on operational commitments.

(c) A known distance firing range for organic infantry weapons can normally be provided at regimental level. Marksmanship has long been an attribute for which the Marine Corps has been famous. Still it is one which requires continuous training. With the issue of the new M-16A1 rifle and its automatic capability, the need for marksmanship training (including familiarization firing and zeroing of weapons) has become even more important. Because of the constant movement and rotation of the infantry battalions it is usually impracticable for a battalion to construct a firing range. The regiment (which normally remains for an extended period in one area) could and should construct a known distance range to include a 15-yard firing line for zeroing battle sights.

(d) Another training facility that can be provided by the infantry regiment is an up-to-date reference material library since it is quite difficult for the infantry battalion to maintain a current training manual library.

(3) The regimental level is the most suitable command echelon to coordinate cross training with local Vietnamese military/civilian leaders and ARVN units. The regimental headquarters, which remains

relatively stationary, is usually required to maintain a close coordination/cooperation relationship with the local district chiefs and adjacent ARVN units in order to carry out the regiment's assigned missions. Because of this continuity and close relationship, the regimental headquarters is usually more suited than the frequently moving battalions to arrange and schedule cross training. The regimental headquarters should schedule orientation classes for the battalion as soon as possible after a battalion's arrival into the regimental OA. Specific subjects desired by the battalion should be requested through the regimental S-3. ARVN units desiring U.S. instruction should make their requests to the regimental S-3 who could arrange suitable instructors from either the regimental headquarters or subordinate battalions. Subjects which lend themselves to cross training by Vietnamese instructors are:

- (a) Local customs and traditions
- (b) Local civilian control measures (includes curfew hours and required individual documentation)
- (c) Local VC tactics (including mining procedures and markers)
- (d) Local intelligence (including known enemy routes of exfiltration and infiltration)

(4) In the supervisory role the regimental headquarters should have a training SOP, which in conjunction with the division training SOP, would require subordinate battalions to conduct a realistic but effective training program. This should be supervised through formal inspections, random informal inspections, staff visits, and proper reporting procedures. Because of the frequent changes of infantry battalions it is mandatory that regimental headquarters quickly assess the training status of subordinate battalions. The guidance given by the regimental headquarters as to what training is to be conducted should consider the weaknesses determined from the inspections and other informative means utilized.

(a) One technique that might be used is to have a small team, composed of officers and senior NCO's, conduct a tactical inspection of a designated company. The company would carry out normal operations with the tactical inspection team accompanying as observers on a non-interference basis. This would permit representatives of the regimental headquarters to observe subordinate units at close range while the units conducted normal operations. The team would be in an excellent position to assess troop discipline, proficiency of the leaders, basic military knowledge of the individual Marines, morale and other intangibles. A sample Inspection Check list is appended as Annex A. The inspection personnel would have to be borrowed from a unit which could afford their temporary loss.

#### c. Battalion level

(1) The battalion headquarters is the command echelon which must control, coordinate and maintain direct supervision over the small unit training program. Through staff visits, inspections and by observing organic companies carrying out the combat missions assigned, the battalion S-3 can normally make a valid assessment of the company's status of training.

DECLASSIFIED

Training requirements should be promulgated by battalion to the companies on a periodic basis, either weekly, semi-monthly or monthly, taking into consideration the commitments and location of the company. The time and dates of the actual instruction should be left to the discretion of the company commander. A weekly report of training accomplished should be required from the companies giving subjects taught and total number of personnel who attended or were involved. Representatives from battalion headquarters should frequently monitor periods of instruction when possible. The battalion S-3 should maintain lesson plans, training aids and training manual library when possible. If the training manual library is too bulky to transport because of the assigned mission the regimental headquarters should provide this support. Lesson plans should be updated on a continuing basis and lessons learned should be included whenever applicable. The battalion's operation orders should emphasize conducting an effective training program in conjunction with accomplishing the combat mission assigned. A training SOP establishing the above procedures should be promulgated by each battalion.

(2) The battalion should provide the following additional support:

(a) Provide instructors in specialized subjects. (e.g. Intelligence Briefings; Vietnamese history; culture and religion; nature of the enemy; medevac procedures; battalion radio procedures.)

(b) Provide or request training areas. (i.e. firing ranges, use of ranges in training FO's.)

(c) Identify training deficiencies and advise Company Commanders. (e.g. if S-2 briefings reveal a weakness in map reading, the S-3 should inform the company commanders and insure that map reading is included in their training schedules.)

(d) Provide assistance in administrative and non-tactical tasks so commanders can concentrate on training. (e.g. battalion should handle all administration and supply. No task should be passed down to a company if it can be handled by a battalion staff.)

(e) Identify company personnel who are expert instructors in a particular field and make them available to the entire battalion.

(f) Catalog field expedient training aids and lesson plans. Make them available to the entire battalion.

(g) Request formal school quotas after receiving recommendations from company commanders.

(h) Provide NBC training with emphasis on the use of field protective masks and riot control agents.

(i) Provide specialists in OJT. (e.g., engineers, when engaged in constructing field fortifications).

(3) The battalion commander should always keep in mind the training status of his rifle companies and if his combat mission permits he should endeavor to relieve one company from combat duties on a rotational



basis in order to conduct a complete and rigorous training program. This program would have to overcome the human tendency for personnel to consider this period as in-country R & R and would require maximum supervision by the battalion. A great deal of prior planning and preparation would be needed in order to assure maximum utilization being made of these training periods.

d. Company level

(1) The infantry company is the command level at which the actual training should be conducted in a combat environment. Combat missions assigned usually preclude formalized training as conducted in a normal peace time condition. The inherent danger of assembling any sizeable unit as a mortar or mine target also limits certain training programs and requires that most of the training be conducted at the lowest level, normally squad. It is felt that the realism and motivation gained by always having an actual enemy threat present whether it be sniper, mine or mortar attack is beneficial to an effective small unit training program.

(2) Conducting small unit training at the lowest level increases the importance of the small unit leader since he frequently must be the instructor. It is imperative that the small unit leader receives as solid a background as possible in all military subjects. By assisting in training these unit leaders, through officer and NCO leadership schools, senior command echelons can make a significant contribution to company's training program.

(3) Training on the company level should include the following and can be normally covered during orientation upon the arrival of the individual in VIET-NAM or upon the unit's arrival in a new OA.

- (a) Mission indoctrination
- (b) VC/NVA tactics
- (c) Terrain and local intelligence
- (d) Marksmanship and weapon familiarization with emphasis on safety
- (e) Use of supporting arms
- (f) Small unit leadership
- (g) Rules of engagement

(4) Training at the platoon and squad level should include:

- (a) Map reading and use of compass
- (b) Scouting and patrolling
- (c) Field fortification and camouflage
- (d) Rules of engagement

- (e) Weapons safety
- (f) Fire and maneuver
- (g) Formations
- (h) Interior guard duty (when appropriate to current missions)
- (i) First aid/buddy aid

(5) This training normally must be conducted in the field while carrying out the assigned combat mission. When and how depends on the specific situation and must be determined by the appropriate leader on the spot. The accomplishment of the training is only limited by the imagination of the leader. Because of the combat environment it is possible to conduct training with live ordnance which would be impossible under peacetime conditions. Any free fire zone becomes a live fire range after the coordination of friendly forces has been accomplished. The leader must at all times remember that his combat mission has top priority, followed by safety, but after these, training opportunities become unlimited. Just several of the thousands of examples are given below.

(a) Upon returning from a search and destroy mission the platoon commander lets a fire team leader, under close supervision, call in an artillery fire mission on a possible ambush site along the route to their patrol base.

(b) A squad, from a platoon whose mission is to defend a well known static position, is permitted to cross-train by firing M-60's, M-79's and LAW's from special firing points used for training purposes.

(c) A squad defending a water point permits one fire team to conduct a class on the compass during the daylight hours while other members of the squad provide the required security.

#### 6. Conclusions:

a. That command interest is required at all levels in order to conduct an effective training program.

b. That it is feasible to conduct training for small infantry units within the 3d Marine Division in a combat environment.

c. That the most effective method to conduct infantry small unit training is by informal instruction at company, platoon, squad echelon with battalion providing direction, supervision and support required.

#### 7. Recommendations:

##### a. Division Level

(1) Emphasis training through staff visits by general and special staff officers and inspections.

(2) Improve reporting procedures to provide more concrete guidance and objective criteria as to the training status of the infantry battalions.

(3) Request an updating in the system of OPSTAT reporting in regards to training so as to more accurately reflect the true status of training for a unit committed to combat operations.

b. Regimental Level

(1) Give command attention to training.

(2) Provide support as specified in paragraph 5 (b) (2).

(3) Revise training SOP's to require subordinate battalions to have a realistic but effective training program.

c. Battalion Level

(1) Give command attention to training.

(2) Provide support as specified in paragraph 4 (c) (2).

(3) Promulgate a training SOP which implements a training program to provide the rifle companies a listing of training requirements to be completed within a specified period. The SOP should require a weekly report of training accomplished.

(4) Whenever the assigned mission permits, relieve a company of combat duties and conduct an effective training program on a rotational basis within the battalion.

d. Company Level

(1) Make maximum use of schools designed to improve the small unit leader.

(2) Give command attention to training and require subordinate leaders to conduct the most instructive and imaginative training that each and every situation permits.

*John J. Pagarelli*  
John J. PAGARELLI  
MEMBER

*Matthew P. Caulfield*  
Matthew P. CAULFIELD  
MEMBER

*Edward M. Ringley*  
Edward M. RINGLEY  
MEMBER

*William C. Reed Jr*  
William C. REED Jr  
MEMBER

*J. D. Beans*  
J. D. BEANS  
Major, USMC  
Senior Member

TACTICAL INSPECTION CHECK LIST

<u>1. Pre Operation</u>	<u>Uns</u>	<u>at</u>	<u>Comments</u>
a. Troop Leading Steps			
b. Operation Order			
c. Signals and COI			
d. Dissemination of Order			
e. Logistics			
f. Coordination			
(1) Fire Support			
(2) Medevac			
g. Inspection of Troops			
(1) Weapons			
(2) Equipment			
<u>2. During Operation</u>			
a. Movement			
(1) Control			
(2) Formations			
(3) Navigation			
(4) Safety precautions			
(5) Dispersion			
(6) Individual			
(7) Security			
(a) Flank			
(b) Point			
(c) Rear			
b. Tactics			
(1) Offense			
(a) Fire discipline			

ANNEX A

	<u>Unsat</u>	<u>Sat</u>	<u>Comments</u>
(b) Observation			
(c) Communications			
(d) Formations			
(e) Leadership			
(f) Signals			
(g) Employment of Crew Served Weapons			
(2) Defense			
(a) Security			
(b) Fields of Fire			
(c) LP, Ambushes			
(d) Fighting Positions			
(e) Locations of CP			
(f) Terrain Location			
(g) Employment of Crew Served Weapons			
c. Supporting Arms			
(1) Use of artillery, and 81mm mortar			
(a) Offense			
(b) Defensive			
(2) 60-mm mortar Employment			
(3) Air			
(4) Medevacs			
d. Communications			
(1) Maintenance and operation of equipment			
(2) Radio Procedure			
(3) Reporting (Spot, Sitrep)			
(4) Alternate means			
(5) Field Expedients			

	<u>Unsat</u>	<u>Sat</u>	<u>Comments.</u>
e. General			
(1) Morale			
(2) Discipline			
(a) Noise			
(b) Light			
(3) Camouflage			
3. <u>Post Operation</u>			
a. Debriefing			
(1) S-2			
(2) Lessons Learned			
(3) Tactical Tips			
b. After Action Report			
c. Reorganization and Resupply			
d. Inspection			
(1) Troops			
(2) Weapons			
(3) Equipment			

## HEADQUARTERS

4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/DEV/jhs

1510

9 December 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines  
Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines  
Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines

Subj: Training of Personnel who Call/Coordinate Artillery  
Fires

Encl: (1) Briefing Outline

1. Background. Several incidents have caused concern as to the adequacy of the training of personnel who call/coordinate artillery fire missions as a primary duty or are required to act in the capacity of an artillery observer as the situation dictates. It is essential that all such personnel have a basic understanding of the essential elements of an artillery fire request, the capabilities as well as limitations of artillery support, and the clearance requirements in the immediate area of operations.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this letter is to establish a program for training of personnel who call/coordinate artillery fires.

3. Action

a. The 3d Battalion, 12th Marines will conduct a two hour briefing in accordance with enclosure (1) for all observer and liaison personnel attached or assigned to the 4th Marines. The briefing will be provided as soon as possible to personnel currently aboard and as often as required thereafter to incoming personnel. Notify this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) of the time and place of the briefings at least 72 hours in advance.

b. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 3d Battalion 26th Marines will ensure all fire support observer and liaison personnel attend one of the briefings conducted by the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines. It is considered that such a briefing is also appropriate for Platoon and Company Commanders. You are reminded that the selection of the appropriate type of supporting arms for reduction of specific targets and the safety of troops being provided this support is a command responsibility.

TAB C

c. The schedule for the initial briefing will be promulgated by separate directive. Direct liaison is authorized all concerned to schedule subsequent briefings for incoming personnel.

4. Reports. 3d Battalion, 12th Marines submit a roster of personnel briefed to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3) within twenty-four hours after each briefing.



W. L. DICK

Copy to: CO, 12th Marines



BRIEFING OUTLINE

I	Clearance Requirements and Rules of Engagoment	(20 Minutes)
II	Ammunition Types and Safety Considerations	(10 Minutes)
III	Fire Requests - Essential Elements	(30 Minutes)
	Break	(10 Minutes)
IV	Tour of FDC (Processing of Actual Fire Mission)	(20 Minutes)
V	Tour of Firing Battery (Observe Mission Being Fired)	(20 Minutes)
VI	Discussion and Opportunity for Questions	<u>(10 Minutes)</u>
	TOTAL	(120 Minutes)

ENCLOSURE (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
4th Marines (-) (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco 96601

3/WCR/pab  
1520  
13 Dec 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Regimental Company Grade Officers School

1. Purpose. To promulgate instructions concerning a regimental school for company grade officers. This school will be designed to increase the individual professional knowledge of junior officers within the Regiment and units under operational command of and in support of the 4th Marines.

2. Background. Experience gained thus far in VIETNAM has revealed that to be an effective leader the individual marine officer must possess a thorough knowledge of a broad range of combat skills. Due to the employment of small units in aggressively seeking and defeating an elusive enemy, a major share of combat leadership responsibility falls on the shoulders of the company/battery commanders and platoon/section leaders. Instruction in leadership and combat skills taught at The Basic School is but the first chapter in the volume of education necessary to effectively mold the junior officer into a capable combat leader.

3. Information. Within the reinforced infantry regiment there is a wealth of applicable combat experience among various unit commanders and staff officers. Higher, adjacent and subordinate units, sister services, as well as the Vietnamese Armed Forces may also provide sources of combat experience and knowledge. Instructors may be available from these sources for the subject school. Instruction can be in the form of lectures, tours, demonstrations, discussions or combinations thereof in order to most effectively provide the company grade officer the maximum in knowledge and experience of others.

4. Action. Addressees are requested to submit recommendations and suggestions concerning subjects to be taught and instructors who can be made available for the subject school by 16 December 1967. Negative reports are required.

*[Signature]*  
Wm. L. BICK

DISTRIBUTION: A (less 1/4, 2/4, 3/4)  
ALL OPCOM units

TAB D

**SECRET**

P R 120310Z DEC 67  
 FROM: FOURTH MARINES  
 TO: FIRST BN NINTH MARINES  
       THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
       CO A THIRD SP BN  
       CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
       CO C THIRD TK BN  
       SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARMY (USA)  
       DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)  
 INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV  
       THIRD MARDIV FWD (DHCB)  
       FLSG-ALFA  
       FIRST MAR  
       THIRD RECON BN  
       THIRD BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR

BT  
 SECRET

FRAG ORDER 58-67 (NEOSHO)

- A. FOURTH MAR OP ORDER 57-87 (NEOSHO)
- B. FOURTH MAR OP ORDER 100-67
- C. FOURTH MAR OP ORDER 101-67

TIME ZONE: H  
 TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES (-) (REIN)

COL DICK

HQ CO

CAPT WILLIAMS

FIRST BN (-) NINTH MAR

LTCOL MITCHELL

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES, CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. REF (A).

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. ONE RIFLE CO (REINF) FIRST BN NINTH MAR REMAINS OPCON TO SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR.

2. MISSION. REF (A).

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. FOURTH MAR (-) (REINF) WITH ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (-) AND SUPPORTING FORCES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OA TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INTERDICT LOC AND DENY ENEMY ACCESS INTO FOOD PRODUCING LOWLANDS.

B. FIRST BN (-) NINTH MAR

(1) CONDUCT MISSIONS ASSIGNED BY REF (B) AND (C).

(2) CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE SMALL UNIT ACTIVITIES (PATROLS AND AMBUSHES) TO INTERDICT ENEMY LOC IN FOURTH MAR OA AND PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF ENEMY ATTACK OF CAMP EVANS, HILL 51 AND HILL 674.

**SECRET**

TAB E

**SECRET**

(3) COMMANDING OFFICER, DESIGNATED CAMP EVANS PERIMETER DEFENSE FORCE COMMANDER, DIRECTS AND COORDINATES DEFENSE OF CAMP EVANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C).

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) REF (A).
  - (2) THRUST POINTS IAW FOURTH MAR 081230Z DEC 67.
  - (3) ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY).
  - (4) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE 121200H DEC 67
4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF (A).
5. COMMAND COMM-ELEC. REF (A) AND FOURTH MAR ECI.
- ANNEX A (OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

O R 181150Z DEC67  
 FROM: FOURTH MAR  
 TO: FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 INFO: CG THIRD MARDIV  
 FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)  
 FIRST MARINES  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 CO A THIRD SP BN  
 CO B THIRD ENGR BN  
 BT  
 SECRET

FRAG ORD 59-67 (COMBINED USMC/ARVN OPNS AND OPN NEOSHO)

- A. 4TH MAR OPORD 57-67 (NEOSHO)
- B. 4TH MAR FRAG ORD 58-67 (NEOSHO).

TIME ZONE: H  
 TASK ORGANIZATION. NO CHANGE.

1. SITUATION.

- A. ENEMY FORCES. NO CHANGE.
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES. REF (A), DET 3D RECON BN DS 1ST BN 9TH MAR FOR DURATION OF OPERATION.
- C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. DET HQ CO 4TH MAR (SCOUT-SNIPERS) ATT 1ST BN (-) 9TH MAR EFFECTIVE 18 DEC 67.

2. MISSION. ON 18 DEC 67 4TH MARINES ESTABLISHES BLOCKING FORCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OPERATION LAN-LON 162 IN "STREET WITHOUT JOY" AREA.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES (A) AND (B), ON 18 DEC 67 4TH MARINES PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS SOUTHWEST PORTION 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) OA, VICINITY MY-CHANH (YD 4741).

B. 1ST BN (-) 9TH MAR

(1) FOLLOWING ENGINEER ROAD SWEEP OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE ON 18 DEC 67, COMMENCE MOTOR MOVEMENT NORTH FROM CAMP EVANS TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION VIC (YD 4946) WITH ONE RIFLE CO (REIN).

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THRUST POINTS. REF (B).
- (2) EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION IN AREA OF OPERATIONS.
- (3) MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS ALERT FOR ENEMY MORTAR ATTACK AND ENSURE THAT TROOPS PREPARE ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.
- (4) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIV LOI 1-67.
- (5) DIRLNAUTH WITH PHONG-DIEN DISTRICT HQ.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF (A).

5. COMMAND COMM-ELECT

- A. REF (A)
- B. REPORT WHEN IN POSITION.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

TAB F

**SECRET**

00250117Z DEC 67

FROM FOURTH MARINES

TO FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)

SELF BRAVO (CTG 79.5)

FIRST MARINES

FIRST BN NINTH MAR

THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR

THIRD RECON BN

CO B THIRD ENGR BN

CO A THIRD SP BN

CO C THIRD TK BN

DET FLSCG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)

SECOND PLAT BTRY D FIRST BN FORTY FOURTH ARTY (USA)

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

THIRD MARDIV FWD DHCB

FLSCG-ALFA

BT

SECRET

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

OPERATION ORDER 60-67 (NEOSHO)

P. MAPS: VIET-NAM, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, SHEET 6442 II

CG 3D MARDIV MSG 191521Z DEC 67

C. 4TH MAR OPORD 100-67

D. 4TH MAR ADMIN ORD 100-67

E. DIV O P2000.2E (COI)

F. DIV O P2000.4C (COMMSOP)

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES(-) (REINF)

BLT 3/1

1ST BN(-) 9TH MAR

REGTL RESERVE

DESIGNATED CO 1ST MAR

COL DICK

LTCOL MCQUOWN

LTCOL MITCHELL

A. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT PERINTREPS AND INTSUMS.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) 3D MARDIV CONTINUE OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED OA TO DESTROY  
C/NVA MAIN AND GUERRILLA FORCES.

(2) 1ST INF DIV (ARVN) ELEMENTS PARTICIPATE IN BLOCKING OPERATIONS

M. AREA ADJACENT 4TH MAR OA.

(3) 1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED AND ROTARY WING SUPPORT.

1601 30  
SLF**SECRET**

TAB G

(4) 7TH FLEET PROVIDES NGF SUPPORT TO III MAF AND CONDUCTS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN I CORPS AREA.

(5) 3D RECON BN GS 3D MARDIV, PROVIDES SHARK (SCUBA-EQUIPPED DIVERS) TEAM DS 4TH MARINES ON CALL JOHN BROWN LZ COMMENCING D-DAY.

(6) 3D BN (-) (REIN) 12TH MAR DS 4TH MARINES.

(7) 2D PLAT (-) (REINF) BTRY D 1ST BN 44TH ARTY (USA)

(A) M-42'S DS 1ST BN 9TH MAR (NEOSHO)

(B) M-55'S GS 4TH MARINES

(8) CO C 3D TK BN DS 1ST BN (-) 9TH MARINES (NEOSHO)

(9) CO B 3D ENGR BN GS 4TH MARINES

(A) PROVIDES NORMAL MINE CLEARANCE SUPPORT TO 1ST BN (-) 9TH MAR (NEOSHO)

(B) PROVIDES DEMO AND TUNNEL TEAMS ON 30 MINUTE STANDBY COMMENCING H-HOUR D-DAY.

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. DESIGNATED RIFLE CO 1ST MAR CHOPS OPCON 4TH MAR 1200H D-1 ASSIGNED REGTL RESERVE.

MISSION. 4TH MARINES, WHILE CONTINUING OPERATION NEOSHO, COMMENCING AT H-HOUR, D-DAY CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION VICINITY MY CHANH IN CONJUNCTION WITH SLF BRAVO AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH ARVN BLOCKING OPERATIONS TO CAPTURE/DESTROY

ENEMY LOGISTICS CACHES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT; OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE; AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY FORCES ENCOUNTERED.

#### 2. EXECUTION.

##### A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) COMMENCING D-DAY 4TH MARINES PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (REINF) IN BLOCKING POSITION TO SUPPORT SLF BRAVO SURFACE AND HELICOPTER ASSAULT TO SEIZE LZ FINCH AND CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TOWARD REGTL OBJ ONE; ON D PLUS 1 4TH MARINES ASSUMES OPCON BLT, CONDUCTS THOROUGH AND DELIBERATE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION TOWARD MY-CHANH IN COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH ARVN BLOCKING FORCES.

(2) ARTILLERY SUPPORT PROVIDED BY 3D BN (-) (REINF) 12TH MAR FROM FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION (VICINITY YD 469387) AND CAMP EVANS.

(3) OPERATION OVERLAY.

##### B. 1ST BN (-) 9TH MAR

(1) CONTINUE MISSIONS ASSIGNED FOR OPERATION NEOSHO.

(2) AT H-HOUR D-DAY CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT WITH ONE RIFLE CO (REINF) INTO LZ SPARROW (YD 518429) TO SEIZE AND DEFEND BLOCKING POSITION ANVIL (YD 508436 TO YD 518441).

(3) ON ORDER, D PLUS 1, CHOP RIFLE CO OPCON TO BLT 3/1.

##### C. BLT 3/1

SECRET

(1) AFTER HAVING SECURED REGTL OBJ ONE AND UPON ASSIGNMENT OFCON 4TH MARINES ON D PLUS 1 ASSUME OFCON DESIGNATED RIFLE CO 1ST BN (-)STH MAR, ON ORDER .

(2) ON ORDER, CONTINUE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ALONG AXIS BLACK AND WHITE TOWARD REGTL OBJ TWO AND THREE.

(3) BE PREPARED TO REEMBARK, ON ORDER, ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATION GREENE (D PLUS 5).

#### D. REGTL RESERVE

(1) DESIGNATED RIFLE CO (REINF) 1ST MAR. COMMENCING H-HOUR D-DAY BE PREPARED (ON 30 MINUTE ALERT) FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BLT 3/1 ZONE OF ACTION OR IN NEOSHO AREA .

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. (1) D-DAY: 26 DEC 1967.

(2) H-HOUR: 1100H.

(3) RCA UTILIZATION AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED IAW CG 3D MARDIV 191232 DEC 67.

(4) PSYWAR OPS WILL BE CONDUCTED AND COORDINATED BY THIS HQ.

(5) REPORTS IAW REF (C).

CONTINUOUS EFFORTS WILL BE EXERCISED TO LOCATE ENEMY SPIDER TRAPS, TUNNELS AND UNDERGROUND INSTALLATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF MINE

DETECTION DEVICES, PROBES AND RECON SHARK TEAM.

(7) ADVANCE BEYOND DESIGNATED PHASE LINES UPON ORDER THIS HQ.

(8) UNITS IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NEAR POPULATED AREAS WILL EXERCISE STRICTEST FIRE DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY.

(9) MAINTAIN MAXIMUM DISPERSION AT ALL TIMES WITH NO MORE THAN VISUAL/AUDIBLE BUT MUTUALLY SUPPORTING DISTANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL WHEN MOVING THROUGH POPULATED AREAS OR HEAVY UNDERBRUSH.

(10) EMPHASIZE EXTREME CAUTION FOR HEAVY EMPLOYMENT OF ENEMY MINES AND SURPRISE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

(11) NIGHT POSITIONS USE MAXIMUM LP'S/AMBUSHES AND MINIMUM ILLUMINATION; CONTINUOUS LIGHT AND NOISE DISCIPLINE WILL BE EXERCISED.

(12) MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE USE OF AIR PANELS MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS.

(13) EMPHASIZE MAXIMUM/CONTINUOUS CAMOUFLAGE TO INCLUDE HELMET AND EQUIPMENT GARNISHING, FACE AND HAND PAINT.

(14) THRUST POINTS EFFECTIVE H-HOUR D-DAY

BRAVO 5449

CHARLIE 5041

DELTA 5245

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**



SECRET SECTION TWO OF TWO SECTIONS  
 ECHO 4944  
 FOXTROT 5138  
 (15) REFERENCE (C) AND OPERATION OVERLAY.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (D) WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONS.

A. SUPPLY

(1) PRESCRIBED LOAD- AS PRESCRIBED BY BLT COMMANDER TO INCLUDE NOT LESS THAN TWO DAYS CLASS I AND BA CLASS V. ENSURE ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF SALT AND HALIZONE TABLETS ARE CARRIED. TWO 62' LENGTHS OF ROPE PER SQUAD/SECTION WILL BE CARRIED.

(2) RESUPPLY- RESUPPLY OF FORWARD ARTILLERY POSITION WILL BE BY ORGANIC TRANSPORTATION: MSR: NATIONAL ROUTE ONE.

B. TRANSPORTATION

(1) THREE MULTI-PURPOSE BARGES WITH 35 HP MOTORS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT LSA, OPERATORS PROVIDED BY 1ST BN 9TH MAR ON STANDBY AT LSA.

(2) SEVEN OTTERS WILL BE POSITIONED AT LSA FOR EMERGENCY LOGISTICAL SERVICES AS REQUESTED.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

A. REFERENCES (E), (F) AND 4TH MARINES (COI) (ISSUED SEPARATELY)

B. RADIO

(1) ACTIVATE RADIO RETRANSMISSION STATIONS ON HILL 674 (YD 516219) AT H-HOUR D-DAY AS FOLLOWS:

SECRET

NET	FREQ	UNIT PROVIDING
DIV TAC	55.25/56.05	HQ 4TH MARINES
REGT TAC	68.3/40.15	HQ 4TH MARINES
BLT COF		3D BN 12TH MAR

(2) RADIO RETRANSMISSION STATION CALL SIGN WILL BE CALL SIGN OF THE NET CONTROL STATION PLUS SUFFIX "ADVANCE"

(3) UNITS MAINTAIN UHF GROUND-TO-AIR CAPABILITY

(4) BLT 3/1 TACP LOCAL RADIO NET WILL BE UTILIZED IN ADDITION TO 4TH MARINES TACP LOCAL. BLT 3/1, 1ST BN 9TH MAR, AND 4TH MARINES WILL MAINTAIN STATIONS ON 4TH MARINES TACP NET (42.8).

(5) CTG 79.5 GUARDS REGT TAC NET COMMENCING D-1.

(6) REGTL RESERVE GUARDH REGT TAC NET AT H-HOUR D-DAY . BE PREPARED TO ENTER BLT TAC NET ON ORDER.

C. CRYPTO

(1) NUMERAL CODE - KAC-QX 12 EFFECTIVE DAY

(2) AUTHENTICATION- KAC-QX 12 EFFECTIVE DAY

(3) BREVITY CODE- KAC-PX 22 EFFECTIVE DAY

D. VISUAL

(1) PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IAW REF (E)

(2) SMOKE

(A) WHITE-MARKING OF ENEMY POSTIONS

(B) RED-AREA NOT SECURE, NOT SAFE TO LAND

(C) VIOLET/GREEN-AREA SECURE/SAFE TO LAND OR DROP SUPPLIES

(D) YELLOW-MARKING OF FRIENDLY POSITIONS.

E. COMMAND POSTS. REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED AND CLOSED.

ANNEX A(OP OVERLAY) (PASEP)

OP-4

AT

700-2512374

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

ON 25 DEC 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO FIRST BRN ARVN  
 INFO C- THIRD MAR DIV  
 THIRD MAR DIV (CND) DRV  
 FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)  
 FIRST MARINES  
 SELF BRAVO (CTG 79.5)  
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR  
 THIRD RECON BN  
 DET FLSG-ALFA (CAMP EVANS)

Copy 9

BT  
 S E C R E T  
 NEOSHO FRAG ORDER FOR DPLUS 3  
 A. 4TH MAR OPORD 66-67 (NEOSHO)  
 TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE  
 B. SITUATION  
 A. ENEMY

(1) 1ST INF REGT (ARVN) MADE CONTACT WITH NVA 416 (AKA 816)

ON 26 DEC 67 AT (YD 492562), NVA ELEMENTS MAY BE MOVING SE TO AVOID CAPTURE.

(2) 1ST VC CO REPORTED (YD 474412) ON 27 DEC 67.

(3) RE/PT CO MADE CONTACT WITH EST VC/NVA CO AT (YD 503401) ON 28 DEC 67.

(4) BA CAPABILITIES: EMPLOY 81/82-MM AND 60-MM MORTARS, INCREASE SURPRISE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AS OPERATION CONTINUES, UTILIZE R-6-7; DELAY AND HARASS ADVANCING FRIENDLY UNITS.

B. FRIENDLY

(1) SELF BRAVO (CTG 79.5) CONTINUES OP BADGER TOOTH IN AOA (SEE OP OVERLAY).

(2) 9TH INF BN (ABN-ARVN) OCCUPIES REGTL OBJ TWO AND THREE ON DPLUS 2 TO ESTABLISH BLOCK POSITIONS; CONDUCTS RETROGRADE MOVEMENT ON REQUEST ON D PLUS 5.

(3) 2D BN 26TH MAR PROVIDES ONE FIELD CO REPAIRED (ON 30 MINUTE ALERT) AT PHU-BAI AIR FIELD COMMENCING 290600H DEC 67 AS REGTL RESERVE/REACTION FORCE.

C. ATT AND LET. 2/1/1 ASSIGNED OPCON 4TH MAR EFFECTIVE 280800H DEC 67.  
 2. MISSION: CONTINUING OPNS TAV REF (A), 4TH MARINES COMMENCING L-HOUR D PLUS 4, CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION VICINITY MY-CHANH IN COOPERATION/COORDINATION WITH ARVN BLOCKING OPNS TO CAPTURE/DESTROY

**SECRET**

ENEMY LOGISTICS CACHES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT; OBTAIN INTERIGENCE AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY FORCES ENCOUNTERED.

### 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPN. COMMENCING L-HOUR D PLUS 3 4TH MARINES HELIIFTS BN CMD GRP AND ONE RIFLE CO INTO MY-CHANH OA AND CONDUCTS S/D OPNS WITH ONE INF BN TOWARD ARVN-A BN BLOCKING POSITIONS. ANTY SUPPORT FROM CAMP EVANS, HAI-LANG AND PHUNG-DIEN. OP OVERLAY.

B. 1ST BN (-) (REINF) 9TH MAR.

(1) AT L-HOUR D PLUS 3 CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO VIC OBJ ONE WITH BN CMD GRP AND B/1/1.

(2) AT H-HOUR D PLUS 3 CONDUCT S/D OPNS VICINITY REGTL OBJ ONE.

(3) ON ORDER, CONDUCT S/D OPNS ALONG AXIS BLACK AND WHITE TO PL BRANDY; CONTINUE, ON ORDER, TO PL WHISKY.

(4) ON ORDER, CONTINUE S/D OPNS TO REGTL OBJ TWO AND THREE.

(5) MAINTAIN ONE RIFLE CO AS BN RESERVE TO BE COMMITTED ONLY WITHO CONSENT THIS HQ.

(6) DESIGNATE ONE PLAT PERIMETER DEF CO PREPARED (ON 30- MIN ALERT) AS REGTL RESERVE.

C. CO D 1ST BN 1ST MAR. CHOP OPCON 1ST BN 9TH MAR EFFECTIVE 281400H DEC 67.

D. CO B 1ST BN 1ST MAR. CHOP OPCON 1ST BN 9TH MAR EFFECTIVE 281400H DEC 67.

E. COORD INSTR.

(1) REF (A).

(2) L-HOUR: TO BE ANNOUNCED

(3) H-HOUR: 0700H

(4) THREE SCOUT-DOG TEAMS AVAILABLE ON CALL.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. REF (A).

5. COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC.

A. REF (A)

B. EFFECTIVE 281400H DEC67 B/1/1 AND D/1/1 WILL GUARD 1/9 BN TAC ON 51.20 MCS (M-638).

C. FOLLOWING FREQ ASSIGNMENTS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT:

(1) A/1/9 TAC 46.85 (M-115)

(2) B/1/1 TAC 36.10 (M-645)

(3) D/1/1 TAC 56.00 (M-376)

OP OVERLAY (PASEP)

P-4

BT

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

031420 H  
 FM: 4TH MAR  
 TO: CG 3RD MAR DIV  
 PA: TO L/ COLONEL HARBER  
 (G-3 COC)

SECRET

COMBINED OPERATION WITH RF/PF

## PART 1.

THIS HQ WILL CONDUCT A COMBINED A AND D OPERATION WITH  
 RF/PF FORCE IN PHONG DIEN DISTRICT ON 6 DEC 67.

## PART 2.

1/9 WILL PROVIDE CO. 8- BLOCKING FORCE VIC (YD 522402)  
 TO (YD 540390) CO. (-) COMMENCE MOVEMENT UNDER COVER OF  
 DARKNESS.

## PART 3.

1 RF CO. AND THREE PF BY DEC 67 WILL CONDUCT SWEEP OF  
 HAMLET VIC (YD 530392) AND (YD 535377).

## PART 4.

PHONG DIEN PROVIDE GUIDE TO MINIMIZE THREAT OF MINE AND  
 SURPRISE EXPLOSIVE DEVEGE.

## PART 5.

4TH MARINE CO HAS REQUIRED AREAL RECON OF AREA PRIOR  
 TO COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION. IF WEATHER PRECLUDES RECON  
 OPERATION WILL BE POSTPONED UNTIL RECON ACCOMPLISHED.

GP-4

TOR 1430/03 DEC 67/A/DIV TAG #2  
 KY-8

UNCLASSIFIED


**SECRET**

TAB-K

**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV

*NEO S140*

DE 9077 AND 42/W NR 887

887.

BA

ZNY SSSSS

O P 273517Z DEC 67

FM FOURTH MAR

TO ZEN/CO D FIRST BN FIRST MAR

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV

THIRD MARDIV (FWD) DHCB

FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)

SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5)

FIRST MAR

ZEN/FIRST BN NINTH MAR

ZEN/THIRD BN TWELFTH MAR

ZEN/CO 2 THIRD ENGR BN

BT

SECRET

OPERATION NEOS40

1, CO D 1/1 CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT 271400H DEC 67 INTO VIC  
 AP CHANH-LOC (YD 5345) TO ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSIT IN CONJUNCTION  
 WITH SLF OPERATION BADGER TOOTH. OA BOUNDED BY GRIDS (YD 5247),  
 (YD 5245), (YD 5547), (YD 5545). OPCON REMAINS WITH 4TH MARINES.

GP-4

BT


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*882*

UNCL

*27***SECRET***18*  
*17* TAB-L

**SECRET**

THIRD MARDIV



AND H/W NR 13

KTK

ZNY SSSSS  
 P R 291500Z DEC 67  
 FM FOURTH MAR  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO THIRD MARDIV (FWD) DHCS  
 FIRST INF DIV (ARVN)  
 FIRST MARINES  
 SLF BRAVO (TG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE)  
 ZEN/FIRST BN NINTH MAR  
 SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 THIRD RECON BN

BT

SECRET

OPERATION NEOSKO

A. 4TH MAR 280950Z DEC 67

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY 29 DEC 67.

A. SMALL CONTACT LEFT FLANK 9TH INF BN (ABN-ARVN) (YD 474438);

NO SIGNIFICANT CONTACT A/1/9 OR D/1/1.

B. APC TRP FROM PK-17 ARRIVED CAMP EVANS 1615H.

2. PLANS FOR 30 AND 31 DEC 67.

A. IF WEATHER CONTINUES PRECLUDE USE OF A/C - TENTATIVE PLANS WILL

PAGE TWO 9077 SECRET

BE TO S/D BN OBJECTIVES WHILE APCS AND OTTERS MOVE TO VIC (YD 548484)  
 BY 1200H FOR PICK UP OF ONE CO AT 1400H. APCS AND OTTERS RETURN FOR  
 REMAINING ELEMENTS 1/9 AT VIC (YD 548484) AT 1600H. 9TH INF BN (ABN-  
 ARVN) WILL HOLD POSITS AT VIC (YD 479420) UNTIL 1600H AS SCREEN AND  
 RETURN PK-17 APPROX 1800H.

B. IF WEATHER PERMITS OPERATIONS WILL BE RUN IAW REF (A) EMPLOYING  
 HELICOPTERS AS AVAILABLE WITHIN A COMPRESSED TIME SPAN TAKING LIMITED  
 OBJECTIVES.

C. REQUEST H/2/26 REMAIN AS REGT RES UNTIL MOVEMENT COMPLETED.

D. 1ST MAINES ELEM TO RETURN LA-VANG AND CHOP OPCON 1ST MARINES

31 DEC 67

GP-4

BT

291500Z DEC 67

A-3100

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**


T/AB-M



**SECRET**

COMM CNTR

THIRD MARDIV



AND H/W NR 007....007

HDKM  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O R 300830Z DEC 67  
 FM FOURTH MARINES  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO SECOND BN TWENTY SIXTH MAR  
 BT

TOR/300830C

 G3  
 COC
**SECRET**

1. OPERATIONS REQUIRING ASSIGNMENT OF H/2/26 ON TWO HOUR ALERT AS  
 4TH MAR REGT'L RESERVE ARE TERMINATED.

GP-4

BT

300830Z DEC 67

A-G-3, COC

CEO.

UNCLASSIFIED

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**SECRET**

TAB-N