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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 4th Marines
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, 96602

153868

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Ser: 003A07068
10 Mar 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FME 2220
(2) Commanding General, III MAF
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5050.8
(c) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, February 1968

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

Lee R. Bendell
LEE R. BENDELL

S&C FILES
HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)

680099

10 MAR 1968

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3RD BN/4TH MAR

CMD CHRON

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1. Designations/Locations

- a. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (-) (Rein).
- b. Camp J. J. Carroll, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- c. Cam Lo Artillery Position, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

2. Period Covered in Report. 1 - 29 February 1968.3. Billet Assignments

a. CO	1-29 February 1968	LtCol LEE R. BENDELL
b. XO	1-29 February 1968	Maj J. E. MEAD
c. S-1	1-29 February 1968	1stLt J. A. PARKER
d. S-2	1-27 February 1968	1stLt J. C. DAY
	27-29 February 1968	Capt R. W. KALM
e. S-3	1-29 February 1968	Maj R. K. YOUNG
f. S-4	1-29 February 1968	Capt S. E. THOMAS
g. CommO	1-29 February 1968	Capt A. A. JANSSEN
h. CO H&SCo	1-12 February 1968	1stLt J. O. SINGER
	12-29 February 1968	1stLt W. S. SELLERS
i. CO Co "I"	1-12 February 1968	1stLt G. F. DICKINSON
	12-29 February 1968	Capt M. A. SEXTON
j. CO Co "K"	1-29 February 1968	Capt E. O. LEROY
k. CO Co "L"	1-29 February 1968	Capt J. L. MCLAUGHLIN
l. CO Co "M"	1-13 February 1968	Capt R. W. KALM
	13-29 February 1968	Capt W. N. FAUST

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SECTION IIS-1 & PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

1. Replacements Received
 - a. USMC Enlisted 149
 - b. USMC Officers 5
 - c. USN Enlisted 4
2. Personnel Rotated
 - a. USMC Enlisted 53
 - b. USMC Officers 1
3. Other Personnel Losses
 - a. Transfer by Service Records
 - (1) USMC Enlisted 72
 - (2) USMC Officers 4
 - b. Wounded in Action
 - (1) USMC Enlisted 27
 - (2) USN Enlisted 1
 - c. Killed in Action
 - (1) USMC Enlisted 2
 - d. Non-battle Casualties
 - (1) USMC Enlisted 11
 - (2) USMC Officers 1
 - e. Intra Division/Regiment Transfers
 - (1) USMC Enlisted 19
 - (2) USMC Officers 1
4. Number of R&R Trips 84
5. Average Monthly Strength
 - a. USMC Enlisted 1114
 - b. USMC Officers 41
 - c. USN Enlisted 59
 - d. USN Officers 2

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6. Personnel Shortages

a. Officers

<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER NEEDED</u>
Capt	0202	1
Capt	0402	1
Lt	0302	1
Lt	6707	1
Lt	6708	1

b. Enlisted

<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER NEEDED</u>
Sgt	0141	2
GySgt	0239	1
Sgt	0331	7
Cpl	0331	9
Sgt	0351	4
Cpl	0351	4
LCpl/PFC	0351	20
SSgt	0369	5
LCpl	1141	1
Sgt	2511	1
PFC/Pvt	2531	8
Sgt	2533	1
Cpl/LCpl	2542	2
Cpl	2815	1
Sgt	3531	1
PFC/Pvt	5591	1
LCpl/PFC	8151	2
SSgt	8421	1

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SECTION III

Feb 68

INTELLIGENCE1. Camp Carroll

a. Terrain. The terrain in the vicinity of Camp Carroll (YD 062548) consists of rolling hills, and flat open valleys. The hills range from 25 to 250 feet in height with moderate to thick vegetation. Steep cliffs and a thick low canopy offer the greatest obstacle to movement located at the south west portion of the Camp Carroll hill at YD 069539. The once cultivated valleys (grid squares 0553 and 0653) and the gradual slopes which are found on most hills that surround the valley afford unrestricted movement at about 1200 meters an hour.

To the direct north of Camp Carroll the terrain remains low rolling hills. However, the northwest and northeast areas consist of dense tall hills with moderate to thick vegetation. The hills in this area average 100 feet in height.

b. Terrain Features. Easily identifiable terrain features consist of Camp Carroll itself (YD 062548), the D-5 refugee area (YD 095523), and the two tall distant mountains of Dong Ha (YD 019594) at 549 meters, and Dong Toan (YD 029479) at 552 meters height. All of these terrain features can be seen from almost all parts of Camp Carroll.

c. Avenues of Approach. The Camp Carroll position offers two types of approaches; through the mountains and over the open valleys. The most likely avenue of approach is from the north over the numerous trails which converge at Camp Carroll after running from Route 9 through four valleys. It is unlikely that the enemy would attack from the south because of the flat open area which offers good visibility for approximately 2000 meters. East and west approaches are blocked by high mountains which offer good mortar and artillery positions, the most likely of which are YD 077556, to the east, and YD 037553, to the west.

d. Streams. Numerous small streams to the south offer no obstacle to travel. Streams run from three to eight inches deep and should be dry within two months. One major stream running through 0751 and 0851 grid squares is a clean, fast moving stream about one foot in depth. It is dotted by numerous large rocks which offer natural bridges.

e. Roads and Trail Conditions. Roads and trails are numerous and well traveled in the area. The roads to the south can be easily traveled by all combat vehicles except after extreme rains. Trails are numerous and are well used by the people of the D-5 refugee village (YD 095523) and by friendly units. The enemy utilizes canopy covered trails which are not shown on the maps. They are mostly along the crests of the mountain ranges to the east, west, and extreme south.

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f. Helicopter Landing Zones. Helicopter landing zones are numerous in the Camp Carroll area especially to the south. Preferred zones are as follows:

061555
068555
073555
077528
078519

085577
094533
092531
093521
096505

106532
107525
102515
110532

2. Cam Lo Complex

a. The Cam Lo valley is part of a narrow piedmont west of Route 1 consisting of undulating hills which are bisected by numerous stream valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from the northern highlands through piedmont into the coastal plains. In this transitional piedmont the hills range from 30 to 70 meters in elevation and slopes are between 10 and 20 degrees. Terrain in the 3/4 AO can be divided into three distinct segments.

b. From the line of the Cam Lo River to where the rice paddies and meadowland meet the foothills, the terrain is typically flat, wet rice paddies with dikes two to four feet high. There is some pastureland along the line of the foothills. In this area, monsoon rains will hamper movement, especially of tracked vehicles. Tracked vehicles may be unable to negotiate the paddies and infantrymen will be forced to use the dikes. Visibility is excellent except in village areas, where hedgerows of bamboo and brush screen the houses. There are no roads in the paddy system west of the Cam Lo River Bridge, but trails follow the dikes. North of the bridge, a secondary road in poor condition runs east toward Highway 1. It is not negotiable by truck for much of its length during the monsoons. Three small streams drain the paddy systems into the Cam Lo River. All are fordable, except at full flood. There are two low hills in the paddy system west of the MSR, Hills 46 and 30 (grid 1060-1160). These stand apart from the main hills. From the topographical crest to the military crest, the hills have been cleared of brush and undergrowth. The slopes are covered with thick brush and elephant grass some four to five feet high. There is a good road running from YD 133624 in a southwest direction to YD 123612 and then in a westerly direction up the north slope of Hill 30 to Hill 46.

c. North of the paddy system and east of the MSR the terrain is low, rolling hills covered with brush ranging from three to ten feet high through most of the area. Within the AO, three major trails run north-south, all well beaten former cattle tracks. A good path runs from the C-2 position southeast along a ridgeline and branches just before Hill 43, one branch running southeast to Can Vu, the other running easterly. Visibility in this area is good, especially from the ridgeline west of Hill 43 (grid 1663) and from the slopes of the hills. Foot trafficability is excellent along the trails and fair throughout the area, barring valleys with heavy thickets and wet rice paddies or streambeds.

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d. North of the paddy system and west of the MSR the terrain has heavier vegetation than to the east, except for the northeast portion. Brush and secondary growth, especially in ravines and valleys, can be more than head-high and particularly dense. In the extreme western portion of the AO the hills are quite high, and often topped with thick, high elephant grass. Visibility, except for hilltops, is poor with brush obscuring vision even along the ridgelines. In the northwest portion of the AO, the terrain levels out with scattered abandoned huts and paddies. Trafficability in this area is good for foot traffic; tracked vehicles may bog down in hedgerows during the monsoon season. In the more hilly area, foot traffic, except along the ridgelines, is slowed by steep slopes and thick vegetation in ravines and valleys.

3. Daily Intelligence Summary. On 1 February, the Battalion, minus two detached companies, was deployed along Route 9 in the vicinity of Camp J. J. Carroll. On 3 February, the Battalion (-) moved to Camp Carroll, being relieved by 2/9. The Battalion received seven rounds of 75mm or 85mm artillery fire on 4 February from a northerly direction. At 171400H, the road sweep observed a destroyed bridge at YD 042566. Upon reaching the bridge, an anti-personnel mine was found in the rubble. At 041430H, a 3/4 FO in the tower observed an active rocket position at YD 068555. The rockets seemed to be fired in an easterly direction. Five rounds of 75mm or 85mm artillery were received on 6 February from a northerly direction.

A patrol to D-5 refugee village (YD 096521) on 10 February, reported that an estimated NVA company was occupying the village nightly between the hours of 2000 and 0500. NVA forced each house to cook rice for NVA. It was also reported that at least two NVA companies are alternating this activity, one coming in from the east one night, and another from the west the following night. On 12 February, the Battalion was alerted to send a reaction company to D-5 where a contact was reported with two NVA companies. Alert was secured at 121611H.

On 14 February, there were three rounds of 75mm or 85mm artillery received from vicinity YD 077558. The D-5 ARVN company reported an NVA company digging in at YD 119528, YD 111521 and YD 106522. The NVA company was reported to have two 82mm mortars, two 60mm mortars and three anti-aircraft machine guns. This report was never confirmed. The Battalion relocated on 17 February and assumed control of the Can Lo Artillery Position (C-3) at YD 142616 and the Can Lo River Bridge (C-3A).

On 21 February, a patrol found the body of one NVA believed killed by 81mm fires the previous night at YD 131622. An active mortar tube was spotted at YD 144622 from the Can Lo tower. Three U.S. 60mm mortar round containers were found upon investigation of the area which was conducted after an 81mm mortar mission. At 211040H, a mine sweep found two DH-10 mines buried on the tank trail at YD 133624. One mine was believed to be booby trapped. Mines were blown in place. On 22 February, villagers of Can Thai village (YD 140596) reported that there was a VC observation team working at YD 150608. They were reported to be dressed in civilian clothes.

On 23 February, a patrol found a recently occupied enemy mortar

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were apprehended in a sweep along the Cam Lo River. The Battalion received 33 rounds of enemy artillery (medium to heavy caliber) on the operation in Cam Vu at YD 175615 and YD 181616 from a 320° angle. Artillery fire killed one Vietnamese detainee and wounded several other Vietnamese. There were two mining incidents during the operation. Two AT mines were found (one on top of the other) at YD 159609 by the Battalion sweep team. The mines were blown in place. As the Battalion was returning from the field a tank hit an undetermined type of AT mine at YD 154619. One POW was captured during the operation.

2. Enemy Losses/Casualties

a. Casualties

NVA KIA (confirmed)	2
NVA POW	1
Detainees	105

b. Captured Equipment

AK-47 Rifle	2
AK-47 Magazine	3
AK-47 Magazine Pouch	4
81mm Fuses	2
82mm Mortar Round	1
ChiCom Grenade	2
ChiCom Cartridge Belt	1
Soviet Fragmentation Grenade	1
NVA Pack	2
NVA Shirt	3
NVA Trousers	3
NVA Hammock	1
NVA Poncho	2
ChiCom Mess Kit	1
7.62 Rifle Rounds	80
Vial of NVA Pills for diarrhea	1
M-79 Rounds	2

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during the period 1-29 February 1968.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
H&SCo	Field Fortifications	120
	Field Sanitation	25
	Comm Procedures	32
	Laying the 81mm Mortar	10
	Wire Construction	70
	Intelligence Procedures	4
	Classifying Captured Equipment	2
	Mapping	4
	Civil Affairs	1
	The M-72 LAAW	2
	Care and Cleaning of M-16 Rifle	6
	Terrain Sketching	1
	Care and Cleaning of 106mm RR	15
	Flame Thrower Firing	25
Co "I"	Mapping and Compass Reading	13
	Care and Cleaning of Individual Weapons	45
	M-60: Functioning and Employment	5
	FO Procedures	6
	Radio Procedures, Radio Preventative Maintenance	6
	Construction techniques of a foxhole	15
	Patrolling	12
	Med-evac Procedures	7
	Enemy Tactics and Our Counter Tactics	8
	Immediate Action Procedures	5
	Use of Trip Flares and their Deployment	2
	Starlight Scope	6
	Defensive Tactics	9
	Functioning and Operation of the NOD	11
	Functioning and Operation of AN/PPS-6	18
	Sanitation	4
Co "K"	Scouting	4
	Patrolling	6
	Demolitions	4
	Field Fortifications	2
	FO Procedures	3
	Weapons Safety	4
	Night Operations	4
	Starlight Scope	2

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF HOURS</u>
	First Aid	4
	Map Reading	4
	60mm Mortar Instruction	10
Co "L"	Gun Drill (CSW)	20
	Weapons Safety	18
	FO Procedures	4
	Radio Procedures and Maintenance	8
	Map and Compass Reading	18
	Platoon Tactics	24
	Hygiene and Field Sanitation	9
	Handling of POW's and Indigenous Personnel	4
	Ammunition Handling and Maintenance	8
	Familiarization and Fam Firing of the 3.5 Rocket Launcher	10
	First Aid	14
	Familiarization and Fam Firing of the LAAW	6
	Firing of M-16, M-79, .45 Cal Pistol, and M-60	14
	Small Unit Tactics for Squad and Fire Team Leaders	12
Co "M"	NCO Leadership	8
	Weapons Safety	8
	Map Reading	6
	Land Navigation	6
	Supporting Arms	6
	Patrolling	8
	Demolitions	8
	Mines and Booby Traps	6
	Tracked Vehicles	5

2. In addition to the above, all individual Marines fired their weapons for "zero", prior to assignment to a unit in the field.

3. All replacements were given indoctrination lectures prior to joining their units by the Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major and their Company Officers.

4. Command and Control

On 1Feb68, Det Co "C", 11th EngrBn chopped from 3/4 to 2/9
 On 17Feb68, Co "M" chopped from 3/4 to 2/9
 On 18Feb68, Co "M" chopped from 2/9 to 3/4
 On 18Feb68, 2dPlat, Btry "B", 1-44th chopped from 2/9 to 3/4
 On 18Feb68, 1stSec, Otter Plat, 3dMTBn chopped from 2/9
 to 3/4
 On 18Feb68, Det Co "A", 3dTkBn (2 Tks) chopped from 2/9
 to 3/4

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On 18Feb68, Det 1stSrchLtBtry (1 light) chopped from 2/9 to 3/4

On 19Feb68, Co "M" chopped from 3/4 to 1/4
 On 19Feb68, Co "M" chopped from 1/4 to 3/4
 On 20Feb68, Co "H" 2/4 chopped from 9th Mar to 3/4

On 23Feb68, Co "K" chopped from 12th Mar to 3/4
 On 23Feb68, Co "H" 2/4 chopped from 3/4 to 4th Mar
 On 25Feb68, Co "L" chopped from 3/9 to 3/4
 On 29Feb68, 1stPlat Co "C", 3dTkBn chopped to 3/4 (one day)
 On 29Feb68, 1stPlat 3dATBn chopped to 3/4 (one day)
 On 29Feb68, Det 11thEngrBn (Bulldozer, 2 operators) chopped to 3/4 (one day)

These were task organized as follows:

Camp J. J. Carroll (1-17 February)

H&SCo (-) BnCP
 Sqd Scout Snipers, HQ, 4th Mar
 Det Btry "I", 3/12 (Liaison Team)
 Det Co "C", 3dEngrBn (3 Demo Teams)
 Co "I" (Rein)
 Det Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)
 Co "M" (Rein)
 Det Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)

Cam Lo Artillery Position (C-3)(17-29 February)

H&SCo (-) BnCP
 Co "I" (-)(Rein)
 Det Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)
 2dPlat, Co "M", 3/4
 3dSec, 106RRPlat, H&SCo, 3/4
 2dPlat, Btry "B", 1-44th
 1stSec, Otter Plat, 3dMTBn
 Det, 3dMPBn (Scout Dogs)
 Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Interpreters and Kit Carson Scouts)

CAP #3 (23-29 February)

Co "K" (-)(Rein)
 Det, Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)
 1stSqd, 1stSec, 106RRPlat, H&SCo, 3/4
 Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Scout Snipers)

Cam Lo District Headquarters (20-29 February)

Co "L" (-)(Rein)
 Det, Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)

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2dSqd, 1stSec, 106RRPlat, H&SCo, 3/4
 Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Scout Snipers)

Cam Lo River Bridge (C-3A)(18-29 February)

Co "M" (-)(Rein)
 Det, Btry "I", 3/12 (FO)
 4thSec, 81mmMtrPlat, H&SCo, 3/4
 2dSec, 106RRPlat, H&SCo, 3/4
 Det Co "A", 3dTkBn (2 Tks)
 Det, 1stSrchtBtry (1 Lt)

Dong Ha (1-29 February)

Det, H&SCo
 Det, Co "I"
 * Det, Co "K"
 Det, Co "L"
 Det, Co "M"

* Includes one rifle platoon for reaction and road/sweep/convoy security missions.

5. Close Combat

a. Battery "A" 1/12 was in direct support of 3/4 until 17 February when Battery "D" 2/12 was assigned. General support fires were available from the 1st 8" Howitzer Battery (SF), 175mm Gun Battery from 29th Arty (USA), "F" 2/12, "E" 2/12 and "K" 4/13.

b. While at Camp J. J. Carroll from 1 February until 17 February, the Battalion provided road sweep and convoy security details as requested by 4th Marines. Local patrolling activities were conducted within the assigned AO. At the Cam Lo Artillery Position, the Battalion operated with one company (rein) at the Cam Lo Artillery Position, one company (-)(rein) at the Cam Lo River Bridge site, one company (rein) at the District Headquarters and one company (-)(rein) at the CAP #3 position on Route 9 with a platoon at Dong Ha to provide road sweep security for Route 1. Road sweeps of Route 561 and Route 9 in the assigned AO are run at first light. After the road sweeps are completed, 3/4 coordinates the flow of convoy traffic north on the MSR (Route 561), maintaining a convoy control net with the C-2 position. OP's are manned at the tower on CP #1 at the Cam Lo Artillery Position and the high ground between Cam Lo and C-2 while convoys are on Route 561. Co "M" provides sentries to keep vendors off the MSR and south of the Cam Lo River.

c. Continuous improvement of defensive positions is emphasized and considerable progress has been made toward completion of the new District Headquarters position. All Companies conducted daily patrols and

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established night time LP's/ambushes as directed by the CO 3/4 daily fragmentary orders. Other significant events of a non-combat nature have been included in the chronological summary for historical and record purposes.

1Feb68: One platoon patrol and two daylight OP's and two night LP's were conducted with negative contact. At 011110H, 3/4 was notified by 4th Marines that it would assume perimeter defense effective 011800H. At 011440H, a convoy on Route 9 was reported receiving incoming rounds. At 011450H, 2/9 reported receiving incoming as the convoy passed through their position. At 011630H, a Co "I" platoon patrol departed for Than Son Lon to return the following day. At 012020H, engineer teams were chopped from 3/4 to 2/9. At 012020H, Co "M" elements observed movement of five to nine NVA at YD 068543. The enemy were taken under fire with small arms with unknown results.

2Feb68: One platoon patrol was conducted along with three squads provided for road sweep and engineer security. Two night LP's were posted with negative sightings. At 021110H, Camp Carroll received eight rounds of incoming artillery of unknown caliber. At 021405H, five rounds of estimated 75mm artillery were received from an azimuth of 5800 mils. At 021445H, another volley of estimated 75mm artillery was received. One emergency med-evac from 2/9 resulted. At 021710H, three rounds of estimated 75mm artillery were received.

3Feb68: One platoon patrol, three squad OP's and three squad LP's were conducted. At 030600H, two rounds of unknown caliber artillery were received. At 031313H, a Co "I" patrol provided security for a recovery detail at the location of a convoy ambush of the previous day at vicinity YD 074574. Reaching the area of the ambush, the patrol found one salvageable 6X6 truck and one unsalvageable. There was also a "low boy" with a dozer aboard. Five casualties, four of whom were emergency med-evacs from 11th Engineers were med-evaced. At 031321H, three rounds of estimated 85mm artillery were received.

4Feb68: Three squad day OP's and three squad night LP's were conducted. At 040550H, four rounds of unknown caliber artillery were received with negative casualties. At 040925H, a Co "I" squad security detail for mine sweep observed a bridge being blown by the enemy with command detonated explosives at YD 042556. One emergency and one routine med-evac resulted from the mine sweep team. At 041425H, a 3/4 FO observed an active enemy rocket site vicinity YD 063613. A fire mission was called with good target coverage. At 041507H, Camp Carroll received three rounds of unknown caliber artillery. At 042230H, three rounds of unknown caliber artillery were received.

5Feb68: Three squad day OP's, two squad security details and a special detail to set in sensory devices were conducted along with three night LP's.

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At 050455H, 4th Marines advised 3/4 that Khe Sanh was receiving rockets and Hill 881 a ground attack. Increased alertness was ordered on the perimeter. At 050500H, five rounds of unknown caliber artillery were received. At 051420H, a Co "M" platoon was alerted to stand by for heli-lift to District Headquarters to carry out a rough rider mission.

06Feb: One platoon patrol was conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security and one platoon for convoy security. At 062340H, Camp Carroll received seven rounds of incoming artillery from vicinity YD 027594. Called counter-artillery mission with unknown results.

07Feb: One platoon patrol and five night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security and one platoon was provided for convoy security. At 070300H, Co "M"'s lines detected movement to their front and threw two M-26 fragmentation grenades. The area was checked out at first light with negative results. At 071515H, the Co "I" platoon patrol, which was installing SID's, observed civilians working vicinity YD 073530. Several were detained and checked for ID cards, which all of them possessed.

08Feb: Two platoon patrols and six night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 081145H, two rounds of estimated 75-85mm incoming artillery were received from an azimuth of 5800 mils. Counter-battery fire was called in with unknown results. At 081330H, a Co "I" platoon patrol found a SID vicinity YD 070526 had been tampered with and one SID, previously planted there, was missing. At 081430H, the road sweep found that the road had been blocked at the Khe Gia Bridge by 2/4 units. 4th Marines was notified, and the road sweep directed to return. At 082215H, a Co "M" fire team LP heard movement approximately 50 meters north of their position. M-26 fragmentation grenades were thrown and small arms fired. The movement stopped and 81mm illumination showed negative results.

09Feb: One platoon patrol and six night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided as road sweep and engineer security. At 091430H, two outgoing 105mm artillery rounds had air bursts over the 81mm mortar position. No casualties resulted.

10Feb: One platoon patrol and five night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided

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as road sweep and convoy security. Co "I" (-) patrol carried MCI's and ammunition to resupply RF unit at D-5.

11Feb: One platoon patrol and five night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon was provided for convoy security. At 111500H, a Co "I" FO called a fire mission on observed activity at YD 046536. FO repeatedly inquired on fire control net if the sighting was friendly troops. The answer was negative. Clearance was granted and the mission was fired and adjusted. 4th Marines then checked fire, indicating that the target was friendly. At 111645H, while providing convoy security, a vehicle hit a mine vicinity YD 075572. Co "M" platoon had four personnel injured. The casualties were evacuated overland.

12Feb: One squad patrol, two day squad ambushes and seven night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security and one platoon for convoy security. At 121030H, a Co "M" squad ambush spotted ten personnel, apparently five male and five female, who appeared to be trying to hide in bushes vicinity YD 076534. An artillery mission was called in with good target coverage and unknown results. At 121045H, 4th Marines directed 3/4 to maintain one company (-) on 30 minute alert for use as a reaction force for the D-5 RF unit. At 121605H, 4th Marines informed 3/4 to secure the company (-) reaction force from alert status.

13Feb: One platoon patrol and seven night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 131307H, Co "I" platoon patrol found five freshly dug fighting holes at YD 067531. The holes were two feet wide and three feet deep with no overheading. The holes were marked for later destruction. At 131500H, six civilians (two adults and four children) were observed by the lines vicinity 060532. 60mm mortars and .50 caliber machine guns were fired across their front to drive them away and they departed to the east. At 131850H, a report was received from D-5 RF company that an estimated VC/NVA company, armed with two 82mm mortars, two 60mm mortars and three anti-aircraft machine guns, were digging in at YD 119528. The report was passed to 4th Marines FSCC.

14Feb: One platoon patrol and seven night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security.

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At 141005H, Co "I" lines spotted five water buffalo 100 to 150 meters in front of their lines at YD 068574. 50 rounds of small arms were fired to scare them away with negative results. At 141215H, a Co "M" Marine developed severe stomach cramps suddenly while on patrol. A med-evac was requested and completed.

15Feb: One company size operation and seven night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon was provided for convoy security. At 150715H, Co "M" departed on a company size operation to determine the friendly/enemy situation at D-5 and to make a route reconnaissance to determine the best way to reinforce D-5 if necessary. At 150913H, Co "M" had an accidental discharge resulting in one priority med-evac. An investigation was initiated. At 150945H, Co "M" found one hole, 2½'X3'X4' at YD 069512, that appeared to be the beginning of a tunnel. Engineers destroyed the hole, and the operation continued. At 151440H, Camp Carroll received six rounds of estimated 85mm incoming artillery. Crater analysis determined an azimuth of 6280 mils and an artillery mission was called, causing a secondary explosion at YD 043585. At 152200H, Co "I" platoon manning lines spotted movement that appeared to be two men at YD 067542. The sighting was verified by FPS-6 and estimated to be 250 to 300 meters outside the perimeter. A Co "I" fire team LP in the area was called back in to clear the area for a 60mm mortar mission. Three WP and nine HE rounds were fired with good target coverage. Checked area at first light with negative results.

16Feb: One platoon patrol and seven night fire team LP's were conducted with negative contact. Two squads were provided for convoy security; one platoon was provided for security for a later convoy; and one squad was provided for vehicle recovery security. At 161200H, Co "I" platoon patrol spotted 16 villagers (10 girls and 6 boys, the oldest 17 years old) at YD 078540. Kit Carson Scouts talked with them with negative results. At 161230H, Co "I" platoon patrol found five fighting holes, 3'X2'X3', with no overheading, at YD 066532. At 161345H, a Co "I" squad spotted six men wearing helmets and dark uniforms and carrying weapons, at YD 064541. an FO was dispatched to the position to observe area and call in fire mission. One WP and 21 HE rounds were fired by 60mm mortars at the movement with excellent target coverage. Results were unknown. At 171400H, Co "M" spotted an enemy rocket ~~site near~~ vicinity YD 062596. The coordinates were reported and 2/9 conducted a fire mission. At 162210H, Co "I" reported mortar fire impacting vicinity D-5 area (YD 0951). This was followed by sporadic small arms fire. One green cluster and two red clusters were observed during the small arms fire. The incident was reported to 4th Marines and Co "I" continued

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to observe the area with NOD. At 162220H, Co "I" located a machine gun firing at D-5 vicinity of YD 106517. 4th Marines FSCC was notified and a mission was fired with good target coverage. Results are unknown.

17Feb: Two squad night ambushes and three fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. At 170916H, Co "I" (-) and Command Group "A" departed Camp Carroll en route to Cam Lo Artillery Position (C-3). At 170930H, Co "M" along with Command Group "B" was chopped OPCON to 2/9. At 171000H, Co "I" (-) and Command Group "A" were chopped OPCON to 9th Marines, ending 3/4's participation in Operation LANCASTER II. At 171345H, Command Group "A" took control of Cam Lo Artillery Position and Cam Lo River Bridge Position (Co "G" 2/9 remained at the Bridge Position.). From 171415H to 171445H, Col SMITH, CO, 9th Marines, visited the Cam Lo Artillery Position. At 171709H, the rear party of Command Group "A" arrived at Cam Lo Artillery Position.

18Feb: Two squad patrols, one squad day OP, two squad (rein) night ambushes, and two fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. At 180940H, Co "M" (-) departed Camp Carroll by convoy. At 181145H, Co "M" arrived at the Cam Lo River Bridge (C-3A). Co "M" was chopped from 2/9 OPCON to 3/4. At 181255H, the MSR Control Point reported an explosion in burning trash at the dump. The control point was informed to warn away any bystanders because hand grenades were known to be in the trash at the dump. At 181545H, Command Group "B" and the remainder of H&SCo, and Co "M" departed Camp Carroll by convoy, arriving at Cam Lo Artillery Position at 181625H.

19Feb: One platoon patrol, two squad patrols, three squad (rein) ambushes, and three fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One squad was provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 190815H, word was received from 9th Marines to provide one company with two tanks for a reactionary stand by. Co "M" was alerted for the stand by at 190820H. At 190847H, Co "M" platoon at Cam Lo Artillery Position was directed to move out. At 190930H, a Co "I" platoon departed Cam Lo Artillery Position for the Cam Lo River Bridge. At 191015H, Co "M" was chopped from 3/4 OPCON to 1/4. Col SMITH, CO, 9th Marines, arrived at the 3/4 COC at 191430H, and departed at 191457H. At 191455H, Co "M" 3/4 was chopped from 1/4 OPCON to 3/4. At 191530H, Co "I" platoon left the Cam Lo River Bridge to return to the Cam Lo Artillery Position. At 191450H, Co "I" platoon was back at the company position. At 192250H, a Co "I" ambush spotted two persons digging at YD 133625. An 81mm mortar mission was fired on the area of the sighting and trails leading into the area. The area was checked out at first light with negative results. At 192320H, Co "I" reported three trip flares going off in the inner protective wire. One M-26 fragmentation grenade was thrown into the area. The area was checked out with negative results.

20Feb: One squad (rein) patrol, one squad (rein) day OP, two squad (rein) ambushes and four fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 201100H, 3/4 assumed OPCON of Cam Lo District Head-

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quarters. At 201100H, Co "H" 2/4 was chopped from 9th Marines OPCON to 3/4. At 201145H, MajGen THOMPkins, CG, 3d Marine Division, along with Col SMITH, CO, 9th Marines, arrived at Cam Lo District Headquarters. They departed at 201400H. At 201430H, Co "H" 2/4 at Cam Lo District Headquarters received 12 rounds of incoming 82mm and 85mm enemy artillery from YD 108597, causing one WIA non-evac. An artillery mission was called and 18 rounds were fired with good target coverage. Results are unknown.

21Feb: Two platoon (rein) patrols, one squad (rein) patrol, one squad (rein) day OP, one fire team day OP, four fire team night LP's and two squad (rein) night ambushes were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 211040H, the road sweep discovered two DH#10 chicom mines on the road at YD 133624. An estimated 20 pounds of explosives were in each. The mines were blown in place. At 211050H, a Co "I" patrol discovered a recent 60mm mortar position for three tubes at YD 149621. Fresh footprints in the area indicated that approximately 20 persons wearing NVA type sneakers had moved off to the northwest. 21 empty containers with increments were found. At 211130H, a Co "I" patrol found one NVA body about one day old at YD 136626, apparently from the mortar fire of 19 February. At 211705H, Cam Lo village received one incoming 122mm rocket, that impacted at YD 120578, from vicinity YD 080570. Five civilian casualties were med-evaced at 211730H. At 212220H, Co "H" 2/4 LP spotted three enemy in the village area. Four rounds of illumination and 15 rounds of M-16 ammunition were fired. The area was checked at first light with negative results. At 212245H, an unknown number of VC threw grenades in the village area, wounding three PF's and one civilian. The wounded were given medical attention and med-evaced.

22Feb: Two platoon (rein) patrols, one squad (rein) patrol, one squad day OP, two fire team day OP's, four fire team night LP's, and three squad (rein) ambushes were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 222320H, a request was received from Co "C" 1/4 for illumination. The 3/4 FSCC coordinated the firing of one illumination round every 30 seconds for 13 minutes. A total of 25 rounds were fired with good target coverage.

23Feb: Three platoon (rein) patrols, one squad day OP, two fire team day OP's, nine fire team LP's and three squad (rein) night ambushes were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. Col SMITH, CO, 9th Marines, arrived at Cam Lo Artillery Position at 231200H, and departed at 231300H. At 231300H, a Co "I" patrol, checking out the area of Co "C" 1/4's activities of 22 February, found at YD 164612, two chicom grenades, one chicom 7.62mm type 51 pistol with holster, two NVA packs with small arms ammunition one AK-47 rifle with two magazines, one M-16 rifle with three magazines and one dead NVA. Across the river in the same vicinity, a pile of other equipment was spotted, however, this was not checked out due to the possibility of an ambush and the late time of day. At 231930H,

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a PF LP from District Headquarters spotted an estimated two companies of NVA vicinity YD 128573, YD 131578, and YD 136572, and requested 3/4 to coordinate a fire mission. Three fire mission were fired, expending 48 rounds of HE with unknown results.

24Feb: Two platoon (rein) patrols, one squad (rein) patrol, two squad (rein) day OP's, two fire team day OP's, seven squad (rein) ambushes, and nine fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 241000H, the road sweep found one manufactured metal type mine containing an estimated 20 pounds of explosive at YD 133624. The mine was blown in place. At 241205H, a PF unit reported they were receiving sporadic mortar fire from vicinity YD 181598 in the 3/4 AO. They requested District Headquarters to fire a mission in support. The mission was cleared by 3/4 and fired at 241236H, with Co "K" 3/4 adjusting. The mission had good target coverage, but unknown results. The PF unit broke contact at 241240H. At 241320H, Co "K" reported that Huey gunships arrived in the Cam Vu area and fired a mission. At 241400H, the Co "M" platoon patrol found a tunnel with a booby trapped entrance vicinity YD 152603. Engineers blew the tunnel and four seconds later, a secondary explosion occurred. Another entrance was revealed. Engineers dug this entrance out and found an M-26 grenade and some shrapnel. Due to the secondary explosion, the second entrance was also believed to be booby trapped and was destroyed. The tunnel was two to three feet in diameter and 50 feet long with two entrances, one in the bank of the river, and the other a spider trap type entrance. At 241822H, a report was received from 9th Marines of the presence of the 27th Independent Battalion 150 meters from YD 128615. An 81mm mortar fire mission was called with excellent target coverage. Results are unknown.

25Feb: Three platoon (rein) patrols, three squad (rein) day OP's, seven squad (rein) night ambushes and nine fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 251200H, Co "M" platoon patrol found one NVA mortar pit which had been used recently at YD 158578. Also found were one 60mm mortar round and one camouflaged cover. At 251300H, Co "H" 2/4 was chopped from 3/4 to 4th Marines and Co "L" 3/4 was chopped from 3/9 OPCON to 3/4. BrigGen HOFFMAN, ADC, 3d Marine Division arrived at Cam Lo at 251335H, and departed at 251415H. At 251615H, Co "K" reported that a CAP #3 patrol had spotted four to five NVA north of the Cam Lo River, vicinity YD 168609. The enemy was well camouflaged wearing green uniforms. The patrol engaged the enemy with small arms and called an 81mm mortar fire mission through the Co "K" 81mm mortar FO. 75 rounds were fired with excellent target coverage. During the mission, many more enemy were observed in the area. The patrol claimed 20 KIA's probable.

26Feb: Two platoon (rein) patrols, one squad (rein) patrol, two fire team day OP's, eight squad (rein) ambushes, and seven fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were

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provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 260450H, Co "L" ambush heard extensive enemy movement from a westerly direction approximately 25 meters to the front of their position at YD 121582. The ambush was pulled back 200 meters and an artillery mission was called. The enemy was estimated at 80 to 100 men and were well equipped. Apparently the enemy had spotted the ambush and deployed to react against it. 36 HE, 10 illumination and two WP rounds were fired with good target coverage. The area was checked out at first light with negative results. At 261010H, the road sweep found four M-5 Russian made AT mines at YD 132617 on the tank trail. The mines were blown in place. At 261025H, nine rounds of estimated 82mm mortar incoming were received from vicinity YD 087600. The rounds landed approximately 600 to 800 meters from the perimeter between Cam Lo Artillery Position and C-2. A counter-mortar mission was fired with unknown results. At 261215H, 3/4 FO's called an artillery mission on active enemy artillery at YD 055605 and YD 087600. Two secondary explosions were observed at YD 055605 and one possible secondary explosion at YD 087600. Observation of the area continued. At 261501H, one 82mm mortar round was received inside the Cam Lo Artillery Position perimeter from an azimuth of 5100 mils. An 81mm mortar mission was fired with unknown results. During the day, incoming rounds were received in the Battalion Rear at Dong Ha, resulting in two WIA's non-evac.

27Feb: Two platoon (rein) patrols, two squad (rein) patrols, three squad (rein) OP's, one fire team OP, seven squad (rein) night ambushes and seven fire team night LP's were conducted with negative contact. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and engineer security. At 271040H, word was received from 9th Marines that an enemy element was suspected to be near vicinities YD 095610 and YD 149619. The information was passed to Co's "I" and "L". At 271045H, the road sweep discovered two mines of undetermined size at YD 133627 and YD 133622. The mines were found off the side of the tank trail in an area not normally swept. The mines were blown in place. At 271355H, a message was received from 9th Marines S-2 stating that elements of the 27th Independent Battalion were to strike Cam Lo vicinity YD 140600 with a ground attack. No time for the attack was given. At 271650H, a Co "K" patrol found 15 good, small one man fighting holes spaced about 10 meters apart facing northwest on the south side of the road from YD 167612 to YD 170601. The holes appeared to be an enemy ambush site about six to seven days old. There was blood by two of the holes. The village of Zom-Thuong-Do is adjacent to the site and was burned and half in ruins. The village had enemy bunkers, one for each hut. The area was checked out with interpreters and S-2 personnel. At 272100H, Cam Lo Artillery Position received small arms sniper fire from YD 143613. The fire was returned with small arms and two 90mm cannister rounds. A squad was sent to check out the area with negative results.

28Feb: One platoon (rein) patrol, one platoon patrol, two squad patrols, three squad day OP's, one fire team day OP, seven squad (rein) night ambushes and eight fire team night LP's were conducted with negative results. One platoon and one squad were provided for road sweep and

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engineer security. At 281210H, Co "I" patrol found 12 bunkers and fighting holes 3'X3'X3', some with overheading of dirt and bamboo at YD 118598. One 60mm mortar round, bloody utilities, several M-79 rounds, bloody bandages, ration cans, ammo cans, assorted documents and one 82mm mortar round were also found. The bunkers were not blown due to the expenditure of the explosives to blow a dam, so tanks could get through. Col SMITH, CO, 9th Marines, arrived at Cam Lo at 281115H, and departed at 281315H. At 281500H, a Co "L" OP spotted an estimated enemy company, which appeared to be digging in at YD 116553 and YD 092561. An artillery mission was called in conjunction with an AO. 16 rounds of HE were fired with good target coverage. The results are unknown. At 282020H, District Headquarters reported an enemy AP minefield and booby traps with a depth of 200 meters and a width of 400 meters vicinity YD 177623. Artillery and 81mm mortar missions were called in. 75 rounds were fired with good target coverage. One secondary explosion resulted with damage unknown.

29Feb: Six squad night ambushes and eight fire team night IP's were conducted with negative contact. The Battalion conducted a three company sweep and clear operation in the Cam Vu area in accordance with CO 3/4 Operation Order 4-68 of 280800H February 1968. At 290500H, Co "L" reported a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons vicinity YD 125600. The District Advisor informed Co "L" that it was an RF unit in contact. Co "L" supported the unit initially with 60mm mortar fire. Artillery was called and fired. 25 rounds of HE were expended with good target coverage. Co "L" continued to fire 60mm mortar missions in support of the RF unit and took a rocket and mortar position under fire until 290630H, when contact was broken. A Co "L" squad checked the area and noted that the villagers appeared to be moving out of the village toward the Cam Lo River Bridge. Also a bamboo pole was found resting on a fence pointed toward the tower at District Headquarters. At 290810H, Co "K", en route to its line of departure, received five to six rounds of small arms sniper fire vicinity YD 148604. Small arms fire was returned. At 291000H, Co's "I" and "M" moved out from the line of departure. At 291005H, two Co "I" Marines moving down a hill captured a VC lying on the deck with a PPS-43 submachine gun at YD 172630. The POW was extracted by helicopter at 291110H. At 291120H, Co's "I" and "M" set in at objectives #1 and #2. At 291125H, Co "K" departed the line of departure. At 291130H, the tower at Cam Lo Artillery Position spotted an enemy OP (four to six personnel) at YD 106620. An 81mm fire mission was called in. 53 rounds were expended with good target coverage. Results are unknown. At 291200H, Co "K" discovered hundreds of pounds of rice at YD 174608. The rice was destroyed. At 291230H, while Co "M" was searching the Cam Vu Stream at YD 174614, one man stepped in a deep spot and drowned. The body was recovered and extracted. At 291240H, Co "K" discovered 50 100 pound bags of cement and assorted tools. The cement and tools were gathered for extraction overland. At 291300H, the tanks had a cook-off resulting in one casualty. A priority med-evac was requested and completed. From 291345H to 291450H, units in Cam Vu received 33 rounds of estimated 100mm enemy artillery. At 291451H, Co "K" attained objective #6. All units were back in their CP's by 291638H.

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During the operation, a total of 105 detainees were turned over to Cam Lo District Headquarters personnel for screening. At 291830H, an FO in the north tower spotted ten NV1 in the open at YD 086608. A fire mission was called. 14 rounds were expended with excellent target coverage. Two secondary explosions were observed. Damage is unknown. At 291930H, a dog set off a cluster of anti-personnel mines in the minefield at District Headquarters. The concussion then set off three nearby clusters. The concussions, plus the debris, started a chain reaction of explosions. Unexploded mines were uncovered and some were thrown onto the road. An emergency request was made for engineers. The engineers stated that the minefield will have to be blown and relaid. At 292130H, a Co "K" LP detected movement vicinity YD 175580. A 60mm mortar mission was fired with good target coverage and the movement stopped. The area was checked at first light with negative results.

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SECTION VLOGISTICS1. General

a. The Battalion remained in its position at and around Camp Carroll, except Co "K" which was still OPCON to 12th Marines at Gio Linh. Early in February, Co "L" was positioned at Ca Lu OPCON to 3/9. On 17 and 18 February, Co's "I", "M" and H&SCo were chopped from 4th Marines OPCON to 9th Marines. at the Cam Lo Artillery Position and the Cam Lo River Bridge Position. On 23 February, Co "K" was chopped from 12th Marines OPCON to 3/4 and positioned at the CAP #3 position. On 26 February, Co "L" was chopped from 3/9 OPCON to 3/4 and positioned at the Cam Lo District Headquarters. The entire Battalion was again participating in Operation KENTUCKY.

b. Daily resupply was attempted while the Battalion was located at Camp Carroll, but due to heavy enemy activity along Route 9 and the lack of aerial observers, due to poor weather, the convoys were very infrequent. At no time was the Battalion in an emergency need for supplies, except for an initial supply of 81mm mortar rounds which was delivered by helicopter. Daily resupply convoys were provided by 9th Marines to the Cam Lo Artillery Position, Cam Lo River Bridge, CAP #3, and Cam Lo District Headquarters.

2. Supply

a. The overall supply support during this period was considered fair.

b. Some shortages in Class II supplies existed and were reported in the Logistics Summary Report:

Antenna, AT-271A	Flame Throwers
Carburetor, for M274A2	Rifle, 106mm
Mattress, Pneumatic	Lamp, Incand (for 81mm)
Rocket Launcher, 3.5	

3. Transportation

a. Motor transportation support from 9th Motors was satisfactory.

b. The deadline rate for the M-422A1 in this reporting period was fifty per cent. Of 20 M-422A1 vehicles, ten are deadlined. Seven of the ten deadlined vehicles are in FLSU for repairs. The remaining three vehicles are being worked on at this time.

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c. There are five communications vehicles in the Battalion of which one is deadlined. One M-38A1 MRC 83 is deadlined for work on the electrical wiring and is in FLSU at this time.

d. The Battalion has four M-37B1 vehicles, of which two are running, one is being worked on at this time and one is in FLSU for a new engine.

e. The Battalion has four M-274A2 (mules) deadlined at this time. There are no parts available to get these vehicles running. The Battalion has been waiting the initial issue of parts that should have arrived with the vehicles four months ago. There is a problem in getting inner-tubes for all of the vehicles. Tires are plentiful, but inner-tubes are not. They have been requisitioned in all sizes for the vehicles.

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SECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS1. Radio

a. The Battalion maintained station on the following radio nets while on field operations during this period:

Regt TAC #1 (FM)
Bn TAC #2 (FM)
Bn Admin (FM)

b. Additional stations manned at the base camp position at Cam Lo Artillery Position included:

Regt TAC #2 (FM) (RC-292)
Convoy Control (FM) (RC-292)
CAP TAC (FM) (RC-292)

c. The Battalion Rear at Dong Ha maintained a station on the Battalion Admin.

d. Supporting arms circuits for air and artillery were employed utilizing FM equipment.

2. Wire

a. The Battalion Rear at Dong Ha maintains wire communications for administrative purposes and provides two trunks to the 9th Marines.

b. The Battalion maintains an extensive CP wire system at Cam Lo Artillery Position and Cam Lo River Bridge, including trunks between these two locations and three trunks laterally to C-2.

3. Radio Relay. Radio Relay provides two common user circuits between Cam Lo Artillery Position and 9th Marines for exclusive use of this Battalion.

4. Power for the CP and Battalion Rear is provided by the 11th Engineers. Extensive cable improvements were made at Cam Lo Artillery Position.

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SECTION VIIARTILLERY SUPPORT

1. During the period from 1 February to 17 February, while 3/4 was operating in and around the Camp Carroll area, direct support artillery was provided by 1/12. Calls for fire during this period were answered by "A" Btry, 1/12, "C" Btry, 1/12, "W" Btry, 3/12, "K" Btry, 4/12, and 175mm Btry, 2d/94th.
2. While operating in the Camp Carroll area, forward observers of 3/4 called in a total of 56 fire missions expending 545 rounds. An additional 1,598 rounds were expended on 282 H & I targets.
3. From 17 February through 29 February, while 3/4 was operating in the Cam Lo area, direct support artillery was provided by 2/12. Calls for fire during this time were answered by "D" Btry, 2/12, "E" Btry, 2/12, "F" Btry, 2/12, "H" Btry, 3/12, "K" Btry, 4/13, and 1st 8" How. Btry.
4. While operating in the Cam Lo area, forward observers for 3/4 called in a total of 98 fire missions expending 1,112 rounds. An additional 1,610 rounds were expended on 268 H & I targets.
5. The following is a summary of artillery support during the month of February:

<u>Battery</u>	<u>Fire Missions</u>	<u>Rounds Expended</u>
"A" 1/12 (105)	17	218
"C" 1/12 (105)	20	172
"W" 3/12 (107)	14	89
"K" 4/12 (155)	5	66
"D" 2/12 (105)	56	579
"E" 2/12 (105)	9	137
"F" 2/12 (105)	8	114
"H" 3/12 (105)	21	234
"K" 4/13 (155)	4	48
	<u>154</u>	<u>1,657</u>

<u>Battery</u>	<u>H & I's</u>	<u>Rounds Expended</u>
"A" 1/12 (105)	81	486
"C" 1/12 (105)	89	494
"W" 3/12 (107)	50	270
"K" 4/12 (155)	35	210
1st/40th (175)	27	138
"D" 2/12 (105)	93	558
"E" 2/12 (105)	47	271

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<u>Battery</u>	<u>H & I's</u>	<u>Rounds Expended</u>
"F" 2/12 (105)	41	242
"H" 3/12 (105)	34	204
"K" 4/13 (155)	28	180
1st 8" How (8")	<u>25</u>	<u>155</u>
	550	3,208

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. During February 1968, 3/4 was assigned the missions of defending Camp Carroll and Cam Lo Artillery Position and Cam Lo River Bridge. These missions required a minimum of air support. The weather during this period was unfavorable for all fixed wing support and only priority missions were carried out.
2. AO's were requested to cover patrol routes and to make VR's of our assigned areas of operations. On 29 February, four AO's assisted 3/4 to carry out a sweep and clear operation at Cam Vu. They were instrumental in locating enemy positions and conducting air strikes and artillery missions against them, resulting in seven buildings destroyed, two rocket positions destroyed and two KIA's confirmed.
3. Fixed wing support was requested on 29 February, making strikes against enemy fortifications. A flight of A-4's destroyed seven buildings and damaged two. Three flights destroyed seven bunkers and two rocket positions.
4. 3/4 requested three med-evacs to remove some wounded men from the field. UH-34's responded to these calls and were instrumental in saving their lives.
5. 3/4 requested a troop lift on 15 February for 180 men, the first of which were picked up on 19 February and the remainder on 25 February. 3/4 also requested two VR's and one POW lift out which were carried out promptly.
6. During February, 85 TPQ's were requested of which only 17 were conducted.
7. The following is a summary of air support for the period 1-29 February.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Fixed Wing	4	BDA Totals: 7 buildings destroyed, 2 damaged; 2 rocket positions destroyed; 7 bunkers destroyed.
AO Aircraft	6	VR's of patrol routes and controlled 4 flights of fixed wing, and artillery missions
Resupply	0	Not Required
Med-evacs	3	6 UH-34's removed 4 wounded and 1 KIA from field.

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<u>Type</u>	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Troop Lifts/VR's	4	1 troop lift, 22 UH-34's, 180 troops; 2 VR's, 4 UH-34's, 13 passengers; and 1 POW lift out, 1 UH-34
SAR	0	Not required
TPQ's	85	17 conducted

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MEDICAL AFFAIRS

1. From 1-17 February, a forward BAS was in operation at Camp Carroll (1 Medical Officer, 11 Corpsmen). At the same time a rear BAS was in operation at Dong Ha (11 Corpsmen).
2. On 17 February, the Medical Officer and three Corpsmen moved to Cam Lo Artillery Position with the forward echelon of 3/4. They were followed on 18 February by the remainder of the forward BAS.
3. Common problems encountered for the Medical Department were:
 - a. A shortage of supplies existed at Camp Carroll and it was necessary to send to Phu Bai to get resupplies. Shortage does not exist at this time.
 - b. Getting information to Company Corpsmen in different companies deployed to outlying areas was difficult.
 - c. Water are not available. Hot water is a must in the BAS.
 - d. The Med-Cap program was not initiated due to non-availability of supplies.
 - e. The waiting period for resupply is one month to one month and one half.
 - f. There is a shortage of heads at Cam Lo Artillery Position (2 short). They are on order.
 - g. A moderate rat problem existed at Camp Carroll and also exists at Cam Lo Artillery Position.
 - h. Other than supplies, no problems exist at the rear BAS.
4. There were no corpsmen casualties during February.
5. The personnel situation is as follows:
 - a. Personnel Transferred 2 Enlisted
 - b. Personnel Received 3 Enlisted
 - c. Number of Personnel on Board 59 Enlisted
1 Officer

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SECTION XCIVIL AFFAIRS1. Activities for the month of February 1968.

On 10 February, the Battalion was in a defensive perimeter at Camp Carroll. A company (-) patrol was conducted to the D-5 refugee center for purposes of making a liaison visit with the village chief and the commanding officer of the D-5 ARVN company. It was learned that the people were short of rice because of closed transportation routes. Medical supplies were running low, however, no major medical problems existed. The people seemed to be in good spirits and seemed to welcome the Marines into the village. Plans were later formulated for Med Caps and possible food assistance projects, but the Battalion deployed from the area before anything could be accomplished.

Plans were being discussed around 15 February to restore the CAP unit to the D-5 location. It was believed that a two squad CAP would be of assistance in solving the nightly VC/NVA visiting problem. This project was not completed due to the deployment of the Battalion.

The Battalion moved to Cam Lo and assumed control of the Cam Lo Artillery Position and the Cam Lo Bridge Position on 17 February. On 18 February, the Battalion S-5 Officer made a tour through the Cam Lo refugee village. People were extremely crowded, but seemed to have enough food. A lack of transportation, both by vehicle and by water, was evident in the area. Large piles of wood, charcoal and baskets were stacked along the streets awaiting transportation to market. New refugees are moving into the refugee village at the rate of approximately 600 per day. The population to date is 17,400 and it is expected to reach 30,000 by the end of March. Talks were begun to start an extensive Med Cap program on 20 February, however, the program cannot be started until supplies arrive.

On 25 February, a psyops team played tapes telling the people of defeats the enemy had during TET and a 3/4 interpreter made a speech informing the people of the awards program for information and enemy equipment. The team worked in Cam Thai Village and Cam Lo Refugee Village.

On 29 February, the Battalion conducted a search and clear operation of the Cam Vu Village area. During this operation 105 people were detained and turned over to the Cam Lo District Chief for screening and evacuation from the area. The Armed Propaganda Team also made a broadcast in the area, informing the people to stay out of the area, and that any persons in the

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ENCLOSURE

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area would be assumed to be enemy sympathizers and killed.

2. Future Plans

Plans for future activities call for an intensive Med Cap program in the Cam Thai/Cam Lo area. A work program will also be instituted to pay refugees from the Cam Lo Village for work possibly on roads and in filling sandbags in order to supplement their incomes. A controlled market will be set up to ensure fair prices for Marines and a just profit for the people with the hope that a closer US/RVN relationship will result in the area.

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X-2

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECTION XIPROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED1. Field Operations

a. On three occasions, the conflict between the ability of an infantry battalion to move quickly and the building of an adequate logistical support capability with protected defensive positions, became highly apparent. When dependent upon helicopter support, rations and ammunition reserves are necessary. One day's rations in the hands of the troops and two day's rations in reserve were considered minimal during poor weather for helicopter operations. A minimum of one third of a BA of ammunition in reserve in addition to the BA in the hands of the troops is considered appropriate. These reserve supplies can be maintained in cargo nets if rapid displacement is anticipated. Fortification material used in the field, for overhanging holes or bunkers or for placing tactical wire around the perimeter, should be ordered only when the position is anticipated to be of a semi-permanent nature or the enemy threat is acute. For short-period perimeters, standard foxholes and a strong camouflage discipline replace fortification materials. In any case, if a position must be abandoned, all reserve supplies and materials of value to the enemy must be recovered and evacuated.

b. The advantage of changing night dispositions in the field are illustrated by this Battalion's experience. After relieving an ambushed convoy, the Battalion established a three company perimeter in low ground to include one hill. Civilians were noticed observing day time activities. The next night three separate high ground perimeters were established. During the early morning hours, the NVA attacked the position with the apparent attempt of penetrating the anticipated low ground perimeter. The Battalion was successful in repulsing their attack against one company perimeter, pinning them down in the open low ground, and sweeping in with other companies to kill or capture the enemy. The enemy's actions imply that it takes at least two days for them to react and that once a plan is made, it is difficult for them to adjust to a new situation.

c. Occupation of critical terrain (good observation and fire capability) prior to exposure in low ground was practiced and saved lives on several occasions. An enemy ambush was reversed through prepositioning half of the unit on high ground prior to sweeping the low ground road area. Instead of the road unit being pinned down, the high ground element immediately gained fire superiority, placing the enemy in an untenable position.

XI-1

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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d. The advantages of a competent team of staff officers with specific areas of staff responsibility permits the battalion commander to stay fully informed while concentrating on the tactical direction of his units. In the midst of a heavy engagement, the S-3 and his COC members were monitoring all traffic, keeping higher echelons informed, maintaining records and submitting spot reports. The Executive Officer, along with the Headquarters Commandant, functioning as the S-4 Forward, and the Battalion Surgeon, were adjacent to the LZ, treating and evacuating casualties, receiving resupply, and directing ammunition to using units. The Executive Officer carried an extra radio to keep the Battalion Commander informed, who was at an OP directing the attack of the companies, coordinating supporting arms, and readying the reserve for employment where and when necessary.

2. Ambushes

a. Ambushes have effectively utilized 81mm supporting fires while set in at an ambush site. Mining activities were heard in the distance and when it was obvious that the enemy was not going to get any closer, 81mm HE and illumination fire were called resulting in one confirmed KIA. The illumination allowed the ambush to spot one NVA and the fire was accurately adjusted on the fleeing enemy.

b. Ambushes should be set in a caltrap fashion, especially in open area, to avoid being surprised from any direction. Even though the likely avenue of approach is covered, all avenues should be taken into consideration.

c. Ambushes should be sprung by one or more claymores set off accurately into the killing zone. The tendency is to get excited and take the enemy under fire at long range rather than wait until the enemy is well within the killing zone.

d. Rehearsals are mandatory before ambushes go out, to ensure that all contingencies are taken into consideration. Especially items such as those listed below should be planned:

- (1) Contact while en route to the site.
- (2) Casualties taken en route to the site.
- (3) Communication is lost.
- (4) Alternate sites.
- (5) When and how to search killing zone.

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(6) Prisoner SOP.

(7) Plan for reentering the perimeter in an emergency.

3. Defensive Perimeter

a. Experience at Camp Carroll again pointed up the need for the infantry battalion commander to be in command of the defensive perimeter. Resident units such as artillery or headquarters units, should fall under the operational control of the infantry battalion when fulfilling the perimeter defense mission. The perimeter defense was reorganized from eight separate sectors, each reporting to a "regimental security officer", to two infantry companies reporting to the Battalion Commander, each company having augmentation elements organized into platoons, reporting to the Company Commander. Redistribution of the direct fire supporting arms (tanks, twin-40's, quad-50') to exploit their capabilities throughout the perimeter was accomplished, in preference to having them grouped by units. These weapons were then under the operational control of the platoon commander, within whose sector they were located. Command relationships and the ability to effectively and immediately engage targets were enhanced by this reorganization.

b. The location and construction of fighting holes often seemed to violate basic principles. Fighting holes should be located to afford good observation and fields of fire to the front and flanks. Machine guns should be sited not only for good PDF's to the front, but also for good FPL's that protect sectors of the perimeter lines. Although above ground sandbag bunker construction for fighting positions affords good drainage in wet weather, it also presents vulnerable targets for RPG, RR and small arms fire. This Battalion strongly endorses fox holes, with overhead protection when time and materials permit, but with low silhouettes and good observation at ground level. At positions where the perimeter is clearly delineated by wire, and camouflage deception was not a major consideration, bulldozers were used to clear vegetation outside the perimeter wire out to 400 meters and to eliminate defilade areas near fighting holes.

c. To avoid loose ammunition, exposed to the weather, stow ammo inside the fox holes in boxes or alcoves built into the walls of the foxhole. Keep as much ammunition as possible in its original waterproof containers. Stow grenades and illumination flares neatly in protected and available locations within the fox hole.

d. Very close coordination is required beforehand between

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units that are switching defensive positions to ensure communication on position will be adequate during this period of transition. Positions should be occupied on a fighting hole relief basis so that the personnel coming in will be thoroughly briefed on range cards, fields of fire, supporting fires in front of the position, etc.

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5-3. SECRET
3/4 Frag Order for 6-7 Feb 1968

1. Situation

a. Enemy forces: See current intelligence summaries.

b. Friendly forces:

(1) 2/9 (-) operates in AO to our north.

(2) 2/4 (-) operates in AO to our northwest.

(3) 3/9 operates in AO to our west and southwest.

(4) RF/PF forces operate to our south and southeast.

(5) Artillery: Artillery missions are requested through 1/12 who assigns fire missions to individual battalions.

2. Mission

a. Camp Carroll base defense.

b. Conduct Search and Destroy operations in AO.

c. Provide "Rough Rider" and mine sweep security as required.

d. Be prepared to provide "Bald Eagle" reaction force.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations: 3/4 (-)(Rein) defends Camp Carroll with two reinforced rifle companies. Patrols, "Rough Rider" and "Bald Eagle" reaction missions are assigned to the base defense companies.

b. Co "I" (Rein): One platoon 2/94 assigned defensive OPCON for perimeter defense. Assume responsibility for southern sector of defensive perimeter. Conduct patrolling activities and O/LP's in accordance with overlay.

c. Co "M" (Rein): One platoon 1/12 assigned defensive OPCON for perimeter defense. Assume responsibility for northern sector of defensive perimeter. Conduct "Rough Rider" missions as assigned. Conduct activities as shown on overlay.

d. One platoon HqCo, 4th Marine assigned defensive OPCON as perimeter defense reserve.

e. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Report all observed rocket/mortar positions by FLASH telephone or radio message to 3/4 COG.

(2) Report all other significant findings or sightings to 3/4 COG.

4. Administration and Logistics: No change.

5. Command and Communications/Electronics

a. Communications

(1) "Rough Rider": provide communication capability on Regimental and Convoy Control TAC Nets.

(2) Primary interperimeter communications by land line.

b. Command and Control: 3/4 CP located at YD 062549.

LEE R. BRIDELL

LtCol USMC

Commanding

SECRET Panel 1

SECRET

C-2 (1/4)

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Rein)
 Cam Lo, RVN
 190800 Feb 1968

3rd Bn, 4th Mar. FragO for 19-20, 68

Time Zone: H

Ref: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 and 6442 IV

1. Situation: No change.

2. Mission: Defense of C-3, C-3A, and operations in AO as appropriate.
 Be prepared to reinforce CAP#1, CAP#3, and District Headquarters on order..

3. Execution:

a. Concept of Operations: Defend C-3 with one reinforced company and C-3A with one company minus reinforced. See Operations overlay.

b. Co"IN" (Rein) : Defend C-3 position, conduct 2LP's, 2 ambushes, and daytime OP, and daytime patrol in accordance with overlay.

c. Co"MN" (-) (Rein) : Defend C3-A position, conduct LP's, ambushes in accordance with overlay..

d. H&S Co. Provide one rifle squad to Co"IN" at 19 1800 hrs to fill Co"IN" lines.

J.E. Mead
 Major U.S.M.C.
 Acting

SECRET

①-#12

SECRET**S-3**

3rd Bn 4th Mar. (-) (Rein)
 Can Lo, RVN
 200000 Feb 1968

3/4 FragC for 20-21 Feb 68

Time Zone: H

Ref: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

1. SITUATION: No change.

2. MISSION: Defense of C-3 complex and Can Lo District Headquarters and patrolling in assigned operating area. Be prepared to reinforce CAP#1, CAP#3 and District Headquarters.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations: Defend C-3 with one company reinforced, and C-3A with one company minus reinforced. See Operations overlay.

b. Co*TF (Rein): Defend C-3 position, conduct two fire team sized listening posts, one squad sized ambush, one squad sized patrol and one platoon sized patrol.

c. Co*TH (-) (Rein): Defend C-3A position. Conduct one IP, one squad sized night ambush and one daylight platoon patrol.

d. Co*TH (Rein): Defend Can Lo District Headquarters. Conduct four IP's, one daytime OP, and one squad sized patrol in accordance with Operations Overlay.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS: No change

5. COMM and ELECT: No change.

J.E. Mead
 Major USMC
 Acting

SECRET

SECRET

5-3

3rd Bn 4th Mar. (-) (Rein)
 Cam Lo, RVN
 201330Z Feb 1968

3/4 Frag O for 21-22 Feb 68

~~Time Zone: H~~
 TASK ORGANIZATION: NO CHANGE.

Ref: Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

1. SITUATION. No change.

2. MISSION. Defense of C-3 complex and Cam Lo District Headquarters and patrolling in assigned operating area. Be prepared to reinforce CAP#1, CAP#3 and District Headquarters. Defense of the MSR within our AO.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations. Defense C-3 with one company reinforced, C-3A with one company minus, and Cam Lo District Headquarters with one company (rein). See Operations Overlay.

b. Co I* (Rein). Defend C-3. Conduct platoon patrol, two squad ambushes, one squad OP and two fire team IP's in accordance with overlay. Provide security for and conduct road sweep.

c. Co III* (-). Defend C-3A. Conduct platoon patrol, squad ambush, and two IP's in accordance with overlay.

d. Co RH* (Rein). Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters. Conduct squad patrol, two CP's, and three IP's in accordance with overlay.

e. Coordinating Instructions— All ambushes will be initiated by setting off one or more Claymores into the killing zone.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COM and EFFECT. No change.

J.E. Mead
 Major USMC
 Acting

10-414
 SECRET

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
 C-3 RVN
 220800H Feb 1968

3/4 FragO for 22-23 Feb 1968

Task Organization: No change

Ref: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

1. SITUATION. No change except sub paragraph 1c.

c. Attachments and Detachments - Attach one dog team to "I" platoon patrol at 230700H.

2. MISSION. Defense of C-3 complex and Cam Lo District Headquarters and patrolling in assigned operating area. Be prepared to reinforce CAP#1, CAP#3 and District Headquarters. Defense of the MSR within our AO.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Defend C-3 with one company reinforced, C-3A with one company minus, and Cam Lo District Headquarters with one company reinforced. See Operations Overlay.

b. Co "I" (Reinf). Defend C-3. Conduct platoon patrol, (set in for two hours at check points 5 and 4), conduct two squad ambushes, conduct one daytime OP, and two IP's in accordance with Operations Overlay. Provide security for and conduct road sweep.

c. Co "H" (-). Defend C-3A. Conduct platoon patrol, set in at check point #5 for two hours. Conduct squad ambush and two IP's in accordance with overlay.

d. Co "H" (Reinf). Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters. Conduct platoon patrol (a recon party from Task Force Robbie will accompany patrol to recon tank routes), two IP's, three squad ambushes and two OP's in accordance with overlay.

e. Coordinating Instructions. All ambushes will be initiated by setting off one or more Claymores into the killing zone. A scout and interpreter will accompany "H" Co. platoon sized patrol to check number and identity of civilians. Report any# of villas, cattle, sex and age of civilians. Report any other unusual behavior of indigenous personnel within the area covered. The squad ambush at ID139595 will move into the NTP by moving south of Route 9 avoiding indigenous personnel and dwellings as much as possible.

4. ADMIN and LOGISTICS. No change.

COMM and COMINT & ELECTRONICS. No change.

a. Challenge and Password. Code #21

1. Primary: Hammer - Lamp
2. Alternate: Chair - Topaz

J.E. Mead
 Major USMC
 Acting.

①-#15
 SECRET

S-3

SECRET

3/4 7/4 6/4
#15

1. PATROL

I-4 (pit r-in)
TOD 231000H
IP 141617
CP2 129615
CP1 120620
CP5 122626
CP3 124630
CP8 133630
CP4 141631
CP9 144624

2. PATROL

M-1 (ult reir)
TOD 230800H
IP 150607
CP3 152617
*CP3 152619
CP1 160615
CP2 160610
CP7 153602
*Note: set in at
CP3 for 2 hours

3. PATROL

H-1 (ult reir)
TOD 230800H
IP 126597
CP6 127594
CP2 110597
CP1 103591
CP3 106588
CP4 116588
Note: accompanied
by 4 personnel
from TP Bobbie

4. AMBUSH

I-18 (sqd reir)
TOD 221830H
TOR 230730H
131623

5. OP

I-36 (sqd reir)
TOD 230730H
TOR 231830H
130621

6. AMBUSH

I-18 (sqd reir)
TOD 221830H
TOR 230730H
142624

7. LP

I-36 (fireteam)
TOD 221830H
TOR 220730H
141619

8. LP

I-44 (fireteam)
TOD 221830H
TOR 230730H
144614

9. LP

M-18 (fireteam)
TOD 221930H
TOR 230700H
146607

10. LP

M-18 (fireteam)
TOD 221930H
TOR 230700H
151605

11. AMBUSH

I-36 (sqd reir)
TOD 221830H
TOR 230730H
156610

12. AMBUSH

H-1 (sqd reir)
TOD 221900H
TOR 230700H
138595

13. LP

H-1 (fireteam)
TOD 230800H
TOR 231800H
142591

14. AMBUSH

H-1 (sqd reir)
TOD 221900H
TOR 230700H
130587

15. AMBUSH

H-1 (sqd reir)
TOD 221900H
TOR 230700H
122588

16. OP

H-1 (fireteam)
TOD 230800H
TOR 231800H
118583

18. LP

H-1 (fireteam)
TOD 221900H
TOR 230700H
128594

17. LP

H-1 (fireteam)
TOD 221900H
TOR 230700H
125594

SECRET

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (reinf)
 G-3, RVN
 230800H Feb 1968

3/4 Frag O for 23 - 24 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

Task Organization: No change.

1. SITUATION, No change

2. MISSION. Defense of C - 3 complex and District Headquarters, and CAP#3, patrol in assigned area, defense of the MSR within AO. Reinforce CAP#1 on order.

3. EXECUTION.

(a) Concept of Operations. Defend C - 3 with one company reinforced, C - 3A with one company minus, Cam Lo District Headquarters with one company reinforced and CAP#3 with one company reinforced. (Operations Overlay).

(b) Co "I" (Reinf). ** Defend C - 3A. Conduct one platoon patrol, two fire team LP's and one squad ambush in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(c) Co "M" (-). * Defend C - 3A. Conduct one platoon patrol, two fire team LP's and one squad ambush in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(d) Co "H" (Reinf). Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters. Conduct squad reinforced patrol, squad reinforced ambush, four fire team LP's, and two fire team day OP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(e) Co "K" (Reinf). Defend CAP#3. Conduct three squad reinforced ambushes and one fire team LP in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(f) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) All ambushes will be initiated by setting off one or more Claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) REIs to include number of villages encountered, number, sex and age of civilians encountered. Report any other unusual behavior of indigenous personnel encountered. DIA's pick out likely spots for NTA's. Take note of dwellings being sandbagged and their location in relation to roads and the MSR.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMD AND COMM - ELECTRONICS - No change.

a. Challenge and Password.

Code # 21

- (1) Primary: Handle Bored
- (2) Alternate: Rayon Gold

* Attach one interpreter with "M" Co effective 240800H.

** Attach one S-2 scout to "I" Co. at 240800H

J. E. Mead
 Major USMC
 Acting

OFFICIAL;

R. E. Young
 Major USMC
 S - 3

SECRET

① - # 16

S-3

1. PATROL
 I-3 (Plt rein)
 TOD 240900H
 IP 140616
 CFI 132617
 CFI 125617
 *CF2 120612
 CFI 124603
 CFI 131603
 *Note: set in at
 CF2 for 2 hours.
 Drop sqd. at
 CFI for 2 hours.

2. OP
 I-4 (sqd rein)
 TOD 240730H
 TOR 241830H
 130622

3. AMBUSH
 I-2 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240730H
 130626

4. AMBUSH
 I-4 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240730H
 134628

5. IP
 I-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240730H
 144619

6. IP
 I-3 (fire team)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240730H
 146614

7. OP
 I-2 (sqd rein)
 TOD 240830H
 TOR 241730H
 144621

I-4A - ROAD SWEEP
 FOR 24 FEB 68

8. PATROL
 H-1 (Plt rein)
 TOD 240900H
 IP 147603
 CFI 143600
 CFI 134596
 CF2 127596
 CFI 132591
 CFI 143593
 CFI 146598
 Note: will be
 accompanied by
 recon party from
 Task Force Robbie
 (approx. 4 - 6 men)

9. IP
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231930H
 TOR 240700H
 151608

10. IP
 H-1A (fire team)
 TOD 231930H
 TOR 240700H
 150602

11. AMBUSH
 H-3A (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240730H
 156605

12. PATROL
 H-2 (sqd rein)
 TOD 240800H
 IP 127590
 CFI 125586

*CF2 133578
 CFI 137582
 CFI 135587
 *Note: set in for
 2 hours.

13. AMBUSH
 H-3 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 111591

14. IP-3
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231930H
 TOR 240700H
 128594

15. IP-4
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231930H
 TOR 240700H
 126588

16. IP-3
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231930H
 TOR 240700H
 125 593

17. IP-1
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 128597

18. OP-1
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 240800H
 TOR 241800H
 139592

19. OP-2
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 240800H
 TOR 241800H
 121595

20. AMBUSH
 H-1 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 178591

21. AMBUSH
 H-1 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 174 584

22. AMBUSH
 H-1 (sqd rein)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 167584

23. IP
 H-1 (fire team)
 TOD 231900H
 TOR 240700H
 181583

①-#16

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
C - 3, RVN
240800H Feb 1968

3/4 Frag O for 24-25 Feb 1968

Ref: Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014
Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

Task Organization: No change.

1. SITUATION. No change.

2. MISSION. Defense of C-3 complex, Cam Lo District Headquarters, and CAP#3. Patrol in assigned operating area, defense of the MSR within AO and reinforce CAP#1 on order.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Defend C-3 with one company reinforced. C-3A with one company minus, Cam Lo District Headquarters with one company reinforced, and CAP#3 with one company ~~MINUS~~ reinforced. (See Operations Overlay).

b. Co "I" (Reinf).

(1) Attach S-2 scouts to "I" CO. effective 241800H.

(2) Defend C-3, conduct one platoon patrol, two squad OP's, three ambushes, two LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

c. Co "K" (Reinf).

(1) Defend CAP#3, conduct platoon patrol, two squad ambushes and two LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Provide security for road sweep.

(3) ~~PROVIDE ONE AT AS REDUCTION/ROAD SWEEP SECURITY LOCATED AT~~ ^{DONG HA}

d. Co "H" (Reinf).

(1) Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters, conduct ~~platoon~~ ^{SQUAD} patrol, two OP's, three LP's, and two squad ambushes in accordance with Operations Overlay. ~~IMPROVE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.~~

e. Co "M" (Reinf).

(1) Attach one interpreter effective 241800H. Defend C-3A, conduct platoon patrol, two squad ambushes, and two LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

f. H&S Co.

(1) Attach one reinforced rifle squad to "I" Co. effective 241800H.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) All ambushes will be initiated by setting off one or more Claymores into the killing zone.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) ~~ALL UNITS IMPROVE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.~~

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMD AND COMM - ELECTRONICS. No change.

a. Challenge and Password.

Code # 21 (24 Feb)

(1) Primary - Pecos Meadow

(2) Alternate - Store Banana

OFFICIAL:
R.K. Young
Major USMC
S-3

L.R. Bendell
Lt Col. USMC
Commanding

SECRET

10-#17

DECLASSIFIED

1. PATROL ✓
I22(plt rein)
 TOD 250700H
 IP 139615
 CP3 132614
 CP5 128609
 *CP2 119609
 **CP1 123602
 CP6 131599
 CP7 133607
 Notes:
 *-set in for
 2 hours
 **--drop off
 rein sqd.
 for 1 hour

2. LP
I28(fireteam)
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H.
 141618

3. LP - I2C
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 146612

4. OP
I3D(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 250700H ✓
 TOR 251830H
 126623

5. OP
I4A(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 250700H
 TOR 251830H
 144622

6. AMBUSH
I1C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250730H
 131617

7. AMBUSH
I3C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250730H
 143624

8. AMBUSH
I4C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250730H
 151618

9. PATROL ✓
M3(plt rein)
 TOD 250830H
 IP 148603
 CP3 155602
 CP5 158592
 CP2 161586
 *CP1 159579
 CP4 148576
 CP7 146582
 CP8 146590
 *Note: set in
 for 2 hours
 LP
 10. M3C(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 146604

11. LP
M1B(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 149602

12. AMBUSH
M2A(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 156611

13. AMBUSH
M1C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 154605

14. AMBUSH - M-1C
M1C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250730H
 151600

15. PATROL ✓
N3(plt rein)
 TOD 251800H
 IP 128590
 CP1 125583
 CP4 133575
 CP5 140575
 *CP2 140586
 *Note: set in
 for 1 hour

16. OP
HOP1(sqd rein)
 TOD 250800H ✓
 TOR 251800H ✓
 122586

17. OP
HOP2(sqd rein)
 TOD 250800H ✓
 TOR 251800H ✓
 142594

18. AMBUSH
H1A(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 118581

19. AMBUSH
H2A(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 242000H ✓
 TOR 250630H
 142593

20. LP
H1P(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250630H
 129587

21. LP
H1P(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250630H
 124592

22. LP
H1P3(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250630H
 128594

23. PATROL ✓
K2(plt rein)
 TOD 250600H
 IP 178584
 CP3 178591
 CP1 173598
 CP5 179604
 CP8 172604
 CP16 168606
 CP4 162603
 CP7 171595

24. AMBUSH
K1C(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 172598

25. AMBUSH
K1B(sqd rein) ✓
 TOD 242000H ✓
 TOR 250630H
 190589

26. LP
K1A(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241900H ✓
 TOR 250730H
 174583

27. LP
K1D(fireteam) ✓
 TOD 241930H ✓
 TOR 250700H
 180582

SECRET

S-3

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
C - 3, RVN
230700Z Feb 1968

3/4 Page 0 for 05 - 06 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014
Sheets 6312 I and 6412 IV

Task Organizations: No change

1. REINFORCEMENT. No change
2. MISSION. No change
3. RELOCATION.

(a) Concept of Operations. No change

(b) Co "A" (Reinf).

(1) Attach engineers to "I" Co. effective 260730Z.

(2) Defend C - 3, conduct one platoon patrol, two squad ambushes and two LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(c) Co "B" (Reinf).

(1) Defend CAEP3, conduct platoon patrol, one section ambush, one squad ambush, two LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Provide security for road sweep.

(3) Provide one platoon as reaction/road sweep security located at Dong - Ha.

(d) Co "C" (Reinf).

(1) Defend Car Le District Headquarters, conduct armed reinforced patrol, two reinforced squad ambushes, three fire team LP's, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(e) Co "D" (Reinf).

(1) Defend C-31, conduct squad reinforced ambush, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(f) Coordination Instructions.

(1) Initiate all ambushes with Claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) Day patrol for "I" Co. will be accompanied by a tank representative from Task Force Hobbs to reconnoiter tank routes. An engineer will accompany also to make recommendations for tank crossing.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMM AND COMINT - ELECTRONICS. No change

Lt. Col. Pendall
11001. USMC
Commanding

SECRET

0-7/8

1. PATROL
I-1 (plt rein)
 TOD 260830H
 IP 146616
 CP3 150612
 CP1 155609
 CP2 160610
 CP5 160625
 CP6 152623

2. AMBUSH
I-2C (sqd rein)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 130621

3. AMBUSH
I-3A (sqd rein)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260730H
 142624

4. LP
I-1A (fireteam)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260700H
 144619

5. LP
I-1A (fireteam)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260730H
 146614

6. AMBUSH
M-1A (sqd rein)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 149600

7. LP
M-2B (fireteam)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 147607

8. LP
M-3C (fireteam)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260700H
 152605

9. PATROL - L-3B
M (sqd rein)
 TOD 260800H
 IP 126590
 CP3 124585
 CP1 120580
 *CP2 118573
 CP5 125575
 CP7 133583
 *Note: set in
 for 2 hours

10. AMBUSH - L-1B
M (sqd rein)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 121583

11. AMBUSH - L-3A
M (sqd rein)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260700H
 134594

12. LP L-1C
M (fireteam)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260700H
 129588

13. LP L-2B
M (fireteam)
 TOD 251930H
 TOR 260700H
 125593

14. LP L-2C
M (fireteam)
 TOD 251915H
 TOR 260700H
 128594

15. OP L-3C
M (fireteam)
 TOD 260800H
 TOR 261800H
 118584

16. OP L-1A
M (fireteam)
 TOD 260815H
 TOR 261800H
 142592

17. PATROL
K-1 (plt rein)
 TOD 260800H
 IP 178585
 CP3 170584
 CP1 162582
 CP5 159579
 CP2 171578
 CP4 175578
 CP6 182576

18. AMBUSH
K-2B (sqd rein)
 TOD 251845H
 TOR 260700H
 168604

19. AMBUSH
K-2A (sqd rein)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 163580

20. LP
K-2B (fireteam)
 TOD 251900H
 TOR 260700H
 178582

21. LP
K-2C (fireteam)
 TOD 251915H
 TOR 260700H
 179588

I-4A ROAD SWEEP
 For tomorrow.

(7-418)

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
C - 3, RVN
250800H Feb 1968

3/4 Frag 0 for 26 - 27 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014
Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. No change.

b. H & S Co. Attach one reinforced squad to Co*I* effective 261730H Feb 68.

c. Co*I* (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3, conduct one squad reinforced patrol, three squad reinforced ambushes, one fire team OP, one squad OP, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

d. Co*K* (Reinf).

(1) Defend CAP#3, conduct platoon patrol, and one squad patrol, three squad reinforced ambushes, one fire team DP, in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Provide security for road sweep.

(3) Provide one platoon as reaction/road sweep security located at Dong Ha.

e. Co*L* (Reinf).

(1) Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters, conduct platoon patrol, two squad reinforced ambushes, two squad OP's, and three fire team LP's in accordance with the Operations Overlay.

f. Co*M* (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3A, conduct platoon patrol, one squad reinforced ambush, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Initiate all ambushes with Claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) All platoon patrols will be accompanied by a FAC, ARTY, FO and 81 MM FO.

L.R. Bendell
LtCol. USMC
Commanding

SECRET

1. PATROL

I-4 (Sqd rein) I 4/1

TOD 270900H

IP 140616

GP4 133617

GP3 127622

* GP6 124627

CP1 132629

CP2 137625

Notes: set in
one hour at GP6.

2. AMBUSH

I-1 (Sqd rein) I-1A

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

125616

3. AMBUSH

I-2A (Sqd rein)

TOD 261915H

TOR 270715H

130427

4. AMBUSH

I-3B (Sqd rein)

TOD 261930H

TOR 270730H

136624

5. IP

I-4B (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

144619

6. IP

I-4C (Fire team)

TOD 261930H

TOR 270715H

145612

7. GP

I-2C (Sqd rein)

TOD 270730H

TOR 271800H

123616

8. GP

I-3C (Fire team)

TOD 270715H

TOR 271800H

145622

9. GP

9. PATROL

H-1 (Sqd rein)

TOD 270900H

IP 145606

GP2 154612

* GP1 163611

GP4 154604

Notes: set in

GP1 for two hours.

10. AMBUSH

H-3C (Sqd rein)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

146602

11. IP

H-1B (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

149607

12. IP

H-1C (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270715H

151604

13. PATROL

L-3C (Sqd rein)

TOD 270830

IP 127591

GP2 125585

* GP1 112579

GP4 115590

GP3 121594

GP6 133594

Notes: Set in
one hour via. GP1.

14. AMBUSH

L-1 (Sqd rein)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270730H

116582

15. AMBUSH

L-1B (Sqd rein)

TOD 261930H

TOR 270700H

143590

16. GP

L-3A (Sqd rein)

TOD 270700H

TOR 271800H

117583

17. GP

L-1A (Sqd rein)

TOD 270800H

TOR 271800H

142593

18. IP

L-2A (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

125593

19. IP

L-2B (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

128593

20. IP

L-3B (Fire team)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

126588

21. PATROL

H-1B (Sqd rein)

TOD 271530

IP 178586

GP2 185587

GP4 191576

GP3 191579

GP7 181584

22. AMBUSH

H-1A (Sqd rein)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

159586

23. AMBUSH K-1 (Sqd REIN)

TOD 261915H K-1B

TOR 270715H

172599

24. AMBUSH

H-1C (Sqd rein)

TOD 261900H

TOR 270700H

146583

25. IP

L-1 (Fire team)

TOD 261915H

TOR 270700H

175583

26. PATROL

I-1 (Sqd rein)

TOD 271800H

IP 178576

GP3 173592

GP1 159591

GP2 156603

* GP5 163606

GP6 175605

Notes: Set in via.

GP5 for two hours.

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
C - 3, RVN
270800H Feb 1968

3/4 Frag C for 27 - 28 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series I 7014
Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Concept of Operations. No change

b. H & S CO. Attach one reinforced squad to COFI¹ effective 271800H.

c. Co¹I¹ (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3, conduct ^{Two} platoon reinforced patrol, one squad reinforced ambush, one fire team CF, one fire team LP, and three squad reinforced ambushes in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Platoon patrol will be accompanied by Task Force Robbie personnel to recon tank routes.

d. Co¹K¹ (Reinf).

(1) Defend CAP/3, conduct squad patrol, two squad reinforced ambushes, and one fire team LP in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Provide security for road sweep.

(3) Provide one platoon as reaction/road sweep security located at Dong Ha.

e. Co¹L¹ (Reinf) (-).

(1) Defend Cao Lo District Headquarters, conduct squad patrol, two squad reinforced ambushes, two squad CF's, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

(2) Provide platoon to Dong Ha for patrolling and security activities.

f. Co¹M¹ (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3A, conduct platoon patrol, squad reinforced ambush, and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Initiate all ambushes with Claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) All platoon patrols will be accompanied by a FAC, ARTY FO, and an 81 mm PG.

LES R. BENDELL
Lt Col, USMC
Commanding

SECRET

①-#20

1. PATROL
 I 3 (11 rein)
 TCD 280930H
 IP 146616
 CP3 121524
 CP2 128623
 CP1 124616
 CP6 119629
 CP4 118605
 CP8 120600
 CP9 132577
 CP11 132607

2. CP
 I 4 (3rd rein)
 TCD 280700H
 TCR 281830H
 126622

3. CP
 I 2A (Fire team)
 TCD 280900H
 TCR 281400H
 148622

4. LP
 I 1B (Fire team)
 TCD 271100H
 TCR 280700H
 146614

5. AMBUSH
 I 2B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271915H
 TCR 280700H
 124617

6. AMBUSH
 I 3C (3rd rein)
 TCD 271930H
 TCR 280730H
 130621

7. AMBUSH
 I 4B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280700H
 142624

8. PATROL
 M 3 (PLT)
 TCD 280930H
 IP 146604
 CP3 155603
 CP1 164606
 CP5 171600
 CP4 169594
 CP9 162595
 CP8 158592
 CP6 152596

9. AMBUSH
 M 1B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280700H
 144603

10. LP
 M 3A (Fire team)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280715H
 147603

11. LP
 M 3B (Fire team)
 TCD 271915H
 TCR 280730H
 147607

12. PATROL
 M 1B (3rd)
 TCD 280700H
 IP 178586
 CP3 186580
 CP1 172530
 CP2 170539
 CP5 178591

13. AMBUSH
 K 2B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271930H
 TCR 280715H
 164587

14. AMBUSH
 K 2B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280700H
 169594

15. LP
 K 2C (Fire team)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280730H
 175593

16. PATROL
 L 1B (3rd)
 TCD 280900H
 IP 126590
 CP8 131590
 CP1 128596
 CP2 127594
 CP6 123587

LP-3
 17. AMBUSH L (Fire team)
 TCD 271915H
 TCR 280700H
 124584

18. AMBUSH
 L 3B (3rd rein)
 TCD 271930H
 TCR 280700H
 142589

19. CP
 L 3A (Squad)
 TCD 280700H
 TCR 281830H
 118584

20. CP
 L 3C (Squad)
 TCD 280715H
 TCR 281800H
 143592

21. LP-1
 L 4 (Fire team)
 TCD 271900H
 TCR 280700H
 124593

22. LP-2
 L (Fire team)
 TCD 271915H
 TCR 280715H
 127597

23. I - Plt. Patrol
 TCD 281200H
 IP 146615
 CP2 153626
 CP1 163626
 CP4 154623

OP
 K-1B (185582)
 OP
 K-2C (175577)
 OP
 K-2D (168585)

①-#20

29 Feb - 1 Mar 62

1. I2-1t Rein Patrol
TOR 010700H
IP - 145414
CP2 - 134508
CP1 - 134603
CP4 - 124604
CP6 - 121612
CP9 - 136614
CP11 - 135621
2. I3A-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010715H
CP1 - 124616*
CP2 - 126627*
*Notes: (1) Set in
CP1 for 4 hours.
(2) Set in CP2
until TOR.
3. I4B-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291930H
TOR 010730H
CP1 - 133627*
CP6 - 142635*
*Notes: (1) Set in
CP1 for 3 hours.
(2) Set in CP6
until TOR.
4. I4C-1d Rein Arb
TOR 010800H
TOR 011800H
133617
5. I4D-1d Rein Arb
TOR 010800H
TOR 011800H
145619
6. I4A-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010700H
139612
7. I2B-1d Rein Patrol
TOR 291715H
TOR 010700H
146613
8. M3-1t Patrol
TOR 010900H
IP - 147602
CP6 - 152506
CP1 - 144504
CP3 - 140596
CP4 - 135504
CP7 - 136605
CP2 - 143601
9. M1B-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010730H
155602
10. M3A-1d Patrol
TOR 291915H
TOR 010730H
148607
11. M3C-1d Patrol
TOR 291930H
TOR 010730H
145601
12. K2-1t Patrol
TOR 010900H
IP - 178586
CP2 - 149593
CP1 - 162595
CP3 - 151601
CP5 - 163606
CP4 - 177604
CP7 - 174598
CP8 - 176591
13. K1-1t Patrol
TOR 010630H
IP - 178506
CP3 - 170577*
CP1 - 160578
CP2 - 150583
CP5 - 154586
*Note: Link up with
road sweep at CP5
and proceed with
road sweep.
14. K2-1t IP
TOR 291900H
TOR 010700H
178582
15. K1A-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010700H
170602
16. K2C-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291915H
TOR 010700H
164594
17. L1-1d Rein Patrol L1A
TOR 010800H
IP - 127591
CP2 - 127595
CP1 - 121594
CP4 - 116590
CP3 - 116595
CP5 - 124596
18. L1B-1d Rein Arb IC
TOR 291900H
TOR 010700H
141592
19. L1C-1d Rein Arb L1B
TOR 010800H
TOR 011800H
117593
20. L1D-1d Rein Arb L1C
TOR 010800H
TOR 011800H
143592
21. L1E-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010700H
125592
22. L1F-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291900H
TOR 010715H
128592
23. L1G-1d Rein Arb
TOR 291915H
TOR 010730H
128589

3dLn, 4thMar
C-3, RVN
290000H Feb60

3/4 Page for 29Feb - 1Mar60

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES I 7014, Sheets 6342I and 6442IV

1. Execution

a. Concept of Operation. No Change

b. Co "1" (Main).

(1) Defend C-3, conduct platoon reinforced patrol, two squad reinforced ambushes, squad reinforced OP's, one FT OP, and two FT LP's in accordance with operations overlay.

c. Co "2" (-)(Main).

(1) Defend CAP #3, conduct two platoon patrols, one FT LP and two squad reinforced ambushes in accordance with operations overlay.

d. Co "3" (-)(Main).

(1) Defend Can Lo District Headquarters, conduct squad reinforced patrol, one squad reinforced ambush, two FT OP's and three FT LP's in accordance with operations overlay.

e. Co "4" (-)(Main).

(1) Defend C-34, conduct platoon patrol, squad reinforced ambush, and two FT LP's in accordance with operations overlay.

2. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Initiate all ambushes with claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) All platoon patrols will be accompanied by a PAC, arty FO and an SSG FO.

LEE R. BENDEN
1stLt USMC
Commanding

0-#21

SECRET

3rd Bn, 4th Mar (-) (Reinf)
 C - 3, RVN
 280800H Feb 1968

3/4 Frag O for 28 - 29 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L 7014
 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. No change

b. H & S Co. Attach one reinforced squad to Co "I" effective 281800H.

c. Co "I" (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3, conduct day activities in accordance with 3/4 operations order 3 - 68, two squad reinforced ambushes, and three fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

d. Co "K" (-) (Reinf).

(1) Defend CAP#3, conduct daytime activities in accordance with operations order 3 - 68, conduct three squad reinforced ambushes, in accordance with Operations Overlay.

e. Co "L" (-) (Reinf).

(1) Defend Cam Lo District Headquarters, conduct daytime activities in accordance with operations order 3 - 68. Conduct one squad reinforced ambush, two fire team OP's, three fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

f. Co "M" (-) (Reinf).

(1) Defend C - 3A, conduct daytime activities in accordance with operations order 3 - 68. Conduct one squad reinforced ambush and two fire team LP's in accordance with Operations Overlay.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Initiate all ambushes with Claymores.

(2) All squad reinforced activities will have a minimum of fifteen personnel and one machine gun.

(3) All platoon patrols will be accompanied by a FAC, ARTY, FO, and an 81 mm FO.

LEE R. BENDELL
 Lt Col. USMC
 Commanding

SECRET

①-#22

28 Feb 1962

1. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290700Z
 135617

2. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290700Z
 131613

3. IP
 1/B (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290700Z
 124619

4. IP
 1/B (Fire team)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290700Z
 121610

5. IP
 1/B (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290715Z
 125617

6. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290700Z
 121601

7. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290715Z
 150607

8. IP
 1/A (Fire team)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290715Z
 147607

9. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290700Z
 118525

10. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 291830Z
 124507

11. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 291830Z
 125502

12. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281945Z
 TCR 290700Z
 126552

13. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290700Z
 129519

14. IP
 1/C (Fire team)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290700Z
 129572

15. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281915Z
 TCR 290700Z
 159386

16. AN-26 K/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281930Z
 TCR 290715Z
 169372

K-1B

17. AN-26
 1/C (Sgd Rein)
 TCD 281900Z
 TCR 290530Z
 173586

①-#22

Copy No. 1 of 6 copies
 3d Bn, 4th Mar (Rein)
 C-3, RVN
 290800H Feb 68

Operation Order 4-68 (Operation Clear)

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L 7014, Sheets 6342I and 6442IV

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. Situation:

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Adjacent battalions continue to occupy defensive perimeters and to patrol within AO's.

(2) 1st Bn, 4th Mar patrols vicinity Thien Chanh (YD 160640) protecting area to north of operation.

(3) Battalion from 2d ARVN Regiment conducts search and destroy operations to east of 19 grid line. See Annex D (Operations Overlay).

(4) Can Vu District Headquarters provides one RF Company as battalion reserve.

(5) 2d Bn, 12th Mar assigns batteries for pre-planned and on call fires in support of operation.

(6) Air Support

(a) AO requested 290800H to 291800H.

(b) Helo med-evacs available on request.

(c) CAS available on request.

b. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. Mission. 3d Bn, 4th Mar (-)(Rein) attacks to search out and destroy enemy in vicinity of Can Vu and conduct the evacuation of civilians in the area.

3. Execution:

a. Concept of Operation. Two companies attack toward Can Vu on a southeast axis supported by a company (-) and a mechanized force to the west of Can Vu. Can Vu is encircled, civilians are evacuated, and area south of Can Vu is searched out by company (-). Annex D (Operations Overlay).

SECRET

Encl 2

b. Co "I" (Rein)

- (1) At 290700H, initiate move to attack position vicinity LD (YD 175634).
- (2) At 290930H, attack in zone of action to seize battalion objective 2.
- (3) Be prepared to continue the attack or reinforce Co "K" on order.

c. Co "H" (Rein)

- (1) At 290730H, initiate move to attack position vicinity LD (YD 163628) being joined by platoon at C-3 while on the move.
- (2) At 290930H, attack in zone of action to seize battalion objective 1.
- (3) Be prepared to continue the attack on order.

d. Co "K" (Rein)

- (1) At 290630H, initiate move to C-3A joined by Command Group ALPHA and mechanized forces.
- (2) Direct one platoon to attack position on south side of Cam Lo River vicinity YD 167607.
- (3) Move to LD (YD 167612) on order providing infantry protection to mechanized forces.
- (4) Be prepared to support the attack and seize objective 1 and 2 on order.
- (5) After seizure of Cam Wu area attack and seize objectives 3 through 6 on order.

e. Co "L" (Rein)

- (1) At 281800H, send one platoon to D-3A to assume defense of bridge upon departure of Co "K" on 29 February 1968.
- (2) Provide security for road sweep from Cam Lo District Headquarters to Dong Ha. Upon completion of road sweep, move platoon with M-42's to vicinity Thon Moo Due (YD 190588) to provide security for river crossing.
- (3) Continue defense of Cam Lo District Headquarters.

f. ReSCo (-). Assume defense of C-3 upon departure of Co "I".g. Fire Platoon

- (1) Support scheme of maneuver by fire.
- (2) Priority of fires to Co "I" initially.

h. Tank Platoon

- (1) At 290800H, move to C-3A to link up with Co "M". Move to ID (167612).
- (2) Be prepared to support assault companies by fire and maneuver.
- (3) Be prepared to support Co "K" in seizing battalion objective 3.

i. Ontos Platoon

- (1) At 290800H, move to C-3A to link up with Co "K". Move to ID (167612).
- (2) Be prepared to support scheme of maneuver by fire.

j. Engineer Detachment

- (1) At 291630H, detach one sweep team to 1st Bn, 4th Mar for road sweep of Route 561 to Route 9.
- (2) At 290800H, sweep road from C-3 to C-3A ahead of armored column.
- (3) Be prepared to provide close combat support for tank crossings.
- (4) Sweep road from C-3A to vicinity Cam Vu.

k. Battalion Reserve (RF company)

- (1) Arrive at C-3A by 290800H.
- (2) Be prepared to assume mission of attacking companies.
- (3) After being secured, search village, clearing out all personnel and providing security for all companies.

l. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-Day: 29 February 1968.
- (2) H-Hour: 0930H.
- (3) Be alert for mines and booby traps.
- (4) Contact left to right.
- (5) Fire support coordination: Annex C (Fire Support Plan).
- (6) Reports will be in spot report form.
- (7) Civilian evacuation procedures: Annex E (Civilian Evacuation).

(6) Companies supplement fire support plan with on call fires as needed.

4. Administration and Logistics:

a. No change.

b. Logistics

(1) All personnel will carry a BA of ammunition.

(2) All units carry air panels and colored smoke to mark front lines.

(3) All personnel carry one MCI.

5. Command and Communications/Electronics:

a. 9th Marines will provide radio on Battalion TAC and operator for liaison to ARVN battalion.

b. Command

(1) Battalion Command Group ALPHA initially with Co "K", after seizure of Cam Vu with battalion reserve (RF company).

(2) District Chief and reserve company commander will accompany the Battalion Command Group ALPHA.

(3) Battalion Command Group BRAVO will work with Co "I".

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LtCol USMC
Commanding

Annexes:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Fire Support
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Civilian Evacuation Plan

3dBn, 4thMar (Rein)
C-3, RVN
280800H Feb68

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 3-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L 7014, Sheets 6342I and 6442IV

3dBn, 4thMar (-)(Rein)
Bn Command Group ALPHA

LtCol BENDELL

S-2

FAC

Armed Propaganda Team

Interpreter

Radio/Messenger

Co "I" (Rein)

Capt SEXTON

Det, 3dMTBn (Scout Dogs)

Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Two Scout Sniper Teams)

Co "M" (Rein)

Capt FAUST

Det, 3dMTBn (Scout Dogs)

Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Two Scout Sniper Teams)

Bn Command Group Bravo

Major YOUNG

S-2 Chief

Radio/Messenger

Co "K" (Rein)

Capt LEROY

Det, H&SCo, 9thMar (Scout Sniper Team)

Co "L" (Rein)

Capt MCLAUGHLIN

H&SCo (-)

1stLt SINGER

1stPlt, Co "C", 3dTankBn (effective 290400H)

1stLt LARSON

1stPlt, 3dATBn (effective 290400H)

1stLt SMITH

Det, 3dEngBn

SSgt PARRISH

Det, 11thEngBn (1 dozer, 2 operators)

81mm Mortar Platoon

1stLt LANE

RF Company

LEE R. BENDELL

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Annex A

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3dBn, 4thMar (Rein)
C-3 RVN
280800H Feb68

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 3-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES L 7014, Sheets 6342I and 6442IV

1. Terrain. The terrain in the Cam Vu Village area (grid squares 1661, 1761 and 1861) consists of low, flat farm lands with numerous trails and frequent tree lines. Rice paddies are currently in one of three stages of development. A few are being plowed and are without vegetation; others are being planted while the majority of the fields are already planted with flooding in progress. Numerous tree lines are found along the shore of the Cam Lo River, and along rice fields. The majority of these tree lines are long, but shallow, and offer concealment, but little cover. The tree lines in many cases run perpendicular to trails and restrict vision greatly.

2. Roads, Trails and Streams. The main road (to the north of Route 9) through this area is highway 8B. It is in fair condition and is a loose surface road. Trails in the area are numerous and well traveled. The bridge at YD 165611 is a reinforced concrete structure about 30 feet long. It is in need of repair, and will support only foot troops. However, the stream is to the south of the bridge. The stream itself (bisecting grid square 1661) flows north to south and is about four feet deep. North of the bridge the banks of the stream are 10 to 18 feet high and restrict movement.

3. Cover and Concealment. All village hamlets are surrounded by trees and dense vegetation which offers good concealment. These areas should be approached cautiously. Hills and tree lines are found to the north of Highway 8B beginning at a distance of 1000 meters. The hills average 35 feet in height and offer good observation and mortar positions.

4. Rate of Movement. Movement can be accomplished as follows:

- a. Roads - 1500 to 1700 meters per hour.
- b. Trails - 1300 to 1500 meters per hour.
- c. Fields - 1100 to 1300 meters per hour.
- d. Tree Lines - 800 to 1000 meters per hour.

Estimated time to move from Cam Lo Bridge (C-3A) to Thon Cam Vu (YD 180616) via road is one hour and twenty minutes. An overland route would require about two hours.

5. Weather. The weather for the Cam Vu area for the week 26 February to 3 March can be expected to be fair with occasional rain and fog. Highs will be in the upper 60's and lows in the lower 50's. Illumination will range from 1% to 13%. Illumination for the night of 29 February will be 1%.

6. Enemy Situation

- a. Past Enemy Situation. The village of Cam Vu has had a long history of

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enemy activity. The people are believed to be 90% enemy sympathizers. Enemy units have been noted in the Cam Vu area as large as a battalion and a small as one or two cells. The people are known to have harbored weapons and ammunition; supplied the enemy with rice; and actively engaged in combat operations by making mines, mining roads, and setting boobytraps. Small arms and 60mm mortars were fired on Co "L" on 19 October 1967 from the tree line surrounding Xom Thuong Do at YD 170609. Enemy strength was believed to be one NVA squad.

b. Current Enemy Situation. Indications are that elements of the 27th Independent Battalion are active in the area as well as unidentified VC units. At least five sightings of VC/NVA were made in the area in the past eight days, and one contact was made on 25 February at YD 169609 with an enemy force estimated at 20 NVA. "URS" intelligence reports have confirmed light to moderate enemy movement throughout the area.

c. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy can be expected to employ booby traps and mines in the area. Both command detonated and pressure release type can be expected. Sniper fire may be expected due to the many possible areas of concealment. The enemy is capable of moderate and large scale ambush activities, and can readily employ both 60mm and 82mm mortars. When a contact is made the enemy can be expected to fire heavily for 10 to 15 minutes, and break contact. However, a mass attack or large scale ambush is possible but not likely.

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Commanding

93Bn, 4th Ar (Rein)
C-3, RVN
220800H Feb68

Annex E (Civilian Evacuation Plan) to Operation Order 3-68

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SERIES 1 7014, Sheets 6342I and 6442IV

1. The procedures followed for the handling and evacuation of civilians will necessarily be dependent upon the tactical situation. All civilians encountered in Cam Vu will be treated as detainees; placed under guard, sent to secure collection points, and held for interrogation and screening.
2. Under conditions of little or no enemy contact, Cam Vu will be isolated on three sides (canal to the south). The RF company will be brought up west of the village, a loud speaker team will broadcast to the villagers to come out of the village to the west end, then a combination of Marines and RF's will sweep from west to east through the village, clearing the village of stragglers. Friendly troops will fire only when being fired upon or if anyone attempts to flee.
3. Elements of the RF company will establish a collection point west of the village and provide security on all apprehended personnel. The national police and intelligence teams will interrogate civilians for immediate exploitation of information gained.
4. In the event of heavy contact and fire from Cam Vu, Co's "M" and "I" will continue into the village of Cam Vu to the canal. Emphasis will necessarily be upon searching out and destroying enemy resistance with secondary consideration to apprehension of all suspects for interrogation.

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Annex E