

SECRET

5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)
 Fleet Marine Force Pacific
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

TEM/wrm
 5750
 7 Feb 1970

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division
 (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 Jan 1970 to 31 Jan 1970

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.8
 (c) DivO 5750.2
 (d) RegtO 5750.2

Encl: ✓(1) 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) through (d), enclosure (1) is submitted.

James C. Atkins Jr.
 JAMES C. ATKINS JR.

11TH MARINES
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5th 175mm Gun Btry

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7 Feb 19705th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)
Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1-31 January 1970

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✓Encl 1 After Action Report-Artillery Raid ECB & CA LU, Task Force
Smith II dtd 20 Jan 1970✓Encl 2 After Action Report-Artillery Raid ECB & CA LU, Task Force
Bradberry dtd 4 Feb 1970SECRET

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7 Feb 1970Part I
Organizational Data1. Designation5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) (REIN)
FPO San Francisco, Calif. 96602CommanderMajor James C. ATKINS Jr.
Commanding OfficerAttached Units

1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery

2. Location1st Platoon, 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery
1-31 January 1970: FSB Alpha-2, YD 21557740645th 175mm Gun Battery
1-31 January 1970: Camp Carroll, YD 0616055068Battery Headquarters
1-31 January 1970: Dong Ha Combat Base, YD 2305763. Staff Officers

Executive Officer, Headquarters

Capt T. E. MAC DERMANT
1-31 January 1970

Executive Officer, Camp Carroll

Capt J. J. MULHOLLAND
1-23 January 1970
1stLt W. E. CROFT III
24-31 January 1970

Asst Executive Officer, Camp Carroll

1stLt W. E. CROFT III
1-23 January 1970
1stLt J. E. MARTINELLI
24-31 January 1970

8 inch Howitzer Platoon Commander

Capt J. W. LUCEY
1-31 January 1970

Asst 8 inch Howitzer Platoon Commander

1stLt M. E. BURR
1-4 January 1970
2ndLt A. C. WHIDDON
8-31 January 1970SECRET

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Fire Direction Officer

1stLt J. B. HATFIELD
1-7 January 1970
1stLt M. E. BURR
8-31 January 1970

Asst Fire Direction Officer

2ndLt A. C. WHIDDON
1-7 January 1970
1stLt J. B. HATFIELD
8-31 January 1970

Maintenance & Motor Transport Officer

Capt J. J. PIERATT
1-31 January 1970

Supply Officer

2ndLt T. J. BARRETT Jr.
1-31 January 1970

Battery Officer

2ndLt R. K. BLOEDAU Jr.
1-31 January 19704. Average Monthly Strength

| <u>USMC</u> | |
|-------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 11 | 195 |

| <u>USN</u> | |
|------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 0 | 7 |

| <u>ARVN INTERPERTORS</u> | |
|--------------------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 0 | 2 |

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Narrative Summary

1. 5th 175mm Gun Battery received incoming mortar and rocket fire on eight separate occasions during January. The 1st Platoon of the 5th 8 inch Howitzer Battery received 6 attacks and the battery position at Camp Carroll received 17 rounds of rockets in 2 separate attacks. No damage or casualties resulted to this battery from these attacks.

On 3 January 1970, the battery was visited by Lieutenant General H. NICKERSON Jr., Commanding General, III MAF.

The battery participated in Operation TASK FORCE SMITH #2, an artillery raid, from 14 Jan 70 to 18 Jan 70. Six 175mm Guns from the battery constituted the main armament of the Task Force. Initially, the battery moved from Camp Carroll to Fire Support Base Elliot (Vic XD983545) and occupied this position for two days. On 16 Jan 70, the battery moved south to Calu (Vic YD013455). On the 18th of January, the battery returned to Camp Carroll after having expended 1600 rounds on the operation. (Appendix I)

The battery again participated in an artillery raid on 28 Jan through 31 Jan 1970. The battery, which constituted the main armament of the Task Force, went to Calu and remained for four days. After having expended 1056 rounds, the battery returned to Camp Carroll on 31 Jan 70. (Appendix II)

2.

| Unit Supported | No. of Rounds | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| | 175mm | 8" Howitzer |
| 101st ABN | 1757 | 4 |
| 2d ARVN, 1st Div | 436 | ----- |
| 1/5th Mech | 892 | 525 |
| 7th ARVN Cav | 35 | 331 |
| 1st ARVN, 1st Div | 18 | ----- |
| Highrise | 180 | 949 |
| TASK FORCE SMITH #2 | 1600 | ----- |
| 6/33d Arty Task Force | 1036 | ----- |
| Total Rounds | 5954 | 1809 |

Number of missions fired: 380/8 inch
611/175mm

Surveillance during the month was minimal due to lack of observation. This was caused primarily by the fact that our principal targets existed along the Laotian Border where ground observation can rarely be achieved. In addition, air observation was extremely limited due to the weather in this mountainous terrain. Partial surveillances may be found in attached after action reports. (Appendices I & II)

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Part III
Sequential Listing of Significant Events

1. Topics.a. Personnel and Administration

| | USMC | | USN | |
|------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| (1) Losses | Off | Enl | Off | Enl |
| Administration | 0 | 35 | 0 | 1 |
| (2) Replacements | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| (3) Net Loss | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 |

b. Intelligence: current INTSUMS

c. Organization and Operations

(1) This battery participated in two artillery raids during the month of January.

(a) TASK FORCE SMITH #2. 14-18 Jan 70 APPENDIX I. The battery expended 1600 rounds.

(b) 6/33d ArtyTaskForce. 28-31 Jan 70 APPENDIX I. The battery expended 1056 rounds.

(2) From its present locations, the battery fired in support of 101st ABN, 1st ARVN Regiment, 2d ARVN Regiment, 7th ARVN Cav, 1/5thMech and several rounds into the Highrise Zone (DMZ). These units were supported daily.

d. Training: Informal on-the-job training was conducted on a daily basis throughout the month in all areas of the battery. In addition, fam-firing of individual and crew served weapons, FDC classes in specialized topics and firing battery drills were conducted. During the operation of 28-31 Jan 1970, a direct-fire demonstration was conducted, first on an individual section basis and then on a battery basis to ensure all cannoneers were competent and prepared for a possible direct-fire mission.

e. Logistics and Supply: During the month of January a complete wall-to-wall inventory of all T/E equipment, a comprehensive Table of Allowance and a new 782 Gear Control System was initiated and put into operation. Initial preparation for possible embarkation including inventories, manifests and marking is almost completed.

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7 Feb 1970Topics (Cont)

f. Civic Action/Civil Affairs: 3 MedCaps were held at the Refugee Camp at Cam Lo in Quan Cam Lo district. Approximately 180 persons were treated at each MedCap; furthermore, various medical supplies were supplied to a local priest for treatment as necessary.

g. Psychological Operations: N/A

2. Entries.

3 January 1970

CG, III MAF, LtGen H. NICKERSON Jr. and party visited Camp Carroll

7 January 1970

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-2 received estimated 7 rounds 122mm rockets. Negative damage.

8 January 1970

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-2 received estimated 3 rounds 82mm mortar. Negative damage.

11 January 1970

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-2 received estimated 4 rounds unknown type mortar. Negative damage.

14 January 1970

175mm Guns participated in TASK FORCE SMITH #2 sending six guns to FSB Elliot.

16 January 1970

175mm Guns departed FSB Elliot to Calu

18 January 1970

175mm Guns departed Calu to Camp Carroll

20 January 1970

Dong Ha Combat Base received unknown size and number incoming. Negative damage.

21 January 1970

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-2 received 5 rounds 140mm rockets. Negative damage.

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7 Feb 19702. Entries (Cont)

21 January 1970

Camp Carroll received
8 rounds 122mm rockets.
Negative damage.

24 January 1970

8 inch Platoon at Alpha-
2 received 6 rounds 82mm
mortar. No damage.

25 January 1970

Camp Carroll received
9 rounds 140mm rockets.
Negative damage.

28-31 January 1970

175mm Guns participated
in Task Force BRADBERRY,
sending four guns to Calu
with remaining guns
supporting operations
from Camp Carroll.SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH BATTALION (175MM/8 INCH)(SP), 4TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269

AVGLD-CO

20 January 1970

SUBJECT: After Action Report-Artillery Raid, ECB and Calu, 14-18 January 1970

Commanding Officer
108th Artillery Group
APO San Francisco 96269

1. Forwarded herewith are inclosures and tabs which describe the planning and execution of the Artillery Raid. Each inclosure describes the general concept of the operation, strong points, weaknesses, a summary discussion and recommendations.

2. The purpose of this raid was to employ the element of surprise by displacing 175MM artillery elements to forward positions with minimal notice. These heavy artillery elements could then engage planned targets which are normally out of range when firing from presently prepared positions. Light artillery was included in the task force organization to provide defensive fires as well as a short range artillery capability. This force composition proved to be effective and highly flexible and enabled Task Force Smith to react to fluid situations quickly and efficiently. Task Force Smith's mission was to engage planned targets and be responsive to calls for fire for targets of opportunity in order to destroy enemy installations and strong points that may have developed by virtue of his sanctuary of being beyond artillery range from established fire bases. This complex operation with many diverse elements participating was conducted highly efficiently notwithstanding the extremely limited planning and coordination time available.

3. During the conduct of the operation many distinct strong points were readily apparent.

a. ARVN ground forces committed to the operation proved themselves to be highly capable. Their cooperative spirit and willingness to take any measures necessary to accomplish their mission of base and convoy security were particularly worthy of note.

b. The effectiveness of the planning and control of the operation may be attested to merely by the impressive number of rounds which were fired against the enemy. Further the speed and efficiency with which firing was conducted and displacement and extraction of the task force were performed speak highly for the effectiveness of the plan and the operation.

c. Fire support coordination was effected by a 108th Group liaison sergeant through the 108th Group FSCA. This coordination link proved to be of great value during the conduct of firing, especially in obtaining clearances for defensive targets and targets of opportunity. This direct liaison with the 108th Group FSCA enabled fast and efficient processing of target grids.

d. The cooperativeness of all elements in the operation was outstanding. Liaison was quickly established in all cases where necessary and the prevailing attitude was a positive one of teamwork. ARVN elements, 3/5 Cav, 5/175 Guns, 6/33 Arty, 1/44 Arty, 178 Maint, 14th Eng, radar elements, and minesweep teams operated with 8/4 Arty elements within Task Force Smith in the finest professional manner.

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e. The provision for base security and a reaction force was carefully planned and executed at both ECB and Calu. The reaction force was in continuous contact with Task Force Smith and the CO, 3/5 Cav exercised positive command and control of both the security force and the reaction force. (CO, 3/5 Cav colocated his CP with TF Smith's which made coordination and planning easy).

f. Defensive fires were planned and fired in at both ECB and Calu by direct and indirect means. On-call fires were scheduled and disseminated to firing units as indicated in OPORD 2-70. Current firing data was maintained on all targets and all fires were immediately available.

g. Guidance and assistance from 108th Group CO and staff materially assisted in the successful accomplishment of the mission. Ammunition, communication equipment, and aviation support were made possible by the action of 108th Group. Additionally, Group Headquarters provided the direct link with all rear command and support echelons which significantly contributed to the success of the operation.

4. Several problems arose which are of distinct concern and should be given maximum attention in the planning and execution of the next operation.

a. Communications was the greatest single problem area. In attempting to establish an AWCC, all aircraft were not informed to check in with the Elliot AWCC. This made it impossible to insure the safe passage of all aircraft in all cases. By the same token, all personnel attempting to communicate on the task force nets did not restrict themselves to the task force SOI rendering it impossible to identify all stations. Both of these difficulties served to add confusion to the communication network.

b. There is a requirement for positive air traffic control at the operation helipad. Since many aircraft did not check in with AWCC it was impossible to control air traffic at the helipad.

c. The weather made visual observation and aerial reconnaissance impossible. Visual observation is essential in this type of operation. Not only does visual observation provide target acquisition, but it provides the only practical means for gathering surveillance.

d. There was not enough light and medium artillery attached with the task force to provide timely reaction to targets of opportunity.

e. A significant problem was caused by the lack of a liaison officer from the 2/17 Cav, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). It is imperative that a representative of the ground unit operating in the area in which the artillery raid is to take place be present with the task force at all times to coordinate and clear fires. Without this liaison officer it is impossible to operate at peak efficiency because clearances must be gained through a circuitous route. The failure to have the presence of this liaison officer caused the request for liaison personnel from the 108th Gp FSCA who then coordinated all fires. Delays in firing were caused several times because of task force inability to pinpoint 2/17 Cav and other friendly positions. In one case elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) occupied FSB Shepherd which is in the task force impact area and the information reached task force operations only by accident. In another case, firing was delayed for over three hours because the location of 101st Airborne Div (AMBL) LRRP teams was uncertain. A liaison officer from the ground unit would have effectively eliminated these problems.

5. The operation accounted for 284 missions and 2,465 rounds in the final accounting. Unfortunately the surveillance available is extremely limited. It is reflected in inclosure 2, tab D. As mentioned earlier there is no better testimony to the effectiveness of this operation than the significance of the above figures.

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I would like to make the following recommendations with the objective of eliminating the above weak points.

a. The operation should be planned for a period of good weather. This would facilitate air coverage and observation as well as long range communications.

b. For the establishment of an effective AWCC, detailed coordination should be effected with Red Devil Arty to insure that all aircraft entering the area of operations check into the operation AWCC net. An alternative to this is the establishment of an actual area of operations under the task force commander for the duration of the operation.

c. Surveillance is of prime importance and every effort should be made to insure that appropriate means of surveillance is closely coordinated and employed.

d. Additional light and medium artillery should be attached to the task force to provide better response to targets of opportunity.

e. A standard artillery raid SOI should be established to allow the immediate assessment of communications requirements.

f. The command structure should be amended to reflect the ground commander as overall commander. The operations order should be prepared by the maneuver headquarters and artillery should be tasked only to submit an artillery annex.

7. I should like to close with the comment that it was my distinct pleasure to once again be associated with an operation of this quality. The professionalism and spirit displayed by every member of the Task Force Smith team made this a deeply rewarding and satisfying experience.

6 Incl
as

Isaac D. Smith
ISAAC D. SMITH
LTC, FA
Commanding

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AFTER ACTION REPORT
TASK FORCE SMITH II ARTILLERY RAID

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✓ INCLOSURE 1 - Plans and Preparations

✓ INCLOSURE 2 - Execution

✓ TAB A - Summary of firing

✓ TAB B - Map of block scheduling

✓ TAB C - Extract from staff journal *NOT ISSUED*

✓ TAB D - Surveillance

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✓ INCLOSURE 3 - Security

✓ INCLOSURE 4 - Extracting plan

✓ INCLOSURE 5 - Logistical support

✓ INCLOSURE 6 - Scenario for the conduct of an artillery raid

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Inclosure 1

PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE TASK FORCE SMITH II ARTILLERY RAID

GENERAL SUMMARY: This inclosure discusses the sequence followed by this headquarters in planning and preparing for the artillery raid.

a. At 1635 hours 13 January 1970 S-3 108th Artillery Group gave this headquarters a warning order to prepare for an artillery raid to Elliott Combat Base within the next 24 to 48 hours.

b. At 1845 hours the Commanding Officer 108th Artillery Group held a coordination briefing with all Task Force elements, at which time he gave the mission and his guidance. The 108th Group S-3 went over the task organization; after which the task force commander (CO 8th Bn, 4th Arty) gave his concept of the operation and specific guidance. At the end of this briefing there were two areas left to coordinate and resolve:

- (1) Transportation of ammunition both initially and emergency resupply
- (2) Sufficient FM frequencies to conduct the mission.

c. At 1915 hours S-2, 108th Group, gave this headquarters the list of targets which were to be engaged by the task force artillery.

d. By 2330 hours CO 108th Group had secured 10 FM frequencies for use by the task force.

e. The task force operations order and the SOI were published and distributed by 0830 hours 14 January.

2. GENERAL DISCUSSION:

a. Offensive fire planning: A program of fires was developed from the targets provided. The program was grouped in "blocks of targets" with the azimuth of lay as a governing factor. The heavy artillery pieces were able to hit all targets within a group without relaying which considerably increased the speed with which targets were engaged. Significantly, by using block designators, air space coordination and the use of Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) were greatly facilitated. Comment by the ARA liaison officer was that this type of targeting was the most effective use of ARA that he had used.

b. Fire support coordination: All grids to be fired would be cleared by the LMO from the maneuver unit at the task force FSOC. Air warning would be posted by the AWCC with the task force. The clearance to fire all targets, regardless of all other clearances, came from the task force FSOC.

c. Fire direction: Both artillery units were required to displace their organic FDC's. Because of the manning level of the Marine 5/175 gun battery, that unit could not provide a forward FDC and still maintain the mission with their remaining element as FSB A-2. The FDC for the 5/175 gun battery was provided from the 8th Bn, 4th Arty; this FDC provided the primary and secondary check, with the third check provided by the 8/4 battalion FDC.

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d. Logistics: Emergency air resupply was planned for class I, class III, and class V; this was prepositioned at the battalion rear area at Dong Ha. Items to sling the emergency loads were provided by the 101st Airborne Division at 0930 hours 14 January. Parts problems were projected where possible and a basic load of spare parts was carried with the task force. Additionally a detachment from 178th Maintenance Company and a compliment from 8/4 maintenance was attached to the task force to provide any necessary higher echelon maintenance service. Resupply of class I included C rations and one hot A ration per day.

e. Command and controls:

(1) Command of the operation was initially invested Commanding Officer 8/4 Arty. At 1600 hours 14 January command passed to CG, 1st Brigade 5th Infantry (Mech).

(2) Control of the task force artillery was through a forward command post (CP) and through a rear command post at Dong Ha. The rear command post provided a point of continuous contact with rear elements. All logistical supplies and ARA were staged at the rear CP to improve response to requirements and facilitate communications.

f. Communications planning:

(1) A task force SOI was prepared and distributed to all participating personnel at 0830 14 January 1970.

(2) Task force command net was opened at 0900 hours 14 January 1970.

(3) The following radio nets were planned for the operation:

- (a) Task force command
- (b) Task force air to ground
- (c) Task force secure
- (d) ARA control
- (e) Aviation control
- (f) Air warning
- (g) Convoy control
- (h) Fire direction 1
- (i) Fire direction 2
- (j) Two spare frequencies

(4) Plans required 14 radio sets, five remotes (AN/GRA-39), and five antennae sets RC 292 (forward) to be used to support the task force

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5.) Nestor equipment was not planned for convoy movement since security forces and support units attached to the task force did not have this equipment.

3. **STRONG POINTS:**

a. The planning and the operation order were detailed and complete. The change of command responsibility did not materially affect the plan or concept.

b. The plan provided for sufficient logistical and communications equipment to accomplish the mission.

4. **WEAK POINTS:**

a. Not enough time was allotted for more detailed planning, which could have facilitated smoother communication and coordination.

b. Communication frequencies were not provided early enough to insure that the SOI was disseminated to all parties necessary. This caused confusion especially with ANCC and air warning.

5. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. That for future artillery raids, the mission be assigned a minimum of 72 hours in advance of the start time for the mission.

b. That a block of ten (10) communication FM frequencies, in the megacycle range of aircraft, be allotted for any future raid a minimum of 72 hours in advance.

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Enclosure 2

CONFIDENTIALEXECUTION OF TASK FORCE SMITH II ARTILLERY RAID

1. GENERAL: The operation was executed essentially as planned with exception that the Task Force moved from Elliott Combat Base (ECB) to Fire Support Base (FSB) Calu without displacement to Vandergriff Combat Base. The duration of the raid was shortened from seven days to five starting 140900 hours January and ending 181530 hours January 1970.

2. DISCUSSION:

a. Command and control: Command and control was established by the task force commander through direct coordination with all elements involved and through task force command frequency at 0900 14 January. Initially the command post was positioned at Dong Ha. When the mine sweep was completed to Khe Gio bridge, task force CP moved to Camp Carroll to better facilitate coordination. The task force deputy commander moved forward with the mine sweep team and set up a forward CP at ECB immediately upon arrival. Task force CP moved to ECB when all elements closed that location. At 1600 hours 14 January command passed to CG 1/5 Mech. There were no significant problems with the change of commanders and direct coordination between the CO 3 Squadron 5th Cavalry and CO 8/4 Arty facilitated all further operations.

b. Fire support coordinations: Fire support coordination was accomplished by the following personnel:

- (1) S-3, 8/4: Deputy task force commander and fire support coordinator
- (2) Asst S-3, 8/4: Assistant fire support coordinator
- (3) Ops NCO, 8/4: NCOIC and enlisted shift leader
- (4) Ln NCO 108th Gp FSCA: Enlisted shift leader
- (5) LNO, C/4/77 ARA: ARA Control
101st Abn Div
- (6) LNO, 108th Gp: air clearance and AWCC
- (7) LNO, 108th Gp: AOGC

c. Once set up the FSOC operated smoothly. There were two exceptions to the planned functioning of this important facility:

- (1) The requested LNO from the maneuver unit (2/17 Cav, 101st Abn Div) was not on station with the task force FSOC. This caused a significant problem in the granting of clearances. For the first three hours of the program of fires, the task force had negative clearance in the area where the principle targets were located, because the LNO arrived at ECB with no knowledge of where the recon teams from his elements were located. The S-3 of the task force shifted to intelligence targets from the last artillery raid during this period. The LNO from the maneuver unit arrived back at ECB at 1730 and after posting no fire areas left the task force location before giving the eastern and southern boundary

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which his blanket clearance covered. This problem was rectified by 108th Gp FSCA. Similar problems occurred throughout the operation, which could have been eliminated had the LNO remained on station with the task force.

(2) Despite continuous requests from this headquarters, Red Devil Arty AWCC did not inform aircraft, flying into the task force area of operations, to check with the task force AWCC. This caused several delays in firing and could have resulted in a serious incident.

d. Conduct of fire: Conduct of fire went extremely smooth and efficient. All planned blocks of targets, which were cleared and within range, were engaged a minimum of four times. Maximum concentration was placed on targets of opportunity and on the supply route running generally east and west from XD 775238 to 955273. Firing was continuous throughout the operation with the exception of a two hour maintenance break during the morning of 17 January. There were no accidents or incidents reported. The gun sections were enthusiastic and displayed a sense of urgency.

e. Communications: All planned radio nets were established. The task force secure net was sporadically operational from ECB, because of climatic conditions; this net, however, was fully operational from FSB Calu. A switchboard at each location was set up and land lines from all task force elements were installed. The telephone net was extremely beneficial and absolutely necessary in controlling the various elements within the task force.

f. Metro: Metro data was received from 8/4 metro section at Camp Carroll. There was no problem in receipt and passing of metro data to both batteries of task force Smith II.

3. STRONG POINTS:

a. The programming of fires by "blocks of targets" greatly facilitated target engagement, air-space coordination, and fire support coordination.

b. The control of security elements by the ground commander allowed the artillery commander to pay maximum attention to the main mission objective.

4. WEAK POINTS:

a. The absence of the LNO from the 2/17 Cav caused delays, by forcing a check fire on main targets initially and subsequently by forcing lengthy clearance procedures, which could have been avoided by his presence.

b. AWCC was not as effective as it should have been because of Red Devil's refusal to inform aircraft to come up on the task force air warning net.

c. The ability to observe the fires was extremely restricted by the weather. Except for a small portion of the missions there was no damage assessment.

Incl 2

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CONFIDENTIAL**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- a. That the program of fires for future artillery raids be designated by "blocks of targets" which can be fired on one azimuth of lay.
- b. That a LNO from the AO maneuver commander be on station with the task force command post for the duration of the raid.
- c. That close coordination between air warning centers be directed and enforced.
- d. That the operation be conducted in weather which permits visual reconnaissance of the target area.

TABS TO INCLOSURE 2

- A. Summary of firing
- B. Map designating block scheduling
- C. Extract from staff journal
- D. Surveillance
- E. OPORD

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A Inclosure 2

Summary of Firing

1. Planned Fires

a. B/5/175 guns

| <u>BLOCK</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>ROUNDS</u> |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| 1. TF Smith #1 | 14 Jan 70 | 1710-1909 | 54 |
| 1. TF Smith #2 | 14 Jan 70 | 2006-2052 | 76 |
| 2. TF Smith #2 | 14 Jan 70 | 2126-2227 | 57 |
| | 15 Jan 70 | 2109-2144 | 16 |
| 3. TF Smith #2 | 15 Jan 70 | 1448-1758 | 72 |
| 4. TF Smith #2 | 15 Jan 70 | 1853-1951 | 36 |
| 5. TF Smith #2 | 17 Jan 70 | 1510-1545 | 27 |
| 6. TF Smith #2 | 16 Jan 70 | 1453-1620 | 75 |
| 7. TF Smith #1 | 16 Jan 70 | 0710-0742 | 17 |
| Road Targets | 15 Jan 70 | 0123-0920 | 133 |
| Group 1 | | 2121-2330 | 60 |
| | 16 Jan 70 | 0504-0617 | 30 |
| | | 1816-0003 | 129 |
| | 17 Jan 70 | 0004-0130 | 30 |
| | | 1601-2335 | 266 |
| | 18 Jan 70 | 0245-0730 | 147 |
| 8. TF Smith #2 | 17 Jan 70 | 1200-1206 | 8 |
| 10. TF Smith #2 | 17 Jan 70 | 1308 | 2 |
| 17. TF Smith #1 | 15 Jan 70 | 1532-2020 | 56 |
| (Road Targets- | 17 Jan 70 | 1655-1657 | 40 |
| Group 2) | | Block Totals | 1331 |

b. A/6/33

| <u>BLOCK</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>ROUNDS</u> |
|------------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| 19. TF Smith #2 | 14 Jan 70 | 1655-1657 | 27 |
| Suspect Enemy Position | 16 Jan 70 | 2030-0010 | 180 |
| (Block Fires) | 17 Jan 70 | 0300-0330 | 36 |
| | | 0345-0400 | 36 |
| | 18 Jan 70 | 0030-0650 | 116 |
| | | Block Totals | 395 |

c. ARA

| <u>BLOCK</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>10 LB RKTS</u> | <u>40MM</u> | <u>7.62MM</u> |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|
| 17 TF Smith #1 | 14 Jan 70 | 1315 | 5 | 50 | 0 |
| 19 TF Smith #1 | 14 Jan 70 | 1320 | 35 | 0 | 800 |
| 3 TF Smith #2 | 14 Jan 70 | 1700 | 80 | 400 | 1500 |
| Total | | | 120 | 450 | 2300 |

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A Inclosure 2 Summary of Fires (Con't)

2. Other Fires

a. B/5/175 guns

| DATE | GRID | NATURE | TIME | RDS |
|--------|--------------------|---------------------------------|-----------|-----|
| 14 Jan | 701680 | Active .50 Cal | 1710-1909 | 24 |
| | 850272 | URS | 2108-2115 | 15 |
| | SD1025 | Movement | 2100-2113 | 9 |
| 15 Jan | SD1249 | Movement | 1011-1057 | 12 |
| | 935246 | Sus. En. Loc. | 1057-1127 | 12 |
| | SD1249 | Movement | 1150-1157 | 6 |
| | 946400 | SLAR | 1225-1229 | 4 |
| | 920418 | SLAR | 1232-1234 | 4 |
| | 962430 | SLAR | 1237-1239 | 4 |
| | SD0249 | Movement | 1319-1322 | 6 |
| | SD1249 | Movement | 1453-1504 | 6 |
| | SD4212 | Movement | 1850-1909 | 8 |
| | SD0249 | Movement | 2140-2207 | 8 |
| | SD1249 | 5 Personnel | 2145-2154 | 4 |
| 16 Jan | SD0249 | Movement | 0010-0010 | 1 |
| | SD0249 | Movement | 0320-0331 | 5 |
| | SD0249 | Movement | 0348-0400 | 5 |
| | SD5135 | Movement | 0415-0427 | 5 |
| | SD0249 | Movement | 0545-0556 | 5 |
| | 867217 | Trails, Tunnel & Living Area | 1652-1724 | 29 |
| | SD0249 | 1 Truck | 2250-2300 | 6 |
| | SD1249 | Movement | 2303-2303 | 1 |
| 17 Jan | SD1125 | Movement | 0002-0021 | 6 |
| | SD1249 | Movement | 1230-1238 | 6 |
| | NB0002 | Truck Park | 1225-1300 | 24 |
| | RE0002 | Truck Park | 1432-1456 | 36 |
| | KF1230 (801232) | 3 VC in Open | 1146-1146 | 3 |

Total 254

b. A/6/33

| | | | | |
|--------|-------------|------------|-----------|------|
| 14 Jan | Direct Fire | 2335-2345 | 6 | |
| | Direct Fire | 2330-0430 | 20 | 4 BH |
| 15 Jan | Direct Fire | 1730-1755 | 8 | |
| | Direct Fire | 1815-1900 | 11 | |
| | Direct Fire | 2330-0530 | 100 | |
| 16 Jan | 946426 | Shepard DT | 1825-1840 | 2 |
| | 940419 | Shepard DT | 1845-1855 | 7 |
| | 921416 | Shepard DT | 1900-1910 | 5 |
| | Direct Fire | 1700-1730 | 12 | |
| | Direct Fire | 2245-2300 | 12 | |

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A. Inclosure 2 Summary of Fires (Con't)

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>GRID</u> | <u>NATURE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>RDS</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 17 Jan | Direct Fire | | 1600-1646 | 36 11 WP |
| | | | Subtotal | 219 HE 11 WP 4 BH |
| | | | Total | 234 Rounds |

c. ARA

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>GRID</u> | <u>NATURE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | 17 LB | 10 LB | 40MM | 7.62MM |
|-------------|------------------|---|-------------|-------|-------|------|--------|
| 14 Jan | 915490 912494 | Twin 51 Cal 4 people | 1253 | | 30 | | |
| 16 Jan | 9752 | Large Cave w/ deer tied in front. | 1245 | 8 | 51 | 50 | 2000 |
| | | | Total | 8 | 81 | 50 | 2000 |

d. Other Units

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>UNIT</u> | <u>GRID</u> | <u>NATURE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>RDS</u> |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|
| 14 Jan | A/8/4 | 915490 | Small Arms Fire (Block 19) | 1253-1630 | 27 |
| 14 Jan | C/6/33 | 971559 | Defensive Fire | 2050----- | 5 |
| | C/6/33 | 970513 | Defensive Fire | ----- | 5 |
| | C/6/33 | 968521 | Defensive Fire | -----2200 | 5 |
| | | | Others Total | | 42 |

3. Consolidated Totals for Operation

a. Artillery

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>ROUNDS</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|
| B/5/175 (175MM) | 1585 |
| A/6/33 (105MM) | 629 |
| C/6/33 (105MM) | 15 |
| A/8/4 (8") | 27 |
| | 2256 |
| | Total Arty |

b. ARA

| | <u>17 LB RKTs</u> | <u>10 LB RKTs</u> | <u>40MM</u> | <u>7.62MM</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Total Rounds | 8 | 201 | 500 | 4300 |

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3 to Inclosure 2

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a. Map of Block Scheduling

b. Additional Planned Fires to OPORD 2-70

BLOCKGRID

Block 1 TF Smith #1

XD689622

715608

745640

743627

678657

677640

682629

677621

679609

688651

691661

Block 7 TF Smith #1

XD678657

682629

677621

679609

688631

691661

Block 17 TF Smith #1

XD793406

793415

795404

793394

821401

845393

822386

821376

Block 19 TF Smith #1

XD783502

780501

789501

Road Targets (Group 1)

XD904250

904280

900275

903265

902260

910241

911229

912234

908233

904238

909283

915288

922290

930286

940280

949276

910250

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3 100 B to Inclosure 2 (Cont)

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BLOCK

GRID

Road Targets (Group 1)

XD906246
885240
886242
888247
890249
892246

Road Targets (Group 2)

XD790240
788241
795240
797238
790233
792232
800231
809231
814232
837228
823237
832238
834238
852239
852241
777241
780232

Suspect Enemy Position Block

YD022436
020436
016437
012434
027438
020426
016428
010437
XD994423
998421
YD000437
005413
009431
007437
015410
017425
023427
021431
025435
030420
XD982430
980419
975425
970413
968421
967428
960422
958414

(2)

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B to Inclosure 2 (Con't)

BLOCKGRID

Suspect Enemy Position Block

XD962408

962402

943417

938408

930403

934417

927413

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D Inclosure 2

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The following is the only surveillance available from Task Force Smith #2:

GRIDSURVEILLANCE

| | |
|--------|--|
| 883490 | Observed New Bunkers and Possible Bivouac Area. |
| 890200 | Destroyed (3) Bridges. Scattered (10) Domestic Animals. |
| 882212 | Destroyed (4) Hootches. Killed (12) Domestic Animals. |
| 912494 | Spotted (4) Personnel Running into Treeline. Fired 4 Vollys of 8 Inch in Treeline 60 Seconds Later. Results Unknown. |
| 915490 | Silenced (2) .50 Caliber Positions. |
| 903257 | Destroyed (2) Hootches. Damaged (2) Bunkers. Destroyed (2) 55 Gallon Drums. |
| 971522 | Damaged Entrance to Cave, One Animal Killed at the Entrance to the Cave. |

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 HQ, 8th BN, 4th Arty
 Dong Ha, RVN
 140030 Jan 1970

OPORD 2-70 (U)

Reference: Map Vietnam: 1:50,000 Cam Lo, Sheet 63421

Task Organizations: Annex A, Task Organization.

1. (C) SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM
- b. Friendly Forces: Current SITREP. No concurrent operations planned.
- c. Attachments. Annex A, Task Organization.

2. (C) MISSION. Task Force Smith 2 displaces on order on 14 Jan west of Camp Carroll to conduct an artillery raid on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations: (Annex B, Operation Overlay; Annex C, Artillery Raid Schedule of Fires). This operation involves the movement of an artillery task force to the west along QL 9 to Elliot Combat Base remaining for period of 1 day plus. On order task force will proceed to Vandergriff Combat Base and remain for 2 days plus. Again on order, the task force will proceed to Calu and remain for 3 days plus. The operation will be to conduct an artillery raid in the southwestern sector of Northern I Corps. ARVN forces will secure LZ Elliot and surrounding terrain prior to EENT on 14 Jan NLT 1000 hours. Four concurrent road sweeps will commence on 14 Jan to clear route of march. 1/77 will sweep road from A-4 to Cam Lo by 0900 hours. 3/5 Cav will sweep road from far side of Cam Lo to Dong Ha by 0930 hours. ARVN's will sweep road from Camp J.J. Carroll to far side of Cam Lo and to Khe Gio Bridge by 0930 hours with 1/44 and 3/5 Cav providing security prior to movement of Task Force Smith 2. Task Force Smith 2 will echelon forward on order to occupy LZ Elliot.

b. Task Force Smith (-)

- (1) Displace by echelon from Camp Carroll on order.
- (2) Road march to preplanned fire bases on order to conduct artillery raid.
- (3) Depart fire base on order for road march back to Camp Carroll.

c. 3/2 Regt (ARVN)

- (1) Secure LZ Elliot prior to EENT 1000 hours 14 Jan.
- (2) Remain in place until relieved.

d. Unknown ARVN units

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- (1) Secure LZ Vandergriff and Calu on 48 hour notice.
- (2) Remain on call for instructions from Task Force Commander.

e. 3/5 Cav

- (1) One plt depart from Check Point 13 at 140630 Jan 70 to sweep QL 9 to Dong Ha.
- (2) Link up with convoy including 14th eng with one lowboy with Dozer and 2 ALVB's, one plt of 1/44, and Task Force Smith 2's headquarters element.
- (3) Return to Check Point 13, pick up remainder of Cav troop and proceed to ECB.
- (4) Provide road security from Check Point 70 to ECB, VCB, and Calu.
- (5) Provide road security for Task Force Smith 2's return road march.

f. 5th 175 Guns (175MM), 6 guns

- (1) Displace 2 plts and 4 ammunition vehicles as 1st echelon of Task Force Smith 2.
- (2) Displace 3 vehicles advance party on order (1000 hours).
- (3) Fire preplanned targets of artillery raid.

g. 6/33 Arty (105MM) 4 Howitzers

- (1) Displace 4 howitzers, 4 ammunition vehicles, and misc. command & control vehicles as soon as road is swept.
- (2) Proceed to Check Point 70 and marry up with main element of Task Force Smith 2.
- (3) Fire preplanned targets of artillery raid.

h. A/8/4 (8")

- (1) Prepare to fire Defcons around LZ Elliot, LZ Vandergriff and Calu.
- (2) Provide FDC element with C/8/4 and 5th 175 guns complete for Task Force Smith 2.
- (3) Fire preplanned targets of artillery raid.

i. C/6/33 Arty

- (1) Prepare to fire Defcons around LZ Elliot.
- (2) Support the convoy element.

j. ARVN Arty (LZ Sarge)

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(2)

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(1) Prepare to fire Defcons around LZ Sarge and LZ Vandergriff.

(2) Support the convoy element.

k. 1/44 Arty

(1) Provide security for 14th Eng mine sweep team from Check Point 70 to LZ Elliot, Vandergriff, and Calu.

(2) Establish fired road security posts along QL 9 from Khe Gio Bridge to LZ Elliot, Vandergriff, and Calu in coordination with 3/5 Cav.

(3) Withdraw fixed security posts to LZ's on order and reinforce perimeter defense.

(4) Provide road security for Task Force Smith 2's return road march.

l. 14th Eng Bn, 1 sweep team, 1 dozer, 1 lowboy

(1) Conduct road sweep of QL 9 from Khe Gio Bridge to LZ Elliot.

(2) Remain on call to sweep road to LZ Vandergriff and Calu.

(3) Sweep entire LZ's in preparation for arrival of Task Force Smith 2.

m. Div Arty, 101st Airborne Div (AM), 4/77 1 plt ARA, 1 section GSR, 8th Bn, 4th Arty

(1) Will fire targets designated by blocks as weather permits.

(2) Will be on standby at 8th Bn 4th Arty for convoy protection to and from designated LZ's.

n. 108th Gp, 2 AO's. Provide aerial recon and observation to Task Force Smith as weather permits.

o. Artillery

(1) Provide artillery coverage for preplanned targets along route of march.

(2) Be prepared to fire on call targets for defense of fire base.

(3) Annex D, Arty Support Plan.

p. Support

(1) XXIV Corps

(a) Provide 1 CH-47 and 1 CH-54 with full crews on 15 minute standby for emergency resupply capability at HQ 8/4 Arty.

(b) Paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

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(3)

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(2) HQ/8/4. Paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

(3) All units will be responsible for organic support except as specified in paragraph 4, Administration and Logistics.

q. Reserve

(1) 3/5 Cav will have tank company on call at Cam Lo.

(2) 1/5 Mech at Quang Tri will be prepared to air lift 1 or 2 companies.

(3) 2nd ARVN Regt will provide react. force on 15 minute standby.

r. Coordinating Instructions

(1) HQ/8/4 will provide 2 interpreters for CO, Task Force Smith 2.

(2) All artillery units will utilize MET message broadcast from 8/4 Arty MET Station at Camp Carroll. Times of broadcast: 0900, 1500, 2100, 0300; frequency: 75.15; Call Sign Pesky Talker 66.

(3) 5th 175 Guns, A/6/33 will run independent FDC's. A/8/4 will check data with Bn FDC, 8/4 Arty. A/6/33 will check data with Bn FDC 6/33 Arty.

(4) Communications during movement will not be by secure mode.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Supply

(1) Class I.

(a) C-rations sufficient for 2 days will be carried.

(b) After 1st day 2 hot meals will be supplied from organic unit resources.

(c) Coordination may be effected with 8/4 for prepositioning of Class I.

(d) 101st Airborne Div (AM) will provide rigging equipment.

(e) Resupply will be effected from CP/8/4 by CH-47.

(2) Classes II & IV no additions or deletions.

(3) Class III

(a) All vehicles will be topped off prior to 140900 Jan 70.

(b) All vehicles will utilize organic load carrying capability to fullest extent.

(c) 8/4 will preposition 600 gallons of diesel and 100 gallons of mogas completely rigged for air pickup at Love Field in 5 gallon containers,

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CP/8/4, by CH-47.

(4) Class V

- (a) All individuals will carry double basic load.
- (b) All automatic weapons will have double basic load.
- (c) 5th 175 guns will displace 400 by organic means, A/6/33 will displace with 500 HE and 100 Bee Hive rounds. HQ/8/4 will displace 400 by organic means.
- (d) 8/4 will preposition 10,000 rounds 5.56 MM, 10,000 rounds 7.62 MM, 6000 rounds .50 cal, 1000 rounds 40MM, 100 frag grenades, M26 at Love Field, CP/8/4 rigged for air pick up. Also 200 rounds 175MM and 200 rounds 105MM and 100 rounds beehive.
- (e) 101st Airborne Div (AM) will provide rigging equipment.
- (f) Emergency resupply will be effected from CP/8/4 by CH-54 and units may coordinate with 8/4 Arty for prepositioning ammunition for air pickup.
- (g) Ten ammunition vehicles will be loaded at Quang Tri, the first 400 rounds loaded will proceed with Task Force Smith 2, the remainder will return to CP/8/4 to be echeloned forward for resupply as needed.

b. Services

(1) Maintenance

- (a) Units will displace with organic maintenance capability.
- (b) Maintenance Task Force personnel from 178th Maintenance Company will displace with trail party.
- (c) Trail party will consist of M578 and 1 wrecker directed by motor officer 8/4 Arty.

(2) Medical services

- (a) One medic will be provided by HQ/8/4 and one by HQ/6/33.
- (b) Medevac will be available through "Dust off Control" primary freq: 47.40; alternate freq: 46.90.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal

- (1) Unit SOI in effect for internal control of major elements.
- (2) Task Force Smith 2 SOI in effect for control and coordination of major elements in the Task Force.

(5)

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(3) Commanders of all major elements will monitor Task Force Command Net but will operate in individual unit net.

(4) Task Force Command Net Control will be *WELCOME WONDER 30*

b. Command

(1) Bn Co 8/4 Arty will command Task Force Smith 2.

(2) CP, Task Force Smith 2 will be at Camp Carroll until approximately 141000 hours Jan 70 when it will displace to LZ Elliot.

(3) Report SP and all check points.

Acknowledge.

SMITH
LTC

ANNEXES: ☒ A - Task Organization
☒ B - Operation Overlay
☒ C - Artillery Raid Schedule of Fires
☒ D - Artillery Support Plan

DISTRIBUTION: 2 ea element, Task Force Smith

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Annex A (Task Organization) to OPORD 2-70--Task Force Smith 2

Task Force Smith 2

3/2 Regt Inf (ARVN)

3/5 Cav, 1 troop

5th 175 Guns (175MM)

A/8/4 (8")

A/6/33 (105T), 2 plt

1/44 Arty, 1 plt

3/101st Airborne Div (AM), ARA, 1 plt

14th Eng, 1 sweep team, 1 dozer, 1 lowboy

1/77, 1 sweep team

5th Mech, 2 AVLB

108th Gp, 2 AO's

57th Trans Co

Task Force Smith 2 Artillery

B/8/4 (175MM)

C/6/33 (105T)

A/62 (105T)(ARVN)

Task Force Smith Support


XXIV Corps

8/4 Arty

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Annex B (Operation Overlay) to OPORD 2-70--Task Force Smith 2



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Annex C (Schedule of fires) to OPORD 2-70 Task Force Smith II.

PHASE I

BLOCK 1 Az of lay - 3500

| TGT # | GRID | RDS |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1200A | XD906252 | 18 |
| XF 1200B | 903251 | 18 |
| XF 1200C | 903257 | 18 |
| XF 1200D | 912276 | 18 |
| XF 1200E | 908258 | 18 |
| XF 1200F | 907258 | 18 |
| XF 1200G | 879248 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 126 |

BLOCK 2 Az of lay - 3350

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1201A | XD936256 | 18 |
| XF 1201B | 949251 | 18 |
| XF 1201C | 930250 | 18 |
| XF 1201D | 940260 | 18 |
| XF 1201E | 939265 | 18 |
| XF 1201F | 953277 | 18 |
| XF 1201G | 943275 | 18 |
| XF 1201H | 955279 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 144 |

BLOCK 3 Az of lay - 3200

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1202A | XD983242 | 18 |
| XF 1202B | 981242 | 18 |
| XF 1202C | 975241 | 18 |
| XF 1202D | 998287 | 18 |
| XF 1202E | 968303 | 18 |
| XF 1202F | 990310 | 18 |
| XF 1202G | 994384 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 126 |

BLOCK 4 Az of lay - 3050

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1203A | YD036259 | 18 |
| XF 1203B | 026235 | 18 |
| XF 1203C | 036259 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 54 |

BLOCK 5 Az of lay - 3700

| | | |
|---------|----------|--------|
| XF 1204 | XD862312 | TOT 18 |
|---------|----------|--------|

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Annex C (Schedule of ~~ces~~) to OPOD 2-76 Task Force ~~S~~ ~~h~~ II.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PHASE II

BLOCK 6 Az of lay - 3550

| TGT # | GRID | RDS |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1205A | XD868193 | 18 |
| XF 1205B | 904239 | 18 |
| XF 1205C | 904224 | 18 |
| XF 1205D | 910225 | 18 |
| XF 1205E | 905236 | 18 |
| XF 1205F | 906235 | 18 |
| XF 1205G | 911211 | 18 |
| XF 1205H | 912223 | 18 |
| XF 1205I | 912217 | 18 |
| XF 1205J | 902230 | 18 |
| XF 1205K | 903224 | 18 |
| XF 1205L | 903225 | 18 |
| XF 1205M | 902221 | 18 |
| XF 1205N | 892233 | 18 |
| XF 1205O | 877217 | 18 |
| XF 1205P | 899215 | 18 |
| XF 1205Q | 890215 | 18 |
| XF 1205R | 885224 | 18 |
| XF 1205S | 885214 | 18 |
| XF 1205T | 871201 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 360 |

BLOCK 7 Az of lay - 3850

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1206A | XD848240 | 18 |
| XF 1206B | 844228 | 18 |
| XF 1206C | 816230 | 18 |
| XF 1206D | 810228 | 18 |
| XF 1206E | 835226 | 18 |
| XF 1206F | 827238 | 18 |
| XF 1206G | 786233 | 18 |
| XF 1206H | 786234 | 18 |
| XF 1206I | 799230 | 18 |
| XF 1206J | 777237 | 56 |
| | | <u>56</u> |
| TOT | | 218 |

BLOCK 8 Az of lay - 4100

| | | |
|---------|----------|--------|
| XF 1207 | XD759280 | TOT 18 |
|---------|----------|--------|

BLOCK 9 Az of lay - 2650

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1208A | YD126273 | 18 |
| XF 1208B | 130272 | 18 |
| XF 1208C | 127266 | 18 |
| | | <u>18</u> |
| TOT | | 56 |

BLOCK 10 Az of lay - 4500

| | | |
|---------|----------|--------|
| XF 1209 | XD712392 | TOT 18 |
|---------|----------|--------|

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Annex C (Schedule of fires) to OPORD 2-70 Task Force Smith II.

ARA SCHEDULED TGTS

BLOCK 12

| TGT # | GRID | TGT DESCRIPTION |
|----------|----------|-----------------|
| XF 1212A | YD154145 | 8 huts |
| XF 1212B | 187158 | 7 huts |

BLOCK 13

| | | |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| XF 1213A | YD200095 | 11 huts |
| XF 1213B | 201095 | 5 huts |
| XF 1213C | 200093 | 50 cal psn |
| XF 1213D | 238089 | 50 cal psns |
| XF 1213E | 198089 | 5 bunkers |
| XF 1213F | 170080 | 3 huts |
| XF 1213G | 180105 | 4 huts |

BLOCK 14

| | | |
|----------|----------|------------|
| XF 1214A | YD220044 | 18 bunkers |
| XF 1214B | 193044 | 8 bunkers |
| XF 1214C | 192028 | 50 cal psn |

BLOCK 15

| | | |
|---------|----------|-------------|
| XF 1215 | YD265195 | 15 foxholes |
|---------|----------|-------------|

BLOCK 16

| | | |
|----------|----------|------------|
| XF 1216Z | YD296295 | 5 bunkers |
| XF 1216B | 294297 | 30 bunkers |

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Annex C (Schedule of ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ res) to OPORD 2-70 Task Force Speech II.

SCHEDULED FIRES FOR A/6/33

Subject to change upon displacement to VCB or Calv

BLOCK 17 Az of fire - 6000

| TGT # | GRID | RDS |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1217A | XD981580 | 12 |
| XF 1217B | 974574 | 12 |
| XF 1217C | 968584 | 12 |
| XF 1217D | 962570 | <u>12</u> |
| TOT | | 48 |

BLOCK 18 Az of lay - 5200

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1218A | XD950570 | 12 |
| XF 1218B | 932575 | 12 |
| XF 1218C | 943562 | 12 |
| XF 1218D | 933558 | 12 |
| XF 1218E | 948553 | 12 |
| XF 1218F | 914548 | <u>12</u> |
| TOT | | 72 |

BLOCK 19 Az of lay - 4400

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1219A | XD934541 | 12 |
| XF 1219B | 943545 | 12 |
| XF 1219C | 939534 | 12 |
| XF 1219D | 895515 | 12 |
| XF 1219E | 902522 | 12 |
| XF 1219F | 915521 | 12 |
| XF 1219G | 918509 | 12 |
| XF 1219H | 941517 | <u>12</u> |
| TOT | | 96 |

BLOCK 20 Az of lay - 3600

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1220A | XD950505 | 16 |
| XF 1220B | 958510 | 16 |
| XF 1220C | 961502 | 12 |
| XF 1220D | 967513 | 12 |
| XF 1220E | 968522 | 12 |
| XF 1220F | 972505 | 16 |
| XF 1220G | 947477 | 16 |
| XF 1220H | 943465 | 16 |
| XF 1220I | 967469 | 16 |
| XF 1220J | 970480 | 16 |
| XF 1220K | 972488 | <u>16</u> |
| TOT | | 164 |

BLOCK 21 Az of lay 3000

| | | |
|----------|----------|-----------|
| XF 1221A | XD982488 | 16 |
| XF 1221B | 993472 | 16 |
| XF 1221C | 996455 | <u>16</u> |
| TOT | | 48 |

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ANNEX D (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 2-70 Task Force Smith II

1. Organization.

A/8/4 (-), 8", Camp Carroll

C/6/33, 105MM, FSB Fuller

A/62, 105MM (ARVN), FSB Sarge

2. Mission. All elements of Task Force Smith II Artillery will be in direct support of Task Force Smith II. Be prepared to fire LZ prep if scheduled and on-call convoy defensive targets as planned.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation. Four schedules of targets will be included in this plan; planned on-call convoy defensive targets, and three planned LZ preps designated LZ Elliot, LZ Vandergriff, and LZ Calu. All planned targets will be cleared to fire prior to H-hour and will remain on call for the duration of the operation. Priority of fire to insert force until H+15.

b. Convoy defensive targets.

(1) A/8/4 (-)

| | |
|--------|------------|
| XF1050 | YD01335704 |
| XF1051 | XD98895447 |
| XF1052 | XD97825465 |
| XF1053 | XD98325414 |
| XF1054 | XD97695375 |
| XF1055 | XD97835423 |
| XF1056 | XD99834941 |
| XF1057 | XD98244952 |
| XF1058 | XD98234831 |
| XF1059 | YD00064831 |
| XF1060 | XD99794672 |
| XF1061 | XD01864621 |
| XF1062 | YD00664462 |
| XF1063 | YD02054418 |
| XF1064 | YD02334550 |

(2) C/6/33

| | |
|--------|------------|
| XF1065 | YD01955639 |
| XF1066 | YD01185650 |
| XF1067 | YD00735643 |
| XF1068 | YD00165660 |
| XF1069 | XD99645618 |
| XF1070 | XD98715654 |
| XF1071 | XD99205521 |
| XF1072 | XD98705517 |
| XF1073 | XD98365317 |
| XF1074 | XD97845218 |
| XF1075 | XD98195138 |
| XF1076 | XD97965100 |

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ANNEX D (Cont)

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(3) A/62 (ARVN)

| | |
|--------|------------|
| XF1077 | XD98355941 |
| XF1078 | XD99234967 |
| XF1079 | XD99324891 |
| XF1080 | XD99204825 |
| XF1081 | XD99584745 |
| XF1082 | YD00474715 |
| XF1083 | YD00764624 |
| XF1084 | YD01064584 |
| XF1085 | YD00904535 |
| XF1086 | YD01484550 |

c. LZ Elliot prep: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1087Z | XD98285469 |
| XF1087B | XD98005440 |
| XF1087C | XD97905419 |
| XF1087D | XD97905475 |
| XF1087E | XD97605423 |
| XF1087F | XD98275444 |
| XF1087G | XD98305490 |

(2) C/6/33 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1087H | XD98425458 |
| XF1087I | XD98405440 |
| XF1087J | XD98285423 |
| XF1087K | XD98005420 |
| XF1087L | XD98675453 |
| XF1087M | XD98625420 |
| XF1087N | XD98325400 |
| XF1087O | XD97945395 |
| XF1087P | XD98905430 |

d. LZ Vandergriff: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1088A | XD99744914 |
| XF1088B | YD00004860 |
| XF1088C | YD00274825 |
| XF1088D | YD00524769 |
| XF1088E | XD99904730 |
| XF1088F | XD98904760 |
| XF1088G | XD98634820 |
| XF1088H | XD98604880 |

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ANNEX D (Cont)

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(2) A/62 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1088I | XD00004775 |
| XF1088J | YD99474760 |
| XF1088K | YD99754810 |
| XF1088L | YD99104800 |
| XF1088M | YD99544850 |
| XF1088N | YD98974855 |
| XF1088O | YD99254895 |
| XF1088P | YD99344820 |

e. LZ Calu: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1089A | YD00654520 |
| XF1089B | YD00654560 |
| XF1089C | YD00654600 |
| XF1089D | YD01294625 |
| XF1089E | YD01774600 |
| XF1089F | YD01704560 |
| XF1089G | YD01704525 |
| XF1089H | YD01194520 |
| XF1089I | YD01474620 |

(2) A/62 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XF1089J | YD01464545 |
| XF1089K | YD01254545 |
| XF1089L | YD01044545 |
| XF1089M | YD01044580 |
| XF1089N | YD01304595 |
| XF1089O | YD01494588 |
| XF1089P | YD01304565 |

4. Ammunition.

a. A/8/4 (-). Insure a minimum of 150 rounds available to support operation.

b. C/6/33. Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.

c. A/62. Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.

5. Command.

a. CO, Task Force Smith II will have direct fire channel to all firing units to be provided to assigned FO, A/8/4.

b. CO, insert force will utilize quick fire channel for fire requests.

c. CO, Task Force Smith II is responsible for coordinating air coverage and artillery fires.

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1. Concept: The security forces were composed of elements from the 3/5 Cav, C/4th Bn (ARA), 77th Arty, 1/44th Arty, 14th Engineers, elements of 3/2 ARVN Regiment and 2/2 ARVN Regiment. The implementation of the operations order was coordinated through command channels.

a. Engineers along with the 3/5 Cav and ARVN infantry provided mine sweeps throughout the entire operation.

c. The 3/5 Cav provided strong convoy and LZ security for both positions.

d. C/4th Bn (ARA), 77th Arty, provided a number of capabilities.

1. Reconnaissance of the route of march
2. Reaction and cover during displacement
3. Observation

e. 3rd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment secured ECB along with the 3/5th Cav.

f. The combination of cavalry forces, dusters, quads, and infantry produced a well balanced strong fighting force for the protection and security of the artillery raid. Night defensive concentrations at ECB were fired by C/6/33 with on call fires from A/8/4 at Camp Carroll and A/62 (ARVN) at FSB Sarge. At Calu A/6/33 fired in defensive concentrations both by direct and indirect fires. In addition, fires were on call from A/62 (ARVN) and A/8/4. ARA was also on call in support of security forces. They were further tasked to fly the route of march both during the emplacement and extraction. A stand-by reaction force composed of 1 tank company and 1 cavalry troop (-) was staged at Cam Lo.

g. During the return march to Dong Ha combat base, 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment assisted in securing the route of march.

3. Weak Points: No significant weaknesses were noted.

4. Discussion

a. ECB. All support elements performed their duties in an outstanding manner. The ARVN forces secured the LZ as designated by the operations order. The 14th Engineers made the sweep from Camp Carroll to ECB while 3/5 Cav made a sweep from A-4 to Cam Lo and from Camp Carroll to Dong Ha combat base. 3/5 Cav was responsible for road security to ECB and the reaction force in case of attack. Upon arrival at ECB a strong defensive perimeter was established from all available forces. Through a very effective security plan, 3/5 Cav was able to keep the entire route of march open during the day without incident or the loss of personnel or equipment. The night defense of ECB was set up by ARVN

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infantry augmented by 3/5 Cav and 1/44th (dusters, quads, and search lights). The cooperation between all units was exceptional in all aspects.

b. Calu. On the third day of the operation the mine sweep was made to Calu by 14th Engineers and extraction from ECB to Calu was immediately commenced. The defensive perimeter was established much the same as at VCB, but the staging area for the reaction force was moved to ECB. In addition, two ARVN companies were deployed in the nearby vicinity on the high ground for additional security. C/4th Bn (ARA), 77th Arty was on continuous stand-by for fire support in case of attack. Defensive targets were fired in on southwestern slopes by A/6/33 Arty both by direct and indirect means. Additional targets were placed on-call with A/8/4 at Camp Carroll and A/62 (ARVN) at FSB Sarge. Road security for resupply purposes again was established by 3/5 Cav in an extremely efficient manner.

5. Recommendation. Provision should be made for the preparation of a security force overlay to indicate the exact location of all units.

6. Comment. 3/5 Squadron should be commended for their outstanding performance.

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Enclosure 4

CONFIDENTIALEXTRACTING FORCE

1. Concept: The 3rd Squadron, 5th Cav had the inherent responsibility to provide the extracting force for all elements of Task Force Smith. The reaction force for ECB consisted of 1 tank company and 1 cav troop (-) which was stationed at the vicinity of grid 0957 with a total deployment time of 45 minutes. The reaction force was on station prior to darkness and was commanded by the security forces commander, CO, 3/5 Cav Squadron. When Task Force Smith displaced to Calu the reaction force was staged at ECB. The estimated deployment time and the size of the elements was the same as for ECB. Additional reaction forces responsive to the task force commander were elements of C Btry, 4th Bn (ARA), 77th Arty which were on 15 minute stand-by and elements of the 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment with a deployment time of 1 hour. To implement scheduled extraction and for security of the route of march, a force was composed consisting of parts of the security and the reaction forces, 2nd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment east and west of QL 9 south of the 51 grid line, and 3rd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regiment along QL 9 north of the 51 grid line. The extraction force was further augmented during routine extraction by ARA.

2. Strong Points:

a. The task force commander's and security forces commander's plans were simple and well coordinated.

b. Having the security forces commander also command the reaction forces gave greater flexibility for planning purposes to the task force commander.

c. The understanding and cooperation between security and task force units was outstanding.

3. Weak Points:

a. Due to lack of time and information available through command channels from higher HQ it was extremely difficult for the task force and security forces commander to plan ahead and augment security and extraction forces.

b. The lack of information concerning the location of friendly forces involved in and nearby the operation made fire planning and the planning of defensive concentrations difficult.

4. Discussion: All commanders were briefed as much as possible by task force commander concerning the area of operation, control points, responsibilities of each element during the operation, the emergency extraction plan, location of friendly forces, and the use and implementation of the SOI.

5. Recommendations:

a. The task force and security forces commander be given more reaction time for planning purposes.

b. Information provided to task force commander be greater in depth concerning friendly situation and other operations that may hinder his mission. (101st Airborne moving into LZ Shepherd).

6. Comment. All security elements from 3/5 Cav, C Btry 4th Bn (ARA), 77th Arty, 1/44th Arty, 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn, 2nd RVN Regiment should be complimented on a job well done.

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Enclosure 5

CONFIDENTIALLOGISTICS

1. GENERAL DISCUSSION: The 8th Bn, 4th Arty prepared plans and executed the logistics portion of the mission.

2. PRE-PLANNED LOGISTICS:

a. There were no problems in providing the ammunition and class one supplies for the operation.

b. Sufficient transportation to haul the ammunition required on the raid and to maintain normal resupply operation was not available. Additional transportation was obtained from external sources.

3. ON-CALL LOGISTICS: In order to provide emergency resupply of the task force, Class I, Class III, and Class V supplies were rigged for airlift to ECB. There were problems in securing the necessary air items and qualified riggers. 10 hours prior to the operation, coordination was effected with 101st Abn Division to secure the air items and necessary personnel to rig the equipment. On call supplies were staged at 8/4 Arty rear CP, Dong Ha RVN.

4. MAINTENANCE: Maintenance support for the task force was a significant factor in the accomplishment of the mission. The necessity of taking a complement from the support maintenance facility can not be overemphasized. The repair personnel and wrecker from the 178th Maintenance Company were key in keeping the 175 guns firing.

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Figure 6

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The following is submitted as a suggested planning and execution scenario for the conduct of an artillery raid.

EVENTREMARKS

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Receipt of warning order | All participating units and all support units should be indicated at this time. |
| 2. Planning conference | All participating units, CO's concept of operation |
| 3. Coordinating conference | Requirements of all units should be stated at this time. |
| 4. OPOD (Maneuver CO) distributed | |
| 5. Arty fire plan distributed | |
| 6. Arty SOI distributed | All questions answered, problems resolved |
| 7. Emergency air resupply rigged and ready | Rigging to be done by support personnel |
| 8. Radio equipment installed and checked | |
| 9. FDC equipment loaded and checked | |
| 10. Survey section briefed | |
| 11. Mine sweep departs | Route security accompany mine sweep. |
| 12. Route security | Security dropped off along route. |
| 13. LNOs report to TF HQ | |
| 14. Radio net opens | TF SOI to be used exclusively. |
| 15. Air cover on station | |
| 16. Recon party moves forward | |
| 17. Units displace | On order |
| 18. Survey completed | |
| 19. Closed in position | Survey data provided to firing elements ASAP |
| 20. Howitzers laid and ready | Block fires should be implemented. |
| 21. Ammo resupply (road) | Emergency resupply prepositioned and rigged for helicopter pick-up if necessary. |

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REMARKS

EVENT

22. Fuel resupply (road)

Fuel prepositioned for emergency air pick-up

23. Class 1 resupply (road)

Class 1 prepositioned for emergency air pick-up

24. Return to home base

25. Closed home station.

Incl 6

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH BATTALION, 33RD ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96269


AVGLE-CO

4 February 1970

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Artillery Raid, EGB-Ca Lu 28-31 Jan 70

Commanding Officer
108th Artillery Group
APO San Francisco 96269

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the after action report of the artillery raid conducted from FSE Ca Lu during the period 28-31 January 1970. The report covers highlights in planning, execution, known results and observations and recommendations applicable to planning future raids.
2. (U) The purpose of this artillery raid, like all others, was to exploit the element of surprise by rapidly displacing a long range artillery element (175mm Guns) to a forward position and engaging and causing maximum damage to preselected targets and targets of opportunity. Preselected targets and some targets of opportunity were provided by XXIV Corps Artillery.
3. (U) Overall command of the raid task force was delegated by CG 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) to LTC Bradberry, Commanding Officer 3rd Sqd 5th Cav. The artillery force commander was LTC Duncan, Commanding Officer, 6th Bn 33rd Arty.
4. (U) Based on the amount of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) obtained, the operation was indeed a success. This success was attributed to all the Army and Marine personnel participating in the raid who displayed a high degree of professionalism, complete cooperation, and a sense of urgency in accomplishing the mission.
5. (U) It was a distinct pleasure and a rewarding experience to command the artillery element of this raid task force.
6. (U) This letter is regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosures.



RCSS E. DUNCAN
LTC, FA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

HQ 108th Arty Gp - 6 ea
8th Bn 4th Arty - 3 ea
5th 175 Gun Bn - 6 ea
F Btry 26th Arty - 3 ea
2nd Bn 94th Arty - 3 ea

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After Action Report - Artillery Raid FSB Ca Lu 28-31 January 1970 (U)

- ✓Inclosure I. Sequence of Events
- ✓Inclosure II. Operational Planning
- ✓Inclosure III. Fire Planning and Fire Control (Tab A Fire Support Plan w/ Target List to FRAGORD 3-70 (Task Force Bradberry) 271430H Jan 70)
- ✓Inclosure IV. Execution of Artillery Raid
- ✓Inclosure V. Target Acquisition & Surveillance (BDA)
- ✓Inclosure VI. Logistical Support & Services
- ✓Inclosure VII. Observations and Recommendations

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Inclosure I. (C) Sequence of Events (U)

| | | |
|-----------|-------|---|
| 25 Jan | 1300H | Received Warning Order. |
| | 1400H | Conducted coordination with participating units within 108th Arty Gp. |
| | 1600H | Draft raid plan completed. |
| 26 Jan | 1400H | Coordination meeting with 1/5th Mech representatives. |
| | 1500H | Received target list for raid. |
| | 1500H | Began detailed fire planning. |
| 27 Jan | 0930H | Planning conference held at 1/5th Mech TOC. |
| | 1600H | Coordination meeting held with CO 3/5th Cav. |
| | 1800 | Briefing for 108th Gp CO and staff. |
| 28 Jan | 0945H | Aerial recon of route and FSB by Arty TF Commander. |
| | 1015H | Route secured. |
| | 1030H | Recon element dispatched to FSB Ca Lu. |
| | 1100H | March serial departed Dong Ha Combat Base. |
| | 1240H | TF closed station - FSB Ca Lu. |
| 28-31 Jan | | Executed Fire Plan. |
| 31 Jan | 1100H | Completed firing operations. |
| | 1145H | CSMO - Departed for home stations. |
| | 1315H | Closed station - Dong Ha Combat Base. |

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Inclosure II. Operational Planning

(C) General Summary. This inclosure discusses the planning sequence followed by this headquarters in preparation for the conduct of the Artillery Raid on 28 to 31 January 1970.

1. On 23 January 1970 the battalion commander, 6th En 33rd Arty, was alerted by the 108th Arty Group Commander for a pending artillery raid to be conducted for FSE Ca Lu and a position west of FSB Elliott.

2. Upon receipt of the alert, planning was begun immediately, and when the actual warning order was received on 25 January 1970 a plan had been formulated and an aerial reconnaissance of the probable Fire Support Bases (FSB) to be occupied had been completed.

3. Artillery units to participate in the raid would be Battery C, 6th En 33rd Arty (two 105T), the 5th 175 Gun Battery (four 175 guns), and C Battery 4/77 ARA (101st Div Arty). Other units to provide support personnel and services were the 173rd Maintenance Company (Ordnance) Battery F 26th TAB (Survey and Counter Mortar Radar), 8th En 4th Arty (FDC personnel) and selected elements of HHB, 108th Arty Group (Air Warning Control and Air Observer Ground Control).

4. Based on past experience it was anticipated that overall responsibility for the artillery raid would rest with the maneuver commander, CG 1st Ede 5th Inf Div (Mech). On 26 Jan representatives from the 1st Ede 5th Inf Div (Mech) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) arrived at Headquarters 108th Group to effect initial coordination. At this meeting, the artillery commander for the operation was tasked to provide the Fire Support Annex for an OPORD to be written by 1st Ede 5th Inf Div (Mech).

5. On 26 January the 6th En 33rd Arty TOC received and began to plot and analyze the targets provided by XXIV Corps Artillery.

6. A coordination meeting was held at the 1st Ede 5th Inf Div (Mech) TOC on 28 January 1970. At this meeting the Commanding Officer 3rd Sqd 5th Cav was given overall command of the raid task force. It was agreed that the maneuver commander would provide the required route and fire support base security and the artillery commander would execute the mission of delivering fires on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity.

7. The general concept of operations that would be conducted was as follows:

a. Clear and secure the route to FSB Elliott and Ca Lu. Also secure both fire bases.

b. Move the task force. The primary firing and control elements move directly to FSB Ca Lu. Task Force trains and reaction force stage at FSB Elliott.

c. Execute the artillery raid from FSB Ca Lu.

d. Upon completion of the mission return elements of the task force to home stations.

8. It was also planned that during this raid the 175mm guns would also occupy positions west of FSB Elliott and fire on targets in the Tri-border area in the northwestern portion of the DMZ.

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Inclosure III. Fire Planning and Fire Control.

1. (C) Offensive Fires. The mission of the artillery with the task force was to conduct an artillery raid on both preplanned targets and targets of opportunity. The list of targets provided by 108th Arty Group and XXIV Corps Arty was plotted and analyzed. It was decided to segregate groups of targets into blocks, and subsequently assign these blocks of targets to the proper weapons system, either 175mm gun, 105mm howitzers or ARA. As the targets plotted, it was necessary to assign the 175mm guns most of the targets. Whereas the 105mm howitzer got one block of close-in targets, ARA was assigned two blocks of targets. One block could not be ranged by tube artillery and the second block of targets lay between the maximum range of the 105mm howitzers and the minimum (optimum) range of the 175mm guns. Targets were grouped in such a manner that the 175mm guns could engage a large number of targets with a minimum amount of shifting and relaying.

2. (C) Defensive Fires. Defensive targets for the route of march and FSB Ca Lu were originally planned and assigned by the 6th Bn 33rd Arty on an on call basis to artillery units within supporting range of the operation. However all initial defensive targets were considered secondary to those planned and called by the FOs with the maneuver force. This priority was determined to be the most practical from the standpoint that the FOs could plan and alter defensive targets based on operational requirements and the changing friendly troop locations. Perimeter security was the primary responsibility of the 3rd Sqd 5th Cav. However, the 105mm howitzers in the direct fire role were integrated into the defensive fire plan for FSB Ca Lu.

3. (C) Fire Direction Control. Firing data for the 175mm guns was computed at FSB Ca Lu with a FADAC. Fire data checks were performed by the 5th 175mm Guns Bn FDC at Camp Carroll. Firing data for the 105mm howitzers was computed by Etry C 6th Bn 33rd Arty at FSB Fuller and relayed by radio to the FDC at FSB Ca Lu. Fire data check for the 105mm howitzer missions was performed by the 6th Bn 33rd Arty battalion FDC at Dong Ha Combat Base (DHCB). In addition to FADAC computations, a manual chart was prepared at FSB Ca Lu as a backup.

Headquarters 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) provided the TF SOI for the artillery raid. Communications to control the fires of the artillery were set up as follows:

a. Radio.

(1) FD#1 - FSB Ca Lu FDC to Camp Carroll (175mm guns Fire Data Check and backup for FDC to 175mm gun position).

(2) FD#2 - FSB Ca Lu FDC to FSB Fuller (105mm howitzers initial and check data; backup from FDC to 105mm howitzer position).

(3) FD#3 - Primary means for directing ARA. This frequency was also used by the Aerial Observer (AO).

b. Land Line. Wire was laid from the FDC to both the 175mm guns and 105mm howitzers XO posts. These land lines served as the primary means of transmitting fire commands. As indicated above, the radio FD nets served as backup in the event land lines were cut by vehicular traffic.

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To relieve possible congestion in the FDC van and to facilitate coordination with liaison elements, an operations tent was set up beside the FDC van. Tables were provided for the S-3, AOGC, ARA liaison officer, and 2nd Sqd 17th Cav liaison officer. Liaison personnel remoted their radios into the tent and the S-3 exercised control through direct contact with the liaison personnel and a direct land line to the FDC in the FDC van. Maps in the FDC van and the operations tent with blocks of targets clearly outlined assisted greatly in controlling and coordinating artillery fires into as many as three target areas simultaneously.

4. (C) Air Warning Control. Of vital concern during any artillery firing operation is the safety of friendly aircraft in the area. The 108th Arty Group provided an Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) to control and warn all aircraft in the vicinity of the raid site. To further assist in the control of air traffic, the 1st Ede 5th Inf Div (Mech) promised to publish a NOTAM to insure that aircraft in the area would be aware of the firings and contact the Ca Lu AWCC for air warning data.

During the firing operations the FDC would post air warning data with the AWCC. The AWCC also displayed on their map the boundaries of each block of targets and during each firing, AWCC posted the maximum ordinate and azimuth of fire for the block(s) of targets being fired.

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Inclosure IV. Execution of Artillery Raid.

1. (C) Route and Position Reconnaissance. The route to FSB Elliott and Ca Lu and the fire support bases themselves were cleared and secured prior to 281100H January 1970. However just prior to the unit's departure for the raid site, the artillery force commander, accompanied by the 175mm gun battery commander and 105mm howitzer platoon chief-of-firing-battery, conducted an aerial route and position reconnaissance of the route to be traveled and the positions to be occupied. Then the reconnaissance party was dispatched to FSB Ca Lu ahead of the main body.

2. (C) Road March. The road march was conducted and controlled as planned by the task force commander. The road march began at 1100 hours and each check point cleared was reported to the task force CP initially established at FSB Elliott. The artillery force commander assisted in controlling the two march serials through the use of a helicopter.

3. (C) Occupation of Position. The last element of the task force closed on FSB Ca Lu at 1240 hours 28 Jan 70. Occupation of the position went smoothly primarily because the advance (recon) party had preceded the unit, determined where to locate elements, and was there to direct traffic. The guns and howitzers were laid and ready to fire at 1305 hours.

4. (C) Conduct of Fire.

a. Firing operations commenced at 1445H (105mm howitzer) and 1527H (175mm gun) respectively. During the four day operation the 175mm guns fired a total of 1049 rounds of High Explosive (HE) ammunition. Of this total expenditure, 795 rounds were expended on preplanned targets contained in the Fire Support Plan (Tab A, Incl ((()). The additional 254 rounds were expended on targets of opportunity passed to the raid site by higher headquarters.

b. The 105mm howitzers fired a total of 684 rounds (600 HE, 60 Ill, 18 EH, 6 smoke). The break down of expenditures during the operation was as follows:

| | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Preplanned Targets | 298 rounds (292 HE, 6 smoke) |
| Targets of Opportunity | 60 rounds (54 HE, 6 EH) |
| Defensive H&I | 326 rounds (254 HE, 12 EH, 60 Ill) |

c. ARA played an outstanding role and contributed immensely to the overall success of the artillery raid. During the operation the following ammunition was expended by ARA:

| | |
|-------------------|------|
| Flechette Rockets | 19 |
| 10# Rockets | 328 |
| WP Rockets | 3 |
| 40mm Grenades | 50 |
| 7.62mm Ammo | 2700 |

Additionally invaluable BDA was reported by ARA pilots.

d. The 2nd Sqd 17th Cav contributed to the success of the artillery raid in three ways. First their liaison representative was able to obtain rapid impact clearances of grids in the 101st Airborne Division's Area of Operation(AO) and to keep the task force advised of the location of various teams inserted into the AO. Secondly the Pink Team of the 2nd Sqd 17th Cav provided the task force "first light" and "last light" perimeter coverage. Finally the 2nd Sqd 17th Cav reported much of the BDA that attested to the success of the operation.

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Inclosure V (C) Target Acquisition and Surveillance (EDA) (U)

1. (C) Throughout the operation a high priority was placed on firing observed missions and assessing battle (gun) damage.

2. (C) Battle damage assessment (EDA) was provided from three sources - Aerial Observers (AO), Aerial Rocket Artillery (4th En 77th ARA), and 2nd Sqd 17th Cav Pink Teams. The fact that the target list provided by XLIV Corps Artillery contained both target grids and target description was of great assistance to the target acquisition effort and subsequent engagement. The element with the primary mission of EDA was the 2nd Sqd 17th Cav Pink Team.

3. (C) The following battle damage assessment is the result of excellent target data, timely and accurate artillery fire, outstanding aerial observation and is the true gauge of the success of this artillery raid:

Battle Damage Assessment

| <u>GRID</u> | <u>WEAPON</u> | <u>EDA</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---|
| 995311 | ARA | 1 Bunker destroyed, 1 bunker damaged |
| 713413 | ARA | Well used trail interdicted |
| 736403 | ARA | Well used trail interdicted |
| 756408 | ARA | Well used trail interdicted |
| 836427 | ARA | 2 bunkers destroyed; area set afire |
| 990310 | ARA | Two 50 cal positions destroyed |
| 991333 | ARA | 5 bunkers, 4 huts destroyed |
| 965417 | ARA | Two bunkers destroyed |
| 995332 | ARA | 7 bunkers, 1 drawbridge destroyed |
| 998324 | ARA | 1 Green and yellow raft destroyed |
| 928415 | 105 | 1 bunker damaged |
| 994384 | 105 | 2 bunkers damaged, 4 bunkers destroyed, 10 foxholes destroyed |
| 776237 | 175 | 3 bunkers destroyed, fires ignited |

4. (C) in addition to all the preplanned targets contained in the fire support plan, the raid force engaged several significant targets of opportunity:

| <u>GRID</u> | <u>WEAPON</u> | <u>EDA</u> |
|-------------|---------------|---|
| 041447 | 105 | 4 NVA dispersed |
| 107415 | 105 | Personnel on raft dispersed |
| 785439 | 175 | Lights and flares extinguished |
| 953305 | 175 | Personnel in open dispersed |
| 9827 | ARA, 175 | Trucks set afire, personnel dispersed, roads interdicted |
| 845245 | 175 | 5 bunkers destroyed (ARA received ground fire from this grid) |

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5. (C) Security.

a. On 27 January 1970, TF Bradberry swept QL-9 as far as and secured FSB Elliott with one reinforced troop. A reaction force remained at FSB Elliott throughout the operation.

b. At first light on 28 January 1970, elements of TF Bradberry in conjunction with two companies of the 2nd ARVN Regiment outposted QL-9 from vicinity of Khe Gio Bridge to FSB Ca Lu and secured both FSB Elliott and Ca Lu.

c. Each day security forces opened and secured the route from FSB Ca Lu to vicinity of Khe Gio Bridge to allow logistical support to travel by road to FSB Ca Lu. Each evening at approximately 1600, route security elements were drawn in to reinforce night perimeter defenses of FSB Elliott and FSB Ca Lu.

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Inclosure VI. (C) Logistical Support and Services (U)

1. (C) Supply.

a. Class I.

- (1) Each element carried a 3 day supply of C rations on the operation.
- (2) After the first day one hot meal per day was prepared by HHB 6/33 and staged out of Pomona Pad at Dong Ha and flown to FSE Ca Lu by helicopter.
- (3) Post Exchange items were flown to FSB Ca Lu as helicopter space was available.

b. Class II.

(1) During the operation a contact team from the 178th Maintenance Company performed the following maintenance for the 175 Guns:

- (a) Changed 2 cannon assemblies (tubes).
- (b) Replaced 3 traversing planetary carriers.
- (c) Replaced 1 elevating drive assembly.
- (d) Replaced 4 rammer hoses.
- (e) Replaced 4 torque locks.
- (f) Replaced 2 loader rammer lift cylinders.
- (g) Rebuilt one hydraulic motor.
- (h) Two welding jobs completed.

(2) Many of the repair parts required to support the firing operation were brought to the raid site by the maintenance contact team. Repair parts needed from the rear were flown in by helicopter with a minimum delay.

c. Class III.

(1) All vehicles were filled with fuel prior to the road march. And to assure sufficient fuel for the return trip, a fuel truck (mogas and diesel) accompanied the convoy to FSE Ca Lu. At Ca Lu vehicles were again filled with fuel and the fuel truck returned to Dong Ha for normal use.

(2) Fuel for operation of generators was transported in 5-gallon cans. Oil was also carried forward.

(3) Aircraft (helicopters and fixed wing) refueled at their home bases and at Quang Tri airport.

(4) The large quantities of fuel required for the tracked armored vehicles and the bulldozer were transported to the field by tanker and portable, collapsible fuel containers.

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d. Class V.

- (1) All individuals carried a double basic load of small arms ammunition.
- (2) The 5th 175 Guns moved to FSE Ca Lu with 400 rounds of HE, and an additional 400 rounds of HE was staged at FSB Elliott. During the operation the 5th 175 Guns received one additional resupply of 400 rounds of HE. Total 175 rounds delivered to the raid site was 1200 rounds of HE.
- (3) Battery C (-) 6/33 (two 105T) moved to the raid site with 320 rounds of ammunition (210 HE, 60 ILL, 40 BE, 6 HC). Four hundred rounds of HE were resupplied to the unit during the operation.
- (4) Resupply of ammunition for the security force was handled by TF Bradberry control elements.

2. (C) Services.

a. Maintenance.

- (1) Elements of the TF displaced with organic maintenance capability.
- (2) The 178th Maintenance Company provided a maintenance contact team which performed in an excellent manner to keep all 175 guns operational. The repair parts usage noted in 1b(1) above indicates both the amount of work done by the maintenance team and the down time experienced by the 175 guns.

b. Medical.

- (1) Each element was tasked to provide one medic. However the 6/33 also provided a medic and a medical officer who set up an Aid Station in the position area.
- (2) Medevac was available through "Dustoff Control," Primary frequency: 47.40; alternate frequency: 46.90.

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Inclosure VII. Observations and Recommendations. (U)

1. (C) Observations.

a. Strong Points.

(1) Sufficient planning time was available and allowed for the required coordination between participating units.

(2) Command guidance and staff assistance from the 108th Arty Group was outstanding and contributed significantly to the overall success of the mission.

(3) Close and continuous coordination between FDC and Air LNO's assured aircraft safety in the target area and the provision of BDA. Considerable battle damage assessment was obtained by the various aircraft crews flying the area of operations. Favorable flying weather and command emphasis greatly assisted in this endeavor. The advantage of having Air LNO's on the ground cannot be over emphasized.

(4) Personnel visiting the raid site were met by the Artillery Commander, given a current operational status briefing, and taken on a tour of the area. This method of handling VIP's was outstanding from two standpoints:

(a) All visitors received a current status report.

(b) Personnel involved in immediate operations were not called away from their duties to escort visitors or answer questions.

(5) Support from Dong Ha Combat Base was timely and consistently outstanding. In addition to the daily hot meals, critical repair parts were expedited to FSB Ca Lu whenever needed.

(6) Grouping targets by blocks minimized the requirement to shift the 175mm Guns.

(7) Firing data for the 105mm howitzers was computed using the FADAC at FSB Fuller and passed to FSB Ca Lu on FD#2. This procedure proved that firing data could be computed at a distant FDC and successfully passed to the raid site, thereby reducing the amount of equipment required at the raid site.

(8) BDA was passed to gun crews and significantly aided morale.

(9) All Army and Marine personnel participating in the raid displayed the high degree of professionalism, cooperation, and sense of urgency which contributed to the successful accomplishment of the mission.

b. Weak Points.

(1) The initial delay in firing was due to the slow receipt of origin clearance and a slow check of the fire data for the 175mm Guns.

(a) Although the LNO at Camp Carroll had the fire support plan, he was doubtful of his authority to grant immediate origin clearance. He delayed by checking with 108th Gp FSCA.

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(b) The FDC at Camp Carroll had the target list on 27 Jan 70 and began computation of data with FADAC. Initial data from Camp Carroll and FSB Ca Lu did not check because Camp Carroll had used the 27 Jan MET whereas FSB Ca Lu was using a more current 28 Jan MET in their FADAC.

(2) Range limitation of the 105mm howitzer for engaging indirect fire targets.

2. (C) Recommendations.

a. Future raids should employ the 155mm howitzer instead of the 105mm howitzer. The 155mm howitzer can better range those targets that fall short of the 175mm gun's minimum range.

b. The Air Liaison representatives should continue to be located on the ground at the raid site during future artillery raids.

c. BDA should always be passed to gun crews.

d. A chronograph team should accompany artillery raids in order to obtain and provide calibration data to the FDC; this would be especially helpful in gaining experience data on performance of the new autofrettage cannons. The chronograph team would also derive great training benefits.

e. If it is determined that survey control will be slow or difficult to obtain, the survey team should give priority to providing directional control (use a sun shot).

f. Targets for 175mm guns should be grouped into blocks to minimize the requirement to shift.

g. A bulldozer should be made available to each artillery raid force to assist in position area improvement and final area police upon departure.

h. Firing batteries should notify support maintenance of any known defects in equipment (including 175mm gun EFC's) prior to movement in order that sufficient repair parts can accompany the maintenance contact team.

i. A person should be appointed as the Headquarter Commandant to coordinate all the requests for support from the rear and to supervise general troop welfare and position area police.

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 Dong Ha (YD 235585) RVN
 301700H Jan 70

FRAGORD 4-70 (Task Force Bradberry)

References: Maps, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS L7014, sheets 6342 I and II and sheets 6442 I, II, III, IV.

Time Zone: HOTEL

Task Organization:

| <u>TEAM A</u> | <u>TEAM B</u> | <u>TEAM C</u> | <u>TEAM D</u> | <u>TF CONTROL</u> |
|---------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|
| A/3/5 (-) | B/3/5 (-) | C/3/5 Plt/A/3/5 | C/2/34 Armor | 4 AW 1/44 Arty Plt/A/7th Arty |

TF DUNCAN

CP from 6/33 Arty
 5/175 Gun Arty
 Plt/C/6/33 Arty

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: See current INTSUM

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) continues operations in assigned AO.

(2) 2nd ARVN Regt assists in the security of FSB Elliott, FSB Ca Lu, and QL-9 between Ca Lu and the Khe Gio Bridge.

c. Attachments and Detachments:

Task organization effective 301700H Jan 70. Plt/A/3/5 reverts to parent unit upon order to leave Ca Lu.

2. (C) MISSION:

TF 3/5 Cav (TF Bradberry) conducts tactical road march from vicinity of FSB Ca Lu and FSB Elliott to bases of origin and de-organizes.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

(1) Maneuver:

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FRAGORD 4-70 (TF Bradberry) HQ 3rd Sqdn 5th Cav

301700H Jan 70

(a) On order TF Bradberry conducts tactical road march. Order of march: TF Duncan, Tm C, Tm D, and Tm A.

(b) Annex A (Operations Overlay).

(2) Fires:

(a) Annex B (Fire Support) to FRAGORD 3-70 applies.

(b) Priority of fires to elements in contact.

b. Team A:

(1) Follow Team D.

(2) Assume responsibility for AO south of QL-9 and north of Vinh Phuoc River.

(3) Secure Black Knight Range.

c. Team B: Assume responsibility for AO south of Cam Lo River.

d. Team C:

(1) Follow TF Duncan.

(2) NDP vic YD 205545.

(3) Assume responsibility of AO south of Vinh Phuoc River at 010800.

e. Team D:

(1) Follow Team C.

(2) NDP vic YD 155567.

(3) Act as ready reactionary force for Cam Lo and DHCB.

f. TF Duncan:

(1) Lead element in road march.

(2) Return to bases of origin.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Report checkpoint clearance times.

(2) SP is northern edge of FSB Elliott; time TBA.

(3) RF is at YD 092567.

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FRAGORD 4-70 (TF Bradberry) HQ 3rd Sqdn, 5th Cav

301700H Jan 70

- (4) Checkpoints shown on Annex A effective 301700H Jan 70.
 - (5) Interval between vehicles: 50 meters.
 - (6) Rate of march is 20 mph.
 - (7) Time interval between troops is 5 minutes.
 - (8) Elements outposted along QL-9 will join march when uncovered.
4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:
- a. SCP.
 - b. MSR is QL-9.
5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
- a. Signal: Current 1/5 SOI and TF Bradberry SOI in effect.
 - b. Command: Command group follows TMC.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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ANNEXES:


A - Operations Overlay (not included)

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 1st Inf Ede, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
 Red Devil (YD 301548) RVN
 271000H Jan 1970
 RMB

OPORD 2-70 Artillery Raid (U)

Reference: Map Vietnam, Scale 1:50,000 AMS 17014, sheets 6442 I, II, III, and IV and sheets 6342 I and II.

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization:

TF 1-11

1st Bn, 11th Inf (-)

TF 1-61

1st Bn (Mech), 61st Inf (-)

D/1-11 Inf
 A/1-77 Armor
 C/1-77 ARMOR

TF 1-77

1st Bn, 77th Armor (-)

C/1-61 Inf (Mech)
 A/4-12 Cav (-)

TF BRADEERRY

3d Sqdn, 5th Cav

C/2-34 Armor
 Arty Raid Force
 CP from 6-33 Arty
 5th 175 gun Battery
 Plat C/6-33 Arty
 4 AW/1-44 Arty
 Searchlight/1-44
 Radar, F Batt, 26 Arty
 CEV/A/7th Engr
 AVLE/A/7th Engr
 3 Mine Sweep teams/A/7th Engr
 Plat A/4-12 Cav (Range Security)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

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OPORD 2-70 Artillery Raid (U)

271000H Jan 70

1. (C) SITUATION

a. Enemy. Current SPOTREPS, INTSUM AND PERINTREP.

b. Friendly.

(1) XXIV Corps.

(a) Continues operations in assigned AO.

(b) Places artillery under OPCON of 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) for conduct of artillery raid.

(2) 101st Abn Div (AM)

(a) Continues operations in assigned AO.

(b) Provides liaison to TF Bradberry for clearance of fires.

(c) Supports TF Bradberry by conducting BDA with 2-17th Cav units.

(d) Places ARA from 4-77 Arty, GSR to TF Bradberry.

(3) 1st ARVN Div (Fwd)

(a) Continues operations in assigned AO.

(b) Secures Elliott Combat Base with 3/2/2 ARVN NLT 271600H Jan 70.

(c) Secures Ca Lu with 3/4/2 ARVN NLT 281200H Jan 70.

c. Attachments and detachments. Task Organization.

2. (C) MISSION

Task Force Bradberry displaces on order to vicinity of Ca Lu and conducts an arty raid on pre-planned targets and targets of opportunity.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. (Annex A, Operation Overlay)

b. Bde employs TF Bradberry in an arty raid vicinity of Ca Lu on order. TF Bradberry in cooperation with 2d ARVN Regt units secures Ca Lu, Elliott Combat Base and QL 9 between Camp Carroll and Ca Lu.

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OPORD 2-70 Artillery (U)

071000H Jan 70

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c. TF 1-11, 1-61, 1-77 continue operations.

d. TF Bradberry.

(1) Displace from Camp Carroll and Dong Ha on order and conduct tactical road march to vicinity of Ca Lu.

(2) Conduct arty raid on targets in western Quang Tri Province.

(3) On order return to bases of origin and disestablish TF.

e. Coordinating instructions: DIRLAUTH ALCON

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: SOP

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal.

(1) Current bde SOI in effect for major bde units.

(2) TF Bradberry SOI in effect for internal use within TF Bradberry.

b. Command. Bde CP remains at Camp Red Devil.

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ANNEX A, Operation Overlay (TBP)

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| XXIV Corps | 2 |
| 1-11 Inf | 1 |
| 1-61 Inf (M) | 1 |
| 1-77 Armor | 1 |
| 3-5 Cav | 2 |
| 101st Abn Div (AM) | 2 |
| 1st ARVN (Fwd) | 2 |
| 108th Arty Group | 2 |
| A/7th Engr | 1 |

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 271430H Jan 70

FRAGORD 3-70 (Task Force BRADBERRY)

References: Map VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS L7014, sheets 6342 I and II and sheets 6442 I, II, III and IV.

Time Zone: HOTEL

Task Organization:

TF Duncan

Team A

Team B

CF from 6-33 Arty
 5/175 Gun Btry
 Plt/C/6-33 Arty

A/3/5 (-)
 Minesweep team A/7 Engr

B/3/5 (-)

Team C

Team D

C/3/5 Cav
 Plt A/3/5 Cav
 4 AW 1/44 Arty
 CEV A/7 Engr
 AVLE A/7 Engr
 2 minesweep teams A/7 Engr

C/2/34 Armor

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy forces: See current INTSUM

b. Friendly Forces: 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) continues operations in assigned AO. 2nd ARVN Regiment assists in the security of FSB Elliott and FSB Ca Lu (YD 012455).

c. Attachments and Detachments:

Task Organization effective 271500 H Jan 70.

Team C be prepared to release Plt/A/3/5 to parent unit during daylight hours 28 - 30 Jan 70.

2. (C) MISSION: TF 3-5 Cav (Task Force Bradberry) in conjunction with the 2nd ARVN Regiment conducts an artillery raid from vic FSB Ca Lu.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver:

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FMACORD 3-70 HQ 3rd Bde 5th Cav L

(a) On 27 Jan 70 TF Bradberry sweeps QL-9 as far as and secures FSB Elliott with one reinforced troop.

(b) Beginning at first light on 28 Jan 70 TF Bradberry sweeps and secures QL-9 from Dong Ha Combat Base to FSB Ca Lu and secures FSB Ca Lu (vic YD 012455).

(c) TF Duncan moves to vic FSB Ca Lu by 281300H Jan 70 and conducts an artillery raid on targets listed in Annex B to 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) OPORD 2-70.

(d) On order TF Bradberry returns to secure bases and deorganizes.

(2) Fires:

(a) Annex B (Fire Support).

(b) Priority of fires to Team C during movement to FSB Ca Lu, then to elements in contact.

b. Team A:

(1) At first light 28 Jan 70 conducts normal minesweep of QL-9 from vic Cam Lo to Dong Ha Combat Base. Conducts minesweep of QL-9 from vic Cam Lo to Khe Gio Bridge (CP - FR). Relieves Team C of outpost mission along QL-9 from vic Khe Gio Bridge to CP - IT upon completion of minesweep.

(2) Secures FSB Elliott in conjunction with Team D and one company from 2nd ARVN Regiment.

c. Team B:

(1) Effective 281500H Jan 70 secures Cam Lo area with Troop (-).

(2) On 29 Jan 70 conduct normal minesweep of QL-9.

d. Team C:

(1) Beginning 271500H Jan 70 sweep QL-9 to vic FSB Elliott. In conjunction with one company of the 2nd ARVN Regiment secure FSB Elliott.

(2) Beginning at first light 28 Jan 70 sweep and outpost QL-9 from vic Khe Gio Bridge to FSB Ca Lu. Secure FSB Ca Lu in conjunction with one company from 2nd ARVN Regiment.

e. Team D:

(1) On order move to and secure FSB Elliott in conjunction with Team A and one company of the 2nd ARVN Regiment.

(2) Act as a ready reaction force for elements vic FSB Ca Lu.

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f. TF Duncan:

- (1) Be prepared (NLT 281100H Jan 70) to move on order to vic FSB Ca Lu.
- (2) Upon emplacement at FSB Ca Lu execute targets listed in Annex B to 1st Bde 5th Inf Div (Mech) OFORD 2-70.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) Elements will report clearance of checkpoints indicated in Annex A (Operations Overlay - not included) when moving.
- (2) All relief must be physical.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

- a. SOP
- b. Main Supply Route (MSR) is QL-9.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

- (1) Current SOI in effect for TF 3-5 Cav elements.
- (2) TF Duncan elements use TF Bradberry SOI and enter TF Bradberry command net.

b. Command:

- (1) TF Bradberry jump CP displaces to FSB Ca Lu in order.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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ANNEXES:


- A - Operations Overlay (not included)
- B - Fire Support

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 Dong Ha (YD 225 597) RVN
 270900H Jan 70
 1st Ede 5th Mech Div

Annex B (Fire Support) to OPORD _____

Reference: Map Vietnam, 1:50,000 Cam Lo; Sheet 6342 I

Time Zone: Hotel

1. (C) SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces: Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces: Current SITREP.
- c. Attachments: Annex A, Task Organization.

2. (C) MISSION

Artillery with the Task Force displaces on order on 28 January 1970 to Fire Support Base (FSB) Ca Lu to conduct an artillery raid on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity.

3. (C) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) General. The Task Force will displace to the west along QL 9 to FSB Ca Lu to remain for a period of approximately three days. During this operation Artillery with the Task Force will engage and cause maximum damage to preselected targets and targets of opportunity.

(2) Fire Support. Artillery units at Fire Support Bases in the vicinity of the operation will provide on call fires for convoy security and fire on call DT's in defense of unit positions.

b. Air Support. Air support will be provided as allocated by the Task Force Commander. Aerial observers will be used to the maximum extent.

c. Artillery, 2 Howitzers (105T) A/6/33 Arty; 4 Guns (175) 5th 175 Guns.

(1) Artillery with the Task Force will conduct the artillery raid by firing the schedule of fires at Appendix 1. Targets of opportunity will be engaged as reported.

(2) Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) assigned to the Task Force will provide aerial convoy cover and be assigned the mission of General Support Reinforcing (GSR).

(3) Air Defense Artillery will provide route, point and perimeter security.

(4) 6th En 33rd Arty will provide one FADAC and operate an FDC in the forward area. Additional FDC personnel will be provided by 8th En 4th Arty and 5th 175 Gun (Marines).

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Clearances to fire from FSB Ca Lu will be given by 108th Arty LNO. Call 552, freq (Prim) 71.95 (Alt) 49.60.

(2) Impact clearances will be given by 2/17 Cav LNO located with the Task Force at FSB Ca Lu.

(3) Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) will be reported to the Task Force Artillery Operations Center.

(4) An independent check of 175 Gun firing data will be performed by the 5th 175 Gun (Camp Carroll).

(5) Fire data for the 105 howitzers will be performed by C/6/33 Arty at Fuller. Battalion FDC HQ/6/33 Arty will perform an independent check of 105 howitzer firing data.

(6) A manual firing chart will be maintained for both 175 and 105 firings at FSB Ca Lu.

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(7) Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) will be operated by the 108th Arty Group at FSB Ca Lu.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Unit ADMINO in effect.

b. Supply.

(1) Class I.

(a) C-rations sufficient for 3 days will be carried by each unit.

(b) After 1st day one hot meal will be supplied per day where feasible. Coordination may be effected with the XO 6/33 Arty for pickup of Class I for transport to FSE Ca Lu.

(2) Class III.

(a) All vehicles will be topped off prior to 280900H Jan 70.

(b) A tanker of diesel and mogas will accompany the Task Force to FSB Ca Lu.

(c) All units will utilize organic vehicular load carrying capability to the fullest extent.

(3) Class V.

(a) A double basic load will be carried for all individual and crew served weapons.

(b) 57th Trans Company will position 400 rounds of 175mm ammo at Ca Lu.

(c) 5th 175 Gun will stage 400 rounds of ammunition by organic means at Elliott Combat Base (ECB).

(d) A/6/33 Arty (105) will transport 400 rounds by organic means.

(e) Subsequent resupply of 175mm and 105mm ammunition will be requested from 57th Transportation Company on an "Emergency" basis.

c. Services.

(1) Maintenance.

(a) Units will displace with organic maintenance capability.

(b) Maintenance Task Force personnel from 178th Maintenance Company will displace with trail party. 178th Maintenance will carry two spare 175 Gun tubes.

(2) Medical.

(a) One medic each will be provided by 5th 175 Gun and HQ/6/33 Arty.

(b) Medevac will be available through "Dust Off Control." Primary freq 47.70; alternate freq 46.90.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal. Special Task Force SOI in effect for control and coordination of major elements in the Task Force.

b. Command.

(1) TASK FORCE -- TASK FORCE CP.

(2) TASK FORCE ARTY - ARTY CP.

Acknowledge.

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Appendix: Schedule of Fires

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Appendix 1 (Schedule of Fires) to Annex E (Fire Support) to OPOD

Block 1 Az of Lay 3050

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|-------------------|--------|
| XG 0201A | YD 042277 | 5-2 Story Huts | 8 |
| B | YD 036259 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| C | YD 036250 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| D | YD 048249 | 2 Bunkers | 8 |
| E | YD 048258 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| F | YD 070273 | 2 Huts/2 Bunkers | 8 |
| G | YD 068269 | 2 Bunkers/Trail | 8 |
| H | YD 072257 | Huts | 8 |
| J | YD 026235 | 15 Bunkers/4 Huts | 8 |
| K | YD 025235 | Bunkers | 8 |
| L | YD 023236 | 3 Huts | 8 |
| M | YD 044203 | Bunkers | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 96 |

Block 2 Az of Lay 3400

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|----------------|--------|
| XG 0202A | XD 967200 | Poss Regt Hqs | 8 |
| B | XD 975241 | 2 A/A Pos | 8 |
| C | XD 983242 | Bunker Complex | 8 |
| D | XD 996248 | S L | 8 |
| E | XD 951200 | S L | 8 |
| F | XD 949251 | 40 Foxholes | 8 |
| G | XD 932210 | S L | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 56 |

Block 3 Az of Lay 3650

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------|--------|
| XG 0203A | XD 942279 | 4 Huts | 8 |
| B | XD 941280 | 2 Huts | 8 |
| C | XD 950279 | Bunker Complex | 8 |
| D | XD 953277 | 21 Huts | 8 |
| E | XD 955279 | Bunkers | 8 |
| F | XD 928293 | 2 Bunkers | 8 |
| G | XD 920293 | Concrete Bunker | 8 |
| H | XD 922295 | Bridge | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 64 |

Block 4 Az of Lay 3650

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------------|--------|
| XG 0204A | XD 918273 | Poss Regt Hq | 8 |
| B | XD 940250 | 32 Huts/Trails | 12 |
| C | XD 940260 | 30 Huts | 12 |
| D | XD 936256 | 50 Foxholes | 8 |
| E | XD 930250 | 50 Foxholes | 8 |
| F | XD 892259 | 8 Foxholes | 8 |
| G | XD 902268 | 3 Huts | 8 |
| H | XD 903267 | 15 Bunkers | 12 |
| J | XD 907258 | 100 Foxholes | 12 |
| K | XD 903257 | Truck Park | 12 |
| L | XD 903251 | Truck Park | 12 |
| M | XD 906252 | Truck Turn Around Area | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 120 |

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Block 5 Az of Lay 3650

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|-----------|-----------|------------------------|--------|
| XG 0205A | XD 899215 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| B | XD 870198 | Poss Reg Hqs | 8 |
| C | XD 888170 | Poss Reg Hqs | 8 |
| D | XD 879218 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| E | XD 877217 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| F | XD 910225 | 30 Bunkers | 12 |
| G | XD 911221 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| H | XD 917219 | Bunkers Complex | 12 |
| J | XD 911223 | Tube | 8 |
| K | XD 915221 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| L | XD 912223 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| M | XD 911211 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| N | XD 885214 | 10 Bunkers | 12 |
| P | XD 882224 | Bridge | 8 |
| Q | XD 885224 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| R | XD 920226 | Bunkers | 8 |
| S | XD 899241 | Foot Bridge | 8 |
| T | XD 894244 | 20 Bunkers | 16 |
| U | XD 890215 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| V | XD 891214 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| W | XD 896212 | 2 Bunkers | 8 |
| X | XD 894224 | 20 Bunkers | 16 |
| Y | XD 892233 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| Z | XD 899215 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| XG 0205AA | XD 902230 | Bridge | 8 |
| AB | XD 903233 | 5 Bunkers/14 Buildings | 12 |
| AC | XD 903224 | 50 Bunkers | 16 |
| AD | XD 901237 | Truck | 8 |
| AE | XD 903224 | 50 Bunkers | 16 |
| AF | XD 904224 | 5 Bunkers | 8 |
| AG | XD 900227 | 2 Bunkers | 8 |
| AH | XD 905236 | 9 Bunkers/Trail | 8 |
| AJ | XD 903225 | 15 Huts | 8 |
| AK | XD 904239 | Truck Park | 12 |
| TOTAL | | | 324 |

Block 6 Az of Lay 3850

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------------|--------|
| XG 0206A | XD 869232 | 50 Cal Pos | 8 |
| B | XD 844228 | Supply Point | 8 |
| C | XD 853235 | 6 Bunkers | 8 |
| D | XD 850239 | 2 Bunkers | 8 |
| E | XD 874225 | 50 Cal Pos | 8 |
| F | XD 877231 | Bridge | 8 |
| G | XD 848240 | Truck Turn Around Area | 8 |
| H | XD 852241 | 10 Bunkers | 8 |
| J | XD 839209 | Bunker | 8 |
| K | XD 839213 | Trail Complex | 8 |
| L | XD 865236 | 2 - 50 Cal Pos | 8 |
| M | XD 865226 | Bunkers | 8 |
| N | XD 864217 | 4 Huts/Bunkers | 8 |
| P | XD 865226 | Bridge | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 112 |

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Block 7 Az of Lay 4000

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------|--------|
| XG 0207A | XD 848286 | 60 Foxholes | 12 |
| B | XD 847283 | SEF | 8 |
| C | XD 844288 | Supply Point | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 28 |

Block 8 Az of Lay 4000

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------|--------|
| XG 0208A | XD 806233 | 6 Bunkers | 8 |
| B | XD 804228 | Bunkers | 8 |
| C | XD 818234 | AA/AM Pos | 18 |
| D | XD 783235 | Bunker Complex | 12 |
| E | XD 786233 | 10 Bunkers | 12 |
| F | XD 786234 | 40-50 Bunkers | 16 |
| G | XD 813230 | Bridge | 8 |
| H | XD 810228 | 8 Bunkers | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 80 |

Block 9 Az of Lay 4300

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|---------------------|--------|
| XG 0209A | XD 806291 | Pos En Hqs | 8 |
| B | XD 787297 | 13 Foxholes | 8 |
| C | XD 783302 | 6 Foxholes | 8 |
| D | XD 784296 | 5 Bunkers, Foxholes | 8 |
| E | XD 759280 | 50-55 Gal Drums | 12 |
| F | XD 812320 | Bunker | 8 |
| TOTAL | | | 52 |

Block 10 Az of Lay 4350

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|----------------------------------|--------|
| XG 0210A | XD 801368 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| B | XD 786357 | Bunkers/Hut | 8 |
| C | XD 767344 | 4 Huts | 8 |
| D | XD 794360 | 1 Bulldozer | 8 |
| E | XD 788358 | 3 Best Trucks, 1 Best Bulldozer, | |
| | | 10 POL Drums | 12 |
| TOTAL | | | 44 |

Block 11 Az of Lay 4650

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------|--------|
| XG 0211A | XD 758408 | 4 Bunkers | 8 |
| B | XD 756408 | Heavy Trails | 8 |
| C | XD 819412 | 3 Bunkers | 8 |
| D | XD 749439 | 25 Foxholes | 8 |
| E | XD 692440 | 50 Cal Pos | 8 |
| F | XD 719413 | 5 Huts | 8 |
| G | XD 712392 | 6 Bunkers | 12 |
| TOTAL | | | 56 |

Block 12 (105mm Targets)

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------------|--------|
| XG 0212A | XD 928415 | 10 Foxholes | 18 |
| B | XD 994384 | 4 Bunkers | 6 |
| C | XD 993378 | Suspect enemy location | 6 |
| D | XD 988376 | Cave Entrances | 6 |
| E | XD 975379 | Suspect Enemy location | 6 |

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Block 12 (105mm Targets)

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target | Rounds |
|----------|-----------|------------------------|-----------|
| XG 0212F | XD 970368 | Suspect Enemy Location | 6 |
| G | XD 972358 | Suspect Enemy Location | 6 |
| H | XD 986369 | Fields | 10 |
| J | XD 986368 | Raft | 10 |
| K | XD 982369 | Suspect Enemy Location | 6 |
| L | XD 994353 | Suspect Enemy Location | 6 |
| | | TOTAL | <u>86</u> |

Block 13 (ARA Targets)

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target |
|----------|-----------|------------------|
| XG 0213A | XD 991333 | 3 Bunkers |
| B | XD 992337 | 3 Bunkers |
| C | XD 995332 | 4 Bunkers/2 Huts |
| D | XD 992330 | 4 Huts |
| E | XD 990310 | 8 Bunkers |

Box 14 (ARA Targets)

| Tgt No | Grid | Nature of Target |
|----------|-----------|------------------|
| XG 0214A | XD 767649 | 5 Huts |
| B | XD 764648 | 9 Huts |
| C | XD 759618 | Hut |
| D | XD 758644 | Hut |
| E | XD 692440 | AW Pos |
| F | XD 732641 | Cave/Hut |
| G | XD 735640 | 15 Bunkers |
| H | XD 733533 | 2 Huts/2 Bunkers |
| J | XD 711471 | 6 Bunkers |

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Appendix 2 (Defensive/Preparation Targets) to Annex E (Fire Support) to OFORD

1. Organization.

A/8/4 (-), 8", Camp Carroll

C/6/33, 105MM, FSB Fuller

A/62, 105MM (ARVN), FSB Sarge

2. Mission. All elements of Task Force Artillery will be in direct support of Task Force. Be prepared to fire LZ prep if scheduled and on-call convoy defensive targets as placed.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation. Four schedules of targets will be included in this plan; planned on-call convoy defensive targets, and three planned LZ preps designated LZ Elliott, LZ Vandergriff, and LZ Ca Lu. All planned targets will be cleared to fire prior to H-hour and will remain on call for the duration of the operation. Priority of fire to insert force until H-15.

b. Convoy defensive targets.

(1) A/8/4 (-)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0215A | YD01335704 |
| E | XD98895447 |
| C | XD97825465 |
| D | XD98325414 |
| E | XD97695375 |
| F | XD97835423 |
| G | XD99834941 |
| H | XD98244952 |
| J | XD98234831 |
| K | YD00064831 |
| L | XD99794672 |
| M | XD01864621 |
| N | YD00664462 |
| P | YD02054418 |
| Q | YD02334550 |

(2) C/6/33

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0216A | YD01955639 |
| E | YD01185650 |
| C | YD00735643 |
| D | YD00165660 |
| E | XD99645618 |
| F | XD98715654 |
| G | XD99205521 |
| H | XD98705517 |
| J | XD98365317 |
| K | XD97845218 |
| L | XD98195138 |
| M | XD97965100 |

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(3) A/62 (ARVN)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0217A | XD98355941 |
| E | XD99234967 |
| C | XD99324891 |
| D | XD99204625 |
| E | XD99584745 |
| F | YD00474715 |
| G | YD00764624 |
| H | YD01044584 |
| J | YD00904535 |
| K | YD01484550 |

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c. LZ Elliott prep: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0218A | XD98285469 |
| B | XD98005440 |
| C | XD97905419 |
| D | XD97905475 |
| E | XD97605423 |
| F | XD98275444 |
| G | XD98305490 |

(2) C/6/33 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0219A | XD98425458 |
| B | XD98405440 |
| C | XD98285423 |
| D | XD98005420 |
| E | XD98675453 |
| F | XD98605420 |
| G | XD98325400 |
| H | XD97945395 |
| J | XD98905430 |

d. LZ Vandergriff: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0220A | XD99744914 |
| E | YD00004860 |
| C | YD00274825 |
| D | YD00524769 |
| E | XD99904730 |
| F | XD98904760 |
| G | XD98634820 |
| H | XD98604880 |

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(2) A/62 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0221A | XD00004775 |
| B | YD99474760 |
| C | YD99754810 |
| D | YD99104800 |
| E | YD99544850 |
| F | YD98974855 |
| G | YD99254895 |
| H | YD99344820 |

e. LZ Ca Lu: to be fired from H-60 to H-05 (if called upon)

(1) A/8/4 (-) (Platoon 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0222A | YD00654520 |
| B | YD00654560 |
| C | YD00654600 |
| D | YD01294625 |
| E | YD01774600 |
| F | YD01704560 |
| G | YD01704525 |
| H | YD01194520 |
| J | YD01474620 |

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(2) A/62 (Battery 1 round, 3 zones and 2 shifts, fuze Q)

| | |
|---------|------------|
| XG0223A | YD01464545 |
| E | YD01254545 |
| C | YD01044545 |
| D | YD01044580 |
| E | YD01304595 |
| F | YD01494588 |
| G | YD01304565 |

4. Ammunition.

- A/8/4 (-). Insure a minimum of 150 rounds available to support operation.
- C/6/33. Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.
- A/62. Insure a minimum of 250 rounds available to support operation.

5. Command.

- CO, Task Force will have direct fire channel to all firing units.
- CO, insert force will utilize quick fire channel for fire requests.
- CO, Task Force is responsible for coordinating air coverage and artillery fires.

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