

DECLASSIFIED

102268

~~SECRET~~

68 3325

SECRET

00105-6F  
12

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Battalion, 4th Marines  
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/RKY:hwh  
5750  
SER: 003A03868  
7 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3D)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF  
(2) Commanding General, III MAF  
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) FMFPacO 5050.8  
(c) Divo 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, January 1968

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

*Lee R. Bendell*  
LEE R. BENDELL

S&C FILES  
HEADQUARTERS  
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)  
680062  
14 FEB 1968  
Copy 1 of 15 Copies

Downgraded at 3 year intervals.  
Declassified after 12 years.

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

**SECRET**TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>UNCLASSIFIED</u>	ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
II	S-1 & PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
III	INTELLIGENCE
IV	OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
V	LOGISTICS
VI	COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS
VII	FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
VIII	AIR SUPPORT
IX	MEDICAL AFFAIRS
X	CIVIL AFFAIRS
XI	PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED & LESSONS LEARNED
XII	DOCUMENTATION

TAB 4  
B } 1. OPERATION ORDER 1-68 110500H JAN68  
2. FRAG ORDER FOR 17-18 JAN68

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~SECTION IUNCLASSIFIEDORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designations/Locations.

a. 3d Battalion (Rein), 4th Marines.

b. Defensive position YD 173733, 1-12 Jan 68; defensive position YD 150710, 12-22 Jan 68; defensive position YD 149692, 22-24 Jan 68; defensive position vicinity of Route 9 north of Camp Carroll, 24-31 Jan 68.

2. Period Covered in Report. 1-31 January 1968.3. Billet Assignments.

a. Commanding Officer	1-31 January 1968	LtCol LER. R. BENDELL
b. Executive Officer	1-31 January 1968	Maj J. E. MEAD
c. S-1	1-31 January 1968	1stLt J. A. PARKER
d. S-2	1-31 January 1968	1stLt B. K. LILE
e. S-3	1-31 January 1968	Maj R. K. YOUNG
f. S-4	1-31 January 1968	Capt S. E. THOMAS
g. Comm. O.	1-18 January 1968	MSGT H. L. COATES
h. CO H&SCo	18-31 January 1968	Capt A. A. JANSSEN
	1-21 January 1968	1stLt W. R. WILLETT
	21-31 January 1968	2dLt J. O. SINGER
i. CO Co "I"	1-27 January 1968	Capt J. L. PRICHARD
	27-31 January 1968	1stLt G. F. DICKINSON
j. CO Co "K"	1-31 January 1968	Capt E. O. LEROY
k. CO Co "L"	1-18 January 1968	Capt J. D. CARR
	18-31 January 1968	Capt J. L. McLAUGHLIN
l. CO Co "M"	1-31 January 1968	Capt R. W. KALM

UNCLASSIFIED~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION IIS-1 & PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION1. Replacements Received

- a. USMC Enlisted - 143
- b. USMC Officers - 6
- c. USN Enlisted - 9

2. Personnel Rotated

- a. USMC Enlisted - 56

3. Other Personnel Losses

## a. Transfer by Service Records

- (1) USMC Enlisted - 32
- (2) USN Enlisted - 2

## b. Wounded in Action

- (1) USMC Enlisted - 171
- (2) USMC Officers - 5
- (3) USN Enlisted - 8

## c. Killed in Action

- (1) USMC Enlisted - 36
- (2) USMC Officers - 3
- (3) USN Enlisted - 6

## d. Humanitarian Transfer - 0

## e. Non-battle Casualties

- (1) USMC Enlisted - 6

## f. Intra Division/Regiment Transfers

- (1) USMC Enlisted - 14
- (2) USMC Officers - 1
- (3) USN Enlisted - 3
- (4) USN Officers - 1

4. Number of R&R Trips - 875. Average Monthly Strength

- a. USMC Enlisted - 1133
- b. USMC Officers - 43
- c. USN Enlisted - 60
- d. USN Officers - 2


UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED



6. Personnel Shortages

	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Number Needed</u>
a. Officers -	Capt	0302	1
b. Enlisted -	E-4	3531	4
	E-1 - E-4	0331	35



~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

## SECTION III

## INTELLIGENCE

JAN 68

1. Terrain: The following is a descriptive analysis of the topography encountered in the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines area of operation:

a. The terrain immediately west of the A-3 position, north and south of the "trace" consists of heavily wooded areas and wide wet rice paddys. Vegetation is secondary growth with bamboo thickets and partial canopys in some areas, 15-20 feet in height. Extensive bombing and artillery have created open areas along most ridge lines 25-75 meters wide. The low wet rice paddys are between 25-125 meters wide and parallel most of the rolling hills. Observation from the ridgelines is good to the low areas.

b. The terrain east of A-3 and north of the trace consists of rolling hills with secondary scrub and thick brush broken by low wet rice paddys 75-150 meters in width. Vegetation consists of broad scrub areas near the trace area bordered by hedgerow complexes to the north. Low wet rice paddys parallel most of the rolling hills. Due to constant bombing and artillery, there is little or no canopy. The ridge lines are generally cleared and open allowing for good observation to the low ground. Rate of movement for large units is 800 meters per hour.

c. The terrain around the contact area of 18 January located at YD 145724 consists of rolling hills broken by thick hedgerows and open grassy areas. Numerous bomb craters and artillery shell craters dot the landscape. Observation from the high ground is good, but observation is limited on the flat grassy areas because of the thick hedgerows. Maximum utilization of the terrain has been made by the enemy for the construction of bunkers for both living, fighting, and spider holes. Elaborate trench line systems located within the hedgerows connect living and fighting bunkers. Movement on this type of terrain was generally unrestricted.

d. The terrain in the vicinity of the Battalion position located at YD 073572 consisted of a low river basin paralleled by Route #9, and steep hills. Vegetation consisted of heavy secondary scrub growth, three to six feet high, broad grassy areas, and partial canopys on the ridge lines 15-20 feet in height. The river is navigable by small water craft during high water periods. Observation is good from the ridge lines but is normally restricted to one direction because of the heavy vegetation and steep rising hills. The Cam Lo River in the vicinity of the Battalion position (YD 073572) is fordable at selected locations during low water periods. Heavy rains of short duration cause flash flooding in that area.

2. Enemy Situation at the Beginning of Period.

a. Enemy strength in and adjacent to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines' area of operation was considered to be one reinforced battalion of the 90th NVA Regiment. As stated in the 3d Marine Division Intelligence Summary, friendly operations and construction of the A-3 position between

UNCLASSIFIED

III-1

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

Gio Linh and Con Thien had confused and upset the enemy's tactical, logistical and infiltration scheme of operation. At the Battalion position north of A-3 the enemy's tactics were primarily of a harassing nature. Persistent sniping and occasional incoming artillery and mortar fire were the only overt acts against the position. Effective patrolling by platoon and company size units kept the enemy off balance and stalled obvious build-ups at two locations north of A-3. Enemy infiltration and supply routes in and adjacent to the area of operation were determined by sightings and contacts during the period 27 December 1967-11 January 1968. The infiltration net works were determined to be most active from YD 169772 to YD 191756 and YD 159745. Sightings and contacts also established the enemy's line of resistance from YD 140735 to YD 176762. On 7 January, contact with the enemy indicated that forward enemy positions had been set up in order to hamper friendly operations and movements short of their main bases and logistical support areas, located in the southern half of the IMZ. Size of the forward elements was estimated to be 30 to 40 men (one platoon). Weapons included light machineguns, automatic and semi-automatic rifles and bolt action Soviet sniper rifles. The enemy positions were well bunkered and concealed with field of fire facing generally in a south-southeast and southwest direction. Enemy snipers positioned in spider holes were used to draw friendly units into the bunkered areas and pre-planned fire zones. During contact with an estimated 20-30 NVA at YD 174746 on 11 January, the enemy unit was identified as the 2d Company of the 7th Battalion, 90th NVA Regiment. Bunker complexes were discovered along two ridge lines from YD 177746 to YD 183749 and from YD 173746 to YD 179751. Most of the bunkers were between seven (7) and nine (9) months old, well constructed and recently used. The bunkers were constructed with overheads of logs and dirt two to four feet thick. Dimensions of the bunkers averaged 5 feet by 5 feet square and four to five feet deep. Partial tunnels had been dug in some of the bunkers which were two to three feet in diameter and five to six feet in length. Most of the bunkers were of the living type and had connecting trenches with individual fighting positions inserted between them. Equipment captured during and after the contact was in good condition. Contents of enemy packs and information contained in the captured documents indicated that the enemy personnel had possibly infiltrated south during the last two months. Bunkers found during the contact were well stocked with rice. Friendly patrols had reported groups of civilians traveling east of the contact area with empty rice baskets a week prior to the contact, indicating that possible NVA sympathizers from the Gio Linh area were assisting in resupplying the enemy units.

b. On 15 January, the Battalion moved to a new location further west and south of the trace at YD 148707. The enemy continued to operate in relatively small screening units of 10-14 men and forward observer teams of three to five men, primarily north of the trace between A-3 and the A-4 positions. The 27th NVA Independent Battalion (approximately 150 men of an original 300) reportedly moved the bulk of their unit south of Route 9, but sightings of small groups (two to three men) in the vicinity of the Battalion position indicated that possible elements of the 27th Battalion headquarters remained north of Route 9 in order to coordinate ac-

UNCLASSIFIED  
III-2

~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE 1

**SECRET**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

tivities with other NVA units.

c. On 14 January a large enemy harbor site (estimated battalion size) was discovered at YD 166690 in a heavily wooded bamboo thicket with 15-20 feet of overhead canopy. The harbor site has been used by a small enemy unit within the last two or three days as indicated by pots and pans of recently cooked rice in the immediate area. Indications were that the camp had been used on a full time basis two to three months previously by a company or larger unit. The harbor site was located near a trail complex known to be used for infiltration of men and supplies. The site appeared to have been used recently as an overnight feeding and resting station. A large tree located in the middle of the camp was used as an observation post. Twenty-one living bunkers were discovered as well as four, 82mm mortar pits. The living bunkers were constructed in an "L" shape with dimensions of six (6) feet long by four (4) feet wide and four (4) to five (5) feet deep. Most of the decks were covered with straw matting and all of the bunkers were overhauled with two to four feet of logs and dirt. One of the bunkers was used for cooking and had a fifteen (15) foot tunnel as part of a smokeless oven. Adjacent to the living area were four, 82mm mortar pits with built-in ammunition bunkers, the dimensions of which were four feet by four feet by four feet. A total of 183, 82mm mortar rounds were discovered. Openings were cut in the canopy in order to fire in the direction of Con Thien. Based on past information and location of the harbor site, it is probable that it was a full time staging and rest area for elements of the 270th NVA Regiment, which operated in the vicinity of Phu Tho YD 178699.

### 3. Total Enemy Losses.

a. Casualties: 325 ~~NNN~~(Confirmed)  
10 ~~NNN~~ (POW)  
13 Detainees

#### b. Captured Equipment:

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item</u>
64	AK-47 Rifles
32	AK-47 magazines
9	AK-47 mag pouches
3	AK-47 mag pouches (Leather)
23	SKS carbine rifles
17	RPD Light Machine Guns
1	SG-43 Heavy Machine Gun
1	Soviet 1891/30 Sniper Rifle w/ a 3.5 power scope
1	Tripod for Heavy Machine Gun SG-43
8	ChiCom Gas Mask (Complete)
13	RPG-2 Rocket Rounds
6	RPG-7 Rocket Rounds
6	RPG-2 Rocket Launcher
1	RPG-7 Rocket Launcher w/ optical sight
208	82mm Mortar Rounds

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SECRET**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**



**SECRET**

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item</u>
34	82mm Fuses
300	82mm Boosters
3 cans	82mm Increments
2	60mm Mortar Tubes
1	60mm Mortar Bipod
6	60mm Mortar Round (ChiCom)
20	60mm Fuses
38	60mm Boosters
6	DH-10 Directional Mine
61	ChiCom Grenades
3	Anti-personnel Mines (Russian)
13	ChiCom Grenade Pouches
3	ChiCom Cartridge Belts
125 ft	ChiCom Communications Wire
4	RPG-2 Fuses
5	RPG-2 Boosters
5	RPG-7 Boosters
4	Polish PCN-60 Rifle Grenades w/ case
1	AK-47 Grenade Launchers
3	Soviet Fragmentation Rifle Grenades w/ case
1	ChiCom Field Radio (Complete w/ handset)
1	MUV-5 Pull Fuse
9	NVA Packs
4	NVA Canteens
6	NVA Shirts
6	NVA Trousers
5	NVA Shoes
8	NVA Hammock
8	NVA Ponchos
2	ChiCom Mess Kits
5	East German Medical Kits
6 btl	Medicine (Unk Type)
1	Russian Biological Decontamination Kit
7	Gas Mask (Russian)
2	NVA Picks
6	NVA Shovel
11	ChiCom Helmet
2	NVA Hats (Straw)
25 ft	Rope
10	Pot and Pan
40 lb	Rice
630 rd	7.62 Long (Type 56)
944 rd	7.62 Short
	Miscellaneous Clothing (Not Uniforms)

#### 4. Enemy Situation at End of Period

a. Enemy activity north of the Battalion position located at YD 148707 continued to remain light with sightings of relatively small

UNCLASSIFIED

the battalion position received a moderate barrage of enemy artillery fire estimated to be from an 85mm field gun. Duration of fire was approximately 20 minutes. Information received from 4th Marines indicated the following enemy units to be operating in the vicinity of the Battalion position; Headquarters elements of the 90th NVA Regiment, 27th Independent NVA Battalion, and an unknown enemy battalion size force operating to the northwest.

f. During the early morning hours of the 26th, the bridge located at YD 074572 was destroyed by an NVA raiding party making it impassable to vehicle traffic. Indications were that the main enemy mission was to sever Route 9 between Cam Lo Village and Camp Carroll, thus forcing resupply of the Camp Carroll artillery position by helicopter. There were continued sightings of NVA units moving north and south of the Cam Lo River from YD 060571 to YD 080591. Sniping and incoming mortar fire persisted throughout the day. Contact with an estimated platoon size force was made at YD 069574. The initial field readout of captured enemy equipment indicated that the enemy forces operating in the area were well equipped with new and up to date weapons and equipment.

g. On 27 January, during the early morning hours, a heavy volume of small arms and sniper fire was received from enemy positions north and west of the Battalion perimeter and concentrated enemy movement and voices were heard southeast of the perimeter. Infiltration during the early morning hours (three-five o'clock) had been made with enemy units positioning for the attack. An estimated company size force was involved in the contact area supported by the remainder of an enemy battalion. Weapons included 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles and machine guns, with anti-aircraft machine guns in general support. During the ensuing contact, eight enemy POW's were captured, one of which was an officer. Some of those captured were in a state of shock and crying; most appeared very young. Many dead and wounded enemy were left on the battlefield. Initial interrogation of the POW's revealed the following:

- (1) Unit Identification: 2d Co, K-7 Bn, 64th Regt, 320 Division.
- (2) Parent Units: 320 Division (48th Regt, 52d Regt and 64th Regt)
- (3) Mission of Enemy Unit: To set up ambush in the vicinity of YD 0757 grid sometime during a seven day period. The battalion general mission was to conduct raids and ambushes.
- (4) Morale: "Average" prisoner stated recruits have no experience, not enough food. Other POW's stated most were "scared to death".
- (5) Supply: POW stated supply of ammunition and equipment was adequate. Civilian workers carried food and ammunition to battalion area at night. POW also stated that a transportation unit brought food and ammunition every seven days. There were about 100 men in this unit.

UNCLASSIFIED



(6) Location: POW stated the approximate location of the A-7 Battalion was at YD 0664. He stated that the 48th and 52d Regiments were still in RVN.

(7) Comments of the Interrogator: POW habitually lied until caught. Reliability could not be judged. (See 7th ITT, III MAF 17-68 271430Z JAN 68 and follow-up report DTG 281415Z for details.) Other POW's captured during the contact stated they were also from the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment. (See 7th ITT, III MAF reports 14-68 DTG 271350Z JAN 68, III MAF 21-68, 290640Z; and III MAF 15-68 271500Z JAN 68, for interrogations).

h. Considering the aggressiveness of enemy action, condition of captured enemy arms and equipment, and introduction of new munitions to this area of operation, indications are that additional offensive action will be initiated by enemy forces.

i. The action of the 27th appeared to have decisively defeated the 7th Battalion of the 64th Regt, pre-empted a potential attack on Camp Carroll, and maintained the overland supply route open to Camp Carroll. The closing days of the month saw sporadic 60mm and 82mm mortar fire along Route 9, but main force units appeared to have withdrawn north of the Cam Lo River.

UNCLASSIFIED

III-7

**SECRET**  
ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the period 1-31 January 1968.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
H&SCo	Care and Maintenance of 106 RR	10
	Map Reading	4
	Weapons Safety	16
	Care and Maintenance of M-16 Rifle	8
	Leadership	4
	Field Sanitation	5
Co "I"	F. O. Procedures	3
	Med-evac Procedures	3
	Weapon Safety	6
	First Aid	3
	Radio Procedures	6
	M-60 Machine Gun	3
	Care and Cleaning of M-16, M-79, M-60, 60mm, NOD, PPS-6	15
	Point Procedures on Patrol	2
	Squad Tactics	6
	Fortification Construction	10
	Defensive Tactics	25
	Squad Ambush Tactics	15
	Convoy Tactics	8
	Map and Compass Procedures	6
	Land Navigation	3
Co "K"	Leadership	4
	Map Reading	3
	Demolitions	4
	Weapons Safety	5
	First Aid	4
	Use of Supporting Arms	4
	Practice Fire Missions	10
	60mm Mortar Instruction	6
Co "L"	3.5 and LAAW	2
	60mm Mortar	1
	Patrolling	2
	FAM LAAW	2
	Mapping	1
	First Aid	1
	Radio Procedures	2

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

enemy groups. On 16 January, information was received of a possible enemy buildup in the area north-northeast of Con Thien. Elements of the 803d NVA Regiment were the probable enemy units. On 18 January, a two company patrol made contact with elements of the 803d NVA Regiment (believed to be the 2d Battalion) estimated to be at least one reinforced company with a heavy weapons unit attached. Weapons included AK-47 rifles, SKS carbines, RPD Light Machine Guns, and Heavy Machine Guns (.50 Cal. US or SG. 43 ChiCom). The enemy also employed 60 and 82mm mortars, RPG-2 rockets and 85/100mm artillery in support of their units. Enemy artillery support was accurately adjusted by forward observers attached to the enemy units. During early phases of the contact, the enemy seemed to be very disorganized and many withdrew in a northerly direction. This indicated the following probabilities:

- (1) That the enemy had insufficient time to organize their defensive positions,
- (2) Inexperienced troops were involved.
- (3) Lack of discipline.
- (4) Poor fighting spirit because of previous heavy losses.

b. The size and dress of the enemy were the most significant items of intelligence gained from the contact. The enemy wore a mixture of khaki and black pajama type uniforms; black pajama attire was the most prevalent. The body dimensions, height and facial characteristics were of special interest. A muscular body structure, 145-180 pounds; average height of 5' 10", and facial features of high cheek bones, upward slanted eyes, and well groomed appearance were the main areas of difference from that of ordinary North Vietnamese.

c. On 21 January, a company observation post observed five NVA north of the Battalion position setting up a forward observation post in a tree. A patrol was dispatched to the area, but returned with negative results. At approximately 1800H, the Battalion was attacked with a combination of artillery, mortars, and recoilless rifle fire. Most of the rounds were estimated to be 100-105mm artillery, 82mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds.

d. On 22 January the Battalion moved its location to YD 149692. Enemy activity in that area was minimal with only suspected movement at night of small groups.

e. On 24 January, the Battalion was alerted and moved one company by helicopter to assist an ambushed unit on Route 9 between Cam Lo and Camp Carroll at YD 073572. On 25 January, the 3d Battalion (-) helicopter lift was completed to its new location at the above coordinate. During the early morning hours of 25 January, Co. "M" made contact with an estimated 20-30 NVA at YD 072574. Increased enemy activity in that area was very apparent and indicated the probability of an attack. At 251800H;

III-5

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
	Weapons Safety	4
	Conduct in RVN	1
	Personal Appearance	1
	Maintenance of Gear	1
	Personal Hygiene	1
	Ambushes	1
	NVA/VC Tactics	1
	FAM M-60	6
	F. O. Procedures	1
	Search Light	1
	FAM M-16	13
	FAM .50 Cal MG	2
	FAM .45 Cal	2
	Command Responsibility	2
Co "M"	Leadership	4
	Map Reading	4
	First Aid	4
	Weapons Safety	6
	Field Fortifications	8
	Use of Supporting Arms	4
	Compass	5

2. In addition to the above, all individual Marines fired their weapons for "zero", prior to assignment to a unit in the field.

3. All replacements were given indoctrination lectures prior to joining their units by the Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major and their Co Officers.

#### 4. Command and Control

On 12Jan68, Co "K" 3/4 chopped to 3/3  
 On 14Jan68, Co "K" 3/4 chopped from 3/3 to 12th Marines  
 On 24Jan68, Sqd Scout Sniper Platoon chopped from 3/4 to 9th Marines  
 On 24Jan68, 3/4 chopped from 9th Marines to 4th Marines  
 On 25Jan68, Sqd Scout Sniper Platoon chopped from 4th Marines to 3/4  
 On 29Jan68, Co "H" 2/9 chopped to 3/4  
 On 29Jan68, Co "H" 2/9 chopped from 3/4 to 2/9  
 On 31Jan68, Co "L" 3/4 chopped to 3/9

These were task organized as follows:

Defensive position YD 173733 (1-12Jan68)

H&SCo (-) Bn CP  
 Det Etry "I" 3/12 (Liaison Team)  
 Sqd, Scout Sniper Plt, HqCo, 9th Mar  
 Det Co "C", 3d Eng (2Demo Teams)

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

Det Co "C" 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)  
Co "I" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt, H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
Co "K" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
Co "L" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt, H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
Co "M" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt, H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)

Defensive position YD 147708 (12-24 Jan 68)

H&SCo (-) Bn CP  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (Liaison Team)  
Sqd Scout Sniper Plt, HqCo, 9th Mar  
Det Co "C", 3d Engr (3 Demo Teams)  
Det Co "C" 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)  
Co "I" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt, H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
Co "L" (Rein)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
Co "M" (Rein)  
Sqd 106 Plt, H&SCo (1 RR)  
Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)

Camp J. J. Carroll (24-31 Jan 68) vicinity Route 9

H&SCo (-) Bn CP  
Det Btry "I" 3/12 (Liaison Team)  
Det Co "C", 3d Engr (3 Demo Teams)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Co "I" (Rein)  
 Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
 Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
 Co "L" (Rein)  
 Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
 Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)  
 Co "M" (Rein)  
 Det Comm Plt, H&SCo  
 Det 81mm Mortar Plt, H&SCo (FO)  
 Det Btry "I" 3/12 (FO)

#### 5. Close Combat

a. Battery "D" 2/12 was in direct support of 3/4 until 25 December 1967, at which time Battery "E" 2/12 was assigned. General support fires were available from the First 8" Howitzer Battery (Self-propelled), 175mm Gun Battery from the 29th Arty (USA) and Batteries "F" 2/12 and "K" 4/12. Air support, including fixed wing attack aircraft, helicopter gunships, aerial observers, med-evac and resupply helicopters were used extensively in the accomplishment of the Battalion's assigned mission.

b. The entire period covered by this report saw the Battalion engaged in almost constant contact with the enemy. Aggressive patrolling and dedicated professionalism by unit leaders at all levels were noteworthy, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The Battalion operating posture was, by nature of its assigned mission, flexible and allowed constant exploitation of the enemy's movements and weaknesses. Successive multi-company defensive positions were utilized which were relocated with continuing frequency to avoid fixation by the enemy who showed an increasing capability to utilize observed artillery and mortar fire. The hard-hitting, imaginative tactics employed by all levels of command within the Battalion kept the enemy off balance and vulnerable.

c. Continuous improvement of all phases of close combat was emphasized at all levels and considerable progress was achieved. All companies conducted daily patrols and established night time LP's and ambushes, as directed by the CO, 3/4 daily frag orders. At the positions forward of A-3 and south of the "trace", heavy patrolling was conducted to the edge of the DMZ, movement north of that point being restricted. Other significant events of a non-combat nature have been included in the Chronological Summary for historical and record purposes.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

IV-4



~~SECRET~~

1Jan: Two patrols and four ambushes were conducted. Co "K", one platoon patrol. Co "M", one platoon patrol. Co "K"'s four squad night ambushes returned with negative contacts or sightings. At 011615H, Co "K" took into custody one VC suspect at YD 181738 which was processed to Dong Ha for classification. At 011620H, 3/4 was informed by DP 2 (9th Marines) that the enemy was under the impression that the truce would end at 011800H. We continued to maintain the cease fire until 020600H Jan68. The CO of 9th Marines visited this position from 011645H to 011720H.

2Jan: Two patrols, four ambushes and two OP's were conducted. Co "L", one day patrol and two ambushes. Co "M", one day patrol, two ambushes and two OP's. Co's "L" and "M" ambushes had negative contacts or sightings to report. At 020915H, Co "L"'s patrol found three chicom claymore mines at YD 184735. At 021150H, Co "L" found two thatched houses and one reinforced concrete and steel bunker at YD 190743. At 021205H, Co "I" received seven sniper rounds within the perimeter from YD 170739. An 81mm mortar mission was called in response. At 021300H, Co "L" found eight chicom 82mm mortar rounds at YD 188736. At 021957H, two possible enemy grenades were detonated on the northeastern perimeter line resulting in one friendly med-evac and one friendly non-evac. At 022217H, 9th Marines informed 3/4 that enemy artillery was preparing to shell A-3 and friendly surrounding area at an unknown time and date.

3Jan: Two patrols and four ambushes were conducted. Co "I" one patrol. Co "K" one patrol. Co "L" two night ambushes. Co "M" two night ambushes. Co's "I" and "L" ambushes had negative contacts or sightings to report. At 030745H, while Battery "F" was prep-firing at YD 158741, two long rounds hit close to 3/4's perimeter. At 031330H, Co "L" found two tunnel complexes at YD 164737 with many alternate passageways. At 031245H, Co "I" spotted twenty AVA at YD 150731 and called in artillery. Upon checking out area, four 3'x5'x4' log and earth bunkers were discovered and marked for future destruction. At 031530H, seven rounds of estimated enemy 75mm RR or artillery were received. One friendly non-evac hostile fire casualty was treated at Bld. At 031812H, eight to ten enemy 82mm rounds impacted adjacent to perimeter at YD 170739. Counter mortar platoon #2 returned 81mm fire.

4Jan: Two patrols and four ambushes were conducted. Co "L" one patrol. Co "I" one patrol. Co "K"'s four night ambushes returned with negative sightings or contacts to report. At 040610H, Co "I" spotted a man at YD 165721 moving east to west toward our lines. A-79 was fired and man fled. At 041300H, several rounds of sniper fire were received from vicinity YD 170739 and YD 175742. Arty, IG, 106RR and fixed wing were called. One friendly med-evac was sustained. At 041512H, a Marine walking along an inner perimeter trail apparently stepped on an old anti-tank mine, resulting in one friendly MIA and three friendly MIA med-evacs. At 041600H, sniper fire was again received from YD 165739. Fixed wing napalm was called.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5Jan: Two patrols and three night ambushes were conducted. Co "L" one platoon patrol. Co "I" one platoon patrol. Co "K"'s three night ambushes, one platoon (-) and two squad, returned with negative sightings or contacts. At 051200H, Co "L" found two NVA bodies decomposed but well uniformed, along with five AK-47 fighting holes and some unserviceable cooking utensils at YD 185739. At 051515H, Co "I" received four rounds of small arms sniper fire while manning lines. Fire was returned by M-79 and small arms.

6Jan: One two company sweep and four night ambushes were conducted. Co's "K" and "M" with Battalion Command Group on sweep. Co "I"'s two night ambushes and Co "L"'s two night ambushes returned with no contacts or sightings. At 050410H, Co's "M" and "I" had four to five enemy at their wire, YD 168733. Targets engaged by small arms and M-79. Upon immediate check of area, enemy small arms fire received. Follow up check at first light revealed that wire had been tampered with. At 060820H, Co "L" received four small arms sniper rounds from enemy YD 172743. At 061000H, Co "K" found four AK-47, 30g and earth bunkers located on commanding terrain with connecting trenches. 360° observation from that point was excellent to A-3, YD 173722 and A-4, YD 116700. Chicom "C" ration cans, one AK-47 magazine, one 7.62mm belt, one Soviet gas mask, five empty 82mm mortar fuse boxes, one 82mm mortar fuse, three 82mm mortar rounds, and one canister for unknown munitions were found. At 061810H, Co "L" again received three small arms sniper rounds from enemy YD 173744.

7Jan: Two patrols and five ambushes were conducted. Co "I" one platoon patrol. Co "L" one platoon patrol. Co "L"'s two night ambushes and Co "I"'s three night ambushes returned with no contacts or sightings. At YD 165726, at 071100H, Co "L"'s platoon patrol dropped off one six man unit and one squad at two locations in vicinity YD 178735 in an attempt to ambush snipers that have been firing at 3/4 perimeter. At 071312H, a sniper firing on ES perimeter hit a Marine resulting in one routine medical. Ambush teams linked up to investigate sniper at YD 170742. At 071400H, at enemy YD 170728, Co "L" found two AK-57 magazines, one NVA canteen and one NVA M-tool, and also spotted three NVA snipers. At same time Co "L" took one KIA and one minor WIA from NVA with AK-47's at YD 170728. Exchange of fire took place with patrol achieving five NVA KIA's confirmed. As heavier fire was received, an additional platoon was committed to aid in breaking contact, linking up at 071515H. Enemy apparently was building up also as intensity of small arms fire increased. NVA observed in freshly dug spider holes and holes in sides of deep bomb craters across unble front. At 071600H, L-6 took remainder of Co "L" to enemy contact site to insert adequate force. Co "L" CC with AO used arty and air strikes within 100 meters of friendly lines but enemy small arms continued. The initial platoon in contact was having difficulty in breaking contact, being pinned down on a forward slope. The Company Commander directed effective small arms and arty to break contact. At 071730H, Kilo 6, with two platoons was sent to blocking/covering position at YD 175736. Co "I" was taking casualties as they broke contact from accurate sniper fire, automatic weapons and one apparent chicom claymore mine. Co "L", carrying casualties and covering rear, returned to perimeter via Co "K"'s

UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

position. NVA KIA confirmed were inflicted by small arms, grenades and 60mm mortar fires, with an unknown number of enemy casualties inflicted by excellent arty, napalm and snake eye strikes. Huey gunship coverage during last stages of contact claimed two additional NVA KIA confirmed. Six friendly KIA routine evac, twenty-nine friendly med-evacs and seven friendly non-evacs were sustained during action. One known dead Marine was inadvertently not returned to perimeter (Note: body recovered on 11 Jan). Twenty-six NVA KIA confirmed were accounted for.

8Jan: Two company sweep and four LP's were conducted. Co's "L" and "K" on two company sweep to recover marine body but sweep delayed due to adverse weather. At 081416H, Co "L" at YD 177742 was informed by AO of NVA ambush site within twenty meters of apparent body. Body was moved further north to a position within the DMZ. Huey gunships drew heavy fire from entrenched enemy. Co "L" was ordered to return due to weather, late-ness and ambush and area was worked over with arty.

9Jan: One company patrol, one platoon patrol and four squad night ambushes were conducted. Co "I", a company patrol. Co "K", a platoon patrol. Co "I" and Co "M"'s, and both of Co "K"'s squad night ambushes returned with negative contacts or sightings. At 091130H, Co "I" found and destroyed four 4'X4'X5' previously reported bunkers with 2' overheadings of log and earth. At 091500H, a Marine from Co "M", while manning an OP, accidentally or deliberately discharged his M-16 rifle injuring his finger. After treatment at 3/4 BAS, he was classified as routine evac non-hostile. Investigation underway.

10Jan: Three patrols, four night ambushes were conducted. Co "K" one platoon patrol. Co "L" one platoon patrol. Co "M" one platoon patrol. Co "I"'s four squad night ambushes returned with negative contacts or sightings. At 101030H, Co "L" found and destroyed four 5'X4'X3' bunkers at YD 172739 with 2 1/2' bamboo and earth overheadings. The CO 9th Marines visited this position from 101400H to 101415H. At 101407H seven sniper rounds were received from YD 166738. Returned fire with small arms, M-79. Huey gunships on station fired MG and rockets. At 101558H, 3/4 was informed of JCMarDiv's message 040349Z JAN68 to 9th Marines: "Be prepared to furnish command group and two companies from 3/4 to assist 1st Mar in the event 1/1 is committed."

11Jan: A three company operation and four ambushes were conducted. Co's "K" and "M", with Bn Command Group and Co "L" as blocking force, conducted the operation. Co "I"'s and Co "L"'s two squad night ambushes returned with negative contacts or sightings. At 110500H, two companies departed the perimeter with the Bn Command Group enroute to objectives. Co "L" moved to a blocking position at 110700H. At 110845H, Co "K" found and destroyed five 4'X4'X3' bunkers at YD 182748 with 2' overheadings of rocks, logs and earth which appeared to be protective shelters. Two NVA cartridge belts with six chicom grenades and one cover were also found. At 110936H at YD 181750, scout dog alerted units of enemy presence and Co "K" made contact with two to ten NVA entrenched and employing small arms and automatic weapons. Two chicom grenades were thrown by fleeing enemy

IV-7

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

resulting in one friendly WIA med-evac and one friendly WIA non-evac. One NVA KIA confirmed at this time. At 111010H, sniper fire increased. Three more NVA KIA confirmed were achieved at this time as Co "K" delivered accurate fire to front. AO noted NVA attempting to reinforce and envelop flank and called arty. NVA were observed fleeing north in final stages of contact. Co "K" checked out bunker complex enemy had been defending, finding gear, weapons and food. Twenty-one bunkers were found; thirteen destroyed within time limitation. Co "M" fired small arms and arty on three camouflaged NVA to rear of column at YD 186745. Co "K" also found six chicom directional claymore mines and five booby trapped chicom grenades in the area. The following weapons and equipment were recovered: one Soviet 7.62 RPD light machine gun type 56 with four drums and ammo, one Soviet 7.62 sniper rifle with a 3.5 power scope M-1891/30, one SKS 7.62 carbine, four AK-47 automatic rifles, twelve AK-47 magazines, one Soviet RPG rocket launcher, three RPG-2 rockets, twenty-three chicom grenades, one chicom DH-10, six Soviet gas masks, eight NVA packs, eight ponchos, six hammocks, four trousers, five shirts, three NVA canteens, one pair of shoes and assorted documents. Two 75mm chicom RR rounds were destroyed. AO was effective in observing NVA in open and adjusting arty, 60mm and 81mm mortar fires. Co's "M" and "K" continued attack toward objective 3. Co "K" found one NVA body dead about three weeks. Co "M" found and recovered Co "L"'s friendly KIA from previous contact (7Jan68), positive identification made. AO directed air strikes north and east of patrol route. At 111330H troops digging in perimeter YD 170731 uncovered an apparent French land mine which was destroyed in place.

12Jan: Four LP's were conducted. Co "I"'s two LP's and Co "L"'s two LP's returned this morning with negative sightings or contacts. At 120930H, chop Co "M" from 3/4 to 3/3, for further chop to 12th Marines at Gio Linh. Bn (-) moved to vicinity YD 150710. At 121600H, final police of former 3/4 position uncovered old anti-tank mine. Area was accepted by 3/3 representatives with no discrepancies noted during mutual inspection.

13Jan: Three patrols and four ambushes were conducted. Co's "I", "L" and "M" had day platoon size patrols. Co's "L", "M" and "I" squad night ambushes returned with negative contacts or sightings. At 131305H, Co "M" while on a platoon patrol was calling an arty mission on a suspected enemy position at YD 135719 when they were hit by three apparent short rounds (Later investigation revealed wind shield on quick arty fuse defective on particular lot of ammo). Two friendly KIA, one emergency, three priority and two routine med-evacs resulted. 9th Marines conducting investigation. At 131345H, Co "M" while continuing on previous mission observed six enemy moving west to east at YD 137717 and called arty mission until target was out of sight. At 1440H 3/4 received seven incoming rounds of unknown caliber from YD 173750 as noted by 2/1 at Con Thien. 2/1 coordinating with 3/4 conducted counter-arty fire. At 131415H, at YD 149704, Co "L"'s patrol found five enemy bunkers 8'X8'X3'. Three bunkers were destroyed, two marked for future destruction. Two shotgun shells and six 82mm mortar rounds and one apparent gas mask container were discovered.

IV-8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14Jan: Two patrols and two ambushes were conducted. Co "I" one company patrol. Co "M" one platoon patrol. Co's "I" and "M" squad night ambushes returned this morning with negative sightings or contact. The CO of 9th Marines visited this position from 140955H to 141032H. At 141035H, 3/3 (S-3) informed 3/4 that Co "K" was chopped to 12th Marines and had departed for Gio Linh. At 141145H, Co "I" while on patrol located five enemy fighting holes with 6' log overheadings in the vicinity YD 145693 and also a large dud. Findings were marked for future destruction and mission continued. At 141150H, three land lines were laid between 3/4 and 3/3, permitting radio relay to 9th Marines. At 141330H, Co "I" at YD 162688 located five 5'X5'X5' bunkers with 2' to 3' log and earth over-headings. Further search revealed plastic ~~can~~ with small amounts of rice, six NVA E-tools, unserviceable packs and rain gear, and NVA sneakers were scattered around the area. Additional bunkers were well concealed in dense brush 10' to 15' high and had not been occupied in two weeks. Site apparently was a recent base camp or feeding station for NVA company size unit. It had complete cooking facilities in a bamboo thicket. Cooking area consisted of six straw hooches dug into the ground. Two of these had underground chimneys and metal wood burning stoves. Utensils with rice, bags of rice, containers of dry fish, potatoe substitutes and bird cages with piles of feathers were located throughout the area. Thirty-one living bunkers were constructed around the straw hooches, average size 4'X5'X5' with 2' to 3' overheadings and straw deck matting. Several east-west and south trails led into the area. Trails were marked with "T" shaped pieces of straw pointing to the camps. Access to trails was ground level crawl space in thick underbrush. Trails were lined with vine ropes 50-75 meters outside cooking area for easy access at night. A tree approximately 60' high, located in the cooking area, had a makeshift ladder leading up to an OP approximately 40' above ground with good observation of all approaches. Site will be destroyed by company patrol 16 Jan. H&I's and TPQ's requested. At 141530H, Co "M" sighted 10-13 NVA in the open and two NVA building bunkers at YD 132710. Arty mission called on NVA in open. At time of arty mission snipers opened up on two NVA building bunkers, claiming one NVA KIA confirmed. An AK-47, two AK-47 magazines, two chicom grenades, one gas mask with carrier and assorted documents were found on check of area.

15Jan: One company and one platoon patrol were conducted along with four night ambushes. Squad ambushes returned with negative sightings or contact. At 151150H, Co "L" found five old bunkers 6'X8'X3' with three foot overheadings of logs and earth, well camouflaged at YD 136725. One bunker contained six 60mm and three 82mm mortar rounds and one chicom claymore-type mine. One dud artillery round was also found in the area. At 151805H, Co "K" (Opcon 12th Marines) at YD 213741 discovered one tunnel 4'X8'X3' with illumination vent at one end 4'X4'X4' with a three foot overheading of logs, sheet metal and earth. All were destroyed with darts.

16Jan: One company and one platoon patrol were conducted, along with four ambushes. Ambushes returned this morning with negative sightings or contact. The CO of 9th Marines visited the Battalion position from 160905H until 161010H. At 161220H, Co "I" returned to a recently

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

discovered enemy battalion size base camp at YD 165693 complete with cooking facilities and mortar pits eight feet in diameter and three feet deep. One hundred and eighty-three rounds of 82mm mortar rounds were found stored in bunkers adjacent to the gun positions. Except for a few rounds turned in for examination, all other rounds and necessary components were destroyed. Recent artillery and TPQ's had little effect on the base camp site. The TPQ's had bracketed the site and the artillery appeared to have been detonated prematurely by the dense overhead canopy. Twenty-two bunkers 5'X5'X5' with two to three feet of over-heading were destroyed. Approximately forty photos were taken prior to destruction of the bunkers.

17Jan: Two patrols and four ambushes were conducted. Co "M" a company patrol, Co "L" a platoon patrol. All night time activities returned with negative sightings or contact. At 171345H, a Co "L" patrol found four 60mm mortar rounds at YD 153700. At 171430H, another Co "L" patrol found and destroyed two enemy bunkers at YD 146698. At 172050H, a Co "M" squad, while manning lines, observed suspected enemy movement through a starlight scope and took target under fire with small arms and grenades. Area was checked at first light with negative results.

18Jan: A two-company sweep and four night ambushes were conducted. The two-company sweep consisted of Co "L" as a sweeping force and Co "M" as a blocking force. At 180700H, Co "M" moved into two preassigned blocking positions north of the "trace" followed by Co "L" sweeping north between these positions. At 180845H, Co "M" observed five NVA moving across its front at YD 148726. At 180945H, Co "L" made contact with an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. Co "L" deployed all units up on line to gain fire superiority. Enemy fire increased in intensity. The right blocking force of Co "M" was directed to move up on Co "L"'s right flank. The last Co "M" platoon was ordered to move into a blocking position from the south side of the "trace" thus disposing two entire companies north of the "trace". Between 181015H and 181100H, an estimated fifty-one rounds of enemy 100mm artillery fire impacted on Co "M"'s west blocking position and the Battalion CP Group. One friendly KIA and two MIAs resulted. Co "L" reported taking heavy casualties at their point of contact as they consolidated their position and attempted to recover elements pinned down by heavy enemy small arms fire. The Co "M" platoon moving to link up with Co "L"'s right flank sustained three friendly WIA's, but flushed the enemy into the open forward of Co "L"'s position, where they were taken under fire with small arms and machine-guns. The close proximity of Co "L" and the enemy prevented the full use of supporting arms to allow Co "L" to break contact. The AO on station aided Co "L" in assisting their pinned down forward elements. At 181102H, "Huey" gunships on station prevented flanking NVA units from reaching friendly positions. At the same time Co "L" began receiving .50cal MG fire from its right flank. They delivered fire on enemy elements moving across their north and northeastern fronts. The enemy returned heavy 60mm mortar and RPG fire. At this time, from the increased volume of enemy fire it was estimated that the enemy force had increased to a reinforced company. Co's "L" and "M" had received an estimated 70

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

60mm mortar rounds by this time. At 181338H, the commander of Co "L", Captain John Carr, was wounded by mortar fragments as he personally went to the aid of his pinned down men. (Approximately 14 men pinned down in a bomb crater). The acting CO of Co "L" reported that the combination of serious casualties and heavy enemy fire prevented his being able to break contact and move south, although his perimeter was intact. At 181345H, the Battalion Commander with Co "M" began to move forward to link up with Co "L". A platoon from Co "I" and a company from 3/3 were directed to flank security positions. A UH-34 med-evac helicopter that had picked up four Co "L" casualties was forced to land near vicinity A-3 after it had been hit by ground fire while departing the Co "L" landing zone. Co "M", in moving to link up with the heavily engaged Co "L" literally overran enemy rifle and machinegun positions. Many NVA were firing from bomb craters where their defilade positions made detection difficult. As Co "M" linked up with Co "L" the AC and gunships returned on station and began to suppress enemy fire. At 181412H, Co "M" had successfully linked up with Co "L" and provided covering fire for Co "L" to med-evac its casualties on a CH-46. A total of three KIA's and nineteen MIA's were med-evac'd. Four KIA's had to be carried back to the Battalion perimeter as Co "L" returned with Co "M" providing rear security. At 181710H, Co's "I" and "M" returned to the Battalion perimeter. Despite the number of casualties, morale was good as 116 NVA KIA confirmed had been achieved by the ground action and an additional 46 by air action. At 182315H, a Co "M" unit heard noises in front of their lines. An individual was observed moving about and was taken under fire. A check of the area at first light revealed nothing of significance.

19Jan: Three patrols and five night ambushes were conducted. All activities had negative sightings or contact.

20Jan: Three patrols and five night ambushes were conducted. At 201010H, General CHICK, the Assistant Division Commander, 31 MarDiv, arrived along with the Commanding Officer of the 9th Marines to visit the Battalion position. At 201010H, a Co "M" patrol found the following items: gear at YD 137713: one half case of trip flares, one 106mm canister round and other assorted equipment. At 201520H, a mortar round impacted outside the perimeter at YD 137715 which was estimated to be an 81mm. Con Thien to our west reported receiving a number of rounds of the same caliber. At 202300H, the Battalion was informed that the scheduled move of the following day had been delayed by the 9th Marines for 24 hours due to nonavailability of helicopters to remove non-transportable gear.

21Jan: Two platoon patrols and five night ambushes were conducted. At 211045H, a Co "L" patrol found one NVA pack and blanket roll with a roll of some wire attached. At 211400H, a short burst of estimated 500cal. fire struck the Battalion perimeter from the direction of Con Thien. However, Con Thien denied that their units had fired the rounds. One minor friendly casualty was sustained. At 211515H, a Co "I" OP spotted five NVA to the north side of the "trace" at YD 136715 apparently climbing a tree to establish an FO position. Artillery, 60mm and 81mm

IV-11

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

mortars were fired at the target. A patrol was sent out to check the area but returned with negative results. At 211807H, the Battalion came under an artillery and mortar attack receiving 250 mortar rounds, 80 artillery rounds and six rounds from a direct fire weapon believed to be a 75mm recoilless rifle. The attack lasted for 13 minutes and ten friendly WIA evacs were sustained. Immediately following the attack, counter-battery fires were called on suspected enemy gun positions. At 212020H, a departing Co "D" ambush received small arms fire. The unit returned a heavy volume of fire and relocated that ambush site. A check of the area the following morning yielded negative results. At 212335H, 9th Marines directed the Battalion to continue the defense of its present AO until further notice.

22Jan: One platoon patrol and five ambushes were conducted. At 220100H, the Battalion requested that it be allowed to relocate its position. The proposed position would be farther south but to include the present AO and an additional area to the south. At 221020H, approval was received from 9th Marines. At 221330H, the lead company proposed the new position be at the vicinity of YD 149692. Non-transportable items (reserve ammo supply and 106 RR) were heloed out of the old position. The Battalion moved to its new perimeter. At 221715H, a booby-trapped chicom grenade was found in an old bunker at YD 149689 and destroyed.

23Jan: One company, two squad patrols and three night ambushes were conducted. All night time activities returned with negative sightings or contact. At 231715H, a Marine, while moving about in his fighting hole slipped on loose dirt causing his weapon to discharge accidentally, wounding himself in the foot. An investigation was ordered. At 231700H, Co "M" reported that a platoon patrol had found four 82mm rounds, increments and fuses at YD 141715. At 231730H, an OP spotted a group of individuals dressed in black clothing moving about. 60mm mortars and artillery were fired with good target coverage, but unknown results. At 232040H, a message was received from 9th Marines extending the Battalion AO an additional 300 meters to the southwest as had been requested.

24Jan: One company and one platoon size patrol were conducted along with three squad night ambushes. At 241400H, an operational immediate message was received from 9th Marines ordering the Battalion to be prepared to move by helicopter as soon as possible. The Battalion Commander took an advance party to Camp Carroll. At 241705H, the Battalion Commander directed Co "M" to move by helicopter to Camp Carroll. The remainder of the Battalion was ordered to remain at its present position. The lead elements of Co "M" lifted off the Battalion LZ at 241730H. At 241845H, Co "M" was ordered to attack to relieve a convoy ambush, ID 062570, moving at night.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

IV-12



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

A summary spot report of Co "M"'s action reads as follows:

"Co "M" (-) (several helo loads of Co "M" were diverted to Dong Ha due to incoming) along with the Battalion Commander moved out at 241900H from Camp Carroll and Hill 250 to relieve a convoy ambush. After receiving word that relief force had evacuated all casualties with the exception of the KIA's, Co "M" established a perimeter at YD 074554 about 242300H. At 242300H, four to six NVA were spotted at YD 071562 and engaged with artillery."

25 Jan: The remainder of the Battalion, Co's "I", "L" and H&S (-), moved by helicopter to vicinity YD 094579 in the following order: 251105H, Co "I"; 251120H, CP Group; 251300H, Co "L". At 250630H, Co "M" moved out from vicinity YD 077571, sent a platoon to high ground vicinity YD 074574 and began sweep of road from east to west. Two jeeps, a tank three 6X6 trucks, four KIA's from the convoy and miscellaneous equipment were found on or near the road. At 250915H, Co "M" received small arms fire including several automatic weapons at YD 073572 from an estimated force of 20-25 NVA. Co "M" returned fire, using the advantage of the high ground occupied earlier, established a perimeter, and called for supporting fires. The area was then secured by Co "M" advancing and casualties were evacuated. The action resulted in two Co "M" KIA's and two minor casualties, with nine NVA KIA's confirmed. At 251110H, Co "I" and the CP Group moved from LZ sight at vicinity YD 092578, arriving vicinity YD 075572 at 251300H. At 251425, Co "L" joined the remainder of the Battalion, after landing at the LZ. At 251649H, the Battalion position received three rounds of mortar fire estimated to be 82mm from an azimuth of 0700 mils. An artillery mission was called on suspected enemy mortar positions. At 251900H, eleven rounds of estimated 85mm artillery fire were received. Two minor casualties resulted. The Battalion established a three company, tied-in perimeter.

26 Jan: One company and two platoon patrols were conducted along with local security LP's. At 260225H, 4th Marines advised the Battalion of suspected enemy forces operating north of the Cam Lo River. The Battalion's mission was given as that of securing Route 9 from YD 034560 east to YD 116582. Two companies were to deploy on the north side of river south of grid line 59. The remaining company was to stay on the south side of the river. The order was contested, advising that the mission of securing the road was best performed along the road and south of the Cam Lo River. Deployment as originally instructed was confirmed. At 260538H, six rounds of estimated 82mm mortar fire were received. At 260845H, a patrol reported that the bridge vicinity YD 074572 was blown during the night and believed to be impassable without engineer improvement. At 261030H, after one company was at the river crossing, the 4th Marines advised the Battalion to remain south of the river. At 261035H, Co "I" was advised to hold their position at YD 067577. Co "L" was advised to hold its position. Co "M" was ordered to continue planned patrol with some alteration in route. At 261105H, Co's "I" and "L" were ordered to establish night time perimeters at YD 051660 and YD 074563 respectively, patrolling enroute to those positions. At 261140H, a frag order was

IV-13

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



received from 4th Marines ordering the Battalion to "continue to square Route #9, to deny enemy access to bridges and culverts, and to patrol and ambush 375 meters north and south of Route #9, occupying the high ground on either side of the route as necessary." At 261215H, Co "I" spotted twelve NVA in the open at YD 072581. Artillery fire was called on the enemy with one confirmed enemy KIA. At 261230H, a wounded Vietnamese civilian was found at YD 070571 who claimed knowledge of enemy positions. He was picked up by Cam Lo District Headquarters. Co "I" found enemy equipment consisting of rifle grenades, machine gun ammo, crimped cartridges and three AP mines. Eight to ten enemy were sighted by Co "I" and engaged with small arms, resulting in one NVA KIA confirmed and one captured NVA at YD 067577. At 261335H, sniper fire and incoming 60mm mortars were received in the Battalion position. Artillery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 261425, Co "I" directed artillery fire which destroyed one enemy recoilless rifle as confirmed by AO estimated to be 75mm. A platoon patrol from Co "L" sweeping along the road took two rounds of 82mm mortar, made contact with an estimated reinforced squad of NVA, exchanged small arms fire. Two med-evacs, six NVA KIA's confirmed, four weapons and a RPG captured were the results. This sweep was coordinated with the Co "I" action to cut off NVA escape route. At 261845H, Co "I" observed five NVA crossing river at YD 071582. Artillery and 81mm fire missions were called with good target coverage. Results of artillery fire on enemy unknown. The night posture was three separate company perimeters on high ground overlooking Route #9.

27Jan: The scheduled three company sized patrols for 27 January 1968 were never completed because of heavy contact beginning early the morning of 27 January 1968 which took place as follows:

Background: On the night of 25-26 January, the Battalion was disposed into a three company defensive perimeter which encircled "Mike's" Hill (YD 074574), and the low ground immediately south and southeast to include both sides of Route 9. On 26 January the area on both sides of the road from YD 078571 to YD 057564 was swept in previously reported action for that day. When the Battalion mission, which included crossing of the river was changed to a new mission of keeping the portion of Route 9 leading into Camp Carroll open, the Battalion Commander requested a platoon of tanks and two M-42's ("Twin-forties") as reinforcements.

This request was denied due to nonavailability of these vehicles. For the night of 26-27 January, three separate company high ground, night perimeters with low ground ambushes were established at "Mike's" Hill (YD 074574), at YD 059564 and at YD 074563. During the early morning hours of 27 January, an enemy force infiltrated into the Battalion's area presumably through the stream bed to the west of "Mike's" Hill and other dry stream beds and gullies to the north and east of the same hill. The noise of movement and voices of the NVA reported by units on "Mike's" Hill indicated that the enemy had completely surrounded the position, although not aware of the location of friendly units. Commencing at 270500H, it is believed that the enemy made a major effort with a force of estimated reinforced company strength to penetrate an anticipated low ground

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

position (The perimeter of the previous night.) which had been altered to the three high ground company perimeters without the enemy's knowledge.

The NVA attempted to assault "Mike's" Hill from the south, west and north, the most determined effort being concentrated on the southern approach to the hill. Co "M" directed artillery and 81mm mortar fire on the enemy during the four hour attack, repulsing repeated assaults upon their positions which took a heavy toll of enemy casualties. As the enemy concentrated his attack on Co "M", he brought to bear the full force of his fire power consisting of heavy automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, RPG rockets and accurate sniper fire. Co "M" repeatedly had to redispense its perimeter to fill in for numerous casualties. Co "L", located on an adjacent piece of high ground, was able to bring observed 60mm mortar and small arms fire on the enemy units attacking Co "M". Co "L" was directed to move a Co (-) down to a trail junction at YD 077571 and sweep west on both sides of Route 9, reestablish contact with a Co "M" ambush that had been pinned down since early morning at YD 075573. Co "L" came in contact with a well entrenched enemy force as it swept to the west, but was able to wipe out pockets of resistance with the support of 81mm mortars and coordinated small arms fire from Co "M" units. At 271200H, Co "L" was able to link-up with Co "M" forces at a bridge located at YD 075572. At this time Co "L" had killed twenty-three NVA, captured three, and sustained few casualties themselves. As Co "L" reached the bridge, Co "I" was ordered to sweep from west to east and link-up with Co "L" at the bridge. The nature of the terrain required Co "I" to move across open area interspersed by thick hedgerows of brush. Heavy artillery covering fire was directed to cover Co "I"'s exposed left flank across the river to the north. Heavy resistance was encountered on both side of the road vicinity YD 070571. Scattered clumps of vegetation, dense streambeds, and heavily foliated knolls, provided cover to a well dug-in and camouflaged enemy estimated to be of at least company strength. In order to rout out the enemy force, Co "I" was forced to make costly assaults across open areas into the enemy positions. The combined effect of increasing casualties and heavy fire by the enemy slowed Co "I"'s attack and pinned its remaining elements down. At 271310H, the reserve platoon of Co "I" was committed to assist the pinned down attacking platoons. A platoon from Co "L" was ordered to sweep west to link-up with Co "I" and eliminate pockets of resistance. At 271350H, the link-up between Co "L" and Co "I" was completed. The Co "L" platoon achieved 11 NVA KIA while covering the 200 meters to the link-up. Vehicle assistance was requested from Camp Carroll to evacuate casualties and from Cam Lo District Headquarters to remove POW's for interrogation. During the link-up attempt, a large gunship was particularly noteworthy, landing near Co "I" casualties to determine location of enemy automatic weapons and evacuating several casualties well before an LZ was secured. The reserve platoon of Co "I" was directed to reinforce units on the north side of the road along a vegetated knoll. The attack by Co "I" continued to push forward to the stream bed west of Mike's Hill, overrunning positions manned by an enemy force determined to hold "at all cost". The "steam roller" effect of Co "I"'s assault resulted in 40 confirmed enemy kills, three more prisoners and large quantities of enemy equipment and weapons captured. At 271445H,

IV-15

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Co "I" had secured an LZ and evacuated most of their seriously wounded, including CO, Co "I", critically wounded. Earlier, at about 271400H, 4th Marines had directed the Battalion to move to Camp Carroll. The Battalion Commander challenged the order on the basis of the tactical disadvantage in re-seizing terrain fought for earlier. At 271530H, 4th Marines reiterated the Division Commander's order of returning to Camp Carroll. However, at 271800H, word was received to remain in the area and continue the road security mission. At that time, Co's "I" and "L" had returned to their previous night time positions to prepare to return to Camp Carroll. Ammo resupply had been removed and Co "M" was in final stages of vacating "Mike's" Hill. Because of the number of casualties the decision was made to occupy the Co "I" and "L" positions with a subsequent reorganization of Co "I" to OPCON of Co "M", and OPCON of "M-3" to Co "L". (Two full strength companies from three short strength companies) The Battalion CP joined Company "L" in its perimeter. During the entire action, the Battalion Commander was able to observe and coordinate both sweeps from vantage points "Mike's" Hill and witnessed superb control by all unit commanders as dedicated Marines moved from bunker to bunker killing or capturing a determined enemy believed to total battalion strength. The S-3 operated the COC on "Mike's" Hill, receiving reports and keeping 4th Marines informed and up-to-date on the action. The XO was in the LZ coordinating the evacuation of casualties and the resupply of ammunition which almost became critical on "Mike's" Hill. The teamwork and communication were outstanding. By 271700H, vehicles were able to move without harassment along Route 9 from both directions to the destroyed bridge, the enemy had been killed, captured, or had fled the area, and the Battalion mission had been accomplished. 21 friendly KIA's and 62 med-evacs resulted from the day's action. A total of 131 NVA KIA's confirmed, six POW's, three 57mm recoilless rifles, one NVA radio, two 60mm mortars, tripod and barrel for a .50 cal. machinegun, 35 AK-47's, three RPG's, eight bolt action rifles and extensive ammunition and equipment had been taken.

28Jan: One company size and two platoon size patrols along with night time LP's were conducted. At 281427H, Co "L" patrol found a tunnel with a 3' entrance, 3' in diameter, 8' underground and 8' long. Five foot intersecting tunnels running east and west were also discovered. Many NVA bodies were found, some on make-shift litters. All were part of previously reported totals. The tunnels were destroyed and bodies buried. At 281435H, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Camp Carroll. At 281620, Co "L" had heloed to Camp Carroll and Co "M" was approaching overland. A B-52 strike was conducted at 281700H.

29Jan: Commencing at 290900H, Co "L" moved one platoon by helo-lift to District Headquarters as security for a tank platoon. Co "L" (-) moved by helicopter to an LZ near Hill 37 (YD 092579). Co "M" moved overland with the Battalion CP Group. Co "H" 2/9 (OPCON to 3/4) was underway with an access road with engineers and equipment to repair the destroyed bridge. At 290925H, 4th Marines notified the Battalion that there was a possibility of the road and bridges being mined. At 290950H, Co "L" had

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

linked up with tanks and began to move from east to west to effect link-up with Co "M" vicinity YD 078571. At 291110H, Co's "L" and "M" effected link-up and Co "M" assumed OPCON of tanks. Co "L" established supporting positions on "Mike's" Hill (YD 074574) and north of the road. Co "M" moved out in a coordinated tank/infantry attack to clear the area vicinity of the bridge. At 291140H, an 81mm mortar round impacted in Co "L"'s position resulting in two priority med-evacs. At 291245H, a Marine from Co "I" shot a flank security Marine mistaken for the enemy. A med-evac was requested and completed. Co "H" 2/9 arrived in position vicinity YD 055564 with engineer equipment to repair bridge. Co "M" continued to move through the objective area with a coordinated tank/infantry attack. At 291250H, the direction of attack was changed to the northwest from YD 072572 to YD 068575. During the move northwest, 30 NVA bodies (previously reported) and several weapons were found. As Co "M" continued its movement northwest, Co "H" 2/9 moved into position at 291428H. At the same time, Co "H" 2/9 found two wounded NVA (POW's) at 291515H. At 291530H, the destroyed bridge site had a trafficable by-pass. At 291531H, a huge Dong Ha convoy began moving through the bridge point, enroute to Camp Carroll. Co "L" departed "Mike's" Hill at 291810H. Co "L" and Co "I/M" returned to the two company perimeters for the night. The following message was sent by the Battalion Commander to the officers and men of the Battalion:

"At 291530H, the successful passage of a convoy to Camp Carroll marked the completion of a mission assigned to the Battalion, commencing with the night commitment of a company (-) at 241900H in relief of a convoy ambush. During the interim days, the Battalion fought the enemy daily; having the road open to each side of a destroyed bridge by the end of each day. This Battalion, minus one of its companies, fought a well disciplined enemy, suicidal in intent to maintain control of the road, and estimated as at least a battalion in strength on 27 January. Killing in excess of 130 NVA, capturing at least ten POW's, with weapons, gear and equipment still being found, this Battalion decisively defeated the enemy and fulfilled its mission. Every Marine in this Battalion has my sincere thanks for his superb performance, and those that were killed or wounded have my heartfelt prayers. You may all take pride in a good job, well done.

LtCol BENDELL sends."

30Jan: One company (-) and one platoon size patrol were conducted. Co "L" platoon reestablished security at "Mike's" Hill and adjacent bridge. At 301100H, a Co "M" Marine was injured by a bore riding safety pin from a 60mm mortar which struck him in the shoulder after detonating prematurely. The individual was med-evaced and an investigating officer was appointed. At 301445H, a message was relayed from General W. C. WESTMORELAND congratulating "the officers and men of 3/4 for the aggressive attack against the enemy's 64th Regiment north of Camp Carroll on 27 January. This action undoubtedly pre-empted enemy attack against Camp Carroll." At 301230H, a convoy from Dong Ha passed through the bridge area having received long range incoming small arms and RPG fire from vicinity YD 045575. At 301550H, a truck from convoy returning to Dong Ha detonated

IV-17  
UNCLASSIFIEDENCLOSURE (1)  
~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

a mine vicinity YD 045575. No personnel injured and convoy continued. Assigned Co "L" to move to previous company night time perimeter with platoon reinforced at YD 059564 and Co (-) at YD 074563. Co "I/M" with the Battalion CP Group moved overland to Camp Carroll.

31 Jan: Three platoon size patrols were conducted. At 310905H, a Co "L" patrol reported observing fresh NVA footprints vicinity YD 075572, also what appeared to be an anti-vehicle mine. The mine was marked to be destroyed later. At 311020H, a Co "L" patrol found several enemy weapons at YD 075588. At 311110H, a Co "L" patrol detained two male suspects ages twelve to fourteen years. Suspects did not have ID's and were wearing civilian clothes. Both were turned over to District Headquarters. At 311200H, a Co "L" patrol found three anti-vehicle mines at YD 072571. All were blown in place. At 311330H, 2/9 assumed 3/4 mission of road security vicinity of YD 076574. At 311345H, Co "L" moved by helicopter to Ca Lu and was chopped to 3/9. At 311330H, two tanks were chopped from 3/4 to 2/9. Status at end of month: Co "K" at Gio Linh, OPCON to 12th Marines; Co "L" at Ca Lu, OPCON to 3/9; Co "I" and Co "M", with the Battalion CP Group at Camp Carroll, preparing to assume perimeter defense mission and area of operations south of Camp Carroll.

UNCLASSIFIED

IV-18

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION VLOGISTICS1. General

a. There were no major logistical problems encountered during this reporting period. The Battalion remained just north of the A-3 position until 12 January 1968. Co "K" was chopped to Gio Linh under 12th Marines Opcon. The remainder of the Battalion moved south of the "trace" and worked the An Dinh and Phu Oc areas until 24 January 1968. The Battalion minus Co "K" then was heli-lifted to positions along Rt. #9 north of Camp Carroll under 4th Marines Opcon to participate in Operation LANCASTER.

b. Daily resupply was effected to the Battalion during this period by helicopter controlled by the LSA and our attached HST. No critical shortages of any major items of supply existed during January.

c. While operating in the Phu Oc area 120,000 sandbags and 12,000 8' metal stakes were heli-lifted to that area for construction of fighting holes with overhead cover. However, before construction had been completed the Battalion was ordered to move and all sandbags and stakes were heli-lifted back to the LSA.

d. Hot chow was prepared for heli-lift to the Battalion on three dates. One of these meals was not delivered because of a weather hold on the helicopters.

2. Supply

a. The overall supply support during this period is considered satisfactory.

b. Some shortages in Class II supplies existed and were reported in the Logistics Summary Report:

Body Armor, Med.	Cover, Canteen
Lamp, Incand.	Bayonets
Liner, Poncho	Pouch, Ammo
Mattress, Pneumatic	Rocket Launcher, 3.5
Cup, Canteen	Rifle, 106mm

3. Transportation

a. Motor transportation support from 9th Motors was satisfactory to support the 3/4 Mosshall and to stage resupplies at the LSA.

b. The deadline rate for the M-422A1 for this reporting period is thirty-five per-cent; of twenty (20) M-422A1 vehicles, seven (7) are

~~SECRET~~  
ENCLOSURE

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

Headlined. Four (4) of the seven (7) deadlined vehicles are in FLSU for repairs. One (1) vehicle in the motor pool is awaiting evacuation to FLSU for repairs. The remaining two (2) vehicles are being worked on at this time.

c. There are five (5) Communications vehicles in the Battalion of which one (1) is deadlined. One (1) M-38A1 MRC-83 is deadlined for a part which is on order.

d. The Battalion has four (4) M-37B1 vehicles. Three (3) are running and one (1) is in FLSU for a new engine.

e. The Battalion has just acquired an M-37B1 (PCP), M-416B1 (Trailer) and an HPCU (Steam Jenny). This brings us up to T/E on these items. These three (3) items were received from the 3d Anti-Tank Battalion.

f. The Battalion has four (4) M-274A2 (Mules) deadlined at this time. There are no parts available to get these vehicles running. The Battalion has been awaiting the initial issue of parts that should have arrived three (3) months ago with the Mules. Since this unit has been deployed to the field and the vehicles are in the rear much maintenance work has been accomplished. We are experiencing a problem in getting tubes for all of the vehicles. Tires are plentiful but tubes are not. We have requisitioned tubes in all sizes for the vehicles.

#### 4. Miscellaneous

a. Approximately 268 tons of resupplies were heli-lifted to the Battalion from 1-31 January 1968.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS1. Radio

a. The Battalion maintained stations on the following radio nets while on field operations during this period:

Regt TAC #1 (FM) (RC-292)

Bn TAC #2 (FM) (RC-292)

Bn Admin (FM) (RC-292)

b. Stations were operated at the Bravo Command Post when activated and at the Battalion Rear at Dong Ha.

c. Supporting Arms: Circuits for air and artillery were employed utilizing FM equipment and a UHF capability for air control was employed.

2. Wire

a. The Battalion Rear at Dong Ha maintains wire communications within the CP Area and has two trunk lines tied in to the 9th Marines. Two SB-22's are employed.

b. While on field operations, CP Area wire was installed and a trunk line was laid to the 9th Marines via AN/TRC-27 at A-3 position. One SB-22 was employed.

c. The Battalion presently maintains wire communications within the CP and one trunk line to the 4th Marines and two trunk lines to the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.

3. Radio Relay

a. In addition to the system cited in 2b above, 4th Marines provides common user circuits to the division system.

b. No radio relay equipment or personnel were attached to this Battalion during this period.

4. Power

a. Power for the Battalion Rear at Dong Ha is provided by the 11th Engineer Battalion.

b. The Battalion presently draws power from the camp power system of Camp Carroll as provided by the 11th Engineer Battalion.

c. No power was utilized in the field.

VI-1

UNCLASSIFIED  
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. During the period between 1 January 1968 to 25 January 1968 while 3/4 was operating north of A-3 and south along the trace direct support was provided by "E" Battery 2/12. During this time calls for fire were also answered by "D" Battery 2/12, "F" 2/12 and "K" 4/13. These batteries were assigned reinforcing and/or general support as appropriate.
2. From 25 January 1968 through 31 January 1968 while 3/4 was operating north of Camp Carroll direct support was provided by "A" Battery 1/12 and "C" Battery 1/12.
3. From 1 January 1968 through 31 January 1968, forward observers in support of 3/4 called in a total of 290 fire missions with a total expenditure of rounds of 3,944. An additional 3,069 rounds were expended on 576 H&I targets.
5. Summary on artillery fire support, 1-31 January 1968:

<u>I</u>	<u>Battery</u>	<u>Fire Missions</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
	"D" 2/12	19	248
	"E" 2/12	51	698
	"F" 2/12	26	242
	"K" 4/13	39	753
	"A" 1/12	85	1,015
	"C" 1/12	70	988
		<u>290</u>	<u>3,944</u>


<u>II</u>	<u>Battery</u>	<u>H&amp;I Targets</u>	<u>Rounds</u>
	"D" 2/12	85	265
	"E" 2/12	180	1,240
	"F" 2/12	115	512
	"K" 4/13	66	240
	1st 8" How	20	180
	"A" 1/12	60	420
	"C" 1/12	50	214
		<u>290</u>	<u>3,069</u>

VII 2

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. During the month of January, the weather was marginal for all 3/4 air support.

2. Fixed wing support was requested daily, but the weather was favorable for only 13 days during the month. While 3/4 was located north of the "traces" on Hill 28, the terrain and observation offered excellent opportunity for 3/4 to employ fixed wing support. Fixed wing strikes were called in support of 3/4 units in contact and in direct support of pending sweeps by units of 3/4. While flying in support of units in contact, flights of F-4's, A-4's and F-8's were used. These aircraft proved very effective in aiding 3/4 in clearing out pockets of enemy resistance and in preventing enemy reinforcement of units in contact with 3/4. Fixed wing strikes in support of 3/4 tallied many NVA confirmed, NVA probable and bunkers destroyed.


a. Significant fixed wing support was given to 3/4 on 7 January in aiding units of Co "L" to break contact with NVA units. A flight of F-4B's from VMFA-314 carrying 659 and 1201A hit an estimated enemy platoon reinforced, resulting in two KIA confirmed with eight probable. This flight was flying in below an overcast estimated at 3000 feet and with heavy volumes of enemy fire concentrated upon them, they made successive passes over the target area and skillfully delivered their ordnance in response to AO and FAC corrections, greatly aiding Co "L" to return their casualties to the defensive perimeter.

b. On 11 January, flights of F-4B's and A-4's were called to aid Co's "M" and "K", while making a sweep to search out an area in the DMZ and to recover a KIA from the action of the 7th. Two A-4's conducted a strike upon NVA in the open at YD 187753, resulting in seven KIA's confirmed and four KIA's probable. A flight of two F-4's conducted strikes upon NVA and bunkers at YD 190751, resulting in one KIA confirmed, three KIA's probable and three bunkers destroyed. A flight of A-4's (Dream 509) struck NVA and bunkers at YD 178755, resulting in one KIA confirmed, two KIA's probable, two bunkers destroyed and 50 meters of trench destroyed. A flight of A-4's (Combat 28) conducted a strike upon an assembly area at YD 167755 with negative results at that time. The AO effectively directed these strikes, protecting friendly flanks and hitting a fleeing enemy.

c. On 18 January, two flights of F-4's and one flight of A-4's flew in support in covering the movement of Co's "L" and "M" back to their perimeter, after heavy contact. The weather did not permit air strikes during the contact, although Huey gunships and the AO were employed most effectively.

d. On 27 January, a flight of A-4's flew a strike mission against a heavy anti-aircraft gun position north of Camp Carroll. While re-

VIII-1



~~SECRET~~  
ceiving intense volumes of .50 Cal fire, they skillfully delivered their ordnance upon selected targets in support of 3/4. A flight of F-4's was called in to suppress anti-aircraft fire and enemy mortars being directed at units of Co "M" on high ground called "Mike's" Hill. This flight aided greatly in suppressing mortars and .50 Cal fire. The flight received intense, accurate .50 Cal fire and took many hits, resulting in the loss of one F-4, although the crew ejected safely in the Da Nang area and were successfully picked up.

e. On 28 January, four fixed wing strikes were conducted in support of 3/4. These flights were instrumental in destroying enemy heavy machine gun positions and mortar positions that were interrupting convoy traffic to Camp Carroll and movement of units of 3/4 conducting patrols in the area of "Mike's" Hill (YD 074574).

3. During the month of January, Huey gunships were instrumental in suppressing enemy sniper fire and in aiding units of 3/4 in returning to the defensive perimeter.

a. Flights of Huey gunships were used on 7 January to cover the return of Co "L" after heavy contact was broken.

b. On 18 January, Huey gunships were instrumental in breaking contact at YD 140717. This flight was working under 700 feet overcast and made repeated rocket and gun passes on well entrenched NVA units, while receiving intense volumes of small arms and automatic weapons fire. This flight enabled Co's "L" and "M" to return after taking several wounded. The results of their efforts and repeated runs were not determined due to weather and darkness.

c. Huey support on 25 and 27 January was particularly effective. They fired at targets extremely close to friendly lines under the direction of the AO, who coordinated with 3/4. One Huey landed in an insecure LZ near front lines to obtain information on enemy weapons locations, then evacuated some severely wounded Marines.

4. During the month of January, 3/4 requested 38 med-evacs, using 38 helicopters and removing 239 wounded and KIA's from the field. Many times during this period of time, med-evac aircraft were requested into somewhat dangerous LZ's to pickup seriously wounded personnel. Without the assistance and devotion to duty of our helicopter pilots, many Marines might have died.

5. During the month of January, 55 requests were submitted for AO aircraft. Through the AO's, 3/4 was able to direct artillery, mortars and fixed wing strikes against the NVA. The AO's were instrumental in spotting enemy troop movements and fortifications and were able to adjust artillery and mortar fire upon them. Through the eyes of the AO's, units were warned of ambushes and possible attacks upon their flanks that could have resulted in the loss of many Marine lives. Without the valuable aid of the many AO flights, 3/4 would not have been able to accom-

VIII-2

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFIED  
JAN 1984

publish their mission without suffering heavy casualties. When 3/4 units were in contact, the AO would frequently remain on station aiding unit commanders by telling them where enemy strong points were and by directing either artillery, 81mm mortars, 60 mm mortars or flights of fixed wing aircraft or Huey gunships onto these targets. Many times, AO aircraft would fly in support of us when the weather was at minimum and with poor visibility. They would remain on station while receiving intense automatic and small arms fire until they ran low on fuel and would have a replacement on station whenever possible.

6. 3/4 requested 152 TPQ strikes against enemy positions and received 52 TPQ strikes. These strikes were instrumental in stopping enemy resupplies and in destroying enemy positions.

7. Several short notice troop lifts were conducted for 3/4 during the month of January. Co "M" was committed from a defensive position at YD 148689 and helicoptered to Camp Carroll to assist an ambushed convoy. On the following day, the remaining two companies and H&S Company elements were helicoptered to YD 075573 along Route 9 to reinforce Co "M". On 28 January, Co "L" and the Bn CP Group were helicoptered from YD 073568 to Camp Carroll to achieve the required safety distances for a B-52 strike. One platoon of Co "L" moved to Cam Lo by helicopter to escort a platoon of tanks making a sweep along Route 9; the remainder of Co "L" was helicoptered to YD 073568 to join the tanks. On 31 January, Co "L" moved by helicopter to Ca Lu to join 3/9 where they were placed under 3/9 operational control.

8. The following is a summary of air support for the month of January:

a. Fixed wing	17 requested	Controlled by AO/FAC due to terrain and negative UHF capability
b. AO aircraft	55 requested	Controlled fixed wing, artillery, 81mm and 60mm mortars and reconned patrol routes in support of 3/4
c. Resupply		All helicopter resupply requests were submitted through S-4
d. Med-evacs	38 requested	239 casualties removed from field
e. Troop lifts	9 requested	Helicopters were used to lift a total of 877 personnel
f. SAR	None requested	Not required
g. TPQ's	152 requested	52 TPQ's were conducted in support of 3/4, hitting enemy artillery positions and harboring sites.
h. Special	2 requested	Two B-52 strikes requested, one was conducted

VIII-3

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIEDSECTION IXMEDICAL AFFAIRS

1. During the month of January 1968, the BAS was divided between the field (except for 1½ days at Camp Carroll), with the doctor and 4 corpsman, and the rear at Dong Ha, with the Chief and approximately 15-20 corpsman.

2. In the field, the problems encountered were:

a. Maintaining good water points and bathing areas (in this area, a water sample was taken at the A-3 forward position and was found to be heavily contaminated; a repeat sample with halizone added showed sterile water, i.e., no bacterial growth).

b. Maintaining adequate heads and urinals.

c. Keeping the forward BAS and company corpsmen supplied with battle dressings, halizone, malaria tablets and medicines (because of heavy casualty load and frequent changes of position, supply was difficult to keep up with, and later in the month battle dressings were increasingly difficult to obtain in the rear).

d. Treating a moderately large number of cases of diarrhea, which had the character of a viral epidemic rather than diarrhea from impure water.

3. In the rear BAS the main problems were:

a. Caring for the patients referred from the field.

b. Obtaining and transmitting supplies to the field.

c. Replacing corpsmen injured in the field.

4. There were nine (9) corpsmen wounded and four (4) killed in action.

IX-1

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Because of the location and tactical situation of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, there was no civil affairs program conducted during the month of January.
2. In anticipation of a battalion move to a populated area, arrangements were made with 9th Marines Regimental S-5 for gifts and money to be given to Vietnamese children during the TET celebration.

X-1

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

## SECTION XI

### PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED

#### 1. Patrolling

a. The AO continues to prove invaluable. Operating in the area north of the "Trace", patrols were at times postponed due to weather which precluded an AO being on station. The AO has been effective in spotting bunker complexes and NVA to the front and flanks of patrols. This permits the patrol to call in early artillery fire, thereby preventing friendly casualties and allowing the patrol to continue its advance. In addition, after ground or aerial sightings, the AO has been used to adjust 60mm or 81mm mortar fire and has effectively controlled artillery, air strikes, and Huey gunships in support of ground action. The effectiveness of such "eyes in the sky" emphasizes a definite need for a future capability of an AO in a helicopter or fixed wing (OE) type aircraft operating continuously in support of each Infantry Battalion.

b. A basic point frequently emphasized in this Battalion has proven especially effective on several occasions. Moving over rough terrain there is an inherent tendency to end up in a single column. Although the lead elements have more difficulty when two, three or more columns are "blazing trail", it pays dividends in ease of movement for those following, as well as increased coverage of terrain and better dispersion of forces. The most significant advantage is the ability to immediately deliver a large volume of fire to the front and rapidly assume 360° security position protecting both the flanks and rear when contact has been made. Many contacts are decided in the first few minutes of a fire fight---a long, strung out column negates immediate effective use of the units fire potential.

c. The use of "blocking positions" on multi-company patrols has proven especially useful. Blocking positions can provide a secure route of return for company patrols operating beyond 1500 meters of the Battalion perimeter. They also constitute a prepositioned reserve force. Their location should permit support by fire while contributing flank and rear security for moving patrol units. A blocking position can also establish secure LZ's and assist with med-evac or casualties of an engaged forward unit. It has also been found that it is a great boost to morale to have other friendly units stationed between the point of engagement and the friendly perimeter to give casualty assistance and rear-guard security to troops returning from contact.

d. An aerial photograph of the operating area greatly enhances patrol planning when used to supplement the 1:50,000 map. The aerial photo was made available to all unit leaders through squad level, and additionally was used for briefing entire patrol units. Hedgerows, rice paddies, thickly vegetated areas and potential enemy strong points

XI-1

~~SECRET~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

can be identified prior to patrol departure. Ground orientation is vastly improved; check points more easily identified. Superimposing a grid on the photo also assists in map-photo comparison and orientation.

e. Surprise is always a goal to be achieved. On one occasion, an early morning departure from a defensive perimeter allowed troops to be in an attack position 2000 meters away from the perimeter before daylight. Surprise was complete after contact as evidenced by a fleeing enemy leaving behind hot rice, weapons, gear and equipment.

f. When contact is made it is wise to keep out of large bomb craters. The enemy uses them as killing zone areas; they tend to segment the attacking force and isolate advance elements. It is difficult to get out of the crater without sustaining casualties, when pinned down. The craters also present easy targets for grenades and indirect fire weapons. Experience has shown that serious if not fatal wounds have been sustained by groups of personnel who took cover in a single bomb crater. Other folds in the ground provide adequate cover, allow observation to the front, permit movement and give a better opportunity to fire in any direction.

g. A common tendency is to underestimate the size of an enemy force resulting in being drawn into unfavorable terrain where automatic weapons can inflict serious casualties. Caution must be used in attempting to exploit initial contact. Employ supporting arms early before attempting to search out the terrain in which the contact has been made.

h. Designate stretcher bearers and have adequate stretchers in the event helicopters cannot get in to evacuate casualties and they must be carried back. Lacking stretchers, ensure that men are carrying ponchos on patrol for improvised stretchers. A positive method should be devised to account for everyone, especially casualties, prior to leaving the scene of the engagement to preclude personnel being left behind. Designate a point within the perimeter to muster platoons after returning from an engagement to account for personnel and equipment. Procedures must be established to ensure casualty return to the perimeter when helicopters are unavailable.

## 2. In the perimeter

a. Although all perimeter holes are manned at night, certain holes are designated as "24 hour holes". These are selected to ensure overlapping sectors of observation during daylight hours; thus permitting perimeter manning at a greatly reduced level. (One platoon can defend a company perimeter as a rule.) Putting small signs adjacent to such holes facilitates another unit manning the lines while the regular perimeter unit is on a daylight patrol. This also permits working parties, training, or other commitments to be conducted with the perimeter fully protected.

XL 2  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SECRET~~

b. Good communications are essential to command, control and reporting. There is a great tendency to rely on the AN/PRC 25 radio to the neglect of wire "comm". Field phones add to the infantryman's load—but make a decided contribution to the defense of any perimeter, particularly if it is to be occupied for several days. Perimeter conference calls keep the COC informed during night contacts and expedite supporting fires days or nights. This Battalion also experienced success in using wire from field positions along the "Trace" between Gio Linh and Con Thien to the stable defensive perimeter at A-3 that had radio relay capability. We were thus able to talk to Regiment and Battalion Rear in Dong Ha, expediting reporting and resupply. Of course, when wire passes through "unfriendly" areas, the same transmission security that applies to radio must be observed.

c. Camouflage discipline was found initially lax after the Battalion move from defensive positions at C-2, C-2 Bridge, and Con Thien, into the field. Camouflage improved rapidly as all levels of command emphasized "learning from the NVA". Where natural tree lines or hedgerows exist, foxholes should be dug into the cover area from the rear. Only enough of the natural foliage should be removed from the front (enemy side) of the position, to permit observation and fields of fire. Living "hootches" should be well behind the lines where ponchos and foxhole covers cannot be observed. Troops have a tendency to cut down everything in the vicinity of their holes and to the front. Remind them that they are exposing themselves to sniper and small arms fire as well as delineating the Battalion perimeter for enemy observers.

d. Foxholes should be deep enough to allow a man to shoot from a near standing position without having to squat down. It should be large enough so that two people can fight with ease of individual movement. Fighting holes should be within sight of each other laterally and have a connecting trail with adjacent positions that is concealed from the enemy's view.

e. Another basic principle that requires constant command attention is maintaining the sanitation and police of defensive positions. Platoon trash pits should be dug, marked, and used; squad heads should be dug convenient to holes and living "hootches". Police of the area must be continuous. The designation of drinking and bathing water points is complemented by marking the trails to the water points. In addition to maintaining the police of the area (picking up cans, papers, etc.), ammunition should be stored neatly by fighting holes, keeping the ammunition in its waterproof container whenever possible.

f. Noise is excessive during the few hours prior to darkness and requires constant attention. This same time is a favorite for enemy incoming. When the threat exists, a "stand-to" policy puts all men on their perimeter positions during such danger hours.

g. Shelves should be dug in the forward wall of fighting holes for ammunition storage not only from the stand point of ready accessibility, but also protection from the elements.

AL-3 UNCLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

3/4 Operation Order 1-68 110500H Jan68

1. Situation

a. Enemy - No change.

b. Friendly -

(1) 3/3 at A-3 is prepared to reinforce/support.

(2) Artillery - Request sent 2/12 for assignment of DS and GS artillery preplanned and on call fire along patrol route.

(3) Air - Preplanned TPQ's in objective area. AO will be on station. CAS and Huey gunships available on 30 minutes notice.

c. Attachments -

(1) Scout Dog Team to Co "K" effective 101800H Jan68.

(2) Engineer Team to Co "K" and Co "M" effective 101800H Jan68.

(3) Co "K" 3/3 effective 110800 Jan68.

2. Mission. To patrol through suspected (NVA) enemy defensive position, thus providing additional security for defensive positions along "trace". To recover friendly KIA from previous action in objective area if possible.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations - At H-Hour on D-Day, three companies will move out in a coordinated attack and seize the assigned objectives (as depicted on overlay). Two companies will man present positions.

b. Co "K" - Jump off at H-Hour, D-Day, seize objectives 5 and 9; be prepared to seize objective 3 on order.

c. Co "L" - Jump off at H-Hour plus two, D-Day and set in vicinity objective 7. Be prepared to support/reinforce Co's "K" and "M" as directed.

d. Co "I" - Defend present position and occupy Co "M" position upon their departure. Be prepared to guide Co "K" 3/3 into Co "L" position.

e. Co "K" (-) 3/3 - Occupy position vacated by Co "L" 3/4.

f. 81mm Plt - Be prepared to support scheme of maneuver by fire. Priority of fire to Co "K" initially.

g. 106 RR Plt - Maintain present position.

h. Bn Reserve - Co "M" initially in reserve. Follow in "trace" Co "K". Be prepared to support/reinforce or assume mission of Co "K".

**SECRET**

TAB A Encl 1

**SECRET**

i. Coordinating Instructions -

- (1) D-Day - 11 Jan 1968.
- (2) H-Hour - 0500H.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Supply -

- (1) Carry BA of ammo.
- (2) Carry gas mask.
- (3) Two litter bearers per platoon will be designated.

b. Evacuation -

- (1) BAS will remain at present position.
- (2) Companies select LZ's on patrol route.

5. Command and Communications/Electronics

a. Signal communications - No change.

b. Command -

- (1) 3/4 OOC will remain at present location.
- (2) Command Group will move with Co "M".

LEE R. BENDELL  
LtCol USMC  
Commanding

**SECRET**

encl

**SECRET**

3/4 Frag Order for 17-18 Jan 1968

1. Situation: No change.2. Mission: No change.3. Execution:

a. 3/4 employs three companies (Rein) in a defensive perimeter.

b. Co "I" (Rein): On 17 January 1968, conduct night time ambushes at YD 148715 and YD 142708. On 18 January 1968 be prepared to assume additional defense of perimeter as directed. Also, conduct daytime activity in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "L" (Rein): On 17 January 1968, conduct night time ambushes at YD 154707 and YD 148703. On 18 January 1968 conduct company size sweep in accordance with overlay.

d. Co "M" (Rein): On 17 January 1968, conduct night time ambush at YD 153713. On 18 January 1968 provide two platoon size "blecking" forces as shown on overlay in support of Co "L".

4. Administration and Logistics: No change.5. Command and Communications/Electronics: No change.LEE R. BENDELL  
LtCol USMC  
Commanding**SECRET**

TAB B Encl