

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT#479668

HEADQUARTERS
4th Marines (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

4TH MARINES (REIN)
S&C FILES
00593-68
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5750
Ser #003A22068
7 August 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific


Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 July to 31 July 1968

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 5750.8
(b) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓(1) 4th Marine Regiment Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at three year intervals; declassified after 12 years in accordance with DOD Instruction 5700.10.


E. J. MILLER

4TH MARR

CMD CHRON

JULY 1968

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HEADQUARTERS
4th Marines (Rein), 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 July 1968 to 31 July 1968

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ENCLOSURE (1)
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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

4th Marine Regiment (Rein)

COMMANDER

Col E. J. MILLER

SUBORDINATE UNITSFirst Bn, Fourth Marines
(1 - 9 July) (15 - 31 July)

LtCol T. H. GALBRAITH

Bt 2/4

LtCol L. A. RANN

Third Bn, Fourth Marines
(6 - 31 July)

LtCol F. L. BOURNE

First Bn, Ninth Marines
(24 - 31 July)

LtCol F. X. COLLETON

Third Bn, Ninth Marines
(29 - 31 July)

LtCol E. J. LAMONTAGNE

First Bn, First Marines
(6 - 12 July)

LtCol A. VANFINKLE

First Bn, Third Marines
(9 - 16 July)

LtCol C. J. JARMAN

2. LOCATION CA LU, CAM LO District, QUANG TRI Province, Republic of VIETNAM.3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol J. B. WILKINSON
(1 - 19 July)
LtCol J. W. MARSH
(29 - 31 July)

S-1/Adjutant

1stLt R. J. GADY

S-2

Maj J. L. POWLER

S-3

Maj R. W. AUSTIN

S-4

Maj J. P. SHERMAN

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S-5

1stLt T. L. WATTS

Communication Officer

Capt A. J. HUNTER

Air Liaison Officer

Maj G. W. FRITSCHE
(1 - 13 July)
Maj G. H. BRAMAN
(14 - 31 July)

Chaplain

Odr J. W. COMBIL, OHC, USM
(1 - 25 July)
Odr W. W. HUBBLE, OHC, USM
(26 - 31 July)

Medical Officer

Lt O. T. ANDREWS, MC, USNR

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH (Hq Co, 4th Marines)

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USM</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>EML</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EML</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
16	198	2	3	219

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period the 4th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II and Operation SCOTLAND II (Simultaneously during 1 - 10 July). Highlights of July's activities were as follows:

01 July 1968 - 1410H-1510H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, C3 TF Hotel, visited Ca Ln.

02 July 1968 - 1410H-1515H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, C3 3d MarDiv, visited Ca Ln.

05 July 1968 - 2030H - 4th Marines assumed opcon "B" Oad Grp 3d Bn, 4th Marines.

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- 06 July 1968 - 1700H - 4th Marines chopped 2d Bn, 9th Marines
opcom to TF Hotel.
- 2025H - 4th Marines assumed opcom 1st Bn, 1st
Marines and 3d Bn, 4th Marines (-).
- 07 July 1968 - 1630H-1650H - BGen COLEMAN (USA), visited Ca Lu.
- 1655H-1730H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 08 July 1968 - 1320H-1350H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 09 July 1968 - 1130H - 4th Marines assumed opcom 1st Bn, 3d
Marines.
- 10 July 1968 - 0830H - 4th Marines chopped LANCASTER II OA to
TF Hotel.
- 1040H-1050H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 1800H - 4th Marines chopped 1st Bn, 4th Marines
opcom to TF Hotel.
- 11 July 1968 - 1050H-1120H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 1500H-1530H - BGen G. W. HOFFMAN, CG TF Hotel,
visited Ca Lu.
- 12 July 1968 - 0915H-0930H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 1625H - 4th Marines chopped 1st Bn, 1st Marines
opcom to TF Hotel.
- 14 July 1968 - 0845H-0905H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 15 July 1968 - 0905H-0930H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca Lu.
- 1120H - 4th Marines assumed opcom 1st Bn, 4th
Marines from TF Hotel.

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1435H-1505H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, CG TF Hotel,
visited Ca In.

16 July 1968 - 0910H-0930H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

1200H - 4th Marines chopped 1st Bn, 3d Marines
opcon to TF Hotel.

2400H - 4th Marines chopped opcon from TF Hotel
to 3d MarDiv.

18 July 1968 - 0945H-1010H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

19 July 1968 - 1100H-1140H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, CG TF Hotel,
visited-Ca In.

1520H-1545H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

20 July 1968 - 1020H-1040H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

22 July 1968 - 1520H-1540H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

24 July 1968 - 0001H - 4th Marines chopped opcon from 3d MarDiv,
to TF Hotel.

0905H-0930H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

1010H - 4th Marines assumed opcon 1st Bn, 9th
Marines from TF Hotel.

26 July 1968 - 1500H-1525H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, CG TF Hotel,
visited Ca In.

28 July 1968 - 1455H-1535H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, CG TF Hotel,
visited Ca In.

1500H-1515H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, CG 3d MarDiv,
visited Ca In.

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29 July 1968 - 1010H - 4th Marines assumed opcom 3d Bn, 9th Marines from TF Hotel.

1105H-1130H - MajGen C. B. DRAKE, ADC, POW, visited Ca Lu.

30 July 1968 - 0920H-0950H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, O7 TF Hotel, visited Ca Lu.

31 July 1968 - 0810H-0900H - MajGen R. G. DAVIS, O3 3d MarDiv, visited Ca Lu.

1030H-1047H - BGen C. W. HOFFMAN, O3 TF Hotel, visited Ca Lu.

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTSA. Combat Missions Assigned

- (1) Operation LANCASTER II (1 - 10 July 1968).
 - (a) Conduct search, fix and destroy operations in CA.
 - (b) Defend combat bases and other vital installations in CA.
 - (c) Maintain combat bases at Camp CARROLL, THON SON IAN and CA LU.
 - (d) Open and secure lines of communication within CA.
 - (e) Maintain active ground surveillance and screening operations and spoiling attacks against NVA/VC forces.
 - (f) Support RVN ND Campaign Plan 1967.
- (2) Operation SCOTLAND II (1 - 31 July 1968).
 - (a) With two battalions conduct mobile operations generally west of FSB's Gates and Shepherd and within range of artillery fires from these FSB's. Maintain surveillance over enemy activity, deny him freedom of movement and destroy his forces, positions and material by fire and/or ground action. From these units provide forces to occupy and defend FSB's and Hill 950.

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- (b) Provide forces from third battalion to defend Ca Lu and LZ Stud.
- (c) Secure Route #9 in OA from Ca Lu north.
- (d) Maintain Sparrow Hawk.
- (e) Be prepared, on order, to provide forces for operations anywhere within the division OA.
- (f) Be prepared to assume opcon of additional forces for employment in SCOTLAND II OA or to coordinate assigned forces for major operations conducted in SCOTLAND II OA.

B. Significant Operations Conducted

(1) Operation SCOTLAND II (CAPTON II 24 - 31 July 1968).

- (a) Conduct heliborne and overland infantry assaults to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces in OA.
- (b) Locate and destroy enemy supply caches, rocket sites and harbor sites in OA.

C. Casualties inflicted on the enemy. (Units opcon and DS of the 4th Mar)

KIA

NVA 114

PW/NVA 3
IWC 112
CSVC 4
RICE 3,700

D. Casualties sustained. (Regimental Headquarters Company)

- (1) There were no hostile nor non-hostile casualties during the month of July.
- (2) Seven personnel were med-evaced due to malaria and fever of unknown origin.

E. New Techniques Employed. None

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F. Command Relations

(1) As Commanding Officer, 4th Marines, the Regimental Commander exercised command over those units assigned to him and in support of the regiment through normal channels.

(2) The Regimental Commander maintained constant communications and liaison with 123d AF Company, CAM LO District Headquarters and the District Chief through U. S. Signal Corps Channels.

(3) Contact with Division Headquarters and adjacent regimental command echelons was maintained through normal command/control communications channels and command/staff visits.

G. Equipment. On 6 July, a 2,000 gallon non-potable water tanker was invoiced to the 3d Marines. No new equipment was received during the month of July.

H. Logistics

(1) Supply. Primary source of supplies was FSU at LZ Stud.

(2) Resupply

(a) Helicopter resupply in general support of Operation LANCASTER II/SCOTLAND II has been normal.

(b) See Tab (a) for Helo Resupply Weights.

(3) Transportation

(a) Co. B, 3rd MP Bn provided truck support through 6 July transporting 98 tons of supplies and 734 troops for a distance of 2,337 miles.

(b) Regimental motor transport provided transportation for a total of 7,826 miles.

(4) Services

(a) 3rd Engr Bn maintained the Regimental Water Point from 1-6 July producing a total of 98,000 gallons of potable water during the month of July. The Engrs were responsible for conducting mine detection sweeps over 27,000 meters of roads daily. Two (2) devices were detected and destroyed during July.

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(b) The following contact teams were provided during July:

(1) Water Trailer (M 107)

(2) BOD

(5) Hospitalisation and Evacuation (Hq Co, 4th Marines)

(a) Medical

(1) Average daily patient visits 05

(2) Referrals to 3rd MED Bn 04

(3) Acute diarrhea/gastroenteritis 08

(4) Emergency medical care 01

(5) Immunizations 27

(b) Dental

(1) There are no dental units in this area.

I. Civic Action and Psychological Warfare

(1) Civic action

(a) During July 45 bundles of laundry were washed by refugees of NAM THUAN Hamlet (YD 129590) and paid for with 5,153 \$VN.

(b) Headquarters, 4th Marines made arrangements for 6 Montanards from LONG KHAT (YD 021455) to go to the market in DONG HA. ON 11 July they were taken by truck to DONG HA on 13 July they were returned to their village with the rice, salt and other items that they obtained.

(2) Psychological Warfare. During the month of July Psy Ops warfare was not used by this command.

J. Administration. Functioning in accordance with Division Order 5450.1.

(1) This unit is operating under split administration (forward and rear). All administrative personnel received on-the-job training in the field during Operations SCOTLAND II and GANTON II. This training consisted of all phases of administration under combat conditions.

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(2) Staff Studies and estimates: None

(3) Local Newspaper: None

K. Personnel

(1) Summary. There is a critical personnel shortage in the following MOS:

Two - 2847

(2) Photographs: None

(3) Discipline, Courts-Martial and NJP:

(a) Courts-Martial: (0)

(b) NJP: (1)

(4) Morale: PX: Postal Affairs: Liberty and R&R

(a) Morale: Morale is considered excellent.

(b) PX: Basic Post Exchange items are currently stocked at a PX located at IX Stud.

(c) Postal: Unit #7 of the Third Marine Division Post Office is functioning to facilitate all outgoing and incoming mail in the Operation area, and provide money order service. The unit is located in Ca In.

(d) Liberty: None

(e) R&R: Quotas for the month were adequate and sufficient for one of 13 Marines on the rolls. R&R continues to contribute to high morale.

(5) Chaplain Support and Religious Services: Worship services were conducted in the field for those of the Catholic and Protestant faiths.

(a) Protestant Services

(1) Seven Sunday services - attendance - 132

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(2) Six week day services - attendance - 71

(3) Five Communion - attendance - 56

(b) Catholic Services

(1) Four Sunday masses - attendance - 72

(2) Nine weekly masses - attendance - 266

(c) The Regimental Chaplain carried out pastoral and counseling ministry in the regiment.

L. Intelligence. There have been no significant additions or deletions to the NVA/VC Order of Battle in the Fourth Marines area of operation during the month of July.

(1) Primary Intelligence interest shifted to the Fire Base Gates and Shepherd area. CANTON II was the main effort in the Fourth Marines area of operations during the latter part of the reporting period. The Intelligence Collection effort indicated moderate to heavy enemy activity in the area. During Phase one of Operation CANTON II, contact with the enemy was light. Scattered unmanured bunkers and fighting hole complexes were uncovered.

(2) No enemy unit identification were confirmed from the captured equipment and/or material that was turned in during the time frame.

(3) During the reporting period two interrogations of an intelligence nature occurred. The initial one on a wounded prisoner of war. Interrogation of the prisoner of war was limited. During the early portion of the interrogation the POW went into shock and was emergency med-evaced. The only significant information obtained from this POW was the identification of the 246th Regt. A review of both the Fourth Marines and Task Force Hotel COB files produced negative results on the 246th Regt.

(4) The second interrogation occurred during the last week of the reporting period. This POW was classified as a returnee, after interrogation. Significant is the identification of a K-8 Bn which returnee stated was operating north of Khe Sanh during operation Robin South. POW was willing to show infiltration routes.

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M. Training

(1) Training for the month of July consisted of fan firing of T/O weapons on a weekly basis, indoctrination lectures for newly arrived personnel, classes on tactical trends and training tips, and on-the-job training.

(2) Small unit, battalion and regimental sized operations conducted during the reporting period have emphasized the critical necessity for thorough training of Marines in basic combat skills. Command attention has been constant at all echelons to underscore the importance for conducting "in the field" training and improving small unit leadership whenever time and the tactical situation permit. Safety procedures for small arms and munitions received special command attention and extensive indoctrination was held to emphasize the importance of safety in the field.

N. Communications

(1) Normal communications were maintained between this command and senior and subordinate Headquarters.

(2) The command communications network received 1813 messages and transmitted 267 messages.

(3) A four (4) channel radio relay link was established on 8 July with Third Battalion, Fourth Marines.

(4) A high command radio relay link utilizing AN/TWC-129 equipment with voice and secure teletype capability was established on 13 July with Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

O. Weather. During the reporting period the temperatures ranged from a low of 70 degrees to a high of 95 degrees, with a average temperature of 80 degrees. The average humidity reading was 68%.

P. Fire Support

(1) 1st Bn, 12th Marines were in Direct Support of the 4th Marines.

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(2) Types of missions

	OPS	UNOPS	REI
105	942	765	2007
155	117	111	123
4.2	14	10	77
8"	19		

(3) Total number of rounds fired

	HE	WP	ILL
105	38255	1304	630
155	6143	140	21
4.2	693	4	126
8"	510		

Q. Air Support. During July the Regiment participated in Operation SCOTLAND II and LANCASTER II. The air support provided was as follows:

(1) Helicopter Support

UNIT	REQ	TROOPS	HR SUP/100/ADMIN	HR/WAG
HqCo	65	189	(See Tab (a))	25
1/4	28	1700		67
2/4	17	1280		80
3/4	34	1387		58
1/9	6	330		6
2/9	3	890		29
1/12	15	60		0
<u>1/1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>130</u>		<u>58</u>
TOTALS	169	6866		305

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(2) Close air support

(a) 521 sorties (CAS/DAS) were flown throughout the 4th Marines OA. The majority during the early portion of the month were in support of 1st Bn, 1st Marines, as they covered the withdrawal from Khe Sanh. The bulk of the F/W sorties during late part of the month were flown primarily in support of CANTON II.

(b) The BDA for 19 July to 31 July is as follows:

Bunkers destroyed - 50

Secondary Fires/Explosions - 10

Trench Line destroyed - 330 meters

KBA - 3

A/W Positions destroyed - 5

Rocket/Sites destroyed - 55

Truck destroyed - 1

(3) TPQ-10 Targets. During the period covered the Bq's initiated requests for 227 TPQ-10 strikes. 63 TPQ sorties were flown and a total of 170 tons of ordnance was delivered. The majority of ordnance was dropped on bunker complexes and suspected enemy positions.

R. Activations/Deactivations/Redesignations. None

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

✓ TAB A - Helicopter Resupply Weights

✓ TAB B - Order of Battle

✓ TAB C - 4th Marines Operation Order 6-68

✓ TAB D - Operation Order #7-68 (Scotland Delta)

✓ TAB E - 4th Marines-Task Force Helicopter, Canton I & II Critique

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Helo Resupply Weights for July 1968

<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEIGHTS</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEIGHTS</u>
1 July 68	47,413	17 July 68	57,000
2 July 68	64,999	18 July 68	90,000
3 July 68	121,532	19 July 68	156,075
4 July 68	121,236	20 July 68	126,317
5 July 68	63,391	21 July 68	85,324
6 July 68	64,819	22 July 68	207,641
7 July 68	238,960	23 July 68	397,600
8 July 68	352,575	24 July 68	82,825
9 July 68	309,994	25 July 68	67,860
10 July 68	299,664	26 July 68	42,695
11 July 68	387,566	27 July 68	121,959
12 July 68	152,760	28 July 68	43,000
13 July 68	29,720	29 July 68	84,520
14 July 68	279,420	30 July 68	166,150
15 July 68	47,632	31 July 68	<u>14,599</u>
16 July 68	162,010	TOTAL	4,587,196

TAB (a)
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(S) REF

Order of Battle to July

Command Chronology

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUB TO</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
66th Regt	304th Div	1400	XD8233 South of Khe Sanh
88th Regt	308th Div	1545	XD8734 South of Khe Sanh
83rd Engr Regt	Unk	2400	XD9232 South of Khe Sanh
102nd Regt	308th Div	1420	XD8843 South of Khe Sanh

Note: Captured documents and statements of returns indicate a possible unit identified as the F-8 Bn. Further confirmation of this unit after read out by Division Documentation Center.

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DRAFTED BY 1STLT D. M. CAMPBELL

RELEASED BY RWDPRIORITY/ROUTINE 220200Z JULY68

FROM: FOURTH MARINES
 TO: FIRST BN, FOURTH MARINES
 BLT TWO SLANT FOUR
 THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES
 FIRST BN, TWELFTH MARINES

INFO: TWELFTH MARINES
 TASK FORCE HOTEL
 CG, THIRD MARDIV
 CO A, THIRD ENGR BN

BT
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OPORDER 6-68 (CAPTON II)

A. MAPS: VIETNAM, 1: 50,000 AMS SERIES L7014, SHEETS

6342 II, 6342 III

B. DIVO 02000.4C (COMM SOP)

C. DIVO 02000.2G (COI)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

4TH MARINES	COL MILLER
1ST BN, 4TH MARINES	LTCOL GALBRAITH
BLT 2/4	LTCOL RAND
3D BN, 4TH MARINES	LTCOL BOURNE

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY

(1) SEE CURRENT INTSUMS.

(2) SEE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 1-68. (PASEP)

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 TAB (C) **SECRET**

SECRET**B. FRIENDLY**

(1) TASK FORCE HOTEL CONDUCTS GROUND OPERATIONS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY NVA FORCES IN OA. PROVIDES MINIMUM ONE INFANTRY BATTALION (4 COMPANIES) FOR ASSUMPTION FOB STUD DEFENSE FROM 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES. 1ST AHWN DIVISION UNITS PARTICIPATION TRA.

(2) ARTILLERY

(A) 1ST BN (-) (REIN) 12TH MARINES DS 4TH MARINES.

(B) 12TH MARINES (-) (REIN) GS 3D MARDIV, PROVIDES GS/REIN FIRES.

(3) AIR SUPPORT

(A) 7TH AF/1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED/ROTARY WING SUPPORT.

(4) RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE

(A) 3D RECON BN GS 3D MARDIV.

(5) ENGINEER SUPPORT

(A) CO A (-) 3D ENGR BN DS 4TH MARINES.

(6) TANK SUPPORT

(A) CO B (-) 3D TANK BN DS 4TH MARINES.

2. MISSION

4TH MARINES (-) REIN CONDUCTS HELIBORNE AND OVERLAND INFANTRY ASSAULT INTO DESIGNATED AO (SEE OPERATION OVERLAY ANNEX A) TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES IN OA AND TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY SUPPLY CACHES, ROCKET SITES AND HARBOR SITES IN OA.

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3. EXECUTION

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A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

PHASE I COMMENCING D-4, MAXIMUM ARTILLERY AND AIR

PREP VICINITY REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 2. ON D DAY, H-HOUR ONE BATTALION (-) (3 COMPANIES) WILL MOVE OVERLAND FROM VICINITY HILL 679 TO SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 1. ON D+1 AT L-HOUR A SECOND BATTALION WILL CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO VICINITY REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 2. BOTH BATTALIONS CONDUCT SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN DESIGNATED OAs FOR PERIOD 3-5 DAYS.

PHASE II ON ORDER, FIRST BATTALION WILL ATTACK IN NORTHERLY DIRECTION TO SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 4 AND CONDUCT SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN PORTION OF OA. SECOND BATTALION WILL ATTACK IN SOUTHERLY DIRECTION TO SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 3, CONDUCTING CAREFUL SEARCH OF DRAWS LEADING TO THIS OBJECTIVE.

B. BLT 2/4

(1) COMMENCING D-2, CONSOLIDATE 3 COMPANIES VICINITY HILL 679 (XD 894457).

(2) AT H-HOUR ON D DAY ATTACK IN NORTHERLY DIRECTION TO SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 1. LOCATE FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLY CACHES, ROCKET SITES AND HARBOR SITES IN SOUTHERN PORTION OF OA FOR 3-5 DAY DURATION.

(3) ON ORDER MOVE TO AND SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 4. CONTINUE SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN PORTION OF OA.

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C. 1ST BN, 14TH MARINES

(1) AT L-HOUR, D+1, CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO LZ'S WREN (XD 934469) AND THRUH (XD 950474). SEIZE REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 2.

(2) LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLY CACHES, ROCKET SITES AND HARBOR SITES IN OA FOR 3-5 DAY DURATION.

(3) ON ORDER, ATTACK IN SOUTHERLY DIRECTION TOWARDS REGIMENTAL OBJECTIVE 3. SEARCH CAREFUL TWO MAJOR DRAWS LEADING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE. CONTINUE SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN OA.

(4) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO HELILIFT INTO 2/4 AO TO REINFORCE/EXPLOIT MAJOR CONTACT.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 24 JULY 68

(2) L/H HOURS: TBA

(3) ALL UNITS USE MAXIMUM COMMUNICATION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY DURING ALL MOVEMENT. SEEK TO LOCATE AND FIX THE ENEMY. ADDITIONAL INFANTRY WILL BE COMMITTED AS REQUIRED TO CORDON ENEMY FORCES. EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON PATIENCE AND FIRE POWER.

(4) ENSURE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS TO AERIAL OBSERVATION. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HELMET MARKINGS AND AIR PANELS.

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(5) EMPHASIZE CONTINUOUS CAMOUFLAGE AND DISPERSION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(6) THRUST POINTS IN EFFECT AS OF 24000H:

DOGS	9252
GIRLS NAMES	8651
COLORS	9550
AUTOS	9616
FURNITURE	9117
SOAPS	9216
VEGETABLES	9319
BIRDS	9719
TREES	9118
SOFT DRINKS	9015
BOYS NAMES	8819
SPORTS	8716
FRUITS	9051
MONEY	9552

(7) ON ORDER CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE/ENEMY CONTACT IN 4TH MARINES OA.

(8) PSYWAR OPNS COORDINATED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BROADCAST TEAM AVAILABLE ON REQUEST.

(9) SIX HOUR SITREPS DUE 0500H, 1100H, 1700H, 2300H; SPOT REPORTS ON OCCURENCE; STATUS OF EQUIPMENT REPORT 0700H DAILY; DAY AND NIGHT ACTIVITIES BY 1100H. ALL TO 4TH MARINES CP.

SECRET

SECRET

(10) ALL COMMANDS EMPHASIZE PROPER ORIENTATION AND LOCATION OF UNITS TO REDUCE POSSIBILITIES OF INJURY TO FRIENDLY UNITS BY SUPPORTING ARMS.

(11) ALL UNITS MAINTAIN ANTI-MECHANIZED CAPABILITY. NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS OF ANY EVIDENCE OF TRACKED VEHICLES.

(12) FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION IAW FMFM 7-1. FIRES WITHIN 500 METERS OF BATTALION BOUNDARIES WILL BE CLEARED WITH REGIMENTAL FSOC.

(13) AIR SENTRIES WILL BE POSITIONED AT ARTILLERY FIRING POSITIONS. AIR SENTRIES, FO'S AND AO'S WILL CHECK FIRE WHEN FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT ARE OBSERVED APPROACHING DANGER AREAS.

(14) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON ORDER.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUPPLY

(1) SOURCE - LZ STUD

(2) PRESCRIBED LOAD - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS TO INCLUDE BA, 2 DAYS MCI, SALT TABLETS, HALIZONE TABLETS, AND INSECT REPELLENT.

(3) RESUPPLY

(A) PRIMARY - HELICOPTER

(B) LSA - LZ STUD - ALL BATTALIONS AND HQ/LTH MARINES WILL ESTABLISH LOG UNITS AT LZ STUD BY D-1.

(C) RESUPPLY REQUESTS WILL BE MADE TO UNIT S LGS BY 1230 THE DAY PRIOR TO THE DAY OF DELIVERY.

SECRET

SECRET

(D) EMERGENCY RESUPPLY REQUESTS WILL BE ACCEPTED ANYTIME.

(E) ON D-DAY ONLY EMERGENCY REQUESTS WILL BE ACCEPTED.

(F) MAXIMUM USE OF DISPOSABLE, PLASTIC CONTAINERS WILL BE MADE BY INFANTRY BATTALIONS. BE PREPARED TO SUBSTITUTE WATER CANS FOR PLASTIC CONTAINERS.

(G) M 107 WATER TRAILERS WILL BE USED AT FIXED POSITIONS.

(H) UNITS MUST PRE-POSITION CLASS II AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AT THE LSA. TYPES AND AMOUNTS ARE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF UNIT COMMANDERS.

(I) UNIT S-4'S WILL STAGE AT THE LZ AN EMERGENCY PACKAGE CONSISTING OF WATER, RATIONS, AND AMMUNITION IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO SUSTAIN TWO COMPANIES OVER NIGHT.

(J) UNITS WILL INSURE THAT CARGO NETS ARE RETURNED TO THE LZ PROMPTLY. WITHOUT THEM, RESUPPLY IS IMPOSSIBLE.

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) EXERCISE PREVENTITIVE MEDICINE MEASURES TO PREVENT HEAT CASUALTIES.

(2) TAKE MAXIMUM ANTI-MALARIA MEASURES.

(3) EVACUEES WILL BE TAKEN TO CO "D" 3D MED BN.

C. TRANSPORTATION

(1) HELICOPTER

(2) TRUCKS PROVIDED BY G-4 LZ STUD.

SECRET

SECRET

D. SERVICES

(1) 1ST AND 2ND PLATOONS CO "A" 3D ENGR BN.

E. PERSONNEL

(1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESENT DIRECTIVES.

(2) BATTALIONS MAINTAIN REPRESENTATIVES AT CO "D" 3D MED BATTALION TO FACILITATE CASUALTY REPORTING AND RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT.

(3) POW'S WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO 3461.1.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. REFERENCE (B) AND (C) AND THE 4TH MARINES COI (ISSUED SEPARATELY).

B. RADIO

(1) ALL BATTALIONS AND DESIGNATED UNITS WILL ACTIVATE AND MAINTAIN A STATION ON THE REGIMENTAL TACTICAL NET (FREQ. (P) 37.40, (M-1179) (S) 65.45, (M-862)).

(2) A REGIMENTAL LOGISTICAL/ADMIN NET WILL BE ACTIVATED ON D-1 AT 0800 BATTALIONS MAY ENTER THIS NET AS REQUIRED. (FREQ. 75.25, (M-978)).

(3) INFANTRY BATTALIONS WILL MAINTAIN A UHF CAPABILITY AND BE PREPARED TO ENTER THEIR DESIGNATED TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION (TAD) NET WHEN DIRECTED.

(4) ALL 4TH MARINES UNITS WILL ENTER THE REGIMENTAL TACP NET (FREQ. 40.40 (M-538)) FOR AIR/GROUND USE WITH HELICOPTERS ARRIVING IN THE CP AREA, AND WILL MAINTAIN A CONTINUOUS WATCH ON THIS NET.

SECRET

SECRET

(5) 4TH MARINES TACP WILL IN ADDITION MAINTAIN A NET AND THE H.D./TAR NET. (FREQ. 62.65, (M-763)).

C. CRYPTO

(1) AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES - KAG
QAG 504.

(2) BREVITY CODES - KAG PAG = 4.

D. VISUAL

(1) PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REFERENCE (C).

(2) SMOKE

(A) WHITE-MARKING OF ENEMY POSITIONS

(B) RED AREA NOT SECURE, NOT SAFE TO LAND

(C) VIOLET/GREEN - AREA SECURED, SAFE TO

LAND

(D) YELLOW - MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS

E. COMMAND PGST

(1) REPORT ALL CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED
OR CLOSED.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

SECRET

COC

PIAN

DRAFTED BY MAJ R. W. AUSTIN

RELEASED BY RWC

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 310735z JULY 68

FROM: FOURTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN, FOURTH MARINES
BLT TWO SLANT FOUR
THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES
THIRD BN, TWELFTH MARINES



GS

INFO: CG, THIRD MARDIV
CG, TASK FORCE HOTEL
TWELFTH MARINES
NINTH MARINES
CO A, THIRD ENGR BN

BT
SECRET

OPORDER 7-68 (SCOTLAND DELTA)

A. MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS SERIES L7014, SHEETS
6342II, 6342 III

B. DIVO 0200.4C (COMI SOP)

C. DIVO 0200.2G (COI)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION

- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|
| 4TH MARINES | COL MILLER |
| 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES | LTCOL GALBRAITH |
| BLT 2/4 | LTCOL HANN |
| 3D BN, 4TH MARINES | LTCOL BOURNE |

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY

- (1) SEE CURRENT INTSUMS
- (2) SEE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 2-68. (PASEP)

Copy #1 of 25 copies

SECRET

TAB-D

SECRET**B. FRIENDLY**

(1) TASK FORCE HOTEL CONDUCTS SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITH TWO REGIMENTS, BOTH SUPPORTED BY DIRECT AND GENERAL SUPPORT ARTILLERY, IN A HELO AND GROUND OFFENSIVE IN THE BALONG AND DAKRONG VALLEYS.

(2) ARTILLERY

(A) 3RD BN (-) (REIN) 12TH MARINES DS 4TH MARINES.

(B) 12TH MARINES (-) (REIN) GS 3D MARDIV, PROVIDES GS/REIN FIRES.

(3) AIR SUPPORT

(A) 7TH AF/1ST MAW PROVIDES FIXED/ROTARY WING SUPPORT.

(4) RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE

(A) 3D RECON BN GS 3D MARDIV.

(5) ENGINEER SUPPORT

(A) CO A (-) 3D ENGR BN DS 4TH MARINES.

(6) TANK SUPPORT

(A) CO B (-) 3D TANK BN DS 4TH MARINES.

2. MISSION

A. 4TH MARINES (REIN) CONDUCTS HELIBORNE ASSAULTS INTO DESIGNATED AO (SEE ANNEX A OPERATION OVERLAY) TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN AO; INTERDICTS KNOWN OR NEWLY FOUND INFILTRATION ROUTES; ESTABLISHES HELICOPTER LZ'S AND FIRE SUPPORT BASE FOR THIS AND FUTURE OPERATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

B. 4TH MARINES CONTINUES DEFENSE OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE CATES AND SHEPHERD AND OPERATIONS IN AREAS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE WEST.

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

PHASE I COMMENCING D-4 MAXIMUM ARTILLERY AND AIR PREPARATION OF ALL SELECTED LZ'S. ON D-1 ONE BATTALION (3/4) WILL CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO NORTHERN PORTION DAKRONG VALLEY AND CONDUCT SEARCH FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN DESIGNATED AO FOR 5-7 DAYS. ADDITIONAL HELIBORNE ASSAULTS WILL BE MADE IN A SOUTHERLY MOVEMENT THROUGH THE VALLEY. A FIRE SUPPORT BASE WILL BE DEVELOPED TO SUPPORT PHASE II.

PHASE II ON ORDER, A SECOND BATTALION (1/4) WILL MAKE A HELIBORNE ASSAULT SOUTH OF DAKRONG VALLEY IN DESIGNATED AO, WILL ASSUME OPCON OF FIRE SUPPORT BASE, AND CONDUCT SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS FOR 5-7 DAYS. ON ORDER FIRST BATTALION WILL ORIENT ACTIVITY TO WEST IN DESIGNATED AO AND CONTINUE SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS FOR 5-7 DAYS.

B. 3RD BV, 4TH MARINES

(1) COMMENCING D-4 MAXIMUM AIR AND ARTILLERY PREPARATION OF SELECTED LZ'S.

(2) AT L-HOUR D-1 CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULTS INTO LZ'S PIGEON (XD 959379), PARROT (XD 9711,11) AND PEACOCK (XD 968358).

SECRET

(3) LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, INSTALLATIONS, AND SUPPLY CACHES IN DESIGNATED AO FOR 5-7 DAYS.

(4) INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES.

(5) DEVELOP SITE FOR FIRE BASE AT (XD 968368).

(6) ESTABLISH AND UTILIZE ADDITIONAL LZ'S AS REQUIRED. DEVELOP MINIMUM OF 3 LZ'S EACH ON BOTH EAST AND WEST SIDE OF DAKHONG VALLEY BETWEEN HORIZONTAL GRIDS 42 AND 34.

(7) ON ORDER CHOP RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE SUPPORT BASE TO 1/4 AND CONTINUE SEARCH, FIX AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN WESTERN PORTION OF AO.

(8) CONTINUE SECURITY OF FIRE BASE SHEPHERD. ASSUME OPCON OF ADDITIONAL COMPANIES AS ASSIGNED AND CONTINUE LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN AREA OF PRIMARY INTEREST. MAINTAIN ONE COMPANY WEST OF 89 GRID LINE.

C. 1ST BN, 4TH MARINES

(1) ON ORDER HELILIFT ONE COMPANY TO FIRE SUPPORT BASE AT (XD 968368) TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ARTILLERY POSITION.

(2) ON ORDER CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO SOUTHERN PORTION OF DAKHONG VALLEY. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIRE SUPPORT BASE AND DESIGNATED AO. LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN AO. INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES.

SECRET

(3) ESTABLISH AND DEVELOP LZ'S AS REQUIRED.

D. BLT 2/4

(1) CONTINUE SECURITY OF LZ GATES, HILL 950 AND CONDUCT LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN AO. MAINTAIN ONE COMPANY WEST OF 89 GRID LINE.

(2) DESIGNATE ONE COMPANY AS REGIMENTAL RESERVE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN LOWER DAKRONG AREA. DESIGNATED COMPANY MAY CONDUCT LIMITED OPERATIONS IN 2/4 AO IN INTERIM.

E. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY: 4 AUGUST 68

(2) L/H HOURS: TBA

(3) ALL UNITS USE MAXIMUM COMMUNICATION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY DURING ALL MOVEMENT. SEEK TO LOCATE AND FIX THE ENEMY. ADDITIONAL INFANTRY WILL BE COMMITTED AS REQUIRED TO CORRIDOR ENEMY FORCES. EMPHASIS WILL BE PLACED ON PATIENCE AND FIRE POWER.

(4) ENSURE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS TO AERIAL OBSERVATION. MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF HELMET MARKINGS AND AIR PANELS.

(5) EMPHASIZE CONTINUOUS CAMOUFLAGE AND DISPERSION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(6) THRUST POINTS IN EFFECT AS OF 030001H AUG. ALL OTHER THRUST POINTS PUBLISHED BY THIS HQ CANCELLED SAME DTG.

SECRET

A. 0037	N. 9148
B. 8342	O. 9545
C. 8544	P. 9641
D. 8638	Q. 9738
E. 8741	R. 9942
F. 0232	S. 0045
G. 8848	T. 0143
H. 8938	U. 0247
I. 9046	V. 9934
J. 9439	W. 9747
K. 9236	X. 8736
L. 9242	Y. 0335
M. 9149	Z. 9535

(7) ON ORDER CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE/ENEMY CONTACT IN 4TH MARINES OA.

✓ (8) PSYWAR OPS COORDINATED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS BROADCAST TEAM AVAILABLE ON REQUEST.

(9) SIX HOUR SITREPS DUE 0500H, 1100H, 1700H, 2300H; SPOT REPORTS ON OCCURENCE; STATUS OF EQUIPMENT REPORT 0700H DAILY; DAY AND NIGHT ACTIVITIES BY 1400H. ALL TO 4TH MARINES CP.

(10) ALL COMMANDS EMPHASIZE PROPER ORIENTATION AND LOCATION OF UNITS TO REDUCE POSSIBILITIES OF INJURY TO FRIENDLY UNITS BY SUPPORTING ARMS.

(11) ALL UNITS MAINTAIN ANTI-MECHANIZED CAPABILITY. NOTIFY THIS HEADQUARTERS OF ANY EVIDENCE OF TRACKED VEHICLES.

SPT

(12) INFANTRY BATTALIONS COORDINATE ALL FIRES WITHIN RESPECTIVE BOUNDARIES. ALL FIRES IMPACTING WITHIN 500 METERS OF OR ACROSS THE 9TH MARINES BOUNDARY WILL BE CLEARED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS FSCC.

(13) AIR SENTRIES WILL BE POSTED AT EACH FIRING POSITION AND WILL CHECK FIRE ARTILLERY OR MORTARS SHOULD AIRCRAFT BE ENDANGERED. FO'S WILL FOLLOW LIKE PROCEDURES.

(14) SUBMIT AIR AND ARTILLERY PREP REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH ASSAULT HELILIFT TO THIS HQ NLT 2200 D-2 FOR EACH APPLICABLE HELILIFT.

(15) AIR SUPPORT

A. ALL UNITS REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT WILL PASS TARGET DESCRIPTION, GRID LOCATION AND POSITION OF FRIENDLIES.

B. MAINTAIN UHF CAPABILITY FOR FIXED WING CONTROL AND SECURE SUFFICIENT AIR PANELS TO MARK FRONT LINES.

C. THE FOLLOWING TIMES WILL BE USED TO REQUEST AIR SUPPORT:

(1) HELI TROOP LIFT - TACTICAL 1000H
TWO DAYS PRIOR TO LIFT.

- ADMIN 1000H DAY
PRECEDING LIFT.

(2) FIXED WING (CAS/DAS) - 1000H DAY
PRECEDING.

(3) 1PC - 1200H DAY OF REQUEST.

SECRET

(4) LOGISTICS - 1200H DAY PRECEDING.

(16) HAND-HELD RCA AUTHORIZED. SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR AIR AND ARTILLERY DELIVERED RCA TO THIS HQ.

(17) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON ORDER.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SUPPLY

(1) SOURCE - LZ STUD

(2) PRESCRIBED LOAD - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS TO INCLUDE BA, 2 DAYS MCI, SALT TABLETS, HALIZONE TABLETS, AND INSECT REPELLENT.

(3) RESUPPLY

(A) PRIMARY - HELICOPTER

(B) ISA - LZ STUD

(C) RESUPPLY REQUESTS WILL BE MADE TO UNIT S-4'S BY 1330 THE DAY PRIOR TO THE DAY OF DELIVERY.

(D) EMERGENCY RESUPPLY REQUESTS WILL BE ACCEPTED ANYTIME.

(E) ON D-DAY ONLY EMERGENCY REQUESTS WILL BE ACCEPTED.

(F) MAXIMUM USE OF DISPOSABLE, PLASTIC CONTAINERS WILL BE MADE BY INFANTRY BATTALIONS. BE PREPARED TO SUBSTITUTE WATER CANS FOR PLASTIC CONTAINERS.

(G) M 107 WATER TRAILERS WILL BE USED AT FIXED POSITIONS.

(H) UNITS MUST PRE-POSITION CLASS II AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AT THE LSA. TYPES AND AMOUNTS ARE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF UNIT COMMANDERS.

(I) UNIT S-4'S WILL STAGE AT THE LZ AN EMERGENCY PACKAGE CONSISTING OF WATER, RATIONS, AND AMMUNITION IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO SUSTAIN TWO COMPANIES OVER NIGHT.

(J) UNITS WILL INSURE THAT CARGO NETS ARE RETURNED TO THE LZ PROMPTLY. WITHOUT THEM, RESUPPLY IS IMPOSSIBLE.

B. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) EXERCISE PREVENTIVE MEDICINE MEASURES TO PREVENT HEAT CASUALTIES.

(2) TAKE MAXIMUM ANTI-MALARIA MEASURES.

(3) EVACUEES WILL BE TAKEN TO CO "D" 3D MED BN.

C. TRANSPORTATION

(1) HELICOPTER

(2) TRUCKS PROVIDED BY B-4 LZ STUD.

D. SERVICES

(1) 1ST AND 2ND PLATOONS CO "A" 3D ENGR BN.

E. PERSONNEL

(1) CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESENT DIRECTIVES.

(2) BATTALIONS MAINTAIN REPRESENTATIVES AT CO "D" 3D MED BATTALION TO FACILITATE CASUALTY REPORTING AND RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT.

(3) POW'S WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIVO

3461.1.

SECRET

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. REFERENCE (B) AND (C) AND THE 4TH MARINES COI
(ISSUED SEPARATELY).

B. RADIO

(1) ALL BATTALIONS AND DESIGNATED UNITS WILL
ACTIVATE AND MAINTAIN A STATION ON THE REGIMENTAL TACTICAL
NET (FREQ. (P) 17.40, (M-1179) (S) 65.45, (M-862)).

(2) INFANTRY BATTALIONS WILL MAINTAIN A UHF CAPA-
BILITY AND BE PREPARED TO ENTER THEIR DESIGNATED TACTICAL
AIR DEFENSE (IAD) NET WHEN DIRECTED.

(3) ALL 4TH MARINES UNITS WILL ENTER THE REGIMENTAL
TAGP NET (FREQ. 40.40 (M-538)) FOR AIR/GROUND USE WITH
HELICOPTERS ARRIVING IN THE CP AREA, AND WILL MAINTAIN A
CONTINUOUS WATCH ON THIS NET.

(4) 4TH MARINES TAGP WILL IN ADDITION MAINTAIN A
NET ON THE H.D./TAR NET. (FREQ. 62.65, (M-763)).

C. CRYPTO

(1) AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES - KAC
QAG 505.

(2) BREVITY CODES - KAG PAG - 5.

D. VISUAL

(1) PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REFERENCE (C).

(2) SMOKE

(A) WHITE-MARKING OF ENEMY POSITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(B) RED-AREA NOT SECURE, NOT SAFE TO LAND

(C) VIOLET/GREEN - AREA SECURED, SAFE TO

LAND

(D) YELLOW - MARKING FRIENDLY POSITIONS

E. COMMAND POST

(1) REPORT ALL CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED

OR CLOSED.

GP-4
BT

SECRET

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CRITIQUE
CAMTON II ACTION
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
COMMANDING GENERAL TASK FORCE HOTEL

We had long suspected that the rugged terrain west of Vandegrift Combat Base served as an NVA hideout and a source of a variety of malicious activities. We knew that friendly intrusion into the area invariably provoked a determined enemy reaction; we remembered that our aircraft that wandered over the region were often shot at and sometimes shot down; we recalled that convoys turning south at the Rock Pile used to face interception from the west; and more recently, we had seen rockets come crashing into Vandegrift from sites to the west.

We also were accustomed to seeing a dusty red symbol on our situation maps surmising the presence of the 8th Battalion, 29th Regiment. Even those who doubted whether that unit remained in the area acknowledged that some unfriendlies were there.

And so to remove some of the uncertainty, Task Force Hotel planned to employ a battalion of the 1st Marines, upon its departure from Khe Sanh, to land at Hill 715--the area's dominant feature--and search surrounding terrain. The 1st Marines nominated 1/1, whose battalion commander reconnoitered the area by chopper and prepared his plans. But by 6 July, when the 1st Marines departed the flat and clean Khe Sanh Combat Base, 1/1 remained behind to battle an NVA force at Hill 689 that seemed reluctant to have the Marines leave. The battalion spent another six days before it could retrieve eight Marine bodies from the Hill's forward slopes.

Meanwhile, on 9 July, a battalion of the 3d Marines--1/3--arrived at Vandegrift and relieved 1/4 as the security battalion. The next day--10 July--the enemy reminded us that our action was overdue by rocketing Vandegrift not once but several times. The following morning--11 July--1/4 landed at the topographical crest of Hill 715, initiating a reconnaissance in force they named the "Canton Action."

Task Force Hotel assumed direct opcon of 1/4 for this action since the 4th Regiment already had its hands full with 1/1 fighting at Hill 689, 2/4 and 3/4 at Cates and Shepherd, respectively, and 1/3 manning the ramparts at Ca Lu--Vandegrift.

Prior to 1/4's landings on Hill 715, we "prepped" the objective area with bombs and rockets from 12 flights of fixed wing aircraft and with 792 rounds of 8" howitzer, 105mm and 155mm howitzers.

Marines of the first wave scrambled from their CH-46 helos at 0950H. Like the two waves that followed, they received no fire and encountered no opposition. But a CH-46 in the 4th wave, only a few feet above the LZ, suddenly took bursts of .50 caliber machinegun fire, crashed and burned. A full load of troops, their helmets jarred from their heads by the impact, and the helo's crewmen all scrambled to safety ahead of the searing flames. One of the crewmen sustained an injury that required his evacuation.

This incident, plus a sprinkling of 82mm mortar rounds impacting in the LZ, caused the flight leader and battalion commander to use an alternate LZ, off the crest, about 100 meters away. The last wave landed there at 1105H. Meanwhile, friendly rockets and bombs plastered the firing site of the enemy .50 caliber and it was heard no more.

There were two contacts on D-Day. Marines of C/1/4, northeast of 715, spotted 3 NVA running into a treeline. Marines called an artillery mission on the area with good target coverage. At 2100H, D/1/4, operating west of the LZ, received 10 rounds of enemy mortar fire. One Marine was killed and two others received minor wounds. The next day, 12 July, at 0930H, C/1/4 received 6 rounds of sniper fire, wounding one Marine. B/1/4 found 5 NVA bodies in the thick canopy west of Hill 715's summit. All elements of 1/4 on the 12th continued to find heavily fortified positions that had been recently occupied.

D+2. At 0800H, the LZ security force killed one NVA with M-16 rifle fire and captured his AK-47. At 1420H, while Marines of B/1/4 were moving westward down a trail, their point element was struck by a command detonated mine. They pulled back, set up a perimeter, and sent elements forward to retrieve casualties. The enemy set off another command detonated mine and fired .50 caliber and 82mm mortars at the Marines. Results of the engagement were 1 KIA (ENR), 1 MIA and 8 WIA (EVAC).

D+3. Planning continued on the morning of the 14th for a recovery operation to retrieve the 1 KIA (ENR) and 1 MIA from B/1/4. At 1530H, A/1/4 displaced by helo to help in the operation. Following a 45-minute artillery prep, elements of A/1/4 moved out at 1900H but soon encountered another mine, resulting in 4 KIA and 6 WIA (EVAC), 1 KIA being the Alpha Company Commander. The unit withdrew. A debrief of 1/4 personnel indicates the mines encountered were of an unknown type. Each incident was initiated by one large explosion followed by a series of smaller ones.

D+4. At 0900H on 15 July, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines commenced its helilift from the vicinity of Hill 715 to Vandegrift Combat Base. The move was necessary to relieve forces to participate in the Lancaster July Action.

Statistics for Canton II are reflected on this chart. (Friendly: 6 killed
16 wounded and evacuated. Enemy: 31 killed).

DECLASSIFIED

I. SECOND ARVN REGIMENT

THE TWO BATTALIONS OF THE SECOND ARVN REGIMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE LANCASTER JULY ACTION HAD COMPLETED THEIR ASSIGNED MISSION OF SEARCHING THE DENSE AND ENTANGLED JUNGLED TERRAIN TO THE NORTHWEST OF VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE, THEREFORE, IN DEVELOPING THE PLAN FOR CANTON II THE SECOND ARVN REGIMENT WAS IN AN IDEAL SITUATION AND LOCATION TO COMPLEMENT THE FOURTH MARINES OFFENSIVE ACTION. THE DERIVED COURSE OF ACTION WAS FOR THE SECOND ARVN TO HELILIFT FROM PRESENT POSITIONS INTO LZ'S AND ESTABLISH A BLOCKING POSITION TO THE NORTH OF THE FOURTH MARINES. SUBSEQUENTIALLY, THEY WOULD SEARCH THE SOUTHERN CAM LO RIVER BASIN.

THIS CONCEPT WAS PRESENTED TO COLONEL GIAI, COMMANDING OFFICER, AND HE EAGERLY ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL AND DEVELOPED HIS SCHEME OF MANEUVER. UPON VERTICAL RECONNAISSANCE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ONLY SUITABLE LANDING ZONES WERE HILLS 492 AND 490. THE SELECTION OF THESE LZ'S CREATED CERTAIN COORDINATING PROBLEMS AS THESE TERRAIN FEATURES WERE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE FOURTH MARINES BOUNDARY. A DETAILED TIME TABLE WAS ESTABLISHED TO SCHEDULE AIR PREPS, ARTILLERY PREPS AND THE LANDINGS IN SUCH A SEQUENCE NOT TO HINDER THE FOURTH MARINES BUT TO POSSIBLY REINFORCE THEIR ACTIONS.

EARLY ON 24 JULY AS GENERAL PREPPING COMMENCED THE CONTROLLING AO, OBSERVED BUNKERS, TRENCH LINES AND SOME NVA. AS THE DAY PROGRESSED ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WERE UNCOVERED. COLONEL GIAI DECIDED TO POSTPONE D-DAY AND REQUESTED MORE AIR. FOR THE NEXT 20 HOURS FIXED WING AND ARTILLERY POUNDED THE AREA. THE MAJORITY OF DEFENSIVE COMPLEXES WERE DESTROYED.

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COLONEL GIAI ASKED FOR A L-HOUR OF 1300 ON 25 JULY, THIS CREATED A MAJOR PROBLEM AS ALL AVAILABLE MARINE HELICOPTERS WERE SCHEDULED TO MAKE SEVERAL HELLIFFTS IN SUPPORT OF LANCASTER JULY ACTION. LT COL PARSON, SENIOR ARMY ADVISOR WITH ARVN, SUGGESTED AND REQUESTED ARMY UH1E HELICOPTERS THROUGH HIS CHAIN OF COMMAND. NINE UH1E HELICOPTERS WITH A CAPACITY OF CARRYING 7 ARVN SOLDIERS PER HELO ARRIVED AT VANDEGRIFT ON TIME BUT THE LANDING WAS DELAYED BECAUSE OF A RAIN SQUALL.

FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL AIR PREP THE FIRST WAVE LOADED WITH ARVN SOLDIERS OF THE 3RD BN, SETTLED DOWN ON HILL 490 AT 1500. IMMEDIATELY THEY RECEIVED INTENSE A/W FIRE FROM A RIDGE LINE TO THE NORTH. AS THE ARVN DEBARKED FROM THE HELO'S THEY WERE MET WITH S/A FIRE FROM AN ESTIMATED NVA SQUAD LOCATED ON A KNOLL ABOUT 150 METERS AWAY. MORE AIRSTRIKES WERE CONDUCTED WHILE TWO MORE WAVES WERE INSERTED. THE A/W POSITION WAS SILENCED AND THE ARVN ASSAULTED THE NVA SQUAD. FIERCE FIGHTING PREVAILED BUT THE DETERMINED ARVNS OVER RAN THE POSITION ACCOUNTING FOR 13 NVA/KIA. THEY SUFFERED 1 U.S. P.O. KIA, 1 ARVN KIA AND 18 WIA (EVAC). COLONEL GIAI HAD SUSPENDED THE LIFT UNTIL THIS POCKET OF RESISTENCE WAS ELIMINATED. MARINE HELICOPTERS EVACUATED THE ARVN WOUNDED AND ANOTHER WAVE OF TROOPS WAS INSERTED AT 1800. THIS TIME 82MM MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE IMPACTED ON THE LZ. TIME WAS NOW BECOMING A MAJOR FACTOR AND 3RD BN HAD ELEMENTS IN TWO LOCATIONS. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO HELILIFT THE REMAINING FORCES TO VANDEGRIFT. MARINE HELICOPTERS COMPLETED THIS MOVE AT 2000H. ON HILL 492 THE UNIT, COMPRISING OF 150 ARVN SOLDIERS, 2 U.S. FO'S AND 2 U.S. ADVISORS ESTABLISHED A PERIMETER DEFENSE. IN A DEBRIEF, ONE U.S. ADVISOR RELATED THAT HILL 492 WAS LITTERED WITH PORTIONS OF BODIES AND MANY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY AIRSTRIKES. HE ALSO FELT THE SQUAD THAT THEY HAD ANNILATED WAS LEFT BEHIND FROM A MUCH LARGER UNIT THAT HAD SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES.

THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT TP-5 AND ARTILLERY BLASTED POSSIBLE ENEMY TARGETS.
THE NEXT MORNING ^{26 July} THE REMAINDER OF THE 3RD BATTALION AND ALL OF THE 1ST BN
WERE HELILIFTED INTO HILL 492. 1ST BATTALION IMMEDIATELY MOVED TO HILL 490
AND COMMENCED A DETAIL SEARCH OF THE AREA. NO CONTACT WAS EXPERIENCED
DURING THIS HELILIFT. 3RD BATTALION ESTABLISHED THEIR BLOCKING POSITIONS
AS THE 4TH MARINES WERE ORDERED TO SEARCH OUT THE NORTHWEST RIDGE.

COMPANY PATROLS WERE DISPATCHED ON THE 27TH BUT NO ENEMY WAS FOUND.
ON THIS DATE COLONEL GIAI RECEIVED WORD TO DISPLACE HIS UNIT TO DONG HA ON
THE 29TH. ON THE 28TH ONE BATTALION SWEEPED NORTHEAST IN THE CAM LO RIVER
BASIN AND THE OTHER BATTALION MOVED ALONG THE ADJACENT RIDGELINE. THEY
DISPLACED ON THE 29TH BY HELICOPTERS AND TRUCKS.

COLONEL GIAI'S REGIMENT ILLUSTRATED EXTREME AGGRESSIVENESS AND PRO-
FESSIONALISM WHILE OPERATING WITH TASK FORCE HOTEL. THE INDIVIDUAL ARVN
SOLDIER DEMONSTRATED COURAGEOUS DETERMINATION TO CLOSE WITH AND KILL HIS
ENEMY.

RESULTS OF THE ARVN PARTICIPATION: FRIENDLY; 1 U.S. AND 1 ARVN KIA,
18 ARVN WIA (EVAC), ENEMY; 13 NVA/KIA, 6 AK-47s CAPTURED, SEVERAL BUNKERS
DESTROYED.

COMMANDING OFFICER, 4TH MARINES COMMENTS ON CANTON II

On balance, the Canton II operation proved highly successful. Its success can not be measured in enemy confirmed. More importantly, it can be gauged by the number of marines who will not become future casualties from the enemy ordnance captured. To the individual Marine, the capture of an enemy mortar or RPG round has a very personal meaning. Additionally, a significant contribution to the defenses of Combat Base Vandegrift and Fire Support Base Gates. Certainly, the NVA was dealt a severe blow. The rice caches are important when consideration is given to the difficulty the NVA will have replacing them in a non-rice producing locale. The ordnance will be especially hard for him to replace before the monsoon season.

Problems developed during the planning and execution of Canton II. Some of these arose because we failed to fully heed lessons previously learned. Also, we managed to create a few new problems on our own. On the other hand we did employ to good advantage lessons learned during our experiences during Operation Charlton, in April, and Robin South in June. I would like to highlight a few of the techniques which worked well during Canton II.

First. Company operating bases were again used to good advantage. We had previously employed them during Charlton. These company operating bases permit the troops to cover a given area faster and more effectively. These COB's must, of course, be readily reinforceable

and well boxed in with supporting arms. We did not use CCB's exclusively during Canton II, but we found it effective when employed.

Second. We again found that the enemy and his caches are usually located near a water source, especially, during the hot season. Further, he will defend by his supporting arms or troops that which is important to him. We again found him vulnerable to deception and rapid movement.

Third. Sufficient time must be allowed to permit thorough search for caches. Interestingly, the largest caches were found toward the end of Canton II. In short, you have to live with the enemy. This permits a much better search of the area as troops become familiar with the ground and gain confidence. This is not meant to imply that units are stationary in the area, since frequent movement within the general area is mandatory.

Fourth. Arclights are fine if you get them, but don't let them dictate your tactics.

Fifth and last. Again we found the 4.2mm mortar a versatile weapon and well suited for this type of operation. When the operation was modified to search out a suspected rocket site, the 4.2's were readily available to insert into the fire support base pending arrival of the 105's.

In summary, Canton II taught us much, and we take justifiable pride in the job done by the Marines of 1/4, BIF 2/4, 1/12 and 3/12. We are also appreciative of the first class support provided by Task Force Hotel.

A. INTELLIGENCE

1. CANTON II. All available intelligence collections means were employed during the period 16 July to 04 August providing data with which to analyze the area and the enemy forces in the area of concern. In the 1/4 area, rugged mountainous, dense double and triple canopy covered terrain existed. The 2/4 AO was characterized by elephant grass, plateaus and less mountainous terrain and only single canopy ran roughly from north to south on the north and south sides of Dong Ca Lu. There were tributaries of the Song Cam Lo to the north and tributaries of the Quang Tri to the south all of these provided routes of access and exit from the area concerned.

2. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE (RECON). In the two weeks prior to the start of CANTON II there were three recon inserts in the vicinity of Dong Ca Lu and Hill 715. Two had contact in vicinity of (XD 9449) and the third was in the vicinity of (XD 9343), but had negative observation. Recon team Football at 20 July vicinity (XD 923503) made contact with (2) NVA wearing light green utilities and covers, resulting in (2) NVA KIA CONF. A recon team made contact on the 11th of July with (2) NVA vicinity (XD 953535) resulting in (2) NVA KIA CONF.

3. PRISONERS. No prisoners were taken during the action, this limited our input of intelligence from the field to captured weapons, material, and observations of base areas.

4. AERIAL PHOTOS. Photography requested on 18 July were received after the operation started, once received the photos were read and data passed to both 1/4 and 2/4 in the field.

5. WEATHER. The weather in the OA during the operation had no adverse effects on our actions. The temperatures ranged from the mid-70's at night to the mid-90's during the day. Ceilings occasionally dropped during periods of rain showers, presenting some problems to our air support. Some problems were encountered trying to get enough weather and astro data far enough in advance to utilize in the planning of the operation. This has since been overcome. Humidity was high due to the frequent showers and the heat in both AO's.

B. Operations

1. Forces Participating

1st Bn, 4th Mar

BLT 2/4

1st Bn, 12th Mar (24 July - 31 July)

3rd Bn, 12th Mar (1 Aug - 6 Aug)

A Co. (-), 3rd Engr Bn

2. Mission. The mission as originally assigned by Task Force Hotel directed operations in the Hill 715 complex to expand previous activity with a secondary purpose to recover bodies of two Marines killed in Canton I. A concept to expand the operation to include a second battalion operating in the plateau area was approved. The mission was finally stated as:

(a) To conduct heliborne and overland infantry assaults into designated AO to locate, fix and destroy enemy forces and to locate and destroy enemy supply caches, rocket sites and harbor sites.

(b) On 3 Aug an additional specific mission to search for possible rocket sites XD 9052 was assigned BLT 2/4. Rockets had been fired at the Rockpile during this operation and immediate reaction was directed.

3. Concept of Operations. The Canton II action was originally planned as a two phase, two battalion operation. 1st Bn, 4th Marines was assigned an AO that included the Hill 715 complex and the major draws leading south to Route 9. BLT 2/4 was to operate initially in the plateau area west of 715 and later move to the north and northwest.

4. Execution

(a) Phase I

(1) BLT 2/4. On (D-1) 23 July BLT 2/4 massed 3 companies at Hill 679 (XD 894456) and on D-Day 24 July began overland movement towards Regimental Objective 1. 2/4 secured Objective 1 on 25 July, conducted operations in this area until 26 July with out enemy contact.

(2) 1st Bn, 4th Mar

(a) On 25 July (D+1) 1/4 conducted heliborne assaults into LZ's Wren and Thrush. Light resistance was encountered from an estimated enemy squad as A and B companies moved toward the east of Hill 715. After additional use of supporting arms, 1/4 secured Regimental Objective 2. C and D companies were dropped nearly 1000 meters south of the designated LZ which created considerable difficulty in navigation. The customary briefing with aviation and ground commanders had been held the previous day and a zone had been agreed upon and approved. Just prior to the landing, the Easy Gunship Commander decided that the previously selected and preped zone was not satisfactory and designated the new one unbeknown to anyone in 1/4. A debrief with gunship commanders revealed his opinion that tree stumps in the LZ made it unsatisfactory. Had the ground commander been notified alternate plans could have been executed, but no such notification was given and two companies were landed in a unpreped LZ. Once oriented the companies began slow movement toward the western crest of Hill 715.

(b) 2/4 continued search and destroy operations without enemy contact until 4 August. Sizable caches of rice, weapons, ammunition plus enemy bodies were discovered.

(c) Phase II

(1) On 29 July 2/4 (-) commenced movement toward Regimental Objective 4. G Co. secured Objective 4 on the morning of 30 July without enemy resistance. B, F and CP established positions approximately 1000 meters to the east. At 1030 G Co. saw 15 NVA to the northwest of Hill 606. They took the enemy under fire with S/A, mortars, artillery and air. At 1330 a platoon went forward to check the area and encountered a small enemy force in entrenched bunkers. 4 Marines were killed by an initial heavy burst of enemy fire. 3 of the bodies remained unrecovered as artillery and air worked the bunker complex the remainder of the day. After additional prep during the night and the following morning, G Co. moved forward to recover the bodies without further incident.

(2) From 30 July - 2 August 2/4 continued operations in Hill 606 area and along the ridgeline south of the ARVN contact (Hill 492).

(3) On 162 August a fire base at 606 was established to support further operations to the north. Selection of 606 was made after consultation and reconnaissance by artillery and infantry commanders. 4.2 mortars were emplaced immediately and after a $\frac{1}{2}$ day of preparation by A Co. 3rd Bn. 3-105's were installed. It was intended and utilized as a quickly developed, temporary FSB. In accordance with the established policy of naming fire bases after former commandants it was designated FB Shoup.

(4) On 3 August 2/4 commenced execution of the additional mission to search the rocky area on the north slopes of the Khe Giang Thuan Valley. F Co. remained with the CP while E and G moved down toward the stream. (It was during this movement that the huge cache was discovered). At first light the BLT's organic recon platoon crossed the stream and searched the area with negative findings.

(5) At 0418 on 6 August approximately 10 NVA probed the lines at FB Shoup killing 4 Marines.

(6) On the afternoon of 6 August (D+3) all artillery and infantry units completed the extract from the field and Canton II was completed.

(7) It should be noted that 1/4 was not ordered to execute Phase II due to the extreme productivity of its search of the 715 complex. 1/4 had been given considerable freedom of movement and had developed a series of battalion objectives which created the necessary flexibility to properly search the 715 complex. Several LZ's, one capable of receiving 2 CH-46's were cut out of heavily wooded terrain and will prove invaluable for future operations. 1/4 completed its portion of Canton II on 4 August (D+1).

5. Lessons Learned

(a) Command/Control

(1) During this 2 battalion operation, one additional battalion 1/9 - became opcon to the 4th Marines and assumed 1/4's area at Vandegrift and Ca Lu. 2/4, with the B Cmd Grp, retained its responsibility for its area of primary interest (FB Gates west to Hill 950) and assumed opcon at various times of M/3/4, G/2/9, and B/1/4, and a platoon of A/1/4 after their extract from Canton II. The A Cmd Grp controlled the Canton II operations, and assumed opcon of D/1/4 on 4 August.

(2) At one point 2/4 consisted of 8 companies, putting great strain on the communications and staff capabilities of the battalion. The B Cmd Grp concept can be productively employed in a 2 and 3 company unit, but, this situation created 2 separate full sized battalions with only one staff, one set of radios and frequencies, one 81mm platoon.

(3) The lesson is that the B Cmd Grp should not be extended much beyond its normal capabilities and additional battalions must be provided intact to properly continue the mobile concept in the western portion of Scotland II AO.

(b) Movement into enemy territory utilizing combinations of overland and heliborne assaults is especially effective. A movement of this type in Robin South by 3/9, 2/4 and 3/4 set up a major defeat for the NVA. Again in Canton II 2/4, slipped unobtrusively towards Objective 1 as 1/4 helilifted to Objective 2 and the ARVN helilifted to the southern portion of its AO. The pincer effect was at least partially responsible for his abandoning large caches.

(c) The third item is really a lesson re-learned. Nearly every cache and bunker complex found on this operation was uncovered after extensive detailed search and small units patrolling. Realistic time frames must be established that allow battalion sufficient time "to get in and live" with the enemy in his area.

(d) The versatility of the 4.2 mortars was a gain reemphasized. This will be covered in detail in the Artillery Critique.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. CAPTURED WEAPONS, ORDNANCE AND MATERIAL. As has been previously indicated the captured weapons, ordnance, and material became the most pertinent intelligence data obtained during this operation. From all observations of captured weapons and material, the following conclusions can be drawn: That this area was used as a transitional point for infiltrating troops moving south, and as a rehabilitation center for casualties to be treated or kept for further evacuation or reassignment. From captured gear and observation of the area, we found the following indications on which we offer these additional conclusions.

(a) The very nature of the terrain is such that it provides access and exit routes into the area for infiltration. Also the rugged terrain and heavy canopy characterizing the area provides excellent concealment for a large size base cache area, resupply point, or hospital site.

(b) The readiness with which enemy troops withdrew and the amount of gear they left behind, indicates that they weren't prepared for the amount of forces that were introduced. However, a token defense was offered. Since our current Order of Battle carries no enemy unit locations in this area, it is possible that only a minimal amount of troops were actually deployed in the original defense of the area.

(c) The size of the base area found, the medical bunker complexes, and the messing areas imply that battalion or regimental size units could be harbored in the area. Other

indications or examples that the area had been in use for sometime were the large variety of uniforms and type of gear found. Some of the uniforms were of the type without camouflaged tie strings (old type). The tops and the bottoms were of different colors, material and were well worn. A body being found with white gloves still on it's hands (surgical) indicative of a doctor or a corpsman substantiates our belief that this was a large medical rehabilitation center. Other indications were the large amounts of medical gear, new surgical instruments, large quantities of medicines. The medicines were of Asian and European origin. Two of the contributing countries detected were Great Britain and Czechoslovakia. There was a large number of graves found. Some seemed to have been dug in advance, possibly anticipating future casualties leading to the death of wounded personnel. Further examples was the discovery of twelve grave sites containing only five dead. All of these elements point to a large hospital complex.

(d) Large enemy caches of weapons, ordnance, and food further indicate these two locations of operation were large resupply areas. Caches were found with as many as two false bottoms. The types of enemy ordnance found gave us a new weapon to add to the NVA's capabilities in our AO. This was the finding of the 82mm Recoilless gun ammunition. The Recoilless gun has been previously designated as the B-7. Old positions were rigged with surprise explosive devices indicating the enemy knew this area and intended to stay. Paths and trails leading upward were boarded with logs to

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hold mud and leaves off the paths indicating well prepared area. A log book with 127 names of patients, (NVA type), that had been treated by the hospital between April and July, was found. This indicates a steady flow of wounded to this area.

D. FSC/Artillery1. Artillery Support

(a) For the Canton II operation the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was assigned the mission of direct support of the 4th Marines. Direct Support artillery was as follows:

- (1) "G" Battery 3d Bn, 12th Marines located at Ca Lu.
- (2) "H" Battery 3d Bn, 12th Marines located at Fire Base Gates.
- (3) "I" Battery 3d Bn, 12th Marines located at Fire Base Shepherd.
- (4) 1st Provisional 155 Battery located at Fire Base Gates.
- (5) "W" Battery (-) located at Fire Base Gates.
- (6) General Support/Reinforcing fires were provided by the

4th Bn, 12th Marines.

(b) It was determined, based on the overlapping fire capabilities, that there was sufficient 105mm overcoverage of all infantry maneuver elements. Because of this there was initially no break down of the Direct Support role.

Of interest was the fact that "D" Battery 2d Bn, 12th Marines was positioned adjacent to "G" Battery at Ca Lu and was able to provide additional reinforcing fires. "D" Battery had been so positioned to support the Ba Long Valley Operation.

It is significant to note that during this period Headquarters 3d Battalion, 12th Marines relieved the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines of the mission of Direct Support for the 4th Marines. No loss of continuity or difficulty in coordination was experienced.

(c) ~~Preparation~~. To support the scheme of maneuver, on D-3 artillery commenced with preparation fires on all known and suspected targets in the area of operations. The prep-fires were culminated on D-Day intense prep-fires on Landing Zone Through and Wren. These LZ's were the primary landing zones for the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. D-Day prep fires were controlled by an aerial observer and fired in conjunction with fixed wing air preps.

The initial support of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, whose movement was overland, was confined to firing preplanned concentrations on suspected targets developed from available intelligence.

During the operation the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was directed to search an area believed to be the location of rocket launching sites. These rockets had been harrasing the ~~Thon~~ Son Lam/Rock Pile area. This maneuver exceeded the effective range for 105mm support. In order to provide artillery support for this phase it was necessary to establish a temporary fire base on Hill 606 (grid square 8849). After the initial recon it was decided that the maximum artillery that could be positioned at Hill 606 would be three 4.2 inch mortars and three 105mm howitzers. Bomb crates were utilized as gun pits in order to expedite occupation of position and still provide protection to the gun crews and ammunition. The mortar battery was emplaced first along with an advanced party from the 105mm battery. The advanced party was sent in early with the mission to prepare the position for receipt of the 105's and ammunition. Considerable engineer effort was required because of the extent of the low brush and trees in the firing position. The position for the 105 howitzers was ready for acceptance.

of the howitzers by the afternoon of the first day. However the weather deteriorated to a point which precluded the helicopter support. The river crossing planned for 2/4 was postponed 24 hours because of the absence of the 105's. This temporary fire base was designated Fire Base Sharp.

2. Counterbattery and Countermortar requirements. The counterbattery and countermortar plan was active. Suppression fires were fired on areas of known or suspected enemy weapon positions. Blocking and suppression fires were adjusted into areas of suspected enemy mortars and rockets.

During the operation when a unit would observe or receive incoming, priority of fires were shifted to the unit under attack. On several occasions units did observe rocket and mortar fire into friendly positions and fire was immediately brought to bear. In all cases the enemy weapons were silenced.

3. Fire Support Coordination. Fire Support Coordination during the Canton II operation revealed no significant problems. The only delays were due to the failure of aircraft to obtain clearance into the 4th Marines area of operation.

4. Air/Artillery. Air and artillery activities were coordinated at all levels. Problems encountered were lack of positive knowledge of the location of aircraft. Because of this, artillery experienced a great number of check fires while aircraft positioning could be determined.

Helicopter supporting artillery units for the operation were in short supply and not always responsive to the immediate lift.

requirements for both tactical moves and logistic build up. Because the fire base areas were often weathered in, it was essential that resupply be immediately accomplished when the weather would break.

5. Communication. Due to the distance and intervening terrain, communications with the forward observers located with elements of 2/4, were being relayed thru units located on Hill 606. Because of this it was decided to place the W/G Battery in direct support of 2/4 providing fires immediately responsive to the infantry battalion.

6. Lessons Learned. The lessons learned or re-learned during the Canton II operation were:

(a) Artillery ammunition intended for heliborne operations must be pre-positioned to enable lift by either CH-46 or CH-53 type helicopters.

(b) Pioneer tools are a must for artillery advanced parties.

(c) Artillery positions in temporary fire bases must be selected for their ability to provide support of the infantry and with a lesser regard as an ideal artillery position.

E. Air Operations

1. General. Adequate air preparations were received in the 7/15 area utilizing 3 1/2 day time flights and 8 TPQ's. No air prep was used in the 2/4 area of operation. Sufficient LZ preps were utilized on Wren and Thrush.

2. Problem Area Encountered

(a) Most problems resulted from inadequate communications. The TACP net was jammed with administrative traffic requiring an additional net for tactical usage. The TACP frequency was also used by other units thus compounding the problem. No status reports were available on helo lifts.

(b) Scrambled fixed wing support was not available unless troops were in contact and the time requirements for fringed fixed wing support are not realistic in a fluid situation.

(c) Helos were not available to pick up return loads unless specifically instructed to do so.

(d) Overall air support was effective. However control was sporadic at times causing undue delay in initiating and hitting check fires.

3. Lessons Learned

- (a) Obtain an additional TACP net for tactical use.
- (b) Select clear frequencies.
- (c) Run all tactical helo lifts on the non tactical TACP net.
- (d) Have the capability to scramble specific heavy ordnance for targets other than troops in contact.

(e) Make maximum utilization of helos regarding fuel resupply runs in that they make pickups at the resupplied A/C only.

(f) Ensure that aircraft have positive communications with TACP before entering, leaving and while in the AO.

(g) A fixed wing representative attend one briefing prior to each major operation to help coordinate the initial assault plan.

F. Logistics

1. Resupply. The 4th Marines moved 1,628,087 pounds of supplies to support the forces in Canton II and the battalion plus that covered the southern and southwestern flanks of the 4th Marines FAOR during the course of this operation. Helicopters were used exclusively for the resupply, with CH-46's and 53's performing most of the work. The CH-34's were used as Q&C helicopters as well as limited resupply aircraft forward of LZ Shepherd in support of the covering forces. The ISA was at LZ Vandegrift, then known as LZ Stud. The stocks of class I, III, IV and V at Vandegrift were adequate as well as the availability of class II from Dong Ha.

2. Evacuation of Captured Items. Only one significant problem was encountered during this operation and that being in the area of the timely evacuation of captured documents and impedimenta. The logistic chain is tasked with the responsibility to handle the evacuation of captured items. As an inordinate amount of enemy stores, weapons and equipment were found and captured in the course of this operation the logistic chain was not ready to handle this size of a load. It was anticipated to use the "dead heading" logistic helicopters and the nets already in the zones from prior resupply lifts as the means of evacuating the booty. Due to a lack of communications between the helicopters and the landing zones this did not happen. To facilitate the solving of this problem the helicopters will be fragg through the LOC at the ISA for the return lift. Additionally it is recommended that a spot at the ISA be designated as a "drop point" for the captured equipment. Then the responsible unit will be able to supply clear

the zone and deliver the equipment to their respective S-2 representatives.

3. Lessons Learned. Once again the policy of helicopters working over the LSA via a specific mission has proved invaluable in handling the resupply requirements for the regiment. The procedure of having S-2 representatives at the LZ to act in a TACLOG capacity also proved valuable. These were lessons learned from our experience gleaned in South and continue to prove valid.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications was established and maintained primarily by using the AN/PRC-25. Relays utilizing the PRC-25 were established on hills 950 and 606 to ensure constant contact with the battalions. The AN/PRC-93 and PRC-41 were also used on occasion for air to ground support. Communications to and within First Battalion Fourth Marines was generally satisfactory with B-T 2/4 experiencing difficulties in acquiring satisfactory frequencies and in establishing direct lines connecting four to the regiment. There were four major problem areas encountered in this operation. They were overcrowding and interference on assigned nets and frequencies, the necessity for relay facilities on certain nets, the use of the brevity code, and security violations.

2. Overcrowding and Mutual Interference

(a) Overcrowding and mutual interference was experienced primarily on Second Battalion Fourth Marines. The main cause of the artillery conduct of fire net and the Regimental TAC net.

(b) The problem was partially eliminated by putting the Bravo Command element of Second Battalion Fourth Marines on a separate Battalion TAC frequency and also utilizing Third Battalion Fourth Marines Artillery C/F for the Bravo Command.

(c) In the case of the Regimental TAC net an additional air/ground frequency was assigned for the Regimental TAC net. However, the frequency was not used during the operation and there was consequently no mutual interference.

the net due to clearing; resupply helicopters, directing helicopters, requesting air support and talking to the AO's.

(d) Second Battalion Fourth Marines also experienced interference on several of their tactical nets. The interference came from Army units, other Marine units, VOA transmissions, and on one net from unauthorized transmissions.

(e) Additional frequencies were requested from division, however some of these frequencies had overriding stations on them, and since radio relay from Task Force Hotel to Division was down for two to three days during the operation, the frequencies were time consuming in acquiring.

(f) **RECOMMENDATIONS**

(1) Corrective action includes that whenever an "Alpha" and "Bravo" command is formed with more than four companies (PCCN) that additional frequencies be utilized for a separate Battalion TAC net, and separate COF nets.

(2) That a secondary Regimental TACP frequency be permanently assigned to each regiment to eliminate congestion.

3 **Necessity to Relay Traffic**

(a) The next problem area was the necessity to relay traffic

(b) When direct communications was maintained with First Battalion Fourth Marines, relay was required on a full time basis on the artillery COF, the Regimental TAC,

and the Regimental LCP and the Regimental LCP
Marines.

(c) This was time consuming, and in some cases three way relay
length of time, and in some cases three way relay
relays of transmissions which are a further complication.

(d) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The adoption of a light weight EF...
be a good solution. The present...
radio, the AN/RC-47 is considered...
a unit operating in the field.

4. Brevity Code

(a) The present brevity code, the...
too awkward and cumbersome... units in the field.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The AN/RC-47 utilizing...
excellent solution to this problem.

(2) An alternate solution may be...
brevity code utilizing only key words...
by operating battalions and companies...

5. Compromises and Security Violations

(a) Though compromises and security violations...
occasion over much of the tactics...
area of concern is air to ground...
is caused by the present need...
in the clear to the pilot...
problem and need... identify...

(b) Determine whether the information is available in the clear, linking call sites with units, and determine of where friendly units are, or should be, located.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) A possible solution may be the adoption of simple code similar to the case shown, with the encryption of grid coordinates, flight numbers, troop lifts, and frequencies.

(2) The ~~optimal~~ solution would be the establishment of secure voice capability within six ft.

(3) In connection with this problem case, 94th Force Hotel is presently conducting a study effort to prevent security violations of this type.