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BSC FILES
HEADQUARTERS
5th BATTALION 4th MARINES (Rein)

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2d Bn, 4th Marines
3/14/68
01 September 1967
Bufile 03122457

2d BATTALION, 4th MARINES
PO Marine Division (Rein), 2d
APO San Francisco, 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code 1000)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subject: Command Chronology for period 1-31 August 1967

Ref: (1) HQ 3750.2
(2) JMW 3750.2
(3) 3d Marine 3750.2

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for 1-31 August 1967

✓ TAB-1 - AARPT (OPN RUSH)

1. In accordance with section 23 (a) of the (a) document (1) is submitted.

[Handwritten signature]
LIEUTENANT COLONEL

2nd Bn/4th Mar
Cnd Chmn

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Aug 1967

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COMBAT OPERATIONS

2d Battalion, 4th Marines

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SECTION I

ORGANIZATION DATA, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS

1. Designation/Location: This report covers the period 1 August to 31 August 1967.

During this period 2d Bn, 4th Marines was committed to Operation FREMONT. FREMONT was suspended on 5 August for Operation CLOUD which was aborted. Operation RUSH was initiated in its stead and lasted until 9 August 1967. During Operation RUSH, elements of 2d Bn, 26th Marines were OPCONED to 2d Bn, 4th Marines. Following RUSH, the Battalion embarked again on FREMONT.

Various missions performed within our AO during FREMONT included Search and Destroy activities, night activities to deny the enemy use of known infiltration routes and to the heavily populated food producing areas and preventing mining and disrupting activities along VN National Route #1.

The mission of operation RUSH, based on hard intelligence from a Chin Pot, was to search, attack, and destroy enemy camps, hospitals and bunkers in the Phu Loc area of Nam Hoa Province southeast of the Phu Lai vital Defense Area.

2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinate E/O
Billet assignments:

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer

3-1
3-2

3-3

3-4

Supply Co

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer
Medical Officer

Chaplain
Company Commanders
H&SCo

Co E
Co F

Co G
Co H

LT COL J. W. HATHORN JR.

MAJ J. L. FOWLER fr 3 Aug 67

MAJ J. J. LAWENDOWSKI fr 4 Aug 67

2d Lt R. L. NORMIE

1st E. S. BLAIR to 21 Aug 67

1st J. H. NISVEN fr 22 Aug 67

Capt H. F. ADAMS to 3 Aug 67

MAJ J. L. FOWLER fr 4 Aug 67

Capt D. W. SCURLEDER

2d Lt J. W. HAMILTON

MSGT P. J. CLEONIK to 15 Aug 67

SSgt H. E. WINNER fr 16 Aug 67

to 24 Aug 67

Capt E. N. ZIKS fr 25 Aug 67

2d Lt J. B. BURT

1st (MC) R. P. TATE USN to 14 Aug 67

1st (MC) R. L. JIMENEZ USN fr 15 Aug 67

1st (CC) R. O. SWIFT USN

2d Lt R. L. MARTIN to 24 Aug 67

Capt E. N. ZIKS fr 25 Aug 67

Capt R. H. TAYLOR

Capt E. N. ZIKS to 24 Aug 67

1st E. S. BLAIR fr 25 Aug 67

Capt H. F. WINNER

Capt D. W. HATHORN JR.

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SECTION II

1-31 Aug 67

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel

a. Average monthly strength during the period.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	34	2
Enlisted	1059	59

b. Critical MOS's have been closely monitored and requested as needed.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during this month.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	7	1
Enlisted	152	16

d. The following number of personnel were joined during this period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	4	1
Enlisted	182	2

e. KIA - 5
DOW - 2
MIA - 0
WIA - 39
WLAND - 87
DISEASE - -
INJURY - 1 (self inflicted GSW)
DUI - 0
OTHER - 0

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SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE

1. During the reporting period intelligence continued at a satisfactory level.

2. - Enemy Casualties:

a. 4th Marines TAOR

	<u>KIA Conf</u>	<u>KIA Prob</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Detainees</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>
H&S Co	0	0	0	0	0
Co E	2	8	1	0	0
Co F	11	6	0	6	0
Co G	3	7	00	2	0
Co H	1	3	0	0	0
Total	17	24	1	8	0

b. Operation RUSH. Commenced on 5 August and ended on 9 August. Data is being submitted for Operation RUSH. Operation FREMONT continues.

c. Total for month of August

VC KIA conf	17
VC KIA prob	24
PW	1
Detainees	8
Ralliers	0

d. Total KIA since 5 May 1965: 1467

3. Captured and Destroyed Equipment:

a. 4th Marines TAOR:

(1) Weapons: 3 AK-47, 1 U.S. Carbine, 1 K-50, 1 MAS-36.

(2) Equipment: 2pr field glasses, 2 ChiCom grenades, 3 AK magazines with pouches, numerous pieces of web gear and clothing.

b. Total weapons captured for the Month of August: 6

c. Total weapons captured since 5 May 1965: 332

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SECRETSECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING1. Special Operations.

a. Operation FREMONT continued during this period with a suspension from 5 to 9 August while the Battalion participated in Operation RUSE.

b. FREMONT began 100001 July as a search and destroy mission. Included in this mission was the additional mission to interdict enemy infiltration routes, prevent mining of National Route #1 and provide security for construction battalion teams making repairs on Route #1.

c. RUSE, initiated after CLOUD was aborted, was a search and destroy mission in the Phu Loc area of Ban Hoa Province southeast of the Phu Bai vital Defense Areas. This Operation lasted 5 days and achieved a limited success due to light contact.

d. The Battalion is credited with 17 VC KIA (conf) and 22 VC KIA (prob).

2. Training.

a. During this period two rifle companies fired their M-16 rifles for zeroing. The remainder of the Battalion will zero their weapons in the near future.

b. Due to operational commitment, in-country indoctrination was conducted on the Company level.

c. One Marine is currently attending Vietnamese Language School and one NCO attending NCO Leadership School. Quotas for the Second Quarter of the Fiscal year has been requested for:

NCO
NCO LEADERSHIP SCHOOL
EMBARKATION SCHOOL
LANGUAGE SCHOOL
REGISTERED PUBLICATION
MOTION PICTURE OPERATOR
FIELD WIRE
ADVISOR
OTHER QUOTAS ARE BEING FILLED AS ASSIGNED

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SECTION V

LOGISTICS

1. The only field operation of consequence during this period was operation RUSH. Logistics were handled through a temporary LSA site at PHU BAI. Logistics representatives from all echelons and activities were physically present. All resupply runs were made by readily available helicopters. No unusual problems were experienced in resupplying, except for water. Because of the terrain it was decided not to use five gallon metal water cans, since they could not be recovered. Six gallon disposable water containers were used once, but these proved fragile and could not be free-dropped from any height. 155mm howitzer powder canisters were used, utilizing the plastic bladder out of the six gallon disposable cans. The containers held slightly over three gallons which were protected from contamination by the plastic bladder. This container proved 75% successful when dropped from heights not exceeding fifty feet.

2. Supply problems during this period centered about boots, socks, small sizes of jungle utilities and weapons cleaning gear. After RUSH, no field problems were encountered which would put great demands on the clothing supplies. Items for the monsoon season have not started arriving to date. Some of these are: nylon poncho liners, warming gloves, and light weight rain suits.

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SECRET8. Summary Of Operational Training:

Message Center Training

Application	720 HRS
Classes	10 Hrs

Technician Training

Application	200 Hrs
Classes	4 Hrs

Radio Section Training

Application	720 Hrs
Classes	30 Hrs

Wire Section Training

Application	720 Hrs
Classes	14 Hrs

9. Summary of Operations Participated in with problems encountered and Lessons Learned.

The covered voice circuit using the AN/MRC-109 and KY-8 was used on Operation RUSE with moderate success. Problem areas encountered were in physically moving the AN/MRC-109 across rugged and impassable terrain, providing adequate security at all times for this secret/ crypto equipment, and the high temperatures which adversely affected the operational functioning of the KY-8.

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SECTION VI
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS1. Significant Events:

During the month of August this unit participated in Operation RUSH and continued Operation FREMONT.

2. New Developments:

None

3. Problem Areas:

Critical shortage of H-138 handsets.

4. Status Of Communications Equipment:

(1)	TA-312	3rd Echelon (AP)
(1)	RT-695/PRC-41	3rd Echelon (AP)
(1)	RT-524	3rd Echelon (AP)
(1)	GRA-39A	3rd Echelon (AP)
(2)	RT-505	3rd Echelon (AP)
(1)	PU-348	3rd Echelon (AP)

5. Number Of Security Violations:

No security violations were reported.

6. Amount Of Messages Sent And Received. (Thru 302359H Aug)

Messages Sent: 65
Messages Received: 733

7. Personnel Status:

<u>Shortages</u>			<u>Overages</u>		
(1)	MSgt	2591	(1)	GySgt	2519
(1)	SSgt	2549	(1)	SSgt	2539
(1)	SSgt	2867	(2)	Sgt	2531
(1)	Sgt	2511	(3)	Cpl	2542
(1)	Sgt	5931			
(1)	Cpl	2811			
(1)	LCpl	2815			
(1)	LCpl	1341			

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SECRETSECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION1. Number of Missions Fired.

105	155	81
1451	516	571

2. Type of Mission.

a. Registrations

105	81
11	9

b. Actual Missions

105	155H	81
99	25	65

c. HEI

105 missions	341	rds	976
155 missions	491	rds	932
81 missions	497	rds	1321
2/40's missions		rds	1766
4/50's missions		rds	840

3. Number of Rounds Fired:

105	155	81	2/40's	4/50's
2506	1316	1766	1619	840

4. Surveillance:

5 KIA
4 P-KIA
7 known structures destroyed

5. Remarks: Totals computed by type of shells:

105	155	81
2334 - HE	1242 - HE	1583 - HE
165 - WF	40 - WF	90 - WF
6 - ILL	34 - ILL	23 - ILL
1 - SMOKE	1316 - TOTAL	1766 - TOTAL
2506 - TOTAL		

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8-11-1977

AIR SUPPORT DATA

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1. Number and Type of Air Missions

a. Fixed Wing

CAP	32
CAS	103
AD	31
TAC(A)	23
FLARE	5
WPQ's	0

b. Helicopters

Troops	29
Logistics	183
Med Evac	43
Admin	11
Recon	0
Gunship	24
VIP Code	2
TAC (A)	12

2. Number of Air Requirements Completed.

- a. Fixed Wing Bottles - 279
- b. Helicopter Bottles - 310

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SECTION IX

MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant Events - None
2. New Developments - None
3. Problem Area - None
4. Average Daily number of patients seen
Total number of patients seen for the month
5. Number of referrals to 3d MED
6. Routine medical complaints
 - a. Diarrhea
 - b. URI
 - c. Dermatitis
 - d. EENT
 - e. Venereal Disease
 - f. Malaria
 - g. PLO

31
967

44

68
27
74
67
13
02
07

7. Number of emergencies

TYPE	TOTAL	EVACUATED	KIA	DOW
a. Injury	11	0	0	0
b. Lacerations	12	1	0	0
c. Heat Casualties	18	16	0	0
d. Shrapnel	40	28	2	1
e. Gun shot	15	14	2	1
f. Others	13	08	0	1

109

Vaccinations and Prophylactics administered
Dental Referrals

5800
41

OFFICERS

Included in total count

- a. Officers seen at sick call
- b. Evacuated with Shrapnel wounds

02
02

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CENTRAL AFFAIRS

1. Significant Data

- a. During the past month the Battalion S-5 made considerable progress.
- b. The Battalion S-5 made various staff visits to the village of Phong Dien and distributed clothing and food to the people.
- c. The S-5, along with the Battalion Medical Department, held a medical camp at the village of Lu Lu and treated 20 people, consisting of 18 children and 2 women. The Medical camp was very successful considering the time element involved.
- d. The Battalion S-5 in conjunction with the Segmental S-5 is providing cement to the Catholic Priest of Phong Dien for the purpose of a swimming pool for the Catholic children.
- e. A visit was planned for the Catholic Priest to visit the Battalion CP area. The visit was postponed due to operational commitments and will be rescheduled for a later date.

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SECTION XI

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PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following data are submitted:

a. Item. The use of empty 155mm Howitzer powder canisters for the resupply of water...

(1) Comment. The canister should be used in conjunction with a plastic bladder (such as that used in the six gallon disposable water cans) to avoid contamination by the toxic paint. The canister proves durable if free-dropped no higher than fifty feet. No other container has exhibited such durability. Also, the loss of the container is no monetary loss, except for the plastic bladder.

(2) Lessons Learned.

(a) Use for resupply of water where the helicopters cannot touch down.

(b) Drop from heights no higher than fifty feet.

(c) Use a plastic bladder as an insert.

b. Item. The use of diesel fuel and motor oil as a field expedient for a weapon lubricant...

(1) Comment. Number 10 weight motor oil and diesel fuel should be mixed in a 2:1 ratio. This provides a thin, protecting oil suitable for use in the M16 rifle. The diesel fuel, in addition, has a detergent action on the metal parts. The mixture can be disseminated in 2 1/2 gallon squad water containers. The individual Marine normally retains an oil container for his personal use.

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco, 96602

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2d BATTALION 4th MARINES (Rein)

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2d Bn, 4th Mar
3/JEC/wds
19 August 1967
SerNo 03A23167

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) 4th Marine Frag Order 37-67 (Operation RUSH)
(b) Map, VIETNAM (1: 50,000) AMS L7014, Sheets 6541 I and IV

1. Code Name: Operation RUSH
2. Dates of Operations: 050715 Aug 1967-091543 Aug 1967
3. Location: Phu Loc and Nam Bo Provinces RVN
4. Task Organization:

2d Battalion, 4th Marines

LtCol HAMMOND

B Co (-)

Det, Co A, 3d SP Bn
Co B (-), 3d Engr Bn
Det, 7th IFF

Company G

Det C Pltn, 3d Engr Bn

Capt WINTER

Company H

Capt BARNHILL

Company E 2/26

Capt FULFORD

Company F 2/26

Capt WINTER

5. Supporting Forces

a. Btry B 1/13 was in direct support. This battery was extensively utilized for a variety of missions throughout Operation RUSH. A total of 874 HE and 131 WP were fired for specific missions. Harassing and interdiction fires accounted for an additional 270 rounds.

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2/7

7/1/67 (Opn RUSH)

5-9 AUG 1967

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b. 1st 155 Cya Btry (general support) for harassing, interdiction and specific fire missions. A total of 249 rounds of 155 and 30 WP were expended.

c. A Btry/2/94 and B Btry/6/27 provided 175 guns in general support. These guns were not employed in support of Operation RUSH. Adequate artillery support was obtained from the efforts of the 105 and 155 Btrys.

d. Tank Plt 3d Tank Bn (direct support). The Tank Plt was unable to traverse the ground from its C.P. to a suitable support position for the first two days of Operation RUSH. This was rectified by engineering assistance at intermediate streams and on D+2 the platoon reached the 2/4 Command Post. The tanks were employed as direct fire support and during hours of darkness on D+3 and D+4 fired harassing and interdiction missions. In addition, the direct fire of this platoon was utilized effectively to cover the retraction of two companies from the objective.

e. Air support was provided by the 1st MAW and consisted of aerial resupply, medical evacuation and close air support missions. Extensive use of fixed wing aircraft was made and seventy eight sorties were flown in support of Operation RUSH. The tactical air control party was utilized. Both preplanned and immediate request air was employed. Reaction time was satisfactory in all cases.

f. Friendly Forces - ARVN HOC BAO (BLACK PANTHER) Company moved in cooperation and coordination with 2/4 elements. An ARVN liaison officer and his staff accompanied command group Alfa but were not OGCN to it.

6. Intelligence: Operation RUSH was conceived to exploit information obtained from a V.C. rallier. In essence he had identified the location of a V.C. base camp area in the vicinity of Dong Truoi mountain. This complex allegedly included a hospital, storage area, POW detention area and defensive fortifications along the 400 meter contour line. The rallier remained under the control of the HUC BOA company and acted as their guide.

The bunkers and dwellings located during Operation RUSH and the enemy resistance supports in part the veracity of the rallier's report.

The enemy unit involved in the defense of this area was believed to be the 304th Bn.

The terrain encountered was steep and thickly overgrown. Movement was slow and exhausting when not using trails. Water was unobtainable in most elevated areas of the mountain.

7. Mission: 2d Bn, 4th Marines (-) was to conduct a combined Heliborne over land assault with the HOC BAO Company (BLACK PANTHERS) against the assigned objective while executing a search and destroy mission in the operating area against NVA/VC.

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DECLASSIFIED8. Concept of Operations

On the afternoon of D-1, E/2/26 and F/2/26 were in the geographical vicinity of the approaches to Dong Truoi Mountain having replaced G/2/26 and H/2/26. Their planned movements under cover of darkness were aimed at placing them within the maneuver area of Operation RUSH without disclosing intentions to the hostile forces. During daylight hours hostile forces on Dong Truoi Mountain possessed commanding observation of all friendly activity.

The initial scheme of maneuver called for a helicopter lift by G/2/4 concurrently with overland movement by H/2/4. Initially G/2/4 would occupy landing zone PIGEON and establish a blocking position. Moving by foot from its detrucking point H/2/4 would join with G/2/4 to strengthen the blocking position. The second step placed F/2/26 at landing zone CRANE, north of Dong Truoi Mountain. F/2/26 was to move under cover of darkness to a suitable access location and provide security in the landing zone for the helicopter borne Hoc Bao Company. The Hoc Bao Company to be lifted in upon the conclusion of G/2/4's air movement. Simultaneously B/1/13 would move into firing positions secured by E/2/26. E/2/26 less one platoon would serve as a reserve. The platoon of tanks would provide direct fire support from LZ PIGEON after an overland move.

Essentially two blocks with fire support were planned. As they displaced forward towards the hostile position the Battalion Commander could thus gauge which approach held the greatest promise and which force should assume a true blocking role.

9. Execution03 August 1967

2300H Warning order received to initiate planning.

04 August 1967

1000H Hoc Bao Company available for the operation.

1100H Coordination effect with artillery, tanks and E/2/26 and F/2/26.

1600H Helicopter reconnaissance of the objective area, selection of LZ PIGEON and CRANE.

1800H Regimental briefing for Operation RUSH.

2000H Issuance of 2/4 order.

05 August 1967

At 0300H Receipt of Regimental written order.

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0730H Operation Fish commences with lift off of G/2/4.

0710H Air prep fires on LZ PIGEON

0750H G/2/4 in landing zone, all secure.

0750H H/2/4 and B/1/13 left Pha Bai CP.

0830H Air prep fires on LZ Crane.

0900H Igo Red Company helicopter lift complete.

0900H H/2/4 and B/1/13 at detrucking position in operating area.

0910H Marine from Command Group "A" activated M-26 booby trap, two Marines WIA and both med evac cases.

1020H H/2/4 and Command Group "A" received 8 rds sniper fire via 895996. Returned fire with (14) 60mm rds. Routine medical evacuation for two USMC WIA called from LZ PIGEON.

1100H H/2/26 ordered to move to 2/4 CP area.

1120H H/2/4 received (3) sniper rds. Marine simultaneously tripped Chi Com anti-personnel device. Range not estimated due to Huk canopy. Returned 400 rds of 5.56 and 2000 rds of 7.62 links results not determined. Priority medical evacuation called for one USMC WIA.

1245H H/2/26 minus arrived at the 2/4 CP and assumed defense.

1720H G/2/4 received (10) rds automatic weapons fire from vic 916989. Range estimated to be within 150 meters (inside canopy). Returned fire with 30 rds of 5.56, 35 rds of M-79. One Marine KIA and one WIA. A routine medical evacuation was requested.

1900H Unable to complete G/2/4 medical evacuation due to hostile fire in the emergency LZ.

1930H H/2/4 began climbing the trail (within canopy) at 905978 and was taken under fire by the enemy. The point man was killed.

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The second Marine was wounded in action by this fire. He returned one round, however, before his M-16 jammed. He observed (8) V.C. as they ran to the body of the slain pointman and removed his rifle. The second platoon pressed their advance and gained the ridge line. They found numerous blood trails and pursued by fire. During this action the platoon received 500 rounds of small arms fire and returned 1700 rounds of 7/62 link, 540 rounds of 5/56 and 3 rounds of M-79. Seven VC were believed to have been killed. No enemy bodies were recovered.

06 August 1967

0735H G/2/4 reported their position as 910985.

0800H F/2/4 continued in trace of Hoc Bao Company.

1035H H/2/4 reported one WIA.

1100H H/2/4, via 916923, received heavy automatic weapons fire from approximately six weapons. H/2/4 returned fire with 20 rounds of M-79, 4000 rounds of 7.62 link and 2000 rounds of 5.56. One USMC WIA, emergency medical evacuation requested.

1105H E/2/26 patrol hit a trip wire at 888988 resulting in (3) WIA's. Trip wire was hidden by vines. Device was Chi-Com grenade. Medical evacuation was required for two of three WIA's.

1120H E/2/26 Marines assisting casualties at 888988 tripped another grenade, fifty meters from location of first one. Two WIA resulted, one required medical evacuation.

1130H Pay Ops loudspeaker team with Vietnamese language tapes arrived at 2/4 command post and were given a daylight broadcast mission.

1200H F/2/26 found earth and wood bunkers for six men (capacity) via 940017. Destroyed bunkers with C-4 explosive.

1430H H/2/4 and G/2/4 requested emergency water resupply.

1630H Water resupply of G/2/4 and H/2/4 by airdrop not successful.

1800H Second water resupply mission successfully completed. 155mm canister cases with plastic water bags formed the package.

1900H Pay Personnel in Pay Ops team conduct one hour Vietnamese language broadcast at enemy positions on Dong Truoi Mountain.

07 August 1967

0730H H/2/4 received two bursts of automatic weapons fire from 912969. H/2/4 fired 200 rds of 7.62 link in return.

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At 0755H, G/2/4 moved forward with F/2/4 in action.

At 0800H, G/2/4, via 932968, received air to ten rounds small arms fire. Golf returned fire with 250 rounds of 5.56 and 3 rounds of M-79. Requested emergency med evac for one WIA.

At 0805H G/2/4 requested supporting fires on enemy forward of 916968.

At 0840H, Air strike supported G/2/4 Company.

At 0850H, F/2/26, via 925001, made contact with enemy squad ambush. Enemy known to have one 45 cal. machine gun, one 50 cal. machine gun and two carbines. F/2/26 returned fire with 1500 rounds of 7.62 link, 350 rounds of 5.56 and 13 rounds of M-79. VC broke contact. F/2/26 swept the area with negative results. One USMC WIA required a priority med evac.

At 0945H, F/2/26 priority med evac was completed.

At 1040H, G/2/4 taken under fire with 15 rounds of small arms fire and 6 "Chi-Com" grenades. Returned fire by G/2/4 included M-60, M-79 and M-16. Area was checked with negative results. Routine med evac requested for (4) USMC WIA.

At 1355H, F/2/26 made contact with VC Force estimated at to be (15) in strength at via 932997. F/2/26 received 2 rounds of 62 mortar, several bursts of automatic weapons and machine gun fire. F/2/26 pulled back to provide necessary distance for air strikes which were requested. Three USMC WIA resulted from enemy fire.

At 1645H, F/2/26 air resupply was effected by drop rather than prearranged hoist. Resupplies were kicked out from a considerable altitude resulting in one USMC with broken shoulder and one knocked unconscious. Med evac requested for one USMC as a result of this accident.

At 1700H, 1st Tank Platoon of Co B reached in C.P. Replaced to support scheme of maneuver with direct fire. H&I fires were planned for hours of darkness.

At 1830H, Pay Ops team broadcast for one hour at hill mass.

03 August 1967

At 0825H, E (-)/2/26 moved out to support G/2/4 and H/2/4 via 933996 - along stream bed.

At 1000H, F/2/26 located chi-com claymore via 933997 and destroyed it in place.

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At 1400H, 6/2/66 via 903995.

At 1400H, 6/2/66 sighted one VC/NVA via 603994. Enemy was taken under fire and hit. Inconclusive results.

At 1400H, 6/2/66 Company, via 913979, found abandoned harboring site with four shelters. Several old cooking fires and the remains of jungle food were noted. Shelters were destroyed.

At 1400H, 6/2/66 saw (1) one VC crawling up side of trail at 91/978. Took VC under fire with 200 rounds of 5.56. (one VC KIA (confirmed)).

At 1400H, Patrol Team 6/2/66 via 934913 was fired upon by seven VC. Returned fire with 80 rounds of 5.56, 4 rounds of M-79. A search revealed a significant blood trail. One VC KIA probable.

At 1450H, 6/2/66 sighted 5 VC/NVA, via 889993. They were unable to fire due to thickness of canopy. 81 mortars were requested in support by 6/2/66. An area search at the conclusion of the mission yielded negative results.

At 1450H, A helicopter resupply 6/2/66 received sniper fire during mission. 6/2/66 returned fire with 4 rounds of M-79, 200 rounds of 7.62, 100 rounds of 5.56. No LZ at 962919. VC broke contact.

At 1450H, 6/2/66 moving down stream at 923988 received one grenade and 20 rounds automatic weapons fire from 2 or 3 snipers. 6/2/66 returned fire with 13 rounds of M-79, 100 rounds of 5.56, 200 rounds of 7.62. VC broke contact. One USMC KIA not requiring evacuation.

At 1400H, 6/2/66 at 918988 received sniper fire one USMC KIA. 6/2/66 returned fire with 80 rounds of 5.56, 100 rounds of 7.62 and 4 rounds of M-79. Area search yielded negative results.

At 1430H, 6/2/66 returned to CP and resumed perimeter.

At 1430H, 6/2/66, via 901990, destroyed by demolitions ten large shelters and 15 bunkers. It was believed this formed an enemy hospital and detention area.

At 1400H, 6/2/66 receives regimental order to cease operation RUSH 9 August 1967.

At 2000H, 6/2/66 began night FMF fires from CP area.

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At 0200H, 6/2/66 observed one squad of enemy moving east from 930-000 on a secondary trail. FMF was scattered when taken under fire with 11 rounds of 5.56. An area search revealed negative results.

At 0300H, 6/2/66 at 932998 destroyed six bunkers.

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140000 1/2/26 and 1/2/26 began movement to Arty position via 910045
and established command post.

140000 Command Group "A" left command post for Arty position via
910045.

140000 1/2/26 destroyed 5001a dug in command post area with
ammunition and departed for Arty position.

140000 Trucks arrived at forward Arty position via 910045 and began
the echelon move to 3d Division area.

140000 2/4 arrived at 3d Division area.

140000 Results.

a. Friendly losses were:	KIA	3 USMC
	WIA	22 USMC
	MBC	40 USMC (predominantly heat)

b. VC/IVA	KIA	1 (confirmed)
	KIA	8 (probable)

c. All areas where air strikes and artillery were called
were not searched. Searches were limited because of the large
mountain area hit by supporting fire and the heavy canopy which
restricted movement.

140000 Administrative Matters

Detailed planning had been effected for Operation CLOUD.
The establishment of the ISA and other supply arrangements formulated
for CLOUD were utilized for Operation HUSH.

a. Supply The source of supply was a temporary ISA sited in
the vicinity of PHN BAI heliport. Shore Party operated the ISA which
kept collapsible (disposable) water cans and emergency ammunition
on hand. The proximity of PLSG-A eliminated the need for large stock
levels of any items. The 2/4 S-4 maintained constant liaison with
the ISA, Regimental S-4 and Division G-4. The basic loads were as
follows: 280 rounds per rifleman, 1200 rounds per machine gun,
two CS grenades per fire team and six meals per individual.

Referring because of the duration of HUSH, the use of
helicopters and the distances covered, Class II items were not in
great demand except for salt tablets.

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Helicopters were utilized for resupply groups for the artillery Battery and its infantry security platoon, which had the use of a hard surface access road. Helicopters encountered difficulty in resupplying high canopied, hilly positions. Slings, nets, baskets and free drops were utilized. Only in isolated instances could the helicopters touch down in the hastily created LZ's on the mountain side. The air gallon disposable water containers were found to be very fragile and difficult to fill. They are suited for use in situations where they can be lowered in baskets or where the helicopter can actually effect a landing. 115 mm howitzer mortar canisters were used in conjunction with plastic inserts from the disposable water containers. They proved very effective provided they were dropped from heights not in excess of fifty feet.

b. Maintenance. NA

c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation. Medical support was provided by companies assigned to the rifle companies and the companies assigned to H&S Company. Casualties were treated in the field and/or evacuated via helicopter to 3d Medical Battalion.

The nature of the casualties fell into two categories: Shrapnel, gunshot wounds and heat casualties. An unusual number of heat casualties were encountered. It is believed the climate, mountainous terrain and supply problem were strongly contributory in this respect.

d. Communications. Some difficulty was encountered in effecting tactical coordination with non-organic units, i.e., Companies of 2/26, Tanks, Artillery and with ARVN Forces; this was a direct result of lack of time for units involved to conduct complete liaison and coordination, including exchange of frequencies.

As the operation progressed queries from non-organic units and the other units in the area were necessary. Such expediency, while necessary for operation, could have provided a monitoring agency with information. The AN/PRC-27, as usual, performed well and little trouble was encountered. Distance from a minimum of 50 meters to a maximum of 3,000 meters were operated over with very good results. Naturally, with the associated terrain, some dead areas were encountered. In most cases the loss of com was brief and attributed directly to the use of the AT-892 antenna which is not designed for long range and should be used only when absolutely necessary to perform the mission. It is recommended that the whip (AT-271) be used at all times when in the assault or on the march. The RC-292, either tree topped or mast mounted, should always be used while in a stationary position.

Interference was noted on the FDC net, but was never more than a minor nuisance.

This was the first operation that the RT-524 and the KY-8 was used to higher Hqs, and it worked very well once the "initial bugs" were worked out. The only problems were technical, involving the RT unit and Model K cable.

From a communications point of view, operation RUSH was very successful. Again demonstrating the superior qualities of the new family of RT equipment.

e. Medical evaluation. Excessive heat casualties.

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12. Special Equipment and Technique

The utilization of 15mm canisters employing disposable plastic water containers merits special comment. For low level drops this combination becomes an effective water delivery package. In mountainous regions where the gradient and the canopy may preclude suitable LZ's this technique has value for supplying forward elements with water.

13. Commander's Analysis

In the utilization of body armor always advantageous? The wearing of body armor in dense foliage during the hot humid season slows movement and increases heat casualties. While seemingly minimizing casualties it has a reverse effect. Individual enemy snipers, unencumbered by excess weight, are able to fire on forward elements and withdraw faster than Marines can pursue. Body armor is primarily anti-fragmentation protection and the enemy's use of fragmentation producing ordnance (mine and booby traps excepted) is limited in dense canopy. The protection afforded by the armor vest when evaluated against the need for rapid and aggressive movement makes an arguable case for the contention that troops should not be burdened in canopy with body armor. This problem is more clearly illustrated when the terrain concerned dictates constant up hill movement.

The use of tanks as a source of direct fire against area targets in dense vegetation as a valuable aid to operations, particularly in providing close covering fire during the period of retraction from combat. Tanks were not available during the movement to contact phase but it is felt they would have made a significant contribution during that phase as well.

The helicopter method of entry utilized in Operation Rush added little to the overall effectiveness of the Marine effort. In this particular set of circumstances all movements could have been made by track and foot.

It is felt there was insufficient time for detailed planning between executing units and friendly and supporting units. Overall coordination would have been better with greater lead time.

14. Recommendations

Employment of body armor be limited when moving in mountainous, heavily canopy covered terrain during periods of high temperature.

Utilization of 15mm canisters for water packaging be given increased publicity for the possible benefit of other users.

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