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CTG 79.4

0077-68

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DECLASSIFIED / HEADQUARTERS  
Battalion Landing Team 2/4  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

SEC FILE  
HEADQUARTERS  
2d BATTALION 4th MARINES (Korea)

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4  
(2) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 - 29 February 1968

Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1A  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8  
(c) 3dMarDivO 5750.1A  
(d) Brigo 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a) through (d), enclosure (1) is submitted.

*Old/Kna fip*  
C. W. KNAPP  
By direction

COPY TO:

CO, 4th Marines  
CO, 9th Marines  
CG, 3dMarDiv  
CG, III MAF

GROUP - 4  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
Battalion Landing Team 2/4

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SECTION I

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ORGANIZATIONAL DATA INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS

1. Designation/Location. This report covers the period from 1-29 February 1968. During this period, elements of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 participated in Operation LANCASTER II under the OPCON of the Fourth Marine Regiment.

Commencing on 1 February 1968, BLT 2/4 (-), consisting of the Alfa Command Group with E, F, and G companies was assigned an area of Operations northwest of Camp Carroll, Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, in the vicinity of YD 037558 with responsibility for the security of the bridge sites at YD 026562 and 043566. BLT 2/4's mission was to conduct extensive patrolling and ambush activities to deny the enemy access to the area south of the Cam Lo River.

On 010830H February, BLT 2/4 commenced movement north from Camp Carroll to the Cam Lo River, establishing defensive positions at the two bridge sites and Hill 91 (YD 035557). Extensive patrolling and ambush activities were begun. On 02 February 1968, Company G was chopped to 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, West of Cam Lo District Headquarters, for operations.

The Mortar Battery (W/3/12) moved from A-3 to Camp Carroll to Support BLT 2/4 operations. Hotel Battery, with it's 105mm Howitzers was emplaced at Dong Ha and augmented 3dBn, 12th Marines. BLT 2/4 Tanks and Amtrac platoons were under the OPCON of the 1st AmtracBn operating in support of BLT 3/1 in Operation SALINE.

The Ontos of CoA 5thATBn moved from C-3 to Cam Lo and merged with Task Force Robbie (3dMarDiv Reserve).

2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinate T/O billet Assignments.

Commanding Officer  
Executive Officer

S-1

S-2

S-3

to 18Feb68  
Fr 19Feb68

S-4

Supply Officer

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Medical Officer

Chaplain

LtCol W. WEISE

Maj C. W. KNAPP

1stLt R. L. MORRIS

Capt R. J. MURPHY

Maj A. P. BRILL

Maj G. H. WARREN

Capt L. L. FOREHAND

1stLt S. D. POMICHTER

1stLt R. L. KLAUER

2dLt D. H. NEFF

Lt F. P. LILLIS USN

Lt S. J. HABIBY USN

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Dental Officer

Lt N. R. DIERS USN

Company Commanders

H&S Company

F Company

F Company

G Company

H Company

1stLt E. S. DAWSON

Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON

1stLt M. H. GAVLICK

Capt M. S. VARGAS

Capt J. L. WILLIAMS

Attachments.

Battery H, 3dBn, 12th Marines

Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines

Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv

1stPlt, CoA, 5thTkbN

1stPlt, CoA, 5thATBn

4thPlt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn

2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn

3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn

1stPlt, CoC, 3dSPBn

Logistic Support Unit, FLC

1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn

Clearing Plt, CoD, 5thMedBn

Capt CONLON

Capt SULLIVAN

1stLt DAWKINS

1stLt KANE

2dLt SMITH

2dLt NOKE

2dLt HAMILTON

1stLt FAUST

2dLt COGHILL

1stLt DESJARLAIS

1stLt MUTER

Lt JOHNSON USN

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SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Period: 01 to 29 February 1968

1. Personnel

a. The average monthly strength during the period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	63	8
ENL	1652	88

b. Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies have been closely monitored and requested.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	5	0
ENL	116	0

d. The following number of personnel were joined during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	2	0
ENL	190	2

e. The following casualties were incurred during this period:

KIA - 10	MIA - 0	INJURED - 22	DAI - 1
WIA - 59	WIANE - 39	DOI - 0	
DOW - 0	DISEASE - 10	OTHER - 15	

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SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

The enemy order of battle can be summarized by stating that elements of the 320th Division and the 164th Artillery Regiment remain north of the Cam Lo River. There have been reports of their moving, however, they still remain within BLT 2/4 AO.

There have been 14 significant contacts with the enemy since 1 Feb 1968. A contact is defined as an actual exchange of S/A fire. Additionally, eight supporting arms missions were called on actual enemy sightings. Route #9 in 2/4's AO has had nine mining incidents since 1 Feb 1968. There have also been instances of booby trapping; namely, the enemy probing attempts seem calculated to acquire our claymore mines and trip flares.

The enemy has been engaged in units ranging from 1 or 2 men to platoon size. They are well-equipped with AK-47's, flak jackets, helmets, and chicom "hell boxes".

In sum, the enemy's mission seems to be one of reconnaissance thru contact. While the bulk of his forces remain north of the Cam Lo River, select groups of sniper/demo/sappers have been operating in an interdiction-harrassing role in the immediate Camp Carroll area. Equipment captured included 3 AK-47's, one RPD LMG, assorted 782 gear, 14 chicom grenades and one "hell box".

2/4 accounted for 35 NVA (Confirmed) with 7 friendly killed (plus 1 NBC).

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## SECTION IV

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING1. Special Operations

a. During the period 01 to 29 February 1968 the BLT 2/4 (-) participated in Operation LANCASTER II near Camp Carroll. In support of the 4th Marines, BLT 2/4 conducted extensive patrol and ambush activities while safeguarding LOC's and vital bridge sites on National Rt #9. Prior to the arrival of BLT 2/4 the NVA had easy access to the Camp Carroll access road and National Rt#9 south of the Cam Lo River.

At 2315H, 4 February 1968 a squad size ambush patrol encountered a large enemy force of undetermined size at coordinates YD 040566. A fierce fire fight took place. As the fire fight developed, 60mm and 81mm Mortars as well as 105mm Artillery fire was called in. A reaction force supported by one tank was dispatched. When the reaction force arrived at the scene of the action the enemy broke contact. A search of the enemy position revealed large pools of blood as well as NVA gear. 2 Marines were killed and 4 wounded while 4 NVA were killed.

Again on 9 February 1968 a squad size patrol from E Company surprised a reinforced NVA platoon waiting in ambush along Highway #9 (YD 047568). The NVA had wire communications with the north bank of the Cam Lo River and were apparently waiting in ambush for a friendly convoy coming from Dong Ha. The squad immediately engaged the enemy. A reaction platoon was dispatched and upon its arrival at the scene of the action the NVA attempted to break contact. Supporting arms was called in on the retreating enemy. 5 Marines were killed, 2 wounded, Medevacs. 12 NVA were confirmed killed. 3 AK-47 automatic weapons, 1 RPG Machine gun, 11 Chicom grenades and miscellaneous 782 gear was captured. After the above listed actions no significant NVA forces were encountered south of the Cam Lo river in the BLT 2/4 AO.

2. Training.

a. Operational commitments and the lack of significant enemy activity provided ample opportunity for "in country" training of all arms. Through necessity, training periods, classes, etc. were conducted on the small unit level with practical application as the final examination. The presence of NVA forces and the continued threat of his supporting arms demanded attentiveness and ensured participation.

b. Training in Scouting and Patrolling was accomplished by assigning squad leaders of rifle squads to accompany patrol inserts from the Recon Platoon. This enabled the squad leaders to observe the proper methods of patrolling and acquire practical experience which he can pass on to his men and practice while leading squad size patrols.

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SECTION V

LOGISTICS

Inclement weather is the biggest problem encountered in having the re-supply flown ashore. As a result of not having this transportation our re-supply was handicapped. On several occasions supplies have been staged for three to four days, awaiting a break in the weather. The wide dispersion of troops has also made it difficult to keep up with the timely re-supply of individual companies/units in the field.

Requests for re-supply were being received from the field often times, after the 1500 deadline, making it very difficult for the LSU personnel to get the proper information from the supply section (weight and cube), in time to place a frag commitment to the SLF-3 prior to 1800. This situation has been partially remedied by having the next days re-supply request sent in by 1300 the previous day for the following day, so as to ascertain more timely support, weather permitting.

Problems were experienced in the area of transportation of supplies from FLC to Tien Chau Ramp, this has been corrected by off loading one M-35 (LSU) with driver to transport all supplies to the ramp and provide any transportation for personnel on official business ashore.

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SECTION VI

COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

During the month of February 1968, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines encountered few problems concerning communications. The PRC-25 continues to be the finest piece of communications gear the Marine Corps has had in years.

Whip antennas, AT-271's, remain in short supply and the handset H-189 tend to break more easily than the older model H-138.

The coordination of frequencies through the 3d Marine Division area is still a problem with mutual interference being the main trouble spot. Due to ship movements in the ARG holding area, UHF Communications suffered when distances exceeded 25 miles from the relay site at Dong Ha.

There were no security violations reported during the month of February. The communications platoon is short the following personnel:

1 Message Center Chief 2549  
6 Wiremen 2511

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SECTION VII  
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

<u>Actual Missions</u>	Artillery - 122	
	81's 105	
<u>H&amp;I Missions</u>	Artillery - 156	
	81's 90	
<u>Total Missions</u>	Artillery - 278	
	81's 295	
Total Rounds Expended:	Artillery - 2170	HE
	116	WP
	3	HC Smoke
	6	ILL
	<u>2295</u>	Rds
	81's - 2696	HEM
	77	WP
	<u>31</u>	ILL
	2804	

Remarks

Artillery - 13 Confirmed  
81's - 4 Confirmed

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SECTION VIII

AIR SUPPORT

1. During the period 01 to 29 February 1968, the following air support was provided BLT 2/4.

a. Medevac Missions	12
b. C&C Flights	4
c. CAS	
(1) Armed Gunships	2
(2) Fixed Wing CAS	2
(3) AO	4
d. Admin and Troop Lifts	378

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## SECTION IX

MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant Events - None
2. New Developments - None
3. Problem Areas - None
4. Average daily number of patients seen 10  
Total number of patients for February 1968 310
5. Number of referrals to NSA, Danang, USS REPOSE and  
USS SANCTUARY 48
6. Routine Complaints
  - (a) Diarrhea 4
  - (b) URI 9
  - (c) Dermatitis 5
  - (d) EENT 53
  - (e) Venereal Disease 12
  - (f) Immersion Foot 0
  - (g) Others 73

154
7. Significant Disease to the area
  - (a) Malaria 0
  - (b) FUO 1

155
8. Number of Emergencies      TOTAL      EVAC      KIA      DOW
 

(a) Burns	5	5	0	0
(b) Lacerations	0	0	0	0
(c) Heat Casualties	0	0	0	0
(d) Shrapnel Wounds	40	38	2	0
(e) Gunshot Wounds	33	23	10	0
(f) Others	45	45	0	0
9. Immunizations and Prophylactics administered 40  
Dental Referrals 200
10. Officers - included in total count
  - (a) Officers seen at sick call 3
  - (b) Evacuated with shrapnel wounds 2

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CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

1. Name: Samir Jamil HABIBY, Lt, CHC, USNR
2. Devine Services

	No. of services	Attendance
a. Protestant	44	500
b. Roman Catholic	6	137
c. Lay Reader Roman Catholic	4	40
TOTAL	56	717

d. It is important to note that during this month the BLT Chaplain ministered only to the BLT (-). Two line Companies and attachments operated with other Battalions. This accounts for the drop in attendance at devine services from that of January.

3. Holy Baptism 2
4. Counselling Services 54
5. Red Cross Cases 12
6. Hospital (beds) 70
7. Brig Visits (III MAF Danang) 6
8. The BLT Chaplain spent most of February in the field with the BLT (-)
9. TAD Orders to visit sick, wounded, and brig.

The BLT Chaplain visited the following places.

- a. NSA Hospital, Danang
- b. III MAF Brig, Danang
- c. USS Repose, Danang Harbor
- d. Air Force Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay
- e. U.S. Army Convalescence Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay
- f. Sick Bay, USS IWO JIMA

The assistance and cooperation rendered the BLT Chaplain by the III MAF Chaplain at Danang and by the Chaplains at each of the Commands enabled the BLT Chaplain to accomplish his mission with great speed and ease.

10. The Chaplains attached to the PHIBRON 3 ships continue to be most cooperative and helpful. They have been ministering to BLT personnel in the Rear, and the IWO JIMA Chaplain has been providing the spiritual coverage for the SLF Staff and Air Squadron while the BLT Chaplain is in the field with the Alpha Command Group.

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11. Gifts from interested friends, individuals and organizations continue to be received by the BLT Chaplain's Office. They are then distributed to BLT Personnel.
12. The Memorial Service was interdenominational with Chaplains from Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish persuasions.
13. Facilities and Transportation were adequate

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## SECTION XI

### PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED

During the period 1 to 29 February 1968 BLT 2/4 was called upon to operate with one half the normal maneuver elements due to fragmentation of the BLT. This gave rise to many tactical problems, the most serious of which was maintaining a proper defensive posture and still having enough troops left to patrol and sweep the assigned Area of Operations. In order to free sufficient troops to effectively cover the area of Operations it is first necessary to develop a patrol base strong enough to withstand ground assault, yet one that requires a minimum of troops. This decision must be made early in the operation to fortify your defensive positions with bunkers and barbed wire, plans laid and work started immediately. The strengthening of the position enables fewer men to cover a greater defensive area and more men are freed for sweeps and patrols. Aggressive patrolling and use of supporting arms can compensate for lack of numbers.

When detaching a company size or smaller unit to operate with another battalion the unit commander who is being detached needs certain information which should be obtained by his parent battalion prior to his detachment. He must know the radio frequencies and brevity codes of the battalion he is going to, he should have a frag order from his adopted battalion which is specific in nature outlining such things as adjacent units, fire support available, logistical support, local ground rules and last but not least specifics of the enemy situation. The first few hours that a "bastard" unit is with an unfamiliar parent are the most vulnerable and the commander should have enough information available for an easy transition. Both his parent and adopted battalion should take extreme care in coordinating the detachment/attachment to avoid confusion and needless casualties.

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