


ॐठ ठ्य

Modern and Junear to accordance with the provinces of the his to secondance with the his to secondance wit

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONTRACT TO



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FEBRUARY 1967 WILLISSFEED



1st Battalian 4th Marian

OD (38-67)

Ougina

HEADQUARTES

1st Bathalian, Ain Marines

FPO San Francisco, 96602

3: MB: dvg 4 Karch 1967

ICK WESTERANTURIUM

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Via: Commanding General, FMF PAC

Commanding General, 9th MAB (Attn. G-3)

CTG 79.5

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-28 February 1967.

Ref: (a) MOD 5750.2

(b) FMF PAGO 5750.8

(c) 3d Divo 5750.1A

Encl: $\sqrt{(1)}$ Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b) and (c), the Subject Command Chronology is submitted.

2. Down graded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

Copy to: 4th Marines

RLT-26



TASTLE OF COMMENTS

SECTION		PAGE
I	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA	1-2
II.	PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION	3+5
III	INTELLIGENCE	6-9
IA	OPPRATIONS/TRAINING	10-14
V	LCGISTICS	15–17
VI	COMMUNICATION / PLECTRONICS	18-19
VII	ARTILLTRY/NAVAL GUNFIRE	20-21
AIII	AIR SUPPORT/DEFENSE	22
IX	MEDICAL/DENTAL.	2324
x	CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE	25



SECTION I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

SECTION I

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF

Commanding Officer

Ltcol Jack Westerman

STAFF ASSIGNMENTS

		# >====================================	
	Maj.	R. S. SUTTER	Executive Officer
	Capt.	B. F. ENNIS	S-1
	SSgt.	R. J. HARWORTH	5-2
	Maj.	E. H. BOYD	S-3
	Lt.	J. L. ZEIHER	S-4
		UNIT OT MANDERS	
	Capt,	R. E. ODROCRAN	Company A
	Capt,	K. R. RANSEY	Company B
	Capt.	R. D. KULLY	Company G
	Lt,	1. E. 19U.	Company D
	Capt.	P. MORGEAU Jr.	Has Company
,	•	AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH	

Officers			listed
Na vy	Marine Corps	Navy	Marine Curps
3	13	51	1098

BLT 1/4 with task organization as follows:

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

LtCol JACK WESTERNAN

Squad; Sniper Platoon, Eq. Co, RLT-26

Det, Hq Co, 4th Marines (Madic Relay)

Det, Hq Co, 9th MAB (ISO Team)

Det, Comm Spt Co, 9th M/O (Radio Relay)

Det, Hq Co, 3rd Mar Div

Det, Disbursing Section

Det, Postal Section

Battery C (Redn), 3rd Dm, 12th Marines

107mm Mortar Bury, 3rd St., 12th Marines

4th Plat (Rein), to D, 1 th Ambrack Bn.

2nd Flat (Rvin), Co B, 3rd AT Fn.

1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd Tk En.

4th Plat (Rein), Co B, and Eng Bn.

2nd Plat, Oo A, 3rd Recom Etc.

C&C Plat, Co D, 3rd Med Ec.

Det, 15th Dental Co

Navy

8

LSU

Det, 3rd Serv Bn, (FLSG-B)

1st Plat (Redn), Co A, 3rd SP Bn

1st Plat (Redn), Co C, 3rd MT Bn

TOTAL STRENGTH

Lt. HUMPHRIES

Capt. KIRLAND

Capt. SIKES

Lt. SULLIVAN

Lt. RICHARDSON

Lt. BERNARD

Lt. ELBER

GySgt MEYERS

Lt. DAVIS

Lt. MAY

Lt. WOODS

Lt. SUMMA

Lt. DUPRE

Marine Corps

67

Officers

Navy

Bhlisted

Marine Corps


91

1633

UNCLASSIFIE

2.

SECTION II
PERSONNEL / AUMINISTRATION



UNCLASSIFIE

PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION

SECTION II

A. Summary

On 1 February 1967, the USS TWO JIMA (LPH-2), departed Keelung, Taiman and sailed for Subic Bay. Prilippine Islands with the Headquarters and "A" and "B" Companies of Battalion Landing Team 1/4 aboard. Arriving in Subject Bay on the morning of 3 February 1967, the USS IWO JIMA joined the other ships of the Amphibious Ready Group, the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-2), on which the remainder of Battalion Landing Team 1/4 was embarked and a mehewrsal was conducted for the training exercise Operation Mudpuppy III. During the afternoon of 3 February 1967, all three shops with Pathalion Landing Team 1/4 aboard, sailed for the Island of Mindoro. On the morning of 4 February 1967, Operation Mudpuppy III commenced with elements of Battalion Banding Team 1/4 landing by surface means and helicopters on the island of Mindoro in the Philippine Island chain. Operation Mudpuppy III terminated on the morning of 6 February 1967 and the Battalion Landing Team backloaded aboard the same ships to return to Subic Bay. Arriving in Subic Bay the morning of 7 February, the Battallion Landing Team held a critique of the training exercise and immediately began planning for the upcoming Special Operations. All personnel were given the opportunity to go ashore for liberty during their stay in Subic Bay. At approximately 0000 on 12 February, all ships of the Amphibious Ready Group, with Pattalien Landing Team 1/4 aboard, sailed for the Republic of Vietnam to conduct Special Operations. On the morning of 16 February 1967, after a twenty-four hour delay due to inclement. weather, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 executed an amphibious landing and vertical assault in the vicinity of Sa Huynh, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, designated as Operation Deckhouse VI. On 26 February 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 reembarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group ships. On 27 February 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 made a second amphibious landing and vertical assault into the Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam, as a part of the multi-battalion operation which combined Operation Desoto and Operation Deckhouse VI Phase II. This operation continued through the end of this reporting period.

B. Significant Events

On 1 February 1967, the USS IWO JIMA with the Headquarters and "A" and "B" Companies of the Battalion Landing Team 1/4 aboard, departed Keelung, Taiwan, for Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.

On the morning of 3 February 1967, the USS IND JIMA arrived at Subic Bay and the Battalion Landing Team commuted a rehearsal for the training exercise, Operation MudPuppy III.

On 4 February 1967 Battalion Landing Team 1/4 commenced the training exercise, Operation MudPuppy III on the island of Mindoro.

On 6 February 1967 Operation MudPuppy INI was terminated and Battalion Landing Team 1/4 returned to Sublo Bay aboard the Amphibious Ready Group Ships.

On 12 February 1967, Battalden Landing Team 1/4 departed Subic Bay for Special Operations in the Republic of Vietnam.

On 16 February 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 made an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Sa Huynh, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.

Cn 26 February 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 again conducted an amphibious landing as part of a multi-battalion operation in the Duc Pho District, Quang Mgan Province, Republic of Vietnam, commencing Operation Deckhouse VI Fhase II.

c. Problem Areas/New Developments

- 1. It is significant to note that the total claims submitted against the United States Marine Corps by the inhabitants of Mindore for Operation MudPuppy III was six dollars.
- 2. During the reporting policid, 1-28 February 1967, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 joined three (3) new officers to fill the billet of Forward Air Controller. However, only one (1) was permanently assigned and remained with the Battalion Landing Team for the operations. The Shortages in MOS OUA1 continues with seven (7) needed to bring Battalion Landing Team 1/4 up to Manning Level in that MOS.
- 3. During the period that operations were conducted ashore, the Battalion's administrative section was divided with one element deploying ashore and the other operating aboard ship.

D. Personnel

1. Monthly Strength (average chargeable)

	USMC OFF ENL	<u>USN</u> OFF ENL
Battalion	43 1098	3 51
BLT	67 1633	8 91

2. Losses

	USMC	USN	
	OFF FAT	OFF	ENL
Battle	0 🅉	0	0
Non-Batble	0 0	Or	0
Administrative	0.26	0	0
Total	0 .03	0	0

3. Joined

- 4. Awards No awards were presented during the reporting period
- E. Discopling Courts-Martial, Non-Judicial Punishments
- 1. Discipline during the reporting period was excellent as evidenced by the following information:
 - a. Courts Marrial.

Awarded:

Summary - None Special - None

Compilet ed:

Summary - None Special - None

b. Non-Judicial Punishments

Battalion Commander: None Company Commander: Seven (7)

F. Morale, PX. Postal Affairs, Liberty, Rev

Morale continues to be excellent. All personnel enjoyed the maximum liberty possible contingent with the work required while in Subic Bay. The Exchange and Recreational facilities of the Naval Station were available while in Subic Bay as well as those facilities on the ships. Although some difficulty was experienced with the mail delivery immediately after the arrival of the Battalion Landing Team in the Republic of Vietnam, the mail did eatch up and mail deliveries were made throughout the operation.

G. Chaplain's Activities

During the past month Chaplain ALMASY has participated in every landing, arriving usually with the second wave. The Chaplain's main area of operation was the CP group, working closely with the BAS. Protestant and Catholic services were possible every Sunday at the CP position. Due to enemy fire, the services at perimeter positions were geverely limited. Aboard ship, services were held almost daily. Some 57 personnel were counselled.

SECTION III

INTRLIGENCE

The same of

INTELLIGENCE

SECT1 :

A. General. During the reporting period the Battalion was the Landing Force Element of the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force, with Headquarters embarked aboard the USS IWO Jima.


Between 4 and 6 February, the BIT took part in Exercise Mud Puppy III. During this period all personnel in the S-2 section participated in the training exercise.

On 13 February, the S-2 section began preparation of the Intelligence Annex to Operation Order 2-67 (Deckhouse VI).

On 16 February, the Pattalion Landing Team commenced "Operation Deckhouse VI - Phase I", in Duc Pho District, Quang Ngai Province, Southern I Corps. On 26 February, at approximately 1200, "Deckhouse VI - Phase I" terminated.

B. Re	ecapitulation of enemy activity for "Deckhouse View	hans T and Tologh97_20\
1.	VC initiated 62	Phase II (27-28 Feb)
2.	USMC initiated 56	11
3.	Total incidents 118	32
4.	VC XIA (conf) 204	77
5.	VC KIA (prob) 395	113
6.	VCC 1	0
7.	VCS 50	20
8.	Weapons captured or destroyed 12	2
9•	Supplies destroyed 20 (Tons)	5 (Tons)
10.	Fortifications destroyed(incl.bunkers) 167	145
11.	Fest of tunnels destroyed	0
12.	Punji traps destroyed 33	0
13.	Booby traps destroyed 84	0
14,	Caves destroyed 10	0
15.	ChiCom grenades destroyed 68	11

On 27 February, at approximately 0800 hours, the Battalion Landing Team commenced Operation "Deckhouse VI - Phase II", approximately 10 kilometers north of Phase I operating area. The Battalion Landing Team was still actively engaged in Phase II of "Deckhouse VI" at the end of the reporting period.



- 1. Enemy Strength and Situation Prior to Phase I.
- a. Enemy Situation. The area of operations was classified as a major resupply and rest area for the VJ. Insurgent forces committed in the area of operation for Phase I were identified as follows:
 - (1) 7th Bn, 22nd NVA regt, 3rd MVA Div. Strength 350
 - (2) Sth Br., 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div. Strength 250
 - (3) Elements of the 409th Sapper Bn. Strength Unknown
- b. Enemy Capabilities. To was anticipated that the enemy would awaid heart normally making maximum use of darkness to exfiltrate the area. He was expected to mine landing zones and avenues of approach in and near his installations and facilities. It was determined that it would be unlikely that he would defend or attack in any strength because to do so he would have to mass and move his troops, exposing them to friendly supporting arms and aerial observation.
- 2. <u>From Strength and Situation</u> During Phase I. During the first phase of the operation, Total Force units up to platoon level were encountered. Heavy sniper fire was received by Marines throughout phase I. The enemy appeared to be deployed in delaying or defensive positions and would expend numerous rounds of small arms and automatic weapons when contact with Marines was inevitable. There were no incidents where Marines received enemy fire from crew-served weapons during the first phase of the operation.

Several enemy documents were captured, but there were no units identified in any of the captured documents or from any other intelligence sources.

There were two significant items of intelligence value gained during phase I. One, throughout the operation the enemy continually displayed the tactic of immediate removal of weapons from his casualties thereby limiting the number of captured weapons to a disappropriate number in comparison to the casualties he suffered. Two, on many occasions Marines encountered primitive and hastily constructed runji pits, surprise firing devices, and mines. On one occasion several tail fin assemblies were located, and it was determined that these fin assemblies were possibly crude mortar tubes. In conclusion the enemy was considered poorly equipped and utilized "home made" armament.

- 3. Topography and Climate.
 - a. Terrain, Cover and Concealment.
- (1) Terrain. The turnam encountered consisted of populated hamlets, rice paddies, moderately dense jungle in rugged hills, with intermittent streams throughout.

- (2) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment was afforded the enemy in populated areas, not only y the use of man-made of jects, but also by intermingling with the local populace. Cover and concealment was predominant in the rugged hills as provided by dense undergrowth.
 - b. Obstacles and Critical Terrain Features.
- (1) Obstacles. The principal obstacles to foot and vehicular movement were the rugged hills, vegetation, and numerous streams.
 - (2) Critical Terrain Features.
- (a) Phase I. Objectives 1, 3, and 5 were critical terrain features during phase I. Objectives 1 and 3 overlooked avenues of approach and suspected energy routes of infiltration/exfiltration. Objectives 1 and 3 ordered good observation and added to the successful utilization of supporting arms. Objective 5 was occupied during phase I because it afforded good observation of Green Beach. In addition hills #49 (BSE93294) and 25 (BSE98306) provided good observation and vantage points for the use of supporting arms. Hill #25 was of particular importance as it provided excellent observation and security for both the BIT CP and adjacent Landing Zones/beach.
- (b) There were no critical terrain features encountered during Phase II within the Battalian TAGR.
 - c. Observation and Avenues of Approach.
- (1) Coastal plain. Observation and fields of fire in rice paddies was good to poor. Restrictions on observation included tree stands, ditches, and the height of the rice plant. Avenues of approach included National Highway #1 and small trafficable streams.
- (2) Hills. For the most part, the vegetation on the hills was discontinuous canopied forest with dense undergrowth which afforded observation which was at best 5 meters. The scattered areas of continuous canopied forests, with light to moderate undergrowth, offered observation up to a maximum of 30 meters.
 - d. Weather.
- (1) Precipitation. Scattered light rain showers, mostly in the early morning and late afternoon, occurred during the time period of the operation.
- (2) Visibility. Visibility was purestricted except during the periods of early morning fog and rain showers when it was reduced to approximately 3 to 5 miles.

(3) Temperature. Temperatures in the operating area ranged from a 60° minimum to an 85° maximum.

SECTION IV
OPERATION /TRAINING

OPERATIONS / TRAINING

SECTION IV

A. MISSION. During the month of February 1967 the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines continued its assignment as the Special Landing Force, OPCON to CTG 79.5. During this period missions assigned were as follows:

1 - 3 February 3 February

Planning for exercise MUD PUPPY III.

PHONE TELEPINE

4 - 6 February 7 - 14 February MUD PUPPI III, MINDORO, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Preparation for Special Operations.

16 - 25 February

DECHOUSE VI. Phase I southern QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

REPUBLIC OF VIEINAM.

27 - 28 February

COMMINDE VI, Frame II control. QUANG NGAI PROVIDERS,

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS / ACTIVITIES

The Battalion Landing Team spent the period embarked on board ships of the Amphibious Ready Group. The BLT Headquarters was located on board LFH-2, USS IND JIMA.

On 1 February 1967, the USS IWO JIMA departed KARLING, enroute to SUMIC BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. On 3 February, at SUBIC BAY, a rehearsal landing was conducted for exercise MUD PUPPY III.

MUD PUPPY III was a training exercise conducted in MINDOKO,

PHRIPPING INLESS which began on 4 February. It was designed to
test the but landing plan, conduct KIVEKINE type tactics in a
RIVEKINE environment and to test communications, helicopter operation
and small toat tactics in preparation for future tactical operations
in the REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

The terrain in MINICRO area selected for MUD PUPPY III was similar to the delta area of RIM. Companies C and D had an opportunity to use landing craft and plastic assault boats to conduct River patrols and test small boat tactics. The size of the maneuver area did not lend itself to tactical employment of the BLT as a whole. The small beach area became crowded by the time Battery "G", Mortar Battery, Shore Party and the BLT Command Post were established ashore.

Party and the BLT Command Post were established ashore.

During this exercise the 105mm Howitz are from Battery "G" were
landed in LVI's in a turn-a-round after landing Company C. This method
proved to be unstisfactory due to the time factor involved getting the
battery ashore.

On the morning of 6 February, MUD PUPPY III was terminated and the BLT backloaded aboard ARG shipping and sailed for an up-keep period at SUBIC BAY. Minor discrepancies in the loading plan were corrected at SUBIC BAY with little difficulty.

During the period 7 - 12 February, the PLT commenced preparation for Special Operations in a VN while at SUBIC PAY.

On 11 February, the HLT received the target area for DECHOUSE VI and began preparation of Operation Order 2-57. On 12 February, ANG shipping sailed for the landing area with tentative D-Day of 15 February and H-Hour 0830H.

On D-Day, H-Hour was delayed until 0930H because of low ceiling and rough seas. The operation may have been compromised at this time as a result of a communication failure between the Command Ship USS IND JIMA and the USS THOMASTON LOW-2 and the Cruiser USS PROVIDENCE. The USS PROVIDENCE commenced preparatory fires at 0730H as scheduled and had fired 5 rounds before the mistake was realized. The USS THOMASTON steamed toward her designated enchorage and was in sight of the Landing Beach before the mistake was realized. D-Day was cancelled and redesignated as 16 February in hopes of more favorable weather.

DECKHOUSE VI Phase I

At E-Hour 0900H on D-Day 16 February, HLT 1/4 began landing by helicopter and surface crait over Deach HLE and in Landing Zone ROHIN. Company A landing in LZ FARROT secured objective 1 by 1200H. Company B landing in LZ FARROT secured objective 3 by 1300H. By 1100H Company C landing over HAUE beach had seized objective 2. Company A received sporadic sniper fire as the first wave entered LZ ROBIN. No casualties were sustained. No other units received fire during the landing phase. Company C moved to objective 2 and provided security for HAUE Beach until security elements from H & S Company was ashore at approximately 1400H. Recom platoon landed on the beach north of objective 4 at 1205H to block exhibitration from the AOA and conduct survey lances of the northern approaches to the objective area.

At 161310H Company C customed the first KIA of this operation when an attached super detonated a range at BS 922225.

All units received energies sniper fire during the first day of operations in saizing the translations in saizing the translations.

At 1616004 CTG 79.5 Frag train #2 was received directing the BLT to continue the attack on 17 Fobruary and seize objectives 4 and 5. Company B was designated as Landing Force reserve and was given the mission protocting the handing Force South and Southwest flank.

The night of 16 February passed without any significant contact although Company C sighted approximately 25 VC in a village at 85 91226 at 1745H and colled an artillery mission. Search of the area revealed 10 VC/KIA (conf) and an estimated 5 VC/KIA (prob). Sporadic sniper fire continued through the early hours of carkness on R. Lay.

At 1706302. NGF began preparatory fire on objective 4 in preparation for landing Company D by helicopter. By 10391, Company D was ashore and moving toward the high ground on objective 4. Company A moved to blocking positions between objective 1 and 4 to prevent exfiltration from objective 4 while Company D was conducting a sweep of that area. Company C began patrolling north of objective 2 along highway #1 and immediately began receiving sniper fire from the village on the left of the road. Company C conducted deep patrols south and west of objective 3 finding caves, tunnels and caches of supplies. All were destroyed.

At 171800H, STG. 79. 5 Frag Order 33 directed SkD operations in the salt flats area north of objects, va 1. Company A was directed to move north along Highway #1 on 18 February to hill near 35 893274 and conduct

SkD operations in that area. Company D was directed to conduct SkD operations South to objective 5 and then return to objective 4 on 18 February. Companies B and C would continue ScD operations on objectives 2 and 3. Companies would place emphasis in the area between objectives 1 and 2. The night of 17 February passed with only scattered incidents of light VC contact.

At. 1808151, representatives from Army Special Forces visited the BLT Commend Post to establish liaison prior to moving a CLIG Team into the area of objective 4 for the purpose of establishing a Special

Forces CIDG Cemp.

At 180900H, Recon platoon arrived at the BLT Command Post from objective 4 and was given the mission to conduct route reconnaissance of route#1 north to objective 1. A section of Ontos would be attached and engineers to destroy roadblocks. Upon leaving the perimeter of Company C the elements began receiving S/A fire from caves and villages on the left side of route #1 and south of objective 1. Gunships on station, ontos and artillery fire destroyed caves and silenced sniper fire. A number of road blocks were encountered and destroyed resulting in allow movement. It became necessary to stop, establish defensive positions and be resupplied with demolition materials some 500 yards short of objective 1. Their mission was resumed on 19 February after destroying the remaining roadblock and they continued to objective 1 without further incident. This area between objective 1 and 2 was the source of the majority of enemy contact during the period 16-20 February.

Company D made continuous contact with VC emipers and small enemy groups throughout the period 17-23 February. Company D remained on objective 4 until 23 February to provide security for the CIDG team preparing to move into that area. When searching the village around objective 4, only old men, women and children were present as which

was the case with the majority of the villages in the WW

Company A on hill at BS 893274 made solid contact with VC elements upon arrival on 18 February. Villages around base of hill were a source of continuous sniper fire and other VC activities.

Company B continued deep matrols in the vicinity of objective 3

continuously destroying burners, tunnels and supply caches.

On 20 February, elements of Company C moved by helicopter to MED Beach, BS 868366, and established security for the ELT Command Post. The remainder of Company C stayed at HLUE Beach. Company B began movement by foot to Landing Force objective 4. By late afternoon 20 February, BLUE Beach was vacated and all elements were relocated at hED Beach.

At 210001H, Task Force X-Ray assumed OPCON of the SLF and it was made a part of Operation DESOTO being conducted on the north side of

Route #1 boardering the present HLT TAOR.

Company C began S& D operations southwest from MED Beach along the peninsula to BS 915279. Numerous punji pits, trenches and bunkers were located throughout this area and destroyed. Sniper fire was continuous throughout the period 21-26 February. The mortar battery on MED Beach sustained 1 WIA on 21 February from sniper fire. The tactics used by the VC sniper in this area was to fire at patrols and change their position to encourage the patrols to follow in pursuit, leading them into A killing zone where several other snipers would concentrate their fire on one portion of the patrol. Tanks and ontos were utilized by Company C during SED operations around MED Beach with good effect.

Recon Platoon was inserted on Hill 215 at BS 865291 to conduct surveillance of the valley area to the northwest and ahead of Company B moving kusud objective 4.

Company A moved to Hill M, at BS 3929 and sustained 3 WIA's from the surprise firing devices in that area. Company A spent the majority of the afternoon of 2! February clearing Hill 49 of the devices. From this location Company A could observe snipers firing from the base of Hill 49 at elements of Company C sweeping the area near BS 896296. Artillery and mortar missions were directed against these enemy elements with good effect. On the night of 2! Feb, a Company A ambush at BS 886292 encountered 30 VC moving north along route #1. The ambush killed 12 VC and captured one Thompson Sub Machine Gun. This was the largest single unit to be encountered in an arbush in the phase of DECKHOUSE VI.


On 22 February, CTG 79.5 Frag Order #8 was received, directing the attack and seisure of objectives 2 and 3 on 23 February. Hat Frag Order #7 directed Company A to move to Hill 105 (GS BS 8730) and conduct Search and Pestroy operations. Company B moved to objective 2 in the vicinity BS 822293. Company D was to be halicopter lifted to objective 3 at BS 802311 and conduct Search and Destroy operations in that vicinity.

Cn 23 February, Recon Platoon was extracted from Hill 215 and reinserted on Objective 4 prior to Company B leaving the position. Company B discovered a VC supply installation at B5 845291, while moving to objective 2, containing cloth, clothes, nedical supplies and food.

On 24 February, Companies 5 and D began a coordinated Search and Destroy operation from objectives 2 and 3 northeast of route #1. Recon platoon with attached sniper team observed their approach from atop objective 4. Contact was much lighter than expected in this area and both Companies were established near the railroad south of route one by late afternoon. On 24 Feb CTG 79.5 Frag Order #10 was received directing one Company to return to the LPH-2 beginning OCOO the next day. This was later changed to two companies. ELT Frag Order #9 directed Company D to provide security for the extraction of Company B from their present of Company A, and move to EED Seath and assist Company C with beach defence on the night of 25 February.

The extraction of Company B was accomplished without incident. Company A began movement from Hill 105 to their IZ. Company B while moving to security positions around Company A's IZ came under intense automatic weapons fire from village near BS 875313. This action lasted for approximately two hours. It was believed that approximately one platoon of WC were following Company A to their IZ to engage the helicopters entering and leaving the IZ. The appearence of Company B, from the northwest unexpectedly, trapped the VC between the two Companies. The first helicopter into the IZ did receive S/A fire resulting in an injury to the pilot. After extraction of Company A, Company D began movement toward of RED BEACH. While crossing a rice paddy area approximately 1000 yds west of RED BEACH, Company D came under an intensive cross fire from automatic weapons. Artillery and air were used to destroy these memy positions and the company arrived in the Company C perimeter at dusk.

GTG 79.5 Frag Order #11 directed the BLT to conduct a tactical withdrawal from RED BEACH on 25 February and prepare to land again on 27 February approximately 10 kilometers fundor north to begin Phase II of



14 6702

Company D returned to the USS VANCOUVER early on 26 February by landing craft. Company C provided security for the withdrawal. Delay in extraction of a downed helicopter on RED BEACH caused elements of Company C to remain on the beach until approximately 1700H. Aside from this incident the withdrawal could have been completed by 1400H. The BLT spent much of the might of 20 February preparing to make another landing at 0830H 27 February 1967.

DECKHOUSE VI Phase II

Fourteen and one half hours after the tactical withdrawal from HED Beachwas completed, the BLT began landing over GREN Beach and in LZ BAT

to begin Phase II of DECKHOUSE VI. (H-hour 270330H February)

Company A received heavy automatic weapons fire as the first wave landed in LZ BAT. Four of the six helicopters were hit by S/A fire. One helicopter received four hits while still airborne sustaining 3 WIA's and returned without landing to the LPH. All other waves landed on GREEN Beach which had been secured by Company C with only sparodic smiper fire. These elements of Company A linked up with those already in LZ BAT and began moving to the right flank of the ZOA. Due to the heavy fire received in LZ BAT Company B was directed to land on GREEN Beach instead of LZ BIZZARD, the company then moved to the left side of the ZOA and established contact with Company A in preparation for a coordinated sweep to Phase Line ALPHA. They did not reach Phase Line ALPHA until midmorning on 28 February.

Recon platoon was inserted at is 802494 to conduct surveillance of the northern approaches to the TAOR. Company D was landed on the afternoon of 27 February and placed in the vicinity of BS 794485 to conduct Search and Destroy operations along the northern boundary and prevent infiltration into areas behind Companies A and B. Company C again maintained the

perimeter around the Boach Area.

After Companies A and B reached Phase Line ALPHA, resistance subsided to sparodic sniper fire and occasional VC encounters in small groups. Company received 2 rounds 82mm and 12 rounds 60mm Mortar fire while in the area between Phase Line ALPHA and BRAVO. The ELT continued Phase II of the operation until its termination on 3 March 1967.

C. Training.

1. Other than MUD PUPPY III the training during February consisted of one Fam fire period prior to leaving SUEIC BAY on 11 February. M-16 rifles, M-60 Machine gun and 60mm Mortars were fixed during this time.

2. Individual classes were held aboard ship on First Aid, weapons and tactics when time permitted. Attached units conducted maintainance on major items of equipment during the preparation for Special Operations in RVN. The remainder of February the HLT was engaged in combat.

SECTION V

LOGISTICS



LOGISTICS

- 1. LOGISTICAL SITUATION. During the first half of February, the BLT was embarked aboard shipping and made stops at KEELUNG, TAIWAN and, SUBIC BAY, Republic of the Philipines. On 4 February, the BLT commenced EXERCISE MUD PUPPY III in the MINDCRA area of the Philipine Islands. After completion of this exercise the BLT then proceeded aboard assigned shipping to the Republic of South Vietnam. On 15 February, OPERATION DECKHOUSE VI was scheduled to commence, however, due to high surf and inclimate weather the operation was postponed until the next day. On 16 February, DECKHOUSE VI commenced with the BLT landing at SA HUYNH, SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.
- 2. SUPPLY. 316 tons of resupply were delivered by helicopter and landing craft during the period 16 28 February 1967.
- a. Class I. 39,000 Heals, Combat, Individual and 11,000 gallons of water was distributed during the period of operations. The rations were supplemented by at least one hot meal of "Alpha" rations daily to all units deployed in the field.
- b. Class II. Class II supplies were issued as appropriate. This mainly consisted of insect repellent, batteries and communication wire.
- c. Class III. Twenty-three cases of rifle oil (4 ounce cans) and 1510 gallons of MOCAS and 600 gallons of DIESEL FUEL were expended during the reporting period.
 - d. Class IV. Class IV supplies were issued as appropriate.
- e. Class V. During the reporting period Class V was issued in the amounts listed below:

DODAC	NGÆNCLATURE	EX PENDED
A124	Ctg, 7.62mm, Tracer	12,280 rounds
Λ127	Ctg, 7.52mm, Link	40,800 rounds
A130	Ctg, 7.62mm, Boll	81,480 rounds
A209	Ctg, .30 Cal. Link	12,000 rounds
A4 75	Ctg, .45 Col. Ball	8,000 rounds
A574	Ctg, .50 Cal. Spot-Trac	832 rounds
A576	Ctg, .50 Cal. Link	6,200 rounds
B568	Ctg, 40m, HE	1,650 rounds
E626	Ctg, 60m, HE	610 rounds
B627	Ctg, 60nm, Illum	56 rounds
C555	Ctg, 81mm, HE	2,646 rounds
0226	Cig, 81mm, Illum	393 rounds
C234	Ctg, 81ma, WP	108 rounds
C262	Ctg, 90mi, Cannister	20 rounds
C266	Ctg, 90mm, HE	20 rounds
C444	Ctg, 105mm, HE	2,140 rounds
C448	Ctg, 105mm, HEP-T	172 rounds
C449	Ctg, 105mm, Ellus	104 rounds
C452	Ctg, 105mm, HC	168 rounds
C454	Ctg, 105mm, WP	76 rounds
C650	Ctg, 106mm, HEAT	408 rounds
-	15.	(

C651	Ctg, 106mm, HEPT	312	rounds
C704	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, HE	-	rounds
.¢706	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, Illum	-	rounds
C708	Ctg, 4.2" Mortar, WP		rounds
G890	Grenode, Hand, Frag	5,750	
G895	Grenade, Hand, Illum		each
G900	Grenade, Hand, Incind.	•	each
G924	Grenade, Hand, Riot, CS1		each
G935	Grenade, Hand, Smoke		each
G940	Grenade, Smoke, Green		each
G945	Grenade, Smoke, Yellow		each
G950	Grennde, Snoke, Red	_ `	each
H030	Grenade, Rifle, WP	•	each
11555	Rocket, 66mm(LAAW)		rounds
H600	Rocket, 3.5" HAT	•	rounds
11602	Rocket, 3.5" WP	_ '	rounds
K143	Mine, AP, M18A1	180	each
IJ311	Signal, Illum, RSP	80	each
L312	Signal, Illun, WSP	278	each
L314	Signal, Illum, GSC	152	each
L325	Signal, Illun, GSC	•	each
L 495	Flare, Surface, Trip	104	each
M030	Charge, Demo 1 lb. block	200	each
M037	Charge, Deno, C-2/5/4	840	pounds
Ii131	Blusting Cap, Mon-elec	500	each
1455	Cord, Det, Prima	9,500	feet
11670	Fuze, Blasting, Time		feet
1412	Fuze, Proximity, 11513		each
		•	

- (1) The above listed expenditures are resupply figures which were issued in addition to the Basic Allowance (B/A).
- (2) Expenditure rates of ammunition as set forth in CMC ltr AC4F-neb of 13 June 1966 (Vietnam Ground Ammunition Expenditure Rates) proved to be unrealistic. Fifteen DOA of C-499 (105mm, Illum) was exhausted in less than three days, C-940, G-945, and G-950 (Grenade, Hand, Smoke) were nearly exhausted in the same period of time. Further the replenishment factor of B-568 (Ctg, 40mm, HE) as listed in the aforementioned letter, 2.4 rounds per launcher per day also proved to be unrealistic.
- 3. HCSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION. See Section IX.
- 4. TRAISPORTATION. During the first day of DECKHOUSE VI, troops were transported ashore by means of both helicopter and landing craft. After the initial landing the majority of the transportation required for resumply was handled by helicopter. LIWCs (mules) were used at the beach area for transporting supplies and equipment to units deployed nearby.
- 5. MISCELLANEOUS. During the period 16-23 February resupply to units ashore was conducted from assigned shipping, which consisted of the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), USO VANCOUVER (LFD-2), and USS THOMASTON (LSD-28). On 24 February, a Logistic Support area (LSA) was established at MUI DANG and resupply was conducted from that area. Shortages of C-704 (Ctg. 4.2" Mortar, HE) and water at the LSA existed therefore it was necessary for these items to be resupplied from assigned shipping.

o. On 26 February, Phase I, DECKHOUSE VI terminated and Phase II went into operation on 27 hebruary. Phase II took place in DUC PHO District, QUAC NYAL ECCNIENCE.

SECTION VI
COMMUNICATIONS / FLECTRONICS

į

COMMUNICATION-FLECTRONICS

SECTION VI

- 1. General. February 1967 was occupied by preparation for and the conduct of Operation MUDPUPPY III and SPECOPS, Operation DECKHOUSE VI. The Communication Platton was embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA from 1 to 15 February 1967. Seven personnel were embarked on board the USS VANCOUVER. DECKHOUSE VI operations commenced on Day 16 February 1967, at which time the bulk of the platoon landed. Personnel from the Message Center section and Maintenance section remained on board the IWO JIMA throughout the operation. DECKHOUSE VI continued through the remainder of February 1967.
- 2. Operations. MUDPUPPY III was conducted during the period 4-6
 February 1967. This operation served to test the organization of
 communications to support impending SPECCPS. Planned communications
 proved generally satisfactory and only minor changes in net structure
 were required.
- a. Communications were satisfactory during all phases of DECKNOUSE VI. The only noveworthy problem emountered was interference on radio nets. Mutual interference was experienced due to insufficient separation of assigned frequencies and some unintentional interference was caused by commercial stations. Additional frequencies provided by the SLF, and cooperation between elements of BLT, SLF and TASK FORCE XRAY, eliminated these problems.
- b. Internal battalion radio communications were normal during all phases of operations ashore. The additional requirement for AN/FRC-25 radios somewhat taxed battalion resources. During movement of the BLT CP minsteen of twenty one radios available to the BLT headquarters were in was. This included two radios used by TACLCG and one checked out to the ANTRAC Flatoon. Equipment failure was minimal however, and no problems were encountered. Eadio communications between the BLT and SLF were satisfactory throughout operations.
- c. Integrated Wire/Radio circuits provided a major part of the communications between BLT and SLF. The ship-to-shore link, using the AN/NRC-62 ashore, was established on D-Day and greatly reduced traffic volume on radio circuits. Down time on the circuit was negligible. A second AN/MRC-62 shot from the BLT to 3rd Battalion 7th Marines was established on 20 February 1967 and operated until the BLF backloaded on 26 February 1967. No difficulties were encountered on this circuit. An AN/TRC-27 shot between the BLT and 3rd Battalion 7th Marines was unsuccessful. Intervening terrain prevented successful operation of this shot.

- d. KY-8 covered operation was attempted between the BLT ashore and the SLF. After initial failure the KY-8 and inter-connecting cables were evacuated to the ship and tested. No defeats could be found, nevertheless the circuit could not be made operational. Subsequent damage to one AN/MRC-109 and down equipment precluded further attempts.
- e. Internal wire communications were normal during all operations.

 Local telephone service was established within the BLT CP ashore and to supporting units located within the CP perimeter. A total of eight endone-half niles of wire was used during SLF operations. Approximately five niles were salvaged.
- f. The BLT Message Center renained on board the IWO JIMA during operations ashore. Distribution and recovery of operational codes was conducted from the ship to the user. Message totals for the month were:

Classified

Incoming - 570 Outgoing - 43

Unclassified

Incoming - 623 Outgoing - 249

- 3. Equipment. Equipment failure during the month was minimal. Combat losses were exclusively accessory type items: primarily antennas, antenna bases and handsets for the AN/PRC-25. Replacement items were available in almost all cases where the item was unrepairable. Major equipment failures included:
 - 1 RT-524
 - 2 R-442
 - 1 AN/PRC-25

There has been no change in the status of T/E equipment shortages.

SECTION VII
ARTILLERY /NAVAL GUNFIRE

ARTILLERY /NAVAL GUNFIRE

SECTION VII

A. Artillery. From 1 February until 15 February, ELT 1/4 FSOC held training and prepared for the uncoming special operations. From 16 February until 26 February, FSCC particated in operation DECKHOUSE VI Phase I. FSCC was in operation DECKHOUSE VI Phase II on 27 February and 28 February. Battery "G" (-) (kein) 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and Mortar Battery 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines fired the following missions in support of BLT 1/4.

1. Type of Missions

Registration

A.	Unobserved	210
	H&I *s	210
	· PFE	18
	Counter Mortar	ó
B.	Observed Missions	
	Target's of Opportunity	39
	Illumination	11
	FO School	oʻ
	P	•

B. Naval Gunfire. During the period 16 February to 28 February 1967. The following ships provided Naval Gunfire Support.

USS CANBERRA	(CA 2)	8"/55	5"/38
USS PHOVIDENCE	(CA 2) (CLG 6)	6"/47	5"/38
USS HENRY B WILSON	(DDG 7)	511/54	7 7 30
USS DUNCAN	(DD 874)	5"/38	
USS CLARION RIVER	(LSMR LO9)	5" SSR	5"/38
USS WHITE RIVER	(LSMR 536)	5" SSR	511/38

Missions fired in support of HLT 1/4 were as follows:

Beach Prepartory	8
LZ Preparatory	, L
Area Neutralization	10
Destruction	24
H&I's	392
Illumination	2

C. 81mm Mortar Missions.

1.	Unobserved	
	FFE	
	H&I	
	Counter Mortar	

2.	0bserved	
	Targets of opportunity	27
	Registration	6 '
	FO School	Ö
	Ill.umination	12



SECTION VIII

Air support played a large part in battalion operations during this month. On 3 February archearcal for operation NUD PUPPY III was held and the operation itself commenced on the 4th. During this operation two rifle companies were helilifted during the initial assault and again during the withdrawal. Extensive use was made of helicopters for logistic purposes during the exercise and a total of 770 helicopter sorties were flown in support of BLT 1/4. Twenty-two air support and simulated TPQ missions were flown during the operation. The period from the completion of MUD PUPPY III on the 6th until the beginning of operation DECKHOUSE VI on the 16th was spent in preparation and movement to the amphibious objective area. Preparations included a close air strike exercise for the TACP's on the 8th during which 72 sumulated missions were flown during 12 sorties.

From 16 to 28 February, the BLT was engaged in operation DECKHOUSE WI. Extensive helicopter operations and fixed wing close air support typified air operations as reflected by the totals below. Air support proved flexible, effective and responsive to the needs of the BLT. During the assault phase of both landings and the withdrawal from Phase I two rifle companies and H&S Company were helilifted. Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines was flown ashore during Phase I. Fire suppression missions flown by UH1E's proved effective. Tactical Air Controllers (Airborne) were highly effective and were used to control many CAS missions. 158 tons of bombs, 387 rockets, 184 500 lb napalm tanks and over 23,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition were expended during CAS operations.

A. Air Support Report

1. Helicopters	
a. Resupply Missions flown	1998
b. Medical Exacuation Missions flown	111
c. Tactical (Includes Recon) missions flown d. Troop lift sorties	92
d. 1100p filt sorties	2177
2. Fixed Wing Transport	None
3. Close Air Support sorties flown (Fixed wing)	267
sorties flown (Rotary wing)	616
4. Aerial Observers missions flown	00
	92
b. Air Defense (Night defensive TPQ's)	
Missions Requested	200
Missions Flown	73
. 2	41
22.	

SECTION IX
MEDICAL /DENTAL

of the

MEDICAL/DENTAL AFFAIRS

SECTION IX

- 1. During the month of February, the sick bay facilities of the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), THE USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28), were utilized by BLT 1/4 personnel.
- 2. The USS IWO JIMA served as hospital ship during the operational period, $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$
- 3. There were 225 visits to routine sick call during the period 1 February through 15 February 1967; routine sick call was secured during Operation Deckhouse VI. There were 87 visits to dental sick call.
- 4. The only group of diseases encountered during this period in significant numbers were the venereal diseases. There was a total of 36 cases, divided into the following disease entities:

Gonorphea 31
Syphilia 1
Chapcroid 4
NSU 0

- 5. No cases of malaria, heat exhaustion or immersion foot were encountered during this month.
- 6. During Operation MUD PUPPY III, three minor casualties occurred, all of which were quickly returned to duty.
- 7. The following medical personnel were assigned to BLT 1/4 during both phases of Operation Deckhouse VI (February 16-28) and were allocated as follows:

Hespital Ship

General Surgeon
Orthopedic Surgeon
Anesthesiologist
General Medical Officers
Hospital Corpsman

Field

Forward Battalion Aid Station:

General Medical Officer Hospital Corpsman 1/4

23.



SECTION IX

Line Companies and attached units:

Hospital Corpsman

39

Six Hospital Corpsman were lost as combat casualties during the operation.

8. The following numbers of casualties were received aboard the Hospital Ship, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) during Operation Deckhouse VI.

Phase I (16 February - 26 February 1967)

	KIA	MIA	NCI
Marines	6	58	24
Navy	0	3	2
Viet Cong	0	1	0
Vietnamese Civ	3	1.6.	Ø
Total	ξ	105	26

Phase II (26 February - 28 February 1967)

Marines	KIA 2(1)	WIA (6)	NCI 3	(No of Marine casulties not	
Navy	0	4	2	members of BLE 1/4 who were	}
Viet Cong	0	i	0	processed)	_
Vietnamese Civ	0	6	3 (No	injury)	
Total	2	36	8	,	

9. The following numbers of Marines and Navy personnel were further transferred to other medical facilities for definitive surgery, convalescent care or for burial purposes.

Phase I		Phase]	
KIA WIA		KIA WIA	

10. Surgical procedures performed were as follows:

	Phase I	Phase II
Major General Surgical Procedures	58	21
Major Orthopedic Procedures	43	19
Minor Surgical Procedures	Ф	07

11. Whole blood utilization was as follows: (16 Feb - 3 March 1967)

	Phase I	Phase II
Units on hand	200	165
Fresh units drawn on board	44	100
Units Typed and Cross-matched	249	122
Units administered	79	90

SECTION X CIVIL AFFAIRS /PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE



CIVIL AFFAIRS / PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SECTION X

During the period of this report the Civil Affairs programs were entirely medical in nature. This medical assistance, (MED-CAP), concisted of a team which involed two medical doctors, one dentist and assisting corpsmen. On four occasions, MED CAP was put into action as the tactical situation permit-ed. The function of the team was as follows: It would be lifted into a Bre-arranged IZ usually near the village or locality where MED-CAP was to operate. It would be than meet a Maxine escort for security purposes and an interpreter to aid in communications with the civilians.

During Operation M&D PUPPY III a NED-CAP was conducted at MAC-IBA, CALAPAN, MINDORO. A total of 136 civilians were treated. Their attitude was friendly and greatful toward the MED-CAP team. All aspects of this MED CAP were made as reallistic as possible in order to prepare for Vietnamese operations which would be encountered during the forth coming. Special Operations.


Three separate MED-CAP's were conducted in coordination with Operation DECKHOUSE VI Phase I and Phase II. A total of 816 Vietnamese civilians were treated as a result of the program. The villages of THAC BY, vicinity of SA HUYNH, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, RVN was visited twice and CHI TRUNG 2, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE once.

Of the individuals seen approximately 20% were children the rest equally divided by adult male and females. The attitude of the treated civilians through out this assistance program was considered as non-hostile toward the Landing Force.

The Psychological Warfare Team was of considerable assistance during Operation DECKHOUSE VI. Their most noticable capacity was the relocation and control of indigenous personnel. The Vietnamese attitude was one of indifference although the majority cooperated.

Through the use of recordings and speakers, the Psychological Warfare
Team emphasized our desire to help the people. This method of indoctrination was used prior to MED-CAP activities.

The Psychological Warfare Team also assisted in Counter-Intelligence operations.



SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SECTION IV

OPERATIONS /TRAINING

Filed (1, Staff Inla)

Clobrad 12 Frag Order #1

Clobrad 2 Frag Order #1

(3) A/A Kpt, Op. SECKHOUSE VT, 16 Del 3 man 67

JOURNAL SHEET 34 NAMDIV 3821/3



010600H to 020600H Feb 1967

Thus our	NO.	DIG	Incidents, MSRS, Chors	action taken
800	1		USS INO JIMA Departed TAIWAN to continue on route to SUBIC BAY	Noted
	an Anna			
			Journal closed 020600H Feb 1967	
			-	
			~	·
				,

30 mail steet 30 maily 3821/3

020600H to 030600H Feb 1967

iliae Out	MO° IIº II	raic	incidents, 1050a, Changs	action taken
	1		USS IWO JIMA continues on route to SUBIC BAY	Noted
			Journal closed 030600H Feb 1967	
٠. هرن				
		selector emiror entre des		
	*			

030400H **★** 040600H

TD IN	OUT	NO.	DIG	Incidents, Macs, Orders	vēltīðu lakan
0700		1		BLT 1/4 prepares for Debarkation Drill By Helo's	NO TED
0800		2		Debarkation Drill Commenced	no t ed
1245		3		Che Howtar was Accidently Droped by Helo. fill Attempt to retreave it. Spot Marked by bony	io ted
1 700		Z ₄	•	Debarkation Drill inded	MOTE D
1 20 6		5		BLT 1/4 continues final prepartation for ELECTION MUD FUPPY III to be held from 04 Feb to 06 Feb 1967.	NO TED
\$.				Journal Closed 040600	
	i.		**		
		2	,		
			<u>.</u>		

EXERCISE MUDPUPPY III

			EXERCISE MUDPO	
TIME NOUT	nj⊪ No.	DIG	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION TAKEN
55	1		Wave 1 Departed	
300	2		lave 1 In the zone	
302	3		ave 1 on the Beach	
309	L,		Tave 2 on the Beach	
318	5		ave 3 on the Beach	
32 1	6		lave 4 on the Beach	1
1324	7		ave 5 on the Beach	
327 .	8		ave 6 on the Beach	
1329	ç,		ave 7 on the Beach	
331	10		Mave 3 on the Beach wesception of Equipment	
345	11	:	ave 9 requested to go into LZ	Went in
402	12		Tave 9 in EAGEL	
410	13		Mave 10 In zone	
415	14		Mave 11 on the Beach	
420	15		Tave 12 Loading off LPD	
435	16		Bn 00 has his CP set up on GUAIN BEACH 2	
430	17		ave 13 on Beach	
433	16		lave 14 on Beach	
<u>4</u> 40	193		Tave 15 on Beach	
450	20	<i>i</i>	Tave 16 on B eac h	
51 5	21		Comand Group A on Beach	
520	22		90: mand Group B on Beach	
1 545	23		I.C At his josition	
600	24	ł	3.4 Arrived at CF	1

040600 to 050600

611	25 26	105's Boarding LVT	
	26	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
1611		Wave 17 on the Beach	
1 1	27	Wave 18 on the Beach	
180d	28	Recon was activated	
181	29	Riverine Strong point established at coord. 124756 & 105633	
		THE FOLLOWING ENTRIES WERE ENTERED AFTER THE C.P WAS FORMED AT THE BEACH	
1512	1	First serial of Alpha Command Group ashore	
1 530	2	(Fr: Co A) At 041525H Co A patrol encountered 1 enemy sniper. Rec 10 rds s/a, Ret 5 rds s/a with 1 En KIA (conf) coord 126755.	
1622	3	(Fr: N.G.F. Team) N.G.F. mission called on coord 118771 Believed En Plat at this posit. Resul 10 En KIA (conf)	ts
1645	4	(Fr: Co C) Co. C pat encountered. 4 un/armed En at coord 119781 at 041405H. Friendly fired 11 rds s/a, 4 M-79 rds, 1 M-26 Grenade, with 4 enemy KIA (conf)	§
1650	5	(Fr: S-3) (To all Co Omdrs) All Co's DO NOT dig foxholes.	Acknowledged
1840	6	(Fr: Boat Group U.S.N) Boat Group report OPCON to BLT 1/4 for Riverine CPs	

JOURNAL SEEET JU WALLEY 3821/3

040600 to **05**0600

TEAE	IJп		:	
r our	NO.	DIG	INCIDENTS, MEAS, ORDERS	ANTHON TAKEN
1840	7.		(Fr: Co A) At 041715H. At coord 128757 2d Plat Co A Rec 25 rds s/a rds Fr 3 En. A2 Ret'd 10 rds s/a Captured 3 En.	
184	8		(Fr: Co A) Have River/Road control points at coords 124756 & 131751	
184	9		(Fr: Co D) Rec'd 3 rds s/a Er coord 097783 at 041630H. Friendly losated at coord 100782. Ret'd approx 50 rds s/a. FT checked area 2 En KIA (prob)	
1935	10	a de la companya de l	(Fr: 79.5) FragO #2 041700 - 051700H Feb 1) continue S&D Opns in assigned sector. 2) Established night defense Pos, amb, night Patrols, 3) one Artic Spin direct support HLT C.P at \$50730H Until sunset. 4) Submit Helo requirement no later than 042100H. 5) Submit H&I fires to SACC ASAP.	
2015	11		(Fr: Co D) Sit Rep #1 Secured LZ, estab 360% security estab 3PPB & River control points No Cas, 6 Helos landed incorrectly causing 1 hr delay in beginning assign Mission.	ed
2020	12		(Fr: 79.5) Your SF C/P will arrive Calpaw 051100N 79.5 will pick up & carry to LPH advictime HLT 1/4 Helo can pick up SFCPAT L	е
202	13		(To: 79.5) Advise this station when SFCP arrives station for Helo Pick up.	this
2030	14		(To All Units) Reminded MAX security & control of its of equip required. Pilferage fibba Loca inhab. can be expected. Unit Cods app all personnel of indiv responsibility safeguard and Maint of equip.	al .

040600 to 050600

TIN I N	(E OUT	"J" NO.	DIG	Thirthenine Mace Ophizes	ACTION TAKEN
LN	OUT	NU.	DIG	incidents, MSGS, order3	ACITON TAKAN
2030		15	042000	(Fr: Co C Sit Rep) 4 En/KIA conf. while prob our pos. called Arty fire no Fw Cas.	
2100		16	0422 2 0	(Fr: Co C Spot Report) J#1 Recfire Fm Approx 10 En. called Arty fire checked no energy location.	
· .	2 255	17		(To: Co A) At 051300H be relieved present mission By Co. B. Return to LPH. By Helo. On arrival assume Sparrow Hawk.	n
2255		18	042235	(Fr: 76.5) Auggressor unit at 115766.	Co. D. Notified & sent Plat to check are
	225	5 19		(To: Co B) At 051300H. Relieved Co A and assume mission. Attach Serial 221,232,233 Prior to Departure. LPH	
	2255	20		(To Co D) Ref J#18) Investagate and/or take enemy under fire you'se supporting arms if necesse	ry.
	2255	21		(To Co. D) Continue assigned mission, report all locactions.	
	2255	22		(To: Co. C) At 050600H. Conducted planned Rivers: Patrols. Report on Dismount & Return	.
0040		23		(Fr: Co D) Ref #20 Swept area, neg. results.	
0 <i>5</i> 0	5	24		(Fr: Co C) Spot Rep at 050445 at coord 129779 one M-14 #553012 Rifle was stolen by a local native. Search now being conducted will advise.	
0400	-	25		(Fr 79.5) Coordination of NGF and Arty to be passed ashore 042130H. Control & coord of air remains SACC will act as relay for all NGF missions.	

acometa sieet ka maadiv 3821/3

0506001 to 06060011

Page of the control					
, Trib	प्र ।	II, ii	1	EXERCISE MUD-PUP Ty III	
IN	our	NO.	i	incidents, MSGS, ordtas	action taken
0630	Í	1		(Fr: Arty Btry 3/16) Fired 48 rds prep fire into LZ robin.	s- 3
0650		2		(Fr Co. C) C-3 reached dest. Coord. 128758	Мар
065 5		3		(Fr Co. C) C-3 off-loaded ICVP's. Boats returning to IPH to await instruction	Hap S3
070 0	:	B		(Fr: Co. C) C-1 now departing for river Pat in River "A".	Нар
070 5		5		(Fr Recon) Recon landing in LZ Robin, Completed.	Мар
0900		6		(Fr Co. E) SIT REP: C-1 at coord 113774 at 050750H. Beat returning to mosth of Ariver was amb by En. Fire ret without beaching, 4 En/KIA (Prob)	
1000		7		(Fr Co. A) SPOT REPORT At 050825H at coord. 118771 A-2 unit ambushed En. Boat. En. fired 5 rds S/A. Marines ret 30 rds S/A, results 8 En/KIA, captured 3 AK-47 and 5 M-1 Carbines rifle.	
1004		8	050800	(Fr Co. D) SIT REP En. Amb sprung presetted No friendly cas. Captured 1 M-60 MG, 7-M-14. Con't mission as assigned.	
	1114	9	051110	(To: 79.5) Reg SPARROW HAWK insertion in IZ Robin Land IZ Robin sweep Nw along hiway to IZ Dove.	•
			051115	Established new C.P. at coord.	
1030		10		(Fr: Co. D) Rat . rec 5 rds S/A fire fr coord 105787. Ret S/A fire. En. cas unk. Con't mission.	

SOUTHARL SHEET 34 MARDIV 3821/3

050600H to 060600H Feb 1967

TIM N	E OUT	NO.	1/10	Incilents, MSGS, Onless	action taken
155		11		(Fr Co. C) Saw 2 En. running-fired 20 rds 7.62 at En. 2 En/KIA	
200		12		(Fr Co. A) SPOT REPORT A-2 pat encountered a Guerrilla Base Camp at coord 105787. Assaulted same. Rec 10 rds S/A fire, ret 30 rds S/A fi Con't on mission.	re.
1210		13		(Fr. Co. D) At 051150H engaged 3 En. En. captured plus one document at coord 117765.	ol.Vs
1230		14		(Fr Co. D) Pat PARTY LINE engaged one En. at coord 107770 at 050935H. Captured one En. and one AK-47 Rifle.	
1235		15		(Fr: Co. D) Pat PARTY LINE engaged 4 En. at coord 117750 at 051015H. All 4 En were captured, plus one Pack, 4 cartridge belts, one grenade and one document. One AK-47 rifle also captured.	
1300		16		(Fr Co. D) D-3 changed C.P. logation to coord 108776.	
1301		17		(Fr Co. D) While crossing open field rec'd 5 rds S/A. At 050750H at coord 107768 from coord 105767. Marines ret fire resulting in 12 EN/KIA.	
1310		18		(Fr Co. D) At 050835H at coord 108777 \$ 4 EN moved into D-3's position and fired 3rds S/A. Marines sqd surrounded and assaulted EN. Resulting in 4 EN/CARTURED. 2 M-14 rifles, 4 cartiges belts, 2 smoke grenades, 100 rds 7.62 ammo captured.	
1315		19		(Fr Co. D 3rd Plat) At 050815H at coord 108775. 1 VET and 81mm FO amb by 4 EN. Marines pulled out and called 81mm concentrations on same. Resulting in 1 EN/KIA.	

Janguas Chiet 31 Mardiv 3821/3

0.50600H to 0.60600H Feb 1967

				
Tli In	OUI OUI	n ترا NO ه	DIG INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1319		20	(Fr Bn C.P. Staff) At 051315H the Bn CP. was taken under S/A fire 15 rds received. Marines ret 20 rds S/A. Fire team sent to suspected area, to set up amb.	
133≵		21	(Fr: Co. C) At 051040H EN Sqd spotted at coord 106786. Fire team deployed to check area.	
1340		22	SPAR: OW HAWK located at coord 131752.	
1342		23	(Fr Co. B) Co. B landed in LZ Falcon.	
1350		24	(Fr Co. C) SIT REP	
			EN activities; and Snipers, small unit delayant tactics. 100% strength. 2 EN Captured, 18 EN/KIA as of this time.	
1355		25	(Fr Co. D) Pat RED-MIKE at 051315H at coord 105787 was amb on both sides of road. Flanked right side and wiped out ambush/ While in pursuit of left side, a Guerilla Base Camp was locate at coord 105787 and annilated same. Resulting in EN/KIA 9	3
1436		26	(Fr S=3A) Civil Affairs came ashore between 0900-0930. 1/4 CP was not notified of arrival or location until now. LOCATION: SILONAY 000RD: 008820	
1437		27	(Fr Co. D) Delta 1 & 2 noticed 2 EN laying in ambush along road side at 051400H A fire team fr D-14/2 captured the 2 EN plus 2 AK-47 rifles.	
1440		28	(Fr Co. D) At 051257H 1st Plat Co. D captured 5 MCI at coord 107767. Supplies taken to Co. D 1st Plat C.P.	

journal steet 3d mardiv 3821/3

0 50 600H to 060 600H Feb 1967

TIM N	our	"J "	1	incidents, MSGS, Online	ACTION TAKEN
1445		29		(Fr: Co. C) . hequest MED-EVAC to LPH (Actual not selious.)	
1450		30	051335	(Fr Co. C) C-2 has commenced pat in assigned area 3 pat in groups of two boats at 10 min interval. C-1 will repeat same when C-2 has ret.	
1455		31		(Fr Co. C) C-2 spotted 3 EN at coord 105780. Took under fire. EN disappeared.	c .
1700	1000	3 \$	05142 6	(Fr. 79.5) NAVAL GUN FIRE TEAM aboard. will provide Helo lift, advise time and location desired.	
1 (10)	1610	33		(To. Co. D) Have Psy Warfare Tm ready for transfer to Co. B in 15 min.	
1655	,	34		(Fr Co. B) Spot: Report B-2 spotted 8 EN at coord 114765. Sent Sqd in pursuit.	
-	1455	35	051435	(To 79.5) Send SFCP to C.P. located at 132777 LZ will be marked with yellow panel.	
1701		36	051400	(Fr: Co D) At 051420H at coord 098782,2 sniper rds were received. Pursuit by fite w/neg res.	
1715		37	O 5 1 555	Fr Bn. C.P. Staff) At 051555 the Bn C.P. Coord 132777 rec 20 rds S/A fire from 4 EN attempting to infiltrate C.P. Bn. scouts ret 4rds M-79 15 rds S/A. resulting in 4 EN/KIA, captured 1 AK-47 rifle.	
1720		38	051605	(Fr 79.5) FRAG 0 #3 for period 051700H to 06- 1700H Feb 1967. 1) Continue S&D Opns in assigned sectors.	

70/99/31 SIBET 31 EUDIV 3821/3

050600H to 060600H

N	our	ii CK	1	incients, asch, ordins	action taken
	e expense degree and the second secon			(J# 38 Con't) 2) Establish night defensive position amby & extensive night patrols. 3) Withdrawal tentatively estedialed for 061300H Feb 67 5) One #949 direct support BLT 060730H thru withdrawal.	
725	er og fygg de e er	39		(Fr Recon) At 051715H at coord 148758 a friendly Sqd was surrounded by estimated 20 EN EN armed with: 1 light MG, 4 SMG, 15 S/A W,. Fr unit unable to move due to Heavy fire. 2 FR/WIA one EN/KIA	/ FSCC
730		40		(Fr RECON) At 051730H at coord 148758 Hecon Sqd called arty mission. good coverage, EN losses heavy. Fr sweeping area, with follow results: EN/KIA (Prob) 6, Captured 6 AK-47 EN/KIA (Conf) 9, Captured 10 M-26 CHI CON carbines.	FSCC
:	1750	41	•	(To 79.5) STAND DOWN ON SPARHOW HAWK	Complied with.
320		42		(Fr Co D) At 051015H at coord 107770 patrol PARTY TIME engaged 4 EN. Capturing all 4 EN plus the following equip: 1 AK-47, 1 Pack, 4 cartistics belts, 1 smoke grenade, 1 tactical document.	S-2
325		43		Fr Co. D) Patrol PARTY TIME at 050935 at coord 107770 engaged 1 EN . EN was captured.	S - 2
330		44	D 51800	(Fr 107mm Howitzer Btry) Located at coord 123780. Will fire direct support for BLT 1/4	Noted Map
837	1	45		(Fr Co D) At 051805H 12 EN passed edge of perimeter at coord 108778. 12 EN captured A AK-47 rifles 1 CHICOM Rp6-2, 1 82mm mortar, 2 carbines m1A1 and 1 light MG	S2

TO COUNTY SELECT SLI BALDIV 3821/3

050600H to 060600H Feb 67

					160 0/
Tia In	E OUI	nja NO.	rss	TRUDETS, MOS, CHORS	ACTION TAKEN
1926		46		(Fr Co. D) At 051840H 3 EN tried to run through Co. D lines at coord 051845. Parsuit by fire and captured one, wounded two. 1 4414 rifle and cartidge belt captured with magzines.	
1955		47		(F&H&S Co.) H&S pat engaged approx 3 EN on the left flank of Co. C. Rec S/A fire from (1) A/W. Fire ret. Sweet area. No trace of EN.	
	2040)	-48	the factor of th	(To kecon) Redon advised to move to LZ ROBIN for pick up at W - 6 HOURS.	will comply with
2050	Allendary and the second secon	49	en en en januarie en en en januarie en	(Fr 79,5 S-3) INFO COPY 1) Will be into your C.P. at 060800H to discuss withdrawal. 2) Coordinate return of EN, &Assault boats with HLT 1/4 3) IEL SUPREMO exiled to ELBA and will return to LPH with 1/4	
	2058	50		(To Co. D) 1) withdrawal begins at W - HOUR. LA coord 105773. 2) External loads will be extracted at W - 5 HOURS	Will comply with
2115		51		(Fr Co. B) 15 EN came thru perimeter, Fr opened fire; Resulting in 1 FR/WIA 12 EN/KIA En/Captured 3, 1 AK-47 Rifl radio and equipment	
2130		52		(Fr Co. B) One Fr WIA due to blank Rd hitting Marine in the chest. NOT serious NON-MED-EVAC.	
	2133	53		(To Co. B)) Withdrawal begins at W-HOUR 2) Serial #233-2 and 233-3 will be extracted at W - 5 HOUR. 3) Extraction at LZ DOVE.	

30 MADIV 3821/3



050600H to 060600H

					Feb 67
TIM En		اا آراا ۵۰،	DTG	indiamis, msss, compa	ACTION TAKEN
515		54		(Fr Co B) Rec'd probe fm Sqd size Guerrilla Force Fire ret. 3 EN/KIA 6EN/KIA (Prob)	•
545		55		(Fr Co B 3rd Plat) EN probing line. Ret fire, resulting in 4 EN/KIA	
	0615	56	.	RECON is now at LZ Robin	
630		57		(Fr Co. B 3rd Plat) 2 Sqd's attacked right flank. Ret fire resulting in 12 EN/KIA, 4EN/KIA (Prob) 1 EN Captured and 1 M-16 Captured.	
		Martine - America Martine (Application of the College of the Colle			
				JOUHNAL CLOSED 060600H Feb 1967.	•
: : :	i.	,			
					·

JOSS SIEET 31 NACHIV 3821/3

060600H to 070600H

			February 1967
Tlai En	OUT NO.	DIG INCIDENTS, MSGS, ONDERS	ACTION TAKEN
731	1	(Fr: Recen) On LPH, req. permis- sion to close down radio.	Permission granted
000	2	(Fr: Co B) Patrel B-3A at 060655H caught 20 enemy in open at courd. 125757. Opened fire resulting in 20 En/KIA and 15 Carbines & 3 H-1's captured.	S-2 Map
X810	3	(Fr: 107mm Howitzer Btry) Started withdraw at 0740H and ended at 0808	
)E10	4	(Fr: Co B) Ammo expendior morning of Feb: 60-81mm mort, 20-60mm mort 16-105mm, and an est 500 S/A rds.	
1 811	5	(Fr: Whiskey, 81mm) Whiskey aboard helo's.	S-3
1830	6	Elms of H&S Co has began withdrawin	g. S-3
920	7	All H&S and Cmds elms ret to LPH. Rear echlon command group remains ashore.	S-3
045	8	(Fr: Co C) Co C position is courd. 128779. Preparing to withdraw.	S-3
1055	9	Bn C.O. has checked off net.	S-3
1100	10	(Fr: Co D) Co D aboard LPH.	S-3
1125	11	(Fr: Co D) Muster Report: All men present on USS VAN COUVER of accounted for, 3 men from 1st plat Co D are not aboard the VAN COUVER. They are with Co B, will come aboard ASAP with same. All equip present except 6 packs stolen on the first night by local inhabitants.	
1308	12	(Fr: S-4) S-4 secured from net leaving island.	S-3 fwd
1310	13	(Fr: S-3) S-3 touch down on ship.	S-3 fwd
325	14	(Fr: HDC) Half of Co aboard ship.	S=3 fwd
1330	15	(Fr: HDC) All LVT's and river boa	ts Noted

JCUSCUL STEET 34 MADIV 3821/3

060600H to 070600H

		······································		February 1967
TIME N C	CK TUC		Incidents, MSGS, Orders	action taken
1332	16		(Fr: Co C) All Co C is abserd LFD.	S-3
1340	17		Aggressors are now being picked up.	8-3
1700	18	1	(Fr: All. Units) All personnel accounted for.	8-1
	er the state of		EXERCISE OPERATION NUD PUPPY III ENDED.	
-			JOURNAL CLOSED 06170GH Feb 1967	
	,			
		*		
		3		
		1		
	,	•		

070600H to 150600H (DTG)
Feb 1967 (MONTH) (TRAR)

TIN	Œ OUT	NO.	DTG	INCLDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
				070600H to 080600H Feb 1967	
1200		1		ELT 1/4 arrived SUBIC BAY.	S– 3
				JOULNAL CLOSED 080600H Feb 1967	
				080600H to 090600H Feb 1967	į
		1		BLT 1/4 in SUBIC BAY. Troops received overnight liberty	s - 3
				JOUNNAL CLOSED 090600H 1967	
				090600H to 100600H Feb 67	
		1		BLT 1/4 in SUBIC BAY.	S-3
				JOURNAL CLOESED 100600H Feb 67	
		·		100600H to 110600H Feb 67	
		1		BLT 1/4 in SUBIC BAY	S-3
				JOU:NAL CLOSED 110600H Feb 1967	
				110600H to 120600H Feb 1967	
		1	į	BLT 1/4 in SUBIC BAY	
00		2		BLT 1/4 famed fired the 60mm Mortars at SUBIC	
4		3		Fam firing of the E0mm Mortars had to cease due to 3 short rds and one miss fire. Personnel returing to their ships.	
				JOURNAL CLOSED 120600H Feb 1967	

070600H to 150600H (DTG)

TI	vrei	пJи			
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKES
				120600H to 130600H Feb 67	
600		1		BLT 1/4 departed SUBIC BAY enroute to VIET NAM	S -3
				JOURNAL CLOSED 130600H Feb 67	
				130600H to 140600H Feb 1967	
		1	,	ELT 1/4 makes prep for OPENATIONS DECK HOUSE VI.	S-3
				JOHNAL CLOSED 140600H Feb 1967	
				140600H to 150600H Feb 1967	
		1	·	BLT 1/4 makes finial prep for operation DECK HOUSE VI.	S-3
300		2		ELT 1/4 had a briefing aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) on OPENATION DECK HOUSE VI	S-3
				JOURNAL CLOSEC 1550600H Feb 1967	
					in the second se
					. •
					15
	}		}		
		1			


150600H to 160600H (DTG)

DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS Pr: SLF The insertation of ELT 1/4 has been posponed du to weather. Will advise on status JOURNAL CLOSED 160600H Feb 67	3-3 000. 2. 0. 111 unit
	The inscription of ELT 1/4 has been posponed du to weather. Will advise on status	3-3 000. 2 0. 111 und h gemmander:
	JOURNAL CLOSED 160600H Feb 67	Marian Carlos



JOSS SE SECT 34 MARDIV 382!/3 140400U to 170400U


TIME IN OUT	NO. DIG	incidents, MSCS. CYCTCS	ACTION TAKEN
0830	1	Frep fire started	Noted
0855	2	First serial departed LPH on time Co	A Noted
0905	3	Second wave landed	Noted
930	4	On first wave touch down lielo took so fire on way out of the LZ	Noted .
0930	5	Co C in route to Beach	Noted
0938	6	Co A in zone all secured. No fire recieved.	Noted
0058	7 ·	(Fr: Co A) Up to wave 2 and 3 on ded	Noted
1000	3	(Fr: Co C) 200 meters off beach	Noted
1000	9	(Fr: Co A) Wave 5 in Zone	Noted
1000	10	LVTs hit beach on time Co C	Noted
1007	11	All A Go. in Zone	Noted
1015	12	B Co. Airborne	Noted
1043	13	(Fr Co C) In Zone, was informed by C of PF in vill#age about mine field.	Noted
1043	14	Battery G on Beach	Noted
1103	15	Gold Lemon 6 aboard Helo	Noted
1109	16	(Fr Co C) 30 Civilian Casualities reported in villiage coord BS 926227	Noted .
1110	17	(Fr Co C) On objective #2	Noted
	18	Serial 429, 307 on the Beach	Noted



160600 to 170600 (DTG)

(MONTH) (TEAR)

IN	ME OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1116	19			GL 6 on Beach	Noted
1118	20			Last serial of G Battery in bound	Noted
1124	21			Last of 3 % in bound	Noted
1130	22			(配 6) Activated Recon at this point	Noted
1132	23			Serials 350,351,210,211,212,282,403, Departed USS Thomston	Not ed
1137	24			Serial 450,451 Landed	Noted
1150	25			Permission to send in Command Group A.	Granted
1201	26			(Fr AT Flat) In position	No ted
1202	27			GL 3 on Beach	Noted
1205	28			\mathbb{R} e ∞ n on way in to LZ	Noted
1210	29			Recieved message to activate D Co by Helo in 2 hours.	Noted
1224	30			SLF was notified of the 30 Civilians who were wound by prep fire. This hed to know what they wished to to with them	SLF
1227	31			Expidite D Co. To recon position	Noted
12 55	32			D Co will not be indite today.	Noted
1300	33			(Fr B Co) On book objective 3	Noted
1331	34			(Fr Co C) Coord 922225 at 161310H One Marine detenated mine. Emergency Med Evac. 1 KIA Fr. Chopper recieved S/A fire during take off.	No tified S-1



160600 to 170600 (DTG)

(MONTH) (YRAR)

TD		មេ		THE WOOD APPEN	ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	WOLLOW TWIEN
1400		35		(Fr Recon) One marine dislocated his jaw, struck by Helo at coord B3-925275	Ş-1
1445		36		30 Givilian Med Evac inbound to USS IWO JIMA from village hit by prep fire. coord 926227.	SLF
1420		37		(Fr 79.5) 5 VC spotted at coord 915227 & 5 VC spotted at coord 922229. All with weapons. Helo in Fr landing sight 919226 recieved one and S/A fire. Both groups going north on Hwy 1. When held came over VC ducked into cave.	FSCC Co C
				(Fr Co C) Sqd size patrol on Hill 93	VI O
1417		3\$		(Fr Tac Log) 160 has mechanical trouble has to returned to well deck for repairs. Reg to send in Ser 360 6 361 at same time	Serial turne
1413		39		(Fr Tac Log) Ser 222 has been fraged at 1345.	Noted
1515		40		PF Company 423 at coord 920219 & 918221	Noted
1600		41		(Fr 79.5) Frag Order #2 Opns period 1616QCH-17160OH Feb (1) Establish night defense positions & Ambush positions (2) Submit night def fire plan. (3) Submit CAS & helo keg by 16180OH. Par Early 17 Feb conduct delibers & Aggressive S&I opns. (5) Cont Atk & sieze Obj 4 & 5	
1630		41		(Fr Co C) Spot Leport C-1 Cord 914226 at 1615454 Rec sniper fire from village cond 920227. Rec S/A fire ontos destroyed Rd BLK at same position No Fr Cas. 4 VC KIA (Conf) 3 VC KIA (Prob).	
1715		42		(Fr Co C) Observed est 25 VC coord BS897247 called arty fine: Gearched area 10 VC KIA Conf. 5 VC Frob No Fr Cas	S-2

160600 to 170600 (DTG)

IN	Œ OUT	njn No.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1919		1,3		Immediate Fr: Hilldale-6 To: CO HMM-363 6 Ranging Miver 6 Frago #2 For Conduct of Opns 161700Hto 171700H (1) GL-6 disregard previous frag issued at your command Post & excute following: A. Estab night defensels submit night Def plan to this Headquarters. B. Con't S&D Opns early 17 Feb, submit close air support require- ments & Helo troops lifts. By 161800H. C. Lai GL-D in Vic of 3d round position Fr snow chief by helo commencing 170830H. Conduct S&D opns to Hwy 1 and seize land Obj 1\$5. D. Revert GL-B to reserve to be committed on order of landing plan force commander. It will occupy a defens position Vic of landing force Obj 3 & LZ PARRO GL-B will provide protection to the landing force S and S/W flank. Unit also conduct Plat S&D opn's in Vic of landing force Obj-2. E. Contine S&D op's from Landing force Obj-2. E. Contine S&D op's from Landing force Obj-2 to the NM toward BASEBALL R. 20 D.20. F. Con' S& D opns from landing force Obj-1 towards LZ CANA Y & extensive Plat actions to north and west from Vic LZ CANARY. G. Provide security for HOSEMARY which will conduct survey east of landing force Obj-2. H. 1 in prep for future Opns reduce units & equipment on BLUB BEACH move Max Fossible No. of GREEN glade vehicles to snow chief & wheeled vehicles fine new road to Cocktail Gulf. Be prepared to displace to north. (2) Forsty Cold provide helo lift as stated in para 1C Report Helo LZ's in AOA on con't basic 3. Ranging river prep to assume control of firing units.	
1800		44		(Fr Co B B-1(898232) Spotted 2 VC coord 98923 moving toward beach fired 6 60MM rds. Plat moving to area to investigate. 2 VC KIA Prob.	
Late		45		(Fr Co B) Sit Rep #1 CP Coord BS\$98232, air strike on hill 4/5 3 KIA Prob, 1 WIA Prob	S-2



(DIG)

TIM		11]11	DIEC	THOTOGRAD MODE ADDEDS	ACTION TAKEN
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	
2010		46	((Fr 00 C) Spot report clearing village at 918227 Destroy Punji Traps, 5 Suprise firing devices, 6 tunnels, 11 bunkers 1 road block.	S-2 79•5
	2110	47		(to Recon) Gun ship • station	
2035		48		(Fr Co A) At 2030H one marine stepped on punji stick. non serious, non med evac.	
		49	161900	(Fr Co A) Discoptored 1 tunnel vic 907268. Destroyed.	
2055		50		(Fr Co A) At 2030H A-3 unit made contact with 3 FC coord BS 917253, Rec'd 30 s/a rds, ret'd 50 7.62, 1- M-79 3 VC KIA prob.	9–2
2230		51		(Fr 79.5) Affirm on C&C helo affirm on Helo Lifts	ALO
0100		52		(Fr 79.5) Pass to GL 1/4 (1) Glose air support sched fo 17 Feb cancelled. all CAS will be on 30 Min stand by. (2) Submit paquest for CAS for 18 Feb to ICE PACK no later than 171600H	.wored
				JOUINAL CLOSED 170600H	
:			:		
					を表 数据 (大変形)

170600H to 189600H

(DTG)

Peb 1967

(MONTH) (TEAR)

TI IN	ME OUT	NO.	DTG	incidents, msgs, orders	ACTION TAKEN
0630		1		Prep fire on Obj-4 has begun by Naval Gunfire.	PS 00 S-3
0735		2		(Fr: Oo A) Oo A leaving present position for P.L. Alpha.	8-3
~~φ		3		AT plat has departed with Co C.	8-3
\ 5		4		(Fr: Co C) C-1 patrol moving from 922224 north along highway to coord 915245 and return to C.P. C-2 patrol moving from coord 923218 south along highway to coord 920190 and return to C.P. Patrols are accompanied by section of AT's.	8-3 35p
0080		5		(Fr: Co B) All ambushes have returned to C.P. Continuing patroling plus providing Sparrow Hawk.	3+3 Ka p
0820		6		(Fr: Co C) C.P. loca tions, no change. Activities, see J-4.	8-3
0835		7		(Fr: Co D) Half of Co D is at Recon. Recon is preparing to depart.	Ested
0845		8	170630H	(Fr: Co B) Spotted two (2) VC at coord 910238. Called mortar fire Two VC KIA (Prob)	82
0850		9		(Fr: Co C) Unidentified round exploded. 450 meters to rear of C-2, at BS 921205.	S-3 Map ALO
0900		10		(Fr: Co B) Day time patrols CAT and BRAR have departed C.P.	Moted
1016		11		(Fr: Hill Dale) Two from Company Store to LE OwL. Escort to Rosemary.	Moted
1020		12		(Fr: Hill Dale) Request present position of Co A. Whiting for last units to reach P.L. Alpha.	
1035		13		(Fr; Co D) Co D moving toward 1st Obj.	Moted
1039 i		14		(Fr: Co B, CO & XO) Obs several groups of dugouts moving BS 931226 to BS 928225.	8-3

170600H to 180600H
(DTG)

Feb 1967
(MONTH)

TI In	OUT	NO.	DTG	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION TAKEN
1045		15		(Fr: Co A) At 170955H, at BS 928253 A-3 rec(d approx 10 rds sniper fire at coord 929251. A-3 returned three (3.5) rds. One (1) FR WIA.	5-3
1055		16		(Fr: Co C) Boobytrapped gate at BS 922203. Engr will blow gate.	\$- 3
. 32		17		(Fr; OD D) CO D sweeping village BS 924270. Round bunkers and two elderly males. The bunkers were destroyed.	8-3
154		18		(Fr: Co C) C-1 found two 81mm mortar rds disassembled in village house at BS 919235. Advised to blow rds.	8-3
155		19		(Fr: 00 B) B-1 sighted caves at coord 894238. Found 10 containers of rice and supplies. Destroyed supplies.	
225		20		(Fr: Co D) Secured 1st Obj. Continue mission.	9- 3
300		21		(Fr; Co A) Located at P.L. Alpha. Waiting further instructions.	8-3
315		22		(Fr: Hill Dale, Major Burgess) Quick Silver-7 firing arty and air missions at coord 896184, due to increased enemy activity.	. 5-3
330		23		(Fr: Good Brandy) Ontos returning to HLUE BEACH from patrol.	8+3
<i>1</i> 00		24		(Fr: Co D) At 1320H,, at coord 933620 Co D came upon suspected VC tunnel system inhabited shortly before D-1 arrival. Tunnel system was destroyed by engineers.	8-2 ************************************
405		25		(Fr: Good Brandy) Ontos returned to C.P. Awaiting further instructions.	8-3
15		26		(Fr: Co C) Request emergency med-evac at cord 917237.	Alo Mad-ovac on my
42 2		27	1345 !!	(Fr: Co B) Co B patrol at coord 905235 spotted 3 VCS. VCS were taken under fire. Lost sight of suspects. Will check out aboa.	S-2 Map

170600H to 180600H

Feb 1967

(MONTH) (ZAR)

m	Œ	пЈп	***		
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACRION
1425		28		(Fr: Co B) Located tunnel complex at coord 899241. Destroyed as much as possible.	8-2 Map
1525		29		(Fr: Recon) Plat proceeding to Hill 93 coord 937238.	8 −3
.7		30		(Fr: Co C) Have captured 1 VCS, vic BS 916237.	B-2 Nap
1 530		31		(Fr: Hill Dale) Quick Silver-7 conducting ops to south coord 850180. Air and arty missions vic coord 885186. 3/7 S&D ops continuing in TAOR. Recon from 3/7 inserted previously will be extracted 191800H. 3/7 conducting ops vic GS 8040. Moderate contact 4 KIA (conf), 6 KIA (prob)	
1540		32		(Fr: Co D) At 1540H coord 931250, patrol received 1 rd sniper fire from coord 929251. Patrol returned approx 200 rds s/a fire. Results unknown. Continue assigned mission.	
. 0		3 3		(Fr: Co D) At coord 932248 rec'd 38deds smiper fire. Sweeping area to flush out smiper. 1 FR/WIA.	8-2 140
1715		34		(Fr: 0o B) At coord 903255 pat spotted 3 VC. Air Strike 100% on target. Patrol searched area. 1 VC/KIA (prob), 1VC/WIA (prob).	4-3
1719		35		(Fr: 0o B) Patrol at coord 899241 found tun- nel complex also 10 Vietnamese old women and children which were unharmed. Hiew tunnels.	3
1800		36		(Fr: Hill Dale) To: Gold Lemon-6 Frosty Gold-6 Raging River-6	
• .				Frag 0 #3 for conduct of opns 171700H to 181700H.	
				1) Gold Lemon establish might defensive pos- itions and might amb. Submit might defen- sive fire plan to this Hq.	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)

170600H to 180600H (DTC)

Feb 1967
(MONTH)

IN OUT NO. DTG INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS (J-36 cont.) 2) Con'd S&D opns early 18 Feb with emphasis on Salt Flat area. 3) Submit Helo troop lift request by 171800H, 'CAS request for 19 Feb are due no later than 131600H. 4) Be prepared to reorient direction of attack on order. 5) Prosty Cold provide helo lifts as stated in para 3. Report helo IZ's in AOA on a con't basis. 6) Raging River prepare to assume control of firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might (To: All Units) Frag 0 \$2 © A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Oc. O.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. © B Continue S&D opns, Expandepairelastacement Co C Con't assigned mission. © D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Prosty Gold to IZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order. Conduct route recon from Obj 2 to Obj 1.	N TAKEN
2) Con'd S&D opns early 18 Feb with emphasis on Salt Flat area. 3) Submit Helo troop lift request by 171800H, 'CAS request for 19 Feb are due no later than 181600H. 4) Be prepared to reorient direction of attack on order. 5) Frosty Cold provide helo lifts as stated in para 3. Report helo LZ's in AOA on a con't basis. 6) Raging River prepare to assume control of firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might (To: All thits) Frag 0 #2 Co A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. O.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 3228. Co B Continue S&D opns. Expandipatrolastacest Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	* Tabita
CAS request for 19 Feb are due no later than 181600H. 4) Be prepared to recrient direction of attack on order. 5) Frosty Cold provide helo lifts as stated in para 3. Report helo LZ's in AOA on a con't basis. 6) Raging River prepare to assume control of firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might (To: All Units) Frag 0 #2 Co A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. 0.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. Co B Continue S&D opns. Expand(pairolistic west) Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
tack on order. 5) Prosty Cold provide helo lifts as stated in para 3. Report helo IZ's in MOA on a con't basis. 6) Raging River prepare to assume control of firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. (To: All thits) Frag 0 #2 Co A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. O.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. Co B Continue S&D opns. Expanding attolists owest. Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Prosty Gold to IZ GANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	•
in para 3. Report helo IZ's in AOA on a con't basis. 6) Raging River prepare to assume control of firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might. 8	
firing units. 7) Flare ship on 30 minutes stand-by all might (To: All Units) Frag 0 #2 Co A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. 0.P Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. Co B Continue S&D opns. Expandipatrolastsowest Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
(To: All thits) Frag 0 #2 On A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. O.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. On B Continue S&D opns. Expandopatiolastsowess On C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
On A Conduct S&D opns north along Rt 1 to Hill located from BS 893274. Establish Co. O.P. Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. On B Continue S&D opns. Expandipatrols: the west of Continue S&D opns. Expandipatrols: the west of Continue S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Prosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
located from BS 893274. Establish Co. O.P Conduct patrols in GS 9027 west to GS 8228. Co B Continue S&D opns. Expandapatrolastsowest Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	d
Co C Con't assigned mission. Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Cold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
Co D Conduct S&D opns to Obj 5 and north to Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Gold to LZ GANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
Obj 4. Be prepared to move by Frosty Gold to LZ CANARY on order. Recon Return to Gold Lemon C.P. on order.	
All other units continue assigned mission.	
(Fr: Co B) Co B spotted 9 VC extering hut at coord 917237. VC were wearing black PJ's, they were also: carrying sacks. VC appeared to be armed. Arty was called in, excellant	

170600H to 180600H
(DTG)

Peb 1967
(MONTH) (1243)

IN	ME OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
2114	0.01	39	<i>D</i> 10	(Fr: 79.5) Fighting Devil moves to FSA 1 to support CREFE MYRTLE from 180730H to 181000H. It's available within 30 minutes if situation requires.	8-3
2200		40		(Fr: Co C) Between 0700 and 1900 C-3 destroyed 1 pill box, 13 bunkers, 11 road blocks, 15 punji pits, 3 booby traps, 5 enemy trench lines 2 caves, and 24 fortified positions. Vic coord 917238. C-2 destroyed: 1 road block, 1 booby trap, 2 bunkers, vic coord 920195.	Мар
2245		41		(Fr: Co C) Rec'd 3 in coming s/a rds from coord 903315. Patrol ret'd 25 rds s/a, fired 60mm illum.	S-3 S-2
0030		42		(Fr: Co C) At 180005H rec'd 7 incoming rds s/a. Ret'd s/a immediately. Results unknown.	S-3 S-2
205		43		YANKEE C.P. lost contact on land line.	Notified Com
)310		44		(Fr: Co B) Co B at coord 897238 rec'd 2 incoming grenades. Ret'd 4 grenades and 30 s/a rds. Called H&I in area to block possible VC escape route.	S-3
)342		45		(Fr: Co C) C-2 at t80245H suspected enemy movement at coord 923217. Returned fire and illum plus observation. Results negative.	S-3
				JOURNAL CLOSES 180600H Feburary 1967	
				·	

180600H to 190600H

(DTG)

Feb 1967

(MONTH) (TEAR)

m		nJn			
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKE
0815		1		Special Forces team visited C.P. to coordinate recon of Obj 4 for possible S.F. Camp.	S-3
0832		2		(Fr: Co B) Found 8 grenadesholes and 1 dud Chicom grenade inside perimeter. Checked area and estimate 5 VC involved by number of foot- prints. Estimate 2 VC/WIA by blood and drag marks leading west.	S-2 S-3
900		3		(Fr: Good Brandy) Ontos units 22 and 26 are back with Good Brandy 6.	S-3
920		4		(Fr: Co D) Co D now on the move.	S-3
941		5		(Fr: Recon) Recon arrived at Bn C.P.	s -3
945		6		(Fr: 00 A) Unit found a pile of rice 6ft x 3ft diameter at BS 918255.	S-3 SLF 79.5
120		7		(Fr: Recon) Recon has passed to C position.	S-3
2 5 0		8		(Fr: 79.5) it will be on station in 15 min.	S-3
<i>3</i> 05		9		(Fr: Co D) At 171245H at BS 92925O located several tunnels. Tunnels were blown causing a secondary explosion from one tunnel.	S-3
330		10	1145 1 1	(Fr: Co A) At 180900H A-1 unit searched village at coord 907253. Patrol uncovered and killed one sniper. One Thompson sub Machine gun with magazine and 20 rds plus numerous documents were captured. Patrol ret'd 15 rds of s/a fire after receiving 3 incoming s/a rds. Patrol destroyed one rice grinding machine, one fortified position with supplies. Medical supplies were also captured. Patrol ret'd to C.P.	S-3 S-2 Map
410		11		Recon is at BS 918238.	S-3
44 5		12		(Fr: Recon) Patrol spotted VC in caves coord 912247. Called close air strike. Caves found at coord 912240 taken under fire by N.G.F.	S-3
450		13		(Fr: Co D) Ummarked island at BS 924246. Rec'd 10 rds sniper fire from island. Ret'd fire with 14 60mm mortar rds and 1 W.P. un-	S-2 Ma p

180600H to 190600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TO	ME	nJn			
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
				(J-13 cont) able to check results.	
	1455	14		(Fr: S-3 to Recon) Continue mission north- ward to establish C.P. tomight.	Noted
500		15	1450H	(From Co D) Co D at BS 932264 spetted VC in open at coord 928265. VC were fired on with VC/KIA (prob). Squad sent to check.	S-3
1505	=	16	140 <i>5</i> H	(Fr: Co D) D-3 at BS 928266 rec'd s/a fire from ridge BS 927268. Spotted man in nearby village with weapon and another on ridge. Ret'd fire results imknown.	S-3
1515		17	1 509H	(Fr: Co D) Position report. Unit set in at BS 924263.	S-3
1600		18	1 549H	(Fr: 00 C) Have 1 man with snake bite, non med-evac.	S-3
1615		19	1400H	(Fr: Hill Dale 6) Frag Order #4 for opns 181700H to 191700H Feb.	
				1) Gold Lemon establish might def positions and might amb. Submit might protective fire plans this Hq.	
				 Gold Lemon execute the following: A) Move to assigned TAOR commencing early 19 Feb 67. Report when all units are within TAOR. 	
				B) Conduct extensive and deliberate S&D opns within assigned TAOR. Particular emphasis in vicinity GS 8739.	
				C) Submit 19 Feb close air support and helo requirements by 181700H.	
•				D) Coordinate with CIDG forces in your area.	
				E) Land 107mm mortar in TAOR.	
	1				

180600H to 100600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (ZRAR)

TI) IN	OUT	nJn NO.	DTG	incidents, MSGS, Orders	action taken
				(J-19 ∞nt)	
				F) Close vacated BLUE BEACH during 19 Feb.	
				G) HMM 363 provide helo lift for Bn 1/4. Lift will be coordinated by 79.5. Helo lift will include New Road MRC-62.	
				H) 105mm Btry select firing positions and assume control of 107mm Btry after unit is landed.	
				I) Grid reference code system effective 190800H is, DOGS, BOYS, GIRLS.	
				J) 1/4 maintain one rifle © as 79.5 reserve.	
1620		20		(Fr: Recon) At 181600H at coord BS 918242 and air strike was called in resulting in 5 VC/KIA (conf).	S-2
1810		21		Helo hit with s/a at BS 890273.	S-3
181 <u>,0</u>		2 2	1742H	(Fr: Co A) Co A position BS 894274. Established an ight defensive position. Sustained 1 FR/WIA vic BS 897268 from sniper fire at approx 1500H med-evac.	
1812	ļ	23		LVT's on way back to USS VANCOUVER.	S-3
1820		24		(Fr: Recon) Recon at BS 919238 recid smiper fire from auto/wpn. Called in arty.	S-3
1855		25		(Fr: 00 A) A-3 at BS 895270 rec'd 60 rds s/a fire from coord 895272. A-3 ret'd fire and advanced through village. Rec'd 125 more rds. A-3 withdrew from village and supporting arms were utilized. Air strikes and arty destroyed approx 18 fortified positions causing extensive fires and damage to the enemy. Arty expended 30 rds HE. A-3 expended 150 7.62 rds, 4 M-79 rds, and 9 60mm mortar rds.	

220600H to 230600H

(DTG)

Feb 1967

(MONTH) (XMR)

TIME IN	our ix	Jii O. DT	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
			(J-22 cont)	
			C-3 remained at same position. Co C (Rein) was subjected to sniper fire until 1300H. Contact lost during tanks breakdown. 15 bunkers blown. Established night time puzzles upon returning to C.P. 1 VC/KIA (prob) 1 VC/WIA (prob), 2 VCS	
800	23	3	(Fr: Co B) B-2 at 221735H at coord BS 847298 found 1 Bouncing Betty within perimeter. Blown in place by Engineers.	S-3
905	24		(Fr: Gold Lemon to Dead Heat) Frag 0 #7	S-3
			On A-Move to position BS 876306, establish Co patrol base. Conduct deliberate S&D en-route and in GS 8630. Establish liamion with Recon.	
			Co B - Move to position BS 822293, establish Co patrol base. Conduct deliberate S&D opns on movement.	
			Co C - Conduct deliberate S&D opns in GS 8931 and GS 8831.	
			Co D - At H-hour move by Frosty Gold to Obj 3, area. Seize Obj 3 and establish Co patrol base.	X
			Recon - Con't assigned mission in GS 8529.	
			Tanks - Direct support of Co C. All units conduct extensive patrols.	
			Naval Gunfire will be available.	

220600H to 230600H
(DTG)

Feb 1967
(MONIH) (IRIR)

TIM IN	E OUT	nJn NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	acțion taken
2015		25		(Fr: Co B) At 1545H B-3 rec'd 200 rds s/a from coord 845305 while entering their position at BS 846298. Ret'd approx 280 rds s/a, plus M-79 and LAAW. Searched area where fire	S - 2
				came from, found hut with false bottom and 200 lbs of rice, also found 1 booby trap and writing paper. Spent cartridge shells were found later. Hut was destroyed, items were sent to Bn S-2. 2 VC/KIA (CONF). Captured 2 booby traps, 1 dairy, several documents, and 30 Cal. cartridges.	:
2130		26		(Fr: Co B) Have reached assigned area. Un- suitable for C.P. request to move to BS 895298.	S-3 approved
2215		27		(Fr: Co C) 1st Plat Co C rec'd 3 rds sniper fire at B S 899307. Fire came from BS 900305. Swept area toward snipers.	s-3
2245		28		(Fr: 79.5) Request one Plat as security for Engr at BS 878350 and BS 903310 for 23 Feb 67.	S-3 Req demied
2310		29		(Fr: Co D) At 222215H patrol BLACK JACK at coord BS 924254 saw 12 VC crossing behind them from east to west. As patrol shifted position to cover the dike 9 more VC started to cross dike. Amb opened fire. Fire was ret'd from flanks BS 920253 and BS 925254. Amb withdrew but was replaced to min later. 4 VC/KIA (conf), 3 VC/KIA (prob), 5 VC/WIA (prob)	S-3
2330		30		(Fr: Hill Dale 6)	
				1) 3/7 will provide security for 12 man survey team to edge of TAOR. (890330).	
				2) 1/4 Plat (Rein) will provide security: from BS 890330 to BS 903310.	
				3) 1/4 Plat (Rein) Must be at coord BS 890330 no later than 231030H. Con- tact 3/7 INDIA on MIKE 655.	

220600H to 230600H

Feb 1967

(MONTH) (TAR)

				(MO MILL)	/ Testa-A
TIMO IN	OUT	nj: No.	DTG	inclients, MSGS, Orders	ACTION TAKEN
				(J-30 cont) 4) 1/4 will provide help transportation back to 3/7 C.P. on completion of mission.	
)O4O		31		(Fr: Co D) At 222240H amb BLACK JACK at BS 923250 rec'd fire from ville. Amb ret'd fire and ret'd to Co D C.P. H&I's plotted on ville.	S - 3
0045		32		(Fr: H&S Co) At 222330H H&S at BS 889305 rec'd 30 rds of sniper fire from house at BS 898304. Ret'd 50 Cal M/G fire, request illum. Destroyed sniper position with 106RR. 2 VC/KIA (conf), 1 VC/KIA (prob)	S-3
				JOUANAL CLOSED 230600H February 1967	
	ļ.				

180600H to 190600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONIH) (TRAR)

TI) IN	OUT	nJn NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKES
0120		26		(Fr: SLF-4) Civic Action Group will be in C.P. at 0745H.	S-3
0520		27		(Fr: Co C) At 190505H C-1 Patrol BEAR TRAP took 8 rds smiper fire. Patrol returned fire. Results unknown.	S-3
				JOURNAL CLOSES 190600H February 1967	
					A

190600H		200600H	
Feb (DTG)	1967	
(MONTH)		(IRIR)	

TIN IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0633		1		(Fr: Co C) C-1 and C-1-2(+) at 190530H at coord 932227 rec'd two (2) four rds burst of rifle fire. Adjusted arty in sniper's position 1 VC/KIA (conf), 3 VC/WIA.	S-3
0730		2		(Fr: '79.5) Displacement scheduled cancelled.	S-3
1755		3		(Fr: Co C) C-3 discovered mine vic coord 927221. Marked and con't mission.	S-3
0800		4		(Fr: Recon) Fire prep fire with ontos prior to moving through at BS 915241. One secondary explosion.	
0800		5		(Fr: Co B) All patrols and ambushes have ret'd.	S-3
0817		6		(Fr: Recon) Rec'd one short round in C.P. coord 919238. Resulting in 1 civilian KIA, 5 USMC WIA.	S-1 S-3 Arty
0850		7		(To: Co A) Intelligence report reveals the following: Rice Cache BS 889276 Def Position BS 890275 Supply Cache BS 897274 Rice Cache B3 398266	S-3
0857		8		(Fr: Co A) At 190500H at coord B3 894274 rec'd approx 5 concussion grenades in their perimeter. Plan more extensive network of trip flares to prevent reoccurance. One FR/MIA, non med-evac.	S-3
0859		9		(Fr: 79.5) Air will be over head for prep of LZ GULL if needed.	ALO
0900		10	овцвн	(Fr: Co D) Concerning mission to cross water in ALL areas except the one reported last night. The water appears too deep to cross. The only feasible place to cross the water would be up to a mans chest or neck. Without actually crossing themselves this is as near as they can determine.	Will request

190600H to 200600H

(DTG)

Feb 1967

(MONIH) (TRAR)

111	ME	nJn			4 AMEA ST (114 STEEL)
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKE
0907		11		(To: Co D) At H + 1.5 provide security for Rosemary at FORD 932258.	Noted
0915		12		(Fr: Co A) Found one 50 gal drum of rice at BS 989276.	
~945		13		(Fr: Oo A) At 190745H at coord BS 894271 A-3 unit rec'd approx 20 rds s/a sniper fire while sweeping ville. A-3 withdrew and called in arty and 81mm. Approx 14 rds HE from arty, 4 rds HE from 81's. Con't sweep.	S-3
0958		14		(Fr: Co D) At 190930H at BS 929263 resupply helo rec'd approx 20 rds smiper fire. Ret'd fire checking results now.	S-3
1000		15	0941н	(Fr: 79.5) HMM 363 helo for UDT delayed. Report when D-1 in position.	Co D noti-
1005		16		(Fr: 79.5) LZ GULL HOT.	8-3 ALO
1020		17		(Fr: 00 C) C-3 at Recon position is going to Blow road block BS 919240.	S- 3
1040		18		(Fr: Oo A) One VCS captured, returning to Bn C.P.	S- 2
1100		19		(Fr: 79.5) 1st helo touched down rec'd no fire. Het'd to ship placed on 15 minute alert.	S-3
1 100		20	1025	(Fr: Co B) Co B found 480 cu ft of salt not packaged at BS 892234. Salt destroyed.	S-3
1105		21		(Fr: Co B) At 191010H patrol MANHUNT at BS 890228 found recently occupied hut fresh foot prints outside. Inside hut were black PJ's VC type, canteen, 10 50 Cal. casings and mechanical devices which appear to be suprise firing devices. Found recently occupied cave and blew it. Searched surrounding area throughly. Syringe, pictures, and pieces of paper with writing were also taken from hut before destroying it.	V

190600H to 200600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TIMI IN	our	"J" NO.	DTG	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION TAKEN
1130		22		(Fr: Co.D) Co D has made contact with UDT.	S-3
1200		23		(Fr: Co B) At 191015H at BS 892234 found box of salt 12 ft by 8 ft by 5 ft, also in area found sniper hole and sharpen punji stakes. Searched area blew up and scattered salt. Destroyed sniper hole.	S-3
320		24		(Fr: Co C) Co C has ret'd to old position. LZ remains same.	S-3
1320		25		(Fr: 79.5) Smipers located in Co D location BS 924259 and BS 928262. Advised Co D. Information rec'd from helo pilots.	S- 3
1450		26		(Fr: Co D) D-2 at coord 927269 found man about 50 yrs of age bearing food in area which we have just taken sniper fire. Appreh man and ret'd him for interrogation. 1 VCS, 1 basket of food.	
1510		27		C-3 and 3rd Recon returned to C.P.	S-3
1630		28		(Fr: Hill Dale 6) Frag O #5	
				A) Be prepared to excute my order #4 on order.	
				B) GL establish might defensive position & might ambushes. Submit night defensive plan to this Hq.	
				C) GL submit close air and halo requirement not later than 191800H for limited 20 Feb opns. Conduct local S&D opns and patrols on 19 Feb. Hill Dale will coordinate helo lift, if required into assigned TAOR.	
				D) Raging River be prepared to assume con- trol of units.	
				E) Frosty Gold provide helo lift as required.	
1700		29		(Fr: Co A) Co A at 191530 had non-serious med-evac. FR (S-003)	S-3

190600H to 200600H
(DTG)

Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TIN IN	Œ our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1730		30	,	(Fr: Co B) Co B appren 3 VCS.	S-2
1720		31		(Fr: Co B) Elackhawk at coord 892228 took into custody 4 suspects, 1 male and 3 females, brought back to LZ for questioning. Found to to be civilians by ITT.	S-3
ر750 i		3 2		(Fr: 00 A) From 190830H to 191600H at coord BS 888285 A-1 unit swept village. Rec'd sporatic smiper fire. Rec'd approx 175 rds. A-1 unit expended approx 200 rds 7.62 link and 750 7.62 ball. A-1 unit destroyed approx 150 lbs of supplies. One FR/WIA.	8- 3
1800		33		(Fr: Co A) From 190830H to 191500H A-1 unit swept ville at BS 888274 encountered negative enemy contact.	S-3
1820		34		(Fr: Co D) Patrol CHESTY PULLEY at 191750H at coord BS 921252 unit rec'd auto/wpns fire, approx 25 rds. Unit ret'd fire and took cover. One FR/KIA.	S-3
834		35		(Fr: Co A) A-3 unit between 190900H and 191300H swept ville at BS 897272, rec'd extensive smiper fire. Enemy expended approx 700 rds s/a. A-3 unit ret'd 130 rds 7.62 Ball, 18 frag grenades, 13 M-79, and 2 LAAWS. Numerous fortified positions and a large quanity of supplies were destroyed. Approx 500 rds were also destroyed. Several documents, coins, and one M-1 clip were captured.	S-3
1937		36		(Fr: Co D) At 191930H at coord BS 924253 Co D rec'd approx 25 rds s/a and auto/wpns fire. Ret'd fire with s/a, LAAW, M-79. One VC/KIA (conf).	S-2 S-3
1940		37		(Fr: Co D) Undetermined number of people at BS 903263 moving north along ridge.	S-3
2125		38		(Fr: Co B) At 1919 25 at BS 916236 spotted 15 (conf) VC with weapons converged at hut. Called in arty. Arty expended 40 rds. 5 VC/WIA (prob), 10 VC/KIA (prob)	S-3

190600H to 200600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TIN IN	Œ lour	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
2305	002	39		(Fr: Co D) At 191730H patrol CHESTY PULLEY at BS 932250 was pinned down by two auto/wpns. Marines ret'd fire with all weapons including 129 arty rds. 4 EN/KIA (conf), 8 VC/KIA (prob) 12 VC/WIA (prob)	S-2 Map
35 5		40		(Fr: 79.5) Do you have comm with 3/7 Bailey in event it's necessary for coordination and control of 105mm Howitzer Btry and other supporting arms. Advised 79.5 that we do have comm.	FSCC
0025		41		(Fr: Co D) At 191745H at BS 933262 while moving through ville rec'd sniper fire. Ret'd s/a fire and M-26 grenade. 1 VC/KIA (conf).	S-3
0025		42		(Fr: Co D) At 191845H while pulling CHESTY PULLEY out of ville at BS 931257 rec'd smiper fire from BS 927284. Ret'd fire with s/a and auto/wpns, mortars, and M-79, while two units from Co D tied in with CHESTY PULLEY and pulled them out.	S- 3
<i>3</i> 025		43		(Fr: Co D) At 191800H at coord BS 927265 rec'd 5 rds fire plus heavy fire from 2 auto/wpns from BS 924263. Ret'd fire with s/a and 60mm mortar. Enemy bunker destroyed, quanity of s/a destroyed with bunker. 3 VC/KIA (conf).	S- 3
0045		44		(Fr: 79.5) Coordination and control of supporting arms remains in Company Store.	S-3
0300		45		(Fr: Co A) 4 med-evac and one emergency at BS 894273.	S-3
0325		46	,	(Fr: Co A) At 0245H at coord 894274 A-2 unit rec'd approx 5 incoming C-3 grenades. A-2 ret'd intensive s/a fire. A-2 suffered 6 WIA. 5 not serious, one serious.	S-3
0445		47		(Fr: Co C) At 0415, C-1 at coord 900307 suffered a small sachal attack. 6 to 7 sachals were thrown. C-1 ret'd grenades and s/a fire to area where charges were believed to have come from. Naval illum was called in. Area (cont)	

190600H to 200600H

Feb (DTG) 1967

(MONTH) (TRAR)

TI) IN	Œ our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKE
			y	(J-47 ∞nt)	
				was checked. Perimeter was not penetrated. 3 VC/KIA (prob)	
				i	
•				TO HARLY GEO AND COO COOK TO Law as 40 CM	
				JOU:NAL CLOSED 200600H February 1967	
	1				i.

200600H to 210600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (DRAR)

0800				INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
)845	1	1		Co C commencing movement to new C.P. location.	8-3
		2	!	(Fr: Oo C) Quite a few civilians, look like fisherman. Sent psy warfare team up.	S - 3
0845		3		(Fr: Co A) Ref Spot Rep 200245H At 200730H at BS 895274 Co A conducted an inmediate search at T.O.I. revealed negative results. Further search at this time revealed one VC hand and small finger plus approx 25 feet of intestines. These parts were found in front of an expended claymore. Patrol following blood trail to village at BS 895272 found one home made tomatoe can, one belt, 3 patches, 1 large basket, 3 carbine magazines, 30 carbine rds, 20 rds 30.06 Cal, 1 short wire, 1 rain jacket, one wire device possibly used for sighting.	9-2 79•5
)916		4		(Fr: Co B) Co B located at BS 898240.	S - 3
916		5		(Fr: Recon) Recon Plat arrived at RED BEACH.	8-3
<i>5</i> 0		6		(Fr: 107mm Btry) Request remainder of N.B. be brought ashore. Advised land remainder of N.B.	S-3
039		7		(Fr: 79.5) UDT reports RED BEACH satisfactory for landing craft.	S3
040		8		(Fr: Co D) Patrol CHYENNE at 201000H at BS 918254 located equipment. Equipment was destroyed.	S-2
050		9		(Fr: Hill Dale-3) TAMBUSH 1-1 inbound for heavy lift of 107mm Btry. Est time of arrival 201030H.	S-3 S-4
130		10		(Fr: Bn 00 to 00 B) Conduct S&D mission vic coord 879262.	Мар
200		11		(Fr: Hill Dale) Info from reliable source that VC may start opns in our AOA.	S - 3

200600H to 210600H (DTG)
Feb 1967 (MONTH) (TRUE)

UT NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
12		(Fr: 79.5) Play Boy will be over our TAOR to observe. Instructed to come upon conduct of fire net.	S-3
13	/	(Fr: NGF Officer) NGF Officer spotted VC in vic.878298. NGF mission not fired due to your proximity to target.	S - 3
14		(Fr: 107mm Btry) At 201325H at BS 904306 107mm Btry rec'd one incoming smiper round. Ret'd fire. One Fn/WIA.	S-3
15		(Fr: 79.5) POW interrogator reported 70 man force at TAN DIEM BS 919235 armed with 60mm mortars, 3 BAR's carbines, M-1's and 36 Thompson sub machine gun. Another 30 man force at BS 925255.	S - 3
16		(Fr: Co B) At 201200H B-1 found assembled gear inside hut at BS 893256. 4 kmayes, 1 cart belt 1 empty bandoleer and 1 bear trap were also found.	8-3
17	1130H	(Fr: Co A) A-3 unit at 201050H at BS 895285 rec'd heavy sniper fire. Enemy expended approx 100 rds, friendly expended approx 200 rds. One FR/WIA.	S-3
18	1217H	(Fr: Co A) Ref Spot Rep 200745H: A-2 followed blood trail and found 1 thumb, several portions of bones believed to be ribs Extensive entrails and portions of scalp and hair. This is in addition to the hand mentioned in J-3. 5 VC/KIA (conf), 10 VC/KIA (prob)	S-3
19		(Fr: Co A) Between 200830H-201500H at BS 888287 A-1 swept area one (1) S&D mission. Rec'd light sniper fire, patrol ret'd fire. Enemy fired approx 5 rds, A-1 ret'd approx 25 rds. A-1 destroyed 15 fortified positions and salarge quanity of supplies.	S-3
	13 14 15 16 17	13 14 15 16 17 1130H 18 1217H	observe. Instructed to come up on conduct of fire net. (Fr: NGF Officer) NGF Officer spotted VC in vic 878298. NGF mission not fired due to your proximity to target. (Fr: 107mm Btry) At 201325H at BS 904306 107mm Btry rec'd one incoming smiper round. Ret'd fire. One Ft/WIA. (Fr: 79.5) POW interrogator reported 70 man force at TAN DIEM BS 919235 armed with 60mm mortars, 3 BaR's carbines, M-1's and 36 Thompson sub machine gun. Another 30 man force at BS 925255. (Fr: Co B) At 201200H B-1 found assembled gear inside hut at BS 893256. 4 kmives, 1 cart belt, 1 empty bandoleer and 1 bear trap were also found. (Fr: Co A) A-3 unit at 201050H at BS 895285 rec'd heavy smiper fire. Enemy expended approx 100 rds, friendly expended approx 200 rds. One Ft/WIA. (Fr: Co A) Ref Spot Rep 200745H: A-2 followed blood trail and found 1 thumb, several portions of bones believed to be ribs Extendive entrails and portions of scalp and hair. This is in addition to the hand mentioned in J-3. 5 VC/KIA (conf), 10 VC/KIA (prob) (Fr: Co A) Between 200830H-201500H at BS 888287 A-1 swept area one (1) SkD mission. Rec'd light sniper fire, patrol ret'd fire. Enemy fired approx 5 rds, A-1 ret'd approx 25 rds. A-1 destroyed 15 fortified positions and

200600H to 210600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	action taken
2000		20		(Fr: 00 A) Between 200830H-201500H at BS 895275 A-3 unit conducted S&D opns in assigned area. Rec'd small hits of smiper fire. Enemy fired approx 50 rds, A-3 expended approx 120 7.62 rds, 150 linked 7.62, 8 M-79 and 16 frag grenades. A-3 destroyed numerous supplies 100 fortified positions, and 50 tunnels. Approx 1200 rds were destroyed. 1 FR/WIA 1 VC/KIA (prob).	8=3
2005		21		(Fr: Co D) At 201500H at BS 922255 D-1 investigated area where sniper fire was rec'd. Found blood spots. 1 VC/KIA (conf)	S-3
2005		22		(Fr: Co D) At 201630H at BS 928252 patrol ROUND-1 rec'd sniper fire from BS 930259 while going up HILL 82. Ret'd fire and withdrew. 1 VC/KIA (conf)	S - 3
2010		23		(Fr: Co D) Patrol KILLER TEAM at 200845H at BS 922253 entered village at BS 922253 and conducted search. Detained two suspects. 2 VCS.	8-3
)54		24		(Fr: Co C) At 202035H at BS 899308 unit rec'd sniper fire from BS 897295. Fired 106mm RR. Sniper ceased firing.	S-3
21 50		25			
				Your Frag 0 #6 Of opns 201700H to 211700H.	·
				1) Situation A) Enemy current instums B) Emery Wheel assume Opcon of H.D. movement provide C.A.S. Co Store provide N.G.F. and additional support as required.	
				2) Mission Hill Dale under Opcon Emery Wheel conducts opns to destroy VC Gurreilla, local forces, and main forces units in the (DUC PHO-NUI DAU) area in coordination with Crete Myrtle	

200600H_to	210600H
200600H_to	
Feb	1967 (YEAR)
(MONTH)	(TEAR)

IN	OUL	nJ⊓ NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	action take
				(J-25 Cont) 3) Execution A) Gold Lemon 1) Establish might def position and amb, submit might def fire plan, submit air requirement by 201900H.	
•				2) On order attack (North along Hiway One) link up with elements of Crete Myrtle (NUI DAU vic BS 8732)	
				3) On order attack and seize Emery Wheel Obj-A (Hill 258), bounded on west by Grid Line BS 85, on North by Grid Line BS 30, on East by Grid Line BS 88, on South by Grid Line BS 27.	
				B) Rapging River assume control of Arty units.	
		:		C) Frosty Gold provide helo support for opns.	
				D) Coordinating instructions: 1) Report when Obj are setzed.	
				 Concept to opns and friendly adjacent units will be briefed seperatly. 	
				3) Grid ref code effective 210600H and supersedes previous issue: All BS: FLOWERS (2981), GIRLS (8426) COLOR (8332), BOYS (8728), CARS (8931)	•
				JOURNAL CLOSED 21 0600H February 1967	

210600H to 220600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TIM		nJn	יייים איני	TAKET DE AMORE ADDEDO	ACTION TAKEN
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ROLLOW THE
0830		1		(Fr: Georgia Moss 6) Tanks and C-2 now departing C.P.	S-3
835		2		(Fr: Hill Dale) Approx 50 VC were seen in Vic BS 803325.	S-3, FSCC S-2, Map
850		3		(Fr: Recon) Recon now departing C.P.	S- 3
920		4		(Fr: Recon) Recon has arrived at Hill 215 cord BS 865292.	S-3m Map FSCC
933		5		(Fr: Tank Plat) Tanks positioned at coord 898307 along with 2nd plat of Co C.	S-3 Map
)9 4 0		6		(Fr: Co D) D-3 at 210845 at BS 925253 rec'd sniper fire from auto/wpn at coord BS 925265. Sniper fire was also directed at helo. D-3 shifted in the direction of the sniper in order to intercept him. Results unknown.	S-2 Map
950		7		(Fr: Recon) Recon inserted in BS 866290. May be extracted from: Extract "A" area BS 866290 Extract "B" area BS 873287 Extract "C" area BS 874289	S-3 Map FSCC
005		8		(Fr: 79.5) Located men in trenches moving out of area near Recon's position BS 865292. Men were wearing helmets. Info from Playboy.	Recon S-3 Map
010		9		C-2 has linked up with Tanks.	S-3
030		10		(Fr: Co D) At BS 931256, D-3 located punji pits and smiper traps. Pits and traps were destroyed.	S-3 S-2
045		11		(Fr: Co B) At 211020H B-2 at coord BS 868265 rec'd 4 smiper rds. Retaining 3 vagabonds. B-2 ret'd 6 rds s/a. Holding the 3 VCS until they can be picked up.	8- 2
048		12		(Fr: Re∞n) Sighted 15 VCS at BS 872291.	S-3, S-2, M
050		13		(Fr: Co B) AO obs a number of camouflage VC in trench line at BS 855285. Will call arty.	S-3, FSCC Co B, Recon

210600H to 220600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (ZEAR)

TIN IN	Œ OUT	njn NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1129		14		(Fr: Bn C.O.) 1 plat from Co D will be helo	Oo D
1000				Lifted to rein Recon at BS 865292.	Recon
1230		15		(Fr: Bn C.O.) Helo lift of Co D 1st plat has been cancelled.	Notified Co and Recon
`300		16	211030Н	(Fr: Co D) At BS 928253, D-3 found spent 30 Cal. cartridges, marks indicate they are MG ammo. M-1 Carbine cartridges were also found. Turned cartridges to Co D C.P.	S-2 S-3
1305		17	21 1030H	(Fr: Co D) At 211030H, D-3 at BS 930250 investigated effect of rockets on target. Found they were extremely effective. 15 VC/KIA	S-3 S-2 Map
1320		18	211315H	(Fr: Co C) At 211300H, C-2 and Hueys rec'd sniper fire at BS 898307. Tanks ret'd fire with 90mm guns. Air support and arty called in. Hueys saw 5 suspects.	S-3 S-2 FSCC
1325		19		(Fr: Co C) C-2 has returned.	S-3
1345		20	211420H 1	(Fr: Co A) At 211220H Co A rec'd sporadic sniper fire at BS 893293 while bringing in helos. Ret'd heavy volume of fire and frag grenades. Marines expended 150 rds 7.62 link 76 rds 7.62 ball ammo. Sustained 3 FR/WIA from surprise firing device. Co A consolidating position and conducting careful search for mines and surprise firing devices.	
1350		21		(Fr: Oo C) Civel Affairs team and one Sqd from Co C, as escort moving north to BS 893322	S-3 S-2
1450		22		(Fr: Co B) Enemy patrol at BS 800265. Called in arty support.	S-3, S-2 Map
1500		23	211455	(Fr: Co D) At 211427H patrol HANNIBALL at BS 912265 rec'd auto/wpns fire from BS 906263. Ret'd fire, presently pinned down. Co D sent 1 unit to HANNIBALL's position to assist. 1 Marine KIA, 2 Marines WIA, Request med-evac. 2 VC/KIA (conf), 4 VC/KIA (prob), 6 VC/WIA (p)	S-3 S-2 Map

210600H to 220600H

Feb 1967

(MONTH) (TEAR)

TIM IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1535	001	24	Dig	(Fr: Co A) Co A at 211300H at coord 893293 obs enemy smipers at coord 895294 firing at C-2 and Georgia Moss. Returned fire from our position. Expended 100 rds 7.62 link and 3 M-79 rds. Co A destroyed one fortification and 3 smipers. Will continue to obs from our position. 3 VC/KIA (conf)	S-3 S-2 Map
535		25		(Fr: Co C) Sqd from Co C and Civil Affairs team returned at 1515H.	S- 3
620		26		(Fr: Co D) HANIBALL at 211530H coord 912264 and 903267 rec'd heavy sniper fire. Ret'd fire resulting in 2 VC/KIA (conf) 2 VC/KIA (prob)	S-2 S-3
628		27		(Fr: Georgia Moss) Tanks ret'd to Co C C.P.	S- 3
700	•	28		(Fr: Co B) B-2 211300H at coord 862268 came across VC patrol base. Found 2 packs, 2 hammocks, uniforms for 3, 30 lbs of rice, canned food, cooking pot, bowls and various other gear along with Carbine ammo. Destroyed most, collected representaive samples for further study. Found also a wallet with pictures, dairy, flashlight, pen pack filled with miss. items.	S-2 S-3
708	į	29		(Fr: Co A) Co A at 211630H at coord 893297 and 895295 covered C-2 and Tanks. Returned to their C.P. took snipers under fire. Expended approx 300 7.62 linked, 7 M-79, 5 LAAWS, and 6 81mm H.E. Destroyed 5 fortifications, 4 VC/KIA. Will search area further.	S-3 S-2
716	: :	30		(Fr: Recon) Recon at 211500H at coord 876287, saw enemy patrol and called in air strike. 2 VC/KIA (conf), 2 VC/KIA (prob)	S-2 S-3
730		31		(Fr: 00 B) Moved to assigned Obj. Will conduct S&D missions in this area, unless otherwise directed will conduct night activities in immediate area.	S-2 S-3 FSCC
740		32		(Fr: Co B) Co B has secured it's Obj.	

210600H	_to_	220600H
-	DIG)	4 -
Feb		1967
(MONTH))	(IMR)

TIM	Œ	nJ:			
IN	OUT	NO.	DIG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1745		33		(Fr: Co C) Co C (Rein) at coord 898305, Co C (-) at 899307, C-1, C-2 at coord 897305. C-3 at coord 898307. C-1 escorted team to coord 882342, C-2 (Rein) swept from present location to north and 1800 around C.P. at coord 898302 with tanks. C-3 escorted Survey team to northern portion of TAOR. C-2 in constant contact with enemy smipers, C-3 contacted 3 VC on one occasion and estimated seven on another. Estimate 1 VC/KIA, 1 VC/WIA Blew 5 bunkers, 1 secondary explosion.	S-2 S-3
1805		34		(Fr: Co A) At 211730H at coord 893296, Co A arty FO called in arty on fortifications in vicinity. Expended 36 rds H.E. Destroyed 4 fortifications, 2 of which contained VC smipers. 6 VC/WIA (prob), 2 VC/KIA (conf), 4 VC/KIA (prob).	5-3 S-2, Map
1930		35		(Fr: Hill Dale) To: Cold Lemon 6 Raging River 6 Frosty Gold 6 This is my Frag Order #7, conduct of opns period 211700H to 221100H. 1) Gold Lemon A) Establish might def and amb position Submit might def fire plan. Submit helo requirement for 22 Feb no later than 212100H. B) Early 22 Feb continue S&D opns in vic of HILL DALE OBJ 4, EMERY WHEEL OBJ A. Establish contact with CRETE MYRTLE KILO. C) Prepare for future opns by reduction of equipment and supplies ashore.	
				2) Raging River: Coordinate fires with HILL DALE & GOLD LEMON.	

210600H to 220600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (DTG)

ŤIM	Œ	11]11]			
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKE
				(J-35 cont) 3) Frosty Cold: Be prepared to support COLD	
2045		36		LEMON opns. (Fr: Co A) At 2030H at coord 891295 patrol WINSTON encountered 6 VC on way to amb sight. WINSTON killed 4 VC and wounded 2. Patrol expended approx 60 rds s/a fire. One Carbine was captured. Patrol continued assigned mission. 4 VC/KIA (conf), 2 VC/WIA (conf)	S-3 S-2 Map
2130		37		(Pr: Co A) At 212125H at BS 886292 amb BIRD DOG encountered 30 VC. Amb took VC under fire killing 12. One Thompson Sub M/G was captured Before withdrawing VC moved north. Amb ret'd to C.P. due to compromising amb site. Marines expended 200 rds link, 100 rds ball 7.62, and 3 M-79. 3 LAAWS were also utilized. 12 VC/KIA (conf), 3 VC/KIA (prob), 3 VC/WIA (prob).	Мар
				JOURNAL CLOSED 220600H February 1967	,

220600H to	
Feb (DTG	1967
(MONTH)	(TRAR)

	ME	nJn			ACTION TAKEN
IN	OUL	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	AUIIUN TAREN
0715		1		(Fr: Co A) At 0640H Co A rec'd sparodic smi-	S-1
				per fire within their perimeter, coord 893293.	
	1	-		Enemy expended approx 10 rds, Co A ret'd	S-3
	7			approx 40 rds s/a. Co A con'd assigned mis- sion. 1 FR/WIA	Мар
1905		2		(Fr: Play Boy) AO observed one 500 Low Drag	S-3
				dud at coord BS 89852960.	FCSS
					BOD
0905		3		(Fr: S-3) S-3 at coord BS 899305 receiving	S-3
				smiper fire from BS 892308. 106RR returned	S-2
	į			fire. 1 VC/KIA (\omeganf)	
0908		4		(Fr: Co C) Have 3 VCS, 2 Males and 1 Female.	S-2
				Female wounded from fragmentation at coord	8-3
	1			BS 903294. S-2 will pick up and send to	
				DUC PHO.	
0910		5		(Fr: 79.5) Request to know what two alligator	E S−3
•				are doing in vic BS 895324. KOD blowing 106	S-2
	ł			duds at BS 8734.	
J933	1	6		(Fr: 79.5) Request position of Companies A.	S_3
-,,,,,,				B, and C, also Recon. Advised Hill/Dale to	-
,		1		contact Hill Dale-3.	
0935		7		(Fr: Co D) Patrol D-2 at 220930H at coord	S-2
- / / /	i	l '		BS 930250. Rec'd s/a fire in ville. Ret'd	S-3
	1			fire and swept down toward smiper. 1 FR/WIA	8-1
0948	1	8		(Fr: Co D) Request priority med-evac at BS	S-1, S-4
, 	1	ľ	ł	933254.	J-1, J-4
	1		Ī		_ 2
8001	1	9	1	(Fr: Co C, CO) We are held up at BS 903307.	8-3
	ı		i	Should be leaving this position in 15 minutes. Will sweep south.	ra.p
			1	warr saceh soudur.	
1020	1	10		(Fr: EOD) Found one 500 lb bomb at BS	SLF
	1			89852960. Will blow bomb. Destroyed at	S- 3
			1	1045H: 7 105mm illum, 1 106 HEAT,	- · ·
			l	3 155mm illum, 11 MK82 500 lb Blow Drag bomb.	
	1	1		mag with.	
		1			
	1			•	
	}	·	}	**	l

220600H to	230600Н
(DTG	1967
(MONTH)	(IRAR)

IN	ME OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1110		11	,	(Fr: 79.5) ITT report on the 4 detainees. Three are civil dependents, DUCPHO, one ARVN deserter. Written report will follow.	S-2
1210		12		(Fr: Bn S-2) 2 security men being sent to Co'C position at BS 903294 to pick up 3VCS.	8– 3
1300		13		(Fr: Co D) At 1030H Co D patrol coord BS 928254 rec'd auto/wpns and s/a fire from vic BS 930254. Estimated 2 auto/wpns postions and 3 sniper positions. Ret'd fire with s/a. Swept area and destroyed enemy positions. 2 FR/WIA, 4 VC/KIA (conf), 8 VC/KIA (prob) 12 VC/WIA (prob)	S-3 S-2 Na p
330		14		(Fr: Hill Dale, Relayed from 1st Calvary CO) 1st Air Calvary Omdr report agents have seen VC among refugees now being fed by Marines in area vic 8930 to Rt #1. The village chief has offered to identify known local villagers from VC and return villagers to their homes after Operation ceases in this area. Agents highly reliable and local PF CO and village chief extremely competant. 1st Calvary CO will be available to assist if necessary. Mike desig- nator 574. Reply ASAP.	Co A S-3 Map
345		15		(Fr: Co A) At 221300H Co A at BS 884302 captured 2 VCS at BS 889302 watching friendly movement.	8– 3
415		16		(Fr: Co D) At 221100H patrol MUSTANG at BS 914263 rec'd fire from auto/wpns, at BS 912268, located in cave. Ret'd fire with M-79 and s/a.	8-3
42 0		7		(Fr: Co D) At 221150H patrol MUSTANG at BS 909263 spotted 3 VC moving along road. 1 VC had weaponVC were spotted at coord BS 912262. Patrol fired on VC with M-79. 2 VC/KIA (prob)	8- 3
500	1	8		(Fr: Co A) Sit Rep Co A conducted S&D opns in coord BS 880300, 890300, and 890290 with negative enemy contact, with the exception of 2 possible VCS.	

220600H to 230600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (IFAR)

IN	Œ OUT	NO.	DTG	INCLIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKE
				(J-18 cont) Destroyed 75 fortifications, 18 turnels, 10 caves, 7 tons of supplies, and 8 bunker type gun positions overlooking rice paddies.	
1615		19		(Fr: Hill Dale-6) To: Gold Lemon-6 Raging River-6 Frosty Gold-6 Frag Order #8	
				A) For conduct of opns. Period covered 221700H to 231700H.	
				1) Gold Lemon: Establish might def and increase number of amb positions. Submit might defensive plan. Continue S&D opns early 23 Feb. Continue at- tack and seize HILL DALE OBJ 2.& 3n On order commence S&D opns in general Acces from OBJ 2 & 3. Submit helo request by 221900H.	
				2) Raging River: Continue support of Cold Lemon.	
				 Frosty Gold: Provide support of Gold Lemon. 	
620		20		(Fr: Co C) C-6 encountered a lot of people and punji pits at coord BS 907241.	S-3, S-2 Map
630		21	;	(Fr: Co C) C-6 reached obj heading back to C.P. on Sea Board side at coord BS 914283.	S - 3
721		22		(Fr: Co C) Co C (Redn) at BS 898305, C-1 at BS 899307, C-1 solo at BS 899305, C-2 at BS 897305, C-3 at BS 898307. Co C (Redn) swept area at coord BS 914283 and ret'd to present position in conjunction with tanks. C-1 solo remained at present position.	
				(ont)	

230600H to 240600H
(DTG)
Feb 967
(MONTH) (TEAR)

TI	ME	11]11			
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0720		1		(Fr: Recon) Rec'd resupply and moving to new position.	S-3
0800		2		(Fr: Co A) Co A is moving to HILL 105.	S-3
0900		3		(Fr: Co D) First elems on OBJ 3, recid no fire.	S-3
0927		4		(Fr: Co B) At 221615H at BS 842295 the resupply helo rec'd s/a fire. B-1 proceeded to area and rec'd s/a fire also. B-1 ret'd 30 rds s/a, 2 LAAWS, and two 3.5 W.P. rds. 1 VC/KIA (prob), 1 VC/WIA (prob)	5-2
0937		5		(Fr: Co B) At 230855H Co B found trip wire and attachment for M-16 type mine at BS 846298 within perimeter. Unable to locate mine with detectors.	S-2
0948		6		(Fr: Co B) Four 250 lbs duds located at BS 844298. Saw them hiton eastern slope. Detector unable to find them.	S-2
1045		7		(Fr: Co B) Co B request med-evac at BS 843304.	S-3, S-4 ALO
1100		8		(Fr: Co B) At 231037H B-2 took 8 incoming smiper rds. Ret'd approx 100 rds and 4 LAAWS to coord BS 838295. 1 FR/WIA, 1 VC/KIA (prob	S-2
1150		9		(Fr: Recon) Recon at LZ. Will mark with yellow smoke.	S-3
1225		10		(Fr: Recon) Have reached Obj 4 by helo.	S-3, Map
123 5		11		(Fr: Co B) At 231200H Co B found deserted installation at BS 840288. Searched and found surprise firing devices, surgical instruments, and written documents. Collected representive samples and destroyed installation.	S-3,
1245		12		(Fr: Co B) At 231205H Co B at BS 901297 found installation containing work bench and several punji stakes. Destroyed installation	S-3

230600Н		240600H	
Feb	(DTG)	9 67	
(MONTH		(TEAR)	

TI IN	ME lour	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	1001		DIG		
1335		13		(Fr: Co D) Secured Obj 3 at 231300H at BS 804308.	S-3
1350		14		(Fr: Co D) D-2 and D-3 at 230900H at coord BS 924263 rec'd auto/wpns fire from along ridge. Fire was directed at LZ at BS 919263 to 919255 as helo was lifting out. Co D returned fire with s/a and 81mm mortars. Air strike called on ridge. Auto/wpns fire ceased.	S-3
1405		15		(Fr: Co B) At BS 845298, B-3 found camouflaged punji pit in middle of road with metal stakes. Destroyed pit, saved stakes.	S-3
1500		16		(Fr: Recon) Recon setting in position on Obj 4.	S-3
1615		17		(Fr: Hill Dale) To: Gold Lemon 6 Frosty Gold 6 Raging River 6 Frag 0 #9 Period covered 231700H to 241700H Feb. 1) Gold Lemon: Establish might defensive and ambush positions. Early 24 Feb continue S&D opns in assigned area. In general direction of BS 8129 and BS 8322. Submit helo request by 231900H 2) Frosty Gold: & Raging River: Support Gold Lemon during opns.	
730		18		(Fr: Recon) At 1730H, at coord BS 849297 spotted 5 VC with weapons our sniper fired 2 rds, killing one VC. Other 4 VC pulled body away. Called air strike. Other 4 believed to be in hut. Arty was called in with good coveraged also had secondary explosions. 1 VC/KIA (conf), 4 VC/KIA (prob)	S-2 S-3 Map

230600H	to_	210600H	_
_230600H (D	TG)		
Feb	نبت	1967 (IRAR)	_
(MONTH)		(TRAR)	

	6 73				
IN IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
2000		19		(Fr: Recon) At 1815H at coord BS 845306 helo rec'd smiper fire. Ret'd s/a fire. 1 VC/KIA (conf)	5- 3
2000		20		(Fr: Kecon) At 1800H at coord BS 845291 saw 4 VC going into hut. Called fire mission with good coverage. 4 VC/KIA (prob)	S-3
2040		21		(Fr: Co B) At 1525H at coord BS 832306 found cache containing items, presumedly VC, and a large number of supplies. Collected samples and destroyed the remaining supplies. Items collected were: written documents, barber scissors, 1 poster, several ponchos and packs, 1 medical packet, 1 canteen filled with tea, 1 helmet, 1 mess kit, utilities, civilian and military clothings, items were in good condition. Several yards of various types of material, pack of tea and tobacco, 30 Cal American rds, photos and negative in wallet, 1 cigerette case and cooked food.	S-3 S-2
2115		22		(Fr: H&S Co, 106 Plat) Enemy activities seen at BS 9129. Simm mortar fire mission called in.	S-3
2130		23		(Fr: Recon) Receiving sniper fire from between my position BS 839301 and Co B BS 846300.	S-3
21 <i>5</i> 7		24	Lah Enlay	(Fr: Co B) Patrol BOB WHITE at 222130H at coord BS 832295 sprung amb on 5 VC entering killing zone at BS 832205. All 5 VC fell to ground. Raked ground with fire. Called for 81mm illum. Sent search party to check area, signs indicated bodies had been moved to adravine. 3 VC/KIA (conf), 2 VC/WIA (prob)	S-2 S-3
2220		25		(Fr: Co C) Co C rec'd 1 non-serious FR/WIA due to fragments. Non-med-evac.	S-3

230600H to 240600H

Feb 1967

(MONIH) (TEAR)

III IN	OUT	njn NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
2240		26		(Fr: Co C) At 232205H at BS 897305, Co C rec'd sporatic fire from several points in the vic BS 895305. Co C ret'd fire with s/a and M-79. 1 Fi/WIA (Ref J-25)	: 8-2 S-3
					,
				JOUANAL CLOSED 240600H February 1967	

240600H to 250600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONTH) (YMAR)

IN	ME lour	nJn NO•	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
TN	001	WO.	DIG	INCLUDATE, MOGS, ORDERS	Worker the second
0735		1		(Fr: Co B) At 0725H at coord BS 829283 found booby trap within perimeter. The trap consisted of a 105mm round. It was blown in place.	S-2 S-3
0827		2		(Fr: Co A) At 0735H, A-1 received sporatices sniper fire at coord BS 875300, while returning from might amb. Fire came from BS 885304. A-1 ret'd heavy volume of fire and observed 2 VC rapidly departing area. Enemy expended approx 10 rds, A-1 expended 75 rds. found 1 magazine pouch with 2 M-1 Carbine magazines and 25 rds.	S-2 S-3
0955		3		(Fr: 00 00 A) Unit rec'd sniper fire from BS 865308.	S-2
10 53		4		(Fr: Co A, CO) Large mass of people (approx 300) moving up and down the road with no particular destination. Coord BS 860316.	S-3 S-2
1055		5		(Fr: Recon) Ref J-4 Recon has seen same as Co A moving in groups of 4 to 6. 1500 to 2000 meters from Recon's position. People seem to be moving toward tracks, don't seem to be carrying anything.	S-2
1130		6		(Fr: Co A) At 241105H at BS 855305, A-2 unit rec'd approx 15 rds smiper fire from BS 853307. Rebid fire with 100 rds. Results unknown. 1 FR/WIA	S-2 S-3
1130		7	,	(Fr: Bn S-2, Souts) At 240935H at BS 906303, rec'd 3 rds smiper fire from BS 901301. Souts ret'd approx 10 rds s/a and called for ontos. Ontos expended 2 rds 106mm; Direct hit on smiper's position. 2 VC/KIA	S-2 S-3
1145		8		(Fr: 79.5) One Co VC at BS 830317 to 832320. Info from reliable source.	S-2, & D & D, FSCC

240600H	to <u>250600H</u>
	DTG)
Feb	1967
(MONTH)	(YEAR)

IN	OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1200		9		(Fr: 79.5) 3/7 will establish blocking positions along the eastern bank of your zone of action, vic BS 805325 to BS 800316. Coordinate with 3/7 before corsaing route #1.	8-3
1205		10		(Fr: Hill Dale Bailey) Hill Dale Bailey report 1 VC Bn located at BS 821335, 820328, and 816324.	3- 3
1210		11		(Fr: Co C) At 241145H at BS 89532O, C-1 encirclement of beach area. Encircle completed, suspects being segregated. Approx 9 VCS, 4 VCC. Request frag to DUC-PHO.	S-2 S-3
1220		12		(Fr: Co C) At 240930H at BS 901310 C-2,3 scouted area BS 897310 from which C-3,2 had recieved 15 rds s/a during the night. C-2,3 found 6 (Rein) bunkers, 450 ft long tunnel and trench line containing Punji Pits. 1 M-2 grenade booby trap, 3 Chi Com grenades booby trapes and a 155mm Booby trap. Also found tail fin assembly from Snake-Eye Rocket with possibility of being used as 60mm Mortars, found 2 new Punji Pits 3ft deep and 3ft long Punji stakes. Bunker and the 2 new Punji Pits were destroyed by Engr. Tail Fins being brought to Bn C.P.	
1400		13	24101 <i>5</i> H	(Fr: Co C) C Co. patrol at BS 903297 rec'd 4 rds sniper fire at BS 904300 VCS was standing 20 meters from position sniper fire came from. Also 2 Chi Com grenades were found booby trapped near his house. Returned 30 rd s/a fire at sniper and pursued with neg resul Captured 1 VCS	3
1425		14	241410H	(Fr: Co B) Rec'd 6 smiper rds from Hut at BS 838311, returned 15 s/a rds, 5 M-79. 1 VC KIA (Prob)	S-3
					;.
j			}		Later to


Journal Sheet 3d Mardiv 3821/3

210600H to 250600H (Fab 1967 (2008)

TI IN	ME	NO.	DTG	inclients, ksgs, orders	ACTION TAKEN
1450		15	241440H		ક S-3 .હો <i>ક.</i> હદ
1615	i e	16		(Fr: Hilldale 6 To: Gold Lemon 6 Frosty Gold 6 Raging River 6	S _3
		THE TAIL OF THE PROPERTY OF TH		Frag Order # 10 for conduct of Operations 241700H-251700H Feb 1. Gold Lemon. Establish might defensive and entensive ambush positions. Submit night Def. fire plan. Early 25 Feb continue S/D operation in area from present positions outlined by Hill Dale 6. (Fr(Highway #1 east) toward (sea) in area bounded by Grid Line (35 to "No & (31 to "S"). Commencing 250800H move one Company to Crosswalk. Complete detailed plans for BRANDYMINE. Raging hiver and Frosty Gold will provide support for Gold Lemon during operation.	
·5 2 0		17		(Fr. Co D) Reached to mights position at BS 835328.	S _3
1635		18		(Fr: CoB) Reached tonights position at BS 848324.	s _3
1950		19		(Fr: Co B) At 241700H at BS 844328 recieved 35 rds sniper fire, returned 450 rds and 8 M-79 rds. Searched area found 2 VC KIA (conf) 7 wounded indigenous. Wounded evacs sent to LPH-2.	S-3
2000		20		(Fr: Co C) C-2 hit on the way to their might puzzles. Enemy fired 7 rds s/a. Returned fire with 25 rds s/a and 2 gernades results unknown Will proceed with might activities. BS 905300	
J40		21		(Fr: Co B 6) For Padlock 25 Feb total spaces will be 260 Coord BS 844328.	S-3

240600H to 250600H
(DTG)
(MONIH) (TRAR)

TIM IN	E OUT	NO.	DTG	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION TAKEN
2190		22		(Fr: Co C) Recieved approx 7 s/a rds from vicinity BS 894307. Returned fire with approx 30 rds s/a fire. Fired 2 60mm flares. Results unknown.	Map S-3 S-2
2130		23		(Fr: Co A) At 242125H patrol B-1 at BS 87430 recieved heavy sniper fire from BS 873313 on way to might ambush site. Returned approx 150 rds s/a, recieved 50 incoming rds. 3 Tr/WIA Med Evac.	9 S-2 S-3
2303		24		(Fr: Co C, 6) C-2 was hit about 7 minutes and was unable to get Illumination. Coord BS 892315, Request MedEvac behind the Tank Flatoon on the beach 4 FR/WIA MedEvac.	S-3 ed
0445		25		(Fr: SSgt Davis, Bn Scouts) AN/TBS-21 located on the beach detacted movement. Requested H&I fire or Illumination.	S-3A
0555		26		(Fr: Co C) Gold Lemon 3 at 0345H, at Coord BS 892315 recieved incoming grenades and rifle fire returned fire and C-3 returned to Co C, C.P. 4 Fr WIA, 3 VC KIA (conf) Spot deport #115	
		1		Journel Closed AT 250600H	
			,		! Н



250600H to 260600H (DTG)

Feb (MONTH) (TRAR)


IN	Œ OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0805		1) 	(Fr Co C) C-2 departes at 0815, for BS 900307.	S-3
0827		2		(Fr: Co A 6) Spaces 217, required pick-up at BS	
J9 1 7		3		(Fr: Co C) C-2 spotted smiper. Have taken him under fire with s/a & M-79.	S-3
0927		14		(Fr: Recon) Are we to be extracted by (4)	S-3
C240		5		(Fr: Co A) At 250930H A-3 unit searched are of last nights ambush at BS 879318. A-3 rector sniper fire from 3 sides vic BS 879317. A-3 returned heavy volume of fire and pursued End As En. fire increased A-3 falt he was being led into a trap. So he withdrew. Enemy expensed approx 200 rds. A-2 expended 600 rds, 3 LAAWS, and 9 frag grenades. A-3 unit found 4 new graves and much blood in the area. 4 VC/KIA Conf 4 VC/KIA Prob	
0955		6		(Fr: Ontos) Smiper located at BS 903303 request to fire.	S-3 Permission fire 4 rds
09 <i>5</i> 7		7		(Fr: Co C) Sweeping to return to orginal position on beach.	S-3
1033		8		(Fr: Co D) D-2 observed 5 VC w/Carbines at BS 848319 rec'd fife & * * fire from ville, returned and neutralized fire. 3 VC/KIA (Conf) Friendly at BS 848319.	·S-2
1034		9		(Fr: Co B) B-6 is on IWO JIMA.	S _3
1040		10		(Fr: Co B) Co B is on IWD J IMA.	S-3
1130		11		Recon Plat is on IWO JIMA.	S-9
1215		12		(Fr Co A) A Co pick up position is BS 88431	, S-3

√0.76 () £40**Л**V (38**21/3**



-250600H to 260600H

1215		1215日	(Fr: S-3) To: Co A and B) (1) PF unit	ACTION TAKEN
1215	13		(Fr: S-3) To: Co A and B) (1) PF unit	
			your position today. (2) Co C has activity from BS 883305 to BS 880320.	S-3
235	14	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	(Fr: Co C) C-3 at BS 890304 has sustained 1 FR/KIA and 1 FR/KIA.	S_3
315	15	1 '	(Fr: Amtrac Plat) Amtrack has returned to CP has 1 VCS casuality 1 KIA and 1 MIA MedEvac requested. Same as # 14.	S-3
20	16	(Fr: Co C) Patrol killed sniper, wounded 1 in vicinity of BS 890304, bursueing blood trail.	S- 3
30	17	(ji	Fr: Co D) Have sustained 5 WLA, where s the MedEvac.	S-3
45	18	ti	Fr: Shore Party) All tanks returned to	S - 3
25	19 25	30 01 as an Do	(Fr: Co C) C-2 on S/D mission at BS 12912 captured 3 VCS. Found expended Cal. and Russian cartrigages, caches buried supplies, 3 foot traps and scorted Documents, destroyed supplies and 4 installations, burned fortafications cuments submitted to S-2. 3 VCS.	S-2 S-3
	20	finbut KI Lir fir fou Tan	r: Co C) C-1 & 2 at 0945 to 1431 at ord BS 900300 rec'd sparodic smiper re, we were drawn into cancealed positionly C-2 was taken into trap. 1 FR and 1 FR/MIA at this point patrols and up trapping 15 VC with A/W. En red 20 rds s/a and Fr ret'd 150 rds. and 10 VC/KIA (Conf), 4 VC/KIA (Prob) aks and C-3 arrived to assist. VC	



250600H to 260600H (DTG)

Feb 1967 (MONTH) (TRAR)

TI IN	ME OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1730		21		(Fr: Hilldale) Frag Order #41 for period 251700H - 261700H 1. Gold Lemon established might defensive positions & limit ambush positions. During 26 Feb complete BRANDYWINE. Submit might defensiplan no later than 251900H. 2. Raging River revert unit to Gold Lemon control for BRANDYWINE, at 260800H. 3. Frosty Gold will provide support to vicinity of Crepe Myrtle C.P as instructed orally. Provide support to Gold Lemon for completion of BRANDYWINE.	Ve
1920		22		(Fr: Co D) Co D is now entering Co C's lines	S-3 Co C
1955		23		(Fr: Army Special Forces) 60 of our C.I.DG team were fired upon by 35-40 VC, from Goord BS 932225, while crossing to Penninsula. est. 4-6 a/w rds and the remainder were all s/a. Friendly: 1 KIA, 4WIA, 5 MIA, 2 Civ WIA. Lost: 1 A6 MG 30 Cal., 4 carbines. Fired arty and air strikes. At appox 1900 gumboat made pass, rec'd heavy fire again.	S-3
2127		24		(Fr: 79.5) 2 468 avalivable for Bn 1/4 at 1000H.	- - 1
2145		25		(Fr: UDT) Survey of Beach 1000 meter south of Gold Lemon Position found suitable for landing craft.	
2145		26		(Fr: Co C) At 251830H the entire Co C defensive perimeter rec'd large amount of sniper fire around entire perimeter fire returned by s/a and auto/wpns area was swept. 5 VC/KIA (Conf), 19 VC/KIA (Prop), 1 Fr Battle Fatigue	
2252		27		Ref J#8 5 VC/KIA (Conf)	S-2
2.253		26		(Fr: Co D) At 251235H D Co, at BS 903309 rec'auto/wpns and s/a fire from ville at BS 87830 876306 and high ground leading units cought in cross fire. D Co deployed units, ret'd fire and swept area to front and flanks. 5 FH/MIA 10VC/KIA (Conf)	d 8,

250600	_to	260600	1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 100
Feb	(DTG)	1967	*
HIN OM)	7	(TRAR)	-

MIT NI	E OUT	nJ∷ NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
2253		29		(Fr: Co D) At 251530H at BS 891305 entire unit taken under fire by numerous auto wpns and were pinned down in rice paddy at BS 888307, 891303, 894307. Units deployed to bot flanks and front and arty, 81's, air called i on eneny position. 3 villes swept and cleared 1 Fi/VIA 29 VC/KIA (Conf)	n c
				Journel Closed at 260600H February	·

JOSEMAL CHEET 3d MardIV 3821/3

260600H to 270600H

Feb 1967

					Feb 1967	
TIME V	our	"J" NO.	DTG	Incidents, usus, criters	ACTION TAKEN	- ,
		1		BLT 1/4 Backloaded. Prep for phase II of operation DESOTO/DECKHOU	SE VI	
				Tactical withdrawal and backleading commenced at 0800H. Backleading completed by 1300H with exception of elements of Company C, security for downed UH-34 helicopter. Elements of Company C returned to USS VANCOUVER at 1700H.	S_3	
		,				
					·	
	, ,		Andrews and the second			
					·	
	1					

270600H to 260600H (DTG)

Feb 1967 (MONTH) (TRAR)

TIME		nJn	DITTO	THOTDENDE MECE ADDEDC	ACTION TAKEN
IN	our	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	NOIZON ZAZZA
		1	270 3 00H	HLT 1/4 commenced to land at GatEEN BEACH	·
332		2		(Fe: Co B) At 271130H at coord BS 798484 Co B encountered 36 VC, rec'd sniper fire 150 rd is/2010 ng enades incoming Returned, 10 M-79 rds and 4 LAAWS. 1 Ft/WIA 10 VC/KIA (Bank 14 VC/KIA (Prob)	
340		3		(Fr: Whise Air Ship) At 271200H at BS 798488 Uhies spotted 15-20 armed V.C, approx 10 wearing helements and green uniforms. This group appeared to be set up in possible ambush position. Uhies took VC under attack, rec'd s/a fire Fr VC. Was hit, forced down at Bn CP.	- S-3
1425	1	4		EOD on route to recon's position to blow 250 lb bomb.	S-3
1452		5		(Fr: Co B) At 271445 at coord BS 801481 Co E rec'd 5 incoming rds from hut. Fired 3.5 into hut, found burned body. 1 VC/KIA (Conf) 3 VC/KIA (Prob) En coord BS 800481	
500		6		(Fr: Co B) At Fr coord 746476 and En coord BS 796478 recieved approx 50 rds s/a fire. B-2 spotted 1 VC/KIA. Found packs, ponches, and one 250 lb DuD. 1 FR/WIA 12 VC/KIA (Bo	γω ' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1615		7		Frag #2 for period 271700H to 201700H. 1. Gold Lemon established night defensive position and ambush position. Submit might defensive fire plan, on 28 Feb con't S/D operation in sector Okinawa. Submit Helo and CAS. Requirments by 271800H more complete dat is required for Spot Reports. Empize capture of wpns and delerate S/D operations. 2. Frosty Gold support to ld Lemon operations. Provide 4 UH-34 to computation for MedEvac 1 Re-supply on 28 Feb. From Sunrise to sunset. Provide 2 UH-34 for night MedEvac from Sunset to sunrise.	

270600H to 280600H
(DTG)

Feb 1967
(MONTH) (TRAR)

TI	TIME "J"					
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
1800		8		(Fr: Co C) Gold Lemon C 33 sole swept area of air strike checking for effect. C-33 observed 6 men in tan uniforms following them subsequently fire returned with no tangable results, air strike area showed heavy strikes wounded civilians in evidence though no men of military age. Co's A and B has already swept same area. Would like to know presence of Tan uniform wearing men. We maintained tig defensive pirimeter, tight defense pirmeter a set out numbrus OP and LP. C-3 counted 2 VC/K (Conf) and 15 VC/KIA (Prob)	it ad	
1815		9		(Fr: Co B) At 1700H at coord BS 802476 came across suspected Vagabondes, held them until Itt personnel arrived. 2 VC/KIA (Prob)	5- 3	
1900		10		(Fr: Co A) Sit Rep Co A landed in one wave vicinity of LZ BAT, and the remainder of the Beach. The first wave recieved heavy smiper fire in LZ and returned same. En. expended approx 600 rds s/a and 10 Chi Com gernades Co A expended approx 1000 rds. 7.62, 5 M-79 and moved southwest toward present position incounter sporadic smiper fire all the way. Encountered 15 VC while on the march Co A-1 killed 8 VC and captured on Mussian Sniper weapon. Co A-2 encountered a small VC patrol and killed 3 including a VC corpsman, capturing his equipment. Night puzzles planned for tomight.		
1845		11		(Fr: Co A) At 1830 at coord BS 806475 A Co recieved heavy sniper fire within parmeter and the same was returned to the enemy. En expended approx 75 rds and Co A expended 150 rds. Co A con't mission. 2 FR/WIA 3 VC/KIA (Conf) 6 VC/KIA (Prob)	S-3	
1935		12		(Fr: Co C) C-3 reciseved s/a smiper fire at present time, returned same will advise.	S-3	

JOURNAL SHEET 3d MARDIV 3821/3

270600H to 280600H
(DTG)
Feb 1967
(MONIH) (TRAR)

TIME IN (J" O. DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1900	13	-	(Fr: Co D) At 271700H firm En coord BS 801486 and Fr Coord BS 800487 rec'd 15 rds sniper fire as MedEvac chopper was leaving position. Returned fire with M-60, M-79, and 60mm	
2000	16	19 <i>5</i> 0H	searched area, 3 VC/KIA (Conf) (Fr A Co) At 1950H at coord BS 796475 recieve 3 germades within perimeter resulting in 1 nor serious WIA, recieved approx 10 rds smiper fire and returned approx 100 rds. Con't mission 1 VC/KIA (Conf) 3 VC/KIA (Prob)	S-2
2006	17	19 <i>5</i> 0H	(Fr: Co C) Check entry #8 At 1400H at coord BS 790488 spotted 6mem at coord BS 799479 wearing tan uniforms followed them and was fired upon while checking air strike insame area. C-33 noted Co, A and Co B had cleared area before. 5 VC/KIA (Conf) 15 VC/KIA (Prof)	
2140	16		(Fr: Co B) At 272115H at coord BS 796476 rec's incoming carbine rounds and 1 gernade. Immed returned 30 to 40 rds s/a and 2 grenadice 2 VC/KIA (Conf)	S-2
2155	17		(Fr: Co A) At 272145H at BS 810474 A-2 caught unknown number of VC in their ambush. Patrol fired 175 rds s/a. Killed 3 VC, and captured 1 Carbine. 3 VC/KIA (Conf)	S-3 S-2
215	18	280 1 50i	(Fr: Co B) Co B at BS 786476 rec'd fire on perimeter, Fr approx 8-10 VC with Auto/wpns 150 to 200 yds, In front of cut lines rec'd 80 incoming rds. Immediatly ret'd fire 400 outgoing rds 5 LAAWS, 5 VC/KIA (Conf) 3 VC/KIA (Prop)	
225	9		(Fr Co D) at BS 793484 Co D rec'd approx 2 incoming smiper rds from south at BS 794480 retifire this hit at the perimeter of 2 Co. who also returned fire about 300 rds s/a and auto/wpns.	

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL SHEET
3d MARDIV 3821/3

270600H to 280600H

TIME) "U"						
IN	out	NO.	DIG	incidents, MSGS, Orders	action taken	4
230		20		(Fr: Co B) Ambush at BS 799478 captured 1 prisoner unarmed, who was behind their position. Prisoner made runtil gaged and bound. Changed position of ambush still holding prisoner for possible interegation. 1 VCC	S-3 S-2 oise n	
530		21		(Fr: Co B) At 0500H at Coord BS 796476 rec'd approx 75 rds and 3 grenades from est. 4 VC on perimeter ret'd 200 s/a rds, 3 M-79, 1 LAAW 3 VC/KIA (Constitution of the constitution of the	m.	★
		22		(Fr: Co B) At 0515 at coord BS 796476 began to move. 8 VC/KIA (Conf)		
				Journel Closed at 280600H February		
	•					

JOINVAL SHEET 3d MARDIV 3821/3

280600H to 010600H

TIME 1 DAIL					
	our	NO.	DIG :	Incidents, meos, dedes	ACTION TAKEN
740		1	280 500	(Fr Co B) At 0500H at coord BS 799480 5 VC moved into ambushes killing zone from the flank. Outstanding coverage. Because of civilians in area puzzle was relocated. 5 VC/KIA (Conf)	S-3
7 50		2		(Fr: S.3) Co D derected to conduct S/s operations to 65 7950.) S_3 Hill dale Laison advised
0815	•	3		(Fr: D Co) At 280745 at coord BS 79 3484 recieved approx 30 incoming s/a fire. Returned fire in heavy volume depatched 1 squad to investigate area. 1 FR/WIA (2 VC/KIA (Conf), 4 VC/KIA (Frop)	S_3
923		4	. 28090	(Fr Co B) At 280900H rec'd incoming gremade at BS 804475 on left flank, returned 20 rds s/a found 1 VC/KIA with ChiCom grenade between his legs. Blew gremades. 1 VC/KIA (Conf)	S-3
0930		5		(Fr: 79.5) GS 7850 VNAF dump area. 10 NOT send units north of Gold Lemon 49.5.	Co D S−3
09 4 0		6		(Fr: Co B) At 280930H at BS 802474 Co I rec'd 2 incoming grenades one 57mm, and 2 82mm in our perimeter. Ret'd fire approx 40 rds s/a, 2 LAAWS, one 3.5 rd 3 FR/WIA, 5VC/KIA (Conf) 6 VC/KIA (Pro 2 VCS	S-3 s.
1000		7		(Fr: Co C) One VN female triped and blew grenade at BS 807477, female was killed.	S-2 S-3
1049	3	8	28103	Ol (Fr: Co A) At 281030H at Coord BS 7914, while advancing south Co A encountered ChiCom grenades strung to tree. 1 FR/wlA, ConCtTon hiesion.	S-2 S-3
111	5	9	28110	(Fr: Co A) At 281105H A-1 unit at BS 796473 rec'd sporadic sniper fire, approx 20 rds from BS 897472. Returned approx 70 rds. 1 FR/WIA, 4 VC/KIA (Pro-	· d

Journal Sheet 3d Mardiv 3821/3



280600H to 010600H

TID N	our our	NO.	DIG	incidents, MSGS, orders	ACTION 1	AKIEN
1145		10		(Fr: Task Force X-ray) Friendly units to 1/5's north and 1/4 south west reported by 32 BS 7745.	t	S_3 S_2
1140		1 1		(Fr: Co D) At 281130H at BS 892495 rec'd smiper fire to front. While sweeping wille. Returned fire and advanced by fire, and maneuver 1 FN/MA, 4 VC/MA (Prob)		S-3 S-2
1213	·	12	281145i	(Fr: Co D) At 281145H at BS 792493 rec'd moderate sniper fire from BS 792495. Assaulted by air support, LAAMS 1 FM/ TA, 2 VC/KIA, (Conf) 4 VC/KIA (Frob). 1 document captured.	•	S-3
131	5	13	281210 ^H	(Fr: Co B) At BS 807471 Co B rec'd 10-12 incoming rds and 3 incoming gernade at BS 807470. Immediatly ret'd 50 s/a rds. Tank Plat blew bunker in vic. 1 FA/VIA, 2 VC/KIA (Conf) 5 VC/KIA (Pr		S - 3
) -	1350	14	. 2 8132 5	I (Fr: Co D) At coord BS 790497 observed 2 persons fleeing Co D advanced to the vic BS 790499. Both well comouflaged a wearing green uniforms. Immediate purs by fire. 1 possible NVA KIA (Conf), 1 VC/KIA (Prob) captured 38 888 mag and cartridge belt, wallet and personnegear.	north nd nt	S-3 S-2
1445		15		(Fr Co D) Reached vic. B3 788500. Now returning south.		S_2 S_3
1640		16		(Fr Co B) Co B at 2816051 at Coord BS 816464. Lec 30 incoming rds and 2 grenades which were launched. Returning 100 MG rds, 9 M-79 rds, and 3 LAAWS. 2 VC/KIA (Conf), 4 VC/KIA (Prop)	:	S-2 S-3
1700		17		(Fr: Hilldale) (To Chand FG) 1. Gold Lemon-Establish night ambush and defensive positions. Submit night defensive fire plan. On March 1 continuated operations in sector Okinawa and Goldwritheld and CAS req by 281800H. Sorthern boundary frigate RT 03 then to coord B3 763510 to B3 781483. Submit complete shell rep on all incoming rds.		

DECLASSIFIED

	L SH	ET 3821,	73		280600H to 010600H
TIM N	our	"J " NO .	DIG	Incidents, MSGC, Charks	action taken
1815		17		(con't(from last page) 2. Frosty Gold- support GL operations providing 4 UH-34's to computation for medivac/resupply, and 1 March and unto therwise directed from sunrise to sunset. Provide 2 UH-34's for night Medivac from sunset to surrise until otherwise directed, available from USS IND JIMA. (Fr Co A) SITEP Co A conducted S/D operations in assigned section. Destroyed numerous fortifical and bunkers and burned approx 3 tons of supplies. Night purzles set for tonight.	11 S-3
1845		19		(Fr Co D) At 1400H at coord BS 78849 chased 3 or 4 north Vietameses to a trench. 2 squads laid a base of fire 1 squad envelop/ed left, 60mm used with effect. 2 VC/KIA (Prob)	8 S-3 S-2
350		20	<u>)</u>	-(Fr Co D) At 1815 at coord BS 792487 D-2 hit by A/W. 2 squads from D-1 arrived to assist. 1 FR/WIA, 3 VC/KI (Prob)	and the second section of the section
1935		21		(Fr: Co C) At 1835H at coord BS 802489 VCS walked into wiew about 100 yds in front of C-1 positions. Retraced steps followed and captured 1 VCS.	S-3 S-2
2105	and the second second	22		(Fr: Co A) At 282100H at coord BS 805449 A-2 caught 3 VC in the ambush. A-2 exp approx 35 rds. 2 VC/KIA (Conf)	S -3 r S-2
0323		23		(Fr: Co B) At 010245H at coord BS 309468 rec'd 12 60mm Mortars in and around primeter. Ret'd 15 81mm rds good coverage of suspected area ajusted by ambushes. Also 56 rds of arty fire teturned. 3 VC/KIA (Pro JOURNEL CLOSED AT 010600H	S-3
			÷,	OCCUMENT CHOSED RIGIOOM	

William VV 10 MART WALLA THE RIPORTERS DESCRIPTION 0 2617000 PMB 67 PR BLT GIR CLARE FOUR TO ZERIABLY ONE STARY FOUR INFO ZFUZOTO SEVEN NINE PT FIVE FRANCO ST NRAY TORTOTO OF SUR SIE BY FINE CONTEMPORARY RESPIRED OF CHARGO PIVE PI ONE Photogramson Basic Venin wak and the following the property

TRAC CIBEL, WE I FOR DESCRIPTION HOUSE VI'PHASE II.

1. The All States Ass Server 1.7014 SSELES 69381 AND II, 6638

17 And 28% 19 (17) 11 bi (04048 2969 19 (17) 12 (17)

THE STATE OF THE SECTION OF THE PROPERTY AND A PROPERTY AND A SECTION OF THE PROPERTY AND A PROP

THE THE STATE A COMPANIES OF STREET OF STATE OF

a dia ny angana ara kaman a <mark>di mma (m)</mark> .

}

CONTROL OF THE CHARMETES FOR HELICOFFER IN LY'S BAT AND CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF

The second of the more present the graph of the second of

COTO COMPANY

and the control of th



PAGE THREE RUMFUAK 594 S E C R E T

C. COMPANY C LAND AT HE HOUR OM D PLUS I IN LVIS OVER BEACH GREEN. SEIZE THE BEACH, ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE PERIMETER TO PROVIDE FOR THE LANDING OF BLT HQDS AND ARTILLERY ELEMENTS. COORDINATE THE SECURITY OF BEACH GREEN.

D. BATTERY G LAND ON ORDER IN LANDING CRAFT OVER BEACK GREEN. ESTABLISH FIRING POSITION. PROVIDE GENERAL SUPPORT WITH PRIORITY OF FIRES TO BLT 1/4.

E. 107MM MORTAR BATTERY LAND ON ORDER BY HELICOPTER VICINITY BEACH GREEN. ESTABLISH FIRING POSITION PROVIDE REINFORCING FIRES

F. TANK PLATOON LAND ON ORDER OVER BEACH GREEN. PROVIDE 1 SECTION (3 TANKS) IN DIRECT SUPPORT COMPANY A. PROVIDE ONE SECTION (2 TANKS) V DIRECT SUPPORT COMPANY B. and the second

G. ONTOS PLATOON LAND ON ORDER OVER BEACH GREEN. GENERAL SUP-T OF BLT. H.AMTRAC PLATOON REF B TRY OF BLT.

1. SHORE PARTY REF B EXCEPT BEACH GREEN

J. ENGINEER PLATOON

(1) LAND ON ORDER OVER BEACH GREEN.

(2) PROVIDE CLOSE ENGINEER SUPPORT TO THE BLT.

PAGE FOUR RUMFUAK 594 S & C R E T

K. RECOR PLATOON

(1) LACO OR ORDER BY HER PROPER IN VICINITY OF BEACH GREEN.

A (2) COMPLET RECOR AND SURVEYILANCE DISSIONS AS ASSIGNED.

L. Hat Gold T. DY

()) LAND ON ORDER BY RELECTIFER IN VICINITY REACH GREEN.

(P) DIED TORTAL PLANOOR (-), 166 RR PLATOON (-) IN GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE HIT.

No BLY RESILEM.

CIN LARD OR OTHER TO REPORT OR LARDING CHAFT IN DESIGNATION OF THE PORTS OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE PROPERTY OF

KAN THE THE CAPAGE LINE COMESSION OF LEXIVALIZATION WAS LIKE THE BUT AREA OF CARRESTON

N. COME TO THE THE MENTER S

(1) Survival Service Service Service Service Bulkering (PASS)

do e a nevel designado. Por esta en a persona de esta en altre en altre



AGE FIVE RUMFUAK 584 S E C R E T

(8) CENTERED GREEN BEACH COORDINATES. BS 812487

(9) CENTERED LZ COORDINATES: BAT BS 798484 ALT DOVE BS 796495 BUZZARD BS 783478 ALT VULTURE BS 789486.

BS 8048 SHIP BS 8545 BS 8040 RANK WHISKEY DISEASE BS 7836 COIN BS 7040 CANDY BS 7345

(11) CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS WILL BE EXERCISED BY IF X-RAY.

(18) ASSAULT COMPANIES GUIDE CENTER ...

(13) REPORT WHEN REACHING 粗L PHASE LINES。

(14) WITHDRAVAL CODE NAME NURPHY NOAR BED

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. REFERENCE F APPLIES

B. TAC LOG WILL BE ESTABLISHED ABOARD THE LPH & LSD.

C. RESUPPLY

1. RESUPPLY REQUEST WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE F. RE-

PAGE SIX RUMFUAK 594 S E C R E T

SUPPLY WILL BE DRAWN FROM THE LSA DUC PHO:

2. WATER RESUPPLY AND A RATIONS WILL BE DRAWN FROM LPH.

3. UNIT RESUPPLY WILL BE DELIVERED DIRECT FROM LSA DUC PHO TO THE REQUESTING UNIT UTILIZING HELDS.

D. SERVICES 1. LSA DUC PHO PROVIDES LIMITED THIRD ECHELON AND COMPELECT MAINTENAUCE,

2. LPH PROVIDES DATTERY RECHARGING SERVICE.

F. IAC LOG SUBMIT REPORT IN FOLLOWING FORMAT BY 1200 AS OF 1800 DAMAY CORMERCING D PLUS I

I. MAINS OF SUPPLIES

CHASS I GUADINING ON HARD OF THE STATE OF TH

100 (100 P) 100 (100 P) 100 (100 P) 为被数据的数据的 (1942年) 1943年(1944年)


Compared to the compared the control of the control

A. INCIDENCE WAS ARRESTED WAS INCIDENCED TO BE SERVED AND PROPERTY AND

PAGE SEVEN RUMFUAK 594 S E C R E T A. ANNEX J (COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS) TO REFERENCE (B). (1) SLF COI ISSUED SEPARATELY. (2) RADION SILENCE UNTIL H-90 MIN. B. COMMAND POST (I) AFLOAT SPECIAL LANDING FORCE GCTG 79.5) IWO JIMA LPH-2 (BLT) BLT 1/4 IWO JIMA LPH-23 (2) ASHORE BLT 1/4 TO BE ANNOUNCED. COMPANIES REPORT WHEN ESTABLISHED C. COMMAND RELATIONS: REFERENCE (B) GP-4 PT ToD! 1850 8 26 406 67 CO. NO. OPS(1)



HEADQUARTERS Battalion Landing Team 1/4 FPC San Francisco, 96502



3: EHB: thg 9 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander Special Landing Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DECKHOUSE VI)

(a) MAPS: VIETNAM, AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000; Sheets 6738 I, II Ref: 6338 III, IV.

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 1204-67

(1) Overlay of operation, Phase I .icl: Overlay of operation, Phase II

(3) Op Order 2-67 (DECKHOUSE VI) actived

1. Operation DECKHOUSE VI.

Dates of Operation.

a. Phase I Operation DECKHOUSE VI 16 February to 26 February 1967. b. Phase II Operation DECKHOUSE VI 27 February to 3 March 1967.

Location. The operation was conducted in the DUC PHO and MO DUC listricts of QUANG NGAI province, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

4. Task Organization

BLT 1/4

Lt Col JACK WESTERMAN

Capt. OR OR RAN

Company A (Rein)

Det, Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm) 3rd Sqd 4th Plat Go B, Engr Bn.

Det H&S Co. (Corpsman) Det H&S Co. (FAC Tm)

Det 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd SP Bn. (LZCT)

1st Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

1st Sec 106RH Plat

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co RLT-26

Company B (Rein)

Det, Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Im)

2nd, Sqd 4th Plat, to B; 3rd Engr Bn.

Det H&S Co (Corpenan)

Det H&S Co (FAU Tm)

Det 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd SP Bn. (IZCT)

2nd Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

3rd Sec 106RR Plat

Det Smiper Sqd, Hq Co RLT-26

Capt RAMSEY

DECLASSIFIED

40 Rpd, SECKNOUSE

UNCLACE

SECTION

Company C (Rein)

Det Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det H&S Btry, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (NG SPT.Tm)

1st Sqd, 4th Plat Co B, 3rd Engr Bn,

Det H&S Co (81mm Fo)

Det H&S Co (FAC Tm)

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

Capt, KELLY

Company D (Rein)

Det Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

Det, 4th Plat Co B, 3rd Engr Bn,

4th Sec 10678 Plat

4th Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

Lt. JUL

H&S Company (-) (Rein)

Det Hq Co 4th Marines (Rdo Relay)

Det Comm SPT Co, 9th MAB (Rdo Relay)

Det Hq Co, 3rd Mar Div (Postal, Disbursing)

Det Hq Co, 9th MAB (ISO Tm)

Smiper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

Det Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (Arty Ln Tm)

C&C Platoon, Co D, 3rd Med Bn

Det 15th Dental Co

Capt. MORIGEAU

Btry G (_) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines

Mortar Btry (Rein) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines

4th Plat, (Rein) Co. B, 3rd Engr Bn.

2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd Recon Bn

4th Plat (Rein) Co B, 1st Amtrack Bn

2nd Plat, Co B, 3rd AT Bn

1st Plat, Co A, 3rd TK Bn

Logistical Support Unit Det, 3rd Serv Bn (FLSG_B) 1st Flat, Co C, 3rd MT Bn

Shore Party Team

1st Plat (-) (Rein) 3rd SP Bn
Det 3rd Serv Bn
Det Beachmaster Unit

Str. Marine

Capt. KIRLAND

Capt. SIKES

Lt. FLDER

GySgt MEYERS

Lt. SULLIVAN

Lt. RICHARDSON

Lt. BERNARD

Lt. WOODS

It. SUMMA

(4ttached on landing)

Francisco Paris Com

GENOLD IN

A STATE OF THE STATE OF

5. Supporting Forces

a. The variety and quentity of supporting forces utilized during Operation DECCOUNTE VI was impressive. Air, Artillery, Naval Gunfire, Tanks, Regimeer and Anti-Wank units all played an integral part in the execution of both phases and contributed to the over LL success.

Operation of the Fire Support Coordination Center was in accordance with current doctrine and no unusual problems were encountered. The selection of raise frequencies within the FSCC did greate minor interference problems implicitly but these were eliminated by changing certain nets to different frequencies.

Tanks were utilized with good results under suitable terrain conditions to support search and desirely operations, however mechanical failures reduced their offectiveness on occasion.

Fach rifle company was provided close combat engineer support for the destruction of fortifications and obstacles with good results. The effectiveness of the Anti-tank Plateon was reduced by terrain factors. Operation Market-Time craft were utilized effectively to control inshore junk and fishing boat traffic and to grand infiltration and exciltration by sea.

b. Air Support. Air support during both phases of DECKHOUSE WI was furnished by the 1st MAW. Fixed wing land bases fighter/attack aircraft provided close air support and Botary wing support was provided by HMM-363 and embarked detachments of UHIF and CH-46 aircraft from 1st MAW. Aviation support of this Operation was adequate. Close air support (CAS) was readily available, accurate and timely. CAS was used more extensively during Phase II due to a larger number of vargets landing themselves to this particular type of attack. CAS was particulary effective against trench and bunker complexes encountered and proved extremely effective when used in conjunction with artillery and Naval Cunfire shead of advancing troops. Control of CAS missions was both by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) organic to the BLT and Tactical Air Controllers Airborne (TACAs). The use of FACs was more evident during Phase I where the terrain provided better observation than in Phase II when TACAs were used predominently due to the low flat terrain and hedgerows. In general the majority of the salities in both phases were controlled by TACAs in coordination with the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs).

Helicopter support was excellent in both phases. Troop lifts during assault and withdrawal operations during both phases went smoothly and proved flexible and responsive to the rapidly changing tactical situation. During the landing operations of Phase II the heavy enemy fire encountered in the landing rones dictated landing the heliborne forces on GREEN Beach. This was accomplished both quickly and smoothly. Helicopter logistical support was generally excellent throught the operation. Minor difficulities were encountered during withdrawal operations in both phases due to the limited availability of CH-46's to carry certain heavy loads such as artillery pieces,

SINGTON

MICHAGE

ammunition and communications wans. Suppressive fire by armed UH1E air-craft proved outstanding in effectiveness and was used heavily throughout the operation under all conditions.

Communications was in general satisfactory. The tactical air control party local net also served as the primary air request net due to the proximity of the shipboard Supporting Arms Coordination Center and the excellent communications available through out the operation on this frequency. It was noted that air-ground communications on a frequency near the high end of the range of the AN/PRC 41 were poor when frequency near the middle of this range proved excellent under identical circumstances.

No unusual uses were made of air forces and existing Marine Corps air ground team doctrine proved sound in all respects.

c. Artillery. Phase I. Battery "G" (-) (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines landed on D-Day in direct support of BLT 1/4. Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines landed on D+4 with the mission of reinforcing the fire of Battery "G"..

Resupply of ammunition was adequate for the most part, thus allowing the batteries to fire extensively in support of the operation.

Both batteries provided accurate fires on all targets of opportunity and preparatory missions. Harrassing and Interdiction fires were utilized extensively to prevent the enemy from massing and using avenues of approach.

Phase II, Battery "G" and Mortar Battery landed D+1 with the same mission as Phase I. The landing was most expeditious and both fatteries were prepared to fire in minimal time.

The extent and accuracy of fires in support of BLT 1/4 during Phase I were continued to an even greater degree during Phase II.

d. Naval Gunfire Support. Phase I. From the pre H-hour fires of D-Day until the withdrawal on D+10, the BLT was actively and accurately supported by Naval Gunfire Support ships which provided beach neutralization, area preparation, destruct and H&I fires. Fire support ships during this phase included: USS CANBERRA (CA-2), USS PROVIDENCE (CLG-6), USS DUNCAN (DD 874), USS HENRY B. WILSON (DDG-7), USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409), and USS WHITE RIVER (LSMR 536). The primary problem was one of communications and utilization of the AN/PRC 47 and was caused by lack of an adequate number of BB 451, and personnel errors in getting the batteries to and from USS IWD JIMA (LPH-2) for recharging and use in the field.

Phase II. Pre H-Hour D-Day fires on GREEN Beach and primary landing zones were not used in this phase of the operation. Area targets, prep fires and H&I fires were provided by USS TURNER JOY (DD 951), USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409) and USS WHITE RIVER (LSMR 536) from H-hour on D+1 until withdrawal on D+4.

UNGLASS

SECON

e. Recapitulation of Air, Naval Gunfire and supporting arms.

Landing Force artillery expended 2698 rounds of ammunition in support of the operation, While firing 23 preparatory missions, 259 H&I missions, 13 illumination missions, 16 concentration adjustment missions, 1 registration and fire missions on 46 targets of opportunity.

Aviation forces expended 23,460 rounds of 20mm cannon, 105,00 rounds of 7.62mm, 334 2.75" rockets, 158 tons bombs and 92 tons of napalm while flying 267 close air support missions, 616 fire suppression sorties and 3708 troop lift, logistical, and medical evacuation flights.

Naval Gunfire ships fired 4,284 rounds of various types of amountaion while firing 14 beach preps, 342 H&I's, 2 illumination and 23 destruction missions.

6. INTELLIGENCE.

- a. Enemy Strength and Situation prior to Operation DECHOUSE VI.
 - (1) Operation DECKHOUSE VI Phase I.
- as a major resupply and rest area for the VC. Insurgent forces committed in the area of operations for DECKHOUSE VI Phase I were identified as follows:
 - 1. 7th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div.
 Strength: Approximately 350
 Weapons: Uhknown
 Location: Reported moving north from
 BS 9104 as of 27 January 1967.
 - ii. 8th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt, 3rd NVA Div.
 Strength: Approximately 250
 Weapons: Unknown
 Location: Reported moving north from
 BS 9104 as of 27 January 1967.
 - iii. Elements of the 409th Sapper Bn.
 Strength: Uhknown
 Weapons: 1 81mm Mortar, 2 60mm Mortars, 1 57mm Rev.
 2 30 cal MG, and an unknown number of smell arms.
 Location: Uhknown.
- (b) Enemy Capabilities. During phase I, generally, it was anticipated that the enemy would avoid contact. If contact was initated by the enemy he would do so at his own discretion, utilizing all military advantages favorable to him. He was expected to mine landing zones and avenues of approach in and near his installations and facilities. It was

Uncertain

TOTAL TOTAL

determined that it would be unlikely that whenevery would defend or attack in any strength because in doing so he would have to mass and move his troops, exponing them to friendly supporting arms and aerial observation.

- (2) Operation DECKHOUSE VI Phase II
- (a) Enemy Situation. The enemy activities in the operating area of Phase II were described as intensive patrolling activity for the purpose of maintaining a secure rouse of transportation for arms, amunition, and other supplies being infiltrated into the area. Enemy forces located in the operational area were identified as follows:
 - 1. 1 unidentified Bn.
 Strength: 350 450
 Weapons: 10 57mm RR, 2 75mm RR, 2 50 cal MG, and
 5 82mm Mortans.
 Location: Chaerwed in area bounded by BS 804470,
 BS 801450, and BS 825452 as of 25
 February 1967.
 - ii. 1 unidentified Bn (Possibly the 19th Main Force Bn)
 Strongth: 350 450
 Weapons: 10 57mm RR, 2 75mm RR, 2 50 cal MG,
 and 5 82mm Mortars.
 Location: Usually operates in area, vicinity
 BS 790496 as of February 1967.
- (b) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was anticipated to avoid heavy contact, limiting their operations to harassing sniper fire and to covertly withdraw the main body of his forces from the area of operations. The enemy would, upon making contact with Marine units consider all phases of engagement and select time and terrain of his own choosing. Enemy initated actions would be to his own advantage.
 - b. Frank Strength and Situation During Operation DECKHOUSE VI.
- (1) Phase I. During the first phase of the operation, local forces units up to platoon level encountered. Heavy sniper fire was recieved by Marines throughout Phase I. The enemy appeared to be deployed in delaying or defensive positions and would only expend numerous rounds of small arms and automatic weapons when contact with Marines was inevitable. There were no incidents where Marines recieved enemy fire from crew-served weapons during the first phase of the operation.

Several enemy documents were captured, but there were no units identified in any of the captured documents or from any other intelligence
sources.

There were two significant items of intelligence value gained during phase 7.

SECRET

One, throughout the operation the enemy continually displayed the tactic of immediate removal of weapons from his casualties thereby limiting the number of captured weapons to a disappropriate number in comparison to the casualties he outliered.

6...

They, on many occasions Marines encountered primitive and hastily constructed purify pits, surplies firing devices, and mines. On one occasion several tail fin assembles were located, and it was determined that these fin assemblies were possible crude mortar tubes. In conclusion the enemy was considered poorly equiped and utilized theme made" areament.

(2) Phase II. Buring the second phase of the operation both Local Force and Main Force write were encountered. The first holicopter wave of Marines to make the landing met with heavy volume of automatic and send-automatic weapons fire hos well concealed enemy positions. Also the first wave of antrace met with automatic and send-automatic weapons fire from enemy positions. Fromy subject fire was recieved continuously during the account phase. Marines recieved fire from enemy crow-served weapons on the second phase of the operation. From the incidence that occurred during the second phase of the operation it is estimated that the remainder of the enemy left in the area had the mission of delaying/harassing friendly units, while the majority of the enemy forces exfilterated out of the area.

Items of captured equipment indicated that there were remnants of

Main Force units in the area of operations.

Beside using the tactic of immediate removal of warpons as described in paragraph 3, (1), the enemy cucountered ducing Phase II displayed evidences of being Main Powce units, specifically in regard to better quality warpons, equipment and closer adherence to military tactics. Therefore, during Phase II, the enemy exhibited the qualitities of a better equipped, better trained military force with access to higher quality and standardized armaments.

c. Torography and Climate.

- (1) Terrain, Cover and Concealment.
- (a) Terrain Phase I. The terrain encountered consisted of populated Hamlets, rice peddies, moderately dense jungle in rugged hills, with intermittent streams throughout.
- (b) Terrain Phase II. The terrain encountered consisted of primarily populated areas and rice paddies with hedge rows running through the area.
- (c) Gover and Concealment Phase I and II. Cover and concealment was afforded the enemy in populated areas, not only by the use of man-made objects, but also by intermingling with the local populace. Cover and concealment was predominant in the rugged hills as provided by dense undergrowth.
 - (2) Obstacles and Critical Terrain Features Phase I and II.
- (a) Obstacles. The principal obstacles to foot and vehicular movement were the rugged bills, vegetation, and numerous streams.

SHOPE

(b) Critical Terrain Features.

- i. Phase I. Objectives 1. 3. 5 were critical terrain features during Phase I. Objectives 1 and 3 over-looked avenues of approach and suspected energy routes of infiltration/exfiltration. Objectives 1 and 3 offered good observation and added to the successful utilization of supporting arms. Objective 5 was occupied during Phase I because it afterned good observation of landing beach. In addition hills #49 (693294) and 25 (898306) provided good observation and vantage points for the use of supporting arms. Hill #25 was of particular importance as it provided excellent observation and security for both the FLT CP and adjacent Landing Zones/beach.
- ii. There were no critical terrain features encountered during Phase II within the BLT TAOR.
- (3) Observation and Avenues of Approach.

(a) Coastal Plain. Observation and fields of fire in rice paddles good to poor. Restrictions on observation included tree stands, titches, and the height of the rice plant. Avenues of approach included National Highway #1 and small trafficable streams.

(b) Rills. For the most part, the vegetation on the hills was discontinuous canopied forest with dense undergrowth which afforded observation which was at been 5 reviews. The sestioned areas of continuus canopied forests, with hight to moderate undergrowth, offered observation up to a maximum of 30 meters.

(4) Westher.

- (a) Fredigitation. Scattered light rain showers, mostly in the early morning and late afternoon, occurred during the time period of the operation,
- (b) Visibility, Visibility was unrestricted except during periods of early morning my and of rain showers when it was reduced to approximately 3 to 5 miles.
- (a) Temperature, Temperature in the operating area ranged from 60° maximum to 35° maximum.
- d. Esychological Warfara Efforts. The psychological Warfare Team was of considerable assistance during Operation DECKHOUSE VI, Phase I and II. Their most roticable capacity was the relocation and control of indigenous personnel. The Vietnamese attitude was one of indifference, although the majority cooperated.

Through the use of recordings and speakers, the psychological Warfare Team emphasized our desire to help the mattive people. This method of indoctrination was used prior to Med-Sap activities.

The Psychological Warfare Team Also assisted in Counter Intelligence Operations.

STOUTH!

7. Mission.

- a. Phase I. Commencing at L-hour on P-day land by heliborne assualt in designated landing zones, relae landing force objectives # and 3 establish blocking positions on review of ogness from SA RUMM area. At H-hour land one company over Beach HAUS and seize objective 2. On order conduct Scarch and Destroy operations in the vicinity of landing force objectives 1 and 3. On order seize objective 4 and 5.
- b. Phase II. Commencing at L-hour on B-day plus 1 land two companies by helicopter in designated handling somes. Land one company by Amphibian tractors over Basel GARN. Conduct Search and Bestroy operations in sector OKINAWA, on order conduct Search and Destroy operations in Sectors GUM and GULDALCANAL.

8. Concept of Operations.

- a. Phase I (Enclosure 1)
- (1) The operation was planned to rapidly isolate the objective area by landing one company by indicapter at Libertian landing zone ROBIN to seize objective 7, and one company immediability following in landing zone PARROT to seize objective 3.
- (2) At Heliour one company was to land by Amphibian tractor ever Beach BLUE to scize objective 2 and secure the landing beach.
- (3) The Recon platoon was to be inserted, on order, in the beach area north of chirothive 4 to maintain observation of an this avenue of escape and through the the of supporting arms to limit exfiltration of the objective area.
- (4) The 105mm Howitzer Battery and 107mm Mortar Battery attached to the Bill were to be formed under a Provisional Artillery Group after landing. The 105mm Howitzer Battery was bested in landing craft, on call, for rapid displacement achors. The 107mm Mortar Battery was to be landed on order in the vicinity of objective 1.
- (5) One reinforced company was to form the PLT Reserve on board the LPD for possible employment by either surface or helitorne means.
- (6) A platoon size SPARROW HAWA was formed from H&S Company and attached units and rotained aboard the LFH for possible on Appendix.
- (7) After the seizing of objectives 1, 2, 3, and the establishment of blocking positions, one company (Rain) was to begin deliberate Search and Destroy operations in objective A and 5 annihilate the enemy forces therein. On order the BAT was to conduct a withdrawel, reembarking aboard the assigned shipping in a general toward of the landing plan.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

SHORTER

b. Phase II (Enclosure 2)

- (1) Phase II of the operation DECKHOUSE VI was actually a part of Op
- (2) This Phase of the operation called for rapid backloading and landing of the RUT. It was but 1/2 hours from the completion of backloading Phase I to the landing of the first wave of Phase II.
- (3) The concept called for the landing of two companies by helicopter borne means at Tahour into landing somes BAT and BUZZARD in order to close of the Feedinsula formed to the South by the SONG TRA CAU.
- (4) One Company was to be landed over Beach GREEN to provide for the landing of the BLT Headquarters and artillery elements.
- (5) The 105mm Howitzer Battery was again pre-boated and placed on call for rapid deployment as the
- (6) The 107mm Mortar Pattery was nonscheduled and was to land by helicopter in the vicinity of Boach GREEN immediate following the landing by the 2nd heliborne assualt company.
- (7) One Company was decignated the PLT Reserve and remained aboard the LPD for landing by either surface or heliborne means.
- (8) The Recon Plateon was to be landed by helicopter in the vicinity of Beach GREEN. Then move north to a position in order to place observation over the northern approaches to the landing area and to interdict the in/exfiltration of the objective area throught the use of supporting arms and or the attached sniper team.
- (9) After the initial landings were accomplished, two companies were to turn southeand and destroy the enemy contained within the area of operations by conducting deliberate Search and Destroy operations to the southern river boundary.
- (10) On order the ELT was to conduct a withdrawal, reembarking aboard the assigned shipping in a general reversal of the landing plan.

9. Execution.

a. Phase I

(1) The initial order for operation DECHOUSE WE was received at 1218005 February 1967. The operation itself did not commence until 160830M. Weather precluded one list on 15 February 1967 as orginally planned.

Smalleage

UNCLANTERA

3200.20

- (2) At 160800H preparatory fires began and the first helicopter borne wave departed the LPH on time at 160855H. The initial lift and all subsequent lifts landed without enemy opposition.
- (3) By 160930H Company A had seized objective 1. Company C landed in LVT's secured ELUE Beach and extended their movement to objective 2. The Alpha Command Group landed on HLUE Beach at 1150H and immediatly began establishment of the ELT Command Post. Recon Platoon was inserted in the northern and of objective 4 at 162010H without incident. They established a perimeter and began surveillance of that portion of the TAOR.
- (4) Company B was helicopter borne into landing zone PARROT at 161015H.
- (5) Battery "G" was landed by LCM over BLUE Beach and arrived at 161043H.
- (6) Company C reported that one Marine detonated a land mine, coordinates BS 922225, at 161310H resulting in the first Marine KIA.
- (7) At 161600H CTG 79.5 Frag Order #2 was received requiring all units to establish night defense and ambush postions. Farly 17 February 1967 conduct deliberate and aggressive search and destroy operations and continue the attack to seize objectives 4 and 5.
- (8) At 161800H Company B spotted 2 VC at coordinates BS 989236 moving toward beach area, 6 rounds of 60mm mortar were fired and a platoom was moved to the area to investigate the results. Investigation revealed 2 VC/KIA (Prob). Company B coordinated an air strike on Hill 415.
- (9) At 162010H Company C cleared the village located at BS 918227 of 8 punji traps, 5 surpise firing devices and 6 tunnels, 11 bunkers and 1 road block.
- (10) At 162030H a platoon from Company A made contact with 3 VC located at BS 917253. The platoon received 30 rounds S/A fire and returned 50 7.62 rounds and 1 M-79 round. Results reported were 3 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (11) At 170630H preparatory fires on objective 4 were begun by Naval Gunfire.
- (12) At 170735H Company A left present location for Phase Line ALPHA, extending north and south between objectives 1 and 4.
- (13) At 170745H Company C moved on Highway #1 accompanied by a section of Ontos.
- (14) At 170800H Company B reported all ambushes returned to their Command Post. Company B reverted to Landing Force Reserve and continued patrolling.

UNCLASSIVE

SECRE

- (15) At 170830H Company D landed at coordinates BS 928275 relieving Recon and began moving toward objective 4.
- (16) At 171132H Company D found enemy bunkers while sweeping a village located at BS 924270. The bunkers were destroyed.
 - (17) At 171300H Company A arrived at Phase Line ALPHA.
- (18) At 171725H Recon Platoon proceeded to hill #93 located at BS 937238.
- (19) At 171800H Frag Order #3 was received from CTG 79.5 to continue assigned mission.
- (20) At 172100H Company B spotted 9 VC entering an installation BS 917237. VC were armed and artillery fire was called in with excellent coverage resulting in 9 VC/KIA (Prob)
- (21) At 180815H a special Forces Team visited the Battalion Command Post to coordinate recon of objective four for use as a possible Special Forces Temps
- (22) At 172200H Company C reported destroying one pill box, 13 bunkers, 11 vpci Wacks, 15 punji pits, 3 surpise firing devices, 5 enemy trench lines and 24 enemy fortified positions.
- Com grenade invide their paraleter.
- (24) At 180920H Recon Platoon arrived at the Battalion Command Post.
- (25) At 181330H a Company A patrol searched the village located at BS 907253, killing one sniper and found one Thompson Sub Machine Cun with magazine and amusition. The enemy supplies were destroyed and medical equipment retained.
 - (26) At 181410H Recon Platoen moved north on Highway # 1 to BS 918288.
- (27) At 181505H a Company D platoon received S/A fire from the ridge at BS 927268. Platoon returned fire, one VC/KIA (Prob).
- (28) at 181615H Frag Order # 4 was received from CTG 79.5 changing the grid reference code system effective 190800H.
- (29) At 181500H Recon Platoon located at BS 918242, called an air strike which resulted in 5 VC/KIA (Conf).
- (30) At 181855H a Company a platoon at BS 895270 received 60 rounds S/A fire from BS 895272. The platoon isturned fire and advanced through the village. The platoon destroyed 18 fortified positions causing extensive fires and damage.
- (31) At 190129H the Battalion Command Post was notified that the Civil Action Group will arrive on or about 190745H.

The Comment

- (32) At 190520H a Company C patrol received 8 rounds sniper fire. The patrol returned slive with unknown results.
- (33) At 190800H Recon Platoon fired preparatory fire with the Ontos at BS 915044 and noted one secondary explosion.
- (34) At 190915H Company A found VC supplies at BS 889276. All supplies were destroyed.
- (35) At 191020H a Company C platoon at BS 919240 destroyed a road block.
- (96) At 191200H Company B at BS 892234H found enemy supplies and installations, all were destroyed.
- (37) At 191630H Frag Order # 5 was received directing displacement to RED Beach on order.
- (38) At 191831H a Company A platoon swept the village at BS 897272 and received expensive supper live. The platoon returned fire and destroyed numerous forbidied positions and supplies.
- (39) At 191937H Company D located at BS 924253 received approximately 25 rounds S/A fire and returned fire with S/A and M-79 grenade launchers. One VO/NOA (Conf).
- (40) At 192125H Company B at BS 916236 spotted 15 VC with weapons converging at an energy inspectation. Artillary was called in resulting in 10 VC/KLA (Frob).
- (A) At 200800H Company C began moving to new command post located at RED Beach.
 - (42) At 200910H the 107mm Fortor Battery began arriving by helicopter to RED Beach.
 - (43) At 200916H the Recon Platoon arrived at RFD Beach.
 - (hh) At 201130H Company B began conducting search and destroy operations in the vicinity of E0 879262.
 - (45) At 201200H Company B platoon found enemy equipment. They brought the equipment to the Battalion S-2.
 - (46) A Company A platoon reported that between 200830H and 201500H at BS 888287 a patrol received light smiper fire. The patrol returned fire and deptroyed a large number of fortified positions and supplies.
 - (17) At 201630H a Company P patrol received sniper fire from BS 930259. The patrol returned fire with one VC/KIA (Comf).

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

مکم

- (48) At 201750H the 105 Battery completed trasnplacement to RED Beach.
- (49) At 202150H Frag Order # 6 was received from CTG 79.5 changing grid reference codes.
- (50) At 210920H the recon Platoon reported arriving at Hill 215, located at BS 865292, to conduct surviellance in that area.
- (51) At 212030H a Company D platoon at BS 931256 located and destroyed Punji pits and spider traps.
- (52) Company C with section of tanks conducted Search and Destroy operations along the peninsula of RED Beach.
- (53) At 21130H Company A in the vicinity of BS 893292 observed enemy sniper at BS 895294 firing at tanks and a Company C platoon. Company A returned fire killing 3 VC/KIA (Conf).
- (54) At 211726H Recon at BS 876287 saw an emeny patrol and called air strikes, 1 VC/KIA (Conf) and 2 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (55) At 210730H Company B moved to assigned objective and began Search and Destroy operations.
- (56) At 212030H a Frag Order # 7 was received from CTG 79.5 indicating that displacement is likely.
- (57) At 212130H a Company A ambush at BS 876292 encountered 30 VC. Ambush took VC under fire killing 12 VC/KIA (Conf), one Thomspon Sub Machine Gun was captured.
- (58) At 220908H the Battalion Scouts received sniper fire from vicinity BS 892308. A 106RR returned fire resulting in 1 VC/KIA (Conf).
 - (59) At 221045H EOD destroyed one 5001b bomb dud, 7 105mm illumination rounds, 3 155 illumination rounds and 1 106HFAT round at BS 89852960.
 - (60) At 221300H a Company D patrol at BS 924254 received automatic weapon fire from vicinity BS 930254. They returned fire with small arms and swept area destroying enemy opposition and positions.
 - (61) At 221300H Company A captured 2 VCS at BS 889302 watching friendly movement.
 - (62) At 221615 the battalion received Frag Order #8 from CTG 79.5 to continue assigned mission.
 - (63) At 221721H Company C (Medin) swept area at coordinates BS 914283. Installations and enemy positions and supplies were destroyed.

CHOLASSIED

CECEST!

- (64) At 230800H Company A began moving to Hill # 105.
- (65) At 231225H the Recon platoon reached objective four by helicopter.
- (66) At 231245H Company B at BS 901297 found an installation containing VC equipment.
- (67) At 231405H Company B at BS 845298 found a camoulaged punji pit in the road with metal stakes. It was destroyed.
- (68) At 231615H Frag Order #9 was received directing continuence of assigned mission.
- (69) At 231730H the Recon Platoon at BS 849297 spotted 5 VC with weapons. One VC was killed by a friendly sniper and air strikes were called on the remaining four.
- (70) At 232040H Company B at BS 832306 found a large amount of VC supplies and equipment. No facilities were available to remove the supplies and equipment. Samples were taken, the remainder were destroyed.
- (71) At 2/0735H Company B located at BS 829283 found a surprise firing device within their perimeter. The device, a 105mm round, was destroyed in place.
 - (72) At 240827H a Company A platoon received light sniper fire, at BS 875300, while returning from night ambush. The platoon returned a heavy volume of fire and recovered 2 M-1 carbine magazines with amminition.
 - (73) At 240930H Company C destroyed bunkers, punji pits and suprise fixing devices at BS 901310 and BS 897310.
 - (74) At 241700H Company C received 30 rounds sniper fire, at BS 844348. Fire was returned and the area searched, 2 VC/KIA (Conf).
- (75) At 21/1700H Frag Order #10 from CTG 79.5 was received indicating a tactical withdrawal would be executed on 25 and 26 Feb 1967.
- (75) At 250940H a Company A patrol returned fire and pursued the enemy. Four new graves and much blood was found in area.
 - (77) At 251034H Company B began moving to IKO JIMA.
 - (78) At 251130H Company B and the Recon Platoon were aboard the USS IND J.D.M.
 - (79) At 251320H a Company C patrol killed one sniper and wounded another near BS 800304.



UNULASS

- (80) At 251345H the Tanks returned to the USS VANCOUVER.
- (81) At 251425H a Company C platoon on search and destroy mission at BS912912 captured 3 VCS. The patrol found and destroyed supplies and installations.
- (82) At 251730H Frag Order #11 was recieved from CTG 79.5 directed the withdrawal be completed on 26 February 1967.
- (63) At 2521/6H a UDT survey of the beach 1000 meters south of RED Beach found the area suitable for landing craft.
- (84) At 251830H Company C received a large amount of fire around entire perimeter. Company C returned fire and area was swept finding 5 VO/AIA (Conf) and evidence of 19 VO/AIA (Prob).
- (86) At 251530H Company D at ES 891305 moving toward the company C position was taken under heavy fire. Units deployed to both flanks, called in artillery and air strikes on enemy positions resulting in 29 VC/KLA (Conf).
- (86) At 260000H the tactical withdrawal and backloading began. Backloading was completed by 261300H with this exception of Company C providing security for a downed UH-34 helicopter on RED Beach. Company C returned to the USO VECCOUNTER at 261700H. Phase I of DECKHOUSE VI was completed. The RET propured a Frag Order and made preparation to conduct another Amphibious landing at 270830H February, 10 kilometers futher north in DUC PHO district of QUANG NGAI provience as part of a larger force under Task Force X-Ray.

b. Phase II

- (1) At 270800H the first wave from Company A began landing in LZ BAT. This wave received \$/4 fire upon entering zone. One helicopter received 4 hits while small air borns sustaining 3 WiA, and returned to the ship without landing in the sone. All other waves were diverted to TREN Beach and linked up with those already in LZ BAT. The enemy fired approximately 600 rounds \$/4 and threw 10 gernades at the first wave into LZ BAT.
- (2) Company B began Landing by helicopter on GREEN Beach at 270902H and immediately moved to vicinity LZ BUZZARD to effect link up with elements of Company A from LZ BAT. Both Companies A and B received continuous sniper fire throughout this phase. By 271200H Companies A and B had sustained 7 MIA's from sniper fire.
- (3) At 270831H the first wave of Company C landed on GREEN Beach by LVT and moved to establish a defensive perimeter around the beach. They received sparodic sniper fire from the tree line just off GREEN Beach.
- (4) At 271145H Command Group Alpha, Bravo and the Recon Platoon landed at CREWN Beach. The EMT command post was established ashore at BS 810482. He con platoon moved to position in the vicinity of BS 802495.





HEADQUARTERS 4th Battalion, 12th Marines 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

C-367-68 529168

3/GJM/rgt 5750 Ser:03A248-68 4 September 1968

From: Commanding Officer

To:

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Via:

Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
 Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Sub j: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 August 1968 (U)

Ref:

(a) MCO P5750.1A

(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

(a) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: 1 (1) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. This document is to be downgraded at three year intervals and declassified after 12 years in accordance with DOD Directive 5200.10.

Copy to: CO, 12th Marines

of // copies



Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H February 1967

Operation Order 2-67 DECK HOUSE VI

- Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, AMS, Series L7014, 1:50,000; Sheets 6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV.
 - (b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67
 - (c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67
 - (d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order 1 (DECK HOUSE VI)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.
 - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
 - (2) Current Intelligence Summaries.
- b. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) CG III MAF provides intelligence of the AOA, coordination with subordinate units, and requested logistical support.
 - (2) CG 1st MAW provides CAS and other Air Support as required.
 - (3) CG 1st MarDiv provides intelligence and reaction force as requested.
 - (4) Task force XRAY conducts a separate combined multi Bn Search and Destroy Operation northwest (QUANG NGAI) of the AOA on 15 Feb 1967 and during DECK HOUSE VI.
 - (5) 3rd Bn 7th Mar (Rein) is currently conducting operations in NUI DANG and NUI DAU areas.
 - (6) A Regional Force Company is located at BS918220.
 - (7) CTG 115.1 will conduct market time support as required.
 - (8) Amphibious Ready Group (CTG 76.5) provides transport, UDT, and Naval Gunfire support.
 - (9) HMM 363 provides helicopter support.



- (10) Provisional Artillery Group lands on order over HLUE Beach.
 Provides tactical control of all Artillery units ashore on order.
- (11) Attachments and detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION.

- a. Commencing at L-Hr on D-Day land by heloborne assault into designated LZS, seize LF Objectives 1 and 3 establish blocking positions on routes of egress from SA HUYNH area, conduct Search and Destroy Operations in the vicinity of LF Objectives 1 and 3.
- b. Commencing at H-Hr on D-Day land by waterborne assault over MLUE Beach and seize LF Objective 2.
- c. On order, continue Search and Destroy Operations and seize LF Objectives 4 and 5.
- d. Establish reserve rifle Co aboard LPD prepared to land by helicopter or surface craft.
- e. By D plus one provide Platoon size SPARROW HAWK, force aboard LPH-2.
- f. On order, conduct tactical withdrawal.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operation)
- b. Company "A" (Rein)
 - (1) Commencing at L-Hour, D-Day land by helicopter in Landing Zone ROBIN. Seize objective 1.
 - (2) On order establish platoon blocking positions on route QL-1 from coordinates BS908267 to BS918251 to prevent exfiltration of objective 4.
 - (3) Be prepared to continue Search and Destroy Operations and seize objective 4 on order.
- c. Company "B" (Rein)
 - (1) When ordered on D-Day land by helicopter in Landing Zone PARROT. Seize objective 3.
 - (2) Conduct Search and Destroy Operations in vicinity of objective 3.
 - (3) Establish company size combat outpost and conduct extensive daytime patroling and night ambushes in assigned area of operations.




SEURET-NOFORT

BLT 1/4

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalian 4th Marines

TOPY 14 OF COPE




OP ORDER 2-67

DECKHOUSE VI

SECRET NOPORN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

DECLASSIFIED



Copies of Copy BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

121200H Feb .1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(Attachments Effective 130800H Feb 1967

BLT 1/4

Ltcol JACK WESTERMAN

Capt. COR.CORAN Company A (Rein)

Det, Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12 Mar (FO Tm) 3d Sqd 4th Plat Co. B, Engr Bn.

Det H&S Co. (Corpsman) Det H&S Co. (FAC Tm)

Det 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd SP Bn (LZCT)

1st Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

1st Sec 106kik Plat

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co. RLT-26

Capt. RAMSEY Company B (Rein)

Det, Btry G,3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm) 2d Sqd 4th Plat, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn.

Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

Det H&S Co (FAC Tm) Det 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd SP Bn (LECT)

2nd Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

3rd Sec 106RR Plat

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co RLT-26

Capt. KELLY Company C (Rein)

Det Btry G, 3rd Bn. 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det H&S Btry, 3rd Bn, 12 Mar (NG SPT Tm)

1st Sqd, 4th Plat Co. B, 3d Engr Bn.

Det H&S Co (81mm FO)

Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

Det Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26

Company D (Rein)

Det Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm) Det Smiper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26


Det H&S Co (Corpsman)

4th Sec 106RR Plat

4th Sec 81mm Mortar Plat

Lt JUL





H&S Company (-) (Rein) Det Hq Co, 4th Marines (Rdo Relay) Det Comm SPT Co, 9th MAB (Rdo Relay) Det Hq Co, 3rd Mar Div (Postal, Disbursing) Det Hq Co, 9th MAB (ISO Tm) Sniper Sqd, Hq Co, RLT-26 Det Btry G, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (Arty Ln Tm) Det Ho Btry, 3rd Bn, 12th Mar (SFCP) C&C Platoon, Co D, 3rd Med Bn Det 15th Dental Co

Capt. MORIGEAU

Btry G (-) (Rein) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines

Capt. KIRLAND

Mortar Btry (Rein) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines

Capt. SIKES

4th Plat, (Rein) Co. B, 3rd Engr Bn

Lt. ELDER

2nd Plat, Co. A, 3rd Recon Bn

GySgt MEYERS

4th Plat (Rein) Co B, 1st AmTrack Bn

Lt. SULLIVAN

2nd Plat, Co B. 3rd AT Bn

Lt. RICHARDSON

1st Plat, Co A, 3rd TK Bn

Lt. BERNARD

Logistical Support Unit Det, 3rd Serv Bn (FLSG-B) 1st Plat, Co C, 3rd MT Bn

Lt. WOODS Lt. DUPRE

Shore Party Team 1st Plat (-) (Rein) 3rd SP Bn

Lt. SUMMA

Det 3rd Serv Bn Det Beachmaster Unit

(Attached on landing)

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

- d. Company "C" (Rein)
 - (1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Lay land by waterborne assault over Beach BLUE. Seize Landing Force objective 2.
 - (2) Prevent exfiltration of Landing Force objective 5.
 - (3) Coordinate defense of beach support area and adjacent artillery positions. Provide one platoon initially as security for Landing Beach.
 - (4) Be prepared to continue Search and Destroy Operations on order.
- e. Battery "G" 3/12
 - (1) On order on D-Day land in landing craft over Beach BLUE.
 - (2) On completion of assault landing on order revert to tactical control of provisional Artillery Group.

f. Mortar Battery 3/12

- (1) On D-Day on order land by helicopter in designated Landing Zone.
- (2) Provide reinforcing fires to Battery "G".
- (3) Be prepared to revert to General Support of landing forces on order.

g. H&S Company (-)

- (1) Land on order in landing Zone OWL.
- (2) 81mm Mortar Platoon (-) and 106kh Platoon (-) in General Support of the BLT.

h. 4th Platoon Co. B, 1st Amtrac Bn.

- (1) Land elements of HLT in accordance with Annex H (Landing Plan).
- (2) Provide cross country transportation.
- (3) Provide Prime Mover support to Battery "G" as required.
- (4) Provide LVTC for BLT Command Group.

i. 4th Platoon (-) Co. B, 3rd Engr Bn.

- (1) Land on order over Beach BLUE.
- (2) Provide close Engineer Support to ELT.

j. 1st Platoon Co. C, 3rd SP Bn.

- (1) Land on order over Beach BLUE.
- (2) Provide normal Shore Party Support to BLT.

3

k. 2nd Platoon Co. A, 3rd Recon Bn.

- (1) Land on order by helicopter in GS BS 9227.
- (2) Conduct Reconnaissance and surveillance and utilizing available supporting arms, prevent exfiltration northward from Objective FOUR.

1. BLT Reserve (Company D)

- (1) Land on order in accordance with Annex H (Landing Plan).
- (2) Be prepared for employment anywhere within the area of operations.
- (3) Provide one platoon as SPARROW HAWK aboard IWO JIMA on D+1.
- m. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Annex K (Rules of Engagement).
 - (2) Annex L (Reports).
 - (3) Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).
 - (4) Map Grid designator in AOA is BS.
 - (5) Operation Code name DECKHOUSE VI.
 - (6) Riot Control Agents are authorized for tactical operations within the AOA.
 - (7) D-Day 15 February 1967. L-Hour 0830H H-Hour 0800H
 - (8) Centered beach coordinates BS 923213.
 - (9) Centered LZ coordinates.
 - (a) ROBIN BS 902254 (b) PARROT BS 895233
 - (b) PARROT BS 895233 (c) CANARY (Alt for ROBIN) BS 893258
 - (d) WREN (Alt for PARROT) BS 897244
 - (e) OWL BS 922213
 - .

(10)

- Centered LF Obj's.
 (a) Obj 1 BS 903262
- (b) Obj 2 BS 925223
- (c) Obj 3 BS 893231
- (d) Obj 4 BS 926262
- (e) Obj 5 BS 937228
- (11) Reference Points.
 - (a) Cars BS 9122
 - (b) Sports BS 8927
 - (c) Days BS 8233
 - (d) Months BS 7726
 - (e) Beers BS 8520
 - (f) Cigarettes BS 8438

- (12) Withdrawal Plan (To be issued)
- (13) Withdrawal Code name BRANDYWINE.
- (14) W-Hour to be announced.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration Order 2-67.
- b. Casualty Reporting (Administration Order 2-67).
- c. Unit Commanders will insure all personal gear is packed, properly marked & staged in respective compartments prior to debarkation.
- d. VC, VCC and VCS will be processed by ITT or S-2. Then transferred to 3/7 collecting point at DUC PHO, coordinates BS 816384.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
 - a. (1) Annex J (Communications-Electronics)
 - (2) Radio Silence until lifted by CATF.
 - (3) All units guard assigned radio nets commencing H-60 min.
 - b. Command Post
 - (1) Afloat
 Amphibious Ready Group (CTG 76.5) IWO JIMA LPH-2
 Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5) IWO JIMA LPH-2
 BLT 1/4
 IWO JIMA LPH-2
 - (2) Ashore
 RLT 1/4 To be announced
 Companies Report when established.
 - c. Command Relations: See Annex D (Command Relations) to Reference (b).

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieuvenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

A - Task Organization

新发展的现在分

- B Intelligence
- C Concept of Operations
- D Fire Support Coordination

5

- E Artillery
- F Naval Gunfire Support
- G Air Operations
- H Landing Plan
- I Withdrawal Plan (To be issued)
- J Communication Electronics
- K Rules of Conduct
- L Reports
- M Omitted
- N Omitted
- 0 Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

LAGIASSINES

Recon plateon moved to position in the vicinity of BS 802495 to conduct survillance of the northern flank of TAOR.

- (5) By 271215H both "G" Battery and Mortar Battery were ashore on GREEN Beach and prepared to conduct fire missions.
- (6) At 271130H, Company B' received 150 rounds S/A fire and 10 grenades from approximately 30 VC and sustained one FR/WIA. Enemy losses were 10 VJ/KIA (Conf.) and 14 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (7) At 271200H UH1E gunchip spotted 15-20 armed VC near BS 798488 wearing green uniforms and helmets. The gunship took the enemy under fire. The VC retured fire and hit the gunship forceing it to land on GREEN Beach. CAS was called on the enemy position resulting in 5 VC/KIA (Conf) and 15 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (8) At 271450H Company D landed by helicopter in BS 804795 and moved to BS 793485.
- (9) At 271500H Company B at BS 746476 received 50 rounds S/A fire from BS 796478. They returned fire, checked the area and found 12 VC/KIA (Conf), 2 packs, and ponches. Friendly casulties sustained, one WIA.
- (10) At 271800H Company B apprehended 2 VCS at BS 802476 after receiving sniper fire from same area. Enemy casulties were estimated to be 2 VC/KIA (Prob):
- (11) At 271830H Company B at BS 806475 received approximately 75 rounds S/A fire. They returned 150 rounds S/A and sustained 2 WIA's. Results were 2 VC/KIA (Conf) and an estimated 6 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (12) At 271700H Company C at BS 801486 received S/A fire from BS 800487 as a Med-Evac helicopter was leaving with 2 wounded civilians. They returned fire, searched area and found 3 VC/KLA (Conf).
- (13) At 271950H Company A at BS 796475 received 3 grenades and approximately 10 rounds sniper fire. They returned approximately 100 rounds S/A resulting in 1 VC/KIA (Conf) and 3 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (14) At 2719 10H a paired from Company C checked the area of an airstrike at BS 790488. Six enemy in ten uniforms were seen at BS 799479. The patrol fired an the moving enemy results are unknown.
- (15) At 2721154 Company B at BS 796476 received 1 incoming grenade and 8 rounds only on fire. They returned 30-40 rounds S/A fire and 2 grenades resulting in 2 VS/CIA (Conf).

CR ET

UNG

SECRET

- (16) At 272145H a Company A ambush caught an unknown number of VC in killing zone, killing 3 VC and capturing 1 M-2 Carbine.
- (17) At 280150H Company B at BS 786476 received approximately
 80 rounds suffered to the from VC 150 to 200 meters in front of their
 position. They returned approximately 400 rounds S/A and 5 Lasws resulting
 in 5 VC/KIA (Cont) and 3 VC/KIA (Prob).
 - (18) At 230530H Company B at ES 796476 received 75 rounds S/A and 3 grenades from an VC near their perimeter. 200 rounds S/A fire, 4 M-79's and 2 Lagra were fired in return resulting in 3 VC/KIA (Conf).
 - (19) At 280500H a Company B ambush caught 5 VC in the killing sone. All were killed and the ambush relocated.
 - (20) At 280730H Company D was directed to conduct Search and Destroy operations in GS 7950.
 - (21) At 230745H Company D at BS 793484 received approximately 30 rounds S/A and sustained one WIA. Fire was returned and a squad sent to investigate, Results were 2 VU/KIA (Conf.) and 4 VC/KIA (Prob).
 - (22) At 200900H Company B at BS 804475 received one granade on their left flank. They returned approximately 20 rounds S/A fire, checked area and found one VC/AIA (Conf) and one Chi Com granade.
 - (23) At 280940H Company B at BS 802474 received 2 incoming grenades one 57mm round and two 82mm mortar rounds in their perimeter. Fire was returned with 81mm mortar at suspected enemy position and the area searched. Results from the action were 3 FR/WIA, 5 VC/KIA (Conf), 6 VC/KIA (Prob), and 2 VCS captured.
 - (2L) At 281030H Company A at BS 794474 encountered Chi Com granades tied to those migged as supriss firing devices.
 - (25) At 281105H 1st Platoon Company A at BS 796473 received approximately 20 rounds S/A fire from B S 897472. Approximately 70 rounds S/A were returned. The area was checked, results were 4 VG/KIA (Prob).
 - (26) At 281130H Company D at BS 692195 received smiper fire from a village to the north while sweeping a village at that location. Fire was returned and they advanced by fire and maneuver. While sustaining one FR /WIA, they accounted for A VO/KIA (Prob).
 - (27) At 281145H Company D at BS 792493 received moderate sniper fire from BS 792495. They returned the fire and assualted enemy position under cover of a guarantee. Results were one FR/WLA, 2 VC/KLA (Conf), 4 VC/KLA (Prob) and one captured document.

UNCLASS.

CHOP IV

- (28) At 281210H Company B at BS 807471 received 10-12 rounds S/A fire and 3 incoming grenades from BS 807470 and returned approximately 50 rounds S/A fire. A tank destroyed the bunker in the vicinity. One FR/WIA was sustained and 2 VC/KIA (Conf), 5 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (29) At 281325H Company D at \$3 790497 observed 3 well camouflaged VC wearing green uniforms fleeing to north vicinity BS 790499 and pursed by fire, 1 VC/KIA (Onf) and 1 VC/KIA (Prob). One BAR cartridge belt with 8 magazines, wallet and personnel gear was captured.
- (30) At 281605H Company B at BS 816464 received approximately 30 rounds S/A and 2 incoming grenades. About 100 rounds S/A fire was returned, the area checked. 2 VC/KIA (Conf) and 4 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (31) At 2817004 CTG 79.5 Frag Order #3 was received directing Search and Destroy operations in Sectors OKENAWA and GUAM on 1 March.
- (32) At 281845H Company D submitted a late report that at 281400H Company D chased 2 suspected NVA into trench at 35 788498. One squad enveloped enemy position and accountered for 2 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (33) At 282100H a Company & ambush at BS 805449 caught 3 VO in the killing zone, 2 VC/KIA (Conf).



- (34) At 010245H Company B at BS 809468 received 12 incoming 60mm mortar rounds in and around their perimeter. Fire was returned at suspected enemy positions with 81mm mortars and artillery resulting in 3 VC/KIA (Prob)
- (35) At 010840H helicopters received about 10 rounds S/A fire while picking up water cans from Company B LZ at BS 806574 they returned approximately 200 rounds S/A fire and M-79's. Checked suspected area and found one VI/KIA (Conf) and indications of one VC/KIA (Prob).
- (36) At 010830H Company D at BS 793485 received approximately 10 rounds S/A fire resulting in 2 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (37) At 011015H 2nd Platoon Company C at BS 795484 received 6 rounds sniper fire from BS 796485. The platoon overran enemy position, capturing one VCS.
- (38) At 011050H Company D at BS 795488 spotted 3 VC at BS 795490. The VC fired and withdraw. Company D sent a squad in pursuit. Several new punji pits were found in the area and blood, but no bodies. They sustained one FR /WIA while inflicting 2 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (39) At 011050H the 2nd Flatoon Company D at BS 795488 received a heavy volume automatic weapons fire from PS 795489 when a Med-Evac helicopter came in. More WLA's were received while moving to a new LZ. They returned fire and another volume of heavy fire was received and the VC withdraw. A company C platoon pursued by fire, checked area and found 6 VC/KIA (Conf) and evidence of a estimated 10 VC/KIA (Prob). Five FR/WIA were received.



UNCLASS

- (40) At 011100H Company B at BS 817445 received 10 rounds S/A fire from the village. They returned 100 rounds fire and secured the village, destroyed several installations and 2 tons of VC supplies. Two VC/KIA (Conf) and Two VC/KIA (Frob).
- (41) At 011235H Company D at BS 796470 received 5 rounds smiper fire from BS 795472. They returned the fire and searched the area. Results were 1 VU/NIA (Conf) and 2 VC/KIA (Prob) and one ChiCom carbine captured.
- (42) At 011620H CTG 70.5 Frag Order #4 received directing Search and Destroy operations an 2 March to Phase Line ECHO.
- (43) At 11700H Company A discovered 5 (250 lb) bomb duds which later EDD destroyed.
- (44) At 011730H the S-3A took a VC informant to BS 802474 to apprehend other vc said to be in the area. The informant pointed out VC supplies, several bunkers and tunnels. All were destroyed. No other VC were found,
- 93
- (45) At 020150H a Company B ambush at BS 833428 received one incoming mortar round resulting in one USMC KIA, and 5 USMC WIA's. 8122 mortar was fired on the suspected enemy position.
- (46) At 020930H the 2nd Platoon Company D discovered approximately 180 cubic feet VC supplies at BS 795491. No facilities were available for evacuation and they were destroyed.
- (47) At 021000H a Company D Platoon size patrol at BS 793483 received approximately 75 rounds somi automatic and automatic weapons fire. They returned fire and pursued the enemy approximately 300 yds against moderate opposition, sustained 2 USMC WIA and found 3 VC/KIA (Conf) and evidence of an estimated 6 VC/KIA (Prob).
- (48) At 021110H the 2nd Platoon Company D fired on a VC automatic weapons position at BS 793495 and checked the area and found evidence of 6. VC/KI. (Prob).
- (49) At 021215H the 2nd platoon Company D found a large amount of VC supplies buried in a hut at BS 803473. The supplies and hut were destroyed. Discurrents in a concrete house in the same viginity were taken to the Lattalion S-2. Light sniper fire was received when leaving village.
- (50) At 021455H 1st Platoon Company D at BS 792473 received 10 rounds S/A fire from a carbine near BS 792474. They returned fire and swept the area and found 31 Chifom carbine cartridge cases. One USMC WIA and an estimated 2 VC/ALA (100b).



UNCLASS

PORT

- (51) At 021615H 6TG 79.5 Frag Order #5 was received directing Company A and B to terminate Search and Destroy operations in sector GUADALCANAL and prepare to excute a tactical withdrawal on 3 March.
- (52) At 021800H a helicopter received S/A fire while delivering supplies to Company D at BS 792482. They returned fire and saked for the assistance of a gunship on station. The resupply helicopter later ded vered the supplies without incident. Results of the action were a 16/KIA (resb).
- (53) At 022205H a Company D ambush at BS 793478 Bred on an endmown number of VC at BS 792477 resulting 4 VO/KFA (Conf) and 5 VO/KFA (Provide
- (54) At 030190H the Company D Command Post received one mortal round beleived to be 60mm. The Simm Forward Observer see the flash bear BS 790498 and called an 81mm mortar mission. Enemy mortar fire was silenced.
- (55) At 03044AH a Company D ambush fired on an unknown number of VC at BS 794484, resulting in 5 VC/KIA (Conf.) and 3 VC/KIA (Prob).
- from the TAOR. Company D moved to CREEN Beach and departed to the USS VANCOUVER by landing craft. Company B provided security for Company A extraction by helicopter at BS 844416. Company B remained until appearing the state of the company C providing security for a UDT team conducting a survey in the area. Company C provided security for beach area during backloading. By 1230H all units had completed backloading except Company B. At 1550H Company B commenced backloading and was completed by 1630H.
- (57) With the completion of backloading of all units at 031800H DECKHOUSE VI Phase II terminated.

10. Results.

a. Friendly Loses.

(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties incurred by Battalion Landing Team 1/4 during Operation BECKHOUSE VI covering the period 16 February - 3 March 1967.

UMC

OFFICERS			PNLI	STED	
KIA WIA MIA DOW		KIA 7	MIA	MIA	O DOM
	USN				
OFFICERS			PALI	STED	
KIA WIA MIA DOW		KIA O	<u>MIA</u> 8	AIM	DOW O
	-21-		-	SE	CRET



(2) There were no major item of equipment or material losses.

b.	Enem	y Losses. PHASE I	PHASE II	TOTAL
	(1)	VC initiated	36	98
	(2)	USMC initiated	22	78
	(3)	Total incidents 118	58	176
	(4)	VC KIA (Conf) 204	97	301
	(5)	VC KIA (Prob) 395	173	568
	(6)	VCC 1	0	1
	(7)	VCS50	21	71
	(8)	Weapons captured or destroyed 12	3	15
	(9)	Supplies destroyed	10	30tons
	(10)	Enemy fortifications destroyed (Bunker Inc) 67	216	383
	(11)	Ft of tunnels destroyed = 201	150	351
	(12)	Punji traps destroyed	64	97
	(13)	Booby traps destroyed 84	7 0	154
	(14)	caves destroyed 10	8	18
	(15)	Chi Com grenades destroyed 68	36	104

- c. It was not always possible to immediately search areas where air strikes and artillery missions were conducted. The results of fires utilized in close support of friendly troops were always evaluated by area searches. Harrassing, deep supporting fires could not always be evaluated.
 - b. No material food stuffs or medicines of U.S. origin were recovered.
- 11. Administrative Matters, The Administrative Plan proved to be adequate in all respects. The serial assignment table was without flaw and was used continually to call in and record items or equipment.
 - a. Supply techniques, combat loads, ammunitions, and weapons carried by assault troops.
 - (1) Prior to D-day ammunition and rations were staged aboard assigned shipping by companies, batteries and attachments. These supplies were staged in accordance with the authorized Basic Allowance (B/A) on D-day units were called to the supply staging area and issued their B/A. This system proved to be very effective and caused the issuance of supplies to be accomplished in an organized manner. Upon re-embarkation using units turned in their supplies to the respective supply areas aboard shipping as soon as they came aboard. These supplies were then inventoried and the B/A reconstituted.
 - (2) Units landed by surface or air lift carried the prescribed load as set forth in the Administrative Plan and the B/A. Resupply requests were submitted by the units to the BLT S-4 one day prior to date of delivery. Helicopters or surface craft were ordered one day prior to delivery, and the time of delivery was dictated by the tactical situation. Combat loads, weapons, and ammunition carried by troops proved to be adequate except in two instances. Large amounts of demolitions were required soon after landing due to the large amount of enemy bunkers, caves, trenches, and road blocks that were encountered. Units requested large amounts of H555 (66mm)

114 6702

UNCLASSIFIED

Rockets, HE, LAAW) because of the same situations mentioned above. These items were supplied quickly and without difficulty.

- (3) While ashore all units 1% the beach area were resumplied at a central control point operated by elements of Shore Party. This was necessary as the haliconfor loads for the requiring units sometimes came in mixed loads (i.e water for H&S Co. and ammunition for "G" Battery). Shore Party elements staged the sumplies by units and distributed them.
- (4) Several times supplies were dropped at the wrong landing zone due to the fact that helicopters were given mixed loads. In some instances parts of three different companies supplies were loaded in one helicopter. Frag Orders containing amount of supplies for each landing zone and their coordinates were given to the crow chief upon departure from the LPH, however, coordination would brookdown between the crew chief and the pilot and all three companies supplies would be dropped at one companies landing zone. These inclidents were common and would necessitate fragging more helicopters to pick up the supplies and deliver them to the correct landing zone. When any helicopter is loaded with a mixed load, great care should be taken to ensure the correct supplies are delivered to the correct landing zone.
- (5) Problems were encountered with communications between ground elements and helicopters delivering supplies. At times helicopters could not communicate with ground elements throught the Landing Zone Control Frequency. Helicopters from other writs sometimes did not know the Landing Zone Control Frequency or the Grid Reference Code of the ground units.
- (6) Expenditure rates of ammunition as set forth in CMC letter AO4F-med of 13 June 1967 (Vietnam Ground Ammunition Expenditure Rates) proved to be unrealistic. 15 EOA of CA49 (CTG, 105mm, Illum) was exhausted in less than trree days, while G-940, G-945, and G-950 (Grenade, hand, smoke) were nearly exhausted in the same period of time. Further, the resupply rate of replenishment for B568 (Ctg, 40mm, HE) as listed in the aforementioned letter (2.4 rounds per launcher per day) is likewise considered unrealistic.
- (7) On D+6 the Logistic Support Area (LSA) at NUI DANG was authorized for use for resupply purposes, however there was no C-704 (Ctg, 4.2" mortar, HE) and on D+8 water resupply of water had to be accomplised from assigned shipping due to the non-availability of adequate amounts of water at the LSA.
- b. Maintenance. Maintenance was performed up to third echelon by the attached LSU of the BLT. It was done either by content team or rembarking item to shipping for major work. In one instance the LPD loaded several tracked vehicles requiring third echelon maintenance and delivered them to FLEG ERAY: at CHULAI. Contact teams for special repairs were made available from the DSA and FLEG ERAY). Maintenance was satisfactory and no major problems were encountered.
- c. Treatment of casualties and evacuations and Hospitalization. During Phase I. (so edulon medical-care was parformed in the field by hospital . -23-

corpsman attached to the various line companies and otherwise. Following field first aid, those patients requiring further care were invariable evacuated by helicopter directly to the hospital ship, the USS IWO JIMA LPH-2 where the surgical team of the ship was augmented by the personnel of the Collecting and Clearing platoon as well as a complement of corpsmen from the medical platoon of the 1st Bn 4th Mar to provide simultaneous 2nd echelon and 3rd echelon medical care. In addition a medical officer and 4 corpsman accompanies H&S Co as a "Forward BAS" but this unit was in no way utilized in the chain of evacuation and confined itself to treatment of wounds and diseases occurring in its own area of the TAOR.

The following system was utilized for processing casualties aboard the hospital ship: The Med-Evac helicopter was met on the flight deck by medical personnel and the patients weapons were removed at this time. If a patient was observed to have wounds requiring specialized skills not available aboard the hospital ship (Neurosurgery, Ophthelmology, Otodaryngology, Maxillo Facial surgery) he was immediately evacuated by helicopter to the nearest facility having this type of care. Remaining patients were taken by elevator to the hangar deck (Triage Area) where they were completely undressed, Tetanus Toxoid administered, the nature of their wounds determined and an order of treatment established. patients were then moved by fork lift into the Shock and Resuscitation area (one deck above the hangar deck) where further examination including X-Ray studies was performed, blood work and other laboratory studies obtained and IV fluid therapy and other supportive procedures initiated. Here the patients were also prepared for surgery and debridement and closure of minor wounds was accomplished. The surgical suite composed of 2 operating rooms, one used primarily for general surgery and the other for orthopedic cases was located adjacent to the shock and resusication area and patients requiring definitive surgery were transferred directly to this facility from Shock and Resusitation.

Total hospital beds available were 250. These were divided into three wards as follows:

Intensive Care Unit- 5 beds used for post operative patients requiring constant surveillance and care.

Ward II- 19 beds used for post operative patients following major general and orthopedic surgical procedures requiring frequent surveillance and care.

Ward III- 226 beds used for medical patients and minor surgery patients, mostly ambulatory, requiring routine care. The over flow from Ward II was also cared for in this ward.

Medical personnel were attached during the operation as follows: Phase I-

- I. Hospital Shin, USS IWO JIMA, LPH-2
 - a. Surgical Team
 - 1. General Surgeon'
 - 2. Orthopedic Surgeon
 - 3. Anesthesiologist
 - 4. General Medical Officer
 - b. Collecting and Clearing Platoon

ERGLASSIFIE

1. General Medical Officer 3
2. Navy enlisted 24

c. Ships Sick Bay
1. General Medical Officer 1
2. Navy enlisted 25

d. Battalion 1/4 Medical Platoon
1. General Medical Officer 1
2. Navy enlisted 15

e. HMM 363
1. Flight Surgeon 1
2. Navy enlisted 3

II. Field.

- a. Forward BAS
 1. General Medical Officer 1
 2. Navy enlisted 4
- b. Line companies
 1. Navy enlisted 30 29
 (One man lost as non-combat casualty)
- c. Attached Units
 1. Navy enlisted

The following numbers of casualties were received aboard the hospital ship USS IWO JIMA LPH-2:

27 1		KIA	<u>M</u> Y	NCI	
Marines		6	58 (8)	24	(No of Marine
Navy		0	3	2	casualties
Viet Cong		Ō	Ī	0	not members
	VCS)	Ž	بلأ	0	of BIC 1/4
Total	/	8	106	26	who were

No cases of Malaria or heat exhaustion were encountered. No diseases

entites were encountered in significant numbers.

No casualties died of wounds aboard the hospital ship. The following numbers of casualties were evacuated from the hospital ship USS IWO JIMA LPH-2 to other medical facilities for definitive surgery, convalescent care or for burial processing:

KTA 6 TO DA NANC

Surgical Procedures performed:

١	14	6702
---	----	------

	UNGLÄSSIFIED		
Laporotomies	10 ·	Appendectomy	4
Spl e nnetowies	3	Colectomy	2
Bowl Resections	2	Ureterorraphy	1
Enterrophy	5	Proctorrophy	1
Colostomy	3	Upper extremities wounds	11
Kidney Repair	1	Lower extremities wounds	29
Hysterectomy	1	Amputations	3
Vaginoplasty	1	Above the Knee	1
Bladder Repair	1	Below th Knee	1
Artery Repair	1	Th umb	1
Arterygraft	1	Open Thoracotomy	1
H _{ernia} kepair	1	Closed Thoractomy	2
Vein Repair	3	Delayed Primary Closures	16
Orchiectomy	1	Skin graft	1
Orchioplasty	1	Misc debruickement	2
Tra che otomy	1		

Approximately 40 cases were minor debridements and closures not accomplished in the Operating Romm.

Whole Blood Utilization:

Units	on hand beginning Phase I	200
Fresh	units drawn on board	44
Units	typed and cross-matched	249
	administered	.79
Abo ve	includes all Med-Evacs - Civilian	

TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES AND EVACUATIONS AND HOSPITILIZATION DURING PHASE II

The treatment, evacuation and hospitalization procedures were carra dout in the same manner in Phase II as in Phase I. (Refer to paragraph I in Phase I.)

The same Medical personnel were attached during Phase II of the operation as were assigned during Phase I.

The following numbers of casualties were received aboard the hospital

enip:	WY			• •
	KIA	WIA	NCI	(N. 00 W
Marines	2 (1)	40 (12)		(No of Marine and
Navy	O 11	4 (1)	2	Navy casualties not
Viet Cong	0	1.	0	members of BLT 1/4
Civilians (incl VCS)	, Ó ;	6	3	who were processed)
Total	2	57	9	

No cases of Malaria or heat exhaustion were encountered. No other disease entities were encountered in significant numbers.

No casualties died of wounds aboard the hospital ship USS IWO JIMA LPH-2. The following numbers of casualties were evacuated from the hospital ship to other medical facilities for definitive surgery, convalescent care or for burial processing:

KIA	2	TO DA NANG
WIA	12	TO CLARK AFB FFT CONUS
	5	TO DANANG

Surgical Procedures Performed:

Laparotomy	8	Liver Repair	3
Splenectomy	1	Liver Resection	1
Bowel Resection	2	Diaphragm Repair	. 1
Small Bowl Repairs	1	Artery Repair	2
Colostomy	2	Upper Extremitie/wounds	9
Lower Extremities/wounds	7	Misc. Debridments	Ś
Amputations	·	Neck Exploration	2
Finger	1	Closed Thoracotomy	2
2nd closures	1		
Whole Blood Utilization:	•		
Units on hand beginning	Phase II	165	
Fresh units drawn		100	
Units typed and cross-mat	tched	122	
Units administered		90	

Approximately 25 cases were minor debridements and closures not accomplished in the Operating Room.

- d. Transportation. One main source of transportation: eachers was the LIMC's (Mules). These proved to be invaluable in the transporting of supplies and equipment in the beach area. LYPP-5s were utilized as prime movers for 105mm Howitzers and water trailers, without which the resupply of water would have caused grave concern due to lack of water cans. The medium helicopter squadron in direct support, was the principle means of transportation utilized. They provided for troop lifts Med-Evacs and over 300 tons of supplies being transported to and from the operating area. Additional transportation was provided by CH-46 helicopters for lifting the majority of the external loads.
- e. Communications. Communications were satisfactory throughout DECIHOUSE VI. Some difficulty was encountered due to insufficient frequency separation periodically during operations; however, there was never a serious communication outes. Also unintentional interference was encountered from commercial radio stations, both Vietnamese and what was believed to be ship to shore communications in the English language. Several frequency changes were necessary as a result. Additional frequencies which were available by the SIF and cooperation between elements of the BIT and Task Force X-Ray made it possible to readily eliminate frequency problems.
- (1) Two radio nets were activated during DECKHOUSE VI, Phase I linking the BIT and SLF; LF TAC #1 and LF TAC #2. TAC #1 was A VHF/FM.



circuit and TAC #2 was an HF/SSB circuit. Both nets remained active throughout Phase I. Traffic volume on TAC #2 was negligible due to the reliability of TAC #1 and the early establishment of radio relay ashore. Consequently, LF TAC #2 was placed in a standby status during Phase II and it never became necessary to activate this net.

- (2) Covered circuit operation (KY-8) was planned for LF TAC #1 and the SHORE PARTY CONTROL/TACLOG nets. Attempts to achieve covered operation on LF TAC #1 during Phase I were unsuccessful. Although equipment operation appeared to be normal, communications in the covered mode me not possible. Interchange of equipment between AN/MRC-109 jeeps achi eved negative results and the KY-8 equipments were returned to the ship for testing. Both equipments as well as the connecting cables proved operative when checked in the maintenance shop. The only plausible explanation would seem to be the environment on the beach. The CP perimeter was very limited and it was necessary to position the equipment on or near the beach. The proximity of landing zones and heavy helicopter traffic caused a continual cloud of sand and dust during daylight hours. Attempts to keep the equipment covered were not successful and possibly caused over heating. One RT-524 became inoperative and required 3rd echelon maintenance. Later during displacement of the battalion CP on 20 February 1967 on AN/MRC-109 was damaged and evacuated. No further attempts were made at covered operations.
- (a) Successful covered curcuit operation on the LF TAC #1 net would have added flexibility as well as much needed security to communications between the BLT and SLF commanders.
- (b) In regard to the SHORE PARTY CONTROL/TACLOG net it does not seem feasible to plan covered operation on this net until KY-8 equipment is available to the Shore Party unit. Physical separation of the BLT CP and Shore Party CP makes it impossible for BLT equipment to adequately serve both units.
- (3) Internal BLT radio nets were satisfactory. The use of both a tactical and administrative net proved most advantageous and greatly alleviated traffic volume on the tactical net. Operating distances were never prohibitive during operations ashore. Relay operations to autlying companies became necessary on two occasions when the companies were moving through heavy brush and using the short tape antenna.
- (1) Integrated, Are/Radio Opns were successful with the exception of the attemped AN/TRC-27 shot between the HLT and 3rd Battalion 7th Marines. Intervening terrain (NUI DAU Mountain) between the HLT (Hill 25 coordinates BS 899306) and 3rd B attalion 7th Marines (DUC PHC/MUI DANG) completely blocked this shot.
- (a) No difficulty was encountered on the AN/MRC-62 shot from the BLT to 3rd Battalion 7th Marines.
- (b) Ship-to-shore radio relay, utilizing the AN/MRC-62, was highly effective during planning all phases of operations ashore... Some

S. Dur

generator down-time was experienced and it became necessary to use the PU-197 as a back-up generator; however, at the termination of operations both PE-75 generators were operative.

11. F Medical Evaluation

The combining of second echelon medical support (Collecting and Clearing Platoon) with third echelon medical support (Surgical Team) aboard the hospital ship proved to be highly effective for the following reasons:

- (1) The time elapsed from occurrance of injury to arrival at a definitive treatment center was greatly decreased.
- (2) Facilities unavailable in the field were made available to the second echelon of support which aided in rapid diagnosis and treatment of the casualties.
- (3) The combining of supplies and personnel resulted in the more efficient utilization of both and decreased duplication of effort.

During Phase I of the operation and to a lesser extent during Phase II numerous severely injured civilian casualties were evacuated to the hospital ship. Due to the ship's limited surgical capacity (2 operating rooms and 2 surgeons), the definitive treatment of civilian casualties was observed to compromise the potential care available to military casualties. It is recommended that in future operations arrangements be made for evacuation of civilian casualties to an On-Shore civilain facility.

Four "Med-Cap" programs were conducted during which 485 medical and '31 dental patients were seen and treated. This program proved to be Medically unsuccessful for the following reasons:

- (1) It required that badly needed medical personnel leave the hospital ship.
- (2) "Med-Cap" supplies were extremely limited in scope and failed to meet the needs of the populace. Significantly absent were anti-tubercular drugs and pediatric medications (antibiotics, vitamins and iron)
- (3) The necessity of limiting therapy to a very few days due to the danger of medications falling into the hands of enemy forces severely with the effectiveness of treatment.
- (4) The total lack of medical follow-up made evaluation of therapy impossible.
- (5) The lack of an established referral facility was distressing. Numerous lesions were observed which would respond readily to ophthalmalogic EENT or general surgery.

O DO THE

(6) The lack of adequate interpreters made the diagnosis of disease and explanation of therapy to the patient extremely difficult. It is recommended that in the future a more ambitious program be adopted or the program be dropped altogether. The good accrued from the present program is negligable; The cost in man hours and supplies is considerable.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

a. Sniper employment: DECKHOUSE VI was the first use of a Sniper Souad as an attachment to the BIT employed with Special Landing Force. The Souad consisted of five two man Sniper teams and a Souad Leader. A team was employed with each company and with the Recon Platoon. During both hases of the operation the souad accounted for a total of 5 VC/KIA (Confirmed), and 4 VC/KIA (Probable). Most of their kills came during phase I. This phase was longer and took place in terrain which lent itself more to sniper team employment. The missions assigned the teams included counter sniper fire, flank and rear security, landing zone security and when operations permitted assignment to observation posts. They were a useful component and should be included in future Special Landing Force BLT's. Their effectiveness in any instance will be governed by the area in which they are operating.

b. Amphibian Tractors used as Command Post installations: Two LVT's were used by the BIT ashore as the Combat Operations Center, The LVTC vehicle was used by the FSCC and an LVTP was used as the S-2/S-3 vehicle. These two vehicles were parked facing each other in a revetment with ramps lowered leaving approximately 8 feet from ramp to ramp. A fly text carried by one of the LVT's was placed over the opening between the two vehicles. This arrangement placed the FSCC in close proximity to S-2/S-3 operations and afforded a covered space with lighting facilities at night. Radios common to the Compat Operations Center were remoted into the second LVT. The space between the two ramps of the two vehicles was a free area used by both sections and for briefings during hours of darkness. With the sides of the fly tent lowered at night, lights could be used inside both vehicles without violating blackout requirements.

The fact that the Battalion Command Post was always in close proximity to the landing beach and that the requirement for the LYP's was lessened after the BIT was ashore enabled this system to be used throughout OPERATION DECKHOUSE VI. In view of the many advantages gained by using the attached LYP's in this manner, it is recommended that future SIP Battalions consider this type employment.

13. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS

a. OPERATIONS DECKHOUSE VI was successful. The performance of the BIT was excellent. The inadvertant exposure of the ships of the Task Group prior to D-day at the landing beach in Phase I may have given the Viet Cong advanced warning of the intended operations and enabled the enemy to remove some of his forces from the AOA and avoid any large scale contact with a sugerior force. The Viet Cong forces

and supplies found in the AOA were largely destroyed. Operations DECKHOUSE VI should leave the lasting effect on the VC operations in the DUG PHO and MO DUC districts of QUANG NGAI provience. CIDG units sponsored by U.S. Army Special Forces moved into the SA HUYNH area on departure of the BIT after phase I.

- b. In conducting phase II of Operation DECKHOUSE VI the BIT probably executed the cuickest backloading and assault landing in Marine Corps History. A bare fourteen and 2 hours lapsed from the completion of the tactical withdrawal in phase I until the assault waves touched down on the beach in phase II. In a matter of lass than 36 hours all assault elements were disengaged, backloaded and wore relanded over an opposed beach with an entirely new mission and concept of operations.
- c. Operation DECKHOUSE VI was a proving ground for confirmation of the basic Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine. haximum utilization was made of the different landing means available. Amphibian tractors, landing craft and helicopters were used for the over the beach movement in both phases and in the shore to shore displacement in phase I.
- d. The operations ashore consisted of the small units engagements inherrant with Guerrilla operations, closely resumbling conventions, warfare. In all operations the need for rapid fire support and detailed fire support coordination was re-confirmed. The widely separated company locations necessitated resumply almost totaly by the median helicopter squadron in direct support. Where possible, coordinated Tank Infrantry actions added greater shock and fire power to the Search and Bestroy operations.
- e. Operations DECKHOUSE VI was conducted in two relatively short phases. The first 10 days in length and the latter only 4 days. This short period of time, the rapid movement and frequent displacement of elements of the BIT reduced the possibility of any large scale Civic Affairs programs. Medical and Dental teams did hold sick call for the villagers on four occasions. A total of 1438 treatments were administrated to 616 patents. In additional thirty eight civilians injured as a results of the combat action were evacuated to the USS IWO JIMA for treatment. Rifle Company Corpsmen treated injured or sick civilians. located in their immediate areas. A Psychological warfare team with an intrepreter attached was assigned to units on a basic of the most need. They provided eleven loudspeaker population control missions to approximately 5,000 people using live an taped broadcasts. Their broadcasts were used to move civilians to safe areas and to establish curfew regulations. It was not planned to evacuate civilians from the objective area. The VCS detained were civilinas and were maintained under guard in a compound, fed and given medical aid if needed prior to evacuation.



14. Recommendations

a. Comment: One problem exparent in the displacement and back loading of the artillery units was the handling of the basic load of ammunition which had veen delivered by individual boxes.

Recommendation: That ammunition, for that manner any bulk supplies be prepackaged on pallets in order to use the equipment, two 6,000 lb and one 3,000 lb fork lifts readily available to the BIT in its handling.

b. Comment: Emphasis on helicopter borne operations tends to cause us to everlook and not take full advantage of other means frequently available. Because some units were located in Land, distant from the beaches, is not a reason for all resupply to be done by helicopter. The cargo handling capability of the IPD with its conveyors and overhead cranes makes it ideality suited as a resupply ship. It was used only sparingly. Development of assist beaching techniques has made utilization of landing craft, especially the ICM and ICU, more reliable even during adverse surf conditions.

Recommendations: Future logistical concepts plan increased surface resupply of units adjacent to good landing beaches. One LCM-8 could have easily provided the entire daily requirements for BHT units located near RED Beach in phase I or GREEN Beach in phase II and in one trip. The savings in helicopter assets is obivious.

c. Comment: Utilization of the IPD as. a carrier of the 107mm Mortar Battery and Reserve Company.

Recommendation: This practice should be continued in future special operations. It provides for a rapid displacement schore by having available additional launch stations for the concurrent landing of elements from the IPD with those from the IPH. Further, it allows greater flexibility in the selection of Landing means. The reserve company or the 107mm Mortar Battery could have landed at any time by either helicopter or surface means.

d. Comment: The time required to Obtain clearance for a fire mission would have been reduced if issuance of Save-a-planes had been more empeditious. The lack of a standard format and the fact that a different format was required with each change in OPCON aggravated this problem and increased reaction time.

Recommondation: Liasion be made in advance with all commands perticipating in the operation and a standardized format be devleoped prior to the commencment of the operation.

1



e. Comment: Deliberate, Accounts detail Hydpographic studies are a necessity in planning any Amphibious Operation.

Recommondation: In future landings the BIT should be provided with adaquate hydrographic intelligence concerning the area of operation.

f. Comment. KAA-60 and KAC-138 codes were planned for the operation, KAC-OT was made available and used.

Recommondation: The KAC-QT/QX series be used insofar as possible for SLF operations, this system combines authentication and numeral copies, is easy to use and is easier to control at the battalion and company level.

g. Comment. The normal infantry battalion cryptocapting allowance is insufficient to provide for a BIT. The brief time a battalion spends on SIF operations makes it impractical to increase the battalion allowance.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the SIF precure sufficient copies of the necessary expression publication to meet the additional requirements for SIF operations.

h. Comment. Taclog organization and functioning.

Discussion. Doctrine states that the ATF has the responsibility to control and coordinate the landing of the landing force and its supplies. The Tac Log function is one of assisting and advising the ATF control organization in this mission. Tac Logs are normally established at each echolon of command, battalion and higher. They should consist of representatives from S-3, S-4 and embarkation. They may have additional representatives as required.

Recommondation. That future SIF operations invision the use of two Tac Logs groups. One on the Primary Control Ship and one on the Central Ship IPH. If the landing force consists of only one BIT the Tac Log on the Primary Control Ship meed consist of a BIT embarkation representive and possible a representive from the S-4. The landing force Tac Log operating on the LPH should infact be coordinated by members of the SIF with members from the BIT, embarkation, S-3,S-4 representatives, and in addition a representative from the attached heliopter aquadron. The above organization coupled with adequate ships platoons from the embarkation teams on each of the ships should assist the ATF control organizations in providing a mere controled rapid response to the BIT needs ashore. Communication equipment to support the Tac Log organization should be provided within the resourses of the SIF. This would reduce the drain on the communication assets of the Battalion already taxed to the maximum by the formation of a BIT and the conduct of Amphibious

operations.

OBORES

JACK WEST ENNAN

DISTRIBUTION: Special

,,



Copy of Copies
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPE-Z)
121200H Feb 1967

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-67.

- Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM AMS Series L7014 1:50,000 Sheet 6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV
 - (b) See ANNEX L (Reports), Spot Reports and INTSUMS.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. See current Intelligence Summaries.
- b. See Intelligence Periodicals and Special Intelligence reports as issued.

2. EEIs.

- a. Determine the enemy's capability to defend his present positions, if so, in what strength.
- b. Determine the enemy's capability to attack and possible routes of advance as well as his strength.
- c. Determine the locations to where the enemy may withdraw, how far, and possible routes of withdrawal.
- d. Determine the enemy's capability to delay advancing friendly forces and in what strength.
- e. Determine whether the enemy has reinforcements available and when and where they may be employed and in what strength.

3. OIRs.

- a. The following list of OIRs is pertinent to this operation.
- (1) Determine the location of fixed enemy installations such as tunnel systems, caves, and supply caches.
 - (2) Determine enemy techniques for sabotage, espionage, and terrorism.
 - (3) Determine enemy capabilities for resupply.
 - (4) Determine the enemy's vulnerabilities and weaknesses.
 - (5) Determine the enemy's physical condition and morale.
 - (6) Determine the condition and quality of enemy equipment.

SECRET-NOFORN



- a. <u>Captured Personnel</u>. All captured personnel shall be searched, segregated, silenced, and safeguarded. Speed is of the essence in forwarding detainees to the collection point.
- (1) Captives will be treated in a humane manner, but will be handled so as to maintain the shock of being captured.
 - (2) Capturing units will:
- (a) Immediately search detainees thoroughtly and enforce rigid silence.
- (b) Segregate into groups: Officer, NCO, kalliers, other enlisted and VC suspects.
- (c) All captured personnel will be tagged with the standard Detainees Tags.
- (d) Place documents removed from the detainees in Captured Documents Envelopes as provided and identified with the detainees.
- b. <u>Captured Equipment/Material</u>. All captured equipment/material will be forwarded to the BLT S-2 unless otherwise directed.
- (1) Any equipment such as communications/electronic equipment will be forwarded by the fastest means possible.
- (2) If unit commanders are directed to destroy captured equipment/material, photographs should be taken whenever possible.
- (3) If the tactical situation permits, detailed reports will be rade as to complete identification of captured equipment/material.
- c. <u>Captured Documents</u>. Personnel who find enemy documents, either on captives or otherwise are to forward same to BLT S-2 as soon as possible.
- (1) Under no circumstances will any mention of captured communication documents or material be made in plain language transmission over any electronic means of communication.
- (2) All captured documents will be tagged as set forth in Paragraph d, Section 5.
- d. Procedures for tagging captured personnel, equipment/material, and documents are listed below.
 - (1) Include capturing unit.
 - (2) Where captured. (Location by coordinates)

ptured. (DTG)

(4) Circumstances of capture.



5. COUNTERINTELLICENCE.

- a. Insure that all personnel are instructed in the Code of Conduct in case of possible capture.
- b. Maximum security protection must be afforded the exact location and date of execution of an operation.
- c. All personnel will be instructed in the proper use of Password and Countersign.
- d. BLT S-2 will be immediately notified when comprenise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.

6. REPORTS.

- a. Spot Reports. Accurate, complete spot reports of incidents will be forwarded to the BLT S-2 as soon as the tactical situation permits. Corrections to spot reports must be expedited to BLT S-2 immediately. (Format for Spot Report see ANNEX L (Reports) to Operation Order 2-67).
- b. Intelligence Summaries. The BLT S-2 will submit intelligence summaries at 0800 and 2000 daily.

7. ATTACHMENTS.

- a. Supported command provides interrogator-translator (ITT) sub-teams.
- b. Supported command provides language qualified advisors.
- c. It is envisioned that a minimum of two liason/plvisors will accompany each rifle company. The ITT will normally remain at the VC/VCS collection point.

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutmant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES.

1. CTG 79.5 Intelligence Estimate

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

A CAMP TO SE

HEADQUARTERS Special Landing Force USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) FPO San Francisco 96602

2/JDC/mac Ser: 001-67 13 Feb 1967

Appendix I to Annex B (Intelligence)

From: Commanding Officer To: Distribution List

Subi: Intelligence Estimate Operation DECKHOUSE VI

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series 7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6738-I, 6738-II, 6838-III, 6838-IV.

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67.

Encl: (1) Beach Study

- (2) Helicopter Landing Zone Study
- (3) Astromonical and Tidal Data
- Target Information List
- (5) Challenge and Password
- 1. This estimate supplements reference (b), 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 for DECKHOUSE VI.
- 2. Characteristics of the Area of Operation.

a. Weather.

- (1) Precipitation. The dry season is from February through July and has a monthly mean rainfall in the coastal plains area of from 1 to 3 inches three to seven days per month.
- (2) Cloudiness. The northeast monsoon is from November through mid-March. During hight hours, clear to scattered clouds can be expected over the Central Plateau and western mountains; scattered to broken clouds over the coastal regions. Periods of fog, light rain or drizzle (crachin weather) appear over the coastal regions during the Northeast Monsoon. Crachin visibilities are occasionally less than 2 miles and occur during nights and early morning. They usually dissipate by late morning, but can persist throughout the day. Crachin penetrates the inland valley, where the ceiling and visibility can be as low as 500 feet and less than one mile.
- (3) Visibility. During the Northeast Monsoon, visibility of less than six miles occures 3-5 mornings per month in the western mountains, and five to ten foggy mornings per month in the coastal and

44 of 130

Sales Sales

plateau regions. Visibilities of less than one mile can be expected on one to four of the foggy mornings.

- (4) Temperature (F). December through February is the cool season. The monthly mean temperature in the coastal plains range from a high of 80° to a low of 60°.
- (5) <u>Winds</u>. During the Northeast Monsoon the prevailing winds are east to northeast. Monthly mean speed are from 5 to 10 knots with a maximum of 50 knots.
- (6) Astronomical and tidal data. See enclosure (3) to Intelligence Estimate.
- (7) Effects on Enemy Operations. During the dry season, deployment of large enemy forces are more vulnerable because weather conditions favor friendly mobility and employment of supporting arms.
- (8) Effects on friendly Operations. The dry season brings good weather, excellent visibility and favors friendly operations.

b. Terrain.

(1) General.

A. Sa Huynh is the only point in the I Corps area where a branch of the central massif extends to the coastline in a completely VC controlled area. This feature affords not only tactical advantages to the enemy for military operations, but also offers protection and concealment for supply routes leading directly to the coast. The existence of a sheltered harbor and anchorage, and several landing beaches in the area enhance the attractiveness of Sa Huynh as an infiltration point.

(2) Landforms.

A. Coastal Plain.

- 1 The southern coastal plain is eleven kilometers wide on the extreme south and narrows to approximately two kilometers as it transgresses into the Suoi Ben Loi Valley in the west.
- 2 A narrow beach, 0.1 to 1.5 kilometers wide, is located along a major portion of the coastline. The beach has an average elevation of ten meters with sand dunes scattered throughout. A large number of hamlets are interspersed throughout the riceland and the clear undergrowth forest of the coastal plains.
- 3 The rugged hills in the central portion rise abruptly from the coastal plains with elevations up to 300 meters. Slopes range from less than 10 percent to 30 percent.

(3) Vegetation.

A. Location of V getation types.

- <u>l</u> Beaches. The beaches are generally barren of vegetation. Locally, grass brush, prickly cacti, thickets of date palms, (3-4 meters high), planted stands of small trees and dry crops are found.
- <u>2</u> <u>Coastal Plains.</u> The coastal plain is characterized by riceland vegetation. Between the beach and route 1, double (twice a year) cropping is practiced. From above Route 1 to the western border of the area and the hills in the central portion, rice is cultivated only once a year. Much of the coastal plains is barren of vegetation or has light scrub, brush and low grass. Many hamlets are surrounded by hedge rows.
- 3 Hills. The hills are primarily covered by dense undergrowth, forests and brushlands. Dense undergrowth forest predominate on the steeper slopes while brushwood predominates on the rolling plains.

B. Description of Vegetation types.

- l Dense undergrowth forest. The dense undergrowth forest are characterized by a wide variety of fast growing, closely spaced trees that overlook an understory of very dense undergrowth which limits visibility to about 5 meters. These forest are major obstacles and are essentially impenetrable to foot troops except along trails or paths hacked through the vegetation. The undergrowth is generally of the rapid growing shallow rooted variety that can be cleared slowly by tanks, tree density, and slopes permitted.
- 25 percent of the ground is concealed by tree canopy with undergrowth that is generally passable to foot movement. The tree canopy may be either continuous or discontinuous. A dense continuous canopy will inhibit the formation of undergrowth by filtering out the light. Discontinuous canopied forest are locaded near hamlets and are clear of undergrowth due to human clearing operations in the area. Although the undergrowth is not particularly dense, a combination of vegetation and tree density usually restricts observation to about 30 meters.
- Cultivated Ricelands. Ricelands are open areas of cultivation which are seasonally inundated either by irrigation or natural flooding. The riceland are surrounded by low Wikes (0.5 to 1.0 meters high and 0.3 to 0.6 meters wide.) When irrigated, the fields are usually covered with 0.5 meters of water. East of Route 1, rice is double cropped. The first crop is grown between September and March. A second crop is grown between March and August.

4 Observation and fields of fire.

(a) Coastal Plains. Observation and fields of fire in the rice paddies are good to poor. They are restricted by treestands.

ditches, embankments and the height of the rice plant.

(b) Hills and Rolling Plains. The discontinuous canopied forest with dense undergrowth affords observation and fields of fire which are at best 5 meters. The scattered areas of continuous canopied forests, with light to moderate undergrowth, offer observation and field of fire up to a maximum of 30 meters.

- (c) Obstacles. The principal obstacles to foet and vehicular movement are the rugged hills, numerous streams and vegetation.
- (d) <u>Key Terrain</u>. Critical terrain which dominates or provides excellent observation over bridges, rivers and stream intersections, the lines of communication and avenues of movements are located at: BS 903150, BS 855143, BS 874194, BS 913203, BS 878261, BS 865292, BS 905264, BS 874325, and BS 849391.

3. Enemy Situation.

a. General. The area of operation is a major resupply and rest area for the enemy for many years. The area also supplies the majority of the salt for I Corps and II Corps. It is also possible that the salt is transported to southern Laos. Viet Cong forces committed in the Sa Huynh area include one NVA Main Force Regiment, one VC Local Force Regt, five separate battalions and two enemy companies.

b. Order of Battle.

(1) 7th Bn 22nd NVA Regt 3rd NVA Div.

Strength: Approximately 350

Weapons: Unknown

Location: Unlocated at this time. Reported as moving north on 27Jan67 from BS 9104.

(2) 8th Bn 22nd NVA Regt 3rd NVA Div.

Strength: Approximately 250

Weapons: Unknown

Location: Reported as moving north on 27Jan67.from BS 9104.

(3) Elements of the 409th Sapper Bn.

Strength:

Unknown

Weapons:

1 81mm Mortar 2 60mm Mortar

2 60mm Mortar 1 57mm RR 2 30cal. MGs

Unknown number of small arms.

4. Enemy Capabilities.

a. Withdraw and avoid contact.

- b. Harass friendly forces with mines, booby traps, and sniper fire.
- c. Ambush friendly helicopter landing zones.
- d. Attack isolated units and ambush patrols with small size units.
- e. Defend in present position with local available forces.
- f. Attack friendly forces with up to five enemy battalions.

5. Conclusions.

a. The enemy will avoid contact, making maximum use of terrain and darkness exfiltrate the area. He can be expected to mine landing zones, avenues of approach in and near his installations and facilities. It is unlikely that he will defend or attack in any strength because in doing so, he will have to mass and move his troops, thus becoming vunerable to friendly supporting arms and aerial observation.

H. D. WORTMAN
Colonel, U. S. MARINE CORPS
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:	NO.	COPIES
COMUSMACV		1
COMNAVFORV		1
CTF 76		1
CTF 79		1
crg 76.5		2
C TF 11 5		1
CTF 116		1
BLT 1/4		5
HMM 363		5
BrigForBravo		5
Senior Advisor IV CTR		1
7th ARVN Div		1
ProvArtyGrp		5
7th Mar		1
III MAF		1

BEACH-15

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series 7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6738-1, 6738-II, 6838-III, 6838-IV.

.

- 1. LOCATION: Centered 28 km southeast of Quang Ngai; beach extends from BS 750686 to BS 905307.
- 2. LENGTH: 41 km, 11 km, of which applies to the study area; nearly straight beach terminated to northwest, outside study area, by sandspit; to southeast at shore where backed by lagoon; northwest sector of beach in study area separated by stream mouth and rocky headland.
- 3. WIDTH: 90 to 300m at low water; 80 to 225m at high water; treeline marks landward edge backshore.
- 4. GRADIENT: 1:5 to 1:50 for low water to high water zone; 1:5 to 1:10 for high water zone; LSTs can expect dry ramp landings at high tide right flank; will ground out approximately 30m out at low tide on right flank.
- 5. APPROCHES: The nearshore bottom has slope of "moderate" to "mild" shoreward of 5.5m depth contour (180 to 600m off high water line); llm depth contour lies 650m to 1.5km off high water line; offshore approach clear; nearshore partly obstructed by wreck 550m off high water line of northwest part of beach; nearshore approach flanked to northwest by shoals and rocks; bottom is sand; anchorage in 1lm depth 6.5km north of northwest end of beach; anchorage bottom unknown; sandbars likely along entire beach with most probable area of occurrence 90-235m off MILW; fishing huts and junks in immediate offshore area.
- 6. SURF AND TIDE: Surf 1.22m or greater can occur 53% winter; 18% spring; 6% summer; 24% fall; tidal range is 1.37m tropic.
- 7. MATERIAL AND FIRMNESS: Sand is firm in wet areas; soft where dry; beach matting and dozing recommended, especially if wheeled vehicles are to be driven extensively; backshore consists of coarse to fine sand.
- 8. EXITS: Exit cross-country by trails and surfaced roads that connect with Route QL/1 2 to 5km inland; inoperative railroad parallels Route QL/1; Route QL/1 leads into Quang Ngai; several bridges are on Route.
- 9. TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY BEHIND BEACH: Beach backed by barren dunes and berm ridge, average height 18m extending as far as 1km inland; dunes backed by lowlands covered with rice fields; lowlands traversed by several streams; coastal plains extend inland 20km behing north half beach to rapidly rising mountains 1000m high; plains extend inland 5 to 10km behind south half of beach before encountering mountains up to 1000m high; several lagoons and isolated hills also back beach; numerous villages on lowland coastal plain.

- 10. CRITICAL FEATURES: Several hills 20m high located 1 to 2km inland along entire coast; at southend of beach, 2 hills are 100m high; all are key terrain; Cau River backs central part of beach 1 to 2km inland and is major obstacle.
- 11. EVALUATION: Northwest half of beach favorable for major landings; south end favorable for small operations.

BEACH-16

- 1. LOCATION: Centered 30km northeast of Bong Song; extends from BS 933253 to BS 939233.
- 2. LENGTH: 2km; slightly concave beach terminated by rocky headlands.
- 3. WIDTH: 30 to 90m at low water; 20 to 45m at high water.
- 4. GRADIENT: 1:5 to 1:20 for low water to high water zone; 1:5 or steeper for high water zone.
- 5. APPROACHES: Nearshore bottom has slope of "gentle" to "mild" shoreward of 5.5m depth contour (225 to 500m off high water line); llm depth contour lies 600 to 800m off high water line; offshore approach clear; nearshore approach clear but flanked by rocky headlands; bottom probably sand.
- 6. SURF AND TIDE: Surf 1.22m or greater can occur 51% winter; 18% spring; 7% summer; 24% fall; tidal range 1.37m tropic.
- 7. MATERIAL AND FIRMNESS: Sand is firm in wet areas; soft where dry.
- 8. EXITS: Exit cross-country north around lagoom, then west through villages and hilly region for 11m to Route QL/1; inoperative railroad parallels Route QL/1.
- 9. TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY BEHIND BEACH: Beach located on peninsula backed by barren dunes extending up to 300m inland; dunes backed by rice fields 200 to 500m wide which extend to large lagoon; headland at south end of beach rises to 93m and headland at north to 82m; these headlands are key terrain from which fire can be effectively directed against landing forces; lkm inland from beach mountains are 160m high and canalize inland movement around the shores of lagoons.
- 10. CRITICAL FEATURES: Defending forces using adjacent northern hills for cover and concealment can easily block advancing landing forces on narrow neck of 200m wide peninsula; upon reaching Route QL/1 landing forces still easily subject to ambush from steep slopes surrounding mountains; headland to south of beach difficult to cross to reach menth of lagoon for alternate exit.
- 11. EVALUATION: Beach evaluated unfavorable for amphibious operations.

BEACH-17

- 1. LOCATION: Centered 22km northeast of Bong Son; beach extends from BS 926220 to BS 936126.
- 2. LENGTH: 7.5km; irregular beach in four discontinuous segments, the northern segment terminated by entrance to Dam Muoc Man lagoom; southern segment terminated by rocky headland; central segment demarcated by three rocky headlands.
- 3. WIDTH: 160 to 225m at low water; 110 to 180m at high water.
- 4. GRADIENT: 1:30 for low water to high water zone; 1:10 for high water zone.
- 5. APPROACHES: Nearshore bottom has slope of "gentle" to "mild" shoreward of 5.5m depth contour (270 to 700m off high water line); llm depth contour lies 350m to 2.5km off highwater line; offshore approach partly obstructed by shoal with minimum depth 5m located lkm off south part of beach; nearshore approach also obstructed by rocks fronting headlands which interrupt beach; nearshore approach flanked to northwest by peninsula and to southeast by rocky headland; bottom sand and coral; anchorage in depth 2km south of south end of beach; anchorage bottom sand and mud.
- 6. SURF AND TIDE: Surf 1.22m or greater can occur 51% winter; 18% spring; 7% summer; 24% fall; tidal range 1.37m tropic.
- 7. MATERIAL AND FIRMNESS: Medium train loosely packed sand on backshore; sand firm in wet areas, soft where dry.
- 8. EXITS: Exit cross-country to trails behind beach which connect with Route QL/1 leads southwest to Tom Quan (BS 900130) and surrounding low-land area; inoperative railroad parallels Route QL/1; hills west of Route QL/1 have trails which allow relatively unrestricted movement into hinterland.
- 9. TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY BEHIND BEACH: Beach backed by partly brush-covered and partly tree-covered dunes extending 50 to 225 m in land; dunes backed by lowlands covered by rice fields and palm trees and traversed by several streams; lowlands extend 200m to 2km inland to wooded hills; hills backed by valley located 5km inland; beyond valley is mountain range over 500m high; villages encountered on lowlands behind beach.
- 10. CRITICAL FEATURES: Hills 200m to 1km behind beach are key terrain; there are 3 critical bridges on Route QL/1 heading southwest; BS 913164; BS 910162; BS 905136; hills adjoining Route QL/1 provide excellent ambush and defensive positions; narrow strip of lowland will canalize landing forces and may even cause backup on the beach.
- 11. EVALUATION: Beach evaluated favorable for amphibious landings, even though terrain is constrictive.

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS Series 7014, 1;50,000 Sheets 6738-1, 6738-11, 6838-111, and 6838 1V.

<u>NO</u> .	UTM GRID COORD INATES	MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS (m)	TERRAIN DESCRIPTION
1	BS 853386	400x200	Area of cultivation surrounded by sand dunes; Thanh Hieu (1) Village approx. 20 meters south; irregular - shaped.
2	BS 859374	650x270	Open area with scattered brush; villages on north and south.
3	BS 860362	660x300	Open area with scattered brush; bi- sected by trail; forested area at base of hill, coord BS 858363, potential ambush site.
4	BS 882334	500x210	Area of cultivation surrounded by mand dunes; dry weather road approx 190 meters west.
5	BS 864324	380×100	Area of cultivation bounded on west by dry weather road; Thug Tach (1) Village approx 20 meters north.
6	BS 854325	300x200	Area of cultivation; Dam Lam Binh approx 400 meters north; Route QL/1 210 meters south.
7	BS 853296	600x380	Area of cultivation; bounded on east by trail; unnamed stream 80 meters southwest.
3	BS 888287	600x300	Cultivated area bisected by trail; Route QL/1 on immediate south; standard gauge inoperative railroad approx 100 meters south.
9	BS 923259	350x200	Open area with scattered brush; bi- sected by trail; irregular-shaped.
10	BS 899242	300x210	Area of cultivation; dry weather road approx 250 meters west; forested area on eastern edge, potential ambush site.
11	BS 913228	950x200	Area of cultivation; exit via trail on northern edge.

Enclosure (2)



	UTM GRID	MAXIMUM	
NO.	COORDINATES	DIMENSIONS (m)	TERRAIN DESCRIPTION
12	BS 894225	200x130	Area of cultivation; dry weather road approx 200 meters west; forested areas on south and east potential ambush sites.
13	BS 915193	1000x500	Area of cultivation; bisected by trail and stream; standard gauge inoperative railroad and Route QL/1 approx 170 meters east.
14	BS 864193	1050x850	Area of cultivation bisected by trail and stream; irregular-shaped.
15	BS 852156	230x70	Ricelands located in valley; scattered trees on west edge; irregular- shaped.
16	BS 850151	270x45	Rice paddies in valley; surrounded by scattered trees
17	BS 856225	230x90	Cultivated area on hill-side; 10% slope.
18	BS 876222	145×75	Cultivated area on hill-side; 15% slope surrounded by scattered trees.
19	BS 874218	350x75	Rice paddy in valley; surrounded by scattered trees.
20	BS 889169	350x180	Open area with scattered brush; bisected by trails; forested areas east of HLZ potential ambush sites.
21	BS 903157	270x150	Open area with scattered brush; located in valley; light vegetation surrounds zone.
22	BS 856183	570 x 250	Open area with scattered brush; bisected by trails; An Hoa (1) village approx 100 meters east.
23	BS 925151	400x230	Partially cultivated area with surrounding brush; bisected by trails; Vinh Tuy (2) Village approx 100 meters south.
24	BS 913144	400x220	Open with scattered brush; exit via trail on south.
25	BS 863146	340x100	Cultivated area bisected by trails; Binh De (2) village approx 80 meters east.
26	BS 852118	1000x300	Cultivated area bisected by trails; Thanh Son (2) village approx 100 meters easts.
. *		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Zenclosuder (2) in the same

NO.	UTM GRID COORD INATES	MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS (m)	TERRAIN DESCRIPTION
27	BS 900118	900x400	Area of cultivation; bisected by trails; Route I approx 10 meters east.
28	BS 875114	510x300	Sand dume area bisected by trail; lake approx 80 meters south.
29	BS 860105	500x400	Area of cultivation bisected by trail; Suoi Lo Biay approx 100 meters north.
30	BS 882098	500x190	Area of cultivation bisected by trails; unnamed stream approx 10 meters north.

3

Enclosure (2)



ASTRONOMICAL DATA FOR OPERATING AREA FEB 67

DATE	BMNT	SRISE	SSET	EENT	MRISE	MSET	MOON PHASE
12	0623	0711	1848	1936	0909	2122	new moon
13	0622	0710	1848	1936	0944	2206	
14	0622	0710	1848	1936	1020	2252	
15	0621	0709	1848	1936	· 1052	2339	
16	0620	0709	1848	1937	1128	0039	
17	0620	0707	1848	1937	1225		lst quarter
18	0619	0707	1848	1937	1252	0122	
19	0618	0707	1848	1937	1405	0218	
20	0618	0706	1849	1937	1454	0315	
21	0618	0706	1849	1937	1555	0414	
22	0618	0705	1849	1938	1700	0512	
23	0617	0705	1849	1938	1804	0606	
24	0617	0705	1850	1938	1839	0654	full moon
25	0616	0705	1850	1938	1952	0742	
26	0616	0 70 4	1850	1939	2051	0826	
27	0615	0703	1850	1939	2149	0912	
28	0614	0702	1851	1939	2250	1001	

Enclosure (3)

	TIME	TIDE DATA FOR (OPERATING AREA FEE	1 67 TIME	HR IGHT
DAY	нм	FEET	DAY	нм	FEET
		•	V		
12	0850	1.8	25	0705	1.3
	1438	3.0		1330	3.0
	1747	2.9		1626	. 2.8
	0103	5.2		0046	6.0
13	0906	2.1	26	0755	1.6
	1440	3.2		1331	3.2
	1853	2.9		1747	2.7
				0039	5.7
14	0148	4.8		•	
	0916	2.4	27	0819	2.0
	1450	3.5		1343	3.6
	1958	2.9		1902	2.5
15	0212	4.4	28	0132	5.1
	0919	2.6		0837	2.4
	1506	3.8		1406	4.0
	1910	2.9		2018	2.4
	2720				
16	0251	3.9			
	0913	2.8			
	1530	4.2			
	2240	2.8			
17	0339	3.4			
	0857	2.9			
	1604	4.5			
	0038	2.7			
18	1647	4.8			
19	0242	2.3			
1,	1743	5.1			
	2,40	7.2			
20	0356	2.0			
	1848	5.4			
21	0448	1.5			
£1	1955	5.7			
	1900	J. 1			
22	0454	1.2			
	2059	5.9			
23	0612	1.1			
23	2157	6.1			
	2137	U.I			
24	0649	1.1			
	2303	6.2			

Enclosure (3)

2

ASTRONOMICAL DATA FOR OPERATING AREA MAR 67

DATE	BMNT	SRISE	SSET	EENT	MRISE	MSET	MOON PHASE
1	0612	0700	1854	1942	2348	1030	
2	0612	0659	1854	1942	0048	1130	
3	0611	0659	1854	1942		1220	last quarter
4	0610	0658	1854	1942	0149	1331	
5	0609	0658	1854	1942	0239	1411	
6	0608	0657	1855	1943	0341	1508	
7	0608	0657	1855	1943	0432	1602	
8	0608	0656	1855	1943	0510	1700	
9	0608	0656	1855	1943	0600	1745	
10	0607	0656	1855	1943	0636	1834	
11	0607	0655	1855	1943	0709	1919	new moon
12	0606	0654	1855	1943	0740	2003	
13	0605	0653	1855	1943	0819	2046	
14	0604	0652	1855	1943	0855	2147	
15	06 03	0651	1855	1943	0919	3209	

3

Enclosure (3)

Ref: (a) Maps, Vietnam, AMS 7014 Series, 1;50,000 Sheet 6738-1, 6738-11, 6838-111, and 6838-1V.

TARGET INFORMATION LIST

ITEM	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION
1	B S 904297	AW position near trench, along top of cliff.
2	BS 899306	AW position along side of path.
3	BS 884322	Possible AA/AW position in an open area.
4	BS 874346	Two AA/AW positions, approx 53 ft. appart, oriented E-W; in cultivated area.
5	BS 909290	AA/AW position in dry crop area.
6	BS 906289	Three AW positions, oriented NE to SW; 50 ft. between flanking positions, in dry crop area.
7	BS 906294	One AAMG and one AW position, 50 ft. apart, oriented N-S; in village crop area.
8	BS 906295	One AW position in dry crop area.
9	BS 902299	One AA/AW position in dry crop area.
10	BS 898311	Two AW positions, 60 ft. apart, oriented N to S in clear area.
11	BS 897311	AA position in clear area.
12	B \$ 906289	AW position in clear area.
13	BS 925269	Bunker; S side of house. House has some kind of camoflauge, tunnel in rear of building, 10 ft. wide by 10 ft. long.
14	B\$ 902303	Possible bunker behind house.
15	BS 900299	Possible underground shelters with numerous small holes.
16	BS 883325	Possible underground shelter.
17	BS 869354	Bunker, overlooks road in clear area.
18	BS 898310	Possible mortar position in dry crop areav
		Enclosure (4)

ITEM	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION
19	BS 846299	Possible AA/AW position; on top of hill.
20	BS 818342	3 possible AA/AW positions; oriented N to S, flanking positions 100 ft. apart, on ridgeline.
21	BS 816328	AA/MG position; on side of brush covered hill.
22	BS 829311	AW position; beside hedgerow in dry crop field.
23	B S 841271	Possible AA/MG position; in dry crop field.
24	BS 888298	"L" shaped trench; base extends 250 ft. S, leg extends 180 ft. NW along tree line
25	BS 913280	Trench; 200 ft. long, oriented NE to SW, in dry crop area.
26	B\$ 905290	Trench; 400 ft. long, oriented E to W, along hedgerow.
27	BS 902294	Trench; 500 ft. long, oriented NW to SE, along road.
28	BS 903294	"L" shaped trench; base 200 ft. long, oriented NW to SE, leg 180 ft. W, in dry crop area.
29	BS 901294	Trench; 500 ft. long, oriented N to S, along road.
30	BS 905295	Trench; 420 it. long, oriented NE to SW, in dry crop area.
31	BS 883317	"L" shaped trench; base extends 600 ft. S, leg extends 250 ft. W, in clear area.
32	BS 878313	"L" shaped trench; base extends 800 ft. N, leg extends 200 ft. E in dry crop area.
33	BS 884328	"L" shaped trench; base extends 500 ft. S, leg extends 200 ft. W, in dry crop area.
34	BS 889297	Trench; 400 ft. long, oriented E to W, in tree line.
35	BS 883307	"L" shaped trench; base extends 550 ft. SE, leg extends 200 ft. NE in dry crop area.
36	BS 877333	AA/AW position; in corner of dry crop area.

2

Enclosure (4)


CHALLENGE AND PASSWORD.

Codes for the effective challenge and passowrd will be disseminated by this Headquarters on a weekly basis to cover seven 24 hour periods from 1200H to 1200H.

	PRI	MARY	ALTER	NATE
CODE	CHALLENGE	PASSWORD	CHALLENGE	PASSWORD
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
18	BAND	STAND	DRUM	MAJOR
60	SMOKE	RING	PIPE	STEM
84	PILLOW	CASE	BED	SPREAD
29	PEANUT	BUTTER	CASE	KNIFE
6 6	APPLE	SAUCE	MILK	PITCHER
97	DRESS	SLIP	BELT	BUCKLE
01	PANTS	CUFF	SHIRT	SLEEVE
110	BOXING	GLOVE	TENNIS	SHOE
44	BEER	CAN	RUM	BOTTLE
39	MAIL	CALL	BUFFALO	CHIP
26	NEWS	WEEK	MAP	CASE
08	FUEL	TANK	WATER	THOUGH
95	STAMP	PAD	RUBBER	CEMENT
73	BALL	POINT	UMBRELLA	SWORD
55	POOL	SHARK	BILLIARD	CUE
99	HEAVY	WEIGHT	PAPER	CLIP
61	ASH	TRAY	PLAY	BOY
87	FLAG	POLE	BOYS	CAMP
102	ART	GUM	TREE	SWING
20	NIGHT	TRAIN	ENGINE	BLOCK
91	LIFT	BALE	HAIR	TRIM
46	WATER	TOWER	DAY	LIGHT

Enclosure (5)





Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM AMS Series L7014 1:50,000 Sheet 6738 I, III., 6839 III.IV

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

(c) FMFM 7-4

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. Situation.

- a. General.
 - (1) Annex K (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 2-67 will be closely adhered to in control and coordination of supporting arms.
- b. Enemy Forces.
 - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
 - (2) Current Intsums.
- c. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) Annex F (Naval Gunfire)
 - (2) Annex G (Air Operations)
 - (3) Annex E (Artillery)
- 2. <u>Mission</u>. BLT 1/4 fire support coordination center (FSCC) will exercise responsibility for planning and coordinating all supporting fires for the BLT after responsibility for coordination is passed ashore.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept.
 - (1) Fire support coordination affoat will be coordinated and controlled by SACC.
 - (2) The BLT will establish a FCSS ashore for coordination of supporting arms. Control and coordination of supporting arms will be passed ashore on request of the CLF from the CATE.

 Control will be passed back to CATF prior to commencement of the Amphibious tactical withdrawal.

- (3) The BLT will plan preparatory pre H-hour and L-hour fires for helicopter landing zones and landing beaches.
- (4) Close air support will be under the positive control of the TACP FAC, TAC(A) or TAO. Airborne Controllers will establish communications with friendly units for positive location before attacking a target.
- (5) Artillery and naval gunfire will be under the positive control of the SFCP, FO or airborne spotter.
- b. Coordination of Air Support. All close air support requests coordinated by the ALO must have final approval by SACC.
- c. Coordination of Artillery and Naval Gunfire.
 - (1) When coordination of supporting arms is passed ashore to FSCC, SACC will be notified of all missions prior to firing. The following information will be passed to SACC.
 - (a) Unit or ship firing.
 - (b) Coordinates of target and target number.
 - (c) Maximum ordinate.
 - (d) Estimated time that firing will commence.
 - (e) When mission has been completed.
 - (2) The FSCC will at all times keep SACC abreast of unit locations.
 - (3) The SACC will immediately pass all information on supporting fires within the AOA to HDC to insure the safety of helos.
 - (4) SACC and HDC will transmit "Save -- A-- Planes" to all aircraft entering the AOA over the TAD nets and HD nets respectively.
- d. Target information.
 - (1) Initially maintained by CATF.
 - (2) FSCC will maintain a target list when ashore.
 - (3) Target numbers will be assigned in accordance with reference (b).
 - (4) Night defensive fire plans will be transmitted by the FSCC to CLF and SACC.
 - (5) Annex B (Intellignece).
 - (6) Current INTSUMS.



e. Aircraft Safety.

- (1) Air sentries and lookouts.
 - (a) Air sentries will be positioned at artillery firing batteries and will cease fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
 - (b) Artillery forward observers, naval gunfire spotters and airborne spotters will check fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and naval gunfire will endanger friendly aircraft.
 - (c) Unless special coordination measures are prescribed, fires on helicopter routes are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopters using the routes.

f. Coordination techniques.

- (1) Restrictive fire plans will be established by CATF while coordination of supporting fires is afloat. When coordination is passed ashore restrictive fire plans will be established and reported to SACC; changes by overlay or message.
- (2) Boundaries, no fire lines, and fire coordination lines will be established and reported to SACC; changes by overlay or message.
- (3) Bomb lines will be established by CATF/CLF as required.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Administrative Order 2-67
- 5. <u>COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS</u>. Annex J (Communication: Electronics)

Ligutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

stiman

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

121200H Feb 1967

Annex E (Artillery) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM AMS Series L7014 1:50,000; Sheet 6738 I, II 6838 III, IV

- (b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67
- (c) FMFM 7-4
- (d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order 1 (DECK HOUSE VI)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

- 1. SITUATION.
 - a. General.
 - (1) Annex K (hules of Conduct) and Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 2-67 will be closely adhered to at all times.
 - b. Enemy Forces.
 - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
 - (2) Current INTSUMS
 - c. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
 - (2) Annex F (Naval Gunfire)
 - (3) Annex G (Air Operations)

2. MISSION.

- a. Battery "G" (-) (REIN), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines will land in accordance with Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67 and occupy position in vicinity of Beach BLUE in direct support of BLT 1/4. Maintain tactical FDC to support landing force artillery elements.
- b. Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines will land in accordance with Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67 and occupy position designated to provide reinforcing fire for Battery "G".

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation.
 - (1) Landing forces artillery will support the landing force by providing direct support and reinforcing artillery fires.
 - (2) Battery "G" (-) (REIN), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines will be deployed to provide maximum fire in direct support of BLT 1/4.



- (3) Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12 Marines will be deployed to provide maximum support to landing forces by reinforcing fires of Battery "G".
- b. Battery "G" (-) (REIN), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines.
 - (1) Direct support of BLT 1/4
 - (2) Be prepared to provide the Command/Control Headquarters for the provisional Artillery group.
 - (3) Land on order by surface means over BEACH_HLUE and occupy position in vicinity of Coord BS920217. Zone of fire: BLT 1/4 ZOA.
 - (4) Be prepared to provide reinforcing fires in support of 3rd Battalion 7th Marines.
- c. Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12 Mairnes.
 - (1) Provide reinforcing fires for Battery "G" in support of ELT 1/4.
 - (2) Land on order by helicopter means in LZ to be designated. Zone of fire: HLT 1/4 ZOA.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Position Areas and Fire Capabilities. Report: 0700, 1100 and 1600 to SACC/FSCC the following.
 - (a) Location
 - (b) Direction of Fire
 - (c) Ammunition Status (CADILLAG REPORT). See Appendix 1
 - (2) Adjusting Rounds. Intial round in "Adjust Fire" missions will be WP or SMOKE.
 - (3) Concentration Numbers. In accordance with Annex E to Reference (b)
 - (4) Counter Mortar Policy. Semi-Active
 - (5) Fire Support Coordination. In accordance with Annex E to Reference (b).
 - (6) Rules of Engagement. Annex H to Reference (b)
 - (7) Smoke and Illumination. Must be coordinated through LF FSCC/, SACC.
 - (8) Restrictions of Fires. All Artillery and MGF missions must be cleared through SACC/FSCC on the Artillery CMD/FD met or NGF control net. Positive receipt of statement, "Mission Approved/cleared SAV-A-PLANE in effect" must be recieved form SACC/FSCC prior to firing.

- (9) Maps. See Reference (a).
- (10) Firing Chart. Grid sheets: Scale 1:25,000
- (11) Survey. Established by Battery "G", 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, as soon as possible.
- (12) <u>Direction of Fire</u>. As designated by the Artillery Group Commander upon occupying position.
- (13) Air Strikes. Annex D (Fire Support Coordination)
- (14) Landing Plan. Annex H (Landing Plan)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Reports
 - (1) Coordinating Instructions (1)
 - (2) Ammumtion Expenditure Report will be submitted daily to Provisional Artillery Group by 0900.
- b. Available Supply Rate. (Rds/Wpn/Day)
 - (1) 105mm Howitzer Battery
 - (a) HE 32
 - (b) HEPT
 - (c) WP 18
 - (d) SMOKE 4
 - (e) ILLUMINATION 3
 - (2) 107mm Mortar Battery
 - (a) HE 61
 - (b) WP 1
 - (c) ILLUMINATION 4 Total 81
 - (3) Batteries will not exceed 75% of allotted HE rounds without specific approval of the Provisional Artillery Group Commander.
- c. Administration Order 2-67.-57.



COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- Annex L to Reference (b)
- Command Post
 - (1) Afloat:

Provisional Artillery Group

USS IWO JIMA

Battery "G" 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines USS THOMASTON

Mortar Battery 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines USS VANCOUVER

(2) Ashore: Report when established. Battery "I" 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines: Coordinates 816384.

> Mustuman JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

1. Cadillac Report

DISTAIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

E-4



Time Zone: H

<u>CODE</u>	<u>DOD#</u>	CADILLAC REPORT DESCRIPTION 107MM MORTAR	ON HAND
ALPHA BRAVO CHAHLIE DELTA ECHO	C704 C706 C708 N412 N280	Ctg, SMK WP w/fz FUZE, VT, M513 FUZE, MTSQ	
FOXTROT GOLF HOTEL INDIA JULIET KILO LIMA MIKE NOVEMBER OSCAR PAPA	C448 C449 C451, C453, C455 C452 C454 N200 N280 N412	Ctg, HE w/o fz Ctg, HEP-T w/fz Ctg, ILLUM w/fz MTSQ Ctg, SMK, COLORED, w/fz Ctg, SMK, HC w/fz Ctg, SMK, WP w/fz	
QUEBEC ROMEO SIERRA TANGO UNIFORM VICTOR WHISKEY XRAY YANKEE ZEBRA ALPHA ALPHA	D540 D541 D544 D545 D550 N525 N200 N276 N280 N319	CHG, PROP, GB CHG, PROP, WB PROJ, HE, M107 PROJ, ILLUM PROJ, SMK, WP PRIMER, PERC & ELEC FUZE, PD, CP, M78 FUZE, MTSQ, M501 FUZE, MTSQ, M520 FUZE, PD, M51 FUZE, VT, M514	
BRAVO BRAVO CHARLIE CHA DELTA DELTA ECHO ECHO FOXTROT FOX GOLF GOLF HOTEL HOTEL INDIA INDIA JULIET JULI	TROT N200 N26 N26 N276 N280 N319	CHG, PROP PROJ, HE PROJ, SMX, WP PROJ, ILL UM PRIMER, PERC & BLEC FUZE, PD, CP, M78. FUZE, MTSQ, M501 FUZE, MTSQ, M520 FUZE, M51 FUZE, VT, M514	

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM AMS Series L7014 1:50,000 Sheet 6738 I, III, 6838 III, IV

- (b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67
- (c) FMFM 7-2
- (d) FMFM 7-4


Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

TU 76.5.1 Naval Gunfire Support Unit

1. SITUATION.

- a. General. Reference (b) states that in other than built up areas
 Naval Gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in contact, in
 accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, unobserved
 NGF will be directed only at targets declared hostile by indigenous
 personnel, ground observers or airborne spotters. Futher, unobserved
 Naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances
 and in cases where:
 - (1) The requested Naval Gunfire mission cannot be observed due to geography, weather, or other factors; or
 - (2) No U. S. TACP, SFCP, FAC's or airborne artillery spotters trained in Naval Gunfire spotting are available.
- b. Enemy Forces.
 - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
 - (2) Current INTSUMS
- c. Friendly Forces
 - (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
 - (2) NGF Support (TU 76.5.1)



3. EXECUTION.

- a. Naval Gunfire support unit (TU 76.5.1) will support the BLT maneuver ashore
- b. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Fire support areas and stations, boundaries and zones of responsibility of fire support ships will be promulgated by CATF..
 - (2) SACC will control and coordinate Naval Gunfire until passed to FSCC ashore.
 - (3) When BLT FSCC is established ashore, coordination of Naval Gunfire with other supporting arms will be in accordance to reference (c).
 - (4) Request for Naval Gunfire support will be made to the gunfire support ships by spot teams, forward observers, air observers and other qualified to adjust fires.
 - (5) VT and MTF fuzed projectiles not set on safe will not be fired over the heads or within 300 yards of friendly ships, troops, landing, or assault boats, unless specifically requested by the supporting unit.
 - (6) Use UTM grid reference system for all target locations.
 - (7) Restrictive fire plans will be in accordance with Annex D (Fire) Support Coordination).
 - (8) Creeping methods of adjustment will be used in all dangerously close missions.
 - (9) All spotters will give the Naval Gunfire Ship, upon completion of a mission, "End of Target". Following by a damage assessment and effectiveness of fire.
 - (10) The SFCP will report to the Naval Gunfire Ship(s) friendly positions every hour or when there is a significant change.
 - (11) BLT Commander will coordinate Naval Gunfire zones of responsibility to correspond to the boundaries of the supported troop unit.
 - (12) All Naval Gunfire missions require positive clearence and approval by SACC/FSCC.



- (13) BLT will submit requirements to CLF for D-Day schedule of fires.
- (14) The BLT commander will coordinate screening smoke with organic units and CLF.
- (15) Rockets will not be fired over heads of friendly troops, landing craft, assault boats or shipping.
- (16) Illumination missions will be fired only upon approval of BLT Commander.
- (17) SFCP will establish radio communications with direct support ships at H-60. In the interval before SFCP commences functioning ashore, NGF ships will execute scheduled fires using an Airborne Spotter. Airborne Spotter (TAO) may request repetition, acceleration, reduction, or shifting of scheduled fires as the situation dictates.
- (18) Coordination of Air support, Artillery, and Naval Gunfire in accordance with Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
 - a. Details published as required.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
 - a See Annex J (Communication Electronics)

JACK WESTERMAN
i eutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

alWesterman

APPENDIX:

- 1. NGF Operations Overlay
- 2. D-Day Schedule of Fires

to be submitted

- 3. Radio Frequency channel chart
- 4. Ammunition loading and resupply to be submitted

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67


Frosty Gold 1 Refuel LPH-2 4 UH-34 LPH-2 LPH-2 L+143 L+151 L+161 PARROT 15

18 Co. B; 2/81mm; Ser 221-2 to 221-4;

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutement Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67



Appendix 5 (Heliteam Wave and Derial Assignment Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

LIA IEE	A/C FLIGHT	PERSONNEL.		SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	Ţ	WEIGHT		ENPLANING STATION
WAVE	NO HELITEAM SER. NC.	TROOP UNIT	NO.		PERS	EQUIF	TOTAL	STATION
1	Artic Spin 260-1	Scd ldr, 1st Sqd, 1st plat. 1st Ft, 1st Sqd, 1st plat. Grenadier	1 4 1 6	Normal Combat	1350		1350	
	260–2	2d Ft, 1st Sqd,1st pla In ldr, 1st MG Sqd. Gunner, 1st MG Sqd.	1 1 6	1-M60 MG	1350	41	1391	
	260-3	Plat. Cmdr, 1st plat (A Rdo Opr IZCT	1 -	2-AN/PRC 25	1350	40	1390	
-	260-4	Plat Guide 1st plat & A Corpsman Sqd ldr 1st Sqd MG sec	1	-	1350		1350	

260-4 (cont)	Ammo man 1st MC Sqd. LZCT	2 1 6				
09145	Sqd ldr 2nd Sqd, 1st Plat Grenadier 1st Ft, 2d Sqd 1st Plat	1 1 6		1350		13.50
260-6	Gunner 1st MG Sqd Tm ldr 1st MG Sqd Engr Sqd Ldr Engr	1 1 3 6	1-M60 MG (41) Demolitions	1350	81	1431
260-7	Sqd ldr, 1st Aslt Sqd. Gunner 1st Aslt Sqd. 2d Ft, 2d Sqd 1st plat	1	1-3.5 HKT LOHR	1350	14	1364
260–8	3d FT,2d Sqd, 1st Plat A-Gunner, 1st Asslt Sqd Ammo Man, 1st Asslt Sqd	1 1 6	2 Cases 3.5 Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	108	1458

H-5-2

2	261–1	Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,1st Plat Grenadier A-Gunner, 1st Assult Sqd Ammo Man,1st Asslt Sqd Corpsman	1 1 1 2 6	2 Cases 3.5 Ammo	1350	108	1458	
	261-2	1st Ft,3d Sqd, 1st Fla Gunner,1st Asslt Sqd Corpsman	1 1 6	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr	1350	14	1364	
	261-3	Plat Sgt,1st Plat CoA 3d FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat Ammo Man,1st MG Sqd	1 4 1 6	1 Case 7,62 Link	13 <i>5</i> 0	75	1425	
	261-4	Co Cmdr, Co A Rdo Opr Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd Tm Ldr, 2d MG Sqd Gunner, 2d MG Sqd	1 2 1 1 1	1 Case 7.62 Link 2 AN/PRC 25 1 M-60 MG	1350	156	1 560	
	•		<u>-6</u>				1	
	261-5	Sec Ldr, MG Sec Ammo Man, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat	1 1 6	1 Case 7.62 Link	1350	75	1425	

				•	
					,
1425	1 541	1370	1370	13.50	
75	191	50	8		
1350	1350	1350	55 57 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50	03.50	
1 Case 7.62 Link	1 M-60 MG 2 Cases 7.62 Link	1 AN/PHG 25	1 AN/PRG 25		
	m	7-6	-amo	000	
Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat Grenadier 1st FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat Ammo Man, 2d MG Sqd	2d FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat Im Ldr, 2d MG Sqd Guner, 2d MG Sqd Amrc Man, 2d MG Sqd	Plat Cmdr, 2d Plat CoA Rdo Opr 3d FT,1st Cqd,2d Plat Corpsman	Plat Guide, 2d Plat CoA Arty FO Im 2d FI, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat	Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat Grenadier 1st Fr, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat 3d Fr, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat	
261–6	261-7	261-8	262-1	262-2	•
			m		

				- ·	~	
262-3	Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,2d Plat FAC Th Grenadier Ammo Man, 2d MG Sqd	1 2 1 2 6	1 AN/PRC 25 1 Case 7.62 Link	13 <i>5</i> 0	95	1445
262–4	1st FT,3d Sqd,2d Plat Corpsman Gunner,2d Asslt Sqd A-Gunner,2d Asslt Sqd	3 1 1 1 6	1 3.5 nkt Lchr 2 Cases 3.5 Rkt Ammo	1350	122	1472
262–5	Plat Sgt,2d Plat Co. A Gunner,2d Asslt Sqd A-Gunner,2d Asslt Sqd FAC Tm	1 1 1 3	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr 2 Cases 3.5 Rkt Ammo 1 AN/PRC 25	1350	142	1492
262–6	Engrs Ammo Man,2d Asslt Tm 2d FT,3d Sqd,2d Plat	3 1 2 6	Mine Detector & Demolitions	1350	110	1460
262-7	Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec Sqd Ldr, 2d Asslt Sqd Ammo Man, 2d Asslt Sqd 3d FT, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat	1 1 3 6		1350		1350




	262-8	Sqd Ldr,1st Sqd,3d Plat Grenadier 1st FT,1st Sqd Ammo Man,3d MG Sqd	1 3 1 6	1 Case 7.62 Ammo	1350	7 5	1425	•
4	263–1	2d FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat Tm Ldr, 3d MG Sqd Gunner, 3d MG Sqd Ammo Man,3d MG Sqd	3 1 1 1 6	1 M-60 MG	1350	41	1391	
	263-2	Plat Cmdr,3d Plat CoA Rdo Opr 3d FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat Corpsman	1 1 3 1 6	1 An/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
	263–3	Plat Guide,3d Plat CoA Engrs 2d FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat	1 2 3 6	Demolitions	1350	60	1410	
	263-4	Sqc Ldr,2d Sqd,3d Plat Grenadier 1st FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat	1 1 4 6		1350		1350	

H-5-6

	2 <u>6</u> 3 - 5	Sqd Ldr,3d MG Sqd Tm Ldr,3d MG Sqd Gunnær,3d MG Sqd Arty FO Tm	1 1 3 6	1 M-60 MG 1 An/PRC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	61	1411	
	263–6	Sqd Ldr,3d Asslt Sqd Gunner,3d Asslt Sqd Ammo Man,3d Asslt Sqd 1st FT,3d Sqd,3d Plat	1 1 1 3 6	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr 2 Cases 3.5 Rkt Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	122	1472	
	263–7	Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,3d Plat Grenadier 81mm FO Tm A-Gunner,3d Asslt Sqd Ammo Man,3d Asslt Sqd	1 1 2 1 1 6	1 An/PRC 25 2 Cases 3.5 Ekt Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	122	1472	
	263-8	2d Ft,3d Sqd,3d Plat Gunner,3d Asslt Sqd Ammo Man,3d MG Sqd	3 1 2 6	1 3.5 Ekt Lehr	1 3 <i>5</i> 0	14	1364	







5	264–1	3d FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat Corpsman. A-Gunner,3d Asslt Sqd Plat Sgt,3d Plat Co.A Engr	2 1 1 1 1 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	
	264–2	Co XO Co. A Sec Ldr,60MM Mortar Sec Sqd Ldr,1st Mortar Sec Cunner,1st Mortar Sqd A-Gunner,1st Mortar Sqd Ammo Man,1st Mortar Sqc	1 1 1	1 60MM Mortar 2 Cases 60MM Ammo	1350	122	1472	
	264-3	Co Gy Sgt Co.A 2d Mortar Sqd Wpns Plat Sgt	1 4 1 6	1 60MM Mortar 2 Cases 60MM Ammo	1350	122	1472	
	2 6 4-4	Wpns Plat Cmdr Co.A Engrs Rdo Opr Gunner,2d Mortar Sqd	1 3 1 1 6	1 60MM Mortar 2 Cases 60MM Ammo	1350	122	1472	
	220-1	1st Sec Hqds,81MM Plat	6	9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	122	1472	
	220–2	1st Sec,1st Sqd 81MM	6	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	221	1571	:





					\ 		
	220-3	2d Sqd,2d Sec,81MM Plat	, 6	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	221	1571
	220-4	1st Mortar Sqd, Ammo Man 2d Mortar Sqd, Ammo Man Asst Ammo Cpl,1st Sec	1 1 1 3	9 Cases 81mm Ammo	675	540	1215
6	230–1	1st Sqd,1st Sec 106RR Sec Ldr,1st Sec 106RR Gunner,2d Sqd,1st Sec 106RR	4 1 1 6		1350		1350
	230-2	Equipment Only	-	1 LIWC w/106RR		1517	1517
	231-1	2d Sqd,1st Sec 106 ER	3	6 Cases 106RR Ammo	675	4 <i>5</i> 0	1125
End Co A	231-2	Equipment Only		1 LIWC w/106RR		1517	1517
	· ·				12.41		
				1 - 1 √	1 (0	î. î	

Wave 1	270-1	COMPANY B 1st Sqd(-),1st Plat CoB Corpsman	5 1 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	
	270-2	1st MG Tm,1st MG Sqd Sqd Ldr, 1st MG Sqd Plat Cmdr,1st Plat CoB Rdo Opr	3 1 1 1 6	1 M-60 MG & Ammo 1 AN/PRC 25	13 50	62	1412	
· ·	270-3	Grenadier,1stSqd,1st Plat 1st Sqd(-),1st Plat	1 5 6		1350	i	1350	
	270–4	Plat Sgt,1st Plat CoB 2d Sqd(-),1st Plat	1 5 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
	270-5	Elms, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd	2 4 6		1350		1350	
	270-6	Corpsman, 1st Asslt Tm,1st Asslt Sqd Right Guide 1st Plat	1 4 1 6	1 3.5 Rkt Lehr	13 <i>5</i> 0	14	1364	
	2 7 0–7	2d Sqd (-),1st Plat Arty FO Tm	4 2 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	



		·						
	270-8	LZCT SP Plat FAC Tm	376	2 AN/PRC-25	13 <i>5</i> 0	40	1390	
	271-1	Elms, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat	6		1350	20	1350	
2	271-2	Elms,3d Sqd,1st Plat	6		1350	20	1350	
	271-3	Ammo Man,2d Asslt Tm Mortar Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec	1 5 6	1 60MM Mortar w/Ammo	1350	95	1445	
	271-4	Asslt Tm. Asslt Sec 1st FT,1st Sqd,2d Plat Grenadier	2 3 1 6		1350		1350	
•	271-5	Plat Cmdr,2d Plat, CoB Rdo Opr Sqd Ldr,1st Sqd,2d Plat 2d FT,1st Sqd,2d Plat	1 1 3 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
	271-6	3d FT,1st Sqd,2d Plat 1st Tm,2d MG Sqd	3 36	1 M-60 MG & Ammo	1350	75	1425	
	271-7	Co Cmdr Co B Co Rdo Opr Bn Rdo Opr Arty FO TM 1st Sgt	1 1 2 1 6	3 AN/PRC 25	1350	60	1410	




	271 -8	Sqd Ldr,2d Mg Sqd Corpsman Elms, 2d Sqd,2d Plat	1 1 4 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		13 50	
3	27 2 -1	2d FT,2d Sqd,2d Plat 1st Asslt Tm,2d Asslt Sqd	3 6	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr	13 <i>5</i> 0	14	1364	
	272-2	Sqd Ldr, 2d Asslt Sqd Mortar Sqd,60MM Mortar Sqd	1 5	1 60MM Mortar & Ammo	1350	200	1550	
	272-3	3d FT,2d Sqd,2d Plat Grenadieu & Rdo Opr Plat Guide,2d Plat	3 2 1 6	1 AN/PRC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	20	1370	,
	272-4 272-5	Sniper Tm 3d Sqd(-), 2d Plat Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,2d Plat	2 4 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		13 <i>5</i> 0	
	,	Grenadier 2d TM,2d MG Sqd	1 1 4 6	1 M-60 MG & Ammo	1350	75	1425	



	272-6	Asslt Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co B Rdo Opr & Corpsman	3 1 2 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
	272-7	Co XO Co B & Rdo Opr Co GvSgt & Corpsman 60MM Sec Ldr 3.5 Sec Ldr	2 2 1 1 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
	272-8	1st FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat Grenadier Sqd Ldr,1st Sqd 3d Plat Plat Cmdr, Wpns Plat	3 1 1 1 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	
4	273-1	2d FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat 1st Tm, 3d MG Sqd Plat Cmdr,3d Plat Co B Rdo Opr	2 2 1 1 6	1 M-60 MG & Ammo 1 AN/PRC	1350	100	1450	
2.	273-2	Sqd Ldr,3d MG Sqd Plat Sgt,3d Plat Co B 3d FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat 1st FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat	1 3 1 6	1 M-60 MG & Ammo 1 AN/PRC 25	1350	100	1450	
Ŷ	273-3	Supply NOO 2d FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat Arty FO Tm	1 3 2 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
								*

371-2

Engrs



DECLASSIFIED



6

1350

1350

;•

		 				<u> </u>	
	221-1	Ammo Man 2d Sec 81MM	2	10 Cases 81MM Ammo	450	600	1050
	221-2	2d Sec Hods (-) 81MM Plat	6	9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	81	1431
	221 -3 11:	2d Sec,3d Sqd(-)81MM Plat	6	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	221	1571
END	221-#	2d Sec,4th Sqd,81MM Plat	6	1 81MM Mortar 9 rds 81MM Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	221	1571
℃. B	/ /	'REAR ELEMENTS	81 M M	MORTAR PLATOON	$I_{k_{\mu},\nu}$		1. L. x
ON-SCHED	222–1	3d Sec Hads, 81MM Plat	6	9 rds 81MM Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	81	1431
	222–2	3d Sec,5th Sqd,81MM	: 6	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	221	1571
	222-3	Plat	t 2	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	221	1571
	222-4	Ammo Man, 3d Sec, 81MM Plat	2	10 Cases 81MM Ammo	450	600	1050
	224-1	Plat Cmdr,81MM Plat Plat Sgt Plat Rdo Chief Plat Wire Chief Rdo Opr	1 1 1 1 1	Comm Equip	1125	200	1325
	<u> </u>						



							_
224-2	Asst Plat Ondr Plat Ammo Sgt	1 2	10 Cases 81MM Ammo	450	600	10 50	
- .							
	ELEMENTS 106RR PLAT						
233–1	1st Sqd,3d Sec 106RR Plat Cmdr,106RR Rdo Opr	4 1 1 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
233-2	Equipment Only		1 LIWC w/106RR		1583	1 <i>5</i> 83	
233-3	Equipment Only		w/6 Rds Ammo 1 LIWC w/106RR w/6 Rds Ammo		1 583	1583	
233–4	2d Sqd,3d Sec 106RR Sec Ldr,3d Sec 106RR Plat Sgt,106RR	4 1 1 6	wy o rede Aguno	13 50		1350	
235-1	.50 Cel MG Sqd, H&S Asslt Im, H&S	3 2 5	1 Cal.50 MG & Ammo 1 3.5 Rkt Lehr & Ammo	1125	327	1452	
235-2	.50 Cal MG Sqd, H&S Flamethrower Tm, H&S	3 2 5	1 Cal. 50 MG & Ammo 1 Flamethrower	1125	350	1475	
23.5 –3	.50 Cal MG Sqd H&S Falmethrower Tm, H&S	3 2 5	1 Cal. 50 MG & Ammo 1 Flamethrower	1125	350	1475	

H-5-16

COPY OF BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Annex J (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref:

- (a) 1stBn 4thMar order 4000.1
- (b) CTG 79.5 OP PLAN 120A-67
- (c) CTG 79.5 (SLF) COI

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.
- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-67 and current intelligence summaries.
- (2) The enemy has the capability to conduct active and passive electronic countermeasures (ECM) operations.
 - (3) Enemy ECM operations may include:
 - (a) Radio Intercept
 - (b) Jamming
 - (c) Imitative Deception
 - (d) Wire Tapping
 - (e) Ambush of wire teams
- (4) Enemy makes maximum use of discarded communication-electronics equipment. All discarded batteries and wire must be thoroughly destroyed.
 - (5) Abandoned communication equipment may be booby trapped.
 - b. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) See Operation Order 2-67.
- (2) Amphibious Task Group (TG 79.5) provides communication and crypto guard for BLT 1/4 during SLF operations.

(3) Command Posts.

(a) Afloat.

CTF (TG 76.5)	USS	IWO JIMA
CLF (TG 79.5)	USS	IWO JIMA
BLT 1/4	USS	IWO JIMA
HMM-363	USS	IWO JIMA
"G" Btry 3rdBn 12thMar	USS	THOMASTON
Mortar Btry 3rdBn 12thMar	USS	VANCOUVER
lstPlat Co "A" 3rd TankBn		THOMASTON
2ndPlat Co "B" 3rd AntitankBn	USS	VANCOUVER
2ndPlat Co "A" 3rd ReconBn	USS	IWO JIMA
4thPlat Co "B" 1st AmtracBn	USS	VANCOUVER
4thPlat Co "B" 3rd EngineerBn	USS	VANCOUVER
lstPlat Co "A" 3rd Shore PartyBn	USS	THOMASTON
lstPlat Co "C" 3rd Motor TransBn		THOMASTON
Det 3rd SVCBn FLSG Bravo	USS	VANCOUVER
Det HqBn 3rd MARDIV	USS	IWO JIMA
C&CPlat Co "D" 3rd MedBn	USS	IWO JIMA
Det CommSptCo 9th MAB	uss	VANCOUVER
Det HqCo 4thMar	USS	IWO JIMA
Co "C" lstBn 4thMar	USS	VANCOUVER
Co "D" 1stBn 4thMar	USS	VANCOUVER
•		•

- b. Ashore. All landing force units report CP locations when established.
- 2. <u>MISSION</u>. Commencing at H-60, D-Day BLT 1/4 communication-electronics elements provide communications and electronics support for the amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Communications Platoon, 1stBn 4thMar.
- (1) Provide organic battalion communications in accordance with reference (a) and this order.
- (2) Provide communications personnel and equipment for battalion TACLOG group as required.
- (3) Be prepared to attach one (1) wireman (2511) to each assault rifle company.
- (4) Be prepared to install hot-line telephone circuits aboard ship as required.

- (5) Be prepared to provide communication equipment to SLF (CTG 79.5) within capability, in accordance with Annex L to reference (b).
 - b. All Attached Units.
 - (1) Provide organic communications as required.
- (2) Guard supported unit tactical net as required. See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
 - c. 1st Platoon Co "A" 3rd Shore Party Bn.
- (1) Provide communications personnel and equipment for SP/LZ Control Teams as required.
- (2) Establish ligison communications with Naval Beachmaster units as required.
 - d. Attached Artillery Batteries.
- (1) When the tactical situation permits install two (2) wire lines to the battalion FSCC switchboard and one (1) line to BLT switchboard.
- e. <u>BLT Artillery Communications</u>. See Annex E (Artillery) to Operation Order 2-67 and Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
- f. Naval Gunfire Communications. See Annex F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 2-67 and Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
- g. Air Support Communications... See Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation Order 2-67 and Tab A (Air Support Radio Plan) to Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
 - h. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Message Center.
- (a) Cryptographic instructions. See Appendix 2 (Cryptographic Instructions).
 - (b) Maintain message center afloat throughout SLF operations.
- (c) Effect distribution of authentication and numeral codes as directed.
 - (2) Messenger Service.

Helicopter messenger service will be available upon request. to the S=4.

(b) Helicopter landing sites will be marked in accordance with Appendix 5.

(c) Vehicle messenger service to be established as the tactical situation permits. Schedule to be announced.

(3) Radio.

- (a) Radio Silence until H-60 Minutes or until lifted by CATF.
- (b) See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan)
- (c) Radio call signs in accordance with reference (c) and Appendix 3 (Radio Call Signs).
 - (4) Wire. See reference (a).
 - (5) Integrated Wire-Radio. See Appendix 4 (Integrated Wire-Radio Plan).
 - (6) Visual and Sound.
 - (a) See Appendix 6 to Annex L to reference (b) and Appendix (5).
 - (b) Pyrotechnic/Smoke signals pocket guide to be published separately.
 - h. Interference and Jamming. See Appendix 7 to Annex L to reference (b).
- (1) Report suspected jamming or deception to the BLT Communications Officer immediately, by PRIORITY message. Include: frequency, time, brief description of jamming, i.e. voice, CW signal, noise; and effect of jamming on friendly communications.
- (2) In the event of suspected deception, immediately challenge suspect station. If station does not authenticate properly, report incident to BLT Communications Officer by PRIORITY message. Include: frequency, time, and brief description of incident.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Administrative Plan 2-67.

b. Submit emergency requests for resupply of communication-electronic items directly to BLT 1/4 Communications Officer

JACK WESTERMAN Lightenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


Villiman

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 Radio Plan
- 2 Cryptographic Instruction
- 3 Radio Call Signs
- 4 Integrated Wire-Radio Plan
- 5 Visual Communications

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67



Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to Annex J (Communication-Electronics to Operation Order 2-67 COPY OF COPIES
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Time Zone: H

Time Tode: v																	کیا۔ ے							•	-	•				
LEGEND		A	В	Ċ	D	E	F	G	H	Į	J	K	L	M	N	0	P	Q	R	8	I	Ú	V	¥	X	Y	Z	M	画	<u>&</u>
C - NET CONTROL	ACTIVATION] .		4,		:					1						
L - LISTEN	NOTES	4						L	T	-	 	-	-	-	† -	-	-	F	3	7	7	k	~	×	2	2	7	1	Н	Γ
O - Be prepared to guard 1 - Guard afloat			1				÷	TAC																						
		3		<u>a</u>				Mar	g			~	1		g		3												e	
2 - Guard ashore		5	,	7,7		TAC #1		ord Bn 7th Mar	A DM TIN / LOG	TAC	TAC	TAC	TAC	Co TAC	PECON PLT CMD	CAL	CONT/TACLOG	Coff	MGF Control	Spot #1	Spot #2	Spot #3	SFC Spot #4	SECP LOCAL	()	Ŝ,	#3	NRTY CMD/FD	TANK PLF CKD	
3 - Guard afloat and ashore		LF TAC		LF TAC		BLT T		THE SERVICE	BLT A	_	m	ა ვ	3	PBOV	PECON	SP LOCAL	SPS	81 MM Coff	NGF C	SPC S			S DES	RECP	COL	רי ו	٠.	ARTY	TANK	
R - Guard as required	FREQUENCY DESIGNATOR	H-521	M=581	9041-K	N-1405	¥-685	6+9-H	H-655	M-1130	¥-723	M-428	14-535	M-578	H-637	11.643	₩-890	828	H-872	C=3	14-990	1 5 C9-H	X-215	K-183	¥_662	K-682	H-633	994-H	4-57h	H-572	765-K
•	FREQUENCY	8-14(4)	5)42:55	(P)6383	(8)8000	(P)48.6	8°54(8)	1.94	31,3	51.4	0		45.4	45.1	П		2	8	4057	4.53	5.04	8776	8060	16.75	48.25	6.44	36.2	42.2	0.25(g)	4.55(8)
UNIT	EMISSION	3613	9	3A 3.I	· 3	36F3		3613	3683	3613	3613	36F3	36F3	36F3	3683	3683	3613	3613	34.34	3653	3653	343.1	343,5	3673	3653	3673	3683	36F3		
1, CTG 79.5 SLF		Ċ						H																						
3LT 1/4		3		3		C			U						0		R					٠,								
7. Co A 1/4		$\perp \perp$			_	3			3	C					Q									•						
4. Co B 1/4		$\bot \bot$			-	3		Ц	3		C		_	Ц	d		\Box	Ц			_			-	7					,
5. Co C 1/4		44				3			3	_		C.	Ц	Ш	Q		Ц	Ц				÷	Ц		3			Ш	Ш	ļ
6, Co D 1/4		44				3		_	3	Ц	Ц		C		Ö			Ц		_		L		4		Ш		Ц		_
7. G BTRY 3/12		11		_		3	Ш	Н		Щ	Ц		Ц	Ц	Ц	1		Ц			_	Щ	Ц			Ы			Ц	
8,107 BTRY 3/12		+	_	4		3		Ш	Щ	Щ		Н	Н	Ц	Н	\Box		Ц	_	Щ		Н	Щ		R	R	Ŗ		ᆔ	_
9. TK BN CO A		₩	_	4		3		Н		Н	Н	\perp	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	_			Н	Н	Н	Н	H		Н	C	<u> </u>
10 AT EN CO B		+-+	_	_		3		,	-	Н	Н	\vdash	Н	Н	Н	\Box	Н	Н	\dashv	Ц		Щ				Н	Н	Н	\dashv	,
11 RECON Plt		ì		R.	-4	34		Н		Н	Ľ	Н	Н	Н	ч			Н		-	_	Н	2		3	R	R	Н	\dashv	_
12 AMTRAC Plt		╀┤	-	-	-	-	H		3	Н	Н	Н	Н		Н		-	H	4	_	_	Н	Щ		Ш	H	_	Н	4	
13 ENG Plt		┿┪		-	-	4	_		3	Н			Н	Н	Н			4	4	Н	_	Н	-	Н	2	Н	Н	Н	\dashv	т-
14 SP Plt		╁┪	-	4	4		Н		م الال	Н		Ţ	Н	Н		4	띡	4	4	Н		Н	щ	Н	Н	${m H}$	Н	⊢┥		_
15 DET FLSG B		╂╌╂		\dashv	+	4	Н		<u>0</u>	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	Н	O.	4	\dashv	-	Н	-	H		H	Н	dash	Н	H	-4	+
16 TACLOG GP 17. SP T/LZ CON T		╅┥	\dashv	+	+	Ч	Н	\dashv	괵	H	-1	Н	Н	Н	H		3	4	-	H		Н	Н	Н	H	Н	Н	Н	-	-
17. SP 17.12 CON 1		╅┥	┥	\dashv	+	-	H	H	\vdash	Н	Н	Н	H	H	Н	P	+		닑	C	\dashv	Н	Н		Н	Н	Н	H	4	
19 COMPOSITE CO		╅┥	\dashv	+	-	R	-	Н	-	Н	Н	Н	Н		Н	\dashv	Н	۳	4	Ч	밐	띡	띰	ч	H	H		E	-	
20 NGF SUP SHIPS		╬	٠	\dashv	┥	4	\dashv	\dashv	Н	Н	\exists	Н	Н	H	Н	닉	Н	Η	亅	R		Н	Н	Н	Н	H	Н	\dashv	-	<u>-</u>
21. SACC		╅┪	-	+	+	┪	\dashv	-	\dashv	H	Н	Н	Н	Н	┝╂		닉	\dashv	7	i,	¥	4	Ļ	Н	H	Н	Н	ı	-4	-
		3	-	3	+		-	c l	-	H	Н	H	Н	Н	H	닉	H	-	۲	+	-4	-	-	•	H	Н	щ	4		. [
22.3/7		424	-	4	-+			4		\dashv	\dashv	Щ	Н	\dashv			Ļ	-	4	Н	_		Н	щ	\vdash				-	<u>. ن .</u>

J-1-1

											4																	است	_	
LEGEND		A	В	C_	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	Ţ	M	N	0	P	0	R	S	T	U	Y	Ų	Į	I	Z	W	B,	CC
C- Net Control	ACTIVATION			1	1				Ц												L									
	NOTES] -		1	ᅥ	Н															l									
L- Listen		Π	,			Ţ	٦		П									Г							Г		П	П	П	
0- Be prepared to guard 1- Guard afloat 2- Guard ashore 3- Guard afloat	nets	CMD (P)			AMTRAC PLT CND	T CMD																							•	
and ashore R- Guard as required		AT PLT	Н	+	7	ENG PLT CMD							,																	
	Frequency Designator	M-378			X-642	¥-888		L																						
	FREQUENCY	(P)24.0	8,45(2)	9.52(1)	45.2	58.1																								
UNIT ORGANIZATIO	EMISSION	36F3			36F3	36F3																								
1. 2nd PltATBn		С	\Box	ightharpoons															L										2	5
2. AMTRAC Plt			Ц	1	C]	Ц		Ц						_		L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L		Ц	Ц	Ľ	L
3. ENG Plt		_	┷	4	_	O	Ц		Ц	4				_	<u> </u>	L	L	L	Ļ	L	ļ	1	<u> </u>	 _	L	L	Ц	Щ	Ш	<u> </u>
4 FSCC		┡	\sqcup	+	4		Ц	_	\sqcup	4	_	_	_	_	 _	┡	 -	 _	Ļ	1	┡	╀	\vdash	┞	L	-	Н	$\vdash \vdash$		
5.		╀	┝┽	+	-		Н	\dashv	dash	4		_	_	H	┝	-	-	⊢	╀	┝	┞	╀	-	Ͱ	-	-	H		\vdash	\vdash
6.		╀	₩	+	4	-	\sqcup	4	\dashv	4		-		_	┝	 -		┡-	╀	├	┞	╀	L	 -	-	-	Н	Н	dash	-
7• 8•		-	$\vdash \vdash$	4	4		Ц	4	\sqcup	4		4	_	_	L	L	_	L	L	L	L	 	L	L	<u> </u>	L.,	Ц	Ц	Ш	
<u> </u>		<u> </u>	بلبإ	4			Ц	_		_	_			٠	<u>. </u>	_	<u>_</u>	Ŀ		<u>L</u>	_	١.	<u> </u>	٠.	بنا	٠.	Ŀ	Ш		

NOTE: 1. SUBORDINATE UNITS GUARD AS REQUIRED

2. ARTILLERY LIAISON OFFICER/ FO TEAM GUARD AS REQUIRED
3. NGF LIAISON OFFICER/EN STC SPOT TEAM GUARD AS REQUIRED

NET WILL SHIFT TO COVERED OPERATION (KY8) ASAP UPON

ACTIVATION OF CP ASHORE

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

Sution) to Operation Order 2-67 J-1-2

Table (dir Support Residence) To appendix I To "Minimum (Communication-Electronics) To Operation Order 2-67

COPY OF COPTES FIFT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Time Some: H

LMGRED		Z	i i	C	0	3	Į,	G	Н	Ī	J	Ä	L	Ŋ.	N	0	P	ij.	R	s	T	U	V	N	Υ	Y	Z	11.11	BI
G-Met Control	ै ।⊌≟ः: .C4.		T		1							Γ																	
L-L ister		3	3	1000	Chemtre					Scarlet	Green A	8					Black (
يان شانده بالل د تعور س ر 		VET TOW		15	9				Line	Sca	ğ	RORe					न		1										
ta stuard			T																ᇽ					T	Γ				Γ
-Guard aflost											7		S	Con	CH	평			ZITE T			(a)	(B)	ı					
-Garya ashore	METS	<u>a</u>	10	1		٦					3	AND	I/VI	One	TAU	Y	ğ	뙲	Zpu			in an	nerent						
-Garan afloat			1	14		1	1	£3 (F)	#	42	COMMAND	COMMAND	TACP LOCAL/ARC	7 20	LPH LAND/LAUNCH	QIA	COMMON	HAM SOD COMMON	Repose Land/Launch	Guard	Guard	Itenerant	Iten						
and ashore		TAR/HR	Z	TAD/AC	V V	TAC #1	TAC #	TAC #3	TATC #1	ATC	HELO	HELO	ACP	andi	H.	a a	HELO	ğ	ode	IIIF G	VHF G		VHF 1	•					
R-Guard as required		L	ļ.,	-	-	ļ		-					-		1		_			7	LV	Y	Λ				4		L
16401160	FREQUENCY DESIGNATOR	M-1114	٩	130 E	10212	M20	M22	21.04	119	M-1269	-3	H-4	H-705	0024	H-6	2	H-5	71116											
	NASTONATON	ļ.,	1	١.	ı	1	L	L			l I			i	- 1	ı		\exists								Ц			_
	Frequency	30.0	4395	375.	269.5	2422	5079	4453	248.5	328.	368.	285.0	7.05	8964	330-6	324.6	352.6	35	312.2	243.0	121.5	118.3	118.7						
::P₹	MOI ŠZIAE	Γ	Γ												1	1	1		1	1							1		
- C	1112.001.014	36F3	3431	63	6 A 3	3A 3.I	3A 3.I	3.43.1	643	3	36F3	643	26F3	200	3	3	3	Ž	3	Z	Z	543	543						
1. HMM-363		-	-	H	-		R			-	R			-	R	_		ċ۲	7	귀		F		Н	Н	\dashv	\dashv	ᅱ	
LSD										\top								Ĭ											
3. CAS A/C			L	R	_				R	R				_					ţ	R	R	R	R						
LPD		2					Ш						_	_	_	\bot	R	_	_								*		
TACPS.		R	R	R	L		Ц	Ц	_	_	Ц		C	B	4	4	4	4	_	4	_	_					_		
6. AIR BASES	·	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	L	_	R	R	R		4	_	Ц	4	4	4	4	_	4	4	4	_	_	_				_	_	
Z HELO ESCORT		-	<u> </u>	R	Н	H	Н	Н	R				_	_	4	_		R	4	4	_	_			Щ	\sqcup	4	_	Ļ.,
B. HELOS		-	 	├-	\vdash	-	Н		R	R	픠	R R	R	R	<u>R</u> l	4	R.	RŲ.	R	₽ļ	R	R	R	Н	Щ	Щ	4	_	<u> </u>
D. LPH		 -	-	-	-	Н	Н	Н	\dashv				4	4	<u>c</u>	-	_	+	4	4	_	4	_	븨	Ц	\sqcup	4	4	ļ.,
LO. HDC			R		\vdash	H	닑	H	닑		C	انا	4	+	+		닭	+	+	۲	C			Н	Щ	\dashv	4		_
11. TACC		۲	۲	С	\vdash	۷	기	۲	С	늬	-	4	+	ᆔ	+	+	R	+	+	4	-	C	C	Н	\vdash		4		L
ו אמת זגרעיו קיד כו		•		L _		إسا				4	_	_	4	C	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	_		Щ		Ц	4		
12. LZ CON TM				I		, 1					- 1		,			•		- 4	~ !				,						i
12. LZ CON TM 13. USS REPOSE				_		Н		-			4		-}	+	+	+	+	4	C	4		4	_	Н	4	4	4		

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieuthant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

COPY OF COPIES
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Appendix 2 (Cryptographic Instructions) to Annex J (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67.

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 OPPLAN 120A-67

Time Zone: H

- 1. See Annex L to reference (a).
- 2. Cryptographic.
 - a. KY-8. Effective edition KAK-3245.
 - b. Authentication. Effective edition KAC-QT
 - c. Numeral Code. Effective edition KAC-QT
- 3. Special Instructions:
 - a. Authentication will be mandatory when:
 - (1) Enemy Intrusion/Deception is known or suspected
 - (2) Lifting Radio Silence
 - (3) Challenged
 - (4) Entering or leaving a net
 - (5) Tactical orders/instructions are issued
 - (6) Contact or amplifying reports are passed in plain language
- b. Numeral codes afford minimum security and must not be used to protect information requiring protection more than 24 hours. The system will not be used to protect:
 - (1) Friendly positions known or believed known by the enemy.
- (2) Coordinates of enemy positions to include target locations for friendly supporting arms.
- (3) Radio frequencies. Use assigned frequency designators when referring to radio frequencies.



- c. Authentication and numeral codes become effective at 0001H Daily.
- d. Message originators should indicate "MOD CLEAR" on field message form when protection of numerals is desired.
 - e. Local time will be used for authentication purposes.
- 4. Maximum use of checkpoints, phase lines and grid code references is encouraged in order to minimize possibility of compromising numeral codes.
- 5. Brevity Code. Issued separately.

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	··· 26	•					
	200–5	OO's Driver Rdo Opr (ALO) Rdo Opr (Arty) Rdo Chief	1 2 1 1 5	1 AN/PRC 47 . 1 AN/PRC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	40	1350
	200–6	Comm Off & S-2 Scout Rdo Opr Wire Supervisor	2 3 1	1 AN/PRC 47	1125	70	1195
	200-7	NGF LnO Rdo Opr (NGF) Rdo Opr (Arty) Wireman	1 1 1 3 6	2 AN/PRC 25	1350	40	. 1390
	200-8	Rdo Opr (NGF) Msg Ctr Man Wireman TPS-21 Opr ISO Man	2 1 1 1 1 1	2 AN/PRC 25	1350	40	1390
2	234–1	50 Cal. MG Sqd H&S Assalt Tm, H&S	3 2 5	1 Cal.50 MG & Ammo 1 3.5 Rkt Lchr & Ammo	1125	327	1452
	234–2	Sec Ldr, .50 Cal MG Sec .50 Cal MG Sqd, H&S	1 3 4	1 C&l.50 MG & Ammo	900	277	1177

	23 4-3	.50 Cal MG Sqd, H&S Asslt Im, H&S	3 2 5	1 Cal. 50 MG & Ammo 1 3.5 Rkt Lchr & Ammo	1125	:3 27	1452	
	250-1	Security Personnel H&S Cmdt& Rdo Opr Co. Property NOO	3 2 1	1 M-60 MG 1 Case 7.62 Link MX-306 (1 Dispons r) 5 TS-10	13 <i>5</i> 0	116	1466	
Wave	250-2	Co GySgt, Co Driver Co. Froperty NCO Security Personnel BRAWO COMMAND GROUP	2 1 3 6	1 M-60 MG 1 Case 7.62 Link MX-306 (1 Dispenser) 5 TS-10	1350	116	1466	
1	202-1	XC BLT 1/4 Driver/Msgr S-1 Off Edo Opr (XO) S-2 Scout	1 1 2 1 6	2 AN/FHC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	40	1390	
	202–2	Admin Chief Admin Man Intell Asst S-2 Scouts	1 1 1 3 6		13 <i>5</i> 0	and this time	13 <i>5</i> 0	
	202–3	3-3A Jrnl Clrk NBC NOO Rdô Opr (NGF) Comm Chief	1 1 1 2 1	2 AN/PRC 25	1350	40	1390	

H-5-20

202-1	Ass't Op Chief S-4 Off Ado Opr (S-4) Log Man Draftsman (S-3)	1 1 2 1 1 6	2 AN/PRC 25		40	1390	
202-9	Admin Man Rdo Repair Man Wire Chief Wireman	2 1 2 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	,
202-6	Wireman	6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	:
380-1	Plat Ldr, Recon Plat Rdo Opr 1st Recon Tm	1 1 4	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
380-2	2d Recon Tm Rdo Opr Driver	1 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
381-1	3d Recon Tm Corpsman Rdo Opr	4 1 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
381-2	Plat Sgt, Recon Plat Rdo Opr 4th Recon Tm	1 1 4 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
				<u> </u>		L	

4		*						" {
REGIN Co. D	290-1	Plat Cmdr,1st Plat CoD Rdo:Opr 2d FT,1st Sqd,1st Plat	1	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	·
	290–2	3d FT,1st Sqd,1st Plat Asslt Tm,1st Asslt Sqd	3 3 6	1 3.5 kkt Lchr	1350	14	1364	
	290–3	Sqd Ldr,2d Sqd,1st Plat Grenadier 1st FT,2d Sqd,1st Plat	1 1 4 6		1350		1350	
	290-4	Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, CoD Rdo Opr 2d FT, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat	1 2 3		1350		1350	,
	290-5	3d FT,2d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Asslt Tm,41st Asslt Sqd Arty FO Tm	3 1 2 6	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr	1350	14	1364	Y
	290-6	Sqd Ldr 1st Sqd,1stPlat 1stFT,1st,Sqd 1st Plat Grenadier		• •	1350		13'50	
	29 0 -7	Sqd Ldr 1stMG Sqd Wpns Plat, Corpsman Sqd Ldr, 1st Asslt Sqd 1stMG Tm, 1st MG Sqd	213	1 M-60 MG	1350	41	1391	
2	291-1	Engrs 2d Asslt Tm (-)1st Asslt Sqd			13 <i>5</i> 0	-	13 50	. 19 <u></u>

							}
	Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,1st Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat	1 1 4		13 <i>5</i> 0		13 <i>5</i> 0	
	Sec Ldr,MG Sec Wpns Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat	1 3 2 6	1 M -60 MG	13 <i>5</i> 0	41	1391	
91-4	Guide 1st Plat, © D 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat	1 4 1 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	
91-5	Co Cmdr, Co D Rdo Opr Arty FO Tm & Corpsman	1 2 3 6	3 AN/PRC 25	1350	60	1 41 0	
91-6	81MM FO Tm	2	1 AN/PRC 25	1350			
	Sec	4	1 60MM Mortar		63	1413	
	Plat Cmdr, Wpns Plat	3 1	1 60MM Mortar	1350	45	1395	
	Sec Ldr, comm Mortar	1 6					•
9	91-3 91-4 91-5	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat Sec Ldr,MG Sec Wpns Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat Guide 1st Plat, Co D 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat Guide 1st Plat, Co D 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 91-5 Co Cmdr,Co D Rdo Opr Arty FO Tm & Corpsman 81MM FO Tm 1st Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec 2d Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec Plat Cmdr,Wpns Plat Sniper Sec Ldr,60MM Mortar	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat 4 6 91-3 Sec Ldr,MG Sec Wpns Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 1 6 91-5 Co Cmdr,Co D Rdo Opr Arty FO Tm & Corpsman 6 91-6 81MM FO Tm 1st Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec 4 6 97-7 2d Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec Plat Cmdr,Wpns Plat Sniper Sec Ldr,60MM Mortar	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec 2d Sqd,60MM Mortar 2d Sqd,60MM Mortar	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 4d 6 91-5 Co Cmdr,Co D Rdo Opr Arty FO Tm & Corpsman 2 1 AN/PRC 25 1350 91-6 81MM FO Tm 1st Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec 4 1 60MM Mortar 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat 21-3 Sec Ldr,MG Sec Wpns Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 3d FT(-),3d	Plat Grenadier 1st FT,3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1st Plat 3d FT(-),3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 2d FT, 3d Sqd,1stPlat 3 AN/PRC 25 1350 1410 91-6 81MM FO Tm 1st Sqd,60MM Mortar Sec 4 6 1 60MM Mortar 1 1350 1 350

H=5=23

	<u> </u>					
	291-8	3d Sqd, 60MM Mortar Sec 4 Sqd Ldr 60MM Mortar Sqd 1 Sniper 1	1 60MM Mortar	1350	45	1395
3	292–1	Sqd Ldr,1st Sqd,2d Plat 1 Grenadier 1 1st FT,1st Sqd,2d Plat 4		1350		1350
	292-2	Plat Cmdr, 2d Plat, Co D: 1 Rdo Opr 1 Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd 1 1st Th, 2d MG Sqd 3	1 AN/PhG 25 1 M-60 MG	1350	62	1412
	292 -3	1st AssltTm,2d AssltSqd 3 2d FT,1st Sqd,2d Plat 3	1 3.5 Ekt Lchr	1350	14	1364
	292-4	Corpsman 3d FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat 3 3d FT, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat 2		13 <i>5</i> 0		13 <i>5</i> 0
	292-5	Sqd Ldr,2d 3qd,2d Plat 1 Grenadier 1st FT,2d Sqd,2d Plat 4		1350		13 <i>5</i> 0
	292- 6	2d FT,2d Sqd,2d Plat 4 2d Tm,2d MG Sqd 2	1 M-60 MG	1350	41	1391



	· 292 <u>-</u> 7	Plat Sqt,2d Plat,Co D Rco Opr & Engrs 3d FT,3d Sqd,2d Plat	1 32 6	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370
	292-8	Scd Ldr,3d Sqd, 2d Pla Sqd Ldr,2d Asslt Sqd 1st FT,3d Sqd,2d Plat	1 4 6		1350		1350
	·						
4	293–1	2¢ Asslt Tm,2d Asslt Scd 2d FT,3d Sqd,2d Flat	N 40	1 3.5 Rkt Lchr	1350	14	1364
	293 - 2	Flat Guide, 2d Flat CoD 3d FT ,3d, Sqd, 2d Ela Ergra & Corpsman	1 3 2 6	Engr Equip	1125	100	1225
	293-3	Rflmn,3d Sqd,1st Plat Engrs & Rkt Sec Ldr XO, Co D, & Co Driver	1 22 5	Engr Equip	1125	110	1235
	293-4	Plat Cmdr,3d Plat,CoD Rdo Opr & Corpsman 1st FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat	1 2 mgo	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370

	293-5	Sqd Ldr,1st Sqd,3d Plat 1st FT%1st Sqd,3d Plat 2d FT,1st Sqd,3d Plat			1350		13'
	293-6	; Plat Egt,3d Plat Co D Sqd Ldr,3d MG Sqd 1st Tm,3d MG Sqd 3d FT(-),1st Sqd Plat	1 1 2 2 6	1 M-60 MG	1350	41	1391
	293-7	3d FT(-),1st Sqd,3d Plat 1st FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat	2 <u>1</u> 6		1350		13 50
	293-8	Sqd 1dr,2d Sqd,3d Plat Corpsman 2d FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat	1 1 1 6		1350		1350
5:	294-1	3d FT,2d Sqd,3d Plat 1st FT(-),3d Sqd,3dPlat	426		1350		13 <i>5</i> 0
	294-2	2d Asslt Tm,3d Asslt Sqd Sqd Ldr,3d Sqd,3d Plat 1st FT(-),3d Sqd,3d Plat	3 1 2 6	1 3.5 Ekt Lchr	1350	14	1364


H-5-26

294-	1	2d FT,3d Sqd,3d Plat 1st Asslt Tm,3d Asslt Sqd	4 2 6	1 3.5 Kkt L chr	1350	14	1364	
294-	A	Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, CoD Ammo. Cpl, Wpns Plat Sqd Ldr, 3d Asslt Sqd 2d Tm, 3d MG Sqd	1 1 3 6	1 M-60 MG	13 <i>5</i> 0	41	1391	
294-	j	3d FT,3d Sqd,3d Plat Plat Guide,3d Plat CoGySgt, Co D Rdo Opr	3 1 1 1	1 AN/PRC 25	1350	20	1370	
294-	-6 F	E ngra	3	Engr Equip	675	100	775	
223-		4th Sec Hqds(-),8IMM Plat	6	9 Rds 81MM Ammo	1350	81	1431	
223-	-2 4 F	4th Sec, 7th Sqd,81MM Plat	6	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	1350	221	1571	·

H-5-27

							
	223± [′] 3	4th Sec,8th Sqd,81MM Plat	6 .	1 81MM Mortar 9rds 81MM Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	221	1571
6	232-1	1st Sqd,2d Sec 106FR Engr Sqd Ldr	4 †	4 Boxes 106707 Ammo	1125	300	1425
	232-2	Equipment Only	5	1 LIWC w/106ER		1517	1517
	232-3	2d Sqd,2d Sec 106RR Driver,1st Sqd,2d Sec Sec.Ldr,2d Sec 106RR	4 1		13 <i>5</i> 0		13 50
End Co D	232-4	Equipment Only	<u>6</u> 	1 LIWC w/106대유		1571	1571
		107MM MORTAR BATTERY		4 24 /0 240 8 4	1270	. (0	2120
	320-1	Recon Party	6	1 M-60 MG & Ammo 1 AN/PRC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	60	1410
1	321-1	4th Gun Sec	6	1 M-60 MG	13 <i>5</i> 0	41	1391
	321-2	3d Gun Sec	6	1 M-60 MG	1350	41	1391
	321-3	ੈ FDC Section	3	1 C.P. Tent FDC Equipment	675	70 0	1375
	321-4	ੈ FDC Section	3	FDC Equipment 1 M-60 MG 2 AN/PRC-25	675	81	1156

H-5-28



	321-5	Equipment Only	2.02	1 107MM Howtar #3	6-J 800	1300	1300
	321-6	*		, , ,			1300
	12(40	Equipment Only	#380	: 107MM Howtar #4	47.1648	1300	1300
	321-7	Cannoneer	1	Sect Gear for 3 Howtar	225	1100	1325
	321 -8	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 MortAmmo		1428	1 428
2	3001	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 MortAmmo	enc.	1428	1,428
	322-2	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 MortAmmo	ences.	: 428	1 4,28
	322-3	1st Gun Sect	6	1 50 Cal. MG & Arms	1350	1 50	i 500
	322-4	2nd Gun Sect	6	1 50 Cal. MG & Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	1 50	1 <u>5</u> 00
	322-5	Equipment Only		1 107MM Howtar #1		1300	1300
	322-6	Equipment Only	*****	1 10 7MM Howtar #2	CDE'S	1300	1300
İ	322-7	Equipment Only		Sect Gear for 3		1100	1100
	3 <i>22</i> _8	Ammo Section	6	Howtar 1 AN/PRC-25	13 <i>5</i> 0	20	1370
3	323-1	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		1428	1428
	323-2	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		1428	1428
	323-3	Ammo	_	34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		1428	1428
	323-4	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		1428	1 428
	323-5	Ammo		34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		1428	1428
	323-6	5th Gun Sect	6	1 50 Cal. MG & Ammo	1350	1 50	1 500



	 						
	323-7	6th Gun Section	6	1 50 Cal. MG & Ammo	1350	1 500	1,500
	323-8	Equipment Only		1 107MM Howtar #5	Fixes	1300	1300
4	324-1	Equipment Only		1 107MM Howtar #6	empt-re	1300	÷ 300
	32/-2	Ammo		34 sds 4.2 MortAmmo		1428	1428
	324-3	Atternes	4.26.1	34 hds 4.2 MortAmmo	14. F.	1428	1428
	324-4	Ammo	amento ansi	34 Rds 4.2 MortAmmo	TERES.	1428	1428
1	324-5	Антю	·***	34 Rds 4.2 MortAmmo	aest ⊑	1428	1428
-	324-6	Assit XO & Cmd Group	6	: AN/PRO 25	1350	20	1370
	324-7	Supplies	in Es	Operating Supplies 8,000 Smd Bags	.u	1300	1300
	324-8	ప ాటిక es	emess.	25 Water cans		875	875
İ		·					
					,		
K							
					- <u> </u>		

		1			 			•
E	265-1	OCMPANY A Equipment Only		hAng Mite		1750	1750	
	?6 5 -2	త్వామారుడు కుమ		: Ir felr		1030	1000	
	266-1	Indir out Only	}	LIUE		1300	1300	
	26 6 -2	Bowiji a.t Cnly		+ 1.II./G		1,34%	300	
	295-1	OCMINATO		1,23,11,56		4学录.	1750	
	295-2	Service and and		in American		1000	1000	
	296-1 296-2 326-1	Squipment Only Radioment Only Equipment Only		> IT AC !LIWC ! LIWC (SIWM Sec)		1300 1700 1300	1300 1300 1300	
	27 4-1	OCTOMENT B Equipment Only		1 M422 Mine		1730	1750	
	274-2	Equipment Only		1 LT Telr		1000	1000	
	275-1	Equipment Only		1 LIWC		1300	1300	
	275-2	Equipment Only		1. LIWC		1300	1300	
	240-1	BAS Bn Surgeon Corpsman	1 4 5		1125		1125	
	241-1	Asst in Surgeon Corpsman	1 5 6		13 <i>5</i> 0		1350	

Altra Comments

	266–1	lstSgt Co A & Clerk Property NCO Drivers	2 1 3		1350		1350	
	225-1	Equipment Only	6	1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	1
	225-2	Equipment Only		1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
 	225–3	Equipment Only		1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
	225–4	Equipment Only		1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
	225–5	Equipment Only		1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
	225–6	Equipment Only	·	1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
	225-7	Equipment Only		1 LIWC (81MM Plat)		1300	1300	
	450-1	SUPPLIES Supplies Caly		40 Cases MCI			1000	
	450– 2	All Supplies		40 Cases MCI			1000	
	4 5 0 – 3	All Supplies		40 Cases MCI			1000	
	450-4	All Supplies		40 Cases MCI			1000	
	4 5 0-5	All Supplies		40 Casses MCII			1000	
* ***********************************	450-6	All Supplies		40 Cosses MCI	:		1000	
	450-7	All Supplies		40 Casses MCI			1000	
	451-8	All Supplies		20 Cans Water		į	1000	
!	451 -2	All Supplies		20 C [±] ns Water		}	1000	
:	451-3	All Supplies		20 Cans Water			1000	



Mark and Salah a



DECLASSIFIED

451- 451- 451-	-5 All Supplies	20 Cans Water 20 Cans Water 20 Chan Water	1000
452- 452- 452-	-2 All Supplies	20 Bundles Sandbags 180 Barbed Wire Stakes 1 Sleeve Concertina	1000 900 1000
453- 453- 453- 453- 453-	-2 All Supplies -3 All Supplies	13 Cases 107MM Ammo 13 Cases 107MM Ammo 13 Cases 107MM Ammo 13 Cases 107MM Ammo	10 53 10 53 10 53 10 53
454 454 454 454	-2 All Supplies -3 All Supplies	8 Cases 105MM Ammo 8 Cases 105MM Ammo 8 Cases 105MM Ammo 8 Cases 105MM Ammo	960 960 960 960
455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455	All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies Supplies Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies Supplies	20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo 20 Cases 81MM Ammo	1070 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070
	All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies	20 Cases 81MM Ammo 9 Cases 90MM Ammo 9 Cases 90MM Ammo 9 Cases 90MM Ammo 9 Cases 90MM Ammo	1070 1053 1053 1053 1053

H-5-33

457-1 457-2 457-3 457-4 457-5 457-6	All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies All Supplies	9 Cases 106MM Ammo w/Spt Tr 9 Cases 106MM Ammo w/Spt Tr	1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089
458-1	All Supplies	2 Cases Frag Grenades 1 Case Yellow Smoke 3 Cases 7.62MM Clip 3 Cases 7.62MM Link 1 Case: 66MM LAAW 3 Cases 60MM Mortar Ammo 1 Case 40MM M-79	912

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieute ant Colonel U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy of Copies

HLT 1/4

USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 6 (Landing Sequence Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

UNIT	ELEMENT	SERIAL NUMBER	CARRIER NO-TYPE	SHIP	BEACH	Ř e Marks
Recon Plat	Recon Plat (-)		2- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Recon Plat	Elms Recon Plat	381	2- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
107MM Btry	Recon Party Mortar Btry	320	1- UH-34	LPD-2	L	Non-Sched
107MM Btry	3rd & 4th Mortar Sec	321	8- UH- 34	LPD-2	_ `	Non-Sched
107MM Btry	1st & 2nd Mortar Sec	322	8- UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
10 7MM Btry	5th Mortar Sec	323	8- UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
107MM Btry	6th Mortar Sec	324	8- UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
c. o.	Cmd Group Alpha	200	8- UH-34	LPH-2	LZ OWL	Non-Sched
N.G.F	N.G.F. Liaison Team	207	1- UH-34	LPH-2	120WL	Non-Sched
H&S Co.	Security	234	3- UH-34	LPH-2	120WL	Non-Sched
H&S Omdt	H&S Security	250	2- UH-34	LPH-2	LZ OWL	Non-Sched
H&S Co.	Comm Plat Vehicle	210	1-LCM-6	LPD-2	Beach BLUE	Non-Sched
H&S Co.	Comm Plat Vehicle	211	1 -LCM -6	LPD-2	Beg sh BLUE	Non-Sched
Company C	Vehricle	283		LPD-2	Beach HLUS	Non-Sched
H&S Co. .	Comm Plat Vehicle	213	1-UH-34	LPH-2	*	on-Sched
BAS	Fwd Elms BAS	240	1- UH-3 4	LPH-2		Non-Sched

·						
Company DD	1st Plat (-) Arty FO Tm	29 10	8 - U H-34	LP9-2		Non-Sched
Company B	Elms 1st Plat 2nd Plat (-) C.O. Hq.	291	8- UH-34	LPD-2	Ĺ	Non-Sched
Company D	Elms 2nd Plat 3rd Plat (-)	292	8- UH-34	ThD-5	24	Non-Sched
Company D	X.O. Elms 2d 3d Plat Co D	293	64 UI− 34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Company 🖪	Elms 3rd Plat Wpns Plat	29 3	6 1- UH-34	LPD-2	ã. ú	Non-Sched
X. O.	Cmd: Group Bravo	202	6- UH-34	LPH-2	LZOWL	Non-Sched
81mm Plat	Plat Hqds & 81mm Ammo	224	2- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
81mm Plat	4th Mortar Sec	223†	3- UH-34	LPD-2		Non—Sched
81mm Plat	3rd Mortar Sec	222	4-UH-34	LPH-2	LZ OWL	Non-Sched
106RR Plat	3rd 106RR Sec Elms Hq Wpns Plat	233	4- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-S ched
106RR Plat	Wpns Sec (-)	235	5- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
BAS	Rear Elms BAS	241	1- U H-34	LPH-2	•	Non-Sched
AT Plat	AT Plat (-)	350	1-LCM-8	LPD-2	Beech BLUE	Non-S ch ed
AT Plat	Elms AT Plat	351	1-LCM-6	LPD-2	Beach BLUE	Non-Sched
SP Plat	Elms SP Plat	432	1-LCM-8	LSD-28	Beach	Non-Sched
Tank Plat	Tank Plat (-)	360	1-LCU	LSD-28	BLUE Beach	Non-Sched
Tank Plat	Elms Tank Plat	361	1-LCU	LSD-28	BLUE Beach	Non-Sched
SP Plat	Elms SP Plat	431	1-L CM -8	LSD-28	BL UE	Non-Sched
SP Plat	Elms SP Plat	429	1-L CM -8	LSD-28	Beach BLUE Beach BLUE	Non-Sched

Engr Plat	Engr Plat (-)	3 7 3	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	B each Blue	Non-Sched
FLSG Bravo	EOD Section	400	1-UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
3rd Service Bn	3000 Lb Fork Lift	401	1-CH-46	LSD-28		Non-Sched
3rd Service Pn	Elms 3rd Serv Bn	404	1-LCVP	LPD-2		Non-Sched
3rd Service Bn	Elms 3rd Serv Bn	405	1-LC m -6	LSD-28	·	Non-Sched
3rd Service Bn	Elms 3rd Serv Bn	4 0 6	40	1.50-25		Non-Sched
H&S Company	TPS-21	204	1- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
H&S Company	TPS-21	206	1- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
81mm Plat	Vehicle	225	7 - UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
81mm Plat	Vehicle	226	1- UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
106RR Plat	Vehicle (Wpns Section)	236	4- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Company A	Vehicle	267	2- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Company D	Vehicle	296	2- UH-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Engr Plat	Vehicle	375	1- UI-3 4	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Engr Plat	Vehicle	376	1- UH-34	LP D- 2		Non-Sched
Engr Plat	Vehicle	3 7 7	1- H-34	LPD-2		Non-Sched
BAS	Vehicle	243	1-LCVP	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Supplies	800 Gal water Tank	459	1-LVTP	LPD-2	,	Non-Sched
Supplies	800 Gal water Tank	460	1-LVTP	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Cmd∵ Group Alpha	Vehicle	203	1-LCM-8	1. PH-2		Non-Sched
H&S Company	SFCP Vehicle	209	1-LCVP	LSD-28		Non-Sched

						
BAS	Vehicle	242	1- C H-46	LPH-2		Non-Sch ed
Omdt Group Brawo	Vehicle	205	1-LCM-8	LPH-2		Non-Sched
H&S Company	Vehicle	252	1- C H-46	LPH-2		Non-Sched
H&S Company	Prov Security Plat	251	4- UH-34	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Company A	Vehicle	266	1-CH-46	LPH-2		Non-Sched
Company D	Vehicle	295	1-CH-46	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Company B	Vehicle	274	1-CH-46	LPH-2	: ,	Non-Sched
Btry G	Vehicle	305	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	Beach BLUE	Non-Sched
3rd Service Bn	Vehicle	402	1-LCM-8	LSD-28		Non-Sched
Recon Plat	Vehicle	382	1-CH-46	LPH-2		Non-Sched
SP Plat	Flood Lights	430	1 -LCM -6	LSD-28	Beach	Non-Sched
Btry G	Rear Elms Vehicle	306	2-LCU	LSD-28	er ve	Non–Sched
107MM Btry	Rear Elms Vehicle	325	1-LCM-6 1-LCM-8	LPD-2		Non-Sched
107MM Btry	Rear Elms Vehicle	326	1-LCU	LPD-2		Non-Sched
AT Plat	Rear Elms Vehicle	352	1-LCM-6	LPD-2		Non-Sched
Tank Plat	Rear Elms Tank Plat Vehicle	362	2-LCM-8	LSD-28		Non-Sch ed
Truck Plat	Elms Trk Plat Vehicle	440	1-LCU	LSD-28		Non-Sch ed
Truck Plat	Elms Trk Plat Vehicle	441	1-LCU	LSD-28		Non-Sched
Truck Plat	Trk Plat (-) Vehicle	442	1-J-CU	LPH-2	OIA	Non-Sched

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieute ant Colonel U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

Annat O. (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

H-6-4 DISTRIBUTION:

Copy of Copies HLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 7 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

SHIP	LCVP	LOM-3	LOM-6	LCM-8	TGU
LPD-2 USS VANCOUVER	2		3	2	
LSD-28 USS THOMASTON			3	2	1
		ı			
TOTAL AVAILABLE	2		6	4	1
LESS 10% SPARES					
NET AVAILABLE	2		6	4	1
CRAFT FOR NAVAL USE	1		1		
A VAILABLE F/TRP USE	1		5	4.	1

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy of Copies
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 8 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

HELICOPTER UNIT AND DESIGNATION	NUMBER OF A/C	A/C AV FIRST TRIP	AILABLE OTHER TRIPS	TYPE	CARRIER	DECK LAUNCH CAPACITY	REMARKS
HMM-363 Artic Spin	24	16	16	Ch-34	LPH-2	6	Maximum Heli Load: UH-34: 1600# 6 Troops
							Crulse Speed: UH-34: 85 Kts
							Avg Flight Dist DP to LZ: 5 Miles

JACK WESTERMAN
Leutenant Colonel U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 9 (Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67.

SHIP	UNIT	AMPH VE		REMARKS		
		LVTP	LVTC	LARC	DUKW	
LPH-2	4 Plat (Rein) Co. A Amtrac Bn.	10	1			LVTC for BLT Command Group only
LS D-28	Beach Party Tm			1	1	Beach Party TM Use only

JACK WESTERMAN

Liteutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

H-9-1 DECLASSIFIED

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967


DECLASSIFIED

Appendix 10 (Amphibian Vehicle Employment Plan) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

ORIGIN	AMPH V	EHICLES NO	% TYPE LARC	DU KW	WAVE	DESTINATION	h emarks
LPD-2	5				1	Beach BLUE	Company C (-)
LPD-2	5				2	Beach BLUE	Elms Company C Btry G & Shore Party Recon
LSD-28			1			Beach BLUE	Free Boat 00-1 Beach Party Im
LPD-2		1				Beach ELUE	Free Boat 00-2
LSD-28				1		Beach ELUE	On Call, boated with serial 428

JACK WESTERMAN
Li venant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67





Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121290H February 1967

APPENDIX 2 (Aircraft Armanent) to Annex G (Air Operations) Operation Order 2-67
Time Zone: H

1. General Instructions.

- a. Ordnance carried will be for missions against targets generally soft in nature. This applies to CAS/helo escort fixed wing aircraft only. Suggested ordnance for a specific mission is as follows:
 - (1) Helo Escort Forward firing arms (20MM, Rockets)
 - (2) Strike/LZ Prep 240/260 FG/GP Daizy cutter fuse, Napalm, 20MM, Rockets.
 - (3) Close Air Support 250/260# Contact fuse or 500# contact fuse, Rockets.
- b. After the completion of each Close Air Support Mission the flight leader will report to the controlling agency ordnance expended, damage assessment and enemy intelligence of immediate tactical importance.
- 2. Flight Leaders will give ordnance loads to "ICE PACK" using the following codes:

D-1	MK 81 250NR LOW DRAG GP BOMB
D-1A	MK 81 SNAKEYE
D-2	MK 82 500NR LOW DRAG GP BOMB
D-2A	MK 82 SNAKEYE
D - 3	MK 83 1000NR LOW DRAG GP BOMB
D-4	MK 82 SNAKEYE MK 83 1000NR LOW DRAG GP BOMB MK 84 2000NR LOW DRAG GP BOMB
D-5	MK 7D POD 2.75" FFAR (19)
D-6	AN-M16A2 2000NR HIGH DRAG GP BOMB LAU-10A POD" ZUNI FFAR (4)
D-7	LAU-10A POD" ZUNI FFAR (4)
	AN-M64 500NR HIGH DRAG GP BOMB
D -9	MK 77 FIRE BOMB 500NR NAPALM
D-10	MK 79 FIRE BOMB 1000NR NAPALM
D-11	AN-M57A1 BANDED LUG 250NR GP BOMB
D-12	AN-M81 BANDED LUG 260NR FRAG BOND
D-13	AN-M88 BANDED LUG 220NR FRAG BOMB
D-14	CBU 1 A/A
D-15	CBU 2 A/A
D-16	AIM 7E SPAKROW MISSILE
D-17	AIM 9B SIDEWINDER MISSILE
D-18	ACM 12B BULLPUP 565NR
D-19	ACM 12C BULLPUP 1800NR
	G-2-1

D-20	20MM AMMUNITION
D-21	FS SMOKE (MK12 SMOKE TANK)
D-22	MK 24 PARACHUTE FLARE
D-23	MK 44 LAZY DOG
D-23A	AERO 7E LAZY DOG
D-24	MK: 4 GUN POD
D-25	AN_M65 1000-HTGH DRAG GP BOMB

FUZES

V	PROXIMI TY
С	CHEMICAL DELAY (DELAY STATED IN SECONDS)
M	MECHANICAL DELAY (DELAY STATED IN HOURS)
Y	INSTANTANEO US
Z	POINT DETONATING
E	ELECTRICAL FUZING (DELAY IN SECONDS)

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy___of___Copies
HLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Tab C (Air Schedule Notes) to Appendix 1 (Aircraft Schedule) to Annex G to Operation Order 2-67

Time Zone: H

- 1. Flight leaders shall report position to the controlling agency prior to entering the AOA or as soon as possible after becoming airborne. Aircraft reporting in will remain VFR. SEVENTH Air Force, III MAF, or CTF 77 provide assigned IFR altitudes for aircraft separation to and from the AOA.
- 2. Upon establishing radio contact with the controlling agency the flight leader will give the following information to the Tactical Air Control Center (TAC) on TATC net:
 - (a) Voice call of flight leader.

(b) Event number.

(c) Number and type of aircraft.

(d) Ordnance.

(e) Position and altitude.

- (f) Estimated time departure (that time an aircraft must depart the farthest point in the AOA to approach and land safely at home plate-for jets use sea level BINGO).
- (g) Any pertinent remarks (an aircraft in the flight without reciviver, etc).
- 3. Act as flare plane during hours of darkness if required.
- 4. During hours of darkness decrease to 2 VA vice 4 VA on station.
- 5. This event becomes effective upon completion of events 105, 106, 107, and 108.
- 6. Events 105, 106, 107 and 108 will be prepared for backloading on order.
- 7. All helicopters will be available for medical evacuation as situation permits.
- 8. If control of air is not ashore the Tactical Air Observer (TAO)/Tactical Air Controller(Airborne)(TAC(A)) when controlling fixed wing close air support (CAS) aircraft on strikes, within the specified tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), must be in radio contact with Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) if established, in order to permit coordination of all supporting arms.
- 9. Condition V aircraft for this event will normally be required on an emergency basis.
- 10. If UH1E aircraft are not available UH34 aircraft will be substituted.
- 11. Be prepared to provide helo escort.
- 12. Be prepared to provide CAS.
- 13. Provide A-1 aircraft when available.

G-1-C-1

CECUED NO.

14. Night CAS with paraflare support will be launched only on emergency basis when ground or airborne controller has target area in sight and can call flares drop.

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutepint Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps


Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operations Order 2-67.

JACK WESTE MAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operations Order 2-67.



Copy__of__Copies HLT 1/4 LPH-2) represery 1967

Tab A (D-Day) to Appendix I (Aircraft Schedule) to Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation Order 2-67
Time Zone: H

EVENT.	MISSION	SQD	NO. & TYPE AIRCRAFT	ORD	Tos	ENTRY PT. ALTITUDE	NO TES	Sept.
80	TAO/FAC(A)	VMO	1/01E		0645 to Sunset	LPH 1,000	1,2,7	
10	LZ PREP (ROBIN)	1 MAW	4/ VA	2 A/C D-1A 2 A/C D-9	0730	PAT 20,000	1,2	
11	BEACH PREP (BLUE)	1 MAW	LA/VA	2 A/C D-1A 2 A/C D-9	0800	PAT 20,000	1,2	
12	LZ PREP (PARROT)	1 MAW	<i>LLAT</i> .VA	2 A/C D-1A 2 A/C D-9	0830	PAT 20.000	1,2	
50	CAS	1 MAW	2/VA	1 A/C D-1A 1 A/C D-9	0800 to Sunset	PAT 22,000	1,2	
171	SAR	НММ	1/H34		0745 to Comp.	LPH 1,000	7	
100	TROOP LIFT (ROBIN)	нмм	/H34 /H46	NONE	L-	3,000	7	
30	TROOP LIFT ESCORT	VMO	/UH1)E	Rockets Guns	L-	3,000	7,10	
101	TROOP LIFT (PARROT)	НММ	/H34 /H46	-	L-	3,000	7	

31	TROOP LIFT ESCORT	VMO	/UH1E	ROCKETS Guns	L-	3,000	7,10
102	TROOP LIFT	НММ	/H34 /H46		COND.	3,000	
32	TROOP LIFT	VMO	/UH4E	ROCKETS Guns	COND.	3,000	
110	HEAVY LIFT	нмм	2/H46		L-	3,000	7
1 50	MED EVAC	нмм	2/H34		COND.	3,000	
33	MED EVAC ESCORT	НММ	2/UH1E		∞ND. III	3,000	
140	RED HAZE	1MAW			2300 & 0300	PAT 2,500	1,2

Special Notes:

- A. Events 80, 10, 11, 12 and 50 contact ICEPACK on 248.7 (LIME).
- B. Events 80 and 50 will be relieved on station.
- C. Events 80 keep ICE PACK advised of progress of ship-to-shore movement.
- D. Events: 100, 101, 102 and 110 will go inbound at 3,000 feet and outbound at 2,500 feet.
- E. Events 150 and 33 will be COND IV during hours of darkness.
- F. Events 102 and 32 (SPARROW HAWK) revert to COND IV during hours of darkness.
- G. Heavy NGF/ARTY fires in AOA all hours.



Сору_ Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation Order 2-67

(a) MAP: VIETNAM AMS Series L7014 1:50,000 Sheet 6738 I, II, Ref: 6838 III, IV

(b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67 (c) NWIP 22-2 (A)

(d) FMFM 7-3

(e) FMFM 3-3

(f) COMUSMACV Directive Number 95-2

Time Zone: H

SITUATION.

a. General

- (1) Reference (f) established guidance, procedures, and restrictions on employment of U. S. military air delivered air power in RW.
- b. Enemy Forces.
 - (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
 - (2) Current INTSUMS
- c. Friendly Forces.
 - (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
 - (2) Reference (b) indicates the aviation support available to the SLF.
 - (3) CTG 76.5 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate; provide coordination and control of all aircraft assigned to support operations; and exercise air traffic control of all aircraft entering into or passing through the AOA.
- MISSION. Conduct air operations in support of the Landing Force.
- EXECUTION. 3.
 - (a) Annex C (Concept of Operations)
 - (b) Annex D (Fire Support Coordination)
 - (c) Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) The AOA is defined by reference (b).
 - Restrictive fire plans will be in accordance with Annex D, (Fire Support Coordination) and references (b) and (c).
 - (3) CAS will be under the positive control of TACP or TAC (A).
 - (4) Primary and alternate helicopter LZ's and landing beaches will be scheduled for preparatory fire prior to landing troops.

- (5) The UIM Military Grid reference 6-digit system will be used for target designation.
- (6) Other helicopterborne and tactical air support operations will be conducted in accordance with references (d) and (e).
- (7) Panels or other suitable substitutes will be displayed to mark friendly front line prior to calling air strikes.
- (8) Helicopters will be available for logistic resupply as the situation permits.
- (9) Helicopters will be available for medical evacuation. Medical evacuations requested will be given priority precedence. If a casualty is in serious condition, emergency precedence will be used.
- (10) Use standard mission request forms for calling missions.
- (11) Helicopter landing zones are: (Center HLZ coordinates).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

Administrative Order 2-67

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

Annex J (Communications - Electronics)

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieuteent Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

APPENDIXES:

(1) Aircraft Schedule

(2) Aircraft Armament

(3) Air Communications (To be issued)

(4) Approach and Retirement Routes

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operations Order 2-67.

Copy of Copies
HLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

APPENDIX 1 (Aircraft Schedules) to Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation:
Order 2-67

Ref: (a) NWP 4

Time Zone: H

- 1. Conditions of aircraft readiness in accordance with reference (a):
 - (a) Condition: 1 Aircraft launch within 2 minutes.
 - (b) Condition 2 Aircraft launch within 5 minutes.
 - (c) Condition 3 Aircraft launch within 15 minutes.
 - (d) Condition 4 Aircraft launch within 30 minutes.
 - (e) Condition 5 Aircraft launch on pre determined schedules.
- 2. Jet aircraft for condition events.
- 3. Condition aircraft that are launched will be replace by other aircraft in the same condition of readiness. Replacement aircraft will add to the event number the letter A for the first relief, B for the second relief, etc.
- 4. "Time on station" is the time that aircraft report to the controlling agency over the assigned orbit or entry point.
- 5. Plus and minus figures combined with H-Hour and L-Hour are in minutes unless otherwise indicated, such as H+30 means 30 minutes after H-Hour, etc.
- 6. If it becomes impossible to fulfill event's scheduled because of reduced availabliity of aircraft, a reduced number of aircraft will be provided, but the entire scheduled mission will not be deleted.
- 7. SAR reference point: IWO JIMA, (Ch 20) MY.
- 8. Entry Orbit Point:
 - (a) PAT: 005/78 NM CH81 XVK; 127/37 NM CH50 CHU.
 - (b) LISA: 017/60 NM CH 81 XVK; 134/65 NM CH 50 CH U.
 - (c) KEN: 015/36 NM CH81 XVK; 150/76 NM CH50 CHU.
- 9. Helicopter wave rendezvous points: See BLT 1/4 helo landing diagram.
- 16. Remain VFR at entry/orbit points.
- 11. Do not overfly shipping.
- 12. NAVAIDS:
 - (a) IWO JIMA TACAN CH2O MY.
 - (b) VANCOUVER TACAN CH25 PG.
 - (c) CHU LAI TACAN CH50 CHU.
 - (d) QUI NHON TACAN CH81 XVK.

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutement Colonel U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Commanding

Tab A - D-Day

Tab B - D+1 and Subsequent (To be issued)

Tab C - Air Schedule Notes

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operations Order 2-67.

Copy of Copies
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
151900H Feb 1967

APPENDIX 2 (D-Day Schedule of Fires) to ANNEX F (Naval Gun Fire) to Operation Order 2-67.

Time Zone: H

SHIP	A&F	BTRY	AMMO	н-90	H-60	H-30	H-3	. H_Hr
	C/S BLT1/4	60/47	1000	九4 1, 2, 9	.TA# 3	Air Surike on call	ŀ	On call as required; III, IV
CLG-1	BLT1/4	741	750	111-50 50 50	IV 100	TA# 3 CB	BEACH	III, IV
1	C/S BLT1/4	5#/38	1500	TA# 1, 10 ,	TA# 8	Air Strike	ω .	On call
	BLT1/4	7 7 73	1175	III 100 50	IV 300	IV TA# 3	A	
LSDIR-	G/S	5" SS R	4100 3150	TA# 3	TA#4, 5, 6, 7.	Air Strike,		On call
	BL1 1/4		3150	TV 500	Y 300500300300			Y ,
ISMR-2	G/S BLT1/4	5"SSR	4100	TA# 2	TA# 11	Air Strike		On call
	BLT1/4		3 150	III 50	III 500			III '

NOTES: 1. Use shell HE, fuze mixed (YT/MTF/PD)

- 2. Use shell HE fuze PD on TA 5, 6, 7, 8.
- 3. All NGF in General Support of Landing Force.
- 4. Save-A-Planes will be passed on NGF Control/Support Net.
- 5. Location of Target Areas:
 - 1. LZ Robin (BS 902254) 200x200 meters.
 - 2. LZ Canary (BS 893258) 200x200 meters.
 - 3. South tip, Penninsula 300x1000 meters.
 - A. 300 x 300 meters center of area (BS 934219)
 - B. 300 x 400 meters center of area (BS 936221)
 - C., 300 x 300 meters center of area (BS 939223)
 - 4. Area vic Hill 274
 - A. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 907214)
 - B. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 909217)





- 5. Area vic Hill 160.
 - A. 200 x 200 meters, center of area (BS 911218)
 - B. 200 x 200 meters, center of area (BS 913218)
- 6. Area vic Hill 75.
 - A. 200 x 250 meters, center of area (BS 919217)
 - B. 200 x 250 meters, center of area (BS 921218)
- 7. Area vic Hill 203.
 - A. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 916205)
 - B. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 914207)
 - C. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 912209)
 - D. 300 x 300 meters, center of area (BS 909211)
- 8. Blue Beach
 - A. 200 x 350 meters, center of area (BS 922212)
 - B. 200 x 350 meters, center of area (BS 923214)
- 9. LZ Parrot (BS 895233) 200 x 200 meters
- 10. LZ Wren (BS 897244) 200 x 200 meters
- 11. Area Target 300 x 300 meters, center of area (RS 924274).

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieuterant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

soman

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 3 (Radio Frequency Channel Chart) to Annex F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 2-67

Time Zone: H

	NETS	NGF CONTROL	SFCP SPOT #1	SFCP SPOT #2 NOTE 1	SFCP SPOT #3	SFOP SPOT #4	SFCP LOCAL NET
	Frequency Designator	C-1	M-990	M-673	M-215	M-183	M-6 62 ·
	Frequency	4057	65.4	47.5	9448	8060	46,75
Uhit Organization	Emission Unit Call	3A3J	36 F 3	36 F 3	3 A 3J	3 A3 J	36 F 3
SACC	Voice CW Company Store	С	L	L	L	L	L
BLT NGLO	26 Oscar	3	С	С	С	С	С
HLT NGF Spt Tm	26 Charlie		R	Я	R	R	R
NGF Support Ships	TBA	3	R	R	R	R	R

NOTES:

1. SFCP Spot #2 will be used as primary spot net. SFCP Spot #1,3,4, and local net to be used as directed.

LEGEND:

C Net Control

L Listen

R Guard as Required

3 Guard affloat and ashore

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutement Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Westerman

SELV MICE SELVEN

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

F-3-1

Copi es
ELT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H Feb 1967

Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67

(b) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

(c) CTG 79.5 Frag Order # 1 (DECK HOUSE VI)

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This plan calls for:

- (1) Landing one Company (Rein) at L-Hour by helicopter in Landing Zone ROBIN.
- (2) Landing one Company (Rein) on order by helicopter in Landing Zone PARROT.
- (3) Landing one Company (Rein) at H-Hour in LVT's over Beach HLUE.
- (4) Landing one 105MM Howitzer Battery on call over Beach BLUE.
- (5) Landing one 107MM Mortar Battery on order by helicopter in designated landing zone.
- (6) Provide for landing command, combat support, and combat service support elements of the HLT over Beaches and in landing somes designated.
- b. See appendixes for detailed instructions.

2. CONTROL MEASURES.

- a. Ship-to-Shore control in accordance with reference (a).
- b. Tac-Log groups organize and function in accordance with Administrative Order 2-67.

JACK WESTEMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

APPENDIXES:

1 - Landing Diagram.

2 - Serial Assignment Table.

3 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table.

4 - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table.

5 - Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table.

- 6 Landing Sequence Table.
 7 Landing Craft Availability Table.
- 8 Helicopter Availability Table.
 9 Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table.
 10 Amphibian Vehicle Employment Plan.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.



Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 1 (Landing Diagram) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

H-hour: 0830								Beach	HLUE		
	Co. D	(-);	4th Pl	at (-)	∞. B	, 1st	Amtracl	k Bn.	G		
Wave 1 H-Hour		1 <u>×</u>	X 1-2	X 1–3	X 1–4	X 1–5			<u>Ser</u> 280 340		•
Elms Co.	C; Bt	ry G; 4t	Recon h Plat	Party;	SP, F	lecon :	Party;	Elms Co. 1	281	208	
Wave 2 H + 3		Х 2–1	х 2 - 2	х 2 - 3	X 2-4	X 2-5			3500 1427 341	370	
Free Boats:	(X)								LARC-OO	1.	
	-X-		-						LVIC-00	2	_
Btry On Call Rpt to PCS	G(-),							BLT Hq	<u>Ser</u> 428 307	301 302 303	21 28 40
H-hour		/0,	/ <u>o</u>	<u>o</u>	o - -0.	0-				304	
LEGEND:	LVTP	-5	<u>o</u> L	CM -6	/o/ L	CU		-			
37	_ LVTC	1	(v)	T.ARC.	-o- L	ow≒£					

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieut hant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

H-1-1

Copy of Copies HLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 2 (Serial Assignment Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

SERIAL NUMBER	UNIT	PERS	MATERIAL EQUIPMENT VEHICLES	CRAFT NO/TYPE	SHIP	REMARKS
200	Cmd Grp Alpha	6-40	Normal Combat	8 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
202	Gmd Grp Bravo	4-32	Normal Combat	6 UH-34	LPH-2	Non—Sched
203	Veh Alpha Cmd Grp	0-4	2 GRC 125 2 M422 Mites 4 ‡T Trlr	1 LCM-8	LPH-2	Non—Sch ed
204	TPS-21	0-2	1 LIWC w/TPS- 21	1 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
205	Veh Bravo Cmd Grp	0–4.	2 GRC 125 2 M422 Mites 4 ‡T Trlr	1 LCM-8	LPH-2	Non-Sched
206	TPS-21	0-2	1 LIWC w/TPS- 21	1 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
207	NGF Liaison Tm	1-4	Normal Combat	1 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched Land w/ser- ial 200
208	NGF Spot Tm	1-4	Normal Combat	<u> </u>	LPD-2	2d Wave Beach BLUE Boated w/ Serial 281
209	SFCP Veh	0-1	1 AN/MRC 83	1 LCVP	LSD-28	Non-Sched
210	Elms Comm Plat H&S Co	0-2	1 AN/MRC 109 1 AN/MRC 83	1 LOM-6	LPD-2	Non-Sched Beach BLUE
211	Elms Comm Plat H&S Co	0-2	1 Trlr ½T 1 AN/MRC 109 1 AN/MRC 87	1 LCM-6	LPD-2	Non—Sched Beach BLUE
212	Elms Comm Plat H&S Co	0-3	1 Trlr ½T 1 AN/MRC 62 (3/4T Trk w/ 3/4T Trlr)	1 LCM-8	LPD-2	On+Call Beach ELUE

213	Comm Veh		1 LIWC	1 Щ-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
220	lst Mortar Section 81MM Mortar Plat	0-21	2 81MM Mortars 47Rds 81MM Ammo	4 UH-34		Land w/Ser- ial 264
221	2d Mortar Section 81MM Mortar Plat	0-20	2 81MM Mortars 47Rds 81MM Ammo	4 UH-34		Land w/Ser- ial 274
222	3d Mortar Section 81MM Mortar Plat	0-20	2 81MM Mortars 47Rds 81MM Ammo	4 UH-34		Non-Sched Beach BLUE
223	4th Mortar Section 81MM Mortar Plat	0-18	2 81MM Mortars 27Rds 81MM Ammo	3 UH-34	LPD-2	bn-Sched and w/Serial 294
224	Plat Hqds,81MM Mortar Plat	1-7	10 Cases 81MM Ammo & CommEquip	2 UH-34	LPH=2	Non-Sched
225	81MM Mortar Plat Veh		7 LIWC	7 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
226	81MM Mortar Plat Veh		1 LIWC	1 UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sch ed
230	lst 106RR Section(-) Wpns Plat, H&S Co	0–6	1 LIWC w/106RR	2 UH-34	LPH-2	Land w/Ser- ial 264
231	Elms 1st 106RR Sec Wpns Plat,H&S Co	0–3	1 LIWC w/106RR 6 Cases 106RR Ammo	2 UH-34	LPH-2	Land w/Ser- ial 264
232	2d 106RR Section Wpns Plat,H&S Co	0–9	2 LIWC w/106RR 4 Cases 106RR	4 UH-34	LPD=2	Non-Sched Land w/Ser- ial 294
233	3d 106RR Section Elms Hqds, Wpns Plat H&S Co	1-11	2 LIWC w/106RR w/106RR Ammo	4 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched Beach RLUE
234		0-14	3 Cal.50 MG w/Ammo 2 3.5 Rkt Lchr	3 UH-34		Non-Sched Land w/Ser- ial 200
235	Wpns Plat(-)H&S Co	0-26	3 Cal. 50 MG 3 Flamethrower 1 3.5 Rkt Lchr	5 UH- 34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
236	Veh Wpns Plat, H&S Co	Y	1	4 UI-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
240	Fwd Elms BAS	1-4	Normal Combat	1 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
241	Rear Elms BAS	1-5	Normal Combat	1 UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
242	Veh BAS	0–1	l M422 Mite l ‡T Trlr	1 CH -46	LPH-2	Non-Sched

243	Veh BAS	0-1	Jeep Amb:	1-LCVP	LPD-2	Non-Sched.
250	Security Grp Cmd Element (H&S Cmdr)	1–11	Normal Combat	2-UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched. Land weerial 200
251	Provisional Security H&S Co.	1–22	Normal Combat	4 - U H-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
252	Veh H&S Co.	0-1	M-422 w/tT Tlr	1-CH-46	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
260	1st Plat (-) Co A LZCT, Engr Tm	1-47	Normal Combat	8-UH-34	LPH-2	1st Wave LZ∷ROBIN
261	Elms 1st Plat Co Hqds,2d Plat(-) Co A	2-46	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	2d Wave LZ ROBIN
262	Elms 2d Plat, Arty FO Tm, Elms 3d Pla Co A	:1–47	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH=2	3d Wave LZ ROBIN
263	3d Plat (-) Co A	1-47	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	4th Wave 12 ROBIN
264	Elms 3d Plat, Co Hqds (-), Wpns Plat Cmdr Co A	2–22	Normal Combat	4- UH- 34	LPH-2	5th Wave LZ ROBIN
265	Elms Co Hqds Co A	0–6	Normal Combat	1-UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
266	Co A Veh	0-1	M-422 w/tT Tlr	1-CH-46	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
267	Co A Veh		2 LIWC	2- UH- 34	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
270	1st Plat(-) Co B Arty FO Tm	1-47	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	.1st-Wave . IZ PARROT
271	Elms 1st Plat,2nd Plat (-), Co Hqds (-), Arty FO Tm	3-45	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	2d Wave . LZ PARROT
272	Elms 2d Plat, 3d Plat(-), Co XO, CoB Smiper Tm	3-45	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	3d Wave . LZ PARROT
273	Elms 3d Plat, Wpns Plat Co B	0–48	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPH-2	4th Wave LZ PARROT
<u></u>		Į	<u> </u>	↓	<u> I</u>	

	·				•	
274	Co. B Veh	0-1	M-422 w/ l T Trlr	1-CH-46	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
275	Co B Veh	_	2 LIWC	2- UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched.
280	∞ C (-)	4-137	Normal Combat	5-LVTP	LPD-2	LZ PARROT 1st Wave Beach BLUE
281	Elms Co C	3-110	Normal Combat	5-LVTP	LPD-2	2d Weve Beach SLUE
282	Rear Elms Co C	0-6	M-422 w/ 1 Trlr		LPD-2	On-Call land w/ser- ial 212
283	Veh Co C	0–2	2-TIMC		LPD-2	Non-Sched - Boated w/ Serial 211
290	1st Plat (-) Co D	1–47	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched.
291	Co. Hqds (-), Elms Wpns Plat, Co D Arty FO Tm, Det Engr Sqd	2-46	Normal Combat	8- u 1-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched. 2nd Wave
292	2d Plat (-), Wpns Plat (-), Co D	2–46	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched. 3d Wave
293	Films 2d Plat,3d Plat (-), XO Co D	2-46	Normal Combat	8- UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched. 4th Wave
294	Elms 3d Plat Co D	0-35	Normal Combat	6- UH- 34	LPD-2	Non-Sched. 5th Wave
295	Co. D Veh	0-1	M-422 w/ l Tr1r.	1- C H-46	LPD-2	Non-Sched
296	Co. D Veh	<u>-</u>	S TIMC	2- UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched
300	Re∞n Party,Btry G	2-6	Normal Combat		LPD-2	Pre H-hr Trans, 2d Wave Beach ELUE Boated w/ serial 281
-						<i>L</i> .



						,
301	Btry G (-)	1-35	3-105 How M-422 w/t T Trlr, MRC 110	1 -LC M-8	LS D-28	On-Call Beach ELUE
302	Elms Btry G	1-36	3-105 How, TD15	1-LCM-8	LS D-28	On-Call Beach HLUE
303	Elms Btry G	0-10	1-Trk 2½T w/ Trlr 1½T M105	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	On-Call Beach BLUE
304	Elms Btry G	0-14	1-Trk 2½T w/ Trlr 1½T M105	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	On-Call Beach BLUE
305	Elms Btry G	0-2	Trk 2½T w/Trlr Tank 400 gal.	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach HLUE
306	Rear Elms Btry G	0-4	1 MRC 109, 7 Trk 22T, 1 Trlr 12T 4-M422,w/Trlrt1		LSD-28	Non-Sched
307	Radio Veh Btry G	0-2	1-MRC 109		LSD-28	On-Call Beach HLUE Boated w/ serial 428
320	Recon Party Mortar Btry	1-5	Normal Combat	1- UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched.
321	3d & 4th Sec, Mortar Btry	2-17	2-107MM How, Sec gear, 34 Rds 4.2 Ammo		LPD-2	Non-Sched.
322	1st & 2d Sec,Morta Btry	r0–18	2-107MM How, Sec gear, 68 Rds 4.2 Ammo, 2 Cal 50 MG		LSD-2	Non-Sched.
323	5th Sec Mortar Btr	y 0 – 12	1-107MM Howtar 1 170Rds 4.2 Ammo 2 Cal 50 MG		LPD-2	Non-Sched.
324	6th Sec Mortar Btr	y 1–5	1-107MM Howtar 136Rds 4.2 Ammo 25 Cans Water 8000 Sand Bags		LPD-2	Non-Sched.
			`			

		,		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		}
325	Rear Elms, Mortar Btry	0-9	6- 3/4T Trk	1-LOM-6 1-LOM-8		Non-Sched.
326	Rear Elms Mortar Btry	0-17	9-M-422 w/Trlr 1/4T, 4-21T Trk 3 Trlr 117 1 Trlr Water		LPD-2	Non-Sched.
340	Amtrac Plat (-)	1-18	5-LVTP	5-LVTP	LP D- 2	1st Wave Beach BLUE
341	Elms Amtrac Plat	0-18	5-LVTP	5-LVTP	LPD-2	2d Wave Beach BLUE
342	Elms Amtrac Plat	0-3	1-LVTC	1-LVTC	LP D- 2	Free Boat 002 Beach ELUE
350	AT Plat (-)	1-9	3-Ontos	1-LCM-8	LPD-2	Non-Sched.
351	Elms AT Plat	0-7	2-Ontos	1-LCM-6	LPD-2	Beach ELUE Non-Sched.
352	Rear Films AT Plat	0-5	1-M422 w/tT Trli 1-Trk 3/4T w/ 3/4T Trlr	1-LCM-6	LPD-2	Beach BLUE Non-Sched.
360	TK Plat (-)	1-12	3-M48A3 Tanks	1-LCU	LSD-28	Non-Sched.
361	Elms TK Plat	0-14	2-M48A3 Tanks 1-Retriever	1-LCU	LSD-28	Non-Sched.
362	Rear Elms TK Plat	0-5	1-5T Trk w/ $2\frac{1}{2}$ T Trlr, 1-M38A1 Jeep w/ $\frac{1}{4}$ T Trlr Trk Refueler $2\frac{1}{2}$ T	11-LCM-8 1-LCM-6	LSD-28	Non-S ched.
370	1st Engr Sqd	0-12	Normal Combat	 .		2d Wave Beach BIUS Boated w/
371	2d Engr Sqd	0–13	Normal Combat	3- UH-34		serial 281 Land w/ Serial 273
372	3d Engr Sqd	0–13	Normal Combat	3 - UI-3 4		Land w/Ser- Lal 263,264

373	Engr Plat (-)	1-7	1-TD 15	1-LCM-6	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach BLUE
374	Elms Engr Plat	0-2	Water Point (7-pallets)	1 -LCM -6	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach BLUE
375	Engr Veh		1-LIWC	1- UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
376	Engr Veh		1-LIWC	1- U H-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched
377	Engr Veh	0-1	1-LIWC	1-LVTP	LPD-2	Non-Sched
380	Recon Plat (-)	0-11	Normal Combat	2-UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
381	Elms Recon Plat	0-12	Normal Combat	2-UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
382	Recon Veh	0-1	1-M422 w/1/4T Trlr	1- C H-46	LPH-2	Non-Sched
400	EOD Sec FLSG B	11	Normal Combat	1-UH-34	LPD-2	Non-Sched
401	Elms 3rd Serv Bn	0-1	3000# Forklift	1- C H-46	LSD-28	Non-Sched
402	3d Serv Bn. Veh	0-3	Trk Wrecker	1-LOM-8	LSD-28	Non-Sched
403	Elms 3d Serv Bn.	0-1	R TFL #6 000	1-LCM-8	LPD-2	On-Call Boated w/ serial 212
404	Elms 3d Serv Bn. (Ammo/RationsTech)	0–3	Normal Combat	1-LCVP	LPD-2	Non-Sched
405	Elms 3d Serv Bn. (Electron/MaintTm)	0–4	1 3/4T Trk ;;/Trlr 3/4 T	1-LQ5-6	LSD-28	Non-Sched
406	Elms 3d Serv Plat (s/a Wpns Repair)	0-5	Normal Combat		LSD-28	Non-Sched Boated w/ Serial 405
425	SP HLZ Con Im	0-5	Normal Combat	1- UH-34	LPH-2	Land w/ Serial 260
426	SP HLZ Con Tm	0-5	Normal Combat	1- UH-34	LPH-2	Land w/ Serial 270
1427	SP Re∞n Party	1–6	Normal Combat		LPD-2	Pre H-HrTran Boated / m/ Serial 281

		1		1		
428	Elms SP Tm & BM Equipment	0-24	1-TD-15 1 3/4T Trk w/ 3/4T Trlr 1-6000# Fork- lift, 1 5KW Flood Light 1-M107 WaterTr	1-LCU	LSD-28	On-Call Beach HLUE
429	Elms SP Plat	0-3	1-KN2 Crane 1-M422 w/1/4T Trlr	1-LCM-8	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach RLUE
430	Elms SP Plat	0-1	1-2½T Trk w/ 5KW Fldlight(to)1-LCM-6	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach BLUE
431	Elms SP Plat	0-3	1-KN2 Crane 1-M422 w/4T Trlr 1-M60 Crane	1-LCM-8	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach BLUS
432	Elms SP Plat	0-1	M50 Dump w/mat layer	1-LCM-8	LSD-28	Non-Sched Beach BLUE
433	SP liaison Tm	0-2	Normal Combat		LPH-2	Land w/Ser - al 202 pre H-Hr Trans
440	Elms Trk Plat	0-11	5-2½T Trks w/3-1½T Trlr	1-LCU	LSD_28	Non-Sched
441	Elms Trk Plat	1-10	5-21T Trks w/2 11T Trlrs	1-LCU	LSD-28	Non–S ch ed
442	Trk Plat (-)	0-13	5-2½T Trks w/5 1½T Trlr 1-M422 w/½T Trlr	1-LCU	LPH-2	Non-Sched
450	Supplies Only		MCI (40 cases) (per lift)	7- UH-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
451	Supplies Only		Water (20 cans per lift)	7- UH-34	LLPH-2	Non-Sched
452	Supplies Only		Class IV (30 bdls sand bags; 180 Barbed wire stakes, 1 sleev concertina	3- UH-34 e	LPH-2	Non-Sched

ı———		 1			T
453	Supplies Only	107MM Ammo (26 Rds Each)	4- UH- 34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
454	Supplies Only	105MM Ammo (16 Rds Each)	4- U H-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
455	Supplies Only	81MM Ammo (60 Rds Each)	10- U H-34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
456	Supplies Only	90MM Ammo (18 Rds Each)	4 - UH- 34	LPH-2	Non-Sched
457	Supplies Only	106MM Ammo (18 Rds w/Spot Trac)	6- Ш→34	LPH-2	Non–Sched
458	Supplies Only	s/a, 2 cans frag, 1 Case Yel.Smk, 3 Case 7.62 link, 3 case 7.62 clip 1 case 40MM 1 case LAAW 3 case 60MM	1- UH-34	LPH-2	Non–Sched
459	Supplies Only (Water)	800 gal water tank	1-LVTP	LH D- 2	Non-Sched
460	Supplies Only (Water)	800 gal water tank	1_LVTP	LPD-2	Non-Sched

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutement: Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 3 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table) to Annex H
(Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67

	(Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67	DO A M	•
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
	1ST WAVE		Column
1-1 LVTP-5	2nd Sqd 2nd Plat Co. C Plat Cndr 2nd Plat Co. C Radio Opr Corpsman 1st Tm 2nd Sqd MG 1st Tm 2nd AT Sqd	14 1 1 1 5 4 26	X 1-1 X 1-2 X 1-3 X 1-4
1-2 LVTP-5	1st Sqd 2nd Plat Co. C Plat Guide, 2nd Plat Co. C 2nd Sqd 60MM Mortars 20. 0 Mortar Sec Ldr 2nd Tm Engr Arty FO Tm	14 1 4 1 4 3 27	X 1-5
1-3 LVTP-5	3rd Sqd 1st Plat Co. C Plat Sgt 1st Plat Co. C Radio Opr Corpsman 2nd Tm 1st Sqd MG 2nd AT Tm 1st Sqd MG Sec Ldr C O GySgt Runner	14 1 4 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 31	
1-4 LVTP-5	2nd Sqd 1st Plat Co. C Plat Guide, 1st Plat Co. C Sqd (-) CO, B, 3rd Engr 1st Sqd 60MM Mortars Arty FO Tm Corpsman	14 1 5 4 2 1	
1-5 LVTP-5	1st Sqd 1st Plat Co. C Plat Cmdr 1st Plat Co. C Radio Opr, 1st Plat Co. C Corpsman Co. C 1st Tm 1st Sqd MG 1st AT Tm 1st AT Sqd	14 1 1 5 4	1. 1

BOAT NO	PERSONNEL	AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
2-1 LVTP-5	3rd Sqd 2nd Plat Co. Plat Sgt 2nd Plat Radio Opr Corpsman 2nd Tm 2nd Sqd MG 2nd Tm 2nd AT Sqd AT Sec Ldr		14 1 1 1 4 3 1 25	X 2-1 X 2-2 X 2-3 X 2-4 X 2-5
2-2 LVTP-5	3rd Sqd 3rd Plat Co. Plat Spt 3rd Plat Radio Opr Corpsman 2nd Tm 3rd Sqd MG Wpns Plat Cmdr 2nd Tm 3rd AT Sqd Arty advance Party	:	14 1 2 1 4 1 3 3	1+1 .+47/3
2-3 LVTP-5	FDO Op Chief FC Man Radio Opr Recorder Shore Party Scout Sniper NGF Spot Im Engr Corpsman Wpns Plat Sgt Company XO		1 1 1 1 3 2 5 5 1 1 1 23	
2-4 LVTP-5	2nd Sqd 3rd Plat Co. Plat Guide 3rd Plat 81 FO Tm SP Det 3rd Sqd 60MM Mortars	C	14 1 2 4 <u>4</u> 25	A: - Z::
2-5 LVTP-5	1st Sqd 3rd Plat Co. Plat Cndr 3rd Plat Co Radio Opr Corpsman 1st Tm 3rd Sqd MG 1st Tm 3rd AT Sqd		14' 1 1 1 5 4 26	
				T.V.T

	DECOMMENT AND FOURDMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FREE BOATS	0. 100	
400		7.Z. Y	
00-1 LARC-5	Beach Pty Recon		
00-2 LVTC	Crew, Amph Tractor	3	
		1.2	
• •		, + a	
•	ON-CALL		
Serial	Radio Opr / Driver	2	
21 <i>2</i>	Heavy Equip Opr	1 6	
282	Co. C Hads Rear Elms AN/MRC-62	0	
403 LCM-8	(3/4T Trk w/Trlr)		
	RTFL 6000 Lb M-422 w/ lT Trlr	25	
	M-422 W/ TI IIII	25 34	•
		•	
	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e		
Serial	X.O,	. \$1.	
30.1 L CM- 8	GySgt. Comm Chief:	1	
	2 Rdo Opr	2 3	
	3- F.C Men Corpsman	1	
	Sec .#1	10 8	
	Sec #2 Sec #3	9.	
	3-10 5MM Howitzers	<u></u> 25	
	1-M422 with Trlr 4 ^T 1-AN/MRC 110	20	
	3-Sec Chests		
	3-Ammo Tarps		
	396Rds 105MM Ammo 344,000 Sand Bags	81	
Serial	3-Ammo Tarps 396Hds 105MM Ammo 4,000 Sand Bags	1	
302	1st Sgt	1	
LCM-8	Admn Man	3	
	3-FC Men Corpsman	1	
	4-Comm Personnel	4	
	TD-15 Opr 3-105MM Howitzers	<u>-</u>	
	1-TD-15	8	
	Sec #4 Sec #5	9 8	
	Sec #6	8	
	Sec Chests	,	ing it
	3-Ammo Tarps	•	er 4
	4,000 Sand Bags H-3-3	37	
	DECLASSIFIED		

Serial 303 LCM-6	F.C. Men Arty Wpns Rpr Man Drivers / Mech 1 M-35 6x6'2½T Trk 1 M-105 Trlr 1½T 4,000 Sand Bags		3 1 6 10
Serial 304 LCM-6	Comm Personnel Ammo Tech S/A Rpr Man Driver/Mech 1 M-35 6x6 2½T Trk 1 M-105 Trlr 1½T Sec Chest & Tamp 1-G.P. Tent 4,000 Sand Bags		5 2 1 ¹ 6 14
Serial 428 307 LCU	Equip Opr S. P. Man Beach Party Tm Driver/ Rdo Opr 1 TD=15 1 Trk'3/4T 1 Trlr 3/4T RTFL-6000 (Forklift) 1 TD=24 1 AN/MRC 38 DUKW 5 KW Flood Light M-107 Water Trlr AN/MRC 109		20 (
Serial 203 LCM-8	Drivers 2 GRC-125 2 M-422 4 Trlr 17	NON-SCHEDULED	25 25 25 50 104
Serial 205 LCM-8	Drivers 2 GRC-125 2 M-422 4 Trlr ‡T		25 25 50 104
Serial 209 LCVP	Driver AN/MRC-83		1 18 19

2	erial 10 CM-6	Radio Opr / Driver AN/MRC 109 w/Trlr tT AN/MRC 83	2 30 18 50
2	Serial 11 CM-6	Radio Opr / Driver AN/MRC 109 w/Trlr tT AN/MRC 87	2 30 18 50
2	Serial 243 CVP	Driver 1 Jeep Amb ‡T	1 20 21
3	Serial 05 .CM-6	Driver / Security † Trk 2½T 1 trlr 1½T (Water)	2 - - 2
3	Serial 306 .CU	Drivers 1 MRC 109 7 Trk 2½T 1 Trlr 1½T 4 M-422 w/Trlr ½T	4 4
3	Serial 325—1 .CM—6	Drivers Mechanic 2 Trk 3/4T	2 1
3	Serial 325—1 .CM—8	Drivers Mechanic 4 Trk 3/4T	<u>4</u> 2 <u>6</u>
3	Serial 326 .CU	1st Sgt Clerks Drivers 9 M-422 9 Trlr 1T 4 22T Trk 3 Trlr 12T 1 Trlr 12T (Water)	1 3 13 — — — — — —
3	Serial 350 JOM—8	Plat Cmdr AT Plat Sec Ldr Heavy Sec Ontos Cmdr Ontos Driver Loader 3 M 50A1 (Ontos)	1 1 2 3 3 3 ————————————————————————————


STATE M	ombu.	
Serial 351 LCM-6	Plat Sgt Ontos Plat Sec Ldr Light Sec Ontos Ondr Ontos Driver Loader 2 M50A1 (Ontos)	1 1 1 2 2 2 ———————————————————————————
Serial 352 LOM-8	Ordnance Man Tractor Veh Repair Man Turret Repair Man Field Radio Opr Corpsman M 422 W T Trlr 3/4T Trk w/ 3/4T Trlr	1 1 1 1 25
Serial 360 1-LCU	Plat Cmdr Tank Plat Sec Ldr Hvy Sec Tank Cmdr Tank Gunner Tank Driver	1' 4- 2 3 3
to to	Tank Loader 3 M48A3 Gun Tanks	3: 13:
Serial 361 1 LCU	Sec Ldr, Light Sec Tank Plat Sgt Tank Cmdr Tank Gunner Tank Driver Tank Loader Retriever Cmdr	1 11 13 2 2 2 2
	Mechanic 2 ML8A3 Gun Tank VTK 51 Tank)Retriever	45
Serial 362-1 1 L CM 8	Corpsman Radio Opr Driver Trk 5T w/ T _r lr 2½T	1 2 2 -
Serial 362-2 LCM-6	M38A1 ½T Trlr Trk kefueler 2½T	1 1 2
Serial 373 LCM-6	Plat Cndr, Engr Plat Plat Set. Const Foreman Combat Engr Equip Oper TD-15	15 4 - 1 - 1 - 8

		xo
Serial	Driver	1
377	I LIWC	8 9
LVTP		•
Serial	Water Supply Man	2 ************************************
374	Water Point (Seven Pallets)	· .
LOM-6	,	2
Serial	Driver/Assist	2
402	Mechanic .	1
LOM-8	Trk Wrecker	
re territoria. Territoria		4
Serial	Ration Tech	2 1 3 5
404	Ammo Tech	_1_
LCVP		3
Serial	Addition Person Ma	5
405	S/A Wpns Repair Tm Electronics Maint Tm	<u>í</u>
406	Electronics Maint Tm 1 3/4T Trk w/Trlr	
LCM-6		9 25 3
Serial 429	KN2 Crane M-422 w/ tT Trlr	25
127 LCM-6	Equip Opr	
nai-o	-derb ob-	28
Serial	Equip Opr	1
430	1 2½T Trk	 _
LCM-8	5 KW Flood Light	1
		•
Serial	Equip Opr	1
431	M-422 w/tT Trlr	25
LCM-8	M-60 Crane	
	KN2 Crane	26
		20
Serial	Equip Opr	1
432	M-51 Dump	
LOM-8	(Mat Layer)	
		1
7	Poul com	5
Serial	Driver Asst. Driver	4
TCA 740	Plat Sgt MT Plat	1
100	Corpsman	1
	5 23T Trk	-1
	3 2½T Trlr	
	•	11
Serial	Plat Cmdr MT Plat	1
441	Driver	5 5
rcu	Asst. Driver 5 2] T Trk	2
	5 25T Trk 2 15T Trlr	
	€ 15+ ++++	

Serial 442 LCU	Driver Asst Driver Mechanic Sec Ldr 5 2 T Trk 5 T Trlr M-422 w/4T Tlr	6 5 1 1 13
Serial 459 LVTP	800 Gal Water Tank	
Serial 460 LVTP	800 Gal Water Tank	
LEGEND X-LVTP-5		Januar Turner

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67



c op	ol ojies
Сору	<u>.of (Copt</u>)es
	(abanteary: 1967
	JIMA (LPH-2) February 1967

Appendix 4 (Helicopter Employment and Assault Table) to Annex H (Landing Plan) to the Plan 2

	HELI UNIT	NO/TYPI	FROM	TO		ÎME		DESTINA'	TION	TROOP UNIT, EQUIPMENT
WA VÆ	& FLIGHT NUMBER	A/C	CARRIER Orgin		LOAD	LAUNCH	LAND	LZ	LS	AND SERIAL
1	Frosty Gold 1 2 3	16. UI-3 <i>I</i>	LPH-2	LPH-2	L-40	L-35	L-Hour	ROBIN		96 Co. A; 4/M-60; 2/3.5 Ser. 261, 262
2	Frosty Gold 1	4 UH . 34	L P H-2	LPH-2	L+10	L+12	L+19	ROBIN		24 Co. A; 1/ 3.5; Ser. 262-1 to 262-4
3	Frosty Gold 2 Refuel LPH-2	4 UH-34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+15	L+23	L+30	ROBIN		24 Co. A; 1/ 3.5; Ser. 262-5 to 262-8
4	Frosty Gold 3	4 UH-34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+26	L+28	L+35	ROBIN		24 Co. A; 1/ M-60; Ser. 263-1 to 263-4
5	Frosty Gold 4 Rafuel LPH=2	4 UR-34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L +31	L+39	L+46	ROBIN		24 0b. A; 1/ M-60; 2/ 3.5; Ser. 263-5 to 263-8
6	Frosty Gold 1 Refuel LPH-2	4 UH-34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+42	L+50	L+57	ROBIN		24 Co. A; 3/60mm); Ser. 264
7	Frosty Gold 2	Щ: UHi+3 Д	LLPH-2	LPH-2	L*52	I+54	L+61	ROBIN		21 Co. A; 2/81mm; Ser. 220

							1	<u> </u>	
8	Frosty Gold 3 Refuel LPH-2	4 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+57	L+65	L+72	ROBIN	9 %. A; 2/ LIWC w/106RR Ser. 230
9		16 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+68	L+84	L+96	P A rchOT	96 Co. B; 2 M-60; 1/3.5; 1/60mm; Ser.270, 271;
10		4 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+108	L+116	L+126	PARROT	24 Co. B; 1/3.9 1/60mm; Sera.9 272-1 to 272-4
11	Frosty Gold 1	4 JH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+118	L+121	I+131	PARROT.	24 0o. B; 1/M-60; Ser 272-5 to 272-8
12	Frosty Gold 2	4 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+123	L+131	I+141	PARROT	24 0o. B; 2/M- 60; 1/60mm; Ser. 273-1 to 273-4
13	Frosty Gold 3	4 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+133	L+136	L+146	PARROT	24 0o. #; 1/M- 60; 2/3.5; Ser. 273-5 to 273-8
14	Frosty Gold 4	4 UH- 34	LPH-2	LPH-2	L+138	L+141	L+151	PARROT	20 Co.B; Ser 273-9; 371; 221-1;

H-4-2

						
	235-4	Flamethrower Tm, H&S 2 Maint Man 2 Plat Sgt, Wpns Sed 1 5	1 Flamethrower	1350	275	1475
-	235-5	Asslt Tm, H&S 3 Maint Sec Ldr Maint Man (106KM&Flame)2		1350	2	1350
	23 6 –1	Equipment Only (H&S)	1 LIWC		1300	1300
	236-2	Equipment Only (H&S)	! LIWC		1300	1300
	236-3	Equipment Only (H&S)	1 LIWC		1300	1300
	236-4	Equipment Only (H&S)	1 LIWC		1300	1300
	(251-1	Equipment Only (H&S)	1 M422 Mite		1750	1750
	251-2	Equipment Only (H&S)	1 17 Trlr & Equip	e E e p	1465	1465
	252-1.	Plat Sgt 1 2d MG Sqd 5	1 M-60 MG & Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	116	1466
	252 <u>-</u> 2	3d MG Sqd 5 Maint Man 1	1 M-60 MG & Ammo	1350	116	1466
	252–3	4th MG Sqd 5	1 M←60 MG & Ammo	1125	116	1241
	252–4	Plat Cmdr Prov MG Plat 1 Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd 1 MG Tm 4	1 M-60 MG & Ammo	13 <i>5</i> 0	116	1466

H-5-17

							<u></u>	
	***,					-		
Wave		ALPHA COMMAND GROUP						
1	200-1	Co BLT 1/4 SgtMaj Rdo Opr Msgr	1 1 3 1	3 AN/PRC 25	1350	60	1410	
	200–2	S-3 Off Jrnl Clk Rdo Opr S-2 Sœuts	1 1 3 1 6	2 AN/PRC 25	1350	40	1390	
	200-3	Ops Chief Arty Lno Rdo Opr (Arty) Msgr (S-3) Chief Scout	1 1 2 1 1 6	2 AN/PRC 25	13 <i>5</i> 0	40	1390	
	200-4	Intell Chief S-2 Clrk Draftsman (S-3) Air LnO Rdo Opr	1 1 1 2 6	2 AN/PRC 25	13.50	40.	13 <i>5</i> 0	

H-5-18

Copy of Copies
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
12120CH Feb 1967

Administration Order 2-67 to accompany Operation Order 2-67

- Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Ams, Series 1 7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV
 - (b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67
 - (c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67
 - (d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order
 - (e) FMFM G-3
 - (f) USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) Helicopter Request (REV Aug 66)

Time Zone: H

L. SUPPLY

a. General

(1) Supplies landed will at no time exceed 1 DCS.

b. Supply Source

- (1) The LPH is the primary source of supply.
- (2) Supplies will be prepared and staged abourd all assigned shipping and ready for loading by helo or surface lift on D-1.
 - (3) Prescribed loads will be drawn from BLT supplies.
- (4) Resupply of all classes will be requested through the S-4. (See Annex A).
- (5) Service platoon elements assigned to TAC LOG have the responsibility of staging and preplanning supplies as directed by TAC LOG.

c. Prescribed Loads

(1) Glass I

- (a) Two full canteens of water.
- (b) Three MCI's per individual.
- (c) One box of trioxane per individual.

(2) Class II

(a) Individual Marine uniform and equipment will consist of:

Jungle utilities.

Limitation with trousers bloused.

nemet w/cover, green side out, and mosquito net.

Light marching pack W/following items:

1 Machete per fire team.

1 Entrenching tool.

3 pr Cushion sole socks.

- 1 coat utility jungle
- 2 pair green drawers
- l poncho
- 1 towel, green
- 1 bottle insect repellent

(note) Each squad will carry 3-30 foot ropes, and two protective mask.

Each fire team will carry 1-3 foot toggle line.

(3) Class III

l can gun oil per individual Gun patches and cleaning rags

(4) Class IV

107mm Battery Sandbags 5000 Per Battery

Concenting 10 Coils Per Battery

1 pr trousers, junda

2 undershirts, gr

Stakes 50 Per Battery

105mm Battery Sandbags 5000 Per Battery

Concentina 10 Coils Per Battery

Stakes 50 Per Battery

81mm Mortor

Sandbags 500 Per Gun

Shore Party

Sandbags 5000 Per SP Unit

(5) Class V

M14 Rifle 7.62mm

80 Rds Ball, 20 Rds Tracer

M14 Rifle Automatic 7.62mm

400 Rds Ball, 100 Rds Tracer

M60 MG 7.62mm Linked

1000 Rds Per Gun

Cal .45 Ball (US Pistol)

21 Rds Per Individual

M79 40mm HE

24 Rds Per Weapon

3.5" Rocket Launcher

3 Rds WP, 3 Rds Heat Per Gun

Rifle Company

Grenade Frag M26 Hand

Grenade C/S Hand

Mine AP, M18Al (Claymore)

300 Per Rifle Company

27 Per Rifle Company (1 per fire team)

3 per platoon

Flare, Surface Trip	16 per Company
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Yellow	27 Per Rifle Company
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Green	9 Per Rifle Company
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Red	9 Per Rifle Company
Grenade Hand WP	30 Per Rifle Company
Grenade Hand Illumation	25 Per Rifle Company
Grenade Hand Incend	5 Per Rifle Company
Signal ground Illumation WSP	24 Per Rifle Company
Signal ground Illumation GSC	4 Per Rifle Company
Signal ground Illumation RSP	4 Per Rifle Company
Grenade Rifle WP	30 Per Rifle Company
Grenade Rifle HEAT	18 Per Rifle Company
Projections Adaptor ML-MLA1	32 Per Rifle Company
Cartridge Rifle Grenade 7.62	80 Per Rifle Company
	00 000 0000g
60mm Mortar HE	75 Per Rifle Company
60mm Hortar Illum	18 Per Rifle Company
60mm Kortar WP	18 Per Rifle Company
LAAW, 66mm, Rocket, HE	30 Per Rifle Company
81mm Morter	
81mm HE	20 Per Gun
81mm WP	3 Per Gun
81mm Illum	3 Per Gun
H&S Company	
Grenade Hand Frag M26	200 Per H&S. Company
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Yellow	
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Green	9 Per H&S Company
Colored Hand Smoke Gren Red	9 Per H&S Company 9 Per H&S Company
Recon Platoon	, 505 444 512
Grenade Hand FRAG M26	2 Per Individual
Grenade Hand WP	10 Per Platoon
Colored Hand Smoke Yellow	4 Per Platoen
Colored Hand Smoke Red	4 Per Plateon
Grenade Hand Illum	12 Per Platoon
Signal ground Illum WSP	4 Per Platoon 4 Per Platoon
Signal ground Illum GSP	4 Per Platoen
107 Battery	
.50 Cal MG Linked	400 Per MG Cal. 50
HE 4.2	315 Per Battery

3

WP 4.2mm 84 Per Battery
Illum 4.2mm 21 Per Battery
Grenade Hand Frag M26 110 Per Battery

105 Battery

.50 Call MG Linked 400 Per MG Cal .50

HE 105mm 593 Per Battery
WP 105mm 69 Per Battery
H11um 105mm 30 Per Battery
Grenade Hand Frag M26 200 Per Battery

106 Recoilless Rifle

106mm HEAT 4 Rds Fer Gun 106mm HEFT 4 Rds Fer Gun .50 Spotter Tracer 32 Rds Fer Gun

Engineer Platoon

Non Electric Blasting Caps
Special Electric Blasting Caps
Cord detonating (Prima Cord)
Charge Demo Block one 1b. TNT
Charge Assembly Demo M37
Lgnitor Blasting Fuze M2
Time Fuze Safety

35 Per Squad
50 Per Squad
650 Ft Est Squad
60 Per Squad
60 Per Squad
60 Per Squad

AT Platoon

Sub Machine Gun Cal.45
Cartridge 106mm HEAT
Cartridge 106mm HEPT
Cal. 30 Linked M.G.
Cal. 50 Spoter Tracer

180 Rds Per Gun
14 Rds Per M50 (Ontos)
1000 Rds Per M50 (Ontos)
176 Rds Per M50 (Ontos)

(6) Communication per plateon:

Two AM/FRC 25
One battery (BA 386) in each radio, two carried outside.
One EE-8
Two sound powered phones.
One half mile wire WP-1/TT.

(7) Medical (Annex B)

(a) Complete basic outfit (ICL) plus 3 day high usage items. Eight salt tablet per individual per day. 12 halizone tablets per individual per day.

d. Supplies and Equipment Available

(1) Control and Distribution

(a) Control

- 1 The BLT will establish a TAC LOG aboard the LPH and the LSD with sub units on other shipping. The LSD is the primary control ship.
- 2 Custody, control and distribution is a BLT responsibility. Request for transportation will be submitted though the S-4.
- 3 Every effort will be made to ensure supplies and equipment are safeguarded against damage, capture, and pilferage from both friendly and enemy forces.
- 4 Report all classes of supplies expended or consumed by type and quantity to the BLT 3-4 upon completion of operations.

(b) Distribution

- 1 Levels of supply in the objective area will not exceed one DCS for any class unless approved by the BLT Commander, or the S-4.
- 2 Landing of supplies and serials will be reported to BLT S-4 when completed.
 - 3 Captured material (See Intelligence Annex).
 - 4 Salvage
- a All material requiring salvage will be reported to the BLT S-4 and returned to the amphibious shipping by the most expedient means.
- b No material of potential use to the enemy will be left unguarded or unattended.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. See Annex B (Medical) to Administrative Order 002-67.
- b. All class V will be removed from casualties prior to being evacuated.
- c. Upon arrival of the casualty to the flight deck aboard the LPH, designated personnel from collection and clearing platoon will search the Hele and casualty i my class V prior to admitting him to the operating room. This process will again be completed when the individual is taken to the Hangar Deck.

3. TRANSPORTION

a. Land. The landing of wheeled and tracked vehicles will be restricted to those requirements is the mission. Vehicles will be designated and debarked on order.

- b. Sea. 20 River boats and 20 outboard engines will be embarked aboard SLF shipping. SP will coordinate and dispatch these chosts to waiting miles can certain. Strict accountability will be observed by SP Commander for the condition of boats checked out and returned. Boats and motors will be marked with masking tape for identification. SP Commander will ensure that motors are flushed with freshwater upon completion of each days use.
 - c. Air. As directed and approved by CTG 79.5.

4. SERVICE

a. Functions

- (1) Construction as required.
- (2) Maintenance to be provided by the service attachments of the BLT. Maximum use will be made of contact teams and end items replacements.
- 5. PERSONNEL. See Annex D (Personnel) to Administrative Order 002-67.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Security of all supplies, equipment and personal effects while abourd is the responsibility of the embarked unit commanders.
- b. When operating ashore, all expended dry cell batteries will be destroyed and buried if possible.
- c. Deadlined equipment will be reported immediately to this Headquarters (Attn: S-4).
- d. Prior to re-embarkation unit commanders will ensure Class V items recovered are free of <u>rust</u>, <u>dirt</u>, and <u>moisture</u>.
 - e. Supply economy will be enforced at all times.
 - f. On D-Day minus one, all units draw prescribed loads. .
 - g. Safety
- (1) Hand grenades will not be removed from their containers prior to L-2 or H-2 whichever is applicable.
- (2) Magazines will not be loaded prior to L-2 or H-2 whichever is applicable.
- (3) Grenades will not be suspended from cartridge belts, belt suspenders, pockets of utility coats or any other area that may cause the pins to disengage from the grenade at any time.

JACK WESTERMAN Lieutepant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding

ATTEMES: A - Plan for loading Supplies

B - Medical

C - Shore Party

D - Personnel

R - Civil Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex A (Plan for landing supplies) to accompany Administrative Order 002-67

Ref: (a) Hap: VIETNAH, Ams, Series L 7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV

(b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67

(c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 1204-67

(d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order

(a) FMCFM G-3

(f) USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) Helicopter Request (REV Aug 66)

Time Zone: H

1. CENERAL

- a. See Annex C (Concept of Operations) OpOrd 2-67.
- b. This plan calls for landing by a combination of helicopterbone and waterborne amphibious assaults.
- c. An amphibious assault in a riverine operation will reflect the tactics and techniques contained in reference (b),

2. EXECUTION

- a. All tactical elements debarking will debark will full B/A.
- b. By 1800 hours on D day, all HLZs and beach areas will be provided with one DOS, one DOA, and two hours of Class V illumination.
 - c. There will be no floating dumps.
 - d. The LPH IWO JIMA will be the primary source of all classes of supplies.
 - e. Resupply will be accomplished as follows:
 - (1) Tactical units request all resupply through 8-4.
 - (2) S-4 forwards request to TAC LOG.
 - (3) TAC LOG Request Helo lift in accordance with serialized leads.
- (4) Service platoon breaks supplies out on the flight deck and stages them according to unit by serials.
 - (5) Helos are dispatched by serials to appropriate HIZ.



- (6) All helicopter requests will be in the format of reference (f).
- f. Emergency resupply may be had at anytime by requesting through channels, or direct to TAC LOG, if required by emergency.
- g. Heavy loads (105), (107), and (90)mm may be directed by TAC LOG to be landed at the beach area by surface craft if conditions permit.
 - h. BLT TAC-LOG will organize, embark, and function in accordance with reference (e).
- i. Serialized helo lifts of supplies will be requested in accordance with Annex H, Operation Order 2-67.

3. WITHDRAWAL PLAN

- a. The withdrawal plan is essentially a ship to shore movement in reverse.
- b. Backloading of non-tactical supplies and equipment shall be accomplished if practical prior to W-hour.
- (1) Tactical units utilize LZC teams to request helos well in advance of W-Hour.
 - (2) LZC teams back-load most critical equipment and supplies first.
- (3) Request for lifts of supplies, equipment, and personnel for W-Hour will be in accordance with subparagraph 2. a. above.

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutement Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding

•

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67.

CORY Of BLAT 1/4
USS: BWO JIMA (LPH-2),
121200H February 1967

Annex B (Medical) to Administrative Order 002-67

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Ams, Series L7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV

(b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67

(c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67


(d) CTG 70.5 Frag Order

(e) DO P6000.4d (Medical SOP)

(f) FMFH 4-5 (Medical and Dental Support)

Time Zome: H

- 1. ORGANIZATION: ANNEX A
- 2. MISSION:
 - a. Medical Support
- (1) Lend on order with 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and establish a Battalion Aid Station. Provide replacement personnel as needed.
- (2) Collecting and Clearing platoon will land on order and establish a collecting and clearing station in a designated area.
- (3). If seaward evacuation of casualties for second echelon care is more desirable, the attached medical units will be prepared to integrate with and compliment the medical department of the casualty receiving ship.
 - b. All Medical Units.
 - (1): Provide markers on evacuation routes to designate location of unit.
 - (2) Be prepared to furnish emergency treatment to civilian populus.
 - (3) Test local water for potability.
- 3. SANITATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. See Appendix 1.
- 4. EVACUATION
 - a. Reference (e).
 - b. Movement
- (1) After departing port of embarkation, casualties occurring aboard ship, which require care beyond the capability of that ship, will be transferred to designated casualty receiving ships at the earliest practicable time.




- (2) The health of all troops embarked is the responsibility of the Amphibious Task Force Commander.
- (3) Troop medical personnel will render all practicable assistance to ship's medical personnel as regards medical service to embarked troops.

c. Assault Plan

- (1) Waterborne Force
 - (a) Ship-to-shore
- l Living casualties in the landing craft will remain in the craft for return to the casualty receiving ships as directed.
- 2 All dead occurring in the landing craft will be placed on the beach above the high water mark for collection by Graves Registration personnel of the Shore Party.
- 3 All dead occurring in amphibious vehicles will remain in the vehicle for return to the beach for collection by the Graves Registration personnel of the Shore Party.
 - (2) Helicopterborne Forces
 - (a) Ship-to-shore
- Living casualties occurring in the helicopterborne force will be evacuated by returning helicopter to the LPH.
- 2 All dead occurring will be returned to the LPH by returning helicopter in the helicopterborne force. Alternatively, they may be left in the landing zone until linkup with ground forces. The choice will be determined by the extensiveness of the commitment of returning helicopters to carry living casualties.

d. Ashore

- (1) Initially, casualties will be evacuated via landing craft or helicopter to casualty recieving ships.
 - (2) Report location of medical installations when established.
- (3) In no case will evacuation of casualties be delayed solely for lack of complete medical records or other administrative requirements.
- (4) Priority will be given to rapid casualty collection and evacuation to Amphibious Task Force medical facilities.
- (5) Normally, casualties will be evacuated to ships of the Amphibious Task Force as soon as possible, either directly by helicopter or via shore party evacuation facilities.



- (7) The LPH will be designated the casualty recieving ship.
- (8) The LPH and LFD, when ready to receive casualties will fly an oversize MIKE flag. At night a blinking green light will be used for identification.

e. Air Evacuation

- (1) Helicopter evacuation.
- (a) All casualties occurring in the helicopterborns force will be evacuated via helicopter to LPH.
- (b) Upon completion of the landing of helicopterborne troops, ambulance helicopter will be available for evacuation.
- (c) Requests for halicopter for shore-te-shere evacuation will be made to the CEGO.
- (d) In requesting ambulance, helicopter, units will use the following classification system for indicating priority of casualties.

Emergency: Those requiring immediate evacuation for emergency treatment.

Priority: Those requiring emergency treatment but whose condition will allow a one to three hour delay.

Routine: Those requiring helicopter evacuation because of the nature of their injury. No emergency treatment necessary but smooth evacuation desirable.

- (2) On order, detained casualties will be evacuated.
- (5) Indigenous civilian casualties will be evacuated from the objective area at the discretion of the Amphibious Task Force Commander.

a. Ship Medical Facilities

- (1) The ships of the Amphibous Task Force will provide hospitalisation. The LPH has been designated to receive the more serious casualties throughout the operation.
- (2) At the discretion of the Amphibious Task Force Surgeon, everflow facilities for minor casualties will be established aboard the LHD.

b. <u>Detainees</u>

(1) Betainess will receive prophylactic injections of smallper, typhoid-paratyphoid, tetanus-diphtheria, policayelitis, typhus, cholers, and plague.

- (2) Detainees will be hospitalized as directed by the Landing Force Commander.
- (3) Maximum use of captured medical personnel and supplies will be made in the treatment of detainees.
 - c. RAMP's. (Recovered Allied Military Personnel)
- (1) All RAMP's will receive prophylactic injections of smellper, typhoid-paratyphoid, tetanus-diphtheria, policyelitis, typhus, cholera, and plague.
- (2) RAMP's will be isolated from troops, civilians and detainees in a detention area on the beach.
- (3) RAMP's requiring hospitalization and casualties requiring emergency treatment will be evacuated in the normal chain seaward.

6. MEDICAL SUPPLY

a. Landing Force

- (1) Reference (f).
- (2) Requests for emergency supplies by air drop will be made as indicated.
- (3) Captured medical supplies will be salvaged for the care of detainees.
- (4) The LPH will be stocked with and act as distribution center for whole blood.

7. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION

- a. Location of Landing Force Surgeon
 - (1) Afloat: LPH
 - (2) Ashore: To be announced.

b. Evacuation and Casualty Reports. Reference (f).

Lieutenari Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Gomanding

ackellerelicular

APPENDIXE

1- Senitation and Preventive Medicine

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Cepy of JOPES BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H February 1967

Appendix I (Sanitation and Preventive Medicine) to Annex B (Medical) to Administrative Order 002-67

Ref: (a) Manual of Preventive Medicine (NAVMED P-5010)

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. To promote and maintain the health and well-being of all troops in the field prior to, during, and after combat operations.

2. SITUATION

- a. Due to conditions and poverty, the country containing the objective area has a distinct impediment toward progress in health and sanitation measures.
- b. As a result of the problem, many diseases are widespread and sanitary measures are almost nil. Vectors of disease are widespread and due to climatic conditions, epidemics of many diseases are almost continuous.

3. DISEASE INFORMATION


- a. Diseases of Special Military Importance
 - (1) Malaria: Greatest mortality cause widespread.
 - (2) Dysenteries: Next in importance widespread.
 - (3) Plague: Occasional epidemics widespread.
 - (4): Cholera: Occasional epidemics widespread.
 - (5) Venereal Diseases: Prevalent in large communities.
 - (6) Typhus Fever: Occurs in hill country.

b. Diseases of potential military importance

- (1) Malaria: Sporadic outbreaks but preventive medication will keep incidence low.
 - (2) Plague: Sporadic outbreaks but control measures may keep incidence low.
 - c. Miscellaneous Diseases
- (1) Typhoid Fever: Common smong civilians due to contaminated water supply.
 - (2) Smallpox: Controlled by vaccines.



B-1-1





a. Vectors of disease.

- (1) Mosquitoes: Anopheles most prevalent.
- (2) Flies: Many varieties the year around.
- (3) Lice: Very Common.
- (4) Fleas: Tropical fleas most prevalent.
- (5) Rodents: Many varieties of rats and rat-like animals transmit typhus fever.

b. Animals. Possibly dangerous animals are wild elephants, bears, tigers, wild cows, and boars. As a rule it is difficult to encounter these animals, but troops maneuvering as a group may anger and stampede them.

5. PREVENTIVE MEASURES

- a. Troop commanders at all echelons will require maximum sanitary discipline possible under combat conditions.
- b. All local water, regardless of source will be considered unsafe and will be treated properly prior to use.
 - c. Fool will be consumed from authorized military sources only.

6. MEDICAL UNITS

- a. Train all personnel in preventive medicine measures required in the recongnition of snakes, dangerous animals, etc., and the treatment of all known and expected diseases in the area.
- b. Medical personnel will ensure that troop personnel are indoctrinated in the wearing of helmet nets and the use of other types of insect repellant nets.
- c. All medical units will indoctrinate troop personnel in the hazards of hot, humid and rainy climates and the methods to combat these hazards.
 - d. All units carry impregnated salt tablets.

e. All troops will have routine immunizations brought up to date, and will be immunized for smallpox, typhoid-paratyphoid, tetanus-diphtheria, policyelitis, cholera, typhus, plague, and gamma globulin before rebarkation,

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutecant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

B-1-2

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex C (Shore Party) to Administrative Order 002-67

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Ams, Series L 7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV

(b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67

(c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

(d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order

(e) FMFM G-3

(f) USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) Helicopter Request (REV Aug 66)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Appendix 1 (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Intelligence Annex to Operation Order 2-67.
- b. Friendly Forces. See Intelligence Annex to Operation Order 2-67.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Operation Order 2-67.

2. MISSION

a. The mission of the shore party organization is to facilitate landing and movement off the beaches of troops, equipment, and supplies of B T 1/4; to evacuate from the beaches casualties and detainers; and the beaching, retraction, and salvage within the Landing Zone. The landing zone control term is to facilitate the landing and movement of heloc uter-borne forces, equipment, and supplies; and to evacuate from the landing zone casualties and detainers.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) Shore party organization provides logistic support throughout the operation. One shore party team will be employed to operate and organize Blue Beach.
- (2) Blue Beach will be developed and prepared to land surface serials and heavy loads.

b. Headquarters, Shore Party Team

(1) Land on order over Blue Beach.

C-1

- (2) Coordinate all Shore Party Operations.
- (3) Plan, coordinate and conduct the BSA defense.
- (4) Install and operate bulk fuel facilities as required to support suphibious tractor and other units operating out of the BSA.
- (5) Provide two landing some control teams for two assault rifle companies and one landing zone control team for Blue Beach HLZ.
 - (6) Be prepared to support back-loading on completion of operations.

c. Shore Party Team

- (1) Land on order over Blue Beach and develope the beach for operations.
- (2) Organize and establish BSA on Blue Beach.
- (3) Provide logisitic support to assault elements as required. Be prepared to provide unit distribution by amphibious tractors and helicopters.
 - (4) Install a bulk unloading station by D+1.

d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Annex H (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 2-67.
- (2) Annex A (Plan for Landing Supplies) to Administrative Plan 2-67.
- (3) Work Priorities.
 - (a) Mark the Beach.
 - (b) Obstacle removal.
 - (c) Improve beach exits and trafficability.
 - (d) Establish evacuation station.
 - (e) Establish helocopter landing points.
 - (f) Initiate CP installations.
 - (g) Establish Class V dump.
 - (h) Establish Class III dump.
 - (i) Establish Class I dump.
 - (j) Establish BSA defense.





- (4) Be prepared to conduct round the clock operations.
- (5) BSA Blue Beach dump levels to be ashore by 1800, D-day are:

Class I - I day.

Class III - I day.

Class V - I day.

- (6) Maximum dump levels of all classes on Blue Beach established at one DOS.
 - (7) All supplies disbursed and revetted.
- (8) All cargo nets and life jackets will be recovered and returned to appropriate ships.
- 4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. See Operation Order 2-67.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS
 - a. Communication
 - (1) Annex J (Comm-Elect) to Operation Order 2-67.
 - b. Command Posts
 - (1) Afloat
 - (a) Shore Party Team ISD-28.
 - (2) Ashore
 - (a) Shore Party Team Blue Beach.
 - (3) Report changes in CP locations as necessary.

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutepant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIX:

1-Task Organization

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

C-3

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

APPENDIX 1 (Task Organization) to Annex C (Shore Party) to Administrative Order 2-67

Shore Party will activate on order.

Headquarters Shore Party	Off	Enl
1st Team Co A 3rd SP BN	1	29
Det H&S Co 3rd SP BN	0	22
Det 3rd Service BW	0	<u>1</u> 52

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieutemant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps: Gommanding

DISTRIBUTION: Armex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Commence of the commence of

Copy BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex D (Personnel) to Administrative Order 2-67

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Ams, Series L 7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV

(b) MCO P5000.3, MARCORPERSMAN

(c) FMFPacO Plood.3, SOP Personnel (d) Uniform Code of Military Justice

BnBul 3040 of 3 May 1966

SLF Order 3800 Standard Operating Procedure for Intelligence

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL. Personnel procedures will be in accordance with references (b) and (c), the provisions of this armex, and any subsequent directives published by this Headquarters.

2. STRENGTH

- a. Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 2-67.
- b. All units will debark with sufficient personnel to ensure maximum combat effectiveness.

c. Personnel Reports

- (1) Submit casualty reports to BLT S-1 as they occur in accordance with casualty reporting procedures contained in reference (e).
- (2) Submit daily strength report indicating total personnel ashore by Marine Officer/Enlisted, Navy Officer/Enlisted as of 1600 to arrive to BLT 5-1 by 1800 daily.
- (3) BLT S-1 report those personnel twice/thrice wounded to SLF S-1 as they occur.
- (4) BLT S-1 submit weekly Personnel Status Report in accordance with reference (c).
- 3. REPLACEMENTS. None anticipated.

4. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

- a. Military justice will be governed by the provisions of reference (d).
- b. Minor infractions will be deferred until completion of the operation. Serious incidents and infractions will be reported immediately.
- c. Subordinate commenders are responsible for stragglers in their area of responsibility.

- d. Straggler control on the beach will be by the Shore Party Places of the Party Place
- e. When the BLT CP is established ashore, straggler control will be by the BLT S-1.

f. Detainees

- (1) All provisions of the Geneva Convention will be observed.
- (2) All detainees will be searched immediately.
- (3) All detainees will be reported immediately upon capture to the BLT S-2. Disposition will be in accordance with instructions provided by the BLT S-2.
- (4) The BLT S-1 will be prepared to establish a temporary detained compound in the vicinity of the BLT CP.
 - (5) Detaines will be handled in accordance with reference (f).

5. CRAVES REGISTRATION

- a. All friendly deceased personnel will be evacuated to the USS IwO JIMA.
- b. All personal effects of deceased personnel will be turned in to the BLT S-1 and processed in accordance with reference (b).

6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES

- a. Leave. Only emergency leave will be granted. Complete verification by the Red Cross will be required.
- b. <u>Decorations and Awards</u>. Recommendations for decorations and awards will be submitted as expeditiously as possible. Every effort will be made to obtain eyewitness statements.
- c. Postal. Pick up and delivery of mail will be arranged by the BLT Postal Officer.
- d. Religious Services. As scheduled by the BLT Chaplain. Information regarding times and location of services will be announced.
- e. Pay. Information will be promulgated by the Disbursing Officer regarding the pay schedule in the event a pay day is held prior to completion of the operation.
- 7. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION. See Annex E to Administrative Order 2-67.



8. PERSCHNEL

- a. Personnel accounting will be in accordance with references (b) and (c).
- b. Prior to debarkation all units ensure that the following is accomplished.

(1) Identification cards, identification tags, Geneva Convention Cards, Records of Emergency Data (NAVMC 10526-PD) and Immunization Certificate (ND 737) ere current.

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieuten int Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67



Copy of Copies
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H Feb 1967

Annex E (Civil Affairs) to Accompany Administrative Order 002-67

Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Ams, Series L 7014, 1:50,000; Sheet #6738 I, II, 6838 III, IV

- (b) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-67
- (c) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan
- (d) CTG 79.5 Frag Order
- (e) MFM G-3
- (f) USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), Helicopter Request (REV Aug 66)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces See Annex B (Intelligence) to OpOrder 2-67
 See Current Intsums
- b. Friendly Forces See BLT OpOrder 2-67

7.46

2. MISSICM. To establish immediate report with the civilian populace by dispensing both medical and dental aid.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Medical assistance will be given to the local population as the tactical situation permits.
- b. <u>Civil Affairs Officer</u>. Advise the BLT Commander in civil affairs and civic action potentialities when directed. Establish contact with local officials and populace.
- c. On Order BAS. Furnish medical team to provide basic medical and sanitation assistance.
- (1) Medical Team. Two M.D., one D. D. S., four Corpsmen, Civil Affairs Officer, Interpreter.
- d. On order Med-Cap will be deployed to a designated area on D+1 by helicopter, meet security unit and proceed to area assigned for civic action.
- e. Coordinating Instructions. All assistance to local civilians will be coordinated by the Civial Affairs Officer or individuals so designated.



The rules of conduct will be strictly followed as directed by Annex (D).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. BAS will supply necessary medical supplies as directed by senior medical officer.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION

- a. Medical civic action will continue under conditions proposed by the medical officer and approved by the tactical commander.
 - b. See Annex J (Communication Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67.

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corpa
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex C (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

COPY OF COPIES
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Appendix 3 (Radie Call Signs) to Annex J (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 (SLF) COI

Time Zone: H

1. Radie Call Signs in accordance with reference (a)

2. ENCODE

UNIT	VOICE CALL
CTG 76.5	COMPANY STORE
TG 76.5	GRUDGE
CTG 79.5	HILL DALE
TG 79.5	FRIENDLY CAT
BLT 1/4	GOLD LEMON
BLT 1/4 Cellective	DEAD HEAT
3rdBn 7thMar	CREPE MYRTLE
HMM-363	FROSTY GOLD
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	CROSS WALK
USS MERRICK (AKA-97)	CAMSHAFT QUEBEC
USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	COCKTAIL GOLF
USS DIACHENKO (APD-123)	ELBOW HOTEL
USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	SNOW CHIEF
USS MANLEY (DD-940)	GUNSMITH
USS ST FRANCIS RIVER (LSMR-525)	ABBEY TANGO
USS TURNER JOY (DD-951)	BALL ROOM
USS WHITE RIVER (LSMR-536)	JILT FOXTROT
USS CANBERRA (CAG-2)	BLOCKBUSTER
Company "A":	GOLD LEMON ALPHA
Company "B"	GOLD LEMON BRAVO
Company "C"	GOLD LEMON CHARLIE
Company "D"	GOLD LEMON DELTA
Composite Company	GOLD LEMON NOVEMBER
H&S Company	GOLD LEMON YANKER
81MM Mertar Plat	GOLD LEMON WHISKEY
106MM RR Plat	GOLD LEMON TANGO
Flame Plat	GOLD LEMON FOXTROT
BLT TACLOG	GOLD LEMON PRODUCT
BLT FSCC	GOLD LEMON BAILEY
Air LmO	GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR
FAC Tm #1	GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR (Co. Suffix)
FAC Tm #2	GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR (Co. Suffix)
NGF LinO	GOLD LEMON TWO SIX OSCAR
105MM Hewitzer Btry	NEW ROAD

J-3-1

ENCODE

UNIT

107 Btry Recon Plat Amtrac Plat Tank Plat AT Plat Truck Plat 60 MM Mortar Sections Tactical Air Observer Engr. Plat Det Beachmaster Unit Primary Control Ship CMDR Boat Group (NO) Det UDT (No) CMDR UDT (NO) Wave CMDR LCU (NO) Shore Party SACC Helo Direction Control TADC Arty Ln Officer Helo Safety Boat (NO) Helo Supt Team LSU NGF Spot Team 1/4 Forward 1/4 Rear

IBtry 3rdsn 11thMar TU 76.5.3 TU 76.5.4 TACC

3rdBn 7thMar (Collective)

VOICE CALL

NATIVE BIRD THIRD ROUND GREEN GLADE GEORGIA MOSS GOOD BRANDY BROKEN NEEDLE WELCOME TOUR HILLDALE PLAYBOY SKY SHADOW (BEACH COLOR) BEET (BEACH COLOR) CATSKILL CLAPPER (NO) ROSEMARY (NO) STEAKFRY (NO) (NO) BEACH COLOR MESH (NO) SPEEDY ADMIRAL COMPANY STORE FAIRMONT JOY RIDE NEW ROAD TWO FOUR SAPPHIRE (NO) EMBANKMENT (LZ NAME) SPARTAN LUCK GOLD LEMON TWO SIX CHARLIE GOLD LEMON XRAY GOLD LEMON REAR COMBUSTION

AVERAGE INDIA SNAKE KING ATTAIN ICEPACK

3. DECODE

VOICE CALL

ABBEY TANGO

ATTAIN AVERAGE INDIA BALL ROOM (BEACH COLOR) BEET (BEACH COLOR) CATSKILL BLOCK BUSTER BROKEN NEEDLE CAMSHAFT QUEBEC COCKTAIL GOLF COMBUSTION CLAPPER (NO) COMPANY STORE COMPANY STORE CREPE MYRTLE CROSS WALK DEAD HEAT ELBOW HOTEL EMBANKMENT (LZ NAME) FAIRMONT FRIENDLY CAT FROSTY GOLD GEORGIA MOSS GOLD LEMON GOLD LEMON ALPHA GOLD LEMON BRAVO GOLD LEMON CHARLIE GOLD LEMON DELTA GOLD LEMON NOVEMBER GOLD LEMON BAILEY GOLD LEMON TWO SIX CHARLIE GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR (CO SUFFIX) GOLD LEMON ONE FOUR (CO SUFFIX) GOLD LEMON FOXTROT GOLD LEMON PRODUCT GOLD LEMON REAR

GOLD LEMON TANGO

GOLD LEMON YANKEE GOLD LEMON WHISKEY

GOLD LEMON YPAY

GOOD BRAN

GREEN GLADE

GOLD LEMON TWO SIX OSCAR

UNIT

USS ST. FRANCIS RIVER (LSMR-525) TU 76.5.4 I Btry 3rdBn 11thMar USS TURNER JOY (DD-951) Det Beachmaster Unit Primary Control Ship USS CANBERRA (CAG-2) Truck Plat USS MERRICK USS THOMASTON (LSD-28) 3rdBn 7thMar (Collective) CMDR Boat Group (NO) CTG 76.5 SACC 3rdBn 7thMar USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) BLT 1/4 Collective USS DIACHENKO (APD-123) Helo Supt Team Helo Direction Control TG 79.5 HMM 363 Tank Plat BLT 1/4 Company "A" Company "B" Company "C" Company "D" Composite Company BLT FSCC NGF Spot Team Air Ln Officer FAC TM # 1 FAC TM # 2 Flame Plat BLT TACLOG 1/4 Rear 106 RR Plat NGF Ln Officer H&S Company 81 MM Mortar Plat 1/4 Forward AT Plat

J-3-3

Amtrac Plat

DECODE

ICEPACK

VOICE CALL

GRUDGE GUN SMITH HILL DALE HILL DALE PLAYBOY JOY RIDE MESH (NO) NATIVE BIRD **NEW ROAD** NEW ROAD TWO FOUR, (NO) BEACH COLOR ROSEMARY (NO) SAPPHIRE (NO) JILT FOXTROT SNAKE KING SKY SHADOW SNOW CHIEF SPARTAN LUCK SPEEDY ADMIRAL STEAKFRY (NO) THIRD ROUND WELCOME TOUR (CO SUFFIX)

UNIT

TG 76.5 USS MANLEY (DD-940) CTG 79.5 Tactical Air Observer TADC LCU (NO) 107 Btry 105 Howitzer Btry Arty Ln Officer Wave CMDR Det UDT Helo Safety Boat (NO) USS WHITE RIVER (LSMR-525) TU 76.5.3 Engr Plat USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) LSU Shore Party Plat CMDR UDT (NO) Recon Plat 60 MM Mortar Sections TACC

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

COPY OF COPIES
BLT 1/4
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967


•

Appendix 4 (Integrated Wire-Radio Plan) To Annex J (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref (a) CTG 79.5 OPPLAN 120A-67

Time Zone: H

1. Radio Relay plan ship to shore:



56.3


2. Channelization:

Channel number	Ashore		Afloat
1 2 3	COMMON USER FSCC BLT (S-3) BLT (S-4)	to to to	SLF (S-1) SACC SLF (S-3) TACLOG
4	J_4-1	CO	INOLOG

T-B

63.9

3. Radio Relay Plan BLT 1/4 to 3rdBn 7thMar:



Terminal	Frequencies			
·	Trans.	Rec		
T-A	68.8	58.4		
т-в	58.4	68.8		

a. Channelization:

Channel number	1/4		<u>3/7</u>
1	COMMON USER	to	COMMON USER
2	FSCC	to	FSCC.
3	S-3	to	S-3
4	COMMON USER	to	COMMON USER

4. Pelarization: Vertical

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenast Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

J-4-2

COPY OF COPIES
BLT 1/4
USS TWO JIMA (LPH-2)
121200H February 1967

Appendix 5 (Visual Communications) to Annex J (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-67

Time Zone: H

1 - W &

1. GENERAL

a. Visual signals are a supplementary means of communications and are transmitted by panels, flashing lights, signal flags and pyrotechnics.

b. Unit tactical CW call signs will be used as applicable on all visual circuits.

2. MISCELLANEOUS VISUAL SIGNALS

a. Flag displayed from tank turret:

Signal	Meaning
"RED"	Tank is in distress, require infantry assistance.
"ORANGE"	Tank is low on fuel or ammunition, pulling back to replenish.
"GREEN"	Request contact on telephone at rear of tank.

b. Aircraft Maneuver Signals:

Aircraft Maneuver	Meaning
360 Degree left turn	Display CP identification.
360 Degree right turn	Mission complete.
*Alternate dips and climbs	Display front line markings.
Rock wings	Message or display understood.
Sharp S-turn	Will support, you mark target.
Circle right-rocking wing	Am trying to contact you by radio.

J-5-1

*It is impractical for jet aircraft to execute these maneuver signals.

3. SIMPLIFIED PYROTECHNICS AND SMOKE SIGNALS

- a. The basic reason for a standardized pyrotechnic and smoke signal code is for personal emergencies and to provide an elementary alternate means of communications. Smoke signals are necessary also to guide fighter planes to enemy position, friendly airplanes and helicopters to friendly positions, and to mark points of reference.
- b. Illumination and smoke signals once used are immediately declassified since the enemy may also see them. When the source of origin cannot definitely be identified, all illumination and smoke signals should be verified by radio or panel markers.
- c. After firing signal for radio breakdown, other signals may be fired as appropriate. Illumination and smoke signal requests for bombardment must repeat must be confirmed by radio, panel markers, or higher headquarters.
- d. Special circumstances may warrant departure from a prescribed signal meaning. Such departure should be kent to a minimum and is feasible provided parties concerned have radio communications or otherwise understand the special meanings. The code is confined to fundamental meanings and is based upon color. The code does not distinguish between a cluster and a parachute pyrotechnic light signal flare.
- e. Except for pyrotechnic signals 7and 8, combinations of different color pyrotechnic or smoke signals are not included. Designation of other combinations is left to the discretion of subordinate commands. As stated in para 3d, all parties concerned must know special signal meanings. Allewing subordinate commands to designate color combination meanings give flexibility to the code and will give security to combination signals which may have to be changed often (e.g. code words).

f. Pyrotechnic Light Signals:

<u>Signal</u>

Meaning

1. One Red Flare

to Request for emergency evacuation for group or troops (Radio Confirmation Required)

er

J-5-2

Request for medical evacuation

or

Aircraft, boat or survivors in distress

- 2. Two or more Red Flares
- 3. One White Flare
- 4. Two or more White Flares
- 5. One Green Flare
- 6. Two or more Green Flares
- 7. One White and One Green Flare
- 8. One White and One Red Flare
- g. Smoke Signals:

Signal

- 9. White Smoke
- 10. Red Smoke
- 11. Violet Smoke or Green Smoke
- 12. Yellow Smoke

- 2. Area not secure of not safe to land
- 3. Cease/Stop illumination or shelling
- 4. Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency
- 5. Area secure or safe to land
- 6. Radio Breakdown
- 7. Request for ammunition
- 8. Request for bombardment or illumination or relieving (Radio or Panel confirmation required)

Meaning

- 9. Marking of enemy positions
- 10. Area not secure or not safe to land
- 11. Area secure or safe to land or safe to drop supplies
- 12. Marking of friendly positions

4. PANEL SIGNALS

a. General.

(1) Use of Panel Sets, AP-30C (Black) and AP-30D (White) as a "means of communication" with aircraft will be in accordance with ACP-136A.

b. Vehicle Identification.

- (1) Use VS-4/U (Red) Panels on edd dates.
- (2) Use VS-6/U (Yellow) Panels on even dates.

c. Helicopter Landing Point Identification.

- (1) All landing points will be marked with an equilateral triangle formed by using three panels from either panel Set AP-30C or AP-30D. The color selection will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft.
- (2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.
- (3) The type of unit will be identified by one or mere panels in the center of the triangle as fellows:

Type of Unit

Identification

Infantry/Recon
Artillery/Tanks
Aviation
Service and Support

One Yellow Panel (VS-6/U)
One Red Panel (VS-4/U)
Two Yellow Panels (VS-6/U)
Two Red Panels (VS-4/U)

(4) The size of unit will be identified by one or more panels (AP-30C or AP-30D) placed directly above and centered on top of the triangle as follows:

Size of Unit

Identification

Company/Battery
Battalion/Squadron
Regt/MAG/MAU
Brigade/MAG
Division/Wing
MAF/MAC

Roman Numeral One Roman Numeral Two Roman Numeral Three Letter "X" Letter "XX" Letter "XXX"

J-5-4

- (5) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of the triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.
- d. Front line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of panels VS-6/U (Yellew) placed parallel to front lines.

JACK WESTERMAN

Lieut mant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Plan 2-67

Copy____of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex K (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT OpOrder 201-(YR), Annex R

(b) COM USMACV Directive number 525-3 of 7 September 1965

(c) COMUSMACV Directive number 525-9 of 2 February 1966

(d) COMUSMACV Letter (MACJ 322), 7 November 1965, SerNo 01448 with changes contained in COMUSMACV Letter (MACJ 321) 8

January 1966, Ser No 045

(e) COMUSMACV Directive Number 95-4 28 June 1966

(f) COMUSMACV message 261030Z Dec 1965

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of an individual Marine to defend himself against attack. In the event of attack, the individual concerned may take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force by any means available.
- b. In order to avoid embittering the friendly indigenous populaation against U.S. Forces in-country, unit commanders must avoid the use of unnecessary force leading to noncombatant battle casualties.
- c. Maximum use will be made of friendly indigenous personnel (liaison) during the conduct of operations in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact and identification of civilians.

2. MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES

Commanders will hold troop indoctrination briefings prior to conducting operation to emphasize the importance of minimizing noncombatant
casualties, and will conduct operations utilizing reference (a) for
operations in hWN and as guidance in other non-hostile countries.
In addition the following guidelines are applicable:

- a. In cases where defensive fire is undertaken, care will be exercised to ensure that friendly or innocent personnel are not endangered.
- b. In situations where light small arms fire is received from a populated area, every effort will be made to identify the exact





target before engagement.

- c. The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants.
- d. TACPs, SFCPs and pilots of armed helicopters will be briefed on areas to be avoided due to the presence of a friendly or potentially friendly population. Such information will be determined from local officials at province and district level by CTF 79.5.
- 3. SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE AND NONHOSTILE INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL, PHOPERTIES AND FOOD SUPPLIES

Reference (c) promulgates the following guidelines concerning property and food supplies.

- a. Marines engaged in search and destroy operations will take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of Vietnamese and non-hostile indigenous personnel property. The destruction of dwellings and livestock by U.S. Forces as a denial measure is prohibited. Such actions must be performed by hVNAF units and in operations in other non-nostile countries by forces designated in the initiating directive.
- b. Requests by indigenous authorities for employment of U.S Forces to destroy indigenous property, including livestock, will be referred to the CLF.
- c. Large food caches discovered or captured in VIETNAM or nonhostile nations will be reported to the CLF for extraction and redistribution by local officials.

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- a. Unit commanders will instruct troops to fire only under the following circumstances;
 - (1) When they observe and identify a person or persons as enemy.
 - (2) When fire is being delivered on friendly troops.
 - (3) When personnel are obviously attempting, by hasty or suspicious acts, to avoid contact with friendly troops.







- (4) When requested to fire by friendly armed forces commanders, after approval from appropriate headquarters.
- b. Reference (d) authorizes artillery and naval gunfire missions to be conducted in accordance with the following:
 - (1) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in accordance with normal fire direction procedures.
 - (2) Unobserved artillery fire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U.S. TAC (A), TAO or SFCP is available and then only at targets declared hostile by GVN or VN liaison personnel.
 - (3) Unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U.S. TAC (A), TAO or SFCP is available and then only at targets declared hostile by GWN or WN liaison personnel. Use of naval gunfire in this manner will be employed only when absolutely required and will not be considered as normal procedure.
 - (4) Missions against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by noncombatants will be conducted as follows:
 - (a) All fire missions on hamlets or villages will be controlled by TAO or ground forward observer (FO) and will be executed only after local government armed forces officials approval, as appropriate. Approval will be requested by CTG 79.5.
 - (b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked by gunfire without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
 - (c) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.





- c. Reference (e) authorizes close air support missions to be conducted in accordance with the following:
 - (1) All targets selected for an air strike will be approved by the Province Chief directly or through higher ARVN authority.
 - (2) All pilots will endeavor to minimize noncombatant casualties and civilian property damage. A strike will not be executed where identification of friendly forces is in doubt.
 - (3) All pilots will have knowledge of the disposition of friendly forces and/or civilians prior to conducting a strike. This information may come from ground or air briefing.
 - (4) For purposes of this directive, references to the Forward Air Controller (FAC) also encompass and apply to the Marine Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne TAC (A).
 - (5) USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:
 - (a) USMC/USAF/ALO/FAC or TAC(A).
 - (b) WMAF FAC/FAO.

- (c) USAF MSQ-77 (SKY SPOT) or USMC TPQ 10.
- (6) In an emergency, when no qualified means of control is available, the following personnel may designate the target for strike aircraft:
 - (a) The commander of a ground unit or US Advisor engaged with the energy.
 - (b) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground unit, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

*Under VFR conditions, when USAF, USAC, or VNAF FAC is not available, a qualified Army Target Identifying Pilot (TIP) may designate the target to be struck and the flight leader of the strike aircraft



- (c) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter or transport crew.
- (7) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must always be controlled by a FAC. If the attack on a village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US-GWN-RWNAF approval is required, except in emergencies. If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker system prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

(8) ALO/FAC will:

- (a) Have thorough knowledge of the ground scheme of maneuver.
- (b) Make every effort to secure a WNAF observer to assist in directing an air strike. If a WNAF observer is not available, an ALO/FAC is authorized to direct the air strike.
- (c) Maintain reliable communications with ground unit and strike aircraft.
- (d) Make positive identification and mark the target.
- (e) Insure that strike pilots are aware of friendly locations in relation to target, characteristics of target area, and local weather conditions.
- (f) Use 1:50,000 scale maps of target area, and photographs when available.

(9) Strike Pilots will:

(a) Always be under the control and have direct radio contact for a strike with a Forward Air Controller or designated control agency (airborne or ground).

- (b) Have visual contact with target or target marked except as noted in paragraph (f), below.
- (c) Always ascertain the position of friendly troops (or civilians, when applicable).
- (d) Ascertain local conditions regarding weather, target area, and surrounding terrain characteristics.
- (e) Defend themselves against ground fire providing:
 - (1) Source of fire can be visually identified.
 - (2) The strike can be positively oriented against the source.
 - (3) The fire is of such intensity that counter-action is necessary.
- (f) Strike at night only with flares, unless under control of TPQ-10 or MSQ-77.
- (10) Aircraft will not cross the demilitarized zone of Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUS-MACV when operating in RVN.
- (11) All FACs operating in the vicinity of the RVN/Cambodian border will have a 1:50,000 map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photos will be made available to the pilots.
- (12) Joint operations-intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and post-strike debriefings will be conducted for strikes within 5000 meters of the RVN/Cambodian border, when practical.
- (13) Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to the above:
 - (a) Strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under postiive control of a Forward Air Controller or MSQ-77/TPQ10. The authority to waive this requirement is restricted to COMUSMACV or his designated representative.
 - (b) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border will have posted in operations a 1:250,000 or larger

scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked, on the HVN side, to the depth of 5km.

- (c) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary in the outpost area, but will neither cross nor fire across the border.
- (d) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft on missions within 5km of the border within equipment capability.
- (14) Munitions will be jettisoned only in designated jettison areas.
- (15) During night or IFR conditions, aircraft will be under positive radar control while jettisoning.
- (16) During day VFR, drops will be monitored by radar whenever possible.
- (17) US Army and US Marines armed helicopters will be marked "US Army" or "US Marine," as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commander direction.
- (18) If the target involves noncombatants, such as in a hamlet or village, whenever possible an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US-GVN-RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly resents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.
- (19) Operational restrictions placed upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RWN/Cambodian border, for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RWN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate the immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived on a case-by-case basis.
- (20) Reconnaissance requests for coverage in areas which present a danger of an overflight or border violation will be forwarded through normal reconnaissance request channels to the TASE. Upon determination that a waiver is justified, the request will be executed. In the event of particularly sensitive complications, COMUSMACV will be the final determining authority.

- (21) US Army OV-1 aircraft may be armed with target marking ordnance while on surveillance missions.
- (22) Commander, 7th Air Force, prescribes Rules of Engagement and Restrictions for air to air combat in RVN. These are published by that headquarters in Tactical Air Control center (TACC) Operating instructions (OI) No 55-33, March 1966.
- 5. CONDUCT OF LANDING FORCE PERSONNEL
 - a. In order to win and maintain the support of the Vietnamese or non-hostile nations people in assisting U.S. Forces in the struggle against the enemy forces, all troops will be indoctrinated in the following rules of conduct while ashore:
 - (1) They are guest of the Vietnamese and non-hostile nation and should act as such.
 - (2) They should join with the people and try to help them in any way possible.
 - (3) They should be particularly polite to women and children.
 - (4) They should make friends with their local nations counterparts.
 - (5) They should be alert at all times.
 - (6) They should give the indigenous personnel the right of way whenever they are driving a vehicle.
 - (7) They should not be loud and boisterous.
 - (8) They should not "show off" money when in the company of indigenous personnel.
 - (9) They should reflect honor on themselves and their country at all times.
- 6. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ACTION IN THE VICINITY OF THE VIETNAM DEMILI-TARIZED ZONE ARE CONTAINED IN APPENDIX

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutement Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2/67

Annex L (Reports) to Operation Order 2-67

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67

Time Zone: H

1. General. This Annex contains instructions for the submission of operational reports required by Ref. (A)

2. Reports Required.

Re	ports	From	<u>To</u>	Time	Remarks/Reference
a.	Intsums	S-2	79.5	Commencing at H plus 4 hrs covering the previous 4 hrs and every 6 hrs thereafter.	See Annex B
b.	Situation Reports	All Units S-3	S-3 79.5	-do-	See Appendix 2
C.	Casualty Reports	All Units S-1	S-1 79•5	As occurring	See Appendix 1
d.	Surveillance/Recon- naissance Team Reports	Recon Plat S-2	S-2 79•5	As occurring	
e.	Spot Reports	All Uhits S-3	s-3 79•5	As occurring	Submit by most expeditious means. See Appendix 3
ř.	Report of Supplies Expended	S-4	79.5	5 days after completion of operation.	

g.	Major Ordnance Engineer/Equipment Lost/Damage Report	All Uhits S-4	S-4 79.5	As occurring	See Appendix 4
h.	Jamming	All Units CommO	CommO 79•5	As occurring	
i.	Civic Action	S - 3	79.5	Daily	
j.	Muster Report	All Units S-1	S-1 79•5	Upon Reembarkation after operation ashore	Message Report
k.	After Action Report	S-3	79.5	5 days after completion of operation	

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutemant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIXES:

- 1. Casualty Report
- 2. Situation Report
- 3. Spot Report
- 4. Major Ordnance / Engineer Equipment Loss / Damage Report

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 1 (Casualty Report) to Annex L (Reports) to Operation Order 2-67

Time Zone: H

Casualty Reports:

A. Reporting Unit

B. Date/time casualty sustained

C. Initial of last name and last three digits of serial number

D. Type of wound

- E. Serious or non-serious
- F. Medivac or non-medivac

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 2 (Situation Report) to Annex L (Reports) to Operation Order 2-67 Time Zone:

- 1. REPORT TITLE: Situation Report
- 2. FORMAT: Message
 - a. CP Locations: (Coordinates of CP's. Include plat CP's if detached from vic of Company CP. Use grid reference code)
 - b. Summary of Activities for period: (Brief description of activities not already included in SPOT REPORTS.)
 - c. Contacts: (Any significant contacts not already included in SPOT REPORTS.)
 - d. Significant Events: (Any unusual event which occured during period.)
 - e. Future Plans: (Plans for any future operations.)
 - f. Casualties:

 (1) Friendly KIA
 WIA (List in this order using casualty CODE WORDS)
 MIA

 (2) Enemy KIA (Conf)
 KIA (Prob)
 WIA
 VCS

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Jakelieurman

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

VCC

L-2-1

Copy___of__Copies

				/4 WO JIMA (1 OH Feb 19	
endix 3 (Spot Report) to Annex	L (Reports	s) to Oper	ation Orde	r 2-67	
	SPOT RE	PORT #	_		
TALF	OLLOW ON	#		FINAL	#_
(UNIT/IND/SOURCE OR REP):	36				
(DTG/INCIDENT):					
(LOCATION BY COORD): FR:		EN :			
(RESUME OF INCIDENT WHEN/WHO/					
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	J			·····	
(RESULTS OF ACTION TAKEN OR A	CTION BEING	G TAKEN):_			
					
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·
(FR/KIA) G. (FR/WIA)	H. (FR.	MIA) I.	(VC/KIA)		
(VC/KIA PROB) K. (VCC)					
(WPNS CAPT/DESCRIPTION):					
(WIND ONLY DIROCCI 1200).		. <u></u>		•	
(EQUIP/DESCRIPTION):					

DISTRIBUTION: Annex O (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

DECLASSIFIED

Copy___of___Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Appendix 4 (Major Ordnance / Engineer Equipment Loss / Damage report) to Annex L (Reports) to Operation Order 2-67.

Time Zone:

- 1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report.
- 2. Format: Message
 - a. Item description.
 - b. Coordinates where lost/damage.
 - c. DTG of occurrance.
 - d. Extent of damage.
 - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
 - f. Replacement required (yes or no).
- 3. Frequency: As occurring.
- 4. Submitted by: All units.
- 5. Submitted to: S-4

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ochwieluman

DISTRIBUTION: Armex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Copy of Copies BLT 1/4 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) 121200H Feb 1967

Annex 0 (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-67

Time Zone: H

Command	Copies
CMC	1
CMC LFDC	1
CG FMFPAC	2
CG LFTC	2
COMSEVEN THELT	1
OOMPHI BPAC	1
COMNAVPHIL	1
COMNAVBASE SUBIC	1
CTF-79	2
CTG-76.5	3
CO, USS INO JIMA (LPH-2)	6
00, USS VAN COUVER (LPD-2)	2
00, USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	2
CTG-79.5	6
00,HMM 363	5
4th MARINES	1
BLT 1/4	45

JACK WESTERMAN
Lieut want Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding.

Distribution: Annex O (Disturbution) to Operation Order 2-67

See: 1/4 Command Chronology, Jan 1967

FOR

BIT 1/4 Operation Order 1-67 and BLT 1/4 Administrative Order 1-67 FOR Exercise MUDPUFPY III