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446568

HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines  
3d Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
APO, San Francisco, 96302

SAC FILES

HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Comm)

680300

18 JUL 1968

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5750

Ser: 003A19268

10 July 1968

Copy 1 of 12 Copies

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)  
Via: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, FMF  
Commanding General, IIV Marine Amphibious Force  
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific


Subj: Command Chronology (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1A  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) DivO 5750.1B

68 8587

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for June 1968

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

  
F. L. BOURKE

3 AD BN/4th MAR

CMD CHRON

JUNE 1968

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- ✓ 3/4 Op Order 6-68
- ✓ 3/4 Op Order 7-68
- ✓ 3/4 Op Order 8-68

✓ Concept of Operations for the Mobile Defense Battalion  
assigned to the Khe Sanh area

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SECTION IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation/Location

- a. 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.
- b. Hill 689 (XD 804409, 1 - 10 June), Hill 552 (XD 822402, 1 - 10 June), Hill 471 (XD 848395, 1 - 10 June), 18 - 30 June), Hill 881 South (XD 776438, 1 - 10 June), Khe Sanh Combat Base (11 June), XD 878297 (11 June), XD 878826 (12 June), LZ Hawk (XD 895407, 18 - 30 June), India's Hill (XD 893783, 18 - 30 June).

2. Period Covered by Report. 1 - 30 June 1968.3. Billet Assignments

a. Commanding Officer	1 - 30 June 1968	LtCol F. L. BOURNE
b. Executive Officer	1 - 30 June 1968	Major J. E. MEAD
c. S-1	1 - 15 June 1968	1stLt J. A. PARKER
	16 - 30 June 1968	1stLt E. N. FIERTZ
d. S-2	1 - 30 June 1968	1stLt J. C. DAY
e. S-3	1 - 30 June 1968	Major V. E. FIRNSTAHL
f. S-4	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt J. D. CARR
g. CommO	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt J. B. WHELEN
h. CO H&SCo	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt J. B. WHELEN
i. CO Co "I"	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt M. A. SEXTON
j. CO Co "K"	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt S. E. THOMAS
k. CO Co "L"	1 - 5 June 1968	Capt J. L. McLAUGHLIN
	6 - 30 June 1968	Capt S. W. AUSTIN
l. CO Co "M"	1 - 30 June 1968	Capt W. J. MCCARDLE

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SECTION IIS-1 AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION1. Replacements Received

- a. USMC Enlisted - 236
- b. USMC Officers - 5
- c. USN Enlisted - 11

2. Personnel Rotated

- a. USMC Enlisted - 17
- b. USMC Officers - 2
- c. USN Enlisted - 3

3. Other Personnel Losses

- a. Transfer by Service Records
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 84
  - (2) USMC Officers - 3
- b. Wounded in Action
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 159
  - (2) USMC Officers - 3
  - (3) USN Enlisted - 7
- c. Killed in Action
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 38
  - (2) USMC Officers - 1
  - (3) USN Enlisted - 2
- d. Humanitarian Transfer
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 1
- e. Non-battle Casualties
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 38
- f. Intra-Division/Regiment Transfers
  - (1) USMC Enlisted - 23
  - (2) USMC Officers - 4
  - (3) USN Enlisted - 9
  - (4) USN Officers - 1

4. Number of R&R Trips

- a. Out of Country - 84
- b. In Country - 60

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### 5. Average Monthly Strength

- a. USMC Enlisted - 1024
- b. USMC Officers - 27
- c. USN Enlisted - 55
- d. USN Officers - 2

### 6. Personnel Shortages

a. Officers - Rank	MOS	Number Needed
Lt	0130	1
Lt	0302	12

b. Enlisted - Rank	MOS	Number Needed
E-9	9999	1
E-7	0369	1
E-6	0369	8
E-5	0311	7
E-5	0321	4
E-4	0321	13

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## SECTION III

INTELLIGENCE

1 June: At 1020, Co "I", on Hill 552 reported receiving four rounds of 152mm incoming artillery from XD 7332. Firing was taking place at that time from the Co Roc area at Khe Sanh and it is probable that they were short rounds. At 1123, "L"-3 reported finding eight AK-47 magazines, 13 chicom grenades, 19 rounds, 60mm mortar (chicom), two NVA grenade pouches, one NVA haversack, two NVA E. tools, one pick, 144 rounds of chicom 7.62mm short rifle rounds, and one chicom gas mask. This gear was later brought in to the S-2 and tagged for shipment to S-2, 1st Marines. The gear was found at XD 788417 in a bunker complex that would indicate a squad size ambush site. This was the same area as yesterday's Lima patrol. At 1510, Co "M" CP at Hill 471 spotted two NVA in the open at 830322. This is 2000 meters southwest of Hill 471. The information was passed to S-3 and a Co "M" patrol has been planned in the area for 3 June. At 1255, a Co "I" patrol found a bunker complex and a cache of supplies at XD 821393. The bunkers consisted of five of the "A" frame type and 15 with flat overheads. All of the bunkers were approximately 6' x 4' x 3 1/2' and had grass mats on flooring. The bunkers would indicate at least a company size bunker site, probably a unit of the 7th Battalion of the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division. An OOB holds this unit in the area. Supply caches consisted of five RPG rounds, 40 rounds of chicom 82mm mortar ammo, ten chicom grenades, ten cans of blasting caps, ten cans of fuses for 82mm rounds, ten cans of powder increments for 82mm mortar rounds, one red cloth with insignia of South Vietnam on it and one card with map on it. Map and insignia will be turned in to S-2, 1st Marines and other gear was destroyed. A message was received from 1st Marines stating the availability of Chieu Hoi propaganda material, and giving details of project being carried on at the present. Message also stated that propaganda materials are available for special projects on request. The message emphasized that NVA in the area are believed prime targets for persuasion to rally in this area.

2 June: Received report from 1st Marines S-2 indicating possible enemy CP at XD 863365; possible mortar position at XD 857372, and regimental and battalion CP's at XD 849351 and XD 836358 and XD 855383 respectively. This was an agent report rated at F-3. Comment - OOB 66th regt of 304 div and its 7th bn slightly west of these positions. Exact positions believed dated, but information generally accurate. Received URS report from 1st Marines S-2 indicating 2d Regt 304 Div located vicinity XD 9334. Also UI units vicinity XD 8932 and 9634. Source indicated HQ 304 Div vicinity XD 8239. This information also checks out with other agent reports and recent Chieu Hoi interrogation. Chieu Hoi interrogation revealed mission of these units to: (1) Close off Highway 9. (2) Position AAW positions around KSCB; and (3) Overrun KSCB. Information parallels other reports and is believed accurate. Unit is believed part of 66th Regt 304 Div. S-2 was also advised by

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1st Marines S-2 to be on the look out for domino like identification badges with triangular shaped center. These badges identify personnel of the 88th Regt 308th Div believed to be north of KSCB. The 3/4 position received one round of 82mm mortar fired from XD 791396. Co "I" found one NVA body and one AK-47 both seriously damaged at XD 809393. Believed killed by air strikes. Rifle will be turned in to 1st Marines S-2. Co "M" found fresh tracks and cooking site at XD 838392. Believed temporary harbor site of small unit of undertermined size of the 7th Bn 66th Regt 304 Div. A second recon patrol has been scheduled to check the area for further information. Co "L" spotted one active mortar at XD 791395. Impact area unknown.

3 June: Co "L" found some NVA gear while searching the hill area (XD 793414) for the MIA. The gear consisted of six short handled chicom grenades, one FM bolt, two battle dressings, one rice pouch with rice and two AK-47 rifles with two magazines. The gear was turned over to S-2, tagged and will be sent to 1st Marines S-2. At 0810, Co "M" reported receiving two estimated 122mm rockets from 843353. The rockets landed outside the perimeter. Co "I" also reported receiving one unknown type of round from vicinity 816348. At 1715, at the Co "L" position, one 122mm rocket was reported landing outside the perimeter from 755407. At 1845, an AO reported seeing 15 NVA at 793415. It appears the enemy is moving back into the area where the patrol had been searching for the MIA. Patrol to go into the area tomorrow was briefed on the NVA activity. Received one agent report from 1st Marines S-2 of an unknown regiment of the 304th Division located vicinity 758418. Rated at B-3. OCB holds 66th Regt of the 304th to the southwest of this position but no regiments in the 7541 area. This is the first agent report of NVA in this area.

4 June: At 0719, Co "L" received approximately 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from XD 791393. The rounds all landed outside the perimeter. At 1445, Co "L" also received five rounds of 82mm mortars from 791391. The rounds landed in the CCC area. Also at 1500, Co "K" received one round of 82mm mortar fire from XD 770452. One hour and 45 minutes later, Co "K" received five more 82mm rounds from XD 773451. At 1700, Co "M" reported finding one NVA body five to seven days old believed killed by artillery at 853391. A thorough search of the area turned up one AK-47, one NVA bayonet, one Russian gas mask, four AK-47 magazines, and one wallet with money, stamps and ID card. Gear will be sent to S-2 for tagging and will be sent to 1st Marines S-2. At 1727, Co "K" received seven additional 82mm mortar rounds from 766456. At 1800 S-2 received a message from 1st Marines S-2 stating that 2/4 was in contact with a unit believed to be the 7th Battalion, 102 Regt of the 308 Division.

5 June: Co "K" reported finding a tunnel in a bomb crater approximately three feet in diameter. Footprints were found in the tunnel and 75 meters southeast of it a bathing area was located in a stream with a bar of soap close at hand. The area did not appear to have been used recently. The tunnel was located at XD 783448. Co "K" also found a

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bunker complex with nine open holes at 776447. The holes were 2' x 3' x 5'. The area had been hit by napalm and had not been recently used. Co "I" spotted three NVA moving southwest at XD 813393. They were moving on an azimuth of 220°. They seemed to be headed toward south side of Hill 542. At 1155, Co "I" received one round of 120mm mortar fire from vicinity 772432. 1st Marines S-2 reported light movement at 799389 and at 843371. At 1200, Co "I" received three more rounds from vicinity 768405. At 1420, Co "I" received three rounds of 82mm mortars from XD 792394 and seven rounds from XD 791392. At 2040, Co "I" saw one NVA about 50 meters outside the wire at XD 819401 and later heard movement in the same area. Enemy seemed to be crawling through the grass and cutting the wire.

6 June: An initial interrogation report of one of the POW's captured by Co "I" (the other is POW) revealed him to be a PFC, rifleman, of the 45th Independent Company of the 304 Division. Their mission was to provide security for the Division CP. There were 75 men in the company in two platoons. The company is armed with rifles, one RPD light machine gun, and five B-40 rocket launchers. When captured, he was in a defensive position around the company CP which was located vicinity XD 8239.

7 June: A spot-light report was received from 1st Marines S-2 at 1030 with medium movement at XD 843957. At 1035, Co "I" received three rounds of 82mm mortar from XD 782404. At 1150, Co "I" reported one NVA footprint approximately 24 hours old at XD 824393. This area has had five reports of movement and is believed to be an NVA base area (XD 821391). Activities are believed to be from the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division.

8 June: A URS was received from 1st Marines S-2 stating that the 9th Regt of 304th Division was located at XD 897445 at 0830.

9 June: Co "I"'s patrol spotted four NVA at 1345 at XD 807395. At 1650, Co "I" found and destroyed five "A" frame bunkers, 5' x 8' x 3' with three feet of overhead at XD 818593.

10 June: At 0800, the S-2 section was prepared for the move from Hill 689 at XD 803409 to the objective 4 area at XD 878298. The halo-lift was accomplished at 0937. The section staged and spent the night at Khe Sanh Combat Base.

11 June: Co "I" made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at XD 880289. The Co "I" squad was approaching the hill up a well traveled path when they were hit from three bunkers oriented toward the trail at the above coordinates. The patrol observed 18 to 20 NVA coming up on line on their left flank and pulled back. The NVA were wearing helmets with 782 gear and green NVA uniforms. The unit is believed to be part of the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division.

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12 June: The S-2 section prepared for helo-lift to objective 14 and moved from the area at approximately 1530. At 1835, the section was relocated at Hill 685 at XD 879259. Section noted large deposits of elephant feces deposited along the trail leading to position at approximately XD 880260. No prints were found. There have been reports of elephant used for transportation purposes by the enemy since early December.

13 June: At 1155, Co "L" made contact with an estimated NVA platoon with small arms, automatic weapons and five light machine guns. The patrol was initially hit from the left and right rear and later received fire from four sides. Contact was at XD 877273. The Co "L" patrol was extracted by helicopter at 1200. The patrol later reported finding a corral for cattle or water buffalo at XD 878268. The grass in the area was stamped down and horn marks were found on the trees.

14 June: At 1130, Co "M" spotted one NVA at XD 880268. He was observed running into a tree line from a cleared area. At 1145, a patrol found fresh footprints at XD 875265. Footprints were of an estimated 10 to 15 people moving east to west along the stream bed. At 1430, a patrol found five fighting holes at XD 878267. The holes were estimated to be five days old.

16 June: During the night several radio messages were intercepted from the enemy over the Regimental frequency at 40.10. Most of these messages utilized code words but several were in the clear. The first message at 2115, stated that a mortar team should "move rest to the hill." Another at 2335 stated "commence white hair" with the reply "no can do". It is estimated that a battalion size, well equipped, NVA unit is operating in our area in addition to the 4th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division which hit this position on 15 June. Indications are that last night a company size probe took a hard look at this position coming in from a position north of this position and commencing a clockwise probe around the position. After suffering casualties and finding no weak points to the position, the NVA unit probably decided not to attack as planned and withdrew.

17 June: A Co "L" patrol reported hearing chopping and digging at 1500 from XD 885260. The noise was reported to be loud and the number of people heard and volume of work seemed to indicate a company working. This was possibly the location of the 13th company, 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 308th Division, which hit the Battalion at daylight of 18 June. Time and the Battalion's moving from the area did not permit a later search of the area. At 1545, a Co "I" patrol spotted five NVA moving northwest to southeast from XD 865261. One NVA was believed to be carrying a heavy machine gun. Route of travel indicates these people were moving toward the 3/4 position to participate in the attack at daylight the following day. However, they apparently did not participate because of the artillery mission on them. The area was not searched due to time and subsequent lift of 3/4 from the area.

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18 June: Enemy tactics consisted of launching a company size attack up the heavily covered draw at XD 876262. This attack was preceded by heavy RPG attack. Captured documents indicated that this unit was the 13th Company, 8th Battalion, 88th Regiment, 308th Division. One additional company of the 308th Division supported by 60mm mortar fire is believed to have supported this attack with fire bases and harassing fire around the perimeter at various positions.

19 June: The terrain in the LZ Hawk vicinity is much the same as previous positions in the area except that the underbrush is less dense in most locales and a river and numerous streams run through the area. The positions maintained up and down Route 9 consist of flat terrain with moderate underbrush. Tree lines dot the area but offer no obstacle to movement. The flat river valley gradually gives way to the rolling hills on either side with moderate to steep slopes and moderate to thick elephant grass with patches of bamboo and occasional dense vines. Streams are one to two feet deep averaging one foot width. The Rao Qian River is one to five feet deep and varies in width from two to 20 feet. The current is moderate and offers excellent trafficability.

20 June: Terrain in this vicinity has been reported by patrols as being generally open providing for easy movement and good dispersion. Streams are reported as swift with 1.5 feet of depth and averaging 15 feet in width. The streams slow movement in crossing but offer no obstacle. Hill in the area are gently rolling hills with light to moderate vegetation. Trails throughout the area are well traveled and two to three feet wide.

21 June: Two spotlight reports were received from 1st Marines of movement in the AO. At 1030, medium movement was reported at XD 848383. At 1050, medium movement was reported at XD 855386. It was later discovered that these movements were probably due to an FOB unit operating in the area.

22 June: At 2300, 2d platoon, Co "L" reported spotting four NVA with no covers or flak gear carrying weapons at XD 924406. The NVA were seen on the road walking west.

23 June: At 1140, a message was received from 1st Marines of an agent report of an enemy battalion located vicinity XD 894455. The report was rated C-2. Co "K" reported movement picked up with the sensor device at XD 848383 at 2200. They also reported movement at 2315 at XD 849381.

24 June: At 1930, a message was received from 1st Marines of an unidentified enemy element at XD 893414 at 1730 with a B-2 rating. A possible company size unit was also reported at XD 8332 at 1430 with a C-3 rating. The message also stated that the possibility exists for "small unit action" vicinity Route 9 and will increase.

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25 June: At 2200, a message was received from 1st Marines stating that it is probable that enemy activity will increase along Route 9. The message stated that it is estimated that the enemy will commence ambush activities against convoys and that the most likely area would be between Khe Sanh and LZ Hawk. No sources or ratings were given for the information.

26 June: At 1035, FOB-3 reported enemy activity of approximately 30 NVA at XD 824364. They were reported being heavily camouflaged and NVA were reported in the Lang Con (1) Hamlet.

27 June: At 2129, an intelligence report was received from 1st Marines stating movement from CID's indicated as heavy was detected at XD 7939, 8038, 7634, 7724, 7834, 7935, 8035, 8436, 8437, 8438, 8438, and possible movement at 8440. Also a recon unit spotted a small enemy unit in the vicinity of Lang Vei I at XD 794362.

28 June: At 0830, Co "I" reported bare footprints of seven or eight personnel at XD 866396. The prints seemed to run in a southerly direction and then return. The patrol also found four or five tennis shoe type prints that went in all directions.

29 June: At 1737, Co "I" received four additional artillery rounds from Co Roc. At 1745, three rounds of 75mm pack howitzer were received by Co "I" and at 1900, Co "I" received 12 rounds of 60mm mortars from XD 874357, 872375 and 874375. The situation is estimated to be an attack by fire possibly in preparation for an attack on the position at a later time.

30 June: At 0635, Co "I" reported receiving ten rounds of 82mm mortars from XD 868358. An artillery mission was fired and one secondary was observed. At 0900, the 2d platoon of Co "M" observed approximately five NVA that seem to be setting up a mortar tube at XD 876393. At 0935, Co "I" reported finding two USMC KIA's. While checking the area, Co "I" was engaged by an estimated NVA platoon with small arms and automatic weapons, believed to be setting up an ambush for Route 9 convoys. The unit called in supporting arms and the NVA withdrew.

The following weapons were captured by this Battalion during June 1968:

AK-47	89
AK-50	15
SKS	14
RPD	21
RPG-2	14
RPG-7	3
60mm Mortar	2
7.62mm AA Gun Type	
53	1

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 Carbine 1  
 AK-47 with grenade launcher 3  
 B-40 3

The following gear was captured by this Battalion during June 1968:

AK-47 Magazines	78
E-Tools	22
Chicom Grenades	252
Gas Masks	37
60mm Mortar Rounds	82
Picks	1
AK-47 Ammunition	313 rounds
Medical Gear	10 pieces
Bayonets	1
Bangalore Torpedoes	10
Wallet w/ money, stamps	1
RPG-7 Rounds	18
RPG-2 Rounds	26
TNT	26 blocks
RPG Increments	29
Rice	335 pounds
Satchel Charges	12
Binoculars	1
Field Phones	2
Radios	5
Rifle Grenades	2
7.62 Long Ammunition	300 rounds
Heavy Machine Gun Ammunition	7 cans
RPD Magazines	11

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SECTION IVOPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. The following training was conducted by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines during June 1968:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Number of Hours</u>
H&SCo	Mapping	8
	Compass	2
	LO6's Nomenclature	10
	81's Nomenclature	12
	Scouting and Patrolling	5
	Personnel Hygiene	3
Co "I"	Map and Compass	10
	Trip Flares; How to Set	3
	Artillery Procedures	8
	Bunker Construction	5
	ERC-25 and Radio Procedure	2
	Claymores	3
Co "K"	IP's and OP's	4
	Scouting and Patrolling	10
	81 FO Procedures	8
	Mapping	12
	Principles of Defense	5
	Weapons Safety	3
	Personal Hygiene	3
	Bunker Construction	11
Co "L"	PPS-6 Nomenclature and Use	3
	Artillery Procedures	12
	Use of Supporting Arms	8
	Personal Hygiene	3
	Care and Cleaning of M-16	4
	Weapons Safety	5
	Principles of Leadership	7
	Bunker Construction	6
Co "M"	Use of Supporting Arms	10
	Camouflage	8
	Mapping and Compass	15
	Principles of Defense	11
	Convoy Security	5
	81's Nomenclature	3
	Tank-Infantry Tactics	4
	Weapons Safety	6
	Personal Hygiene	4

2. In addition to the above, all individuals Marines fired their weapons for "zero" prior to assignment to a unit in the field.

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3. All replacements were given indoctrination lectures prior to joining their units by the Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major and their Company Commanders.

#### 4. Command and Control

On 101130H June 1968: Two teams Scout/Snipers (HqCo, 1st Marines) and one engineer team (Co "A", 3dEngrBn) chopped from 3/4 OPCON to 1st Marines.

On 110700H June 1968: 3d Battalion, 4th Marines chopped from 1st Marines OPCON to 4th Marines.

On 111400H June 1968: Four engineer teams (Co "A", 3dEngrBn) chopped from 1st Marines OPCON to 3/4.

On 141500H June 1968: Two engineer teams (Co "A", 3dEngrBn) chopped from 3/4 OPCON to 2/4.

On 161240H June 1968: One engineer team (Co "A", 3dEngrBn) chopped from 3/4 OPCON to 4th Marines.

On 181930H June 1968: 3d Battalion, 4th Marines chopped from 4th Marines to Task Force Hotel OPCON to 1st Marines.

On 191000H June 1968: Two engineer teams (Co "A", 3dEngrBn) and one engineer team (Co "A", 1stEngrBn) chopped from 2/3 OPCON to 3/4.

On 191000H June 1968: Two teams scout snipers (HqCo, 1st Marines) chopped from 2/3 OPCON to 3/4.

On 240800H June 1968: Co "K" 3/4, one section 81mm MortPlat and one section 106RR Plat chopped from 3/4 OPCON to 2/1.

These were task organized as follows:

#### Hill 689 CP Alpha (1 - 10 June)

Det, H&SCo 3/4 (Cmd Grp)

Co "L" (Reinf)

Det 81mm MortPlat, H&SCo 3/4

Det 106RR Plat, H&SCo 3/4

Det Flames, H&SCo 3/4

Det Scout Sniper Plat, HqCo, 1st Marines

Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

#### Hill 552 (1 - 10 June)

Co "I" (Reinf)

Det 81mm MortPlat, H&SCo 3/4

Det 106RR Plat, H&SCo 3/4

Det Flames, H&SCo 3/4

Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

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## Hill 471 (1 - 10 June)

Co "M" (Reinf)  
 Det 81mm MortPlat, H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 106RR Plat, H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

## Hill 881 South (1 - 10 June)

Co "K" (Reinf)  
 Det 81mm MortPlat, H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

## Khe Sanh Combat Base (11 June)

Det H&SCo 3/4 (Cmd Grp)  
 Co "I" (Reinf)  
 Co "K" (Reinf)  
 Co "L" (Reinf)  
 Co "M" (Reinf)  
 81mm MortPlat, H&SCo 3/4  
 Flames H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)  
 Det Co "A" 3d Engr Bn

## Lang Hoa (XD 878297, 11 - 12 June)

Det H&SCo 3/4 (Cmd Grp)  
 Co "I" (Reinf)  
 Co "K" (Reinf)  
 Co "L" (Reinf)  
 Co "M" (Reinf)  
 81mm MortPlat  
 Flames H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)  
 Det Co "A" 3d Engr Bn

## Phou Nhoi (XD 878261, 12 - 18 June)

Det H&SCo 3/4 (Cmd Grp)  
 Co "I" (Reinf)  
 Co "K" (Reinf)  
 Co "L" (Reinf)  
 Co "M" (Reinf)  
 81mm MortPlat H&SCo 3/4  
 Flames H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)  
 Det Co "A" 3d Engr Bn

## LZ Hawk (XD 895407, 18 - 30 June)

Det H&SCo 3/4 (Cmd Grp)  
 One platoon Co "M"  
 Det 81mm MortPlat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 106RR Plat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det Scout/Sniper Plat HqCo 1st Marines  
 Det Co "A" 3d Engr Bn  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

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 DOWNGRADING AND  
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Hill 471 (18 - 30 June)

Co "K" (Reinf)  
 Det 81mm MortPlat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 106RR Plat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

India's Hill (XD 808383, 18 - 30 June)

Co "I" (Reinf)  
 Det 81mm MortPlat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det 106RR Plat H&SCo 3/4  
 Det Scout/Sniper Plat HqCo 1st Marines  
 Det 3d Shore Party Bn (HST)

Between 18 - 30 June, Co "L" and the remaining platoons of Co "M" maintained platoon patrol bases along Route 9 at XD 871397, XD 903397, XD 913403, XD 921405 and XD 918416.

Battalion Rear Dong Ha (1 - 30 June)

Det H&SCo  
 Det Co "I"  
 Det Co "K"  
 Det Co "L"  
 Det Co "M"

## 5. Close Combat

1 June: Battalion activities were conducted to check out the area between Hill 881S and Hill 689 and the triangular area between Hills 552, 471 and 542 in preparation for the scheduled platoon combat patrol of 2 June to locate and recover the two MIA's and one PRC-25 radio from Co "M"'s contact of 27 May 1968. Co "L"'s patrol was unsuccessful in locating the MIA from the recon patrol of 30 May 1968. 1st Marines Operation Order 89-68 which scheduled D-Day for 1 June was set back to 2 June. The Battalion remained in the same positions as before. One reinforced company on each of the following Hills: 881S, 689, 552, 471. The Battalion CP remains on Hill 689.

2 June: Active patrolling was continued with the main effort vicinity LZ Peanuts (Hill 542) to recover the two MIA's from Co "M". Co "I" conducted a platoon combat patrol from their combat base (Hill 552) to the west to check out the area of Hill 542 for the Co "M" MIA's. With the assistance of an AO, both MIA's were recovered. The patrol also located one dead NVA and one AK-47. During the patrol, vicinity XD 824394, NVA footprints approximately three hours old were discovered.

3 June: Activities were scheduled to check on enemy movement within the 3/4 AO, areas of probable harbor sites and another sweep of the area of contact by Co "L" (XD 793416) to locate the MIA from that company. At 1120H, the MIA was located, alive and in good condition. Upon return to the Co "L" combat base, the MIA was debriefed and, an order

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of the CO, 1st Marines, sent into Khe Sanh for debrief by Regimental S-2 and the ITT team. At 0945H, a warning order was received from 1st Marines to be prepared to participate in the 4th Marines operation south of 2/3 on 6 or 7 June. Passed to all companies that LP's will be a minimum of 100 meters from each companies lines.

4 June: At 0815, the XO of 4th Marines arrived at Hill 689 with an operation overlay for an operation to the south of the present 1st Marines operation 89-68. 3/4 was scheduled to participate. At 1918, 1st Marines S-3 notified this Battalion that another battalion was scheduled to assume the 3/4 mission and 3/4 would stay in its present disposition. At 0915, a Staff/CO's meeting was held on the Hill 689 complex area to see the standard three man bunker to be built by 3/4 units in the field.

5 June: Two companies received incoming mortars (Co "K", Hill 8818 and Co "L", Hill 689) while Co "I" made the only enemy sighting and contact. Co "M" received the modified M-16 and conducted fan firing of each weapon upon issue. Co "I" conducted a squad recon patrol to check the stream bed areas to the west and northwest of Hill 552. The patrol observed three NVA at XD 813393 and called in an artillery mission with unknown results. One CP and two LP's were conducted. At 2035, one NVA was observed when a trip flare was set off about 50 meters down a gully in a tree line west of Co "I"'s perimeter. The NVA was taken under fire with M-79 and M-26 frag grenades. Five minutes later another NVA was observed in the same general vicinity near a bomb crater (XD 819401) and taken under fire. Results were unknown. At 2125, movement was heard at XD 818403. Lines were on 100% alert from first contact.

6 June: Hill's 689 and 552 received a heavy attack by fire from 82mm mortars (estimated four) located vicinity XD 791392. Artillery missions and 81mm counter-mortar missions were fired resulting in on secondary explosion and one mortar destroyed. At 1950, a warning order was issued to Co's "I" and "L" to be prepared for a possible ground attack up to company size. Lines on 50% alert until 2400 and 100% thereafter. A check with the S-3 of 1st Marines in regard to 3/4's participation in the 4th Marines operation revealed no change. 3/4 will stay in its present positions with no firm word on the Battalion's participation. Co "M" continued issuance of the modified M-16 rifle with 30 weapons being issued and fan fired. Co "I" continued to have contact during the early hours from an unknown number of NVA which included several light probes with chicom grenades and suspected satchel charges. No penetration of the defensive wire was made. Co "I" fired 60mm mortars and artillery night defensive fires. At first light a sweep of the perimeter was made. Small arms fire was received at 0615 from estimated three NVA. Fire was returned with small arms and 60mm mortars. Check of the perimeter was completed at 0925 with units finding four NVA KIA and two NVA WIA (POW, one of which died before he left Hill 552) plus three AK-47 rifles, one SKS rifle and assorted NVA equipment and ammunition. A warning order was given to be prepared to move out at 1100 and sweep the area to the

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west vicinity of Hill 542. Co "I" conducted a company (-) combat patrol to vicinity XD 820390. The combat patrol departed from the combat base at 1102. The combat patrol found additional NVA ammunition and equipment vicinity XD 818393. No other findings resulted and the company patrol returned to the combat base at 1535. From 1835 to 1920, Co "I" received 42 rounds of 82mm mortars from XD 79193926 resulting in one KIA and five WIA's. Artillery missions were returned on the enemy position resulting in one mortar destroyed. Also conducted one OP and two LP's. Warning order given to expect possible attack.

7 June: Two companies received incoming mortars. Co "K" on Hill 881S received a total of 19 rounds of 82/120mm mortars between 0913 and 2000, while Co "L" and the Battalion CP on Hill 689 received ten rounds of 82/120mm mortars between 1035 and 1755. No casualties resulted from the incoming mortars. Late in the afternoon, the 4th Marines Operation Order 5-68 was delivered to this Headquarters by helicopter. A note written on the order by the 4th Marines Liaison Officer stated that though the plans have changed somewhat, Col. MILLER (CO 4th Marines) desires flexibility on the part of 3/4.

8 June: Hill 689 received three rounds of 82mm and 11 rounds of 120mm mortars resulting in two WIA's non-evac. Hill 881S received ten rounds of 120mm mortars with no casualties. At 1050, the Battalion received a spotlight report of heavy movement at XD 843371. At 1700, a malaria prevention notice was issued to all companies. At 2100, the Battalion received Operation Order 97-68 from 1st Marines.

9 June: Hill 689 received 74 rounds of 82mm mortars. The CO and S-3 had a visual reconnaissance of the operation area and a meeting with the CO, 4th Marines and a meeting in Khe Sanh with the CO, 1st Marines and Task Force Hotel. At 1950 the Battalion received 1st Marines Operation Order 96-68.

10 June: The proposed lift of the Battalion at 0800 was postponed for 4 1/2 hours due to the adverse weather condition. Once the weather had cleared the lift of the Battalion was completed at 1500 with all units arriving at the east end of the landing strip at Khe Sanh. Because of the lateness of the day the operation into the Lang Hole area for the arms cache was delayed until 11 June with L-Hour at 0800. The 1st Marines utilized the Battalion in a night defensive posture at the old 3/9 position at Khe Sanh and also notified us that the Battalion was designated Regimental Reserve.

11 June: At 110700, 3/4 was chopped from 1st Marines OPCON to 4th Marines. Trucks were used to move the Battalion from their night defensive positions to the pick-up zone. The lift started at 0750 with all units being lifted from Khe Sanh to vicinity XD 880295 which was 1000 meters south of the LZ which was previously designated. In the process of securing the LZ, a Co "K" squad walked into a bunker complex resulting in contact being initiated by the NVA. The first two men were felled by heavy enemy small arms fire. The unit had to withdraw calling in Huey

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gunships to work the area over. Once the LZ had been firmly secured and the CP area set up, the CO, 3/4 directed that each company send out recon patrols to check out the area in front of their lines and for Co "K" to try to mark the position of their MIA's. The CO 3/4 was directed by the CO 4th Marines to carry out the assigned mission and be prepared to move at 121400 June 1968 by helicopter to LZ vicinity objective 14.

12 June: Two company size patrols were conducted: one, Co "I", to search for supply caches and diversionary for Co "K" patrol; the other, Co "K", went out to recover the two MIA's from 11 June. The CO 3/4 made a VR of objective 14 at 1000. At 1400, the helo-lift started in the order of Co "M", "I", "L", "K". At 1430, Co "I" secured the LZ (objective 14). The helo-lift was completed at 1645. At 1500, three estimated 250 pound snake eyes were dropped on the LZ resulting in one KIA, 15 WIA evac and four WIA non-evac.

13 June: All units continued to improve their defensive positions. Two platoon recon patrols and one squad recon patrol were conducted. The Co "L" platoon recon patrol made contact with an NVA squad or larger size unit at 1155. In the initial contact the rear unit was hit by small arms fire wounding two men. Small arms fire was returned accounting for two NVA KIA. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was received around the patrol and they were unable to return toward the squad position at XD 879268. The patrol moved north to XD 877278 and set up defense and the remainder of Co "L" moved out to link-up at 1250. At 1300, two Huey gunships came on station and 1303, permission was given to extract the patrol by helicopters if possible. At 1327, two CH-46's covered by the gunships successfully extracted the patrol returning them to the Co "L" position at 1335. Co "L" linked up with the remaining squad and returned to their position. The area of contact was strafed and rocketed by Huey gunships at 1830 with two flights of fixed wing using napalm and snake eyes hitting the area at 1900 causing two secondary explosions and causing the whole area to burn. At 1407, word was received from 4th Marines to be prepared for a retrograde move on or about 17 June. Boundary changes within the 4th Marines AO were received from 4th Marines at 1854. At 2206, a request went to 4th Marines from 3/4 for helicopters at 140900 to lift approximately 90 personnel from Co "M" to the area of Co "L"'s patrol contact.

14 June: A company size operation was planned to return to the area of the Co "L" patrol contact of 13 June. This was to be heloborne and commence at 0730. The helo-lift was cancelled at 0930. Co "M" executed the alternate plan of foot movement to the area. At 1130, Co "K" was notified to set up an ambush in the stream bed at XD 866261 and a reaction force at XD 868257. At 1140, 1st platoon, Co "M" was in blocking position and at 1342, Co "M" (-) started moving toward the blocking position. At 1630, all Co "M" units were back in the 3/4 position. No significant sightings or contacts were made. At 1710, Co "K" unit was in a daylight ambush position and at 1925, after making no contact were told to return to the 3/4 position. At 1447, four helicopters were requested from 4th Marines for a heliborne assault on 15 June. At 1838, the frag order was

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received for a recovery operation at LZ Moon with one company from 1/4 to recover their MIA's. At 2143, a message was received from 4th Marines to make maximum use of artillery and plan to complete the road operation on 16 June and have evacuation on 17 June by helicopter retrograde.

15 June: The 3/4 position started hearing movement about 0445 in the streambed to the north and at 0545 started receiving an attack from what was estimated at portions of two NVA battalions. The attack was preceded by the firing of 30 RPG rounds. At 0550, Huey gunships and an AO were requested. At 0605, four flights of fixed wing were on the way. At 0643, an emergency med-evac was requested. At 0645, AO was on station. At 0647, an active enemy mortar was observed at XD 879266. About 0635 five NVA occupied some of the Co "M" holes. At 0710, Co "M" reported a machine gun set up inside their 2d platoon CP. All holes were cleared at 0730. At 0720, Huey gunships were on station. At 0737, a Co "I" FO observed a mortar tube destroyed. At 0853, Co's "I" and "L" observed a green star cluster in the vicinity of the Co "M" position. After the star cluster went off, the attack seemed to slow down and ceased at 0915. At 0915, a Co "K" platoon was alerted that they would check out the streambed to the north of the Co "M" position. At 1115, units sweeping in front of Co "M" made contact with an enemy sniper at XD 877262. At 1128, the Co "K" platoon moved out to check the assigned area. At 1135, Co "M" reported killing the sniper at XD 877262. At 1138, a Co "M" unit sweeping in front of the Co "M" lines reported NVA playing dead and opening up on personnel as they passed by. At 1202, the Co "M" sweep unit made contact with an unknown number of NVA at XD 876263 and encountered automatic weapons fire at XD 877263. At 1315, Co "I" heard a tube popping and observed four NVA at XD 867264. At 1350, the Battalion received seven rounds of 82mm mortars in the area of the old LZ and 81mm mortars. At 1428, a Co "K" platoon made contact with several automatic weapons at XD 872262. At 1530, all contact was broken and at 1745, all units were back in the perimeter. During the day the BAS and LZ had been relocated to the vicinity of XD 879258. The totals for the day were: USMC: KIA - 16, WIA evac - 58, WIA non-evac - 3, MIA - 1; NVA: KIA confirmed - 128, POW - 7.

16 June: All 3/4 units conducted sweeps in front of their lines to check for NVA and NVA gear. As a result of these sweeps, 3/4 was credited with 30 additional confirmed and four additional POW's, and at 0955, a patrol from Co "I" located the MIA from Co "K" at XD 873259. Numerous NVA gear was also found. All sweep units were back in the perimeter by 1645. At 1713, Co "K" received small arms fire from three to five NVA and at 1725, small arms fire ceased. At 1754, a platoon from Co "I" swept the area (XD 878268) where the three-to five NVA were spotted and returned at 1905 after leaving off a squad at XD 878267. At 1950, the 3/4 position received 50 rounds of 82mm mortars from two locations, XD 862268 and XD 873265. 81mm mortars and artillery missions were fired. Two secondary explosions were reported from the artillery missions at XD 862268. No more incoming was received after 2000. At 2000, in view of events, a flare ship and a gun ship were requested. At

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about the same time, Co "L" spotted five to six NVA at XD 883257 and had Co "M" fire illumination in support. At 2045, Co "L" was directed to fire 81mm mortar mission over the arty radio. At 2015, a Co "M" LP had movement 20 to 30 meters to their front and pulled back to the perimeter. At 2122, Co "M" had more movement at XD 880259 moving from south to north. At 2125, the flare ship had to leave due to the loss of one engine and another was requested. At 2125, heavy volumes of M-16, M-60 and M-79 fire with M-25 grenades were being thrown from the lines. This continued until 2140. At 2145, Co "K" reported their area all secure and they had observed nothing except a small light. At 2153, Co "I" spotted 15 NVA at XD 875256 and received AK-47 fire from one of the NVA. At 2230, Co "M" sent their LP back into position. At 2240 the flare ship was on station and 2310 the gun ship arrived. Both left the area at 170330 for a priority mission. At 2200, a Co "L" LP while returning to the perimeter received small arms fire from personnel on the lines resulting in three wounded. All three were taken to the BAS. During the day the 3/4 position received a visit from BrigGen HOFFMAN, CG, TF Hotel at 0750. At 1005, MajGen DAVIS, CG, 3d MarDiv, visited the position and at 1600, Gen ROSSON, CG, PCV, visited the position. At 2145, word was received of a possible helicopter (Russian) threat in the DMZ. At 1530, 3/4 requested eight helicopters from 4th Marines for an operation planned for 17 June. Regiment came back with a message stating the L-hour would have to be 0600 due to other helicopter commitments on 17 June. The request was cancelled at 1620.

17 June: The 3/4 position received 13 rounds of 82mm mortars from XD 822268 and two rounds of 60mm mortars from XD 861270. Artillery and 81mm mortar missions were fired on the above coordinated with one secondary explosion at XD 861270 from the artillery mission. One KIA and three WIA's resulted from the mortars. S-3 requested information from 4th Marines as to where, when and how we would move from the present position on 18 June. The answer was by helicopter beginning at 180900. S-3 then requested to know where from 1st Marines, who stated one company would go to Hill 471, one company to XD 824383 and the remainder of the Battalion to LZ Hawk. The message from 1st Marines also cancelled the Battalion's request for four helicopters to move to LZ Hawk at 1300. Co "K" was assigned the mission of recovering the Co "K" MIA at XD 881288. Co "I" assigned the mission of one squad recon patrol and Battalion reserve. Co's "L" and "M" assigned the missions of perimeter defense and police of the battlefield with Co "L" to conduct one platoon patrol.

18 June: 3/4 received an attack from an estimated NVA company from the 88th Regiment of the 308th Division. At 0555, Co "K" received a light probe and called in illumination mixed with HE. At 0610, Co "K" received the main thrust of the attack. The enemy crawled within 30 feet of the lines before launching their attack. The attack was supported by 82mm mortars and RPG's. The NVA were able to penetrate the FEBAs. Co "M" was informed by Col BOUFFE to displace one platoon O'CON to Co "K". At 0620, an AD came on station and observed one group of 25 to 30 NVA and numerous smaller groups of eight to ten NVA at XD 875264. He called in

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fixed wing air strikes and Huey gun ships. The attack continued until 0945. The NVA left snipers and automatic weapons behind to try to cover their withdrawal. During the attack, the fixed wing air strikes and artillery were used against Hill 703 and Hill 749 in order to block reinforcement of the NVA units in contact. At 1030, Co "K" with the platoon from Co "M" were able to reestablish the FEBA and tie in with Co "I". At 1137, the Battalion received 12 rounds of estimated 152mm artillery from Co Roc. At 1215, units began to sweep the battlefield and to clear out the remaining pockets of resistance. At 1417, the sweep was completed and all units were prepared for heli-lift to their new position. The casualties were 14 KIA's and 30 WIA's. There were 129 NVA KIA confirmed (91 small arms, 25 artillery and 13 air). The heli-lift commenced at 1515, two LZ's were utilized. A fire broke out on the southern LZ which caught on to the staged ammunition causing it to explode, but all personnel had been cleared of the area. During the heli-lift, 3/4 received 100 rounds of 82mm mortars and 90 rounds of 152mm artillery. The heli-lift was completed with Co "I" at Fox Trot Ridge, Co "K" at Hill 471 and the GP Group with Co's "L" and "M" at LZ Hawk.

19 June: 3/4 assumed CP30N of the 2/3 AO at 191000 June. Also under the Battalion's control came two sweep teams from 3d Brigade, Co "A", and one sweep team from 1st Engineers, Co "A". Two teams of scout snipers were attached to the Battalion from HQ Co, 1st Marines along with the other attachments. The Battalion received two 106 recoilless rifles on position at 1500 and they were tactically positioned during the afternoon. A major portion of the day was spent moving into the new positions. Police calls were started and position improvements began immediately. The Battalion received an artillery battery consisting of six 105mm howitzers from "I" Btry 3/12. Three 175mm guns were received from the army.

20 June: At 0920, Co "I" reported receiving two rounds of artillery from Co Roc. There were no casualties. An artillery mission was fired with unknown results. The procedure for the road sweeps were sent to all the units which take part in this daily activity. This order designated teams, size of security, time elements and the use of the swim area during these sweeps. A request from Co "L" that the time of departure be varied to avoid establishment of any set pattern was granted. At 1924, Co "K" reported receiving five rounds of estimated 60mm mortars from XB 347380. An artillery and 81mm mortar mission was fired with unknown results. Co "I" reported at 2000, receiving several small bursts of AK-47 fire, then approximately 30 rounds from a light machine gun. At 2045, Co "I" reported a large amount of movement in their area. Artillery missions were fired and the movement ceased with no further developments. Co "M" reported observing a light at XD 209325. After several minutes, the light went out. The lines continued to observe the area with no further results. At 2130, Co "K" reported hearing enemy movement of numerous personnel about 400 to 500 meters from their position. They fired one round of illumination along with an artillery mission.

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21 June: 3/4 units conducted two platoon patrols, three squad patrols, two ambushes and six LP's. All road sweeps left as scheduled and returned without incident.

22 June: The road sweeps during the day were completed on schedule with no major difficulty. Swim calls were started and will be scheduled daily at various times. A message was received from 1st Marines concerning the slacking off of fixed wing support in the 1st Marines AO. The message was to to the Battalion 14. Another message was received about the policing of Route 9 and the MSR. Convoys reported considerable loss of equipment along the road which could be of use to the enemy. Road sweep units were notified.

23 June: Road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted on schedule with no incidents. A police of the road was conducted in response to a message sent by 1st Marines. At 1140, the Battalion received a message from 1st Marines on a suspected enemy battalion position at XD 894455. Later in the evening, at 2200 and 2230, Co "K" picked up enemy movement at XD 848383 and XD 849381 with a SID which is located at their position.

24 June: At 0800, Co "K" was chopped to 2/1 in accordance with the 1st Marines Frag Order 104-68. One section of 106's and one section of 81mm mortars were chopped along with the Artillery FO team and TACP at the same time. The chop was made on schedule with 2/1 assuming OPCON of Co "K". Road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule with negative findings. The Battalion conducted two platoon patrols, four squad patrols and two ambushes along with LP's and CP's.

25 June: All road sweeps were completed as scheduled with nothing of significance to report. At 2247, word was received from 1st Marines of increased enemy efforts to ambush convoys, particularly in the area between LZ Hawk and Khe Sanh. Patrolling along Route 9 has been increased in these crucial areas. Artillery depressive fires are to be stepped up also. At 1900, a message was received informing the Battalion of the change of the 4th Marines call sign from "April Showers" to "League Leader". Word was passed to all sections and units concerned. A request was submitted for helicopters to conduct an exchange of Co's "I" and "M". At 2140, word was received from 1st Marines S-3 cancelling the switch of the companies. The units concerned were notified immediately.

26 June: Road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule. Sweeps were made by a lesser team than usual, due to lack of mine detectors, which were defective. The team is to return on 27 June with new equipment.

27 June: All road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule. The sweeps were conducted without incident. A visit was made by the CO and S-3 to the new Battalion position, Fire Base Mike, to

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check out the area for positioning of lines, bunkers, etc. Another visit is planned for 28 June to include the Artillery Officer and Air Officer. During this visit, the group stopped at Ca Lu to make liaison with the CO, 4th Marines.

28 June: All road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule without incident. The CO visited 4th Marines Headquarters to make liaison with the CO, 4th Marines on the upcoming operations with the Mobile Defense Battalions.

29 June: All road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule without incident. At 0900, BrigGen HOFFMAN, CG, Task Force Hotel, visited LZ Hawk departing at 0920.

30 June: All road sweeps in the 3/4 AO were conducted and completed on schedule. All units continued to tear down areas for future planned deactivation of the Sanh Combat Base to Fire Base Mike. There was one platoon patrol and eight squad recon patrols conducted by 3/4 units during the day. There were also two ambushes conducted by Co "M". At 0900, a Co "M" OP observed five NVA in the vicinity of XD 876393 moving west. Information was passed to Co "I" who had a patrol moving toward that area. At 0935, the Co "I" patrol made contact with partially dug in NVA. The patrol called in artillery and gunships. A sweep of the area was conducted and seven fresh fighting holes were found. The patrol continued the sweep and at XD 867391, discovered two USMC bodies about one month old and one NVA KIA about one month old. The two USMC bodies were sent to the Co "M" 2d platoon position and were later sent to 1st Marines. Another patrol was sent out to check the area to the south of the initial contact. The units linked-up without further contact. The patrols returned to their positions at approximately 1830. At 2040, Co "I" received about 15 rounds of artillery from Co Roc. At 2045, Co "I" received an additional 32 rounds of 130mm artillery from Co Roc. An arolight and TPQ were requested.

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a. The Battalion remained on Hills 689, 471, 552 and 881 until 10 June. At that time the Battalion was helo-lifted to Khe Sanh in preparation for the operation. On 18 June, the Command Post with Co's "L" and "M" moved to LZ Hawk. Co "K" was shifted to Hill 471. Co "I" occupied Foxtrof Ridge.

b. Daily resupply of Class I, III, IV and V items have been conducted from LZ Stud by helicopter. Class II items have come by motor convoy to LZ Stud from Dong Ha and by helicopter to the companies at their various positions.

c. Scheme of Operation. The S-4 operation was divided into three areas:

(1) S-4 rear maintained all paperwork, and coordinated movement of men and material (primarily Class II) to LZ Stud.

(2) Our resupply base at LZ Stud is maintained with S-4 personnel, one supply representative from each company, the Battalion mess section, motor transport personnel and a mailman. In addition to normal resupply, a company a day is fed hot chow from the galley at LZ Stud in the field. During the month resupply operations went a lot more smoothly than previously. Helicopter support improved considerably, largely due to a G-4 forward representative to coordinate transportation. Truck support from 9th and 1st Motors also improved. The messhall was set up as a small field kitchen that originally sent out hot meals to the Battalion two companies at a time. Due to a shortage of vat cans and difficulties encountered while the Battalion was deployed in the field, this was changed to one company at a time. When the Battalion was brought back to stationary positions, field chow was resumed. The messhall also cooks for personnel and transients at LZ Stud, and occasionally, through arrangements with G-4, for units moving through LZ Stud. Elements of 1/4, 2/4 and some army units were fed under these arrangements. The only shortages of goods during the period were selected Class V items such as claymores and W.P. mortar ammunition. These items never became critical, however. The operation at LZ Stud during the month ran relatively smooth and efficiently.

(3) An S-4 capability was always maintained with the Battalion Command Post to handle incoming and outgoing goods and provide proper liaison with the Battalion Commander. An HST capability was maintained at each position.

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## 2. Supply

- a. The overall supply support during this period was satisfactory.
- b. Some critical shortages at supplies existed and were reported in the Logistics Summary Report:

Gas Mask - Small, Medium and Large  
 Rocket Launcher - 3-58  
 Motor Transport Repair Parts  
 Compressor - Reciprocation for Flame Thrower

- c. The critical water problem has been somewhat relieved by the use of two water buffalos, which are filled at LZ Stud and sent to LZ Hawk.

## 3. Transportation

- a. Motor Transport support from Division Motor Transport has greatly improved. This support has reduced the load on the Battalion vehicles.

- b. Helicopter support from LZ Stud to the Battalion positions has improved. Gear still must be moved on a priority or emergency basis.

- c. The M-151A1 was accepted by the Battalion Motor Transport Section on 6 June 1968. The M-422A1 Mites were turned into FLSU on 19 June 1968.

- d. The Battalion's communications vehicles are all running with the exception of one MRG-83, which is in FLSU for a throw out bearing.

- e. Only one of the Battalion's four PG's is running. The others are down for engines. Two are in FLSU and one is held by the motor pool for repair and rebuild exchange.

- f. The Battalion has 29 M-274A2 vehicles with one on order. 15 of these are deadlined for parts that are on order through FLSU on Direct Exchange. The Battalion recently received two M-100 trailers.

- g. The Battalion's Steam Jenny is still on deadline and the parts are being Red Balled for it.

- h. One of the five water trailers held by the Battalion is deadlined. One water buffalo has been dropped from our account and a replacement is on order.

## 4. Maintenance

- a. The M-151A1 has been serviced and issued to the Battalion. A strong 1st and 2d echelon maintenance program has been initiated and will be continued on all the new vehicles.

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DECLASSIFIEDSECTION VICOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS1. Radio

a. The Battalion maintained stations on the following radio nets while on field operations during June 1968:

Regt TAC #1 (FM)  
Regt TAC #2 (FM)  
Bn TAC #1 (HF)  
Bn TAC #2 (FM)  
Bn Admin (FM)

Co "I" TAC Net  
Co "K" TAC Net  
Co "L" TAC Net  
Co "M" TAC Net  
81mm Mortar Conduct of Fire  
Net

b. Supporting arms circuits for air and artillery were employed utilizing FM equipment.

2. Wire

a. The Battalion Rear at Dong Ha maintains wire communications for administrative purposes and provides two trunks to the 9th Marines.

b. The Battalion maintained an extensive CP wire system between Hill 689 and Hill 552 until 10 June.

c. While the Battalion was operating in the field, a wire system including links to each rifle company was maintained.

3. Radio Relay. An AN/TRC-27 circuit was employed between Hill 689 and the Khe Sanh Combat Base, maintained by 1st Marines until 10 June, and was reestablished from LZ Hawk to Khe Sanh on 19 June.

4. Power. Power for the Battalion Rear at Dong Ha is provided by the 11th Engineers.

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ENCLOSURE  
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~~SECRET~~SECTION VIIFIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. Support for 3/4 was provided by 1/12 and 1/11. Support was provided by 1/11 for the period 1 to 10 June and 18 to 30 June. Support was provided by 1/12 for the period 11 to 18 June.
2. The total number of H&I's requested for June was 1,424, with 5,696 rounds expended.
3. The total number of TOT's requested for June was 129.
4. The total number of fire missions requested for June was 754.
5. The total number of rounds expended on fire missions was 10,652.
6. The total number of rounds expended with the H&I's and fire missions was 16,348.
7. On the operation of June 10 to June 18, 3/4 received support from 2/12. Approximately 3,000 rounds were fired in our support. In the operation, artillery was credited with 104 NVA KIA's confirmed.
8. Fire support from the artillery batteries of 1/11 and 3/12 was outstanding throughout the month. There were no major problems encountered with the artillery support during the month.

VII-1

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SECTION VIIIAIR SUPPORT

1. During the month of June, the weather was good for all 3/4 air support.
2. Fixed wing support was requested daily. While 3/4 was located in the Kho Sanh area, the terrain and observation offered excellent opportunity for 3/4 to employ fixed wing support. Fixed wing strikes were called in support of 3/4 units in contact and in direct support of pending sweeps by units of 3/4. While flying in support of units in contact, flights of F-4's, A-4's and F-8's were used. These aircraft proved very effective in aiding 3/4 in clearing out pockets of enemy resistance and in preventing enemy reinforcement of units in contact with 3/4. Fixed wing strikes in support of 3/4 tallied many NVA confirmed, NVA probable and bunkers destroyed.
3. During the month of June, 3/4 requested 118 med-evacs, using 118 helicopters. Many times during this period of time, med-evac aircraft requested into somewhat dangerous LZ's to pick up seriously wounded personnel.
4. During June, 72 requests were submitted for AO aircraft. Through the AO, 3/4 was able to direct artillery, mortars and fixed wing strikes against the NVA. The AO's were instrumental in spotting enemy troop movement and fortifications and were able to adjust artillery and mortar fire upon them.
5. During the month of June, 3/4 received 35 TPQ's of which 10 were emergency. These strikes were instrumental in stopping enemy resupplies and in destroying enemy positions.
6. During June, 3/4 conducted four heli-lifts of battalion size.
7. The following is a summary of air support for the month of June:
 

a. Fixed wing	84	Controlled by AO/FAC
b. AO aircraft	72	Controlled fixed wing, mortars and reconned routes in support of 3/4.
c. Med-evac	118	
d. Troop lifts	4	Helicopter CH-46's were used to lift a total of 2832 troops.
e. TPQ's	35	TPQ's were conducted, hitting artillery positions and harboring sites.
f. Flare ships	1	On 15 June, flare ships were used.

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8. On 15 June, there were 32 fixed wing air strikes run in support of this Battalion.

9. On 18 June, there were 21 fixed wing air strikes run in support of this Battalion

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECTION IXMEDICAL AFFAIRS

1. 3/4 maintained two BAS's during the month of June: a rear BAS was maintained at Dong Ha and the forward BAS was maintained at Hill 689 (1 - 10 June), went into the field on the operation until 19 June and then maintained a BAS at LZ Hawk.
2. There were approximately 500 patients to visit the forward BAS, in addition to casualties resulting from hostile action. There were two suspected cases of malaria. Both patients were evacuated immediately.
3. During June, 3/4 captured 11 POW's, all of whom were wounded. Before being taken out by helicopter, they were treated by the BAS.
4. Med-caps were not conducted this month due to the adverse locations of the forward BAS's.

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IX-1

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECTION X

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. No civil affairs activities were conducted by this Battalion during June 1968.

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ENCLOSURE (1)  
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SECTION XIPROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. When a combat base is wired for internal land lines, lines to the companies should be duplicated wherever possible. By using alternate routes, the chances of maintaining wire communications to the companies are increased during mortar or artillery attack.
2. Okinawan type batteries should not be used in the field operation. It was found that they are unreliable for durability and dependability.
3. At all times an emergency ammo net should be staged. This Battalion had two emergency nets containing one company BA of ammo staged on the LSA at LZ Stud. Once this net was needed, Regimental S-4 was notified and it was received on position within the hour.
4. When a Battalion is operating in the field it is imperative that communications with both the Battalion S-4 and the Regimental S-4 be maintained. When there is no communications with Battalion S-4, there is a break down and supplies are slowed down. Both Battalion S-4 and Regimental S-4 should be notified of resupply requests.
5. The BAS should be located near the primary landing zone. In the event the primary zone becomes unuseable, the BAS should be relocated near the alternate zone. This is to facilitate the movement of priority and emergency med-evacs from the BAS to the landing zone.
6. During heavy contacts of 15 and 18 June, the artillery was firing for two hours before the first air strike. As the day wore on, the AO would run an air strike and instead of lifting a check fire once the air strike was over, he would remain in the area. In order to use artillery support effectively with air, it is imperative that the AO notify FSCC at once when he has completed an air strike so that the check fire on artillery can be lifted. Even if the AO has another flight coming on station, in the 20 to 30 minutes before the strike is ready, the artillery missions that are in check fire can be lifted. The AO must realize that he works with and not independently of the FSCC. This is imperative to maintain continuous support both from artillery and air.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Plan  
OPERATION ORDER 6-68

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES: SEE CURRENT INTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY FORCES:

1ST MARINES COORDINATES ACTIVITIES  
WITHIN SCOTLAND II A.O.

1/1 CONTINUES OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH 1ST MAR OPORD 89-68

2/1 CONTINUES DEFENSE KHE SANH  
COMBAT BASE

2/3 MAINTAINS BLOCKING FORCE IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH 1ST MAR OPORD 89-68

2/4 CONTINUES OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH 1ST MAR OPORD 89-68.

C. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS: NO CHANGE

d. Assumption, THAT THE ENEMY HAS SUFFICIENT FORCES  
TO PENETRATE A COMBAT BASE

2. MISSION. TO ASSIGN REACTION FORCES  
FOR THE PERIOD ENCOMPASSED BY 1ST MARINES  
OPERATION ORDER 89-68.

3. EXECUTION

A. DUE TO THE UNIQUE DISPOSITION OF  
THE COMPANIES WITHIN THE ASSIGNED AO  
DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE 1ST MARINES

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OPERATION ORDER 89-68, REACTION FORCES ARE ASSIGNED SO AS TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE FORCE TO COUNTER-ATTACK AND DRIVE OUT ANY ENEMY FORCE THAT PENETRATES ANY COMBAT BASE DEFENSE PERIMETER. A BATTALION REACTION FORCE TO REINFORCE ANY COMPANY THAT IS ATTACKED BY ANY ENEMY FORCE IS ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FORCE TO REPEL THE ENEMY FROM A PENETRATED COMBAT BASE.

B. EACH RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER WILL DESIGNATE REACTION FORCES WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMBAT BASES TO INSURE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE REACTION TO ANY ENEMY PENETRATION OF THEIR DEFENSIVE PERIMETER. REACTION FORCES WILL HAVE CLEAR CONCISE ORDERS IN REGARDS TO MISSION, ASSEMBLY AREA, PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AND PREDESIGNATED ROUTES FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREA TO POSSIBLE AREAS OF PENETRATION

C. BN REACTION FORCE

(1) EACH COMPANY WILL DESIGNATE TWO PLATOONS FROM THEIR COMBAT BASE FOR THE BN REACTION FORCE

(2) UNITS DESIGNATED WILL BE ON A 30 MINUTE STAND-BY WHEN DIRECTED BY

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THE COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD BN, 4TH MARINES.

(3) WHEN A REACTION FORCE IS REQUIRED, IT WILL MOVE OVERLAND, WHEN ORDERED, TO EFFECT A LINK-UP WITH THE COMPANY FROM THE THREATENED/PENETRATED COMBAT BASE,

(4) REACTION FORCES WILL BE PREPARED TO ALSO MOVE BY HELICOPTER TO THE LZ OF THE THREATENED/PENETRATED COMBAT BASE OR TO A CLOSE SECURE LZ,

(5) THE BELOW LISTED REACTION FORCES ARE DESIGNATED FOR THE NAMED COMBAT BASE:

REACTION FORCE	THREATENED COMBAT BASE
I	M CO HILL 471
L (ALT M)	I CO HILL 552
I (ALT K)	L CO HILL 689
L (ALT CO 1ST MAR)	K CO HILL 881 S

(6) THE REACTION FORCE DESIGNATED FOR HILL 881 S WILL BE DISPATCHED PRIMARILY BY HELICOPTER DUE TO DISTANCE AND TERRAIN.

(7) UPON DISPATCHING OF A REACTION FORCE, THE BN S-3 OFFICER WILL REQUEST A RIFLE COMPANY FROM THE 1ST MARINES TO PROVIDE

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SECURITY AT THE REACTION FORCE'S COMBAT BASE. WHEN THE RIFLE COMPANY FROM THE 1ST MARINES ASSUMES CONTROL OF THE COMBAT BASE, THE REMAINING PLATOON AND ATTACHMENTS WILL BE PREPARED TO JOIN ITS COMPANY ON ORDER.

**D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

(1) COMPANIES SUBMIT (~~INNER-COMBAT~~ <sup>COUNTER-ATTACK</sup> ~~BASE REACTION~~) PLANS TO COMMANDING OFFICER, 3RD BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES FOR <sup>THEIR</sup> RESPECTIVE COMBAT BASES.

(2) DESIGNATE ASSEMBLY AREAS INSIDE PERIMETER TO INCLUDE AN AREA NEAR AN LZ IF MOVE IS TO BE MADE BY HELICOPTER.

(3) ASSEMBLY AREA, LINE OF DEPARTURE, APPROACH MARCH ROUTE AND OBJECTIVE WILL BE DESIGNATED.

(4) THIS <sup>PLAN</sup> ~~ORDER~~ EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

PLANNING PURPOSES AND EXECUTED ON ORDER.

**4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS**

A REACTION FORCE CARRY N/A AND EQUIPMENT TO INCLUDE FLAK JACKET, GAS MASK.

B. ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO BN REACTION FORCE WILL HAVE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE USE B/A CLASS V, 1 RATION, 2 CANTEENS WATER, SALT TABLETS, INSECT REPELLENT,

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A. BN CP: NO CHANGE

B. BN REACTION FORCE WILL HAVE COMPANY  
COMMAND GROUP.C. REACTION FORCE REPORT CP LOCATION  
HOURLY.D. COMMUNICATION CONTROL BY BATTALION  
TACTICAL NET

BY COMMAND OF

F. L. BOURNE JR

AUTHENTICATED

V. E. FERNSTADT

MAY

USMC

S-3

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10 of 10

FILE

3RD BN, 4TH MARINES

OPERATION ORDER 7-68

A. MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES  
L 7014 SHEETS 6342 II, III; AMS SERIES  
L 7015 SHEETS 6341 I, IV.

B. 4TH MAR. OPORD 5-68

C. DIVORD. 02000.2F (COI)

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ATTACHMENTS - 3 TEAMS ENGINEERS FROM 3RD  
ENGINEERS OPCON TO 3RD BN, 4TH MAR. AT 100800H JUNE 68

DETACHMENTS - 2 TEAMS SCOUT SNIPERS, HQTRS CO,  
1ST MARINES CHOPPED FROM 3RD BN, 4TH MAR. OPCON  
TO 1ST MAR. AT 101130H JUNE 68. 1 TEAM, 1ST ENGINEERS  
CHOPPED FROM 3RD BN, 4TH MAR. OPCON TO 1ST MAR.  
AT 101130H JUNE 68.

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## I. SITUATION

A. ENEMY - (SEE ANNEX B - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.)

B. FRIENDLY

1<sup>ST</sup> MARINES - CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION WITHIN AO.

2<sup>ND</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1<sup>ST</sup> MAR. OPODER 89-68.

1<sup>ST</sup> BN, 1<sup>ST</sup> MAR - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1<sup>ST</sup> MAR. OPOD 89-68.

4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION WITHIN AO.

3<sup>RD</sup> BN, 9<sup>TH</sup> MAR. - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. OPOD 5-68.

1<sup>ST</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. OPOD. 5-68.

1<sup>ST</sup> BN, 12<sup>TH</sup> MAR. - IN G/S OF 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. PRIORITY FIRES, 3<sup>RD</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR.

4<sup>TH</sup> BN, 12<sup>TH</sup> MAR. - "L" BTRY IN G/S OF 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. PRIORITY OF FIRES TO 3<sup>RD</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR.

1<sup>ST</sup> MAW - PROVIDES F/W, HELI-SUPPORT AND AERIAL OBSERVER.

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2. MISSION: 3<sup>RD</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE ASSAULT TO VICINITY REGT. OBJ 4 (LANGHOLE AREA) TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ALL ENEMY WEAPONS AND SUPPLY CACHES AND TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ANY ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE OBJ. 4 (LANGHOLE) AREA. BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE ASSAULT REGT. OBJ 14 (XD 8725) (SEE ANNEX A)

3. EXECUTION -

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY 3<sup>RD</sup> BN, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR. CONDUCT HELICOPTER-BORNE ASSAULT TO LZ VIC. XD 884306, SEIZE AND SECURE THE LZ AND CONDUCT SEARCH OPERATIONS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ALL ENEMY WEAPONS AND SUPPLY CACHES WITHIN THE AREA OF LANGHOLE VILLAGE (XD 871309) AND TO LOCATE, FIX AND DESTROY ALL ENEMY FORCES THEREIN.

B. I COMPANY - CONDUCT HELIBORNE ASSAULT INTO LZ VIC. (XD 884306) SEIZE AND SECURE THE LZ. UPON ARRIVAL K COMPANY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR NORTHERN HALF OF THE LZ. BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO SEARCH OUT DESIGNATED AREAS, AS DIRECTED BY C.U. 3/4 FOR ENEMY WEAPONS & SUPPLY CACHES.

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H. FLAME SECTION - ATTACHED TO I COMPANY.

DEPLOY AS DIRECTED BY C.O. I COMPANY.

I. 106 R.R. PLATOON - BATTALION RESERVE. DISPLACE TO LZ STUD. BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO JOIN THE BATTALION.

J. L COMPANY - BATTALION RESERVE, BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY IN BATTALION HQ, ON ORDER. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME MISSION OF ANY OF THE ASSAULT COMPANIES.

K. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) - D-DAY: 10 JUNE 68

(2) - 2-HOUR: 1200H

(3) - ALL UNITS MAINTAIN MAXIMUM COMMUNICATION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY DURING ALL MOVEMENT.

(4) - INSURE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS TO AERIAL OBSERVER.

(5) - EMPHASIZE CONTINUOUS CAMOUFLAGE AND DISPERSION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(6) - SPOT REPORTS ON OCCURRENCE

(7) - ADDITIONAL THRUST POINTS IN EFFECT.

ALPHA - 9529

ECHO - 9227

BRAVO - 9232

FOXTROT - 8931

CHARLIE - 8527

GOLF - 8729

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C. K COMPANY. - CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE MOVE TO LZ VIC. (XD 884306), ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOUTHERN HALF OF LZ FROM I COMPANY. BE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO SEARCH OUT DESIGNATED AREAS, AS DIRECTED BY C.O.  $\frac{3}{4}$  FOR ENEMY WEAPONS & SUPPLY CACHES.

D. M. COMPANY. - CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE MOVE TO LZ VIC. (XD 884306) MOVE INTO BLOCKING POSITION TO THE SOUTHWEST AS DIRECTED BY C.O.  $\frac{3}{4}$  AND, ON ORDER, SEARCH OUT DESIGNATED AREAS, AS DIRECTED BY C.O.  $\frac{3}{4}$  FOR ENEMY WEAPONS AND SUPPLY CACHES.

E. 81mm PLATOON. - CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE MOVE AFTER RESERVE COMPANY (COMPANY L) TO LZ VIC (XD 884306).  
GENERAL SUPPORT.

F. SHORE PARTY (4ST). ONE TEAM ATTACHED EACH COMPANY. CONTROL HELICOPTER LIFT AT KSCB AND PROVIDE CONTROL WITH AO FOR MED EVAC AND RESUPPLY HELICOPTERS.

G. DET. 3RD ENGINEERS. ASSIGN 2 TEAMS TO I COMPANY AND ONE TEAM TO K COMPANY UPON ARRIVAL KSCB. TAKE MAXIMUM DEMOLITION PACKS. DESTROY WEAPONS AND SUPPLY CACHES AS DIRECTED.

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8. STAGE PERSONNEL ON EAST END OF KSCB  
RUNWAY. - WELL DISPERSED, BREAK UNITS  
INTO HELITEAMS, 12 MEN / HELICOPTER FIRST  
WAVE, 15 MEN, HELICOPTER EACH SUCCEEDING  
WAVE. 8 HELICOPTERS / WAVE. COMPANIES STAGE  
MINIMUM 50 METERS BETWEEN UNITS.

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4. Administrations and Logistics.A. Supply

(1) Source - LZ Stud

(2) Prescribed Load - As directed by unit commanders to include BA + 2 days, 3 MCI, 3 canteens of water, 20 sand bags, (4) Trip flares per fire team, 2 smoke grenades, 10 magazines per M 16, 1 Claymore per fire team, 1 entrenching tool, 3 frag. grenades, salt tablets ~~and~~, Halizone tablets and insect repellent.

(3) Local water to be used whenever possible but only after treating with halizone tablets.

(4) Resupply

A. Primary Method - Helicopter

B. LSA - LZ Stud - S-4 and all Line Companies will have a Representative at LZ Stud.

C. Companies will place resupply request to S-4 prior to 1800.

D. Emergency resupply request anytime.

E. Two Company emergency Class II nets will be staged at LZ Stud.

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B. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Exercise preventive medicine measures to prevent heat casualties.
- (2) Take maximum anti-malaria measures
- (3) Medevacs will go from Company to Bn. to "D" med, Dong Ha.

C. Transportation.

- (1) Helicopters
- (2)  $\frac{3}{4}$  Motor Transport Officer will provide one Personnel Carrier at LZ Stud for S-4.

D. Services.

- (1) Detachments of 3rd Engineers is required

E. Personnel

- (1) 106 personnel less those required to maintain maintenance and security of 168's at LZ Stud will provide security for the Bn CP group.

- (2) Casualty reporting in accordance with present Directives. S1 Representative will be with Bn CP.

- (3) POW's will be handled with Div B. 3461.1  
POW's will go from Company to Bn to 4th Mar. Regt.

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## 5. Command and Communication - Electronics

## a. Establishment and Maintenance of Communications

- (1) Current COI is effective (REF C)
- (2) This HQ will guard 4th Mar Regt Tac #1 on order at about L-3.
- (3) Radio Silence until assault company lands in objective area.
- (4) All changes to COI will be coordinated through Comm O.

## b. Command Post Locations

- (1) See operations overlay
- (2) Company CP locations will be reported when established to this headquarters
- (3) All changes in CP location will be reported to this headquarters.
- (4) ALFA CMO CREOP MOVES, WITH LAST UNITS K CO.

## c. Command Relationship

- (1) Control of 3rd Bn 4th Mar passes from 1st Mar Regt to TF Hotel at L-1/2 who immediately passes OPCON to 4th Mar Regt.

By Command of  
F. L. BOURNE JR

AUTHENTICATED

J. E. Farnstapf

Major USMC S-3

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## ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)

1. ENEMY SITUATION. THE 66TH REGT. OF THE 304TH DIV. IS LOCATED VIC XD8429. THE 57TH REGT. OF THE 304TH IS LOCATED VIC XD 9035. THE 102TH REGT OF THE 308TH IS LOCATED VIC XD8738. THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTACK OR DEFEND IN UP TO COMPANY SIZE STRENGTH AND REINFORCE WITH 1 BATTALION IN 4 HOURS OR 2 WITHIN 12 HOURS. THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE WELL DUG-IN UTILIZING REVERSE SLOPE TACTICS. UNITS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS OF SNIPERS IN HIGH TREES COVERED BY THE JUNGLE CANOPY.

2. TERRAIN. THE AREA IS ROUGHLY THE SAME AS THE PRESENT TERRAIN EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY THICK UNDERGROWTH AND A HIGH JUNGLE CONOPY IN SOME AREAS. CONCEALMENT IS EXCELLENT, OBSERVATION POOR TO FAIR.

3. WEATHER. TEMPS. WILL APPROACH 100°. RAIN AND FOG CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE EARLY MORNINGS AND LATE AFTERNOONS.

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3RD BN. 4TH MARINES

OPERATION ORDER 8-68

A: MAPS VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS SERIES

L 7014 SHEETS 6342 II, III AMS SERIES

L 7015 SHEETS 6341 I, IV

B. 4TH MARINES OPORD 5-68

C. Divord 02000. 2F (COI)

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## ENEMY POSITIONS (LAST 3 MONTHS)

855305 - BUNKERS	857324 - BUNKERS
850319 - SUPPLY CACHE	871303 - } BUNKER
848308 - BUNKERS	871309 } COMPLEX
851311 - AA POSIT	879321 - CP
852308 - C.P.	878324 - HUTS
857302 - BUNKERS	879328 - BUNKERS
861330 - C.P.	
862330 - BUNKERS	
866323 - "	
864326 - "	
862321 - MORTAR SITE	
869324 - " "	
864315 - BUNKERS	
868314 - MORTAR SITE	
865327 - BUNKERS	
860324 - TRENCHES & FOX HOLES	
850318 - BUNKERS	

NOTE: STREAM VIC XD 8730 IS EXPECTED  
TO BE BUILT UP WITH SUPPLY CACHES  
AND FORTIFICATIONS.

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## 1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY - (SEE ANNEX B - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.B. FRIENDLY -4TH MARINES - CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION WITHIN AO.1ST BN, 4TH MAR. - CONDUCT SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4TH MARINES.

OPORD 5-68.

2ND BN, 4TH MARINES - CONDUCT SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4TH MARINES.

OPORD 5-68.

3RD BN, 9TH MARINES - CONDUCT SEARCH AND FIX MISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 4TH MARINES

OPORD 5-68.

1ST BN, 12TH MARINES - IN G/S OF 4TH MARINES.

(ARTILLERY SUPPORT ANNEX B)

4TH BN, 12TH MARINES - IN G/S OF 4TH MARINES - "LIBTRY"1ST MAW - PROVIDES F/W, HELI-SUPPORT AND AERIAL OBSERVER (AIR SUPPORT ANNEX C)ATTACHMENTS - 1 TEAM ENGINEERS FROM 3RD ENG.  
"A" CO - 4 TEAMS HST, 3RD SHORE PARTY - ~~SECRET~~UNCLASSIFIED  
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UNCLASSIFIED

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2. MISSION - 3RD BN, 4TH MAR. CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION VIC. HILL 703 TO RECOVER MIA OF 12 JUNE 68 AND TO KILL OR CAPTURE ALL ENEMY PERSONNEL, WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT.

### 3. EXECUTION -

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - 3RD BN, 4TH MARINES CONDUCT 2 COMPANY ~~HELI-BORNE~~ ASSAULT TO VIC. HILL 703. ~~AND ONE COMPANY ASSAULT OVERLAND TO BLOCKING POSITION VIC XD 878282 TO RECOVER MIA OF 12 JUNE 68~~

B. CO "I" - CONDUCT OVERLAND ASSAULT TO SEIZE BN. OBJ. 1 (XD 876273) ~~AND~~ AND BN. OBJ 2 (XD 878282) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY.

C. CO-I - CONDUCT HELI-BORNE ASSAULT AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY TO LZ VIC 872283 SEIZE & SECURE BN. OBJ. 3 (XD 872283). ON ORDER, BE PREPARED TO ATTACK NORTH TO SEIZE BN. OBJ. 5 (XD 872289), TO CAPTURE, KILL ENEMY PERSONNEL, WEAPONS OR EQUIPMENT.

D. CO "K" - CONDUCT HELI-BORNE ASSAULT AT L-HOUR <sup>PLUS</sup> 30 ON D-DAY TO LZ VIC. 881284, SEIZING BN. OBJ 4 (XD 881284). ON ORDER BE PREPARED TO ATTACK NORTH TO SEIZE BN. OBJ. 6 (XD 882285)

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TO KILL OR CAPTURE ENEMY PERSONNEL,  
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT AND TO SEARCH  
AREA TO RECOVER MIA OF 12 JUNE 68.

E. ENGINEERS - 1 TEAM ENG. ATTACHED TO CO "K".

F. FLAMES SECTION - 1 TEAM ATTACHED TO CO. K, L, I.

G. 81mm. PLATOON - REMAIN PRESENT POSITION G/S  
OF OPERATION.

H. SHORE PARTY (HST) - ONE TEAM ATTACHED  
TO EACH COMPANY.

I. Co "M" - BATTALION RESERVE - ASSUME DEFENSE OF  
Hill vic. (XD 878262), ON ORDER BE PREPARED TO  
BE EMPLOYED WITHIN ZONE.

J. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS -

(1). D-DAY : 17 JUNE 68

(2). L-HOUR : 1000H

(3). H-HOUR : 0700H

(4) ALL UNITS MAINTAIN MAXIMUM COMMUNICATIONS  
AND PHYSICAL SECURITY DURING ALL MOVEMENT.

(5) INSURE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ALL  
PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS TO AERIAL OBSERVER.

(6). EMPHASIZE CONTINUOUS CAMOUFLAGE AND  
DISPERSION OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

(7) SPOT REPORTS ON OCCURENCE.

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UNCLASSIFIED~~SECRET~~4. Administration & Logistics -A. Supply(1) Source - LZ STUD

(2) Prescribed Load - AS DIRECTED BY UNIT COMMANDERS TO INCLUDE BA+2 DAYS, 3 MCI, 3 CANTEENS OF WATER, 20 SAND BAGS, 1 TRIP FLARE PER FIRE TEAM, 2 SMOKE GRENADES, 10 MAGAZINES PER M-16, 1 CLAY MORE PER FIRE TEAM, 1 ENTRENCHING TOOL, 3 FRAG GRENADES, SALT TABS, HALIZONE TABLETS AND INSECT REPELLENT.

(3) LOCAL WATER TO BE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY AFTER TREATING WITH HALIZONE TABS.

4. ResupplyA. Primary method - HELICOPTER

B. LSA - LZ STUD - S-4 AND ALL LINE COMPANIES WILL HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE AT LZ STUD.

C. COMPANIES WILL PLACE RESUPPLY REQUESTS TO S-4 PRIOR TO 1800.

D. EMERGENCY RESUPPLY REQUEST ANYTIME.

E. ONE COMPANY EMERGENCY CLASS IV NETS WILL BE STAGED AT LZ STUD; ONE AT THIS POSIT.

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(1). EXERCISE PREVENTIVE MEDICINE MEASURES TO PREVENT HEAT CASUALTIES.

(2) TAKE MAXIMUM ANTI-MALARIA MEASURES

(3) MEDIVACS WILL GO FROM COMPANY TO BN TO PAS OR "D" MED, DONG HA.

C. TRANSPORTATION:

(1) HELICOPTERS

(2)  $\frac{3}{4}$  MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER WILL PROVIDE ONE PERSONNEL CARRIER AT LZ STUB FOR S-4.

D. PERSONNEL

(1). 106 PERSONNEL LESS THOSE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN MAINTENANCE & SECURITY OF 106'S AT LZ STUB WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE BN. CP GROUP.

(2). CASUALTY REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESENT DIRECTIVES. S-1 REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE WITH BN. C.P.

(3). POW'S WILL BE HANDLED WITH DIV O 3461.1. POW'S WILL GO FROM COMPANY TO BN TO 4TH MAR. REGT.

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## 5. COMMAND &amp; COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

## A. ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION

1. CURRENT COI IS EFFECTIVE (REF C)

2. ALL CHANGES TO COI WILL BE COORDINATED WITH COMM O.

## B. COMMAND POST LOCATIONS

1. SEE OPERATIONS OVERLAY

2. COMPANY CP LOCATIONS WILL BE REPORTED WHEN ESTABLISHED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

3. ALL CHANGES IN CP LOCATIONS WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

4. ALPHA COMMAND GROUP MOVES WITH "K" CO. INITIALLY.

5. BRAVO COMMAND GROUP REMAINS AT THIS LOCATION WITH CO M.

## C. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.

NO CHANGE

By Command of:

F. L. BOURNE JR.

Authenticated  
 VJ Gurnstad  
 Major USMC  
 5-3

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## AIR OPERATION PLAN FOR 3/4, 17 JUNE, 1968

- 1) From 1430 TO SUNSET ON 16 JUNE, 1968, ONE A.O. WILL RUN 2 FLIGHTS OF BOMBER/NAPE FIXED WING ADJACENT TO TRAIL HEADING NORTH FROM 3/4 POSITION FOR 1,000 METERS. COORDINATES ARE FROM XO 876270 TO XO 873280.
- 2) From 0930 TO 1000 ON 17 JUNE, 1968, ONE A.O. WILL RUN 2 FLIGHTS OF BOMBER/NAPE ON LANDING ZONES XO 872283 AND XO 881285
- 3) From 1000 TO 1030 ON 17 JUNE, 1968, 8 CH-46S WILL HELD LIFT FROM 3/4 POSITION 1) "K" COMPANY TO L.Z. - XO 881285, AND 2) "I" COMPANY TO L.Z. - 872283.  
THE SAME 8 CH-46'S WILL REMAIN ON CALL UNTIL 1800H FOR 3/4 IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY.
- 4) From 1000 - 1015H ON 17 JUNE, 1968, ONE A.O. WILL WORK OVER AIR BOX: XO 866287 - XO 869277 - XO 872278 - XO 869288 WITH 2 FLIGHTS OF BOMBER/NAPE FIXED WING.

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## Amers Bravo (Artillery Support)

## 1. Artillery Support Plan

A. Preps for LZ<sup>s</sup> 0830 to 0930

871283 Pkt. Zone 1 Shift

874279 Battery 3

871281 " "

868285 " "

881284 Pkt. Zone 1 Shift

883288 Battery 3

883290 " "

878283 " "

## B. Preps Zone B 0930 TO 1000

874289 Battery 2 Zone 1 Shift

873292 Battery 2

868289 " "

## C. Preps - Zone B 1000 TO 1030

878288 Battery 2 Zone 1 Shift

873291 Battery 2

879295 " "

## 2. Artillery On Call

## A. Zone C

878286

882287

885288

887285

891281

## B. Zone D

879284

878282

882283

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C. Enemy Situation: Elements of the 66<sup>TH</sup> Regt. of the 304<sup>TH</sup> Division operate to the south and west of Hill 703. However, platoon sized units have been located north of the hill. It is believed that the enemy is actively patrolling in the area with squad, platoon and company size units. The enemy can also be expected to employ up to platoon size ambushes utilizing "reverse slope" tactics. Indications are that the enemy is capable of attacking USMC positions in the area with up to 1 Battalion at any time and can reinforce with up to 1 Regt. within 48 hours. The enemy is not believed to be utilizing booby traps in the area, however snipers can be expected both in spider holes and in trees. Emphasis is placed on caution against snipers utilizing high trees with excellent camouflage techniques.

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Intelligence Annex

A. Terrain: The terrain in the vicinity of hill 703 at 878289 consists of rolling hills with steep to moderate slopes and thick brush. Hills and valleys have scattered groups of 30 to 40 foot trees, with moderate underbrush, but the majority of the terrain consists of thick elephant grass 8 to 10 feet high with scattered vine and bamboo entanglements. Trails are 2 to 3 feet in width and well traveled. Streams in the area are 18 to 24 inches in width and an average 6" in depth. The water is drinkable with halizas and offers no obstacles. A new trail runs from the hill crest in a Southeast direction to vic. XD 881294

B. Weather: The weather in the area is that of a tropical climate with high temperatures. Temperatures will average a high of 95° and a low of 83°. The humidity averages 80%. Fog is erratic and can be expected in the early mornings and late afternoons. Rain can be expected at any time, but usually falls in the mid-afternoon or late evenings.

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HEADQUARTERS  
3D BATTALION, 4TH MARINES  
3D MAR. DIV. (REIN) FMF  
APO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96602

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3 COPIES

241720H JUN 68

FM: CO 3RD BN, 4TH MARINES

TO: CO, 1ST MARINES

SUBJ: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE MOBILE DEFENSE  
BATTALION ASSIGNED TO THE KHE SANH AREA (PHASE IV) 3RD MAR  
DIV. 121510Z JUNE 68)

REF: (A) 1ST MAR OPORD 311-68

ENCL: (1) 3/4 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A), ENCLOSURE (1)  
IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION & UTILIZATION.

2. IN THE PREPARATION OF THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
CAREFUL ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE POSSIBLE  
CONTINGENCIES THAT MAY ARISE DURING THE CONDUCT  
OF THE PROPOSED OPERATIONS.

3. ALL REQUIREMENTS LISTED ARE CONSIDERED TO BE  
MINIMUM. THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE PROPOSED  
OPERATION MAKES IT MANDATORY THAT THESE

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
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REQUIREMENTS BE MET IF THE OPERATION IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, AND MINIMUM CASUALTIES SUSTAINED.

4. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER OFFICERS, A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED OPERATION WILL BE THE WEATHER WHICH BECOMES UNPREDICTABLE IN THE ENSUING MONTHS

5. THE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION WILL BE THE AVAILABILITY AND MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATELY TRAINED AND MOTIVATED LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS PLUS THE NECESSARY MANPOWER TO MEET THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS. SKELETON COMPANIES AND A SKELETON BATTALION CANNOT ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES DESIRED OF THIS OPERATION.



COPY TO: CO, 4<sup>TH</sup> MAR

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1. Mission: CONDUCT MOBILE DEFENSE / RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WITHIN ARTILLERY SUPPORT RANGE TO DETECT, LOCATE AND FIX ENEMY FORCES OPERATING IN THE KHE SANH AREA.

2. Assumptions:

A. THAT THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO SEIZE AND SECURE THE AREA IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH FOR USE AS A BASE FROM WHICH THEY WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS AGAINST 3<sup>RD</sup> MARINE DIVISION TO THE EAST AND SOUTHEAST.

B. THAT THE BATTALION WILL OPERATE FROM A COMBAT BASE.

C. THAT ONE RIFLE COMPANY WILL DEFEND THE COMBAT BASE.

D. THAT ALL RIFLE COMPANIES WILL CONSIST OF A MINIMUM OF 5 OFFICERS AND 185 ENLISTED.

E. THAT THREE RIFLE COMPANIES WILL BE OPERATING IN THE BN AO AT THE SAME TIME.

F. THAT EACH COMPANY WILL OPERATE IN THE FIELD FOR 3-5 DAYS AND ROTATE BACK TO THE COMBAT BASE.

G. THAT ALL COMPANIES WILL BE HELILATED

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TO AND FROM THE FIELD FROM THE COMBAT BASE.

H. THAT REACTION FORCES FROM OUTSIDE KHE SANH AREA OF UP TO TWO REGIMENTS IN SIZE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT HELIBORNE AND HELICOPTER SUPPORTED OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DETECTED ENEMY PRESENCE.

I. THAT SUPPORT OF FORCES IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND PERMANENT FIRE BASES WILL BE BY HELICOPTER.

J. THAT THE WEATHER WILL BE A DECIDING FACTOR ON ALL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE KHE SANH AREA.

K. THAT SENSOR DEVICES WILL BE PLACED WITHIN THE OPERATING AREA.

L. THAT A BARRIER DENIAL BELT WILL BE PLACED AROUND THE OPERATING AREA.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: AN INFANTRY BATTALION OPERATING FROM A COMBAT BASE SUPPORTED BY LIGHT AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND FIXED WING AND ROTARY AIRCRAFT CONDUCTS MOBILE DEFENSE/ RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS WITHIN A BARRIER DENIAL BELT, CONSISTING OF GRAVEL MINES, DELAYED BOMBS, DESTRUCTOR BOMBS AND RCA PERSISTANT CS, EMPLOYS HIGHLY MOBILE HELICOPTER TRANSPORTABLE FORCES, OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY IN ASSIGNED AO'S FOR A PERIOD OF 3-5 DAYS AND ROTATED, ONE COMPANY AT A TIME, BACK TO THE COMBAT BASE FOR REHABILITATION AND REOUTFITTING. THE COMPANY PERFORMING COMBAT BASE DEFENSE SENT TO THE FIELD UPON ARRIVAL OF ONE DESIGNATED COMPANY TO INSURE MAXIMUM OF 3 COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE FIELD AT ANY ONE TIME. COMPANIES TO MOVE TO AND FROM ASSIGNED MOBILE DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE AREAS BY HELICOPTER. COMPANIES RESUPPLIED DAILY AT EVERCHANGING PRE-DESIGNATED RENDEZVOUS AREAS BY HELICOPTER. WITHIN LIMITATION, COMPANIES, UPON LOCATION OF ENEMY, WILL MASS UTILIZING HELICOPTER LIFT TO FIX

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THE ENEMY UNTIL DIVISION FURNISHED REINFORCEMENTS / ASSAULT FORCES MOVE TO ATTACK THE FIXED ENEMY FORCES.

### REQUIREMENTS:

1. SENSOR DEVICES MUST BE PLACED WITHIN THE BATTALION AREA OF OPERATIONS.
2. THAT READ OUTS OF SENSOR DEVICES MUST BE PASSED TO BATTALION WITHIN 30 MINUTES AFTER ACTIVATION OF ANY DEVICE.
3. DESTROYED SENSOR DEVICES MUST BE REPLACED BY QUALIFIED UNITS.
4. THAT INFRARED / SNIFFER ACFT ARE USED TO DETECT MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND/OR VEHICLES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE BATTALION AREA OF OPERATIONS TO SUPPLEMENT SENSOR DEVICES.
5. THAT THE COMBAT BASE ~~NAME~~ BE SITUATED WITHIN THE AO CONTIGUOUS TO A FIRE BASE BE DEFENDED BY ONE RIFLE COMPANY.
6. THAT THE COMBAT BASE HAVE A MINIMUM OF TWO RPS-5'S TO DETECT ENEMY MOVEMENT NEAR THE COMBAT BASE.
7. THAT THE COMBAT BASE HAVE A MINIMUM OF THREE ANPRC-47'S TO INSURE POSITIVE

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COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, ARTILLERY FDC AND REGIMENTAL FSCC.

8. THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF 85% PERSONNEL STRENGTH, IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT ITS ASSIGNED MISSION.

9. THAT A RADIO RELAY SET WITH QUALIFIED PERSONNEL FROM REGIMENT BE FURNISHED FOR SUPPLY/ADMIN. TRAFFIC. THIS IS A MUST FOR TRANSMITTING SUPPLY REQUESTS, CASUALTY REPORTING.

10. A MINIMUM OF 3 BATTERIES (BB-451) REPLACED ON A DAILY BASIS.

11 THAT EACH RIFLE COMPANY HAVE A MINIMUM OF 5 OFFICERS AND 185 ENLISTED IN ORDER TO

~~REINFORCE THE BATTALION~~

OPERATE EFFICIENTLY, PROVIDE NECESSARY LEADERSHIP, INSURE ADEQUATE FORCE TO MEET ENEMY FORCES OF UP TO BATTALION STRENGTH UNTIL REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

12. RIFLE COMPANIES ROTATE BACK TO THE COMBAT BASE EVERY 3-5 DAYS IN ORDER TO REOUTFIT AND REHABILITATE THEIR PERSONNEL.

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13. CASUALTIES MUST BE REPLACED WITHIN 3 DAYS.
14. BN. MUST HAVE ALL WEAPONS AS OUTLINED IN THE T E.
15. THAT EACH 81mm MORTAR SECTION MUST HAVE A MINIMUM OF 16 MEN AND THE HQTRS SECTION A MINIMUM OF 4 MEN IN ORDER THAT THE PLATOON CAN EFFECTIVELY PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT IN ALL SITUATIONS.
16. THAT THE 106 R.R. PLATOON HAVE A MINIMUM OF 60 MEN (7/SQD, 4 IN HQS SECTION).
17. TWO 105 BTRYs. AND ONE 155 BTRY BE LOCATED AT PRE-DESIGNATED FIRE SUPPORT BASES TO PROVIDE D.S. WITHIN THE A.O.
18. COMPANIES WILL REMAIN INSIDE 105 ARTY RANGE. THE 155 BTRY WILL BE UTILIZED AS A COUNTER-MORTAR BTRY BEYOND THE RANGE OF THE 105 BTRY.
19. BOTH 105 BTRYs WILL BE USED IN D.S. OF THE 3 COMPANIES IN THE FIELD IN ORDER TO GIVE MAXIMUM FIRE SUPPORT WHILE COMPANIES ARE ON THE MOVE (PREP FIRES), OR IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

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20. SIX HELICOPTERS (CH-46) FOR LIFTING COMPANIES TO AND FROM THE FIELD FROM THE COMBAT BASE. THIS WILL BE REQUIRED ON A DAILY BASIS OR A MINIMUM OF 3 TROOP LIFTS EVERY 5 DAYS.

21. FOUR HELICOPTERS (CH-46) FOR DAILY RESUPPLY OF THE COMBAT BASE AND 3 COMPANIES IN THE FIELD.

22. TWO HELICOPTERS (CH-46) ON 24 HOUR STAND-BY FOR EMERGENCY MEDEVAC / RESUPPLY.

23. EIGHT HELICOPTER (CH-46) AVAILABLE FOR REINFORCING / EMERGENCY EXTRACTION OF A RIFLE COMPANY

24. A C/C HELICOPTER FOR THE BN CMDR. ON A DAILY BASIS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE CONTROL OF THE WIDELY DISPERSED COMPANIES.

25. TWO AERIAL OBSERVERS, ONE FOR OBSERVING THE AO AND ONE FOR Co Roc AND MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE AO. BOTH AO'S WILL BE USED AS PRIMARY CONTROL FOR FIXED WING AIR STRIKES BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

26. BOTH AERIAL OBSERVERS ON STATION FROM FIRST LIGHT TO DUSK, ONE TO ASSIST IN

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MOVEMENT OF COMPANIES WITHIN THE A.O. ONE TO OBSERVE THE AREA FOR MORTAR, ROCKET, ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND TRACKED VEHICLES. BOTH AO'S WILL CHECK FOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

27. REQUIRE ALL-WEATHER SUPPORT F/W AIRCRAFT TO INSURE AIR SUPPORT UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH DAY AND NIGHT REGARDLESS OF WEATHER CONDITIONS.

28. ASRT CAPABILITY TO CONTROL TPO'S WITHIN THE BN AO.

29. BE RESUPPLIED DAILY AT A DESIGNATED PLACE AT A PRESCRIBED TIME WITH NO DEVIATION, AND THAT HELICOPTERS BE AVAILABLE FOR PICK-UP OF NETS, CONTAINERS AT TIMES DESIGNATED BY THE BN S-4 AS COORDINATED THROUGH THE COMPANIES THAT ARE BEING RESUPPLIED.

30. THAT ALL AIR WITHIN THE BN AO COME UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE BN CMDR.

31. HST WITH EACH COMPANY IN THE FIELD AND AT COMBAT BASE.

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32. THAT UP TO TWO REGIMENTS, ASSIGNED BY DIVISION, BE AVAILABLE FOR HELICOPTER BORNE DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE AO UPON DETECTION OF ENEMY PRESENCE THEREIN.

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## Distribution

S-3

1<sup>ST</sup> MARINES4<sup>TH</sup> MARINES

1 of 3

2 of 3

3 of 3

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C C C

ZNY 15555  
 URGENT JUN 68  
 FM 1ST MARINES  
 TO 3RD BN FOURTH MAR  
 O 121102Z JUN 68  
 KM CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TO ZEN CG IF HOTEL  
 ZEN/17TH MARINES  
 ZEN/9TH MARINES  
 ZEN/30 MARINES  
 ZEN/11TH ENGR BN  
 INFO/HUNGKA/CG 11MAF  
 RUMHMA/CG PCV  
 RUMHMB/11TH ENGR BN  
 RUMHAM/11TH ENGR BN  
 ZEN/3RD MARDIV

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11 SET POP

**SECRET** SECTION 1 OF 11  
 CONCEPT OPERATIONS: POSITION TO MOBILE DEFENSE AT  
 KHE SANH

- A. 3D MARDIV OPERATION PLAN 120-68
- B. 3D MARDIV 101 1-67
- C. 3D MARDIV OPERATION PLAN 121-68 (TO BE ISSUED)
- 1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES: SEE CURRENT INTSUMS AND PERINTREPS
- B. FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1) SENSORS A DENIAL BARRIER REPLACED IN RESPONSE  
 TO 3RD MARDIV REQUESTS TO HIGHER HQ. DENIAL  
 BARRIER BELT WILL BE OUTSIDE POTENTIAL GROUND  
 OPEN AREA AT KHE SANH. (SEE OVERLAY PAPER).

(2) ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION/DESTRUCTION SUPPORT AS  
 ASSIGNED BY HIGHER HQ IN RESPONSE TO SUPPORT AS  
 REQUESTED. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AT PERMANENT  
 FIRE SUPPORT BASES WILL HAVE TO BE HELIFTED  
 TO SETES.

(3) OTHER TO CHANGE

2. MISSION

3RD MARDIV IN ORDER CONDUCT OPERATION ALONG ROUTE MR9  
 EFFECTING A TRANSITION IN THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN  
 THE KHE SANH AREA TO A MOBILE DEFENSE POSTURE. INITIALLY,  
 FORCES OF UP TO ONE BATTALION IN STRENGTH WILL OPERATE IN  
 THE VIC OF KHE SANH WITH REACTION FORCES AVAILABLE FROM  
 OTHER APO'S FIRE SUPPORT BASES ARE ESTABLISHED TO COVER  
 OTHER PTS OF FORCES AND TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR FUTURE

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## OPERATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA

## 2. EXECUTION

## A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THIS OPERATION CONDUCTED IN PHASES.

(1) PHASE I. COMMENCING IMMEDIATELY TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL PERFORM EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION TASKS AT KSR JAW REF A WHICH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT LOSS OF TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THAT POSITION. CONCURRENTLY, BEGIN SECURING AND CONSTRUCTION OF ALL FIRE SUPPORT BASES TO COVER GOVERNMENT. PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE MOBILE POSTURE AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AREA SECURITY.

(2) PHASE II. ON ORDER PHASE DOWN/EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL COMMENCES JAW REF A. SELECTED ARTILLERY BATTERIES DISPLACE FROM KSR TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES. WHICH MAY BE TEMPORARY BUT ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL

POSITIONS. OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AREA SECURITY.

(3) PHASE III. EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF KSR IS COMPLETED. EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS COMMENCES. TRADITIONAL INFANTRY OPERATIONS COMMENCE PARALLELING THE NK9. MOBILE DEFENCE POSTURE IS ASSUMED AS SECURITY/RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF UP TO ONE BATTALION REMAIN IN THE KHE SANH AREA CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO DETECT ENEMY PRESENCE WILL REMAINING WITHIN RANGE OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT. ARTILLERY DISPLACES BY BATTERY TO PERMIT FIRE SUPPORT BASES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING TACTICAL MOVEMENT AND THE SECURITY/RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS REMAINING IN THE KHE SANH AREA. EMPLACEMENT OF SENSORS AND DENIAL BARRIER COMMENCES WITH DENIAL BARRIER BELT OUTSIDE OF POTENTIAL GROUND OPS AREA.

(4) PHASE IV. TACTICAL BRIDGING WEST OF CA LU IS

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REMOVED AS TRANSITIONAL MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY FORCES PARALLELING RTE NR9 IS COMPLETED. TH FORCES REMAINING IN THE KHE SANH AREA CONDUCT MOBILE OPNS, PERFORMING RECONNAISSANCE MISSION WITHIN ARTILLERY SUPPORT RANGE TO SUPPLEMENT EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS DESIGNED TO DETECT ENEMY PRESENCE AND MOVEMENT. MOBILE DEFENSE POSTURE HAS REACTION FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE SANH AREA UP TO TWO REGIMENTS IN SIZE PREPARED TO CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE AND HELICOPTER SUPPORTED OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DETECTED ENEMY PRESENCE. SUPPORT OF FORCES IN THE SANH AND PERMANENT FIRE BASES AS WELL AS REACTION FORCE (IF COMMITTED) IS BY HELICOPTER.

R. TASK FORCE HOTEL.

- (1) DEVELOP DETAILED PLANS FOR PHASES I THRU IV.
- (2) COORDINATE SELECTION OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES WITHIN SCOTLAND II AO. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASE UPON AO EXTENSION.

(3) ON ORDER. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN EXTENSION AND OPCON OF FORCES THEREIN (COMMENCEMENT OF PHASE III)

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FORCES FOR FIRE SUPPORT BASES WITHIN AO. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF PERMANENT FIRE BASES AS AO IS EXTENDED.

(5) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY ALONG RTE NR9 FOR LOGISTIC MOVEMENT CONDUCTED (AW REF A).

(6) BE PREPARED TO DESPLACE CP TO LZ STUD (OR CA LU IF LZ STUD NOT READY) IN ORDER DURING PHASE II.

C. 9TH MARINES

(1) PROVIDE INITIAL SECURITY FOR PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASE BEING CONSTRUCTED. CONSTRUCT PERIMETER DEFENSES FOR THESE BASES.

(2) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR LOGISTIC OVERHEAD ALONG RTE NR9 BEING CONDUCTED (AW UPON 20-68).

(3) BE PREPARED TO ASSIGN OPCON OF FORCES WITHIN AN EXTENSION TO TF HOTEL. ON ORDER

(SEE OVERLAY

PHASE).

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SECRET FINAL SECTION OF II. SECTIONS  
CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION

D. 30 MARINES

(1) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

E. 12TH MARINES

(1) COORDINATE WITH TF HOTEL IN DEVELOPMENT OF  
PLAN FOR ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR ALL 4 PHASES

F. OPERATIONS.

(2) SELECT SITES AND ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR  
AND ASSIST IN CONSTRUCTION OF ARTILLERY  
FACILITIES AT TWO PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASES.  
THESE BASES WILL BE LOCATED WITHIN DIRECT  
SUPPORT ARTILLERY RANGE FROM CA LII AND WILL BE  
ORDINARILY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ARTILLERY SUPPORT  
TO UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF HILL 960.

F. COORDINATE INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) PHASE I COMMENCES UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER.  
SUBSEQUENT PHASES COMMENCE OF ORDER. ESTIMATE  
THE PHASE II COMMENCES IN MID JUNE AND PHASE III  
COMMENCES IN JULY.

(2) DURATION OF OPNS. TO BE DETERMINED

(3) AREA OF OPERATIONS: SCOTLAND II AO IS EXTENDED  
IN ORDER TO INCLUDE ROUTE NR 9 FROM BONG KHO  
(XD 920420) TO CA LII AND LZ STUO (SEE OV ALAMY  
PASEP).

(4) FORCES APPLICABLE

PHASE I AND PHASE II: MINIMUM OF THREE BNS.

OUTLYING THE SANH HILL POSITIONS, KSP.  
AND ALONG ROUTE NR 9 IN SCOTLAND AP. ONE BN UNDER  
9TH MAR OPNS ALONG RIE NR9 (WEST OF CA LII).  
CURRENT OPNS SOUTH OF RIE NR9 IN SCOTLAND AO  
CONTINUE WITH THREE OF MORE BNS. FROM THESE  
RESOURCES, IF HOTEL AND 9TH MARINES ALSO  
PROVIDE SECURITY TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES.  
PHASE III: UP TO ONE BN REMAINS IN THE SANH  
AREA (NOT AT KSP). OPNS SHIFT FROM SOUTH OF  
RIE NR 9 TO NORTH AND SOUTH OF RIE NR 9 FOUR OF

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MORE BNS PROVIDE SECURITY TO KHE NR0 WHILE ALSO CONDUCTING OPNS PARALLELING RTE NR0. FROM THESE RESOURCES, TF HOTEL PROVIDES SECURITY TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND SECURITY FOR REMOVAL OF TACTICAL BRIDGING.

PHASE IV: UP TO ONE BN REMAINS IN KHE SANH AREA, ANOTHER BN PROVIDES SECURITY TO TWO PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND PATROLS WEST OF CA LU. NO SECURITY FORCES ALONG RTE NR 9. REACTION FORCES OF THREE OR MORE BNS PREPARED

TO RESPOND TO DETECTED ENEMY PRESENCE IN KHE SANH AREA WHILE OPNS BEING CONDUCTED IN OTHER AUs.

(5) MAINTAIN ONE ARTY BATTERY AND/SEARCH BN.  
(6) TF HOTEL SUBMIT SUPPORTING ARMS AND LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ VIA NORMAL CHANNELS AT EARLIEST.

(7) DIR AUTH ALCON

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. CONCEPT OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

(1) GENERAL: SEE REF B.

(2) TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED

IN THE PROVISIONS OF REF C.

B. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

A. SEE ANNEX C (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) IF R F C.

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## OPERATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA

## 3. EXECUTION

## A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THIS OPERATION CONDUCTED IN PHASES.

(1) PHASE I. COMMENCING IMMEDIATELY TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL PERFORM EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION TASKS AT KSR (AW REF A) WHICH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT LOSS OF TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF THAT POSITION. CONCURRENTLY, BEGIN SECURING AND CONSTRUCTING OF ALL FIRE SUPPORT BASES TO COVER GOVERNMENT AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE MOBILE POSTURE AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AREA SECURITY.

(2) PHASE II. ON ORDER PHASE DOWN/EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL COMMENCES (AW REF A). SELECTED ARTILLERY BATTERIES DISPLACE FROM KSR TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES, WHICH MAY BE TEMPORARY BUT ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL

POSITIONS. OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AREA SECURITY.

(3) PHASE III. EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF KSR IS COMPLETED. EVACUATION/DESTRUCTION OF OUTLYING KHE SANH HILL POSITIONS COMMENCES. TRADITIONAL INFANTRY OPERATIONS COMMENCE PARALLELING THE NK9. MOBILE DEFENCE POSTURE IS ASSUMED AS SECURITY/P RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS OF UP TO ONE BATTALION REMAIN IN THE KHE SANH AREA CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO DETECT ENEMY PRESENCE WILL REMAINING WITHIN RANGE OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT. ARTILLERY DISPLACES BY BATTERY POSITION TO PERMIT FIRE SUPPORT BASES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING TRANSACTIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE SECURITY/RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS REMAINING IN THE KHE SANH AREA. EMPLACEMENT OF SENSORS AND DENIAL BARRIER COMMENCES WITH DENIAL BARRIER BELT OUTSIDE OF POTENTIAL GROUND OPS AREA.

(4) PHASE IV. TACTICAL BRIDGING WEST OF CA LU IS

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REMOVED AS TRANSITIONAL MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY FORCES PARALLELING RTE NR9 IS COMPLETED. TH FORCES REMAINING IN THE KHE SANH AREA CONDUCT MOBILE OPNS, PERFORMING RECONNAISSANCE MISSION WITHIN ARTILLERY SUPPORT RANGE TO SUPPLEMENT EXTENSIVE INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS DESIGNED TO DETECT ENEMY PRESENCE AND MOVEMENT. MOBILE DEFENSE POSTURE HAS REACTION FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE SANH AREA UP TO TWO REGIMENTS IN SIZE PREPARED TO CONDUCT HELICOPTER BORNE AND HELICOPTER SUPPORTED OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DETECTED ENEMY PRESENCE. SUPPORT OF FORCES IN THE SANH AND PERMANENT FIRE BASES AS WELL AS REACTION FORCES (IF COMMITTED) IS BY HELICOPTER.

R. TASK FORCE HOTEL.

(1) DEVELOP DETAILED PLANS FOR PHASES I THRU IV.

(2) COORDINATE SELECTION OF FIVE SUPPORT BASES WITHIN SCOTLAND II AF. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASE UPON AF EXTENSION.

(3) ON ORDER. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR A EXTENSION AND OPCON OF FORCES THEREIN (COMMENCEMENT OF PHASE III)

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FORCES FOR FIRE SUPPORT BASES WITHIN AF. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF PERMANENT FIRE BASES AS AF IS EXTENDED.

(5) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY ALONG RTE NR9 FOR LOGISTIC MOVEMENT CONDUCTED (AW REF A).

(6) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE CP TO LZ STUD (OR CA LU IF LZ STUD NOT READY) IN ORDER DURING PHASE II.

C. 9TH MARINES

(1) PROVIDE INITIAL SECURITY FOR PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASE BEING CONSTRUCTED. CONSTRUCT PERIMETER DEFENSES FOR THESE BASES.

(2) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR LOGISTIC OVERHEAD ALONG RTE NR9 BEING CONDUCTED (AW UPORD 76-68).

(3) BE PREPARED TO ASSIGN OPCON OF FORCES WITHIN AN EXTENSION TO TF HOTEL. ON ORDER

(SEE OVERLAY

PHASE).

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CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION

D. 3D MARINES

(1) CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION.

E. 12TH MARINES

(1) COORDINATE WITH TF HOTEL IN DEVELOPMENT OF  
PLAN FOR ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR ALL 4 PHASES

F. OPEN LMS.

(2) SELECT SITES AND ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR  
AND ASSIST IN CONSTRUCTION OF ARTILLERY  
FACILITIES AT TWO PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASES.

THESE BASES WILL BE LOCATED WITHIN DIRECT  
SUPPORT ARTILLERY RANGE FROM CA LU AND WILL BE  
ORDINARILY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING ARTILLERY SUPPORT  
TO UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF HILL 950.

F. COORDINATE INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) PHASE I COMMENCES UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER.  
SUBSEQUENT PHASES COMMENCE ON ORDER. ESTIMATE  
TIME PHASE II COMMENCES IN MID JUNE AND PHASE III  
COMMENCES IN JULY.

(2) DURATION OF OPNS: TO BE DETERMINED

(3) AREA OF OPERATIONS: SCOTLAND 11 AF IS EXTENDED  
IN ORDER TO INCLUDE ROUTE NR 9 FROM BONG LHO  
(XD 920420) TO CA LU AND LZ STUO (SEE OV ALAAY  
PASEP).

(4) FORCES APPLICABLE

PHASE I AND PHASE II: MINIMUM OF THREE BNS

OUTLYING THE SANH HILL POSITIONS, KSR.  
AND ALONG ROUTE NR 9 IN SCOTLAND AF. ONE BN UNDER  
9TH MAR GROUP ALONG RIE NR9 (WEST OF CA LU).  
CURRENT OPNS SOUTH OF RIE NR9 IN SCOTLAND AF  
CONTINUE WITH THREE OF MORE BNS. FROM THESE  
RESOURCES, TF HOTEL AND 9TH MARINES ALSO  
PROVID SECURITY TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES.

PHASE III: UP TO ONE BN REMAINS IN THE SANH  
AREA (NOT AT KSR). OPNS SHIFT FROM SOUTH OF  
RIE NR 9 TO NORTH AND SOUTH OF RIE NR 9 FOUR OF

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MORE BNS PROVIDE SECURITY TO RIF NR9 WHILE ALSO CONDUCTING OPNS PARALLELING RIF NR9. FROM THESE RESOURCES, TF HOTEL PROVIDES SECURITY TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND SECURITY FOR REMOVAL OF TACTICAL BRIDGING.

PHASE IV: UP TO ONE BN REMAINS IN THE SANH AREA, ANOTHER BN PROVIDES SECURITY TO TWO PERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND PATROLS WEST OF CA LU. NO SECURITY FORCES ALONG RIF NR 9. REACTION FORCES OF THREE OR MORE BNS PREPARED

TO RESPOND TO DETECTED ENEMY PRESENCE IN THE SANH AREA WHILE OPNS BEING CONDUCTED IN OTHER AUs.

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(6) TF HOTEL SUBMIT SUPPORTING ARMS AND LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS TO THIS HQ VIA NORMAL CHANNELS AT EARLIEST.

(7) DIR ARTH ALCON

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. CONCEPT OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

(1) GENERAL: SEE REF B.

(2) TASK FORCE HOTEL WILL BE LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF REF C.

C. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. SEE ANNEX C (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) OF REF C.

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