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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein)
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/RGG/abg
5750
0034-67
6 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF
(2) Commanding General, III MEF
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pac

Subj: Command Chronology for 1-30 June 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓ (1) Subject Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1), is submitted.

W. N. Vest
W. N. VEST

Copy to:
3d Marine Regiment

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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SECTION IA. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA:

3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein)
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force

1. COMMAND POST LOCATIONS:

1-2 June 1967 - YD 063648
3 June 1967 - YD 057609
4-5 June 1967 - YD 077606
6-7 June 1967 - YD 087539
8-30 June 1967 - YD 062547 Camp J J CARROLL

MAP: VIETNAM, Series L7014, 1:50,000 Cam Lo and Quang Tri
Sheet Numbers 6342I and 6442IV.

2. Period Covered: 1-30 June 1967a. STAFF OFFICERS:

Commanding Officer	1-30 June 1967	LtCol W. N. VEST
Executive Officer	1-30 June 1967	Maj E. J. FAIRBANKS
S-1	1-30 June 1967	2ndLt L. R. THOMPSON
S-2	1-26 June 1967	MSgt J. H. CHAPMAN
	27-30 June 1967	2ndLt C. J. WEST, III
S-3	1-30 June 1967	Maj J. M. LILLA
S-4	1-30 June 1967	Capt E. O. LEROY
Comm Officer	1-30 June 1967	Capt A. A. JENSEN

b. SUBORDINATE UNITS:

H&S Co	1-6 June 1967	Capt R. K. YOUNG
	7-30 June 1967	Capt H. H. HAWKINS
"I" Co	1-6 June 1967	Capt H. H. HAWKINS
	7-30 June 1967	Capt R. K. YOUNG
"K" Co	1-30 June 1967	Capt J. H. FLATHMAN
"L" Co	1-30 June 1967	Capt D. J. RYAN
"M" Co	1-30 June 1967	Capt C. G. HOILMAN

3. Average Monthly Strength: USMC USN

a. Officers:	35	2
b. Enlisted:	1040	54

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a. Number of replacements received:

USMC Officers .. 4
USMC Enlisted - 17
USN Officers - 0
USN Enlisted - 10

b. Number of personnel rotated: None

c. Breakdown of personnel lost other than rotation:

(1) Transferred by Service Records:

USMC Officers - 1
USMC Enlisted - 39
USN Enlisted - 2

(2) Death non-battle: 0

(3) WIA: USMC Officers - 3
USMC Enlisted - 73
USN Officers - 0
USN Enlisted - 4

(4) KIA: 2 USMC Enlisted KIA

(5) Humanitarian transfer: 0

(6) Non-battle injuries: 3

(7) IntraDiv/Regt transfer: USMC Officers - 3
USMC Enlisted - 18
USN Enlisted - 11

d. R&R trips: 119

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SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE1. ENEMY SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD:

During this period 3d Battalion, 4th Marines area of operation was north of Cam Lo and then the Camp J J CARROLL TAOR.

a. AREA NORTH OF CAM LO:

On Hill # 203 (YD 0464) and surrounding hills numerous bunkers, supported by spider traps were found and destroyed. This area is believed to contain harboring sites for infiltrating NVA units moving south out of the DMZ. This belief is supported by the fact that L/3/4 received 25 rounds of 60mm Mortars on the 1st of June from this position. Company "L" received 35 rounds of 60mm Mortar and sporadic sniper fire on 25 June from Hill 124 (YD 004621). Kho Ma (YD 080597) was found to be heavily booby trapped with DH-10's (NVA's Claymore) and M-26 grenades.

b. CAMP J J CARROLL AND DELTA-5 AREA:

In these areas there has been almost no enemy ground activity. It is believed that 31st NVA Regiment has been employing training cadre in the D-5 area to train the local guerrillas in the use of booby traps.

2. TOTAL ENEMY LOSSES FOR THE PERIOD:

a. Casualties: 1 VC/NVA KIA CONF
1 VC/NVA KIA PROB
4 Detainees

b. Individual Weapons: 1 Chicom SMG (K-50)

c. Equipment: 1 DH-10 Directional Mine

3. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

There has been an increase in the enemies' use of booby traps, sniper fire and mortar fire. There has been no major contact in the TAOR. Intelligence sources indicate that the enemy is replenishing his supplies and personnel for a major ground effort.

4. ENEMY SITUATION AT THE END OF THE PERIOD:

Since the beginning of the month enemy ground activity has decreased.. He is apparently using small sized units to harass patrols and cadre for training the local VC in the use and deployment of booby traps..

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the period 1-30 June 1967. Throughout this period the Battalion was engaged in heavy and constant patrolling.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
H&S Co	Communications Security	1
	Waterproofing and Comm Equipment	1
	Message Preparation	1
	Antennas	1
	Phonetic Alphabet	1
	TI Weapons M-16	3
	FAM Firing M-16	4
	Weapons Inspection M-16 & 106	18
	Care and Cleaning of M-16	12
	Drivers Training	22
"I" Co	Attack on Fortified Positions	12
	Patrols and Ambushes	12
	FAM Firing Crew Served and Individual weapon	12
	Squad Tactics	12
	First Aid, Personal Sanitation	12
	Spot Report, Casualty Procedures	8
	Pyro Signals	8
	NCO Leadership	4
	Weapons Safety	4
	Radio Procedure	4
"K" Co	Functioning and Maintenance of M-16	30
	Weapons Inspection	30
	Map and Compass Reading	10
	FAM Firing of Individual Weapons	8
	NCO Leadership	8
	Military Courtesy	8
	First Aid and Personal Hygiene	3
	Supporting Arms and Adjustments	2
"L" Co	Weapons Safety	3
	Functioning and Maintenance of M-16	4
	FAM Firing of Individual Weapons	6
	Mines and Booby traps	1

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"M" Co

- a. On 12 June 1967, Second Platoon, Company "L", 3/4 Chop to 3/3.
- b. On 18 June 1967, Second Platoon, Company "L", 3/4 Chop from 3/3 to 3/4.

a. 01 June 1967:

- (1) At 0740H, Company "K", found a grave at YD 071669 with 1 NVA body in uniform without weapon. Results: 1 NVA/KIA CONF
- (2) At 1720H, Company "L", at YD 053649 and Company "I" at YD 059642 received 25 rounds of incoming 60mm mortars from vicinity YD 052642. Returned fire with 81mm Mortars and Artillery. Results: (39) USMC KIA.

- (1) At 1810H, Company "L" observed 5 persons at YD 068660. Opened fire with LAAW, M-79, and Small arms. Results: (1) NVA/KIA PROB
- (2) At 1900H, Company "I", at YD 056651 received 4 incoming 82mm Mortars from vicinity YD 043657. Returned fire with 81mm and Artillery. Results: (2) USMC WIA
- (3) At 1920H, H&S Company at YD 062649 received 10 incoming 82mm Mortar rounds from vicinity YD 043657. Returned fire with 81mm and Artillery. Results: No friendly casualties.

(1) At 1945H, a friendly ~~Shrike~~ type air to ground missile designated outside Camp J J CARROLL perimeter at vicinity YD 059559. No friendly casualties.

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d. 15 June 1967:

- (1) At 1115H, Company "M", while on a search and destroy mission, detonated an anti-personnel mine, while probing a punji pit cover to place a charge inside punji pit at YD 120527. Results: (12) USMC WIA

e. 16 June 1967:

- (1) At 2115H, Company "K" spotted moving lights at vicinity YD 025590, 035576, 039582. Fired 60mm and called Artillery mission. Lights went out. Results of firing mission unknown.
- (2) At 2030H, Company "K" at YD 031581 received 16 rounds incoming 40mm fire. Believed to be friendly. Results: (3) USMC WIA.

f. 17 June 1967:

- (1) At 2230H, Company "M" heard movement at vicinity YD 019593. Called in 81mm illumination and opened fire with small arms. Results: Unknown.

g. 18 June 1967:

- (1) At 2230H, Company "M" heard movement at vicinity YD 100510. Called in 81mm illumination and opened fire with small arms. Results: Unknown.

h. 20 June 1967:

- (1) At 1245H, Company "M" tripped a booby trap, while crossing hedge row at YD 102527. Results: (2) USMC WIA
- (2) At 1330H, Company "M" tripped a booby trapped anti-personnel mine on heavily weeded trail at YD 097485. Results: (3) USMC WIA.
- (3) At 2015H, Company "M" apprehended (1) male Vietnamese at YD 106543, without identification. Individual was taken to Cam Lo for interrogation.

i. 21 June 1967:

- (1) At 1850H, Company "M", at YD 120526 spotted VC in black pajamas and carrying weapons at vicinity YD 122531. Called in Artillery mission with unknown results.

j. 22 June 1967:

- (1) At 1015H, Company "M" found 3 NVA graves at YD 124500. Results: (3) NVA/KIA CONF
- (2) At 1130H, Company "M", at YD 121510, while on patrol received one round small arms sniper fire from vicinity YD 125510. No friendly casualties.

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- (3) At 1135H, Company "M" tripped a booby trap at YD 105438. Results: (1) USMC WIA
- (4) At 1215H, Company "M" tripped a booby trap at YD 129511. Results: (3) USMC WIA
- (5) At 1900H, Company "L", while on sweep at YD 081596, tripped two booby traps. Results: (1) USMC KIA, (7) USMC WIA

k. 23 June 1967:

- (1) At 0930H, Company "L" had one man trip a booby trapped Chicom grenade at YD 083599. Results: (1) USMC WIA
- (2) At 1725H, Company "L" at YD 072625 received 10 rounds sporadic small arms sniper fire from vicinity 078622. Returned fire with small arms. Results: (1) USMC KIA
- (3) At 2100H, Company "M" tripped a booby trap at YD 120503, while moving into night time position. Results: (3) USMC WIA
- (4) At 2250H, Company "M" at YD 101511 spotted 2 figures at YD 115515. Opened fire with 7 rounds M-79 and flares. Results: Unknown.

l. 24 June 1967:

- (1) At 1000H, Company "M" apprehended one Vietnamese male with 20 small bags of rice and one Vietnamese female with 4000 piasters at vicinity YD 095515. Both were sent to Cam Lo for interrogation. Results: Both were released.
- (2) At 1603H, Company "M" apprehended 3 Vietnamese males carrying scythes at YD 062582. Two had ID Cards and were released. One had no ID Card and retained for interrogation. Results: (1) Detainee.

m. 25 June 1967:

- (1) At 1515H, Company "M" found harboring site at YD 135535. Also found clothing and documents. Results: Clothing destroyed and documents returned to rear.
- (2) At 1545H, Company "K" apprehended two Vietnamese females without ID Cards at YD 063570. Taken to Cam Lo for interrogation. Results: (2) Detainees.
- (3) At 1930H, Company "L" at YD 067605 received 35 rounds 60mm mortar fire from vicinity YD 077622. Artillery mission called. Results: No friendly casualties.

n. 26 June 1967:

- (1) At 1700H, Company "M" spotted 12 individuals, called 10 who received three rounds sniper fire from vicinity YD 118539. 10 developed engine trouble and had to return to base.

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o. 29 June 1967:

- (1) At 1235H, Company "M" destroyed a concussion type explosive device at YD 125513.
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SECTION VLOGISTICS1. General:

a. There were no major logistical problems encountered during this reporting period. One Battalion size operation was conducted. All units in the field were resupplied by helicopter through the ISA at Dong Ha. Outstanding support in this respect was rendered by the 3d Shore Party Battalion; by personnel at the ISA and HST teams in the field.

b. The move of the Battalion from the field (and some of its elements from Dong Ha) to Camp Carroll and to Ba Long and D-5 was effected smoothly. 9th Motors provided sufficient vehicles for the move. The S-4, 3d Marines was instrumental in arranging for India Company's helolift to Ba Long.

c. Resupply of units at Camp Carroll, and at the outposts at D-5 and Kho Gia Bridge were accomplished by truck without incident. India Company at Ba Long was resupplied daily by helicopter directly from the ISA. HST teams were readily provided by 3d Shore Party Battalion for companies conducting sweeps of three or more days.

2. Supply:

a. Overall supply support during this period was excellent. There was a serious shortage of sandbags at one point but this has been corrected. There still exists numerous shortages in the area of "in country" allowances.

3. Transportation:

a. Motor transport support from the 3d Marines and 9th Motors for tactical and administrative requirements has been sufficient.

b. Heavy employment of the M-274A1(mule) for administrative tasks has resulted in deadlining of a large number of those vehicles. Therefore, a Division Order has placed them in Administrative Deadline - for tactical use only.

c. Spare part shortages for vehicles do exist but has not presented a serious problem in the 1st and 2nd Echelons of Maintenance.

4. Miscellaneous:

None

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SECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS1. Radio:

- a. The Battalion established and maintained the following radio circuits:

Regimental TAC # 1 (FM)

Perimeter Defense (FM)

Bn TAC # 2 (S) (FM)

* Bn TAC # 2 (P) (FM) Reaction Force

* As required.

- b. Supporting Arms:

(1) T CP/PAC established and maintained (1) (FM) and (1) (UHF) net to fulfill their requirements.

(2) Artillery attachments established and maintained (1) (FM) net to meet their requirements.

(3) HST provided their own (FM) net while supporting operations.

- c. While at Camp J J CARROLL, (4) RC-292 antennas were employed for added reliability of radio communications. They were utilized on the:

Perimeter Defense Net

Bn TAC # 2

Regimental T CP (FM)

Artillery Net

In addition, all line companies employed RC-292 Antennas at their CP locations.

2. Wire:

- a. A complete new wire system was installed with three switch boards (SB-72) stacked to provide adequate wire communications within the Battalion CP.

- b. A switchboard (SB-22) and wire system was installed at the Bridge and at the D-5 Defensive positions.

3. Radio Relay:

- a. A radio relay shot was established by the 3d Marine Regiment from Camp J J CARROLL to the CAC unit located in the D-5 area. One (1) channel was allocated to the Battalion for telecom between the Battalion CP and Mike Company CP in D-5, with hours of operation from 0700-1930 daily.

4. Power:

- a. The 11th Engineers Battalion provided Camp power for the Battalion throughout the month of June.

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SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. During June calls for fire from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines were answered by the following Batteries:

Battery "C", 1/12 (105 Howitzer)
 Battery "I", 3/12 (105 Howitzer)
 Battery "M", 4/12 (155 Howitzer)

In addition Battery "C", 1/94th Artillery (175mm Guns) were available.

2. The Missions fired:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>H&I TARGETS</u>
Btry "C", 1/12	18 for 222 rounds	223 for 531 rounds
Btry "I", 3/12	49 for 1016 rounds	259 for 688 rounds
Btry "M", 4/12	15 for 342 rounds	212 for 415 rounds
Btry "C", 1/94th	None	None

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. Air support continued to be a major supporting element for operations in June. Statistics below indicate the use of air.
 2. Several new procedures have been introduced to the TACP. Night MedEvac for a squad size ambush presented one problem because the radio operator was not properly briefed and equipped. Each afternoon the TACP member now briefs the squad on proper procedures for MedEvacs. All night ambushes now carry at least three flash lights for use in guiding MedEvacs.
 - a. MO's: 15
 - b. TPQ's Requested: 188
 - c. Troop Lift: 6 CH46; 13 UH34
 - d. Fixed Wing: 118 Sorties
 - e. MedEvacs: 2 CH46; 15 UH34
 - f. Resupply: 19 CH46; 49 UH34
 - g. Gunships: 2 UH1E
 - h. Recon Airflights: 1 UH1E
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SECTION IXMEDICAL AFFAIRS

1. Medical problems encountered during this reporting period were in the field of sanitation and the treatment of non-hostile casualties in outlying areas.
 2. Upon arrival at the Battalion's new camp site a large rat problem was evident. At the end of this reporting period a firm rat control program is underway with excellent results. Latrines were relocated and Hoads renovated in the area. At this time area sanitation is good with daily improvements. Lost man hours have been difficult to avoid due to having to transport patients from outlying areas to the BAS for treatment of Jungle Rot and infections, which consisted mostly of hot soaks and antibiotics on a daily level. The Battalion Aid Station had had improvements made daily in the working area assigned. Bunker facilities for artillery attack are good with a large medical holding bunker for the treatment of casualties and a large bunker for the protection of patients interned on the ward.
 3. MedCap has been held on a twice weekly basis in the D-5 area since our arrival here with a total of 377 civilians receiving treatment.
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SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS

1. This unit has treated approximately 377 Vietnamese civilians through our MEDCAP program, and is currently employing 50 Montagnards to clear fields of fire outside our perimeter wire.
 2. On 27 June 1967, six houses were destroyed as the result of a defective 60mm Mortar round. The heads of the families were issued six sheets of tin, pots and pans, rice, bulgar, corn, salad oil, and will be awarded a solatium payment of 500 \$VN per family.
 3. One woman suffered minor burns on her back and was treated by the Battalion surgeon. She will be awarded 300 \$VN via a solatium payment.
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SECTION XILESSONS LEARNED PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED1. ITEM: Artillery and Aircraft:

a. Clearance of routine artillery missions is often excessively delayed by a general "Check Fire" for Aircraft in the area. In practice it is often impossible for the Commanding Officer to exercise his responsibility as Fire Support Coordinator within his TAOR. A routine resupply mission once airborne seems to result in an automatic cancellation of all fires for the duration of the mission without regard to the actual presence of aircraft in the area. Attempts to divert aircraft and get fires cleared usually result in total frustration and end with neither supply nor Artillery support. During a multi-Battalion operation someone's aircraft is bound to be constantly on the Gun Target Line. On the question of Save-a-plane this Battalion has actually experienced delays of up to 30 minutes while a Save-a-plane was established for one marking round of illumination, even though H&I fires were continuing to be fired in the same grid as that requested for the illumination round. The conduct of fire net is so cluttered with "Clearing" stations that inquiries as to delay result in a series of "Wait Outs" which provide neither information nor fire.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That the problem of fire support coordination be studied with a view towards flexibility in diverting aircraft, switching missions to different gun positions to alter the gun target line, the reduction of blanket check fires for entire TAOR's and the elimination of unnecessary Save-a-planes.

2. ITEM: Ammunition and 782 Gear:

a. Experience has dictated modifications to the Basic Allowance of ammunition carried and the items of 782 gear issued.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That the following items of ammunition and 782 gear be taken into consideration as basic allowance:

(1) Basic Ammunition allowance for Rifle Company:

- (a) M-16 ammo: 7 Magazines and 1 Bandoleer
- (b) M-26 as prescribed.
- (c) Smoke grenade: 2 Red, 2 Green, and 5 Yellow per squad.
- (d) Hand held illumination: 2 Red, 2 Green, and 4 White per Squad.
- (e) Claymores as prescribed.
- (f) Trip Flares: 1 per fire team.
- (g) LAWS: 1 Per Squad.
- (h) M-79: 24 Rounds.
- (i) M-60 ammo: Gunner 100 rounds, Ammo Carrier 400 rounds, Team Leader 200 rounds, Squad Leader 200 rounds, Asst Gunner 300 rounds, Members armed with M-16 carry 7 Magazines.

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- (j) 60mm Mortar Section: Rifleman 7 Magazines, HE 8 rounds, per gun team, WP 6 rounds per gun team, illumination 5 rounds per gun team.

(2) 782 Gear Issued:

- (a) Blankets: One during monsoon season.
- (b) Mosquito Net: One during hot season.
- (c) Boots: One pair during hot season, 2 pair during monsoon.
- (d) Suspender Straps: Upon request.
- (e) Mosquito Head Net: One during hot season.
- (f) Canteens: 3 per man during hot season, 2 per man during monsoon.
- (g) Ponchos: One per man during hot season, 2 per man during monsoon.
- (h) Haversack: One per man, No knapsack.

3. ITEM: Artillery and Aircraft Preparation Fires:

a. Often artillery and Air to ground preparation firing tend to give away the intended objective and mission.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That Artillery and Air to ground preparations should be fired on different locations simultaneously, in order to confuse the enemy as to what objective you are moving to.

4. ITEM: Resupply and MedEvac Helicopters:

a. With the enemies increased use of rockets and mortars, it is apparent that the resupply and MedEvac helicopters are becoming prime targets. It is important that when helicopters land that there is maximum dispersion and that helmets and flak jackets be worn.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That when supplies are dropped in the LZ, have a minimum of men helping with the handling of supplies to avoid a concentration of men. It is also not desirable to be resupplied in what will be your next night time position, when you know you will be on the move the next day and can be resupplied at a temporary position.

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