

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force  
 Fleet Base Africa  
 San Francisco, California 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/RJC/jak  
 5750  
 23 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 30 June 1967  
 Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
 (c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) 5th Marine Regiment Command Chronology *Filed*  
 (2) Headquarters Company, 5th Marines Command Chronology *Ref*  
 (3) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology *Ref*  
 (4) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology *Ref*  
 (5) 5th Marine Regiment Combat After Action Report, Operation UNION II *Filed*  
 (6) 5th Marine Regiment Combat After Action Report, Operation ADAIR *Ref*

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c),  
 enclosures (1) through (6) are submitted.

  
 S. DAVIS

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 1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

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0001 OF 9

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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINES  
1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June to 30 June 1967

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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-1-

ENCLOSURE (1)  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~~~ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH~~1. DESIGNATION

5th Marine Regiment (-)(Rein)

COMMANDER

Colonel K. J. HOUGHTON Jr.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines

1stLt G. E. CROWELL

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

LtCol P. L. HILGARTNER

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

2. LOCATION

QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces, RVN 1 - 30 June 1967

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol W. H. DRAPER

(1-12 June)

Major R. J. ALGER

(13-30 June)

2ndLt J. W. HORTON

WO J. W. WALSH

Major R. J. ALGER

Major L. E. JOHNSON

Capt W. F. BELL

Major R. E. WALKER

None assigned

None assigned

LCdr W. D. BRUNER CHC USN

S-1

S-2

S-3

S-4

S-5

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Supply Officer

Regimental Chaplain

Regimental Surgeon

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
77	2245

<u>USN</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
7	106

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Operation UNION II ended on 5 June 1968; Operation ADAIR commenced on 15 June and ended on 24 June; and Operation CALHOUN commenced on 25 June. Tanks were employed for the first time in this area on Operation ADAIR, when one heavy section was placed in Direct Support of the First Battalion, and one heavy section in Direct Support of the Third Battalion. Frequent tank-infantry patrols were conducted in the vicinity of Hill 29 and between QUE SON-NUI LAC SON and Hill 29. Indications are that the enemy does not wish to engage a tank-infantry force. Ontos were also introduced into the operating area this month when a heavy section of Ontos with .50 caliber machineguns mounted was placed in Direct Support of the First Battalion after Operation ADAIR.

The Regimental Command Post remained co-located with the Headquarters of the 5th ARVN Regiment, although plans were made to displace the Command Post to a permanent base camp in the vicinity of Hill 63 (BT135452). The Combat Base at QUE SON continued to develop and undergo further improvement. Joint patrols with Popular and Regional Force units continued to be conducted at QUE SON and NUI LAC SON.

Logistic support for the Regiment continued to be provided by the Logistics Support Area at TAM KY. Transportation requirements were met by helicopters, except for the convoy commitments from DA NANG and CHU LAI. Engineer effort commenced on the bridges north of TAM KY.

In the area of Civil Affairs/Civic Action refugees continued to request safe conduct to QUE SON-NUI LAC SON where they could be further evacuated to a refugee center. Psychological Warfare leaflet drops and broadcasts were made throughout the area of operations during the month. The leaflets dropped around QUE SON stressed sanitation and hygiene, while those dropped throughout the remainder of the area exploited the set backs of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong on the battlefield.

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[REDACTED]

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel and Administration. The Regiment experienced a turnover of approximately 231 personnel; 104 rotated to CONUS, with 127 being evacuated out of country. Approximately 240 replacements were received during the month. The average chargeable strength was 31 Marine Officers and 1001 enlisted.

Shortages of officers in the 0130, 0202, 0402 and 0430 MOS's continue to exist. These shortages, although not critical, tend to impair the operational capabilities of the Regiment. Expected personnel losses for the coming month are 175 personnel due for rotation to CONUS. Expected losses in the next two months of SNCO rank are considered to be of utmost concern.

Casualties for the month of June are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA(N)</u>	<u>WIA(E)</u>	<u>NBC</u>	<u>MTA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hq Co	2	3	7	0	0	12
1/5	27	89	58	34	0	208
3/5	27	11	69	27	0	134
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>134</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>354</u>

2. Intelligence. Operation UNION II concluded on 5 June 1967. Plans and dissemination of intelligence continued throughout the month in connection with Operations ADAIR and CALHOUN. Significant aspects of enemy, weather and terrain were as follows:

a. Enemy

(1) On the afternoon of 2 June enemy forces while engaged along a 1500 meter front with elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines attempted to maneuver against our forces by enveloping our left flank, vicinity BT092319 to BT096318. Again on 15 June, the same tactic was employed against Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines vicinity BT164325, when the leading elements were engaged by heavy automatic weapons, machine gun and mortar fire an enemy force attempted to envelope the left flank of Company "K". In both instances the maneuver was executed during mid-day and was successful in negating the majority of our supporting arms fires due to close proximity of friendly forces. Noteworthy is the fact that the enemy appeared to have no ammunition resupply problem, while friendly units required from one to four emergency ammunition resupply missions.

(2) A prisoner taken during the final phase of Operation UNION II reported NVA units have been instructed to prepare twenty graves per company prior to a battle or planned engagement. Reportedly, graves are dug within 2000 meters of the proposed battle site, preferably on high ground near a ridgeline. Credence is lent to this information by the efforts ex-

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pended by the VC and NVA to police the battlefield of bodies and equipment. Further evidence was revealed when the QUE SON District Chief reported that some residents from the battlefield areas were requesting relocation to areas under friendly control along Route 1 because they could not tolerate the stench of the dead.

(3) On 12 June a Kit Carson Team attached to Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines monitored portions of three enemy radio transmissions utilizing the company tactical radio. The transmissions were not completely copied due to interference, but the substance of the text included: (a) 2 NVA companies had been in ambush for 48 hours (Company "K" made contact with a large force later); (b) A 3-40 man unit was to move to the vicinity of QUE SON and disperse to three separate camps; (c) A casualty report from the previous day's air strike. This method of utilization of Kit Carsons and Company Interpreters can result in the collection of timely intelligence.

(4) On 23 June, a Field Information Report (FIR) was received from National Police Special Branch (NPSS), TAM KY identifying "VC Special Platoons". Their mission was to dress in ARVN uniforms and observe the habits and activities of FWMF bases. Several days thereafter, a report from S-2, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines reported that an 8 man patrol, claiming to be PF's, was observed questioning the civilian population in the vicinity of the TAM KY Combat Base. Their questions touched on such subjects as meal hours for the Marines. An S-2 Interpreter challenged them, a round was chambered into one weapon in the group and the interpreter told to mind his own business. The group then ran away toward TAM KY.

b. Weather. Negative

c. Terrain. Operation CALHOUN proved a challenge insofar as terrain was concerned. Color contouring and stream lining of maps for the operational areas proved beneficial for terrain appreciation. Reconnaissance patrol leader debriefing reports on trails assisted in compilation of map correction data. Reconnaissance Battalion patrol reports assisted in identification and location of LZ's within AO, and additional trails not shown on existing maps.

3. Training. During the month training with the M-16 Rifle continued to be emphasized, with special emphasis on care and cleaning of the weapon. The accelerated indoctrination training program for all replacement continues with special emphasis placed on the following subjects:

Mines and Booby Traps  
FO Techniques  
Listening Posts and Ambushes

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Principles of Patrolling  
 Code of Conduct  
 Rules of Engagement  
 Field Sanitation  
 M-16 Rifle (to include the firing of 125 rounds for familiarization)

The following schools were utilized by the Regiment during the month of June:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER ATTENDED</u>
ICG Leadership Course	Okinawa	5
Basic Ammo Tech Course	Okinawa	1
Vietnamese Language Course	Okinawa	2
Field Radio Operator Course	Okinawa	2
Field Wire Course	Okinawa	1
Basic Infantry Weapons Repair Crs	Okinawa	2

4. Operations. Operation UNION II was concluded this month, Operation ADAIR was conducted, and Operation CALHOUN was begun. Between these operations the First Battalion conducted numerous day and night activities, making frequent contacts in the vicinity of QUE SON and NUI LAC SON, and destroying many caves and tunnel complexes. The Third Battalion conducted a company-sized patrol which initiated Operation ADAIR and frequent tank-infantry patrols in the vicinity of Hill 29 and between Hill 29 and QUE SON.

5. Fire Support. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines continued as the artillery unit in Direct Support of the 5th Marines. During the month of June the following missions were fired in support of the Regiment:

<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOB</u>	<u>H&amp;I</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>TYPE AND NO OF ROUNDS EXPENDED</u>
449	221	1713	2383	105mm	HE 20210 ILLUM 256 WP 634 OTHER 92 TOTAL 21399
202	84	604	890	155mm	HE 6256 ILLUM 94 WP 172 TOTAL 6521
108	23	462	593	4.2 Mtr	HE 3137 ILLUM 623 WP 121 TOTAL 3881

REF ID: A65120  
[REDACTED]6. Air Support. Air support for the month of June was as follows:

Total requests/Total filled	186/374
Troop lifts	10
Prisoner lifts	0
Escorts	0
Unit Commander	13
TAR	5
Medical Evacuation	59
Cargo	1,288,542
Troop total	1052
TAC(A)	20
Flareship	2

7. Logistics. Operation UNION II was terminated on 5 June. During this period logistical support for three battalions was provided by the LSA located at TAM KY. From 15-24 June the 5th Marines conducted Operation ADAIR, with logistical support continuing to be from the LSA at TAM KY. From 26 June to the end of the month the Regiment participated in Operation CALHOUN with logistical support still being provided from the LSA at TAM KY. On 24 June the Regiment began a re-evaluation of embarkation data and preparation of gear for the movement by sea of the 5th Marines (Rear) to DA NANG. Completed data was submitted to Division Embarkation on 26 June. On 28 June the 3rd Battalion commenced staging gear on the Sand Ramp at CHU LAI for shipment to DA NANG. The shipping arrived on 29 June and loading began. One constricting factor was the lack of adequate staging area at the Sand Ramp, due to the volume of gear handled there. On 26 June initial planning was undertaken for the movement of one engineer company from the 9th Engineer Battalion and additional heavy equipment from "B" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion to TAM KY and Hill 29. This move was scheduled for early July. The major logistical problem encountered during this period was the fact that the troops coming out of the field from operations did not have any extra utilities with them. As their personal effects were stored in the rear at CHU LAI, this placed an extra commitment on the LSA to completely outfit companies with utilities. Battalion S-4's were instructed to provide laundry facilities for the utilities and store them for re-issue to the troops.

8. Civil Affairs/Civic Action. Much of the Regiment's Civil Affairs activities for June were concerned with the preparation and support of the 17-man survey team sent to QUE SON between 13 and 16 June. Later in the month preparations were undertaken for the return of the team to conduct a survey of the NUI LAC SON area in early July. A great deal of time was also spent planning and executing support for the 450 refugees at NUI LAC SON. As the month ended plans were either underway to either evacuate these refugees to THANG BINH or to institute regular monthly refugee commodity supply runs to NUI LAC SON using Marine helicopters. The

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remainder of the Regiment's Civil Affairs activities for June consisted of numerous minor incidents; solatium payments, backlash reports, etc.

9. Psychological Operations. The majority of PsyOps work conducted during June was in support of Regimental operations and is reported elsewhere. A "Health and Hygiene" aerial leaflet drop campaign was held in the QUE SON-THANG BINH valley from 20-23 June. In late June an HB loudspeaker team was detached from Regiment and attached to the 1st Battalion for work in the QUE SON-NUI LAC SON areas.

10. Communications. The following significant communications operations occurred during the month of June:

a. Manual re-transmission teams were provided by the 7th Communications Battalion. These teams were situated on NUI LAC SON to provide reliable radio communications between Headquarters, 5th Marines on Hill 29 and subordinate units operating in the QUE SON-NUI LAC SON area.

b. The AN/TRC-97 tropospheric scatter radio relay equipment was attached to Headquarters, 5th Marines from the 7th Communications Battalion. The AN/TRC-97 was used to provide telephone and teletype communications between 5th Marines and 1st Marine Division. This was the first application of the AN/TRC-97 at regimental level.

c. A switching central was installed at TAM KY using the call sign SELECT Rear. Local and long distance telephone service was provided between Marine units in TAM KY, the 5th Marine Regiment at Hill 29 and the CHU LAI switchboard. AN/TRC-27 radio relay was installed by the 5th Marines between TAM KY and Hill 29.

d. An AN/TRC-27 radio relay link was established between 5th Marines at Hill 29 and the 1st Battalion at QUE SON. NUI LAC SON was used as a relay point.

11. Medical. A total of 150 patients were treated during the month; 50% were from Headquarters Company, 5th Marines, 20% were from other 5th Marine units, and 30% were from units outside the Regiment. Of this group several were Vietnamese civilians, ARVN military personnel and PW's treated for humanitarian reasons. One MEDCAP was held at BINH THRONG (2) hamlet in conjunction with the 5th ARVN Regiment. Approximately 300 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

12. Dental. During the month of June the dental clinic treated 176 patients. They were from the following units in the given percentages: 50% were from Headquarters Company, 5th Marines; 20% from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines; 17% were from the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines;

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10% were from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1% was from the 1st Tank Battalion, 1% was from the 1st Engineer Battalion, and 1% was from the 7th Communications Battalion. During the month our DENTCAP program was not initiated due to operations and lack of suitable areas in which to commence work. The only problem experienced by the dental clinic was the lack of electrical power for equipment, however, that problem has now been eliminated. Total days lost to power problems has been two days, while total days lost this month total 13.

13. Chaplain. Four Catholic and four Protestant Services were held in the Regimental area during June. Attendance at these services were:

Catholic - 121  
Protestant - 138

The Battalion Chaplain of First Battalion provided Catholic coverage for the Regimental Command Post. The Regimental Chaplain provided coverage for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. A total of 11 services were held with a total attendance of 231. On Friday, 9 June a Memorial Service was held at the Regimental Command Post for men killed in action during Operations UNION and UNION II.

#### PART IV

##### CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. ✓ ENCLOSURE (2) HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
 ✓ ENCLOSURE (3) 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
 ✓ ENCLOSURE (4) 3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
 ✓ ENCLOSURE (5) 5TH MARINES COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION UNION II  
 ✓ ENCLOSURE (6) 5TH MARINES COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION ADAIR

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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINE DIVISION  
1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California 96602

3/RJC/jak  
3480  
23 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1

Encl: (1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report *filed 100*  
(2) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report *filed 100*

Code Name: Operation ADAIR

1. Operation ADAIR was characterized by very light contact, however the first efforts at employing tanks in the THANG BINH-QUE SON-HIEP DUC area were successful, despite the fact that trafficability was fair to poor in some areas. Tanks provided a strong deterrent to snipers and apparently caused the enemy to avoid contact until some means of neutralizing the tanks could be found. By avoiding the use of roads the enemy was never afforded the opportunity to employ mines.

2. When the Collecting and Clearing Platoon is employed on Regimental sized operations it has been found to be beneficial for each battalion to maintain an aid station near the Collecting and Clearing Station in order to have sufficient Medical Officers on hand in the event of mass casualties, to handle medical resupplies more efficiently and to give more definitive treatment to minor casualties and return them to the field more rapidly.



S. DAVIS

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REF ID: A61994

1st Marine Division - Marine Air Wing Force  
Street 400, Crissy Field  
San Francisco, California 96602

3/RJC/jak  
3480  
17 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1

Encl: ✓(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report  
✓(2) 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report  
✓(3) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report

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Code Name: Operation UNION II

1. Operation UNION II, closely following Operation UNION, continued the heavy attrition in personnel, weapons and materiel in the 2nd NVA Division. The depth of the enemy defenses and the tenacity with which he defended Regimental Objective "F" on 2 June strongly indicated that the forward command post of the division was located within the objective area. The heavy bombardment by air and artillery produced numerous secondary explosions. It is believed that severe personnel casualties resulted to combat and combat service support units of the 2nd NVA Division.

2. The delay in landing the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines as indicated by the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in paragraph 14 of enclosure (2) was due to the extensive zone preparation conducted by the Tactical Air Controller (Airborne). The decision to continue the preparation of the primary zone rather than shift to the alternate was made by the Regimental Commander on the advice of the TAC(A). The decision resulted in a night landing with the attendant control problems, but was justified by the suitability and proximity of the landing zone to the objective and the terrain features which provided excellent navigational assistance for the attacking ground units.

3. The comment made by the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in paragraph 14a (page 7) of enclosure (2) is heartily endorsed.

4. The comment by the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in paragraph 14d (page 8) of enclosure (2) is concurred in. Tracked vehicles have been employed in that area on subsequent operations ALAMIR and CALHOUN with good effect.



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1. Code Name.  
Operation "UNION II" (Search and Destroy)
2. Dates of Operation.  
260001H May 1967 to 051800H June 1967
3. Location. From 26-30 May 1967, the Battalion participated in Operation UNION II in the central part of Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, RVN. On 30 May 1967, the Battalion was helicopter lifted from the combat base (BT 025343) to LZ Robin (BT 012210), located in the northeast part of Tien Phuoc District, RVN. The Battalion commenced a coordinated attack in a northeasterly direction from the LZ into the northwest portion of the Tam Ky District, RVN around the eastern side of Nui Da Ngua (BT 165267) to a northwesterly direction through Thang Binh District, Quang Tin Province, RVN, to combat base located in Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, RVN.
4. Control or Command Headquarters.

1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein)	LTCOL P. L. MIGARTNER
H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein)	CAPT G. L. MCKAY
Co A, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (26May-2Jun67)	CAPT R. G. BABICH
Co A, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (3-5Jun67)	CAPT B. K. BRODIE
Co C, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (26-29Jun67)	CAPT R. J. CASWELL
Co D, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (30May-5Jun67)	1STLT D. L. MCINTURFF
Co F, 2ndBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (27May-2Jun67)	CAPT J. A. GRAHAM
Co F, 2ndBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (2-5Jun67)	2NDLT W. A. TIGHT
5. Task Organization.

1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein)	LTCOL P. L. MIGARTNER
H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein)	CAPT G. L. MCKAY (Acting)
H&S Company (-)	
Det, 81mm Mortar Plt	
Det, Med Plt	
Det, Comm Plt	
Kit Carson Tm	
ARVN Ln Off	
Det, Co B, 1stSPBn	
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn	
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar	
Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)	

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

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 3480  
 16 June 1967

00183-67

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From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division  
 Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines  
 Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation "UNION II"

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1  
 (b) 5th Marines Frag Order 28-67  
 (c) 5th Marines Frag Order 29-67  
 (d) 5th Marines Frag Order 30-67  
 (e) 5th Marines Frag Order 31-67  
 (f) 5th Marines Frag Order 32-67  
 (g) 5th Marines Frag Order 34-67  
 (h) 5th Marines Frag Order 35-67  
 (i) 5th Marines Frag Order 36-67  
 (j) 5th Marines Frag Order 37-67  
 (k) 5th Marines Frag Order 38-67

00910-67  
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Encl: ✓(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 47-67  
 ✓(2) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D-Day  
 ✓(3) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+1  
 ✓(4) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 48-67  
 ✓(5) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 49-67  
 ✓(6) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+2  
 ✓(7) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+3  
 ✓(8) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 50-67  
 ✓(9) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 52-67  
 ✓(10) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+4  
 ✓(11) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 53-67  
 ✓(12) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+5  
 ✓(13) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 54-67  
 ✓(14) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+6  
 ✓(15) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 55-67  
 ✓(16) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 56-67  
 ✓(17) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+7  
 ✓(18) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+8  
 ✓(19) Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+9  
 ✓(20) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 57-67  
 ✓(21) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 58-67  
 ✓(22) Operation Overlay D+10

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 DECLASSIFIED IN 12 YEARS.  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

REF ID: A6518047

Company A (-)(Rein) (26May-2Jun67)  
Company A (-) (3-5Jun67)

CAPT R. G. BABICH  
 CAPT B. K. BRODIE

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn  
 Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
 Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
 Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar  
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plt (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plt  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, FAC Tm  
 S-2 Scout  
 Kit Carson Tm

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

CAPT R. J. CASWELL

Company C (-)(Rein) (26-29May67)  
Company C (-)  
 Det, Co B, 1stSPBn  
 Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
 Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
 Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar  
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plt (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plt  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, FAC Tm  
 S-2 Scout  
 Kit Carson Tm

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

1STLT D. L. MCINTURFF

Company D (-)(Rein) (30May-5Jun67)  
Company D (-)  
 Det, Co B, 1stSPBn  
 Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
 Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
 Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar  
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plt  
 Det, Comm Plt  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, FAC Tm  
 S-2 Scout  
 Kit Carson Tm

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

Company F, 2ndBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) (27May-2Jun67) CAPT J. A. GRAHAM  
Company F (-) (2-5Jun67) 2NDLT W. A. TIGHT

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn  
 Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
 Det, Btry E, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
 Det, H&S Co, 2ndBn, 5thMar  
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plt  
 Det, Comm Plt  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, FAC Tm  
 S-2 Scout  
 Kit Carson Tm

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~6. Supporting Forces.A. Air.

(1) During period of 26-29 May 1967, no fixed wing aircraft were utilized. Air Force and Marine A/O's were utilized daily throughout the period.

(2) On the morning of D+4, 12 fixed wing aircraft conducted a preplanned LZ preparation of LZ Robin located in vicinity coordinates (BT 100210). Strike was controlled by a Marine TAC/A in support of debarking 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units in vicinity coordinates (BT 100200). Strike was controlled and supported by a four plane flight of Marine UHIE gunships. The strike effectively suppressed moderate sniper fire that was being received from the area. Two A4 aircraft struck enemy sniper positions in vicinity coordinates (BT 124225) which was hindering the advance of Company F. The enemy fire was suppressed. The strike was controlled directly by Company F's FAC Team. One of the A4 aircraft collided with the ground during his second run on the target. Cause of the accident was undetermined.

(3) On D+5 and D+6 Marine and Air Force observation aircraft were utilized extensively by advancing 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units. On D+7 two F-8 and two F-4 aircraft conducted a close air support strike on fortified enemy positions in vicinity coordinates (BT 123324) in support of Company D. The strike was controlled by an Air Force TAC/A in an O1 aircraft. Result of these air strikes was one KIA, confirmed. Four A-4 aircraft conducted a close air support strike at vicinity coordinates (BT 115325) against enemy positions that were hindering the advance of Companies D and F. Five houses were destroyed and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units were able to sweep the area. The air strikes were conducted by a Marine TAC/A in an O1 type aircraft. During the night of D+7 and morning of D+8, six flights of F-4's, six flights of F-8's and four flights of A-4's conducted continuous air strikes against heavily fortified enemy positions, which were located between vicinity coordinates (BT 095324) and (BT 086318). The strikes were flown in support of Companies D and F which were engaged with a large enemy force. The strikes were controlled by an Air Force C-47 DRAGON SHIP and Marine UHIE gunships. Coordinating instructions and enemy/friendly position reports were supplied by the Company D FAC. During intervals when fixed wing aircraft was not on station, the DRAGON SHIP strafed the target area. One small fortified village was completely destroyed. 5th Marines AIO response to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines immediate requests for tactical air support on D+7 and D+8 was considered to be outstanding. The timeliness and effectiveness of the fixed wing air support provided to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units contributed directly to the successful accomplishment of the Battalion's mission.

B. Artillery.

(1) Artillery support until D+5 of UNION II was provided by Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. As 1st Battalion, 5th Marines continued the advance on D+5, support shifted to Battery W, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines again assumed the role as direct support on D+8 and continued to support 1st Battalion, 5th Marines until the conclusion of the operation. Operation "UNION II" was characterized by extensive use of preparation fires. The preparations were very effective and contributed to a noticeable lack of sniper harassment. Observed missions

during the first 8 days of Operation UNION II were few due to insufficient target areas. On D+8 Battery D supported 1st Battalion, 5th Marines by firing continuous concurrent missions for Companies A, D, and F from 1100H until dark, with excellent effect on the target areas.

(2) H&I fires were used nightly during UNION II on avenues of approach, mortar positions, assembly areas, harbor sites, areas of known VC activity, and routes of communication and resupply.

(3) A total of 267 such areas were denied use to the VC. Artillery support for Operation UNION II was excellent and contributed significantly to the overall success of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

C. Engineer.

(1) Engineer support for Operation UNION II was provided by the 1st Platoon, Company "B", 1st Engineer Battalion attached to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(2) On 4 June 1967 three separate caves and one tunnel complex were destroyed by the engineers in the vicinity (BT 108316). All caves were approximately 6 feet deep and 3-4 feet high extending 15 feet, 20 feet and 50 feet into the ground. The tunnel complex was 96 feet long and 3 to 5 feet high with wooden planks for decking.

(3) A total of 25 pounds of C-4 demolitions and 688 pounds of cratering charges were used to destroy these caves and the 29 ordinance items listed in paragraph 11e.

7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location, and Disposition in the Objective Area.

(1) Forces anticipated in the immediate area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
3rd NVA Regt	BT 095315	2,000	Highly trained and well disciplined

(2) Intelligence was initially provided to this unit by the 5th Marine Regiment and 1st Marine Division PREINTREP 5-67.

b. Enemy Strength and Situation actually determined during the operation.

(1) Estimate of actual strength was determined to have been about 2,000 men including VC and NVA units.

(2) The cadre and soldiers displayed a high degree of self sufficiency and appeared ready to put forth a determined defense.

c. VC/NVA Units Identified.

(1) 3rd NVA Regiment.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

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(1) It was discovered that the Vietnamese populace were friendly and of a cooperative nature when approached for information but at times were hesitant to volunteer information in apparent fear of VC reprisal.

(2) The suspects captured displayed obvious fear when approached by Marines.

(3) Interrogation of detainees indicated a strong VC infrastructure, consisting of Youth, Farmers, and Womens Associations.

(4) The enemy employed a chemical irritant agent.

(5) The objective of this operation was to fix and destroy VC forces and supplies in the objective area.

e. Terrain.

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

- (a) Hill 242 (BT 128226)
- (b) Hill 123 (BT 165234)
- (c) Hill 63 (BT 083325)

(2) The terrain in the objective area of Thang Binh Valley is composed of paddyland surrounded by densely forested mountains with elevations of 100 to 479 meters. Paddyland was interspersed with hills thickly covered with brush.

(3) Obstacles. Few rivers and streams traverse the objective area and did not present any major problems.

(4) Avenues of Approach. Trails in the operational area were good to excellent for foot troops.

(5) Cross Country Movement. No unusual problems were encountered.

f. Weather.

(1) Throughout the operation, weather was characterized by partly cloudy skies and for the most part, unrestricted visibility.

8. Assigned Mission.

(1) To conduct search and destroy operations in area of operation to capture or destroy enemy forces and supplies located therein.

9. Concept of Operation.

(1) The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines establishes blocking positions east

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of valley in vicinity coordinates (BT 067396) to vicinity coordinates (BT 055384), prepared to continue attack on order. Conducts combat patrols between combat base located at (BT 025347) Hill 51 and east west grid line 31 on D-Day.

10. Execution.

a. D-1. 25 May 1967

(1) 251920H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 28-67 committing the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to Operation UNION II. See reference (b).

(2) 252130H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (1).

b. D-Day 26 May 1967 (See enclosure (2)).

(1) 260001H At H-6 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units departed combat base to establish blocking positions in accordance with 5th Marines Frag Order 28-67 and as directed by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 47-67. See reference (b) and enclosure (1).

(2) 260530H Units of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were established in blocking positions in vicinity coordinates (BT 067396) and (BT 055384).

(3) 260615H Platoon Patrol 5B2 departed combat base on established patrol route in accordance with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 47-67.

(4) 260900H Platoon Patrol 5B2 arrived at checkpoint N.

(5) 260925H Platoon Patrol 5B2 arrived at checkpoint 31.

(6) 261203H Platoon Patrol 5B2 located in vicinity coordinates (BT 044310) apprehended two Vietnamese males, ages 30-35 years old, wearing black clothing running across a rice paddy toward patrol. Detainees were returned to the combat base for questioning and were forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(7) 261420H Platoon Patrol 5B2 arrived at checkpoint 1.

(8) 261453H Platoon Patrol 5B2 arrived at checkpoint 3.

(9) 261515H Platoon Patrol 5B2 returned to combat base.

(10) 261615H Company C squad patrol entered hamlet vicinity coordinates (BT 050396) and observed 2 Vietnamese males and 1 female fleeing from the hamlet in a northwest direction. All three were dressed in black clothing, and were approximately 25 years of age. Patrol ordered Vietnamese to halt three times. When Vietnamese failed to halt, Marines fired three rounds small arms fire and two M-79 rounds at Vietnamese wounding the female in the buttocks. A thorough search was conducted for the two males with negative results. The female detainee received first aid for shrapnel wounds, and was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(11) 261700H Company C located vicinity coordinates (BT 066393) observed one Vietnamese male, age 33 dressed in black clothing and straw hat leave a trail and return several moments later carrying a pack. The Vietnamese was apprehended and searched. The detainee and the following equipment

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was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2; one pack, assorted clothing, food, pills, hammock, papers and documents.

(12) 261800H Company C squad patrol located in vicinity coordinates (BT 072397) observed one Vietnamese male age 40 dressed in black and white clothing running in a northwest direction approximately 45 meters from patrol. Patrol apprehended the Vietnamese male. The detainee was questioned by the Battalion S-2 and forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(13) 262015H Company A squad patrol 5A5 while moving into position vicinity coordinates (BT 037387) observed 3 Vietnamese following approximately 25 meters to the rear. The rear point fired 3 rounds small arms fire at Vietnamese and observed one Vietnamese fall and get up. All three Vietnamese fled in a westerly direction. Patrol activity altered their positions and set in for the night. Patrol conducted a detailed search of the area at 272100H with negative results. Results: 1 VC WIA probable.

(14) 262100H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter and activities were established. See enclosure (2).

c. D+1, 27 May 1967. (See enclosure (3).)

(1) 270400H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 29-67. See reference (c).

(2) 270600H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 48-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (4).

(3) 271025H 1st Battalion units commenced S&D operation in accordance with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 48-67. See enclosure (4).

(4) 271131H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines secure Objective D and E. Units patrolled and screened Phase Line White from vicinity coordinates (BT 060360) to (BT 080390).

(5) 271515H Company C Outpost located in vicinity coordinates (BT 074377) observed 3 VC with weapons dressed in gray clothing moving in a northeast direction at a range of approximately 300 meters in vicinity coordinates (BT 077375). Outpost fired 100 rounds of small arms fire at VC. A squad searched the area with negative results.

(6) 271640H Resupply for 1st Battalion, 5th Marines completed.

(7) 271830H OPCON of Company F was passed from 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(8) 272000H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter and activities were established. See enclosure (3).

(9) 272300H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 30-67. See reference (d).

d. D+2, 28 May 1967. (See enclosure (6).)

(1) 280830H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines squad patrol located in vicinity coordinates (BT 075366) observed 15-20 VC in camouflaged uniforms moving in a southwest direction approximately 1100 meters away in vicinity coordinates (BT 086364). Patrol called for artillery mission, 16 105mm HE and 3 rounds 105mm WP were fired on target with excellent

coverage. Patrol observed three VC fleeing to the east during artillery missions. Area was searched from coordinates (BT 075366) to (BT 089364) to coordinates (BT 090634), and patrol found a tunnel complex at coordinates (BT 088364), and two holes approximately 4 feet in diameter and 10 feet deep. The tunnel was searched with CS grenades and field protective masks with negative results. Detailed search of the area was conducted with negative results.

(2) 280850H Company A squad patrol located in vicinity coordinates (BT 070358) observed one Vietnamese male, approximately 25 years of age dressed in black clothing, throw an object believed to be a weapon into bushes approximately 100 meters southwest of patrol in vicinity coordinates (BT 069357). Patrol challenged VC and VC failed to halt, patrol fired 10-12 rounds small arms fire, killing the VC. Patrol searched the corpse and found pack strap marks and shrapnel wounds on the VC's body. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(3) 281200H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 49-67 promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (5).

(4) 281400H Company A located vicinity coordinates (BT 082362) apprehended 2 males age 22 and 60 hiding in a cave. One detainee was dressed in green clothing and the other detainee was dressed in black clothing. Detainees were forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(5) 281930H Company A while searching area in vicinity coordinates (BT 085353) to (BT 085356) found 120 rounds 5.56mm ammunition, 1 M26 fragmentation grenade, 1 ChiCom grenade, 1 VC belt with M14 magazine pouch and 4 graves approximately 4 weeks old. Captured equipment was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(6) 282100H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter and activities were established. See enclosure (6).

(7) 282158H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 31-67. See reference (e).

e. D+3 29 May 1967. (See enclosure (7)).

(1) 290055H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 50-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (8).

(2) 290530H Lead elements of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines crossed Phase Line Black moving to combat base located at Hill 51.

(3) 290845H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines reported that a current list of thrust points was lost sometime between 282400H to 290500H vicinity coordinates (BT 077366).

(4) 291220H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines squad patrol vicinity coordinates (BT 009406) observed 7 VC wearing packs and helmets running through a treeline approximately 400 meters to the southwest vicinity coordinates (BT 005345). Patrol fired 100 rounds small arms fire at the VC. Patrol received approximately 30 rounds sniper fire. Artillery mission was called and 30 rounds 105mm HE and 2 rounds 105mm WP were fired with excellent coverage. At 291250H while searching area vicinity coordinates (BT 008335) patrol received approximately 20 rounds sniper fire from an undetermined number of VC at approximately 500 meters to the southeast vicinity

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coordinates (BT 00118). Patrol returned fire with 1 round small arms fire, 2 rounds 3.5 WP and 5 M-79 rounds. Area was searched with negative results.

(5) 291430H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units arrived at combat base.

(6) 291900H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter was established. See enclosure (7).

(7) 291930H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 32-67. See reference (f).

(8) 292215H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 52-67 promulgated to all subordinate units. Company D replaced Company C in the task organization. See enclosure (9).

f. D+4 30 May 1967 (See enclosure (10).)

(1) 300740H H+10 Lead element of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines departed LZ located vicinity Combat Base for insertion into LZ Robin located in vicinity coordinates (BT 100210). See enclosure (9).

(2) 300805H Lead elements of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines were inserted into LZ Robin with negative enemy contact.

(3) 300850H Personnel of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines detected unknown chemical irritants in vicinity coordinates (BT 113218). The chemicals produced no significant results.

(4) 300855H Completed insertion of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines into LZ Robin, and were conducting an attack on Objective A.

(5) 300930H All 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units had cleared LZ Robin, and were conducting an attack on Objective A.

(6) 301135H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines observed friendly A4E aircraft crash in vicinity coordinates (BT 125230). Aircraft came in low, clipped a tree and flipped into a valley vicinity coordinates (BT 130037). 5th Marines were notified.

(7) 301200H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines located vicinity coordinates (BT 125226) received approximately 100 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 6-10 VC at a range of approximately 400 meters to the north located in vicinity coordinates (BT 125230). Company F returned 200 rounds small arms fire and called in air strike. Enemy fire ceased. The area was searched with negative results.

(8) 301300H 1st Battalion (-) Command Group located vicinity coordinates (BT 131227) received approximately 3 to 5 rounds small arms fire, from an estimated 1 sniper at a range of approximately 400 meters to the north vicinity coordinates (BT 130231). Company A returned 5 rounds small arms fire and searched the area with negative results.

(9) 301500H Company A located vicinity coordinates (BT 146228) received one round small arms fire from an unobserved sniper at a range of approximately 250 meters to the northwest, located in vicinity coordinates (BT 145229). Company A returned 5 rounds small arms fire and searched the area with negative results. Sniper's most likely route of withdrawal was to the northwest.

(10) 301910H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines secured Objective A.

(11) 302100H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter and activities were established. See enclosure (10).

(12) 302200H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 53-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (11).

## g. D+5 (31 May 1967) (See enclosure (12).)

(1) 310040H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 34-67. See reference (g).

(2) 310630H Lead element of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines commenced coordinated Search and Destroy Operation to secure Objective B.

(3) 310715H Companies A and F arrived at Phase Line Yellow.

(4) 310730H Companies A and F departed Phase Line Yellow moving to attack and secure Objective B.

(5) 310920H Company F located in vicinity coordinates (BT 159245) received approximately 30 rounds small arms fire from an undetermined number of VC at a range of approximately 350 meters to the north. Company F returned approximately 315 rounds small arms fire and 5 M-79 rounds. The area was searched and Marines encountered one VC with weapon at a distance of approximately 200 meters. Company F fired 10 rounds small arms fire at VC. VC fell as if hit and rolled down the hill in thick brush. A detailed search of the area was conducted with negative results. Results: 1 VC WIA probable.

(6) 310950H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines secured Objective B vicinity coordinates (BT 164249).

(7) 311500H Company F, located vicinity coordinates (BT 158248), apprehended 1 Vietnamese male, age 23. Detainee was questioned by Battalion S-2 and forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(8) 311515H Company F squad security patrol located in vicinity coordinates (BT 147254) encountered two VC with weapons in undergrowth approximately 25 meters away. Patrol fired approximately 30 rounds small arms fire killing one VC and capturing one BAR serial number 658465. Patrol searched the area and found heavy blood trails. Blood trails were followed with negative results. It is believed local villagers dragged 2nd VC's body away. The incident resulted in 1 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC KIA probable and one BAR captured. BAR was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(9) 311545H Commanding Officer, 5th Marines visited 1st Battalion, 5th Marines vicinity coordinates (BT 16249).

(10) 311715H Company D squad patrol located vicinity coordinates (BT 162242) received approximately 20 rounds small arms fire from 4 VC at a range of approximately 350 meters from the west vicinity coordinates (BT 158243). VC were dressed in black clothing and carrying carbines and M-1 rifles. Patrol returned 80 rounds small arms fire and 8 M-79 rounds. Detailed search of the area was made with negative results.

(11) 312000H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive positions and activities were established. (See enclosure (12).)

(12) 312245H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 35-67 See reference (h).

(13) 312345H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 54-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (13).

## h. D+6 (1 June 1967) (See enclosure (14).)

(1) 010800H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines commenced movement to conduct

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coordinated Search and Destroy Operation.

(2) 011000H Company D located vicinity coordinates (BT 189273) received 5 rounds small arms fire from one sniper dressed in black clothing located in vicinity coordinates (BT 188274) at a distance of approximately 200 meters to the west. Company D returned 20 rounds small arms fire killing the VC. Results: 1 USMC WIA, 1 VC KIA confirmed, with the following equipment captured: 1 modified carbine serial number 5403486, 1 magazine and 20 rounds. Captured equipment was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(3) 011105H Companies A and F crossed Phase Line Purple.

(4) 011115H Company D located one mine vicinity Objective 20. Mine was destroyed in place by engineers.

(5) 011235H Company A located in vicinity coordinates (BT 162204) received 8-10 rounds small arms fire from 3-7 VC dressed in black clothing. Company A captured one VC wearing black clothing inside a cave with 1 US Carbine serial number 1783307 and 30,500 piasters. A further search of the area turned up 2 VC KIA confirmed. VC KIA were wearing black clothing. Results: 2 USMC WIA; 2 VC KIA confirmed, 1 VC captured. VCC and captured equipment were forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(6) 011530H Company D located vicinity coordinates (BT 189272) apprehended one male, age 17, wearing white clothing hiding in hedrow trying to avoid friendly troops. Detainee was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(7) 011700H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 55-67 promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (15).

(8) 011700H Company A located in vicinity coordinates (BT 158293) received 5-10 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4 unobserved VC at a range of approximately 550 meters north in vicinity coordinates (BT 158288). Company A returned fire with 45 rounds small arms fire and swept the area, encountering 1 VC sniper, who fired 3 rounds small arms fire and fled into heavy brush. Patrol fired 15 rounds small arms fire at fleeing VC, VC fell as if hit, area was searched and a heavy blood trail was found. Blood trail was followed with negative results. Incident resulted in one USMC WIA, 1 VC KIA probable.

(9) 012200H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines night defensive perimeter and activities established. See enclosure (14).

(10) 012130H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received 5th Marines Frag Order 36-67. See reference (i).

(11) 012130H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 56-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (16).

i. D+7 (2 June 1967) (See enclosure (17).)

(1) 020500H Company D on Search and Destroy Operation vicinity coordinates (BT 139310) received 1 round sniper fire from unobserved sniper at a range of approximately 250 meters from the west vicinity coordinates (BT 137312). Company D returned 20 rounds small arms fire and searched area with negative results.

(2) 020620H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines located vicinity coordinates (BT 129307) received approximately 10 rounds small arms fire from an undetermined number of VC at a range of approximately 550 meters to

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the northeast vicinity coordinates (BT 132812). Returned approximately 120 rounds small arms fire and 10 60mm mortar rounds. Enemy fire ceased. Area was searched with negative results.

(3) 020805H Company D located vicinity coordinates (BT 125316) received 40-50 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 15 VC at a range of approximately 700 meters to the northwest vicinity coordinates (BT 124323). Returned 100 rounds small arms fire and called for airstrike. Detailed search of area was made after the airstrike and blood trails were found and followed with negative results. Results: 2 VC KIA probable.

(4) 021035H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines located vicinity coordinates (BT 112314) received 10-20 rounds small arms fire from 5 VC dressed in black clothing vicinity coordinates (BT 107314). Returned 150-200 rounds small arms and 5 M-79 rounds. Enemy broke contact to the southwest.

(5) 021130H Company D was sweeping the paddy area vicinity coordinates (BT 095322) in a southwesterly direction when elements approaching the village vicinity coordinates (BT 095320) were taken under fire by 80 to 100 well camouflaged NVA in heavily fortified positions. The enemy fire swept across the front and left flank catching the left flank platoons in a cross fire. At approximately 021445H when the reserve platoon was deployed to the right to roll up the enemy flank, it was brought under heavy automatic weapons fire. 60mm mortars were fired on the enemy positions and an assault on the enemy position pulled up short. Company D consolidated its positions at approximately 021940H and continued to engage the enemy through the night with small arms, automatic weapons, artillery and airstrikes, several large secondary explosions being observed. There were 40 NVA KIA confirmed, 75 KIA probable and 50 VC WIA probable while Company D had 17 KIA's, 22 WIA's and 1 DOW. See Enclosure (20).

(6) 021200H Company F advanced to search the area vicinity coordinates (BT 107314) at approximately 021205H, and while moving through the area encountered scattered resistance resulting in 5 NVA KIA confirmed. The company continued down into the flat paddy land at vicinity coordinates (BT 107314) when a Kit Carson scout started shooting at flat mats of hay laying in the paddy. The NVA had concealed themselves under the hay mats and 31 NVA KIA confirmed were counted as Company F advanced. At approximately 021420H, heavy enemy mortar, rocket, small arms and automatic weapons fire were received from vicinity coordinates (BT 094314) from an estimated 300-500 enemy in a heavily fortified trench position. The enemy fire stopped Company F, which consolidated their position and brought heavy fire on the enemy position. At approximately 021520H the reserve platoon was maneuvered to secure the high ground vicinity coordinates (BT 108314) when an estimated 40 VC were encountered. The platoon assaulted the enemy position and there were 35 NVA KIA confirmed. At approximately 021730H the Company F commander led an assault on the enemy defensive command bunker, personally killing 15 NVA before he was killed trying to secure a machine gun bunker. The acting company commander consolidated into night positions vicinity coordinates (BT 100315) at approximately 021920H and called in artillery and airstrikes throughout the night. Results of the engagement: 170 NVA KIA confirmed, 310 NVA KIA probable; 32 USMC KIA, 59 USMC WIA.

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(7) 021400H Company A, the Battalion Reserve, was committed to engage the enemy vicinity coordinates (BT 110315) and ease pressure on the companies. As Company A deployed to engage the enemy they came under sniper fire and recoilless rifle fire, Company A returned fire resulting in 4 NVA KIA confirmed, 2 KIA probable and the capture of 1 Chinese rocket launcher. At 021700H Company A was ordered to linkup with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in the vicinity coordinates (BT 103317) and immediately encountered heavy fire from 25-50 NVA entrenched in area covered with heavy underbrush. The Company returned fire, and assaulted the enemy position. The Company Commander of Company A was killed during this fire fight. At approximately 021900H the dead and wounded were carried out of the area as Company A was respoitioned into night security positions. Results of this action were 30 NVA KIA confirmed, 33 KIA probable, 27 WIA probable, while Company A lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA.

(8) 021430H The Battalion Command Group moved into vicinity coordinates (BT 108318) where it was taken under enemy sniper fire and received mortar and rocket attacks throughout the night. The 81mm mortar platoon fired missions all night and a landing zone was set up to evacuate the dead and wounded and receive emergency ammunition supply.

j. D+8 (3 June 1967). (See enclosure (18).)

(1) 030600H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines continued to consolidate, regroup, reorganize and search the area for equipment and wounded and to evacuate the dead and wounded.

(2) 030615H Commanding Officer, 5th Marines visited 1st Battalion, 5th Marines vicinity coordinates (BT 106317).

(3) 030840H Captain BRODIE assigned as Commanding Officer, Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(4) 031430H Newsmen arrived at 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Post.

(5) 031530H Battalion Command Post relocated at vicinity coordinates (BT 098316) to set up night defensive positions and conduct patrol activities. See enclosure (18).

k. D+9 (4 June 1967). (See enclosure (19).)

(1) 040930H Company D vicinity coordinates (BT 095316) while searching area found one VC KIA, one completely destroyed 82mm mortar and one badly damaged ChiCom assault rifle AK 47, due to the condition of the weapon, the serial number was not readable.

(2) 041030H Company D vicinity coordinates (BT 093323) on search and security patrol found one ChiCom sub-machine gun serial number L8632, 2 ChiCom grenades, one canteen, two entrenching tools, 1 first aid packet, 30 small arms rounds, one magazine for ChiCom sub-machine gun, and two NVA bodies.

(3) 041045H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 57-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See Enclosure (20).

REF ID: A65110  
REF ID: A65110

(4) 041300H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines provided landing zone security for 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines helicopter lift in accordance with Regimental Frag Order 38-67.

(5) 041400H OBCON of Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was passed from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(6) 041520H Commanding General III MAF and Commanding Officer, 5th Marines visited 1st Battalion, 5th Marines vicinity coordinates (BT 095321).

(7) 041700H Enemy equipment captured from 021035H to 041700 was extracted from the Operational area.

(8) 041700H Helicopter lift of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines units was completed.

(9) 041700H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines departed vicinity coordinates (BT 098317) for Objective K in accordance with Regimental Frag Order 38-67.

(10) 041900H Objective K was secured and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines established night positions and conducted night activities.

(11) 041930H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 58-67 was promulgated to all subordinate units. See enclosure (21).

1. D+10 (5 June 1967) (See enclosure (22).)

(1) 050740H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units commenced movement from Objective K vicinity coordinates (BT 002329) in trace of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(2) 051005H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines arrived at Objective Golf, secured landing zone for 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines helicopter lift.

(3) 051020H Leading elements of Battalion Command Group arrived at Combat Base at Hill 51.

(4) 051530H Helicopter lift for 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines completed. Landing zone security at Objective Golf returned to combat base at Hill 51.

(5) 051800H Operation Union II terminated.

11. Results.

a. Friendly casualties.

KIA	54
DOW	1
WIAE	71
WIAWE	3

b. Enemy casualties.

KIA confirmed	258
KIA probable	425
WIA confirmed	1
WIA probable	79
Detainees	13

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~c. Captured Ordnance

12 - Chinese Communist 7.62mm assault rifle type 56., serial numbers: 2L 6535II, 2L4762II, 2L6535II, 2L1061II, 2L8874II, 2L59238II, 2L43446II, 2L8632II, 2L48632II, 3 serial numbers unreadable.  
2 - U.S. Carbines caliber 30, serial numbers: 1783206, 5403486.  
1 - U.S. Browning Automatic Rifle, serial number 658465.  
1 - U.S. Rifle caliber 30 M-1, serial number 197314.  
1 - 12 gauge shotgun, serial number 970330.  
1 - North Vietnamese modified 7.62mm Sub-machinegun, type 50, serial number, 90374.  
4 - Chinese Communist anti-tank grenade launchers, type 56.  
1 - U.S. M-60 machinegun, serial number 71323R.  
1 - Chinese Communist 36 caliber machinegun, serial number 214534.  
2 - Chinese Communist Light Machineguns, serial number 908921, one serial number unreadable.

d. Captured Enemy Equipment

7 Magazines, drum for ChiCom light machinegun  
1 Magazine, Browning Automatic Rifle  
9 Magazines, for ChiCom sub-machinegun AK-47  
5 Magazines, for M-16  
6 Packs, marching  
11 Hammocks  
14 Uniforms, (green and khaki)  
1 Carrier, magazine (.45)  
2 Bottles assorted pills  
6 Belts, pistol  
1 Packet, first aid  
8 Canteens  
4 Covers, Canteen  
9 Belts, cartridge  
2 Helmets, jungle  
17 Clips, 7.62 ammo  
14 Ponchos, NVA type  
1 Flashlight  
1 Wire brush  
4 Entrenching tools  
1 Bayonet with scabbard  
30,500 Piasters  
Small quantities of assorted papers, documents and notebooks.

e. Destroyed Enemy Equipment

18 ChiCom stick hand grenades (frag)  
4 Defensive hand grenades (concussion)  
1 Antipersonnel mine  
6 2.35 inch rockets

4 Caves

12. Administrative Matters.a. Supply.

(1) Resupply was effected by helicopters controlled by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines HST with the Battalion Command Group. HST's were attached to Company A, Company C and Company D during Operation Union II. Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines did not have an HST and requests were relayed to the Battalion Command HST over the Tactical Air Request net. During the first three days of Operation Union II, one priority medical evacuation, one routine resupply and a troop lift for Company F were completed.

(2) From 30 May through 1 June one emergency medical evacuation and one routine resupply were completed. On 2 June - 3 June six separate medical evacuations, one emergency resupply and one routine resupply were completed. Troop lifts for 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and 3rd Battalion 5th Marines were completed on 4 June and 5 June.

(3) The necessity of using the overcrowded Tactical Air Request net for resupply and evacuation requests for company forces was the only problem encountered.

(4) The basic allowance of ammunition and 5 MCI was sufficient for sustained operations by scheduling normal resupply every other day. This combat load did not hinder the movement of the units.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Cleaning equipment for crew served and individual weapons was carried by all units of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. There were no maintenance problems during Operation Union II.

c. Transportation.

(1) Transportation for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units was limited to the helicopter troop lift on D+4. The troop lift was completed with no problems.

d. Communications.

(1) No significant problems were encountered with communications during Operation Union II. Due to the terrain and distance it was necessary to use the Regimental relay site at NUI LAC SON and a C-117 Airborne Radio Relay during the initial stages of the operation.

e. Medical Evacuation.

(1) Medical support for Operation Union II was provided by company corpsmen and by the Battalion surgeon and two corpsman with the Battalion

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Command Group. On 2 June 1967 casualties were brought to the Command Group where medical personnel rendered first aid and effected a triage for helicopter evacuation to medical support activities in Chu Lai and DaNang. No significant medical problems were encountered.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

(1) No special equipment or techniques were utilized during Operation Union II.

14. Commanders Analysis.


(a) There was little or no contact with noncombatants. Thus, no problems or special actions on CA/PSYWAR were required. NVA forces were disposed in well prepared positions, emphasizing the requirement of a complete fire support plan to include preparation, planned and on call fires.

(b) On one occasion the enemy was found to be hiding under straw mats in an open field, and were detected by a Kit Carson Scout. The effective utilization of Kit Carson scouts is limited only by the imagination of the Unit Commander.

(c) The enemy's employment of an irritant chemical agent did not effect the combat efficiency of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, but it does illustrate the enemy's ability to employ a variety of weapons.

15. Recommendations.

(1) That the tenets of proven combat principals continue to be emphasized at all levels.



J. P. WHITE  
By direction

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 252130H May 1967

Frag Order 47-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series B 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

Task Organization1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein)H&S Company (-)(Rein)

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, 81 Mort Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, ARVN Ln Off

Det, Kit Carson Tm

Det, Comm Plt

Company A (-)(Rein)Company A (-)

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, H&amp;S Co,

81 FO Tm

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tm

Kit Carson Tm

Company C (-)(Rein)Company C (-)

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Hq Co, 5th Marines (Scout Sniper Tm)

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Plt Co D,

Det, H&amp;S Co,

81 FO Tm

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tm

Kit Carson Tm

## 1. SITUATION. No change.

LTCOL HILGARTNER  
 CAPT MCKAY (Acting)

CAPT BABICH

CAPT CASWELL

SECRET

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

2. MISSION. Conduct search and destroy operations in area of operation to kill or capture VC, weapons and supplies.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation.

(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines deploys to establish blocking positions east of the valley in vicinity coordinates (BT 067396) to vicinity coordinates (BT 055384). See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.

(3) Conduct patrols between Hill 51 Combat Base and east west grid line 31.

B. Company C.

(1) At H-6 on D-Day move along route of advance to establish blocking position at Objectives A and B. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) At H-Hour be prepared to continue attack on order.

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. Company A.

(1) At H-5½ on D-Day move in trace of Company C to establish blocking position at Objective A. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) At H-Hour be prepared to continue attack on order.

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

D. Company B.

(1) At H-30 minutes on D-Day conduct platoon (Rein) combat patrol between Hill 51 Combat Base and east west grid line 31. See Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

E. H&S Company.

(1) General Support.

F. Platoon Company D.

(1) Battalion Reserve.

(2) Provide Command Group security.

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

G. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) H-Hour 0600H; D-Day 26 May 1967.

(2) Position reports hourly at 10 minutes before the hour.

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- (3) Unclassified Code Name - Operation "UNION III".
- (4) Use of RCA authorized and encouraged.
- (5) Gas mask will be carried by all personnel.
- (6) Flak jackets optional.
- (7) Order of march - Company C, Company A, Command Group and Battalion Reserve.
- (8) Portion of Operation "UNION III" in Que Son NFZ responsibility of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (9) Spot reports of significant events, particularly when crossing phase lines and checkpoints in securing objectives and contact with enemy forces.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. The following thrust points effective at H-Hour:

Day	BT 0731
Month	BT 1132
Animal	BT 0934
Coin	BT 0636

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A-Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

SECRET


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ANNEX A-(Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 47-67  
Ref: Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE-SON, RVN  
252 00H May 1967

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OFFICIAL

J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

1

## SECRET

Enclosure (1)

DECLASSIFIED

Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D-Day  
Ref: Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014 Sheets 6640 II - III

Day

A 4x4 grid with circled numbers and arrows. The grid contains the following values:

04	11	11	11
40	5	5	5
	1	1	1
	5	5	5

Arrows point from circled '4' to circled '1' in the first row, and from circled '1' in the first row to circled '1' in the second row. A large arrow points upwards from the bottom row to the top row.

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


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Enclosure (2)

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Day



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Enclosure (3)

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 271025H May 1967

## Frag Order 48-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company A.

- (1) On order attack to southeast to secure Objective E, continue attack on order in assigned sector to secure Objective F in zone.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

B. Company C.

- (1) On order attack to southeast to secure Objective D, continue attack on order in assigned sector to secure Objective F in zone.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.

D. 2nd Platoon, Company D.

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) Provide Battalion Command Group security.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour (0900 for planning purposes); D-Day (27 May for planning purposes).
  - (2) Be prepared to move out on 30 minute notice,
  - (3) Battalion Command Group and Battalion Reserve will follow in trace of Company A.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

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Enclosure (4)


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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGERTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A-Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL



J. P. WHITE.  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 271000Z May 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 48-67  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000 Series L 7014; Sheets 6640 II - III

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OFFICIAL

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
 J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer

P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

SECRET

Enclosure (4)

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 281200H May 1967

Frag Order 49-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company C.

(1) Conduct S&D operations from present position to vicinity (BT 082367) and establish blocking position.  
 (2) Be prepared to patrol actively to southeast, northeast and northwest to a range of 700 meters.

B. Company F.

(1) Conduct S&D operations from present position to vicinity (BT 076366) and establish blocking position.  
 (2) Tie in with Company C and conduct S&D operations to the southwest to a range of 1000 meters.

C. Company A.

(1) Conduct S&D operations from present position to vicinity (BT 077360) and establish blocking position.  
 (2) Be prepared to patrol actively to the southwest and south to range of 1000 meters.

D. H&S Company.

(1) General Support.  
 (2) Follow in trace of Company F.

E. 2nd Platoon Company D.

(1) Battalion Reserve.  
 (2) Provide security for the Command Group.  
 (3) Follow in trace of Battalion Command Group.

F. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Units depart present position as soon as possible and move to

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designated positions.


(2) Submit position reports hourly at 10 minutes before the hour.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding


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J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer


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Day

Night




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Operation Overlay D+3  
Ref: Maps, RWN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.



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Enclosure (7)

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE SON, RVN  
290055H May 1967

Frag Order 50-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company C.

- (1) At H-Hour conduct search and destroy operations north of boundary to secure portion of Objective Tango in zone.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume missions on order.

B. Company A.

- (1) At H-Hour conduct search and destroy operations south of boundary to secure portion of Objective Tango in zone.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Battalion Command Group follow in trace of 2nd Platoon, Company

D.

D. Company F.

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) At H-Hour move along axis of advance in trace of Battalion Command Group to combat base at Hill 51.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.
- (4) Provide rear and flank security.

E. 2nd Platoon, Company D.

- (1) Battalion Reserve move along axis of advance to Combat Base at Hill 51.
- (2) Provide security for Battalion Command Group.

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Enclosure (8)

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F. Coordinating Instructions.


- (1) H-Hour 0530.
- (2) D-Day 29 May 1967.
- (3) Report lead element reaching Phase Line Black.
- (4) Unit Commanders insure that every man has a fighting hole.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

SECRET

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 292215H May 1967

Frag Order 52-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III

- Task Organization (Effective 0500, 30 May 1967)

1st Bn, 5th Mar (-)(Rein)

LTCOL HILGARTNER

H&amp;S Company (-)(Rein)

CAPT MCKAY (Acting)

H&amp;S Company (-)

Det, 106 RR Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, Comm Plt

Kit Carson Tm

ARVN Ln Off

Det, Co B, 1st SPBn

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Company A (-)(Rein)

CAPT BABICH

Company A (-)

Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout Sniper Tm)

Det, Btry D, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st SPBn

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, H&amp;S Co.

81 FO

Det, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, Comm Plt

Kit Carson Tm

FAC Tm

S-2 Scout

Company D (-)(Rein)

1ST LT MCINTURFF

Company D (-)

Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout Sniper Tm)

Det, Btry D, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st SPBn

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, H&amp;S Co.

81 FO

Det, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Med Plt

Det, Comm Plt

Kit Carson Tm

FAC Tm

S-2 Scout

SECRET

SECRET

F Co, 2ndBn, 5thMar. (-)(Rein)

Company F (-)

Det, Hq Co, 5thMar (Scout Sniper Tm)

Det, Btry E, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det H&amp;S Co, 2ndBn, 5thMar

81 FO

Det, Med Plt

Kit Carson Tm

FAC Tm

S-2 Scout Tm

CAPT GRAHAM

1. SITUATION. No change.

2. MISSION. To conduct search and destroy operations to kill or capture VC and weapons.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation.

(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines lands at L-Hour on D+5 in LZ Robin in a column of companies, secures LZ Robin and on order continues attack to secure Regimental Objective A.

B. Company A. (Rein)

(1) At L-Hour on D+5 land in primary LZ (Robin), secure Objective 1, continue attack on order.

(2) If landed in alternate LZ (Blue Jay), secure Objective 4, continue attack on order.

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. Company F. 2ndBn, 5thMar.

(1) Land in primary LZ Robin in trace of Company A, secure Objective 3, continue attack on order.

(2) If landed in alternate LZ (Blue Jay), secure Objective 5, continue attack on order.

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

D. Det, H&S Company.

(1) General Support.

(2) Land in primary LZ Robin, establish Battalion Command Post on Objective 3.

(3) If landed in alternate LZ (Blue Jay), establish Battalion Command Post on Objective 5.

E. 81 Mortar Platoon.

(1) Initially attached to Company A.

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SECRET

(2) On order to General Support.

F. Company D (Rein)

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) Land in primary LZ Robin in trace of Company F, secure southern sector of LZ, continue attack on order.
- (3) If landed in alternate LZ (Blue Jay), secure northeastern section of LZ, continue attack on order.
- (4) Be prepared to assume mission of Company A or Company F on order.

G. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Landing Zone, vicinity (BT 025344) (Hill 51 Combat Base).
- (2) Pick up 1st wave 0710.
- (3) L-Hour 0730.
- (4) In addition to thrust points effected 290900H, any Girls name (BT 1223).
- (5) LZ Robin (Primary) (BT 100210)  
LZ Blue Jay (Alternate) (BT 113217)  
LZ Cardinal (BT 129277)
- (6) Flak jackets optional.
- (7) Use of RCA authorized and encouraged.
- (8) Spot reports on significant events, particularly crossing phase lines and check points, securing objectives, contact with enemy forces.
- (9) Position reports hourly at 10 minutes before the hour.
- (10) HST with first plane, FAC in first wave.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- (1) Engineers carry maximum demolitions.
- (2) Next regular resupply D+7.
- (3) Routine resupply will be scheduled for 1200. Submit requests prior to 1800H day prior to resupply.
- (4) Three gas masks per rifle company squad.

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
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

A. Carry hand illumination, colored smoke grenades and air panels.

P. L. HILLGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX A: Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

  
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

SECRET

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Fragment Order 52-67  
Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II-III

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE SON, RVN  
292215H May 1967

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J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

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
Recon  
29 May 67

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

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Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+4  
Ref: Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III



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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 302200H May 1967

## Frag Order 53-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation.

(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines attacks with two companies to seize Objective B, be prepared to continue attack to east along Phase Line Brown.

B. Company A.

- (1) At H-Hour + 1½ hours, attack to seize Objective 16.
- (2) Continue attack on order to seize remaining portion of Objective B in zone.
- (3) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. Company F.

- (1) At H-Hour + 1½ hours, attack to seize Objective 15.
- (2) Continue attack on order to seize remaining portion of Objective B in zone.
- (3) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

D. Company D.

- (1) Initially Battalion Reserve.
- (2) Provide security for Battalion Command Group.
- (3) Be prepared to assume mission of Company A or Company F on order.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour 0500; D-Day 1 June 1967.
- (2) Contact left to right.
- (3) Preparation fires at 0600H.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

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Enclosure (11)


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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A-Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

  
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer


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SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUEzon, KVN  
30220H May 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 53-67  
Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.



P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

**OFFICIAL**


J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

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
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Enclosure (11)

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Day



Day

Night

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Enclosure (12)

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE SON, RVN  
312345H June 1967

Frag Order 54-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.
4. Concept of Operation.

(1) At H-Hour 1st Battalion, 5th Marines attacks with two companies along axis of advance east of terrain feature vicinity (BT 178267) to seize Objective B.

B. Company A.

(1) At H-Hour attack in zone to seize Objective 17, continue attack on order. Keep troops east of terrain feature vicinity (BT 178267) in zone.

(2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. Company D.

(1) At H-Hour attack in zone to seize Objective 18, continue attack on order.

(2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

D. H&S Company.

(1) General Support.

E. Company F.

(1) Battalion Reserve.  
(2) Provide security for Battalion Command Group.  
(3) On order, move as directed generally along boundary between Company D and Company A.  
(4) Be prepared to assume mission of either attacking unit on order. Priority to Company A.

F. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) H-Hour 0800, D-Day 1 June 1967.

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Enclosure (13)

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- (2) Take salt tablets as prescribed.
- (3) Cross Phase Lines only on order.
- (4) Assault units be at LOD at 0730.
- (5) PSN reports hourly at 10 minutes before the hour, Spot reports as significant events occur.


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A-Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

  
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE~~DN~~ N, RVN  
312~~43~~H May 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 54-67  
Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II III



OFFICIAL

J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC

### Executive Officer


P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

4-1

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
Enclosure (13)

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Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+6  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III

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 Enclosure (14)



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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 011700H June 1967

Frag Order 55-67.

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L7014, sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company A.

(1) On order, deploy from present position, seize and attack Battalion Objective 22, then conduct search and destroy operations to Regimental Objective HOTEL and link up with Company F. See ANNEX A (Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

B. Company F.

(1) On order, deploy from present position along assigned axis of advance, seize northern and western sector of Regimental Objective HOTEL and link up with Company A. See ANNEX A (Operation Overlay).

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Follow in trace of Company F.

D. Company D.

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) Provide rear and flank security.
- (3) Follow in trace of Battalion Command Group.
- (4) Upon arrival at Regimental Objective HOTEL close defensive positions by making physical contact with Company A and Company F.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Limit of advance Phase Line ORANGE.
- (2) H-Hour for planning purposes 1800; D-Day 1 June 1967.
- (3) Coordinating point for Companies A and F is (BT 142300).

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
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX A - Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL

  
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

SECRET

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
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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 011 H June 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 55-67  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014; Sheet II - III

+

88



P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

OFFICIAL


P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer

SECRET  
 Enclosure (15)

A-1

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 012345 June 1967

Frag Order 56-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company D.

- (1) At 0430 move to attack position Checkpoint #1.
- (2) At H-Hour on order attack to secure Objective 23, search for suspected enemy supply dumps in hamlet located vicinity (BT 138311), continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

B. Company F.

- (1) At H-Hour on order attack to secure Objective 24, continue attack on order.
- (2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.

D. Company A.

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) Provide security for Battalion Command Group.
- (3) Move as directed, generally in trace of Company F.
- (4) Be prepared to assume mission of attacking units on order.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour 0500 on order. D-Day 2 June 1967.
- (2) Take salt tablets as prescribed.
- (3) Report all personnel accounted for prior to deployment.
- (4) LOD, Phase Line Orange.
- (5) Cross Phase Lines on order.
- (6) Use RCA in caves, make every effort to get prisoners.
- (7) Rules of engagement apply.

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1 Enclosure (16)

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
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (a) Red side out for air panels at 0800.
  - (b) Air panels should be distributed throughout unit.

P. L. HILLGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

## ANNEXES:

A - Operation Overlay  
B - Fire Support

OFFICIAL


  
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

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ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 56-67  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014,  
 Sheets 6640 II - III

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 012345H June 1967



P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

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J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 012345H June 1967

ANNEX B (Fire Support Plan) to Frag Order 56-67.

- (1) Artillery preparation fires. See tab 1 (Fire Support Overlay).
- (2) Air Support.

(a) 01-E TAC/A will be available as required for visual reconnaissance of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines operational area as defined in Frag Order 56-67.

(b) Fixed wing support will be available as required by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units for suitable targets.

- (3) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Air will be under control of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines ALO.  
 (b) Decisions on use of air support remains with the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.  
 (c) All air requests must come through the Company FAC Team.

- (4) Preparation Fires.

(a) All preparation fires on Objectives 24, 25, 26 will be fired on order about 020450Z.  
 (b) All preparation fires on Objectives 27 and 28 will be fired on order as friendly units secure Objective 24.  
 (c) All preparation fires on Objectives 29 and 30 will be fired on order as friendly units secure Objectives 25 and 26.  
 (d) All preparation fires will remain on call.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

TAB: 1 - Fire Support Overlay

~~OFFICIAL~~  


J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
QUE SON, RVN  
012345H June 1967

Tab 1 (Fire Support Overlay) to ANNEX B (Fire Support Plan), to Frag Order 56-67.

Ref: (a) Maps, HVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III



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
J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

B-1-1


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Enclosure (16)

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Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+7  
Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III


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Enclosure (17)

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
Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D+8  
Ref: (a) Maps, IKN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III




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Enclosure (18)

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Night



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Enclosure (19)

Operation and Night Disposition Overlay D-9  
Ref: (a) Maps, IWN; 1:50,000; Series I, 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 041000H June 1967

Frag Order 57-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Company A.

- (1) On order at H-Hour, attack in zone to CP-1, continue attack to Regimental Objective K.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

B. Company D.

- (1) On order at H-Hour, attack in zone to CP-7, continue to Regimental Objective K.
- (2) Be prepared to continue attack on order.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.
- (4) Provide flank security for Battalion Command Group.

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Move with Company D.

D. Battalion Reserve.

- (1) Squad from 81's, rear security.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour for planning purposes - 1700.
- (2) All hands take salt tablets as prescribed.
- (3) Conduct thorough search for enemy graves and equipment.
- (4) Using north as 12 o'clock, Company A set in night defensive position from 9 to 3, Company D set in night defensive positions from 3 to 9.
- (5) Unit Commanders submit recommended night activities on arrival at Regimental Objective K.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

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Enclosure (20)


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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEX: A-Operation Overlay

OFFICIAL



J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 041000H June 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 57-67  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; series L 7014, sheets 6640 II - III

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OFFICIAL


J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer

P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

A-1

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Enclosure (20)

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 4 June 1967

## Frag Order 58-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. SITUATION. No change.
2. MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation.

(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines follows in trace of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines to Objective Golf and provides LZ security for helo lift of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

B. Company A.

(1) On order at H-Hour follow in trace of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines along axis of advance to Objective Golf. Provide one platoon for LZ security and continue to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

(2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

C. H&S Company.

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Provide HST for control of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines helilift at Objective Golf.
- (3) Attach HST to Company A at 050530H.
- (4) Follow in trace of Company A.

D. Company D.

- (1) Battalion Reserve.
- (2) On order at H-Hour, follow in trace of Battalion Command Group along axis of advance.
- (3) Provide flank security for Battalion Command Group.
- (4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

E. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour 0600H, D-Day 5 June 1967.
- (2) All personnel take salt tablets.
- (3) Reville and Stand-To at 0500.

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
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. No change.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Operation Overlay
- B - Fire Support

OFFICIAL




J. P. WHITE  
Major, USMC  
Executive Officer

SECRET

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 4 June 1967

ANNEX A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 58-67  
 Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series B 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III



SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 4 June 1967

## ANNEX B (Fire Support Plan) to Frag Order 58-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets 6640 II - III.

1. Artillery.

(a) Artillery preparation fires. See Tab 1(Fire Support Overlay).

2. Air.

(a) 01-E TAC/A will be available on request for visual reconnaissance of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines operational area as defined in Frag Order 58-67.

(b) Fixed wing support will be available as required by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units for suitable targets.

3. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Air will be under control of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines ALO.
- (2) Decisions for use of air support remains with Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (3) All air requests must come through Company FAC teams.

P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

TAB: 1 - Fire Support Overlay

OFFICIAL


J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 QUE SON, RVN  
 4 June 1967

Tab 1 (Fire Support Overlay) to Frag Order 58-67

Ref: (a) Maps, RVN, 1:50,000; Series L 7014, Sheets II - III

OFFICIAL

J. P. WHITE  
 Major, USMC  
 Executive Officer

P. L. HILGARTNER  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

B-1-1

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Enclosure (21)

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### 1/5 Combat Base

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Operation Overlay D+10  
Ref: (a) Maps, RVN; 1:50,000; Series L 7014; Sheets II - III

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Enclosure (22)

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Copy 1 of 9 Copies

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
 Headquarters  
 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines  
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/MCJ/wfm  
 8 June 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines  
 Subj: Combat After Action Report  
 Ref: (a) 5th Marines Operation Order (Operation Union II)

(b) Maps: AMS Series L7014 Vietnam

Encl: (1) 2/5 Frag Order 17-67 (Operation Union II)  
 (2) 2/5 Frag Order 18-67 (Operation Union II)  
 (3) Operation Overlay (1)  
 (4) Operation Overlay (2)  
 (5) Operation Overlay (3)

00784-67  
 8 JUN 1967

1. Code Name: Operation Union II (Search and Destroy)
2. Dates of Operation: 021400H to 041700H June 1967
3. Location: Thang Binh District. Area of 2/5 operation was bounded on the north by EW Grid Line 34, on the east by NS Grid Line 11, on the south by EW Grid Line 30, and on the west by NS Grid Line 08.

4. Control or Command Headquarters:

5th Marine Regiment

Col K. J. HOUGHTON

5. Task Organization:

2nd Battalion (-) (Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol M. C. JACKSON, JR.

Detachment H&S Co (-) (Rein) 2nd Battalion,  
 5th Marines

Captain P. J. BLESSING

Company "E" 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines

1stLt C. L. RENEAU

Company "D" 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Captain M. C. HIGGINS

Company "E" 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines

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6. Supporting Armsa. Air

(1) A helo-lift was conducted on the afternoon of 2 June 1967 to move an operational reserve into a landing zone at coordinates BT103333. The operational reserve consisted of Company E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines with Battalion Command Group Alfa, G, V, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, and Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. This was accomplished by the utilization of CH-46 support.

(2) Six (6) Med-Evacs were conducted with an average elapsed time of 20 minutes from inception to pick-up. Thirty-one (31) personnel were evacuated. One CH-53 came under heavy hostile fire and mortar attack. The CH-53 was partially damaged by an 81MM mortar round.

(3) TAC (A) was available during most of the daylight hours throughout the operation and "Spooky" was on station throughout the first night surprising enemy fire and marking targets for fixed wing aircraft.

(4) Company F, Company E and the Battalion Command Group were helo-lifted from (BT095317) to An Hoa utilizing CH-53 support on the afternoon of 4 June. No enemy fire was received.

b. Artillery

(1) 105 MM D/2/11

FIRES MISSIONS

OBS 2

ROUNDS HE 24

WP 4

7. Intelligence

a. Enemy strength in the area of operation was placed at (2) NVA Battalions. It is quite likely that the headquarters battalion of the 2nd NVA Division was in this area due to the fierce fighting that took place and the determination that the enemy showed to keep the Marines out of the area.

b. The enemy was located in the area of BT0931. It was quite obvious that most of the high ground had well prepared defensive positions and that the enemy meant to retain this area possibly as a headquarters for future operations.

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c. The situation anticipated in the objective area as received from 5th Marines was that a large, well equipped NVA force was in solid contact with 1/5 reinforced by Foxtrot 2/5.

d. Sources of intelligence were 1st Marine Division, 5th Marines, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and MAG-16 Aircraft in the area.

e. The enemy did not oppose in anyway the landing of the Battalion at BT102333. As "D", 1/7, and "E", 2/5, moved out of the LZ occasional sniper fire developed although not enough to hamper movement. At BT094328 the leading platoon of "E" 2/5 was ambushed by an unknown number of NVA with automatic weapons. Due to intense fire by "E" 2/5 the enemy was driven off leaving behind (2) dead with (2) weapons. As a Med-Evac helicopter landed, mortar fire was received totaling approximately (50) rounds. It is believed that this was covering fire for the withdrawl of the NVA unit.

f. The unit engaged is believed to be the Headquarters battalion and one other battalion of the 2nd NVA Division. Captured equipment demonstrates quite vividly that they were a well disciplined professionally equipped military unit from Hai Phong, North Vietnam. The dead seen on the battle-field were clean cut and well fed individuals in Khaki Uniforms.

g. Terrain in the area of operation was basically rice paddies encompassed by 20-40 meter high ground. The high ground had good natural concealment and excellent cover in the form of trench lines and fighting holes built by the NVA. The loose surface road running NE to SW located vicinity BT090327 has bomb shelters and fighting holes along both sides every 15-20 meters. The trail running NNW to SSE has similar man made features. Critical terrain features include high ground at BT095313 and BT108317.

h. Very few civilians were encountered in the operation area. Those that were, however, were extremely afraid and stated only that NVA soldiers had been in the area during the previous 4 days. Although psychological warfare broadcasts were made, none were originated by this battalion. Broadcasts made were unintelligible due to the altitude of the aircraft.

#### Results

a. Enemy

NVA KIA's (Conf)

18

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

## b. Equipment

SKS	1
RPD	1
AK-47	1
Packs	6
7.62 Russ short	200 rounds

## c. Other

Miscellaneous papers	2 lbs.
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8. Mission: See Para 2 enclosure (1)

9. Concept of Operation: See Para 3a enclosure (1)

10. Execution:

At 021240H 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was alerted to commitment to the operation (See Enclosure (1)).

At 021415H the first element of E/2/5 was helilifted out of An Hoa. Landing in the LZ was delayed 2 hours due to Air Strikes being conducted in the immediate area and for refueling helicopters.

At 021815H 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (-) reinforced chopped OPCON to 5th Marines.

At 022015H the helilift of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Group A, Company E/2/5, and Company D/1/7 was completed.

At 022230H, 2/5 (-) (Rein) at coordinates BT093328 while enroute to Objective 1 was taken under fire by an unknown number of enemy armed with automatic weapons. Returned S/A, A/W and hand grenades. Results: 2 USMC WIA (Evac), 2 NVA KIA (Conf); captured 1 SKS, 1 RPD, 2 packs, cartridge belt, ammo and assorted documents.

Commencing at 022400H 2/5 (-) (Rein) Loc vic BT093328 received from 50 to 60 81/82 MM Mortars. Results: 4 USMC KIA, 23 USMC WIA (Evac) and 21 USMC WIA (Minor).

At 030130H Company E/2/7 completed helilift into LZ and moved to 2/5 position (BT093328). Move was completed at 030245H.

At 030630H 9 men from D/1/5 reported to 2/5 vic (BT093328). Two of the men had been wounded the previous day and were immediately evacuated.

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At 031615H 2/5 (-) (Rein) while sweeping objective Foxtrot (BT0931) found 8 NVA bodies, 3 packs and assorted documents.

At 041030H Company F/2/5 chopped OPCON to 2/5.

At 041255H F/2/5 found 8 NVA bodies (BT099315) one of which was buried in a shallow grave, five along the edge of a rice paddy and two in a nearby tree line. Equipment found included (1) AK-47, (3) packs and assorted documents.

At 041400H commenced helilift of 2/5 (-) (Rein) to An Hoa Combat Base which was completed at 041630H.

At 041700H 2/5 (-) (Rein) chopped OPCON to 1st Marine Division.

11. Results:

a. Enemy Personnel

(1) 18 NVA KIA (Conf)

b. Friendly Personnel

(1) 4 USMC KIA  
(2) 23 USMC WIA (EVAC)  
(3) 2 USN WIA (EVAC)  
(4) 20 USMC WIA (MINOR)  
(5) 1 USN WIA (MINOR)

12. Administration and Logistics:

a. Supply: All supply requests were submitted to and fulfilled by the 5th Marine Regiment.

b. Maintenance: Normal PM of equipment was accomplished throughout the conduct of the operation.

c. Treatment of Casualties & Hospitalization: All casualties received First Aid from the Company Corpsmen or the Medical Officer. BAS (forward) consisted of one Medical Officer and one Corpsman who moved with the Command Group. All casualties sustained during the operation were evacuated by helicopter. A Medical Assistant was present on all emergency Med-Evac's. All head wounds were taken to NSA hospital, DaNang. Remaining casualties were taken to the 1st Medical Battalion Hospital, DaNang, or a Collecting and Clearing Station located at Chu Lai.

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d. Transportation: Transportation of personnel and supplies was accomplished exclusively by helicopter.

e. Communication:

(1) Radio

(a) There were no problems with radio communications throughout the operation. The AN/PRC-25 radio continues to provide excellent service.

(b) As a result of Company F's contact of 2 June while under OPCON of 1/5, three AN/PRC-25 radios are missing. Two are assumed captured by the enemy. One set was evacuated with a casualty. The report of missing radios has been submitted to the 1st Marine Division CEO. Attempts are underway to recover the radio that was evacuated.

(2) Antenna: There was no requirement for any special antenna to be employed during this brief operation.

(3) Voice Procedure:

(a) Generally satisfactory. A need for additional training is indicated.

(b) A communication security class scheduled for June will increase the proficiency of personnel in communication procedures.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques: None

14. Commander's Analysis - The participation of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines in Operation Union II was of brief duration but occurred at a critical stage of the operation. The Battalion was alerted to commitment to the operation at about 021240H June and by 1400 Company E and the Command Group were prepared to depart An Hoa. The delay in the helilift occasioned by the unusual length of time in preparing the landing zone, prevented an early departure from the landing zone by the Battalion (-). It is believed this delay was extremely critical in that it imposed a requirement for organization of the troop elements and movement over unfamiliar terrain during the hours of darkness particularly in view of the requirement for immediate relief of pressure on the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. At 2015, on completion of the helilift of the Command Group and the bulk of two rifle companies, a decision was made to:

a. Leave one platoon of Company E to maintain security of the LZ for the upcoming helilift of E/2/7.

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b. To move the remainder of Co. ~~2/5~~, D/1/7 and the Command Group forward immediately to make contact with D/1/5 and to relieve the pressure on 1/5.

c. To move E/2/7 immediately forward along the road to the southwest on their arrival and consolidation at the LZ. E/2/7 would take control of the platoon of E/2/5 left for security of the LZ for the movement forward.

During the movement to the southwest, direction was maintained by guiding on the road. Under conditions of very limited visibility, the move was made quickly and in a controlled manner. During the move, communications were maintained with 1/5, and by the use of pyrotechnics, the position of D/1/5 was ascertained. This served to assist in the direction of movement of the lead elements of the Battalion.

It is felt that the flank of the enemy position was reached at about 022230H June and the resulting sharp fire and mortar exchange alerted the enemy to the presence of a sizable force on their northern flank. It appears that there was an element of surprise achieved in that helicopters were still arriving in the LZ about 2000 meters to the northeast bringing in E/2/7 and it is likely that the enemy anticipated the movement of a sizable reinforcing element would not commence until the helilift was completed. The CO of 1/5 by radio transmission at approximately that time indicated that enemy action had greatly receded and that he was under no pressure. It may be concluded that the sudden presence of 2/5 on their flank at this time was significant in the hasty withdrawal of the enemy from the battlefield. Remaining action of 2/5 in the operation subsequent to the initial fire fight and mortar exchange consisted of patrol action attempting to regain contact with the enemy force throughout the night of 2-3 June and the sweep and search of Regimental Objective F on 3-4 June. No additional significant contact occurred on 3-4 June prior to the Battalion's return to its combat base at 041400H.

In reviewing 2/5's participation in Operation Union II, the following observations are considered pertinent:

a. The flexibility of Marine tactical units was reaffirmed in this operation. A composite Battalion of three rifle companies and a Command Group derived from three different infantry Battalions was inserted into the operation on short notice and under conditions of limited visibility. The quick assembly and organization of this force into an effective fighting unit, accomplished with no lost motion, was due to the combat readiness and professionalism of the rifle companies which participated. The performance of the rifle companies from the Seventh Marines, i.e. D/1/7 and E/2/7 was particularly noteworthy when viewed from the standpoint of the rapidity of insertion and the limited advance knowledge of the tactical area and assigned objectives.

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b. There appears to be a requirement for increased coordination of ground and air units at the higher echelons to insure a more timely response to tactical requirements for helicopter insertion of reinforcing ground units. It is anticipated that the impact of the insertion of 2/5 in this operation would have been significantly increased if the helilift had been completed in time to permit a daylight attack.

c. Air in support of 2/5 in this operation particularly during the night of 2-3 June was outstanding. Strikes were conducted on enemy forces and weapons positioned between 2/5 and elements of 1/5. The air strikes were exceptionally accurate and the pilots demonstrated a high degree of professional ability in adjusting quickly on targets. An unusual technique of acquisition of targets was noted in one instance. Two F-4 aircraft were operating in tandem. The first aircraft approached a target at a slow rate of speed. During his approach he switched on his landing and running lights and drew the fire of 50 caliber machine guns. The second F-4 following closely in trace and without lights, quickly acquired the target and delivered a napalm strike which appeared to eliminate the enemy weapon and crew. This technique was continued for several runs. It is further concluded that air strikes eliminated a minimum of two 81-82MM mortars which caused the majority of the casualties suffered by 2/5.

d. An unusual feature of the area of operation noted by this Battalion was the absence of mines and booby traps. Additionally, it appears that this area would present a suitable area for the employment of tracked vehicles as a means of increasing mobility and fire support.

15. Recommendations: None

*M. C. Jackson Jr.*  
M. C. JACKSON, JR.

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines  
An Hoa, Vietnam  
021200H June 1967

Frag Order 17-67 (Operation Union II)

Ref: Map; South Vietnam 1:50,000 (Tam Ky) AMS Series L7014 Sheet 6640 II

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Large enemy force w/AW and mortars located vicinity (BT100310). Enemy disposed in tree line at above position, presently attempting to move in on flank of 1/5.

b. Friendly:

(1) 1/5 presently receiving A/W and mortars. Mortars landing short, size unknown. CO feels enemy trying to envelope. Company location: D/1/5 - BT095315, F/2/5 - BT096310, A/1/5 - BT100310.

(2) 3/5 receiving intermittent fire at (BT125297).

c. Attachments and Detachments. D/1/7 and E/2/7 will be attached to 2/5 on arrival in LZ.

2. MISSION: 2/5 (-) (Rein) conducts heliborne landing in LZ (BT103333) and sweeps northwest to southeast to relieve enemy pressure on 1/5.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations: Company E and Command Group A move from An Hoa to LZ. D/1/7 and E/2/7 moves from present positions to LZ and joins 2/5 for sweep. 2/5 (-) OPCON 5th Marines on arrival in LZ.

b. Co E

(1) Move to LZ vicinity (BT103333) and uncover LZ. Be prepared to attack in a southwesterly direction along Route #534. Command Group will move with Company E.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) H-Hour 1400
- (2) Direction of Attack - Northwest to southeast
- (3) Insure knowledge of other units frequencies

ENCLOSURE (1)

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- a. Enough supplies for 3 days


5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS:

- a. Comm Elect

- (1) Frequencies as follows:

- (a) Regimental TAC - 66.2
    - (b) Conduct of Fire - 44.85
    - (c) TACP - 32.40
    - (d) Med-Evac and Resupply - 35.10
    - (e) 1/5 TAC - 59.30
    - (f) 3/5 TAC - 57.80

- b. Command: The Bn Command Group will move initially with Company E/2/5.

  
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-2-

ENCLOSURE (1)



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07

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MAP VIET NAM 1:50,000  
SHEET 6640 II  
2nd Bn., 5th MARINES (-)(Rein)



ENCLOSURE (1) to  
Frag Order 17-67

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2nd Battalion, 5th Marines  
An Hoa, Vietnam  
2 June 1967

Frag Order 18-67 (Operation Union II)

Ref: Map: South Vietnam 1:50,000 (Tam Ky) AMS Series 6640II

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

1. SITUATION: No Change2. MISSION: No Change3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation - On consolidation of the Landing Zone (BT103333) attack southwest astride Route #534 with two companies abreast to seize Objective 1 (BT083325). On seizure of Objective 1, continue the attack to the south to seize Objectives 2 and 3 and the northern portion of Regimental Objective F.

b. Company E (-) (Rein) 2/5

(1) Continue attack to the southwest on a frontage of 200 meters to the south of Route #534 toward Objective 1.

(2) Detach one platoon to remain as LZ security to assist the helo insert of E/2/7. Platoon will be assigned to temporary operational control of E/2/7 on that unit's arrival in LZ.

(3) On seizure of Objective 1 by Company D, 1/7 and on order, continue the attack to the south to seize that portion of Objective 3 in zone.

(4) Be prepared on order to continue the attack to the south to seize that portion of Regimental Objective F in zone.

c. Company D/1/7

(1) Continue the attack to the southwest on a frontage of 200 meters north of Route #534 to seize Objective 1.

(2) On seizure Objective 1 and on order continue the attack to the south to seize Objective 2.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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(3) Be prepared on order to continue the attack to seize that portion of Objective 3 and Regimental Objective F in zone.

d. Company E/2/7

(1) On arrival in LZ (BT103333) assume temporary OPCON of platoon E/2/5.

(2) Assume mission as Battalion Reserve. On order move to the southwest along Route #534 in trace of E/2/5.

(3) Be prepared to assume the mission of either of the two assault companies.

e. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) For movement to Objective 1, guide is from right to left.

(2) Line of Departure - Present positions.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: No Change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION: No Change



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-2-

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ENCLOSURE (2)


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MAP VIET NAM 1:50,000  
SHEET 6640 II  
2nd Bn., 5th MARINES  
022015H - 030630H



Point of contact

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
ENCLOSURE (3)

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MAP VIET NAM 1:50,000  
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2nd Bn., 5th MARINES (-)(Rein)  
030630 - 031500H

07  
+ 35



ENCLOSURE (4)


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MAP VIET NAM 1:50,000  
SHEET 6640 III  
2nd Bn., 5th MARINES (-)(Rein)  
031500H - 041400H

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ENCLOSURE (5)

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## HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/CBW/plb  
 3121  
 11 June 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines  
 To: Commanding General, First Marine Division  
 Via: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

SERIAL NO. 00223-67

Subj: Combat After Action Report

COPY # 3 of 30 COPIES

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1  
 (b) 5th Marines Frag Order 28-67  
 (c) 5th Marines Frag Order 32-67

CWT 1967 CAC FILES

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay No 1 for 26 May 1967  
 (2) Operation Overlay No 2 for 30 May 1967  
 (3) Command Group Route of March

00790-67

COPY NO. 1 OF 1

1. Code Name. Operation UNION II.
2. Dates of Operation. 260600H May 1967 to 051700H June 1967.
3. Location. Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization.
5. Task Organization

3rd Bn (-) (Rein). 5th Mar

LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER  
 Maj L. E. JOHNSON  
 Maj B. R. CUMMINS  
 LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

H&S Co (-)  
 Det, Co K, 3rd Bn, 5th Mar (Bn Security Plat)  
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (LnTm)  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co I (Rein)

Capt H. C. STACKPOLE Jr  
 2/Lt K. W. MOORE

Co I  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plat  
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plat (FAC Tm)  
 Det, Intelligence Sect (Scouts & Interpreter)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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DOD DIR 5200.10

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3121  
11 June 1967

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, Hq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co L (Rein)

Co L  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plat  
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plat (FAC Tm)  
 Det, Intelligence Sect (Scouts & Interpreter)  
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, Hq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Capt H. D. PETTENGILL  
 2/Lt A. CURTIS  
 Capt P. H. GOTTLIEB

Co M (Rein)

Capt J. R. McELROY

Co M  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plat  
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plat (FAC Tm)  
 Det, Intelligence Sect (Scouts & Interpreter)  
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, Hq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

3rd Plat (-) Co B, 1st Eng Bn

2/Lt C. D. VENUTO

2nd Plat (-) Co B, 1st SP Bn (HST)

1/Lt R. H. BAXTER  
 2/Lt R. G. WILMES

Bn Reserve

Co K(-) (Rein)

Capt J. R. TENNEY

Co K  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plat  
 Det, 81mm Plat (FO Tm)  
 Det, Intelligence Sect (Scouts)

3121  
11 June 1967

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
Det, 1st SP Bn, (HST)  
Det, 1st Engr Bn

## 6. Supporting Forces

### a. Artillery

(1) From 26 May through 5 June 1967, during Operation UNION II, the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines was provided artillery support by the Second Battalion, Eleventh Marines. In direct support of the Battalion was one 105mm Howitzer Battery, Foxtrot Battery, consisting of four howitzers. Foxtrot Battery was used as a mobile support force, making three battery displacements and one platoon displacement in support of Operation UNION II.

(2) In General Support of the Battalion was one 4 gun battery of 155mm howitzers, one 4 gun battery of 105mm howitzers, and one composite battery consisting of four 155mm howitzers and four 105mm howitzer.

(3) By effectively displacing the mobile battery at ~~erroneous~~ times, artillery support was available to the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines during all phases of the operation.

(4) Extensive artillery preparation fires were employed during the entire operation. The timeliness of these fires proved to be most effective in supporting the Battalion's scheme of maneuver.

(5) Harrassing and interdicting fires were planned and fired each night during the course of Operation UNION II. Placing these fires close to our position together with timely firing deprived the enemy of the knowledge of our exact position as a pattern of fire was not established.

(6) Live fire missions were provided by the artillery forward observers during critical phases of the operation. Timely and effective fire was delivered on each occasion. In one situation, artillery covering fire enabled "M" Company to successfully withdraw from an open area in which they were receiving fire. After the Company had made it's withdrawal a heavy volume of artillery fire was adjusted on the enemy position. A sweep of the area followed the artillery fires and revealed that the enemy had fled the area after taking heavy casualties. Villagers in the area attested to the fact that many enemy troops had been wounded. A captured prisoner also told of the devastating effect of the artillery fire. He said he was separated from his unit as the enemy ran in all directions to escape the incoming artillery.

3121  
11 June 1967

(7). It is the personal opinion of the FSC that the enemy used the noise of our incoming artillery to cover the firing of their mortars. There were several instances when immediately after an artillery mission was fired friendly units received incoming mortars. When the battlefield was relatively quiet the enemy mortars could be heard firing thus giving friendly troops a chance to take cover.

b. Air Support

(1) Operation UNION II took place inclusively from 26 May to 5 June. There were no periods during the operation where weather was a deterrent to the utilization of close air support.

(2) A total of 21 fixed wing strikes were run in support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 15 of which occurred the first and second days of the operation. In addition to fixed wing, Marine and Army armed helicopters and Air Force armed C-47 aircraft lended support. On several occasions during critical periods excessive delays occurred in obtaining air support which decreased the overall effectiveness of the air strike.

(3) All fixed wing air strikes were controlled by a Tactical Air Controller (Airborne). There were no occasions when air strikes could have been controlled as effectively from the ground as they were from the air.

(4) The AN/PRC-25 is a sturdy and reliable radio and served as the primary means of communication. The AN/PRC-41 units in the field were beset by minor mechanical problems which caused the reliability of this radio unit to be questionable.

(5) One of the major problems during the operation was the heavy volume of traffic on the 5th Marines air frequency (TACP local). With three Battalions in the same area and all wanting maximum air support one frequency cannot handle the traffic.

(6) With the exception of one USMC WIA by an Air Force armed C-47, all ~~ordnance~~ was accurately put on target with excellent coverage. On 2 June strikes were called within 75 meters of friendly lines with excellent results.

7. Intelligence

a. The enemy forces that were expected to be encountered on Operation UNION II were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 3rd NVA Regiment located in the BT 0736 area and the 2nd Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment in the BT 1131 area. Elements of the 21st NVA Regiment located in the BT 1030 area and elements of the GK-30 Communications Battalion which supports the 2nd NVA Division, were also expected to be encountered.

3121  
11 June 1967

b. Contact was made on the first day of the operation when encountered by elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment; heavy fire was received immediately upon landing at the helicopter landing zone at BT 0729. The enemy appeared to be deployed in an L shaped battle position around our landing zone. The enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, and 82mm mortars. Approximately twenty 82mm mortar rounds were dropped on the Battalion Command Post. Under the cover of darkness the enemy withdrew. A sweep of the area revealed several enemy graves which were dug straight down six feet with an opening of approximately 12 x 12 inches. Thus, the individual was shoved feet first into the hole with about 3 to 6 inches of dirt on top of his head. Extensive camouflage and well-dug entrenchments were used by the enemy. During the next two days, only sporadic sniper fire was received.

c. On Phase II (301030H-051700H) the battalion was lifted into the BT 1020 area and proceeded on the operation for the next two days receiving only sporadic sniper fire. On 2 June the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines encountered elements of the 2nd NVA Division. Heavy fire was received throughout the afternoon and into the early hours of the next morning. Again, under the cover of darkness the enemy withdrew. On 3 June the Battalion moved in and occupied the area from which the enemy had been dug-in the day before. A sweep of the area revealed the enemy's 75 recoilless rifle position from which they fired six rounds the previous day. This was the first time this Battalion had encountered a 75mm recoilless rifle. Also, indications of three 82mm mortar positions were evident. Enemy gear that was recovered revealed that the enemy probably had fresh troops that had been brought into the area recently. Again, indications pointed toward the enemy's use of extensive camouflage and well dug-in emplacements. During both phases of the operation the enemy was heard on the Battalion tactical control net. The enemy was heard using the words "Don't shoot, Marines", when the Marines were closing with the enemy. Numerous documents and a crude map were captured. The map showed the deployment of their troops and the possible avenues of approach. Fifteen Viet Cong suspects were captured, among them was one NVA corpsman who stated he was from the 108th NVA Battalion. The NVA units were armed with assorted Chicom small arms, machine guns, automatic rifles, 60mm mortars, and 82mm mortars, and a 75mm recoilless rifle.

d. The area in which the Battalion operated in the first phase in the vicinity of BT 0729 and going west, was mostly rice paddies, hedgerows and tree lines which concealed entrenchments that afforded protection from air strikes and artillery fire. The second phase started when the Battalion was heli-lifted into a valley at BT 1122 which was surrounded by mountainous terrain. The mountains were covered with either high and thick elephant grass, or dense forests with thick undergrowth. After passing over the mountains, the Battalion moved again through rice paddy and hedgerow terrain.

3121  
11 June 1967

e. The reactions of the civilians to civic action and psychological warfare efforts were satisfactory. Civic action efforts varied from individual corpsmen helping with medical aid to the handing out of soap, candy, etc. to the villagers as the Marines passed through. Through these efforts there were incidents of the people volunteering information of local VC forces in the area. Psychological warfare was effected by the evacuation of ~~some~~ civilians from VC areas.

8. Mission. During the conduct of Operation UNION II, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission of conducting coordinated search and destroy operations within the assigned areas of operation to capture or destroy enemy forces and supplies located therein.

9. Concept of Operations.

a. In conjunction with ARVN Forces and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, conducted search and destroy operations. Priority of fires were initially to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. (See Operation Overlay, Part I).

b. At L-hour (261000H), D-day (26May) land in LZ Eagle (BT 073296) and secure the LZ. On order, continue the attack to secure Objective No 22 (BT 100310).

c. At approximately L+3 (301030H), land in LZ Robin (BT 100210) in trace of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. On order, be prepared to follow in trace of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Be prepared to continue the attack to secure Objective B (BT 161248). Be prepared to revert to Regimental Reserve.

d. As Regimental Reserve, on order land in LZ Cardinal (BT 129277) and secure the LZ. Continue the attack and establish blocking position vicinity Objective C (BT 138275-BT 137288).

10. Execution

a. 24 May 1967

(1) At 241600H the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the initial plans and operation overlay for Operation UNION II.

b. 25 May 1967

(1) At 252000H the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received Frag Order 28-67, enemy situation overlay and operation overlay for Operation UNION II.

3121  
11 June 1967c. 26 May 1967

(1) At 260945H Company L was heli-lifted from the Tam Ky LZ (BT 291233) to LZ Eagle (BT 073296). Upon landing Company L came under moderately heavy sniper fire from the north which wounded one officer and five enlisted Marines.

(2) At 261015H the Command Group left the Tam Ky LZ for LZ Eagle. Heavy sniper fire was received when the Command Group landed. No friendly casualties were taken.

(3) At 261100H Company M landed in LZ Eagle.

(4) At 261130H Company L (BT 072300) assaulted a tree line to the north in an attempt to reach Objective No. 2 (BT 083306). The entrenched enemy (BT 070304) countered with intense small arms fire, numerous rifle grenades and mortars. Two 81mm mortar missions, an artillery mission and two air strikes were called in with good coverage of the target area. Results were 8 USMC KIA, 13 USMC WIA including the Commanding Officer of Company L, 5 VC KIA (confirmed), 14 VC KIA (probable) and 2 VCS captured.

(5) At 261135H a CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter was shot down in LZ Eagle (BT 073296).

(6) At 261200H Company I landed in LZ Eagle, completing the heli-lift.

(7) At 261330H it was learned through the interrogation of the local populous that there is a reinforced company of approximately 200 men in the vicinity of BT 080300.

(8) At 261400H Company M (BT 073301) swept a village in support of Company L when they encountered the enemy (BT 078305) with automatic weapons, rifle grenades and mortars. A platoon from Company I was sent to reinforce Company M. Two 81mm mortar missions and two very effective air strikes were called in. Results were 9 USMC KIA, 20 USMC WIA, 5 VC KIA (confirmed) and 12 VC KIA (probable).

(9) At 261500H Company L (BT 072300) spotted an estimated 15 VC run into a treeline where a heavy volume of fire had just been received. Fired 20 rds of 81mm mortars and called in one air strike with excellent coverage of target. Results were 7 USMC WIA and 11 VC KIA (probable).

(10) At 261600H Company I (BT 071300) platoon which was sent to reinforce Company M returned and Company I attacked south and east to come up on the southern flank of the enemy relieving the pressure on Company L so that they could retrieve their casualties

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from the open rice paddies. Company L encountered and suppressed the enemy at BT 082301.

(11) At 261700H Company L began pulling back to the Battalion Command Group's position leaving one platoon to provide security for the casualties until darkness fell when the casualties could be brought back to the LZ under cover of darkness.

(12) At 261730H the Command Group (BT 071300) and the downed helicopter received 10 rds incoming 82mm mortars from an unknown enemy position. Results were 2 USMC WIA including the Battalion Operations Officer.

(13) At 261800H the downed helicopter was repaired and flown out.

(14) At 261830H the Command Group again received approximately 10 rds incoming 82mm mortars resulting in the death of the Battalion Communications Officer and the wounding of the Battalion Commanding Officer.

(15) At 262000H LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER was med-evac'd and Maj L. E. JOHNSON was flown in to assume command.

(16) At nightfall the units were located as follows:

- (a) Command Group - BT 073298
- (b) Company I - BT 071298
- (c) Company L - BT 073298
- (d) Company M - BT 070305

(17) The following is a Narrative Summary of Combat Action for 26 May 1967.

- (a) 0945 - Company L landed in LZ Eagle and received moderate sniper fire.
- (b) 1030 - Command Group landed in LZ Eagle and the sniper fire increased.
- (c) 1115 - Company M landed in LZ Eagle. Company L left to attack and seize Objective No. 2 (BT 083301) when they ran into heavy enemy fire from BT 073303.
- (d) 1230 - Company M was sent to BT 070304 to reinforce Company L.
- (e) 1630 - Company I was sent south and east to come up on the southern flank of the enemy when they encountered heavy enemy fire from BT 082301. Company I overwhelmed the enemy and set up a night perimeter.
- (f) 1700 - Company M received incoming mortars, evacuated their casualties and set up a night perimeter.

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(g) 1700 - Company L pulled back to the Command Group's position leaving a platoon to provide security for the remaining casualties until they can be extracted after dark.

(h) 1830 - Command Group received incoming mortars wounding the Commanding Officer.

(i) The results for the day were 38 USMC KIA, 42 USMC WIA, 118 VC KIA (confirmed), 153 VC KIA (probable), 2 VCS captured, and 1 Chicom AK-47 rifle captured.

(18) Between 262030H-262359H Company M received Vietnamese transmissions over their company tactical net. The interpreter listened and recorded the following information: unit call signs were T-6, T-4, Txai Nguyen 33, zo Cong II, Nguyen Hai, Ming An, Tang An, Tang Nguyen, 113 and 12; messages were:

(a) 113 attack 5/3, 12 and over 5/3.

(b) T-6 or T-4 over, one unit reported it didn't have enough men to carry wounded.

(c) One officer was wounded.

(d) Two platoons pull back to reorganize.

(e) Nguyen Hai to T-6, too many dead bodies in the field. Not enough men to pick up bodies, over, (Return), must pick up bodies.

(f) Ming An To Nguyen Hai. Make sure you pick up bodies.

(g) Tang An called Ming An and told him that if he didn't kill a Commanding Officer Ming An would be punished.

(h) Someone told Ming An to go out and get weapons so they (the weapons) may be used for an attack tonight.

(i) Note - all other call signs were used for radio checks. Also, between the hours of 2030 and 2230 they made frequent radio checks; that may have indicated unit movement.

d. 27 May 1967

(1) At 270500H Command Group moved the casualties and two platoons of Company L from the CP LZ (BT 073298) to a more secure LZ at BT 075297.

(2) At 270700H Major B. R. CUMMINS arrived to assume command.

(3) At 270800H the ALO spotted VC at the base of a hill at BT 065283 and called in 2 air strikes resulting in 15 VC KIA (confirmed) and 25 VC KIA (probable).

(4) At 270845H an OE Aircraft in support of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines spotted numerous VC in a treeline (BT 078310).

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Five air strikes were called in resulting in 23 VC KIA (probable).

(5) At 271030H the Command Group moved from its present location (BT 073298) to join Company L at BT 075297 after all the excess and damaged equipment was evac'ed.

(6) At 271040H Command Group and Company L (BT 075297) moved out to secure Objective Y (BT 075303). Company I (BT 071298) moved out to secure Objective X (BT 083307).

(7) At 271200H Company I (BT 301089) swept village from which fire was received last night. Killed one VC male who ran when Marines approached. Local people stated that 40-50 VG had been in the village yesterday and that they had gone north last night. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed), 1 VC pack and 2 chicom grenades.

(8) At 271245H Company I and Company M reached Objectives X (BT 083307) and Z (BT 069306) respectively and were searching and clearing them thoroughly.

(9) At 271445H Company L (BT 072308) captured a VCS male and sent him out on a med-evac helicopter.

(10) At 271515H Company M (BT 072306) swept through area of yesterday's encounter finding four USMC bodies. Two had previously been reported as KIAs and the other two had been reported as WIAs. Also, twelve M-16s were found. All bodies and gear were evac'ed.

(11) At 271525H Company M linked up with Company L and the Command Group at BT 081308. Company M was moved through this position to secure the area at BT 075315.

(12) At 271730H LtCol C. B. WEBSTER arrived and assumed command.

(13) At 271800H Company L (BT 073309) searched area and found documents, canteen cover and a U. S. Cal 45 pistol serial No 13581. All were heli-lifted out.

(14) At 271830H Company L (BT 075301) found three bodies in shallow graves which appeared to be one or two days old. Results were 3 VC KIA (confirmed).

(15) At 272055H all units moved into and set up for the night in the following positions.

- (a) Command Group and Company M - BT 082325
- (b) Company I - BT 081321 to BT 083323
- (c) Company L - BT 083323 to BT 086325

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(1) At 280600H all units attacked along axis of advance to seize Objective No. 44 (BT 102347) with Company L guiding on the river, Company I guiding on the road and Company M in the rear as battalion reserve with command group.

(2) At 281200H all units had consolidated Objective No. 44 in the following positions to set up blocking positions for 1st Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (a) Command Group - BT 107347
- (b) Company I - BT 106346
- (c) Company L - BT 103344
- (d) Company M - BT 104346

(3) At 281215H Company I (BT 102344) searched their portion of Objective No. 44 finding one Chi-Com grenade and an NVA pack. Both items were destroyed in place.

(4) At 281700H a VN girl was med-evac'd with shrapnel wounds.

(5) At nightfall all units are located as in (2) above.

f. 29 May 1967

(1) At 290600H all units moved out in the attack to conduct search and destroy operations toward Objective No. 55 (BT 083355) and then on to Que Son. The units moved out in a battalion column with Company L Leading followed by Company I, the Command Group and Company M protecting the Battalion rear. All units were using strong flankers.

(2) At 290700H the first element of Company L crossed the river.

(3) At 290830H the last element of Company M crossed the river.

(4) At 291100H the Battalion arrived at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines position near Que Son.

(5) At 291200H all units were set in their night positions as follows:

- (a) Command Group - BT 023346
- (b) Company I - BT 022346
- (c) Company L - BT 024348
- (d) Company M - BT 025345

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g. 30 May 1967

(1) At 300945H the first element lifted off from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' LZ (BT 13218) to the alternate LZ Bluejay (BT 113218) in trace of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(2) At 301115H the last element landed in LZ Bluejay. No enemy contact.

(3) At 301125H Company L moved out to seize Objective No 3 (BT 118217).

(4) At 301300 all units moved out to seize the following Objectives:

- (a) Company L - Objective No 5 (BT 129226)
- (b) Company M - Objective No 6 (BT 129230)
- (c) Company I - Objective No 7 (BT 125230)

Very light sniper fire was encountered enroute to these Objectives.

(5) At 301400H Company L's S-2 scout learned from the local people that 30-50 VC carrying small arms and one mortar tube moved from the area of LZ Bluejay to vicinity BT 135289 on 29 May 1967.

(6) At 301530H Company M spotted 15 VC and called in 9 rds of artillery on them. The area was searched out with negative results.

(7) At 301730H all units have reached their assigned objectives and are again on the move to seize the following Objectives:

- (a) Company M - Objective No 8 (BT 141238)
- (b) Company L - Objective No 9 (BT 138239)
- (c) Company I - Objective No 10 (BT 137237)

(8) At 301800H Company L (BT 127230 to BT 132230) received 150 rds of small arms fire from BT 128232 and BT 131231. Company L returned a heavy volume of small arms fire and 5 rds M-79 and continued to move.

(9) At 301910H Company M (BT 137237) received 5 rds sniper fire as they moved up a narrow trail. A heavy volume of small arms fire was returned which suppressed the enemy's fire. Company M then started back up the trail and received 45 rds of automatic fire. This was also suppressed by a heavy volume of small arms fire in return. Company M then returned to consolidate with the rest of the Battalion for the night.

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(10) At 301930H all units arrived at their night positions as follows:

- (a) Command Group and Company L - BT 135232
- (b) Company I - BT 135231
- (c) Company M - BT 134233

h. 31 May 1967

(1) At 310500H Company I moved out to seize Objective D (BT 140233).

(2) At 310610H Company M moved out to join Company I on Objective D.

(3) At 310745H Command Group and Company L moved out for Objective D in trace of Company M.

(4) At 311100H Objective D was secured and all units moved out in column through the thick vegetation for the resupply point (BT 153230).

(5) At 311300H all units arrived at resupply position and are patrolling immediate area.

(6) At 311400H the resupply helicopter received 8 sniper rds and Company I returned 50 rds small arms fire and called in an 81mm mortar mission and an artillery mission with good target coverage. Results were undetermined.

(7) At 311600H Colonel HOUGHTON made a short visit. Orders were to remain for the night.

(8) At nightfall units were located as follows:

- (a) Command Group - BT 152230
- (b) Company I - BT 155229
- (c) Company L - BT 153230
- (d) Company M - BT 148232

All units were employing LPs and ambushes in their respective areas.

i. 1 June 1967

(1) 010800H all units left last night's position in a battalion column with flankers on either side to follow in trace of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines as the Regimental Reserve to Objective E (BT 165290).

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The order of march was Company I, Command Group, Company L and Company M.

(2) At 01100H the 81mm mortar platoon corpsman was wounded by a sniper while crossing an open rice paddy at BT 162245.

(3) At 011245H Company M (BT 165242) received 8 rds sniper fire from BT 162245 wounding 1 Marine. Returned 25 rds small arms fire and continued to move.

(4) At 011700H all units arrived at BT 168238 just south of Objective E (BT 165290) to await further orders.

(5) At 011730H the Commanding Officer received orders to attack and seize Objective I (BT 135283). All units moved out in the attack.

(6) At 011900H Company I received 60-70 rds of automatic fire from 7 VC at ET 135284. 300 rds small arms fire were returned, two VC fell and were dragged off. An artillery mission was called in on the enemy area with excellent target coverage. Results were 5 VC KIA (probable).

(7) At 012100H all units arrived at Objective I (BT 135283) and set in at the following locations:

- (a) Command Group - BT 136287
- (b) Company I - BT 136287
- (c) Company L - BT 137286
- (d) Company M - BT 137287

j. 2 June 1967

(1) At 020700H all units moved out in the attack to seize the southern portion of Objective F at BT 096304. Enroute to Objective F Company I would seize Battalion Objective No 1 (BT 125298) and Objective No 3 (BT 122304) and Company M would seize Battalion Objective No 2 (BT 130300) and No 4 (BT 112303). The formation was two up and one back, with Company M on the right, Company I on the left and Company L in the rear. The CP group was in the middle.

(2) At 020830H Company M secured Battalion Objective No 2 finding the village devastated by previous bombings. There was not a building standing.

(3) At 020845H Company M (BT 130302) flushed 3 VC carrying weapons. One VC was wearing a khaki uniform. The VC were taken under fire with small arms and M-79s. One VC fell and was dragged into the bushes. Results were 1 VC KIA (probable).

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(4) At 020930H Company I (BT 120302) prepared the enemy positions (BT 120304) with 20 minutes of artillery and one air strike. After the prep Company I assaulted the enemy position. The enemy, estimated at 100 men, returned a heavy volume of small arms fire from the north and west holding up Company I short of their objective. Company M then swept toward the enemy position from the east and Company I moved up to join Company M. Results were 2 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIA, including the Commanding Officer of Company I, 22 VC KIA (confirmed) and 45 KIA (probable).

(5) At 021250H a med-evac helicopter landed to pick up Company I's casualties and received a direct hit from a 75mm Recoiless Rifle round resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIA.

(6) At 021330H the Chieu Hoi stated that the enemy will draw back into the village complex located in the vicinity of BT 107317.

(7) At 021700H Company I and Company M started toward Objective F again but were stopped short by enemy mortars and heavy small arms fire. Called in one air strike and numerous artillery missions. Results were 2 USMC KIA, 8 USMC WIA, 31 VC KIA (confirmed) and 41 VC KIA (probable).

(8) At 021730H ten refugees were heli-lifted out.

(9) At 021900H Company M received 3 rds of incoming 75mm recoiless rifle fire which inflicted no damage. An air strike was called in with excellent target coverage. Pilot believes he scored a direct hit on the 75mm recoiless rifle. Results were 5 VC KIA (probable) and 1 75mm recoiless rifle possibly destroyed.

(10) At 021930H Company M started attacking toward Objective F when they encountered the enemy dug in along a 600 meter front running east and west from BT 112303. The enemy had at least six automatic weapons and at least one 82mm mortar. Called in 3 artillery missions but the artillery did not silence the automatic weapons. Company M drew back to allow more artillery to prep the enemy position. Results were 6 USMC KIA, 8 USMC WIA, 22 VC KIA (confirmed) and 25 VC KIA (probable), lost one M-60 MG and captured one chicom LMG.

(11) At 022300H the units were in the following locations:

- (a) Command Group and Company L - BT 120302
- (b) Company I and Company M - BT 114304

(12) The following are total casualties for the day of 2 June 1967.

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- (a) USMC KIA - 12
- (b) USMC WIA - 40
- (c) VC KIA (confirmed) - 75
- (d) VC KIA (probable) - 117

k. 3 June 1967

(1) At 030230H the Command Group and Company L received 20 rds of enemy 82mm mortars resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIA.

(2) At 030400H Company M and Company I moved out to attack and seize Objective No 4 (BT 112303), the enemy position.

(3) At 030530H the Command Group moved out to join Company M and Company I at Objective No 4.

(4) At 030730H all units had consolidated on Objective No 4. The area was then thoroughly searched out.

(5) At 031300H Company L found two shallow graves within their perimeter containing the bodies of 2 NVA troops. Results were 2 VC KIA (confirmed).

(6) At 031305H Company K found one wounded NVA in a tunnel. Every effort was made to extract him, but he was armed with grenades and refused to come out. He was subsequently killed. Captured a cartridge belt, 3 chicom grenades, and five AK-47 magazines. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed).

(7) At 031720H Company M found freshly used battle dressings covered with blood at BT 09299. All hamlets within a 500 meter radius of BT 105295 were deserted and had been for some time. The hamlet immediately south of BT 105295 has been completely destroyed by air and artillery.

(8) At 031750H Company I (BT 114304 to BT 107304) found many caves on and near the river banks. All were checked out with negative results. Also, many heavy blood spots were found in the area where the artillery hit the heaviest yesterday (BT 111302). One NVA was spotted wearing a helmet and carrying a weapon (BT 112305). He successfully ran and hid before the Marines could take him under fire.

(9) At 032215H Company L's LP attempted to enter the perimeter (BT 111304) without using the proper procedure and one Marine was wounded by the perimeter watch.

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(10) At nightfall the units were located as follows:

- (a) Command Group - BT 111304
- (b) Company I - BT 112302
- (c) Company L - BT 113303
- (d) Company M - BT 110303

i. 4 June 1967

(1) At 040700H all companies left with two platoons each to conduct search and destroy operations in the following areas:

- (a) Company L - Area #1, vicinity of BT 102302
- (b) Company I - Area #2, vicinity of BT 096294
- (c) Company M - Area #3, vicinity of BT 088294

(2) At 040730H Company M (BT 110302) found a body buried wearing green utilities and NVA cartridge belt. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed).

(3) At 041230H Company K (BT 090293) caught two VC in a hole after they ran when the Marines approached. Results were 2 VC captured.

(4) At 041300H Company I (BT 112302) searched a village complex near their position and captured 10 VCS. All were forwarded to ITT.

(5) At 041705H a Company M patrol escorted a VC detainee who had been sent out to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines from the 5th Marines with the information that he knew where a VC leader lived and the location of a VC hospital at BT 112310. The patrol did not find the VC leader and the hospital turned out to be a very small hut that was capable of housing only a very few people. The only evidence of VC presence were several large blood spots just outside the hamlet where the alleged hospital was.

(6) At 041800H all units left for Objective J (BT 076326)

(7) At 041930H all units arrived at Objective J.

(8) At nightfall the units were located as follows:

- (a) Command Group and Company L - BT 074323
- (b) Company I - BT 076324
- (c) Company M - BT 074324

j. 5 June 1967

(1) At 050600H all units left to attack and secure Objective G (BT 045345).

(2) At 051000H all units arrived at Objective G.

(3) At 051300H the first elements were heli-lifted to the LSA at Tam Ky.

(4) At 051700H Operation UNION II was secured.

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11. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (a) VC KIA (confirmed) - 227
- (b) VC KIA (probable) - 379
- (c) VCC - 1
- (d) VCS - 14
- (e) Refugees taken out of VC controlled areas - 22.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (a) AK-47 rifles - 2
- (b) Chicom LMG - 1
- (c) NVA packs with gear (destroyed and evac'ed) - 12
- (d) Chicom grenades destroyed - 8
- (e) Documents (destroyed and evac'ed) - 25 lbs
- (f) Medical Supplies (destroyed and evac'ed) - 15 lbs
- (g) Rice destroyed - 2700 lbs

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were as follows:

- (a) Killed in Action - 50

- 1. Gunshot - 38

(2) The following is a compilation of VC personnel disabilities inflicted by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (b) Died of wounds - 1

- 1. Gunshot - 1

- (c) Wounded in Action - 130

- 1. Gunshot - 69

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (a) AK-47 rifles - 2
- (b) Chicom LMG - 1
- (c) NVA packs with gear (destroyed and evacuated) - 12
- (d) Chicom grenades destroyed - 8
- (e) Documents (destroyed and evacuated) - 25 lbs
- (f) Medical Supplies (destroyed and evacuated) - 15 lbs
- (g) Rice destroyed - 2700 lbs

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(2) The following is a list of weapons and equipment lost or destroyed by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines:

- (a) 1 M-60 MG lost
- (b) 1 M-79 destroyed and evacuated

12. Administration

a. Resupply

(1) Resupply was accomplished from the Logistical Support Area (LSA) at Tam Ky.

(2) Normal resupply of all classes of supply was accomplished every other day. Emergency resupply was accomplished when requested.

(3) Availability of helicopters was a controlling factor but overall support was excellent.

(4) The HST net was used as a logistical, administrative, and helicopter control net. The use of HST has improved considerably over the last operation. HST controlled the supporting helicopters very effectively and with a minimum of confusion with one exception. When the helicopters came into the zone a large group of people would rush out to help unload the supplies. This situation presents a lucrative target for the enemy. Commanders quickly corrected this when they were informed of the situation.

b. Maintenance

(1) Maintenance of equipment was accomplished through the LSA. Replacement of defective equipment took place in the field. No problems were encountered with maintenance.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization

(1) Evacuation of personnel was accomplished smoothly and usually in a minimum of time. Again, availability of helicopters was a big factor.

(2) Commanders must allow their trained corpsmen to ascertain the casualties' condition and determine what priority of med-evac they need. There were instances where an emergency med-evac was called for casualties that needed only a priority med-evac. Also the location and nature of the wound must be sent into the HST when requesting a med-evac helicopter as this also determines the priority of the med-evac. This is especially important to emergency med-evac's.

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(3) Wounded were removed expeditiously from the battlefield and excellent care was received throughout the evacuation chain.

d. Transportation

(1) Replacements and special supplies were transported by truck to the LSA. All resupply and replacements were delivered to the field by helicopter from the LSA.

(2) HST handled all the transportation into and out of the LZ in the field. Normally, everything worked very smoothly. On occasion some people would appear in the LZ as a helicopter was landing desiring to be heli-lifted out without informing the HST prior to this time. At times these individuals would not be heli-lifted due to previously planned loads. After a few incidents this was corrected.

e. Communications

(1) The AN/PRC-25 FM radio provided the primary means of communications during Operation UNION II. Some difficulty was noted in communicating from areas masked from the Regimental CP by foothills, but the problem was generally solved by erecting a high RC-292 antenna or establishing an airborne relay station for short periods.

(2) No interference between frequencies was noted, however on several occasions the enemy forces were encountered on our frequencies. It should be pointed out that the enemy is capable of initiative deception and general harassment on our circuits.

(3) Wounded were removed expeditiously from the battlefield and excellent (3) The Battalion operated a front line mobile command post during Operation UNION II. Two RC-292s were carried and used when necessary. The CP communications group was large in order to carry the extra RC-292s and radios. This also provided a readily available pool of replacements when casualties among radio operators occurred, were transported by truck to the LSA. All resupply and replacements were delivered to the field by helicopter. Some difficulty was encountered with the accessories for the AN/PNC-25. The whip and tape antennas and their bases and handsets were in short supply. The AN/PNC-10 accessories were adequate substitutes when used with the proper adapters. It is suggested that supplies of these adapters be made up and made available so that the substitute equipment may be used, but without informing the HST prior to this time. At times these individuals would not be heli-lifted due to previously planned loads. After T. Medical Evaluation was corrected.

e. (1) Killed in Action - 50  
(2) Wounded in Action - 130

(3) Non-combat injuries include the primary means of communications during Operation UNION II 191 Total (evac) was noted in communicating from areas masked from the Regimental CP by foothills, but the problem (4) Wounded in Action by a 35 Total (non-evac) 2 individuals best utilizing an airborne relay station for short periods.

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(5)	Died of wounds	-1
(6)	Non-combat deaths	-0
(7)	Combat injuries-non wound	-0
(8)	Non-combat injuries (Total)	-11
	(a) Heat exhaustion	-9
	(b) Possible Malaria	-1
	(c) Battle shock	-1

### 13. Special Equipment and Techniques

None

#### 14. Commander's Analysis

Operation Union II was designed to find, fix and destroy elements of the 2nd NVA Regiment located somewhere west of Thang Binh close to grid square BT 0930. This was a mission accomplished more quickly than anticipated. Contact with NVA units was made immediately upon landing on D-day; heavy losses were inflicted upon the enemy on D-day and subsequently on 2 June. The maneuver of Battalion elements was made smoothly, and supporting arms were normally quick to assist when needed. On operations of this type where "search and destroy" takes on major importance it is often expedient to move very slowly; this gives small units the time required to thoroughly seek out the enemy in caves and tunnels. While slow movement is not always feasible in a pursuit or emergency support movement there are many instances where a more prolonged stay in certain hamlets could most certainly have uncovered more enemy prisoners as well as weapons and equipment. The NVA units are well disciplined and equipped but morale appears to be at a low level and their logistic support is very limited. Their greatest combat advantage is in their superbly prepared fortified hamlet positions from which they fight tenaciously but must break contact after 4 or 5 hours of sustained combat because of their limited support. This advantage can be materially reduced by judicious use of preparatory fires and/or reconnaissance by fire. A definite tactical pattern seems to be developing from recent operations against the well dug-in NVA units.

(1) Contact is generally initiated by the enemy who is in a stationary concealed position from which he can observe approaching friendly forces.

(2) Heavy fire is exchanged by U.S. and NVA units.

elements of the Task Force and included a company from the 1st Bn, 2d Inf. (3) U.S. forces hold positions from 200 to 500 meters from enemy lines and call in concentrated air and artillery missions while continuing small arms fire.

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(4) U.S. forces maneuver to assault and overrun enemy positions and enemy withdraws in an orderly manner when possible delaying U.S. forces with accurate sniper teams and some mortar fire.

(5) Battered enemy remnants escape under cover of darkness unless large U.S. forces are present to cut off escape routes.

Generally speaking, the NVA forces fight very well but are taking very heavy losses from recent encounters with Marine units—specifically 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

#### 15. Recommendations

(1) That company corpsmen always be allowed to make the final assessment as to the priority of a med-evac.

(2) Due to the fact that the enemy uses the noise of our artillery to cover the sound of his mortar firing it is recommended that Marines stay under cover as much as possible during an artillery mission and shortly thereafter as a precaution.

(3) That radio discipline over air control nets be stressed and re-stressed to alleviate the volume of extraneous conversation during critical combat periods.

  
C. B. WEBSTER

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