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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/4
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

35168

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S&C FILES
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20 BATTALION 4th MARINES (kole)

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period of 1-31 December 1967.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) 3dMarDivO 5750.1A

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a) through (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

Charles W. Knapp
CHARLES W. KNAPP
By direction

Copy to: CG, 9th MAB

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DEC 1967

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
Battalion Landing Team 2/4

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SECTION I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS.~~SECRET~~
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1. Designation/Location. This report covers the period from 1-31 December 1967. During this period the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) participated in Operation OCEOLA at Quang Tri Airfield. Company F was initially OpCon to the 1st AmTrac Battalion in the vicinity of Cua Viet participating in Operation KENTUCKY. Company F returned OpCon this Battalion at Quang Tri Airfield on 16 December 1967.

On 2 December 1967 the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was redesignated as Battalion Landing Team 2/4 and commenced preparation to embark amphibious shipping as the landing element of Special Landing Force ALFA (TG 79.4). Paragraph 3, below, reflects the composition of the newly designated Battalion Landing Team 2/4. Aside from the platoon from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, the Radio Relay Section, 4th Marines, and Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, the other attachments did not become operational until embarked on shipping in early January 1968.

2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinate T/O Billet assignments:

Commanding Officer	LtCol W. WEISE
Executive Officer	Maj C. W. KNAPP
S-1	1stLt R. L. MORRIS
S-2	Capt J. E. NICHOLto 11Dec67
	Capt R. J. MURPHY.....fr 12Dec67
S-3	Maj A. P. BRILL
S-4	Capt L. L. FOREHAND
Supply Officer	1stLt J. W. HAMILTON.....to 7Dec67
	2dLt S. D. POMICHTER.....fr 8Dec67
Communications Officer	1stLt R. L. KLAUER
Motor Transport Officer	1stLt J. H. BURT.....to 1Dec67
	2dLt D. H. NEFF.....fr 2Dec67
Medical Officer	LT (MC) R.L. JIMENEZ USN..to 6Dec67
	LT (MC) F. P. LILLIS USN..fr 7Dec67
Chaplain	LCDR J. W. MCELROY USN....to 4Dec67
	LT S. J. HABIBY USN.....fr 5Dec67

COMPANY COMMANDERS

H&S COMPANY	1stLt E. S. DAWSON
E COMPANY	Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON
F COMPANY	1stLt M. H. GAVLICK
G COMPANY	Capt R. L. HARSHMAN
H COMPANY	Capt J. L. WILLIAMS

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3. Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (as of 2 December 1967)

Commanding Officer

LtCol WEISE

Company Commanders

H&SCo

1stLt DAWSON

E Co

Capt LIVINGSTON

F Co

1stLt GAVLICK

G Co

Capt HARSHMAN

H Co

Capt WILLIAMS

Attachments

H Battery 3dBn, 12th Marines

Capt CONLIN

Mortar Battery, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

Capt SULLIVAN

4thPlt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn

2dLt NOKE

1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn

2dLt MUTER

2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn

3dLt HAMILTON

1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn

2dLt COGHILL

3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn

1stLt FAUST

1stPlt, CoA, 5thTKBn

1stLt KANE

1stPlt, CoA, 5thATBn

1stLt SMITH

Clearing Plt, CoD, 5thMedBn

Lt JOHNSON, USN

LogSptUnit, FLC

1stLt DES JARLAIS

Detachment, HqBn, 3dMarDiv

1stLt DAWKINS

Detachment, HqCo, 4th Marines (Radio Relay)

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SECTION II
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1-31Dec67

1. Personnel

a. Average monthly strength during the period.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	40	2
Enlisted	1090	54

b. Critical MOS's have been closely monitored and requested as needed.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during this month.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	6	2
Enlisted	149	5

d. The following number of personnel were joined during this period.

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
Officers	6	2
Enlisted	219	6

o. KIA	5
WIA	29
DOW'	0
MIA	0
WIANE	24
DISEASED	3
INJURED	3
DOI	0
OTHER	0

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SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

1. During the reporting period intelligence continued at a satisfactory level.

2. Enemy Casualties:

a. 1st Marines TAOR

	<u>KIA conf</u>	<u>KIA prob</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Detainees</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>
H&SCo	2	1	0	5	0
Co E	1	8	2	22	0
Co F	0	0	0	5	0
Co G	4	5	0	0	0
Co H	4	1	0	4	0
Total	11	15	2	36	0

b. Operation OCEOLA commenced on 31 October

c. Total for the month of December

VC KIA Conf	11
VC KIA Prob	15
PW (NVA)	2
Detainees	36
Ralliers	0

d. Total KIA since 5 May 1965: 1578

3. Captured and destroyed Equipment:

a. 1st Marines TAOR

- (1) Weapons: 2AK47's, 1 German Mauser Model 98
1 Submachine Gun
- (2) Equipment: 1 Bayonet, 1 French Grenade
- (3) Provisions: Various Medical Supplies and 3000 lb of rice

4. Intelligence Data. Prior to the operation (OCEOLA), it was known that the enemy had the capability of (1) conducting unconventional and psychological warfare to include:

- a. Small scale attacks
- b. Ambushes
- c. Interdiction of lines of communication
- d. Terrorism
- e. Sabotage

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- f. Propaganda activities
- g. Mine Warfare

(2) Mass a ground attack either on the Quang Tri Airfield or Quang Tri City, and (3) Attack US/GVN positions with rockets and/or Mortars.

A rocket base or storage area was suspected in the vicinity of Hill 80 (YD 2444) and Hill 58 (YD 2353), with a capability of shelling the airfield. The hamlets of Thon Nai Cùu (1), (2) and (3), Thon Ai Tu (1), (2) and (3) and Thon Nahn Bieu (1), (2) and (3) were considered strictly Viet Cong. Elements from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines were subjected to constant enemy sniper fire when operating in the vicinity of these areas. The area around Hill 22 (East), especially to its south and southwest were heavily mined and boobytrapped. Several intelligence reports received during the month of December indicated that the Viet Cong were active in laying mines and setting boobytraps in the vicinity of Thon Ai Tu (2) and (3).

The terrain analysis of the Quang Tri Airfield and the Battalions' Area of Operations consists of rolling plain with low hills and few terraces sloping less than 10%. Much of the land is cultivated with ricelands and many native settlements. These fields and settlements are bordered by thick hedges, trees, and thorny shrub, interspersed by forest, thick shrub and grasslands. There are a few steep banked streams. The soils are generally firm, but mire during the 2 or 3 days following rains of 1 inch or more. The rice-fields are firm only during and immediately following the harvest. Trafficability is poor for trucks and fair for tanks when the ground is firm; and becomes unsuitable for both when the ground mires.

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SECTION IV

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

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1. Special Operations.

a. During the period 1-31 December 1967 the Battalion participated in Operation OCEOLA with a primary mission of defending the Quang Tri Airfield Complex. In addition, the Battalion was responsible for interdicting routes of communication which the NVA/VC use for resupply in this area, including day and night patrols, ambushes and pacification projects in nearby hamlets and villages. Active patrolling and company sized operations penetrated to the depths normally consistent with the enemy's capability to rocket and mortar US/GVN positions.

b. With the addition of Company F on 16 December 1967, the Battalion was able to both defend the airfield and effectively employ at least one rifle company in the field to accomplish its other assigned responsibilities.

c. Company, platoon, squad and fire-team activities during December consisted of search and clear sweeps, patrolling, ambushes, and listening posts. Enemy contact was made throughout the month, but the frequency and intensity of the contacts definitely slackened in the later two weeks of December. Platoon and company sized operations were based upon the latest intelligence. Sweeps tended to be concentrated in three village complexes, Phouc My, Throng Phouc and Thon Nai Bieu (2) where the VC have held an effective control.

d. Rice caches were found located in nearby hamlets not too distant from the airfield complex. Each incident was coordinated with the Thrieu Phong or Mai Linh District Advisors. The rice was kept under security until the Popular Forces and Advisor Personnel could gather it for redistribution to refugee areas.

e. On 15 December 1967, Viet Cong personnel set up firing positions about 3000 meters west of the airfield complex and at 2240 fired approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortars into the MAG-36 billeting area and on to the airstrip. Countermortar fires were quickly returned, the enemy muzzle flashes having been clearly observed from the perimeter. Within five minutes the area of the enemy firing and neighboring two grid squares were saturated with friendly support fires. MAG-36 helicopters were airborne immediately and assisted in locating the enemy position. Reports later from GVN Intelligence sources indicated that at least two Viet Cong were killed and another fifteen were wounded as a result of the countermortar fires. Friendly casualties were two USMC KIA, 16 WIA medevac and 20 WIANE from MAG-36 and 2 WIA medevac from this Battalion. One CH-46 and four UH34D helicopters were damaged while parked on the airstrip, as well as several tropical buildings. A Marine in Company H was in the midst of tape recording a message when the attack occurred, and a play-back the next day accounted for 31 explosions. Numerous duds were recovered by the attached

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Engineer platoon, examined and destroyed. It was further noted that some of the mortar rounds contained Variable Time (VT) fuzes, exploding above the metal roofs of the tropical buildings.

f. On 16 December 1967 Company F rejoined the Battalion from Cua Viet. The company was initially employed in reserve. Starting on 18 December 1967, Company F began conducting patrols, ambushes and manning night defensive positions along the perimeter.

g. During the period 19-29 December 1967 a rifle company was based in the Nhan Bieu (2) region of Thuong Phouc village for security of the pacification program. The purpose of the pacification effort was to prevent the VC/NVA from establishing a "pipeline", for both intelligence and supplies, into the adjacent city of Quang Tri. The operation was initiated with a recon insert providing a surveillance mission while the rifle companies participated in the actual clearing and pacification of the villages. Companies E, G and H each participated along with elements of H&S Company, Popular Force, and Regimental Civil Affairs and Psychological personnel. The area was to be held and continuous GVN interest and assistance was to be maintained.

Company G, while in Thon Nai Bieu (2) vicinity in conjunction with a Regimental MEDCAP, an Armed Propaganda Broadcast Team and Provincial Forces installing a new Village Chief along with other minor officials, experienced a prosperous business in exchanging grenades for reward money. Investigation later proved local children were obtaining the grenades and some ammunition from Popular Forces personnel and then turning them over to Marines for reward. Liaison was quickly established and these practices discontinued. During the first six hours of the MEDCAP, 250 Vietnamese civilians were treated. In the remaining days an additional 70 Vietnamese were treated.

h. Daily AOR sweeps by MAG-36 in Armed Huey helicopters assisted the Battalion in intelligence gathering and tended to discourage enemy movement during daylight. Artillery H&I's and TPQ's were often based on the aerial observations with good results. It was noted that many cattle and corrals were present in the southwestern portion of the AOR which reportedly was an uninhabited area.

i. Intelligence, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, being closely related, were increased during this period. Liaison at Regimental, Provincial, District, Village and Hamlet level was effected. Armed propaganda teams utilizing portable broadcast units, were employed with the rifle companies during the operation. Popular Forces cooperation led to their use as guides on patrols and night ambushes. The reward program, after initiating broadcasts and leaflet drops in late November, began to pay dividends.

j. During the period 1-31 December 1967 the Quang Tri (Ai Tu) Airfield complex continued to expand. As facilities were built and improved, the perimeter was expanded to include the POL and

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ASP across Highway #1. This area formerly was a separate perimeter. The former 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Command Post, just south of the airfield was also included. Battalion, Engineer and MCB-10 personnel graded, cleared fields of fire, improved obstacles and installed permanent defensive wire. Tenant units were incorporated into the defensive posture and a Base Defense Communications Net was established. The Base Defense continued to be the responsibility of this Battalion, and defensive planning, coordination and instruction was effected. Countermortar fire plans were instituted, as well as quadrants being established in the two towers on the airfield for locating enemy direction of fire. A platoon of ONTOS and a platoon of DUSTERS (1/44 Artillery, USA) were included in the Base Defense. Roadblocks were established at both the north and south entrances of the complex along Highway #1. Liaison and final establishment of National Police personnel along with Military Police provided an effective means of controlling the movement along the airstrip. A Catholic School and Buddhist Monastery were incorporated within the perimeter for their safety. Liaison in these projects were personally completed by the Battalion Commander.

k. From 241800H to 251800H December 1967 the Christmas Truce was effected. On two occasions, enemy and Marine personnel met without incident, each going his respective way. On two other occasions, Battalion units were fired upon during the day, where- by they returned fire, accounting for 1 VC KIA Confirmed. In both instances, patrols from Company E and Company G were fired upon by small arms. At 311800H December 1967 the New Year Truce went into effect. No incidents occurred up to the end of the year.

1. Planning and readiness were accomplished for the coming BLT employment and embarking aboard amphibious ships. Elements commenced actual loading, initial phases, on 24 December 1967 and continued through the month end. The BLT Advance Party consisting of an S-3 Liaison Officer, an S-4, Mess, Communications and Supply representative departed on 25 December 1967 for Subic Bay, Philippines. A tentative operation plan and administrative plan were drafted for the new assignment.

2. Training activities conducted from 1 December through 31 December 1967.

a. FO Procedures. The training emphasis was on practical application in calling and adjusting artillery and mortar fires. Quadrant Boards were installed in the two observation towers to assist observers in accurate spotting and adjusting of counter-battery/mortar fires.

b. Technique of Scouting and Patrolling. Classes were conducted by the S-3A Officer based upon up to date techniques, including reconnaissance. Other subjects were camouflage, concealment, patrol planning, patrol orders, patrol procedures, spot voice procedure, rally points, control and security.

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c. Stream Crossing. Continued emphasis was placed on the techniques with practical application on swollen streams in the AOA adjacent the airfield.

d. Helicopter medevac Procedures. Instruction on SOP including radio procedures.

e. Psychological Warfare. Instruction and practical application including distribution of leaflets to be deposited in each hamlet along patrol routes. Chieu Hoi and the Rewards Program were themes emphasized.

f. NCO Leadership. Instructions concerning leadership and duty performance were emphasized.

g. M-16 Training. 316 personnel zeroed their M-16 rifles on a 100 meter range. An LTI by 3dFSR was conducted and faulty weapons were replaced by later models.

h. Mortar Drills. Crews of the 81mm Mortar Platoon and those of the 60mm Mortar Sections conducted live fire drills with special emphasis on their reaction in countermortar firing.

i. M-60 Machinegun Drill. Classes and drills accomplished, including firing twice a week and instruction on FPL and Range Cards.

3. School quotas have been filled as assigned and requested, with the exception where a loss of key personnel would result in effecting the SLF assignment. Where personnel could attend the school and return to the Battalion prior to the anticipated embarkation, they were sent. All Battalion personnel attended classes on Personal Response during the period 19-23 December 1967 when visited by the Third Marine Division Personal Response Team. Two Marines attended the Vietnamese Language School.

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LOGISTICS

1. General. The movement of units from Dong Ha Combat Base and C-4 area resulted in the consolidation of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines at the Quang Tri Airfield Complex. Physical separation and communications with BLT 2/4 attachments posed difficult problems. The delays and inaccuracy of submission of required reports by attached units resulted in the creation of embarkation problems. The above, coupled with normal supply requirements for tactical operations, dictates BLT assets to be made readily available for utilization by BLT Commander in preparing for SLF.

2. Supply. Requisitions for BLT 2/4 equipment shortages were submitted to FLC on a "fill or kill" basis. Remaining shortages were resubmitted to 9th MAB. Most shortages in 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and BLT 2/4 were eliminated due to the fifty-one percent fill rate at FLC.

3. Transportation. Accomplishment of Battalion support and Activation of the BLT imposed heavy transportation requirements. Transportation for logistic support was provided by Division G-4, (Ninth Motor Transport Battalion) and First Marines. Trucks were furnished on a daily basis as follows; five trucks from 9thMTBn and four trucks from First Marines.

Lack of material handling equipment hampered the preparations of BLT 2/4. No assets were available from either Dong Ha Combat Base or the Quang Tri area. Support ultimately had to be provided from BLT 2/4 assets, e. g. Shore Party; (1-6000 pound RTF with two operators provided by Sea Transport from Phu Bai).

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SECTION VI
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS1. Significant events.

During the month of December, this unit participated in operation OCEOLA. This Battalion was also assigned the primary mission of security of the Quang Tri Airfield Complex.

2. New Developments.

During the month of December, this unit assumed the status of BLT 2/4.

3. Problem Areas.

Supply shortages in operating components for the AN/PRC-25 remain the most critical problem. This shortage extends to modules for second and third echelon repair parts. H-138 and H-189 handsets, also AT-271 antennas are the most critical shortages.

This Battalion was not equipped to provide necessary communications for facility defense (e.g. radio, wire communications to observation towers and defensive positions covering a 9KM perimeter). Special allowances for additional communications equipment has been requested for infantry battalions with a base defense mission.

Supply problems in the AN/PRC-41 radios remain constant due to the shortage of mono blocks "in country" to keep the batteries in a ready status.

4. Status of Communication Equipment.

During the month of December all communication equipment on a "Deadline Status" was picked up from FLSU-1 and FLSG-A, as well as TERC's for each piece, to prepare it for BLT 2/4 posture. The equipment will be turned in to Sub Unit #1, 9th MAB at Subic Bay sometime during the month of January for repair/or replacement.

5. Number of Security violations reported during this period.

Two: 1Dec67, and 8Dec67

6. Amount of messages sent and received.

Messages sent: 143
Messages received: 1224

7. Personnel Status.

Shortages
2511-9 2815-1
2531-15 2847-1
2549-1 2867-1
2811-1 5931-1

Overages
2533-5
2542-1
2841-1

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8. Summary of Operational Training.

Message Center Training:

Application: 744 Hours

Classes: 31 Hours

Technician Training:

Application: 372 Hours

Classes: 31 Hours

Radio Section Training:

Application: 744 Hours

Classes: 31 Hours

Wire Section Training:

Application: 669.6 Hours

31 Hours

9. Summary of Operations participated in, with problems encountered and lessons learned.

The communications platoon participated in all Battalion, Company, and Platoon Operations during the month, and no new lessons were learned.

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SECTION VII
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. The following number of missions were fired from 1 December to 31 December 1967: 105mm How - 900 ; 81mm Mort - 240
 2. Actual Missions: 105mm How - 138 ; 81mm Mort - 99
 3. H&I Fires: 105mm How - 762 ; 81mm Mort - 141

4. Rounds expended for H&I Fires:

105mm How - 4837; 81mm Mort - 1246

- 5 Total number of rounds fired:

	105mm How - HE - 6458	81mm Mort - HE - 2464
	WP - 224	WP - 105
	HC - 52	ILL - 53
	ILL - 9	
TOTAL	6743	2712

6. Surveillance: 1 NVA KIA (Confirmed)
 2 NVA KIA (Probable)
7. Remarks: None

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SECTION VIII
AIR SUPPORT

1. During the period 1-31 December 1967 the following Air Support was provided the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines:

a. Medevac Missions:	15
b. Command and Control Missions:	12
c. Close Air Support Missions:	
(1) Armed Huey-gunships	6
(2) Fixed-wing CAS	2
(3) Air Observer missions	3

2. VMO-6 provided daily Area of Responsibility flights, and as otherwise needed. Two Armed Huey-gunships were employed, generally at 1600-1700 daily. These same flights, on occasion, were available for the CO, S-3, S-2 and Company Commanders to view the area of operations and specifically recon selected areas.

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SECTION IX
MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant Events

(a) Major preparation in packing to go aboard ship for Special Landing Force.

2. New Developments: None

3. Problem Areas: None

4. Average daily number of patients seen: 20
Total number of patients for Dec67 580

5. Number of referrals to 3dMedBn: 28

6. Routine Complaints

(a) Diarrhea	4
(b) URI	25
(c) Dermatitis	105
(d) DENT	79
(e) Venereal Disease	11
(f) Immersion Foot	7
(g) Others	190

7. Significant diseases to the area

(a) Malaria	3
(b) FUO	5

8. Number of Emergencies

	Total	Evac	KIA	DOW
(a) Burns	4	0	0	0
(b) Lacerations	5	0	0	0
(c) Heat Casualties	1	1	0	0
(d) Shrapnel wounds	28	28	2	0
(e) Gunshot Wounds	24	23	4	0
(f) Others	5	5	0	0

9. Immunization and Prophylactics administered 18
Dental Referrals 28

10. Officers - included in total count

(a) Officers seen at sick call	01
(b) Evacuated with shrapnel wounds	0

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SECTION X
CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Significant Data.

a. During the month of December Civil Affairs has been at a high peak. The Battalion Medical Department held 15 MEDCAPS and treated over 1000 Vietnamese civilians.

b. The Battalion Commander personally participated in many of the Civic Action Projects.

c. One of the most successful projects was the Christmas Party held at the Ai Tu Hamlet. Well over \$1,000 in toys were given to the people. The Battalion Mess Hall baked 9 cakes, each consisting of 90 pieces and approximately 810 people were fed. The Messhall also made ice Kool-Aid for these people. Toys were given to the S-5 by U. S. Naval personnel who received them from various organizations and clubs in the U. S. The Battalion Commander along with the Battalion Chaplain, and Battalion Medical Officer and his staff helped coordinate the mission and make it as successful as possible. Blankets and clothing were given out to the people who were relocated from the current Airfield.

d. During the month of December, the Commanding Officer of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines gave the Nuns at the Catholic School bordering the Airfield \$100.00 in Piasters for repairs to the school.

e. The S-5 obtained a working party and paid a visit to the Catholic School on the edge of the Airfield where a new roof was erected on the school. The roof was composed of tarps which were obtained in the CP area.

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CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

- A. Battalion Services provided by Battalion Chaplain.
Protestant: No: 66 Services - Attendance 1973
- B. Service provided by Chaplains other than Battalion Chaplain.
Protestant: No: 4 - Attendance 145
Roman Catholic: No: 8 - Attendance 376
- C. Total number services provided Battalion and attendance.
Services: 78
Attendance: 2494
- D. Memorial Services - No: 5 - Attendance 595
- E. Counselling of Pastoral - 26
- F. Sick Calls: 146
- G. Civic Affairs
1. Participated in 4 civic affairs projects
 2. Made arrangements through the Chaplain of the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) for Hand-Clasp materials. 6 Bales of blankets (25 in each) were distributed by the Battalion to Vietnamese villagers. 600 toys were also provided by the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
- H. Distributed a large number of Christmas packages received from the United States.
- I. Facilities and Transportation - Adequate
- J. Battalion Staff meetings-Opened with prayers.

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SECTION XII
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Availability of helicopter support was limited, denying the Battalion mobile flexibility. Nearly all reaction to enemy activities had to be by foot marches which were often too slow to readily take advantage of the situation.
2. Aircraft flight over friendly mortar positions caused loss of opportunity. During the mortar attack on 15 December, MAG-36 helicopters immediately became airborne and flew a pattern directly over Battalion 81mm Mortar positions preventing rapid counter-mortar fires. Communications were established directing these aircraft to use other flight patterns away from friendly guns.
3. Overhead 81mm Mortar fires were curtailed due to faulty fuzes during this period. Many short rounds occurred presenting a hazard for friendly troops.
4. The perimeter at Quang Tri Airfield, as it expanded, became too large for it's defending platoon of 81mm Mortars and 105mm Artillery Battery to effect counter-battery/mortar fires without a coordinating fire plan. A plan was established whereby the perimeter was subdivided into sectors, similar to the clock system, with assigned coverage in each sector. This plan was brought to bear during the 15 December mortar attack with very good results.
5. As the perimeter of Quang Tri Airfield was bisected by Highway #1, certain indigenous personnel control problems developed. The line of communications between Quang Tri City in the South to Dong Ha in the North had to remain operating, yet transients passing through the corridor in the defense perimeter had to be screened. Roadblocks at each extremity were established as well as check points along the corridor and sentries at each roadway leading from the corridor. Marine Military Police and Vietnamese National Police, as an integrated team, were employed to maintain the checkpoints and a roving patrol during daylight hours. This assisted in keeping a steady flow of traffic, yet discouraged vendors and stragglers within the corridor. (On several instances youth were apprehended peddling narcotics). Vietnamese violators, etc. were immediately placed under the jurisdiction of the National Police and U.S. personnel would fall under MP jurisdiction. The roadblocks were manned by Marines from this Battalion during hours of darkness when the highway was closed to all traffic.
6. As the airfield complex expanded, all tenant units were required to participate in its defense, the one communications net became unwieldy. Often defense traffic interfered with tactical transmission between the Battalion and its operating companies/patrols. The Third Marine Division authorized a separate frequency for the purposes of a Base Defense Net. All tenant units, less the Battalion, were incorporated into this net. In this regard, with two distinct radio nets, the coordination of the Base Defense and Battalion night activities could be effected readily and simultaneously.

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