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3RD BATTALION/4TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

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10770 P942 of 12 October 1971.

P. C. V. [Signature] 3/2/77
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4 DEC 1967

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HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force 31468
UNCLASSIFIED c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/REY/ALB

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11 Jan 68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF
(2) Commanding General, III MAF
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MEO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5050.8
(c) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, December 1967

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.

Lee R. Bendell
LEE R. BENDELL

SEC FILES
HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (retn)

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- ✓5. "Dye Marker Status Report for C-2".
- ✓6. Camp Terry V. LEACH (Dedication Statement)
- ✓7. new letter 3/4
- ✓8. Letter, 4 pgs. Special Report on 3/4 Assignment at C-2

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~~SECRET~~SECTION IUNCLASSIFIEDORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation/Location.

- a. 3d Battalion (rein), 4th Marines
- b. C-2 (YD 135645), C-2 Bridge (YD 129670) and Defensive Position (YD 173733) Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam

2. Period Covered by Report. 1-31 December 1967.3. Billet Assignments.

a. Commanding Officer	1-31 Dec 1967 LtCol LEE. R. BENDELL
b. Executive Officer	1-31 Dec 1967 Maj J. E. MEAD
c. S-1	1-31 Dec 1967 1stLt J. A. PARKER
d. S-2	1-31 Dec 1967 2dLt B. K. LILE
e. S-3	1-31 Dec 1967 Maj R. K. YOUNG
f. S-4	1-31 Dec 1967 Capt S. E. THOMAS
g. CommO	1-5 Dec 1967 Capt A. A. JANSSEN
	6-31 Dec 1967 MSgt H. L. COATES
h. CO H&SCo	1-31 Dec 1967 1stLt W. R. WILLETT
i. CO Co "I"	1-31 Dec 1967 Capt J. L. PRICHARD
j. CO Co "K"	1-31 Dec 1967 Capt E. O. LEROY
k. CO Co "L"	1-31 Dec 1967 Capt J. D. CARR
l. CO Co "M"	1-31 Dec 1967 Capt R. W. KALM

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~~SECRET~~SECTION II~~UNCLASSIFIED~~S-1 & PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION1. Replacements Received

- a. USMC Enlisted - 220
- b. USMC Officers - 12
- c. USN Enlisted - 13
- d. USN Officers - 1

2. Personnel Rotated

- a. USMC Enlisted - 101
- b. USMC Officers - 0

3. Other Personnel Losses

- a. Transfer by Service Records
 - (1) USMC Enlisted - 13
 - (2) USN Enlisted - 1
- b. Wounded in Action
 - (1) USMC Enlisted - 12
 - (2) USN Enlisted - 1
- c. Killed in Action
 - (1) USMC Enlisted - 1
- d. Humanitarian Transfer - 0
- e. Non-battle Casualties
 - (1) USMC Enlisted - 7
- f. Intra Divisions/Regiment Transfers
 - (1) USMC Enlisted - 36
 - (2) USMC Officer - 8
 - (3) USN Enlisted - 4

4. Number of B&R Trips - 875. Average Monthly Strength

- a. USMC Enlisted - 1111
- b. USMC Officer - 43
- c. USN Enlisted - 56
- d. USN Officers - 3

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Personnel Shortages

a. Officers - <u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Number Needed</u>
Capt	0402	1
Capt	0202	1
WO	0130	1

b. Enlisted - E-6	0369	12
E-1 - E-4	0331	40
E-2 - E-4	2531	12

7. Personnel Overages

a. Officers - <u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Number</u>
Lt	0302	1

8. Personnel Administration still requires delay in processing due to the requirement to route correspondence from the rear area at Dong Ha to forward areas. Courier runs are currently being made daily to minimize delay. Casualty reporting has been improved by assigning an S-1 Representative to the forward areas to accompany the Battalion forward elements during tactical situations to provide timely reporting. Additionally to provide timely and accurate reporting in the rear, an Officer and NCO from the S-1 are immediately dispatched upon notification of a casualty evacuation to the Medical Facility at Dong Ha to provide assistance and obtain necessary casualty reporting information. A representative from Battalion Supply is also dispatched to recover weapons and equipment of casualties.

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SECTION IIIINTELLIGENCE1. Enemy Situation at Beginning of Period.

a. Enemy reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance elements operating in four to ten man teams continued to monitor friendly activities in the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines area of operation, concentrating mainly on the C-2 Bridge position. Enemy bunker positions to the west of the C-2 Bridge were noted while on patrol in that area. The positions consisted of a series of bunker net works, in heavy vegetated areas, which seemed to be three months to six months old, but recently occupied. A noticeable withdrawal of large enemy units was evident, although probable enemy strength adjacent to the Battalion's western boundary was estimated to be one reinforced Battalion of the 90th NVA Regiment. One company (50 to 60 men) of the 27th NVA Battalion operating east of the C-2 position continued to be reported in the vicinity of Thien Chanh YD 165641.

b. Friendly reconnaissance teams operating west of the C-2, C-2 Bridge positions had contacts and sightings of groups ranging from four to twenty men. The reconnaissance teams operating east of the C-2, C-2 Bridge positions encountered a number of booby traps and noted recent enemy harboring sites. Enemy sightings were not made east of the C-2 position during the first half of December indicating a possible withdrawal of enemy forces from that area due to friendly operations and recent losses in personnel strength.

2. Enemy Losses.

a. Casualties: KIA CONFIRMED - 35
KIA PROBABLE - 5
DETAINEES - 11

b. Captured Equipment:

<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
5	AK-47 rifles
10	AK-47 magazines
200	7.62 (short) rounds
1	Surveying instrument (Russian)
1	Surveying tripod
8	NVA packs
3	Hammocks

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AMOUNTITEM

1	TM-41 AT mine
1	DH-10 directional mine
5	CHICOM AP mines
7	CHICOM grenades
5	NVA Uniforms (complete)
3	NVA Cartridge belts
3	CHICOM grenade pouches
15 lbs.	RICE

3. Situation at End of the Period.

The enemy continued to use unconventional warfare tactics employing units of 6-10 men to gather information on friendly positions and movements. Enemy activity of a reconnaissance and harassing nature increased around the C-2 Bridge position. Friendly reconnaissance teams had contacts west of the C-2 position with enemy elements ranging in size from four to twenty man groups. Of significance were contacts both east and west of the C-2 position with artillery survey parties. Captured equipment and documents indicated extensive planning and preparation for the use of indirect fire weapons on friendly positions. Light probes of C-2 were detected using surveillance radar (AN-PPS-5&6), night observation devices (NOD), and Starlight scopes. Probing elements were estimated to be no more than four to six personnel. On 26 Dec 1967, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved to the north-east of the C-2, C-2 Bridge positions and assumed the mission of providing a screening defense for the A-3 position, forward of the trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh. Enemy activity consisted mainly of sniping at patrols and positions in addition to gathering information on friendly activities both day and night. Enemy movement was observed by air to be moderate to the north of the A-3 position; although sightings were of small groups. Heavy enemy contact was experienced north and northwest of the Battalion perimeter just below the southern border of the DMZ and frequent AO spottings were reported of NVA groups in open.

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the period 1-31 December 1967. Throughout this period the Battalion was engaged in constant patrolling as outlined in paragraph 5.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
H&SCo	First Aid	6
	VD Lecture	2
	81mm gun drill	50
	FDC procedures	3
	Safety procedures for 81's	4
	M10 plotting board	4
	Care & Cleaning of 81's, 106's and Flame Tanks	49
	Assembly and Disassembly of Flame Tanks and 106's	4
	Employing Flames and 106's	4
Co "I"	Weapons safety	3
	Night Obs. Device familiarization	5
	Radio procedures	2
	Radio Maintenance	1
	Squad tactics	1
	Patrolling techniques	10
	Immediate action drills	2
	Camouflage	2
	Mapping	5
	Fam firing of all weapons	10
	Care and cleaning individual wpns.	15
	First Aid	1
	M-60	1
	Radio operator class	3
	60 MM	1
	Use of compass	1
	Platoon tactics	2
	Company tactics	2
	LAAW	1
	Use of claymore	1
Co "K"	Leadership	5
	Patrolling	3
	Demolition	1
	Marksmanship/Technique of Fire	20
	Conduct of ambushes	5
	Weapons safety	4

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Co "K"	AN/PPS5.	20
	Mapping/Compass	6
	Field Procedure with the	
	60 mortar	4
	Practical employment of	
	the 60 mortar	20
	First Aid	3
Co "L"	3.5 & LAAW	4
	60mm mortars	1
	Patrolling	3
	Mapping	1
	First Aid	1
	Radio procedures	2
	Weapons Safety	4
	Conduct in RVN	1
	Personal appearance	1
	Maintenance of gear	1
	Personal Hygiene	1
	Ambushes	1
	NVA-VC Tactics	1
	FO Procedures	1
	Search light	1
	FAM M16	13
	FAM M60	6
	FAM .50 cal MG	2
	FAM .45 cal	2
	Command responsibility	2
Co "M"	.45 Cal. pistol (FAM, Care, Clnng)	45
	M16 (FAM, Care&Cleaning)	75
	M60 (FAM, Care&Cleaning)	20
	Map reading	15
	Compass	15
	Field Sanitation	15
	First Aid	3
	Spt rpt & Cas rpt procedures	9
	Radio procedures	7
	60mm gun drill	60
	Night-movement & ambush tech	5

2. In addition to the above, all individual Marines fired their weapons for "zero", prior to assignment to a unit in the field.

3. All replacements were given indoctrination lectures prior to joining their units by the Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major.

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
4. Command and Control

On 4Dec67, 1 Sect, 1st Searchlight Btry chopped from 3/4 to 3/3
 On 5Dec67, 1st Plt(-), Co "A", 3dATBn, (2 Ontos) chopped from 3/4 to 1/3
 On 5Dec67, 3d Plt, Co "C", 3d TKBn, FMF (5 gun tanks) chopped from 3/4 to 1/3
 On 9Dec67, Det 2d Sect, Dog Plt, 3dMPBn, chopped from 3/4 to 3d MPBn
 On 10Dec67, One Plt Co "I" chopped to 3/3
 On 11Dec67, One Plt Co "I" chopped back to 3/4
 On 11Dec67, Co "M"(-) 3/3 chopped to 3/4
 On 11Dec67, Co "M" chopped to 9th Marines
 On 12Dec67, Co "M"(-) 3/3 chopped back to 3/3
 On 12Dec67, Co "M" chopped back to 3/4
 On 24Dec67, 1stPlt, Co "A", 3dTKBn FMF chopped from 3/4 to 2/1
 On 24Dec67, 2dPlt, Co "A", 3dTKBn FMF chopped from 2/1 to 3/4
 On 26Dec67, Co "L" chopped to 1/4
 On 26Dec67, Co "I" chopped to 1/3
 On 26Dec67, Co "A" 1/4, Co "C" 1/4, chopped to 3/4
 On 27Dec67, Co "A" 1/4, Co "C" 1/4, chopped back to 1/4
 On 27Dec67, Co "L" chopped from 1/4 to 3/4
 On 27Dec67, 5thPlt Co "A", 3dTKBn chopped from 3/4 to 1/4
 On 27Dec67, 2dPlt Co "A" 3dTKBn chopped from 3/4 to 1/4
 On 27Dec67, Sect 5thPlt Co "A" 3dATKBn chopped from 3/4 to 1/4
 On 27Dec67, 3d Sect, 1stPlt, 1stSL Btry chopped from 3/4 to 1/4
 On 27Dec67, Co "I" chopped from 1/3 to 3/4
 On 27Dec67, Co "K" chopped from 3/4 to 1/3
 On 30Dec67, Co "K" chopped from 1/3 to 3/4

These were task organized as follows:

C-2 (1-27Dec67)

H&SCo(-) Bn CP
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (Liason team)
 Co "M"(rein)
 Det "C" Co, 3dEngr (2 Demo teams)
 1st Sect, 106's Plt, H&SCo (2 RR's)
 Det Communications Plt, H&SCo
 Det 81mm Plt, H&SCo (FO)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)
 Co "I"(rein) (1-26Dec67) (Co "A" 1/4(rein) 26-27Dec67)
 2dPlt(-) "A" Co, 3dTKBn (2 guns, 1 flame)
 Det Communications Plt, H&SCo
 Det 81mm Plt, H&SCo (FO)
 3d Sect, 1st Plt 1stSL Btry (1 light)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)



C-2 Bridge position (1-27Dec67)

Bn CP Bravo
 Det H&SCo
 Co "L"(rein) (1-26Dec67) (Co "C" 1/4 26-27Dec67)
 5thPlt Co "A" 3dTKBn (4 guns)
 Det 81 mm Plt, H&SCo (FO)
 Sect(+) RR Plt, H&SCo (3 RR's)
 Det Co "C" 3dEngrBn (3 Demo teams)
 Det Communications Plt, H&SCo
 Det Btry "I" 3/12
 Co "K"(rein)
 Sect 2dPlt A/3 ATBn (2 Ontos)
 Sect 5thPlt A/3 TKBn FMF
 3d Sect 106 Plt, H&SCo (2 RR's)
 Det 81mm Plt, H&SCo (4 guns)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)

Defensive position YD #173733 (27-31Dec67)

H&SCo(-) Bn CP
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (Liason team)
 Sqd Scout Sniper Plt, HqCo, 9thMar
 Det Co "C", 3dEngr (2 Demo team)
 Co "I"(rein)
 Sqd 106 Plt H&SCo (1 RR)
 Det Comm Plt H&SCo (FO)
 Det 81mm Plt H&SCo (FO)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)
 Co "K"(rein)
 Sqd 106 Plt H&SCo (1 RR)
 Det Comm Plt H&SCo
 Det 81 Plt H&SCo (FO)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)
 Co "L"(rein)
 Det 81mm Plt H&SCo (FO)
 Sqd 106 Plt H&SCo (1 RR)
 Det Comm Plt H&SCo
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)
 Co "M"(rein)
 Sqd 106 Plt H&SCo (1 RR)
 Det Comm Plt H&SCo
 Det 81mm Plt H&SCo (FO)
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)

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5. Close Combat.

Battery "D" 2/12 at Cam Lo Artillery position is in direct support of 3/4. General support fires are available from the first 8" Howitzer Battery (self-propelled) and 175mm Gun Battery from the 29th Arty (USA) and Batteries "F" 2/12, "E" 1/12, and "K" 4/13. A company at C-2 was assigned the "Rough Rider" convoy security mission when required. 3/4 units assisted coordination of the flow of convoy traffic north on the MSR, from Cam Lo to Con Thien. Convoy control points were established at C-2 and C-2 Bridge position. OP's were manned at the towers of C-2 and an OP at C-2 Bridge position.

Continuous improvement of defensive positions was emphasized and considerable progress was achieved at all positions at the C-2/C-2 Bridge complex. All companies conducted daily patrols and established night time LP's/ambushes or conducted night time patrols as directed by CO 3/4 daily fragmentary order. At the defensive position forward of A-3, the battalion was dispersed with three companies on the perimeter and one in reserve. Patrolling was principally east and west due to the proximity of the DMZ to the north. Other significant events of a non-combat nature have been included in the chronological summary for historical and record purposes.

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1Dec: Four patrols and one night ambush were conducted: Co "I" platoon patrol west of C-2, Co "K" platoon patrol west of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge and Co "M" squad patrol northwest of C-2. At 1620H, Co "K" ambush spotted one NVA using binoculars at YD 123671. Fired 81mm mortars with good target coverage, results unknown. At 1706H, Co "K" patrol found 13 prone shelters at YD 119673. Shelters were two to three days old and had good observation of C-2 Bridge. In the same area found NVA battle dressing, part of poncho, two caps of 82mm mortars, one day old human defecation on top of ground and anti-american leaflets in english.

2Dec: Four patrols and three night ambushes were conducted: Co "I" squad patrol northwest and squad night ambush north of C-2, Co "K" platoon patrol northwest and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol northeast and squad ambush south of C-2 Bridge, and Co "M" platoon patrol southeast of C-2. At 0945H, while on a patrol, Co "M" had an accidental discharge resulting in one medevac non-hostile casualty. He was medevaced by vehicle to Dong Ha "D" Med. At 1600H, three artillery rounds impacted outside the perimeter at C-2 at YD 135655; origin of rounds unknown. At 2055H, Co "K" ambush spotted movement, sprang ambush and checked out area with negative results. No USMC casualties.

3Dec: Four patrols and three night ambushes were conducted: Co "I" squad patrol southwest and squad night ambush south of C-2, Co "L" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush east of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge. At 1240H, a man from Co "K" suffered suspected epileptic seizure. Man medevaced by vehicle to Dong Ha, "D" Med.

4Dec: Four patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "K" platoon patrol to the west and squad night ambush to the northwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2, Co "M" squad patrol southeast of C-2. At 1030H, chopped 1 Sect, 1st Searchlight Btry to 3/3. At 1410H, one AP mine was detonated in minefield at C-2 by stray round during FAM firing. At 1840H, engineers and Fire Team for security attempting to blow dud ammo south of the C-2 perimeter received one sniper round from vicinity YD 130636. Unit pulled back in perimeter due to darkness.

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5Dec: Two patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" patrol to west and night ambush to south of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2. At 0930H, 1st Plt(-) Co "A", 3dATBn (2 Ontos) and 3dPlt Co "C" 3dTKBn FMF (5 gun tanks) chopped from 3/4 to 1/3. At 1435H, CG, 3d MarDiv, MajGen TOMPKINS, with Col MILLER and LtCol STEWART, arrived at C-2 for briefing on progress of Dyemarker project by CO 3/4.

6Dec: Five patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol and squad night ambush northwest of C-2 and Co "M" platoon patrol east of MSR between C-2 Bridge and C-2, and squad patrol east of C-2. At 1300H, Recon unit in 3/4 AO hit explosive device at YD 156658. Explosive device directional claymore type detonated by trip wire. Recon extracted by helicopter. At 2025H, PPS-6 acquired target at YD 121671. 81mm mortars adjusted on target by device. Rounds on target area checked out at first light with negative results.

7Dec: Five patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2, and Co "M" platoon patrol west of MSR between C-2 Bridge and C-2, and squad patrol northeast of C-2.

8Dec: Two patrols and two ambushes conducted: Co "K" Company patrol to the east and squad night ambush to the north of C-2 Bridge, Co "M" platoon patrol between C-2 Bridge and C-2, Co "I" squad night ambush west of C-2. At 1315H, Col E. S. SCHICK Jr., CO 12th Marines, visited MPQ-4 and MPQ-10 at C-2. At 1400H, Co "K" reported stream at YD 141664, 6 feet deep, unsafe to cross, and a very swift current. Patrol returned to C-2 Bridge. At 1930H, three Marines were burned with gasoline while cooking food in bunker at C-2 Bridge. Casualties treated and released at C-2 BAS.

9Dec: Five patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "K" squad patrol northeast and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol southwest and squad night ambush north of C-2, Co "M" platoon patrol east of MSR between C-2 Bridge and C-2, and squad patrol east of C-2. At 1245H, Co "K" patrol found at YD 135678 two bunkers 12' x 4' x 5'. Top cover of one consisted of tin and 12" of dirt, other bunker, wood and 12" dirt. Bunkers were occupied recently and were destroyed with demolition.

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At 1430H, Co "K" at C-2 Bridge spotted three NVA at YD 134673. 81mm mortars fired with good target coverage. Patrol checked out area immediately with negative sightings. At 1458H, CG 3d MarDiv, MajGen TOMPKINS, and CO 9th Marines, Col SMITH, visited C-2 and C-2 Bridge. At 1920H, AN/PPS-6 acquired suspected troop movement at YD 122668. 60mm and 81mm mortars were called on target. Area checked out in morning with negative findings. At 2000H, Co "K" position heard movement to west of C-2 Bridge perimeter, brushes moving and twigs snapping. Position opened up with small arms and heard no further movement. At 1400H, Det 2d Scout Dog Plt, 3dMPBn chopped from 3/4 to 3dMPBn.

10Dec: Two patrols and two ambushes were conducted: Co "K" squad night ambush to northwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" (rein) patrol northeast of C-2, and Co "M" platoon patrol west of MSR from C-2 Bridge to C-2. At 0826H, a fire was discovered in bunker #1 at C-2. Fire was started by a candle, with minor damage. At 1735H, 3/4 chopped one platoon from Co "I" to 3/3.

11Dec: Four patrols and three night ambushes were conducted. Co "K" squad patrol northeast and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" squad patrol west and squad night ambush south of C-2 Bridge, and Co "M" platoon patrol east of MSR between C-2 and C-2 Bridge, and squad patrol west of C-2. At 1125H, Co "M" squad patrol found and blew with demo a 250 Lb. bomb at YD 127654. At 1545H, one platoon from Co "I" chopped from 3/3 to 3/4. At 1700H, Co "M" (-) 3/3 arrived at C-2 and was chopped to 3/4. At 1715H, Co "M" 3/4 departed C-2 and was chopped to 9th Marines, moving to Dong Ha as Regimental reaction force due to heavy contact in the Cua Viet area.

12Dec: Two patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "K" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, and Co "I" squad night ambush north of C-2. At 1445H, Co "M" 3/4 returned to C-2 from Dong Ha and chopped from 9th Marines to 3/4. At 1515H, Co "M" (-) 3/3 departed C-2 and was chopped back to 3/3.

13Dec: Five patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" six man two day patrol to the east and squad night ambush to northwest of C-2 Bridge. Co "I" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2 and Co "M" platoon patrol east of C-2 and platoon patrol west of MSR between C-2 and C-2 Bridge. At 1453H, a recon unit at YD 103642 engaged one NVA on trail. At 1730H, recon unit at YD 153637 saw five NVA walking east to west on trail. All were armed with AK-47's. Recon engaged with small arms and broke contact.

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14Dec: Seven patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" platoon patrol to the west, and seven man three day patrol to the west and a squad night ambush to the southeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" six man two day patrol continued, Co "K" platoon patrol to the east and squad night ambush to the northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 and Co "M" platoon patrol east of MSR between C-2 and C-2 Bridge and platoon patrol southeast of C-2. At 1020H, a Marine from Co "M" dropped an M-16 resulting in an accidental discharge while inside defensive perimeter. He was medevaced overland. At 1010H, Maj PAYNE (Senior Army Advisor to Cam Lo District) asked for and received one squad to accompany PF's to investigate arms cache. Vietnamese civilian reported cache and was payed a token sum for leading patrol to cache. Three 81mm mortar rounds were found vicinity YD 139563.

15Dec: Three patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" seven man three day patrol west of C-2 Bridge continued and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" Co(rein) patrol to the west and squad night ambush northwest of C-2 and Co "M" squad patrol southeast of C-2. At 1600H, 3/4 placed on alert for possible employment as aid to 1/1 in heavy contact north of Con Thien. After CO and Co Cdmr visit to Con Thien, it was determined reaction force not needed. At 1845H, Co "L" three day seven man patrol spotted bluish smoke coming from tree line (possible enemy cooking fires) at YD 113672, called in artillery on target, checked out area in morning with negative results. At 1930H, AN-PPS-6 detected movement of 4 or 5 figures at YD 122673, 81mm and 60mm mortars were called in on target, movement stopped and then retreated to treeline, area was checked out in the morning with negative results.

16Dec: Five patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" continued three day, seven man patrol, Co "L" platoon patrol east and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" squad patrol northwest and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" platoon patrol southwest and squad night ambush north of C-2 and Co "M" platoon patrol east of C-2. At 1552H, Gen W. C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, LtGen R. CUSHMAN - III MAF CG, MajGen TOMPKINS, CG 3d MarDiv, BrigGen CHAISSON, COC Div MACV, and BrigGen RASMUSSEN, J-4 MACV, visited and inspected C-2 Artillery position. All comments favorable.

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17Dec: Six patrols and two ambushes were conducted: Co "L" (rein) patrol to the west of C-2 Bridge, set up company patrol base and sent two squad size patrols further west, and later dropped off squad night ambush on the way back to CP. Co "K" squad patrol to the northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol west of C-2 and Co "M" platoon patrol southeast of C-2. At 0110H, Co "K" squad night ambush spotted four enemy at YD 126676. Ambush was sprung and killing zone was checked out with negative results. At 0930H, Co "L" patrol located a tunnel at YD 113677. Smoke grenade was employed prior to entering tunnel. Marine entered tunnel ten minutes later and was overcome from smoke inhalation, medevac was accomplished. At 1115H, Col SMITH, 9th Marines CO, visited C-2 artillery position. At 1130H, Co "L" patrol found 12 covered bunkers size 3'x5'x4' at YD 107674. Bunkers had not been used recently. Bunkers were destroyed. At 2320H, an emergency medevac was requested for Co "K" Marine who was vomiting blood, had severe stomach cramps and a history of peptic ulcer.

18Dec: Four patrols were conducted: Co "L" squad patrol west of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" platoon patrol east of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol west of C-2 and Co "M" squad patrol east of C-2. At 0355H, sniper in Co "K" LP spotted 2 NVA by use of starlight scope at YD 124675. Sniper fired one round, hit one of the enemy and then fired again. Starlight scope confirmed sniper success. Checked out area at first light found blood and evidence that a body had been dragged away, one enemy KIA confirmed. At 0830H, Co "K" patrol found one bunker 3'x5'x3' constructed of heavy logs and mud at YD 133684. Bunker had been recently used. Bunker was destroyed. At 1335H, Co "I" squad patrol observed one individual at YD 122644. Figure was observed only briefly then disappeared into brush. Checked out area with negative results. At 2045H, Co "I" (-) 3/3 arrived at C-2 and was chopped to 3/4. At 2345H, Co "L" LP spotted man digging approximately 200 meters northwest of perimeter; LP opened up with small arms, person disappeared. Area checked out at first light with negative results.

19Dec: A three company operation to the northwest of C-2 and west of C-2 Bridge covering western portion of the area of operations was conducted: At 0315H, a Co "M" Marine received a gunshot wound in upper left leg as a result of an accidental discharge outside C-2 perimeter. He was medevaced overland at first light. At 0850H, Co "K" at vicinity YD 093685 received five rounds of 81/82mm mortars from unknown direction. Three medevac casualties were sustained. Counter mortar fire was called in with unknown results. At 0800H, Co "M" vicinity YD 103683 found two bunkers of logs and mud construction 6'x6'x4'. Bunkers were destroyed. At 1420H Co "M" sustained two heat casualties while on operation. One was medevaced via helo. At 1715H Co "I" (-) 3/3, departed C-2 and was chopped from 3/4 to 3/3.

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20Dec: Three patrols and two ambushes were conducted: Co "L" (rein) patrol to the northeast of C-2, Co "K" platoon patrol northeast and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, and Co "M" platoon patrol southwest of C-2. At 0945H, Co "L" patrol found one booby trap chicom grenade with trip attachment at YD 147655, grenade was disarmed and returned to 9th Marines S-2. At 1212H, Co "L" patrol encountered 4 NVA at YD 154652. Returned fire with small arms resulting in two confirmed enemy KIA. The area was searched and the following gear was found: 3-AK-47's, 6-AK-47 Mag's, 1-chicom grenade, maps, diary, and schematic drawings, surveying instruments and tripod, four pair of HQ-Chi Minh sandals, three hammocks, one package of pens, one fountain pen, three 504th Regt Cigarette lighters, one Russian made stop watch, one haversack, one bag assorted medicine, one NVA flashlight containing propaganda leaflets, five uniforms, twenty pieces other clothing and assorted cooking pots and pans. Contact resulted in one USMC priority medevac. At 1247H, acting on intelligence information, Co "I" Co(rein) with Battalion Command Group moved out to vicinity YD 150637. Co "L" patrol route was altered and started moving towards vicinity YD 158630. One company from 3/3 also moved into a blocking position of the suspected enemy location. At 1730H, Co "I" found two well camouflaged tunnels at YD 147637. Tunnels were 2'x2' in width, depth undetermined. Tunnels showed evidence of being used recently, both were destroyed. Intelligence information on unit headquarters apparently unreliable.

21Dec: Three patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "L" squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "K" squad patrol west and squad night ambush northeast of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" platoon patrol northwest and squad night ambush north of C-2, Co "M" company reinforced patrol east of C-2 linked up with recon unit to search out bunker complex.

22Dec: Four patrols and three night ambushes were conducted: Co "L" squad patrol west of C-2 Bridge and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad patrol west of C-2 and squad night ambush northeast of C-2, Co "K" squad patrol east of C-2 Bridge, Co "M" squad patrol southeast of C-2. At 0815H, Co "L" Marine had an accidental discharge within the defensive perimeter. Marine sustained a minor wound in his left foot and was medevaced to Dong Ha. At 0855H, a Marine from Co "K" burning heads splashed gasoling on self which ignited, burning his left leg. After treatment at C-2 he was medevaced by vehicle to Dong Ha. At 1315H, recon team made contact with twenty-five NVA, in 3/4's AO, at YD 100630. At 1416H, recon team was helo-extracted. At 2025H trip flare was set off in area of YD 124673 and AN-PPS6 picked up three to four targets at edge of woodline. 60mm mortars delivered illumination and HE adjusted with radar. Area checked at first light with negative results.

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23Dec: Four patrols, three ambushes were conducted: Co "K" squad patrol west and squad night ambush west of C-2 Bridge, Co "I" squad night ambush northwest of C-2, Co "L" squad patrol east and squad night ambush east of C-2 Bridge, and Co "M" squad patrol west and squad patrol northeast of C-2. At 2330H, Co "I" observed movement and light at YD 116654. At least two persons were spotted and engaged with 81mm mortars illumination and four HE rounds. Two mines were detonated in the northwest of minefield at C-2, cause undetermined. Co "K" squad checked area at first light and found perimeter wire cut in three places. At 0110H, Co "L" observed suspected enemy movement near C-2 Bridge and received four to six rounds of small arms. Small arms fire was returned after observing muzzle flashes with starlight scope. At 0430H, personnel operating NOD detected two individuals crawling from the brush line to the exterior perimeter wire in order to observe activities at C-2. Observation of area continued but figures did not reappear. At 0828H, 81mm mortars at C-2 fired one short WP round which impacted inside minefield. No casualties were sustained and no mines were detonated. At 1400H, C-2 was dedicated Camp Terry V. LEACH. MajGen TOMPKINS CG 3d MarDiv, Col E. S. SCHICK Jr., CO 12thMar, and Col SMITH, CO 9th Marines attended the dedication ceremony. At 2100H, suspected enemy movement at YD 139641 was detected by AN-PPS6. 60mm mortar illumination and HE rounds were fired on target with good coverage.

24Dec: Three patrols and three ambushes were conducted: Co "K" squad patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge. Co "L" company patrol southeast and squad night ambush southwest of C-2 Bridge. Co "I" squad patrol west and squad night ambush northwest of C-2. At 0355H, Co "M" sighted movement outside perimeter at C-2, fired machine gun and illumination with unknown results. At 1130H, 1stPlt, Co "A", 3dTKBn, chopped to 2/1 and 2dPlt, Co "A", 3dTKBn, chopped from 2/1 to 3/4. At 1545H, Co "I" squad patrol at YD 122640 received seven to ten rounds enemy small arms. Area saturated with 81mm mortar fire, unknown results. At 1415H Co "3/4" made Christmas Party visit to children in An Hung Catholic Church. At 2100H fire broke out in H&SCo bunker occupied by Corpsmen. No personnel injured, bunker total loss. Cause of fire undetermined.

25Dec: Four patrols and two ambushes were conducted: Co "K" platoon patrol west and squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge, Co "L" squad patrol east of C-2 Bridge, Co "M" squad patrol southeast and squad night ambush south of C-2. Co "I" squad patrol west of C-2. At 1715H, Col SMITH, CO 9th Marines visited C-2. At 1850H, two mines detonated on east side of perimeter in minefield. Cause of detonation was animal in minefield. No casualties were sustained. At 2000H, a man from 1/12 "A" Co, received a broken leg from the recoil of a 105 Howitzer. At 2140H, Co "I" position observed movement to the northwest of perimeter, small arms with hand illumination followed by 81mm mortars, HE and illumination were employed.

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One probable enemy KIA resulted. At 2210H, Co "M" position spotted movement north of perimeter. 60mm and 81mm mortars and illumination were fired with unknown results. At 2315H, a recon unit in 3/4's area of operation at YD 093667, after having sporadic small arms contact for several hours was extracted. An aerial observer was shot down near recon position while trying to call in close air.

26Dec: Co "L" and Co "I" along with Battalion CP group, Alpha moved to A-3 at YD 178718 and the Battalion's new defensive perimeter at YD 173733. Two ambushes were held: Co "K" squad night ambush north of C-2 Bridge and Co "M" squad night ambush northeast of C-2. At 1005H, Co "I" while moving near the trace spotted 1 NVA at YD 151713. Small arms fire was brought to bear resulting in 1 confirmed enemy KIA and the following captured equipment: 1-AK-47, 4-full magazines, 1-pack with 15 lbs of rice, 1-magazine pouch, 1-bush kit, 1-olive utility set, 1-pair sandals, and 1-cellophane packet of personal papers. At 1530H, Co "A" 1/4 and Co "C" 1/4 arrived at C-2 and C-2 Bridge respectively. Both company's chopped opcon to 3/4 effective 1530H. At 1600H, Co "L" with Battalion CP group Alpha reached 1/4's position, and was chopped to 1/4. At 1600H, Co "I" reached 1/3 position and chopped to 1/3. At 2300H, five mines were detonated in minefield in the southeastern portion of perimeter. Cause was unknown and no casualties were sustained.

27Dec: Co "K" and Co "M" along with Command Group Bravo joined remainder of Battalion at new defensive position at YD 173733. At 1240H, Co "L" OP took 2 rounds of sniper fire while moving into position. However no casualties were sustained. The following switches in Opcon occurred: At 0900H, Co "I" from 1/3 to 3/4. At 1700H, Co "K" from 3/4 to 1/3. At 1914H, two enemy were sighted at YD 181728 and brought under fire with 50 cal. The enemy ran out of sight. Results of contact were not determined. At 2330H, a flash message from 9th Marines indicated a possible 82mm mortars attack against units in vicinity of Trace, probably Con Thien. However, the attack failed to materialize.

28Dec: Four ambushes and one patrol were conducted: At 1045H, Co "I" patrol found large quantity of USMC 782 gear, small arms ammo, grenades and demolitions at YD 158725. At 1215H, Co "L" received 3 rounds of sniper fire from YD 175743. A man was spotted in a tree line and brought under artillery and small arms fire with unknown results. The artillery reaction time was 8 minutes. At 1315H, Co "L" OP spotted 2 NVA at YD 166736. Snipers with squad OP fired at one NVA who fell, the other disappeared from view. A squad sent to check area had negative results. At 1620H, approximately 10 rounds of estimated 60mm mortar fire was received outside the western perimeter.

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An AO was requested and arrived on station in five minutes. Search of the area by the AO failed to disclose any presence of enemy in area.

29Dec: Three patrols and five ambushes were conducted with negative contact on sightings. At 1445H, approximately 7 rounds of estimated 82mm mortar fire were received from an azimuth of 5200 miles. At the same time, 10-15 rounds of sniper fire were received by Co "I" and Co "L" perimeter. Artillery missions were called on the suspected mortar position with a total reaction time of 25 minutes. The sniper fire was silenced after 106mm RR and 50 Cal MG fire was brought to bear on the enemy. The 25 minute reaction time on the artillery was considered to be too slow and a message was submitted to 9th Marines requesting faster reaction. In view of recurrent mortar attacks on positions, continuous counter-mortar radar coverage was requested from 2/12. At 1910H, a departing ambush unit was discovered to have been observed by an enemy unit. The ambush was recalled and relocated.

30Dec: One company size patrol and four ambushes were conducted: Co "M" patrol at 1130H, located 6 bunkers at YD 167708 with apertures facing to the southwest. All appeared to be quite old and had not been occupied for some time. All bunkers were destroyed with explosives. At 1330H, Co "M" made contact with an estimated force of 3-4 NVA. Later information received revised this estimate to 5-10 NVA in prepared position. Contact continued until 1445H, after which Co "M" broke off the engagement to medevac casualties. The contact resulted in one enemy confirmed killed and one probable. Co "M" sustained one killed and four medevac casualties. At 1700H, Co "I" fire team with attached sniper team observed three NVA at a distance of 30 meters and brought them under fire. Three confirmed kills were recorded for the units. At 1400H, Co "K" chopped from 1/3 to 3/4.

31Dec: Three patrols and four night ambushes were conducted: At 1125H, Co "I" company patrol made contact with an estimated force of ten NVA at YD 157744. As the enemy force was brought under small arms and artillery fire, one enemy confirmed killed was reported. During the initial contact, Co "I" reported jamming of their internal radio net (M-193) by the enemy. At 1155H, a second small enemy force was observed by Co "I" at YD 157744, brought under fire and pinned down. A second enemy KIA resulted. At 1225H, Co "I" began to receive 82mm mortar fire from YD 148734. Co "I" returned 60mm counter-mortar fire until an AO arrived on station. The AO spotted 8 NVA in the open and adjusted fire from Co "I"'s 60mm mortars. The AO reported 1 probable who appeared to be seriously wounded. The AO at 1350H, ran a coordinated air strike employing Huey gunships at YD 157743. NVA were observed to be dragging 8 bodies into a tunnel.

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At 1355H, Co "I" began to break contact, covering their withdrawal with artillery fire. At 1513H, Co "I" returned to the 3/4 position. A detailed report from the Battalion Commander described the action as follows:

"The Darting Star Co "I" patrol initially spotted and engaged four to five NVA, deployed into a perimeter and called in 60mm mortar fire. As ever increasing numbers of NVA appeared to the front and right front. Working with an AO they saturated enemy positions with small arms, M-79 and 60mm mortar fire. With artillery fire in check, the AO operated close to friendly troops and adjusted 60mm counter-mortar fire on NVA mortar crews emplaced in open bomb craters with excellent results. As artillery fire was called in, the NVA would run into the open presenting a easy targets for riflemen and machine gunners. Enemy mortar fire generally fell short of friendly lines. Many NVA were killed as they stood erect to shoot at the AO and Huey gunships which arrived later. Artillery fire threw bodies into the air as Co "I" "walked" 155mm fire toward their lines. Sniper teams with Co "I" had much success. Co "I" Commander is being recommended for an award for outstanding employment of supporting arms, effective control of his units and prompt reporting in addition to an individual act of heroism in recovering one of his wounded snipers. As Co "I" broke contact, a large unit of NVA with apparent USMC uniforms were observed moving toward contact."

The contact resulted in twenty-seven confirmed enemy kills, one AK-47 rifle and other miscellaneous gear captured.

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SECTION VLOGISTICS1. General

a. There were no major logistical problems encountered during this reporting period. The battalion remained at the C-2 and C-2 Bridge positions until the 26th of December, when two companies moved to new positions just north of the "trace" and of A-3 position. The rest of the Battalion moved into the new position on 27Dec67.

b. Daily resupply was effected to the C-2 and C-2 Bridge positions over the road. Resupply convoys were controlled using our organic assets with 9th Motor Transport Battalion providing the necessary vehicles. No critical shortage of any major items of supply existed during December.

2. Supply

a. The overall supply support during this period is considered satisfactory.

b. Some shortages in Class II supplies existed and were reported on the logistic Summary Report:

- Poncho Liners
- Magazine Pouches
- Bag, Waterproof
- Matress, pneumatic
- Entrenching Tool
- Bayonets
- Utilities, Lt Wt., Medium & Small
- Flame Throwers

3. Transportation

a. Motor transportation support from 9th Motors was satisfactory. Helicopter resupply was commenced 27Dec67.

b. The deadline rate for the M-422A1 (mite) for this reporting period was forty percent; of twenty M-422A1 vehicles eight are deadlined. Four of the eight deadlined vehicles are in FLSU for repairs. One vehicle in the motor pool is awaiting evacuation to FLSU for repairs. The remaining three vehicles are being worked on at this time.

c. There are five communications vehicles in the Battalion of which one is deadlined. An M-38A1 MRC-83 is deadlined for a part which is on order.

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d. The battalion rates four M-37B1 (PC) vehicles. We have three. One is in FLSU for a new engine and two are running. One other M-37B1 was destroyed by enemy action and a replacement is on order.

e. The inability to get parts when needed adds to a high deadline rate. At present we are awaiting the initial issue of parts that should have arrived with the M-274A2 (mule). We have two vehicles now deadlined for parts that should have arrived with the vehicles. The initial issue should have arrived sometime in October when we received the vehicles. There is a recurring problem with the M-422A1; it has a tendency to throw a wheel while moving. This is partly due to faulty hub design, and also to the rough terrain over which the vehicles travel. We are trying to alleviate this problem by torquing the hub nut to 130 pounds.

V-2

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECTION VI

COMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS

1. Radio

a. The Battalion maintained stations on the following radio nets while at C-2 position:

Regimental TAC #1 (FM) (RC-292)
 Regimental TAC #2 (FM) (RC-292)
 Regimental TAC #3 (FM) (RC-292)
 Battalion TAC (FM) (RC-292)
 Convoy Control (FM) (RC-292)

b. At the Bravo Command Post position (C-2 Bridge) stations were maintained on the Battalion TAC and Regimental TAC #1 nets utilizing RC-292 Antennas and FM equipment.

c. Supporting Arms

(1) TACP/FAC - in addition to the forementioned air net in paragraph (a), one (UHF) station was employed.

(2) Artillery attachments maintained one (FM) station at both C-2 and C-2 Bridge Command Posts to meet their requirements.

d. The Battalion presently maintains stations on the following radio nets while forward of the A-3 position:

Regimental TAC #1 (FM) (RC-292)
 Regimental TAC #3 (FM) (RC-292)
 Battalion TAC (FM) (RC-292)
 Battalion Admin (FM) (RC-292)


e. Supporting Arms

(1) TACP/FAC - maintain one (UHF) station on position.
 (2) Artillery attachment maintain one (FM) station at present position to meet their requirements.

2. Wire

a. The Battalion rear at Dong Ha maintains wire communications within the Battalion rear CP area and two trunk lines to 9th Marines Regiment. One SB-22 is employed.

b. While at C-2 Bridge position wire communications were provided for both companies and supporting arms. Wire Communications were provided down to the squad level at both companies. Two SB-22 (switchboards) were employed.



c. The Battalion Command Post at C-2 position maintained wire communications within the CP and provided two trunk lines to 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, at Cam Lo. Three SB-22 (switchboards) were employed.

d. The Battalion presently maintains wire communications within the CP and two trunk lines to 3d Battalion, 3d Marines located at A-3 position, and also established a hot-line between COC's.

e. While at C-2 position the wire section was augmented with equipment from Dyemarker sources. Two SB-22 switchboards, and fifteen TA-312 telephones.

3. Radio Relay

a. While at C-2 position Radio Relay (AN/TRC-27) was employed between C-2 position and 9th Marines. Equipment and personnel were provided by 9th Marines.

b. In the Battalion's present position (Forward of A-3) it utilizes Radio Relay established between A-3 and 9th Marines. The Battalion is assigned two channels. One channel a Common User, and one channel which is a Hot-line between this Battalions COC and 9th Marines COC.

4. Power

a. Power for the Battalion rear at Dong Ha is provided by the 11th Engr Battalion.

b. While at C-2, the entire position was being furnished power by 12th Marines Radar site for a period of time.

c. The Communication Platoon of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines along with materials and generator furnished by 11th Engr Battalion surveyed, engineered, and constructed a pole line for camp power. A PU-239 generator was utilized. 3 Phase power, two phases 120v for living and working spaces, and one phase 240 for galley reefer.

d. At present position no power is required.

VI-II

ENCLOSURE (1)



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SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT OCCORDINATION

1. During the period from 1-26Dec67, while 3/4 was operating in the C-2 area, direct support was provided by Delta Battery 2/12. From 26-31Dec67, while 3/4 was operating north of A-3, direct support was provided by Echo Battery 2/12. During the month of December, calls for fire were also answered by "F" Btry 2/12, "A" Btry 1/12, "W" Btry 1/12, "K" Btry 4/12, and 1st 8" HOW Btry. These batteries were assigned general an/or reinforcing support as appropriate.

2. During the month of December, forward observers operating with 3/4 called in 143 fire missions expending 1,948 rounds. An additional 1,983 rounds were expended on 490 H&I targets.

3. Summary of fire support, 1-31 December 1967:

<u>I Battery</u>	<u>Fire Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
"D" 2/12	64	757
"E" 2/12	26	492
"F" 2/12	14	141
"A" 1/12	10	108
"W" 1/12	6	47
"K" 4/12	18	358
1st 8" HOW	5	45
	<u>143</u>	<u>1948</u>

<u>II Battery</u>	<u>H&I Targets</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
"D" 2/12	271	1202
"E" 2/12	41	143
"F" 2/12	35	105
"A" 1/12	38	108
"W" 1/12	35	105
"K" 4/12	45	225
1st 8" HOW	25	95
	<u>490</u>	<u>1983</u>

VII-1

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. During the month of December the weather was favorable for all 3/4's air support. All medevacs were completed promptly. AO's did a fine job of VR for 3/4's patrols whenever requested.

2. The following is a summary of air support for the period 1-31 December:

a. Fixed wing	None
b. AO Aircraft	12
c. Resupply	None
d. Medevacs	7 UH-34's, 1 53
e. Troop lifts	VR-3, C&C-4, troop lift(2-53&2gunships)
f. SAR	None
g. TPQ's	Requested-7, Run-4

3. Gear, H&S Troops, and 4 106 RR's with mules were helilifted from C-2 to 3/4 position forward of the trace on 27Dec67.

VIII-1

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SECTION IXMEDICAL AFFAIRS

1. Medical problems encountered during this reporting period were of a minor nature in the field of sanitation and the treatment of non-hostile casualties.

2. At C-2 a firm rat control program was underway with fair results. At the Battalion rear area latrines were relocated and new heads constructed to replace old ones. At this time area sanitation is excellent with daily improvements. During this report the Battalion health has been excellent with the exception of a few minor injuries and diseases.

3. No MedCap conducted during this reporting period.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS

1. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines did not have a civil affairs responsibility while at the C-2 and C-2 Bridge position. However close liaison was maintained with the Cam Lo District Advisors and Vietnamese Civil Military Officials. A "Food for Work" program was continued so as to provide the necessary sandbags required at the C-2 position. A Children's Christmas party was given by the Battalion in the village of An Hung at Father Neyroun's Church on the 24th of December. Lieutenant Colonel BENDELL and representatives from the Battalion attended. A donation of money collected from within the Battalion was presented to Father Neyroun along with boxes of assorted clothing. Ice cream, cookies, and cake were given to the one hundred and fifty children in attendance which seemed to be a real treat for them. The Children's Christmas party was a very successful and worth while Civil Affairs effort.

X-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

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~~SECRET~~SECTION XI~~SECRET~~ PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED1. Patrol of Opportunity.

a. In areas where small enemy recon and intelligence activities occur, the "Patrol of Opportunity" proved of value. The "Patrol of Opportunity" as used by 3/4 was a small size patrol used by rifle companys to supplement regular security combat and recon patrols in the battalion's area of operation. The patrol operated for several days at a time. It ranged out to 4000 meters from a permanent defensive base. The patrol was instructed to engage or report small enemy recon and infiltrating units. It thus was to provide surveillance and intelligence information in the battalion area of operation where larger units would have been more easily detected. The patrols were composed of from six to nine well trained and highly motivated Marines. The nucleus of the patrol of opportunity was two snipers and one officer. In the daytime the scout snipers can then move to a new position several hundred meters away and engage the enemy again or the patrol could use supporting fires such as 81mm mortars, artillery or close air to engage the target spotted. At night the patrol positioned itself in a concealed area near an avenue of approach. A starlight scope was used by the scout snipers in an attempt to detect and engage the enemy at some distance. Because the patrol of opportunity operated at some distance from the battalion perimeter, maximum coordination with supporting fires, recon and air support elements was effected. Several individuals in the patrol were capable of calling in and adjusting 81mm mortars, artillery and air support. This capability gave the small patrol an enormous fire power potential. Other members of the patrol included a corpsman, radioman and riflemen as desired. The patrol was drawn from the rifle company and operated in the company's patrolling area. Members of the patrol were volunteers from each platoon of the company. Members of the patrol thus later served as guides for platoon and company size operations in the area.

b. A small, hard hitting, well disciplined, well trained team using supporting arms, scout snipers and aerial observers to the maximum has the potential of detecting and preventing enemy recon elements from nearing a static defensive position. It also added a more flexibility to the daily security, combat and recon patrols in the battalion's area of operation.

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2. Patrolling: In areas where companies were patrolling out to as far as 3000 meters from a base camp with negative contact or sightings, yet where defensive base positions were still getting occasional probes on the lines, a new tactic was tried. A squad size unit was sent out about 3000 meters with a company size unit following in trace less than a thousand meters. The company set in an area that had thick undergrowth while the squad patrolled out in a rather open rice paddy area not more than one thousand meter distance. If the squad made contact the company was ready to be employed as an immediate reaction force in less than 10 minutes. A variation of this technique was also tried. A company moved out of its base perimeter under the cover of darkness. A company size base camp was set up about 3000 meters out. From this base camp several squad sized patrols were sent out. If the patrol made contact a company size reaction force could have exploited the contact immediately.

3. Fire Safety in Wooden Living Bunkers.

a. Maximum fire safety precautions must be maintained to prevent the possibility of fire in wooden living bunkers. All candles, lanterns, kerosene stoves or other flame producing instruments should be extinguished when the bunker is unoccupied. When personnel are sleeping, flame producing instruments should also be extinguished. All candles should be placed in metal containers to avoid tipping over and to keep the candle from burning down and catching wood on fire. All heating stoves will be mounted in dirt or sand to avoid contact with combustible materials. Candles will not be used where electric lights are available. Gasoline, kerosene and other combustibles should not be stored in or near living bunkers. Pyrotechnics, grenades and other ammunitions should not be stored in or near living bunkers. Each living bunkers should have a 55 gallon drum of water with a bucket nearby.

b. An officer at each one of the Dyemarker sites should be designated as fire marshall. He would make recommendations on fire prevention, inspect the bunkers on a periodic basis and coordinate with the NCO in charge of each bunker. Senior man in each living bunker should be responsible for fire safety. He should make periodic inspections to see that safety regulations are complied with.

4. Harboring and Cache Sites: In reacting to intelligence of possible enemy harboring sites, low ground, defiladed areas and locations near running streams should be checked thoroughly. Friendly units often will seize the high ground, observe the area around it, and then move out without searching the low land. The enemy has been found to use areas in defilade, valleys and thick vegetation most frequently as a harboring site.

HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 4th Marines
3rd Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

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1/LRB/aj
004000
28 December 1967
Ser: 0066-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment

Subj: Special Report on 3/4 assignment at C-2

Encl: - (1) Op Order 2-67 (Defense of Cam Lo Complex) } missing
- (2) Annex J (C-2 Bridge Defense) to Op Order 2-67 }
✓ (3) CO 3/4 Dyemarker Status Report of 26 December 1967
✓ (4) CO 3/4 Dyemarker Installation, suggestions concerning of 30 Dec 1967

1. Purpose. The purpose of this report is to summarize 3/4 experience, accomplishments, and future plans at C-2 for the information of senior and relieving Commanders and to thus provide a record of events. Enclosures (1) and (2) will be appended only to the copy of this report going to the Commanding Officer 1/4.

2. Background. Although areas of responsibility for 3/4 have changed, C-2 has remained a part of this Battalion's mission from 14 September to 27 December 1967. On 10 September 1967 3/4 exchanged areas of responsibility with 3/9 at C-3 (Cam Lo)/C-2 Complex. However, on this same date 3/4 was alerted to move to the assistance of 3/26 northwest of C-2. It was not until 14 September that 3/4 resumed opcon of C-2 and C-3. Since that time 3/4 has defended all four positions in this general area (Cam Lo Bridge, C-3, C-2, and C-2 Bridge). On 22 November 3/4 took opcon of C-2 Bridge and chopped C-3 and C-3 Bridge to 3/3. This report will confine its discussion to the C-2 and C-2 Bridge positions.

3. Task Organization at C-2 and C-2 Bridge.

a. C-2 (14 Sep to 27 Dec 67)

Bn CP Bravo (14 Sep - 3 Nov 67) Bn CP (3 Nov - 27 Dec 67)
H&S Co (-) (14 Sep - 27 Dec 67) (Includes 2 RR and 4 81mm mortars)
Co I (Rein) (14 Sep - 4 Nov 67) (13 - 14 Nov 67) (17 Nov - 26 Dec 67)
Co M (Rein) (14 Sep - 18 Oct 67) (24 Nov - 27 Dec 67)
Co G (Rein) 2/4 (18 Oct - 16 Nov 67)
Co K (Rein) 3/3 (17 Nov - 24 Nov 67)
Plt (Rein) Co L 3/4 (4 Nov - 16 Nov 67)
Plt (Rein) Co F 2/4 (3 Nov - 6 Nov 67)
Plt, 3rd AT Bn (5 onto 14 - 30 Sep 67) (2 onto 30 Sep - 4 Nov 67)
Plt, 3rd AT Bn (2 onto 14 - 30 Sep 67)
Tm, 1st Searchlight Btry (1 searchlight initially) (2 searchlights as of 1 Nov 67)

Sec Co A 3rd Tk Bn (2 tks 14 - 30 Sep 67) (4 tks, 1 flame, 30 Sep - 27 Dec 67)

Det, 3rd Engr Bn (1 demo tm 1 Oct - 5 Nov 67)
Det, Scout Sniper Plt HqCo 9thMar (1 tm 1 Oct - 27 Dec 67)
Det, 2nd Scout Dog Plt 3rd MF Bn (1 tm 21 Nov - 27 Dec 67)

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b. Resident Units at C-2 not under 3/4 opcon included:

F Btry 2nd Bn 12thMar (14 Sep - 19 Dec 67)
 E Btry 2nd Bn 12thMar (20 Dec - 27 Dec 67)
 A Btry 1st Bn 12thMar (6 Nov - 17 Nov 67) (28 Nov - 27 Dec 67)
 K Btry 4th Bn 13thMar (14 Sep - 27 Dec 67)
 Sec, 1st 8" How Btry
 Co A (-) 3rd Engr Bn (10 Sep - 25 Nov 67)

c. C-2 Bridge (5 Nov - 12 Nov 67) (22 Nov - 27 Dec 67)

Bn CP Charlie (5 Nov - 12 Nov 67) (14 Nov - 16 Nov 67); Bn CP Bravo (22 Nov - 27 Dec 67)
 Co I (-) (Rein) 3/4 (5 Nov - 12 Nov 67)
 Co C (-) (Rein) 1/9 (6 Nov - 12 Nov 67)
 Co L (Rein) 3/4 (5 - 6 Nov 67) (22 Nov - 26 Dec 67)
 Co K (Rein) 3/4 (22 Nov - 26 Dec 67)
 Plt (Rein) 3rd Tk Bn (4 Gun Tank) (6 Gun Tank from 28 Nov - 27 Dec 67)
 Det, H&SCo (Includes 4 RR and 4 81mm mortars)
 1st Sec 3rd Plt 1st Searchlight Btry (1 searchlight)
 1st Sec 5th Plt Co A 3rd AT Bn (2 ontos)
 Det, 3rd Engr Bn (Demo tm)

4. Enemy Situation. During the month of September, enemy artillery, rocket and mortar fire and ground activity increased in the C-2 area. Enemy observation of C-2 from Hills 117 and 174 enabled him to adjust accurate fires on friendly positions and convoys along the MSR. This concentration of activity in and around C-2 continued into the month of October. The primary objective during this time centered on the interdiction of the MSR and Route #9. Towards the end of October there was a marked decrease in enemy activity. In November and December enemy incoming rocket, artillery and mortar harassment was negligible at C-2. Enemy ground activity around C-2 and C-2 Bridge was confined mostly to reconnaissance of friendly positions and monitoring friendly patrol activities.

5. Conduct of Operations and Accomplishments at C-2.

a. Bunker Construction (Initial Stages). On assuming the defensive mission of C-2 on 14 September, 35 of the then planned 48 18x24 bunkers were framed out, and most had back fill on the sides plus limited sandbag protection on the roofs. During 15 - 18 September, heavy rainfall inundated the C-2 area, proving many bunkers uninhabitable with inadequate waterproofing and drainage. Almost all of the 22 non-perimeter bunkers were constructed principally below ground surface. Those on the perimeter were built on hillside slopes and had adequate drainage. Bunkers without adequate drainage were flooded to an average of four feet of water and mud during the heavy rains. The first priority of work was trenching for drainage and covering the bunkers. During September construction of the basic 48 18x24 bunkers was completed, and about 30 September an additional 15 18x24, 1 12x18 (Arty FDC), and 18 12x18 (Ammunition) bunkers were approved primarily for the artillery position. These were constructed by the end of October.

b. Bunker Construction (Final Stages). As of 27 December 81 bunkers had been framed out and had protection on the roofs. One was destroyed by fire on

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24 December, 67 of the bunkers are complete in all respects. 25 have the roof constructed with the membrane under the burster layer as prescribed and 32 have the membrane over the burster layer rather than completely remove previous work. On 15 November the T-17 membrane arrived on this position and as it was installed all bunkers were "coned" on top to provide better drainage. To improve the underground drainage from those bunkers built into the ground, a drainage ditch was constructed with a culvert at floor level to drain off accumulated water. Protection for the vents under the roof was also developed that allowed for air circulation and provided blast protection from incoming artillery fire. Although a plan has been developed for interior living arrangements only one bunker had been so constructed with plywood bunkers by the Engineers. As of 27 December the 3d Engineer Battalion planned to pre-cut the material and deliver it to the C-2 position for infantry installation.

c. Minefield. As of the 14th of September, 180° of minefield to the west had been completed. The remaining 180° of minefield was completed by the 11th Engineers by the end of September. The field contains four strips and an irregular outer edge. The width of the minefield is 130 paces and circumvents the entire C-2 perimeter of approximately 5000 meters. The density of the field is 2 M-16 and 4 M-14 per yard of frontage. Since the laying of the minefield there have been a number of detonations without apparent cause. This will necessitate eventual maintenance by engineer personnel. Additional lanes should be breached to the east and west. This will allow for greater flexibility in planning patrol routes of exit and entrance. A request for lanes was submitted in the month of November; there has yet been no reply to the request.

d. Drainage. As indicated above, drainage has been developed for each bunker. However, emphasis can not be overly stressed on the importance of this effort. Even the smallest misdirected trough can cause a torrent of water to pour into a bunker during a rainstorm. A program in conjunction with the bunker drainage was developed for the entire area. This covered leveling dirt refuse from previous bunker holes, improving the gradient of the entire area and building up roadbeds. To improve foot traffic ability, a duck walk of 105 ammunition boxes has been laid in the more traveled areas, and is now starting in the outlying areas as well. At present there is one duck walk approximately a thousand meters long in the central area and a number of short ones throughout the C-2 position.

e. Observation Towers. The DYEMARKER Plan calls for a fifty foot tower. However, due to the lack of material two small towers of approximately twenty two feet have been constructed in the west and north sections of this position. These towers add to the observation capability of the position, and are useful for artillery observers. FOs in the tower called counter-rocket fire on several occasions during September and October. A counter rocket/mortar fire plan combining tower observation and fire support weapons was developed to provide rapid response fires against enemy rockets or mortars. The towers also provided an air watch capability when a hotline was installed to the tower with each of the artillery units on this position. The employment of the Night Observation Device from these towers as a back up for the radar sets PPS-5 and 6 and visual observation all proved to be very effective. The recent employment of BC Scopes at the towers has increased the overall observation capability by allowing the observer to obtain accurate azimuths to targets and to adjust fires with improved accuracy and speed.

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f. Radar. As this position was developed, more and more Dyemarker equipment became available. Items presently in use on this position include the radar sets PPS-5 and 6, Night Observation Device (NOD), and MSS-10 Searchlight. The employment of the PPS-5 and 6 is considered to have directly contributed to the lessening of enemy activity in this area. Employing these sets by the means of a conference call from the switchboard connecting the FO's in the towers, COC, FDC, Commanding Officer, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon and such other agency as might be necessary, provided rapid communication and fire adjustment on targets. On one occasion by using the PPS-5 two patrols were maneuvered to within 500 meters of each other in the dark and 81mm mortar fires adjusted between the patrols. This incident was developed in response to a contact and information furnished by the PPS-5. Although no actual body count was attributed to contact made by the radar units, evidence such as 82mm mortar tubes, various types of enemy 782 gear and drag marks were observed in areas brought under fires that were directed and adjusted by the PPS-5. To maintain this radar capability it was necessary, after regiment had trained the initial instructors, to operate schools on the battalion level. In addition to organic personnel trained, Marines from other battalions were also trained to supplement the regimental schooling. To achieve a continual operating status for schooling and tactical requirements, a battery resupply concept was developed involving a charging and recharging cycle. This became necessary because of the peculiar initial charging cycle and the close monitoring necessary during the recharging cycle. The battalion Communication Officer was responsible for battery recharging.

g. Roads. The C-2 position is approximately 2 thousand meters square. To support the normal housekeeping mission of police, resupply and messing, it was necessary to have constructed several internal roads and to emplace four culverts. Additional support areas such as turn arounds and hard stands were developed in the command area and the LSA. The roads should be covered to have an all weather capability.

h. Mess Facilities. To feed the battalion a single mess/cooking area was developed for preparation and storage of food. This was complemented by unit distribution of prepared food to company areas. In the vicinity of the main mess an area large enough for three general purpose tents was leveled. These tents were decked with available wood and used for dry storage and a mess tent. The cooking area was located in a defilade. Each rifle company developed its own mess facilities. In general all company mess areas had two sandbagged general purpose tents with hard decking and Marine constructed tables and benches. The serving line of tents contained a stove for frying eggs or heating food, thus serving the additional purpose of a drying and warming tent.

i. Logistical Support Area. An LSA was developed consisting of seven cleared and bermed areas for gasoline, rations, ammunition, living and working area, and class IV items.

j. Fighting Holes. A four man (fire team) hole was prescribed as a standard for a fighting position on the perimeter. These holes were dug into the ground and overheaded with five sheets of landing mats and two rows of sandbags. The positions were constructed in such a manner that each gave 360° observation. Communication trenches connect all fighting holes and provide routes from living bunkers to the fighting holes. In each hole the ammunition was stored in a container with a cover built into the side of the fighting hole. Waterproof range cards with ammunition count were made for each hole.

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k. Combat Operational Center. The COC was located in a 18x22 bunker. This was divided in half by placing sandbags in between the center supports, leaving both ends open. Against this backdrop the situation map was hung for both the S-2 and S-3. Additional charts necessary to support tactical and Dyemarker requirements were also used. Along the two long walls a working bench was built allowing room for planning and daily work requirements to be accomplished at the same time. Communication equipment space was provided by building a bench along the short side of one end of the bunker.

l. Command Bunker and Visitor Tour. Because of the interest in the Dyemarker project, a briefing room and tour was developed to explain to visitors the significant aspects of C-2. This was accomplished by building a briefing area in one end of the command bunker. Diagrams, fire plans, maps and charts were mounted on swinging frames in an area with adequate seating and lighting. The diagrams gave a comprehensive review of the bunkers as to construction status and location, depicted defensive fire plans, minefield construction, and equipment peculiar to Dyemarker, and explained the techniques of construction of bunker protection and interior arrangements. After such a briefing, the visitors were escorted via duck walk from the command bunker to the COC for a briefing on operational organization and patrolling plans. The visitors were then led along the duck walk to a company messing area, a model living bunker, a typical fighting hole, a 60mm mortar position and then back to the HLZ through the 81mm Mortar Platoon. On the way to the HLZ the MPQ-10 radar set could be pointed out, and some of the artillery positions could be seen.

m. Electrical System. An installation of this permanency needs electrical support. After extensive requests, a generator was made available to the position as on site equipment. The generator was erected in a central protected location and maintained by school trained operators from the communication platoon. The communication platoon planned and emplaced a complete overhead electrical and communication wiring system. This system extended for approximately 1000 meters and was strung from emplaced 2x4 telephone/electrical poles, consisting of 3 2x4's nailed together with bases dipped in tar. This system with its 20 KW generator is capable of supporting the battalion refrigerators and furnishing lights to approximately 20 command and working bunkers.

n. Overall Defensive Plan for C-2. The observation around C-2 perimeter is limited to approximately 200 - 250 meters across the minefield from the perimeter both to the east and west. Eventually, additional clearing should be done outside the minefield. The observation to the north and northwest is better. Along the MSR it runs up to 2000 meters and 1500 - 2000 meters to the northwest. The observation to the south is limited to the MSR and it runs approximately 1500 - 2000 meters.

There is a perimeter trench line 5 to 10 meters behind all the fighting holes with connecting trenches to the living bunkers and ammunition storage bunkers. Each fighting position had a total of 3 claymore mines 20 to 30 meters in front. Numerous trip flares were positioned throughout the perimeter wire. A comprehensive fire plan (enclosure (1)) has been developed incorporating the fires of all available weapons, individual firing positions and FPL and PDF's of all automatic weapons. A separate counter rocket/mortar plan has been forwarded to the Ninth Marine Regiment. This plan calls for a distribution of fires organic, direct, and general support weapons on most probable sites of enemy rockets and mortars. A defense order has been issued for the position.

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6. Patrolling and Night Activities. It is considered that the real security to the C-2 position was accomplished by a comprehensive patrol plan. Each day patrols of squad and platoon size were sent out from each company generally within to 2000 meters of C-2. During 3/4 stay, periodic company or multi-company size patrols went out to both the east and west boundaries of the area of operation. Frequent recon teams also patrolled in the area and were supplemented by recon-type patrols from the rifle companies. Routes and times of departure were always varied. Squad size ambushes and fire team size CP's covered likely avenues of approach to the perimeter each night.

6. Conduct of Operations and Accomplishments at C-2 Bridge.

a. Disposition. This position was formerly occupied by an infantry battalion. When 3/4 assumed opcon of C-2 Bridge, it was reduced to a two company position. The original perimeter was maintained to take advantage of the tactical wire installed and to incorporate defensible terrain within the bridge perimeter. To support this redistribution, fields of fire were cleared with bulldozer and hand tools as fighting holes were pulled back from the wire and given larger sectors of fire. The improvement also provided better observation. Tactical wire was extended to cross the river bed in order to block these critical avenues of approach. It has been recommended to the Ninth Marines that this position be considered for inclusion into the Dyemarker project as C-2A.

b. Living Conditions. Living conditions continued to be improved by building new bunkers as necessary, adding urinals in each squad area and adding two wooden constructed heads. Eating facilities were provided for the one hot meal brought from C-2 daily by providing a sandbagged general purpose tent in each company area. A stove was installed in the tent for drying.

c. Comments made in regard to C-2 on patrolling, improvement of fighting holes, defense order, fire plan, range cards, and establishment of CP's with FO's all apply equally to C-2 Bridge.

7. Reports.

a. Daily reports on bunker construction and protection are submitted to LtCol CHRISTOPHER. Weekly Dyemarker status reports are submitted to 9th Marines.

b. To allow others to profit from experience gained by 3/4, and to facilitate the exchange of responsibility while maintaining a continuity of effort, several non-required reports in addition to this report have been developed. The defense orders for C-2 and C-2 Bridge are enclosed for the copy of this report going to 1/4 (fire plans, diagrams, and briefing charts were left on position). Enclosure (3) is a last copy of the Dyemarker Status Report submitted to 9th Marines. Enclosure (4) may appear somewhat redundant of this report, in purpose this report tells what we started with and what we accomplished, while enclosure (4) depicts plans for the future.

8. Summary. The work done at C-2 by 3/4 during its tenure was extensive; starting with flooded bunkers, the battalion developed the position into a model Dyemarker site. All work was accomplished mindful not only of tactical and logistical considerations but also of appearance. The quality of the work was considered as important as the speed with which it was accomplished. Much was done and more remains to be done.

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3d Battalion, 4th Marines
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
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4000
50 Dec 1967
Ser: 0067-67

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment

Subj: Dyemarker Installation, suggestions concerning

1. The purpose of this letter is to summarize techniques and experience gained by 3d Bn, 4th Marines in building Dyemarker installations.

2. Bunkers.

a. Supervise the construction of bunkers in the initial stages to ensure that the bunkers are located exactly where the tactical commander desires. Proximity to fighting holes, cover from direct fires, entrances facing toward interior perimeter, and adequate drainage are all siting considerations.

b. Two smaller 9'X16' bunkers have been recommended to be built from the same bill of materials for an 18'X24', pending installation of permanent concrete bunkers. These would permit locating the bunkers closer to the fighting holes, and present a smaller target, with fewer potential casualties.

c. Try to protect the natural vegetation when constructing bunkers to improve camouflage, prevent mud conditions, and withstand soil erosion.

d. Compromise in building the bunkers above ground for better drainage and below ground for better protection. Hillside "cuts" protect one side of the bunker while permitting good drainage. Think ahead to the requirement to push dirt up against the sides of the bunker ----- is dirt available? Must it be hauled in?

e. The hillside "cut" should leave an outside "shelf" to allow fill dirt to be piled against the bunker sides, leaving air vents on at least one side of the bunker is considered desirable. Usually this is most easily done on the low or open side of the bunker. For perimeter bunkers, the vent preferably should be on the "friendly" side. A means of protecting the vent while permitting air flow is shown in an attached drawing. Care in emplacing sandbags achieves a lasting wall; carelessness results in cave-ins.

f. The attached drawing also depicts an approved method of protecting the bunker roof. An initial layer of sandbags protects the tarpaper or felt lining. Peaking the covering dirt about one foot along the long axis of the bunker facilitates proper drainage as the membrane is placed over it. A steeper peak would be a detriment to installing subsequent layer materials. A layer of sandbags protects the top of the membrane.

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g. The burster layer is ideally of rock but shell casings, cannister, runway matting or other hard material may be used. If trucks and clam shells are available, they can be used to transport the rock and place it on top of the bunker to the required depth. Three criss-crossed layers of 105mm shell casings have been used but require more labor than rock or matting materials. If matting is used, the required depth should be achieved by extra dirt.

h. The membrane does an effective job of protecting the roof from leakage. A 160 foot roll can be cut in 3 pieces (33'X36') for 18'X24' bunkers. The 24' length bunkers have 8' door well extensions at each end. It was found desirable to leave about a 2 foot coverage over one door well, covering the other door well completely with a 2 foot overlap. ($24' + 8' = 32' + 2' + 2' = 36'$). The uncovered door well can be covered either with sections of the patching material accompanying each roll or by cutting a piece from the corner of the opposite end of the 33'X36' membrane.

i. The time consuming laborious effort in protecting the bunker can be expedited by using the program in which Vietnamese fill sandbags for pay. All such projects are facilitated by making arrangements through the District Headquarters. Supervision should ensure those sandbags are completely filled. The plastic sandbags did not seem to pack as well or last as long as the regular burlap bags.

j. The schematic of an approved interior design for an 18'X24' bunker is attached. Ideally bunkers would be Navy-type lash-up style, giving more room during daytime. 3 high stacking is adequate; and permits maximum billeting while leaving recreation space (15 men in an 18'X24' bunker). Shelving (ammo box type) can be inserted adjacent to the bunks between the 10"X12" vertical supports. Sandbagging provides compartmentation, privacy, and protection in the event of a hit on the bunker. Eventually, lighting is very desirable for all living bunkers; care concerning the fire hazard must be exercised when candles, kerosene lamps, or other fire devices are used.

3. Fighting Holes.

a. The trace of the perimeter and the location of the fighting holes is a responsibility of the tactical commander. Certainly, the forces available and the terrain are limiting factors. At times, some perimeters have been selected based entirely on the extent of the cleared area; instead, the tactical commander should prescribe the area to be cleared -- keeping in mind the need for a minefield, fields of fire and observation from the perimeter.

b. MG's, 106's and if available, tanks or ontos should cover avenues of approach. Special attention to MG FPLs will help in their hole location. Rifle holes then can fill in the gaps. 3/4 always assigned all perimeter sectors to companies and platoons, attaching the supporting unit fire weapons to the platoon in whose sector it was located.

c. 3/4 used fire team sized fighting holes, able to accommodate four men but usually manned by three men due to light strength fire teams. This also permitted a one in three watch with every hole manned at night. Only selected holes with good observation were manned during daylight hours, since units were assigned patrols during the day as well as construction or work tasks.

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d. Each hole was required to develop and have on position a range card, showing each man's sector of fire and the PDF and FPL for automatic weapons. Additionally, the number of rounds of ammunition, grenades, claymores, and pyrotechnics were shown on the range card.

e. Built into the inside of each hole was an ammunition storage capability, normally using ammo boxes placed on their side, with the lid opening upward. The "dead end" of the hole also could be dug out for ammo storage. The entrance to the hole was desirably a narrow extension to the hole beyond the overheading, allowing the men freedom to step out and throw grenades.

f. An approved overheading consisted of four sandbag columns at each corner of the hole, surrounded by metal stakes and wired together for added stability. Across the width of the hole two short metal plankings (6') were laid on the columns and five long metal airfield plankings spanned the length of the hole with overlap to the front, rear, and sides. Plastic sheeting was placed over the planking for waterproofing and two layers of sandbags were tamped neatly on top. The roofing permitted all around observation while giving overhead cover from shrapnel. The height of the shooting and viewing apertures were maintained at less than one foot, in order to keep a low silhouette.

g. Of course, the holes were located to permit mutually supporting fire. Perimeter trenches to the rear provided access to the hole and lateral movement from hole to hole. These could also be used as fighting holes if a section of the line had to be reinforced. Supplementary positions to the rear should be developed as time permits.

4. Fire Plan.

a. The range cards should be integrated at the squad and platoon level, consolidated by companies, and submitted to reflect the position fire plan. Artillery, 81mm mortar and 60mm mortar close defensive and final protective fires should complement the direct fire weapons coverage.

b. The indirect fire weapons should be registered at the earliest opportunity, desirably while the perimeter troops are manning their holes. In the event of a target, they can then request fire by target number rather than grid; the registration also is a morale booster.

c. The fire should be completed, reproduced and issued at the earliest, modifying if later if needed. It also proved an invaluable asset, along with an accompanying defense order, in turning over the position to a relieving unit.

5. Minefield.

a. The engineers will plan and install the minefield, the location being dictated by the trace of the perimeter determined by the tactical commander. Recording the minefield is also an engineer responsibility. Determination of the number and location of minefield lanes is a tactical commander's responsibility. The tendency is to have an inadequate number of lanes; lanes at a minimum in each of the cardinal directions permit a greater freedom for patrol, CP, LP, and ambush exit and entrance.

b. Mines will explode due to animals, weather (water run), enemy testing (throwing rocks) or unknown reasons. Perimeter troops should take cover when mines are exploding. Minefield maintenance is still an unanswered question that requires examination.

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a. Despite the plan, the number of towers should be dictated by the terrain to permit 360° long range observation. 3/4 manned towers on a 24 hour basis with Forward Observers; they served the purpose of detecting sources of incoming artillery, rocket, and mortars and were ideal for night observation devices as well.

b. Equipping towers with long range optical devices (BC Scopes or superior telescopes) or other devices to assist in determining range and azimuth is very desirable.

7. Sensory Equipment.

a. The AN/PPS-5 is excellent but maintaining batteries on hand and charged is a problem. The AN/PPS-6 could be used outside the perimeter if deemed appropriate. Both should track or register friendly LPs or ambushes in order to pinpoint their location. 81mm mortar fires are compatible with the "5" and 60mm mortar fires with the "6". Animals will give much the same signal as troops. The ideal situation was to establish a conference call when a radar contact is made, attempt to confirm it by NOD or Starlight Scope from the ground or tower, call 81mm mortar HQ on target, and attempt to adjust fires by the signal or directional sensing based on the direction the antenna is pointed in relation to the sound of the impact.

b. The Battlefield Surveillance Radars require trained employment and maintenance personnel. It was found desirable to employ the "5" under battalion control and the "6" under Company control.

c. The NOD is effective but should not be used in the rain or when illumination is being fired. The training requirement is minimal.

d. Searchlights with or without infrared capability are an asset to the night defense. Infantry troops can be easily trained in their employment. Technical assistance is required for more complex sensory devices.

8. Summary: The barrier plan allocation of resources should be enthusiastically employed by the tactical commander and will significantly improve his defensive posture. However, active patrolling outside the perimeter complemented by OPs, LPs, and ambushes is still the best security to a stable defensive position.

Lee H. Bannell
LEE H. BANNELL

Encl: A (1) Bunker Protection Diagram
B (2) Interior Arrangement Diagram


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TAB A

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BUNKER PROTECTION DIAGRAM

ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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INTERIOR ARRANGEMENT DIAGRAM
BUNKER, 18 x 24

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ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET 3/4 Reg Order for 11-2 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXISTENCE.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "I" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability. Provide one plt to C-2 Bridge Position to act as reserve. On 2Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 1Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 134638.

c. Co "J" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 2Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 1Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133651.

d. Co "K" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 1Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 133678. On 2Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "L" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 1Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 129674. On 2Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMINT AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. ARNDALL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

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I

3/4 Frag Order for 2-3 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.
 - a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.
 - b. Co "I" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume Co (-) rough night mission on 30 minute availability. Provide one plt to C-2 Bridge Position at night to act as reserve. On 2Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 134038. On 3Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - c. Co "II" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 3Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 2Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 128551.
 - d. Co "III" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 2Dec67 conduct night ambush vicinity 125666. On 3Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - e. Co "IV" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 2Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 129676, and ambush vicinity 125672. On 3Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change
5. COMBAT AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS
 - a. No change
 - b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LtCol R. DODDALL
LtCol LING
Commanding

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①-#2

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3/4 Frag Order for 3-4 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 1 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability. Provide one platoon to C-2 Bridge Position at night to act as reserve. On 3Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. *Provide Convoy Control*

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 3Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 132652 and night ambush vicinity 128637. On 4Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 3Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 123664. On 4Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 3Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 129676 and night ambush vicinity 130672. On 4Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

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LtCol USMC
Commanding

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①-#3

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3/4 Frag Order for 4-5 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one plat to C-2 Bridge night of 4Dec67 and day of 5Dec67 to act as reserve. On 4Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133638. On 5Dec67 be prepared to move to C-2 Bridge on order. Provide convoy control for C-2 and C-2 Bridge.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 5Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 4Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 128652. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider on 30 minute availability on 5Dec67.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 4Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 126671, and LP vicinity 132667. On 5Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 4Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 126677. On 5Dec67 be prepared to move out on order as reaction force for Co "L" patrol.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

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LtCol USMC
Commanding

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3/4 Frag Order for 5-6 Dr

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1. SITUATION. 1 change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 1 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge Position at night 5Dec67 to act as reserve. Provide convey control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 5Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 132638. On 6Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 6Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to assume Co (..) Rough Rider on 30 Minute availability. On 5Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 130652.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 5Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 124672, and LP vicinity 129667. On 6Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "R" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 5Dec67 conduct night ambush vicinity 127667. On 6Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDALL
IACol USMC
Commanding

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①-#5

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"I"

3/4 Frag Order for 6 Dec 67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.
 - a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with command Group Bravo.
 - b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night (6 Dec 67) to act as reserve. Provide convey control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 6 Dec 67 conduct night time LP vicinity 130641. On 7 Dec 67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 6 Dec 67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 131653. On 7 Dec 67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.
 - d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 6 Dec 67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 127668. On 7 Dec 67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 6 Dec 67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 134675. On 7 Dec 67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change
5. FORWARD AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.
 - a. No change
 - b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEON A. BIRDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

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C-#6

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3/4 Frag Order for 7-8 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night (7Dec67) to act as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 8Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 8Dec67 conduct, on order, day time activity ~~in~~ in accordance with overlay. On 7Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 129638 and LP vicinity 132651.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 7Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 126670 and LP vicinity 128647.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 7Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 133674. On 8Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge Position.

LSE R. BENDELL

LtCol USMC

Commanding

①-#7

1/4 Frag Order for 8-9 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.
 - a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.
 - b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night (8Dec67) to act as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 8Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 131637. On 9Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 9Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider on 30 minute availability. On 8Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 135654.
 - d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 8Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 124669, and L vicinity 128665. On 9Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
 - e. Co "R" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 8Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 130675. On 9Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.
 - a. No change
 - b. 3/4 GP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE E. BENDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

0-118

EFFECTIVE THRUST POINTS AS 100001H TO 172400H DEC67

DOGS	1659	SPORTS	1169
ODORS	1459	TREES	11 570
STATES	1058	MAGAZINES	1974
HOLIDAYS	2459	PLANETS	1673
CIGARETTES	2060	PRESIDENTS	1872
CITIES	1663	COUNTRIES	1473
FISH	1361	FLOWERS	1572
BIRDS	1263	AUTOS	1272
DOGS DAYS	1062	ANIMALS	1164
BEERS	1564	MONTHS	1468
BASEBALL TEAMS	1667	VEGETABLES	1071
GIRLS NAMES	1266	FRUITS	1067
		MEATS	1772

①-#8

3/4 Frag Order for 9-10 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night (9Dec67) as reserve. Provide convey control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 9Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133638. On 10Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider on 30 minute availability.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 10Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 9Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 129654.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 9Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 124665, and LP vicinity 129664. On 10Dec67 ~~must~~ be prepared to support Co "I" on order.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 9Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 125672 and LP vicinity 128674. On 10Dec67 conduct OP vicinity 124668.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL

LTCOL USMC

Commanding

D-48

3/4 Frag Order for 10-11 Dec 1967

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 200's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "H" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve on 10Dec67. Provide convey control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 10Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 133638. On 11Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume CP(-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability. On night of 10Dec67 send one Platoon to Cam Lo Bridge OPCON to 3/3. On 10Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 131649.

d. Co "J" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge position. On 10Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 123664. On 11Dec67 be prepared to support Co "H" on order and conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge position. On 10Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 125676. On 11Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BEDELL
LTCOL USMC
Commanding

(P)-#10

Co I 11

3/4 Frag order for 11-12Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with command group alpha at C-2. 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 bridge position with command group bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 bridge at night as reserve on 11Dec67. On 11Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 131637. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 bridge. On 12Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume CO(-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability. On 11Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 135655.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 bridge position. On 11Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 127662. On 12Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 bridge position. On 11Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay. On 11Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 127677.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION. ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 bravo at C-2 bridge.

LEE E. BENDELL
LTCOL USMC
Commanding

①-#11

3/4 Frag Order for 12-13 Dec67.

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convey control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 12Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133638. On 13Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minutes availability. On 12Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 130655. On 13Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 12Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 122663, and LP vicinity 129665. On 13Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 12Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 126676. On 13Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COLLATERAL AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LAE R. MENDALL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

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D-142

3/4 Frag Order for 13-14 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one platoon at C-2 Bridge at night as Reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 13Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 132637. On 14Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "T" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Ridge mission on 30 minute availability. On 14Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 13Dec67 conduct night time Ambush vicinity 129652.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 13Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 125660, and LP vicinity 132666. On 14Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 13Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 123674. On 14Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LtCol R. EMBELL

LtCol USMC

Commanding

①-#13

3/4 Frag Order for 14-15 Dec.

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one squad at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 14Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133638. On 15Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to assume Co "M" Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 15Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 14Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 135654.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 14Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 135665, and LP vicinity 126663. On 15Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Be prepared to reinforce Co "I" on order.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 14Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 131676. On 15Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL

LtCol USMC

Commanding

①-#14

3/4 Frag Order for 15-16 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one squad at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 15Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 131637. On 16Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 16Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 15Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 131652. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 15Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 123664, and LP vicinity 132664. On 16Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 15Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 131675. On 16Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-#15

3/4 Reg Order for 16-17 Dec 67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at G-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the G-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "H" (rein): Defend eastern sector of G-2. Provide one squad at G-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at G-2 and G-2 Bridge. On 16Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 134637. On 17Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of G-2. On 17Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 16Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 130655. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability. Be prepared to reinforce Co "H" on order.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of G-2 Bridge Position. On 16Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 123668, and LP vicinity 131664. On 17Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Drop off one squad for night ambush 17Dec67 at 118664.

e. Co "X" (rein): Defend northern sector of G-2 Bridge Position. On 16Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 127676. On 17Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at G-2. 3/4 Bravo at G-2 Bridge.

LAE R. MEDALL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-712

"I"

3/4 Frag Order for 17-18Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change2. MISSION. No change3. EXECUTION.a. 3/4 employs 2 CO's (rein) with command group alpha at C-2.
2 CO's (rein) at the C-2 bridge position with command group bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one squad at C-2 bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 bridge. On 17Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 131637. On 18Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 18Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay. On 17Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 131651. Be prepared to assume CO(-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 bridge position. On 17Dec67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 118664, and LP vicinity 129663. On 18Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 bridge position. On 17Dec67 conduct nighttime LP vicinity 127675. On 18Dec67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.5. COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS. ALLEGATIONS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 bravo at C-2 bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL
LTJOL USMC
CONTINUING

①-#17

SECRET**I**

3/4 Frag Order for 19-20 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change2. MISSION. No change3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "I" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide convoys at C-2 Bridge at night as req'd. On 19Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 151637. Provide convoy control at C-2 Bridge and C-2. On 20Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "J" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 20Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 19Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 129651. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minutes availability.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 19Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 124669. On 20Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 19Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 127675. On 20Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 Co at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDALL

1st Col USMC

Commanding

SECRET

D-#19

3/4 Frag Order for 22-23 Dec 67

1. SITUATION. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with command group Alpha. at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with command group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one squad at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve. On 22 Dec 67, Conduct nighttime LP vicinity 134637. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 23 Dec 67 conduct daytime/ activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 23 Dec 67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay. On 22 Dec 67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 129653. Be prepared to assume Co(-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 22 Dec 67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 134666. On 23 Dec 67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay; submit proposed activities prior to 1030H.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 22 Dec 67 conduct nighttime ambush vicinity 126675. On 23 Dec 67 conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION- ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-#22

3/4 Frag Order for 20-21 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change

2. MISSION. No change

3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "H" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. Provide one squad at C-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at C-2 and C-2 Bridge. On 20Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133637. On 21Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 21Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 20Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 135653. Be prepared to assume Co (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 availability.

d. Co "J" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 20Dec67 conduct night time LP vicinity 124669.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 20Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 132677. On 21Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at C-2, 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE R. BENDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-#20

" I "

3/4 Frag Order for 21-22 Dec67

1. SITUATION. No change2. MISSION. No change3. EXECUTION.

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at G-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the G-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "M" (rein): Defend eastern sector of G-2. Provide one squad at G-2 Bridge at night as reserve. Provide convoy control at G-2 and G-2 Bridge. On 21Dec67 conduct night time LF vicinity 132637. On 22Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of G-2. On 22Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. On 21Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 133654. Be prepared to assume CG (-) Rough Rider mission on 30 minute availability.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of G-2 Bridge Position. On 21Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 123665. On 22Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of G-2 Bridge Position. On 21Dec67 conduct night time ambush vicinity 131675. On 22Dec67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION - ELECTRONICS.

a. No change

b. 3/4 CP at G-2. 3/4 Bravo at G-2 Bridge.

LtCol R. BENDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-#21

3/4 Frag Order for 24 Nov67

1. No Change
2. 3/4 will defend C-2 and the C-2 Bridge Position.
3. a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.
3/4 b. Co "I" (rein): Defend east sector C-2. On 23Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 132640. On 24Nov67 be prepared to move on order to relieve Co "M".
c. Co "I" (rein): Defend west sector C-2. On 23Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133648. On 24Nov67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit position for night time/day time activity prior to 241030H.
d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 23Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 130666. On 24Nov67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit location of day time/night time activities prior to 241030H.
e. Co "K" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 23Nov67 conduct night time activity vicinity 125672. On 24Nov67 conduct day time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit positions of day time/night time activities prior to 241030H.
4. No Change
5. a. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

Lt Col. SANDHILL
Lt Col. DEMO
Commanding

D-#22

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DECLASSIFIED

3/4 Prog Order for 24-25 Nov67

1. Situation. No Change

2. Mission. No Change

3. Execution

a. 3/4 employs 2 Co's (rein) with Command Group Alpha at C-2, 2 Co's (rein) at the C-2 Bridge Position with Command Group Bravo.

b. Co "H" (rein): Defend eastern sector of C-2. On 24Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 132640. Submit proposed daily activities prior to 1030H.

c. Co "I" (rein): Defend western sector of C-2. On 24Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 133648. On 25Nov67 conduct day/night time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit proposed daily activities prior to 1030H.

d. Co "L" (rein): Defend southern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 24Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 130646. On 25Nov67 conduct day/night time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit proposed daily activities prior to 1030H.

e. Co "T" (rein): Defend northern sector of C-2 Bridge Position. On 24Nov67 conduct night time LP vicinity 128644. On 25Nov67 conduct day/night time activity in accordance with overlay. Submit proposed daily activities prior to 1030H.

4. Administration and Logistics. No Change

5. Command and Communications & Electronics

a. No Change.

b. 3/4 CP at C-2. 3/4 Bravo at C-2 Bridge.

LEE E. DANDELL
LtCol USMC
Commanding

①-#24

SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 15 Copies
 3d Battalion, 4th Marines
 Quang Tri Province, RVN
 180800H Dec 1967

Operation Order 3-67 (Operation Sleigh Ride)

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets 6432 IV, 6442 IV
 (b) 3/4 OpPlan 2-67

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces: Small groups of NVA have been observed near west boundary of 3/4 Area of Operation. C-2 Bridge Position has also been probed by small units.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) 1/1 supports/reinforces 3/4 operation with up to two companies in addition to patrolling their AO to our north.

(2) 3/3 to our south defends positions and patrols AO.

(3) Delta Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines directs support 3/4 (Artillery).

(4) Air Support

(a) 1st Marine Air Wing provides Air Support and helicopter medevac as requested.

(b) AO requested on station during daylight hours.

2. MISSION: 3/4, commencing at H-hour on D-day conduct one day search and destroy operation in northwest portion of AO.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations: Three companies will depart defensive positions at H-hour to reach western most objectives by first light. Maintaining one company in reserve. Successive objectives are seized to maintain units within reinforcing distance of each other while sweeping northwest portion of AO in one day operation. (See overlay)

b. Co "K" (rein).

(1) Move one platoon to Yankee Station prior to darkness on D-1. This platoon will coordinate movement of Co "I" past Yankee Station on D-day.

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(2) Commencing at H-hour, depart C-2 Bridge with Co(-), rejoin advance platoon and follow axis of advance to seize objective A. Defend objective A, protecting flank and rear of other companies. Be prepared to seize objective E and G on order.

c. Co "M" (rein).

(1) Move one platoon to C-2 Bridge prior to darkness on D-1. This platoon will coordinate the movement of Co "M" through C-2 position on D-day.

(2) Commencing at H-hour, depart C-2 with Co (-), rejoin advance platoon, follow in trace of Co "K" until branching off to seize objectives B and C. Be prepared to seize objectives D and F on order.

d. Co "L" (rein).

(1) Defend C-2 Bridge during daylight hours on D-day.

e. Co "I"(-) (rein) 3/3 (Opcon eff. 181800H)

(1) Defend C-2 on D-day after departure of Co's "I" and "M".

(2) Assume opcon of one platoon from Co "I" 3/4 (eff. 190300H).

f. 81mm Mortar plt.

(1) General Support.

(2) Move one section to Yankee Station D-1.

g. Battalion Reserve.

(1) Co "I"(-) (rein).

(a) Leave one platoon on C-2 position to revert to opcon Co "I" 3/3. (eff. 190300H)

(b) Commencing at H-hour, follow in trace of Co "M".

(c) Be prepared to assume mission of Co "K" or Co "M".

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-day: 19 December, 1967.

(2) H-hour: 0300

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(3) Keep units dispersed as passive measure against enemy artillery, rockets or mortars.

(4) Proceed cautiously employing supporting arms as appropriate in accordance with operating procedures of 3/4 OpPlan 2-67.

(5) Report all contacts or nightings immediately.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Carry one days rations and BA of ammunition.
- b. One claymore per fire team.
- c. One air panel per squad.
- d. All personnel will carry gas mask.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS- ELECTRONICS.

a. Communications - Electronics: Radio silence will be maintained until on objectives A and B, unless unable to maintain schedule or contact with the enemy is made.

b. Command Posts.

(1) En COC remains at C-2. Executive Officer 3/4 in command of C-2 and C-2 Bridge.

(2) En Command Group moves out with Co "M", on order shifts to Co "I".

LEE R. BENDELL
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES

✓A - Operations Overlay

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Copy No. 34 of 50 Copies
 3d Battalion, 4th Marines
 Quang Tri Province, RVN
 220800H Dec 1967

Operation Order 4-67 (Operation Four for Four)

Ref: (a) Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, sheets 6432 I, 6442 IV
 (b) 3/4 OpPlan 2-67

SBC FILIS
 HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)

Time Zone: H

0064-67
 670524
 Copy 34 of 50 Copies

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces: Small groups of NVA have been observed along the route of march. The objective area has received probes from small units during the hours of darkness.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 3/3 to our south defends positions and patrols AO.
- (2) 2/1 to our north defends positions and patrols AO.
- (3) 1/4 will move from their present position as depicted on the operation overlay.
- (4) Delta Btry 2d Bn 12th Mar, DS 3/4 until Green of positions shift then DS for 3/4 reverts to Echo Btry. ANNEX C (Fire Support Plan)
- (5) Air Support.

SECRET (a) 1st Marine Airwing provides Air Support and helicopter medevac as requested.

(b) AO requested on station during daylight hours.

2. MISSION: 3/4, commencing at H-hour on D-day will relieve 1/4 at their present position.

3. EXECUTION: Map: Vietnam 1:50,000, sheets 6432 I, 6442 IV

a. Concept of Operations: Two companies reinforced with elements of H&S will depart defensive positions at H-hour on D-day following a predesignated route of march to the 1/4 defensive positions. Two companies reinforced with elements of H&S company will depart defensive positions a L-hour on D-day plus one following a predesignated route of march to the 1/4 defensive positions. (See Annexes A & B)

b. Co L (Rein). (See Annex A)

(1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, depart C-2 Bridge with company reinforced with elements of H&S company and follow designated route of march to present 1/4 position.

(2) Upon reaching the 1/4 defensive position coordinate with 1/4 Command Group and assume defense of portion of perimeter vacated by 1/4 companies.

c. Co I (Rein). (See Annex A)

(1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, depart C-2 with company reinforced with elements of H&S company and follow designated route of march to present 1/4 position.

(2) at requested on station during daylight hours.

End 13

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(2) Upon reaching 1/4 defensive position be prepared to assume defense of designated portion of perimeter.

d. Co K (Rein). (See Annex B)

(1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, be prepared to assume defense of C-2 Bridge position upon the departure of Co L.

(2) Be prepared to coordinate with company from 1/4 which will move into Co L's positions.

(3) Commencing at L-hour on D-day plus one, depart C-2 Bridge reinforced with elements of H&S company and follow designated route of march to join Co's L and I in a defensive position.

e. Co M (Rein). (See Annex B)

(1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, be prepared to assume defense of C-2 upon the departure of Co I.

(2) Be prepared to coordinate with company from 1/4 which will move into Co I's positions.

(3) Commencing at L-hour on D-day plus one, depart C-2 reinforced with elements of H&S company and follow designated route of march to join Co's L, I, and M, in a defensive position.

f. 81mm Mortar Platoon.

(1) On D-day be prepared to move two sections of mortars by helicopter to the present 1/4 defensive position.

(2) On D-day plus one be prepared to move the remaining section of mortars by helicopter to the present 1/4 defensive position.

g. 106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon.

(1) On D-day be prepared to move one section of guns by helicopter to the present 1/4 defensive position.

(2) On D-day plus one be prepared to move the remaining section of guns by helicopter to the present 1/4 defensive position.

h. Detachments.

(1) Effective 270600H Dec 1967, following units are detached from 3/4.

- (a) 1st Plt Co "A" 3d TKBn, FMF
- (b) 5th Plt Co "A" 3d TKBn, FMF
- (c) 1st Sect 5th Plt Co "A" 3d ATBn
- (d) 3d Sect 1st Plt 1st SL Btry, FMF

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(2) Units continue present mission until detached.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-day: 26 December 1967

(2) H-hour: 0500

(3) L-hour: 0500

(4) H&S company commander will determine the distribution of his various units as attachments to the four rifle companies. He will also coordinate the movement of the 81mm mortar and 106mm Recoilless rifles.

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(5) Units will be alert for the movement of 1/4 units to their south as they move along the route of march.

(6) Keep units dispersed as passive measure against enemy artillery, rockets and mortars.

(7) Proceed cautiously employing supporting arms as appropriate in accordance with operating procedures of 3/4 OpPlan 2-67.

(8) Report all contacts or sightings immediately.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Carry one days rations and a BA of ammunition.

b. Two claymore mines per fire team.

c. One air panel per squad.

d. All personnel will carry gas mask and wear dog tags.

e. All personnel will carry a Field Marching Pack with poncho blanket roll containing:

- (1) Poncho liner.
- (2) Long Johns.
- (3) Green wool shirt or sweat shirt.

f. All personnel will carry:

- (1) Rain suit.
- (2) 3 Pr Socks.
- (3) 1 Underdrawer.
- (4) 1 Undershirt.
- (5) 1 Towel.
- (6) Toilet Articles.
- (7) 1 Pair Utilities (optional).
- (8) WP Bag.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

a. Communication - Electronics.

(1) Radio discipline will be maintained and transmission will be held to a minimum during the movement.

(2) The communications platoon will be responsible for the immediate establishment of communications upon arrival.

(3) Communication Platoon will provide for a KY8 capability.

b. Command Posts.

- (1) The Alpha command group will depart C-2 on D-day with Co I.
- (2) The Bravo command group will command the remaining units until their departure on D-day plus one.
- (3) The Bravo command group will move with Co M.

Lee R. Bencell
LEE R. BENCELL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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ANNEXES:

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- ✓A - Operations overlay 26Dec67
- ✓B - Operations overlay 27Dec67
- ✓C - Fire Support Plan

DISTRIBUTION:

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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/LRB/aj
003000
26 December 1967
Ser: 0065-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Dyemarker Status Report for C-2

Ref: (a) 9th Mar Ltr 5/WFG/etb serial 55-90-67 dtd 7Dec67 - Dyemarker Report

1. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (a) and amplifies the weekly message report. It is also submitted as 3/4 departs the C-2 position and has the purpose of providing information which can be used to ensure continuity of plans and effort in developing C-2.
2. As of 27 December 1967, when opcon changed, 67 of the 81 bunkers at C-2 have been completed with prescribed burster layer and membrane roof coverings. All bunkers used or occupied by the infantry battalion and its attached elements have been completed; remaining uncompleted bunkers are in the artillery positions. One bunker of the original 82 was destroyed by fire. The minefield has been completed although the wire surrounding the minefield as installed by the 11th Engineer Battalion is not in strict accordance with the plan, having been installed prior to the plan. LtCol CHRISTOPHER is determining whether the wire will have to be modified. Requests for two minefield lanes (east and west) have been made. This should greatly facilitate patrols, LF's, and OP's movement in flank directions.
3. Two 21 foot towers have been erected. One additional 50 foot tower has been requested. It is understood that such a tower (metal) has been allocated. Recommend setting it on the highest ground in the center of the site, to give additional observation, particularly to the west. 3/4 manned towers 24 hours a day with Artillery FO's. A counter-rocket and counter-mortar plan involving the tower OP's has also been developed.
4. Materials for constructing the model bunking plan (15 bunks in each bunker) are supposedly now available from the 11th Engineer Battalion. Suggest bringing in material for only 5 or 10 bunkers at a time and carefully supervising the material storage and installation since such materials have a tendency to "get lost". Some of the required interior bracing of bunkers has been accomplished; a quality control team should have identified bunkers requiring such work.
5. The project of overheading the fighting holes is well underway. CG, 3dMarDiv, emphasizes the low silhouette. Five long pieces of matting are placed on four corner supports of staked-in sandbags with two short pieces of matting or 8 foot stakes at each end for added strength. Waterproofing material over the matting is then covered by two layers of sandbags. Sufficient materials to complete C-2 fighting hole overheading should be on position.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

Page 1 of 3

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6. The new battalion commander may want to change MG positions. A bulldozer inside the wire but forward of the fighting positions would aid in improving fields of fire and grazing fire; additional tactical wire inside the perimeter wire would also channelize the enemy into fields of fire.

7. Ideally, the perimeter trench system permits a man to move from bunker to perimeter trench to fighting hole with trench protection. Where old trenching has caved in, blocking drainage or passage, it must be cleared by hand. Consideration to removable barbed wire blocks in perimeter trench lines should be given. Recommend obtaining a trencher to complete an inner perimeter trench line as supplementary positions. Work the trenches so spoil falls on the outboard side. Filling sandbags from the trencher spoil as the trencher works is desirable.

8. The fire hazard in bunkers continues to exist; keep troops conscious of the danger. Candles should be placed in metal can holders, orders on fire prevention should be promulgated, and fire extinguishing material should be located near each bunker. Ideally, all living bunkers should have electric lighting - - - for safety and comfort. Troops presently are paying for their own candles and Coleman lanterns are in short supply. The electric wiring has been significantly improved, a generator obtained (be sure it has a qualified maintenance man), and an alternate system for critical lighting developed through use of the radar generators. Wiring (electric and telephone) has been put on poles and considerably improved in appearance.

9. The internal road net should eventually be surfaced similar to the MSR. Trash collection along this net is a major project. Require TAD 6x6's to assist in trash collection if possible. Burn off and bury the dump residue at least weekly (a dozer is required). Eventually the helicopter landing zone and S-4 storage sites should also be hard surfaced. The S-4 area has been developed into a good logistic support area with berms around POL, ration, and ammo dumps. Another major S-4 forward effort is coordinating available transportation (trash, personnel, resupply runs).

10. Dozers are needed for extending the cleared area outside of the minefield, particularly on the high ground ridge to the west and to the northeast. These areas could also be developed into rifle ranges - - - short rounds in other areas will set off mines. Defoliation would also extend the cleared area and effective observation.

11. Minefield maintenance is a problem that needs attention. Many mines have been detonated by weather, animals or unknown reasons. Are they to be replaced? Who will do it? See LtCol CHRISTOPHER.

12. Knife rest type gates have been requested but not received.

13. More Dyemarker sensory gear is to be installed. Major COUCH, (Div Comm), is the project officer. Training personnel for employment and maintenance of AN/FPS-5, AN/FPS-6 NOD, and searchlights will be a continuous problem.

14. The COC and the CO's briefing room have proven valuable assets in taking care of Dyemarker or other visitors to this position. Recommend continued effort in maintaining a VIP tour which includes the briefing room, visit to the model bunker, a fighting hole, and return to the hole pad following

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the wooden walkway.

15. A policy of "going first class", concern for appearance and lasting quality, as well as tactical and logistical integrity has proven its value and is recommended.

LEE R. BENDELL
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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CAMP TERRY V. LEACH

Initially, the site of the present camp was but a relatively high hill on the road leading to Con Thien. In early August, 1967, construction started on bunkers and defensive positions at the site designated as "C-2" under the anti-infiltration Barrier Plan. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was the initial battalion to occupy the position and Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, was the first artillery unit on the position.

During the month of September, heavy fighting broke out around Con Thien, with close ground combat just northwest of C-2 and south of Con Thien. The entire C-2 and Con Thien area was subjected to enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar fires.

Private First Class Terry V. LEACH, 2182182/0811, United States Marine Corps, met his death while in the performance of his duties as a cannoneer during the first rocket attack on this position on 2 September 1967. At the request of his fellow Marines and in memory of the brave Marine artillerymen who man their guns night and day, despite adverse weather or enemy incoming fires, this Camp was named Camp Terry V. LEACH.

On the occasion of dedicating this Camp on 23 December 1967, the Camp is close to completion as a model Barrier Plan site. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines relieved 3d Battalion, 9th Marines on 10 September about the time the construction effort had been hindered by unseasonable rains and flooding conditions. Since then, construction of 82 bunkers and installation of a minefield has been completed by the 11th Engineer Battalion, almost all of the bunkers have been protected and waterproofed by Marine labor, two observation towers have been erected, and the fighting holes have been integrated into a comprehensive defensive fire plan. Additional batteries with 105mm howitzers, 155mm howitzers(SP), and 8" guns have increased the Camp's combat power.

This extensive project, completed in a relatively short period, hopefully signals a future time when secure defensive installations can be turned over to the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam---and the Marines who have served here can take pride in having made a significant contribution to the freedom of the South Vietnamese people.

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JANUARY 1968 ISSUE

*Thundering
Third Battalion*



*Fourth Regiment
Of Marines*

FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER

My sincere wish for a happy, safe, successful New Year to each and every Marine in 3/4. You can look back with pride on your accomplishments of the old year. From Con Thien to Cam Lo River Bridge, Cam Lo Artillery Position, C-2 and C-2 Bridge you have always left your mark of a significantly improved position -- tactically, logistically, and in appearance. Your active patrolling has served to minimize enemy activity in each of these areas, keeping the enemy back from the perimeter and reassuring enemy reconnaissance elements that 3/4 is waiting for them with fire power and alert dispositions.

In late November we assumed responsibility for C-2 Bridge while keeping C-2. About the same time, the membrane (rubberized waterproof covering) for the bunkers at C-2 arrived. Congratulations to Co I, Co M, and H & S Co on completely finishing the bunker roof protection on every bunker occupied by 3/4 at C-2 prior to our departure. My special thanks for the neat appearing jobs and the work in keeping the entire area "squared away".

Highlights of the last month included General Westmoreland's visit--accompanied by Lt. Gen. Cushman, CG III MAF; Maj. Gen. Tompkins, CG 3d Mar Div, and Brig. Gen. Chaissin, Coc, MAC V -- and the dedication of C-2 as Camp Terry V Leach on 23 December by Maj. Gen. Tompkins. On both occasions, our visitors were complimentary of the site and troop appearance. --Well done, men!

At C-2 Bridge, the improvement in locating the defense fighting holes and the work on improving fields of fire was particularly noteworthy. A "pat-on-the-back" to Co K and Co L.

All of you will also remember our expanded patrolling effort in December. Co. K and Co. L both sent out special two and three day reconnaissance type patrols. Our most ambitious patrol effort took units to the western boundary of our area of operations in December and then to the eastern boundary the next day in response to some intelligence information. You moved well and covered long distances in these activities.

Special bouquets to Co L for the capture of documents and surveying instruments while on patrol (2 NVA confirmed) and to Co I for its rapid response to a sniper while on the move (1 NVA confirmed).

On our move forward to the vicinity of A-3 we must continue to operate effectively. Remember:

(1) Whenever not in the immediate vicinity of fox holes, wear flack jacket and helmet.

(2) Always use halizone tablets with water from streams.

(3) Police up your area CONTINUOUSLY!

(4) Keep your feet dry and clean.

(5) If you don't want to carry any gear, turn it in to your platoon guide, Co. supply sergeant, and Battalion S-4. At the same time, remember it may well turn colder again.

It is the hard work and skill of every Marine that, in my opinion, makes the Thundering Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, the finest battalion in North or South Vietnam.

Lee R Bendell

LEE R BENDELL
Lt Col, USMC

CHAPLAIN'S CHAT

How do you feel about New Year's resolutions? Some men just shrug their shoulders and say, "It doesn't do much good to make them - I'll end up breaking them anyway." Others might say, "Yeah, they're all right, but wait until I get back to civilian life, or back to the states. Vietnam is just not the place to make New Year's resolutions".

There is a story in the Old Testament of a young man who lived in somewhat similar circumstances as we are in. He was in a strange land, among different people and away from the familiar surroundings of home. But he had a strong determination to make of himself something in this discouraging situation. Hear the point of the story - "Daniel resolved that he would not defile himself - --." A religious fanatic? No, just a young man who had definite convictions upon which he wanted to build his life even in Babylon far away from home. Bargaining with God in his despair? No, God meant so much to him that his determination was an outgrowth of his love for God, not out of fear of God.

I suppose that the whole matter of making resolutions "boils down" to how seriously one considers himself before God. The one who looks upon his life as belonging to more than himself will constantly be resolving to mold his life into what the Master would have it to be. The apostle Paul states, "Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creation; old things are passing away; behold all things are becoming new." In other words, old habits are being changed and one resolves to become the "new creation" that God expects him to be.

What about those resolutions now?

Chaplain Anderson

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3/4'S CHRISTMAS PARTY FOR VIETNAMESE CHILDREN

On 24 Dec the 3d Bn, 4th Marines, represented by LtCol Bendell and representatives from each of the companies, gave a Christmas party at Father Negroud's Church for the refugee children of An Hung village near Cam Lo. Ice cream, cookies, candy, and cake were eaten by the children with great delight. Donations of toys, clothing, and soap which were sent by parents and organizations in the United States were presented to Father Neyroud and his church. A donation of money (about 7000 piastres) was also given by the men of the battalion and presented to Father Neyroud by Lt Col Bendell.

Members of the Children's Church Choir led by the Father sang traditional (continued in the next column)

(continued from first column)
Christmas songs in Vietnamese. All the Marines who participated in the party came back to Camp Leach with a rewarding feeling of having made Christmas a time of joy for these children of RVN.

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MAJ. GEN. HOCHMUTH MEMORIAL SCHOLARSHIP GRANT

"I wish to personally extend a 'well-done' to all units of this division for your outstanding support of the Major General Hochmuth Memorial Scholarship Grant. I am pleased to report that a total of \$12,065.15 was collected and has been forwarded to Third Mar. Div. Association. The Association will use this money to insure that worthy dependents of Third Mar. Div. Marines killed in action in Vietnam will be afforded college financial assistance in the form of scholarship grants. The enthusiastic spirit with which this task was undertaken by the members of this division assures me that an outstanding 'Esprit De Corps' continues to flourish throughout the 3d Mar. Div."

Maj. Gen. TOMPKINS
CG, 3d Mar Div

*(3/4 contributed \$827.00 to this fund)

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YOUR CHAIN OF COMMAND

PRESIDENT OF THE US	Lyndon B Johnson
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	Robert S McNamara
SECRETARY OF NAVY	Paul R Ignatius
C M C	Gen Leonard F Chapman, Jr
CG, USMACV	Gen W C Westmoreland, USA
CG, FMF, PAC	Lt Gen V H Krulak
CG, III MAF	Lt Gen R E Cushman, Jr
CG, 3D MAR DIV	Maj Gen R M C Tompkins
ADC, 3D MAR DIV	Brig Gen L Metzger
CO, 9TH MARINES	Col R B Smith
CO, 3/4	Lt Col Lee R Bendell
YOUR COMPANY COMMANDER	_____
YOUR PLATOON COMMANDER	_____
YOUR SQUAD LEADER	_____
YOUR FIRETEAM LEADER	_____

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DEDICATION OF CAMP TERRY V. LEACH

The C-2 position was dedicated as Camp Terry V. Leach on 23 December.

Private First Class Terry V. LEACH, 2102182/0811, United States Marine Corps met his death while in the performance of his duties as a cannoneer during the first rocket attack on this position on 2 September 1967. At the request of his fellow Marines and in memory of the brave Marine artillerymen who man their guns night and day, despite adverse weather or enemy incoming fire, this Camp was named Camp Terry V. LEACH.

ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE FOR IMMEDIATE RE-ENLISTMENT (MCO 1133.22)

1. This order provides for the promotion of first-term Marines upon reenlistment, in addition to other incentives available. All Marines who can effectively serve in the next higher grade and are recommended for reenlistment by this command, are considered to be qualified for promotion.
2. Commanding officers are authorized to promote one grade to sergeant, corporal, or lance corporal, all first-term Marines who reenlist for a period of at least three years, including lance corporals and corporals who reenlist early.
3. All Marines considered qualified for reenlistment who have six months in grade as a lance corporal or private first class at the time of reenlistment, may be promoted (temporarily) on the last day of their current enlistment contract. Upon immediate reenlistment, the promotion will become permanent. Marines who do not have the above specified time in grade as of the last day of their current contract will be promoted when they have attained the required time in grade subsequent to reenlistment, provided they are still considered qualified.

Just one of the many benefits awaiting you upon reenlistment.

S/Sgt James L Gentry
En. Career Advisor

Chatting with her uncle, teenaged Margie mentioned that one of her girl friends had received a friendship ring from a boy and that another girl had just received an engagement ring.

"Tell me," said her uncle, "What is the difference between a friendship ring and an engagement ring?"

"Well, you see," replied Margie, candidly, "once you're engaged, the friendship is over."

MILITARY PAY INCREASE

The military pay increase has been recently signed by the President and it is retroactive to 1 October 1967.

The raises range from \$5.32 a month for recruits to \$123.60 for members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The increase is approximately 5.6%.

This bill included a raise in BAQ for young servicemen (E-4 and below with less than four years service) with up to two dependents. Those with more than two dependents will continue to collect \$105 per month.

(Continued in next column)

(Continued from first column)

The "without dependents" quarters allowance for E-4's and below goes from \$55.20 to \$60.00, as does the allowance for E-3's and below with no dependents. The rate for E-4's and below with less than four years service and two dependents goes from \$83.10 to \$90.00. E-4's and below are required to furnish \$40.00 per month from base pay, thus the allotment to dependents will be raised to \$100.00 for one dependent and 130.00 for two dependents.

During January 1968, allotment offices will automatically increase Q allotments.

The raise in BAQ for the months of October, November, and December will be paid directly to the serviceman.

Personnel are requested to make their dependents aware of the raise in BAQ to preclude misunderstandings.

Concerning your pay each month:

The pay raise will be retroactive to 1 October 1967, however it will be 1 Feb. before you will notice the raise in your pay. Here are a few examples of the amount of the increase:

	Under 2	Over 2	Over 3
E-5	211.50	260.70	273.00
E-4	177.90	223.20	235.50
E-3	128.70	179.70	192.30
E-2	106.20	148.80	-----

*(See your company office for a complete new pay scale)

CHRISTMAS CARDS RECEIVED

One of the cute Christmas cards received in over 1000 that came through the chaplain's office for men of 3/4 was from little Irene Hasink, 3819 West Cornelia, Chicago, Illinois, 60618.

"Dear Marine, the "Wash 'n Dry" is for you, and the pre-sweetened Kool Aid (these were items enclosed in the card) is for water and I hope you have a happy Christmas. May God please keep you from harm."

/s/ Your friend
Irene Hasink

CHRISTMAS CARDS FROM FORMER 3/4 BN. CO'S

A Christmas card from Lt. Col. W. J. Masterpool, 83 Lundys Lane, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, was sent to the officers and men of 3/4:

"Never a Christmas morning

Never an old year ends

But someone thinks of someone

Old days, old times, old friends"

/s/ You are not forgotten

Bill Masterpool

Also a card came addressed to the officers and men of 3/4 from Lt. Col. Vest, Marine Corps Education Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., who commanded 3/4 prior to Lt. Col. Bendell.

COMPANY NEWS

H & S Company:

NEW REPLACEMENTS

2ndLt Martin H. Traiser
Easton, Penn.
SSgt Burton J. McGuire
Carlsbad, Calif.
Sgt Donald W. Megby
Warrenton, Va.
Sgt Robert A. McCormick
Port Royal, S.C.
Sgt James F. Stevens
Burlington, N.J.
Cpl Dannie R. Edwards
Hanna, Okla.
L/Cpl Edwards R. Lake
Neptune City, N.J.
L/Cpl Allen R. Gadberry
Bakersfield, Calif.
PFC Leroy Easman
Dunnellon, Fla.

PFC Lawrence E. Long
Waco, Texas
PFC Johnathan F. Griffin
Roseburg, Ore.
PFC Dwayne E. Woods
Portland, Ore.
PFC Robert G. Dumont
Saco, Maine
PFC Ronald F. Buss
Lake View Terrace, Calif.
PFC Raymond Eskridge
Chicago, Ill.
PFC James B. King
Tehachapi, Calif.
PFC Arther Ramirez
San Bernadino, Calif.
PFC Robert A. Belzer
Cleveland, Ohio

PFC Jack E. Thogerson
Sunnyvale, Calif.
PFC Robert J. Urbis
Staddard, Calif.
PFC Kenneth D. Mccourry
Bakersfield, Calif.
PFC Daved Parker
Philly, Pa.
PFC James J. Woolsey
Bantan, Conn.
PFC Phillip R. Armijo
Nipomo, Calif.
PFC Thomas D. Gualandi
Peru, Ill.
PFC Henry H. Williams
Washington, D.C.
PFC Carroll L. Williams
Washington, D.C.
PFC Paul A. Cory
Hubbard, Iowa

New Corpamen In H & S Co

HMC Frederick D. Screen
Washington, D.C.
HM2 Basel M. Hildreth
Deep Run, N.C.
HM3 Eugene F. Sywenski
Bath, Pa.
HM3 Larry D. Wells
Wray, Colo

Hm3 Denis M. Mudd
Las Vegas, Nevada
Hm3 Richard D. Gordon
Seattle, Washington
HM3 Charles D. Pickard
Billings, Mont
Hm3 Bruce R. McDowell
Trenton, Maine

HN Kenneth Seefeldt Jr.
Fullerton, Calif.
HN William L. Mercer
Las Angeles, Calif.
HN Danny M. Pomeroy
Topeka, Kan
HN Cecil D. Belt Jr.
Corn, Okla
HA Michael T. Daniels
Buffalo, N.Y.

Promotions

Appointed to rank of 1st Lt:

Michael W. Reilly- MT Officer
Robert A. McIntosh- S-3 Alpha

People attending Schools

SSgt James J. Gentry - Career Advisory
School, Okinawa

From to Corporal

Thomas P. Dunne
Arthur Ochoa
Daniel R. Culver
Douglas D. Karns
Dennis W. Weaver

TAD to Combined Action Program School,
Phu Bai:

Benton, N.D.
Wright, R.L.
Holder, J. B.
Byrd, T.D.E.
Penkwitz C.
Cerrone, J.

"I" Company

New Replacements

2nd Lt Reilly R. F.
Forest Hills, N.Y.
2nd Lt White W.S.
Atlanta, Georgia
2nd Lt Stewart M.H.
Geneseo, N.Y.
Brown, R.H.
Newark, N.J.
Williams, C.E.
Phila. Pa

Waldrop, B.R.
Gullman, Ala.
Williams T.F.
Panama City, Fla.
Stone, R.H.
West Palm Beach, Fla.
Mitchell, T.D.
Raton N. Mexico
Kribs, J.A.
Vassar, Mich.

D'Innocenzo, R.A.
Newton Central, Mass.
Caracciolo, G.F.
Mount Clemens, Mich.
Bienkowski, C. F.
Stamford, Conn.
Resnick, R.A. Jr.
Upper Darby, Penn.

"I" Company New Replacements Continued:

Pvt R W Welch
Chicago, Ill
Pfc C W Large
Irving, Tex
Pfc J C Swords
Willow Beach, Ala
Pfc W M Pennick
Lexington, Va
Pfc J J Wood, Jr
Jennings, Mo
Pfc C L Smith, Jr
Slippery Rock, Pa
Pfc F Chmielecki
Milton, N H
Pfc T A Coleman
Charleston, W V
Pfc R I Leek
Macon, Ga
Pfc D H Hopson
Pelahatchie, Miss
Pfc C Aguilera, Jr
Whittier, Calif

Pfc P J Harris
Stony Point, N Y
Pfc L J Ioanni
Memphis, N Y
Pfc M Hernandez, Jr
Bronx, NY
Pfc E M Ogozalek
Jersey City, N J
Pfc E F Ryan, Jr
New Rochelle, N Y
Pfc C H Shultz
Wilmington, Ohio
Pfc D E Bressler, Jr
Mishawaka, Ind
Pvt R E Patrick
Chicago, Ill
Pfc J C Foster
Macon, Ga
Pfc J W Graham
Heath Springs, S C
GySgt M A Mikitas
Lakewood, Ga

Pfc R J Ayers
Phoenix, Ariz
Pfc E Morgan
Philadelphia, Pa
Pvt C R Farmer
Sylva, N C

PROMOTIONS TO CORPORAL

Cpl Gardner
Cpl Garner
Cpl Hatfield

Congratulations to:
Cpl James Dunaway who
was married while on
R & R in Hawaii

"K" COMPANY

NEW REPLACEMENTS:

David E Chaney
Maryville, Tenn
Charles, H Priesand
Fairview Park, Ohio
Robert B Graves
Warwick, R I
Willie A Williams
Chicago, Ill
Donald L Ratliff
Greenbrier, W Va
John R Burke
Lynn, Mass
James W Woods
New Haven, Conn
Eugene A Antoine
Marenisco, Mich
Jacob J Cook
New Orleans, La
Steven D Johnson
Thurston, Wash
Jerry L Rose
Bumdaw, Wash
Roger D Wingard
Eagle Grove, Iowa

Jesse H Hartman
Harrisburg, Pa
William B Jackson
Waco, Texas
Davie E Wittler
Spirit Lake, Iowa
Ronald E Burch
Fredricktown, Ohio
Thomas M Centola
Charlestown, Mass
Dennis T Dudley
Roanoke, Va
Daniel L Navarro
El Paso, Tex
Ray A Page
Concord, N H
William R King Jr
Old Town, Maine
William R Garland
Satellite Beach, Fla
Louis A Teata, Jr
Philadelphia, Pa
George P Demaris
Concord, N H

Dennis J Priest
Mobile, Ala
Clarence R Saylor Jr
Camden, N J
Fredrick J Schlick
Beachwood, N J
Ronald D Ayers
Dayton, Ohio
James L Bosheers
Leoma, Tenn
Elmer G Craig
Columburg, Ala
Frank Johnson, Jr
Chattanooga, Tenn
Anthony C Thurston
Poughkeepsie, NY
Melvin Simmons
Washington, D C
David L Barnes
Enclid, Ohio
Timothy M Klein
Ogden, Utah
Terry L Ivis
Fayetteville, Ark

PROMOTIONS

Harry Varnadoe to Sgt
Gary Hurd to Cpl
Paul Ragan to Cpl

ATTENDING SCHOOLS:

Sgt G D Ohman to CAG
Pfc R J Williams to CAG

SSgt John W Diflaurio re-
enlisted for 6 years on
25 Dec 1967

"L" COMPANY

NEW REPLACEMENTS

2d Lt Thomas J Hoare Jr
Bellerose, N Y
GySgt Coy L Blakey Jr
Waco, Texas

Pvt Michael J Talley
Malvern, Pa
Pfc Terrell L Randall
Cedar Rapids, Iowa

Pfc Ronald W Griffin
Winnfield, La
Pfc Richard Z Ashby
Waycross, Ga

DECLASSIFIED

"L" COMPANY NEW REPLACEMENTS CONTINUED:

Pvt Terry L Roberts
Ginnaminston, N J
Pfc Gary S Katline
South Haven, Mich
Pfc John E Saltee
Hamilton, Ohio
Pfc Michael A Barratt
Riverdale, Mich
Pfc William M Anderson
Opalocka, Fla
Pfc Bruce Sammel Jr
Jacksonville, Fla
Pfc Clyde E Johnson
Gastonia, N C
Pfc Hubert Givens
Cincinnati, Ohio
Pfc George G Hughes
Haywood, Calif
Pfc Rex V Ingram Jr
Bremerton, Wash
Pfc Ronald A Pundai
Westmoreland, Pa
Pfc Albert D Osusky
Middlesox, N J

Pfc Roger E Tart
Wynne, Ark
Pfc Willie O Ford
Nacogdoches, Texas
Pfc Richard W Bradley
Lynchburg, Va
Pfc Barry T Hopper
McKinzine, Tenn
Pfc Charles C Grow
Bakersfield, Calif
Pfc Jerry L Williams
Newtown, Missouri
Pfc David C Thielen
Omaha, Neb
Pfc John A Webb
Kansas City, Mo
Pfc Rickie L Sharp
Des Moines, Iowa
Pfc Carl C ^{Harless}
Jacksonville, Fla
Pfc Francisco V Delgado
Brooklyn, N Y
Pvt Lawrence C Covington
Hudson, N J

Pfc Peter F Jackson
Philadelphia, Pa
Pfc James W Ashley II
Ward, Texas
Pfc Willie Washington Jr
Caddo, La
Pfc Gavio Tinaza
Sacramento, Calif
Pfc Doyle Overton
Chicago, Ill
Pfc Oliver H Emerson Jr
Contra Costa, Calif

PROMOTION TO PFC
Lester M Crozier
Michael Talley
Terry Roberts

PROMOTION TO CPL
Romie L Bennett
Bryan E Jordan III

MERITORIOUS PROMOTION TO SGT
James J Ables

ATTENDING SCHOOLS: Lamar Daniels, Cpl Clarence R Duplessis, Cpl Ralph Weese

EXTENSION OF OVERSEAS TOUR: Richard G Bowers

"M" COMPANY

NEW REPLACEMENTS:

2d Lt Robert W O'Connor Jr
South Bend, Ind
1st Sgt George L Todd
Maple Wood, Mo
S/Sgt Robert D Knuston
Lanesboro, Minn
Gy/Sgt Kenneth Phringer
Burlington, Wis
Pvt Alfred Goodermote
Bershive, Mass
Pvt Steven R Jansen
Orem, Utah
Pfc James Pinckney Jr
Newark, N J
Pfc James Poplaski
Philadelphia, Pa
Pfc William P Blind
Glencove, N Y
Pvt Bernard Scozzafaua III
Stoney Point, N Y
1/Cpl Michael Toth
San Diego, Calif
Pfc Larry E Gillingham
Hopkinsville, Ky
Pfc Rickey L Lilla
Riverside, Calif
Pfc Thomas P Tenebrin
Chicago, Ill
Cpl William G Baun
Leesburg, Va
Pvt Eduardo E Elizondo
Brownsville, Tex
Pfc Michael E Kudia
Chicago, Ill

Pfc Luis Santiago
New York, N Y
Pfc Richard B Murphy
Norwood, Mass
Pfc Michael O'Connell
Jersey City, N J
Pfc Allen Clark
Hugo, Okla
Pfc John C Young
Baldwin, Miss
Pvt Thelbert A James
New Rochelle, N Y
Pfc Robert M McLean
Jacksonville, Fla
Pfc Henry E Shelton
North Hollywood, Calif
Pfc Robert A Wilson
Stamford, Conn
Pfc Grover L Garriss
Charlotte, N C
Pfc Richard Kasproicz
Brenham, Tex
Pfc Gilberto Tapia Jr
Brownsville, Tex
Pfc Earl Triplett Jr
Chicago, Ill
Pfc Tandy W Wells
Lebanon, Tenn
Pfc Zack Addington
Clermont, Ga
Pvt Kenneth Bierman
Brunswick, Ohio
Pfc Thomas Higgins
Upper Darby, Pa

Pfc William O Jett III
Chicago, Ill
Pfc Francis L Morgan Jr
McPherson, Ka
Pfc Louie Patterson
Birmingham, Ala
Pfc Donald J Usey
New Orleans, La
Pfc Thomas Hargrove
Klamath Falls, Oregon
Pvt Wesley Harline Jr
Ogden, Utah
Pvt David E Hatch
Vernal, Utah
Pfc Thomas L Hickam
San Bernadion, Calif

PROMOTION TO CPL

James A Ferrie
Randall Planchon II
Langery R Tucker Jr

ATTENDING III MAP LANGUAGE
SCHOOL:
John M Barrow

CONGRATULATIONS TO:
L/Cpl Dale I Wainers whose
wife had a baby girl

Cpl Thomas Fritze who was married in Hawaii 15 Dec 67

COMPANY NEWS CONTINUED

FROM "I" COMPANY:

"OUR GUNNY"

By Lt J C Day

We call him the gunny just like all other gunnys, but OUR GUNNY is different because he is OUR GUNNY. With a short, pointed walking stick, and a half-smile, and a full, quick voice of authority he led the Marines of Lima Company for thirteen full months. He always saw that the men were fed and had the equipment they needed, and he gave them his hard attitude that led them through the cold, thick mud, and tortures of heat and dust. He never complained; he never thought about himself; the men would have followed him to hell itself. His reward was small—it was simply to be referred to as "OUR GUNNY"—and somehow it was enough.

OUR GUNNY had been around, too. He had served his country in Japan, Korea and Viet Nam, and who knows where else. He carries thirteen ribbons and has scars for two of them. OUR GUNNY was liked by some, hated by others, but respected by all, and we called him "GUNNY" because he deserved it. There wasn't a man in the company who didn't have a touch of envy for the man who never ducked because he was too busy looking out for the rest of us.

One Marine put it this way, "I feel I have served under the best Gunnery Sgt in the United States Marine Corps."

"I remember the time," one platoon sgt said, "when the gunny brought in a chopper to pick up those who had fallen. He ran around yelling for everyone to keep down and to keep putting out the rounds. It wasn't until it was all over

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NEW COMMANDANT FOR USMC

President Johnson has named Lt. Gen. Leonard Chapman as the new Marine Corps Commandant. Lt. Gen. Chapman was assistant to the commandant, Lt. Gen. Wallace M Greene, Jr, who retired on 31 Dec '67.

Gen. Chapman began his career with the United States Marine Corps on 8 July 1935, as a second lieutenant.

Aboard the USS Astoria when WW II started, he took part in the early Pacific raids and in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, earning the Navy Commendation Ribbon as commander of the Marine detachment. Later, while commanding an artillery battalion with the 11th Marines, 1st Marine Div., he earned the Legion of Merit and the Bronze Star during combat at Peleliu and Okinawa.

During post-war assignments, he served

and we were out of the murderous heat that we noticed he had lost his helmet and flack jacket. He never once got down even though the rounds kept coming in."

OUR GUNNY has all the qualities anyone ever said that a military leader should have. He spoke very loudly, and carried a big stick. The phrase "aggressive Marine" was written for him.

In a few days OUR GUNNY will rotate. He will leave the company, check in a new gunnery sergeant, pack his bag, take one last look, and return to the States. Most of us will never remember the name of Gunnery H L SLAYDEN, but we will always remember "OUR GUNNY".

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FROM "I" COMPANY:

From mid September until 26 December India Company was given the mission of defending Camp Leach which is about four and a half miles south of Nui Con Thien. During this period India Company was skippered by three CO's: Major Young, Lt Deese, and Capt John Prichard who is the present CO. During India Company's tour at Camp Leach, formerly known as C-2, ambushes and security patrols were an everyday occurrence. However, the barrier program was the main project of the company. India Company, affectionately known as the "Hungry I", was responsible for the completion of the Barrier program on the western sector. (Continued on back page, first column)

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with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; the division of plans and policies, Headquarters Marine Corps; completed the Amphibious Warfare School, senior course at Quantico (1950); and was chief of the supporting arms group, Marine Corps Development Center, Quantico.

Next came duty in Japan with the 12th Marines and at Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.

On January 1, 1964, Gen. Chapman was named chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, with the rank of lieutenant general. For service in this capacity, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He became assistant commandant of the Marine Corps on July 1 of this year.

Lt. Gen. Chapman stated to the president upon his appointment, "I want to assure you, sir, I am going to do the very best I can for you, the country and the Marine Corps."

(*I" Comapny news continued)

This involved waterproofing the bunkers, raising a serving tent and mess tent, and most importantly constructing dry, deep, fighting holes with good overhead covers.

On the day after Christmas, Capt Prichard took his company north to a hill just south of the DMZ making India the closest company to the DMZ in South Vietnam.

On the march to this new defensive position, India was credited with one enemy confirmed, thanks to the alertness of S/Sgt C L Colley who first sighted the NVA soldier. The company had no trouble reaching it's objective since the confirmed built morale to a point where all forgot about the heavy packs they were carrying.

The last day of the old year India had its most successful day in the field since September. The Company was credited with twenty-one confirmed dead while Lt. Albert Doyon, the attached artillery forward observer officer, showed the infantrymen just how valuable artillery could be. He and his team were credited with six confirmed dead and air was credited with five. India Company, going into the field that day with about 40% inexperienced troops, once again upheld the fine reputation the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines enjoys within the Division. The company suffered only light casualties with no KIA's. It was probably the last battle fought in 1967, and it was a fine way for the company to send the old year out and to toast the new year in. The men of the "Hungry I" were congratulated and given a "well done" by the regimental commander, Col Smith.

Since September the company has joined two staff and seven officers and has lost three staff and four officers to other units. The new staff NCO's are: GySgt Michael Mikitis, and S/Sgt Nathan Turcort. The new officers are: Capt John Prichard, CO; 1st Lt Forrest Dickinson, XO; 1st Lt James Cowan, 1st Platoon; 2d Lt William White, 2d Platoon; 2d Lt Malcolm Stewart, 3d Platoon; 2d Lt Raymond Rielley, weapons platoon; and 2d Lt Albert Doyon, forward observer.

The "Hungry I" looks forward to continued success in 1968, and extends its best wishes for having a successful New Year in Third Battalion, Fourth Marines.

3d Battalion, 4th Marines
Company
3d Mar Div (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

O.O ERROR PERCENTAGE ON UNIT DIARIES FOR COMPANY "L"

Congratulations to the administrative personnel of Company "L" for an O.O error percentage on Unit Diary submissions for the month of Nov 1967. The overall Battalion error percentage was 1.8 percent errors. Keep up the good work!

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An Easterner was being driven by a rancher over a blistering and almost barren stretch of West Texas when a gaudy bird, new to him, scurried in front of them. The Easterner asked what it was.

"That's a Bird of Paradise", the rancher informed him.

The stranger rode on in silence for a while, then said:

"Pretty long way from home, isn't it?"

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GIFT AIRLIFT FOR GI'S

For a \$1 fee plus the regular postage the Post Office Department will airlift packages weighing up to 30 pounds to American military personnel anywhere in the world beginning January 7.

The special service will be available on packages mailed to military personnel at APO and FPO addresses overseas, and in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Armed Forces personnel will be able to use the special service on packages that they send home.

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NEW EM CLUB AT 3/4 REAR

Plans are underway to have an EM Club in 3/4 rear, and hopefully it is to be completed in two or three weeks. Cold beer, sodas and snacks will be available. There will be a flick every night from the 9th Marines. If you have any suggestions about the club see the representative in your company office. The senior advisor is 1st Sgt Egan (H&S Co) and representatives from the companies are: L/Cpl R A Belzer (H&S Co), Sgt J K Fijacko (I Co), Cpl R J Sachett (K Co), L/Cpl R A Siemers (L Co), and Cpl F T Smithke (MCo).

POSTAGE AND FEES
PAID BY DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY

TO: _____