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HEADQUARTERS  
2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)  
3rd Marine Division, FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines  
Subj: Command Chronology for August 1966  
Ref: (a) RegtO 3120.3B  
Encl: (1) Command Chronology

S&C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
2d BATTALION 4TH MARINES (Rein)  
55-PT-66  
0022-66  
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1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

*A. E. Bench*  
A. E. BENCH

4TH MARINES (REIN)
55-PT-66
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
2D BATTALION, 4TH MARINES (REIN)  
1 - 31 AUGUST 1966

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SECTION IORGANIZATION DATA, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS

1. Designation/Location. On 1 August 1966, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was located at Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, RVN. At 010830H August 1966 Company F departed Hue/Phu Bai for Dong Ha. Arrived Dong Ha 011300H August 1966. 2/4 continued as Task Force Delta Reserve from 1 August 1966 to termination of "Operation Hastings" at 031200H. From 031201H August 1966 to 312400H August 1966 2d Battalion, 4th Marines participated in "Operation Prairie."

2. Period Covered by report: 1 - 31 August 1966

3. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinate T/O Billet Assignments.

Commanding Officer		LtCol A. E. BENCH
Executive Officer	(1-23Aug66)	Maj E. L. DE FAZIO
	(24-31Aug66)	Maj D. R. WALKER
S-1		2dLt E. S. LEWANDOWSKI
S-2		1stLt J. C. PANTHER
S-3	(1-4Aug66)	Capt L. A. KAUFMAN
	(5-31Aug66)	Capt J. J. W. HILGERS
	(1Aug66)	GySgt J. F. MC KITTRICK
S-4	(2-31Aug66)	1stLt J. E. HENDERSON
Supply Officer		2dLt W. C. VINING
Communications Officer		1stLt N. P. CARIOTIS
Motor Transport Officer		1stLt W. O. TOWSON
Civil Affairs Officer	(1-20Aug66)	2dLt R. E. GAINOR
	(21-31Aug66)	Unassigned
Medical Officer	(1-8Aug66)	Lt E. S. ROYS
	(9-31Aug66)	Lt J. L. ENIS
Chaplain		LtCmdr F. E. SIMS

## Company Commanders:

Headquarters and Service Company		1stLt L. O. GRIGSBY
Company E	(1-11Aug66)	Capt H. V. LEE
	(12-31Aug66)	Capt B. W. BESCH
(Acting 8-11Aug & 23-31Aug66)		2dLt G. T. MOWRY
Company F		Capt B. D. MOORE
Company G		Capt W. H. LEONARD
Company H	(1-4Aug66)	Capt J. J. W. HILGERS
	(5-31Aug66)	Capt L. A. KAUFMAN

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4. Average Monthly Strength during the period:

	<u>Total Average On Rolls</u>		<u>Total Average Non-Effective</u>	
	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
Officers	30	2	2	0
Enlisted	875	52	94	4

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Section IIPersonnel and Administration1. Personnel.

a. Officer strength on rolls during the period was 66% on the average with 60% effective. The enlisted strength averaged 77% of the T/O with an average of 68% effective. On the last day of the period the effective officer strength was 55.5% of T/O and the effective enlisted strength was 63% of the T/O.

b. Critical shortages of company grade officers and enlisted personnel in occupational fields 01; 03; 21; 25; 28; and 30 were steadily increasing. Many MOS replacements are urgently needed, and situation will worsen during the month of September unless suitable replacements are made available.

c. The following personnel joined during the reporting period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	4	1
Enlisted:	143	15

d. The following personnel were transferred during the reporting period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers:	7	1
Enlisted:	111	11

e. Battle and Non-Battle Casualties

(1) Battle Casualties:

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
KIA	2	22	0	2
DOW	0	1	0	0
WIA (Evac)	3	58	0	0
WIA (Non-Evac)	1	28	0	0

## (2) Non-Battle Casualties:

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
DOI	0	0	0	0
Disease	0	9	0	0
Injury	0	5	0	0
Other	0	2	0	0

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f. Discipline, Law, and Order:

Office Hours	8
Courts-Martial	3
Investigations	4

g. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale remained good throughout the period.

(2) Mail service was slow during the period. It is believed that the main cause for the slower service was due to transportation not always being available. A Post Office has been established in the Dong Ha complex which offers money orders and stamp service. Package service has not started due to the unavailability of scales and rate books.

(3) Disbursing. The troops were paid one time during the month. In addition, the Disbursing Officer servicing this battalion is located in Phu Bai and transportation to Phu Bai presents a problem to rotating personnel and personnel departing on emergency leave and R&R as the out of country flights depart from Da Nang and sometimes transportation problems exist between Phu Bai and Da Nang. A Disbursing Agent at Dong Ha, if assigned, would alleviate the problem completely. If this is not feasible, it is considered that service would be greatly improved if the pay accounts of personnel in this area were transferred to a Da Nang disbursing office.

(4) No liberty was granted during the period.

(5) A PX well stocked with health and comfort items is operating in the Dong Ha complex.

(6) Rest and Relaxation:

Hong Kong	6
Tokyo	12
Taipei	7
Bangkok	11
Okinawa	18
Singapore	3
Manila	2
Kuala Lumpur	3
Penang	3
Hawaii	2
TOTAL:	67

[REDACTED]

2. Administration: Rotation orders and seat spaces are still presenting problems. The CP was relocated within the Dong Ha complex during the month. At the end of the period electricity in the staff and company offices was still not available. In addition, administration is being hampered due to the lack of trained personnel. At the end of this period there are no SSgt or Sgt, MOS 0141, available for company administrative chiefs.

3. Miscellaneous:

a. There were 3 BSM, 8 NCM, 36 PHM and 4 gold stars in lieu of second PHM presented during the period.

SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE

1. During the reporting period intelligence functions continued at a satisfactory level.

2. Enemy Casualties:

a. Operation Hastings: None

b. Operation Prairie:

	<u>KIA Confirmed</u>	<u>KIA Probable</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WIA Probable</u>	<u>NVAC</u>
E	63	220	1	1	0
F	32	38	0	0	0
G	2	20	0	0	1
H	5	55	0	25	0
H&S	6	30	0	0	0
Recon	32	113	0	0	0
Total	140	476	1	26	1

c. Total for August:

KIA Confirmed:	140	WIA Probable:	26
KIA Probable:	476	NVAC:	1
WIA Confirmed:	1	Ralliers:	0

d. Total KIA since 7 May 1965: 861

3. Captured and Destroyed Equipment:

a. Operation Hastings: None

b. Operation Prairie:

(1) Weapons: 1 U. S. M-2 Carbine, 1 Chicom K-50 sub-machine gun, 12-AK-47 assault rifle, 7 Chicom carbines, 5 type-56 LMG, 1 type-58 LMG, 1 - B40 anti-tank grenade launcher, 1 Chicom pistol type-54.

(2) Equipment: 46 Chicom grenades, 31 AK-47 Magazines, 9 LMG type-56 drums, 1 box linked ammo for LMG type-58, 1 medical kit, 6 - 82mm rocket launcher rds, 7 - B40 propellants, 1700rds 7.62 short, 8 packs, 2 maps, 35 - 60mm Mortar rds, 3 canteens, 3 belts, 1 ammo can, 4 grenade pouches, 1 sword, and various documents.



c. Total weapons captured during the month of August: 29

d. Total weapons captured since 7 May 1965: 219

NIF 4. Intelligence Summary: See Tab "A"

NIF 5. Intelligence Journals: See Tab "B"

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS1. General

a. From 1 August - 031200H August 1966, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines participated in "Operation Hastings", a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation in Quang Tri Province. (For details see tab G) <sup>NI</sup>

b. From 031201H August to 312400H August 1966, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines participated in "Operation Prairie", a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation in Quang Tri Province. This operation continues.

2. Chronological sequence of events: None3. Training:

- a. Company F conducted Fam firing of organic weapons 13-14 August 1966.
- b. Company H Artillery FO conducted Artillery FO School for all Company Squad Leaders 8 - 10 August 1966.
- c. Company H conducted Fam firing of organic weapons 11 - 12 August 1966.
- d. Two men attended the Vietnamese Language School at Da Nang, RVN.
- e. One man attended Ammo Tech School, conducted by Division Schools Camp Hansen, Okinawa.
- f. One officer and one enlisted attended Embarkation School, conducted by Division Schools, Camp Hansen, Okinawa.
- g. One officer attended Registered Publications School, conducted by Fleet Training Unit WESPAC, Yokosuka, Japan.

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SECTION VLOGISTICS

1. Normal logistic functions continued throughout the reporting period. The following are problem areas which hamper the efficient operation of the battalion.

## a. Shortages

Radio Set AN/MRC-83	1
Typewriters	4

## b. Deadlined

Radio Set AN/MRC-109	1
Radio Set AN/PRC-25	2
Trk Platform M274A1	6
Trk M422A1	3
Machine Gun M-60	3
Mortar 81mm	1
Mortar 60mm	2

c. The battalion currently has a critical requirement for 40 additional General Purpose tents. There are currently 86 on hand and 32 of these have been code X. The 40 additional tents are on order, Priority 2.

SECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events:

The battalion has participated in Operation Prairie throughout the month of August. With the introduction of the Fourth Marine Regiment to Dong Ha, the Battalion now faces the task of laying out a new Battalion CP. The Battalion operates a combined message center with Regiment and 1st Bn, 4th Marines; same applies to the switchboard.

2. New Developments:

Introduction of the PRC-25 radio into the communication system. Battalion now has 67 PRC-25, seven PRC-125 (Radio PRC-25 vehicle mounted in mite). The Battalion will now turn in all PRC-6, and all but eight PRC-10 radios. Each company has been allotted seven PRC-25's and one PRC-125. The recommended distribution of radios is:

Rifle Company (7 ea) . . . . .	28
Sl's . . . . .	10
Air . . . . .	3
Arty . . . . .	2
Cmd Grp . . . . .	5
Supply . . . . .	19
Total	67 PRC-25

Rifle Company (1 ea) . . . . .	4
CO . . . . .	1
XO . . . . .	1
Comm . . . . .	1
Total	7 PRC-125

3. Problem Areas:

Battalion now short 16 radio operators with two more due to rotate in September. Battalion also in need of one 2811, (2) 2822 therefore need for techs (Radio, KW-7) critical also. In all, Battalion rates 77 communicators and now has 51, short 26 personnel.

4. Status of Communication Equipment:

Deadline Report;

(1) AN/PRC-25 -----2nd Echelon Maintenance

- (1) AN/PRC-25 ----- 3rd Echelon Maintenance
- (1) AN/PRC-41 ----- 2nd Echelon Maintenance
- (1) AN/PRC-41 ----- 3rd Echelon Maintenance
- (1) AN/PRC-47 ----- 3rd Echelon Maintenance

#### 5. Number of Security Violations:

Have not received official notification, but majority would be voice/radio procedure. Had one compromise of KAC-138 by loss of days 16-26 Reg nr. 4856, by battalion company operator when engaged in heavy fire fight with enemy forces.

#### 6. Amounts of Message Traffic Sent and Received:

Messages Sent: 397  
 Messages Received: 912

#### 7. Personnel Status:

There is a grave shortage of MOS 2531's and SNCO's.

<u>Shortages</u>	<u>Overages</u>
14 LCpl/Pfc 2531	1 Cpl 2532
2 LCpl/Pfc 2511	4 LCpl/Pfc 2532
1 Sgt 2533	1 Sgt 2561
1 SSgt 2543	
1 Cpl 2533	
4 LCpl/Pfc 2533	
1 Cpl 2541	
2 LCpl/Pfc 2543	
1 Cpl 2811	
2 Cpl 5931	
1 Cpl 2822	
1 LCpl/Pfc 1341	

#### 8. Summary of Operational Training:

Technician Training:  
 Shop Application:  
 Classes

450 Hrs (Bench Work)  
 90  
 None

Radio Section Training:  
 Application:  
 Classes:

720 Hrs (Radio Watch)  
 360 Hrs (Operations in Field)  
 None

Message Center Training:  
 Application:  
 Classes:

720 Hrs (Message-center watch)  
 360 Hrs (Operations in Field)  
 None

Wire Section Training:  
 Application:  
 Classes:

720 Hrs (Switchboard Watch)  
 360 Hrs (Operations in Field)  
 None

9. Summary of operations participated in, with problems encountered and lessons learned:

The first half of the month, Battalion's main effort was concentrated in the establishment of the Dong Ha complex. The last half of the month found the battalion in the field on "Operation Prairie". This has resulted in valuable experience to many of our untrained radio operators and wiremen. The biggest problem encountered was the drain put on the various sections (Radio, TACP, SI's) because of the shortage of radio operators within the Battalion.

10. Directory Listings:

None

11. Equipment and Personnel Located in areas other than Dong Ha Enclave:

The Battalion T/E used extensively on "Operation Prairie". During August maintained a relay capability on the observation post (Rock Pile) west of Cam Lo with highly successful results.

SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT, COORDINATION, NAVAL GUNFIRE1. Number of Missions Fired:

<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>81mm</u>	<u>90mm</u>	<u>NGF</u>
25	111	58	15	None

2. Type of Mission:

a. Registration: 2

1. 90mm (Tanks)
2. 8" How

b. Actual Missions.

	<u>Artillery</u>	<u>81mm</u>	<u>NGF</u>
1. HE	162	57	None
2. ILL	1	8	None

c. Defensive Fires and Proficiency:

1. Proficiency - 7 (Training)

d. H &amp; I

105mm	420 missions	2100 rounds
155mm	860 missions	3920 rounds
81mm	330 missions	3000 rounds
90mm (Tanks)	55 missions	350 rounds

3. Number of Rounds Fired:

<u>105mm</u>	<u>107mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>81mm</u>	<u>90mm</u>	<u>8" How</u>	<u>NGF</u>
2810	None	5020	3620	550(Tanks)	6	None

4. Surveillance:

On 3 August 1966 artillery was credited with 15 KIA by Groucho Marx recon team. During Operation Prairie artillery was credited with 4 enemy KIAs and 7 KIA probables. Due to the heavy overhead canopy and rough terrain other surveillance was not obtained.

## 5. Remarks:

The FSCC must effect close and continuous coordination between five elements. These are Air, Artillery, 81mm mortars, HST and the S-3. In order to effect this coordination, it is necessary for the TACP, FSCC and HST to be located physically close together. This is especially true for the TACP and FSCC. Since HST works under the S-4, it was found that coordination with this element was best effected through the S-4 and excellent results were obtained in this manner. Since radio communication is available with the 81mm mortar platoon, close physical proximity with this element is not necessary.

It was found that through close coordination that all of the above elements could be used simultaneously and with great effectiveness. At one point on Operation Prairie artillery, fixed wing, helicopter gunships, aerial observers, 81mm mortars and HST resupply helicopters were all used simultaneously without one interfering with the others. This however requires extremely close coordination with every element by FSCC.

There are only two instances where air and artillery cannot be used simultaneously. One is when it is necessary for aircraft to cross the gun-target line for attacking a target. The other is when it is desired to attack the same target with both air and artillery.

In both instances aircraft should normally be given priority due to their limited time on station. In some instances however a fire mission is in progress and the aircraft have sufficient fuel to remain on station until it is completed and then air brought in. The deciding factor in this is the fuel left in the aircraft at that time.

It is also recommended that the 81mm mortars be located in such a manner that their main direction of fire does not cross the path of the resupply helicopters coming into the landing zone. In instances where it is not possible a helicopter watch in the mortar platoon alleviates this problem. This watch should be maintained at all times during any fire mission by 81mm mortars.

When a company is widely separated from the rest of the Battalion it was found that normally coordination of air and artillery is best effected by the Forward Observer and the Forward Air Controller at the company level. This is only true however when the company is widely separated from the rest of the battalion, when the company is using both air and artillery and there are no other fire missions or air strikes in progress. When there are other air strikes and artillery fire missions in progress coordination should take place at both company and battalion level. The FSCC must insure that coordination takes place at both levels.



[REDACTED]

It has been found that all forms of supporting arms can, in most cases be used, simultaneously, with effective coordination. All forms of supporting arms must be coordinated through FSOC and by FSOC. When this is done, all forms of support can be used efficiently and to the greatest capacity of each.

SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT - DEFENSE1. Number of Air Support Requirements

- a. Fixed Wing Sorties: 626
- b. Helicopter Sorties: 954

2. Number and Type of Air Missions Requested

## a. Fixed Wing: 628 Total

CAP	58
CAS	364
AO	8
TAC(A)	1
Flare	8
TPQ	187

## b. Helicopter: 954 Total

Troops	382
Logistic	192
Med Evac	38
Admin	12
Recon	15
Gun Ship	252
VIP	16
TAC (A)	30
Command & Control	3
AO	14

3. Number and Type of Air Missions Completed

## a. Fixed Wing: 549 Total

CAP	55
CAS	340
AO	8
TAC(A)	1
Flare	8
TPQ	137

## b. Helicopter: 925 Total

Troops	360
Logistic	190
Med Evac	38
Admin	12
Recon	15
Gun Ship	252
VIP	16
TAC(A)	25
Command & Control	3
AO	14

4. Problem Areas

a. Equipment: TACP has three UHF radio's (AN/PRC-41). During Operation Prairie the TACP had many problems with its UHF radio's. One FAC Team was rendered nearly useless when it lost its UHF capability without a replacement available. It is recommended that a fourth AN/PRC-41 be appropriated for the TACP.

b. Personnel: TACP T/O level is 3 officers and 12 enlisted. Present strength is 3 officers and 6 enlisted, with one enlisted scheduled to enter the hospital for an indefinite period. To deploy three teams in the field, TACP requires a minimum of 9 enlisted.

SECTION IXMEDICAL AND DENTAL1. Significant Events:

The below medical services were rendered to personnel of 1st and 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. 1/4 & 2/7 joined this area of operations during the last two weeks of this reporting period. It was revealed that 90% of all venereal disease reported for the three battalions were contacted while personnel were on R&R.

2. New Developments: There is now a dental unit located in 2/4's BAS.

3. Problem Area: Getting diagnostic material (ie., centrifuge, stains, reagent, etc.)

4. Average daily number of patients seen 35  
Total number of patients seen for the month 1044

5. Number of referrals to A Med 258

6. Routine Medical complaints

a. Diarrhea	69
b. URI	9
c. Dermatitis	18
d. ENT	124
e. Venereal Disease	30

7. Significant diseases to the area: None

8. Number of emergencies

TYPE		<u>EVACUATED</u>	<u>DIED</u>
a. Fragments	191	188	3
b. Missile Wounds	86	55	31
c. Lacerations	6	0	0
d. Burns	2	0	0
e. Heat Exhaustion	30	0	0

9. Inoculations and prophylactic medicine administered 2000

10. Dental referrals 55

SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS1. Significant Events:

a. 4 August 1966. At 1330H Corporal L. R. NEWBY 2d Plt, Company H shot and killed a civilian child Truong Duc CHAU 12 years old who was ~~aggravating~~ sentry on post. Condolence payment was made to mother Nguyen Tri LUONG of 3,000\$ VN.

b. 14 August 1966. At 1630H a civilian house burned near the perimeter. No negligence of U. S. Forces involved. Members of the 155 unit and crash crew from MAG-16 assisted in putting the fire out and keeping it from spreading. Civil Affairs 2/4 assisted the family with blankets and food.

c. 16 August 1966. Approximately 1,000 lbs of clothing was distributed to the District Chief of Dong Ha.

d. 17 August 1966. A memorium donation of \$60.00 was made to the Eglise Catholique Church, Father Etchatten. This collection was taken by 2d Lt A. Sherman from his 2d Platoon, Company E just prior to his being killed and members of his platoon wounded.

2. Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare was controlled by higher headquarters during August 1966.

3. Med Cap Report

During the period 170 people were treated during Med Caps conducted by this command.

SECTION XIPROBLEM ENCOUNTERED, LESSONS LEARNED1. ITEM: Tank Employment.

Discussion: From 17-29 August a platoon of tanks was attached to this Battalion. The tanks were found to be indispensable in eliminating a series of fortified enemy bunkers enfilading a road down which the Battalion had to move. Their armor and 90mm guns proved effective on fortified positions which could not be neutralized by infantry alone. They also provided direct and indirect 90mm fire support for the Battalion in areas out of artillery range. Trafficability in the area of operations was good during this period. The only limitations were imposed by steep banks and dense rain forest jungle. It is anticipated that terrain trafficability will become even more limited during the monsoon, however this will not preclude the use of tanks as indirect fire support weapons.

Recommendations:

a. That unit commanders fully explore the feasibility of using tanks in their areas of operations and not limit them to defensive positions.

b. That tanks place more emphasis on indirect fire support and the care and handling of ammunition to produce maximum accuracy.

c. That a blade tank be included with units operating over uncertain terrain.

2. ITEM: 106mm Recoilless Rifle Employment

Discussion: On several occasions 106mm recoilless rifles were used successfully against enemy bunkers, fortified emplacements, and as a direct fire weapon against enemy troops in the open when the use of indirect fire weapons was precluded by the close proximity of friendly troops. One night one held off an enemy attack for five hours. The 106mm recoilless rifle was dropped into position by helicopter and was carried into place by five infantry men not including ammunition carriers. It was also extracted by helicopter. The use of the 106mm recoilless rifle greatly enhanced the combat capability of the Battalion against well emplaced regular North Vietnamese Army Forces. The mobility of the Battalion was not impaired through the timely use of helicopters to emplace and extract the weapon. They were helilifted to LSA support areas and retained there on call until requested by the unit.

Recommendations: That more consideration be given by unit commanders in the use of the 106mm recoilless rifle, with helicopter support, against regular enemy units.

3. ITEM: .50 Caliber Machine Gun Employment

Discussion: The .50 Caliber machine gun was found to be an advantageous addition to the infantry battalion when faced with enemy fire from 12.7mm machine guns. The range and striking power of the .50 caliber machine gun contributed significantly to the silencing of many enemy positions. The mobility of the Battalion was not impaired due to the availability of helicopters to insert and extract the weapon as in the case of the 106mm recoilless rifle.

Recommendation: That .50 caliber machine guns be made available to infantry units.

TABS to 2d Bn, 4th Marines Command Chronology, Aug 1966 - NIF

Tab A: Intelligence Summary

Tab B: Intelligence Journal

Tab G(sic): Not described, presumably SITREPs and/or S-3 Journal