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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)  
1-30 September 1966

SER: 0041-66

ESC FILES

HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)

.....660181.....

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*WJ Masterpool*  
U. S. MARINE CORPS  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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*3/4 18 Marine*

*Aug 1966*

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SECTION I

## A. Organizational data including attachments:

3d Battalion, 4th Marines  
 4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)  
 3d Marine Division, FMF

- (1) Period Covered: 1 September 1966 - 30 September 1966
- (2) Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel W. J. MASTERPOOL  
 Executive Officer: 1-9Sep66 Captain W. E. MCKENNA  
 10-30Sep66 Captain R. J. MODRZEJEWSKI

S-1	1-6Sep66	WO-1 J. GIBSON
S-1	7-30Sep66	2ndLt O. V. LORD
S-2	1-30Sep66	SSgt J. J. MCGINTY
S-3	1-30Sep66	Capt R. J. MODRZEJEWSKI
S-4	1-30Sep66	2ndLt P. V. THIBAUT
CommO	1-30Sep66	Capt C. R. MITCHELL
H&S Co	1-30Sep66	1stLt W. E. HEALY
"I" Co	1-30Sep66	Capt H. W. ROSS
"K" Co	1-5Sep66	2ndLt D. A. RICHWINE
"K" Co	6-30Sep66	Capt J. J. CARROLL
"L" Co	1-30Sep66	Capt R. K. RYMAN
"M" Co	1-9Sep66	Capt J. W. WOOLARD
"M" Co	10-30Sep66	1stLt E. J. CROWELL

- (3) Average Monthly Strength: USMC USN
- |             |     |    |
|-------------|-----|----|
| a. Officers | 32  | 2  |
| b. Enlisted | 860 | 47 |

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SECTION II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. PERSONNEL

- a. Number of replacements received:
- |               |     |
|---------------|-----|
| USMC Officers | 0   |
| USMC Enlisted | 169 |
| USN Officers  | 0   |
| USN Enlisted  | 7   |
- b. Number of Personnel rotated:
- |               |    |
|---------------|----|
| USMC Officers | 2  |
| USMC Enlisted | 41 |
| USN Officers  | 0  |
| USN Enlisted  | 11 |
- c. Breakdown of personnel lost other than rotation:
- (1) WIA: 21 USMC Enlisted
  - (2) KIA: 9 USMC Enlisted
  - (3) DOW: 1 USMC Enlisted
  - (4) Humanitarian/Emergency transfers: None
  - (5) Non-Battle injuries: 55
  - (6) Intra Div/Regt transfers: 2 USMC Officers, 2 USMC Enlisted, 4 USN Enlisted
- d. R&R Trips: 94

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SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE1. Enemy Situation At The Beginning of the Period.a. Operation PAWNEE, 26 August 1966 to 6 September 1966.

The PAWNEE Operational Area extends from CAO DOI Pass at ZD055026 in the east to LANG CO Bridge at AT887957 in the north to the South China Sea and CAU HAI BAY, and the BACH MA Resort Area and NUI CAI TON Mountains Z0192952 in the south. An estimated 300 enemy guerrillas were believed to be operating in the area in addition to two Main Force units, the 810th Battalion and the 95th B Regiment. The exact strength and locations of the Main Force units were not known but the 810th Battalion with a strength of 400 men was believed to be in the vicinity of AT8593. The 95th B Regiment with a strength of over a thousand men and possessing 82mm mortar capability, was estimated to be within 24 hours of reinforcing distance of the BACH MA Resort Area. Two Local Force platoons were known to operate in the high ground in the vicinity of ZD1505 and AU835060. Suspected missions of the enemy besides gathering rice from the LOC TRI and LOC THUY Villages are:

- (1) To launch a coordinated attack on the Lang Co Bridge AT887957.
- (2) To harass and ambush vehicular traffic along National Highway #1.
- (3) To attack and destroy railroad and highway bridges in the area.

The enemy is reported to have established a pattern of moving into the villages during the hours of darkness and moving out shortly before first light. If no unusual activity takes place in the early morning hours, (i.e. allied operations usually commence in the morning) the VC move back into the villages and spend the day. Reports of VC spending an entire 24 hour period in the builtup areas are not uncommon. Specific areas of suspected enemy activity are:

- (1) VC supply point at ZD128067.
- (2) Enemy Storage area at ZC1584.
- (3) A highway resupply point at AT846998.
- (4) Possibility of the beach being mined at ZD19-3059.

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(5) Enemy Observation post on Hill 88 at AU80-7017.

b. Operation PAWNEE II. 8 September 1966 to 14 September 1966.

The PAWNEE Operational Area extends from CAO DOI Pass ZD055026 in the east to LANG CO Bridge at AT887957 in the north to the South China Sea and CAU HAI BAY, and the BACH MA Resort Area and NUI CAI TON Mountains ZC192952 in the south. An estimated 300 enemy guerrillas were believed to be operating in the area in addition to two Main Force units, the 810th Battalion and the 95th B Regiment with a strength of over a thousand and possessing 82mm mortar capabilities, was estimated to be within 24 hours of reinforcing distance of the BACH MA Resort Area. Two Local Force platoons were known to operate in the high ground in the vicinity of ZD1505 and AU83-5060. Suspected missions of the enemy besides gathering rice from the LOC TRI and LOC THUY Villages are:

- (1) To launch a coordinated attack on the LANG CO Bridge AT887957.
- (2) To harass and ambush vehicular traffic along National Highway #1.
- (3) To attack and destroy railroad and highway bridges in the area.

The enemy is reported to have established a pattern of moving into the villages during the hours of darkness and moving out shortly before first light. If no unusual activity takes place in the early morning hours, (i.e. allied operations usually commence in the morning) the VC move back into the villages and spend the day. Reports of VC spending an entire 24 hour period in the built up areas is not uncommon. Specific enemy activity are:

- (1) VC supply point at ZD128067.
- (2) Enemy storage area at ZC1584.
- (3) A highway resupply point at AT846998.
- (4) Possibility of the beach being mined at Zdl9-3059..
- (5) Enemy observation post on Hill 88 at AU807017.

c. Perimeter Defense. 17 September 1966 to 22 September 1966.

Intelligence reports indicated that NVA Units were moving back into the CAM LO, DONG HA Area south of the DMZ. With the 6th VC Regiment located in the area of the BA LONG Valley. Suspected missions of the enemy are.

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- (1) To infiltrate enemy forces across the DMZ through the BA LONG Valley.
- (2) To launch large scale offensives with battalion size units or larger.
- (3) To mortar friendly installations in the area.

d. Operation PRAIRIE, 22 September 1966 to 30 September 1966.

The PRAIRIE Operational Area extends from the DMZ to the north to Laotian border on the west and the South China Sea on the east. An estimated NVA Division, the 324th B, and the VC 6th Regiment is believed to be operating in the area. The location of the 324th B Division is not known but the 6th VC Regiment is believed to be located in the BA LONG Valley area. Suspected missions of the enemy are:

- (1) To launch a coordinated attack on Allied installations in the operating area.
- (2) To hamper supply route of Highway #1 during the monsoon season.

2. Enemy Incidents During Period. See Section IV.

3. Total Enemy Losses. 159 VC KIA (Conf), 289 VC KIA (Prob)

a. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses.

(1) Individual Weapons: Total 178

1 heavy MG Cal .30 with traversing and wheels, 1 light MG Cal .30, 4 ChiCom SMG 7.62, 2 ChiCom AK-47 Assault Rifles 7.62, 2 extra barrels for MG Cal .30, 1 (US) M-1 carbine, 65 ChiCom grenades, 93/82mm ChiCom mortar rounds, 11/82mm mortar fuses, 20/82mm mortar fuses, 20/82mm mortar initiation cartridges, 4 Russian RPG-2 82mm rockets, 2 light Holo & light vehicular mines, 10 cans for MG ammo, 6 magazines w/ammo 7.62, 13 lbs. TNT, 1 (US) M-26 grenade, 2 Claymore mines (US), 2 AT mines.

(2) Equipment: 15 entrenching tools, 10 NVA ponchos, 1 (US) poncho, 12 packs, 9 hand picks, 8 hammocks, 9 machetes, 2 rolls comm wire, 1 telegraph key, 1 head set, 2 canteen cups (US), 1 canteen (US), 1 utility uniform (ARVN type), 30 lbs. rice, assorted documents.

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4. Significant Trends During Period. During the first part of the month an increase of enemy sniping and harassment fire along Highway #1 in the PHU BAI Area during the hours of daylight which included a daylight ambush of a US military vehicle was highly noticeable. In the PAWNEE Operational Area the enemy appears to utilize the relative security of the mountains and jungles to transport rice. Information obtained from local farmers and PHU LOC District Advisor personnel indicates possible enemy storage areas at ZC165955, ZC172965, AU835064, and AU840028. Effective liaison established with the nuns and priest at the Catholic church and orphanage at ZD142007 aided in gaining information and getting a "feel" for the area. The VC apparently move throughout the operating area with a high degree of security. The exception to this is along the national railroad and Highway #1 where local PF squads provide security for the bridges and hamlets. With the initiation of Operation PAWNEE, the enemy was forced to utilize the hours of darkness and restricted to the mountains and jungles to conduct his rice transportation activities. No significant contact was made and it appears that the enemy is avoiding contact. A VC platoon was spotted by Recon on 280810H at ZC163965 and possibly may be guarding the trail. An increase of enemy activity in the PRAIRIE Operational Area toward the second half of the month which included attacks by mortars and large units on Allied Forces in the area. Up to present NVA Units appear to move freely through mountain areas and have established heavily fortified areas on ridgelines. Significant contact was made at XD989613 to XD968616.

5. Enemy Situation at End of Period.

a. Operation PAWNEE, 26 August 1966 to 6 September 1966.

Encounters with VC have been light and lacking. It appears the VC is avoiding contact. To date there is no evidence of Main Force units in the area.

b. Operation PAWNEE II, 8 September 1966 to 14 September 1966.

The lack of significant contact or sightings indicated that the VC in the area are avoiding contact. Suspected enemy areas have been observed with negative results.

c. Perimeter Defensive, 17 September 1966 to 22 September 1966.

No contact made during this period.

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d. Operation PRAIRIE, 22 September 1966 to 30 September 1966.

The operation is continuing as the reporting period ends. Strong resistance was met at XD989613 and continued west with lighter resistance with each encounter. It appeared that a NVA Battalion was operating in this area.

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS1. Close Combata. 01 September 1966

(1) At 0206H, Company I, (ZD142008) was taken under fire by approximately 25-30 VC. Fire was returned by 60mm mortars, S/A, M-60, M-79, and 81mm mortar illumination. Artillery mission was called in. Results, 6 VC KIA, 2 VCS, 2 burp gun magazines, 4 ChiCom grenades, 4 1/2 pound block of TNT, 1 USMC WIA.

b. 02 September 1966

(1) At 0745H, Company M sprung an ambush on 2 VC at ZC144993. Swept area with negative results.

(2) At 1315H, Company K received automatic weapons fire from approximately 3 VC at ZC118978. Returned fire with S/A and M-60's. Results, 2 USMC WIA, Artillery mission called in on VC position.

c. 03 September 1966

(1) At 1710H, Company M made contact with 5 VC at ZC147984. VC taken under fire by S/A. Results, 1 VC KIA, 2 ChiCom grenades, 1 bag of rice, 1 first-aid kit.

(2) At 1800H, Recon patrol spotted 12 VC moving east at ZC143953. Artillery mission called in with unknown results.

d. 04 September 1966

(1) At 0530H, Company M received 2 incoming M-26 grenades at ZC137997.

(2) At 0535H, Company M received 1 round sniper fire at ZC137997.

(3) At 0545H, Company M received 1 incoming 60mm mortar round. No casualties were sustained.

e. 08 September 1966

(1) At 1825H, one aircraft fired six rockets

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fifty meters to the rear of Company K. Aircraft reported sighting approximately seventeen VC, vicinity of ZC459821. Search was conducted with negative results.

f. 09 September 1966

(1) At 2020H, a patrol from Company L initiated an ambush at ZC139991 on an estimated 5 VC. Area was swept with negative results.

g. 11 September 1966

(1) At 1153H, Company I received sniper fire from 3 VC vicinity of ZC093986. S/A fire was returned, area was swept and two sets of drag marks were discovered. Results 2 VC KIA (Probable).

h. 12 September 1966

(1) At 2210H, Company I had contact with approximately 30 VC from the vicinity of ZC119993. Received approximately 30 rounds of S/A fire and one grenade. Fire was returned with approximately 50 rounds of S/A and Artillery fire mission was called in with good effect on target. Results estimated at 2 VC KIA (Probable).

i. 13 September 1966

(1) At 1130H, Company I received approximately 20 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated 7 VC in the vicinity of ZC119976. Fire was returned with S/A fire and Artillery mission. Area swept with negative results.

(2) At 1140H, a patrol from Company L reported that a Claymore mine had been detonated in the vicinity of ZC157977 resulting in one (1) friendly WIA. A search of the area revealed 200 feet of communications wire which confirmed the theory that the mine was electrically detonated.

(2) At 1218H, a patrol from Company L received 3-4 rounds of S/A fire from the vicinity of ZC166-978 and countered with S/A fire. Area swept with negative results.

(4) At 1430H, a patrol from Company I received approximately 6 rounds of S/A fire from ZC117972. The patrol countered with S/A fire, artillery mission

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was executed, area was searched with negative results.

j. 25 September 1966

(1) At 1200H, Company M while moving on trail to Objective GOLF killed one NVA at YD006613. Results, 1 NVA KIA, 1 ChiCom semi-automatic weapon, 1 pack, 1 canteen, web gear, and document which appeared to be pay record and personal items.

(2) At 1215H, Company L made contact with approximately sixteen NVA (YD997614) firing automatic weapons from bunkers. Returned fire with S/A, M-79, and grenades. Also Artillery and Air strikes called in. Results 12 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 10 NVA KIA (Probable).

k. 26 September 1966

(1) At 1300H, Company L (YD997613) received 50 rounds S/A fire from 3 NVA (YD996613). Returned fire with S/A, Artillery, and Tanks. NVA observed moving west. Results 2 NVA KIA (Probable) due to several blood stains found in area.

l. 27 September 1966

(1) At 1715H, Company K was hit by 2 Claymore mines, and 3 ChiCom grenades. This was followed by heavy MG fire. Air, Artillery, and Tanks were called in. Company K pressed on with heavy recon by fire. Results 4 USMC KIA, 14 USMC WIA, 7 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 20 NVA KIA (Probable), 2 ChiCom grenades, 3 assorted magazines for automatic weapons.

m. 28 September 1966

(1) At 0215H, Company I received S/A and 60mm fire from vicinity of XD996613. Returned fire with S/A, M-60, grenades, and 1 Claymore. Search conducted at first light produced negative results.

(2) At 0843H, Company K located heavily fortified bunkers (XD985613) and started receiving automatic weapons fire from them. Artillery mission called in and short round landed in Battalion CP 7 minutes later the Battalion CP received five rounds 81/82mm mortars. Results 1 USMC KIA, 25 USMC WIA, 2 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 10 NVA KIA (Probable).

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(3) At 0945H, Company K observed NVA trying to move around to their flanks. Artillery and 81's called in. Results unknown.

(4) At 1203H, Bn CP received 6 rounds 81/82mm mortars. Results 18 USMC WIA.

(5) At 1358H, Company K was taken under heavy S/A and mortar attack, XD989613. Company I was sent forward to reinforce Company K and an Artillery mission was fired. At 1445H, Company I reached Company K's position. Mortar attacks had ceased and S/A fire was sporadic. As Company K patrol went forward to attempt rescue of MIA they came under counterattack by a (Rein) Company, receiving heavy machinegun fire, mortars, and automatic weapons. Company K was reinforced by elements of Company M and Company I. Enemy was taken under fire by all units. Results 6 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIA, 50 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 25 NVA KIA (Probable), 1 heavy MG, 3 light MG, 6 ChiCom Automatic rifles, 50 ChiCom grenades. 2 Light MG's and 5 ChiCom automatic rifles were badly destroyed and were not returned to rear. Numerous packs were found and destroyed.

n. 30 September 1966

(1) At 1715H, Company I (XD973614) was taken under fire by automatic weapons from two mutually supporting bunkers. Returned fire and called in Artillery and Air strikes. Results 7 USMC WIA, 10 NVA KIA (Probable).

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SECTION VLOGISTICS

This unit experienced two combat operations during the period covered by this report. The first, "Operation PAWNEE" posed no major logistical problems for this command. In that all resupply was effected by overland vehicles. The availability of vehicles and resupply items were sufficient for the needs of this unit.

In the second part of the month, on "Operation PRAIRIE", the helicopter was the primary vehicle used for resupply. During this period the availability of helicopters, and their coordinated use, caused many logistical and resupply problems.

Specifically, many critical items of resupply, i.e. ammunition, water and food were delivered short in quantity on several occasions. On the date of 28 September, and periodically there-after only a token resupply was effected in water and food. Normally only two to four helicopters were employed and were able to carry only half loads due to elevation and terrain. Therefore approximately 60% of resupply was delivered overall for that last week period. In addition, the helicopters arrived late in the day and were sometimes diverted for med-evacs and twice experienced mechanical malfunctions. Thus their use was negligible for additional resupply runs. Considering flight and loading time, it was virtually impossible for this limited amount of vehicles to resupply a unit of this size during the hours of 1600 or 1700 to darkness. (About two hours).

It is recommended that better coordination be effected in the dispatching of the resupply helicopters. A unit coordinator should control and effect every flight incoming and outgoing to see that the most economical and practical use be made of whatever helicopters are available.

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SECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS1. Operation PAWNEE II

a. The nets used on Operation PAWNEE were the Battalion and Regimental Tactical Nets and a Regimental Command Net. The Supporting arms nets were Artillery, Air, and Mortars.

b. There were no unusual problems encountered.

2. Operation PRAIRIE

a. The nets used on PRAIRIE are the Battalion and Regimental Tactical and Regimental Command. A Logistics Net is also utilized. All of these nets are FM.

b. Supporting arms nets are Artillery (MF), Air (FM, UHF), and Mortars (FM).

c. Frequent interference has been encountered with enemy and South Vietnamese stations. There has been no imitative deception or jamming.

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SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION1. Significant Events.

a. During the period from 1 September 1966, to 5 September 1966, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines had "I" Battery, 3/12 in direct support of Operation PAWNEE.

b. On 8 September 1966, "I" Battery, 3/12 again displaced to the 100 THUY Area in direct support of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. This displacement was to support the second phase of Operation PAWNEE.

c. During the period from 18 September 1966, to 21 September 1966, six hours of school in observed fire procedures was conducted for the artillery forward observers of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.

d. On 22 September 1966, "G" Battery, "H" Battery, and "I" Battery, 3/12 were in direct support of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. These batteries fired a schedule of fires in preparation for the battalions' helicopter insertion to the northeast of DONG HA Mountain. This preparation consisted of 324 rounds of 105mm, HE, - including 108 rounds of 105mm, HE, fuse VT, on the landing zone itself just three minutes prior to the landing.

e. Throughout the period from 22 September to 30 September 1966, artillery support was used extensively in support of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines' advance westward.

(1) Timely and accurate fire were placed on targets of opportunity.

(2) Preparation fires were placed on objectives and covering fires were placed to the flanks and rear.

(3) "H and I" fires were used to suppress enemy activities and deny them access to key terrain.

2. Artillery Units.

"G" Battery, 3/12	105mm
"H" Battery, 3/12	105mm
"I" Battery, 3/12	105mm
"M" Battery, 4/12	155mm

3. Naval Ships. (None)

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4. Ammunition Expended.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Rounds</u>
HE	4,183
WP	594
ILL	83
HC Smoke	19
Colored Smoke	35
HEPT	17

a. A total of 4,931 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired in support of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the month of September.

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. From the first of September 1966, until the close of Operation PAWNEE on the fifth of September 1966, helicopters were utilized for resupply, reconnaissance, and the insertion and extraction of Recon elements. Fixed-wing were available but were not utilized. Airborne Observers were utilized as Convoy escorts at the close of the Operation.

2. Airborne Observers again escorted the Convoy at the initiation of PAWNEE II and were used daily, providing extensive coverage of the TAOB. Until the completion of the operation at approximately 1500H September 1966. Fixed-wing were available throughout the operation on several suspected and known targets with excellent results. Helicopters were used for resupply, recon, and the insertion and extraction of recon elements throughout.

3. On 22 September 1966, helicopters lifted the 3d Battalion in support of Operation PRAIRIE and were used thereafter for reconnaissance, resupply, and MedEvacs. Throughout the operation fixed-wing with mixed ordnance were used on suspected and known targets with excellent results. Airborne Observers provided extensive coverage of the TAOB each day and supplemented control on numerous Air strikes. Air Force Flare Ships were utilized several evenings, in general support of friendly troops and the harassment of the enemy. Air support on the last two days of the operation was limited due to unfavorable weather.

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SECTION IXMEDICAL AFFAIRS1. MEDICAL TRENDS

a. The BAS was established in the DONG HA Area for medical support of this battalion and several attached units who were without medical facilities.

b. The Battalion Surgeon and five (5) Hospital Corpsmen were assigned to a combined battalion aid station which functioned as a clearing station for the DONG HA Area.

c. A laboratory was set up in the aid station and one additional technician was assigned T.A.D. from Division Surgeon to assist the technician of this Battalion.

2. MEDICAL SUPPLY There continues to be long delays in receiving medical supplies from DaNang, however, since arriving at DONG HA the supplies were received through FLSG and the service has been excellent.

3. BATTLE CASUALTIES

a. KIA - 11

b. WIA - 93

4. NON-BATTLE INJURIES There were 47 non-battle injuries reported for the month.

5. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE A large number of rats were noted upon our arrival at DONG HA and a baiting program was started immediately, however, due to the lack of the proper equipment this has not proved successful. Representatives from the Division Preventive Medicine Section have visited this area and stated that proper equipment will be sent to the area.

6. PROBLEM AREAS This battalion experienced a shortage of Hospital Corpsmen during the month. This was brought to the attention of the Division Surgeon Office and additional personnel were assigned to the Battalion.

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**SECTION X**

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. During the period of 1 September 1966, thru 6 September 1966, a total of six hundred and fifty (650) Vietnamese Civilians were treated by the MEDCAP Team in the PHU LOC District.

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SECTION XIPROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED, LESSONS LEARNED

1. ITEM. Movement of troops along a narrow ridgeline through heavy growth against mutually supporting fortified positions.

a. Discussion: On Operation Prairie (22Sep66-7 Oct66), the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines moved along a ridgeline which was dotted with many enemy emplacements. The nature of the terrain was such that it presented a frontage of from three to thirty meters in which to work. Such a narrow frontage limited the unit commanders in their ability to mass or maneuver their troops, and the steeply sloping ground to either flank prohibited effective movement there. To further hinder our advancement the enemy used the heavy foliage to his advantage in concealing both his fortifications and his individual troops, who, incidentally were wholly indistinguishable from that foliage in which they lay.

b. Recommendation: The answer to the problem seemed to come from two sources; use of supporting arms and an innovation in the arrangement of the various elements in the unit. First, air and artillery were used extensively to eliminate as much of the growth as possible and to expose and destroy the enemy. Second, the order of march was revamped slightly to provide for ~~maximum firepower~~ and control at the head of the column. The point element was composed of sixteen individuals as follows:

(1) A scout, armed only with a shotgun and smoke, this individual depends on his stealth to discover the enemy. When contact is made he throws his smoke and rejoins the remainder of the point. This provides for immediate marking of the forward friendly elements to facilitate air strikes.

.. (2) An automatic rifleman to cover the scout.

(3) A machinegun team.

(4) Either the lead squad leader or lead platoon commander depending on the individual and his capabilities.

(5) A radioman

(6) The company commander or the company executive officer.

(7) A forward Air Controller Team.

(8) An artillery Forward Observer Team.

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## (9) Another machinegun team.

This point element is followed by the rest of the advance party (a reinforced platoon minus the element in the point). Movement with flank security out is nearly impossible so each member of the column should be alert to one side or the other; and, each unit must have a plan for deployment when hit even if it is as simple as each man hitting the deck and alternately facing right and left. When contact is made the unit retracts, having already marked their forward limit with smoke, to a minimum safety distance. During this retraction the area to the front should be sprayed with machinegun fire to prevent the enemy from creeping forward to stay within our own safety limits. At the conclusion of the air and artillery bombardments, the column moves again, spraying the area ahead with machinegun fire as the unit moves forward.

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Ser

12Jan67

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SECRET (unclassified upon removal of basic material)

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CO, 3dBn, 4th Marines ltr 3/RED/mjy 3120 Ser:  
0038-66 of 20Sep66From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: J343)

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report (Operation PAWNEE) (U)

1. Forwarded.
2. Concur in the comments contained in the second endorsement.

R. W. WILSON  
By directionCopy to:  
CMC  
CMCS  
CG FMFPAC  
MACJ2  
MACT

303449

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Tab A

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a/a Gen, PAWNEE

26 Aug - 6 Sep 66

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3/10A/pns

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Ser: 003A34066

DEC 10 1966

SECRET (DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL WHEN BASIC MATERIAL IS REMOVED)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, 3d Bn, 4th Marines ltr 3/RED/mjy 5120 Ser:  
0038-66 of 20 Sep 66

614266

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: J343)  
 Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report (Operation FAWKEE) (U)

Ref: (b) COMUSMACV Inst (O) 335-B of 2 April 1966

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (b).
2. (O) Concur with the remarks contained in the first endorsement. One of the significant features of the GAO program is the familiarity of PF personnel with the local situation. For maximum effectiveness they should be employed only in the neighborhood of their assigned village. Other RVN forces or agencies can provide the desired assistance for Civic Action activities during operations not in the vicinity of GAO location

W.B. KYLE

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Ser: 00458-66  
10 Oct 1966

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 3d Bn, 4th Mar ltr 3/BED/mjy over 3120  
Ser No: 0038-66 of 20 Sep 66

From: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (Rein), 3d Marine Division  
(Rein), FMF

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation PAWNEE) (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. The recommendation pertaining to the use of CAC units, as shown in paragraph 15, of enclosure (1) is not considered a valid utilization of CAC squads. CAC squads/platoons are employed interior of their village boundaries, and are utilized for the explicit purpose of protecting the village in which they are found. To remove CAC units from their village for employment in other operational areas is not considered feasible. The use of Chieu Hoi or regular ARVN forces as augmentation to Marine forces is considered worth while and is recommended in order to obtain information and provide assistance in civic action.

M. S. CAMPBELL  
By direction

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HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)  
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/9ED/mjy  
3120  
20 Sep 1966  
0038-66

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF  
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation PAWNEE)

Ref: (a) RegtO 3120.3B

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

S&C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)  
660177  
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1. CODE NAME. Operation PAWNEE
2. DATE OF OPERATION. 26 August 1966 - 06 September 1966
3. LOCATION. PHU LOG District (Enclosure 1)
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. Commanding Officer, 4th Marines, Colonel A. D. CERECHINO, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, LtCol W. J. MASTERPOOL.
5. TASK ORGANIZATION. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
6. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery Support

- (1) India Battery, 3/12 - 105's Direct Support

b. Naval Gunfire Support.

- (1) USS BEALE (DD471) Direct Support
- (2) USS MULLINEX (DD944) Direct Support

c. Air Support.

- (1) Four (4) fixed-wing A/C on station for landing and until L plus 1 Hour. Mixed ordnance loads of Snakeye Bombs, Rockets, Napalm and 20mm Cannon.
- (2) Two (2) fixed-wing A/C on station from L plus 1 Hour to L plus 2 hours with mixed ordnance load.
- (3) Fifteen (15) minute strip alert for fixed-wing thereafter.
- (4) AO during daylight hours on D-Day and D plus 1. As requested thereafter.

4TH MARINES (Rein)
S&C FILES
660492
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INTERVALS UNLESS NOTED AFTER  
12 YEARS FROM DATE 09/20/00

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(5) Two (2) MedEvac helicopters on strip alert.

(6) Two (2) Resupply helicopters at the LSA

7. INTELLIGENCE. The Pawnee Operation area extends from CAO DOI Pass ZD 055026 in the east to LANG CO Bridge AT 887957 in the north to The South China Sea and CAU HAI BAY, and the BACH MA Resort Area and NUI CAI TON Mountains ZC 192952 in the south. An estimated 300 enemy guerrillas were believed to be operating in the area in addition to two Main Force Units, the 810th Battalion and 95th B Regiment. The exact strength and locations of the Main Force Units were not known but the 810th Battalion with a strength of 400 men was believed to be in the vicinity of AT 8583. The 95th B Regiment with a strength of over a thousand men and possessing 82mm mortar capability, was estimated to be within 24 hours of reinforcing distance of the BACH MA Resort Area. Two Local Force platoons were known to operate in the high ground in the vicinity of ZD 1505 and AU 835060. Suspected missions of the enemy besides gathering rice from LOC TRI and LOC THUY villages are:

- a. To launch a coordinated attack on the LANG CO Bridge AT 887957
- b. To harass and ambush vehicular traffic along National Highway #1
- c. To attack and destroy railroad and highway bridges in the area

The enemy is reported to have established a pattern of moving into the villages during the hours of darkness and moving out shortly before first light. If no unusual activity takes place in the early morning hours, (i.e. allied operations usually commence in the morning) the Viet Cong move back into the village and spend the day. Reports of Viet Cong spending an entire 24 hour period in the built up areas are not uncommon. Specific areas of suspected enemy activity are:

- a. Viet Cong supply point at ZD 128067
- b. Enemy storage area at ZC 1584
- c. A highway resupply point at AT 846998
- d. Possibility of the beach being mined at ZD 193059
- e. Enemy observation post on hill 88 at AU 807017

8. MISSION. Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines conduct search and clear operations in the PHU LOC Area, to destroy enemy units and influence in the area of operations and increase security of the railroad and Route 1 in the operating area in order to prevent interdiction by enemy units.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. See Operation Overlay (Enclosure 1)

10. EXECUTION.

a. 26 August 1966

(1) At 0930H, the Battalion received Frag Order from Regiment to commence Operation PAWNEE.

(2) At 1045H, the Battalion Command Group (Rein) plus Company K (-) departed the PHU BAI Area via motor march.

(3) At 1140H, Company I, Company M and 2d Platoon (Rein), Company K departed PHU BAI Airport via helicopters.

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(4) At 1200H, Company I, Company M and 2d Platoon (Rein), Company K arrived at LZ's located ZC156975, ZC 129986, and ZD189055 respectively.

(5) At 1205H, the Battalion Command Group plus Company K arrived at operating area in the vicinity of ZC150012, Company K established a perimeter defense.

(6) At 1215H, Company I commenced search and sweep from ZC156975 to ZC151988 with negative results.

(7) At 1220H, Company M commenced search and sweep NE from ZC129986 to vicinity of ZC151988.

(8) At 1225H, 2d Plat (Rein), Company K commenced to search and sweep from ZD189055 to ZD131011.

(9) At 1437H, 2d Plat (Rein), Company K apprehended one (1) VCS at ZC157995. VCS was brought to the Battalion CP for interrogation.

(10) At 1525H, 2d Plat (Rein), Company K arrived at ZD131011 to link up with the remainder of Company K.

(11) At 1645H, 1st Plat, Company M made physical contact with Company I at ZC149984.

(12) At 1750H, Company M established a nighttime defensive position at ZC145984.

(13) At 1800H, Company I established their nighttime defensive position at ZC150989.

b. 27 August 1966

(1) At 0008H, Company I fired on suspected enemy movement at ZC155989 with 4 rounds S/A and 2 hand grenades with negative results.

(2) At 0905H, Company L commenced sweep of area from ZD140010 and ZD 145010 to ZD137024 and ZD143026.

(3) At 0906H, Company I commenced sweep of area from ZC150989 and ZD 165011

(4) At 0906H, 2d Plat, Company K furnished security for MEDCAP at ZD140010.

(5) At 0912H, Company M commenced sweep of area from ZD145984 to ZC149999.

(6) At 1130H, Company M and Company I joined at ZC150993 and continued sweeping northwest.

(7) At 1131H, 2d Plat, Company K returned to the Battalion CP from MEDCAP security at ZD140010.

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(8) At 1140H, Company M apprehended two (2) VCS at ZD147993. Sent to Battalion CP for interrogation.

(9) At 1148H, Company L completed sweep of assigned area. Remained at ZD140025 to run patrols.

(10) At 1236H, Company M apprehended one (1) VCS at ZD143001.

(11) At 1250H, Company M reported having one (1) more VCS at ZD143001

(12) At 1300H, Company M reported finding 400 lbs of rice at ZD144003.

(13) At 1327H, Company M apprehended one (1) VCS at ZD144003.

(14) At 1420H, Company M reported finding 500 lbs of rice at ZD142008.

(15) At 1600H, Company L returned to Battalion CP to set in their nighttime position.

(16) At 1605H, Company I and Company M set in nighttime positions at ZD165011.

(17) At 1625H, the Regimental Executive Officer arrived at the Battalion CP (ZD151011).

(18) At 1700H, the Regimental Executive Officer departed the Battalion CP.

(19) At 1952H, Naval Gun Ship reported three (3) high speed boats at AU820065; requested to take them under fire. Permission was granted. Boats were fired upon by Artillery and Naval Gunfire. Results unknown.

(20) At 2103H, the recon unit attached to the Battalion reported 4 VC moving in open at ZD167034. 81mm Mortar mission was called in. Results unknown.

c. 28 August 1966

(1) At 0420H, Company I fired 1 round S/A at VC walking on railroad tracks in vicinity of ZD165011. Results unknown.

(2) At 0837H, Company M proceeded by vehicle to AU807010 to conduct sweep of the surrounding area.

(3) At 0842H, Company K departed their CP (ZD165011) to conduct a sweep in the vicinity.

(4) At 0904H, Company M apprehended one (1) VCS at ZD807012.

(5) At 0926H, Company M reported a column of smoke rising from the midst of 4 or 5 houses. Believed to be signal set off shortly after their arrival in that area. Requested AO to investigate.

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(6) At 0930H, fixed-wing aircraft requested permission to fire upon a boat at ZD184062. Permission was granted and boat was sunk without secondary explosion.

(7) At 0944H, Company M apprehended one (1) VCS at AU812015.

(8) At 0947H, Company K reported having one (1) VCS at ZD160010. VCS was escorted to Battalion CP.

(9) At 1208H, Company I was helo-lifted to AU816044 to commence sweep of surrounding area.

(10) At 1355H, villagers (AU817047) reported to Company I that when the company landed in their LZ, 10 VC took 9 villagers to AU824055.

(11) At 1440H, Company M apprehended one (1) VCS at AU809050.

(12) At 1517H, Company I and Company M completed sweeps of their respective areas.

(13) At 1548H, Company K returned to the Battalion CP after completion of their sweep.

(14) At 1845H, Company K set in at new objective (ZD117016) and established a defensive perimeter.

d. 29 August 1966

(1) At 0839H, Company M commenced sweep of ZD181023 and surrounding area.

(2) At 1055H, Company M finished sweep and returned to their CP.

(3) At 1327H, General Kyle arrived Battalion CP for a briefing on the operation.

(4) At 1445H, General Kyle departed Battalion CP by helicopter.

(5) At 1900H, while extracting recon patrol from vicinity ZC166956, and estimated platoon of VC was spotted moving in a NW direction. Fixed-wing aircraft flying overhead received ground fire. Air strikes and Artillery missions were called in with unknown results.

e. 30 August 1966

(1) At 0705H, Company I departed CP to commence sweep of GS ZD1400 and ZD1499.

(2) At 0900H, Battalion Aid Station reported having one Med Evac request to send a Vietnamese woman to A-MED

(3) At 0950H, Company I found six (6) bags of rice and one (1) rifle case, and one (1) pack at ZC145995. The gear was extremely old and mildewed.

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(4) At 1031H, Company L relay station began receiving sniper fire from hill opposite their position. Area placed under surveillance.

(5) At 1035H, Company L received 5 rounds sniper fire from vicinity AU 838003 unable to detect sniper due to heavy foliage.

(6) At 1513H, Company L, completed sweep of their area and returned to CP.

(7) At 2345H, Company I, sprung an ambush on an estimated squad of VC at ZC 153987. Results, 2 VC KIA confirmed.

f. 31 August 1966

(1) At 0836H, Company L (-) commenced sweep in vicinity ZD 186045 and ZD 198045 to ZD185057 and ZD197057.

(2) At 1230H, Company L, completed sweep of assigned area and began sweep vicinity of ZD185060.

(3) At 1545H, Company L, completed their sweep and returned to CP.

(4) At 1730H, Company I, reported being fired upon by approximately 3 VC, vicinity ZC 156975. Results, 2 VCS, 1 Carbine, 2 packs and 1 USMC, WIA.

(5) At 2053H, Company M, reported 1 rd sniper fire from village 200 meters away. Area placed under surveillance.

g. 01 September 1966

(1) At 0206H, Company I, (ZD 142008) was taken under fire by approximately 25-30 VC. Fire was returned by 60mm mortars, S/A, M-60, M79, and 81mm mortar illumination. Artillery mission was called in. Results, 6VC KIA, 2VCS, 2 burp guns magazines, 4 Chi Com grenades, 4 1/2 pound block of TNT, 1 USMC WIA.

(2) At 0753H, AO recon reported spotting 1 Plt, VC at ZC 160985.

(3) At 1007H, Company L commenced sweep vicinity ZD 140010 and ZD 145010 to ZD 137024 and ZD 143026.

(4) At 1127H, Company L completed sweep and began reconnaissance of area for a nighttime position.

(5) At 1425H, Company L reported no suitable nighttime in near vicinity, returned to original CP.

(6) At 1505H, Bn Cp received reports from nuns that unknown number of VC were located at ZC 140980.

h. 02 September 1966

(1) At 0640H, Company L commenced sweep of area from AT 873987 to AT 877982.

(2) At 0745H, Company M sprung an ambush on 2 VC at ZC 144993. Swept area with negative results.

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(3) At 1145H, Company L apprehended 2 VCS with canteens and mess gear at AT 986957.

(4) At 1315H, Company K, received automatic weapons fire from approximately 3 VC at ZC 118978. Returned fire with S/A and M-60's. Results, 2 USMC WIA, artillery mission called in on VC position.

(5) At 1445H, Company L completed sweep and returned to their CP.

i. 03 September 1966

(1) At 1030H, Company M, moved to new position and set up defensive perimeter.

(2) At 1250H, Company K, began sweeping a village at vicinity of ZC 190995.

(3) At 1710H, Company M made contact with 5 VC at ZC 147984. VC taken fire by S/A. Results, 1 VC KIA, 2 ChiCom grenades, 1 bag of rice, 1 first aid kit.

(4) At 1540H, Company K completed the sweep and returned to their CP.

(5) At 1800H, Recon patrol spotted 12 VC moving east at ZC 143953. Artillery mission called in with unknown results.

(6) At 1930H, Company L called in Artillery on 3 VCS at ZD 107005 with negative results.

j. 04 September 1966

(1) At 0530H, Company M received 2 incoming M-26 grenades at ZC 137997.

(2) At 0535H, Company M received 1 round sniper fire at ZC 137997.

(3) At 0545H, Company M received 1 incoming 60mm mortar round. No casualties were sustained.

k. 05 September 1966

(1) At 0705H, Company L apprehended 2 VCS at AT 108994.

(2) At 1105H, helo's arrived with CG, FMFPac.

(3) At 1120H, Company K commenced sweep on village in GS AU 8005

(4) At 1133H, Company K found 240 pounds of rice at AU808048.

(5) At 1135H, helicopters departed the Battalion CP with the CG, FMFPac

(6) At 1330H, Company M found Tax Collectors book, 11,000 piastres, 2 lighters, several tactical markers, and one land document.

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1. 06 September 1966

(1) At 0800H, Operation PAWNEE was officially terminated.

(2) At 0945H, the first elements of Battalion Forward departed for the PHU BAI Area.

(3) At 1100H, lead elements of the Battalion Forward arrived Rear CP.

(4) At 1330H, remaining elements of Battalion Forward departed for Rear CP.

(5) At 1454H, movement of Battalion Forward to Battalion Rear was completed.

11. RESULTS.a. Casualties. USMC/WIA - 11, VC/KIA - 13, VC/KIA PROB - 19b. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses.(1) Weapons: 1 Total(a) Individual: 1 Carbine (US), 4 Chicom grenades, 4 -  $\frac{1}{2}$  blocks of TNT.(2) Equipment: 2 automatic weapon magazines, 2 canteen cups, (US) 1 poncho (US), 1 canteen (US), 1 utility uniform (ARVN type), 2 packs, 1 bag of rice.c. Friendly Equipment and Material Losses.

5 Helmet Covers  
 2 Haversacks  
 2 Ponchos  
 3 Air Mattresses  
 1 Cartridge Belt  
 4 Magazine pouches  
 1 Bayonet w/Scabbard  
 1 First Aid Pouch  
 3 Canteens  
 2 Canteen Covers  
 2 Canteen Cups  
 2 Flak Jackets  
 5 E-Tools w/Covers  
 1 Head Mosquito Net  
 1 K-Bar Knife  
 5 Helmets  
 1 Compass  
 3 Mess Gear Sets

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Supply - Adequate



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- b. Maintenance - Adequate
- c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization - Adequate
- d. Transportation - Adequate
- e. Medical Evaluation - There were thirteen (13) friendly WIA's and 27 non-combat casualties.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. None were employed.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS. On Operation PAWNEE I this battalion made extensive use of psychological warfare. Many of the villages in our TAOR were swept at least several times during which time the psy-war plane was used for broadcasts and leaflet drops. However, there was no significant response to these broadcasts drops that can be measured in our short stay.

The Civic Action Program was extremely effective. Help was given to several local orphanages in the way of minor projects such as building pews for the churches, minor repairs to the buildings, etc. A MEDCAP Program was conducted in practically all of the villages with excellent response, particularly after initial hesitation on the part of the local villagers. The success of this program was evident by the friendly reaction to us demonstrated by the local villagers.

On many occasions information as to enemy locations, routes into and out of various areas and intentions were made known to the Marines. In most cases, however, the information received was not timely enough for quick action. On operations of this type, particularly in the PAWNEE Area, augmentation by CAC Squads would achieve excellent results.

15. RECOMMENDATIONS. That on extended operations whereby close contact with local villages is constantly maintained, CAC squads from other than the operating unit should be attached to the Battalion for Civic Action in these villages.

W. J. MASTERPOON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

660515

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3:MSC:jhs

3480

Ser: 00470-66

23 Oct 1966

**SECRET**

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 3d Bn, 4th Mar ltr 3/BED/jpl  
over 3120 Ser No: 0040-66 of 22 Sep 66

From: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (Rein), 3d Marine  
Division (Rein), FMF

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Actions Report (Operation PAWNEE II) (U)

1. Forwarded.

2. In reference to paragraph 15, of the basic report, it is considered advantageous to support operations in populated areas with GVN assistance. The use of National Police, Sector Intelligence personnel, Chieu Hoi, RF/PF, and regular ARVN forces are all considered valuable in assisting USMC forces in intelligence gathering and population control.

*M. S. Campbell*  
M. S. CAMPBELL  
By direction

3/4

7/4 RPT (OPN PAWNEE II

8-14 SEP 1966

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR  
INTERVALS UNLESS AFTER  
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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Tab B

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## HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)  
 3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/BED/jpl  
 3120  
 22 Sep 1966  
 0040-66

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMP  
 Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat After Actions Report (Operation PAWNEE II)

Ref: (a) RegtO 3120.3B

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

S&C FILES  
 HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)

660180

1. CODE. Operation PAWNEE II
2. DATE OF OPERATION. 08 September 1966 - 14 September 1966
3. LOCATION. PHU LOC District (Enclosure 1)
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. Commanding Officer,  
 4th Marines, Colonel A. D. CERECHINO, Commanding Officer,  
 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, LtCol W. J. MASTERPOOL,
5. TASK ORGANIZATION. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
6. SUPPORTING FORCES.

Copy ..... 2 ..... of ..... 15 ..... Copies

(A) Artillery Support.

1. "India" Battery, 3/12 - 105's Direct Support

(B) Air Support.

- a. Four (4) fixed-wing A/C on station for landing and until H plus 1 Hour. Mixed ordnance loads of Snakeye Bombs, Rockets, Napalm, and 20mm Cannon.
- b. Two (2) fixed-wing A/C on station from H plus 1 Hour to H plus 2 Hours w/mixed ordnance load.
- c. Fifteen (15) minute strip alert for fixed-wing thereafter.
- d. AO during daylight hours on D-Day and D plus 1. As requested thereafter.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR  
 INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
 12 YEARS. 1000 DDD 5000.10

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- e. Two (2) MedEvac helo's on strip alert.
- f. Two (2) Resupply helo's at LSA.

7. INTELLIGENCE. PAWNEE Operational Area extends from CAO DOI Pass ZD 055026 in the east to LANG CO Bridge at AT 88-7957 in the north to the South China Sea and CAU HAI BAY, and the BACH MA Resort Area and NUI CAI TON Mountains ZC 192952 in the south. An estimated 300 enemy guerillas were believed to be operating in the area in addition to two Main Force Units, the 810th Battalion and the 95th B Regiment with a strength of over a thousand men and possessing 82mm mortar capability, was estimated to be within 24 hours of reinforcing distance of the BACH MA Resort Area. Two Local Force platoons were known to operate in the high ground in the vicinity of ZD 1505 and AU 835060. Suspected missions of the enemy besides gathering rice from the LOC TRI and LOC THUY villages are:

- a. To launch a coordinated attack on the LANG CO Bridge AT 887957.
- b. To harass and ambush vehicular traffic along National Highway #1.
- c. To attack and destroy railroad and highway bridges in the area.

The enemy is reported to have established a pattern of moving into the villages during the hours of darkness and moving out shortly before first light. If no unusual activity takes place in the early morning hours (i.e. allied operations usually commence in the morning) they move back into the village and spend the day. Reports of VC spending and entire 24 hour period in the built-up areas are not uncommon. Specific areas of suspected enemy activity are:

- A. VC supply point ZD 128067
- B. Enemy storage area at ZC 1584
- C. A highway resupply point at AT 846998
- D. Possibility of the beach being mined at ZD 193059
- E. Enemy observation post on Hill 88 at AU 807017
- F. 7 Documents

8. MISSION. Commencing on D-Day, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines conduct search and clear operations in the PHU LOC Area, to destroy enemy units and influence the area of

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operation and increase security of the railroad and Route 1 in the operation area in order to prevent interdiction by enemy units.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. See OPERATION OVERLAY Enclosure (1)

10. EXECUTION.

A. 08 September 1966

- (1) At 0900H the Battalion received Frag Orders to commence Operation PAWNEE II.
- (2) At 1030H the Battalion (-) departed the Phu Bai area enroute to operating area.
- (3) At 1220H the Battalion (-) arrived in operating area. Command Group and Company M in the vicinity of ZD 151021, Company K vicinity of ZD 154010, Company L vicinity of ZD 138010.
- (4) At 1240H Company K commenced sweep Sout to East, West grid line 98. with negative results.
- (5) At 1345H Company L apprehended 1 VCS in vicinity of ZD 146001.
- (6) At 1530H a village chief reported to the Battalion CP that a 57mm dud was located in the vicinity of ZD 146001.
- (7) At 1535H Company I departed Phu Bai area enroute to operating area.
- (8) At 1540H Company L located 1200 lbs of rice at ZC 140982.
- (9) At 1640H Company I arrived in operating area and located in the vicinity of ZC 117014.
- (10) At 1810H Company L is in night time defensive position vicinity of ZC 136998.
- (11) At 1825H one (1) aircraft found six (6) rockets fifty (50) meters to the rear of Company K. Aircraft reported sighting approximately seventeen (17) VC's. At impact area vicinity of ZC 459821. Search was conducted with negative results.
- (12) At 1855H Company K is in night time defensive position, vicinity of ZC 145982.

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## B. 09 September 1966

- (1) At 0830H Company L, located 1200 lbs of rice and documents in the vicinity of ZC 140982 which were subsequently turned in to the Battalion CP.
- (2) At 1045H the Battalion S-2 section apprehended four (4) VCS in the vicinity of ZC 147987 and subsequently sent to the Battalion CP.
- (3) At 1430H Company K located a spider hole and network of caves in the vicinity of ZC 152985. Area was searched with negative results and subsequently destroyed.
- (4) At 1527H a patrol from Company L discovered an attic full of rice at ZC 139981. A VCS was observed carrying two (2) bags of rice to the same dwelling and was apprehended. VCS and rice was taken to the Battalion CP.
- (5) At 2020H a patrol from Company L initiated an ambush at ZC 139991 on an estimated 5 VC's. Area was swept with negative results.

## C. 10 September 1966

- (1) At 1115H a patrol from Company K discovered what appeared to be a VC P.O.W. compound. Trails leading to the compound had an abundance of punji pits and stakes which were destroyed.
- (2) At 2120H a LP from Company K located at ZD 191002 fired S/A upon an unknown number of VC's. Area was swept with negative results.

## D. 11 September 1966

- (1) At 1153H Company I received sniper fire from 3 VC's vicinity of ZC 093986. S/A fire was returned, area was swept and two sets of drag marks were discovered. Results 2 VC KIA (PROBABLE).
- (2) At 1430H Company K discovered eleven (11), one (1) lb blocks of TNT and one (1) M-26 hand grenade at ZD 172059 which subsequently was turned into the Battalion CP.

## E. 12 September 1966

- (1) At 2210H Company I had contact with approximately 30 VC from the vicinity of ZC 119993. Received

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approximately 30 rounds of S/A fire and one (1) grenade. Fire was returned with approximately 50 rounds of S/A and artillery fire mission was called with good effect on target. Results estimated at 2 VC KIA (PROBABLE).

F. 13 September 1966

- (1) At 1130H Company I received approximately 20 rounds of S/A fire from an estimated 7 VC's in the vicinity of ZC 119976. Fire was returned with S/A fire and artillery mission. Area swept with negative results.
- (2) At 1140H a patrol from Company L reported that a claymore mine had been detonated in the vicinity of ZC 157977 resulting in one (1) friendly WIA. A search of the area revealed 200 feet of communications wire which confirmed the theory that the mine was electrically detonated.
- (3) At 1218H a patrol from Company L received 3-4 rounds of S/A fire from the vicinity of ZC 166978 and countered with S/A fire. Area swept with negative results.
- (4) At 1415H a patrol from Company L discovered a tree OP at ZC 160925 which was subsequently destroyed.
- (5) At 1430H a patrol from Company I received approximately 6 rounds of S/A fire from ZC 117972. The patrol countered with S/A fire, artillery mission was executed, area was searched with negative results.

G. 14 September 1966

- (1) At 0800H Operation PAWNEE II terminated.
- (2) At 1535H the Battalion commenced motor march to the Phu Bai Vital Area.
- (3) At 1715H the Battalion arrived at the Phu Bai Vital Area.

11. RESULTS.

a. Casualties. USMC/WIA - 3 VC KIA PROB - 5

B. Enemy Equipment and Medical Losses.

- (1) Weapons: None

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(2) Equipment:

- 1 bamboo hat with black covering
- 1 Chicom Grenade
- 1 M-26 grenade (U.S.)
- 11 one pound blocks of TNT

c. Friendly Equipment and Material Losses.

- 1 haversack
- 1 magazine (M-14)
- 2 first aid packets
- 1 canteen
- 4 entrenching tools w/cover
- 1 canteen cup
- 5 ponchos
- 2 blanket roll straps
- 1 mosquito head net

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

- A. Supply - Adequate
- B. Maintenance - Adequate
- C. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization - Adequate
- D. Transportation - Adequate
- E. Medical Evacuation - There were three (3) friendly WIA's and three (3) non-battle casualties.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. None were employed.

14. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Upon initiation of PAWNER II, a sweep of the major village complex in our area of operation was conducted. The sweep originated with two companies abreast pushing south to the high ground. No blocking force was positioned due to lack of helicopters, however, artillery blocking fires were substituted. A prepositioned blocking force by helicopter would produce greater results. The sweep took two days without significant contact, however 145 civilians of 25 years of age or under were rounded up and screened by interpreters, National Police and our own CIT, ITT TEAMS. Of the 145 screened, 12 were determined to be VCS. This was the first time the National Police were used by this battalion and they were extremely helpful. The next three days the companies operated from patrol bases where patrols and ambushes were sent out in company areas of responsibility. No contacts were made in the vicinity of any of the villages, however further pursuit into the Jungle Canopy resulted in enemy sightings and several small contacts.



SECRET


15. RECOMMENDATIONS:

That in any type of sweep operation helicopters must be available for quick reaction to seal off the area.

That whenever possible National Police be utilized to augment Marine personnel in search and interrogation operations.

*W. J. Masterpool*  
W. J. MASTERPOOL

SOUTH VIETNAM  
 MAP: 1-50,000  
 SERIES: 1-701  
 SHEETS: 6559 I  
 6659 IV



OPERATION OVERLAY

W. J. MASTERPOOL  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

Enclosure (1)

3/4 C/Chm. Sep 1966  
 w/ Tab. B  
 SIGNATURE