

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 4th Marines
3rd Marine Division, (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

ROUTINE
GIVE PRIORITY
TO
ED

3/JAA/jvn
5750
8 December 1967
SAC, 003B 34667

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 November to 30 November 1967.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMF P.MOC 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2A

Encl: ✓(1) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines Command Chronology.

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter of transmittal is declassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

E. A. Deptula

E. A. DEPTULA

Copy to: 4th Marines

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BY [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 4th Marines
3rd Marine Division, (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

COMING CHRONOLOGY

1 November to 30 November 1967

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DOWNGRADED AT THREE YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER TWELVE YEARS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATION DATA

1. MISSION

LEADER

1. Mission, 3d Marines

LtCol E. A. DEPTUO

4-30 November

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company	Capt. R. G. MUNNIN	1-30 November
Company A	Capt. A. K. THOMPSON	1-30 November
Company B	Capt. R. F. WIRSCHING	1-30 November
Company C	Capt. J. L. EDWARDS	1-9 November
Company D	Capt. O. B. RIEFRO	10-30 November
	Maj. C. B. SPERRY	1-9 November
	Capt. R. D. WEDE	10-30 November

ATTACHED UNITS

1st Team, Co A, 3d SF Bn (AST)	1-4 November
	9-10 November
	18-21 November
Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Team)	9-10 November
Det, 3d Recon Bn (Scuba Team)	9-10 November
Det, HQ Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Team)	18-21 November

2. LOCATION. (See TAB A, TAB B, TAB C, TAB I, TAB J, TAB L, TAB M, TAB H)

Battalion CP	1-4 November	THU THIN, RVN
	4-17 November	Camp EVANS, RVN
	17-18 November	THU B/I, RVN
	18-21 November	THU THIN, RVN
	21-23 November	THU B/I, RVN
	24-25 November	Camp EVANS, RVN
	26-30 November	DOONG L., RVN
Bravo Command Group	21-25 November	THU THIN, RVN
Battalion Rear (Supply)	1-30 November	THU B/I, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS.

Executive Officer	Major J. I. KOPKINS	1-30 November
S-1	1stLt B. D. GRIFFIN	1-30 November
S-2	1stLt P. J. WOJCIECHOWSKI	1-19 November
S-3	SSgt J. T. KRUTAL	20-30 November
S-4	Major H. L. NELSON	1-30 November
S-5	Major L. A. BROWN	1-30 November
Supply Officer	1stLt J. A. MENDOLINI	1-30 November
IT Officer	1stLt R. L. FISHER, JR.	1-30 November
	2ndLt C. W. SHOBE	1-30 November

ENCLOSURE (1)

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1. **OFFICERS**
Cdr. Officer Capt. C. J. FAGERSEN 1-30 November
Battalion Chaplin Lt. A. S. MARK USNR 1-30 November
LtCdr. J. W. HUTCHIN USNR 2-30 November
Lt. Chaplin Langdon Lt. J. H. DAWKS USNR 1-30 November

2. **THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH**

3. **OFFICERS** **USNA** **USNR**
39 1073 2 60

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

In the first four days of the reporting period the entire Battalion was still engaged in Operation GRANITE (See TAB A&B). Operation GRANITE, Phase II consisted of a two company blocking force during the period 4-6 November (See TAB C).

Upon completion of Operation GRANITE, the Battalion at Camp EVANS was assigned on OA within the 4th Marines T&R. (See TAB N). Squad, platoon, and company size operations were conducted within the assigned OA and other areas as directed by the 4th Marines.

Operations of note included a Battalion size search of the SONG BO River area and its tributaries (See TAB E), a two company search and destroy operation to exlcit a sighting of 250-300 NVA (See TAB F), a one company ambush patrol in OA to prevent VC/NVA from interdicting National Route One (See TAB G), a company size blocking force for a PF/RF sweep (See TAB H), a Battalion size search and destroy operation in the PHU LOC area (See TAB I), and a two company blocking force in the NY CH/NH Area for an ARVN sweep (See TAB K).

From 280800H November 1967 thru the end of the month the entire Battalion participated in Operation NEWTON /KENTUCKY V (See TAB L).

At 131600H November 1967 Company "O" chopped OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines and chopped OPCON back to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on 211500H November 1967. Companies "B" and "D" and the Bravo Command Group chopped OPCON to the 3d Marine Division at 211800H November 1967. At 054230H November 1967 the 1st Battalion (-), 4th Marines chopped OPCON from the 4th Marines to the 9th Marines. Companies B and D and the Bravo Command Group chopped OPCON from the 3d Marine Division to the 9th Marines at 271200H November 1967.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Combat Missions Assigned.

(a) Operation GRANITE (1-6 November) (Ref: 4th Mar Operation Order 50-67, Operation GRANITE).

(1) On D-1, under cover of darkness, move by foot from Camp EVANS along ROUTE OF ADVANCE ALF. to an assembly area in the vicinity of YD 520250.

(2) At L-hour, D-day advance south along XIS OF ADVANCE to conduct search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE A (Vicinity of YD 510210).

(3) On D-day provide a minimum of one company (-) with a tank platoon and one section of Gatos as security for a forward artillery position (Vicinity YD 501289).

(4) On order, continue search and destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE C (Vicinity YD 526230) (Ref: 4th Mar Operation Order 50-67).

(5) On D+ 10 establish blocking position NVJL (YD 4641) and FORGE (YD 4639) in conjunction with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Operation LIN SON 140 Phase II in the "Street Without Joy" Area.

(b) Operation NEOSHO (7-25 November 1967) (Ref: 4th Mar Operation Order 57-67, Operation NEOSHO).

(1) Conduct aggressive small unit activities and search and destroy activities in assigned OA (Ref: 4th Mar Msg 310637Z Oct67).

(2) Land by helicopter at L-hour in LZ CRANE and PELICAN. Conduct systematic search of the SONG BO River Area and its tributaries in assigned OA for caves, saipans, supply caches and enemy forces. Provide security for a forward artillery base in the vicinity of YD 636250. (Ref: 4th Mar Msg 071340Z 2Nov67).

(3) Conduct aggressive small unit activities and search and destroy operations in assigned OA to exploit sighting of 250-300 NVL in the vicinity of YD 5524. (Ref: 4th Mar Msg 101145Z Nov67).

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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(4) Conduct ambush patrols in assigned OA and prevent VC/NVA from interdicting National Route 010.

(5) Provide one company blocking force for a PF/RF sweep in the vicinity of YD 4635.

(6) On 23 November 1967 move two companies to NY 11-3 area and assume blocking positions as requested by 1st ARVN Division.

(c) Operation COVET (16-21 November 1967)

(1) The 1st Battalion (-), 4th Marines commencing L-hour, D-day will conduct search and destroy operations in assigned operating area in the vicinity of PHU LOO to capture/destroy enemy logistic caches, installations, materials, obtain intelligence and kill or capture enemy personnel.

(d) Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V (29-30 November 1967)

(1) Commencing 29 November 1967 attack in assigned zone of action to seize objectives 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 and prepare to support subsequent operations in support of the 1-3/Route 666 Counter Action Project.

2. OPERATIONS.

01 November 1967 At 0920H, at YD 508224, a helicopter lost power while hovering over the LZ and was forced down. Chain saws were brought into the area to clear a zone to recover the helicopter. Company "D" provided security.

At 1730H, Companies "A", "B" and "C" and the command group arrived objective #5. No contact.

02 November 1967 At 0930H one squad, 3d Platoon, Company "D" at YD 507225 made contact with 8-10 VC. Squad fired at enemy, estimated 6-8 enemy wounded. Checked area with negative results.

Company "B" at coordinates YD 518228 received one burst of A/V fire. Returned fire resulting in one NVA KIA (C) (unable to retrieve weapon).

04 November 1967 At 0720H, Companies "A", "B" and "C" executed a sweep of the CO HI THINH TIN Valley.

At 0945H, Company "D" and Command Group arrived at Camp EVANS.

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At 1730, all 1/4 units arrived at Camp EVANS.

05 November 1967 At 1000H, 3/4 sections of 81mm mortars returned to Camp EVANS from Hill 674.

At 1110H, Companies "C" and "D" set in blocking positions ANVIL and FORGE IAW 4th Mar Div Order 50-67.

06 November 1967 At 1700H, Operation GRANITE terminated.

08 November 1967 At 1330H, Company "C" departed Camp EVANS to provide security for the forward artillery base.

09 November 1967 At 0815H, Companies "A" and "B" landed by helicopter in LZ CRANE and PHILIP.

Company "A" found and destroyed 16 sampans throughout the day's activities.

10 November 1967 Conducted Marine Corps Birthday ceremonies in new mess-hall with Major B. A. HOCHMUTH presiding.

11 November 1967 Company "C" received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Returned 35 rounds of 60mm and 6 rounds of 81mm with negative results. Fire came from YD 656624.

12 November 1967 Companies "B" and "D" conducted S/D mission throughout the day. Found various types of VC gear, small rice caches, 12 bunkers reinforced with concrete (YD 556252), some small arms ammunition and an assortment of cooking utensils.

13 November 1967 At 1600H, Company "C" dropped OPCON to 2nd Bn, 26th Mar.

14 November 1967 Due to weather and the swelling of the rivers, Company "B" was unable to return by foot. Helo extraction was completed in 2½ hours.

Received CG 3d Mar Div MSG 141125Z November 1967 informing 1st Bn, 4th Marines of Major General HOCHMUTH's death and that BGon Lietzger had assumed duties as CG 3d Mar Div.

15 November 1967 Company "A" departed Camp EVANS to establish blocking positions in the vicinity of YD 475358 and YD 468347.

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16 November 1967

Company "A" terminated operation, Frag Order 21-67, and returned to Corp EWNS at 1543H.

18 November 1967

At 0845H, the helicopter lift commenced to start Operation COVE. The lift was completed at 1048H with Negative contact.

At 1255H, Company "A" reached Battalion Objective 1 with negative contact.

At 1530H, Company "B" reached Battalion Objective 2 with negative contact.

19 November 1967

Throughout the day Company "A" found and destroyed a total of 13 bunkers and received sporadic sniper fire.

At 1430H, Company "B" reached regimental objective A.

At 1745H, Company "A" secured regimental objective A.

At 1652H, Company "B" returned to battalion objective 2.

20 November 1967

At 1042H, Company "D" reached regimental objective A.

At 1045H, Company "D", at coordinates Z0 118972 received approximately 25 rounds of S/I and 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an undetermined number of VC at coordinates Z0 118966. Returned fire with S/I and an artillery mission, then checked the area with negative results. The attack resulted in 11 friendly WIA.

At 1500H, Company "B" reached regimental objective A.

21 November 1967

John Brown 6 visited Southern 6 to deliver 3d Mar Div Msg 201615Z November 1967, cancelling Phase II of Operation COVE.

At 1500H, Company "C" chopped OPCON from 2/26 to 1/4.

At 1800H, Operation COVE terminated and Companies "B" and "D" and the Bravo Command Group chopped OPCON to the 3d Mar Div.

At 1830H, Company "A" and the Alfa Command Group arrived at PHU B.I.

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23 November 1967

At 0830 Companies "A" and "C" and the Alfa Command Group departed PHU B.I. for Camp EVANS to establish blocking positions in the NY CH.NH Area.

25 November 1967

Companies "A" and "C" and the Alfa Command Group moved from NY CH.NH to DONG H.I. At 1235H the 1st Bn, (-), 4th Marines dropped LOD to the 9th Mar.

26 November 1967

Companies "B" and "D" and the Bravo Command Group moved from the PHU LOD Area to PHU B.I.

27 November 1967

Companies "B" and "D" and the Bravo Command Group moved from PHU B.I. to DONG H.I. and dropped OPCON to the 9th Mar at 1200H.

28 November 1967

The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines moved from DONG H.I. to the assigned attack position in the vicinity of coordinates YD 132685 for Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V.

29 November 1967

At 0817H lead elements of Company "C" and "D" crossed the LOD. There was no contact throughout the day. Objectives 2, 4, and 6 were secured.

30 November 1967

Secured objectives 8 and 10, no enemy contact throughout the day. However, our units did find an assortment of enemy equipment and ordnance.

Usually one or two sniper teams accompanied all company size operations. These teams, equally divided between "bolt" and "starlight" teams, were employed as the Company commanders directed.

A search dog team was assigned to "A", "C" and "D" Companies during Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V.

3. TRAINING.

Training during the reporting period consisted of classes in map reading, compass, counter ambush, immediate action drills, mines and booby traps, scouting and patrolling, personal response, weapons safety, and particular emphasis was placed on the care and cleaning of the M-16 rifle. All Marines and Corpsmen received a thorough indoctrination in the Rules of Engagement.

The Camp EVANS and PHU B.I. firing ranges were utilized to the maximum to train Marines with the M-16, M-79 and M-60. Corpsmen were given instructions on the .45 caliber pistol and were provided an opportunity to FAM fire at the Camp EVANS range.

The program, which was initiated last month to ensure that all new replacements into the battalion received a thorough briefing by all staff sections, the Battalion Sergeant Major and the Battalion Commander, has shown positive results. Efforts are being continued to improve this indoctrination program. All replacements received thorough instruction on the M-16 rifle and were able to zero their weapons on a 15 meter range.

Due to the tactical commitments of the battalion, difficulty was again experienced in providing time for training. Efforts will be continued to improve training procedures and methodology during the coming months; however, the majority of the training will still be conducted at the squad and fire team level.

4. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy.

YTD/VC (Conf)	=	1
YTD/VC (Prob)	=	0

5. Friendly Casualties Sustained.

KIA	2
WIA	23
Non-Hostile Deaths	0
Died Of Wounds	2
Non-Battle Cas.	49

6. New Techniques Applied.

Two dog teams were placed with units conducting night ambushes. The dogs were muzzled to prevent barking, but still "alerted" prior to the time the ambush could sight the enemy. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that dogs placed in ambush are not utilized on night ambushes.

7. Equipment. The following is a report of major items of equipment readiness:

a. Major Equipment

- (1) M-422.
 - (a) 1 Radio
 - (b) 1 Radio Telephone
- (2) M-37 (2) 1 Radio Telephone

b. Communications. Major end items evacuated to higher echelon that have not been returned.

2 Radar Sets	AN/TPS-21
9 Radio Sets	AN/PRC-25
1 Remote Set	AN/GRA-39
1 Radio Set	AN/PRC-6
1 Generator	PL-197

INCLOSURE (1)

The below list of requisitions for major items of equipment is
100% 16.

5 Radio Sets	AN/PRC-25	22 June 67
1 Radio Set	AN/PRC-25	3 July 67
1 Control Group	AN/GR4-39	4 Jan 67
1 Battery Charger	PP-3240	20 Apr 67
1 Antennae	RC-292	29 Apr 67
2 Receiver/Transmitter Units	AN/PRC-25	28 May 67

8. Logistics. From 1-6 November, the battalion rear was located at Camp EWNS, while the remainder was on Operation GRINITE. Resupply was provided by the LSA, Camp EWNS, and support was handled by Company "A", 3d Shore Party Battalion. The LSA supported the battalion with Class II, III, IV and V, with the battalion supply located at PHU BAI, provided Class II. Helicopters were utilized and provided a total of 16 lifts for 18,950 pounds.

From the period 7-17 November, the battalion ran company size operations and was resupplied entirely by truck convoy.

Operation COVE, which took place from 19-21 November, made sole utilization of helicopters as a source of resupply. An LSA was established near the vicinity of the airstrip in PHU BAI and resupply was made through HSLG-4. Twelve lifts were made for a total of 11,400 pounds during Operation COVE.

On 21 November, the battalion was once again divided with two companies operating in the PHU LOC area and two in the Camp EWNS area. Resupply was by truck convoy and was furnished by HSLG-4 and the LSA at Camp EWNS separately. The battalion rear was located at PHU BAI and resupply facilities were provided by 3d Recon Battalion and Headquarters Battalion.

On 25 November, the Battalion moved to DONG HAI via 3d Motor Transport Battalion and immediately began Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V. Resupply was from 1st HSLG HAI, operated by Company "C", 3d Shore Party Battalion. All sources of supply were provided by HSLU-1 as battalion supply was located at PHU BAI. Five C-130's were employed to move up part of the battalion rear on 30 November.

9. Civil Affairs.

During the reporting period, the battalion operated strictly in uninhabited areas however, no civic action programs were initiated. The few times liaison contacts in or around inhabited areas the period was usually no more than one to two days.

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1. Psychological Warfare.

Psychological warfare activities were conducted by higher headquarters in all operations conducted by the battalion during the reporting period.

2. Personnel and Administration. During the reporting period the Administration section was located at Camp EWINS (1-17 November 1967) and at PHU BIA (18-30 November 1967). At the close of the reporting period each rifle company averaged one below the authorized level in addition to averaging 35 men below their respective status. The battalion is presently 2 Officers below authorized MOS 0302.

Personnel losses and gains during the reporting period:

COMPONENT	USMC		USN	
	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	OFFICERS	ENLISTED
Recon	0	4 (2 KIA, 2 DOW)	0	0
Rec. Battile	0	0	0	0
Administrative	7	103	1	7
Med	7	107	1	7
CWNS	8	218	1	9

The following awards were presented during the reporting period:

1. Japanese Cross of Gallantry

2. Purple Heart Medals

The number of disciplinary cases acted upon or pending action are as follows:

COURT-MARTIALS

Convictions - 4
Favorable

DISCIPLINARY PUNISHMENT

Rebels 1
Court-Martial

Rebels is exceptionally high. The battalion received R&R quotes to Okinawa, Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hawaii, Japan and Sydney.

A breakdown of the R&R quote on R&R is as follows: Hawaii 24; Bangkok 19; Hong Kong 15; Tokyo 15; Sydney 6; Penang 4; Okinawa 2; and Manila 6 and Singapore. Twenty-seven Marines went to China Beach, Danang for in-country R&R.

INCLOSURE (1)

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EX facilities are adequate and postal services continue to be satisfactory.

On 24 November 1967 Chaplin James R. HUTTON relieved Chaplin L. S. L. S. as the Battalion Chaplin. Operations in and around PHU LOC saw church Divine services held during this time. Just prior to the Battalion participation in Operation KENTUCKY V both Protestant and Catholic Divine Services were held.

12. Intelligence. During the reporting period the battalion was involved in Operations GRANITE, HAWK, COVE and NEWTON/KENTUCKY V.

(a) Operation GRANITE: See Command Chronology October 1967.

(b) Operation NODISHO:

(1) Army. Army tactics did not change during the reporting period; however, there was an increase in booby traps, random sniper incidents and enemy sightings throughout the O.I. During the month, the enemy concentrated on the movement of rice instead of engaging allied forces. There were no major engagements with the enemy and no positive identification of VC units.

(2) Terrain. See Command Chronology October 1967.

(3) Weather. Temperatures did not change much during the month, ranging from the mid 80's to the low 70's. During the reporting period, there was a slight increase in rainfall, but for the greater part of the month the weather was dry and cool.

Operation COVE

(a) Army. The enemy encountered during Operation COVE were believed to be main force VC. There was no identification made of any subgroups during the operation. Contact with the enemy was made in meeting engagements with from two to six men. The enemy utilized individual weapons and crew served RPD light machine guns. On one occasion 60mm mortars were used against a company level. During the meeting engagement, the enemy displayed no aggression, but due to the dense canopy the effect was negligible.

(b) Terrain. The natural stoniness of the terrain and the dense vegetation were obstacles in themselves and significantly impeded movement. Rate of movement was between 1000-1500 meters per hour.

(c) Weather. Temperatures averaged from the low 80's to the high 60's. Humidity averaged 90% and the visibility was five miles. Rain occurred nightly in the form of moderate showers, and winds were mild throughout the operation.

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(a) Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V

(1) History. Four NVA Regiments are known to be in the operating area. The four regiments have a supporting division and artillery elements. The enemy is considered capable of attacking friendly forces at his choosing. The enemy has mortar and rocket positions within the area.

(2) Terrain. The operating area consists generally of gently rolling hills with some paddy land. Numerous hedge-rows are scattered in the area. The many grassy areas provide good concealment but poor cover.

(b) Enemy Personnel and Equipment.(1) Cumulative Totals.

OPERATION	GRANITE	NEOSHIO	COVE	NEWTON/KENTUCKY V
ARTILLERY (Conf)	1	0	0	0
Barriers Destroyed	5	33	14	11
Buildings Destroyed	0	15	10	0
BR. Rounds Destroyed	0	0	0	16
RPM Mortar Rounds Destroyed	0	0	0	12
60mm Mortar Rounds Destroyed	0	0	0	27
Boxes of 60mm Fuses Destroyed	0	0	0	2
Explosives Destroyed	0	0	0	2

(c) Medical and Dental.

The total number of visits to the Battalion Aid Station during the month of November was 581.

Provided medical services encountered were:

Abortion	40	Fever of Unknown Origin	7
Abuse	5	Ringworm	19
Abortion	26	Schrapnel Wounds	4
Abortion	3	Physical Exams	6
Abortion	18	Hepatitis	1
Abortion	3	Sprains	23
Abortion	4	URI	17
Abortion	10	Gastro-Enteritis	16

3. All suspected and confirmed cases of VD were given a Serological Test for Syphilis in accordance with MANNED 22-18 and the results entered in the individuals Health Record.

4. A total number of 97 patients were sent to "A" and "D" Med. for further examination and treatment. Of these the following were consults:

ORTHOPEDIC	24	Orthopedic	1
MENT	3	Urgecical	6

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5. KIA 2 DOW 2
WIA 26 NBC 49

6. Weekly Malaria prophylaxis was continued through the use of Chloroquine-Primaquine Tablets.
7. Sanitation inspections were held weekly in accordance with Article P600.2D.
8. A forward BMS was established during Operation MOSSO and Operation COVE, consisting of three Hospital Corpsmen on Operation MOSSO and the Battalion Surgeon and six Corpsmen on Operation COVE. All injuries encountered were treated by their line company Corpsmen on Operation MOSSO. A small number of people were seen at the forward BMS on Operation COVE. No patients were tagged in as all treatment given was a continuation of aid begun by line Corpsmen who had tagged the patients previously. No serious delays were encountered in resupply or med-evacs during this period.

14. Air Support.

Generally the requirements for air support during this period remained weighted toward hole's in troop carrying, logistical transport and med-evac operations. The FIC teams remained separated, supporting each of the companies individually as well as the command group. Normally the company would be provided one enlisted man with FM capability while the command group included UHF radio and an Officer FIC. This was found to work satisfactorily because throughout all O.P.'s assigned, ground cover prohibited direct observation of targets. FIC (A) aircraft were used extensively for observation.

Logistics support was provided by Navy CH-46 aircraft in a convoy format during several invasions.

The command group encountered continued to be the poor reliability of the FIC aircraft.

15. Artillery Support.

- a. On Operation TIGER, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines received direct artillery support from "G" Btry, 3/12, and general support from "H" Btry, 3/12, "I" Btry, 4/12 and "P" Btry, 4/12.
- b. On Operation TIGER, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was provided general support by "G" Btry, 3/12, "H" Btry, 3/12, "P" Btry, 4/12 and "I" Btry, 4/12.
- c. On Operation TIGER, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines received direct artillery support from "G" Btry, 3/12.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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d. On Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines received direct artillery support from "F" Btry, 3/12. Reinforcing fires were provided by "M" Btry, 1/12, "D" Btry, 2/12, "E" Btry, 2/12, "K" Btry, 4/12, "N" Btry, 4/12, "W" Btry, 1/12 and "V" Btry, 3/12.

e. The following missions were fired in support of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during the month of November:

(1) Observed:

(a) FEB	14
(b) Adjust Fire	58
(c) Illumination	6

(2) Unobserved:

(a) FEB	18
(b) H&I	580
(c) Counter Btry	7
	Mortar

f. On Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V, numerous long delays were encountered in clearance for prep fires and fire missions due to the restricted zone of action 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was operating in and the close proximity of adjacent units. Regimental RSCC was made aware of this situation and corrective measures are underway.

g. Communications. During Operation GRANITE, continual communications at the rear of Camp DILLING was maintained. By utilizing an RC-292 relay station, communications were made with the rear during the search and assault phase area. The relay station on Hill 674 was used to maintain contact with "B" and "I" Companies in the Southeast perimeter and the 10th Marines R&M Valley.

During Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V, the relay station, two radio operators with the 10th Marines, proved invaluable and was instrumental, not only in passing radio traffic to the rear, but also in helping maintain communications with units when the terminal barrel direct communications equipment on Hill 130 developed an oil leak so a PRC-25 communications set were utilized instead.

Communications problems were encountered during the first day of Operation NEWTON/KENTUCKY V. However, on the second day some atmospheric problems caused weak radio communications. A relay was set up at the 10th Marines R&M to pass admin traffic.

Once again, the lack of accessories for the AN/PRC-25 radios created operating difficulties during the reporting period. The battalion is short 40 H-135 antennas and 37 whip antennae for the AN/PRC-25. Each company is down to seven radios per company due to shortage of accessories.

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Message totals for the month were:

	CLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED
Forwarding	295	364
Overriding	1	17
On Count	0	0

Major items evacuated to higher echelon and returned:

1 Radio Set AN/PRC-41
11 Radio Sets AN/PRC-25
1 Radio Set AN/PRC-6

Major items repaired locally:

40 Sound Power Phones M-1
1 Radio Set AN/PRC-41
2 Radio Sets AN/PRC-25

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB

✓A Initiated in Oct 57 } F, Ld Sep
Command Chronology }

✓B

✓C

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✓R

CONTENTS

Operation Order 16-67 (Operation
GRANITE)

Maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000, Series L-614;
Sheets 6441 I, 6442 II, 6442 III

Operation Order 17-67 (Two Company
Blocking Force)

Operation Order 18-67 (Not executed)

Operation Order 19-67 (Operation NEUTRO)

Operation Order 20-67 (Two Company
Search and Destroy)

Operation Order 21-67 (Company Line)

Operation Order 22-67 (Company Blocking
Force)

Operation Order 23-67 (Operation COVE)

Maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000 Series L7014,
Sheets 6541 I and 6541 II

Operation Order 24-67 (Two Company
Blocking Force)

Operation Order 25-67 (Operation NETTOP)

Maps, VIETNAM 1:50,000, Series L7014,
Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

Operation NEOSHO Overlay

Journal Entries

A/ARPT (OPN COVE)

A/ARPT (OPN GRANITE)

A/ARPT (OPN NEOSHO)

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion 4th Marines

DRAFT 386B-67

COPY 2 OF 5 COPIESCopy 2 of 3 Copies
1st Battalion, 4th Marines
Camp EVANS, RVN
041500H October 1967

OPERATION ORDER 37-67

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014, Sheets 6411 I and
6412 II
(b) 4th Marines OPORD 53-67

TASK ORGANIZATION.

1st Bn (-) (Rein), 4th Marines

LtCol. DEPTULA

Co. C (Rein)

Capt. EDWARDS

Det, HQ Co, 4th Mar (2 sniper teams)

Det H & S Co.

Det, Comm platoon (Comm and FAO)

Det, Mod platoon

Det 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO team)

Co. D (Rein)

Maj. SPERRY

Det H & S Co.

Det, Comm platoon (Comm and FAO)

Det, Mod platoon

Det 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO team)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSURSb. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 1st Inf. Div (ARVN) conducts ground operations in zone to locate and defeat VC/NVA forces, destroy installations and capture enemy supplies.
- (2) Fourth Marines continues present operations in conjunction with Operation NEOSHO.
- (3) Artillery. 3d Bn, Twelfth Marines is direct support and provides liaison officer to ARVN TF artillery. 1st Inf. Div. (ARVN) TF artillery provides reinforcing fire upon request.

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TAB C and (1)

~~SECRET~~

(4) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helicopter support.

2. MISSION. On D plus 10 (5Nov67) establish blocking forces in conjunction with 1st Inf. Div. (ARVN). Operation Lan Son 140 (Operation GRANITE) Phase II in "Street Without Joy" area.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations. See operations overlay.
- b. Company C. After engineer road sweep of National Route one on 5Nov67, commence motor movement north from Camp Evans to vic. K1461. Establish blocking position ANVIL (see OP overlay).
- c. Company D. After engineer road sweep of National Route one on 5Nov67, commence motor movement north from Camp Evans to vic. K1461. Establish blocking position FORGE (see OP overlay).
- d. Battalion Reserve.
(1) Company A.
(a) 30 minute alert status commencing 050830H.
- e. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Adhere strictly to the rules of engagement.
(2) Report by fastest means available all enemy contacts.
(3) Caution friendly troops on mines and booby traps.
(4) Do not destroy captured food or medicine. Report their location and await instructions.
(5) Report POW's and detainees to Bn CP and await instructions.
(6) Depart Camp EVANS at 050930H.
(7) Thrust points:
a. K140 4440

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- (8) Submit normal reports.
- (9) Rendezvous with truck at 050915H on road in front of company offices.
- (10) Operation terminates on order this HQ.
- (11) Company Commander Co. D designated local tactical commander of USMC units.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS.

- a. Prescribed loads. As set forth by company commanders.
- b. Uniform and Equipment. Normal arms and equipment to include: flak jacket, ID tags, entrenching tool and weapons cleaning equipment.
- c. Medical. Hole evacuation in accordance with standard procedures. All personnel will carry sufficient quantity of salt and halivone tablets.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- (a) Command Posts. Report all CP locations when established.
- (b) Visual.
 - (1) Carry adr panels and colored smoke.
- (c) Communications-electronics.
 - (1) Guard 60.35 upon departure Camp Evans.
 - (2) Alternate frequency 45.10
 - (3) Med Brdg frequency 45.70
 - (4) Company ¹⁵ bring 292's.

OFFICIAL

H. M. NELSON
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
S-3

E. A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Annex A (Operation Overlay)

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 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 Camp EVANS, RVN
 080800H November 1967
 Ser No: 003431267

Operation Order 19-67 (NEOSHO)

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series I7014, Sheet 6111. I
 (b) 4th Marine OpOrder 54-67
 (c) 1st Battalion 4th Marine COI

Time Zone: H

Task Organization.1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

LtCol DEPTULA

H&S Co (-)

1stLt FAGERSTON

2 Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat

Co A (Rein)

Capt. THOMPSON

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)
 Det, 3d Reconnaissance Bn (Scuba Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat (Corpsman)
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm
 Det, Co A, 3d SP Bn (HST Tm)
 Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Tm)

Co B (Rein)

Capt. WIRSCHING

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)
 Det, 3d Reconnaissance Bn (Scuba Tm)
 Det, Co A, 3d SP Bn (HST Tm)
 Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Comm Plat
 Det, Med Plat (Corpsman)
 FAC Tm

Co D (-), 4th Marines

LtCol DEPTULA

Co C (Rein)

Capt. RENFRO

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Sec, 81mm Mortar Plat (w/ F)
 Det, Comm Plat
 Det, Med Plat (Corpsman)
 FAC Tm

Capt. THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~

Det, 81mm Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat (Corpsman)

Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm
 Det, Co A, 3d SP Bn (HST Tm)
 Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Tm)

TAB E

~~SECRET~~Co D (Rein)

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO)
 Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)
 Det, 3d Reconnaissance Bn, (Scuba Tm)
 Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat (Corpsman)
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm

Capt WEEDS

1. SITUATION.**a. Enemy forces.**

(1) Current INTSUNS and PERINTREPS.
 (2) Intelligence Estimate (PASEP).

b. Friendly forces.

(1) 4th Marines continues operations in assigned TAOR to destroy VC/NVA main and Guerrilla forces.
 (2) 3d Bn, 12th Marines, DS 4th Marines; on 8 November 1967 will displace one 105mm battery plus 2 155mm howitzers to vicinity ID 636250 and establish forward artillery position.
 (3) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provides fixed wing and helicopter support.
 (4) 3d Reconnaissance Battalion will insert a reconnaissance team from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marine OA on 9 Nov 67.
 (5) Plat, Co C, 3d TK Bn, DS 1st Bn (-), 4th Mar.
 (6) Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn, DS 1st Bn (-), 4th Mar.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) See Task Organization.
 (2) Co B detach one plat on order after securing LZ to provide security for 81mm Plat (-).

2. MISSION.

1st Battalion, 4th Marines land by helicopter at L-hour on D-day in LZ CRANE and PELICAN. Conduct systematic search of the SONG BO River area and its tributaries in assigned OA for caves, sampans, supply caches and enemy forces. Provide security for forward artillery base vicinity ID 636250.

3. EXECUTION.

1st Marines continues operations in assigned TAOR to destroy VC/NVA main and Guerrilla forces.

a. **Concept of Operations.** On order on D-1 day displace one company with tanks for security for one 105mm battery plus two 155mm to vicinity ID 636250 and establish forward ~~forward~~ **SECRET** position.

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howitzers, at the forward Artillery base (YD 636250). At L-hour on D-day land one company in LZ PELICAN and two companies in LZ CRANE by helicopter and conduct detailed search of SONG BO River and its tributaries in assigned OA's utilizing scuba teams and Engr Demo teams. On order about D+1 return to designated LZ's and prepare for helilift to Camp EVANS. (See Annex A, Operation Overlay)

b. H&S Company.

- (1) On order D-1 attack one section 81mm platoon to Company C to augment security for the forward Artillery Base (YD 636250).
- (2) On D-day move two sections from the 81mm mortar platoon with H&S Co (-), land in LZ CRANE and establish firing position vicinity YD 573184 to support operations in the Battalion OA.
- (3) Provide control/Comm personnel as necessary.
- (4) Provide one T/O squad as CP security.

c. Company A (Rein).

- (1) At L-hour on D-day land by helicopter in LZ PELICAN, conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective C with particular emphasis on banks of SONG BO and its tributaries. Upon securing objective C and order move to LZ GROUSE or LZ CRANE for extraction.

On D-day land one company in LZ PELICAN and two companies in LZ CRANE by helicopter and conduct detailed search of SONG BO River and its tributaries in assigned OA's utilizing scuba teams and Engr Demo teams.

d. Company B (Rein).

- (1) At L-hour land by helo in LZ CRANE conduct search of SONG BO River banks at Objective B. Conduct Search and Destroy operations toward LZ GROUSE with particular emphasis to SONG BO river banks in zone. Provide security for expansion of LZ GROUSE for extraction of remainder of Battalion.
- (2) Provide security for Battalion Command group and 81mm platoon upon landing. Utilize H&S Co security squad as supplement.
- (3) Utilize Scuba Teams where appropriate when searching river banks.

e. Company C (Rein).

- (1) On order on D-1 with tanks in direct support provide security for the movement of artillery to the forward Artillery position (YD 636250) and subsequently provide security for the forward Artillery position composed of one 105mm battery, two 155mm howitzers.

On D-day land one company in LZ PELICAN and two companies in LZ CRANE by helicopter and conduct detailed search of SONG BO River and its tributaries in assigned OA's utilizing scuba teams and Engr Demo teams.

e. Company A (Rein).

- (2) Conduct small unit patrols/night activities in support of security mission.
- (3) At L-hour on D-day land by helicopter in LZ PELICAN, conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective C with particular emphasis on banks of SONG BO and its tributaries in assigned OA's utilizing scuba teams and Engr Demo teams.

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(3) Be prepared on order to provide security for return of artillery unit to Camp EVANS.

f. Company D (Rein).

(1) At L-hour on D-day land by helicopter in LZ CRANE after LZ is secured by Company B, conduct Search and Destroy operations upstream along banks of SONG BO to Objective A.

(2) Conduct search of river banks of SONG BO river and its tributaries utilizing scuba team where appropriate.

(3) Upon securing objective A and on order be prepared to move to either LZ CRANE or GROUSE for extraction.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-day: 9 November 1967
L-hour: 0800H
TOD Camp EVANS: 0700H

(2) RCA authorized and encouraged in caves.

(3) Maximum use of supporting arms mandatory.

(4) Absolute maximum dispersion of personnel at all times. Maintain no more than visual/audible contact between individuals when moving in canopy or close terrain where possibility of ambush greatly increased. Flank security mandatory whenever possible. Recon by artillery/mortar fire along flanks of routes of advance in particularly heavy canopy to provide moving envelopes in which troops can advance and from which they can attack. Night positions employ maximum LP(s), minimum illumination.

(5) Submit position reports hourly when landing in LZ's, and when reaching objectives.

(6) Submit Spot Reports IAW standard procedures

(7) Report enemy contacts immediately.

(8) Caution friendly units on mines and booby traps.

(9) Do not destroy enemy caches until advised by this headquarters. All indigenous personnel, supplies or other activity in this area is considered to be enemy or enemy controlled.

(10) Report all POW's/Detainees to In CP and await instructions.

(11) Utilize Scuba teams to search river banks for underwater caves. Utilize Kit Carson scouts for the purpose intended.

(12) Thrust Points:
(a) LIMA YD 5620
(b) MIKE YD 6017

(13) Helicopter Landing Zone RED (YD 547323) will be utilized for personnel being lifted into LZ CRANE, and Landing Zone YELLOW (YD 551323) will be utilized for personnel being lifted into LZ PELICAN. All companies will be broken down into 5 man heliteams and staged in desired loading sequence by helicopter in ready circles at the appropriate Loading Zone. HST personnel will coordinate loading activities in the Loading Zone and will collect plane tickets which will be filled out by all members of the embarking heloteams.

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(14) Operation terminates on order on 10 November 1967. Prepare for extraction at approximately 1500H.

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

a. Resupply

(1) No resupply scheduled due to short duration of operation.
 (2) Submit any emergency resupply requests to S-4 IAW standard procedure.

b. Prescribed Load: As prescribed by unit Commanders to include the following.

(1) 3 MCI. Ensure adequate quantities of salt and Halazone are carried.
 (2) One (1) 60 ft rope per squad (1 grappling hook per Plat)
 (3) One (1) CS Grenade per fire team.
 (4) One (1) block C4 per fire team.
 (5) Machettes as available.

c. Uniform and Equipment. Primary means of evacuation will be by helicopter.

(1) Halo evacuation IAW standard procedures.
 (2) Primary BAS will be established at Camp EVANS. A light BAS will be located with the Bn CP.
 (3) Heat casualties will be evacuated to Regimental Aid Station. All other casualties will be transported directly to Company A, 3d Medical Bn at PHU BAI.
 (4) Each Company will carry at least 10 nylon stretchers.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. CP group with Company B

b. Report all CP locations when established.

c. Radio nets and Frequencies.

(1) Regt Tac 68.30
 (2) Bn Tac 60.35
 (3) TACP Local 42.8
 (4) Med Evac 45.7
 (5) HST 42.8
 (6) Recon Tac 46.8

d. Radio Relay station will be established on Hill 674 to augment Communications if needed.

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~~SECRET~~*E. A. Deptula*

E. A. DEPTULA

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
CommandingANNEXES.

✓ A - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION.

4th Marines	3
3d Bn, 26th Marines	1
3d Bn, 12th Marines	1
Plat Co B, 3d Engr Bn	1
3d Recon Bn	1
Plat, 3d TK Bn	1
H&S Co	1
Co A	1
B	1
C	1
D	1
File	6

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 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 Camp EVANS, RVN
 041500H October 1967

OPERATIONS ORDER 20-67 (NEOSHO)

Ref: (a) 4th Mar msg 101145z Nov 67
 (b) Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6412 II

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Current INTSUMS.
- (2) Ref (a).

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 4th Marines continues Operation NEOSHO against VC/NVA in assigned TAOR.
- (2) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helo support.
- (3) 3d Battalion, 12th Marines provides artillery support.
- (4) Det, Co. B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Tms), direct support.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

- (1) Det, HQ Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tms), attached effective 110830H, Nov 67.
- (2) Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 4th Mar
 - (a) Det, Comm Plat (Comm and FAC)
 - (b) Det, Med Plat
 - (c) KC Scouts, S-2 Scouts and Interpreters

2. MISSION. Conduct aggressive small unit activities and S&D operations in assigned OA to exploit sighting of 250-300 NVA via YD 5524.

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TAB F

~~SECRET~~**3. EXECUTION.**

- a. Concept of Operation. (See overlay)
- b. Co. B (Rein). On orders, on 11 Nov 67, sweep along axis Blue into assigned OA and conduct S&D operations there in.
- c. Co. D (Rein). On orders, on 11 Nov 67, sweep along axis WHITE into assigned OA and conduct S&D operations there in.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
 - (1) Company Commander Co. B designated local tactical commander.
 - (2) Adhere strictly to the rules of engagement.
 - (3) Report by fastest means available all enemy contact IAW normal spot reporting procedures.
 - (4) Submit day and night activities to Bn CP NLT 1200H the day prior.
 - (5) Caution friendly troops on mines and booby traps known to abound in OA.
 - (6) Do not destroy captured materials or food stuffs. Report locations and await instructions.
 - (7) Report POW's and detainees to Bn CP and await instructions.
 - (8) Operation terminates on order this end (sched. duration is 3 days).
- e. ADMIN and LOGISTICS.
 - a. Prescribed Load. As prescribed by Company Commanders.
 - b. Resupply. Submit requests by 1300H day prior.
 - c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by Company Commanders to include flak jackets and helmets.
 - d. Med Evac. Helo evac IAW standard procedure.
 - e. Drinking Water. Streams avail in OA. Ensure halizone tablets are utilized.

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~~SECRET~~5. COMMAND and COMM-ELEC.

- a. Command Posts. Report all locations when established.
- b. Visual. Flats, carry colored smoke and air pannels.
- c. Comm-Elec.
 - (1) Guard 60.35 upon departure Camp EVANS
 - (2) Alternate net 45.10
 - (3) Med Evac frequency 45.7
 - (4) New Brevity Code Sheet attached
 - (5) Thrust points (See operation overlay)

E. A. BEPTULA
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Annex A (Operation Overlay)

~~SECRET~~

OFFICIAL

H. M. NELSON
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
S-3

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Copy 1 of 9 Copies
 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 Camp EVANS, RVN
 121600H November 1967

OPERATION ORDER 21-67

Ref: (a) Naps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS 17014, Sheets 6441 I and 6442 II
 (b) 1st Battalion, 4th Marines COI

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 4th Marines continues present operations in conjunction with Operation NEOSHO.
- (2) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helicopter support.
- (3) 3d Bn, 12th Marines provides artillery support as required.
- (4) 3d Bn, 26th Marines provides security for Camp EVANS and conducts aggressive small unit activities in assigned OA.
- (5) Companies B and D conducts search and destroy operations in assigned OA.

2. MISSION. Conduct ambush patrols in assigned OA to prevent VC/NVA from interdicting National Route One.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. See Operation Overlay.

b. Company A.

- (1) At 1730H move by truck to ARVN Compound at PHONG DIEN District Headquarters.
- (2) Delay at PHONG DIEN until after dark then move into ambush sites.
- (3) Return at first light to Camp EVANS by foot march.

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TAB G

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c. Battalion Reserve.

(1) Company C.

(a) 30 minute alert status commencing 121730H.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Adhere strictly to the rules of engagement.

(2) Report by fastest means available all enemy contacts.

(3) Caution friendly troops on mines and booby traps.

(4) Do not destroy captured food or medicine. Report their location and await instructions.

(5) Report POW's and detainees to Bn CP and await instructions.

(6) Operation terminates on order this Headquarters.

(7) Call in ~~STANDBY~~ ^{POSITION REPORTS} hourly.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS.

a. Prescribed Load. As Company Commander directs.

b. Resupply. Emergency resupply requests to be submitted as soon as possible.

c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by Company Commander.

d. Med Evac. Heli evacuation in accordance with standard procedure.

e. Drinking Water. Streams available in OA. Ensure troops utilize halazone tablets.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

(1) Guard 60-35 upon departure Camp EVANS.

(2) Alternate net 15-10.

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- (3) Med Evac frequency 15.7.
- (4) Thrust Points: SPORT 5035
Cigarettes 5733

E. A. DEPUTA
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

✓ ANNEX A (Operations Overlay)

OFFICIAL

H. M. NELSON
MAJOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS
S-3

SECRET

151345

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 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 Camp EVANS, RVN
 151345 November 1967

Operation Order 22-67

Ref: (a) Maps, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 A/S Series 17011, Sheet 6442 II

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy forces.

- (1) Current INTELL
- (2) PD District reports 1 VC Co. in vic. TD 4735.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) 1st Marines continues Operation NAMMO
- (2) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helo support.
- (3) 3d Bn, 12th Marines provides artillery support.
- (4) PF/RP from PHONG DIEN participate in operation.

2. MISSION. Provide a one company blocking force for a PF/RP sweep in the vicinity of TD 4635.

3. MISSION. See operations overlay.a. Concept of Operations.b. Company A (Rein).

Attached

Det, 1st Co, 1st Marines (Snipers)

Det, H/C Co.

Det, Comm Plat

Det, Med Plat

S-2 Scouts, Interpreter, KO Scouts

Commencing H-Hour on D-Day move by truck to PHONG DIEN District Headquarters, exchange liaison personnel, and proceed to blocking position in order to be in position by 150000H.

c. Battalion Reserve.

Company D

~~SECRET~~

7A8 4

~~SECRET~~4. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Adhere strictly to the rules of engagement.
- (2) Report by fastest means available all enemy contacts.
- (3) Caution friendly troops on mines and booby traps known to be in area.
- (4) Do not destroy captured food or medicine. Report location and await instructions.
- (5) Report POW's and detainees to Bn OP and await instructions.
- (6) Operation terminates on order this HQ.
- (7) Submit normal spot reports.
- (8) H-Hour: 1400
- (9) D-Day: 15 Nov 67

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

- a. Prescribed load. As directed by Company Commander to include 3 MCI.
- b. Resupply. None should be required. Emergency request to be submitted ASAP.
- c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by Company Commander.
- d. Med-Evac. Hail evacuation IAW SOP.

5. COMMAND and COMM-ELEC

- a. Command Posts. Report locations as soon as established.
- b. Visual. Carry colored smoke and air panels.
- c. Thrust Points. Common PF/USMC thrust point ZULM : YD 4936

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~~SECRET~~d. Radio Frequencies.

- (1) Guard 60.35 upon departure Camp EVANS.
- (2) Alternate Net 47.2
- (3) Med-evac 45.7
- (4) HAOV PD District: Call Sign "Secure Ripple 65", frequency: 39.8

✓ ANNEX A:
Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

H. M. NELSON
MAJOR, U. S. MARINE CORPS

S-3

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1st Battalion, 4th Marines
Camp EVANS, RVN
Ser No. 003A32367
161200H November 1967

OPERATION ORDER 23-67 (Operation COVE)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014, Sheets 6541 I and 6541 II.
(b) 4th Marines Operation Order 55-67.

Time Zone: H

Task Organization.

1st Bn (-) (Reinf), 4th Mar

LtCol E. A. DEPTULA

1st Tm, Co A, 3d SP Bn

H&S Co (-)

1stLt FAGERSTON

Co A (Reinf)

Capt THOMPSON

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81mm Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Team

Co B (Reinf)

Capt WIRSCHING

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81mm Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Team

Co D (Reinf)

Capt WEED

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, Hq Co, 4th Mar (Sniper Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81mm Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Team

-1-

SECRET

-TAB I

~~SECRET~~1. SITUATION.a. Enemy forces.

(1) Current INTSUMS (PASEP)

b. Friendly forces.

(1) 4th Marines continues operations to destroy VC/NVA
rain and guerrilla forces.

(2) 2d Bn, 26th Marines provides blocking force to north
of 1st Bn, 4th Marines OA.

(3) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helo support. One hour
fixed wing prep scheduled.

(4) Naval gunfire: one DD (5" 54) in GS of 4th Marines).

(5) Artillery.

(a) 3d Bn, 12th Marines, in DS of 4th Marines.

(b) 4th Bn, 12th Marines, in GS/Reinf.

(6) Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn, DS 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization.

2. MISSION. 1st Battalion (-), 4th Marines commencing L-Hour. D-Day will conduct search and destroy operations in assigned operating area in the vicinity of PHU LOC to capture/destroy enemy logistic caches, installations and materials, obtain intelligence, and kill or capture enemy personnel.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Phase I. On D-1 day, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines, moves by truck convoy to staging area in vicinity PHU BAI Airfield. At L-Hour on D-Day 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines lands 3 companies in LZ FALCON by helicopter. After securing LZ 2 companies and command group conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective A and one company conducts search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective C. On Order, sweep NW toward blocking positions D and E. Be prepared to continue Phase II on order. (See Annex A (Operations Overlay)).

(2) Phase II. To be issued upon receipt Frag Order from higher headquarters (See Appendix I to Annex A)

b. H&S Ccs.

(1) On order on D-1 day move to PHU BAI staging area by truck convoy. On order move 81mm mortars platoon to Blocking Position E to provide GS to 1st Bn (-), 4th Mar.

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- (2) Provide control/comm personnel as necessary.
- (3) Provide one squad (Reinf) as CP security.

c. Company A (Reinf)

- (1) On order on D-1 day move to PHU BAI staging area by truck convoy. At L-hour on D-Day land by helicopter in LZ FALCON. Conduct Search and Destroy operations along designated axis toward Battalion Objective 1 and Regimental Objective A. On order continue search and destroy operations toward Battalion Objective 3. On order conduct search and destroy operations in designated zone toward Blocking Position E. Be prepared to continue Phase II on order.

d. Company B (Reinf)

- (1) On order on D-1 day move to PHU BAI staging area by truck convoy. At L-hour on D-Day land by helo' in LZ' FALCON, secure LZ and conduct search and destroy operations along designated axis toward Battalion Objective 2 and Regimental Objective C. On Order, conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective A. On order conduct search and destroy operations in designated zone toward blocking position E. Be prepared to continue Phase II on order.

e. Company D (Reinf)

- (1) On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to PHU BAI staging area . At L-hour on D-Day land in LZ FALCON. Follow in trace of Company A to Regimental Objective A. On order conduct search and destroy operations along designated axis toward Regimental Objective B. On order conduct search and destroy operations in designated zone toward blocking position D and E. Be prepared to conduct Phase II on order.

f. Corrdinating Instructions.

- (1) Unclassified Code Name: COVE
- (2) D-Day:
 - (a) Phase I: 18 November 1967
 - (b) Phase II: 23 November 1967 (tentative)
- (3) L-Hour: 0900H
- (4) Time of Departure Camp EVANS: 17300H
- (5) In the event helicopters are unavailable due to weather conditions, after 24 hours postponement in the PHU BAI staging area, move to vicinity of LZ FALCON by surface means and conduct operations as planned.
- (6) RG: use authorized.
- (7) Absolute maximum dispersion of personnel at all times.

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Maintain no more than visual/audible contact between individuals when moving in canopy or close terrain where possibility of ambush greatly increased. Flank security mandatory whenever possible. Recon by artillery/mortar fire along flanks of routes of advance in particularly heavy canopy to provide moving envelope in which troops can advance and from which they can attack. Night positions employ maximum LP's, minimum illumination.

- (8) Maximum use of supporting arms fires with emphasis on observed fire and preparation fires directed.
- (9) Submit position reports hourly when moving.
- (10) Submit spot reports on occurrence LAW standard format.
- (11) Adhere strictly to rules of engagement.
- (12) Report by fastest means available all enemy contacts.
- (13) Caution friendly forces on mines and booby traps.
- (14) Do not destroy captured food, medicine or materials. Report their location and await instructions.
- (15) Report POW's and detainees to Bn CP and await instructions.
- (16) Thrust Points:

ALFA	ZC 0599
BRAVO	ZD 0101
CHARLIE	ZC 0998
DELTA	ZC 1399

- (17) Operation terminates on order of this Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.

- (1) Primary source is LSA located at PHU BAI.
- (2) Medical supplies: primary source is BAS.

b. Prescribed Loads. As prescribed by company commander to include:

- (1) Minimum of two days Class I and V. Insure that adequate quantities of salt and halzone tablets are carried by all personnel.
- (2) One (1) 60 ft rope per rifle squad.
- (3) One (1) CS grenade per squad.
- (4) One (1) block C4 per fire team.
- (5) One (1) rubber air mattress per squad.
- (6) One (1) nylon stretcher per squad.
- (7) One (1) probing device per fire team.
- (8) All available machetes.

c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by Company Commanders to include flak jackets, helmets and ID tags.

d. Resupply.

- (1) Resupply will be by helicopter.
- (2) 1st Team, Company A, 3d Shore Party Battalion will relay all resupply requests over the HST Log Net to the LSA.

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(3) All resupply requests will be submitted to the Bn S-4 by 0900H the morning of the day preceding the resupply. Resupply requests will include a full description of the LZ to include surrounding terrain and height of canopy.

(4) Six (6) Otters will be available at the LSA for resupply.

a. Hospitalization and Evacuation.

- (1) Primary means of evacuation will be by helicopter to Co 4, 3d Med Bn.
- (2) Holo evacuation in accordance with standard procedure.
- (3) BAS will be established in the vicinity of the Battalion CP. BAS will handle all casualties in the event that holo med evac is not possible.

f. Service.

(1) Engr LZ clearance teams with engineer and tunnel teams will be on standby at LSA.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Command Posts. Report positions of all CP's when established.

b. Visual Signals. (All platoons carry colored smoke and air panels)

(1)	WHITE	-	ENEMY POSITIONS
(2)	RED	-	NOT SECURE/NOT SAFE TO LAND
(3)	VIOLET/ GREEN	-	SECURE/SAFE TO LAND
(4)	YELLOW	-	FRIENDLY POSITIONS

c. Frequencies and Call Signs.

(1) See 1st Bn, 4th Marines COI

d. Wire.

(1) Wire and sound power phones will be available for CP security.

e. Message Center.

(1) Each operator will carry an initial supply of 5 days KAC-PX and KAC-QX sheets.

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(2) One message center man will carry an additional 5 days supply to be issued on order.

E. A. Deptula

E. A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX

✓ A (Operations Overlay)

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-6-

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COPY _____ of _____ Copies
 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 FMS Bldg, FMS
 222700N November 1967

OPERATION LADY 24 - 67

Task (a) Alpha, YTB-804, 24 50,000 lbs Series U7034, Sheet 642 II.

Line Name: R

Task Organization

1st Battalion (-)(Alpha), 4th Marines

LtCol. C. A. COOK

Company A (Alpha)

Capt. D. C. WILSON

2d, 3d Bn, 12th Marines (10 tn)
 2d, HHS Company
 2d, Gun Mortar Plt (10 tn)
 2d, Mort Plt
 2d, Gun Plt
 FAB Team

Company C (Alpha)

Capt. R. J. WILSON

2d, 3d Bn, 12th Marines (10 tn)
 2d, HHS Company
 2d, Gun Mortar Plt (10 tn)
 2d, Mort Plt
 2d, Gun Plt
 FAB Team

b. MISSION

1. Initial Mission See Current IFFING.

2. Primary Mission

- (1) 1st Infantry Division (A/2) conduct ground operations in zone to locate and defeat VC/PVA forces, destroy installations and capture enemy supplies.
- (2) 1st Marine Division conduct present operations in conjunction with Operation HOGHIDE.
- (3) 2d, 3d Bn, 12th Marines to conduct support, 2d RCT provides fixed wing and helicopter support.
- (4) 2d RCT provides fixed wing and helicopter support.
- (5) The balance of 1/4 (2 companies and Command Group) remain in HMC 100 zone to conduct extensive patrolling, search Route 1, conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area.

TAB K ~~SECRET~~

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C. ATTACHMENT. See Task Organization.

2. ~~SECRET~~. On 23 November 1967 move two companies to RV CHAN
area and assume blocking positions as designated by 05 Front Area
Command.

3. ~~SECRET~~

a. ~~SECRET~~. At approximately 230000 November 1967 move the companies and command group by truck convoy
to RV CHAN area in the vicinity of RV 4641 and RV 4633.
See Annex A.

b. ~~SECRET~~. At approximately 230000 November 1967 move by
truck convoy from RV 341 to RV CHAN. Upon arrival commence
movement to blocking positions in vicinity of RV 4641.

c. ~~SECRET~~. At approximately 230000 November 1967 move by
truck convoy from RV 341 to RV CHAN. Upon arrival commence
movement to blocking position in vicinity of RV 4633.

D. COMMUNICATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) Adhere strictly to the rules of engagement.
- (2) Report by fastest means available all enemy contact.
- (3) Condition friendly troops on rules and body search.
- (4) Do not destroy captured food or medicine. Report their
location and exist instructions.
- (5) Report POW's and detainees to the CO and await instructions.
- (6) Submit a set reports on occurrence IAV standard format.
- (7) Submit position reports when established.
- (8) Coordinate coordinates in order this Headquarters
Direct Joints
- (9) a. B-3472 4639
b. B-34 4632

E. APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS.

- a. ~~SECRET~~ Land. As per form by Company Commanders.
- b. ~~SECRET~~. Vehicles and Equipment. Normal guns and equipment, to include
field jackets, P-38s, entrenching tools and weapons of various
caliber.
- c. ~~SECRET~~. Note execution IAV standard procedures. All personnel
will carry only silent holsters with them.

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5. COMMUNICATING WITH AIR FORCE

a. General Notes

- (1) S-3 to be located at Camp Evans.
- (2) Report all OP locations when established.

b. Visual.

- (1) Carrier MR. Pendleton and aircraft carrier.

c. Communications and Instruments

- (1) Queen Mary. 200 upon departure and 200 P.M.
- (2) West Virgin Frequency 43.70

E. A. BAPTIST
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

✓ Annex A (Operations (cont'd))

OFFICIAL

H. M. NELSON
MAJOR, U. S. MARINE CORPS
S-3

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 1st Battalion, 4th Marines
 Long Ha, RVN
 Ser No:
 271600H November 67

OPERATION ORDER 25-67 (Operation NEUTON)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV
 (b) 9th Marines Operation Order 15-67 (Operation NEUTON)

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION.1st Bn (Rein), 4th Mar

Lt Col DEPTULA

H&S Co (-)

Capt FAGERSTON

Company A (Rein)

Capt THOMPSON

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm

Company B (Rein)

Capt WILSHING

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm

Company C (Rein)

Capt REINFRO

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm

Company D (Rein)

Capt WEEDE

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Comm Plat
 FAC Tm
 Scout Dog Tm

~~SECRET~~ TAB L

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~~SECRET~~1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 9th Marines continues operations to destroy or capture enemy forces and logistic caches and to uncover access road from Route 1 to position A-3.
- (2) 2d Bn, 9th Marines conducts operations in assigned zone as part of Operation NEWTON.
- (3) 1st Bn, 3d Marines is regimental reserves for Operation NEWTON.
- (4) 2d ARVN Regiment conducts operations to destroy enemy in adjacent zone in conjunction with Operation NEWTON.
- (5) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helo support.
- (6) Naval gunfire: one Cruiser (8"55) or one DD (5"54) in GS of 9th Marines.
- (7) Artillery.
 - (a) Btry F, 2d Bn, 12th Marines in DS 1st Bn, 4th Marines.
 - (b) 2d Bn, 12th Marines in DS 9th Marines.
 - (c) Btry K, 4th Bn, 13th Marines and Btry M, 4th Bn, 12th Marines GS/Rein to 9th Marines as required.
- (8) Det Co C, 3d Engr Bn in DS 1st Bn, 4th Marines
- (9) Shore Fire Control Party assigned to augment FSCC.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 4th Marines (Rein), commencing H-hour on D-day attacks in assigned zone of action to seize objectives 2,4,6,8,10 and 12 and prepares to support subsequent operations in support of the A-3/Route 666 construction project.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. At approximately 0845 on D-1 1st Bn (Rein), 4th Marines moves by truck convoy to a position south of C-2 (YD 1364), debarks and moves by foot to the assigned attack position (YD 132685). At H-hour on D-day crosses line of departure with 3 companies up and one back to seize Objectives 2 and 4. Halts at Phase Line BULL and attacks with 2 companies up and 2 back to seize Objective 6. After physical contact is made with A forces on the right flank, on order, continues coordinated attack to seize Objective 8. On order, continues attack across the TRAGE to seize Objectives 10 and 12. On order, withdraws and assumes defensive posture in vicinity of Objective 10. See Annex A (Operations Overlay).

b. H&S Co (-)

- (1) On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of C-2 position. Provide 81mm mortar platoon in GS. (The mortar platoon will be divided into two section groupings for dispersed movement with two rifle companies.)
- (2) Provide control/comm personnel as necessary.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~c. Company A (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on right flank of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operations Overlay).

d. Company C (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on center of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

e. Company D (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on left flank of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

f. Company B (Rein)

(1) Initially battalion reserve.

(2) On B-1 day move by truck convoy to a debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to the attack position. On D-day follow initially in trace of Company C.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-day: 29Nov67
- (2) H-hour: 0800H
- (3) Code Name- Operation NEWTON
- (4) Initially guide on center company; after crossing Phase Line BULL, guide on right company.
- (5) Ensure physical contact is maintained between all companies to prevent the enemy from isolating units.
- (6) Take maximum defensive measures against enemy fire by maintaining greatest possible interval between individuals and digging deep field fortifications.
- (7) Forward elements of leading companies will display air panels on their packs at all times.
- (8) Tanks, Ontos and M-42's will be available on request from 9th Marines.
- (9) All enemy bunkers and fortifications will be destroyed. Don't destroy other captured materials. Report their location and await instructions.

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- (10) Report all POW's and/or detainees and await instructions.
- (11) Liaison Teams are being exchanged between the 1st Bn, 4th Marines and the 4th Bn, 2d ARVN regiment.
- (12) The following thrust points are in effect until 022400H December 1967:

BASEBALL TERMS	1068
GIRLS NAMES	1869
SPORTS	1667
MONTHS	1166
FRUITS	1368
STATES	1465
COLORS	1765
FLOWERS	2075
TREES	1070
CITIES	1371
MEATS	1570
CIGARETTES	1468

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.

- (1) Primary source is LSA located at DONG HA. Company supplies will provide all class II supplies.
- (2) Medical supplies: Primary source is BAS.

b. Prescribed Loads. As prescribed by company commanders to include:

- (1) Class I - 2 days
- (2) Class V - BA
 - 280 rds per rifle
 - 1000 rds per machine gun
 - 4 M-26 grenades per man
 - 27 rds per M-79
 - 6 rds per 3.5 rocket launcher
 - 30 rds per 60mm mortar
 - 1 LAAG per sqd.

- (3) Adequate colored smoke and pyrotechnics
- (4) One protective mask per individual.

c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by company commanders to include flak jackets, helmets and ID tags.

d. Resupply.

- (1) Primary means will be by helicopter.
- (2) Company commanders will submit requests by 1000H of the day prior to resupply. First day of resupply will be D+1.
- (3) Resupply requests will be consolidated by the S-4A and submitted to the S-4 via the Bn Admin Net.
- (4) Emergency resupply will normally be used only for Class V and water.

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- e. Hospitalization and Evacuation.
 - (1) Primary means of evacuation will be by helicopter Co D, 3rd Med Bn.
 - (2) Helicopter evacuation in accordance with standard procedure.
 - (3) BAS will be established in the vicinity of the Bn CP. BAS will handle all casualties in the event that helo med evac is not possible.
- 5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
 - a. CP group initially with Company B.
 - b. Report all CP locations when established.
 - c. Visual Signals:
 - (1) White enemy positions
 - (2) Red not secure, not safe to land
 - (3) Violet/Green secure, safe to land
 - (4) Yellow friendly positions
 - d. Radio nets and frequencies:

(1) Regt TAC #1	42.95	M174
(2) Regt TAC #2	64.5	M474
(3) Bn TAC	60.35	M389
(4) Bn ADMIN	47.2	M238
(5) TACP LOCAL	35.2	
(6) MED EVAC COMMON	45.7	
(7) TAD PURPLE	369.9	
 - e. 9th Marines will have a forward position at C-2. All traffic on the Regt. TAC will be passed to that position.
 - f. A Bn Admin net will be manned in the rear to receive admin traffic.

E. A. Deptula
E. A. Deptula
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX

✓ A (Operations Overlay)

Distribution: Special

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TAB O
TO
ENCLOSURE 1.

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010600H

TO 020600H

Nov

1967

MONTH

YEAR

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	DAY	SEC	INCIDENTS, LOGS, ORDERS	TIME
0920	1		(From Co. D) A helicopter lost power while hovering over LZ and was forced down. Chain saws are due to arrive in area in order to free chopper. Co. D providing security.	
1030	2		Co.'s A, B, C, CP moving to objective 5.	
1115	3		Co. B at YD 518229 while enroute to obj. 5 found large blood stains and NVA bandage wrapper along trail.	
1105	4		At YD 518232 lead elements of Co. B found two bunkers with connecting tunnels. Hooch above ground contained ammo clips, cartridge belts, canteens, packs and clothes still on line. Est. 4-5 NVA. NVA fired on lead elements with S/A while investigating area. Cont. mission. 1 Fr. WIA non-ovac.	
1730	5		1/4 CP and Co. B arrived obj. 5.	
1730	6		Co. C arrived obj. 5, no contact.	
1800	7		Co. A arrived obj. 5, no contact.	
			Cumulative total of GRANITE casualties: 19 KIA Fr. 61 WIA Fr. 5 WIA Fr. non-ovac 21 NBC	

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020600H

TO 030600H

Nov

1967

[REDACTED] KOMND [REDACTED] YEAR
CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

0000H	0000H	ACT	INFO	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACROSS	TAKEN
0900	1			Co. D still providing security for downed chopper at YD 508221.		
0930	2			Co. A and Co. C sending plat. sixe patrols out. One patrol for Co. C and two patrols for Co. A.		
1115	3			Thrust point "K" added for inter Bn. use at YD 5525.		
1	4			Co. B sending out daytime ambush in area where they found hooches yesterday.	4th MAR, CO.C, M, and S-3	
(late ontary)	5			At 0930H D-3 at YD 507225 (en. at YD 506226) spotted 8-10 VC. Squad fired at enemy. Estimated 6-8 VC wounded in fire fight. VC fired back with S/A and RPG. Co. D lost comm and sent up squad as reinforcement. Three VC were actually spotted wearing jungle utilities with no hats. No weapons seen. VC retreated SW. Retd. fire with S/A, gunship and arty. Search ed out area and found fin assembly of RPG. Found no blood or drag marks. 6 Fr. WIA's (5 evac, 1 non-evac)		
1200	6			At YD 518228 Co. B security for water detail recd. 1 burst A/W fire from one NVA in tree platform. Retd. fire with S/A. Continued mission. 1 NVA KIA (C). 1 Fr. WIA non-evac.	S-3, 4th 1. MAR, CO.C	
1213	7			Co. B daytime ambush set in.		
1215	8			Co. B water run departing CP.		
1250	9			A-1 plat. patrol departed CP.		
1315	10			Co. B water run retd. CP.		
1730	11			A-1 patrol retd. CP.		
1740	12			All daytime activities of Co. A & C in CP.		
1758	13			Co. D arrived obj. 5.		
1800	14			Com. totals: Fr. 19 KIA; 66 WIA evac; 6 WIA non-evac; 22 NBC.		
1805	15			Day's summary. 1/4 Co. A, B, C conducted small unit S/M operations around Obj. 5. Co. D at obj. 5 after relieved of chopper security.		

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030600H

040600H

Nov

1967

MONTH YEAR
CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	NO.	DTG	INCOMING, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0815	1		1/4 with command group began moving toward obj. 6.	
1315	2		Co. C at 03110H found five bunkers with interlocking tunnels. Blew bunkers in place.	
1550	3		Obj. 6 secured.	

Journal Closed 040600H Nov67

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040600H

TO 050600H

Nov

1967

MONTH

YEAR

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME IN OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	SECTION TAKER
0635	1		Co. D moved out with OP Cmd. Grp. toward Camp EVANS.	S-3
0720	2		Co. B, Co. A and Co. C moved out to execute Phase II. Route #66 will be used as LOD for sweep of 00 BI THANH TAN Valley. Co. D will move out ahead toward Camp EVANS for future operation.	
0945	3		Co. D arrived Camp EVANS.	
1000	4		Co. A, B and C crossed the saddle and arrived low ground.	
1100	5		Co. C at YD 536257 tripped one booby trap. 105mm round with pressure device was booby trap. 1. Fr. KIA.	
1200	6		C-2 at YD 530240 found bunker complex consisting of 3 bunkers and connecting tunnels. Blew in place. No gear or equipment found.	
1210	7		Co. C and Co. B arrived LOD and getting on line.	
1255	8		Co. A arrived LOD and getting on line.	
1300	9		Co.'s A, B, and C crossing LOD for Phase II Operation GRANITE with sweep of valley toward Camp EVANS of 8000 meters.	
1720	10		All units arrived in perimeter Camp EVANS, terminating Operation GRANITE.	
2000	11		Issued Op Order 17-67 for Phase II Operation Granite. Co. C and D will provide blocking forces for ARVN S/D operations beginning 050930H Nov67.	
2040	12		Red alert drill held by 3-26.	
Journal Closed 050600H Nov67				

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050600H ^{TO} 060600HNov 1967
MONTH YEAR

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	OPP	NO.	INFO	ACTION
			INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	EXPLAN
1000	1		Co. C and D began movement by vehicle to blocking positions JAW Op Order 17-67.	
1000	2		Two sections 81mm mortars retd. to Camp EVANS from fwd. arty base at Hill #674.	
1110	3		Co. C and D arrived blocking position ANVIL and FORGE JAW 1st Mar Op Order 50-67.	
1915	4		Co. C and D are set in position for nighttime activities of Op Order 17-67. All units participating in JPI's and ambushes.	

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060600H

070600H

Nov

1967

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

1650	1	D-2 plat. going 500meters around CP.
1655	2	Co. C and D arrived at Camp EVANS after providing blocking positions for ARVN.
1700	3	Co. B retd. from convoy security.
	4	At 1700H terminated Operation GRANITE. Began Operation NEOSHO.

Journal Closed 070600H Nov67

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070600H

080600H

Nov

1967

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

IN 1000 1000 1000 JOURNAL, 1000, ORDERS

0600

Recd. 11th Mar Op Order 54-67.

Journal Closed 080600H Nov67

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080600H

TO 090600H

Nov

1967

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES
0800	INCIDENCE, PLGS, CROSSES	
1330	1. Co. C departed Camp EVANS for fwd. arty base IAW Op Order 19-67.	
1410	2. Co. C reached fwd. arty position at YD 636250.	S-3
1800	3. Issued Op Order 19-67.	

Journal Closed 090600H Nov67

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090600H

100600H

Nov

1967

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES	TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES
0710	1	First wave left LZ at Camp EVANS for operation vic. YD 5718.			
0815	2	Co.'s B and A in LZ Crane and Pelican. No contact.			
0830	3	Co. A is moving out of LZ. (Pelican)			
0910	4	Co. A found two empty sampans vic. YD 583185. Destroyed in place.			
1030	5	Co. B at 1030H at coord YD 570180 found two partially sunk sampans. Investigated and destroyed in place.			
1220	6	Co. A at YD 584188 found 3 bunkers with reinforced overhead. Bunkers were 1x5x7, 1x4x5 and 1x3x4. Located approx. 10 meters from river. Found 3 sampans, $\frac{1}{2}$ gal. gas and six paddles. Destroyed in place.			
1310	7	Co. A at 1000H found five sampans in draw and fresh footprints on trail leading SE. Destroyed sampans.			
1250	8	Co. A at 1230H at coord YD 584188 found one submerged sampan. Retrieved it and destroyed same.			
1310	9	At 1300H Co. A patrol found three sampans and 2 lean-to shelters large enough for five people. Burned hooches, destroyed sampans.			
1500	10	Co. A found 1 hooch 12x12 four feet off deck, approx. 35 feet from river. Looked as it had been used in last 2 days. Found 2 rice bags with NATO and U.S. markings. Destroyed hooches, saved one bag and will retd. to SE2. Continued mission.			
1500	11	Recon insert (Jawbreaker) spotted approx. 20 VC at YD 587187. Requested Co. A to assist. Request granted.			
1900	12	Nightime positions: Co. A- YD 588182; Co. B and CP- YD 571181; Co. C-YD 636250; Co. D- YD 563187.			

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100600H

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CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

DA	OP	ACT	REMARKS, EXEC, ORDERS	DISP
0830	1		Conducted Marine Corps Birthday ceremony in new messhall with MGen B. A. Hochmuth cutting cake. Representative from each company rear attended as all units of 1st Bn, 4th Marines are engaged in combat against the enemy in the field.	
0900	2		At 0740H, Co. A at YD 586182 found two hooches approx. 10x30 and platform 3 ft. high 4x20. All 10 meters from river. Also found bomb shelter 5x10 and 6 ft. deep. In these hooches, found 10 bamboo mats 3 ft. wide, 8-10 ft. long, one empty rice bag (100 lb. type) with U.S. markings. Kept 1 mat and rice bag and will return to S-2. Destroyed rest.	
1030	3		At 0930H, Co. A at YD 579182 found 2 well made hooches 20'x20' along with 1100 lbs. of rice (11 100 lb. bags) all with U.S. markings. Also found vent believed to be tunnel complex. Checked area for possible tunnels with neg. results. Transported rice to LZ. Rest destroyed.	
1800	4		All units retd. to CP except Co. C at 1800H. Co. C will remain at fwd. arty base. Op Order 19-67.	
21	5		Recd. 4th Mar Operation Overlay to Msg 101145z to conduct 2-company S&D operations vic. GS 5624 on 11 Nov. 67.	
0125	6		Co. C recd. 15 rounds 82mm fire. Retd. 35 60mm mortar and 6 rds. 81mm. Neg results. Fire came from GS 6624.	

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TO 120600H

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CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

MISSIONS, DATES, ORDERS			ACCT/
DATE	TIME	ACTIVITY	ENTRY
1345	1	Co. B departed CP area IAW Op Order 20-67	S-3, 4th MAR
1200	2	Co. C is moving from fwd. arty base. (ref op order 19-67) enroute to Camp EVANS.	S, M
1230	3	Co. D departed CP area IAW Op Order 20-67.	S-3
1300	4	Co. C is now entering Camp EVANS.	
1600	5	Co. B at 1616H at Coord YD 527274 found three bunkers. Bunkers were covered with dirt. Est. 45 VC have been in area, approx. 6 mos. old. Blew in place.	
1800	6	Co. B at coord 542584 found 1 AP mine, will blow in place.	S,M
1800	7	Co. D found 1 500 lb. bomb, blew in place.	S,M
(late entry)	8	Co. D at 1730H at coord YD 547262 found 3 fish nets and 2 cooking pots setting in stream. Also 1 garden 50'x59'. Freshly dug. Destroyed everything.	
1930	9	Co. D at YD 549250 Starlight scope personnel spotted three figures in vic. YD 556250 also heard 3 rds. S/A fire. Called in arty mission and fired 60mm mortar. Results unknown. Will check area at first light.	

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CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	TO	NO.	PTO	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0815	TO	1		A-2 returned to Camp Evans CP from night ambush.	S-3
0940	TO	2		At YD 556254 Co. D patrol found 4 rein. bunkers made of concrete and 2 dirt bunkers 15'x20'. Also found approx. 100 lbs. of rice in various types of containers none of which were commercial. Also found 2 small animal traps made of bamboo, 1 wooden tool box with tools. Kept sample of rice and tools. Remainder of findings destroyed.	S-3, 4th MAR
1050	TO	3		Co. B at 1125H at coord YD 567244, found 1 250 lb. bomb. Will destroy in place.	
1255	TO	4		Co. D at 1030H at coord YD 556252, found 1 lantern, 1 tea kettle, garden tools, 12 bunkers (rein.) with concrete, VC propaganda sheets hung on walls, 175 lbs. of rice, 200 rds. 7.62 link, 100 rds. 30 cal., 1 block ChiCom C-4 with blasting caps, 60 rds. AK-47 enmos, chow prepared but not warm. Will destroy rice and bunkers and continue mission.	
1200	TO	5		Co. B at coord 1125H at coord. YD 567244 found one 250 lb. bomb. Blew in place.	
1230	TO	6		Co. B at 121300H at 585244 recd. 3 rds. A/W fire from estimated 1 VC about 11,00 meters S/W of them. Called in arty mission, excellent coverage on target, neg. results.	S-3
1450	TO	7		Co. D-2 at 1215H at YD 567254 found 1 55 gal. drum of rice embedded in ground, small no. BA-30's, one undetonated 81mm rd., 4 U.S. ammo cans filled with rice, one Vietnamese mess kit, 2 U.S. canteen cups, 1 U.S. canteen, 1 ash can filled with bamboo shoots, cooking fire still warm, 1 Vietnamese tennis shoe, 1 metal box with hammer and other small tools, cooking pots and pans with garden tools, one insect sprayer, 1 weaving wheel for making fish nets, two tea kettles, 1 fish net, two gallon containers filled with rice, 2 Vietnamese canteens, 1 section of napalm tank, 1 bunker 5x8 four feet from ground to roof, 1 large hooch with tin roof, mats and chairs. Kit Carson says it would probably sleep 10 VC. Possibly used by an officer, Lt. or below. One block Chinese TNT, 1 syringe with needle, few pieces of kaki clothing, 2 freshly dug gardens 30x50. Took samples, destroyed rest.	S-3

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120600H cont. to 130600H cont.

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YEAR

CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	DATE	PO.	DFG	INCIDENTS, KILLS, OUTINGS	ACTION	VAR EW
1505		8		Co. B at 1250H at YD 583241H found one bunker 8 ft. long, 2 ft. wide and 3 ft. deep. Blew in place.	S-3	
1938		9		Co. B-3 at 0630H at YD 585246 found 7 sets of fresh footprints heading in southwesterly direction. Called in arty mission in vicinity. Good coverage. One ambush in vicinity.	S-3	

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130600H

TO 140600H

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CAMP EVANS, PHONG DIEN

TIME	ACT	IN OUT	PO	INFO	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0830	1				All night activities are in. Co. A is moving at 0800 enroute to Camp EVANS.	
0845	2				Co. A arrived at Camp EVANS.	
0925	3				Co. C is moving to Phu Bai for further operations. Co. C will become OpCon to 2/26.	
0945	4				Co. D at 0910H at YD 567248 found 3 rein. bunkers of logs and dirt, 8x10, one CS grenade, 1 WP 3.5 rd, 50 lbs. of rice in U.S. ammo cans and baskets. Destroyed bunkers in place. At 0945 permission to destroy rice was granted by Regt. S-2.	
1029	5				Co. B at YD 600259 at 1010H recd. approx. 4-5 rds. sniper fire from est. 1 VC. Retd. 4 M-79, 50 S/A, 20 rds. M60. VC 400 meters east of Co. B position. Searched area, neg. results.	
1110	6				Co. B at 1110H at coord. YD 587257 found footprints est. 3 VC heading NE.	
1600	7				Co. C 1/1 chopped OpCon to 2/26 at 130600H.	
	8				Co. D-1 at 1600H spotted two VC at 519264. VC wearing poncho and grass hats, neg. weapons. Fired S/A at VC and VC fled in a NE direction.	S-3

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150600H

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Camp Evans, RVN

TIME	IN	OUT	NO.	INFO	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	SECTION	SECTION
0850			1		(Fr: Co D) 1st Platoon of Co D, at 0745H at YD 513274 tripped a booby trap while heading west on trail. Booby trap was a M-26 delayed with a tripping device in a C-ration can. 1 FR/WIA (Evac)		S, M, 4th COC
09			2		Trucks arrived to extract Company D, at YD 505286.		-do-
1007			3		Company D arrived at Camp EVANS.		-do-
1010			4		(Fr: Co B) At 0945H at Coord YD 578247 a Company B unit, while trying to find stream crossing, rec'd approx 50 rds A/W fire from tree line at YD 578248 and 579247 from an estimated 6 to 7 VC. Ret'd fire with S/A and A/W and M-79, M-60 also called in arty mission, searched area with negative results.		-do-
1310			5		Extraction of Company B by helo began.		-do-
1400			6		Company A with attachments of 81's was committed as security element for downed helicopter at vic YD 295269.		-do-
1405			7		The commitment of Company A and 81's was cancelled by the 4th Marines.		-do-
1535			8		The last element of Company B arrived at Camp EVANS		-do-

JOURNAL CLOSED AT
150600H November 1967

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280600H TO 280600H

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MONTH

YEAR

DONG HA, RVN

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1045		1		1/4 (Rein) departed DONG HA via trucks to attack position for Operation NEWTON.	S-3, M
1155		2		Arrived CAM LO enroute to assembly area.	M
1312		3		Dismounted trucks and proceeded in tactical march N to assembly area.	M
1428		4		Passed C-2 perimeter in march.	M
1512		5		Passed through C-2 bridge cite.	M
1630		6		Arrived at attack position at YD 128687. Setting M in for night at above coord.	M
late entry		7		At 1510, 5 Marines were evaced: 1 sprained ankle, and 4 FUO's. 5 NBC.	
2315 to 0120		8		C-1 LP at YD 131686 heard and spotted from one to two figures moving between YD 131686 and them. Unable to detect any weapons. At 2345H called in arty mission of illum. LP threw 3 M-26 grenades and retd. to lines. Results unknown. Arty secured at 0120H after expending 27 illum rds. At 290700H checked area with negative results.	S-3, M 9th MAR

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PHU BAI, RVN

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0710		1		First elements of 1/4 departed attack position for LOD.	S-3, M
0817		2		Lead elements of Co. C and D crossed LOD	S-3, M
1005		3		Assault elements reached obj. #2 with neg. contact. Continuing attack toward obj. #4.	S-3, M
1030		4		Co. C had 2 NBC (1 heat stroke, 1 back cas) and and requested med-evac, which was completed at 1100H.	S-3, S-1
1045		5		D-3 found several bunkers at YD 145693, recently used. Engrs. blew in place.	S-3, M 9th MAR
1230		6		Med-evac completed for another heat stroke Co. C.	S-1
1300		7		Co. A request med-evac for Marine bit by scorpion.	S-1
1310		8		Lead elements of Co. D and C entering Obj. #4.	S-3, M
1320		9		Obj. #4 secured.	
1400		10		Co. C moving toward Obj. #6 to link up with ARVN.	S-3, M
1519		11		Co. C secured obj. #6.	
1723		12		All units setting in at YD 162702 for nighttime posit. planning LP's and H&I fires.	S-3, M
late entry		13		At 1530, one Marine med-evac'd for sprained wrist.	S-3, S-1
Journal Closed 300600H Nov67					

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PHU BAI, RVN

TIME IN	TIME OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0700		1		Co. A and D departed as lead elements in attack north toward obj. #8.	S-3,M
0800		2		Co. B and C and Command Group moved out enroute to obj. #8.	
0800		3		Co. D arrived at obj. #8 with neg. contact.	S-3,M
0801		4		3 med-evacs from Co. A. 1 sprained foot, 2 powder burns from claymore blasting cap.	S-1
0815		5		Co. B one med-evac for feet.	S-1
0835		6		Two NBC, 1 hernia and 1 heat exhaustion.	S-1
0835		7		At YD 160715, A-1 found 1 VC cartridge belt with ChiCom grenade, 1 canteen with pouch and one pouch containing soap. Gear appeared to have been dropped. Kept gear and continued mission.	S-3,M
0950		8		All units arrived vic. obj. 8. Awaiting H-hour to continue attack. twd. obj. #10.	S-3,M
1100		9		Continued attack toward obj. 10.	S-3
1255		10		Lead elements secured obj. 10(Co. 's D and A)	S-3,M
1330		11		A-3 found bunkers and huts in obj. 10 area along with one bag of rice.	
1355		12		Fwd. elements of Co. A recd. incoming rounds from 2/9's contact on right flank with enemy. Co. A periodically marked posit. with pupups and continued mission of securing obj. 10.	
1530		13		All units arrived at Obj. 10 and setting up perimeter.	S-3,M
1830		14		D-3 found hut with 16 RPG rds, 27 60mm rds, 12 RPG motors and 2 boxes 60mm fuses. Found while investigating area. Requested to blow in place.	
2000		15		All nighttime LP's in position.	M
Journal Closed 010600 Nov67					

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160600H TO 170600H
Nov. 1967
Camp EVANS, RVN MONTH YEAR

TIME IN	OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
1150		1		Co. A terminated operation 2-67.	
1225		2		Co. A-2 at 0800H at YD 462346 spotted two VC on hill at YD 474341. Called in arty mission, had good coverage but was too far to check.	S-3
1430		3		A-1 and A-2 moving back to Camp EVANS in convoy shuttle with A-3 to follow.	
1543		4		All of Co. A back in Camp EVANS.	
late entry		5		From Co. A at 1345 at YD 471363. Popular forces captured 1 VC suspect and turned him over to Co. A to turn over to 4th Mar. Co. "A" took VC's to 4th Mar after returning.	S-3
2100		6		Red Alert drill held without 1/4 participating.	S-3

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170600H

TO

180600H

Nov.

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Camp EVANS, RVN

TIME IN	OUT	"J" NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
				Journal Closed 180600H Nov67	

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180600H TO 190600HNov. 1967MONTH NOV YEAR

PHU BAI, RVN

IN	OUT	TIME "J"	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0845	1				Lift commenced.	S-3
0847	2				L-hour delayed 15 minutes due to prep fires.	S-3
0918	3				1st wave touched down at LZ FALCON.	S-3
1048	4				Lift completed.	S-3
1130	5				Co. B moved out enroute to obj. #2.	S-3
1255	6				Co. A reached obj. #1.	S-3
1530	7				Co. B reached obj. #2.	S-3

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190600H TO 200600H

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PHU BAI, RVN

IN	TIME "J"	OUT NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0655		1		All elements moving towards assigned objectives.	S-3
0845		2		Co. A found five huts with bunkers built underneath at coord 120968. All huts were fairly old and did not appear to have been used recently. Checked huts and bunkers with negative results and destroyed at 1222 by engrs.	S-3
0935		3		Lead elements of Co. A at coordinates 118972 recd. approx. 10-15 rds. S/A fire and 1 grenade from est. 2 VC. Contact resulted in 2 fr. WIA (1 E-evac and 1 P-evac). Retd fire with S/A, A/W, M-79 and an arty mission.	S-3
1200		4		At ZC 118972, Co. A found 8 bunkers 4 ft. long, three feet wide and three feet deep. Bunkers appeared to be old but were in fairly good condition. Bunkers were destroyed in place.	S-3
1305		5		Med-evacs completed.	S-3
1400		6		Co. A recd. 5 rds. A/W fire at ZC 119971. Called arty mission.	S-3
1420		7		Co. A recd. 15 rds. A/W fire from est. 2 VC at ZC 116971. Retd. fire with S/A, A/W and called in arty.	S-3
1430		8		Co. B reached Regt. Obj. C.	
1525		9		A-2 recd. 15 rds. S/A from west at ZC 116971 from 2 VC. Retd. fire and called in arty mission.	
1645		10		Co. A secured obj. A.	
1652		11		Co. B retd. to obj. #2.	

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200600H TO 210600H

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PHU BAI, RVN

IN	TIME "J"	OUT NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
	0700	1		Co. A departed Regt. obj. A enroute to Bn. obj. #3.	S-3
	1042	2		Co. D reached obj. A.	S-3
	1045	3		Co. D-1 and D-2 at ZC 118972 recd. approx. 25 rds. S/A and 10 rds. 60mm mortar fire from undetermined number of VC at ZC 118966. Retd. fire with S/A and called in arty mission. Checked area with negative results. Contact resulted in 11 fr. WIA.	S-3
	1130	4		Co. A found one bunker and one mud 105mm round vic. coord. ZC 115976. Engrs. blew both in place.	S-3
	1250	5		Med-evacs commenced.	S-3
	1300	6		Co. A reached Bn. obj. #3.	S-3
late entry		7		At 1245H, Co. D-1 at ZC 119964 recd. approx. 60 rds. S/A from est. 2 VC at ZC 119966. Retd. fire with 150 rds. S/A and 4 rds. M-79. Enemy broke contact. Checked area with negative results.	S-3
	1500	8		Co. B reached obj. A.	S-3
	2245	9		Recd. message from John Brown cancelling Phase II of operation Cove.	S-3
Journal Closed 210600H Nov67					

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210600H TO 220600H

Nov. 1967

MONTH

YEAR

PHU BAI, RVN

TIME	"J"				
IN	OUT	NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MSGS, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN
0825		1		Co. D med-evacs completed.	
0835		2		Co. D departed night posit.	
0850		3		Co. A departed obj. #3 for blocking positions.	
1220		4		Co. B recd. 30-40 rds. A/W fire from est. 3-4 VC with 2 RPD LMG's. Retd. fire with 300 rds. M-60, 20 rds. M-79, 250 rds. S/A and called in placekicker mission of 114 rds. Action resulted in 1 fr. KIA and 2 WIA.	
1300		5		Co. A found 10 fighting holes 3'x4'x5', 1-2 weeks old. Checked area with neg. results and continue mission.	
1450		6		John Brown 6 visited Southern 6 to deliver 3rd Mar Div message 201615Z Nov67 cancelling Phase II of Operation COVE.	
1500		7		Co. C chopped opcon from 2/26 to 1/4.	
1630		8		Co. C 1st plat. provided security for truck convoy to pick up Co. A and Alfa Command Group.	
1800		9		Co.'s B, D and Bravo Command Group chopped opcon to 3rd Mar Div.	
1800		10		Operation COVE terminated.	
1830		11		Company A and Alfa Command Group arrived at PHU BAI.	

Journal Closed 220600H Nov67

[REDACTED]
HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion 4th Marines

00 7438-67

COPY 3 OF 15 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 966023:HMN:jvm
Ser. No. 003431567
29 November 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines

Ref: (a) MAKS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6541 I and 6541 II.

1. Code Name. Operation COVE
2. Dates of Operation. 180845H - 211800H Nov 67.
3. Location. THU THIEN Province, THU LOC District, RVN
4. Task Organization.

1st Bn (-) (Rein), 4th Mar
 H&S Company (-)
 Company A (Rein)
 Company B (Rein)
 Company C (Rein)

Lt Col E. A. DEPTULA
 1st Lt FAGERSTEN
 Capt THOMPSON
 Capt WIRSCHING
 Capt WEEDIE

1st Tm, Co A, 3d SP Bn
 Det, HQ Co, 4th Marines (Sniper Teams)

4TH MARINES (REIN)
 S&C FILES

00 831-67

DIRECT SUPPORT UNITS

Det, Co B, 3d Engr. Bn

COPY 3 OF 15 COPIES

5. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. General. Artillery and air were the primary supporting forces utilized in Operation COVE. Air was used in a resupply and medevac role. Movement into the operating area was by helicopter. The battalion Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) continued to operate in accordance with current doctrine. Artillery support was responsive and effective.

b. Artillery. Direct fire support for the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on Operation COVE was provided by G Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines. Three sections of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines 81mm mortar platoon were also employed in direct support. Both artillery and mortar support was responsive and accurate throughout the operation.

(1) The following missions were fired in support of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on Operation COVE.

(1) Observed	81mm	G Btry
(a) FFE	18	7
(b) Illum	2	1
 (2) Unobserved		
(a) FFE	7	12
(b) H&I	38	49
(c) Registration	0	0

c. Air. During the principle portion of the operation, mountainous terrain, with a high canopy, prevented the establishment of LZ's.

Med-evacs were accomplished by external lift from a hover. All the requests were filled, with a total of four emergency, three priority and seven routines accomplished by this method. Additionally, two routines were evacuated from a landing zone on the low ground at the completion of the operation.

Resupply was accomplished in drop zones and in one LZ. Four exceptional night resupply sorties were accomplished in answer to an emergency request, old shell holes, which were numerous throughout the area, were used for these zones.

Only one airstrike was called, this being controlled by a TACP, resulting in ten sampans destroyed. The air strike consisted of UH-1E gunships and given a BDA of 80%/85%.

d. Communications. Communications were satisfactory throughout the entire operation. On 17 November a MRC-109 with two operators was dispatched to hill 130 in the PHU LOC area to establish a relay site for communications with the rear at PHU BAI. This net was utilized primarily to pass admin traffic. However, on the 20th of November, due to unit separation and difficult terrain, the relay station passed traffic between our units in the field. This proved most satisfactory to maintain contact between units. We experienced some mutual interference between the artillery COF and the battalion TAC nets, but this problem was resolved by placing the radios a greater distance apart.

Wire communications were provided on the first and second nights for internal and external security. Due to the close proximity of the battalion CP and the company CP, there were no problems encountered. On the third night, wire was strung between the battalion CP and the Company B CP, a distance of about 300 meters. The TA-1, as in the past, proved very unreliable at this distance.

Five days supply of KAK-PX and KAK-QX sheets were issued initially. One message center man brought an extra five days supply in the event they were needed. Due to the operation securing earlier than anticipated, resupply of these sheets was not necessary.

6. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy Situation. Agent reports and sightings by recon inserts during November indicated that a buildup of enemy forces was in progress in the OA. The forces were believed to be well armed and well disciplined and were further believed to be main force VC. Later reports, just prior to the start of the operation, placed the headquarters elements and four companies of the 2nd NVA battalion in the OA. In spite of the reports, it was expected that enemy forces encountered during the operation would not exceed platoon size and that he would not fight decisive combat, but would limit his action to small unit harassing tactics.

The enemy encountered during Operation COVE are believed to be main force VC. There was no identification made of enemy units during the operation. Contacts with the enemy consisted of meeting engagements with from two to six men. The enemy utilized individual weapons and crew-served RPG light machine guns. On one occasion 60mm mortars were used against a friendly patrol. During one meeting engagement the enemy employed an RPG, but due to the dense canopy the effect was negligible.

b. Cover and Concealment. Concealment in the OA was excellent due to the dense undergrowth and the high canopy. Cover was considered good with the many trees and large rocks providing adequate protection.

c. Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and fields of fire were limited throughout the OA and at best, could be considered fair. The dense growth and canopy hampered both observation and fields of fire for distances in excess of 10 to 15 meters.

d. Obstacles. The natural steepness of the terrain and the dense vegetation are obstacles themselves and impede troop movement greatly. Rate of movement was between 300 and 500 meters per hour.

e. Avenues of Approach. These include the large valley running south-east into the mountains from GS ZC 0799 to GS ZC 0895 and the low paddy lands in the southern part of the OA, ending in GS ZC 1397.

f. Weather. Temperatures averaged from the low 80's to the high 60's. Humidity averaged to 90% and the visibility was five miles. Rain occurred nightly in the form of moderate showers and winds were mild throughout the operation.

7. MISSION. 1st Battalion (-), 4th Marines commencing L-Hour, D-Day will conduct search and destroy operations in assigned operating area in the vicinity of PHU LOC, to capture/destroy enemy logistic caches, installations and materials, obtain intelligence, and kill or capture enemy personnel.

8. CONCEPT of OPERATIONS. The 1st Battalion (-) (Rein), 4th Marines, moves by truck convoy to the staging area in the vicinity of the PHU BAI Airfield. At L-Hour on D-Day the 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 4th Marines lands three companies in LZ FALCON by helicopter. After securing LZ, two companies and command group conduct search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective A and one company conducts search and destroy operations toward Regimental Objective C. On order, sweep NW toward blocking positions D and E. Be prepared to continue Phase II on order.

9. EXECUTION. Companies A, B and D and Command Group departed Camp EVANS at 171400H November 1967 and moved by truck convoy to the PHU BAI Staging area, arriving at approximately 171630H November 1967.

18 November 1967 At 0845H, the helicopter lift commenced. The first wave touched down at 0918H in LZ FALCON. The lift was completed at 1048H.
At 1530H, Company B arrived at Objective 2. No contact.

19 November 1967 Company A, at coordinates ZC 120968, found five huts with bunkers built underneath the huts. All were fairly old and did not appear to have been used recently. They checked the huts and bunkers with negative results. Company D engineers destroyed same at 1222H.
Company A, at 0935H at coordinates ZC 118972, received approximately 10-15 rounds of S/A fire and one grenade from an estimated two VC. Returned fire with S/A, A/W, M-79 and an artillery mission. Results were two friendly WIA (non-evac).
At coordinates ZC 118972, Company A found three bunkers four feet long, three feet wide and three feet deep. They appeared to be old but were still in good condition. Destroyed in place.
At 1400H, Company A received five rounds A/W fire at coordinates ZC 119 971. An artillery mission was called in and the results are unknown.
At 1420H, Company A received approximately 15 rounds A/W fire from an estimated two VC at coordinates ZC 116971. Fire was returned with S/A, A/W and an artillery mission. Results were unknown.
At 1430H, Company B reached Regimental Objective C.

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The 2nd Platoon, Company A at 1525H, at coordinates ZC 116971 received approximately 15 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated two VC. Returned fire with S/A and an artillery mission, results unknown.

At 1645H, Company A secured Regimental Objective A.

At 1652H, Company B returned to Objective # 2.

20 November 1967

At 1042H, forward elements of Company D reached Objective A.

At 1045H, the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company D at coordinates ZC 118972, received approximately 25 rounds of S/A fire and 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from an undetermined number of VC at coordinates ZC 118966. Returned fire with S/A and artillery mission, and checked area with negative results. The contact resulted in 11 friendly WIA.

At 1130H, Company A found one bunker and one dud 105mm round in the vicinity of coordinates ZC 115976. Attached engineers destroyed them in place.

At 1245H the 1st Platoon, Company D received approximately 60 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated two VC at coordinates ZC 119966. They returned fire with approximately 150 rounds of S/A and 4 rounds of M-79. The enemy broke contact. Our units checked the area with negative results.

At 1300H, Company B reached Battalion Objective 3.

At 1500H, Company B reached Objective A.

21 November 1967

At 0825H, Company D med-evacs were completed.

At 1220H, Company B received approximately 30-40 rounds of A/W fire from an estimated 3-4 VC with two RPD LMG's at coordinates ZC 097783. They returned fire with 300 rounds M-60, 20 rounds M-79, 250 rounds S/A and an artillery mission. The action resulted in one friendly KIA and 2 WIA.

At 1300H, Company A found 10 fighting holes at coordinates ZC 097983. They were approximately 1-2 weeks old. No action was taken.

At 1450H, John Brown 6 visited Southern 6 to deliver CG 3d Mar Div message 201615Z Nov 67 cancelling Phase II of Operation COVE.

At 1500H, Company C chopped opcon from 2/26 to 1/4.

At 1630H, 1st Platoon, Company C, provided security for a truck convoy to pick up Company A and the Alfa Command Group.

At 1800H, Companies B and D and the Bravo Command Group chopped opcon to the 3d Mar Div. Operation COVE terminated as of 1800H.

At 1830H, Company A and the Alfa Command Group arrived at PHU B.I.

10. RESULTS.

a. Friendly Losses.

(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during Operation COVE covering the period 18 November 1967 to 21 November 1967.

USMC

Officers				Enlisted			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	1	0	0	1	13	0	0

USN

Officers				Enlisted			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

b. Enemy Losses.

VC/NVA/KIA (C) 0
VC/NVA/KIA (P) 0

VC (O) 0

Bunkers destroyed 14

Sampons destroyed 10

11. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. The battalion was assembled at PHU B.I prior to Operation COVE. Initial supply was drawn at the LS₁ at Camp EVINS. Two DOS was the prescribed load. An LS₁ was established at PHU B.I to support Operation COVE.

a. Resupply requests were channeled through the S-4 to the LS₁ via the HST. Classes I and V were provided at the LS₁. Class II was drawn at the battalion supply and delivered to the LS₁ for transportation to the operational area. All aspects of supply and resupply were very good.

b. Maintenance was adequate and 3d echelon maintenance was performed by ~~MSG-1~~.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation, and Hospitalization.

(1) First echelon medical care was performed in the field by corpsmen attached to the line companies. Those patients who required further treatment, but not hospitalization were treated by a portion of the BAS in the field, consisting of the Battalion Surgeon and six Corpsmen. Those in need of further care and/or hospitalization were evacuated by helicopter to A Med, 3rd Medical Battalion at PHU BAI.

(2) There were 96 patients seen at the Battalion Aid Station during this period.

The following is a breakdown of the casualties for the period.

KIA	1 Marine Enlisted
WIA	1 Marine Officer
	1 Navy Enlisted
	13 Marine Enlisted

(3) Medical Evaluation. Difficulty with respect to adequate and immediate medical care was minimal during Operation COVE. Evacuation of casualties was prompt and reliable. Medical resupply presented no significant difficulty.

d. Transportation was adequate. Helicopter (UH-34) transportation was utilized during the operation. The only vehicular transportation that was used was to pick up Company 4 and the Alfa Command Group at the conclusion of the operation.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT and TECHNIQUES. No special equipment or new techniques were used during Operation COVE.

13. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS.

a. General. Operation COVE was characterized by slow movement through low to medium canopy with dense undergrowth. Enemy activity consisted of harassing attacks with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. The heavy undergrowth restricted observation to such an extent that flankers had difficulty in maintaining visual contact and, consequently, had to be kept relatively near to the main body. This resulted in a significant advantage to the enemy who could hear the companies as they cut their way through the undergrowth toward the assigned objectives. The VC were able to choose positions near the established trails from where they could conduct harassing attacks on the moving units and quickly withdraw. Despite this advantage, however, the movement of companies through the undergrowth rather than on trail networks undoubtedly saved Marine lives as the trails were covered by well constructed fighting holes and bunkers.

b. Lessons Learned. Prior to D-day, personal liaison was effected between the commanders and staff of the battalion and HMM 362, the unit providing helicopter support for the lift into LZ FALCON. This pre D-day liaison included a walk through of the selected staging area and ready circles as well as agreement on possible alternate LZ's. The result of the liaison was a smooth, efficient lift into LZ FALCON.

c. C4/PSY OPS ACTIVITIES. No civic action was conducted as the battalion's OA was in an unpopulated area. Psys Ops for Operation COVE were conducted at regimental level.

14. RECOMMENDATIONS. Whenever possible, prior to helicopterborne operation, close liaison should be conducted between the helicopter unit and the supported unit. A mutual exchange of views and a discussion of the details of the lift will minimize confusion and enhance the success of the operation.

E. A. DeTulio
E. A. DeTULIO

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion 4th Marines

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COPY 1 OF 11

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

FPO San Francisco, 96602

4TH MARINES (REIN)

S&C FILES

00806-67

COPY 1 OF 11 COPIES

3:HMNadv
Ser No. 003A02067
10 November 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines

Ref: (A) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1 : 50,000, AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6442 II
 and 6441 I

1. Code Name. Operation GRANITE
2. Dates of Operation. 260600H Oct 67 - 071700H Nov 67.
3. Location. THUA THEIN province, PHONG DIEN District, RVN.
4. TASK ORGANIZATION.

1st Bn, 4th Marines (Rein)	LtCol E. A. DEPTULA
H&S Co.	Capt L. A. BROWN
Company A (Rein)	Capt A. K. THOMPSON
Company B (Rein)	Capt R. A. ROSS
	2nd Lt R. B. MORGAN
Company C (Rein)	Capt J. A. EDWARDS
Company D (Rein)	Capt C. B. SPERRY

Det, HQ Co, 4th Marines (Sniper Tms)
 Det, Co A, 3d SP Bn (HST Tms)

DIRECT SUPPORT UNITS

Co B (-), 3d AT Bn
 Plat, Co C, 3d Tk Bn
 Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

5. Supporting Forces.

a. General. Artillery and air support were used consistently throughout Operation GRANITE. Five artillery batteries were in general support of the battalion and fixed wing, gunships, and flareships were utilized whenever possible. In some instances the support was not completely satisfactory. Helicopters were utilized for all medical evasions.

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b. Artillery. From 25 October to 7 November, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines engaged. in Operation GRANITE received general support from "G" and "H" Batteries, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, "P" and "T" Batteries, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines and "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. A forward artillery support base was set up to provide the depth of coverage needed during the operation. This forward support base consisted of "G", "T" and "A" Batteries, as well as a separate FDC. The following missions were fired in support of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines from 25 October to 4 November.

Missions	Co. A	Co. B	Co. C	Co. D	FSCC	Total
HE	9	17	18	15	53	112
WP	176	371	369	1238	1180	3634
Illum	8	62	12	21	35	138
Smoke	159	0	7	259	15	440
	0	0	1	0	0	1

Due to the broken and hilly terrain in the area of operations, preplanned, unobserved fires were found to be of only limited value. Advancing behind a wall of prep fires, spaced 200-300 meters ahead of the lead elements, proved to be an excellent method for discouraging snipers and ambushes. The FO's with the forward companies coordinated and adjusted these fires.

After Company B made solid contact with an NVA unit in the vicinity of ID 508225, heavy artillery fire was directed into the area over the next 36 hours and is credited with destroying 15-20 heavily reinforced enemy bunkers. A casualty count of enemy dead inside these bunkers was not conducted, as any bodies that might have been inside were under tons of rubble. It is probable that the same artillery fire kept the enemy from recovering or mutilating any of the dead Marines, weapons and equipment which were not immediately recovered.

The major problem in connection with artillery support during Operation GRANITE were the long and numerous delays encountered in trying to obtain "Save-a-plane" clearance to fire. On numerous occasions fire support was denied for 30 minutes or more due to helicopters in the area. Many times, these helicopters were resupplying adjacent units and artillery clearance was denied so that they could cross the Gun-Target line. Recommendations concerning coordination of helicopter supply routes with artillery fire have been submitted to higher authority.

c. Air Support. The Air Team called in numerous air strikes, TPQ's and med-evacs working directly with a variety of A/C including flare-ships, gunships, Puff, fixed wing and AO's. Emergency and priority med-evacs and TPQ's were timely and efficient while resupply med-evac helicopters and the majority of flareships proved less than satisfactory on occasion.

Emergency med-evac helicopters performed a commendable job entering hot zones and hoisting wounded from tight zones while working under marginal weather conditions, heavy vegetation and high terrain.

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frequently after last light.

A0's were able to give only limited surveillance due to the high canopy. Control of fixed wing by the TAC (A) was accomplished in a professional manner in most instances. Had the TAC (A) more frequently used artillery WP rounds as a means of marking fixed targets, fixed wing accuracy would have been enhanced.

Fixed wing were hampered by low ceiling and moderate haze which lingered in the target area throughout the operation. This was a contributing factor in the failure to get on target in most instances. Small area targets were often missed resulting in poor coverage. One A6 flying a single pattern dropped its ordnance without a single hit on target. Proprietary fires by fixed wing scheduled for morning hours were often postponed, thereby delaying friendly tactical movement.

Flare planes with the call sign "Basketball" proved unsatisfactory, dropping illumination great distances from the target area, flying too loose a pattern and dropping many duds. "Dreamhour" flareship proved far more satisfactory working in direct conjunction with night med-evac helicopters. Puff was utilized once, expending 11,600 rounds 200 meters from the friendly perimeter. Gunships were utilized on two enemy contacts, expending ordnance 50 meters from the friendlies.

Helicopters flying in the Area of Operation without checking in on the TAC net caused delay and confusion with artillery fires. Helicopters of the same type, often took various weight loads resulting in gear not being staged correctly and time lost on the ground while coordination between ground personnel and ~~pilots~~ was accomplished. Communications caused another problem. Air strikes were unable to be controlled on VHF because of the down status of the PRC-41's. Had VHF capability been maintained, one flight of Puff would not have been diverted and direct communications with fixed wing by the ground controller would have achieved better results.

Total Sorties Operation GRANITE:

Med-evac sorties	27
Fixed wing sorties	35
TPQ's	12
Gunship Sorties	10
Puff	1
Flareship	4
Resupply	45

6. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation GRANITE.

It was expected that this battalion would encounter enemy forces up to and including company strength. It was further expected that the enemy would be NVA regular soldiers as opposed to VC guerrillas. These forces were expected to be well armed and equipped, and well disciplined and organized. The battalion expected to encounter frequent mines and booby traps in the OA.

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b. Enemy Situation During Operation GRANITE.

The enemy encountered during Operation GRANITE were proven to be NVA regular soldiers. Positive identification was made of the C-2 Company of K-12 Battalion. Contacts were sporadic and consisted of mostly snipers, with one exception. On 27 October, 1967, Company "B" made contact with a ~~well~~ dug in enemy estimated to be two platoons of NVA. The enemy was well armed and organized and maintained contact by aggressive attacks and maneuvers. Mines and booby traps were encountered in the OA, but not in as large a number as was anticipated.

c. Cover and Concealment.

The terrain progressed from rolling lowlands to mountains and a variety of cover and concealment was found. In the lowlands, cover was sparse and consisted of paddy dikes and bomb craters. In the mountains cover was more readily available and consisted of large rocks, trees and bomb craters. Concealment was good throughout the OA. In the low lands it consisted of waist high brush and occasional tree lines. In the mountains concealment of dense undergrowth and heavy canopy which rose as high as 70 feet was found.

d. Observation and Fields of Fire.

Observation is good in the low lands and is poor in the mountains due to the density of the undergrowth. Fields of fire in the lowlands are generally good but are considered poor in the mountains due to the trees and thick brush.

e. Critical Terrain Features.

The most prominent terrain feature in the OA is the CO BI THANH TAN Ridge, which halves the OA.

f. Obstacles.

The major obstacles in the OA is the CO BI THANH TAN Ridge which averages 300 to 400 meters in elevation. The perpendicular spurs jutting off the major ridges present a restriction to movement except on trails and in stream beds.

g. Avenues of Approach.

There are numerous avenues of approach in the OA. Trails are abundant but movement is hazardous during the monsoon season due to the treacherous footing. In addition all trails are invariably well bunkered.

h. Weather.

Temperatures ranged from a high of 82 degrees to a low of 70 degrees. Relative humidity averaged 80% and visibility was about 7 miles. Rain showers fell in the course of one late afternoon and evening.

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7. Mission. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines commencing at H-Hour on D-Day in cooperation/coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) forces and BLT 1/3, conducts Search and Destroy operations in the VC/NVA Base Area 114, vicinity Hill 674 (YD 5121) to capture/destroy logistic caches, installations, and equipment; obtain intelligence, and kill or capture enemy encountered.

8. Concept of Operations. On D-2, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines move one company by foot to vicinity YD 519260 to secure assembly area, conduct search and destroy operations and carry out extensive reconnaissance patrols. On order, on D-1, move one company with tanks and onto to vicinity YD 501289 as security for forward artillery position. On D-1 two companies and command group move by foot under cover of darkness to assembly area. At first light on D-Day conduct search and destroy operations along designated axis toward battalion Objective 1 and 2. On order continue attack toward regimental objective A and C. (See Enclosure 1)

9. Execution. Companies C and D and Command Group departed Camp EVANS at 2000H on 25 October 1967 and moved by foot to the vicinity YD 505287. Guides from Company B guided the battalion (-) into the designated assembly area (YD 519260) arriving at approximately 260300H.

At 260645H the battalion (-) crossed the LD and began Operation GRANITE. Company D and the Command Group Company B (YD 512245 and YD 519245) and commenced the attack toward battalion objective 2. Company C commenced the attack toward battalion objective 1 (YD 501235) via the high ground in the vicinity of YD 508246. Company B followed in trace Company D.

26 October 1967.

At 1010H lead elements of Company D received 20-30 rounds of A/W fire from YD 513223 resulting in three WIA (med-evac). The lead elements returned fire with S/A and M-79's at close range. The enemy broke contact immediately and fled. There were no apparent enemy casualties.

At 1355H, the lead elements of Company D, near YD 5112 received 10-15 rounds 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YD 510230 resulting in one minor WIA. Returned fire with 60mm and 81mm and enemy mortar fire ceased.

At 1520H, 2nd Platoon, Company "D", vicinity YD 511235 discovered 6-8 bunkers with interconnecting tunnels. The bunkers and tunnels were destroyed.

Company "D" received approximately 15 rounds of A/W fire from YD 509234 resulting in three WIA. Fire was returned with S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortars.

27 October 1967

At 0725H, Company "C" in the vicinity of YD 502236, discovered two bunkers, three canteens, two sticks of

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dynamite and one light ChiCom machine gun. All gear was destroyed and the machine gun was returned to Bn. S-2.

At 1120H, the point of Company "B", vicinity YD 508225 heard movement approximately 50 meters to the right flank. The point fired to the front and right flank with 150 rounds S/A and 300 rounds of M60 machine gun. An estimated 6-10 enemy returned fire with approximately 150 rounds of A/W fire and then broke contact. An artillery mission was fire and a subsequent area sweep produced negative results.

3d Platoon, Company "C" received approximately 100 round of A/W fire and grenades from VC dug in on ridge line in the vicinity of YD 505225. Fire was returned with S/A, M-79 and M60 machine guns. An artillery mission was called on the fortified position. Two WIA were sustained in the action.

At 1436H, point elements of Company "B" made contact at YD 508224 receiving 30 rounds of A/W fire. Fire was returned resulting in one NVA KIA (C) with one AK-47, one pack, E-tool, cartridge belt, personal diary and ID papers captured. The diary disclosed that the C-4 Company of the 800th NVA Bn had been in the area three months with a mission of guiding and scouting for the 800th Bn.

At 1445H, Company "B" at YD 508222 made heavy contact while advancing toward OBJECTIVE A with an unknown size NVA force. The Company Commander was wounded during the initial contact but remained in control of the company. An estimated 50-100 NVA firing S/A, A/W and RPG's tried to surround the company. An 81mm mortar and artillery mission was sent in along with a gunship request.

At 1620H, Company "B" again requested an artillery mission but the request was denied due to planes and helicopters in the area. Gunships were utilized with good results.

At 1630H, Company "B" was still receiving S/A and MG fire from the east and west slopes of the ravine. Company "B" reported that ammunition was getting low.

At 1647H, Company "B" was advised to consolidate into a tight perimeter and that Company "D" (-) was being dispatched to aid them in disengaging from the enemy and to assist them in removing casualties.

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At 1708H, Company "B" radio operator called in the first artillery mission that was adjustable. Company "B" was now in a tight perimeter and attempting to remove casualties.

At 1714H, artillery fired for effect around Company "B".

At 1730H, Battalion CP at YD 513235 had improved the IZ and completed all possible preparations to receive casualties.

At 1731H, Company "D" (-) made contact with Company "B".

At 1733H, Company "D" (-) called an artillery mission to support movement of Company "B" to Battalion CP.

At 1752H, an AO observed NVA massing casualties on hill. An air strike was requested but was denied due to proximity of friendly troops.

At 1755H, Company "B" started movement with wounded to Battalion CP. Company "D" continued its efforts to retrieve Company "B" dead from the battle field.

At 1915H, Company "C", in the vicinity of YD 503226 received S/A fire and one incoming grenade resulting in one WIA.

At 2040H, Company "C", in the vicinity of YD 505230 received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. No casualties were taken and no counter mortar was possible at that time due to helicopters in the area.

Company "D" received approximately 100 rounds of A/W fire and grenades while retrieving Company "B" casualties. Company "D" sustained two KIA and two WIA in the action. Fire was returned with S/A and an artillery mission.

At 2330H, all elements of Companies "B" and "D" had returned to the Battalion CP with the exception of nine Company "B" dead who could not be reached on the battlefield. Med-evacs were in progress.

28 October 1967

At 0030H, all priority and emergency med-evacs were completed. Summary of casualties for Company "B" action on 27 October 67 stood at 5 KIA, 4 MIA, 31 WIA and 8 NBC. Enemy casualties were 13 NVA KIA (C) and 10 NVA KIA (P).

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At 1055H, a fixed wing strike of the valley complex where Company "B" made contact commenced.

At 1405H, Company "A" completed a helicopter move from foward artillery position to Battalion CP.

At 1855H, Company "C" secured the crest of OBJECTIVE 2 in the vicinity of YD 505226. Eight unoccupied bunkers were uncovered with great amounts of blood estimated to be one day old. Bunkers were destroyed. The Battalion CP was relocated at YD 513232 with Companies "A", "B" and "D" providing perimeter security. Company "C" remained at OBJECTIVE 2.

29 October 1967

At 0930H, Company "D" commenced movement to a position to start sweep of valley complex where Company "B" had made contact.

At 1150H, Company "D" commenced search of the valley in the vicinity of YD 507225.

At 1307H, Company "A" commenced movement to sweep east side of valley while Company "D" swept west side. Company "C" remained on top of Hill 300 as a blocking force.

At 1430H, forward elements of 3d Platoon, Company "A" received heavy A/W fire from an unknown number of NVA while moving toward mouth of draw in the vicinity of YD 509229. Fire was immediately returned and Company "A" commenced moving to flank of enemy.

At 1445H, Company "A" commenced receiving extremely accurate sniper fire from a high powered rifle.

At 1519H, Company "A" requested the Bn. CP to send stretchers and stretcher bearers up to assist in removing dead and wounded from the battle field.

At 1528H, Company "D" commenced movement to aid Company "A". Company "A" reported that NVA were in trees and bunkers with carefully planned and cleared killing zone.

At 1645H, Company "A" assumed blocking position at YD 509229 while Company "D", YD 509223, and Company "C", YD 507226, swept south on both sides of valley towards Company "A".

At 1730H, Company "D" contacted Company "A" and commence collecting wounded, dead and equipment. Company "A" killed one NVA and captured one AK-47 in their contact.

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At 1830H, Company "A" while setting in night defensive positions tripped an unknown explosive device resulting in one KIA and one WIA.

At 1831H, Company "D" swept the bunker complex and recovered all bodies of friendly MIA's and KIA's. The sweep revealed 20-30, two to four man bunkers, the majority of which had been destroyed by air strikes and artillery fire. Time prevented detailed inspection of the area; however, a heavy odor of death prevailed.

30 October 1967

At 0030H, Company "D" returned to the Battalion CP. Company "A" 's contact on 29 October 67 resulted in 8 friendly KIA and 16 friendly WIA.

At 1015H, Company "G", vicinity YD 508226 received S/A and A/W fire from YD 509228 resulting in one WIA. Fire was returned and enemy fire ceased.

At 2150H, four to five rounds of friendly artillery landed in Company "A" 's position in the vicinity of YD 508225 causing 3 WIA's, all emergency med-evacs.

31 October 1967

At 0650H, Companies "A" and "C" commenced attack toward OBJECTIVE A.

At 0715H, point element of Company "A" found a hut at YD 508222 containing 400 lbs. of rice. The hut and rice were destroyed.

During Search and Destroy operations toward OBJECTIVE A, Companies "A" and "C" discovered 11 huts on the side of Hill 674 between YD 508222 and YD 511215. The huts were well constructed, four to five months old and each capable of sleeping 25 people. All were burned.

At 1300H, OBJECTIVE A secured. No enemy contact or evidence of recent enemy activity was found in the area.

At 1730H, Companies "A" and "C" returned to YD 508224 and set in night defensive positions.

01 November 1967

At 0930 a helicopter lost power while hovering over LZ at YD 508225 and was forced down. Chain saws were brought into area to clear a zone to remove the helicopter. Company "D" provided security at the site until the helicopter could be removed.

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At 1400, Company "B" at YD 518229, while enroute to Objective 5, found large blood stains and NVA type bandage wrappers along trail.

Lead elements of Company "B", at YD 518232, found two bunkers with connecting tunnels and a hut above ground containing ammunition clips, cartridge belts, canteen packs and clothing on clothes line. It was estimated facilitating 4 to 5 NVA. NVA fired on lead elements with S/A. Fire was returned, the area was investigated with negative results and the mission was continued. 1 friendly WIA (non-evac)

At 1730H, the Battalion CP and Companies "A", "B" and "C" arrived at Objective #5.

02 November 1967

At 0930H, one squad, third platoon, Company "D" at YD 507225 spotted 8 to 10 VC. The squad fired at enemy resulting in an estimated 6 to 8 enemy wounded. Enemy returned fire with S/A and RPG. Company "D" lost communications with the squad. One squad was sent to reinforce the squad in contact. The area was searched out resulting in the discovery of an RPG fin assembly but no blood stains or drag marks were found. 6 Fr. WIA (1 non-evac)

At 1200H, Company "B" at YD 518228 providing security for water detail, received one burst of A/W fire from one NVA on a platform in a tree. Fire was returned with S/A resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 friendly WIA (non-evac).

03 November 1967

At 1805H, Company "D" arrived at objective 5.

04 November 1967

At 0815H all 1 1/4 units began moving toward objective 6. At 1550 Objective 6 was secured.

At 0630H, Company "D" with command group commenced move towards Camp EVANS.

At 0720H Company "A" and "B" moved out to execute a sweep of the CO BI THANH TAN Valley.

At 0945H Company D arrived at Camp EVANS with the Command Group.

Company "C" at YD 536257 tripped a 105mm round rigged as a mine with a pressure firing device.

1 friendly KIA. The squad was able to clear the mine and continue the mission.

At 1000H Company "D" at YD 536257 provided security.

At 1100H Company "D" at YD 536257 provided security.

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2nd Platoon, Company "C", at YD 530240 found a bunker complex of 3 bunkers and connecting tunnels. The bunkers were destroyed.

At 1302H Companies "A" and "B" crossed the IOD.

At 1930H, all units arrived in perimeter at Camp EVANS terminating operation GRANITE, PHASE I.

At 2000H OP order 17-67 was issued on phase II of Operation GRANITE. Companies "C" and "D" provided blocking forces for ARVN search and destroy operations beginning 05 0930H Nov.

05 November 1967 At 1000H two sections of 81mm mortars returned to Camp EVANS from Hill 674.

At 1110H Companies "C" and "D" arrived in blocking positions ANVIL and FORGE IAW 4th Mar OP Order 50-67.

06 November 1967 At 1700H, Companies "C" and "D" arrived at Camp EVANS terminating Operation GRANITE.

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10. Results.**UNCLASSIFIED**a. Friendly Losses

(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the Battalion, during Operation GRANITE covered the period 26 October 1967 to 4 November 1967.

U.S.M.C.OfficersEnlisted

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	5	0	0

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
21	55	0	3

U.S.N.OfficersEnlisted

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
0	0	0	0

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>
1	6	0	0

(2) There were no major items of equipment or material losses.

b. Enemy Losses

VC/NVA KIA (C)	-	17
VC/NVA KIA (P)	-	19
Wpns Captured	..	2 AK-47's
		1 RPD
Booby Traps/Destroyed	---	2
S/A Ammo Captured	..	30 rounds AK-47 Ammo
Bunkers Destroyed	..	70
Huts Destroyed	..	13
Rice Captured	..	400 Pounds

11. Administrative Matters. Resupply of Classes I and V were pre-planned to the maximum extent possible. Resupply by helicopter commenced on D+2 on a routine basis as scheduled; however, initial resupply was not completed until the following day due to Med Evac a. All resupply was received but the timeliness, due to helicopter availability, was not always desirable. A total of 45 lifts for such class II items as jungle utilities and nylon stretchers was needed. Adequate LZ's could not be found in many areas and resupply had to be "kicked" out of the helicopter. Body bags were an item found to be needed at the LZ for use by Med Evacs. The only item of resupply that became critical was 81mm ammunition for the mortar platoon on Hill 674.

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a. Supply techniques. Supplies were adequate for this operation. A Basic Allowance of Class V was carried by all personnel.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance was performed at Camp EVANS.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization.

First echelon medical care was performed in the field by Corpsmen attached to the line companies. Those patients who required further treatment but not requiring hospitalization were treated by a contingency of the Battalion Aid Station in the field consisted of the Medical Officer and eleven Corpsmen. Those requiring further treatment and/or hospitalization were evacuated to Regimental Aid Station, Fourth Marines, Camp EVANS, or Company A, Third Medical Battalion, PHU BAI.

There were one hundred and two patients seen at the Battalion Aid Station during this period.

The following is the break down of casualties for the period:

21 Marine Enlisted KIA
1 Navy Enlisted KIA
3 Marine Enlisted DOW
5 Marine Officers WIA
55 Marine Enlisted WIA
6 Navy Enlisted WIA

Significant Medical Entities were:

Diarrhea	6	Tonsillitis	4
Immersion Foot	10	Fungal Infection	8
Cellulitis	11	Headache	3
Anxiety reaction	2		

d. Transportation. Vehicular transportation was not used.

e. Communications.

(1) Communications were satisfactory throughout Operation GRANITE. In the late afternoon of 27 October, during the time Company "B" was engaged in a heavy fight with the enemy, some interference was received on the 81 COF net for about ten minutes. On the same day, Company "B" lost one AN/PRC-25 with an H-138 handset and two whip antennas. The radio had been shot twice and the operator turned it off frequency, so there was no compromise. On 29 October all UHF-TAD capabilities were lost due to bad PRC-41's.

(2) FM radio nets activated during the period covered were; Battalion TAC, Regimental TAC, TACP local, Arty COF, and 81 COF, and HST net. Relay on hill 674 was available for all nets except the Battalion TAC.

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(3) Wire and sound power phones were utilized for communications between the COC and Company CP's located in the vicinity of the Battalion CP. This means proved satisfactory for the entire operation.

f. Medical Evaluation.

Minimum difficulty was experienced with respect to adequate and immediate medical care during Operation GRANITE. Evacuation of casualties was prompt and reliable. Much valuable assistance was rendered by the Regimental Aid Station, 4th Marines, and Battalion Aid Station, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines.

13. Commanders Analysis.

a. General. Operation GRANITE was characterized by slow movement in rugged, boulder strewn terrain with steep gradients, medium to high canopy and heavy undergrowth. Movement was much slower than anticipated due to the terrain. A realistic rate of movement in the area proved to be 1000-1500 meters per day. Enemy activity consisted of small delaying actions and sniper activities with occasional strong points along likely avenues of approach. Two means were utilized to thwart this tactic. One was to stay off all existing trails and to utilize flank security regardless of the density of undergrowth. The other was to keep advancing behind a wall of artillery prep fire spaced 200-300 meters ahead of lead elements.

The mission assigned to 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was successfully carried out. The number of enemy kills is undoubtedly higher than the final figure shows as the bunker complex in the valley between hill 674 and 340 (ID 6022) was smashed and buried by artillery and air strikes. No assessment of enemy dead was made due to the time element and tactical commitments, but a heavy odor of death was present, indicating that enemy dead were in the bunkers.

No Civic Action was conducted during the operation and all PsyOps activities were initiated at regimental level.

b. Problems Encountered.

The most significant problem, from a tactical viewpoint, was the interference of artillery fire by air traffic. This has been covered in paragraph 5 above. Another problem encountered was the difficulty of being resupplied on a timely basis due to non-availability of helicopters and the limited number of landing zones. On several occasions this delayed friendly troop movement. A third problem noted was the effect of the long tactical foot march into

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the operating area. After moving most of the night of D-1 and all day on D-day, the troops were not as fresh as desired upon nearing Objectives 1 and 2.

14. Recommendations. For future operations conducted in the GRANITE area, it is recommended that all friendly elements be lifted into the objective area by helicopter. This will enhance tactical surprise, ensure the optimum physical condition of the troops, and facilitate the closing of natural enemy escape routes.

E. A. DeTulio
E. A. DEPTUL

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion 4th Marines

60119C-68

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 966023:JAN:jvm
SerNo 003.314
10 December 1967From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th MarinesSubj: After Action Report
Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442 II
and 6441 L1. Code Name. Operation NEOSHO2. Dates of Operation. 061700H November 1967-172400H November 1967
and 221000H November - 251000H November 1967.3. Location. THUAT THANH Province, PHONG DIEN District, RVN.4. Task Organization.1st Bn, 4th Marines (Rein)
H&S Company
Company A (Rein)
Company B (Rein)
Company C (Rein)
Company D (Rein)LtCol E. A. DEPUTIA
Capt. R. G. NUNNALLY
Capt. A. K. THOMPSON
Capt. R. F. WIRSCHING
Capt. O. B. RENFRO
Capt. R. D. WEEDEDet, HQ Co, 4th Marines (Sniper Team)
Det, Co B, 3d Engr Bn (Demo Team) (9-10 November)
Det, 3d Recon Bn (Scuba Team) (9-10 November)

4/1

COPY 10 OF 15 COPIES	4TH MARINES (REIN)
	SACRILEGE
003-601	
ENCLOSURE (5)	

4/1

5. Supporting Forces.a. General. Artillery and air were the primary supporting forces utilized in Operation NEOSHO. Air was used mainly in a resupply and med-evac role, although helicopters were utilized to lift the battalion into our OA during the first part of the operation and to extract Company "B" from the CO NI THANH TAN Valley. The Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) continued to operate in accordance with current doctrine. Artillery support was responsive and effective.b. Artillery. The 1st Battalion, Fourth Marines engaged in Operation NEOSHO from 6 November to 17 November, received general artillery support from "G" Battery and "H" Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines and "P" Battery and "T" Battery, 4th Battalion, 12 Marines. No problems were encountered in any phase of fire support during this period.

ENCLOSURE (5)

TAB-R

The following missions were fired in support of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during Operation NEOSHO.

<u>Observed</u>	<u>Unobserved</u>
Targets of opportunity 26	H&I 325
Illumination 3	FFE 7
FFE 0	

c. Air Support. During Operation NEOSHO the air team provided a FAC capability for convoys, participated in all company size or larger operations, scheduled liaison and C&C flights and coordinated three troop lifts. On 9 November, 3 companies and a command group were helilifted into the SONG BO River Valley to conduct a one day search and destroy operation. With only 24 hours advance notice, planning and liaison were completed between the battalion and HMM 263, the supporting squadron. The lift commenced at 0740 from a loading zone near Highway One adjacent to the Camp EVANS access road. At 0815 the last elements of the battalion were landed on two sand bars along the river. On 10 November, during a steady rain with limited visibility and a low ceiling, the battalion was flown back to Camp EVANS. On 14 November, Company "B" was extracted from a rice paddy area, swollen by heavy rainfall. Two H-34's shuttled Company "B" four miles from the loading zone to the landing zone at Camp EVANS. The lift took a total of 90 minutes. No major problems were encountered during Operation NEOSHO.

6. Intelligence.

(1) Enemy. The enemy encountered during Operation NEOSHO were local force VC. Enemy tactics consistently included use of snipers and booby traps. There were no major engagements.

(2) Terrain. Terrain consisted of rolling type hills covered with waist high brush. Numerous streams and rice paddies were found throughout the OA.

(1) Terrain Features. Key terrain features in the OA included the SONG O LAU River which flows from the Southwest to the Northeast portion of the OA and Route #1 which runs in a Northwest to Southeast direction in the north of the OA. At the southern portion of the OA, generally running East to West, is a steep ridge line which controls the entire CO BI THUH TAN Valley.

(3) Observation and Fields of Fire. These are considered good to excellent in the Camp EVANS area.

(4) Cover and Concealment. Concealment in the area is considered fair to good due to the waist high vegetation; however, cover is limited.

(5) Obstacles. The primary obstacle in the area is water. The rivers and streams, now swollen with the monsoon season, are formidable obstacles to all movement.

(6) Avenues of Approach. The principal avenues of approach are the RACH MY CH/NH River, SONG O LAU River and the CO BI TH/NH TAN Valley.

(7) Weather. Temperatures ranged from the high 80's to the low 70's during the first part of November. An increase in rainfall was noted as the monsoon season drew near.

7. Mission. 4th Marines Frag Order 51-67 directed the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines to conduct search and destroy operations in the OA, to conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications in the OA and to be prepared, on order, to assume any of the missions assigned to the 3d Bn (-), 26th Marines.

8. Concept of Operations. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines with four rifle companies conduct search and destroy operations in the OA, conduct patrol and ambush operations to interdict enemy lines of communications in OA and be prepared to assume any of the missions assigned to the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, on order.

9. Execution. In accordance with 4th Marines Frag Order 51-67, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines with Companies "A", "B", "C" AND "D" conducted aggressive search and destroy operations, ambushes, patrols and small unit activities in the Camp EVANS area.

06 November 1967 At 1700H, commenced Operation NEOSHO.

08 November 1967 Company "C" provided security for forward artillery position at coordinates YD 636250 in accordance with frag order 19-67.

09 November 1967 At 0740H, commenced helicopter lift I/M frag order 19-67.
At 0815H, Co. "A" landed in LZ PELICAN and "B" and "D" Co.'s landed in LZ CRANE. Negative contact.

At 1500H, recon insert (Jawbreaker) spotted approximately 20 VC at coordinates YD 587187. They requested Co. "A" to assist them. Request was granted. Negative contact.

Co. "A" found and destroyed 16 sampans throughout the day's activities. No significant contact was made with the enemy.

10 November 1967 Co.'s "A", "B", "D" and Command Group returned to Camp EVANS.

11 November 1967

At 0125H, Company "C" received approximately 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Returned fire with 35 rounds of 60mm and 6 rounds of 81mm, results were unknown. The enemy fire came from grid square 6624.

At 1145H, Company "B" departed Camp EVANS IAW frag order 20-67.

At 1230H, Company "D" departed Camp EVANS IAW frag order 20-67.

At 1345H, Company "C" returned to Camp EVANS from the forward artillery position.

At 1600H, Company "B" at coordinates YD 527274 found three bunkers. The bunkers were covered with dirt. Estimated 45 VC had been in area. The bunkers were approximately 6 months old; all were destroyed by demo.

At 1800H, Company "B" at coordinates YD 542258 found one AP mine, blew in place.

At 1930H, at coordinates YD 549250 Company "D" Starlight scope personnel spotted three figures in the vicinity of YD 556250. Also heard 3 rounds of S/A fire. Called an artillery mission and fired 60mm mortars with unknown results.

12 November 1967

At 0940H, Company "D" at coordinates YD 556254 found four bunkers reinforced with concrete and two 4'x30' dirt bunkers. Also found approximately 100 pounds of rice in various types of containers, none of which were commercial. Also found two small animal traps made of bamboo, and one wooden tool box with tools.

At 1255H, Company "D" at coordinates YD 556252 found one lantern, one tea kettle, assorted garden tools, twelve bunkers reinforced with concrete, VC propaganda sheets hung on walls, 175 pounds of rice, 200 rounds of 7.62mm, linked, 100 rounds of 30 caliber, 1 block of ChiCom C-4 with blasting caps and 60 rounds of AK-47 ammo.

At 1450H, Company "D" at coordinates YD 567254 found one 55 gallon drum of rice imbedded in the ground, a small number of R-30's, one 81mm mortar round, four U.S. ammo cans filled with rice, one Vietnamese mess kit, two U.S. canteen

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Cups, one U.S. canteen, one ash can with bamboo shoots, one metal box with hammer and other small tools, cooking pots and pans, one insect sprayer, one weaving wheel for making fish nets, two tea kettles and one fish net and assorted small items. Returned samples of rice and equipment to S-2 and destroyed the rest.

13 November 1967

At 0910H, Company "B" at coordinates YD 567248 found three 8'x10' dirt and log bunkers, one CS grenade, one 3.5 WP round, and 50 pounds of rice. Destroyed the bunkers and at 0945H permission to destroy the rice was granted by the Regimental S-2.

At 1210H, Company "B" received approximately 4-5 rounds of sniper fire from an estimated one VC; returned fire with four M-79, approximately 50 rounds of small arms, and 20 rounds of M60 machinegun. The VC was estimated to be 400 meters east of Company "B"'s position. Searched area with negative results.

At 1600H, the first platoon, Company "D" spotted two VC at coordinates YD 519264, wearing ponchos and grass hats and no weapons. The VC fled in a NE direction after Company "D" took them under fire.

14 November 1967

At 0745H, the first platoon, Company "D" at coordinates YD 513274 tripped a booby trap while heading west on a trail. The booby trap was an M-26 grenade in a C-ration can with a tripping device. 1 Friendly WIA.

At 0945H, Company "B" at coordinates YD 578247, while trying to find a stream crossing, received approximately 50 rounds of A/W fire from the tree line at coordinates YD 578248 and YD 579247 from an estimated 6-7 VC. Company "B" returned fire with S/I, A/W, M-79 and M-60; also called artillery mission. Searched area with negative results.

At 1007H, Company "D" returned to Camp EVANS.

At 1316H, the extraction of Company "B" by helicopter began.

At 1535H, the last element of Company "B" arrived at Camp EVANS.

15 November 1967

At 1430H, Company "A" departed Camp EVANS enroute to blocking positions in the vicinity of YD 457358 and YD 468347, in accordance with frag order 22-67. Company "D" provided convoy security for Company "A".

At 2030H, Company "A" reported all units in blocking positions.

16 November 1967 At 1150H, Company "A" terminated frag order 22-67.

At 1543H, all of Company "A" returned to Camp EVANS.

17 November 1967 Operation NEOSHO was suspended for the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in order to prepare for Operation COVE.

24 November 1967 Companies "A" and "C" and the Alfa Command Group returned to the Camp EVANS area to establish blocking positions in the MY CHANH area.

25 November 1967 Companies "A" and "C" and the Alfa Command Group terminated the blocking positions and commenced movement to DONG HA Combat Base.

10. Results.

a. Friendly Losses

(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the Battalion during Operation NEOSHO covering the period 7 November to 17 November and 22 November to 25 November 1967.

USMC

Officers				Enlisted			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0

USN

Officers				Enlisted			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

b. Enemy Losses

VC/NVA/KIA (CONF)	0
VC/NVA/KIA (PROB)	0
VC (C)	0
Bunkers destroyed	33
Sampans destroyed	16

11. Administrative Matters. While the battalion was home based at Camp EVANS, administrative and logistic support was provided for platoon and company size operations conducted in operating areas assigned by the Fourth Marines.

e. Supply. Classes I, III, IV and V were drawn from the ISA at Camp EVANS. Class II was provided by the battalion supply located at PHU B.I. Supplies were adequate throughout this period. All personnel carried a basic allowance of Class V. Resupply was normally effected by vehicular convoy; however, on some occasions, helicopters were utilized.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance was performed on a routine basis. Second echelon maintenance was accomplished at Camp EVANS and third echelon at FLSG-1.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. First echelon medical care was performed in the field by corpsmen attached to the line companies. Those patients who required further treatment, but not hospitalization, were treated by a contingency of the BAS in the field consisting of three Hospital Corpsmen. Those in need of more intensive care and/or hospitalization were evacuated by helicopter to "A" Mod, 3d Medical Battalion at PHU B.I.

There were 343 patients seen at the Battalion Aid Station during this period. The following is a breakdown of the casualties for the period:

KIA	- 0
WIA	- 3 Marine Enlisted
NBC	- 12 Marine Enlisted

Difficulty with respect to adequate and immediate medical care was minimal during Operation NEOSHO. Evacuation of casualties was prompt and reliable.

d. Transportation. Transportation was satisfactory during this period with two household trucks provided daily from the platoon of 3d Motors attached to the 4th Marines. Additional support as required also came from attached Motor Transport Platoon.

e. Communications. Communications by radio was satisfactory during the period covered. During the two day sweep of the SONG BO, RC-292's were utilized to maintain contact with the rear. Wire was utilized for CP security during the sweep of the SONG BO River area, and proved satisfactory. K.C-PX and K.C-QX sheets were issued prior to the operation. Due to the short duration of the operation, resupply was not necessary.


12. Special Equipment and Techniques.

e. Scuba Teams: During the search and destroy operation along the SONG BO on 9 and 10 November, scuba teams were assigned to each of the 3 participating companies. The teams checked the river banks for caves with underwater entrances while the companies searched from the banks outboard and provided security for the teams. The companies also had one scout dog team each assigned to them for searching the banks which were covered with an extremely thick undergrowth.

13. Commander's Analysis

a. General. With the exception of a two day search and destroy operation along the SONG BO, Operation NEOSHO consisted of company size search and destroy or blocking operations. The aviation support rendered during the SONG BO operation was considered outstanding. This was particularly true during the withdrawal phase when the 3 companies and the command group were lifted from the operating area under extremely marginal weather conditions.

b. Lessons Learned. Liaison between the commanders and staff of the helicopter unit and the battalion prior to the SONG BO operation resulted in a smooth hellilift into and out of the operating area. The rapport established between the units resulted in a mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations.



E. A. DEPTULA

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion 4th Marines
ΦΦΦ8C-67COPY 1 OF 1 COPIESCopy 1 of 1 Copies
1st Battalion, 4th Marines
Dong Ha, RVN
Ser No: 003A31367
271600H November 67OPERATION UNLAW 25-67 (Operation ~~UNLAW~~) Ref: CG 3d MARDIUMSG 296627Z Nov 67Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV
(b) 9th Marines Operation Order 15-67 (Operation NEWTON)

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION1st Bn (Rein), 4th Mar

LtCol DEPTULA

H&S Co (..)

Capt FAGERSTROM

Company A (Rein)

Capt THOMPSON

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Tm

Scout Dog Tm

Company B (Rein)

Capt WASHING

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Tm

Company C (Rein)

Capt REINFRO

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Tm

Scout Dog Tm

Company D (Rein)

Capt WEED

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, H&S Co

Det, 81 Mortar Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

FAC Tm

Scout Dog Tm

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TABA

~~SECRET~~1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 9th Marines continues operations to destroy or capture enemy forces and logistic caches and to uncover access road from Route 1 to position A-3.
- (2) 2d Bn, 9th Marines conducts operations in assigned zone as part of Operation NEWTON.
- (3) 1st Bn, 3d Marines is regimental reserves for Operation NEWTON.
- (4) 2d ARVN Regiment conducts operations to destroy enemy in adjacent zone in conjunction with Operation NEWTON.
- (5) 1st MAW provides fixed wing and helo support.
- (6) Naval gunfire: one Cruiser (8"55) or one DD (5"54) in GS of 9th Marines.
- (7) Artillery.
 - (a) Btry F, 2d Bn, 12th Marines in DS 1st Bn, 4th Marines.
 - (b) 2d Bn, 12th Marines in DS 9th Marines.
 - (c) Btry K, 4th Bn, 13th Marines and Btry M, 4th Bn, 12th Marines GS/Rein to 9th Marines as required.
- (8) Det Co C, 3d Engr Bn in DS 1st Bn, 4th Marines
- (9) Shore Fire Control Party assigned to augment FSCC.

2. MISSION. 1st Bn, 4th Marines (Rein), commencing H-hour on D-day attacks in assigned zone of action to seize objectives 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 and prepares to support subsequent operations in support of the A-3/Route 666 construction project.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. At approximately 0845 on D-1 1st Bn (Rein), 4th Marines moves by truck convoy to a position south of C-2 (YD 1364), debarks and moves by foot to the assigned attack position (YD 132685). At H-hour on D-day crosses line of departure with 3 companies up and one back to seize Objectives 2 and 4. Halts at Phase line BULL and attacks with 2 companies up and 2 back to seize Objective 6. After physical contact is made with A forces on the right flank, on order, continues coordinated attack to seize Objective 8. On order, continues attack across the TRACE to seize Objectives 10 and 12. On order, withdraws and assumes defensive posture in vicinity of Objective 10. See Annex A (Operations Overlay).

b. H&S Co (-)

- (1) On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of C-2 position. Provide 81mm mortar platoon in GS. (The mortar platoon will be divided into two section groupings for dispersed movement with two rifle companies.)
- (2) Provide control/comm personnel as necessary.

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c. Company A (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on right flank of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operations Overlay).

d. Company C (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on center of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

e. Company D (Rein)

On order on D-1 day move by truck convoy to debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to attack position and assume defensive position as part of the battalion perimeter thereat. At H-hour on D-day, cross line of departure to conduct attack on left flank of battalion zone of action. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

f. Company B (Rein)

(1) Initially battalion reserve.

(2) On D-1 day move by truck convoy to a debarkation point south of the C-2 position. Move by foot to the attack position. On D-day follow initially in trace of Company C.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-day: 29 Nov 67

(2) H-hour: 0800H

(3) Code Name- Operation NEWTON

(4) Initially guide on center company; after crossing Phase Line BULL, guide on right company.

(5) Ensure physical contact is maintained between all companies to prevent the enemy from isolating units.

(6) Take maximum defensive measures against enemy fire by maintaining greatest possible interval between individuals and digging deep field fortifications.

(7) Forward elements of leading companies will display air panels on their packs at all times.

(8) Tanks, Ontos and M-42's will be available on request from 9th Marines.

(9) All enemy bunkers and fortifications will be destroyed. Don't destroy other captured materials. Report their location and await instructions.

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- (10) Report all POW's and/or detainees and await instructions.
- (11) Liaison Teams are being exchanged between the 1st Bn, 4th Marines and the 4th Bn, 2d ARVN regiment.
- (12) The following thrust points are in effect until 022400H December 1967:

BASEBALL TMS	1068
GIRLS NAMES	1869
SPORTS	1667
MONTHS	1166
FRUITS	1368
STATES	1465
COLORS	1765
FLOWERS	2075
TRAVELS	1070
CITIES	1371
MEATS	1570
CIGARETTES	1468

4. ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS.

a. Supply.

- (1) Primary source is LSA located at DONG HA. Company supplies will provide all class II supplies.
- (2) Medical supplies: Primary source is BAS.

b. Prescribed Loads. As prescribed by company commanders to include:

- (1) Class I ~ 2 days
- (2) Class V ~ BA
 - 280 rds per rifle
 - 1000 rds per machine gun
 - 4 M-26 grenades per man
 - 27 rds per M-79
 - 6 rds per 3.5 rocket launcher
 - 30 rds per 60mm mortar
 - 1 LAAW per sqd.
- (3) Adequate colored smoke and pyrotechnics
- (4) One protective mask per individual.

c. Uniform and Equipment. As prescribed by company commanders to include flak jackets, helmets and ID tags.

d. Resupply.

- (1) Primary means will be by helicopter.
- (2) Company commanders will submit requests by 1000H of the day prior to resupply. First day of resupply will be D+1.
- (3) Resupply requests will be consolidated by the S-4A and submitted to the S-4 via the Bn Admin Net.
- (4) Emergency resupply will normally be used only for Class V and water.

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- e. Hospitalization and Evacuation.
 - (1) Primary means of evacuation will be by helicopter Co D, 3rd Med Bn.
 - (2) Helicopter evacuation in accordance with standard procedure.
 - (3) BAS will be established in the vicinity of the Bn CP. BAS will handle all casualties in the event that helo med evac is not possible.

5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATIONS-electronics

- a. CP group initially with Company B.
- b. Report all CP locations when established.
- c. Visual Signals:
 - (1) White enemy positions
 - (2) Red not secure, not safe to land
 - (3) Violet/Green secure, safe to land
 - (4) Yellow friendly positions
- d. Radio nets and frequencies:

(1) Regt TAC #1	42.95	M174
(2) Regt TAC #2	64.5	M474
(3) Bn TAC	60.35	M389
(4) Bn ADMIN	47.2	M238
(5) TACP LOCAL	35.2	
(6) MED EVAC COMMON	45.7	
(7) TAB PURPLE	369.9	
- e. 9th Marines will have a forward position at C-2. All traffic on the Regt. TAC will be passed to that position.
- f. A Bn Admin net will be manned in the rear to receive admin traffic.

E. A. Deptula
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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX

✓A (Operations Overlay)

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