

0077-68

DECLASSIFIED / HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF FPO San Francisco 96602

> HEADQUARITIES 26 BATIALICE, 4th MARINES (Kers)

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of 29 Cople.

From: To:

Commanding Officer

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 79.4

(2) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF

Command Chronology for the period 1 - 29 February 1968 Subj:

Ref:

(a) MCO P5750.1A

(b) FMFPACO 5750.8

(c) 3dMarDiv0 5750.1A

(d) Brig0 5750.10

Encl: √(1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a) through (d), enclosure (1) is submitted.

By direction

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
CO, 4th Marines

CO, 9th Marines

CG, 3dMarDiv CG, III MAF

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
GROUP - 4 Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years



DECLASSIFIED
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
Battalion Landing Team 2/4

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#### SECTION I

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#### ORGANIZATIONAL DATA INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS

1. Designation/Location. This report covers the period from 1-29 February 1968. During this period, elements of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 participated in Operation LANCASTER II under the OPCON of the Fourth Marine Regiment.

Commencing on 1 February 1968, BLT 2/4 (-), consisting of the Alfa Command Group with E, F, and G companies was assigned an area of Operations northwest of Camp Carroll, Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, in the vicinity of YD 037558 with responsibility for the security of the bridge sites at YD 026562 and 043566. BLT 2/4's mission was to conduct extensive patrolling and ambush activities to deny the enemy access to the area south of the Cam Lo River.

On 010830H February, BLT 2/4 commenced movement north from Camp Carroll to the Cam Lo River, establishing defensive positions at the two bridge sites and Hill 91 (YD 035557). Extensive patrolling and ambush activities were begun. On 02 February 1963, Company G was chopped to 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, West of Cam Lo District Headquarters, for operations.

The Mortar Battery (W/3/12) moved from A-3 to Camp Carroll to Support BLT 2/4 operations. Hotel Battery, with it's 105mm Howitzers was emplaced at Dong Ha and augmented 3dBn, 12th Marines. BLT 2/4 Tanks and Amtrac platoons were under the OPCON of the 1st AmtracBn operating in support of BLT 3/1 in Operation SALINE.

The Ontos of CoA 5thATBn moved from C-3 to Cam Lo and merged with Task Force Robbie (3dMarDiv Reserve).

#### 2. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinate T/O billet Assignments.

Commanding Officer Executive Officer

S-1

3-2

S-3

to 18Feb68 Fr 19Feb68

S-4

Supply Officer

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Medical Officer

Chaplain

LtCol W. WEISE
Maj C. W. KNAPP
1stLt R. L. MOHRIS
Capt R. J. MURPHY
Maj A. P. BRILL
Maj G. H. WARREN
Capt L. L. FOREHAND
1stLt S. D. POMICHTER
1stLt R. L. KLAUER
2dLt D. H. NEFF
Lt F. P. LILLIS USN
Lt S. J. HABIBY USN

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Dental Officer

Lt N. R. DIEKS USN

#### Company Commanders


H&S Company E.Company F Company G Company H Company lstLt E. S. DAWSON
Cept J. E. LIVINGSTON
lstLt M. H. GAVLICK
Capt M. S. VARGAS
Capt J. L. WILLIAMS

#### Attachments.

Battery H, 3dBn, 12th Marines
Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines
Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv
1stPlt, CoA, 5thTkBn
1stPlt, CoA, 5thATBn
4thPlt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn
2dPlt, CoB, 3dEngrBn
3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn
1stFlt, CoC, 3dSPBn
Logistic Suprort Unit, FLC
1stPlt, CoD, 3dReconBn
Clearing Plt, CoD, 5thMedBn

Capt CONLON
Capt SULLIVAN
1stLt DAWKINS
1stLt KANE
2dLt SMITH
2dLt NOKE
2dLt HAMILTON
1stLt FAUST
2dLt COGHILL
1stLt DESJARLAIS
1stLt MUTER
Lt JOHNSON USN





SECTION II

#### PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Period: Ol to 29 February 1968

1. Personnel

a. The average monthly strength during the period:

	USMC	UŞN
off	63	8
ENL	1652	88

b. Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies have been closely monitored and requested.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during the month:

	USMC	USN
OFF	5	-0
ENI.	116	0

d. The following number of personnel were joined during the month:

	USMC	USN
OFF	2	
ENL	190	2

e. The following casualties were incurred during this period:

KIA - 10	MIA - O	INJURED - 22	DAI - 1
WIA - 59	WIANE - 39	DOI - 0	
DOW - O	DISEASE - 10	other - 15	





#### SECTION III

#### INTELLIGENCE


The enemy order of battle can be summarized by stating that elements of the 320th Division and the 164th Artillery Regiment remain north of the Cam Lo River. There have been reports of their moving, however, they still remain within BLT 2/4 AO.

There have been 14 significant contacts with the enemy since 1 Feb 1968. A contact is defined as an actual exchange of S/A fire. Additionally, eight supporting arms missions were called on actual enemy sightings. Route #9 in 2/4's AO has had nine mining incidents since 1 Feb 1968. There have also been instames of booby trapping; namely, the enemy probing attempts seem calculated to acquire our claymore mines and trip flares.

The enemy has been engaged in units ranging from 1 or 2 men to platoon size. They are well-equipped with AK-47's, flak jackets, helmets, and chicom "hell boxes".

In sum, the enemy's mission seems to be one of reconnaissance thru contact. While the bulk of his forces remain north of the Cam Lo River, select groups of sniper/demo/sappers have been operating in an interdiction-harrassing role in the immediate Camp Carroll area. Equipment captured included 3 AK-47's, one RPD LMG, assorted 782 gear, 14 chicom grenades and one "hell box".

2/4 accounted for 35 NVA (Confirmed) with 7 friendly killed (plus 1 NBC).



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SECTION IV

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#### OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

#### 1. Special Operations

a. During the period Ol to 29 February 1968 the BLT 2/4 (-) participated in Operation Lancaster II near CampCarroll. In Support of the 4th Marines, BLT 2/4 conducted extensive patrol and ambush activities while safeguarding LOC's and vital bridge sites on National Rt #9. Prior to the arrival of BLT 2/4 the NVA had easy access to the Camp Carroll access road and National Rt#9 south of the Cam Lo River.

At 2315H, 4 February 1968 a squad size ambush patrol encountered a large enemy force of undetermined size at coordinates YD 040566. A fierce fire fight took place. As the fire fight developed, 60mm and 31mm Mortars as well as 105mm Artillery fire was called in. A reaction force supported by one tank was dispatched. When the reaction force arrived at the scene of the action the enemy broke contact. A search of the enemy position revealed large pools of blood as well as NVA gear. 2 Marines were killed and 4 wounded while 4 NVA were killed.

Again on 9 February 1963 a squad size patrol from E Company suprised a reinforced NVA platoon waiting in ambush along Highway #9 (YD 047568). The NVA had wire communications with the north bank of the Cam Lo River and were apparently waiting in ambush for a friendly convoy coming from Dong Ha. The squad immediately engaged the enemy. A reaction platoon was dispatched and upon its arrival at the scene of the action the NVA attempted to break contact. Supporting arms was called in on the retreating enemy. 5 Marines were killed, 2 wounded, Medevacs. 12 NVA were confirmed killed. 3 AK-47 automatic weapons, 1 RPG Machine gun, 11 Chicom grenades and miscellaneous 782 gear was captured. After the above listed actions no significant NVA forces were encountered south of the Cam Lo river in the BLT 2/4 AO.

#### 2. Training.

a. Operational commitments and the lack of significant enemy activity provided ample opportunity for "in country" training of all arms. Through necessity, training periods, classes, etc. were conducted on the small unit level with practical application as the final examination. The presence of NVA forces and the continued threat of his supporting arms demanded attentiveness and ensured participation.

b. Training in Scouting and Patrolling was accomplished by assigning squad leaders of rifle squads to accompany patrol inserts from the Recon Platoon. This enabled the squad leaders to observe the proper methods of patrolling and acquire practical experience which he can pass on the his men and practice while leading squad size patrols.

[Inclustric Enclosure (1)]



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SECTION V

#### LOGISTICS

Inclement weather is the biggest problem encountered in having the re-supply flown ashore. As a result of not having this transportation our re-supply was handicapped. On several occasions supplies have been staged for three to four days, awaiting a break in the weather. The wide dispersion of troops has also made it difficult to keep up with the timely re-supply of individual companies/units in the field.

Requests for re-supply were being received from the field often times, after the 1500 deadline, making it very difficult for the LSU personnel to get the proper information from the supply section (weight and cube), in time to place a frag commitment to the SLF-3 prior to 1800. This situation has been partially remedied by having the next days re-supply request sent in by 1300 the previous day for the following day, so as to ascertain more timely support, weather permitting.

Problems were experienced in the area of transportation of supplies from FLC to Tien Shau Ramp, this has been corrected by off loading one M-35 (LSU) with driver to transport all supplies to the ramp and provide any transportation for personnel on official business ashore.

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#### SECTION VI

#### COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS


During the month of February 1968, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines encountered few problems concerning communications. The PRC-25 continues to be the finest piece of communications geer the Marine Corps has had in years.

Whip entennes, AT-271's, remain in short supply and the handset H-189 tend to break more easily than the older model H-138.

The coordination of frequencies through the 3d Marine Division area is still a problem with mutual interference being the main trouble spot. Due to ship movements in the ARG holding area, UHF Communications suffered when distances exceeded 25 miles from the relay site at Dong Ha.

There were no security violations reported during the month of February. The communications platoon is short the following personnel:

1 Message Center Chief 2549 6 Wiremen 2511



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#### SECTION VII FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

Actual Missions Artillery - 122 81's 105

H&I Missions Artillery - 156 81's 90

Total Missions Artillery - 278 81's 295

Total Rounds Expended: Artillery - 2170 HE

116 WP 3 HC Smoke

6 ILL 2295 Rds

81's = 2696 HEM 77 WP 31 ILL 2804

#### Remarks

Artillery - 13 Confirmed 81's - 4 Confirmed

# -- Declaration

#### SECTION VIII

### AIR SUPPORT

1. During the period O1 to 29 February 1968, the following air support was provided BLT 2/4.

a.	Medevac Missions	12
b.	C&C Flights	4
G.	CAS	_
	(1) Armed Gunships	2
	(2) Fixed Wing CAS	2
	(3) AO	Ц
d.	Admin and Troop Lifts	378



DECLARATED

## SECTION IX

## MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1.	Significant Events - Nor	ne		-	
2.	New Developments - None				
3.	Problem Areas - None				
4.	Average daily number of patients seen Total number of patients for February 1968			10 310	
5.	Number of referrals to USS SANCTUARY	NSA, Dane	ang, USS I	REPOSE and	48
6.	Routine Complaints (a) Diearrhea (b) URI (c) Dermatitis (d) EENT (e) Venereal Disease (f) Immersion Foot (g) Others				495 53120 734
7•	Significant Disease to (a) Malaria (b) FUO	the area			0 1/65
8.	Number of Energencies	TOTAL	EVAC	KIA	DOW
	<ul> <li>(a) Burns</li> <li>(b) Lacerations</li> <li>(c) Heat Casualties</li> <li>(d) Shrapnel Wounds</li> <li>(e) Gunshot Wounds</li> <li>(f) Others</li> </ul>	5 0 0 40 33 45	5 0 0 38 235 45	0 0 0 2 10 0	0 0 0 0 0
9•	Immunizations and Proph Dental Referrals	ylactics	administ	ered	կ0 200
10.	Officers - included in (a) Officers seen at si (b) Evacuated with shra	ck cell			3 2





#### SECTION X

#### CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

1. Name: Samir Jamil HABIBY, Lt, CHC, USNR

2. Devine Services

		No. of services	Attendance
a.	Protestant	44	500
b.	Roman Catholic	·6	137
c.	Lay Reader Roman	Catholic 4	<u>40</u>
-	TOTAL	<del>56</del>	717

- d. It is important to note that during this month the BLT Chaplain ministered only to the BLT (-). Two line Companies and attachments operated with other Battalions. This accounts for the drop in attendance at devine services from that of January.
- 3. Holy Baptism 2
- 4. Counselling Services 54
- 5. Red Cross Cases 12
- 6. Hospital (beds) 70
- 7. Brig Visits (III MAF Danang) 6
- 8. The BLT Chaplain spent most of February in the field with the BLT (-)
- 9. TAD Orders to visit sick, wounded, and brig.

The BLT Chaplain visited the following places.

- a. NSA Hospital, Danang
- b. III MAF Brig, Danang
- c. USS Repose, Danang Harbor
- d. Air Force Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay
- e. U.S. Army Convalascence Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay
- f. Sick Bay, USS IWO JIMA

The assistance and cooperation rendered the BLT Chaplain by the III MAF Chaplain at Danang and by the Chaplains at each of the Commands enabled the BLT Chaplain to accomplish his mission with great speed and ease.

10. The Chaplains attached to the PHIBRON 3 ships continue to be most cooperative and helpful. They have been ministering to BLT personnel in the Rear, and the IWO JIMA Chaplain has been providing the spiritual coverage for the SLF Staff and Air Squadron while the BLT Chaplain is in the field with the Alpha Command Group.



- 11. Gifts from interested friends, individuals and organizations continue to be received by the BLT Chaplain's Office. They are then distributed to BLT Personnel.
- 12. The Memorial Service was interdenominational with Chaplains from Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish persuasions.
- 13. Facilities and Transportation were adequate

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#### SECTION XI

#### PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED

During the period 1 to 29 February 1968 BLT 2/4 was called upon to operate with one half the normal nameuver elements due to fragmentation of the BLT. This gave rise to many tactical problems, the most serious of which was maintaining a proper defensive posture and still having enough troops left to patrol and sweep the assigned Area of Operations. In order to free sufficient troops to effectively cover the area of Operations it is first necessary to develop a patrol base strong enough to withstand ground assault, yet one that requires a minimum of troops. This decision must be made early in the operation to fortify your defensive positions with bunkers and barbed wire, plans laid and work started i mediately. The strengthening of the position enables fewer men to cover a greater defensive area and more men are freed for sweeps and patrols. Agressive patroling and use of supporting arms can compensate for lack of numbers.

When detaching a company size or smaller unit to operate with another battalion the unit commander who is being detached needs certain information which should be obtained by his parent battalio prior to his detachment. He must know the radio frequencies and brevity codes of the battalion he is going to, he should have a frag order from his adopted battalion which is specific in nature outlining such things as adjacent units, fire support available, logistical support, local ground rules and last but not least specifics of the enemy situation. The first few hours that a "bastard" unit is with an unfamiliar parent are the most vulnerable and the commander should have enough information available for an easy transition. Both his parent and adopted battalion should take extreme care in coordinating the detachment/ attachment to avoid confusion and needless casualties.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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