

5TH MAR S&C FILES

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FMFPacO 5750.2
 1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force
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 5750
 15 Sept 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 August to 31 August 1967.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.8
 (c) DiVO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓ 1 Fifth Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ 2 Headquarters Company, 5th Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ 3 First Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ 4 Second Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ 5 Third Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
 ✓ 6 Combat After Action Report Operation JOCHISE
 ✓ 7 Opn ORDER-2-67

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b), and (c), enclosures (1) through (6), are submitted.

[Signature]
 S. DAVIS

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 HEADQUARTERS
 1ST MARINE DIVISION
 3812
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 August 1967 TO 31 August 1967

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(1) ENCLOSURE

THREE

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

5th Marines Regiment (-) (Rein) Colonel S. DAVIS

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Co., 5th Marines	Capt R. J. SALVATI
1st Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol P. L. HILGARTNER
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol G. C. McNAUGHTON
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol G. R. WEBSTER

(1) ENCLOSURE

ATTACHED UNITS

THREE

(NONE)

2. LOCATION

QUANG NAM Province, RVN 1 - 31 August 1967

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	LtCol J. S. HECKER
S-1	2ndLt J. W. HORTON (2-7 August)
	Capt B. J. MULHERIN (8-31 August)
S-2	Warrant Officer J.W. WALSH (1-8 August)
	Major M. A. SAYE (9-31 August)
S-3	Major R. J. ALGER
S-4	Major C. E. CAUDILL
S-5	Capt W. F. BELL
ComdO	Capt R. W. SLOAN
INFO	1stLt R. E. BLACK
Supply O	Capt S. THOMPSON
Regimental Chaplain	MCdr W. D. BRUNER CHC USN (1-7 August)

(1) ENCLOSURE

THREE

ENCLOSURE (1)

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15 Sept 1967Regimental Surgeon
Regimental Dental Officer

LCDR E. TAKESIAN CHC USN
 (8-31 August)
 Lt T. E. BRUNNEL MC USNR
 Lt W. D. OVERFIELD DC USNR
 (1-5 August)
 Lt S. J. WILSON DC USNR
 (6-31 August)

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC	
Off	Enl
134	3434

USN	
Off	Enl
11	163

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

2nd Battalion, Fifth Marines continues under the operational control of First Marine Division. From 1 to 3 August 3rd Battalion participated in Operation PIKE, under operational control of the First Marines. The period 3-9 August was devoted to planning and preparation for Operation COCHISE. On 9 August units commenced prepositioning for Operation COCHISE, which was conducted from 11 August to 28 August. Upon completion of the operation, Fifth Marines commenced retraction from the field and displacement of units to Seventh Marines TACR for participation in Operation YAZOO.

Logistic support for all units continued to be provided by the Logistic Support Area at the Regimental Combat Base while restocking of the LSA was accomplished by motor convoy from Da Nang on a near daily basis. Engineer effort was focused on preparation of roads, living areas, a helicopter landing pad at the LSA, and re-vetting the storage points at the LSA in anticipation of the monsoon season. Helicopter continued to be the only mode of transportation between the Regimental Combat Base and 1st Battalion Combat Base at Que Son.

Personnel services were vastly improved with installation of a mobile Post Exchange and a Disbursing Office at the Regimental Combat Base. These facilities with the Post Office, are capable of supporting 1st Battalion at Que Son.

Defensive positions continued to be improved at both combat bases. Protective wire around both positions was expanded, and Combat Operations Center bunkers were constructed at each location.

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With the completion of the bridges north of Tam Ky and subsequent assumption of security responsibilities by RF/PF units, 3rd Battalion was consolidated and Battery W, 2nd Battalion, ~~Marine~~ ~~Marines~~ displaced to the Regimental Combat Base. Security continued to be provided to Company A, 9th Engineer Battalion, for the road effort on National Route #1 north to the Song Ba Ren in support of convoys from the north.

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel and Administration. During the month of August 1967 the Regiment experienced a turnover of approximately 316 personnel of which 189 rotated to CONUS. 97 were evacuated. The average chargeable strength was 127 Marine officers and 3073 Marine enlisted.

Casualties for the month of August are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>NBC</u>	<u>NBD</u>
HqCo	0	0	0	0	0	0
1/5	7	0	13	55	87	2
2/5	16	0	27	15	38	2
3/5	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	28	2	52	104	177	4

2. Intelligence.a. Enemy.

(1) There has been no marked increase in mine and booby trap incidents that can be coupled to the move of Fifth Marines to Hill 63 (BT 133454). In this connection, only one incident of AT mining has been reported. On 4 Aug 67 in connection with a Tank/Infantry patrol moving abreast of route 535 between Hill 63 and the Combat Base at Que Son (BT 035345), a 50-100 pound mine was located at a Ford Site that had been used on several previous occasions (BT 110422). Mine was found by Infantry/Engineers Team and blown in place.

(2) Suspected use of 75mm RR. On 290315H, Fifth Marines perimeter (BT 133445) received 3 rounds of unidentified, incoming fire. Crater analysis team tentatively identified rounds as 75mm

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RR fire from BT 124428. Fragments recovered the next day revealed rotating bands with lands and grooves. Craters verified as being made by flat trajectory weapon. Fragments were forwarded under separate cover, requesting technical analysis and identification. This is the first reported instance of 75mm RR fire directed against Fifth Marine units in this area. First Marines, vicinity BT 1853, reported receiving 75mm RR fire during Operation PIKE (4-7 Aug 67). Only known units known to be armed with 75mm RR are GK 32 Bn (12X75mm RR) (AKA: RQ 22 Bn), 2nd NVA Division, and 21st NVA Regiment (unkX75mm RR), 2nd NVA Division.

(3) An enemy attack, on 6 August, against the RF Co, at BA REN Bridge (BT 102510) afforded Fifth Marines opportunity to further employ the Regimental Interpreter. Report of the attack were relayed by the COP to MCC BAI Special Zone Hqs. The commander, in turn, relayed the data to Fifth Marines FSCC on the hot line connecting the two posts. The Interpreter acted as the coordinator between the FSCC and the Zone Commander, and the mission was fired. Numerous repeat performances have occurred since, to the mutual benefit of all.

(4) Exploitation of information acquired during interrogation of detainees.

(a) Interrogation of detainees captured 131000H revealed the following about VC tactics regarding rice dispersal, "Families in Cam La #1 (H) vicinity BT 080200, with more than 300 pounds of rice are harboring VC tax rice or rice confiscated from refugees."

(b) Interrogation of detainee disclosed VC minefield, with approximately 50 mines, has been installed vicinity BT 095377 on north side of hill. Source stated VC chose this locale because Marine patrols had been observed resting here on two previous occasions.

(c) Several other instances of exploitation of data acquired from detainees occurred:

(1) One detainee offered to lead elements to a cache of 400-500 mortar rounds; upon exploitation, no mortar rounds were found, however, a 9mm Pistol, 4 NVA packs, 2 Transistor radios,

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a quantity of clothing and some documents were recovered. A cache of 200X82mm mortar rounds, 30X50mm mortar rounds, fuzes and detonators was uncovered in the same general locale on the previous day.

(2) Another detainee is awaiting exploitation. He claims knowledge of a cache of weapons, ammo, and a hiding place for guerrillas vicinity grid square AT 9729.

(3) Yet another detainee reported the location of a minefield on the north side of the road, vicinity AT 905246 on 26 August 1967.

(4) D-1-5 exploitation of a detainee's offer to lead elements to his GP on 25 August, vicinity AT 874264, netted a large thatched building (40'X20'), one gallon of warm, cooked rice, and one 60 year old detainee. As element approached LCD, a single shot was heard. Possible warning shot by local security, allowing pre-arranged withdrawal of any enemy forces that might have been in the area. Another sizeable medical supply cache was found in the area (AT 890257) later in the morning, revealing packs, mosquito netting, kerosene, wash basins, cups, pots, 250 surgical masks, 25 gas masks, a large surgical sterilizer, clothing, 1 SMG serial number 577117, several magazines with ammo, 6 maps, 17 record books, a VN Unit one, drugs, blood plasma, and pills.

(5) Finally, on 26 August, a rallier from the R-20 Bn turned himself in to the RF Outpost at BA REN Bridge (BT 102510). Fifth Marines ITT was afforded an opportunity to interrogate subject for several hours on 27 August. He revealed knowledge of a weapons cache somewhere in the vicinity of BT 0148. He offered to lead a patrol to the site. Information was passed to Division, the rallier was reinterviewed, and Recon Bn was assigned the mission of exploitation of the data.

b. Weather. Precipitation increased in the latter portion of the month.

c. Terrain. With the increase in precipitation, the terrain became less trafficable for tracked vehicles.

3. Training. During this reporting period, the Fifth Marines has been operating in whole or part continually. The Replacement Indoctrination Program has been maintained for both officers and en-

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listed men prior to assignment to a unit. This program promotes a better understanding of their mission and brings these personnel up date on the latest enemy equipment and tactics.

Emphasis was placed on the following subjects: NCO Leadership, Fire Control and Application of Fire and Small Unit Tactics. The battalions utilized combat ranges for familiarization firing of the M 16, to obtain battle sights, and to improve fire discipline and control.

This command is presently training personnel in use of the Starlight Scope. Sniper Platoon personnel that had not been trained with the M-70 Remington Rifle attended Sniper School at Da Nang.

The following schools were utilized during the month of August 1967:

<u>School</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No attended</u>
NCO Leadership	Okinawa	16
Vietnamese Language School	Okinawa	5
Vietnamese Language School	Da Nang	2
Ammunition Technician School	Okinawa	2
Psychological Operation School	Da Nang	2
Civic Action Orientation Course	Da Nang	3
Infantry Weapons Repair School	Okinawa	2
Embarkation Course	Da Nang	1

4. Operations. 3rd Battalion participated in Operation PIKE under operational control of the First Marines from 1 to 3 August. On 9 August, 3rd Battalion departed for Que Son and on 10 August both battalions and the Regimental Command Group moved into positions for Operation COCHISE. Both battalions participated in Phase I, which ended on 18 August. 3rd Battalion Command Group then returned to the Combat Base, while 1st Battalion participated in Phase II with two companies of each battalion. Phase II terminated on 25 August, and Phase III on 28 August.

After completion of Operation COCHISE, Fifth Marines commenced displacing companies to the Seventh Marines in support of Operation YAZOO. Operations in support of the Vietnamese National Elections began immediately following Operation COCHISE. A one-day two-company operation was conducted east of National Route #1 on 29 August in support of the District Headquarters at Thang Binh which had been attacked the previous night.

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5. Fire Support. The 2nd Battalion, Eleventh Marines continued as the artillery unit in direct support of the Fifth Marines. During the month of August the following missions were fired in support of the Regiment:

OBS	UNCB	H&I	TOTAL	WEAPON	TYPE AND NO OF ROUNDS EXPENDED
397	333	1152	3606	105mm	HE 25865
42	8	49			ILLUM 1549
193	137	1295			WP 2609
					Other 92
					TOTAL 30116
43	54	254	666	155mm	HE 4096
28	23	264			ILLUM 119
					Other 249
					TOTAL 4464
155	79	829	1614	4.2mm	HE 9363
63	34	454			ILLUM 893
					WP 429
					TOTAL 10685
7	7	15	56	155Gmm	HE 420
8	13	6			ILLUM 20
					WP 33
					TOTAL 473

6. Air Support. During August, 2,420,000 pounds of all classes of supplies were lifted by First Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters in support of the Fifth Marine Regiment. This total includes 1,600,000 pounds in support of the supporting artillery battalion, 2/11, and 820,000 pounds of resupply. The totals do not include supplies carried on helicopters utilized daily by the HST, nor does it include emergency resupply or tactical helicopter lifts in support of Operation COCHISE.

During August, 78 personnel were transported as Medevac's in the following categories: 34 USMC WRA, 32 USMC NBC, 10 CIVILIANS, and 2 ARVN. This total does not include those personnel medevaced by helicopter assigned to the HST as medevac helicopters during Operation COCHISE.

Fixed Wing Support. These totals are covered separately by 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion.

AO/TAC(A) Support: From 1 August until the commencement of Operation COCHISE on 11 August, 52 AO/TAC(A) flights were flown

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in support of the Fifth Marines. During Operation COCHISE, the Fifth Marines were supported with 24 hour a day AO/TAC(A) coverage.

7. Logistics. During the month of August, construction of the Combat Operations Center bunker was completed. Construction effort for the preparation of the CP complex for the monsoon season continued. Heavy rains recently fell on the CP and indicated erosion problems that will arise during the monsoon season. Co B, 1st Engineers commenced installation of culvert where erosion was the greatest, drained and placed culvert in the 3rd Battalion Motor Pool, raised the level of the water point area by adding fill dirt, built up the berm in the LSA and the level of the revetments to facilitate drainage, and commenced construction of an all-weather road around the base of Hill 63. On 27 August, the bridge over the Song Cau Lau was destroyed by the VC, necessitating resupply by helicopter for several days. A ferry operated by the 9th Engineer Battalion was put in service, and the convoys resumed, although only a few trucks could make the transit during high tide.

8. Civil Affairs/Civic Action. During August the hamlets of THANH KHE (1) and (2) were moved with the assistance of USMC vehicles and under the supervision of the Civil Affairs Officer to provide better fields of fire for the Hill 63 complex and increase safety for the villagers. Investigations were conducted into serious incidents resulting in death or injury to civilians or destruction of their property. Solatium payments were made where Fifth Marines or supporting units were at fault. Villagers who desired to re-locate graves from the Hill 63 complex were given assistance in the form of wooden boxes and transportation. Certain graves of historical significance were identified, marked, and will be preserved. The PHU HUONG Village Chief gave his approval for the removal of a sugar cane field which limited observation from defensive positions.

9. Psychological Warfare. Extensive Psychological Warfare operations were conducted throughout the Que Son - Thang Binh - Hiep Duc Valley during August, principally in support of Operation COCHISE. Themes emphasized were: Demoralization, Chieu Hoi, Rewards for Mines and Booby Traps, and Combined Might of Allied Forces. Additionally, several extensive PsyOps campaigns not related to Operation COCHISE were conducted throughout the area of Operations. Themes used were: Health and Hygiene, Don't Listen VC, and Don't Run from Marines.

10. Medical. During Operation COCHISE, the Medical section rendered medical support to the Collecting and Clearing Platoon by providing them with urgently needed medical supplies and additional stretchers.

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Several casualties (U.S., Vietnamese, and detainees) were also transported by the Hq Co, Fifth Marines ambulance from the LSA to the Collecting and Clearing Platoon.

An insecticide fogging machine for use in the control of mosquitoes was obtained from the preventive medicine section, NSA Da Nang, on a permanent basis, along with several cans of Malataien insecticide. Daily evening spraying at the Hill 63 complex has been done during this period, greatly reducing the mosquito population. A light trap was also obtained for use in trapping small insects which are sent to the epidemiological laboratory at the PLS, NSA, Da Nang to determine if any insects are carriers of disease.

One Vietnamese child from a nearby hamlet who was blind and suffering with a severe case of conjunctivitis was treated by the Regimental Surgeon. Much improvement was noted following treatment. The following number of patients were treated during this reporting period:

Hq Co, Fifth Marines	69 (42%)
Others	93 (58%)
Total treated	162(100%)

A report of a cholera outbreak by the officer in charge of local PFs was investigated by the Regimental Surgeon. The findings were a total of eight (8) children affected with a type of infantile diarrhea, not cholera. Of these eight, six died before they could receive adequate medical care.

Immunizations were administered to all Headquarters Company personnel on 4 August 1967. The following vaccines were given:

Gamma Globulin	150
Plague	100
Cholera	100
Typhus	50
Typhoid	30
Tetanus-Diphtheria	4
TOTAL	484

During the month, the Regimental Medical section rendered assistance in the immunization of personnel from Tank Bn, Engineer Bn, and the LSA. These immunizations were in addition to the regular immunizations administered to personnel of M Company, Fifth Marines. A total of approximately 150 immunizations were given to other personnel.

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11. Dental. The Dental section treated 207 patients during the reporting period. They were from the following units with the following figures;

1/5	47	22.9%
3/5	46	22.3
2/11	37	17.9
9th Engr	13	6.3
Hq Co	31	14.9
1/3	13	6.3
AT Bn	8	3.9
FLC	4	1.8
1st Engr	2	.9
1st SP	2	.9
3/11	2	.9
LSA	1	.5
POW	1	.5
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>100%</u>

12. Chaplain. During the reporting period the Regimental Chaplain held twenty-four (24) services. A total of 685 personnel attended the services (Protestant). Coverage was given to Nui Lac Son, 1st Battalion, 3rd Battalion, Hill 29, 2nd Battalion, ~~Eighth~~ ^{Eleventh} Marines and Fifth Marines Headquarters. Roman Catholic coverage was given at the same units.

PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. ENCLOSURE (2) HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
 (3) 1ST BATTALION, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
 (4) 2ND BATTALION, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
 (5) 3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
 (6) 5TH MARINES COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION
 COCHISE Filed w/ Cmd Chron

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 Sep

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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
 1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California 96602

3/RJC/phm
 003100
 20 September 1967

5TH MAR S&C FILES

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
 Via: Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1
 (b) 1st Mar Div OpnO 93-67 (Operation COCHISE)
 (c) Task Force X-Ray OpnO 1-67 (Operation COCHISE)

Encl: (1) First Battalion, Fifth Marines Combat Operations After Action Report (See 1/5)
 (2) Third Battalion, Fifth Marines Combat Operations After Action Report (See 3/5)
 (3) ☒ Battalion Landing Team 1/3 Combat Operation After Action Report.

1. Code Name. Operation COCHISE. Search and Destroy.
2. Dates of Operation.
 - a. Phase I. 110900H to 181700H August 1967
 - b. Phase II. 190600H to 250600H August 1967
 - c. Phase III. 250600H to 280600H August 1967
3. Location. Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. Task Force X-Ray, 1st Marine Division (Rein), BGen F. C. LaHue.
5. Task Organization.

Fifth Marines (-) (Rein)
 Fifth Marines (-)
 Headquarters Company
 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein)
 3rd Battalion, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein)

Col S. DAVIS
 Capt R. J. SALVATI
 LtCol P. L. HIL-
 GARTNER
 LtCol G. B. WEBSTER

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1st Battalion, Third Marines
(PHASE II and III)
Co B(-), 1st Engineer Bn
Co B, 1st Shore Party Bn
Co A(-), 1st Tank Bn
Co B(-), 1st Anti Tank Bn
Collecting and Clearing Platoon

LtCol A. I. THOMAS
Capt H. A. MORGAN, III
Capt R. R. O'NEILL
Capt W. J. BRITTON
Capt A. R. GREEN
Lt K. L. SACK USNR (MC)

6. Supporting Arms.

a. Air.

(1) Excellent air support was provided to the Fifth Marine Regiment throughout all phases of Operation COCHISE. Especially noteworthy were the assets made available for the troop lift on D-Day of Phase II, when 26 CH-46 and 25 UH-34 helicopters were utilized simultaneously for a tactical lift of troops. Air discipline during the troop pick-up, rendezvous, and landing phases was exemplary, resulting in an efficient and smoothly coordinated vertical envelopment by two battalions.

(2) The following resume of aircraft communications procedures and the air support request chain utilized during the operation is set forth as background for discussion of the air communications and support problems encountered.

(a) Air Request Procedures.

1. Resupply. The HST Commander, located at the LSA, Hill 63, was tasked to provide resupply for both organic battalions and BLT 1/3. The HST Commander requested daily working helicopters from the Task Force X-Ray Air Officer, and was normally provided four UH-34B aircraft from 0700-1800. All resupply requests were consolidated at the battalion level and passed to the HST Commander who scheduled the resupply runs.

2. Medical Evacuation. Each day a medical evacuation package consisting of a UH-34B and a UH-1B escort was assigned to the HST Commander and stationed at the LSA for medevac use only. If these aircraft were refueling or on a mission, the HST Commander passed the medevac request through the Task Force X-Ray Air Officer to the Mini-DASC. The Mini-DASC could either call upon the medevac packages at DA NANG or CHU LAI or divert helicopters in the operating area to perform the mission.

3. Fixed Wing. Fixed wing support was requested by the Battalion/Company through the Regimental TACP over the TACP(local) net.

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The Regimental TACP passed the request to the Mini-DASC via the Task Force X-Ray Air Officer. AO/TAC(A) aircraft also requested fixed wing support directly from the DASC, utilizing UHF or HF communications.

(b) Air-Ground Communications.

1 Resupply Helicopters, after briefing by the HST Commander, checked in with the Mini-DASC for clearance into the operating area and sav-a-plane information. After clearance into the area the helicopters contacted the appropriate HST LZ Control Team on LZ Common for landing control.

2 Medevac Helicopters. After initial briefing the same procedures as above were followed with the exception that the medevac frequency was used in place of LZ Common.

3 AO/TAC(A) Aircraft. When in support of units of the regiment, these aircraft checked in with the Mini-DASC and then the Regimental TACP, which in turn passed them to the requesting unit.

4 Fixed Wing. These aircraft also checked in with the Mini-DASC and were passed to their controller (AO/TAC(A)) on a UHF frequency. Since ground units at the battalion level and below have experienced a great deal of difficulty in maintaining the PRC-41 in the field, all communications with jet aircraft were handled by the AO/TAC(A).

(3) Air Problems Encountered During Operation COCHISE.

(a) Throughout enclosure (2) mention is made of air strikes conducted near troop units without proper clearance. Investigation into each case indicated that aircraft had followed proper procedures and were in communications and under positive control of ground units/AO/TAC(A) before conducting airstrikes or taking targets under fire. Corrective action has been taken to ensure that ground units inform nearby units when aircraft are performing a mission under their control. Since several air-ground nets may be in use simultaneously, the HST and TACP must keep the ground commander informed on a continuous basis in order to accomplish fire support coordination at the lowest level.

(b) On several occasions resupply missions were not accomplished on time, causing ground units to slow their operations to conform to the aircraft availability. The reasons for these delays were evidently caused by:

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1 Lack of helicopters due to battle damage, mechanical failure, or non-availability of assets.

2 Unwillingness or inability of the resupply helicopters to proceed to their destination because of priority air strikes or artillery missions.

3 On several occasions, the Mini-DASC pre-empted resupply helicopters for emergency medevac use because the assigned medevac helicopters were employed elsewhere or were otherwise unavailable.

b. Artillery.

(1) Excellent artillery support was provided by the 2nd Battalion Group, Eleventh Marines, placed in direct support of the Fifth Marines by Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray. To support Phase I Battery F was helilifted to VIET AN to support 3rd Battalion, Fifth Marines, and Battery A, 1st Battalion, Twelfth Marines and Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, Twelfth Marines were positioned at Hill 29 to support 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines. 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines was supported by Battery D and Battery F(X) from their normal positions. The Provisional 155 mm Howitzer (TD) Battery, 2nd Battalion, Eleventh Marines and the 2nd Platoon, 5th 155 mm Gun (SP) Battery were in General Support from Hill 29 and Que Son, respectively. Upon commencement of Phase II the Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, Twelfth Marines and the Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, Eleventh Marines were helilifted into the HIEP DUC area to support 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines and 1st Battalion, Third Marines. As Phase II progressed Battery A and Battery F were helilifted into the HIEP DUC area to provide additional artillery support. Battery A was helilifted to VIET AN to provide support for Phase III. Helicopter support in resupplying the helilifted batteries was excellent in all respects.

(2) Minor communication difficulties were experienced during Phase I due to terrain mask. A continuing problem was encountered in providing artillery support as a result of the insistence of some resupply medevac pilots, with the concurrence of the DASC, that artillery be check-fired prior to aircraft entering the operating area. Education on the functioning of the sav-a-plane system with emphasis on proper check-in procedures for pilots and the dissemination of safe approach and retirement lanes for the helicopters by the DASC would eliminate the majority of check-fires requested. A total of 2500 missions were fired by the 2nd Battalion Group, Eleventh Marines in support of Operation COCHISE.

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7. Intelligence.

a. Operation COCHISE provided a test vehicle for a combined regimental collection point. The facility included an Interrogation-Translation Team, a Document Translation Sub-Team, and a Counter-Intelligence Sub-Team.

b. Implementation required recalling the Interrogation-Translation Sub-Team attached to 1st Battalion, acquiring the assets of the Special Landing Force, once under the operational control of the Fifth Marines, requesting augmentation of a CI Sub-Team from 1st Marine Division and a Document Translation Team from CDEC, Saigon. Units in the field were to utilize Battalion interpreters, Kit Carson Teams, and Vietnamese-speaking Marines to satisfy the requirement for immediate tactical interrogation and translation of captured documents. While the concept is believed to be sound, in practice, it was only partially successful. This was due to the following factors:

- (1) Inadequate quantity and quality of Vietnamese Interpreters.
- (2) Insufficient quantity and quality of Vietnamese-speaking Marines.

(3) A Document Translation Sub-Team had been requested prior to the commencement of the operation. The team, consisting of one US Army Specialist, arrived after the operation commenced, had no equipment, no interpreter, and no knowledge of the operational area. After augmentation by a Vietnamese Interpreter from Division and after briefing on the area he was able to furnish a rapid synopsis of documents received.

(4) Difficulty was encountered in the timely evacuation of captured equipment, personnel, and documents due to helicopter availability.

(5) Proper tagging of documents, personnel, and equipment required constant supervision by intelligence personnel. Present tags are inadequate in their ability to withstand the elements. The lack of a single standard tag complicated recording and processing information.

(6) Few detainees of interest to the Counter-Intelligence personnel were received on this operation. The information gained from those detainees proved to be of no immediate tactical value.

8. Mission. Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) continues defense of AO, provides security for engineer effort, and conducts search and destroy operations in the Hiep Duc - Tam Ky - Thang Binh triangle to capture, destroy or dislodge enemy forces in the vicinity of the hill mass north of Tien Phuoc and to capture or destroy the personnel, equipment, and facilities of the 2nd NVA Division and its supporting forces in the vicinity of Hiep Duc.

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9. Concept of Operation.

a. Phase I. By H-Hour on D-Day, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) positions units to support helilift of 1st ARVN Ranger Task Group. Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations abreast Ranger Task Group eastward to the central plain where BLT 1/3 and two battalions of the 2nd ARVN Infantry Division have established blocking positions.

b. Phase II. Upon conclusion of Phase I, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein), with BLT 1/3 opcon, in conjunction with three ARVN battalions, executes a phased helicopter-borne envelopment into Hiep Duc and the Headquarters area of the 2nd NVA Division. Conduct a detailed search of the area to discover and destroy enemy forces, supplies, and facilities in the area.

c. Phase III. On termination of search and destroy operations in the Hiep Duc area, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) conducts search and destroy operations along the valley from Hiep Duc northeastward to Que Son.

10. Execution.

a. Commencing 11 August 1967, Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) began operations on the hill mass south of Nui Lac Son. At 0900, 12 August 1967, conducted search and destroy operations eastward with two battalions of three companies each abreast of the 1st ARVN Ranger Task Group. On 18 August 1967, Phase I of the operation terminated with the return of two chopped companies to the First Marine Regiment (L 3/1 and G 2/1) and the return of 3/5 Command Group to Hill 63.

b. The remaining battalion of four companies executed Phase II. Fifth Marines (-) (Rein) assumed opcon of BLT 1/3 at 181200H for the duration of the operation. Phase II commenced with the helilift of one battalion of four companies and BLT 1/3, in conjunction with three battalions of the 2nd ARVN Infantry Division, into LZ's southwest of Hiep Duc, to conduct detailed search and destroy operations into the base area of the 2nd NVA Division. Phase II of the operation terminated at 250600H August 1967.

c. Phase III commenced at 0600 25 August 1967 with BLT 1/3 attacking north toward Que Son astride the Hiep Duc - Que Son Road. The remainder of 1/5 and supporting units were helilifted to their respective combat bases. Operation COCHISE terminated at 0600, 28 August 1967.

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d. Six leaflet drops totaling 1,260,000 leaflets accompanied by approximately 20 hours of aerial broadcasts were made in the operational area. Themes were: Demoralization of the NVA Forces, Chieu Hoi, Safe Conduct Pass, Inform on VC Locations, and VC Mines Kill Civilians. However, no Chieu Hoi's rallied.

11. Results.

a. Friendly.

KIA	4
DOW	0
WIA(MEDEVAC)	53
WIA(MINOR)	12
MIA	0
NBC	0

b. Enemy.

NVA KIA probable	2
VC KIA confirmed	113
VC KIA probable	115
PW	11
Detainees	96
IWC	39
CSWC	0

c. 361 refugees were evacuated from the operational area.

12. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply. Paragraph 12.a.(3) of enclosure (1) refers to incomplete resupply and failure to fill back orders. The following items were in short supply in the Logistic Support Area during the operations.

- (1) Cleaning gear for the M16A1 rifle.
- (2) BA-386 batteries for the AN/PRC-25 radio.
- (3) Tape Antennas for PRC-25 radio.
- (4) Handsets for the AN/PRC-25 radio.

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(5) Water purification tablets.

(6) Maintenance float of AN/PRC-25 radios.

(7) The LSA did not have adequate stocking levels of all sizes of utility trousers. The problem was compounded since the LSA failed to fill requests by substituting the next larger size for those not in stock.

(8) Socks were not available.

(9) Towels were not available.

b. Maintenance. Normal.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization.

(1) Paragraphs 12.c.(4) and 15. of enclosure (1) refer to a necessity for a battalion surgeon to be in the field. Each battalion presently is assigned two battalion surgeons. Normal employment is for one medical officer to remain at the combat base and one to augment the Collecting and Clearing Platoon at the Regimental Combat Base. The Battalion Commander may change this concept at any time he sees fit, but experience has indicated this is the most desirable employment of the medical officers in this regiment.

(2) The Collecting and Clearing Platoon supporting the Fifth Marine Regiment in this operation functioned in a completely professional manner throughout the operation, rendering expeditious and effective medical assistance to casualties.

d. Communications.

(1) Radio communications to subordinate units while in the area between coordinates BT 0724 and BT 1922 during the period 16-20 August 1967 was masked by mountains from both Hui Lac Son and Hill 29. This situation required the capability for relay operations.

(a) Airborne AUTOCAT retransmission was requested commencing 0800 16 August 1967 with the following results:

1 Assigned aircraft arrived at 0920, one and one half hours late.

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2 The assigned aircraft was incapable of automatic retransmission and could provide only one manual relay. This procedure proved unsatisfactory due to inexperience of the airborne relay operator in MANOCAT procedures and infantry terminology and techniques. It is necessary that experienced infantry radio operators be utilized during MANOCAT operations with infantry units.

3 The airborne relay team had neither Division CEOI nor frequency designators, causing difficulty in establishment of radio communications in addition to necessitating practices dangerous to communications security.

4 For the period that relay operations were necessary, relief on station had been requested and approved. However, of the eight aircraft utilized only two were relieved on station. This resulted in the temporary loss of communication with the 1st Battalion.

(b) Automatic ground retransmission was attempted by elements of Communications Company, 7th Communications Battalion for utilization by the Fifth Marines on 16 August 1967, with the following results:

1 Insufficient AN/MRC-110 radio sets were available for the required retransmission capability necessitating utilization of AN/PRC-25 radio sets with MK-456 retransmission cables. This arrangement resulted in either one-way retransmission or no transmission. Suitable cables should be developed and be readily available for AUTOCAT use with AN/PRC-25 radios.

2 Frequencies available were found to be unusable due to interference or incompatibility. Spare frequencies must be readily available to units when employing AUTOCAT.

3 On 17 August an AN/MRC-110 radio was established for AUTOCAT on the Regimental Tactical Net. After trying three frequencies, it functioned in a highly satisfactory manner until retransmission was no longer needed.

(c) Airborne retransmission aircraft were again requested for 1300 19 August 1967. This aircraft arrived late, at 1410, with the capability for one manual relay operated by the pilots. Once again this MANOCAT technique proved unsatisfactory due to the inexperience of the operator concerning MANOCAT procedures and infantry language and techniques.

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(d) Aircraft utilized on 20 August performed utilizing AUTOCAT in a highly satisfactory manner even while flying in a severe electrical storm. This aircraft also provided support as a flare ship and air observation craft.

(2) Power supply equipment consisting of a W20HMT3A Variac and PP-2953/U power supply were used to power the RT-523/KY-8 combination for the covered radio circuit. This equipment is capable of operating on 400 cycle or 60 cycle power and provided a very efficient and reliable power source for the RT-524/KY-8. It is also designed to switch automatically from AC to battery operation upon loss of the AC power source. This equipment was obtained on temporary loan from the Army. It is strongly recommended that this equipment be acquired for use throughout the First Marine Division. It is already available within the Third Marine Division.

e. Civil Affairs

(1) During Operation COCHISE, 361 refugees were evacuated from the operating area by units under the operational control of the Fifth Marines. Evacuation was to Tam Ky and Thang Binh refugee centers.

(2) Fifteen thousand pounds of rice were evacuated from AF 851212 (B Co, 1/3) and turned over to Quang Tin Province authorities. The rice was discovered at 201155H August 1967, evacuation to the Hill 63 LSA was completed at 211730H August 1967 (elapsed time 29 hours 35 minutes).

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. The Launcher, Tactical CS, 16-tube, E-8 was employed as indicated in paragraph 13. of enclosure (1) by 1st Battalion, however no enemy forces were in the impact area and the effectiveness could not be determined.

14. Commanders Analysis.

a. This operation was targeted primarily to destroy or capture tactical units and logistical installations of the 2nd NT Division. As envisioned Phase I was designed to insert friendly elements between the tactical elements of the 2nd NT Division and their suspected logistical base. Marine Corps forces would then drive east to destroy the enemy's tactical units. This phase would ensure the minimum of tactical units in the vicinity of the logistical base. Phase II was to be a helilift of two Marine Corps battalions into the area suspected to be the logistical base of the 2nd NT Division (Hiep Duc Area). Phase III envisioned a two

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battalion sweep from Hiep Duc to the Que Son area to destroy enemy tactical elements located in that area.

b. Initially the operation was to be executed in early August and the conceptual plan was completed in July. Unavoidable circumstances forced postponement of the operation until 11 August 1967. Despite the delay, the operation was executed exactly as envisioned in the conceptual plan.

c. During Phase I the only solid contacts with elements of the 2nd NT Division were made by the Ranger Task Force in a companion operation to the south of Operation COCHISE and by BLT 1/3 late in Phase I. Enemy contacts made by Fifth Marines' elements were light and were confined to local force units. Since major contact was not made, it appears that Phase I did not successfully complete its mission of destroying enemy forces or separating those forces from their base area.

d. The Ranger Task Force to our south became heavily engaged with an estimated enemy regiment. Because of lack of information, we did not initially react to this contact. By the time sufficient information was available and the two battalions of Fifth Marines moved to the area of the contact, the VC had fled. This emphasizes the fact that success can be achieved only if enemy contacts are exploited rapidly. Even a slight delay provides the enemy a chance to escape.

e. The area of operation of the Fifth Marines during Phase I was the hill mass between the Que Son Valley and the Tien Phuoc Valley. Our contact in this area was very light, consisting primarily of snipers and mines and booby traps. A review of past operations in this area also indicates that no major enemy units have been contacted in the mountainous area. It is evident that we either do not have sufficient mobility to trap enemy units in rugged terrain or that the enemy confines the bulk of his activity to the valley areas. The latter is believed to be the case.

f. Our only major contact was made with a local force unit, in the valley area, late in Phase I. It is described in paragraph 10.j.(2) of enclosure (2). This action demonstrates the success that can be obtained when reaction to enemy contact is rapid. It also exemplifies the success which can be achieved by the close cooperation of the Marine Air-Ground Team. Near perfect coordination resulted in 40 confirmed kills and 14 probable kills inflicted on a 70 man force at the cost of only 1 Marine wounded.

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g. Phase II was also marked by only very light enemy contact. During the phase, one rice cache and one ammunition cache were discovered. A few weapons that had been hastily hidden by VC coolie laborers were also found.

h. The rice cache consisting of over 15,000 pounds severely hampered the operations of one rifle company. The unit had to remain in place nearly 30 hours awaiting helicopter evacuation of the rice.

i. The early withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines from Operation COHISE forced the prepositioning of that unit for extraction and moving the 1st Battalion, Third Marines for Phase III. Thus the entire area assigned was not thoroughly searched.

j. Even though the area was not entirely searched, a sufficient area was searched to conclude that the modest success achieved indicated that either the area is not a base area or that the facilities are so well concealed and camouflaged as to escape detection by the average Marine.

k. As Phase II commenced, the 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines was heli-lifted back to Que Son. This reduced the troop density to one battalion and made it easier for the enemy forces to evade contact. Even though the enemy force in the area was believed to be sizeable, they chose to avoid contact. Thus the contact in Phase III was confined to sniper fire and booby traps.

15. Recommendations.

a. That future operations be conducted to fix and destroy the 2nd NT Division.

b. That complete flexibility be retained during the execution of all operations in order to rapidly react to enemy contact or intelligence.

c. That in all future operations with ARVN elements, liaison officers and forward observers be assigned and that these officers be used to rapidly appraise Marine elements of the complete situation in event of an ARVN contact with enemy forces. This rapid flow of precise information will permit rapid reaction to exploit such contacts.

d. That operations designed to destroy enemy forces concentrate on the valley areas where the enemy will most likely be found.

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e. That rice caches be evacuated only when it is possible to complete the evacuation within a reasonable period of time.


f. That a Document Translation Team or sub-team be requested from MACV for all major operations. That such team arrive with necessary interpreter and equipment and in sufficient time to permit adequate briefing prior to commencement of operations.

g. That a minimum of seven proficient interpreters be assigned to each infantry battalion.

h. That the standard USACV form 365 (2 Dec 65) be modified so as to be easily attached to detainees. That this form be made of material suitable for rigorous field use under the various climatic conditions encountered. That the reverse side of the tag be printed for use as a captured document or equipment tag so that only one type of tag will have to be taken in the field.

i. That airborne AUTOCAE retransmission aircraft arrive on station punctually, fully prepared with operators and equipment to accomplish the assigned missions.

j. That power supply equipment W20BMT3A Variac and PP-2953/U power supply be acquired by the First Marine Division as a power source for the RT-524/KY-8.



S. DAVIS

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO San Francisco 96602

SECRET NOFORN

3 September 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

1stBn, 3dMar S & C No. 00381-67
Copy No. 20 of 40 Copies

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation COCHISE)

Ref: (a) BLT 1/3 Frag Order #1 (Operation COCHISE) to Operation Order 5-67

Encl: (1) Overlay to Operation COCHISE, Phase I
(2) Overlay to Operation COCHISE, Phase II
(3) Overlay to Operation COCHISE, Phase III

5TH MAR S&C FILES

001031-67

COPY NO. 100F 15

1. Code Name. Operation COCHISE, Search and Destroy Operation.
2. Dates and location of operation. 11-28 August 1967, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin Provinces, RVN.
3. Command Headquarters. BLT 1/3 LtCol. A. I. THOMAS

Subordinate Units

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------|
| H & S Company | Capt. MACK |
| Company A | Capt. JORDAN |
| Company B | Capt. LANDES |
| Company C | Capt. HECZEK |
| Company D | Capt. RICHARDSON |
| 4.2" Mortar Btry, 2/12 | Capt. PATTERSON |
4. Task Organization.

BLT 1/3

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

H&S Co (-)

Det (-) Hq Bn 3rd Mar Div

Det Disbursing Section

Det Postal Section

Det 9th MAB (Radio Relay)

Det Hq Co 26th Mar (Radio Relay)

Det Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar (Intm)

LtCol. THOMAS

Capt. MACK

Capt. YELLIG

Sgt LEDFORD

Lt ZWICK

Cpl MAGGI

Lt JOHNSON

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Det Hq Btry 1st Bn 12th Mar (NGFLnTm)
 Logistics Support Unit
 Det 3rd Serv Bn
 1st Clearing Plt Co B 3rd Med Bn
 Det 15th Dental Co
 Det IT Team

Lt. COLE (USN)
 Lt. KINNEY

Lt. KANTER (USN)
 Lt. MCGINN (USN)
 GYSgt HERNANDEZ

Co. B (Rein)

Co. B
 Det Hq Btry 1st Bn 12th Mar (NGF Tm)
 FO Team Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
 Det 2nd Plt Co. A 3rd EngrBn
 Det 2nd Plt Co. B 3rd SPBn
 Det H&S Co.
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Med Plt
 Det Comm Plt
 Det TACP

Capt. LANDES

Co. C (Rein)

Co. C
 FO Team Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
 Det 2nd Plt Co A 3rd EngrBn
 Det 2nd Plt Co B 3rd SPBn
 Det H&S Co
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Med Plt
 Det Comm Plt
 Det TACP

Capt. RECZEK

Co. D (Rein)

Co. D
 Det Hq Btry 1st Bn 12th Mar (NGF Tm)
 FO Team Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
 Det 2nd Plt Co A 3rd EngrBn
 Det 2nd Plt Co B 3rd SPBn
 Det H&S Co
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Med Plt
 Det Comm Plt
 Det TACP

Capt. RICHARDSON.

4.2" Mortar Btry 2nd Bn 12th Mar

Capt. PATTERSON

2nd Plt (-) (Rein) Co A 3rd EngrBn

Lt. WENTWORTH

2nd Plt (-) (Rein) Co B 3rd SPBn

Lt. WYMER

BLT RESERVECo A (Rein)

Co A
 FO Team Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
 Det 2nd Plt Co A 3rd EngrBn
 Det 2nd Plt Co B 3rd SPBn

Capt. JORDAN
 (1-15 August 1967)
 Capt. LARIMORE
 (16-31 August 1967)

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Det H&S Co
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Med Plt
 Det Comm Plt
 Det TACP

5. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery.

(1) Phase I.

Fire support for the battalion was provided by a 155mm howitzer battery located at hill # 29, which gave the battalion priority of fires. A-1-12, also located at hill # 29, provided the battalion with general support. At times both batteries were firing simultaneously.

(2) Phase II.

BLT 1/3 was helilifted into Landing Zone Hawk with no artillery support and relied entirely on air. Mortar Battery 2-12 landed in LZ Hawk and was ready to fire four hours after the initial wave of troops were landed. At that time Mortar Battery 2-12 was in direct support, however, later in the day A-1-12 was landed in LZ Dove and joined Mortar Battery 2-12 in a direct support role. Mortar Battery 2-12 was extracted from LZ Hawk and returned to hill # 29 on the 3rd day of Phase II.

(3) Phase III.

A-1-12 provided direct fire support for the battalion and displaced once to further support the battalion. During the displacement of A-1-12, F-2-11 supported the battalion with priority of fires. When A-1-12 was removed from direct support and returned to hill # 29 on 27 August, priority of fires were received from a 155mm howitzer battery at Que Son.

Missions Fired

Observed	32
Unobserved	43
H & I	721

Ammunition Expended

High Explosive	3325
White Phosphorus	117
Illumination	84
Smoke	12

b. Air.

Helicopter support consisted of the insertion of four rifle companies and the Alpha Command for Phase I, the extraction and insertion of three rifle companies and the Alpha Command for Phase II, and the extraction of four rifle companies and the Alpha Command for Phase III. All resupply, medevacs, detainee extraction and the extraction of 15,000 pounds of rice were provided by helicopter. Armed UH-1E aircraft were used for aerial observation and TAC(A) control while also running seven strike sorties in support of the battalion. Fifty-nine fixed wing sorties were run during the operation with the terrain and the tactical situation precluding the obtaining

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of an accurate BDA for most missions. The BDA for the fixed wing and UH-1E's were 6 structures destroyed, 2 structures damaged, 4 secondary explosions and 10 probable KBA.

6. Intelligence.

Overall enemy activity in the Amphibious Objective Area was limited with one significant exception. During the first phase of the operation heavy fire from small arms and machine guns resulted in a heavy contact in the vicinity of coordinates 148277. Throughout the rest of the operation sporadic sniper fire was the only contact. The enemy in the AOA generally evaded contact by exfiltrating into the mountains to the north. Numerous tunnels, covered fighting holes, and bunkers fortified the entire area.

7. Mission.

a. Phase I.

Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day land by helicopter into LZ Grouse and established predesignated blocking positions in support of 1st Marine Division operations.

b. Phase II.

On order move by helilift to the Hiep Duc area and conduct extensive search and destroy operations to capture or destroy the personnel, equipment and facilities of the Second NVA Division.

c. Phase III.

On order continue search and destroy operations in a Northeasterly direction from Hiep Duc to Que Son.

8. Execution. Concept of Operations.

a. Phase I.

A H-Hour BLT 1/3 landed four rifle companies and the Alpha Command into LZ Grouse and moved to blocking positions in support of the 1st Marine Division. In the last days of Phase I BLT 1/3 conducted search and destroy operations east toward Highway #1. See enclosure (1).

b. Phase II.

On order BLT 1/3 lifted three rifle companies into LZ Hawk securing the LZ and surrounding critical terrain for the insertion of the Alpha Command, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Mortar Batter 2/12 and Mortar Battery 2/11. Upon completion of the insertion BLT 1/3 conducted search and destroy operations in the Hiep Duc area. Company A was detached to the 1st Marines to furnish security for the artillery units at LZ Dove. See enclosure (2).

c. Phase III.

BLT 1/3 conducted search and destroy operations Northeast from Hiep Duc to Que Son. See enclosure (3).

Chronological Sequence of Events

- 110640 The first wave of Co C was heliborne. The helicopters received sniper fire on the lift out.
- 110700 The first wave of Co C landed at LZ Grouse. The zone appeared safe.
- 110720 All of Co C was heliborne.
- 110730 The first wave of Co A was heliborne.
- 110800 Co C secured Obj. #2 with negative enemy contact. Co C captured 1 wounded VC. All of Co A was heliborne.

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- 110807 Co A moved to Obj. #2. Co B spotted 5 VC trying to work their way into Co B's position. They were taken under fire and withdrew.
- 110820 Co C found 2 dead VC at LZ Grouse, 1 from fragments and 1 from small arms fire.
- 110910 The Alpha Command landed at LZ Grouse. Co A secured Obj. #2, and Co D secured Obj. #3.
- 110950 Co B landed at LZ Grouse and linked up with Co D. Recon and the 81mm mortar platoon landed at LZ Grouse. 81's immediately set up in general support.
- 111025 The lift was completed.
- 111115 All 1/3 units began moving toward Phase Line Red.
- 111215 Co D captured 2 VCS just forward of Obj. #3.
- 111220 Co A crossed Phase Line Red and the lead elements of Co D were approaching Phase Line Red.
- 111230 Co A found a bloody M-1 rifle by an artillery crater.
- 111330 Co A and Co D proceeded toward Phase Line White.
- 111400 Co D captured 1 VCS at Phase Line White.
- 111530 Co A was at Phase Line White.
- 111600 Co D was at Obj. #5.
- 111610 Co A secured Obj. #4.
- 111625 Co C found 2 brand new French typewriters hidden in the brush.
- 111830 All 1/3 units consolidated in a night perimeter.
- 111900 A-1-12 and Mortar Battery 2-12 are set in at Hill #29.
- 112000 Two squads from battalion Recon checked out Obj. #6.
- 120600 The two squads from Recon were in position to observe Companies A and D advancing on Obj. #6.
- 120710 Co C sent a patrol back to cover Obj. #4.
- 120730 Co A was at Phase Line Blue.
- 120745 The Recon platoon was on Obj. #6.
- 120815 Co D was on Obj. #6 with Co A abreast to the South.
- 121100 A patrol from Co B spotted 10 to 15 persons in the open, well deployed, with a point out. The AO said they appeared to be carrying mortars. An artillery mission was called.
- 121230 Co B had 1 WIA USMC from a friendly, short artillery round. Co B was unable to give an assessment on the artillery mission fired at VC carrying mortars because they moved into heavy vegetation and the area had not been swept.
- 121405 Co B again spotted VC at coordinates 125337. VC were brought under small arms fire. One VC was wounded and captured. Co B sustained 1 WIA USMC.
- 121700 All 1/3 units were back into their blocking positions on Obj. #5.
- 122045 B-2 made contact in searching a village at 125337. One VC was killed and blood stains warranted the claiming of 2 VC KIA probables.
- 122200 A Co B listening post fired small arms and threw a grenade at movement forward of their position. In the exchange of small arms 1 Marine was killed in the perimeter by stray rounds fired by the VC and meant for the listening post.
- 130745 Co A secured Obj. #7.
- 130800 Co D secured Obj. #6.
- 130915 A Co B patrol called artillery on 10 VC at 135325.
- 130920 Based on bloody clothing and drag marks on the deck the patrol from Co B claimed 5 VC KIA probables from the artillery mission fired at 135325.

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- 131000 A patrol from Co A found 1 dead VC buried in a shallow grave.
- 131230 The interrogation of 3 captured VC brought out that 8 VC have been operating in the area of Obj. #5. Of the 8, 3 have been killed, 2 were wounded and the rest fled the area. Also brought out was the fact that 3 weeks ago 300 NVA passed through the Vinh Huy area (coordinates 1030) headed South.
- 131345 Co B reported 1 VC KIA and 2 probables from an artillery mission fired on 7 to 10 VC in a tree line at 115337.
- 131545 Co B reported 1 VC KIA and 1 probable from small arms.
- 132145 Co C captured 1 VCS when he ran out of a hole under a hut.
- 132307 The Platoon Sgt from G-2 checking his lines, ran into 2 VC. He killed 1 and the other could be heard moaning as he moved off through the brush, but he couldn't be found.
- 140630 Co C found the VC shot the night before by the Platoon Sgt. He was dead.
- 140700 Companies A and C are moving to Objectives #8 and #9. Recon out-posted Obj. #5.
- 140830 Co D caught 2 VCS when they attempted to run.
- 141030 Companies A and C and the Alpha Command moved in trace of Companies B and D.
- 141300 All 1/3 units selected positions on Objectives #8 and #9.
- 142400 All 1/3 units secure. No enemy contact.
- 150830 Co A caught 1 VCS moving around forward of their perimeter.
- 151245 Division Recon teams on Hills #434 and #474 were contacted by radio to check on any movement in the valley forward of Objectives #8 and #9. No movement was sighted.
- 152400 All 1/3 units secure. No enemy contact.
- 160700 Companies A and C started moving.
- 160745 Companies B and D and the Alpha Command started moving in trace of Companies A and C.
- 160800 Co C called artillery on snipers at 141290.
- 160845 Companies A and C were at Phase Line Peach.
- 161000 Co C received heavy automatic weapons fire from 156288 and they called artillery on Obj. #11. The 5th Marines ran air strikes on the ridge line South of Obj. #11.
- 161125 Co A found a tunnel with 20 2 pound sticks of TNT in it. After the TNT was blown in the tunnel the Company Commander went into the tunnel and was overcome by the lack of oxygen. He was medevaced.
- 161300 Co C had 5 priority medevacs, but the area was under too much fire to bring in helicopters at that time. Co C continued to run air and artillery on Obj. #11. It was difficult to get an assessment because the area could not be swept.
- 161400 Co C reported 2 VC KIA and 20 probables from air strikes.
- 161630 Co C reported 4 KIA USMC and 6 WIA USMC from initial contact on Obj. #11. The friendly KIA bodies had not been recovered.
- 161730 Co C reported 1 WIA USMC from a sniper.
- 161845 Co A reported 5 VC KIA and 25 probables from artillery.
- 161945 A patrol from Co C departed to recover the KIA bodies from the action earlier. Artillery fired smoke to cover the movement of the patrol.

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- 162235 The patrol from Co G was back into the perimeter with the 4 KIA bodies. The bodies were completely stripped of clothing and equipment, but they were not mutilated.
- 170210 An outpost from Co B was being hit hard by automatic weapons fire and infantry, and was partially overrun.
- 170245 Co B's outpost regained. There were still 2 friendlies unaccounted for. The Bravo Company Commander felt the outpost was hit by approximately 1 platoon sized unit.
- 170310 Artillery fired night defensive fires.
- 170345 Co B's medevacs were out. Co B reported 1 KIA USMC, but they were not sure of the total count on friendly wounded.
- 170515 Co C moved out in the assault of Obj. #11.
- 170610 Co C met slight resistance moving through Obj. #11.
- 170645 The tanks leaving Hill #29 on the way to BLT 1/3's position were at check point #1.
- 170710 The tanks were at check point #2.
- 170730 The tanks were at check point #3.
- 170750 The tanks were at check point #4.
- 170820 Co C found 11 Butterfly mines.
- 170837 Co C captured 3 VCS on Obj. #11.
- 170900 After a thorough search of their outpost area, Co B had all friendlies accounted for and had 13 NVA KIA. The Bravo Company Commander felt more NVA were killed and seriously wounded because of the cries and moans heard from positions forward of the outpost after the firefight. The total casualties sustained from the contact were 1 KIA USMC and 13 WIA USMC, all from Co B. Co A had the tanks in sight.
- 170910 Co C found some USMC 782 gear and 4 NVA packs at 152288.
- 171105 Companies A and B started moving.
- 171125 Companies C and D and the Alpha Command started moving.
- 171410 Co D captured 3 VCS in a village at 181302.
- 171445 Co A reported 1 VC KIA and 3 detainees at 175315.
- 171700 Companies A and D and the Alpha Command were consolidated on Obj. #13. Companies B and C were consolidated on Obj. #14.
- 172400 All 1/3 units secure. No enemy contact.
- 180700 One platoon from Co C and one section of tanks checked Obj. #15 for a battalion position and a suitable landing zone.
- 180930 Co C platoon and tanks returned to Obj. #14. No suitable landing zone was found at Obj. #15. Companies B, C and Recon moved to Obj. #13 to join the rest of the 1/3 units.
- 181050 All 1/3 units consolidated on Obj. #13.
- 181200 BLT 1/3 chopped Opcon to the 5th Marines.
- 181415 The tanks were sent back to Hill #29.
- 181500 Resupply commenced for the battalion.
- 181615 The battalion received word by radio that the tanks had arrived at Hill #29.
- 181730 The BLT Commander and the S-3 held a briefing for 1/3 unit leaders on the second phase of Operation Cochiase.
- 182400 All 1/3 units secure. No enemy contact.
- 190630 The helicopters were in early for the lift of BLT 1/3.
- 190715 Companies B and C were loaded on the helicopters.
- 190730 The first wave was lifted out with Companies B, C and most of D.
- 190745 The first wave landed in LZ Hawk. The aircraft reported no fire in the zone.

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- 190815 The last elements of Co D and the Alpha Command were heliborne. Co C reported 2 NVA probables and 2 captured at LZ Hawk. Co B reported that interrogation of villagers disclosed that the villagers were instructed not to go North of the river because the NVA were massing their troops there. Helicopters received sporadic sniper fire from North of the river while inserting the Fifth Marines.
- 190950 The insertion of 1/5 was complete.
- 191010 Co B found 3 NVA and 1 woman in green uniforms in a cave at 874210. Co B claimed 1 probable KIA from blood stains on the ground where a young male was knocked down by small arms fire.
- 191130 The lift into LZ Hawk was complete for all units.
- 191400 An NVA Warrant Officer captured by 1/5 and turned over to 1/3 led a patrol from Co C to rice cache of about 2 tons.
- 191430 A Co C patrol killed 3 VC, captured 3 VCS and found 300 pounds of rice.
- 191830 Co C killed 1 VC trying to infiltrate their lines.
- 192400 All 1/3 units secure. No enemy contact.
- 200630 Companies B and D moved out to commence search and destroy operations within the 1/3 ZOA.
- 200815 Co B had 1 Marine wounded by a booby trap.
- 200905 Co B secured Obj. #5.
- 201025 Co B killed 1 VC.
- 201120 Co B secured Obj. #11.
- 201155 Co D found a huge rice cache at 851211.
- 201210 Co D found 2 VC hiding in a hole.
- 201330 Co C had a VC detainee try to escape by running toward their perimeter. The VC couldn't be caught, so when he cleared the perimeter he was brought under fire and killed.
- 201630 Co B started returning to the battalion perimeter. Co D also started returning minus the 3rd platoon, which stayed with the rice cache until it could be extracted.
- 201700 Co B was back in the perimeter.
- 201730 Co D was back in the perimeter. Co B reported finding 1 Stevens 12 gauge shotgun and some shotgun shells in a hut.
- 210700 Resupply of the 1/3 units commenced.
- 210910 Co B moved out to continue search and destroy operations.
- 210930 The helicopters bringing refugees and rice bags to D-3's position received sniper fire and couldn't land. The refugees and bags were placed in LZ Hawk and Co D escorted them to D-3's position to load the rice cache for extraction. Both 4.2" mortar batteries were helilifted from LZ Hawk.
- 211230 Co B was sniped at while looking for a site for a river crossing. They did not find a crossing, but did find a hut with 100 Piasters and 20 AK-40 rounds in it.
- 211345 Co D reached D-3's position. Co B secured Obj. #4.
- 211630 Co B returned to the battalion perimeter.
- 211800 Five CH-46 loads of rice and the refugees were extracted and Co D started for the battalion perimeter.
- 211930 Co D returned to the perimeter.
- 220700 UH-1E and fixed wing aircraft ran strikes North of the river on Objectives #12, #13 and #14. 15 KIA were claimed.

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- 220715 The air strikes secured.
- 220730 The helicopter brought in the rope to effect the river crossing.
- 220910 Co B sent 1 squad across the river to secure the rope for the crossing.
- 221000 The squad from Co B secured the rope on the North side of the river.
- 221130 Co D had half its elements across the river.
- 221330 Co D had completed the crossing and Co C had half its elements across. Co B challenged a VC, he ran and was killed.
- 221600 Co C was across the river, the Alpha Command was across and half of Co B was across the river. Resupply of the battalion was commenced. Co B found a cache of rice and corn. It was burned due to the tactical situation.
- 221700 All 1/3 units had effected the river crossing.
- 230800 A detail from the Alpha Command, on a water run, uncovered an ammo cache at 872223.
- 230830 Co D had 13 refugees desiring to be evacuated from a village at 873225.
- 230930 Co B reported a total of 174 82mm mortar rounds, 48 60mm mortar rounds, 24 Chicom grenades, 14 boxes of 60 mm mortar fuzes, 27 boxes of 82mm mortar fuzes, 8 boxes of 60mm mortar nose detonators and 26 boxes of 82mm mortar nose detonators from the arms cache that was uncovered. It was all blown in place except one sample from each lot number, which was sent to the 5th Marines.
- 231000 All 1/3 units moved in continuance of search and destroy operations within the battalion TAOR.
- 231010 Co C secured Obj. #16.
- 231135 Co C reported having 1 female VCS and a 5 year old boy. Co B killed 1 VC who ran when challenged.
- 231315 Co C secured Obj. #18.
- 231330 Co D secured Obj. #20 and still moving. Co D called artillery on an automatic weapon firing from Obj. #19.
- 231345 Co B secured Obj. #20.
- 231400 Co D captured 3 VCS hiding in a cave.
- 231530 Co D secured Obj. #21.
- 231600 Co C secured Obj. #19.
- 231630 Companies B, D and the Alpha Command were consolidated on Obj. #21.
- 240600 D-2 departed back to the river crossing with a detainee who claimed to know the location of an ammo cache.
- 240630 D-2 was at check point #2.
- 240650 D-2 was at check point #3.
- 240820 D-2 was at check point #4.
- 241000 Co B had 1 friendly WIA from a booby trap.
- 241020 D-2 reached the river crossing, made contact with 4 persons in green uniforms and called in artillery. They claimed 2 probable VC KIA.
- 241215 D-2 reported finding 1 ton of rice, 1 9mm pistol, 2 transistor radios and several rounds of assorted small arms.
- 241250 Co C started moving.
- 241420 D-2 was helilifted back to Co D position.
- 241503 Co D and the Alpha Command started moving.
- 250600 Phase III of Operation Cochise commenced.

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250845 Co D was at Phase Line Red.
 250915 Co D called artillery on 15 VC at 955278. The results were not known until the area could be swept.
 251325 Co A had 1 friendly WIA from a sniper.
 251400 Co D captured 1 female VCS.
 251730 Resupply commenced for the battalion.
 260700 All 1/3 units started moving.
 260855 Co A captured 6 VCS.
 260955 Co A secured Obj. #6. Three VC were killed and 3 captured.
 261030 Co B secured Obj. #7. One VC was killed and 3 were captured.
 261145 Co A had 1 KIA USMC from sniper fire.
 261230 Co B killed 2 VC snipers 964315.
 261550 Co C secured Obj. #8. Four VCS were captured.
 261600 Co B had 1 WIA USMC from sniper fire.
 261800 Co C found 300 M-1 rounds and some 782 gear. All 1/3 units were consolidated in night positions.
 270700 All 1/3 units started moving.
 270845 Co C secured Obj. #13.
 270930 Co B secured Obj. #14.
 271050 Co C had 1 WIA USMC from a booby trap.
 271210 Co D and the Alpha Command received sniper fire. In the exchange of small arms, Co D knocked 1 VC down and they claimed 1 VC KIA probable.
 271645 All 1/3 units were consolidated at Que Son.
 280700 The helilift of BIF 1/3 to Chu Lai commenced.
 281330 The helilift of BIF 1/3 to Chu Lai completed. All 1/3 units started preparing for the backload back to the ships of the ARG on the 29th of August 1967.

9. Results.

a. Enemy Losses:

43 KIA Confirmed
 76 KIA Probable
 53 Detainees

b. Enemy Equipment and Weapons Captured.

12 K-44
 1 SKS
 1 9mm Pistol
 1 M-1 Rifle
 1 Stevens 12 gauge shotgun
 25 12 gauge shotgun shells

c. Friendly Losses.

8 KIA
 39 WIA

d. Friendly Equipment and Weapons Lost:

1 PRG/25 Radio
 3 M-16 Rifles
 1 .45 Cal. Pistol

10. Administrative Matters

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- a. Postal. Mail was delivered to BLT 1/3 rear in DANANG, sorted by company/attached units and delivered to Hill #63 for further distribution to the field. Mail delivery was accomplished every other day on a regular basis with the difficulties being delay of delivery due to transportation availability and timing.
- b. Logistics. All resupply was accomplished by helicopter from the LSA on Hill #63 every other day during Operation COCHISE. Unit resupply requests came directly from using units to the LSA where unit distribution was effected. All classes of supplies were available and provided in satisfactory quantities from LSA, Hill #63. No extreme difficulties were encountered in effecting resupply. During Operation COCHISE, R&R, rotations and replacement personnel, in transit to and from the field, were processed thru 1/3 admin rear DANANG.
- c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation. Casualties were evacuated by helicopter from the operating area directly to the C & C Platoon established at Hill #63. BLT 1/3 supply liaison personnel were placed at Hill #63 to claim and safe guard casualty equipment and individual weapons. Unit casualties were reported via HST net to BLT 1/3 S-1 representative at LSA, Hill #63 and phoned to BLT 1/3 admin rear where the battalion personnel officer reported directly to 1st Division casualty reporting section. No severe difficulties or problems were encountered.
- d. Communications. During Operation COCHISE logistics communications with units in the field were generally good via the HST net. Commencing Phase II of Operation COCHISE a radio relay was established and maintained at NUI LAC SON for relay from units in the field to LSA for resupply, evacuation and movement of personnel to and from the field.

11. Commander's Analysis.

At the commencement of Phase II, Mortar Batteries 2/11 and 2/12 were brought in to LZ Hawk prior to the completion of the survey by the recon party from 2/11. Consequently, they were landed in the wrong location and helicopters had to be fragged to return and reposition the initial elements of the Mortar Batteries. This did not have an adverse effect on the overall tactical situation, but the consequences could have been critical. It is suggested for similar operations in the future, the Mortar Batteries be placed in an "on-call" status. H&I fires were seldom approved or received final clearance to be fired prior to 2200. In order to deny the enemy freedom of movement under the early hours of darkness it is suggested that all efforts be made to begin H&I fires immediately after dusk. Especially when the enemy are known to be in a particular area of operations. The lack of insufficient time allotted to conduct thorough and extensive search and destroy type operations appears to be a common discrepancy. Phase II was cut short by two days which prevented BLT 1/3 from completing coverage of the Battalion's Zone of Action.

BLT 1/3 received a warning order at 1500 on D+2 to be prepared to effect a river crossing in the Battalion's Zone of Action on the morning of D+3. Due to recent heavy rainfalls, there was no suitable crossing site as the water level had risen and the current was too swift for a man to walk across the river without the aid of some type of crossing equipment i. e., lines,


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rubber boats, flotation devices etc. The above items were requested but the Battalion only received one line. Several personnel were nearly drowned, but fortunately no one was lost in the operation. In addition, due to the lack of adequate equipment an entire day was required to complete the crossing. It would appear that prior detailed planning and coordination might prevent recurrences of this nature in future operations.

AE Thomas
A. I. THOMAS

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
Operation COUMISE (Phase I)
Map Sheet #6640 II



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Operation COCHISE (Phase II)
Map Sheet #6640 III

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ENCLOSURE (2)
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Operation GOCHISE (Phase III)
Map Sheet #6640 IAI

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