

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CTG 79.4
00143-68

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/4
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMB
FPO San Francisco 96602

SEC FILES
HEADQUARTERS
Bd BATTALION 4th MARINES (Rela)

3/GFW/jab
5750
31 May 1968
SerNo: 003A16068

0070468

From: Commanding Officer Copy 1 of 25 Copies
To: Commander Task Group 79.4

Subj: Command Chronology for the Period 1-31 May 1968

Ref: (a) Erig 5750.1C
(b) FMFPac 5150.8
(c) Map Vietnam, Quang Tri Sheet No. 6442 IV

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

Charles W. Knapp
CHARLES W. KNAPP
By direction

DISTRIBUTION:

CTG 79.4 1-15
CO 3D Marines 16
CG 3D MarDiv 17
CG 9th MAB 18
CG III MAF 19
File 20-25

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

000001

BLT 2/4

CTG CHRON

1968

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/4
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 May to 31 May 1968

INDEX

- | | |
|----------|---|
| PART I | - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA |
| PART II | - NARRATIVE SUMMARY |
| PART III | - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS |
| PART IV | - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS |

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1-31 MAY 1968

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS.

2. Commanding Officer	To 2 May 1968	LtCol W. C. WEISE
	Fr 3 May 1968	Maj C. KNAPP
	To 5 May 1968	
	Fr 6 May 1968	LtCol L. A. RANN
Executive Officer		Maj C. W. KNAPP
S-1		1stLt R. L. MORRIS
S-2		Capt R. J. MURPHY
S-3		Maj G. H. WARREN
S-4	To 11 May 1968	Capt L. L. FOREHAND
	Fr 12 May 1968	Capt R. J. MASTRION
Supply Officer		2dLt. J. D. CLARKE
Communications Officer		1stLt P. J. MCILHINNY
Motor Transport Officer		1stLt D. H. NEFF
Medical Officer		Lt F. P. LILLIS USN
Chaplain	Fr 7 May 1968	Lt G. E. JACOBSON USN
Dental Officer		Lt N. R. DIERS USN

Company Commanders

H&S Company		1stLt E. S. DAWSON
E Company	To 7 May 1968	Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON
	Fr 8 May 1968	Capt E. G. MASSMAN
F Company		Capt J. H. BUTLER
G Company	To 11 May 1968	Capt R. J. MASTRION
	Fr 12 May 1968	Capt J. M. DWYER
H Company	To 3 May 1968	Capt J. L. WILLIAMS
	To 20 May 1968	1stLt A. F. PRESCOTT II
	Fr 21 May 1968	Capt O. M. THOMPSON

ATTACHMENTS

Battery H, 3dBn, 12th Marines	To 23 May 1968	Capt A. C. CONLON
	Fr 24 May 1968	1stLt A. D. NETTLEINGHAM
Mortar Battery, 3dBn, 12th Marines		Capt F. X. SULLIVAN
Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv		1stLt E. D. DAWKINS
1stPlt, CoA, 5th TrkBn	To 20 May 1968	SSgt T. GARVIN
	Fr 21 May 1968	2dLt R. D. SMITH
1st Plt, CoA, 5th ATBn	To 20 May 1968	2dLt R. D. SMITH
	Fr 21 May 1968	SSgt C. B. WHITEFIELD
4th Plt, CoB, 1stAmTracBn		1stLt H. E. LINDFELT

DECLASSIFIED

03 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



2dPlt, CoB, 3d EngrBn
3dPlt, CoC, 3dMTBn

2dLt. P. S. HAMILTON
To 20 May 1968 2dLt. J. T.
LASLIE

1st Plt, CoC, 3dSPBn
Logistic Support Unit, FLC

Fr 21 May 1968 1stLt. E. BREEZE
1stLt. J. R. COGHILL
To 11 May 1968 1stLt. B. L.
SHERROW

1st Plt, CoD, 3dReconBn
Clearing Plt, CoD, 5th MedBn

Fr 12 May 1968 1stLt. H. L.
HOSTRANDER
1stLt. C. W. MUTER
Lt. E. W. JOHNSON USN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

2/4 (May 68)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Period: 01 to 31 May 1968

1. a. The average monthly strength during the period:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	63	7
ENL	1682	93

b. Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies have been closely monitored and requested.

c. The following number of personnel were transferred during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	19	0
ENL	234	8

d. The following number of personnel were joined during the month:

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
OFF	22	0
ENL	418	13

e. The following casualties were incurred during this period:

KIA	- 89	MIA	- 0	INJURED	- 12
WIA	- 249	WIANE	- 182	DOI	- 1
DOW	- 5	DISEASE	- 3	OTHER	- 16

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

From 1 May through 311400H May BLT 2/4 continued its participation in Operation Napoleon/Saline under the OPCON of the Third Marines. The primary mission of the BLT continued to be keeping the Cua Viet River open to Naval logistic traffic. This was successfully done by controlling and occupying the north banks of the Cua Viet River, the "Jones Creek" drainage system, and denying all other infiltration routes within the BLT's AO. The secondary mission of pacification became impractical as the Vietnamese Nationals formerly found within the AO were driven out by NVA infiltrating south from the DMZ in a determined offensive.

The first three days of the month saw the entire BLT committed in a fierce battle that commenced on 30 April when the NVA, from the hamlet of Dai-Do, closed the river down to Naval logistic traffic. Although Dai-Do was in the 2nd ARVN Regiment's AO, it was decided to commit the BLT (-) against what was originally thought to be an NVA Company because the ARVNs were in heavy contact up north. As the battle progressed it became apparent that the BLT was up against at least two NVA battalions (later found to be an entire NVA Regiment). In the bloodiest day of the battle (2 May), the NVA launched two separate counter attacks that almost pushed the BLT maneuver elements out of Dai-Do. Constant use of artillery, Naval gun fire, close air strikes and huoy gunships in support of the BLT's maneuver elements enabled the vastly outnumbered Marines to push the NVA north out of Dai-Do, and again open the Cua Viet River to traffic by 3 May.

Because of the heavy casualties sustained by the BLT the AO was cut to include approximately two grid squares to enable the Battalion to reorganize, and train the large influx of new replacements. Heavy emphasis was given to a training program which emphasized basic tactics including fire and movement, compass and map work, FO procedures, night firing techniques, familiarization of all crew served weapons and the M72 LAAW, and training on the use of LVTP-5 and the M-48 tank.

It should be noted that while the battalion was reorganizing Marine and Army units working within the BLT's former AO were in heavy contact throughout the first six days of May. On 9 May the BLT was given an extension of its AO and the BLT's maneuver elements started patrolling. The numerous light contacts made by the BLT's maneuver elements gave credence to the fact that the AO was not aggressively patrolled in its entirety, NVA forces would

36

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 May The first of the month found the BLT heavily engaged with what was later determined to be elements of two regimental size NVA forces. The contact started on 30 April and would last to 3 May. To understand what occurred during the first three days in May it is felt that the positions of the BLT's maneuver units must first be given.

As the day of 1 May started Companies F (-) and H had established a perimeter in the Ville at coordinates (YD 261631). Company G was at the BLT 2/4 CP (Mai Xa Chenh - YD 280667), B 1/3 (OPCONED to BLT 2/4 on 30 April) was on the north bank of the Cua Viet in 2 small village in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 257624). Company E had been chopped to the Third Marine Division, and was located just north of the bridge at Dong Ha (YD 241612). The second platoon of Company F was located at the base camp at My Loc (YD 305680).

At 0600H Company B 1/3 assaulted the ville at coordinates (YD 254629), and by 0700H reported having ville secured, but were still taking recoilless rifle and artillery incoming. Throughout the remainder of the day enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire would spordically land among attacking BLT maneuver elements.

At 1040H Company G, two tanks, and the BLT Commander landed in two Mike-8 boats in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 263632) where they linked up with Company F (-) and Company H. A frag order was issued by the BLT Commander which called for Company G, supported by two tanks, to assault and sieze the objective area (Dai-Do YD 253628). Company F would move in from the north to retrieve their one KIA/BNR from the action of 30 April. Company H was to move on line within 400 meters of the eastern edge of Dai-Do and act as a base of fire/screening force for Company G's assault. Company B 1/3, located in the ville to the southeast of Dai-Do was the BLT reserve. From 1100-1240H the objective area was hit with air and artillery.

At 1253H, Company G commenced their attack on Dai-Do. As the assault progressed north Company G encountered heavy enemy resistance to its western front and flank. The CO of BLT 2/4 requested that Company E be chopped back to the BLT so that they might sweep to the objective from the west. At 1330H Company E was chopped back to BLT 2/4. Meanwhile a smoke screen to the western flank of Company G proved effective as the flanking enemy fire ceased and became ineffective.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 1445H, Company F had recovered its KIA/BNR and was on the way to join Company H, when it came under enemy artillery fire which resulted in three Marine KIA's and eight Marine WIA's. At 1625H, all units became engaged with enemy small arms, artillery and mortar fire, including Company E which was in the process of linking up with Company B 1/3 in the vicinity of (YD 256623). It then became apparent that the NVA forces were about to launch a coordinated counter attack so Company B 1/3, was ordered to link up with Company G, which was now located in the southern corner of Dai-Do, and holding off a heavy enemy ground counter attack.

At 1745H, Company B was just approaching the southwestern portion of Dai-Do, when it came under intense small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy forces which apparently had maneuvered to the south of Company G. Both Companies G and B 1/3 were ordered into tight perimeters, and repulsed the counterattack.

Meanwhile Companies F(-) and H were ordered to form a tight perimeter occupied the previous night (YD 261631). Company E had meanwhile formed a perimeter in the vicinity of coordinates (YD 258624). At 1845H the recon platoon was given the responsibility of medevacing casualties sustained by B 1/3 and Company E from the Company E perimeter.

The casualties were slowly extracted from the B 1/3 area and moved back to the FLT perimeter (Mai Ka Chanh) by skimmer boat and otter, where they were medevaced by helicopter. Throughout the early evening Companies G, H, F and B 1/3 all reported taking heavy enemy artillery, mortar and rocket incoming. From 1900H to 2000H the artillery nets were jammed making counter battery near impossible. By 1945H B 1/3 had medevaced all its casualties from the area of its contact and pulled back 500 meters south to the Company E perimeter.

By 2100H it was apparent the enemy counter attack had been repulsed for the moment as only light incoming small arms was reported. With a flare ship up, the remainder of the night was relatively quiet. 2 May At 0023H the CO FLT 2/4 issued a freg order which called for Company E, under the cover of darkness to move north and link up with Company G. An assault line would then be formed with Company E to the west and Company G to the east. At first light they would commence their attack north through Dai-Do and into the ville of Dinh To. Company H would move from its perimeter by first light and follow in trace of the two assault companies. Company F

*NOT QUIET !!
ACTUALLY, G CO.
RECEIVED 3000H
STRONG ENEMY
NIGHT ATTACKS
WHICH WERE
REPULSED WITH
HEAVY ENEMY
LOSSES
W.W.
TAPAN 82*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

would stand ready to aid either attack unit, and would generally screen the eastern approach to Dai-Do. Company B 1/3 would aid in resupply., handling medevacs and provide security for the 81mm mortar section at (YD 258624).

The attack commenced at first light and by 0800H both Companies E and G were heavily engaged with well dug in NVA at the northern portion of Dai-Do. By 0914H Companies E and G had pushed the NVA north out of Dai-Do, and were consolidating their lines. It was reported that both companies had sustained heavy casualties by this time, and were still receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. From 0915H - 0930H all attacking elements in the vicinity of Dai-Do came under intense artillery fire from the north.

At 0955H permission was given to pull the second platoon of Company F from My Loc and have them join Company F. Throughout the remainder of the morning the assault Companies E, G and H continued to advance on the entrenched enemy under the cover of heavy supporting arms and close air strikes.

At 1322H, Companies E and H had secured the ville of Dinh To north to the vicinity of coordinates (YD 250632) and were consolidating. Meanwhile the ARVN's to the west of the creek boarding the western edge of Dai-Do reported securing the ville to the west. At 1340H enemy forces launched a counter attack from the north and by 1430H both Companies E and H were resisting a major enemy counter attack. It was reported that both company commanders had been wounded, and the companies had taken heavy casualties. A retrograde movement to the southern edge of Dai-Do was made and all maneuver units proceeded to reorganize, get resupplied and evacuate their casualties.

The area to the north of the maneuver elements was pounded by air strikes and heavy artillery. Meanwhile the second platoon of Company F had arrived at the Company F perimeter (YD 261631) and Company F was ordered to move to the southern portion of Dai-Do and prepare to join Company G in the attack.

At 1550H Companies G and F commenced their attack north through Dai-Do. As the assault units moved north resistance became heavier and incoming fire increased in intensity.

By 1645H both companies reported being heavily engaged with the enemy. For fifty minutes a fierce firefight

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ensued, and the assault elements moved forward under the support of artillery, close air strikes and Huey gunships.

At 1740H it was reported that the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/4 was hit and that both company assault lines were being overrun by waves of NVA attacking south. At this time a retrograde movement was ordered and by 1803H both Companies F and G had reached the hasty perimeter setup by Companies E and H on the southern portion of Dai-Do. The BLT Executive Officer had at this time assumed command of the BLT. Throughout this period every attempt possible was made to retrieve known missing and wounded personnel, but heavy pressure by attacking NVA elements made it impossible to push out too far from the perimeter.

At 1830H, sixty (60) personnel from the Mai Xa Chanh Base Camp were sent out to aid the four rifle companies. By dark the BLT maneuver elements had consolidated into a perimeter in the southern portion of Dai-Do, while B 1/3 and the section of 81mm mortars were in the ville at (YD 258624).

A flare ship was called up and all supporting arms possible was called into prevent the enemy from massing a ground attack. Although probed for the remainder of the evening, the situation remained relatively quiet.

3 May No significant enemy contact was experienced by the BLT maneuver elements throughout the day. The maneuver elements continued to account for their dead and wounded and prepared to move back into the area of contact of 2 May. A total of sixty-seven (67) NVA bodies were found in the immediate area of the hasty perimeter. At 1455H, B 1/3 was chopped back to 1/3, and at 1500H 1/3 assumed control of that portion of BLT 2/4's AO which included Dai-Do.

Companies F and E left for the Mai Xa Chanh Perimeter while Companies G and H prepared to follow traces of 1/3 elements to retrieve the BLT's KIA, BNR.

By 1935H the retrieval operation was completed and elements of Companies G and H started back to the Mai Xa Chanh Perimeter. By 2116H the "lost of all 2/4's units" had entered the 2/4 CP area. Results of the encounter were 452 NVA KIA (C) (INFANTRY) and 3 POW's.

4 May As a result of the high casualties sustained in the Battle of Dai-Do, the BLT's AO was out to approximately two grid squares to allow the BLT to reorganize and retrain the maneuver elements and the many new replacements.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At 1035H the body of a Marine from BLT 2/4, who was apparently taken prisoner by the NVA was found by C 1/3 at coordinates (YD 250532). An inspection revealed that the Marines' wounds had been treated by the enemy, but that he was later shot. The day was spent reorganizing and reequipping the BLT's maneuver elements.

5 May Company E conducted an equipment retrieval operation in the vicinity of Dai-Do and Dinh To (YD 255628 and YD 250632). At 1600H LtCol L. A. RANN assumed command of BLT 2/4, and Major C. W. KNAPP resumed duties as the BLT Executive Officer. Training and reorganization continued.

6 May At 0535H a CAS mission landed just outside the BLT perimeter (YD 277662) resulting in one Marine priority medevac. BLT units continued to regroup, reorganize and train replacements. No enemy contact occurred for the duration of the day.

7 May Civilians again appeared in the area of Vinh Quan Thuong (YD 270660) harvesting rice. Primary emphasis throughout the day was given to the training of new replacements. It should again be noted that the BLT's AO had been temporarily reduced, to give the organization a chance to reorganize and retrain its many new replacements. No enemy contact was experienced throughout the day.

8 May At 0040H two figures (YD 273603) were spotted by Company H elements utilizing a starlight scope. A 60mm mortar mission was put on the order, but a check at first light revealed negative results. Throughout the day all maneuver elements were actively training and zeroing weapons.

9 May The BLT's AO was expanded and Company H reestablished its base camp (YD 265648). The third platoon of Company H, while patrolling in the vicinity of Ky Truc (YD 250670) came under small arms fire from an estimated 6 enemy. The platoon formed a small perimeter (YD 252659) and proceeded to dig in so as to be able to keep Ky Truc under observation. Eventually both Company H and its third platoon came under enemy artillery fire (78 Rds), but sustained no casualties. When counter battery was called the incoming artillery ceased. Throughout the day the other maneuver elements of the BLT continued to train.

10 May At 0030H Company H called in an artillery mission on five (5) NVA in the open (YD 253650), but a check at first light yielded negative results.

DECLASSIFIED

2/4 May 68

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

move in to establish fortified belts.

On 21 May a platoon of PF's from Gio Linh District was OPCONED to the BLT. It was the intention to utilize the PF's with Marine patrols and check points to screen Vietnamese Nationals entering the area to harvest rice. On 25 May Companies E and H made heavy contact in the vicinity of Nhi Ha (2). It was later learned that evening that NVN forces in Division strength were making a determined drive south across the eastern portion of the 3d Marine Division AO.

To counter this move by the enemy a regimental size operation was executed during the last four days in May by the Third Marines and its OPCONED units. Heavy contact was made by two Marine battalions attacking north shortly after leaving the BLT's AO (YD 247728).

In summary it can be said the NVN forces were constantly trying to establish another "Dai-Do" within the BLT's AO from which they could close the Cau Viet River. Constant patrolling by the BLT's maneuver elements prevented this from ever happening.

At 1400H 31 May the BLT was chopped to the Task Force Hotel and was helilifted out of the Mai Xe Chanh area to Landing Zone Stud near Calu where we entered Operation SCOTLAND II/ LANCASTER II.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At 0540H approximately three(3) rounds of enemy artillery landed at the BLT CP from a direction of 6400 mils. Counter battery was immediately called in and the incoming ceased. Again the maneuver elements continued to train and FAM fire all Marines.

11 May From 1320H to 1415H Company H received a total of twelve (12) enemy medium caliber artillery rounds, but sustained no casualties. At 1600H elements of Company H spotted 3-4 enemy, and called in an 81mm mission. The coverage of the 81mm mortar mission was good, but the results are not known. At 1810H Company H (YD254657) received three rounds from an enemy 75mm recoilless rifle, but sustained no casualties. 81mm mortar and 106mm recoilless rifle fire was brought to bear on the suspected enemy position.

12 May At 0330H a Company E ambush took five (5) NVA under fire (YD277676) and captured one (1) POW. At 0725H while on its way to relieve the third platoon of Company H (YD 256657), Company G came under small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from the vicinity of coordinates (YD254658). Supporting arms were called in on the enemy position while elements of Company G maneuvered on the entrenched enemy. By 1220H Company G had assaulted the enemy position and had killed ten (10) NVA. In the action four (4) Marines were killed and four (4) were wounded and evacuated. At 1710H Company F reported receiving one enemy recoilless rifle round from the vicinity of coordinates (YD277678). A 81mm mortar mission was called on the suspected enemy position. At 2100H 2-3 NVA approached the Company G position (YD258658), and were immediately brought under fire. A search at first light revealed one (1) NVA body and one AK-47.

13 May Company G found four (4) additional NVA bodies (YD254658) when searching the area of contact of 12 May. Also found with the bodies were one AK-47 and one LPD LMG. At 0850H elements of Company G located one (1) NVA in a bunker, and after repeated attempts to capture him alive, had to kill him. At 1630H Company H elements ran down one of the men that tried to flee as they approached. The Vietnamese male was sent to regiment as a detainee. At 1940H Company G received sporadic enemy small arms fire (YD 263660), and immediately returned a large volume of small arms and M-79 fire that suppressed the enemy fire. The remainder of the BLT's maneuver elements continued to train and zero their M-16 rifles.

14 May Company E moved out to the base camp at (YD 265648) and relieved Company H. At 1030H Company G fired at two (2) NVA (YD 260671) with 60mm mortars. A check of the area yielded negative results. No other contact was experienced for the remainder of the day, and the maneuver elements continued to train extensively.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

15 May At 0830H Company F moved north to Lam Xuan (West) (YD 268700) to relieve the Army Company (B/3/21) and by 1100H the unit was formally relieved. Meanwhile Company E moved from their base camp (YD 265648) and by 1500H arrived at Nhi Ha (1) (YD 265648) to formally relieve the Army Company there (C/3/21). Company G finished destroying their fortifications in the vicinity of Vinh Quan Thuong (YD 258658) during the morning and moved to the Mai Xa Chanh Perimeter by 1230H.

At 1540H an ontrac traveling to Company F's perimeter at Lam Xuan (West) struck an explosive device and had to be towed back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter, because of damaged track. One Marine received a minor wound from this incident. Throughout the day Company H conducted training. For the remainder of the day no enemy contact was experienced.

16 May The third platoon of Company G was sent to occupy the base camp in the destroyed ville of My Loc (YD305680). At 0900H the perimeter occupied by BLT 2/4, formerly known as Mai Xa Chanh, was renamed Camp Big John in honor of Sergeant Major John Malnar (deceased on 2 May at Dia-Do). The majority of personnel on SLC-A shipping were off loaded to DHCF in preparation for the exchange of vessels at Subic Bay, R.P.I.

At 2325H a Company F LP spotted ten (10) NVA (YD268699) and simultaneously received small arms fire. The LP returned a large volume of fire and a check of the area at first light revealed blood stains and drag marks.

17 May At 0015H a Company F night activity spotted enemy movement (YD269698) and called in a 60mm mortar mission. The area was checked at first light and again drag marks and fresh blood pools were found.

At 0925H the first platoon of Company E, while patrolling in the area of (YD256714) started receiving small arms fire from the ville line (YD253717) to the north of their position.

An AO was called on station and adjusted artillery and air strikes on the enemy position. The Commanding Officer of Company E, the third platoon, and two tanks moved north to link up with the first platoon and to exploit the contact. This unit attacked the enemy held position under the support of artillery, 81mm mortars and the tank's fire. As the third platoon neared the villes

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

edge a large volume of small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and mortar fire was received from the ville (YD253717) and from the west bank of Jones Creek (YD256717). The Company Commander ordered the third platoon and tanks to pull back, and continued to call in Naval Gunfire, artillery, 81mm mortars and close air support in the enemy held positions. It was decided that rather than execute a costly frontal attack, to continue to use supporting arms to level the ville. The AO called in air strikes on retreating enemy as the afternoon progressed. One tank got stuck, which required that a Company E platoon remain as security until a third tank could arrive to aid in the retrieval. Also at this time a platoon from Company F swept north along west bank of Jones Creek, crossed east through it and linked up with the third platoon of Company E at the tank. Company E (-) came under moderate mortar fire at 1400H while it was moving back to Nhi Ho, and sustained four (4) more minor WIA's. By 1530H the tank was extracted and moving south with the two platoons from Companies E and F.

The result of the days action were two (2) Marine KIA's and Thirteen (13) Marines wounded and evacuated. At least thirteen NVA were killed in the action. The remainder of the night was relatively quiet with no enemy contact.

18 May During the early morning hours Company F made three separate enemy sightings and each time called in 60mm mortar missions on the enemy.

At 0430H Company F (Lam Xuan (West)) received three (3) rounds of enemy 60mm mortar within their perimeter. Counter mortar fire was immediately fired at the suspected enemy position and the incoming ceased. A Company F squad sized patrol found assorted individual equipment ordnance (YD272696), which were forwarded to regiment.

The other maneuver elements continued to train throughout the day. Major General THOMPkins, CG Third Marine Division visited the BLT area at 1530H.

At 2000H Company E called in an 81mm mortar mission on enemy movement (YD251716).

At 2030H an LP from Company F observed four (4) people (YD265700) moving in a south easterly direction. A 60mm mortar mission was fired, but a check at first light yielded negative results.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

19 May Throughout the entire day the maneuver elements of the BLT conducted combat patrols and trained extensively. Company H personnel, while training in front of their portion of the perimeter, found a homemade bangalore torpedo under the outside wire (YD278664). No contact was experienced throughout the entire day.

20 May At 1240H a skimmer boat enroute to Nhi Ha struck a submerged dud round (nature unknown) that exploded, and slightly injured the boat operator. The engine was destroyed so the boat was towed back to the Camp Big John Perimeter by its passengers.

During the afternoon a Company F patrol discovered a large complex of thirty (30) bunkers (YD272692). All digging and construction was recent. Plans were made to return the next day with an engineer squad and enough demolitions to destroy the entire complex.

At 1805H Company E received twelve (12) rounds of 130mm artillery inside the perimeter, but sustained no casualties. For the remainder of the night no contact was experienced.

21 May At 0800H a platoon patrol from Company H checking out a suspected enemy rocket site (YD264683) discovered four 140mm rockets and one 122mm rocket warhead. The 140mm rockets were destroyed in place, while the 122mm warhead and some NVA web gear were sent to regiment.

Later in the morning three squads of PF's from Gio Linh District arrived to work with the BLT. They were to aid the rifle companies in screening the indigenous personnel harvesting rice in the BLT's AO.

At 2230H Marines from Company G spotted one figure (YD271668) moving in front of the wire and took him under fire with small arms.

At 2315H a Company E ambush spotted nine NVA digging positions, brought them under fire and then shifted its position.

At first light check of the areas where both contacts were made, revealed negative results.

22 May The only enemy contact occurred when three skimmer boats making their regular scheduled 1630H run to Dong Ha Ramp came under sniper fire from the north bank of the Cua Viet (YD246617). The security personnel aboard the skimmer boats returned fire, and the boats continued on. No casualties resulted.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Throughout the day all maneuver elements conducted combat patrols and training of new replacements. No other contact was reported for the remainder of the day.

23 May At 1655H a Company H patrol discovered two explosive devices (VIC YD 265680) and NVA individual equipment. These explosive devices were destroyed in place and the individual equipment was turned over to the Regimental S-2.

A Company E patrol discovered 3 NVA KIA's that had been buried (YD274702) and one SKS rifle at 1245H. It was believed that the enemy KIA's had been killed by artillery or 81mm mortar H&I fire and were thus claimed by the PLT as three KIA's (C).

There were no significant events reported for the remainder of the day.

24 May At 0200H Company G was in a cordon position in the resettlement ville (YD312690). A CIT team with a squad from the First Amtrac Battalion entered the ville and by daylight 3 VC had been taken prisoner and forwarded to Division. Several sightings of NVA in the PLT AO were made, but no contacts were made that day. At 1400H the Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division visited Camp Big John. That night Company E, while conducting aggressive night patrolling sighted several large groups of NVA moving in their area. Because of their sightings, Company E was ordered to conduct a sweep of Nhi Ha 2 the following day.

25 May At 0730H Company E made a significant contact at Nhi Ha 2 (YD 284714) with what was later discovered from POW sources to be an NVA battalion. The battle lasted for 12 hours with the ELT employing close air and artillery strikes on the ville. Company H was moved up to screen Company E and as they did so they killed 40 NVA. Company E with the support of two tanks was able to clear the ville that evening. The enemy was cleverly camouflaged and well dug in. They employed small arms, automatic weapons, RPG's, mortar and artillery fire. The result of this action was 241 NVA KIA's (c) and 5 POW captured. At 2000H all CIT units came under a 20 minute mortar, artillery and rocket attack. Two Marines were killed and four wounded at the Camp Big John Perimeter. Marine losses as a result of the actions were 21 KIA (5 KIA/PNR not recovered till 27 May) and 35 WIA's evacuated. Elements of 3/3 were moving into the Camp Big John area in preparation for a pending multi-battalion operation.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

26 May Throughout the early morning hours the maneuver elements of BLT 2/4 came under sporadic artillery, mortar and small arms fire. The fire was returned with unknown results. At 0600H elements of Company H captured an NVA officer who was wounded outside Company H's lines. The NVA officer was treated for his wounds and medevaced to 3d Marine Regiment. The rest of the day was spent by all maneuver elements of BLT 2/4 in preparation for the pending mutter battalion operation.

The CO of the 3D Marines issued the operation order at Camp Big John to the CO's of 2/4, 1/3, 1/9 and 2/9. BLT 2/4's mission was to establish a blocking position for the operation.

27 May At 0310H Company G at Nhi Ha (YD273704) took twelve (12) rounds of enemy artillery 19 minutes later took (2) two more rounds incoming.

At 0605H Company F chopped to the Third Battalion 4th Marines.

The remainder of the BLT maneuver elements moved into their blocking positions. Company H moved to (YD279710) and Company E moved to (YD281714).

By 1400H Company E had swept through the area of their May 25 contact and recovered their KIA/BNR. Company E also found 22 fresh graves as well as several crew served and individual weapons. All blocking units of BLT 2/4 (-) were in position by 1700H. No significant contact was made by units of BLT 2/4 (-) for that day.

28 May No significant contact was made by BLT 2/4 (-) elements that morning. At 1225H Company G (YD265712) took two (2) rounds incoming.

At 1300H BLT 2/4 (-) received orders to abandon their blocking positions and return to previously occupied positions at Nhi Ha 1, Lam Xuan (West) and Camp Big John. All maneuver elements were in their respective positions by 1700H. Aggressive night activities were constituted in their area but no contact was made.

29 May Companies H and G received sporadic incoming artillery and mortar rounds throughout the morning. A squad patrol made contact with unknown size enemy unit at (YD274699). A Company G platoon was sent to aid the squad. Result of the action was one (1) NVA KIA (C)

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

and two (2) AK-47's captured. Marine losses were one (1) KIA and two (2) WIAE. No further contact was made that day. During the night Company H observed small enemy units moving in the BLT's AO. Small arms, mortar and artillery fire was directed on the enemy. A search of the area revealed drag marks, blood, a pack and three bangalore torpedoes.

30 May A platoon from Company G made contact at 0930H with a small unit of NVA and took them under fire at (YD 284680). Results of the contact were three (3) NVA KIA's (C), two (2) AK-47's and hand grenades. No Marine Casualties were sustained. Later in the day a platoon from Company H discovered a cache of NVA ordnance at (YD282712) containing anti-tank mines, RPG's, grenades, mortar rounds and bangalore torpedoes. This was destroyed in place. A patrol from Company G found 10 boxes of 7.62 rounds at coordinates (YD263692) and destroyed it in place. A skimmer boat enroute to Camp Big John hit a dud round at (YD270704) destroying the engine. No friendly casualties resulted. At 1400H BLT 2/4 received a warning order to prepare to be helilifted on the 31st for Khe Sanh and/or Calu. The rest of the day and night was quiet except for sporadic incoming artillery reported by Company H.

31 May BLT 2/4 was relieved in place by units of the 3D Marines at Camp Big John. BLT 2/4 (-) was helilifted to Landing Zone Stud under OPCON 4th Marines terminating OPCON 3D Marines and Operation Napoleon/Saline for BLT 2/4. Company G was helilifted to Khe Sanh combat base chopping to the First Marines. Throughout the afternoon Landing Zone Stud received light to moderate enemy rocket, mortar and artillery incoming.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- TABS
- ✓ A S-2 INTELLIGENCE
 - ✓ B S-3 TRAINING
 - ✓ C S-4 LOGISTICS
 - ✓ D WIRE AND AIR SUPPORT
 - ✓ E COMMUNICATION/ELECTRONICS
 - ✓ F MEDICAL AND DENTAL
 - ✓ G CHAPLIN SUPPORT

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INTELLIGENCE
NAPOLEON-SALINE - MAY 1968

MAP REFERENCE: VIETNAM, QUANG TRI MAP SHEET, NO: 6442 IV

1. During the period 1-31 May 1968, intelligence operations were satisfactory.

2. BATT 2/4 was heavily engaged with the 52nd NVA regiment and elements of the 49th NVA regiment of the 320th C Division on 1-3 May at Dai Do. The NVA had built a fortress at Dai-Do. Dai-Do had covered spider holes, trench lines and bunkers that were well built and heavily fortified. The villages in the immediate vicinity of Dai-Do were likewise fortified. In Dai-Do spider holes were found every 20-25 meters in the treeline encircling the village. They were large enough for one man, and they were covered with earth and reinforced with bamboo. The heaviest concentration of spider holes were along the river side of the village and to the eastern and western edges. There were several bunkers. Two of these bunkers were 10 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 3-4 feet below ground. These bunkers were heavily fortified and very well built, there was approximately 5 feet of dirt with bamboo reinforcing the top of the bunkers. It is believed that these two bunkers were used as observation posts, because they were located where they could observe Dai-Do and its environs. These two bunkers had two entrances, one facing north and the other facing east. U. S. concertina wire, single strand was used along the treeline. U. S. sandbags were also used to a great extent in the fortification of enemy positions. The NVA appeared healthy, well fed and most of them to be between the ages of 18-21. The aggressiveness and viciousness with which the NVA defended Dai-Do and conducted counterattacks indicates a well trained and disciplined enemy.

3. The enemy had built a strong hold at Dai-Do. From Dai-Do, the enemy could easily interdict the Cua Viet River and was in a very good position where he could mass for a ground attack against U. S. /ARVN military installations at Dong-Ha. As the battle of Dai-Do progressed, it became apparent that all of 2/4 maneuver elements would be committed to Dai-Do. As 2/4 diverted its attention to Dai-Do, and withdrew its maneuver elements from Nhi-Ha, Lam Xuan and My Loc, the enemy tried to take advantage of the opportunity and the existing situation by making a determined effort to establish a strong hold at Nhi-Ha. Maneuver elements of 3/21 USA were assigned to the 3rd Marines, and upon their arrival

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

were given the initial mission previously assigned to 2/4. The maneuver elements of 3/21 USA immediately made ground contact with the NVA in the vicinity of Nhi-Ha, and became heavily engaged. The Army remained engaged with the NVA in the vicinity of Nhi-Ha throughout their stay in the 3rd Marines area of operations. The Army completed its mission in the 3rd Marines area of operations on 15 May.

4. After the battle of Dai-Do, the enemy appeared to have lost all desire to engage Marine units in ground action in the 3rd Marines area of operations. The loss of desire of the enemy to engage Marine units in ground action is a good indication that he had suffered a heavy defeat at Dai-Do. The only heavy contact with the enemy after the battle of Dai-Do is the aforementioned contact by elements of 3/21 and ground contact made by E/2/4 on 25 May in the vicinity of Nhi-Ha.

5. There were several enemy contacts after Dai-Do, most of which were light contacts. The heaviest contact was on the 25th of May, when E/2/4 became heavily engaged with an estimated NVA battalion in the vicinity of Nhi-Ha (2). The first ground contact was on 9 May, when H/2/4 made contact with an estimated 5-6 enemy in the vicinity of Ky Truc (YD249661). On 12 May, G/2/4 made contact with 10-15 NVA in the vicinity of Vinh Quan Thoug (YD 260661). On 17 May, E/2/4 made moderate ground contact with the NVA in the vicinity of (YD253717).

6. The Army completed its mission on 15 May, and BLT 2/4 regained its original area of operations. The 2/4 area of operations was sub-divided into 4 parts. Each of 2/4 maneuver elements was given its own area of operations and its own area of responsibility within the 2/4 area of operations. The mission of the maneuver elements was to establish a company size base camp/patrol base within their own area of operations. The purpose of the base camp/patrol base was to deny the enemy the opportunity to establish a strong point in the hamlets and villages. From the base camp/patrol base, the maneuver elements could keep known and suspected infiltration routes under surveillance. On 21 May, three squads of Popular Forces were assigned to BLT 2/4 from the Gio Linh District Headquarters. They were integrated with 2/4 maneuver elements, with the mission of screening indigenous personnel during the rice harvest.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

7. The enemy continued to use artillery, mortar and rocket attacks against P/4. These attacks were mainly directed against the 2/4 maneuver elements, when they were occupying established base camps/patrol bases at Nhi-Ha, Lam Xuan, My Loc and any other area in which base camp/patrol bases had been established. The enemy has given strong indications that these base camps/patrol bases have been an obstacle to the accomplishment of his mission. It is felt that these base camps/patrol bases have denied the enemy the opportunity to establish strong points. Infiltration has not been stopped completely, but by constant surveillance, it has been kept in check. The timely and accurate artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks indicate that the NVN have well trained forward observers. All indications are that the enemy has placed strategic value in the areas where 2/4 maneuver elements have established base camps/patrol bases, and he will continue to use artillery, mortar and rocket attacks on these areas as long as they are occupied. The enemy will occupy these areas if they are abandoned.

8. The NVN apparently has still not abandoned his ultimate goal of gaining control of the Cua Viet River. There was one intelligence report from a usually reliable source which stated that the enemy was going to employ anti-ship weapons in the Cua Viet River. A Chieu Hoi who surrendered to elements of 3/21 USA on 3 May confirmed this report. The Chieu Hoi told of a new type mine being used by the enemy in the Cua Viet River. Six of these mines have been found, but because of their intelligence value, little is known of them. These mines were evacuated to the United States for technical exploitation. In another incident on 22 May, 3 skimmer boats from 2/4 on a regularly scheduled run to Dong Ha received small arms fire from the north side of the river bank, vicinity of (YD246617).

9. There have been numerous usually reliable source reports of enemy maneuver elements in the 2/4 area of operations up to and including regimental size. There have been constant reports of the 52nd NVA regiment, elements of the 48th NVA regiment, the 126th sapper and other enemy units operating in the 3rd Marine regiment area of operations north of the Cua Viet River. Current order of battle carries the 52nd NVA regiment and elements of the 48th regiment in the 2/4 area of operations. The presence of the 52nd and the 48th were confirmed on the 25th of May when E/2/4 made heavy contact with the enemy, and captured 5 prisoners of war.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

RESULTS

NVA/MIA's	751
NVA POW's	7
Detainees	8

WEAPONS CAPTURED

AK-47	47*
STG	31*
RED LMG	14
ROG-2	9
RPG-7	1
82MM MORTAR	1
7.62 HMG (M1600)	3
12.7MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT	2
60MM MORTAR	2

* During the heavy fighting of Dai-Do many Marines medevaced were carrying these weapons aboard the helicopters. It is believed that these were lost to Navy personnel aboard Hospital Shipping and to helicopter flight crews; therefore it is felt that these numbers should be significantly higher.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

TRAINING - MAY 1968

The heavy casualties sustained during the first two days of the month and the subsequent large number of new replacements made it mandatory that an "in country training program" be emphasized to a greater degree than in past months.

As in past months all Marines upon joining BLT 2/4 were taken to the field rifle range where they would FAM-fire their M16's and then zero them using the 15 foot zeroing target. While there and throughout the training that followed rifleman safety was stressed.

The following classes highlighted the month of May:

(a) Night firing procedures and techniques using a lecture/demonstration. The Marines were then allowed a period of practical application at both dusk and then after darkness.

(b) Fire team assault course (livefire) on a field expedient combat target course.

(c) Map reading and use of a compass. In conjunction with the lecture and demonstration period a practical application period in the form of a compass march was executed by all participants (fire team leaders and above).

(d) FO procedures given to all fire team leaders and above with the students given a period of practical application by calling in and adjusting an 81mm mortar mission.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LOGISTICS

1 MAY - 31 MAY 1968

Logistic support during the month continued to be directed primarily toward the periods when the battalion was engaging the enemy, specifically the period 1-3 May when entire BLT was involved in the battle for Dai-Do.

Support during the month mainly was provided from the Mai Xe Chanh area where a dump containing all classes of supply was established. Unit distribution was accomplished by utilizing the M-35 truck, LVTP-5, M-76 (otter) and fireteam assault boats (skimmers). The skimmer boats were of vital assistance in linking up with the subordinate units as they were accessible by water the majority of the time. The only handicap encountered was during periods of low tide, when skimmers could not navigate the small creeks.

Logistical support was coordinated with regiment (on a limited scale) and FSLG-B at Dong Ha through a rear echelon located at that point.

Supply problems during the month were normal with the exception of repair parts. The shortage of repair parts has caused a critical reduction in the amphibious capability of the attached LVTP-5 Platoon. Two M-35 trucks are deadlined because of a lack of radiators. The battalion has yet to receive replacement items for two M48A3 tanks and two LVTP-5's, some of which have been on requisition for a period of three months. Utility trousers are a critical item. A field galley was in operation during the month with the BLT receiving one hot meal daily. Perishable food items were transported daily from Dong Ha by skimmer. Companies outside the battalion CP were sent their hot meal by skimmer or otter depending upon the terrain and tides.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FIRE SUPPORT
MAY 1968

(1 May - 3 May) Unknown fire missions and H&I missions
 (1 May - 3 May) Expended 8,802 rounds
 Arty - 5,272 rds
 81mm - 1,147 rds
 NGF - 2,383 rds

 (4 May - 31 May)
Artillery 105: Fire missions - 86 missions
 H&I missions - 267 missions
 Fire missions - 1,198 rounds H.E.
 132 rounds W.A.
 27 rounds H.C.S.
 409 rounds 155mm Howitzer
 Total rounds for fire missions: 1,756 rounds

H&I missions: 1,433 rounds expended

Total missions: 353 missions

Total rounds expended: 3,189 rounds

 (4 May - 31 May)

81mm mortar Fire missions: 117 missions
 H&I missions: 128 missions
 Fire missions: 2,367 rounds H.E.M.
 353 rounds W.F.
 29 rounds ILL.

Total rounds for fire missions: 2,749 rounds

H&I missions: 2,310 rounds expended

Total missions: 245 missions

Total rounds expended: 5,059 rounds

* -----
 (4 May-31 May)

Total missions: 598 missions
 Total rounds: 8,248 rounds

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(1 May - 3 May) 8,802 rounds

(4 May - 31 May) 8,248 rounds

Total Rounds: 17,050 rounds

DECLASSIFIED

AIR SUPPORT
MAY 1968

	Requested	Received
A. Med Evacs	320	300
B. C&C Flights	17	14
C. CAS		
(1) Gunship	12	14
(2) Fixed Wing	43	38
(3) AO	38	31
(4) Flareships	8	6
D. Administrative and Troop Lifts	73	73

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS

1. Significant Events.

During the month of May, this unit continued to participate in Operation Napoleon/Saline.

2. New Developments.

After nearly five months of not having an opportunity to employ the equipment, a radio relay (using the AN/TRC-27) shot was established between this headquarters and the 3D Marine Regiment.

3. Problem Areas.

(a) Supply shortages in operating components and repair parts for AN/PRC-25 radio sets (particularly modules A10, A17, A18 and A24) remain the greatest problem.

(b) A scarcity of linesmen's kits TE-33 makes it difficult to maintain wire communications as quickly as might otherwise be possible.

(c) Accountability of equipment is difficult due to inadequate record keeping.

(d) A greater percentage of equipment is being deadlined because of intense heat, rain and increased operation.

(e) Past experience has demonstrated that the demand on supply will be heavier in the coming months and more deadlined equipment probably will be sent to FLSG-B in the hope that it will have the materials required for speedier repair and return.

4. Status of Communication Equipment

(1)	RT-252B	
(13)	H-138	4 Code H
(7)	H-189	
(1)	H-33	
(3)	TA-222	1 Code H
(3)	TA-221	1 Code E
(2)	TS-10	1 Code H
(7)	RT-505	3 Code E
(4)	RT-505	Combat Loss
(1)	RL-27B	
(1)	AN/TPS-21	3D FSR OKI
(1)	KYB-6	
(1)	Q2328A	
(1)	R-388	
(1)	TA-1	

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(7) H-44 4 Code H
 (2) PU-278
 (1) TD-101-B
 (1) URC-83

DECLASSIFIED

5. Number of Security Violations.

None reported this period.

6. Number of Messages Sent and Received.

Sent: 204
 Received: 1645

7. Personnel Status.

Shortages	Excess
(2) Sgt 5931	(1) SSgt 2519
(1) SSgt 2549	(6) Pfc 2511
(3) Pvt 2531	

8. Summary of Operational Training.

Special Training	450 hours bench work
	80 hours shop application
Radio Section Training	720 hours radio watch
	120 hours in field
	24 hours field work
Message Center Training	720 hours Message Center
	watch
Wire Section	720 hours Switchboard watch
	120 hours field work
TACP	720 hours radio watch

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. Significant events
- (a) Much better relationship with C&C doctors after they were permitted to come out and spend some time at our facility. This gave them an awareness of what patients could or could not be sent to the field and made our duties in the field more meaningful.
 - (b) Sudden decrease in rat bites.
2. New Developments
- (a) Hospital Corpsman from C&C company brought to field to fill spaces left by our wounded or killed corpsmen.
 - (b) Dental officer and assistant brought off ship and placed at Cua Viet Dental facility.
 - (c) One C&C doctor brought to BAS rear in Dong Ha while ship change made at Subic Bay.
 - (d) Rabies vaccine and routine immunizations in the field because of the use of a refrigeration system.
 - (e) Overall camp found in adequate condition by Preventive Medicine Unit including water point.
 - (f) Village point at river shore functioned very good and handled over four hundred people for the month of May.
3. Problem Areas
- (a) Increase in the number of gastroenteritis in the troops.
 - (b) Problem of determining if minor scratches are treated as wounds, especially when they are third such wounds and hence will take the Marine out of the field.
4. Average daily number of patients seen 40
 Total number of patients for May 1968 1215
5. Number of referrals to NSA, Danang, USS REPOSE, USS IWO JIMA, etc. 191
6. Routine complaints
- | | |
|----------------------|-----|
| (a) Diarrhea | 102 |
| (b) URI | 39 |
| (c) Dermatitis | 1 |
| (d) EENT | 14 |
| (e) Venereal Disease | 31 |
| (f) Immersion foot | 84 |
| (g) Others | 639 |

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- ~~SECRET~~
7. Significant disease areas
 - (a) Malaria 0
 - (b) FUO 45

 8. Number of emergencies

	Total	Evac	KIA	DOW
(a) Burns	8	5	3	0
(b) Lacerations	6	6	0	= 0
(c) Heat casualties	48	48	0	0
(d) Shrapnel wounds	115	78	37	0
(e) Gunshot wounds	69	18	49	2
(f) Others	36	35	1	0

 9. Immunizations and prophylactics administered 50
 Dental referrals 170

 10. Officers seen at sickcall - included in total count
 - (a) Officers sickcall 12
 - (b) Evacuated with shrapnel and gunshot wounds 7

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPLAIN-SUPPORT

DECLASSIFIED

WORSHIPS

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1. Conducted by BLT Chaplain | ATTENDANCE |
| A. 26 | 716 |
| 2. Communion Services | |
| A. 8 | 165 |
| 3. Memorial Services Conducted by BLT Chaplain | |
| A. 7 | 542 |
| 4. Roman Catholic Services Conducted by Visiting Chaplains | |
| A. 14 | 329 |
| 5. Lay Leader Services | |
| Not Reported 6-31 May | |
| 6. - Innumerable | |
| 7. - Iwo Jima - 46 | |
| Valley Forge - 12 | |
| Repose - 14 | |
| 8. Brig Visits III MAF. Brig - 3 | |

DECLASSIFIED

3D MARDIV S&C FILE
BT# 504168

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/4
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMP
FPO San Francisco 96602

DECLASSIFIED

3/WBZ/trf
3500
SerNo: 003A18668
4 July 1968

S & C FILES

3D MARINES

UNCLASSIFIED
00768-68
Copy 15 of 25 Copies

From: Commanding Officer 00454-68
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) / FMP
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (a) 3d MarDiv 03100.1D 6442 IV
(b) Map: Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L70014, Sheet 442 IV

- Encl: ✓(1) Battalion Landing Team 2/4 Frag Order #1 issued 6 March 1968
- ✓(2) Battalion Landing Team 2/4 Frag Order #4
- ✓(3) Battalion Landing Team 2/4 Operation Order for Operation HANDSHAKE
- ✓(4) Battalion Landing Team 2/4 Operation Order 3-68 (Operation NIGHT O/L)
- ✓(5) Battalion Landing Team 2/4 Combat After Action Report (Operation TASK FORCE KILO)

1. Code Name. Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE
2. Dates of Operation. 051145H March 1968 --- 311400H May 1968
3. Location. Quang Tri Province, RVN
4. Task Organization:
Battalion Landing Team 2/4

To 2 May 1968	LtCol W. WEISE
To 5 May 1968	Maj C. W. KNAPP
From 6 May 1968	LtCol L. A. BANN

H&S Company (-)

1stLt E. S. DAWSON

1st Plt, Co D, 3d Recon Bn

2nd Plt, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

1st Plt, Co A, 5th AT Bn

1st Plt, Co B, 3d SP Bn

1st Plt, Co A, 5th TK Bn

4th Plt, Co B, 1st AmTrac Bn

Det MP Plt, HQTRS Co, 9th MAB

3d Plt, Co D, 3d MT Bn

Det M-76 Otters, HQTRS Co, Third Marines

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PLT 2/4

5/18 Rpt (Ops) NAPOLEON/SALINE

SMAR-31MAY 1968

TAB-11

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

To 7 May 1968
From 8 May 1968

Capt J. E. LIVINGSTON
Capt E. G. MASSMAN

FO Tm, H Btry, 3/12

FO Tm, 81mm Plt

S-2 Scout

Company F

To 8 April 1968
From 9 April 1968

1stLt M. S. GAVALICK
Capt J. H. BUTLER

FO Tm, H Btry, 3/12

FO Tm, 81mm Plt

NGF Tm

Engr Tm

S-2 Scout

Company G

To 21 March 1968
To 28 April 1968
To 3 May 1968
To 12 May 1968
From 13 May 1968

Capt E. VARGAS
Capt MASTRION
Capt E. VARGAS
1stLt L. L. LAWSON
Capt J. M. DWYER

FO Tm, H Btry 3/12

FO Tm 81mm Plt

NGF Tm

Engr Tm

S-2 Scout

Company H

To 30 April 1968
To 20 May 1968
From 21 May 1968

Capt J. L. WILLIAMS
1stLt A. F. PRESCOTT IV
Capt O. M. THOMPSON

FO Tm, H Btry 3/12

FO Tm 81mm Plt

NGF Tm

Engr Tm

S-2 Scout

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

5. Supporting Forces.

- 1) W/3/12 in Direct Support
- 2) C 1/11 in General Support
- 3) 3/12 (REIN) in General Support
- 4) Naval Gunfire support has been obtained from the following ships so far during the operation:

USS CHANDLER	DD
USS EPPERSON	DD
USS MANLEY	DD
USS HULL	DD
USS HOLLISTER	DD
USS JOHNSON	DD
USS CARPENTER	DD
USS OSBOURNE	DD
USS BLUE	DD
USS MULLANY	DD
USS BORDELON	DD
USS CANEPRIA	CA
USS NEWPORT NEWS	CA

- 5) Helicopter support from Squadrons 361 and 363 of MAG 16. Helicopter support from Squadron 362 of MAG 36.

6) Fixed-wing support from the 1st MAW. All air requests were through the 1-4 net to the Regimental 1-4, or in the case of the majority of helicopter support through SIF-A. The majority of fixed-winged close air support and CSS missions were preplanned. Helicopter medevac missions and gunships were called as needed. Until 30 April, fixed-wing air support usually required a 36 hour notice to the Regimental 1-4 before it could be planned on. This caused problems when situations would change between the planning stage and actual execution of an operation order.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

As the Battle of Dai-Do proceeded it became less difficult to get the close air support that the BLT requested. It is believed that as a result of the Dai-Do conflict, higher echelons realized the threat NVA forces were posing within the BLT's AO, and consequently to the Cua Viet River Supply System. For the remainder of the BLT's participation in Operation Napoleon/Saline the "scramble" or "on call" close air support given BLT maneuver elements was excellent.

6. Intelligence.


1) During this period of the operation, intelligence operations were satisfactory.

2) At the outset of the operation it was apparent that the BLT's AO was a main area of operation and infiltration routes for several NVA units. These units ranged in strength from company to regimental size. It was confirmed by POW's and other reliable sources that the 27th Regiment, the 52nd Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 803rd Regiment, the K-400 Local Force Company and the 126th Sapper unit were operating in the BLT's AO. The presence of the 52nd and 48th Regiment was confirmed on 30 April when the BLT made heavy contact at the village of Dai-Do. It was also ascertained that these units had the primary mission of closing the Cua Viet River to logistical traffic to Dong Ha Combat Base. The secondary mission was to counter the sweep operations that BLT 2/4 conducted in the area.

3) It was soon realized that the infiltration route the NVA were using was outside the BLT's AO. From recon patrols and POW's it was learned that the NVA knew the limits of the BLT's AO and stayed just outside of it. The enemy's route was in the 2nd ARVN Regiment's AO. The BLT was committed outside its AO at Dai-Do to help the 2nd ARVN Regiment as it was committed to the north at the time. The enemy had had time to prepare Dai-Do as a veritable stronghold. From this position the enemy could easily use Dai-Do as a base from which to launch a ground attack on Dong Ha Combat Base only 2000 meters to the southwest. This enemy had ample time to build an extensive series of fortified bunkers, trenches and fighting holes in and around the village. This type of fortified village was encountered throughout the operation by the BLT. The typical bunker complex was a series of A-frame bunkers covered with several feet of earth, reinforced by bamboo logs and well camouflaged. Also the bunkers usually had two small entrances at both ends. Each bunker was mutually supported by fire from other bunkers. It should also be noted that these bunkers were usually occupied by from 2 to 5 NVA. Spiderholes and numerous trenches were usually found supporting the bunkers from tree lines or hedgerows.

4) The BLT's AO was sub-divided into 4 parts. Each of the BLT's maneuver elements was given their own area of responsibility in the BLT's AO. Each maneuver element established base camps at strategic points to deny the enemy an opportunity to establish a strong point in the BLT's AO. From the base camps the maneuver elements could keep suspected and known infiltration routes under surveillance. On 10 April and 21 May, PF platoons from Gio Linh District Headquarters were attached to BLT 2/4

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

maneuver elements to help screen indigenous personnel during the rice harvest. The PF's worked well with the maneuver elements and aided in gaining intelligence concerning the enemy.

5) The enemy continued to use artillery, mortar and rocket attacks against the maneuver elements of BMT 2/4. These attacks were generally directed at the base camps or any other place where the maneuver elements established such bases. The timing and accuracy with which these attacks were launched indicated the presence of well trained enemy FO's. The enemy had given strong indications that these base camps had been an obstacle to the accomplishment of his mission. It is felt that these camps/patrol bases have denied the enemy the opportunity to establish strong points. Infiltration had not been stopped completely, but by constant patrolling, ambushes and operations, it had been kept in check within the BMT's AO. All indications were that the enemy had placed strategic value in the areas where 2/4 maneuver elements had established patrol bases. The enemy would occupy and defend these base camps if they were abandoned.


6) The NVA soldier encountered by BMT 2/4 was generally well trained and well disciplined. He was generally from 18-20 years of age and in excellent health. His morale was good but there were several cases of Chieu Hoi's. He was very well equipped with the latest communist weapons, communication equipment and web equipment. A good indication of his training and discipline was the fact that at the Battle for Dai-Do he was able to mount several well coordinated counter attacks in the face of superior Marine firepower. The type of tactics employed by the enemy was reminiscent of the Pacific Island Campaigns of WW II. The enemy had to be blasted out of his bunker or fighting hole by the individual Marine employing the hand grenade or satchel charge.

7) The NVA have not abandoned their ultimate goal of gaining control of the Cua Viet River. Reliable intelligence sources and POW's indicate that the NVA are infiltrating south in force and that they are also trying to mine the Cua Viet River. New types of mines had been captured and turned over to Division. Also 4 POW's captured on 25 May 1968 indicated that elements of the 48th and 52nd NVA Regiment were still operating in the BMT's AO.

7) Mission. During the month of March the primary missions of BMT 2/4 were to keep the Cua Viet River open to Naval Logistical traffic by controlling the north bank, to deny the "Jones Creek" drainage system (a known infiltration route) to the enemy; and to conduct search and destroy operations in the assigned AO. Five battalion-size operations of three rifle companies or more, as well as continual ambushing and patrolling highlighted the month of March.

After Operation Task Force Kilo terminated on 3 April, the primary mission of the battalion became one of pacification as thousands of refugees moved back in the battalion AO.

DECLASSIFIED





DECLASSIFIED

Three PF platoons from Gio Linh District were attached to Companies E, F and G and started training under Marine supervision. As the month of April passed MEDCAPs were conducted with increased frequency. Through the month of April the battalion mission became more one of Civic Action rather than one of search and clear and deny. On 30 April the Civic Action Program terminated as the NVA launched a determined drive south down the northeastern I Corps Coastal Plains.

Throughout the month of May the BLP, and units operating within the BLP's AO continued to counter the NVA drives south by aggressive patrolling and conducting search and destroy operations.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS


March


Initially the concept of operation involved searching, clearing and then denying the terrain immediately north of the Cua Viet River. As this was accomplished the battalion pushed north to the extent of its AO, and then into the 2nd ARVN Regimental AO to the DMZ. In all, 5 major search and clear operations involving three or more rifle companies were executed during the month of March. Originally the battalion operated out of the village of Mai Xa Chanh (YD 280667) and had one company at My Loc (YD 305680). Contact occurred daily as patrols swept out from these bases of operation. As enemy positions were fixed by these contacts, operations were planned to destroy the resistance. As the battalion swept and cleared areas, occupation of the secured areas would follow so as to deny the areas further use to the enemy. This was especially true in that part of the AO immediately adjacent to the Cua Viet River, where keeping the river open was of paramount importance.

April

There occurred in the first two weeks of April a change of primary mission, and thus a change in the over all concept of operation. By 14 April the BLP 2/4 had subdivided its AO so as to allow each rifle company to have its own AO. Company E had the northeastern quadrant with its patrol base located at Nhi Ha (YD 270704). Company F's AO was the southeastern quadrant. Two platoons were located at Mai Xa Chanh, and one platoon was located at My Loc (YD 305680). Company G's AO included the northwestern quadrant with the company's base camp at Lan Xuan (West) (YD 268700). Company H had the southwestern quadrant with two platoons at Mai Xa Chanh, and one platoon at (YD 267648), immediately adjacent to the Cua Viet River. As the month progressed daylight activities gave way to night patrols, ambushes, and battalion operations. During the day limited squad patrols were sent out, MEDCAPs executed, and "roving checkpoints" set up to screen the numerous Vietnamese Nationals traveling within the AO.

DECLASSIFIED





DECLASSIFIED

May

For the first three days in May the BLT was engaged with an NVA regimental size force at Dai-Do. The enemy was intent on interdicting the logistical traffic on the Cua Viet River and apparently had been moving in supplies and fortifying Dai-Do (outside the BLT's AO) for quite some time. By 3 May the NVA had been pushed north out of Dai-Do by BLT 2/4, and the battalion was relieved in place by the First Battalion Third Marines.

As a result of the heavy casualties sustained by the BLT during the Battle of Dai-Do, the BLT's AO was cut to include approximately two grid squares. This reduced AO remained in effect until 10 May. During this period (4-10 May) all the BLT's maneuver elements were reorganizing and training the many new replacements coming into the battalion. Included in the training were classes on basic tactics (including formations and movement), night firing techniques with practical application, FO procedures (practical application), cross training on crew served weapons, and tank infantry coordination.

After 10 May the BLT's maneuver elements continued to patrol aggressively, and made several light contacts throughout the month. On 25 May Company E and H became engaged with an estimated battalion for an eight hour period. It was determined that evening that this engagement was part of a drive south by the NVA's 325th Division. A regimental operation was executed during the last four days in May in which the BLT actively participated.

In summary it can be said that NVA forces were constantly trying to enter the BLT's AO, and establish a stronghold from which they could interdict the logistical traffic on the Cua Viet River. Aggressive patrolling by the BLT's maneuver elements, and continued search and clear operations by the BLT prevented this from ever happening within the BLT's AO.


EXECUTION 4 March

The battalion sent advance parties to BLT 3/1's position, and a liaison officer to the Third Marines Headquarters (YD 246697). Company G, formally OPCONed to 2/9 was chopped back to BLT 2/4 and helilifted from Landing Zone Eagle at Camp Carroll to BLT 3/1 position. Company H which was under the OPCON of 3/9 was chopped back to BLT 2/4, and also was helilifted to BLT 3/1's position.

5 March

The remainder of the battalion (less Company E) was lifted to Mai Xa Chanh, and came under the OPCON of the 3d Marines at 1135H. Company E was lifted to My Loc (YD 305680). Defensive responsibilities were assigned and construction of defensive positions started immediately.

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

6 March

At 0115H an unknown size NVA force launched a night ground attack against the battalion perimeter which was preceded by a heavy rocket and mortar attack. The ground attack was repulsed by small arms, mortars, and artillery night defensive fires. In the ensuing action, only two Marines were slightly wounded and evacuated. At first light 13 NVA bodies were found outside the defensive positions. Enemy weapons collected were 13 individual, and 6 crew served, as well as numerous other ordnance and pieces of NVA individual equipment. At 0930H while patrolling in the area of their lines a Foxtrot unit came across a wounded NVA with RPD 50 LMG. The NVA, later identified as an officer refused to surrender. A CS grenade was used to flush the entrenched NVA and he was killed. At 2040H a Company H ambush made contact with an estimated 4 enemy. A brief fire fight resulted with neither side apparently inflicting casualties. Supporting fire from the 81mm mortar platoon were called in, and the ambush shifted its position.

7 March

A battalion search and clear operation along the north bank of the Cua Viet River commenced at approximately 0700H. The concept of operation called for Company H to maneuver to a blocking position at coordinates YD 270659. Company F would sweep southwest through an intermediate objective at YD 266648, and then proceed to the final objective at YD 263637 (Bac Vong). Company G would remain at the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter with the platoon of antracs as the battalion reserve. Once Company H was in its blocking position, Company F started to sweep generally south, its main axis of advance 500 meters from and running parallel to the Cua Viet River. At 1000H two significant events occurred that played an important part in the events which were to follow. The third platoon of Company F, which had been following 500 meters in trace of the main company element, came under heavy enemy small arms, mortar, and rocket fire as it pushed south of the blocking position established by Company H. Eventually all of Company H became engaged in this action, and at 1045H Company H assumed operational control of the third platoon of Company F. At about this same time the main sweeping element of Company F started receiving small arms fire from the battalion intermediate objective, a small ville located at coordinates YD 264648. As the situation developed it became obvious that the enemy was well dug in and being supported by mortars, artillery, and rocket fire. At 1315H Company G was boarded on antracs, and proceeded to the final battalion objective by traveling down the Cua Viet River. Meanwhile Company F, under the cover of smoke and CS gas, was able to bypass the intermediate objective and proceed on toward the battalion final objective. Company H and the platoon from Company F continued to engage the enemy unit, but could make little ground against the well dug in enemy, because of casualties being sustained from enemy small arms, rocket, and artillery fires. By 1530H Company G had secured the final objective (YD 263637), but because of the absence of defensible terrain on this site, moved northeast along the Cua Viet River. At 1630H Company G and Company F(-) linked up and established a defensive perimeter in the area of coordinates YD 266643, where they would spend the night. Moderate Company F (REIN), still engaged

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

quite heavily with the enemy, was slowly extracting their wounded and dead, but could not reach many of the dead from the Foxtrof platoon because of the lack of cover. By 1815H the last redevac was completed, and Company H and the platoon from Company F entered the perimeter at Mai Xa Chanh. Earlier in the day Company E had moved down from My Loc (YD 305680) to the Ma Xa Chanh perimeter, after first destroying all the fortifications in the destroyed ville. Casualties for the day were 10 Marines killed and 35 wounded and evacuated. Seven of the KIA's were not recovered due to their exposed position in relation to the entrenched enemy. 15 enemy were known killed (confirmed).

8 March

Company E boarded antracs and proceeded to relieve Company F (-) and Company F was taken back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. The Frag Order called for Company E to continue the attack on a new battalion objective at coordinates YD 256646. Company G was to remain at the position it had defended with Company F the night before, and act as the battalion reserve. Companies F and H, at Mai Xa Chanh, continued to establish and improve the defensive positions at Mai Xa Chanh. At 0930H under the cover of Naval Gunfire, artillery, and 81mm mortar and 4.2 inch mortar support, Company E went into the attack. By 1100H, after meeting light enemy resistance, Company E had swept through and secured the objective (YD 256646). At approximately 1130H Company E started receiving light sniper fire from coordinates YD 248648 and YD 251641, both of which were out of the battalion's AO. By 1230H the "sniper fire" had increased in intensity and Company E was receiving automatic weapons, mortar, artillery, and rocket fire. No clearance could be obtained to fire supporting arms into the aforementioned grids despite approval by the American liaison officer working with the ARVNs (2 ARVN Regt) in that AO. Under the screening cover of smoke and HE from friendly supporting arms, Company E was able to make a retrograde movement back to Company G's perimeter. Company E sustained 14 MIA casualties all of which were evacuated by helicopter. At 1630H a BLT 2/4 LVTP-5 tractor on a resupply mission, struck a submerged mine while traveling on the Cuu Viot River back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. Three Marines were killed (bodies not recovered till several days later) and one wounded and evacuated. Enemy killed by Company E and supporting arms on the objective area numbered 15. That night found Companies E and G in the established defensive perimeter occupied on the night of the 7th. Companies F and H were at the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter.

9 March

The concept of operation called for Companies E and G to feint an attack from the south on the ville at YD 266648 (old objective bypassed by Company F on 7 March), while Company H attacked the ville from the northeast. If Company H successfully occupied the ville, Company G to the west of Company E, would attack west and sweep through the ville at YD 257646 (objective taken by Company E on 8 March but not thoroughly searched). Company E was to help Company H in searching the ville out,

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

and to also act as the reserve in the event Company G experienced difficulty. All of the forementioned would only be executed after the two objective areas had been "prepped" by NGF, artillery, 4.2 inch mortar, and 81mm mortar. The execution of the scheme of maneuver went as planned and by 1415H Company H had secured the ville at coordinates YD 266648. Once it became apparent that Company H did have the objective secured Company G swept to the west and secured and searched their assigned objective at coordinates YD 256646. As Company G swept through the ville one NVA was shot as he tried to run from a bunker. Search of both objectives yielded additional kills and a large assortment of enemy equipment and ordnance. Throughout the day sporadic enemy artillery incoming plagued the three rifle companies, but at no time did the companies ever meet entrenched enemy. The results of enemy incoming were 12 Marines WIA evacuated. Two NVA were killed by the companies, and an additional 15 killed by supporting arms. Company E helped Company H make a thorough search of the objective, after which all three rifle companies swept northeast, back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. This terminated the operation which has started on 7 March.

10 March

Company E was given the mission of patrolling northeast to the destroyed ville of My Loc (YD 305680), occupied from 5-7 March by Company E, and establishing another patrol base. In the vicinity of the ville sporadic sniper fire was received and one detainee captured. Before entering the ville it was prepped by NGF, with several large secondaries resulting. No resistance was met however, and the company was able to enter My Loc with no trouble.

At 0710H, the skimmer boat enroute to Camp KISTLER (3d Marine Headquarters), carrying BLT 2/4's Commanding Officer, received 6 rounds of incoming thought to be 82mm mortars.

During the morning Company H returned to the area of heavy contact on 7 March (YD 269660), and recovered the 7 Marine bodies not previously recovered. While searching this area four additional NVA KIA's with gear were discovered.

At 1400H Company F arrived at My Loc, and relieved Company E of the defensive position being established there. Company E then patrolled back down to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter without incident.

11 March

Company F was ordered to make a sweep from their position at My Loc to the ville of Lam Xuan (East) at coordinates 284689. Company F was to sweep the village and occupy the area until receiving further orders. That same morning a platoon from Company G had made a patrol to Lam Xuan (East) and had made no contact. Company F was delayed in their movement because the 3d Marine Regiment called and directed that Company F observe a funeral that was taking place in the vicinity of YD 302687. After observing the funeral and observing nothing unusual the Company proceeded on towards Lam Xuan (East). Upon approaching the village four or five persons were observed inside the village. The Company Commander of F Company suspected a trap and alerted the BLT 2/4 Commanding Officer. At

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

this time the BLT Commander chose to withdraw instead of engaging because of the late hour, and approaching darkness within two hours.

At 1730H an airtac operating within the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter hit a mine resulting in four Marine WIA evacuated.

At 2200H a squad size ambush from Company B made contact with an unknown size enemy unit at coordinates YD 275674. One Marine was wounded in the action and evacuated the next morning. A search of the area at first light (12 March) revealed that no enemy had been killed.

After this action considerable movement was heard around the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter, and supporting arms (81mm, 4.2 inch mortar, and 105 artillery) were called in to box in the perimeter. No enemy action resulted and for the rest of the night all remained quiet.

12 March

Company F was assigned the mission of seizing Lam Xuan (East). The Company moved from Mai Xa Chanh (vic YD 281669) to Lam Xuan (East) deploying with the 1st Plt to the south as a blocking force and maneuvering the third platoon to the east of the objective in preparation for an east-west sweep. At approximately 1030H as the 3d Platoon was maneuvering to the position some small arms fire was received. This incident was reported to the BLT COC and permission was given to advance into the area from which the fire was received. The company commander maneuvered his elements cautiously, and by 1245H he was just into the edge of the village with the 3d Platoon when both the 1st and 3d Platoons came under heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire.

Company G was alerted to move forward on the west side of the small river known as Jones Creek to take some of the pressure off of Company F and to neutralize the fire coming from the grave yard at YD 278688 in order to protect the flank of Company G, and to deliver direct fire into Lam Xuan (East). Two tanks with a security platoon from Company E were ordered to move to the vicinity of YD 274675 to support Companies F and G.

Company F was ordered to withdraw when the pressure was sufficiently relieved by Company G to the west. The Company Commander was ordered to bring back all wounded and dead with him, but that priority would go to the evacuation of wounded non. Instructions were given as the day wore on and the enemy fire continued with its deadly accuracy. Fox units were to withdraw with everything possible, but no Marines were to be risked for the sole purpose of retrieving a body known to be dead. The recon platoon was committed up the east side of Jones Creek to assist Company F in the evacuation of its dead and wounded. The Company F Commander was directed to break contact by 1830 and to proceed back to Mai Xa Chanh. At 1830 Company F's Commander asked permission to remain a little longer due to the difficulty in withdrawing his troops under the heavy volume of fire. Permission was given to remain until 1915. Contact was broken and all units proceeded into the BLT perimeter of Mai Xa Chanh. 10 Marines were killed, 23 wounded and evacuated, and 7 listed as MIA. It was impossible to ascertain enemy casualties.

11 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

13 March

A three Company operation was executed with the mission of seizing Lam Xuan (East), and recovering the Marine bodies left on the previous day. The scheme generally called for Company H to follow the same route that had been used by Company F the day before and to become a base of fire after making a feint at the village from the south.

Company E was to move up the west side of the creek and use LVTP-5's to assault across Jones Creek into the left rear of the objective looking north. Company G was to follow in trace of Company H and would be the BLT reserve. Company F was to remain in Mai Xa Chanh and defend the BLT perimeter.

The operation went as planned except that considerable difficulty was encountered in getting proper clearance for supporting arms and the attack was delayed for two hours at one point while trying to solve the fire support coordination problems. Both Company E and G received heavy mortar, artillery and rocket fire during their movement to the assault positions. Considerable difficulty was experienced with supporting arms throughout the day and it was late afternoon by the time Company E was able to mount an assault across Jones Creek with the lead platoon. The objective was full of NVA, an estimated battalion in size, placed in well fortified, mutually supporting bunkers. Company H was under heavy fire during this entire period and finally the BLT Commander chose to disengage and withdraw because of the lateness of the hour. At the time this decision was made one LVTP-5 was reported as being stuck and the order was given to strip it of weapons and leave it in place. Two more LVTP-5's subsequently got stuck in trying to retrieve the one previously stuck and had to be abandoned also.

At 1220H a wounded Marine from Company F walked into Company H's lines. This man had previously been listed as an MIA. At 1630H 4 bodies from Company F were found and were in the process of being moved to the rear when Company H came under intense enemy fire. It was impossible to evacuate the KIA's without suffering additional loss of life so Company H withdrew on order. The total friendly casualties sustained for this day's operation were 1 KIA, 30 WIA evacuated and 6 WIA NE. 31 NVA were killed in action on this day.

14 March

For the most part the BLT conducted local patrolling and had no significant contact.

At 0900H a "Bucey Cobra" from Company C took a group of NVA under fire in the village of Lam Xuan (East) and killed 7. They reported receiving enemy .50 caliber fire. At 1120H Company H units spotted approximately 6 NVA at YD 252653, and called in a 4.2 inch mortar mission. A search of the immediate area revealed no NVA casualties. At 1540H while on a local patrol a unit from Company H discovered 250 lbs of rice, which was later destroyed, in the vicinity of YD 270659. Shortly after this same unit spotted 2 NVA at YD 264659, but the enemy escaped during the initial adjustment of artillery fire. At 1540H Company F reported taking one incoming sniper round from an unknown origin. For the remainder of the evening, no contact was made with the enemy.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

15 March

At 0025H an operation commenced which called for Companies E and F to enter the ville of Lan Xuan (East), to secure it, and to retrieve the bodies of the Marines killed on 12 March. Two tanks and a security unit from Company G traveled along a route to the west of Jones Creek to both screen Companies E and F's exposed flank, and prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lan Xuan (East) from the northwest. Company E maneuvered up south of the ville and entered it without incident, then pushed north on through it. Once Company E had the ville secured Company F moved on up into the ville and started the retrieval operation. A technical team from the 1st Antrac Battalion was flown out to look over the three stuck antracs and a plan was formulated for their extraction. Sixteen Marine bodies were recovered and loaded on board helicopters but only fifteen arrived at the BLT CP. Throughout the day sporadic enemy artillery fell into the Marine positions, but only four minor WIA's were experienced. A large assortment of enemy equipment and ordnance was recovered and 98 fresh enemy graves were discovered inside the ville. Company H, just to the west of the Mai Xe Chanh perimeter found a large assortment of NVA equipment and ordnance. Throughout the day Companies E and F with a detachment of engineers continued to destroy the bunker complexes built by the enemy. The antracs were slowly being extracted and towed back to the BLT CP. Companies G and H moved back to the BLT perimeter, while Companies E and F, with the Alfa Command Group dug in at Lan Xuan (East). For the remainder of the day and night all BLT units made no significant enemy contact except for the units at Lan Xuan (East) which would periodically receive one to two enemy artillery or rocket rounds.

16 March

In the early morning hours under the cover of darkness Companies E and F along with the Alfa Command Group moved south down to the BLT perimeter and arrived by first light. A recon unit was sent out to keep the ville of Vinh Quan Thuong (YD 260660) under observation for an impending operation to be executed on 18 March. A Company H platoon at 1400H reported finding a large cache of enemy equipment (including ordnance) at YD 265660, which included one complete 60mm mortar, 145 82mm rounds, 82 60mm rds, and 15 cases of .30 caliber ammunition. At 1600H, before all this ordnance could be destroyed or evacuated contact was made with an undetermined size enemy unit by the recon unit to the west. The Company H platoon sustained a number of casualties in the initial link-up, and it was dark before both the reconnaissance unit and the Company E platoon could be retracted with the aid of Company H. Huey gunships and fixed-wing that were called to support the units in contact reported receiving .50 caliber AA from the enemy positions below at YD 258658. In the contact 3 Marines were killed and 6 MIA evacuated. In the contact 21 NVA were killed. The enemy broke contact at dark and for the remainder of the day no significant activity occurred.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

17 March

The first platoon of Company E discovered a number of enemy claymores and other enemy ordnance, including several enemy fighting holes in the vicinity of YD 273668 at 0930H. The ordnance and fighting positions were destroyed. At 1235H in the vicinity of YD 261691 a Company G unit spotted 15 NVA, and called 4.2 mortar mission. Two NVA were killed and a number of secondary explosions resulted. At 1500H Frag Order # 9 was given which called for a battalion sized attack on the fortified ville of Vinh Quan Thuong (vic YD 262659) on 18 March. All remained quiet till 2135H, when an LP from Company H spotted two enemy at YD 275659. The enemy was taken under fire and the LP returned to a position within the perimeter. It is believed that no enemy were killed, but a check wasn't immediately possible because the BLT moved out in the attack prior to first light.

18 March

At 0330H, Company E and H crossed the IOD and followed the route proscribed in BLT Frag Order number 4 for Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE. At first light, with Company H to the south and Company E to the north, the assault companies attacked west through the eastern portion of Vinh Quan Thuong. The concept of operations called for Company G, mounted on the armored column, to remain at the IOD, and on order attack from the desert, north of the ville, and smash through the enemy defenses once their limits were established. By 0730H both assault Companies were heavily engaged with a well dug in, well equipped, and disciplined NVA force in the vicinity of YD 262659. Marine casualties mounted as they slowly drove the enemy west under heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapon, rocket, and artillery fire. A BAS forward was established approximately 400 meters to the rear of the skirmish lines, and emergency medevacs were lifted out of the hastily established LZ. The second platoon of Company F provided security at the LZ, and for the others shuttling other less seriously wounded Marines back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. As a result of the casualties being sustained, and the particularly heavy enemy resistance to the front of a Company H unit, Company E had to pull back and readjust its attack units so as not to leave a hole in the assault line. While this was being accomplished the objective area was constantly being hit by close air strikes, artillery, and Naval Gunfire. Ammunition was redistributed and the assault units reorganized for the continuation of the attack. At 1530H Company G was ordered across the IOD with the instructions to attack the portion of the enemy held ville from the north as previously conceived. When it was determined that Company G had reached its final coordination line, Companies E and H commenced their assault from the east on the enemy held position. All supporting arms and close air support was shifted to the west and north to prevent the enemy from being reinforced and to cut off his path of retreat. By 1715H all three rifle companies had broken through the enemy defenses, and were fighting the enemy in isolated pockets of resistance. The mopping up and consolidation phase of the attack continued till darkness. The BLT (-) set into a defensive perimeter on the objective (YD 259659).

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Continuous artillery and Naval Gunfire missions were called to the west and northwest to prevent the enemy from massing a counter-attack. The fighting that had highlighted this day was characteristic of that found during the WWII Pacific Island campaign, as in most cases the Marine with a rifle and satchel charge was the only effective way of killing the enemy fighting from covered trenches and mutually supporting reinforced bunkers. During the night several instances of enemy trying to escape from within the perimeter occurred. Some were killed, but two were captured as POW's. Results of the day's action were 20 Marine KIA, and 88 wounded seriously enough to require evacuation. Captured enemy equipment included 35 individual weapons, 2 60mm mortars, one Chinese Communist radio, three RPD LMG's, and an antrac full of NVA ordnance and equipment too numerous and varied to list.

16 March

The BLT maneuver elements on the objective swept through the area collecting all abandoned enemy gear, and searched the enemy dead for intelligence data. The enemy fortifications were destroyed by attached engineer personnel, and the maneuver elements were ordered back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. At 0900H an antrac enroute back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter hit a mine or dud artillery round (vic YD 266661) which resulted in little damage to the vehicle. At 1520H a platoon size patrol from Company F discovered an enemy anti-tank mine and a series of trip flares at YD 267682; all were destroyed in place. For the most part no significant enemy contact was encountered by any of the BLT's day or night activities. The maneuver units mainly spent the day cleaning weapons, reorganizing, and resting.

20 March

The BLT continued to reorganize, and prepare for future missions. Local patrols and observation posts were established within the AO. At 0920 a Company F patrol spotted approximately 20 NVA in 5 man groups moving in the vicinity of YD 273686. An artillery mission was called in on the enemy, but a sweep of the area revealed no NVA casualties. During the morning Brigadier General CHIP, CG, 9th MAB visited the BLT at the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. No other significant events occurred until 2220H, when enemy movement was observed in front of the lines manned by Company H. The suspected enemy was taken under fire with small arms and grenades, but a search at first light yielded negative results.

21 March

Maneuver elements from the BLT conducted aggressive patrolling within the AO. At 1045H Company E, while swooping the area in the vicinity of YD 275684, received approximately 40 rounds of enemy artillery. Counter battery was called and additional artillery fire missions were called on the suspected enemy FO position. The decision was made to have Company E sweep back south in order to prevent unnecessary casualties from NVA artillery. At 1443H a Company F unit reported finding

DECLASSIFIED

a series of fortified positions and ~~positions~~ and equipment at YD 259625. The positions and munitions were destroyed in place. Later in the afternoon the same unit from Company F found another series of enemy tunnels and NVA equipment which was also destroyed in place. At 2100H a two man screening element for an ambush that was displacing spotted five NVA but did not take them under fire because they had no communications with the screening element. The ambush reorientated itself so as to interdict the 5 NVA but made no other contact for the remainder of the night.

22 March

A platoon from Company H patrolling in the vicinity of coordinates YD 264649 made contact with an undetermined sized enemy force. The remainder of Company H moved out to exploit the contact, but at 1020H the maneuvering units came under enemy rocket and mortar fire. Regiment directed that Company H get the wounded Marines out as quickly as possible, and then disengage. At 1045H a medevac helicopter received approximately 12 rounds of enemy small arms fire on his initial approach. The LZ was shifted further east, away from the source of enemy fire, and by 1200H the medevac was completed. Supporting arms were concurrently being called in against the dug in enemy, and suspected artillery and rocket sights. By 1300H Company H had moved back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. The morning's action had resulted in 8 WIA medevacs. At 1300H a unit from Company E observed 4 suspected NVA, and promptly called in an artillery mission. The results of the mission were unknown. At 1500H in the vicinity of YD 264634 (SW tip of A0) elements of Company F discovered five outer rings for the base plate of an unknown type enemy mortar. At 2130H a squad sized ambush from Company E made contact with an unknown size enemy unit. The squad sustained one wounded (minor) Marine, and pulled back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. A check of the area of the contact at first light revealed negative results.

23 March

At 0050H Company F discovered movement to their front. The enemy was carrying radios and was believed to be of Company size. The ambush pulled back and called in artillery and 81 mortars. A check at first light yielded nothing. The third platoon of Company G spotted 5 figures moving in the brushline at YD 285587. An artillery mission was called with good coverage of the target area but results are unknown. All BMT maneuver units continued to conduct training, and executed their daily patrols. At 2000H a night patrol from the reconnaissance platoon spotted two figures in the water in the area of YD 293667. It was felt that these men might have been VC setting in a water mine but a check at first light yielded no mines. At 2330, Company E while on a night ambush patrol spotted 10 NVA moving toward their ambush position, however the NVA failed to appear. The remainder of the day was void of any enemy contact.

24 March

All maneuver elements continued to train, re-equip, and reorganize, in addition to carrying out day and night ~~patrols~~ Company E found and destroyed two newly constructed enemy bunkers. Later on this

DECLASSIFIED

same patrol apprehended five Vietnamese Nationals, who were forwarded to regiment as detainees. At 2130H a company H listening post spotted 3 or 4 figures in the vicinity of YD 273665. The figures were taken under fire with small arms and hand grenades. The JP shifted positions and made a check of the area at first light on 25 March. One NVA cover was found at the scene of contact the next morning.

25 March

At 0710 enemy rockets were shot at Dong Ha Combat Base from YD 260680. Immediate counter-battery was called in by the BMT 2/4. Also an 81mm mortar mission was fired by the BMT's 81 platoon. Three NVA were seen walking north by a Company F unit, and an artillery mission was called in. Results of the fire mission were unknown, but good target coverage was reported. Again the day was relatively quiet with no other significant enemy contact.

26 March

At 1000H a recon patrol apprehended 3 VC suspects (via YD 302686) which were sent in to regiment. A platoon patrol from Company H found a series of 6 NVA Claymores, which were booby-trapped, in the vicinity of coordinates YD 268664. The claymores were blown in place by an attached engineer unit. The remainder of the day was quiet with no enemy contact experienced.

27 March

No enemy contact was experienced despite aggressive patrolling by BMT units. The maneuver elements continued to train and prepare for an impending operation, TASK FORCE KILO.

28 March

The maneuver elements continued to prepare for Operation TASK FORCE KILO. No significant contact with the enemy was experienced by the BMT during the day. At 1700H a Company F patrol found 3 fresh graves containing bodies of three NVA at YD 275675. All BMT night activities reported negative enemy contact.

29 March

The third platoon of Company G secured Lan Xuan (East), BMT Obj. A, with negative contact, and established a night defensive position.

At 0900H, Company H, the tank platoon and the 81mm platoon were moved by LCM-8 to an assembly area in the vicinity of Bao Vong (YD 300684), and established a defensive perimeter. At 1300H Company E, the AnTrac platoon, and the ALFA Command Group departed Mai Xe Chanh and landed at an assembly area at My Loo (YD 305680). Night defensive positions were established immediately upon arrival at the assembly areas. No enemy contact was experienced by the BMT units for the entire day.

DECLASSIFIED

30 March

(Note: The 3d Marine Division coordinated plan for the attack required that the 2d ARVN Regt. seize Division Obj. C, Nhi Ha (YD 272704) by BLT 2/4. The east/west boundary between the 2d ARVN Regt. and BLT 2/4 was Jones Creek. Both Objectives B and C lay astride this boundary with Objective B slightly south and west of Objective C). Company F and Company G moved out from the BLT base operating area, Mai Xa Chanh at 0300 and advanced towards Lam Xuan (East), BLT 2/4 Objective A. At 0600H the operation commenced and Company G moved immediately into Lam Xuan (East) with Company F on its right; Company G then moved to a preplanned position (Phase Line Red) so that prearranged preparatory fires could be called on Nhi Ha, Division Obj. C. After 15 minutes of the prep fires, Company G and Company F moved forward leaning into their supporting arms. Company E moved a security element to the right rear of Company F and, employing a mine detector team, cleared a route for tanks and amphibian vehicles.

Company F and Company G moved close to Nhi Ha (YD 272704) and were in the attack position, 500 meters from the objective by 0700H, however, they were not permitted to assault this objective until the 2d ARVN Regiment secured Division Objective B, Lam Xuan (West) (YD 268700), because they would mask ARVN assault and prep fires. There was considerable delay in launching the attack on Division Objective B by the 2d ARVN Regt. Therefore, Company E was ordered to attack and seize Regimental Objective 1 (Hill 23, YD 279719) located north and east of Division Objective C. This attack commenced at 0900 and Regt. Obj. 1 was secured by 1000H.

Company F was ordered to move forward of Company G and seized BLT Objective D (YD 282708), which was also northeast of Division Objective C. Seizure of Regimental Objective 1 and BLT Objective D rendered Division Objective C untenable to the enemy and cut off possible escape routes.

When it became obvious that the ARVN unit could not seize Lam Xuan (West), Company G and Company F were ordered to form a night defensive perimeter to the east of Nhi Ha. Company E was ordered forward to join Company B at Hill 23 (Regt. Obj. 1). Accompanying Company H was the mobile supply dump mounted in Ottors and LVT's. The 81mm mortars displaced forward in two increments to Hill 23 with elements of Company H providing security during the displacement. The day ended with Company E and H with the tanks, Antracs and mobile supply dump located at the Hill 23 area (YD 279719). Companies F and G were located in a separate perimeter to the southwest of Hill 23 and to the east of Nhi Ha. BLT 2/4 had reached Division Phase Line Apple without major contact but had not seized Nhi Ha because the 2d ARVN Regiment had not taken Lam Xuan (West). All units established local security and plans were made for continuation of the attack on the following day.

The enemy contact was characterized by small arms fire and heavy mortar, artillery and rocket fire. Two direct contacts were made, one by the tanks and one by Company G. These two contacts accounted for 18 NVA KIA (Confirmed). Naval Gunfire, artillery, and mortars were used.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

in prep, on-call, and counter-battery missions throughout the day. Resupply was accomplished with Otters and routine and priority medical evacuations handled in the same manner. Emergency medical evacuations were accomplished by helicopter. The only major problem on this first day of the operation was in coordinating fires and movements with the ARVN unit on the BLT's left flank. For instance, it took approximately one hour to stop illumination from being fired in support of the ARVN unit when it was reported that the cannisters were falling into Company F and Company G positions. One cannister hit a Marine and amputated one of his legs. In general, the attack was successful and the BLT was in an excellent posture to continue the attack in the morning.

31 March

Company G commenced the attack against Division Objective C (Nhi Ha) before first light, and met virtually no resistance. As Company G swept through Nhi Ha much enemy equipment and ordnance was discovered. Company F, which was prepared to assist in the event Company G met resistance, swept northeast through BLT Objective D (YD 255708), then turned west to attack BLT Objective F (YD 255715). Concurrently, Companies H and E attacked to the north. Company E seized Regimental Objective 2, Nhi Thuong. Only one incident occurred when a Marine from Company E tripped a grenade rigged as a mine--two minor WIA's resulted. Once Company G secured Nhi Ha it reverted to BLT reserve and followed generally in trace of Companies E and H. Company F captured 2 NVA soldiers at Objective F, one of whom had an RPG-2 rocket launcher. At Regimental Objective 4 (YD 258737), Company H encountered a dug-in squad size unit of NVA. In the ensuing firefight 13 enemy were killed at the cost of 1 Marine KIA, and 5 Marine WIA's. After Company H had secured the objective, the BLT established a perimeter east of the objective at YD 264737. Also moving northward through Regimental Objective 3, and on to a position at YD 295750 was Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines which was OPCON to BLT 2/4. Company B had no enemy contact, but did run across many signs indicating that the NVA had used this area quite heavily at an earlier date. Overall, the day was quite successful in that the BLT continued to move well, reaching its assigned Objectives ahead of schedule. Little enemy contact was made while considerable enemy equipment was found and a number of bunkers destroyed. The ability of the NVA to deliver effective artillery on the advancing Marines from across and/or within the DMZ was quickly silenced by rapid counter-battery from many sources. Again the M-76 Otter proved invaluable in conducting rapid resupply, and transporting priority and routine medical evacuees. One M-48 tank hit a mine in a "friendly", unmarked minefield northeast of Combat Outpost A-1, YD 265734.

1 April

Under the cover of an early morning fog, Company G, supported by Company E attacked Regimental Objective 5 (vic YD 254652). While Company E screened on the higher ground to the northeast, Company G was able to sweep through the Objective area, AN MY, with no significant contact. (Company F followed in the trace of Company E and was prepared to assist either Company G or Company E as required. Company E and G then pushed to the southern boundary of the DMZ, turned south, and started a more thorough search of the destroyed villages. As the fog

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

started to lift Company G received sporadic enemy incoming, and at 1000H Company E received approximately 30-40 rounds of artillery but sustained no casualties. The BLF returned to its night defensive position of 31 March, and awaited further orders. Meanwhile Company B had, under the same fog cover, seized Regimental Objective 6 (Ha Loi Trung) with no enemy contact. Company B destroyed enemy positions in the Objective area, turned and started a sweep back to the south. At coordinates YD 292752 they found a large ordnance cache containing 140mm rockets and 82mm mortars. An AmTrac was used to carry the ordnance back to Regiment. Except for incoming artillery no enemy contact occurred until about 2200H when the 1st Platoon, Company E had a probe of its position resulting in one enemy KIA, one POW and no friendly casualties.

The 81mm platoon, amtracs, tanks, and the mobile supply dump remained at Hill 23 for the night of 1 April. A second tank struck a friendly mine at YD 265773 while attempting to assist the tank disabled on the 31st of March. These mining incidents slowed down the attack and detracted from the overall mission because security had to be left with them (resulting in fewer Marines to participate in the attack).

Another problem area developed in obtaining adequate fire support for the prep fires on Regimental Objective 5. It was too overcast to observe Naval Gunfire for initial adjustment and the Objective was out of range of all direct support artillery units except the LVTH-6 battery which had displaced forward from Cua Viet to cover this critical area. However this battery apparently did not have the HHT frequencies and the resulting confusion delayed the scheduled prep fires and the attack. Also, the battery did not fire HC smoke or WP requested to screen the maneuver units due to an apparent shortage of this ammunition; although the need for screening agents was specified in all planning conferences.

2 April

The battalion started a retrograde movement to the south. Company E and G crossed to the west side of Jones Creek, and commenced to sweep the villages previously secured by the 2d ARVN Regt. Company H with the 81mm platoon, Amtrac platoon, tanks, and supply personnel returned directly to the Mai Xa Chanh area by traveling south along the eastern side of Jones Creek to My Lee, and then by LCM-8 and LVTP-5's to Mai Xa Chanh. Company E with the ALFA Command Group swept rapidly south and was inside the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter by 1000H. Company C/1/3, the Regimental reserve was chopped to BLF 2/4 and ordered to occupy Nhi Ha (Reg. Objective C) for the day and night of 2 April. Company F swept south down the east side of Jones Creek with the final Objective of Lam Xuan (East). Company F was ordered to remain at Lam Xuan (East) during the night of 2 April. At Lam Xuan (West) Company G encountered 5 enemy in a bunker. A firefight resulted in which three enemy were killed, two were wounded and taken prisoner. Considerable delay was experienced in getting a helicopter for medical evacuation and one of the POW's died. As Company G searched the area they found large stores of NVA ordnance, twenty more bodies, and other equipment (listed in paragraph 11). Company G formed a perimeter with (East) and spent the

DECLASSIFIED

the remainder of the day searching the village and destroying enemy positions and ordnance. Company B, 1stBn, 3d Marines, was chopped back to the 1st AirTrac Battalion and it returned to position C-4.

Phase I of TASK FORCE KILO was terminated at 020700H, however the BLT did not receive this information until the morning of 3 April. Company F, Company G and Company C/1/3 remained at Lam Xuan (East), Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha respectively for the night of 2 April. Company E moved to coordinates YD 285671 and became the Regimental reserve.

3 April

All companies swept to the south and encountered no enemy contact. Company G found several more freshly killed NVA, and more abandoned enemy equipment. By midmorning Companies F and G were inside the Mai Ka Chanh perimeter. Company C/1/3 was chopped back to 1stBn, 3d Marines at 1530H and was transported across the Cua Viet River by LVTP-5's.

Results of the entire 5 day operation were: NVA losses were 53 KIA (confirmed by body count) and 4 POW's. Weapons captured included 8 AK-47's, 7 SKS rifles, 2 RPD IMGS, 1 RPG-2, 1 PPS-43, 1 Soviet 1891 sniper rifle with scope, and 1 AK 44 bolt action rifle. Other ordnance found included 276 60mm rds, 225 82mm mortar rds, 16 cases of 12.7 ammo, 5 cases of 7.62 Russian Short, and numerous ChiCom grenades. Assorted uniforms, over 50 gasmasks, and other NVA individual equipment were also found. All enemy bunkers found were destroyed by engineer personnel. Marine casualties for the operation were 1 KIA and 29 WIAE.

4 April

No enemy contact was experienced throughout the entire day of 4 April. A noticeable increase in the number of Vietnamese Nationals entering the BLT's AO was observed. To better carry out the primary mission of the BLT (denying the north bank of the Cua Viet to the enemy) it was decided that two of the rifle companies should work out of base camps in the areas of My Loc (YD 305680), and to the southwest of the Mai Ka Chanh base camp at YD 266649. During this day Company E moved to the destroyed ville in the area of YD 266649 and established a base camp while Company G moved to the My Loc area to establish a base camp. It was determined that the BLT's maneuver elements would rotate out of the Mai Ka Chanh camp on a 5 day basis. Companies F and H remained at the Mai Ka Chanh perimeter, and aside from conducting day and night patrols carried out a rigorous training program. The third platoon of Company G was sent from My Loc to Lam Xuan (East) to occupy it as a platoon base camp.

5 April The BLT received an intelligence report at 041100H which stated that a booby trapped mine was in Bac Vong, so a squad from Company G and attached engineers were sent to destroy the mine. At 1030H the Company G squad found and destroyed several trenches, bunkers and fighting holes and various enemy ordnance at YD 289692. At 1100H the squad found a 15 lb AT mine which was quickly destroyed. At 1300H, Company G picked up 3 Vietnamese men, all of military age, and forwarded them to regiment. Later the men were released as innocent civilians. At 1430H an OP from the 3d Platoon of Company G spotted three NVA in the area of Lam Xuan (East) at coordinates YD 272699, but lost sight of them before they could

DECLASSIFIED

take any action. At 2130H an IP in front of Company H's lines (YD 274664) spotted approximately 5 NVA moving from mound to mound. The IP withdrew to the lines and a 60mm and 81mm mission was called in on the location of the last sighting. A check at first light revealed negative results.

6 April

The BLT received word that a large cache of ordnance was buried in the vicinity of coordinates YD 268681, so a patrol from Company H, with attached engineers and a mine detector was sent to search out the area. Nothing was reported the first day, but it was later found out that the squad had been searching in the wrong area, so another patrol was planned for the next day. At 1028H while improving their defensive position (YD 266649) personnel from Company E discovered 2 NVA claymore mines. At 1445H Company E personnel again discovered enemy ordnance which included RPG and 82mm rounds. Company G at 2125H received one incoming round which was thought to be a friendly short round. The remainder of the day was quiet with no enemy contact reported.

7 April

A patrol from Company E found 15 freshly dug fighting holes in the vicinity of YD 251659 at 0715H. A short while later the same patrol came across another series of bunkers, fighting holes, and numerous 782 equipment. The fighting holes and bunkers were destroyed. In the same area at 0800H two fresh graves, each containing one NVA were discovered at YD 250660. At 1015H a little boy encountered by the Company E patrol stated that 2 NVA companies, with mortars, left Ky Lam (YD 247668) and headed north two days previously. An OP from the 3d Platoon of Company G at Lan Xuan (East) took two enemy small arms rounds from an unseen enemy. Artillery missions were called in on the suspected positions. At 1500H this same OP spotted 3 NVA in the open at YD 270697, and a sniper accompanying the OP took them under fire. One was observed to fall (presumed KIA) while the other two made it to the sanctuary of a tree line. The OP was unable to check out the one that had fallen because of the barrier formed by Jones Creek. The reinforced squad from Company H plus the engineer team equipped with mine detectors searched the entire area of the supposed enemy cache but could locate nothing. The remainder of the day was relatively quiet with no enemy contact being experienced.

8 April

Company G conducted platoon size patrols within their assigned AO in the vicinity of the My Loc and Lan Xuan (East) villages. Elements of Company G, S-2, battalion surgeon w/staff and the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/4 performed a MedCap program among the villagers in the refugee camp located at Xon Con Tong (vic YD 320694). The program was highly successful. Within the Company F AO a platoon size patrol discovered

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NVA ordnance and equipment. (Total count, two (2) 61mm mortar rds, two (2) ChiCom grenades, and one (1) pack).

At 1340H Company E received two (2) incoming medium size artillery rounds in their company CP. Results: one (1) WIA, an investigation is being conducted by higher Headquarters, it is unknown at this time whether the rounds were friendly or enemy. (WIA medevaced by helicopter at 1500H).

Company H conducted a two-squad patrol establishing an OP/LP at YD 274685 until 0800H. Company E, G, H and F conducted scheduled night acts in accordance with the assigned missions for 8 April. Each activity reported negative enemy contact throughout the night.

9 April

The BLT's primary mission involved the relief of two company size outposts. Company H assumed the mission of Company E at YD 266649 around 1100H and Company F replaced Company G at YD 305682 at 1300H. As Company H and Company E were enroute to their assigned areas, both units found Vietnamese literature (YD 248664) (Company E), and notebooks (YD 255654) (Company H) containing possible enemy records. All data was turned into BLT 2/4 S-2 for further translation. Company E had one NBC while enroute to BLT CP. A Marine fell off an Otter fracturing his right arm. A medevac chopper was in at 1425H to transfer the Marine to the USS IWO JIMA. Company F successfully relieved Company G at My Loc, (YD 305682) and Lam Xuan (East) (YD 285690) around 1500H. Company F conducted a daylight patrol northwest of the BLT CP with negative results. All units conducted their scheduled night activities with Company E LP#1, the only element encountering a reported six (6) enemy. They fired S/A and M-79 at the target. A search was conducted at first light with negative results.

10 April

Company H conducted two platoon size patrols from their company outpost located at YD 266649. The first platoon of Company H patrolled southwest between 1400-1700H. Both patrols completed their assigned missions without difficulty or contact with the enemy. Company H established one fire team size observation post at YD 257643 during the hours of 1000-1700H. The OP reported negative contact or sightings upon the completion of their mission.

Company E and G conducted company level training within the BLT's defensive perimeter. The following training was conducted by each unit: small unit tactics, ambushes and patrolling techniques, radio procedures, Fan firing of weapons and map reading. The 2nd Squad, 3rd Platoon, Company F conducted a patrol northeast of their platoon outpost located at Lam Xuan (East) (YD 285692). The patrol uncovered ten 82mm mortar rounds at YD 289692 which were forwarded to the BLT S-2. Company F established a fire team observation position at YD 279683 during the hours of 0715-1700H which reported negative contact or sightings upon the completion of their mission.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Around 2545H three PF platoons joined the BLT for combined training and operations. The PF platoons were attached as follows: Unit 101 (25men) to Company G, Unit 96 (15 men) to Company E, and Unit 98 (28 men) to Company F. Each of the BLT companies conducted scheduled night activities with negative enemy contact.

11 April

Company E, G, & H&S with their attached PF platoons conducted training on small unit tactics within the BLT 2/4 base camp. Company F conducted two squad size patrols in its assigned AO to the west and south, with the patrol to the west establishing a fire team observation post at YD 278693 as it returned to the company base camp. Each unit reported negative contact with the enemy upon completing their assigned mission. Company F still maintained the 3d Platoon in a platoon outpost at Lan Xuan (East) (YD 285690), and the remaining elements of the company positioned at My Loc (YD 305682). Company H and the Armed Forces Propaganda Team conducted a MedCap program for 200 villagers in the vicinity of YD 255658. Comfort items, food and other miscellaneous gifts were passed out to the Vietnamese people. Approximately 110 people were treated by the BLT Surgeon and his medical staff. At YD 255658 Company H found Vietnamese documents and one name plate assumed to belong to the enemy forces. All items were turned in to the BLT S-2 for further translation, then forwarded to 3d Division Headquarters. Around 1400H, one PF passed information to one of the BLT S-2 interpreters pertaining to a possible attack on three locations as follows: (1) Cua Viet, (2) My Loc, or (3) C-4. The S-2 transferred the PF to Regimental Headquarters. Each unit completed their assigned night activities with negative enemy contact.

12 April

Company E, G and F with attached PF platoons conducted training within the BLT perimeter on small unit tactics. Company F conducted one squad size patrol in the northern portion of their assigned AO and established two fire team size observation posts at YD 293693 and YD 278661.

Company F day activities reported negative enemy contact. Within Company H's AO a two platoon search and destroy mission was conducted northwest from the company outpost at YD 266649 with negative enemy contact. Two Marines participating in the search and destroy mission were injured by friendly WP rounds from 4.2 Battery, 3/12. (One routine medevac and one minor). Both individuals were transferred by helicopter to the USS IWO JIMA around 1000H. Each company conducted their night activities without any difficulties or enemy contact.

13 April

Company E, G. and H&S with attached PF platoons conducted training within the BLT perimeter on small unit tactics. Company F conducted a squad size patrol (0700-1600) to the north-northwest of their outpost (My Loc, 304679) with negative enemy contact. At 0930H, a scout-sniper accidentally wounded a young civilian boy with a ricochet (via YD 303682). The boy

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

was evacuated to Delta Med by chopper. His condition was serious. At 1000H, Company F received seven (7) rounds of unidentified large caliber rounds within 200 meters of their position, (YD 289689). A crater analysis was performed and the fuze type used by NGF was found. No Marines were injured.

At 1200H, the patrol spotted 30 men (vic YD 315705). They proved to be friendly. Company F had two observation posts from 0700-1600H, (vic YD 279694) and (vic YD 293696). At the completion of their mission, they reported negative enemy sightings or contacts. Company G had a platoon size patrol with PF's from 0900H -1400H to the north of BLT 2/4's position. At YD 268679, Company G found thirteen 60mm mortar rounds, assorted papers, and two ChiCom grenades, which were forwarded to regiment. At the completion of their mission negative sightings or contact had been made. Company H had a squad sized (rein) patrol from 0800H-1500H west of their base camp. They also conducted a MedCap at vic YD 251643, that treated about twenty-five people. At 0830H, Company H found three RPG rounds, two boxes of .50 caliber ammunition, two 82mm rounds, and one 60mm mortar round in a fighting hole while searching the villo of Ky True (YD 255658). The gear was forwarded to the BLT CP. At the same time, Company H, while laying wire around their position (vic YD 265650), found two ChiCom claymores. The claymores were sent to regiment. At 1507H, Company H found one 82mm round while cleaning a trenchline (YD 265650). H&S Company spent the day training a platoon of PF's at the Battalion CP. All companies conducted their normal assigned night activities and reported negative enemy contact or sightings upon completion of their missions.

14 April

Company F conducted two squad size patrols (073001600H) northwest of My Loc (YD 304697), and established two fireteam size OP's at YD 285706 and YD 302697 until 1630H. At 1020H a Marine in Company F stopped on a punji stake at My Loc area, and was medevaced by helicopter to the USS IWO JIMA. A platoon of PF's accompanied the platoon. Company G conducted a platoon size patrol with it's attached PF platoon size patrol was sent to the northwest (0800-1200H). Each day activity reported negative enemy contact after completing their assigned missions. All night activities reported negative enemy contact throughout the night.

15 April

At 0001H, Operation HANDSHAKE commenced with Company E and G assigned to seize and occupy BLT Obj's A (Lam Xuan (West))(YD 268699) and B (Nhi Ha)(YD 272705). At 0355H Company G secured objective A and Company E secured objective B at 0458H. No enemy contact was encountered by either company. Company H(-) moved into the BLT Command Post (Mai Xa Chanh) at 0415H from YD 265649 (the Company H outpost) leaving one platoon in the established company outpost. Company H (-) was to assume the mission of the mobile reaction force in the event Companies E and G met heavy enemy resistance while securing their

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

their objectives. Company F (-) likewise moved (minus a platoon) to the BIT Command Post area leaving a platoon at YD 305681. All companies prepared strong defensive positions in their assigned areas. As Operation HANDSHAKE progressed into the first day a total of five daylight patrols were conducted with the assigned AO's to Companies E, F and G. Company E conducted two platoon size patrols to the east and north of Nhi Ha. The 2nd Platoon, Company E encountered forty civilians moving from Ha Throung (YD 222714) to the resettlement village of Xom Con Tong at YD 320694. The same patrol later found two 82mm mortar rounds at YD 268704 and one dead NVA at (YD 285682). The 3d Platoon, Company E discovered a booby-trapped mine in the vicinity of YD 277705 and a large rice cache at YD 279711. Both the mine and rice were blown in place. Company G conducted two platoon size patrols to the northwest and southwest of Lan Xuan (West). Each platoon on patrol discovered NVA ordnance along their routes. The 1st Platoon, Company G found one ChiCom grenade and assorted NVA web gear at YD 272649. All ordnance obtained by the companies was transferred to the Third Marine Regiment. Each Company conducted two night patrols each and established three LP's each, all of which made no enemy contact.

16 April

Company E conducted a platoon size patrol northeast of their base camp, and established a squad size OP at YD 265712. As the patrol continued its mission several NVA documents were discovered near the vicinity of YD 270704. In the same general area one patrol member set off an enemy booby trap causing minor injury to his leg, which was treated by a corpsman. Within the Company H assigned AO a very successful platoon size MedCap was held at YD 252644. Upon completion of the MedCap two fire team size outposts were positioned at YD 270670. A total of 145 Vietnamese were treated, issued food and comfort items. The 1st Platoon, Company H on a platoon size patrol took three detainees (forwarded to regiment) at YD 273672 and discovered one RPG w/booster, three ChiCom grenades, and one AT mine (destroyed in place) in the vicinity of YD 267698. Company F dispatched a squad size patrol within its assigned AO. Company G conducted a platoon size patrol which detained and sent to regiment five Vietnamese at YD 273672. They also found four NVA helmets, five ChiCom grenades at YD 254701 and established a squad size OP at YD 253701.

All captured ordnance was forwarded to 3rd Marine Regiment Headquarters. Each unit conducted their scheduled night activities with Company G being the only element to make enemy contact. Company G received one round of enemy small arms in their position, and returned fire on the suspected enemy position. At first light a pool of blood and an AK-47 were found.

17 April

On the third day of Operation HANDSHAKE the 2nd Platoon, Company E conducted a patrol northwest of Nhi Ha (YD 270705). The patrol

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

discovered a bunker at YD 270705 which contained seven RPG's w/boosters, eleven 60mm mortar rounds, two 82mm mortar rounds and assorted 782 equipment. As the patrol returned to the company base camp it established a squad size OP at YD 280718. Company F established two squad size OP's at YD 313686 and YD 287678. Company G set in two fireteam OP's at YD 262688, YD 254700, and sent the 2nd Platoon on a sweep through the vicinity of YD 253703, the general area in which the company received fire from the evening of 16 April 1968. Completing the sweep the platoon reported finding pools of blood, tennis shoes, and one AK-47 in the vicinity of YD 253703. No NVA/VC bodies or fresh graves could be located by the platoon. Company H established two OP's (YD 271655 and YD 271671) while the remainder of the company continued to prepare strong defensive positions. While improving their defensive positions the following assorted ordnance was discovered: 10 82mm mortar rounds, one box of fuses, one claymore mine, and one 75mm round. The reconnaissance platoon located at Mai Ka Chanh (YD 286671) received one M-16 rifle, one belt of 7.62 linked MG ammo, and two smoke grenades from four children. The children received food in return for the ordnance and weapons from the recon personnel. All NVA ordnance, 782 equipment and weapons found during the daylight activities were transferred to Regiment.

The night activities scheduled for 17 April consisted of Company E conducting a platoon size patrol northeast of Nhi Ha (YD 270705), which established two ambushes (YD 273704 and YD 270705). Company F conducted two squad size patrols north of My Lee and Company H sent out a squad size patrol east of their platoon outpost (YD 265649) which established two OP's (YD 276660) and (YD 274671). Within the Company G assigned AO, two squad size roving ambushes made contact with each other after dark resulting in two Marines and one PF Vietnamese medevacod.

18 April

As Operation HANDSHAKE moved into its fourth day the daylight activities consisted of two platoon size patrols, seven OP's and one platoon size MedCap. The night activities scheduled for the BLT were six fireteam LP's, four squad ambushes, three squad size patrols and one platoon patrol. During the daylight hours the 2nd Platoon, Company E conducted a patrol to the northwest of Nhi Ha (YD 269705) which discovered one AT mine at YD 283710 (destroyed in place) and 193 rounds of 7.62 linked enemy ammunition, (YD 283712). A fireteam OP was set in at YD 275704, 0830-1600H)

The 3rd Platoon of Company H conducted a successful MedCap in the vicinity of YD 283712, and established two OP's at YD 271655 and 271671. A total of 101 Vietnamese Nationals, and children were treated by the BLT 2/4 medical staff. The platoon also issued food and comfort items to the older Vietnamese people. While enroute back to the platoon outpost the 3rd Platoon detained three Vietnamese who were listed on the black list possessed by a PF representative attached to the platoon. Company G established two OP's at YD 251671 and YD 251703 and sent the 2nd Platoon on a patrol southwest of Lam Xuan (West) (YD 268699). At 1130H at YD 267699 the patrol discovered ninety 60mm mortar rounds, seven 82mm mortar rounds, four RPG's w/14 cans of boosters, sixteen boxes of fuses, one case 7.62

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

ammunition, two AK-47 magazines and one 75mm FR round. All captured ordnance and the three detainees were forwarded to 3d Marine Headquarters. All night activities reported negative contact during the night.

19 April

The fifth day of Operation HANDSHAKE BLT 2/4 units conducted extensive day and night activities with little difficulty. At 1500H while on a patrol northeast of Nhi Ha the 2nd Platoon of Company E detained two Vietnamese (YD 257706). Company E while improving their defensive positions in Nhi Ha found assorted enemy ordnance and destroyed twenty-five enemy bunkers and fifteen spider holes. Company F maintained two daylight OP's at YD 302687 and YD 287686 (0700-1700H). Company G conducted a squad size patrol southwest of Lam Kuan (West) (YD 288699) which discovered one destroyed 60mm mortar, six 60mm rounds, two 82mm rounds, two RPG rounds, and one ChiCom grenade. Company H established two OP's at YD 271655 and YD 271761 (0700-1700H).

All day activities reported negative enemy contact. All captured enemy ordnance and the two detainees were forwarded to the 3d Marine Regimental Headquarters.

The night activities for BLT 2/4 consisted of six squad size patrols, ten listening posts, and fourteen well planned ambushes. All night activities reported negative enemy contact throughout the night.

20 April

Operation HANDSHAKE moved into its sixth day with Company E conducting a platoon size patrol (0800-1400) northwest of Nhi Ha (YD 270705), and established one OP at YD 273704. In the vicinity of coordinates YD 268704 Company E destroyed thirty-three bunkers and one spider hole. Company E and Company F established two OP's each during the daylight hours (YD 261684). The 3d Platoon, Company H was relieved by the 2nd Platoon Company H at the platoon combat outpost (YD 267649). The night activities for BLT 2/4 consisted of three squad patrols, five squad ambushes, and five LP's. Each activity did not make enemy contact during the night hours.

21 April

At 0545H Company H security patrol fired upon two Vietnamese killing one female and apprehending one male detainee. The Vietnamese had ventured into a free fire zone during curfew hours and were found to be at fault. The male detainee was transferred to the 3d Marine Regiment and released after questioning.

Company E conducted two squad size patrols (0800-1600H) to the north and northwest of Nhi Ha (YD 270705), and established two OP's at YD 251719 and YD 280717. At YD 272704 the patrol enroute north discovered one 60mm mortar round, one ChiCom entrenching tool and a bandolier of

28 DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

AK-47 ammunition. Company F dispatched a squad size patrol to the north of their Company (-) area in Mai Xa Chanh and established two OP's (YD 287677 and YD 313686). The patrol encountered civilians at YD 280691 and were told that VC were in the vicinity of My Loc (YD 305682). Company G conducted a squad size patrol northwest of Lam Xuan (West) (YD 267690) and established one OP at coordinates YD 262688. The patrol encountered three Vietnamese civilians to whom they paid 1500 Piastros for information leading to the discovery of eighteen bunkers in which was found one rifle grenade, two ChiCom grenades, four 82mm mortar rounds, five 60mm mortar rounds, seven BA-40 batteries, one RPG canvas and two AT mines. All captured ordnance and equipment was destroyed in place. The night activities for BLT 2/4 consisted of eight squad size patrols, six ambushes, three LP/ambushes, and two LP's.

22 April

At 0300H a Company F squad ambush made contact with five NVA in the vicinity of YD 318689. The squad fired small arms and M-79's at the NVA with unknown results.

On the eighth day of Operation HANDSHAKE BLT 2/4 day activities consisted of a combined USMC/PF/ARVN company size patrol north of Nhi Ha (YD 270705), six OP's, one platoon patrol, and one squad patrol. No enemy contact was reported throughout the day. The 3rd Platoon of Company H discovered assorted ordnance and documents in the Ky Truc (YD 250661) and Ky Lam (YD 244670) areas. The ordnance and documents were forwarded to the BLT 2/4 S-2.

During the night six ambushes, four squad size patrols and one platoon size patrol were conducted within BLT 2/4 AO. At 2300H a Company G squad ambush made contact with approximately twelve NVA (YD 262689) moving in a northern direction. A total of eight M-79 rounds were fired at the NVA with unknown results.

23 April

During the ninth day of Operation HANDSHAKE Company E conducted a squad size patrol north of Nhi Ha (YD 270705) during which the patrol apprehended three civilian detainees at coordinates YD 266704. All three detainees were transferred by skimmer boat to the 3d Marines Headquarters for interrogation. From the Lam Xuan (West) village (YD 267690) a combined USMC/PF patrol operation was conducted by Company G and PF unit 101 to the northwest. The patrol discovered well traveled NVA trails leading to the southwest towards Ky Truc, and also destroyed two AT mines at coordinates YD 249717. Company H sent a squad (rein) with the BLT 2/4 surgeon and representatives from the S-2 to YD 252643 to conduct a MedCap program. A total of 155 Vietnamese were given medical treatment, food, and comfort items. Two fireteam OP's were also established by Company F at coordinates YD 313686 and YD 284677. The night activities for BLT 2/4 consisted of five LP's, three LP/ambushes, and eight squad size patrol/ambushes. Each activity did not make enemy contact during the night hours.

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

24 April

At 0015H on the tenth day of Operation HANDSHAKE, Company E detected movement north of the company-size outpost (YD 270705), and opened fire with small arms. The area was searched at first light by a fireteam which found blood pools, one AK-47 w/folding stock, four AK-47 loaded magazines, two ChiCom grenades, one medical kit, and cartridge belt. During the day four Vietnamese check points were established (YD 272706, YD 274704, YD 271704, YD 273704), and two squads patrolled to the northeast and northwest. The squad patrolling to the northwest detained one Vietnamese (YD 281718), who was released after interrogation. The squad patrol to the northeast discovered at coordinates YD 255714, forty new trenches, two RPG rounds, one 60mm mortar round, one rifle grenade, one light machine gun drum w/ammunition and one set of NVA utilities. Forty-two bunkers were destroyed by Company E at coordinates YD 272703. Between Companies F, G, and H, a total of four OP's were established, and two squad-size patrols sent out. A Company G squad-size patrol discovered and destroyed in place thirty-three 82mm mortar rounds, twenty-five 60mm mortar rounds, three cans of increments, and one 140mm rocket at YD 256698. The night activities for BLT 2/4 consisted of three LP/ambushes, seven LP's, four squad-size patrols, and six squad-size ambushes.

25 Pmt
 Operation HANDSHAKE entered into the eleventh day with extensive day and night activities. At 0100H Company H sent a squad patrol west of their platoon outpost (YD 266649), which encountered a 12 man NVA patrol at YD 263648. The enemy patrol was fired upon with small arms, and 60mm mortars. A search at first light revealed one NVA KIA (C), one AK-47 NVA weapon, personal gear, blood pools and drag marks leading to a hamlet (YE 256646). No other NVA bodies or weapons could be found in the hamlet. At 0400H a Company G platoon ambush engaged an enemy patrol (YD 246697) and took the enemy under small arms fire, which resulted in one NVA KIA (C) and one AK-47. Company E sent two squad size patrols to the northeast and northwest of Nhi Ha (YD 270705). The patrol moving northeast discovered along its route twelve 82mm mortar rounds (YD 279711), six ChiCom grenades (YD 282715), and twenty-five bunkers (YD 282715). All ordnance and weapons found were forwarded to the BLT 2/4 S-2. BLT 2/4 night activities consisted of four squad patrol/ambushes, and ten LP's. At 2130H a Company F LP sighted 20 enemy (YD 307683) and received one incoming rifle grenade into their position, (results one WIA) and simultaneously an artillery mission was called on the fleeing enemy. The area was checked at first light but the check revealed negative results. The BLT 2/4 Alfa Command Group conducted a night movement exercise in preparation for a future night operation.

26 April

Operation HANDSHAKE entered into its twelfth day of extensive patrols, OP's, and ambush sites. Company E sent two squad size patrols to the east of Nhi Ha (YD 270705) and established four check points south of their company outpost. At YD 283707 Company E destroyed nine enemy

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

fortified positions. Company H conducted a squad patrol with an attached armed force propaganda team to the south of their platoon outpost (YD 265649). In the vicinity of coordinates YD 254648 the patrol discovered assorted enemy and USMC 782 equipment, and one Vietnamese was detained. The 2nd Platoon of Company H, with the mission of relieving the 1st platoon (YD 265649), first conducted a patrol to the west and the south from the BLT 2/4 base area. Enroute to the platoon outpost the patrol detained a ten year old Vietnamese male (YD 246673). Three daylight OP's were also established by Company H within their assigned AO. The two detainees were forwarded to 3d Marine Regimental Headquarters. BLT 2/4 night activities consisted of a company size patrol, four ambushes, and nine LP's. No enemy contact was encountered throughout the night.

27 April

Operation HANDSHAKE entered into its thirteenth day with extensive ambushing and patrolling. At 0725H Company E (YD 268703) received one incoming artillery or rocket round which resulted in two friendly KIA's and three WIA's (medevaced). At 1213H BLT 2/4 terminated Operation HANDSHAKE and commenced Operation NIGHT OWL (BLT OP ORDER 3-68). At 1500 Company G received nineteen rounds of incoming artillery resulting in two WIA's (medevaced) at YD 249270. Companies E and F moved in accordance with BLT 2/4 OP ORDER 3-68.

At 2215H Company G reported making contact with an unknown size enemy force, (YD 249720) and then returned to a state of radio silence.

28 April

At 0140H (Operation NIGHT OWL in its second day) Company G reported being in contact with an enemy force of unknown size (YD 249721). Contact was broken after two and one-half hours with a total of eight NVA KIA's (C), one friendly KIA and eight friendly WIA's (medevaced). At 0700H Company E found items of NVA equipment (one AK-47 assault rifle, four 30 rd magazines for an AK-47 rifle, four ChiCom hand grenades, one protective mask and assorted medical supplies) lying on the ground at YD 254709. At 0740H while swooping the area in vicinity of coordinates YD 249721 Company E found two M-16 rifles and one M-14 rifle. At YD 249721 they captured and medevaced one NVA WIA (POW was DOA at DECB). In the vicinity of coordinates YD 249722 one AK-47 assault rifle was found by Company E.

At 0727H, Company E (YD 254707) received thirty-two rounds of enemy artillery fire resulting in one WIA. Counter-battery missions were fired. An AO controlled three TPQ air strikes on suspected enemy gun positions that resulted in seven secondary explosions and two fires. At 1000H, Company H (YD 305680) encountered a PF soldier who claimed knowledge of the location of two VC platoons. The PF soldier was forwarded to 3d Marine Regiment for interrogation. At 2130H, Company F observed movement (YD 281669) and engaged the suspected enemy with small arms. A check of the area yielded negative results. At 2145H an LP

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

from Company H observed four to five individuals moving towards a village (YD 266649). Approximately seventy-five rounds of artillery fire was delivered, with negative surveillance being reported.

29 April

At 0145H Company E fired at three figures moving toward their lines (YD 282717). At 0520H again Company E fired at movement in front of their lines (YD 268704). A check at first light of both instances yielded negative results. During a tank retrieval operation from A-1 Company F located and destroyed two anti-tank mines (YD 286708). At 1610H Company H received nine rounds of enemy artillery which resulted in two medovacs. At 1715H Company E was chopped to the Third Marine Division and hoisted to a position north of the Dong Ha Bridge in the vicinity of coordinates YD 241614. Company G shifted east and was given the responsibility of occupying both base camps at Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha. At 2045H an LP from Company G called in 81mm mortar support on suspected movement (YD 261706). A search at first light revealed a blood trail, but no enemy casualties.

30 April

At 0810H, a platoon from Company H sent to check out a ville (YD 261631) from which one of the Navy river patrol boats had received an RPG round, came under small arms, and automatic weapons fire. The remainder of Company H moved to reinforce the platoon while air strikes and supporting artillery were called in. By 1200H the recon platoon, two tanks, and Company F(-) were all down in the proximity of the ville and maneuvering on it, and on the adjacent ville of Dai-Do to the west. Company H was given the mission of seizing the ville where the contact initiated (YD 261631), while Company F(-) was to attack and secure the ville of Dai-Do. Throughout the attack the Marine units were under artillery, rocket, light and heavy machine gun fire, and heavy small arms fire. By 1412H Company H had its objective secured. Company F, which had sustained heavy casualties, although able to get into the northeast edge of Dai-Do, was unable to secure it. At 1550H Company B 1/3 was chopped to the BLT and by 1625H had landed in the north bank of the Cuu Viet River at coordinates YD 266627. They were immediately taken under heavy enemy fire and were only able to establish a beachhead on the north bank (YD 258623). By 1634H Company F reported having only 26 effective Marines, and was immediately ordered to withdraw to join Company H on its secured objective. At 1723H Company G was given the warning order to be prepared to move back to the BLT CP at Mai Xa Chanh. At 1925H after attempting to land helicopters in the LZ at Lam Xuan (West), and receiving heavy enemy artillery incoming the decision was made to have Company G return overland by foot. As Company G moved south to the BLT CP heavy enemy incoming artillery was received, and by the time Company G reached the BLT CP it had sustained six WIA's which required evacuation. Thus as the day ended Companies F and H were tied in a perimeter in the ville at YD 261631, Company G was at the BLT 2/4 CP, B 1/3 was on a beachhead in the vicinity of YD 257624, and Company E was chopped to the Third Marine

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Division and located just north of Dong Ha bridge. During the day Company H had killed 30 NVA, Company F 35, and B 1/3 20.

1 May

As the day of 1 May started Companies F(-) and H had established a perimeter in the ville at coordinates YD 261631. Company G was at the BLT 2/4 CP (Mai Xa Chanh - YD 280667), B 1/3 (OPCONed to BLT 2/4 on 30 April) was on the north bank of the Cua Viet in a small village in the vicinity of coordinates YD 257624. Company E had been chopped to the Third Marine Division, and was located just north of the bridge at Dong Ha (YD 241612). The second platoon of Company F was located at the base camp at My Loo (YD 305680).

At 0600H Company B 1/3 assaulted the ville at coordinates YD 259624, and by 0700H reported having the ville secured, but were still taking recoilless rifle and artillery incoming. Throughout the remainder of the day enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire would sporadically land among attacking BLT maneuver elements.

At 1040H Company G, two tanks, and the BLT Commander landed in two Miko-S boats in the vicinity of coordinates YD 263632 where they linked up with Company F(-) and Company H. A frag order was issued by the BLT Commander which called for Company G, supported by two tanks, to assault and seize the objective area (Dai-Do YD 253628). Company F would move in from the north to retrieve their one KIA/BNR from the action of 30 April. Company H was to move on line within 400 meters of the eastern edge of Dai-Do and act as a base of fire/screening force for Company G's assault. Company B 1/3, located in the ville to the southeast of Dai-Do was the BLT reserve. From 1100H-1240H the objective area was hit with air and artillery.

At 1253H, Company G commenced their attack on Dai-Do. As the assault progressed north Company G encountered heavy enemy resistance to its western front and flank. The CO of BLT 2/4 requested that Company E be chopped back to the BLT so that they might sweep to the objective from the west. At 1330H Company E was chopped back to BLT 2/4. Meanwhile a smokescreen to the western flank of Company G proved effective as the flanking enemy fire ceased and became ineffective.

At 1445H, Company F had recovered its KIA/BNR and was on the way to join Company H, when it came under enemy artillery fire which resulted in three Marine KIA's and eight Marine WIA's. At 1625H, all units became engaged with enemy small arms, artillery and mortar fire, including Company E which was in the process of linking up with Company B 1/3 in the vicinity of YD 256623. It then became apparent that the NVA forces were about to launch a coordinated counter-attack so Company B 1/3 was ordered to link up with Company G, which was now located in the southern corner of Dai-Do, and holding off a heavy enemy ground counter-attack.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At 1745H, Company B was just approaching the southwestern portion of Dai-Do, when it came under intense small arms and automatic weapons fire from enemy forces which apparently had maneuvered to the south of Company G. Both Companies G and B 1/3 were ordered into separate tight perimeters, and repulsed the counter-attack.

Meanwhile Companies F(-) and H were ordered to form a tight perimeter occupied the previous night (YD 261631). Company E had meanwhile formed a perimeter in the vicinity of coordinates YD 258624. At 1845H the recon platoon was given the responsibility of evacuating casualties sustained by B 1/3 and Company E from the Company E perimeter.

The casualties were slowly extracted from the B 1/3 area and moved to the BLT perimeter (Mai Xa Chanh) by skimmer boat and Otter, where they were medevaced by helicopter. Throughout the early evening Companies G, H, F and B 1/3 all reported taking heavy enemy artillery, mortar and rocket incoming. From 1900H to 2000H the artillery noise was jammed making counter battery nearly impossible. By 1945H B 1/3 had extracted all its casualties from the area of its contact and pulled back 500 meters south to the Company E perimeter.

By 2100H it was apparent the enemy counter-attack had been repulsed for the moment as only light incoming small arms was reported. With a flare ship up, the remainder of the night was relatively quiet.

2 May

At 0023H the CO BLT 2/4 issued a frag order which called for Company E, under the cover of darkness to move north and link up with Company G. An assault line would then be formed with Company E to the west and Company G to the east. At first light they would commence their attack north through Dai-Do and into the ville of Dinh To. Company H would move from its perimeter by first light and follow in trace of the two assault companies. Company F would stand ready to aid either attack unit, and would generally screen the eastern approach to Dai-Do. Company B 1/3 would aid in resupply, handling medevacs and provide security for the 61mm mortar section at YD 258624.

The attack commenced at first light and by 0600H both Companies E and G were heavily engaged with well dug-in NVA at the northern portion of Dai-Do. By 0914H Companies E and G had pushed the NVA north out of Dai-Do, and were consolidating their lines. It was reported that both companies had sustained heavy casualties by this time, and were still receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. From 0915H-0930H all attacking elements in the vicinity of Dai-Do came under intense artillery fire from the north.

At 0955H permission was given to pull the second platoon of Company F from My Loo and have them join Company E. Throughout the remainder of the morning the assault Companies E, G and H continued to advance on the entrenched enemy under the cover of heavy supporting mortar and air strikes.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At 1322H, Companies E and H had secured the ville of Dinh To north to the vicinity of coordinates YD 250632 and were consolidating. Meanwhile the ARVN's to the west of the creek boarding the western edge of Dai-Do reported securing the ville to the west. At 1340H enemy forces launched a counter-attack from the north and by 1430H both Companies E and H were resisting a major enemy counter-attack. It was reported that both company commanders had been wounded, and that the companies had taken heavy casualties. A retrograde movement to the southern edge of Dai-Do was made and all maneuver units proceeded to reorganize, get resupplied and evacuate their casualties.

The area to the north of the maneuver elements was pounded by air strikes and heavy artillery. Meanwhile the second platoon of Company F had arrived at the Company F perimeter (YD 261631) and Company F was ordered to move to the southern portion of Dai-Do and prepare to join Company G in the attack.

At 1550H Companies G and F commenced their attack north through Dai-Do. As the assault units moved north resistance became heavier and incoming fire increased in intensity.

By 1645H both companies reported being heavily engaged with the enemy. For fifty minutes a fierce firefight ensued, and the assault elements moved forward under the support of artillery, close air strikes and Huey gunships.

At 1740H it was reported that the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/4 was hit and that both company assault lines were being overrun by waves of NVA attacking south. At this time a retrograde movement was ordered and by 1830H both Companies F and G had reached the hasty perimeter set up by Companies E and H on the southern portion of Dai-Do. The BLT Executive Officer had at this time assumed command of the BLT.

Throughout this period every attempt possible was made to retrieve known missing and wounded personnel, but heavy pressure by attacking NVA elements made it impossible to push out too far from the perimeter.

At 1830H, sixty (60) personnel from the Mai Xa Chanh base camp were sent out to aid the four rifle companies. By dark the BLT maneuver elements had consolidated into a perimeter in the southern portion of Dai-Do, while B 1/3 and the section of 81mm mortars were in the ville at YD 258524.

A flare ship was called up and all supporting arms possible was called in to prevent the enemy from massing a ground attack. Although probed for the remainder of the evening, the situation remained relatively quiet.

3 May

No significant enemy contact was experienced by the BLT maneuver elements throughout the day. The maneuver elements account

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

for their dead and wounded and prepared to move back into the area of contact of 2 May. A total of sixty-seven NVA bodies were found in the immediate area of the hasty perimeter. At 1455H, B 1/3 was chopped back to 1/3, and at 1500H 1/3 assumed control of that portion of BLT 2/4's AO which included Dai-Do.

Companies F and E left for the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter while Companies G and H prepared to follow in trace of 1/3 elements to retrieve the BLT's KIA/BNR.

By 1935H the retrieval operation was completed and elements of Companies G and H started back to the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter. By 2116H the last of all 2/4's units had entered the 2/4 CP area. Results of the encounter were 452 NVA KIA (C) (INFANTRY) and 3 POW's.

4 May

At 0530H the river patrol boat, call sign Traffic Cop, reported taking 2 rounds of RPG fire from the north bank. At 1035H, C/1/3 found a BLT 2/4 Marine body at YD 250632. An inspection of the body revealed that his hands were tied behind his back, he was blindfolded and his wounds had been treated by the enemy. It is believed he was taken prisoner until the seriousness of his wounds was determined at which time he was shot.

5 May

Company E conducted a gear retrieval operation in the village of Dai-Do (YD 255628). Among the gear picked up was one 12.7mm AA barrel, three AK-47's, one sight for an AA gun, and one enemy radio. At 0930H a Vietnamese male walked into the Company F lines with a story indicating that the VC/NVA had killed his wife. He was sent to regiment for further questioning. At 1600H, LtCol L. A. RANN assumed command of BLT 2/4, and Major C. W. KNAPP resumed duties as the BLT Executive Officer. Training and reorganization continued.

6 May

At 0535H a CSS mission landed just outside the BLT perimeter resulting in one VLA Marine who was medevaced. 1530 piasters were paid to two Vietnamese for Marine equipment they returned to the BLT perimeter (one M-14 rifle, six rifle grenades, and two M-26 grenades). Units continued to reorganize, regroup and train replacements. No enemy contact occurred for the duration of the day.

7 May

Civilians again were noticed in the area of Vinh Quan Thuong. It appeared that they were cutting rice. Again primary emphasis was given to the training of the BLT's maneuver units. It should also be noted that as of 4 May the BLT's AO had been sharply reduced temporarily, to give the organization a chance to reorganize and train its replacements. No enemy contact was experienced.

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

8 May

At 0400H units from Company H utilizing a starlight scope spotted the figures at YD 273663. A 60mm mission was put on the area, but a check at first light yielded negative results. Throughout the day all maneuver elements were actively training and zeroing their weapons. At 2145H the river patrol boat took two people under fire with small arms and M-79's. The people were either killed or fell to the ground. No check of the area was reported by Navy personnel.

9 May

Company H moved down to their old base camp site at YD 265648, where they again established a base of operations. At 1030H personnel with green uniforms were sighted in the vicinity of YD 262658. Snipers put several rounds into the likely areas of concealment. A check by the 3d Platoon revealed fresh tracks and a harboring sight. The 3d Platoon continued on toward Ky Truc (YD 250660) and further on found 13 freshly dug foxholes at YD 252659. On their final approach to Ky Truc the third platoon came under small arms fire from an estimated 5-6 enemy. Eventually the third platoon and Company H(-) started receiving sporadic enemy artillery incoming (78 rounds medium caliber). Counter battery was called and eventually the enemy artillery was suppressed. The third platoon of Company H set up a small perimeter just southeast of Ky Truc and kept the ville under observation. Throughout the day the other maneuver units of the BLT trained and continued to reorganize.

10 May

At 0030H Company H units spotted 5 NVA in the open (YD 253650). An artillery mission was called in, but a check at first light revealed no enemy. At 0540H approximately 3 rds of incoming was received at the BLT CP area from a direction of 6400 mils.

10 May

At 1000H Company F reported receiving 5 rounds of light enemy artillery. Counter battery was called in immediately, and the enemy incoming ceased. Throughout the day all units continued to train and fam fire all now. Marines.

11 May

At 0010H movement was spotted in front of the lines manned by Company F. Small arms, M-79's, and hand grenades were directed toward the source of movement. A check of the area at first light revealed one dead water buffalo. At 1320H and at 1415H, Company H reported receiving a total of 12 rounds of medium caliber artillery. Again at 1645H Company H received 1 round of medium caliber enemy artillery. At 1600H Company H spotted 3-4 enemy at coordinates YD 251660 and an 81mm mission was called in with unknown results. At 1810H Company H received 3 rounds from an enemy recoilless rifle. An 81mm mission was immediately called in and a 106 recoilless rifle took the suspected enemy gun position under fire.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

At 0730H a Company E ambush took 5 NVA under fire, and captured 1 POW. At first light Company G moved out to relieve the third platoon of Company H at YD 256657. At 0725H they started receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from a position in the vicinity of YD 254658. The company maneuvered against the position while supporting arms was called in on the enemy position. At 1000H while maneuvering on the enemy unit Company G came under sporadic enemy artillery fire. At 1000H a Huey gunship caught 1 NVA out in the open, (YD 252659) killed him, and then retrieved his weapon. By 1220H Company G had assaulted the enemy position and killed 10 NVA, at the cost of 4 Marine KIA and 4 Marine WIA evacuated. At 1710H from YD 277687 Company F reported receiving one enemy recoilless rifle round, and immediately called in an 81mm mission on the suspected source of the fire. At 2100H, 2-3 NVA approached the Company G lines and were fired upon with small arms and M-79's. One NVA KIA(C) was found in the morning. Captured 2 AK-47's, 1 SKS, and 1 RPD LMG.

13 May

Company G, while approaching the area where contact was made on 12 May found 4 additional NVA bodies (YD 254658) apparently killed by supporting artillery on 12 May. 1 AK-47 and 1 RPD LMG was found with the bodies. At 0810 units from Company G located one NVA soldier hiding in a bunker, several attempts were made to capture him alive, but he finally had to be killed, after he wounded a Marine in the head with his AK-47. At 1630H the third platoon of Company H ran down one of three men who tried to flee as the platoon approached. The detainees were sent to regiment as an NVA/WC suspect. At 1940H Company G received sporadic enemy small arms from 1 or 2 enemy. The Marines immediately returned a large volume of small arms and M-79 fire which suppressed the enemy fire. Other units back at the BLT CP area continued to hold classes, train in tactics, and zero their M-16 rifle. No enemy contact occurred for the remainder of the evening.

14 May

At 0600 Company E moved out to the ville at YD 265648 and relieved Company H. Company H had returned to the BLT CP by 0800H. At 1030H Company G fired at two NVA at YD 260671 with 60mm mortars, and a unit was sent to check the area out. There was no evidence that the enemy had been hit or wounded. Company F continued to train on the island east of the Mai Xa Chanh CP. While Company H also held training in the afternoon. Throughout the remainder of the day, in spite of aggressive patrolling and night activities by Companies G and E no enemy contact was experienced.

15 May

During the night of 14 May BLT 2/4 received an order from regiment which called for the relief of the two army companies occupying Lon Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha, and the subsequent expansion of the BLT's AO. At 0830H Company F left the Camp Big John perimeter (located known at Mai Xa Chanh) and formally relieved E/3/21 at Lam Xuan (YD 260671) at 1100H. Meanwhile Company E proceeded from their base camp at YD 265648 and moved to YD 265648.

DECLASSIFIED

to the Camp Big John perimeter. At 1230H Company E left the perimeter and relieved C/3/21 at Núi Hả by 1500H. Company G finished destroying NVA and friendly fortifications in the ville of Vinh Quan Thuong (vic YD 258658) and arrived inside the Big John perimeter by 1250H. Company H had been carrying out a vigorous training program throughout the day. At 0745H an AO reported one recently killed NVA soldier at YD 255665, who was probably killed by friendly H&I fires. At 1540H an amtrac traveling to Company F's perimeter at Lam Xuan (West) struck a mine, that resulted in one injured Marine (concussion, held at BAS). The amtrac lost 3/4 of its tread on the left side and had to be towed back into the perimeter. The amtrac was finally towed back into the perimeter at 2000. For the remainder of the day no significant enemy contact was experienced by BLT 2/4.

16 May

The maneuver units of BLT 2/4 conducted a number of platoon size patrols, but made no contact with NVA forces. A platoon (third) from Company G was sent to occupy a base camp at My Loo (YD 305680). The first platoon of Company H patrolled out to a position in the western portion of Vinh Quan Thuong (YD 254658), and established a base camp. At 0900H the perimeter occupied by BLT 2/4 was renamed in honor of Sergeant Major John MALNAR, and will henceforth be referred to as Camp Big John (formerly Mai Xa Chanh). The former BLT Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel WEISE was present at the dedication ceremony, as was the Commanding Officer of the Third Marines, Colonel M. A. HULL. The majority of personnel on SLF A shipping were off-loaded to DHCB in preparation for the exchange of vessels at Subic Bay, P. I.

At 1115H a patrol from Company F discovered an assortment of NVA ordnance which was destroyed in place at coordinates YD 265702. The maneuver units continued to conduct numerous classes augmented by practical application. At 2325H a Company F IP spotted approximately 10 NVA at coordinates YD 268699. The Marines received 4 rounds of small arms fire, and returned both small arms and 60mm fire. At first light on 17 May the area was checked and blood stains and drag marks were found.

17 May

At 0015H a Company F night activity had definite enemy movement to their front at YD 269698. A 60mm mission was called immediately, and a check at first light revealed drag marks and blood stains. At 0925H the first platoon of Company E, while patrolling in the area of YD 256714 started receiving small arms fire from the north (YD 253717). An AO was called on station, and immediately after arriving observed approximately 30 NVA apparently trying to reinforce the enemy unit. The Company E platoon was engaged with. Artillery and 81mm were called in on those enemy as well as suspected enemy positions closer to Company E's units. Meanwhile the Commanding Officer of Company E, the 3d Platoon, and two tanks maneuvered up to exploit the contact. By 1130H it looked as though the enemy had pulled back, so Company E maneuvered up to the area where the enemy previously had been. This time the enemy let the advancing Company E units get up close before bringing them under fire with a heavy

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

volume of small arms fire from the north and west of Jones Creek along with RPG, mortars, and 130mm artillery. Company E was ordered to pull back and "level" the ville with all available supporting arms. As the tanks provided a base of fire the company retracted its casualties. As one of the tanks was displacing to the rear it became stuck which necessitated a platoon from Company E to provide security while a third tank was sent to aid in the retrieval operation. During the move back the remainder of the Company E unit came under enemy mortar fire, and sustained a few more non-serious WIA's. During this time a platoon from Company F maneuvered up the west side of Jones Creek, crossed to the east, and linked up with the third platoon of Company E providing security for the tank. Also at this same time Marine close air support directed by the AO continued to pound the suspected enemy positions with napalm and 500 pound bombs. By 1530H the tank was pulled free and the Company E and F platoons moved south to Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West) respectively. At 1336H a skimmer boat enroute up Jones Creek to Nhi Ha hit a dud round which exploded ruining the outboard engine and slightly injuring the boat's operator. The results of the day's action were 2 Marine KIA's, and 13 Marine WIA's evacuated. 13 NVA were KIA(C) in this action. For the remainder of the day and night, artillery, NGF, and air strikes continued to pound the suspected enemy positions. The remainder of the night was relatively quiet with no enemy contact.

18 May

At 0036H a Company F LP spotted enemy movement and called in an artillery mission that resulted in good coverage of the suspected enemy position. At 0210H in the vicinity of YD 272697 a Company F unit observed 5 NVA troops carrying what appeared to be a mortar tube. A 60mm mission was shot by Company F and the enemy dispersed. Fifteen minutes later the enemy was again observed in the vicinity of the previous sighting and once more a 60mm mortar mission was called with the enemy appearing to disperse again. At 0430H Company F, at their Lam Xuan (West) perimeter, received 3 rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire. It was believed to have come from a position to the east of Jones Creek. A squad sized patrol by Company F found a small amount of 782 gear and ordnance in the vicinity of YD 272696. While the area was being searched numerous civilians were questioned and two detainees sent to regiment because they had no ID cards. The other maneuver units continued to train and run daylight patrols throughout the day. Major General McC Thompkins, CG Third Marine Division visited the BLP at 1530H. At 2000H Company E called in an 81mm mortar mission on enemy movement at YD 251716, with excellent target coverage being obtained. The area was checked out at first light with negative results.

19 May

At 0800H while marking a check point (YD 272677) for a platoon patrol from Company H, a Vietnamese woman was burned by a 60mm WP marking round. The wounds were treated, and the woman flown to a medical facility at Danang. A unit from Company H picked up a draft age Vietnamese National, who after being questioned by the Company interpreter, was sent back to regiment as a detainee. He was later released as an innocent civilian.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Company H personnel, while training in front of their lines, found a homemade bangalore torpedo under their outside wire (YD 278664). The bangalore torpedo was forwarded to regiment. Besides their daylight patrols, all companies continued to train replacement Marines in field subjects, and improve their defensive positions. At 1830H the third platoon of Company H found what appeared to be a sleeping area for a single person at YD 290661. It was well camouflaged, and after close inspection found to contain dried blood. No enemy contact was experienced throughout the remainder of the day.

20 May

A Company H unit, while checking Vietnamese ID's at a river crossing (vic YD 284679) came across the 19 year old male previously picked up by a Company H patrol. He had a recent facial wound and was sent back to be questioned by an interpreter, but again was released as an innocent civilian. At 1240H a skimmer boat enroute to Nhi Ha vic Jones Creek hit (vic YD 284674) a submerged dud round that destroyed the outboard engine and slightly injured the boat driver. The skimmer was not damaged so the occupants towed it back down to the Camp Big John perimeter. The decision was made that the Jones Creek route would only be used on the rising tide. The Company G platoon at My Loc (YD 305680) reported receiving one ChiCom grenade at 1300H. No casualties resulted, but no enemy could be found in the area. Throughout the day companies continued to train when not on actual combat patrols. In the vicinity of coordinates YD 272692 Company F reported finding a large complex of 30 A-frame bunkers and 60 fighting holes. The bunkers were connected by a series of tunnels. Also found within the perimeter were six reinforced above ground houses. All digging was recent and the entire complex was expertly camouflaged. There was not enough demolitions to destroy everything so plans were made to return the next day with an engineer squad to destroy the complex. At 1850H Company E, located at their Nhi Ha perimeter, received 12 rounds of 130mm artillery. A naval gunfire mission was called as counter battery, and the incoming was suppressed. No casualties resulted from the incoming. All was quiet for the remainder of the day and night with no enemy contact experienced.

21 May

At 0735H a Company H sweep element came across an enemy helmet (YD 265681) with a shrapnel hole in it. The inside of the helmet contained parts of scalp that appeared to be not older than one day old. The helmet was brought into the S-2. The same patrol from Company H, which had the mission of checking out a suspected rocket site (YD 264683), arrived at the suspected site. A sweep of the area resulted in the discovery of four 140mm rockets, one 122mm rocket warhead, and some assorted 782 gear. The 140mm rockets were destroyed in place while the 122mm warhead and miscellaneous 782 gear was forwarded to Regiment. It was recommended that a reinforced platoon and an engineer squad with mine detectors be sent out in the near future to thoroughly search the area for more rockets. Throughout the day the maneuver units continued to conduct their daily

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

training programs. In the morning three squads of PF's from Gio Linh District became OPCONed to the BLT. They were to help the companies screen the indigenous Vietnamese people who were harvesting rice in the BLT's AO. Two of the PF squads were assigned to Company H, and one PF squad was assigned to Company F at Lam Xuan (West). It was expected that the PF squads would remain with the rifle companies for 10 days. At 1050H, the first platoon of Company F found a large A-frame bunker (large enough to hold 3-4 men), and destroyed the same (YD 262684). At 1510H a Company F unit found another two freshly dug bunkers (YD 264691) that were connected by tunnels, camouflaged, and well reinforced. This complex was also destroyed by demolitions. At 1630H Company F found 2 rounds of medium artillery (YD 262684) partially buried. The rounds had Chinese markings and were destroyed in place. A unit from Company E spotted movement in the vicinity of coordinates YD 264705 at approximately 2100H. Hand grenades were thrown at the movement, but a check of the area immediately after yielded negative results. At coordinates YD 271668 some Marines from Company G spotted one figure moving in front of the wire at 2230H. The Marines took the figure under fire with small arms and a claymore mine. A check at first light yielded negative results. At 2315H a Company E ambush spotted 9 NVA digging approximately 75 meters south of their position (YD 274702). The ambush brought the enemy under fire with small arms, and then shifted their position. At first light the area was checked by the squad but they could not uncover any sign of the enemy.

22 May

The only significant enemy contact occurred when the regularly scheduled 1600H skimmer boats (three) received fire from the north bank (YD 246617) while enroute and returning from Dong Ha ramp. The boat security returned fire with their M-16's and reported the incident upon their return to the Camp Big John area. Throughout the day all maneuver elements participated in their training program, patrolled in the assigned AO's and in the cases of Companies F and H worked with the PF squads in screening the Vietnamese Nationals harvesting rice in the BLT AO. No other enemy contact was reported for the remainder of the day.

23 May

At 0655H a Company H patrol discovered two explosive devices (vic YD 265680) and some NVA 782 equipment. The explosive devices were destroyed in place and the equipment brought in to the S-2. At 0730H, while checking Vietnamese ID cards, a Company H patrol found two Vietnamese males with ID cards but who acted suspicious. One of the men had a foot wound wrapped with a military bandage. The men were sent back to regiment as detainees, but were released later as innocent civilians after being interrogated. A Company E patrol discovered 3 NVA KIA's that had been buried (YD 274707) and one SKS rifle at 1245H. It was believed that the enemy KIA's had been killed by artillery or 81mm mortar H&I fire, and were thus claimed by the BLT as 3 KIA's (C).

DECLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

The remainder of the day saw no significant enemy contact. Throughout the day the BLT maneuver units continued to train its new replacements. For the fourth consecutive night, men were trained in night firing techniques. At 2330H Company G commenced a company size night operation in the vicinity of the resettlement ville in the vicinity of YD 312690.

24 May

Company G was in their cordon position around the resettlement ville (YD 312690) by 0200H. The junk fleet patrolled on the Cua Viet River to the south to prevent any VC from escaping in that direction. A reinforced squad from First Amtrac Battalion and a CIT team entered the ville at 0200H and commenced to search for VC/NVA thought to be in the ville. By first light 3 VC (C) had been taken prisoner, and forwarded to Division for further questioning. At 0700H a patrol from Company E observed 6 NVA with rifles (YD 278714) maneuvering behind some grave mounds. An 81mm mission was called, but a check of the area indicated no NVA casualties. The CG of the Third MarDiv visited the Camp Big John area at 1400H. Throughout the day the BLT's maneuver units continued to train, and after dark, elements of Company G participated in the night firing exercise. At 1945H elements of Company E spotted approximately 2 NVA squads at coordinates YD 282717. The NVA were moving south and an 81mm mortar fire mission was called in on them. The results of this mission were unknown. At 2315H in the vicinity of YD 273704 elements of Company E detected an enemy force thought to possibly be an NVA battalion moving south. Artillery and 81mm mortars were called in on the NVA, however results were unknown. It was thought that perhaps this NVA unit were seeking to position itself in Lam Xuan (East) to interdict logistical traffic to the two maneuver elements at Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West) and to counter the BLT's sweeps and patrols.

25 May

As a result of the large enemy sighting by Company E the night before, it was decided to maneuver Company E to a blocking position (vic YD 276705 to YD 281717), while Company H attacked from the south to the north. Company G, at first light had moved into a blocking position (YD 262660) for an ARVN operation being conducted to the BLT's west. At 0645H while moving towards their blocking position, elements of Company E spotted 10 NVA at YD 281717, and called in an artillery mission, and the enemy disappeared. At 0730H with the third platoon of Company E prepared to provide a base of fire (vic YD 279714), the second platoon maneuvered up to Nhi Ha 2 (YD 284714). Just as the forward elements of the platoon were entering the western edge of the ville, they came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire that killed or wounded every member of the point squad. In this initial burst of fire the platoon commander of the second platoon was killed, and the artillery officer wounded. With virtually no cover or concealment available the remainder of the second platoon pulled back under the cover of the third platoon's base of fire, and immediately called for artillery and air strikes. The enemy (later from POW sources found to be in the ville in battalion strength) tried to maneuver around to the south of the two platoons, but were cut down by Marine small arms fire, artillery,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

and air strikes. At 0900H the CO of Company E, the first platoon, and two tanks linked up with the second and third platoon (vic 279714), while artillery and close air support continued to pound the enemy positions. For two and one half hours supporting arms were called in on the ville held by the enemy. By 1130H the company had been resupplied with ammunition and water and commenced to attack the ville under the cover of artillery, air, and tank fire. Again the advancing unit came under withering small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, and mortar fire. At 1200H while closing on the scene of Company E's contact, Company H made contact with an undetermined size unit and after a fierce firefight pushed through the enemy force killing 40. By 1330H it was decided to pull Company E back to their assembly position (YD 279714), as the tanks and many Marines had run out of ammunition. Air strikes and artillery continued to be called in on the objective area while the company was being resupplied. A platoon from Company H moved up to protect the rear of Company E, while the remainder of Company H deployed so as to screen Company E to the north. At approximately 1645H, after two close air strikes and under the cover of Marine artillery, Company E, supported by two tanks again commenced their attack on Nhi Ha 2. This time the company pushed on into the ville where they collected their KIA's and WIA's from the initial contact of the morning. It was thought at that time that all casualties had been collected so the company was ordered to make a fast sweep of the ville, and then pull back through Company H and move back to their perimeter at Nhi Ha 1. At this time elements from 3/3 started arriving at the Camp Big John perimeter and moving out to the east in preparation for a regimental operation. At 1700H Company G was ordered to pull back to the Camp Big John perimeter. By 1945H Company F was at Lam Xuan (West), Companies E and H were back at the Nhi Ha perimeter, and Company G was in the Big John perimeter. At 2000H all BIF units came under artillery, rocket, or mortar fire. The maneuver elements at Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha received incoming rocket, mortar and artillery fire until 2020H, but sustained no casualties. At the Camp Big John perimeter two Marines were killed and four wounded as a result of the incoming. Counter battery was called on the suspected enemy gun positions. Except for sporadic incoming mortars and small arms fire at the Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan positions, all remained relatively quiet for the remainder of the evening. The results of the day's action were 241 NVA KIA's (C), and 4 POW's captured. Marine losses were 21 KIA's (5 KIA/BNR not recovered until 27 May) and 35 WIA's evacuated. For the remainder of the night a flare ship remained on station and NGF continuously fired on the ville of Nhi Ha 2.

26 May

At 0055H Companies E and H received approximately 10 rounds of 82mm mortar inside their defensive perimeter at Nhi Ha. Counter battery was immediately called in, and the incoming mortars ceased. At 0018H Company F, in Lam Xuan (West) reported they were receiving small arms fire and incoming rifle grenades from an estimated 10 NVA at coordinates YD 255701. The enemy fire was suppressed with friendly 60mm and artillery fire. Again at 0555H Company H reported receiving incoming mortars from the vicinity of coordinates YD 234805. Counter battery was called and the

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

incoming ceased. At 0600H elements of Company H captured a wounded NVA officer in front of their lines. The POW's wounds were treated and he was moved to regiment. At 0700H Company G was moving north from the Camp Big John perimeter, and sweeping the west side of Jones Creek. Concurrently Company E was sweeping south from Nhi Ha, along the eastern side of Jones Creek. By 0930H Company E was inside the Camp Big John perimeter and Company G had joined Company F at Lam Xuan (West). The third platoon of Company G was ordered to move from its base camp at My Loc and proceed to the Camp Big John perimeter. Throughout the day elements of three Marine infantry battalions passed through the Camp Big John perimeter in preparation for a regimental operation. At 1600H the CO of the Third Marines issued the operation order to the four infantry battalion Commanding Officers (1/3, 2/4, 1/4 and 2/9) at the Camp Big John CP.

The concept of the operation called for elements of 1/9 to remain at the Camp Big John perimeter as regimental reserve. First Battalion Third Marines and 2/9 would attack north along the west side of Jones Creek to the vicinity of YD 255734 then cross over to the east and attack south through Nhi Thuong (YD 266727). Company F/2/4 was to be chopped to 1/3 as it passed through Lam Xuan (West). BLT 2/4 was to establish a block at Nhi Ha 1 (vic YD 273704) to the vicinity of coordinates YD 282714, for 2/9 and 1/3 as they attacked south. First Battalion Third Marines and 2/9 crossed their LOD at approximately 1800H and proceeded north. Since three of the BLT's maneuver elements were already up in Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha 1, it was decided to move them into the blocking position at first light of 27 May. Company E with the Alfa Command group would move from the Camp Big John perimeter to Nhi Ha at first light with the third platoon of Company G and two tanks.

At 1500H Company F received two (2) incoming 82mm mortars. The direction of the incoming could not be determined so no counter battery was fired. For the remainder of the day elements of BLT 2/4 made no contact with the enemy. The rifle companies prepared for their participation in the impending operation.

27 May

At 0310H Company G (at Nhi Ha - YD 273704) reported receiving twelve (12) rounds of enemy artillery and 19 minutes later took another two (2) rounds. No direction could be determined and counter battery was not fired. At 0602H Company E, the third platoon of Company G, the two tanks, and the Alfa Command group moved north to Nhi Ha along the east side of Jones Creek. At 0605H Company F reported being chopped to the First Battalion Third Marines. Company H moved out of the Nhi Ha perimeter toward their assigned blocking position (vic YD 279710) to cover Company E when it moved to its blocking position (vic YD 281714). By 1400H Company E had swept through a portion of the scene of the 25 May contact and had collected their KIA/BNR. During a cursory search of the immediate area 69 NVA bodies, and 22 freshly dug graves (many thought to be multiple) were found, as well as several crew served and individual weapons. By 1700H all units were in their blocking position and tied into each other. Company E was in the vicinity of YD 280717, Company H at YD 277712 and Company G at YD 274717. The Alfa Command group, the recon platoon, a

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

a section of 81mm mortars and four 106 RR's mounted on amtracs were located at Nhi Ha 1. Although 2/9 and 1/3 made heavy contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Lai An (YD 246723), BLT 2/4 elements (with the exception of Company F which was chopped to 1/3) made no significant contact with the enemy for the remainder of the day.

28 May

During the morning Companies E, G and H remained in the blocking position occupied the day earlier by these units. No enemy were observed or contact experienced during the morning hours. At 1225H elements of Company G (YD 265712) reported that two enemy incoming rounds impacted to their north from a direction of 6200 mils. Counter battery was fired on the suspected enemy artillery position. At 1330H the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/4 received orders to move the BLT's maneuver elements to positions at Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan (West). Company G returned to Lam Xuan (West) while Company H moved to Nhi Ha. Company E and the Alfa Command group returned to the Camp Big John perimeter by 1700H. Local night activities were established, but no contact was experienced by the maneuver elements for the remainder of the day.

29 May

Company H (YD 271703) received three (3) rounds of incoming 130mm artillery at 0745H. No casualties were sustained and counter battery was immediately fired on the suspected enemy artillery emplacement. At 0900H, Company H at Nhi Ha, spotted mortar flashes (YD 263722) and called in an artillery and 81mm mortar mission. The coverage of the target was excellent, but results were unknown. At 1100H Company G (YD 258706) received an undetermined number of incoming mortar rounds and immediately called in and adjusted counter mortar fire. The incoming ceased. At 1530H a squad sized patrol received small arms fire from at least one (1) NVA (via YD 274699), that killed one Marine and wounded two others. A Company G platoon maneuvered around the enemy and killed him and captured two AK-47's. Shortly after Company G swept south down both sides of Jones Creek to the Camp Big John perimeter. No enemy contact was experienced during the sweep south, or on the return back to Lam Xuan (West). At 1814H elements of Company H observed ten (10) NVA (YD 280718) moving northwest, and immediately called in an 81mm mortar mission. Because of the late hour it was decided to wait until 30 May before going to check out the area. At 2326H Company H observed eight (8) NVA moving north to south (YD 266705) and opened fire on them with small arms and M-79's. A search at first light revealed three drag marks, blood, a pack and three Bangalore torpedoes.

30 May

At 0930H a platoon from Company G encountered two NVA (YD 284680), and immediately brought them under fire. Both enemy were killed and two AK-47s were captured. At 1000H a Company G OP spotted one (1) NVA running northeast toward Jones Creek (believed to be flushed by earlier incident at 0930H), and took him under fire (YD 275697). This enemy also was killed but he was carrying only grenades. He did not have a weapon in his possession. In both contacts no Marine casualties resulted. At 1000H a platoon

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

sized patrol from Company H discovered a cache of NVA ordnance (YD 282717) that included thirty (30) ChiCom grenades, ten (10) RPG rounds, three (3) anti-tank mines, twenty-five (25) NVA mortar rounds and five (5) bangalore torpedoes. All the ordnance was destroyed in place. At 1430H a Company G patrol discovered a spider hole complex (YD 263697) in which were hidden ten(10) boxes of AK-47 ammunition, det-cord and primer caps. The ordnance and spider holes were destroyed by the engineer attachments. A skimmer boat enroute to the Camp Big John perimeter along Jones Creek (YD 270704) hit a dud round that exploded and destroyed the engine. No casualties resulted from the incident, but it should be noted that this was the third such incident within the month of May. At 1400H the BLT received a warning order to prepare to be lifted out of the Camp Big John perimeter to either Khe Sanh and/or Ca Lu on the next day (31 Mar). At this time the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer of BLT 2/4 left for the Third Marine CP to obtain more information on the move. At 1550H Company H received an undetermined number of enemy mortar rounds, and immediately called for counter mortar fire (YD 257714). No casualties were reported. All was quiet for the remainder of the day until 2045H when Company H (YD 270704) reported receiving two (2) rounds of 130mm artillery from a direction of 5900 mils. No casualties resulted and counter battery fires were immediately called.

31 May

At 0930H Company F was chopped back to BLT 2/4 and was located inside the Camp Big John perimeter. Companies G and H were also inside the Camp Big John perimeter after having been relieved in place at Lam Xuan (West) and Nhi Ha, respectively, by rifle companies under the OPCON of the Third Marines. Throughout the entire morning the BLT was preparing for a helicopter lift out to landing zone Cameo (near Ca Lu), with the exception of Company G which was to be helilifted to Khe Sanh Combat Base. At 1245H the liftout commenced with Company G being moved out first. The order of movement after Company G was to be the Alfa Command group, Company E, Company F, Company H and the 106mm recoilless rifle platoon. At 1400H BLT 2/4's participation under the Third Marines in Operation Napoleon/Saline terminated and the BLT was placed under the OPCON of the Fourth Marines. By 1630H the BLT's four rifle companies, a portion of H&S Company and the Alfa Command group had been lifted out of the Camp Big Joh perimeter. After arrival at Landing Zone Cameo (YD 003484) the rifle companies were sent to the perimeter lines to man night defensive positions. The Commanding Officer of BLT 2/4 and the Operations Officer were given detailed briefing on the impending operation. Throughout the afternoon Landing Zone Cameo received light to moderate enemy rockets, mortars and artillery incoming.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

RESULTS

<u>USMC</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KIA	53	9	89	151
WIA (EVAC)	243	22	249	584
DOW	4	1	5	10
MIA	0	0	0	0
<u>NVA</u>				
KIA	364	107	753	1222
POW	9	3	7	19
<u>DETAINEES</u>	47	11	8	66
<u>CAPTURED INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS</u>	57	43	78*	178
<u>CAPTURED CREW SERVED WEAPONS</u>	18	8	32	58

* Most of the Marines medevacuated from the Battle of Dai-Do carried AK-47's and SKS rifles with them. Those weapons were either thrown overboard when the helicopters landed on ARG shipping, or they were left for the helicopter flight crews. It is therefore felt that the number 78 is conservatively low, and possibly should be twice as high.

Besides the forementioned weapons three ChiCom UHF radios were captured by BLT 2/4 units during the operation. Tons of ordnance were destroyed (to include small caliber ammunition, 12.7mm ammunition, 60mm and 82mm mortars, RPG rounds, mines both AT and AP, ChiCom grenades, 122mm and 140mm rockets and warheads, black-power charges, TNT charges, and mortar boosters) during the three month operation. In addition, much NVA web gear, including packs, gas masks and medical kits were captured by the BLT.

In most instances where air strikes or artillery missions were utilized the damage was assessed as Marine elements would assault through the enemy held positions.

The enemy entrenched in Dai-Do had utilized US type single strand concertina wire around the many hedgerows boarding the ville. Also utilized by the entrenched NVA were US sandbags (used to provide overhead protection on trenches and spiderholes), and US comm wire (for handphones and to detonate NVA claymores). This was the only reported instance of the enemy utilizing **DECLASSIFIED** materials.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

Throughout the entire operation the methods and techniques of resupply were excellent. A supply dump was established right inside the Mai Xa Chanh perimeter, and the BLT had an adequate logistical system with only minor problems occurring.

The M-76 Otter, the skimmer boats, the LVTP-5's, and M-35 truck all aided in the distribution of supplies to the outlying rifle companies. Due to the waterways available, the Otter and the skimmer boats were of particular value.

Maintenance problems occurred most frequently with the LVTP-5 and to a lesser degree with the Otters. The biggest problem resulted from the fact that the LVTP-5's were constantly being utilized during the day and no facilities were present to P.M. the tractors at night. Another factor was the high degree of mining incidents that occurred with the LVTP-5's. Near the end of the operation several M-35 trucks remained in "down status" because of the lack of replacement parts (radiators).

A BAS was set up in the Mai Xa Chanh area to handle the immediate medical needs of the BLT. When the BLT's maneuver units were in heavy contact the casualties were usually transferred to Mai Xa Chanh BAS/LZ in skimmer boats or Otters unless they were an emergency medevac, in which case they would be flown out of the nearest secure LZ. Due to the fact that the BLT was working on the coastal plains adjacent to the Tonkin Gulf, the BLT's helicopters were always available, and medevacs were handled quickly and efficiently. All casualties were flown to ARG shipping or to the USS REPOSE or USS SANCTUARY.

Transportation for key personnel between Camp Kistler and DHCB was provided by skimmer boats. In most cases the C&O flights requested were obtained the following day after the initial request.

In the communications field mutual interference, caused by numerous radios operating in the same frequency range, and operating in close proximity to each other continued to present problems, though not as severe as during the first month of the operation. This problem was mostly solved by removing from the COC all the radios and antennas and utilizing the AN/GRA-39 remote unit. In April a radio relay system was established between the BLT's Headquarters and the 3d Marine Regiment (utilizing the AN/TRC-27). This greatly aided the coordination and planning between battalion and regimental levels.

Two problem areas in the medical field were encountered, and while one was solved the other continues to present problems in keeping Marines in the field. The first problem encountered involved a high percentage of "rat-bites" among BLT Marines. When a subject Marine reported to BAS with an alleged "rat-bite" he would be medevaced to the USS IWO JIMA where he would receive a series of rabies shots. This process took the Marine out of the field for fifteen days or more. In mid-April a refrigerator was brought to the field with a portable generator so that the rabies serum could be stored and administered out in the

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED

field. Within one week's time there was over a 500 percent decrease in the number of "rat bite" incidents.

The second problem and still unsolved, are the cases involving the "third purple heart". In a high number of cases Marines are claiming a slight break in the skin as an enemy inflicted wound. Such skin breaks are quite common among active combat participants, especially when firing and falling to the firing position. It is recommended that all wounds be monitored as closely as possible by the immediate commander so as not to place the burden of determining a "scratch" from a legitimate hostile wound on the Battalion Surgeon. It is also felt that the thrice wounded rule should be dropped in favor of the "two 48 hour purple heart" rule.

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

1) During the operation BLT 2/4 used both the M-76 Otter and "skimmer boats" extensively. Due to the close proximity of the BLT's AO to water routes, these pieces of equipment were used daily. The Otter proved its effectiveness in its ability to travel over land and water. They were used to bring resupply to the combat base camps of the BLT's maneuver elements. These base camps were quite a distance from the main headquarters. The Otters were able to supply these base camps on a daily basis by taking advantage of both land and water routes. They were also able to bring hot meals to Marines in the field which was a welcome change from MCI's. During the Battle of Dai-Do and on many other occasions they proved invaluable in serving to get emergency resupply to the front line troops and to evacuate the wounded to the rear quickly.

2) The skimmer boats were used regularly on the Cua Viet River and its tributaries in the BLT's AO. They were used as a supplement to the Otters for rapid resupply of the maneuver elements at these base camps. They also proved invaluable in their ability for rapid shuttle of personnel and equipment from and to the BLT area to places like Camp Kistler (3d Marines HQ) and Dong Ha Ramp. They were also used with good success for emergency resupply and medical evacuation during the many operations which the BLT executed. They were able to travel the many tributaries of the Cua Viet River with ease due to their shallow draft. They did prove vulnerable to enemy small arms fire and river obstacles such as mines and unexploded ordnance in shallow portions of Jones Creek.

3) LVTP-5's were used by the BLT in all its operations for troop movement. They proved effective in being able to bring large numbers of troops into a combat zone quickly. On several occasions they were used to land maneuver elements on the flanks of the enemy and therefore surprise the enemy. By feinting a ground assault with one maneuver element and landing another maneuver element on the flank of the committed enemy in LVTP-5's, the BLT was able to route the enemy on several occasions. They were also used to transport heavy equipment and supplies to the maneuver elements in the field. This effectiveness was limited somewhat in that they sometimes became stuck on sandbars or in mud in the Cua Viet River or by throwing a track.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4) LCM-8's were used by the BLT to haul heavy trucks, tanks and equipment. The BLT also used them on 1 May to land troops and two tanks to reinforce the engaged troops at the Battle of Dai-Do. By using the LCM-8's in this manner the BLT was able to maneuver a number of Marines and two tanks quickly and which resulted in a good shock effect on the entrenched enemy. The LCM-8's were restricted to only the main channels of the Cua Viet River due to the shallowness of the river in spots. These boats could defend themselves against enemy ambush by use of .50 caliber machineguns mounted on them. Also they afforded some protection against small arms and PRG fire for troops and equipment.

5) The use of the helicopter squadron in direct support of the BLT proved of immeasurable value. They afforded the BLT excellent maneuverability and flexibility in the field. They provided for rapid evacuation of wounded in the field. On the night of 27 April they extracted eight seriously wounded Marines under heavy fire. These Marines would probably have died, had not prompt evacuation by helicopter been effected. The helicopter also proved invaluable for emergency resupply of engaged maneuver elements and for rapid troop movement. They also provided for good reconnaissance flights over the terrain, before and during operations, over which the maneuver elements would travel.

6) The M-72 LAAW and the 3.5 rocket launcher were used extensively by the BLT against the many enemy bunkers encountered during the BLT's operation. They proved effective in reducing the A-frame bunkers commonly used by the enemy in the area. The white phosphorous capability of the 3.5 was used with good results to screen troop movement by the maneuver elements. The M-72 LAAW was preferred though by most of the maneuver elements because of its compactness and ease of use. On the 30th of April Company H employed their rocket men (0351) in an assault carrying M-72 LAAW's instead of the 3.5. It was noted that those men could direct a heavy volume of accurate suppressive fire on the enemy with the M-72 LAAW. When employed with the assault elements, the use of the M-72 LAAW greatly increased the shock effect of the assault and aided by accurate rifle fire, effectively suppressed the enemy's fire.

COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS


Operation Napoleon/Saline provided the best test of the BLT since initial employment in the 3d Marine Division AO in January 1968. The close proximity to the sea coast provided the means to utilize helicopter assets of the SLF for direct resupply and rapid response to medical requirements.

The isolated area along the north bank of the Cua Viet River proved to be ideal for employment of the BLT's Shore Party and LSU Detachment. All units of the BLT were employed in support of BLT operations.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




DECLASSIFIED

The overall readiness of the B1T proved equal to the test as the frequency and intensity of contact increased. This was especially true when throughout the Battle of Dai-Do, units continued to function despite losses of key leaders at the platoon and company level.

Charles W. Knapp
CHARLES W. KNAPP
By Direction

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

DD6

DD

PRIORITY DTG-171900H

Frag Order #1 Operation Napoleon/Salene II issued 6 March 1968

Ref: MAP: VIETNAM: 1:50,000 Series L 7014 Sheet 6442 IV

Task Organization

BLT

LtCol W. WEISE

Company E

Capt LIVINGSTON

Company G

Capt VARGAS

Company H

Capt WILLIAMS

H&S Company

1stLt DAWSON

81mm Mortar Platoon

106mm RR Platoon

Engineer Platoon

Reconnaissance Platoon

Shore Party Platoon

BLT Reserve

Company F

1stLt GAVLICK

DECLASSIFIED

1

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. Verbal briefing given by S-2.

b. Friendly. BLT 2/4 is under the OPCON of the 3d Marine Regiment. The mission of the 3d Marine Regiment is to clear the enemy from positions along the Cua Viet River and to provide protection for Quang Tri Airfield. First Battalion Third Marines is to the south. The 2nd ARVN Regiment is to the west and far northeast. The First AmTrac Battalion is to the east, located at the mouth of the Cua Viet River. General support fires are available from the 11th and 12th Marines and from the First AmTrac Battalion. A destroyer will be in direct support for Naval Gunfire.

c. Attachments and Detachments. W Btry 2nd Bn 11th Marines attached to BLT 2/4 will provide general support fires as requested by the fire support coordinator.

Amtrac Platoon BLT 3/1, will be in general support of BLT 2/4 and will be prepared to provide sufficient vehicles to move the reserve company on order. Two command vehicles will be used for the Alfa and Bravo Command groups. Take OPCON of BLT 2/4 Amtrac Platoon at 070700H for duration of operation.

2. MISSION.

To clear the northern bank of the Cua Viet River in the BLT 2/4 AO and prevent the enemy from bringing direct fire weapons to bear on boat traffic in the river.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. See operation overlay.

b. Company E. Complete move of remainder of company to vic YD 283668. Occupy Foxtrot positions for duration of operation.

c. Company F. Detach three 106 RR squads at 070700H. Be prepared to attack to the southwest to seize BLT Objective B on order. Occupy and defend BLT Objective B until ordered otherwise. Establish night and day activities in vicinity BLT Objective B.

d. Company H. Be prepared, on order to occupy BLT Objective A and provide a blocking force for Company F's attack to the southwest. Be prepared to return to friendly lines on order and assume defensive position. Two tanks attached as of 070700H for duration of operation.

e. 81mm Mortar Plt. Provide general support fires as requested.

f. 106 RR Plt. Assume control of three squads from Company F at 070700H. Attach same squads to Company E once established in a defensive position.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

g. BLT 2/4 Amtrac Plt. Report to BLT 3/1 Amtrac Plt Cdr at 070700H for duration of operation.

h. BLT 2/4 Tank Plt. Attach two tanks to Company H at 070700H for the duration of the operation. Remain in general support of BLT with remaining assets.

i. BLT 2/4 Reserve, Company G. Be prepared on order to reinforce either Company H or Company G by foot or by Amtrac.

j. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) LOD is Company H's defensive perimeter.

(2) Company H be prepared to move across LOD at 0730H.

(3) Company F be prepared to move across LOD at 0800H.

(4) Move across LOD on order.

(5) Report when BLT objectives are seized and when crossing phase lines (see OPN overlay).

(6) Fire Support coordination.

(a) Artillery and NGF prep of village to west of BLT Objective A from 0645H to 0730H.

(b) Arty fire will be placed via YD 266648 during period Company H is moving to BLT Obj A.

(c) Arty fire will be placed via YD 257747 during period Company F is advancing towards BLT Obj B.

(d) AO will be on station, CAS will be on strip alert.

(7) EEI's

(a) Determine strength and location of enemy

(b) Determine extent of enemy fortifications.

(c) Determine traffic ability of general area for vehicular traffic to include tank, amtrac, mule and onts.

(8) Use of CS encouraged in order to take prisoners.

(9) POW collection PT is on island south of BLT OP position. All detainees will be blind folded but treated humanely.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

~~DECLASSIFIED~~4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

1. Company F. Take 3 meals and two day supply of ammo.
2. Company H. Take 1 meal and two day supply of ammo.
3. Medevac by fastest means.
4. Request resupply when required.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.a. Command.

- (1) 3d Marine. CP YD 345695.
- (2) BLT 2/4 CP YD 280277.
- (3) Company CP reported when established.

b. Communications.

- (1) Reg TAC #1 M2060
- (2) Reg TAC #2 M53
- (3) BLT TAC - M1046
- (4) COP - M254
- (5) Liaison nets

FREQ. 44.4.

(a) 2nd ARVN Regt Adviser. call sign BEEKNOW GIRDER

(b) A Company 1/3, CANDY TUFT ALFA 30.45.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change from established procedures except land lines will be established to Lam Koon (West) and Nui Ba area.

/s/ L. A. RANN
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

ANNEX:

A - OPERATION OVERLAY

DISTRIBUTION: UNIT COPY NO.

PLM 2/4 FILE	1
3d Marines	2
CTG 79.4	3
Co E	4
Co F	5
Co G	6
Co H	7
H&S Co	8
S-2	9
S-4	10

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET.

BLT 2/4
 Quang Tri Province, RVN
 151200H May 1968

OPERATION ORDER 4-68

Ref: (a) 3d Marines OP ORDER 2-68 (NAPOLEON/SALINE)
 (b) 3d Marines Frag Order #9 dtd 10 May 1968
 (c) MAP: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS L7014 Sheet 6442 IV

Time Zone: H

Task Organization (Attachments effective as assigned by verbal orders)

BLT 2/4

LtCol L. A. RANN

Company E (Rein)

FO TM, H/3/12
 FO TM, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC TM
 Engr Squad
 Light Tank Section
 Sniper TM
 NCF Spot TM

Company F (Rein)

FO TM, H/3/12
 FO TM, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC TM
 Engr Squad
 Sniper TM
 NCF Spot TM

Capt BUTLER

Company G (Rein)

FO TM, H/3/12
 FO TM, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC TM
 Sniper TM

1stLt LAWSON

Company H (Rein)

FO TM, H/3/12
 FO TM, 81mm Mortar Plt
 FAC TM
 Sniper TM

1stLt PRESCOTT

Company (-)

1stPlt CoD, 3dReconBn
 4thPlt(Rein) CoB, 1stAmTracBn
 2ndPlt(Rein) CoB, 3dEngrBn
 1stPlt(Rein) CoA, 5thTkBn

1stLt DAWSON

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

1st Plt, CoB, 3d SF Bn
81mm Mortar Plt
106mm RR Plt

DECLASSIFIED

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. Current INTSUMS and daily briefings.

b. Friendly.

(1) BLT 2/4 is under the operational control of the 3d Marine Regiment which has the basic responsibility to keep the Cua Viet River open for logistic traffic and to prevent the enemy from using portions of the assigned AO as a place from which to deliver artillery, mortar or rocket attacks on Dong Ha Combat Base.

(2) The 1st Bn, 3d Marines is to our south and southwest.

(3) The 1st Amphib Bn is to our east and northeast.

(4) The 2nd ARVN Regiment is to our north.

(5) The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division is to our west.

(6) 3d MarDiv will provide Naval Gunfire ships for support on a priority basis.

(7) The 2d Bn, 12th Marines will provide artillery support on a priority basis, and the 12th Marines will provide reinforcing fires as required. BLT 2/4 requests will go through the 3d Marines.

(8) The 7th Air Force will provide close air support through Marine Control agencies. BLT 2/4 requests will go through the 3d Marines.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) A light section of M48A3 tanks from BLT 3/1 will be attached to BLT 2/4.

(2) A detachment of M-76 Otters will provide logistical support for BLT 2/4.

2. MISSION.

a. Continue to maintain operation base at Camp Big John (formerly known as Mai Xa Chanh) via YD 282688.

b. Continue S&D operations in AO to screen Cua Viet location, interdict NVA/VC infiltration routes and deny enemy use of rocket sites in AO.

c. Be prepared to chop one rifle company to 1st Amphib Bn for employment in C-4.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

d. Maintain reaction force IAW with Sparrow Hawk SOP.

e. Be prepared for employment anywhere in 3d Marines AO on short notice. Commence movement within 30 minutes of notification.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. See ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY). The BLT 2/4 AO will be subdivided into four company sized operating areas, lettered A, B, C, and D. Two companies will generally be positioned in the vicinity of Lam Xuan (West)/Nhi Ha. Two companies will be in and will operate out of Camp Big John (vic YD 280667). When assigned an operating area a company will be responsible for all friendly fire delivered into the area and will coordinate fires through the BLT FSCC.

b. Company E (Rein). At 1230H on 15 May move to Nhi Ha (vic YD 273704) and establish a company combat outpost. Assume responsibility for operating area D at 151500H. Conduct day and night activities in accordance with oral orders issued on a daily basis. Be prepared to displace by foot or helicopter within 30 minutes after receiving a warning order. Be prepared to assume responsibility for Operating Area A, B, or C on order.

c. Company F (Rein). At 0830H on 15 May move to vic Lam Xuan (West) (YD 266699) and establish a company combat outpost. Assume responsibility for Operating Area C at 151100H. Conduct day and night activities in accordance with verbal instructions issued on a daily basis. Be prepared to displace by foot or helicopter within 30 minutes after receiving a warning order. Be prepared to assume responsibility for Operating Area A, B, or D on order.

d. Company G (Rein). Maintain a defensive posture in the assigned defensive position at Camp Big John. On order assume responsibility for Operating Area B. Be prepared to establish a platoon sized combat outpost at My Loc (YD 305681) on order. Be prepared to assume responsibility for Operating Area A, C, or D on order. Be prepared to move by foot or helicopter within 30 minutes from receiving a warning order. Conduct day and night activities in accordance with instructions issued on a daily basis.

e. Company H (Rein). Maintain a defensive posture in the assigned defensive position at Camp Big John. Assume the responsibility for Operating Area A. Be prepared to establish a platoon sized combat outpost vic YD 269659 on order. Be prepared to assume responsibility for Operating Area B, C, or D on order. Be prepared to move by foot or helicopter within 30 minutes from receiving a warning order. Conduct day and night activities in accordance with instructions issued on a daily basis.

f. 1st Plt, Co D, 3d Recon Bn. On order assume defensive responsibility for defense of that area of the BLT CP perimeter to the east of Jones Creek. Provide security for resupply runs to outlying units on requests of S-4. Continue present mission.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

h. 2nd Plt (Rein), Co B, 3d Eng Bn. Provide engineer squads IAW Task Organization. Continue present mission.

i. 1st Plt (Rein) Co A, 5th Tank Bn. General support of the BLT. Continue presently assigned mission.

j. 1st Plt, Co B, 3d SP Bn. Continue to provide logistics support for the BLT.

k. 81mm Mortar Platoon. Displace two sections to Lam Xuan (West). Move with Company F (Attached for the movement only). Remain in general support of the BLT.

l. 106mm RR Platoon. Remain in general support of the BLT. Employ weapons as directed by the base defense coordinator while in the Camp Big John Area.

m. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This order is effective upon receipt and will be modified by verbal orders as required to meet the changing situation.

(2) During rice harvest, April through June, all units conduct activities to deny the enemy freedom of movement; uncover assembly and storage areas, and deny the enemy access to rice stores.

(3) Cooperate with river security units by clearing fires in operating areas that are adjacent to the Cua Viet River.

(4) Be especially alert to apprehend personnel who appear to be conducting a reconnaissance of the river traffic. Make every effort to locate and apprehend any NVA/VC artillery forward observers in assigned areas.

(5) Enforce the land curfew (2000-0600) and water curfew/blockade (24 hours daily) as established by the Province Chief for all VN civilians.

(6) Request any additional support required as soon as the need becomes known. (Attached for the movement only). Remain in general support of the BLT.

(7) Direct liaison between units of the BLT is authorized and encouraged. Remain in general support of the BLT. Employ weapons as directed by the base defense coordinator while in the Camp

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change from established procedures.

Coordinating Instructions.

(1) This order is effective upon receipt and will be modified by verbal orders as required to meet the changing situation.

4

SECRET

(2) During rice harvest, April through June, all units conduct activities to deny the enemy freedom of movement; uncover assembly and storage areas, and deny the enemy access to rice stores.

DECLASSIFIED

(3) Cooperate with river security units by clearing fires in operating areas that are adjacent to the Cua Viet River.

(4) Be especially alert to apprehend personnel who appear to be conducting a reconnaissance of the river traffic. Make every effort to locate and apprehend any NVA/VC artillery forward observers in assigned areas.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DD6

DD

PRIORITY DTG-171900H

Frag Order #4 for Operation Napoleon/Saline II

Ref: MAP: VIETNAM: 1:50,000 Series L 7014 Sheet 6442 IV

TASK ORGANIZATION

BLT	LtCol W. WEISE
Company E	Capt LIVINGSTON
Company G	Capt VARGAS
Company H	Capt WILLIAMS
H&S Company	1stLt. DAWSON

81mm Mortar Platoon

106 RR Platoon

Engineer Platoon

Reconnaissance Platoon

Shore Party Platoon

BLT Reserve

Company F	1stLt GAVLICK
-----------	---------------

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

ENEMY SITUATION

1A) The 6th Battalion of the 52nd Regiment (NVA) has the village of Vinh Tuan Thuong within its AO. Specifically its AO encompasses the following grids: YD 2468-2770-284670-267630. This ville originally harbored the K-Yoo Battalion which was used in a "guide" role in interdiction and infiltration along the Cua Viet River. In taking over present ville, it is felt that the balance of the NVA defenders, probably a company, fled to this ville. However, there are sufficient bunkers and fighting holes in the ville to accommodate units larger than company size. The weapons, gear and supporting arms found in this area indicate at least a well equipped company sized NVA force O.G. 145-82mm rounds, 82 60mm rounds, and 15 cases of .30 caliber ammunition. An AO has spotted rocket positions in the Hill #4 area just north of the ville at YD 265663. An air strike on 16 March received 12.7mm anti-aircraft fire. This fire was received as the planes flew north to south from 258660 to 258656. Contact made in this area on 16 March also indicates the enemy has at least 3 tubes of 60mm and the same number of machine_guns.

B) FRIENDLY: The 1st AmTrac Bn is to the east. 1/3 is to the south. 2nd ARVN Regt is to the west. General support fires and reinforced fires are available. From the 12th Marines utilizing the appropriate FSCC. Air support will be provided by the 1st MAW. BLT 2/4 is OPCON to the 3d Marine Regiment whose mission is to provide secure passage of boating in the Cua Viet River and to prevent the enemy from launching a rocket or ground attack from within the assigned AO.

C) Attachments and detachments: 2 platoons of LVT's, one tank platoon, one ontos platoon and detachments are in direct support of BLT 2/4. 7 LVT's, 2 tanks, and 2 Otters will form an armored column under the command of the S-3B.

2) MISSION: To seize and search the village of Vinh Quan Thuong centered YD 262658, Ky Truc YD 251659 and Ky Lam YD 244670. All ammunition, weapons and equipment possible for evacuation to higher headquarters. Ammunition that cannot be evacuated will be blown in place. All bunkers will be blown to prevent their future use by the enemy.

3) EXECUTION:

A) CONCEPT - See operations overlay two companies will attack from east to west along the village running generally parallel to and 200 meters south of the 66 grid line. A third company will be mounted in LVT's and with tanks and Otters will comprise an armored column that will provide shock action and firepower into the flanks of any major resistance encountered. A reserve company will be capable of movement by helicopter, LVT, or by foot to assume the mission of any company, to reinforce or to exploit any enemy weaknesses. Movement to the attack position will be under cover of darkness.

B) Company B attack towards the west remaining to the north of the village. Line in the scrubbrush and sand areas, protect the right $\frac{1}{2}$ of BLT A and be prepared to continue the attack on order.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

C) Company G on order conduct an armored force thrusting into the enemy's flank at a point to be designated after fixing the enemy in position. Be prepared to wheel to the east or to the northwest on order.

D) Company H attack to the west to seize the left $\frac{1}{2}$ of BMT Objective A. Protect the left flank during the advance. Be prepared to continue the attack on order.

E) H&S Company - Be prepared to man Company H defensive positions on order of the S3A who is designated as the base camp security coordinator provide support for the operation as follows:

(1) 81mm Mortar Platoon, general support of the BMT. Be prepared to fire WP rounds at control points 1, 2, 3, and 4 in order to orient the armored column.

(2) 106mm RR Platoon, attach 2 mule mounted 106 RR to Company E provide two 106 RR to the armored column commander for employment on LVT's.

(3) Engineer Platoon, attachments remain the same. Be prepared to destroy ammunition and bunkers during the search operation.

(4) Shore Party Platoon continue in general support performing normal functions.

F) BMT reserve Company F, be prepared to assume the mission of any of the other companies or to be employed to reinforce or to exploit enemy weaknesses. Be prepared to occupy the night defensive positions of E and G companies on order of the Base Camp Coordinator.

G) Coordinating instructions.

(1) The LOD is the outer wire of the defensive perimeter.

(2) Company E will move in trace of Company H across the LOD in a column of Companies.

(3) The company release point will be via YD 269659.

(4) Deploy along phase line black after passing through the company release point.

(5) Move out from phase line black on order.

(6) Company H is the base company.

(7) Company H report when crossing P.L. white.

(8) Company H report when in the attack position.

(9) All control will be accomplished on the Bn TAC net.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

(10) Company H cross the LOD at 0345H; report on crossing Company G. Be prepared to conduct the assault on ten minutes notice from 0630H on.

(11) Hold all traffic on the Bn TAC to an absolute minimum during the movement to the attack position.

(12) Fire support-see fire support overlay.

4) ADMIN AND LOG

A) Classes I, III, V adequate
Classes II and IV critical

B) Prescribed Loads

Class I; 3 MCI/2 canteens per man

Class II; As designated by CO and Unit Cndrs.

Class III;

Class IV; As required

Class V; Basic allowance

C) Resupply

First resupply morning 19 Mar. Submit request for required items, request either normal or emergency, emergency armored column helo's of await.

D) Administration

Normal personnel procedures remain in effect. Insure all evacuees identified prior to evacuation.

E) Reports required

CAS reports as occurring log requests as required. Equipment status log/deadline, as soon as possible following operations.

5) Command and Communications

A. Alfa Command group will move with the reserve, elements of Echo mutually.

B. Bravo Command group remain at base camp.

C. Frequencies as normally assigned.


DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

OVERLAY FOR FRAG ORDER #4

OBSERVATION



- ① Company Release Point
- | Attack Position
- / Phase Line
- ⊙ Mechanized Control Point
- ① Mechanized Guide Point
- ⓐ Battalion Objective

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED