

5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)  
Fleet Marine Force Pacific  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

JCA/wrm  
5750  
9 Jan 1970

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
From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 Dec 1969 to 31 Dec 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) DivO 5750.2  
(d) RegtO 5750.2

Encl: (1) 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) through (d), enclosure (1) is submitted.

  
JAMES C. ATKINS JR.

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5TH 175mm GUN BTRY

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Dec 1969

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5750  
9 Jan 1970

5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)  
Fleet Marine Force Pacific  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1-31 December 1969

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9 Jan 1970Part I  
Organizational Data1. Designation5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)  
FPO San Francisco, Calif. 96602CommanderMajor James C. ATKINS Jr.  
Commanding OfficerAttached Units

1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery

2. Location1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery  
1-31 December 1969: FSB Alpha-2, XD 21458740705th 175mm Gun Battery  
1-31 December 1969: Camp Carroll, XD 0616055068Battery Headquarters  
1-31 December 1969: Dong Ha Combat Base, XD 2305763. Staff Officers

Executive Officer, Headquarters

Capt J. J. MULHOLLAND  
1-19 Dec 69  
Capt T. E. MAC DERMANT  
20-31 Dec 69

Executive Officer, Camp Carroll

1stLt W. E. CROFT III  
1-19 Dec 69  
Capt J. J. MULHOLLAND  
20-31 Dec 69

Asst Executive Officer, Camp Carroll

1stLt R. L. BAILEY  
1-19 Dec 69  
1stLt W. E. CROFT III  
20-31 Dec 69

8 inch Howitzer Platoon Commander

Capt J. W. LUCEY  
1-31 Dec 69

Asst 8 inch Howitzer Platoon Commander

1stLt M. E. BURR  
1-31 Dec 69SECRET  
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9 Jan 1970

Staff Officers (cont)

Fire Direction Officer

1stLt J. GORTER  
1-27 Dec 69  
1stLt J. B. HATFIELD  
28-31 Dec 69

Asst Fire Direction Officer

1stLt J. B. HATFIELD  
1-27 Dec 69

Liaison Officer

1stLt J. E. MARTINELLI  
1-31 Dec 69

Maintenance &amp; Motor Transport Officer

Capt J. J. PIERATT  
1-31 Dec 69

Supply Officer

2ndLt T. J. BARRETT Jr.  
1-31 Dec 69

Battery Officer

2ndLt R. K. BLOEDAU  
1-31 Dec 69

4. Average Monthly Strength

USMC	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
12	234

USN	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	7

ARVN INTERPRETORS	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
0	2

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9 Jan 1970Part. II  
Narrative Summary

1. 5th 175mm Gun Battery received incoming on three separate occasions during December. 011248H Dec69, two 122mm rockets landed outside the wire at Camp Carroll. On 20 Dec 69, the 1st Platoon of the 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery reported receiving four mortar rounds of unknown caliber. 261145H Dec69, Camp Carroll received 12 rounds of 140mm rockets, one of which hit the battery area destroying a partially completed bunker, but causing no casualties.

On 23 Dec 69, the 5th 175mm Gun Battery was visited by Colonel D. D. EZELL, Commanding Officer of the 11th Marine Regiment.

The battery participated in Operation TASK FORCE SMITH on 28-29 Dec. The operation consisted of an artillery raid by a combined task force at Fire Support Base Elliot. Four 175mm Guns from the battery went to FSB Elliot, while the remaining platoon of guns supported from Camp Carroll (Annex A).

2.

Unit Supported	No. of Rounds	
	175mm	8"Howitzer
101st ABN	1559	-----
2d ARVN, 1stDiv	890	-----
1/5thMech	196	295
7thARVN Cav	127	311
1stARVN, 1stDiv	194	
Highrise	448	1007
TaskForceSmith	635	-----
Total Rounds	4049	1613

Number of missions fired: 447/8 inch  
611/175mm

Surveillance was minimal due to rain and lack of observation and in addition, many SID's were fired without observation. Surveillances received stated one truck and one .50 cal. machine gun were destroyed; 25 bunkers destroyed; 2 structures destroyed and 1 day camp, as well as many trench lines, both uncovered and destroyed.

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9 Jan 1970Part III  
Sequential Listing of Significant Events1. Topics.a. Personnel and Administration

	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
(1) Losses				
Administration	2	18	0	1
(2) Replacements	3	25	0	1
(3) Net Gain	1	7	0	0

## b. Intelligence: current INTSUMS

## c. Organization and Operations

(1) Units of this battery participated in one operation during the month of December.

(a) Operation TASK FORCE SMITH. 28-29 Dec 69 APPENDIX I. The battery expended 635 rounds in 90 missions. The surveillances are listed in APPENDIX I.

(2) In addition, the battery supported from present positions, many operations in support of 1/5thMech, 101stAbn, 2dARVN and 7th ARVN, as well as Operation Highrise. These units were each supported almost on a daily basis.

d. Training: Informal on-the-job training was conducted in all areas of the battery on a daily basis throughout December. The unit also conducted fam-firing, FDC classes and firing battery drill

e. Logistics and Supply: Relations with FLC in Danang were established, assuming a RUC line at 15th Aerial Port, Quang Tri. The ISSA drawn up between III MAF and the Army has relieved difficulties in dealing with 63d Maintenance and 625th Supply. Supply was inspected by a 1st Marine Division Team and a rating of satisfactory with discrepancies was received.

f. Civic Action/Civil Affairs: 4 MedCaps were held, two in the village of Thiet Trang and two near Cam Lo. A total of 450 people were treated and some medical supplies were given to a local priest to assist in the treatment of Plague. On Christmas Day, members of the battery visited Dong Ha Orphanage, where the children were presented with gifts contributed by battery personnel.

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9 Jan 1970Topics (Cont)

g. Psychological Operations: N/A

2. Entries.

1 December 1969

Received two (2) 122mm rockets  
at Camp Carroll. Negative damage.

20 December 1969

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-2 received  
four (4) unknown type mortar  
rounds. Negative damage.

23 December 1969

CO, 11th Marines, Colonel D. D.  
EZELL and party visited Dong Ha,  
Alpha-2 and Camp Carroll.

26 December 1969

Twelve (12) incoming rounds of  
140mm rockets hit Camp Carroll.  
One rocket damaged a living bunker.  
No casualties.

28-29 December 1969

175mm Guns participated in TASK  
FORCE SMITH, sending four guns  
to FSB Elliot with remaining two  
guns supporting operations from  
Camp Carroll.~~SECRET~~  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~INDEX - AFTER ACTION REPORT TF SMITH~~**SECRET**

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Appendix 1



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Enclosure 1

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE ARTILLERY RAID

1. GENERAL SUMMARY: This inclosure discusses the sequence followed by this headquarters in planning and preparing for the artillery raid.

a. Requirement was levied by 108th Group HQ to prepare an OPLAN to implement a battalion artillery raid. This OPLAN was prepared by 21 December and presented to the 108th Group CO on 22 December. Original guidance was to plan only for an 8" howitzer platoon to conduct the raid.

b. On 23 December, a verbal warning order was issued by the battalion commander to the battalion staff to prepare for implementation of the raid OPLAN as written. No specifics were provided to the battalion commander concerning the projected location of the raid or the units and resources that would be available to conduct the raid. The date of the raid was set at 27 December.

c. The artillery composition of the task force was changed on 24 December to add a 175MM gun platoon to the original 8" howitzer platoon. This did not cause any significant change in planning requirements except that the procurement, transportation, and resupply of 175MM ammunition now had to be added to the logistical requirements in the OPLAN. The task force tactical organization was merely enlarged to include a 175MM gun platoon.

d. On 25 December, the guidance for the artillery organization of the task force was again changed to include four 8" howitzers and four 175MM guns. This caused significant changes in task force organization and scheduling fires due to the doubled tactical force. Doubled maintenance and logistical requirements required an element from the direct support maintenance facility be attached to the task force. At this time there was still no information available as to what resources or units would be made available to fulfill requirements of OPLAN (security, observation, external artillery and logistical support).

e. Another request was made on 26 Dec for information concerning units and resources available for support of arty raid so that some coordination could be made by the task force staff. At 1000 hrs, this unit was informed by 108th Gp HQ that they would assume command and coordination of the artillery raid. The date for the raid was changed to 28 December. This unit was informed that its only responsibility would be to provide the required 8" howitzer element. At 2200 hrs this unit was notified that it would again assume responsibility for command and control of the artillery raid. The artillery composition was changed to include four 175MM guns, four 8" howitzers, four 155MM howitzers, and two 105MM howitzers. Information was also provided that the artillery raid would be a combined US-ARVN operation. Also, designation of units to be in task force was specified. The battalion commander held a staff briefing and the OPCR was published at 0500 hrs, 27 December.

f. At 1300 hrs on 27 December, the artillery organization was again changed. The modified task force organization was four 175MM guns and four 155MM howitzers. Later at 1500 hrs, the battalion commander conducted a briefing for task force elements at Camp Carroll.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****2. STRONG POINTS:**

a. The original plan was detailed and complete. It was sound enough to withstand several significant changes and still be implemented as 8/4 OPOD 7-69 basically as written.

b. The planning provided for necessary double checks to insure the completeness of preparation and the success of execution.

c. The plan evolved from a 12 hour, totally US force 8" howitzer platoon size raid to a 48 hour, combined US-ARVN operation involving four 175MM guns and four 155MM howitzers as well as a battalion sized ARVN infantry element and other supporting units, and still insured a successful operation with 34 hours notice.

d. A coordination meeting was held at 1500 hrs 27 December at Camp Carroll which enabled the CO 1/5 Mech to detail the security force operation and enabled all participating personnel to confirm or change operating procedures. Eye to eye contact was made among commanders of participating forces and guidance was received from senior commanders. Operation order and SOI's were distributed to all personnel. This meeting was the key to the entire operation.

**3. WEAK POINTS:**

a. Units to be involved in artillery raid were not specified early enough to enable adequate coordination with all elements.

b. Coordination meeting was not held with all rear logistical and support elements provided for in 8/4 OPOD 7-69.

c. Visual air reconnaissance and surveillance was not planned in sufficient detail to provide for close coverage and coordination over the target area.

d. ARVN artillery elements were not brought into the operation early enough to assist in the initial planning of the operation.

**4. GENERAL DISCUSSION:**

a. Offensive fire planning: A time phased schedule of fires was received from higher headquarters which required the firing of targets 10 minutes apart which were on consistently different azimuths of lay. This list was reworked and targets grouped by azimuth of lay. This enabled the designation of blocks of targets to facilitate firing. Heavy artillery pieces were able to hit all targets in a group from one azimuth of lay which would considerably speed the firing of the targets. All grids were submitted for clearance by block designation prior to the commencement of the operation.

b. Defensive fire planning: The original OPLAN called for an artillery prep of the firing position. When the plan was modified to provide for an ARVN infantry element to secure the fire base the day before the operation was to begin, this prep was eliminated. Defensive targets along the route of march and around the fire base were planned and the firing unit designated.

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c. Fire coordination planning: All grids to be fired, both offensive and defensive, were planned to be submitted for clearance prior to the operation. The plan was to submit these grids to 5/4 Arty for appropriate clearance so that fires would be free for task force direction. All grids west of YD00 grid line were cleared by 2nd ARVN Regt prior to the commencement of the operation. The grids were not cleared by 5/4 Arty as planned. Plans for clearing of fires from ECB required that a small FSOC with AWCC be established at ECB. This FSOC would be in contact with all forces in the target area and with all firing elements. The final clearance to fire all targets regardless of all other clearance would come from this FSOC at ECB. Air warning data would be posted at the ECB AWCC. Air warning data of all fires coming from the east of YD00 grid line would be posted with Red Devil Arty.

d. Fire direction: All units were to be fired through their own FDC's in accordance with the schedule of fire. XXIV Corps Artillery SOP requires that three checks be made of all firing data. Therefore, a forward FDC was planned to accomplish the primary and secondary checks and the third check would be accomplished by the 8/4 Bn FDC located at Dong Ha for all US units firing from ECB. The third check for US units firing from other locations would be accomplished by the 8/4 Bn FDC at Dong Ha.

e. Logistics: Emergency air resupply was planned for Class I, Class III and Class V. This was prepositioned at this headquarters and was rigged for immediate air pick-up if needed. Parts problems were projected and a basic load of spare parts was carried with the task force. Also, a maintenance element from the direct support maintenance organization was attached to the task force for any necessary higher echelon maintenance service.

f. Ground forces: A security element was planned for the road march as well as the firing position. The position was secured the day before the operation commenced and ground security forces remained in position during the entire occupation. Provision was made for road sweep of the entire route of march both before initial occupation and before return march. A react force was also constituted and remained on stand-by during the operation. The perimeter defense was manned by ARVN infantry forces involved in the operation as well as Cav forces and M55's and M42al's.

g. Operations: A command post would be established at ECB for direct control of the entire operation. A rear command post was maintained at Dong Ha to provide a point of continuous contact for rear elements and to provide a secondary means of control. All logistical supplies and ARA would be staged at the rear CP to improve response to requirements and facilitate communications.

h. Arty forces: 175MM guns were planned to engage distant targets along the Laotian border from the DMZ on the north and as far south as range capability would permit. These were augmented by 155MM howitzers to provide an intermediate range capability. External artillery support of ECB was to be provided by 105MM howitzers for close in defensive fires around the fire base as well as along the route of fire. 8" and 175MM weapons located at FSB's Carroll and C2 were also on call for defensive fires.

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## 4. Communication planning:

(1) A task force SOI was prepared and distributed to all participating personnel at 1600 hrs 27 December 1969.

(2) The TF command net was planned to be opened at 1000 hrs 28 Dec and all participating personnel would enter this net.

(3) The following radio nets were planned for the operation:

- (a) TF command net
- (b) Fire direction net
- (c) Grid clearance and fire coordination
- (d) Air control
- (e) Air warning
- (f) Air Cav control
- (g) Base defense
- (h) Convoy and movement control
- (i) TD secure net
- (j) One spare frequency

(4) Emergency signals and warning were included in the SOI

(5) Plans required twelve radio sets, three antennae sets RC 292 and one log periodic antennae be used to support the TF.

(6) Nestor equipment was planned for use for convoy movement but it was determined that security forces and support units traveling with the TF did not have this equipment. Therefore this plan was cancelled.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That ARVN forces be brought into the operation during the initial planning stage.

b. That participating forces be tasked by appropriate levels of command to facilitate planning, coordination and preparation of orders for the operation.

c. That the security and extracting forces plans be prepared and coordinated along with the initial artillery plan.

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INCL 1

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Inclosure 2

EXECUTION OF THE ARTILLERY RAID

1. **COMMAND AND CONTROL:** This operation was executed essentially as planned in operation order 7-69. The major exception was that the TF commander did not have command of all US forces participating in the raid. This deviation created no significant problems since all participating forces operated a radio on the TF command net, liaison was established between all units and all units were familiar with the overall plan of the operation.

2. Command and control was provided initially by direct communication between the TF commander and the commander of the US forces tasked with the responsibility for clearing and securing the route of march and the position area. When the security of the position at ECB was nearing completion the deputy TF commander with the TF reconnaissance party was moved to the forward area. The TF commander established a rear CP at Camp Carroll in order to have direct access to all participating artillery units. When reconnaissance of the position was completed by the deputy TF commander, the artillery batteries advanced parties were displaced forward to ECB. Artillery survey was initiated at this time in order to establish exact location and common direction for all firing elements. Shortly after departure of the battery reconnaissance parties, the artillery weapons were displaced forward. The move was orderly and both batteries moved into position and prepared to fire on targets designated by the schedule of fires. TF commander's CP was then displaced to ECB and all facilities were established to control the operation as follows:

a. The TF deputy CO reverted to the TF S-3.

b. Forward FDC was set up with FADAC to compute and check firing data for the 5/175 gun battery and to check data for other artillery batteries firing in support of the operation.

c. Operation center was set up to control the firing portion of the exercise. Liaison officers from ARVN firing battery, Air Cav were located in the operation center with the TF S-3. The Air Cav liaison officer provided impact clearance for all targets in the 101st ABN Division reconnaissance zone and coordinated gunships and visual observation with the artillery.

d. TF command post was established to control the entire operation. The air warning control center (AWCC) and liaison officers from ARVN and US security forces and the ARA liaison officer were located at the TF CP.

e. Communications: all planned radio nets were established. A switchboard was set up and land lines from security forces, firing batteries, TD FDC and TF CP were installed. Direct lines were laid between TF CP and FDC to facilitate communications between AWCC, TF S-3, Cav and ARA liaison officers.

f. At 1415 hrs both command posts were established, firing data was checked and was completed for the first block of targets for each battery. Clearance was also received.

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g. At 1428, B/34 (ARVN) fired the first round of the exercise. The entire firing exercise was conducted in accordance with the schedule of fire as shown in OPORD 7-69 with the exception of the 5/175 gun battery. This exception dealt only with time lags due to malfunction of the guns from time to time. However, 3d echelon ordnance technicians from the 178th Maintenance were on the spot and assisted in keeping the guns up.

h. The method of attacking targets were planned in target blocks. A direction was determined to the center of a group of targets and the artillery weapons were laid on that direction. All targets within the block could be fired w/o shifting trails. Block targeting facilitated control of the air space over the objective area and integration of ARA with cannon artillery. When the aircraft pilot arrived in the area air data was posted after which time the ARA liaison officer (seated next to AWCC officer) gave the pilot target block to be engaged. When the aircraft were over the object area the specific target was specified to the pilot. ARA and gunship pilots were furnished with the entire schedule of fires. While the artillery engaged targets to the northwest, ARA engaged targets to the west and southwest. Plans were made to switch ARA and cannon artillery but weather did not permit aircraft flights in the northwest portion of the objective area.

i. Firing was continuous throughout the night and there were no accidents or incidents reported. The entire operation was executed smoothly and efficiently. All personnel were enthusiastic and displayed a sense of urgency.

j. Fire support coordination was accomplished by the following personnel:

- |                                       |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| (1) S3, 8/4                           | Deputy task force commander and fire support coordinator |
| (2) Asst S3, 8/4                      | Assistant fire support coordinator                       |
| (3) Ops NCO, 8/4                      | NCOIC  |
| (4) LNO, 2/17 Ca,<br>101st Abn Div    | Ground clearance   |
| (5) LNO, C/4/77 ARA,<br>101st Abn Div | ARA Control  |
| (6) LNO, 108th Group                  | Airclearance and AWCC                                    |
| (7) LNO, B/34                         | ARVN Liaison   |

Once set up there were no significant problems in the execution of the fire support coordination function. Point of origin clearances were obtained through 108th Group S3 prior to the start of the operation. Point of impact clearances were given by LNO, 2/17 Cav for 101st Abn Div recon zone and by 2nd ARVN Regt through 108th Arty Gp LNO for 2nd ARVN AC. Air warning was posted with AWCC at Elliott and Red Devil Arty.

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k. Metro: Metro data was received from 8/4 metro section at Camp Carroll. There was no problem in receipt and passing of metro data to both batteries of task force Smith.

3. **STRONG POINTS:**

a. The scheduling of fires by blocks and target numbers facilitated every aspect of target engagement and fire support coordination. This method facilitated air space control and coordination as well as ARA utilization. Further, it simplified grid clearance and communications concerning firing. Most importantly it enabled coordinated and efficient heavy artillery attack of targets by eliminating the necessity to consistently relay the weapons.

b. The use of ARA to engage targets and to give visual recon aided significantly in complete coverage of the task force targets.

c. The schedule of fires was flexible enough to allow targets of opportunity to be engaged.

4. **WEAK POINT:** The ability to observe the fires was extremely restricted by the weather. Except for a portion of the missions fired by the ARA, there was no damage assessment.

4. **DISCUSSION:** None

5. **RECOMMENDATION:** That targeting for future artillery raids be designated by blocks.

TABS:

- A. Summary of firing
- B. Map designating block scheduling
- C. Extract from staff journal
- D. ARA Surveillance
- E. Initial OPLAN
- F. Initial OPGORD

INCL 2

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AB A, INCL 1, AFTER ACTION REPORT, T. SM. FORCE SMITH

UNITS FIRING BY BLOCKS-NUMBER OF RDS FIRED PER-BLOCK

<u>BLOCK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO OF RDS</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION FIRED FROM</u>
1	5/175 guns	94	1430	Elliott
2	5/175 guns	144	1718	Elliott
3	5/175 guns	84	2050	Elliott
	5/175 guns RV 59280/URS 853/280	6	2352	Elliott
4	5/175 guns	48	0010	Elliott
5	5/175 guns	32	0245	Elliott
6	5/175 guns	63	0513	Elliott
7	5/175 guns	60	0734	Elliott
8	A/8/4 8"	36	1709	Camp Carroll
9	A/8/4	12	1810	Camp Carroll
10	A/8/4	196	2400	Camp Carroll
11	ARVN 155T	72	1428	Elliott
12	ARVN 155T	48	1708	Elliott
13	ARVN 155T	20	1908	Elliott
14	ARVN 155T	120	2008	Elliott
15	ARVN 155T	84	0420	Elliott
16	ARVN 155T	60	0628	Elliott
17	5/175 guns	32	1540	Camp Carroll
18	5/175 guns	32	1820	Camp Carroll
19	5/175 guns	12	2120	Camp Carroll
20	5/175 guns	14	0020	Camp Carroll
21	B/8/4 guns	40	1530	C-2
		TOTAL	1309 rds	

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C/6/33

DEF CONS

23 rds

ARA C/4/77 171b RKT

84 rds

ARA C/4/77 101b RKT

115 rds

40 MM

490 rds

7.62 mini gun

2100 rds

TOTAL 2812 rds

TAB A INCL 2 (Con't)

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**CONFIDENTIAL**BLOCK LOCATIONS


1. Near southwestern boundary of DMZ
2. Southeast of Khe Sanh, 1 K north of Laos
3. Southeast of Co Roc near Laotian border in South Vietnam
4. North of Co Roc near Laotian border in South Vietnam
5. West of Khe Sanh near Laos
6. North of block #5
7. On and south of southwestern boundary of DMZ near Laos
8. In 9360 grid on Cam Lo River
9. West of Calu near the Calu and Chio mountains
10. In the Ba Long Valley and bordering hills near Calu
11. In 8261 grid on Cam Lo River
12. Same place as block #8
13. South of Calu and Chio mountains on the Quang Tri River
14. Same place as block #10
15. In and around Calu on and around Highway 9 and Quang Tri River
16. 3 K's south Ke Soc Mt. on Trinh Hin River west of Rockpile
17. South of Khe Sanh and Dang Mt. and north of route 9
18. South of Khe sanh and Juong Joa and running east and south of highway 9
19. Near 7750 grid
20. South of Calu near Laos
21. On and in DMZ running 2 K's north and 3 K's south of southern boundary near Luhu on 8465 grid

TAB 3 INCL 2

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DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.				PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 1	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
Task Force Smith		FSB Elliott	FROM		TO	
			HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
			0001	28 Dec 69	2400	28 Dec 69
M	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS	
	IN	OUT				
1	0625		Opened log for Task Force Smith			
2	0630		MS started from FSB Elliott			
3	0920		MS completed at CP 70			
4	0930		TF CP departed Dong Ha			
5	1020		TF CP arrived CP 70			
6	1021		TF CP departed CP 70			
7	1100		B/34 recon party departed Camp Carroll			
8	1115		5/175 recon party departed Camp Carroll			
9	1200		TF CP arrived FSB Elliott			
10	1200		B/34 recon arrived FSB Elliott			
11	1210		5/175 recon arrived FSB Elliott			
12	1215		B/34 guns departed Camp Carroll			
13	1230		5/175 guns departed Camp Carroll			
14	1250		B/34 last gun arrived FSB Elliott			
15	1310		5/175 last gun arrived FSB Elliott			
16	1330		5/175 laid and ready to fire			
17	1340		B/34 laid and ready to fire			
18	1428		B/34 fired first round			
19	1430		5/175 fired first round			
20	1445		5/175 gun #3 went down			
21	2400		close log			


TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY COURTNEY E. PRISK, MAJ, FA	SIGNATURE 
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1 NOV 62

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DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.				PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2	
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED			
Task Force Smith		FSB Elliott	FROM		TO	
			HOUR	DATE	HOUR	
			0001	29 Dec 69	1200 29 Dec 69	
M	TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.		ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
	IN	OUT				
1	0001		Opened log			
2	0145		5/175 has 1 gun up and 3 guns down		Controlled can-	
			1 for elevation gear stripped		nibulation to	
			1 for nitrogen leak		repaired guns	
			1 for ESC tube life			
3	0300		5/175 3 guns up for firing			
4	0500		5/175 2 guns up; 1 down for elevation motor			
			frozen			
5	0710		5/175 1 gun up; 1 down for hydraulic problem			
6	0725		Mine sweep departed Elliott			
7	0750		Mine sweep at CP 75			
8	0804		MS found canister w/det cord 100 meters			
			north of CP 75; dest in place; res crater			
			2 1/2 ft dia, 6 ft deep			
9	0920		MS completed at CP 70 returning to FSB			
			Elliott			
10	0940		MS returned to FSB Elliott			
11	0950		B/34 departed Elliott for Carroll			
12	1000		5/175 completed firing			
13	1020		5/175 departed Elliott for Carroll			
14	1030		IF CP departed Elliott for Deng Ha			
15	1050		B/34 closed at Carroll			
16	1110		5/175 closed at Carroll			
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY			SIGNATURE			
COURTNEY E. PRISK, MAJ, FA						

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DA FORM 1594  
1 NOV 62

GPO: 1968 O-243  
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**CONFIDENTIAL**ARA SURVEILLANCE

## GRID

## SURVEILLANCE

XD 835212

4 hooches destroyed w/secondary explosion

XD 834210

engaged bunker complex

XD 905236

2 hooches destroyed

XD 918176

1 hooch destroyed

XD 765272

3 hooches destroyed

XD 784286

2 construction sites damaged

YD 030414

1 hooch destroyed

YD 042431

1 anchored sampan destroyed

YD 071433

1 hooch destroyed

YD 042422

1 shelter destroyed

YD 025425

1 hooch destroyed

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D-INCL 2

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Copy No. 5 of 30 Copies  
 HQ, 8th Bn, 4th Arty  
 Dong Ha, RVN  
 270300H Dec 1969

OPORD 7-69 (U)

Reference: Map Vietnam: 1:50,000 Cam Lo, Sheet 63421

Task Organization: Annex A, Task Organization.

1. (C) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM
- b. Friendly Forces: Current SITREP. No concurrent operations planned.
- c. Attachments. See Annex A, Task Organization.

2. (C) MISSION. Task Force Smith displaces on order on 28 Dec west of Camp Carroll to conduct a 48 hour artillery raid on preplanned targets.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation: (Annex B, Operation Overlay; Annex C, Artillery Raid Schedule of Fires). This operation involves the movement of an artillery Task Force to the west along QL 9 to Elliot Combat Base to conduct an artillery raid in the western sector of Northern I Corps. ARVN forces will secure LZ Elliot and surrounding terrain prior to EENT on 27 Dec. Three concurrent road sweeps will commence on 28 Dec to clear route of march from Dong Ha Combat Base and Camp Carroll to LZ Elliot prior to the movement of Task Force Smith. 3/5 Cav and 1/44 Arty will position fixed road security during progress of road sweep from Khe Gio Bridge to LZ Elliot in order to secure Task Force Smith during movement. Task Force Smith will echelon forward on order to occupy LZ Elliot.

b. Task Force Smith (-)

- (1) Displace by echelon from Camp Carroll on order.
- (2) Road march to preplanned fire base to conduct artillery raid.
- (3) Depart fire base on order for road march back to Camp Carroll.

c. 1/2 INF (ARVN)

- (1) Secure LZ Elliot prior to EENT, 27 Dec 69.
- (2) Assist 3/5 Cav and 1/44 Arty in providing road security between Khe Gio Bridge and LZ Elliot.
- (3) Displace 1 Company from Dong Ha Combat Base at 280700 Dec as road sweep from DHCB to Cam Lo. Occupy high ground to SE of LZ Elliot.
- (4) Provide perimeter defense for duration of raid.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 OOD OIR 5289.16

PLAN (Cont)

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(5) Extract from fire base on order.

d. 3/5 Cav, 1 Plt

(1) Depart Cam Lo at 230700 hours Dec with 14th Engineer Bn road sweep team to sweep QL 9 to check point 70.

(2) Link up with ARVN road sweep team from Camp Carroll at check-point 70.

(3) Continue road sweep to LZ Elliot.

(4) Utilize APC's to establish fixed security posts along QL 9 from Khe Gio Bridge to LZ Elliot in coordination with 1/44 Arty.

(5) Two M-60 tanks will accompany road sweep team into LZ Elliot to assume perimeter defense posts.

(6) Withdraw fixed security posts to LZ Elliot as ordered and reinforce perimeter defense.

(7) Provide road security for Task Force Smith return road march.

e. 5th 175 Guns. (175MM), 2 Plts

(1) Displace 2 plts and 4 ammunition vehicles as 3rd echelon of Task Force Smith.

(2) Displace 3 vehicle advance party as attachment to 2nd echelon, Task Force Smith.

(3) Fire pre-planned targets of artillery raid.

f. A/8/4 (8")

(1) Displace unit plus 4 ammunition vehicles as 2nd echelon of Task Force Smith.

(2) Displace 3 vehicle advance party as attachment to 1st echelon, Task Force Smith.

(3) Fire pre-planned targets of artillery raid.

g. B/34 Arty (155T), 2 plts.

(1) Displace 2 plts as 1st echelon of Task Force Smith.

(2) Fire pre-planned targets of artillery raid.

h. A/6/33 (105T), 1 Plt

(1) Displace 1 platoon as 4th echelon of Task Force Smith.

(2) Displace 2 vehicle advance party as attachment to 3rd echelon, Task Force Smith.

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(3) Fire pre-planned targets of artillery raid operating with FDC, S/4 as secondary data check,

i. 1/44 Arty, 2 sqds, M42A1 and M55 Combined.

(1) Provide security for RVN infantry company departing Dong Ha Combat Base at 280700 Dec as road sweep of QL 9 from DHCB to Cam Lo.

(2) Establish fixed road security posts along QL9 from Khe Gio Bridge to LZ Elliot in coordination with 3/5 Cav.

(3) Withdraw fixed security posts to LZ Elliot on order and reinforce perimeter defense.

(4) Provide road security for Task Force Smith return road march.

*Div Arty 101st*

j. *in GS-R 8/4<sup>th</sup> Arty*  
~~3/101 Airborne Div (AM), ARA, 1 section remain on 15 minute stand-by~~

k. 14th Eng Bn, 1 Sweep team

(1) Conduct road sweep of QL 9 from Cam Lo to check-point 70.

(2) Continue sweep to LZ Elliot and sweep entire LZ in preparation for arrival of Task Force Smith.

l. 108th Gp, 2AOs. Provide aerial recon and observation to Task Force Smith.

m. Artillery

(1) Provide artillery coverage for preplanned targets along route of march.

(2) Be prepared to fire on call targets for defense of fire base.

(3) Annex D, Arty Support Plan.

n. Support

(1) XXIV Corps

(a) Provide 1 CH-47 and one CH-54 with full crews on 15 minute standby for emergency resupply capability.

(b) Paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

(2) HQ/8/4. Paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

(3) All units will be responsible for organic support except as specified in paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

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o. Reserve. 2nd Arvn Regt will provide react force on 15 minute stand-by

p. Coordinating Instructions

(1) 2nd ARVN Regt will provide an english speaking officer to act as liaison for CO, Task Force Smith with 3/2 Inf (ARVN).

(2) All artillery units will utilize MET message broadcast from 8/4 Arty MET Station at Camp Carroll. Times of broadcast: 0900, 1500, 2100, 0300; frequency: 75.15; Call Sign: Aged Sizes 66.

(3) 6/34 Arty (ARVN), 5th 175 Guns will run independent FDCs. A/8/4 and A/6/33 will check data with Bn FDC, 8/4 Arty.

(4) Communications during movement will be by secure mode.

#### 4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

(1) Class I.

(a) C-rations sufficient for 2 days : will be carried.

(b) Emergency resupply will be effected from organic unit resources.

(c) Coordination may be effected with 8/4 for prepositioning of class 1 at Love Field for air pick-up.

(d) 101st Airborne Div (AM) will provide rigging equipment.

(e) Resupply will be effected from CP/8/4 by CH-47.

(2) Classes II & IV: No additions or deletions.

(3) Class III.

(a) All vehicles will be topped off prior to 280700 Dec.

(b) All vehicles will utilize organic load carrying capability to fullest extent.

(c) 8/4 will preposition 300 gallons of diesel and 100 gallons of mogas completely rigged for air pick-up at Love Field, CP/8/4, by CH-47.

(4) Class V.

(a) All individuals will carry double basic load.

(b) All automatic weapons will have double basic load.

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(c) A/8/4 will displace by organic means 300 rounds, 5th 175 Guns will displace 600 rounds by organic means. 6/34 Arty (ARVN) will displace \_\_\_\_\_ rounds by organic means, and A/6/33 will displace 150 HE, 30 beehive, and 60 Illum. by organic means.

(d) 8/4 will preposition 10,000 rounds 5.56MM, 10,000 rounds 7.62MM, 6000 rounds .50 Cal., 1000 rounds 40MM, 100 frag grenades, M26 at Love Field, CP/8/4 rigged for air pick-up. Also 150 rounds 8" and 200 rounds 175MM will be prepositioned for air pick-up at Love Field.

(e) 101st Airborne Div (AM) will provide rigging equipment

(f) Emergency resupply will be effected from CP/8/4 by CH-54 and units may coordinate with 8/4 Arty for prepositioning ammunition for air pick-up.

(g) Eight ammunition (8"/175MM) vehicles will be prepositioned at Camp Carroll. The remaining loaded vehicles will echelon forward from Dong Ha Combat Base after 280700 Dec to Camp Carroll to stand by for resupply as needed.

#### b. Services

##### (1) Maintenance

(a) Units will displace with organic maintenance capability.

(b) Maintenance Task Force personnel from 178th Maintenance Company will displace with trail party.

(c) Two trail parties will be constituted.

(1) Trail party for 2nd echelon will consist of M68, abd M62 directed by motor officer, 8/4 Arty.

(2) Trail party for 3rd echelon will consist of M51 and M62 with maintenance Task Force personnel with shop van.

(2) Medical services. Medevac will be available through "Glossy Pinner," primary freq: 47.40; alternate freq: 46.90.

#### 5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

##### a. Signal

(1) Unit SOI in effect for internal control of major elements.

(2) Task Force Smith SOI in effect for control and coordination of major elements in the Task Force.

(3) The following cyphers are in effect: AKAK 8159G, KAC-PE 257/TSEC, and KAC-QE 655/TSEC.

(4) Commanders of all major elements are required to operate in the Task Force Command Net.

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(5) Task Force Command Net Control will be Rainy stoner 16, Bn FDC, 8/4 Arty.

(6) Units possessing Nestor equipment will utilize the equipment to the fullest extent possible to include during road movement for convoy control. Rainy stoner 16, Bn FDC, 8/4 Arty will be NCS for this net. A secure frequency has been provided for this use in Task Force Smith SOI.

## b. Command

(1) Bn CO, 8/4 Arty will command Task Force Smith.

(2) CP, Task Force Smith will be at Camp Carroll until approximately 281000 hrs Dec when it will displace to LZ Elliot.

(3) Report SP and all check points.

Acknowledge.

SMITH  
LTC

ANNEXES: /A - Task Organization  
/B - Operation Overlay  
/C - Artillery Raid Schedule of Fires  
/D - Artillery Support Plan

DISTRIBUTION: 2 ea element, Task Force Smith

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Annex A (Task Organization) to OPORD 7-69--Task Force Smith

Task Force Smith

Inf (ARVN)

3/5 Cav, 1 plt

5th 175 Guns (175MM), 2 plts

A/8/4 (8")

Arty (155T) (ARVN), 2 plts

A/6/33 (105T), 1plt

1/44 Arty, 2 sqds, M42A1 and M55 combined.

3/101st Airborne Div (AM), ARA, 1 section

14th Eng, 1 sweep team

108th Gp, 2 AOs

Task Force Smith Artillery

B/8/4 (175MM)

C/6/33 (105T)

A/62 (105T) (ARVN)


Task Force Smith Support

XXIV Corps

8/4 Arty

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 ANNEX B (OPERATION OVERLAY) TO OPORD 0-69 -- TF SMITH  
 REFERENCE: MAP, VIETNAM: 1:50,000 CAM LO, SHEET 63421



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Annex C (Schedule of fires) to OPOD 7-69 Task Force Smith.

1. 5th 175MM Gun Self Propelled  
Azimuth of fire 5050

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
H+0 hrs	XD689622	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD715608	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD745640	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD743627	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD678657	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD677640	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD682629	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD677621	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD679609	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD688651	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD691661	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
H+3 hrs				

Block  
ONE

Azimuth of fire 3500

H+3 hrs	XD902268	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD903267	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD899241	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD905237	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD919239	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD902230	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD903233	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD892259	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD894244	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD901236	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD902268	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD903267	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD899241	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD905237	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD919239	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD902230	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD903233	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD894244	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
H+9 hrs				

Block  
Two

Azimuth of fire 3800

H+9 hrs	XD787297	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD783302	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD784296	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD848286	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD851296	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD855294	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD848286	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
H+11 hrs				

Block  
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Annex C (Schedule of fires) to OPORD 7-69 Task Force Smith.

## Azimuth of fire 4150

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
H+11 hrs	XD756408	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD758408	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD734376	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD740340	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD788358	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD758408	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
H+13 hrs				

} BLOCK  
4

## Azimuth of fire 4400

H+13 hrs	XD749439	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD711471	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD692440	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD711471	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD719413	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
	XD711471	Q&D	1 Zone 2 qe	8
H+15 hrs				

} BLOCK  
5

## Azimuth of fire 4700

H+15 hrs	XD686645	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD686555	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD735530	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD739509	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD671529/672529	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD671529	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
H+17 hrs				

} BLOCK 6

## Azimuth of fire 5100

H+17 hrs	XD678657	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD682629	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD677621	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD679609	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD688651	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD691661	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
H+19 hrs				

} BLOCK 7

total rounds expended 600

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Annex C (Schedule of fires) to OPOD 7-69 Task Force Smith

## 2. A Btry, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery

~~Azimuth of Fire 5500~~

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
H+0 hrs	XD887617	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD880623	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD881618	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD892612	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD892621	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12

H+2hrs40min

~~Azimuth of Fire 5500~~ <sup>5200</sup>

H+2hrs40min	XD930608	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD934608	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD935606	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD835604	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12

H+2hrs40min

~~Azimuth of Fire 5500~~

H+1hr20min	XD943464	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	XD928415	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12

H+1hr20min

~~Azimuth of Fire 5500~~

H+6 hrs	YD030453	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD032448	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD035452	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD020441	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD036434	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD038431	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD060461	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD051429	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD065431	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD072410	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD024444	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD025444	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12
	YD088459	Q&D	1 Zone 3 qe	12

H+12hrs30min

total rounds expended 288

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Annex C (Schedule of Fires) to OPORD 7-69 Task Force Smith.

4. 6/33 105 towed

Azimuth of Fire 4900

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
H+0 hrs	XD960554	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
	XD953547	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
	XD955554	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
	XD965559	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
H+2hr40min				

Azimuth of Fire 370 &amp; 2600

H+2hr40min	XD930608	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
	XD934608	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18
	XD935606	Q&D	plt 3 3 qe	18

total rounds expended 126

30 rounds of bee hive will be kept on hand for emergency use.

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Annex C (Schedule of Fires) OPORD 7-69 Task Force Smith.  
5 tft 175 firing from Camp Carroll

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
------	------	------	----------------	------------------

## Azimuth of Fire 4300

Block 17	H+0 hrs	XD793406	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD793415	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD795404	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD793394	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD821401	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD845393	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD822386	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD821376	Q&D	plt 2	4
H+4 hrs					

## Azimuth of Fire 4100

18	H+4 hrs	XD862394	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD873394	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD841381	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD855384	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD854384	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD871382	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD895376	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD883362	Q&D	plt 2	4
H+7 hrs					

## Azimuth of Fire 4650

19	H+7 hrs	XD785502	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD780501	Q&D	plt 2	4
		XD769501	Q&D	plt 2	4
H+8 hrs					

## Azimuth of Fire 3500

20	H+8 hrs	XD011338	Q&D	plt 1	2
		YD008332	Q&D	plt 1	2
		YD008322	Q&D	plt 1	2
		YD011302	Q&D	plt 1	2
		YD016302	Q&D	plt 1	2
		YD991333	Q&D	plt 1	2
		XD985328	Q&D	plt 1	2
		XD981301	Q&D	plt 1	2
		XD987304	Q&D	plt 1	2
		XD994339	Q&D	plt 1	2
	XD995316	Q&D	plt 1	2	
H+15 hrs					

total rounds expended 98

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Annex C (Schedule of Fires) to OPORD 7-69 Task Force Smith.

6 B Btry, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery C-2

Azimuth of Fire 4700

Time	Grid	Fuse	Method of Fire	Ammo expenditure
H+0 hrs	XD828643	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD821634	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD826617	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD834630	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD836665	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD844631	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD840640	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD843667	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD844647	Q&D	Btry 1	4
	XD853659	Q&D	Btry 1	4
H+2 hrs				

total rounds expended 40

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## Annex D (Fire Support Plan) To OPOD 7-69 -- Task Force Smith

## 1. Organization

B/8/4 (175MM), FSB C-2

C/6/33 (105T), FSB Fuller

A/62 (105T)(ARVN), FSB Sarge

2. Mission: All elements of Task Force Smith Artillery will be in direct support of Task Force Smith.

## 3. Execution

a. Concept of Operation. All defensive targets and on-call convoy defensive targets will be cleared to fire prior to EENT, 27 Dec. and will remain on call for the duration of the operation. Priority of fire to infantry security force until 280700 Dec 69.

## b. Convoy defensive targets

## (1) C/6/33 (105T)

XF1050	YD0212	5570
XF1051	YD0188	5629
XF1052	YD0153	5636
XF1053	YD0082	5620
XF1054	YD0022	5629
XF1055	XD9959	5617
XF1056	XD9948	5578
XF1057	XD9904	5565
XF1058	XD9899	5527
XF1059	XD9861	5534

36.80

## (2) A/62 (105T)

XF1060	YD0208	5675
XF1061	YD0115	5670
XF1062	YD0014	5676

## c. LZ Elliot Defensive targets

## (1) C/6/33 (105T)

XF1063	XD9916	5477
XF1064	XD9869	5456
XF1065	XD9841	5524

## (2) A/62 (105T)

XF1066	XD9926	5521
XF1067	XD9930	5500
XF1068	XD9838	5470
XF1069	XD9826	5500
XF1070	XD9899	5509

XF1061

XF1062

XF1063

XF1064

9870 5357

9769 5371

9753 5435

9792 5500

9843 5507

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## Annex D (Con't)

(3) B/8/4

XF1071	XD9789 5584
XF1072	XD9881 5590
XF1073	XD9723 5487
XF1074	XD9937 5437
XF1075	XD9802 5425

## 4. Ammunition

- a. B/8/4. Insure a minimum of 100 rounds available to support operation.
- b. C/6/33. Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.
- c. A/62 Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.

## 5. Command and Signal

- a. All supporting artillery units will monitor air-ground frequency in Task Force Smith SOI, which is also designated as the quick fire channel.
- b. CO, Task Force Smith will utilize the direct fire channel to all firing units and this frequency will be provided to the assigned FO, A/8/4.
- c. Infantry commander will utilize quick fire channel for fire requests.
- d. CO, Task Force Smith is responsible for coordinating air coverage and artillery fires.

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③ 2/22/21

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Enclosure 3

SECURITY

1. **CONCEPT:** The security forces were made up from the 3/5 Cav, C/4 ARA, 77th Arty, 1/44th Arty, 14 Engineers, elements of the 1st Bn, 2nd ARVN and 3d Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment. The operation was coordinated through normal command channels and basically followed the concept set up by the operation order.

2. **STRONG POINTS:** The outstanding features of the combined security force were as follows:

a. Engineers along with the ARVN infantry provided the capability to sweep the route of march and thoroughly secure the area.

b. 1/44 provided a quick hard hitting reaction element for the mine sweep team and base defense.

c. 3/5 Cav provided strong fast moving convoy security.

d. ARA (Aerial Rocket Artillery) provided a number of capabilities:

(1) Reconnaissance of route of march

(2) Reaction force and cover during displacement

(3) Observation

e. 3d Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment augmented by 3/5 Cav provided perimeter security and directed all operation for the security of ECB.

f. The combination of these units produced a well balanced strong fighting force for the protection and security of the artillery raid. Artillery defensive concentrations were fired in on avenues of approach into ECB.

3. **WEAK POINTS:** No significant weaknesses were noted.

4. **DISCUSSION:** All support elements performed their duties in an outstanding manner. The ARVN's secured the LZ as designated by the operations order. The ARVN Bn CO's performance was conspicuously outstanding. The Engineers, ARVN elements, dusters and quads made the mine sweep. The ARVN infantry and part of the 3/5 Cav stationed themselves on pre-designated positions for road security. Upon arrival at the LZ a strong security force was set out. A defense plan was quickly established among all units for night defense and departures. Convoys and escorts moved back and forth on the road all day without incident. The night defense was set up by ARVN infantry augmented by 3/5 Cav, dusters, quads and search lights. The cooperation between all units was exceptional in all aspects.

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RECOMMENDATIONS: The following recommendations are made:

- a. That more emphasis be directed to insure that there is no doubt as to time and place and that no language barrier between ARVN and US forces exists.
- b. That the advisor with the ARVN's are thoroughly briefed on the operation order and SCI.
- c. That a chain of command is clearly established in case that the regular commander is killed.

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Inclosure 4

EXTRACTING FORCE

1. GENERAL SUMMARY: The 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division (1/5) prepared plans and provided forces for extracting all units participating in the artillery raid at Elliott Combat Base (ECB) on 28 December 1969.

a. The extracting force was positioned in the vicinity of Cam Lo, RVN (XD 1259) and consisted of 1 Cav troop and 2 tank companies.

b. Upon order of the artillery raid commander (CO TF Smith) the extracting force would deploy to ECB, reinforce local defense, assist in repelling enemy forces and cover the withdrawal of all forces.

c. At 281410 Dec, CO 1/5 Mech informed CO TF Smith of the extraction plan. At 281630 Dec the S-3 of the extracting force arrived with detail plans for the conduct of the extracting operation. On the ground coordination was made and signal operation instructions (SOI) was passed between both units. At 281800 Dec TF Smith CO held a meeting for all commanders (US, USMC, ARVN) and briefed on the extracting plan. Internal communications, illumination, signals, liaison and line-up procedures were established at this time. Additionally, the command structure was specified for ECB should the extracting force be required.

2. STRONG POINTS:

a. Plan was simple, easily understood.

b. Objectives of extracting force were readily identifiable on the ground which significantly reduced internal and external fire coordination.

c. The plan provided for escorts, guides and security of the route of withdrawal.

3. WEAK POINT: At the 1630 hour meeting with the S-3 of the extracting force, CO TF Smith did not have the exact location of all forces that were positioned outside of ECB perimeter.

4. DISCUSSION: All commanders knew the area, exit points, extraction plan, route of withdrawal and the radio frequency to be used to control the operation. Periodic radio checks were made throughout the night with extracting force command post.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: That the extracting force commander together with the commanders of all ECB elements make a daylight reconnaissance of the entire position in order to verify composition and location of all forces involved.

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Enclosure 5

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## 1. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND PARTICIPATION:

a. ARVN Artillery was tasked to participate in an Artillery raid with units of the 108th Artillery Group on 28-29 December 1969 at Elliott Combat Base (ECB). ARVN Infantry was tasked to sweep and secure ECB and defend the flanks of QL 9 from Khe Gio bridge to ECB for the duration of the operation. Further the ARVN were tasked to mine sweep the Camp Carroll road.

b. The participating ARVN units were two (2) platoons of B/34th Artillery with four (4) 155MM towed howitzers. One (1) company of 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment swept and secured ECB on 27 December. This company was relieved by two (2) line companies and the headquarters company of 3rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment who provided flank security for the road marches to and from ECB and security of ECB during the occupation by the U.S. and ARVN Artillery units.

c. The Infantry provided approximately 400 personnel. The Artillery provided 48 personnel and carried 500 rounds. No contact was made by the Infantry throughout the operation. No accidents or incidents occurred to ARVN personnel.

2. FAVORABLE COMMENTS: The reconnaissance by the combined U.S. - ARVN parties was thorough and effective. The road march by B/34 (-) was completed without incident. Coordination between ARVN and U.S. after the operation began was excellent. ARVN Artillery provided a liaison officer to the task force commander which worked out successfully. ARVN Infantry operations were executed in a particularly effective manner and received favorable comments from observers. The flank coverage of QL 9 and the march order and departure from ECB was noteworthy. The fires of B/34 (-) were well executed and 404 rounds were fired. Contingencies for inclement weather I.E. VTR and wrecker, were positioned to preclude road movement problems.

3. PROBLEM AREAS: The fundamental problem that effected all areas of the operation to varying degrees was not including the appropriate ARVN command and staff personnel in initial and subsequent planning sessions after ARVN forces were tasked for this operation. It is considered more appropriate to have semi-permanent U.S. liaison officer attached to the ARVN Artillery commander to preclude problems of control and expedite emergency contingencies from the task force commander to the ARVN Artillery commander. The chain of command of the task force presumes that the next in command was the ARVN Infantry commander, however this should be specified in the operation order. Due to inclement weather no damage estimate could be made. MACV advisors should not have been "go betweens" for the U.S. and their ARVN counterparts during the planning operation. Combined U.S. - ARVN planning staffs would be more desirable with only assistance from the MACV advisors.

## 4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION:

a. There were obvious problems arising from the changes of the task force composition. The final preponderance of personnel were ARVN. It is most important that a major effort be made to draw ARVN staff of

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## ARVN COMMENTS (CON'T)

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participation and discussion of future plans of this nature. There is a wealth of experience and knowledge to be gained from the talented ARVN officers in the 1st ARVN Division. They should be made to feel their contributions to planning staffs is needed. Every effort should be made to create the proper atmosphere for exchange of ideas in these staff sessions in order to give the ARVN staff officers confidence in their negotiations with U.S. staff officers. It is a misconception that language is a barrier to planning of combined operations. Key ARVN staff officers and battalion commanders are quite capable of conversing in English, to include military terminology.

b. As previously mentioned an ARVN liaison officer was provided to the U.S. task force commander. It is desirable, due to experience and confidence in semi-permanent U.S. liaison officers with the ARVN Artillery, that U.S. liaison officers be attached to the ARVN Artillery commander. This could be the key to possible future combined operations in which the ARVN would create a similar type mission and be the task force commander. Thus the roll of the liaison officer would work in reverse from the attached U.S. unit to the ARVN task force commander.

c. Aerial observers should include provisions for using ARVN observers and possible future use of VNAF aircraft.

## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Future U.S. - ARVN combined operations include ARVN representation and active participation in planning sessions at the earliest appropriate time after receipt of the mission.

b. Semi-permanent U.S. liaison officer be attached to the ARVN Artillery commander for the duration of the combined operation.

c. Chain of command be established through at least three levels and that the ground commander as the deputy task force commander.

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Inclosure 6

LOGISTICS

1. **GENERAL DISCUSSION:** The 8th Bn, 4th Arty prepared plans and executed the logistics portion of the mission.

2. **PRE-PLANNED LOGISTICS:**

a. There were no problems in providing the ammunition and class one supplies for the operation.

b. Sufficient transportation to haul the ammunition required on the raid and to maintain normal resupply operation was not available. Additional transportation was obtained from external sources.

3. **ON-CALL LOGISTICS:** In order to provide emergency resupply of the task force, Class I, Class III, and Class V supplies were rigged for airlift to ECB. There were problems in securing the necessary air items and qualified riggers. 36 hours prior to the operation, coordination was effected with 101st Abn Division to secure the air items and necessary personnel to rig the equipment. On call supplies were staged at 8/4 Arty rear CP, Dong Ha RVN.

4. **MAINTENANCE:** Maintenance support for the task force was a significant factor in the accomplishment of the mission. The necessity of taking a compliment from the support maintenance facility can not be overemphasized. The repair personnel and wrecker from the 178th Maintenance Company were key in keeping the 175 guns firing.

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