

DECLASSIFIED

90-68

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

68 0163A

3/OMF/jrb
5750
7 April 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 - 31 March 1968

Ref: (a) MCC 5750.2A Ch 1
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) DivC 5750.2B Ch 1

Encl: (1) Fifth Marine Command Chronology
(2) Headquarters Company Fifth Marines Command Chronology
(3) First Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology
(4) Second Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology
(5) Third Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b) and (c), enclosures (1) through (5) are submitted as the Command Chronology from the Fifth Marine Regiment for the period 1 - 31 March 1968.

R. D. Bohn

R. D. BOHN

5 & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
68 1249
Copy 1 of 5 copies

5 & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
Copy 1 of 5 copies

5TH MARD 5 & C FILES
022413-68
COPY NO. 2 OF 6

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

5750
7 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March to 31 March 1968

INDEX

- PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

5750
7 April 1968PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein) Colonel R. D. BOHN

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines	Capt R. H. KIRKPATRICK
1st Battalion, 5th Marines	Maj R. H. THOMPSON
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol E. C. CHEATHAM JR.
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol W. K. ROCKEY (1-27 Mar 1968) LtCol D. N. REXROAD (28-31 Mar 1968)

ATTACHED UNITS

2d Battalion, 502 Airborne Infantry (21 Feb - 6 Mar 1968)
1st Battalion, 327th Airborne Infantry (11 Feb - 8 Mar 1968)
2d Battalion, 3d Marines (27 Feb - 11 Mar 1968)

2. Location

Thua Thien Province, Phu Bai, RVN Regimental CP

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	LtCol G. C. MCNAUGHTON
S-1	Capt B. J. MULHERIN
S-2	Major C. M. WOGAN
S-3	Major J. F. CODY
S-4	Capt S. K. MCKEE
S-5	1stLt G. E. OWSLEY
CommO	Major E. R. PIERCE
MTO	1stLT D. G. WILKIE
SupplyO	Capt S. THOMPSON JR (1-25 Mar 1968)
Regimental Chaplain	1stLt J. T. LOVELL (26-31 Mar 1968)
	LtCdr E. TAKESIAN CHC, USN (1-27 Mar 1968)
	LtCdr L. U. BECK, USN (28-31 Mar 1968)

1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

REF ID: A6575

5750
7 April 1968

Regimental Surgeon
Regimental Sergeant Major
Regimental Dental Officer

Lt R. A. HARRISON MC, USN
Sgt Maj K. CHASE
Lt S. J. WILSON DC, USN

4. Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	122	<u>ENL</u>	3571	<u>OFF</u>
				10
				<u>ENL</u>
				155

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5750
7 April 1968

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-31 March the Fifth Marines conducted Operation Houston in the Phu Loc AO. This was a multi-battalion Search and Destroy Operation with the primary mission of securing and reopening Highway 1, the Main Supply Route from Danang to Phu Bai.

Operation Houston also entailed extensive reconnaissance efforts to locate trail networks and enemy harbour sites located in the canopy south of Highway 1.

As the month began, the First and Second Battalions of the Regiment remained under the operation control of the First Marine Regiment, and operated in the vicinity of Hue.

The Regiment had the Operational Control of the Second Battalion Five Hundred and Second Infantry Airborne and the First Battalion Three Hundred and Twenty Seventh Infantry Airborne and the Second Battalion Third Marines. Along with the Third Battalion of the Regiment, these three Battalions participated in Operation Houston.

On the Sixth of the Month, the Second Battalion Five Hundred and Second Airborne Infantry left the operational control of the Regiment, and the First Battalion of the Regiment returned to the Fifth Marines, and began immediately to participate in Operation Houston in the vicinity of Hai Van Pass.

On the Eighth of the month, the First Battalion Three Hundred and Twenty Seventh Airborne Infantry left the operational control of the Regiment and the Second Battalion of the Regiment returned to the operation control of the Fifth Marines and began immediately to participate in Operation Houston in the vicinity of Phu Loc.

On the Eleventh of the Month, the Second Battalion Third Marines left the operational control of the Fifth Marines.

Even though units participating in Operation Houston changed frequently at first, the Operation continued successfully. Highway 1 was reopened to daily convoy traffic, and all units conducted Search and Destroy Operations much deeper into the canopy than ever before. Extensive Intelligence of the area was attained, and most important, the Main Supply Route from Da-nang to Phu Bai was open and secure.

DECLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Personnel and Administration. The command received an input of 10 Officers and 363 Enlisted personnel during the month of March 1968.

A total of 2 officers and 251 enlisted personnel were medically evacuated out of RVN during the month.

The average chargeable strength for the Regiment was 120 Marine Officers, 3271 Marine Enlisted, 10 Naval Officers and 106 Naval Enlisted personnel.

Casualties for the month of March:

UNIT	KIA	DOW	WIA	NBC	NBD	WIANE
HqCo	0	0	0	0	0	0
1/5	17	0	31	18	1	27
2/5	2	0	27	8	0	31
3/5	18	1	79	21	0	16
TOTAL	37	1	137	47	1	74

Med-Evac

USMC		USN		
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	
HqCo	0	2	0	0
1/5	0	75	0	3
2/5	1	94	0	0
3/5	1	77	0	0
TOTAL	2	248	0	3

2. INTELLIGENCE

a. General. During the month of March, the S-2 Section continued collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information in support of Operation Houston, as well as preparing plans and estimates for Operation Order 5-68.

(1) From 1-21 March 1968, the Regimental S-2 (-) remained deployed with the Regimental CP group at the Cau Doi Peninsula (ZD0503). On 21 March 1968 the S-2 (-) displaced with the CP group to Claymore Pass (ZD1101), and returned to the Phu Bai Combat Base on 26 March 1968. The mobility of the S-2 (-) facilitated close, daily contact with the Battalion S-2's and enhanced the timely development of combat intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

(2) Close liaison with 1st Force Recon Co, established during February, continued throughout the month of March, permitted maximum surveillance of the 5th Marines AO, and facilitated full exploitation of reconnaissance-developed information.

(3) Personnel changes, necessitated by routine rotation, were accomplished with minimum disruption in S-2 functioning. On 9 March, MSGT W. S. BARBEE relieved MSGT J. D. WYNN as Regimental S-2 Chief; and on 24 March GYSGT WHITE transferred to 3/5 to relieve SSGT M. G. A. RIDDELL, who rotates in early April.

b. Projects.

(1) Annex D (Intelligence) to Operation Order 4-68 (Operation Houston) published 4 March 1968 as part of change 1.

(2) Appendix 4 (Target List) to Annex (B) Intelligence to Operation Order 301-68 (Revised) published on 9 March 1968.

(3) Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 5-68, which included an Intelligence Estimate, Target List, Trails Overlay, and Landing Zone Overlay, was published on 28 March 1968.

(4) One "Patrol Seismic Intrusion Device" was issued to each Battalion on 25 March 1968 for use and evaluation.

(5) A program of publishing OOB listings weekly was initiated on 20 March 1968.

c. Cumulative Enemy Losses During the Reporting period:

(1) 60 NVA/19 VC KIA's

(2) 70 DETAINEES

a. 3 VC PW's

b. 17 VC RETURNNEES

c. 3 CIVIL DEFENDANTS

d. 47 INNOCENT CIVILIANS

(3) 33 WEAPONS CAPTURED

a. 29 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

b. 4 CREW SERVED WEAPONS

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

(4) CAR and ARVN Units in the 5th Marines AO received 10 CHIEU HOI's during the reporting period.

d. Significant Aspects of Enemy, Weather, and Terrain.

(1) Enemy

(a) Operation Houston produced two company size delaying actions in the vicinity of Dong Top (ZC1898) and Loc Tri (ZC1195) during the first week of March. In the later case, a significant base camp (ZC115957), which had been pin-pointed by CAP-7 Marines who escaped their NVA captors on 22 January, was uncovered and destroyed.

(b) Contacts diminished sharply following the first week of March. Small unit sightings and contacts, occasional local guerrilla activity consisting of harassing small arms and mortar fire and sporadic mining continued through 30 March, giving credence to the low level agent reports that the major enemy elements had withdrawn into the mountains south and west of the 5th Marines AO to train replacements and resupply. Further evidence of this came from numerous CHIEU HOI's, who had been forced to join the VC during the TET Campaign, and the widespread reports of increased taxation and rice collection efforts.

(c) Reconnaissance in Force of the Troui Valley during the 2nd week of March produced no major contact; but did uncover many heavily used east-west trails and recently occupied harbour sites. In addition, effective ambushes vicinity YC973975 resulted in killing an NVA doctor and an NVA ordnance supply Warrant Officer on the 14th and 15th of March. Documents recovered from the KIA's reveal the continued presence of the 804th Bn, the K-4C Bn, the K-2 Bn (possibly an AKA for the K-4B) and the C14 (AKA C-19) Engineer/Sapper Co. It should be noted that both KIA's were moving southwest at the times the ambushes were sprung. Further, the ordnance Warrant Officer was formerly assigned to the 9th NVA Regiment, indicating that elements of the 9th NVA Regimental HQ may have formed the Cadre for the 4th NVA Regiment.

(d) Extensive mining activity throughout the month occurred in the area east of the ZD20 Grid and north of the ZD05 Grid. These efforts appeared to concentrate in the vicinity of Nui Tran (408306), indicating the possible presence of large supply caches. Extensive search failed to produce these caches and a program of terrain denial through intensive bombardment of Nui Tran was initiated in order to minimize friendly casualties from mines.

(e) On 24 March, a Reconnaissance in force penetrated the former resort area of Bach Ma peak, finding no evidence of significant enemy use of the area.

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

(f) At 0200H on 31 March, the enemy punctuated the close of the reporting period with a well coordinated attack on the Troui Bridge (YD9606) and adjacent defensive positions. The main attack, supported by 82 and 60mm mortars, and B-40 rockets as well as small arms and automatic weapons, was affected by 2 NVA Companies, possibly the K-4B Bn, reinforced with sappers. The attack was partially successful in that sappers penetrated the bridge defenses, planted and detonated their demolition charges, rendering the bridge impassable to vehicular traffic. A simultaneous supporting attack on Bridge 4 (YC9507) was also partially successful, resulting in the destruction of about a 15 foot section of decking on the new timber trestle bridge. The old, class 50, concrete bridge, however, remained intact. Additional supporting attacks on Caps H-3, H-8, the CB Rock Crusher and the Phu Loc Combat Base were unsuccessful from an enemy point of view. The breadth and obvious coordination of the attacks indicate Battalion control. The sustained nature of the fighting (contact continued until 0600H) indicated both a professional force and a priority mission. This marks the enemy's first serious attempt in over a month to interdict Route 1. As such, the attacks possibly indicate the beginning of the next phase in the enemy's offensive.

(2) Weather. Throughout the reporting period, partly cloudy to cloudy conditions, which favored friendly operations, prevailed. Almost daily low ceilings, however, did interfere with helicopter and fixed-wing air-support operations.

(3) Terrain. No change. However, the 5th Marines' expanding body of knowledge of trails and landing zones enhanced our mobility in the heavy canopy south of highway 1. Detailed terrain information continues to be a high priority collection item.

e. Miscellaneous

(1) Information concerning the K-4C Battalion and the NVA K-4 Battalion reported last month to have replaced the 804th Main Force Battalion, has been correlated with the 1st Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment.

(2) Villager reports during March continued to have a high frequency rate and fair reliability. A concerted effort is being made to coordinate exploitation of this source.

4. Training. During the period 1-31 March the Regiment established a five day replacement training course consisting of weapons firing and/or demonstrations to include the LAAM, M-79, M-60 Machine Gun and M-16 zeroing. In addition to the M-26 frag grenade, the M33 cofram was introduced for lecture and demonstration. The following formal schools were attended during the same period both in RVN and other West Pac areas:

Comm Crypto Security	Japan	1
Basic Ammo Tech	Okinawa	2
Embarcation course (Enl)	Okinawa	1

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

Vietnamese Language	Okinawa	6
Vietnamese Language	III MAF	10
NCO School	Danang	4
S/NCO School	Danang	2
Officer Leadership	Danang	2
Basic Ammo Tech	Okinawa	2
Embarkation course (Officer)	Okinawa	1
Embarkation course (Enl)	Okinawa	2
Basic Organic Supply Asst	Danang	1
Motor Transport Maint Asst	Phu Bai	10
AN PP/S 6	Danang	4
Career Advisor	Okinawa	1
Registered Lubs Course	Japan	2
Military Justice	Okinawa	1

4. Operations. During the month of March, all operation efforts of the Regiment were included in Operation Houston in the Phu Loc 40.

Initially, efforts were placed on securing Highway 1 for engineer units while the engineers replaced damaged bridges and culverts. Once the road was repaired, security was provided for convoy traffic, and units began sweeps north of Highway 1 to eliminate local VC units still operating in the area.

Next, units began extensive Search and Destroy operations south of Hwy 1 to gain intelligence of the area, locate harbour sites, and destroy NVA elements which had been operating in the area.

Enemy contact was light, as it appeared units had pulled back into the mountains following the TET Campaign. However, numerous bunkers, harbour sites and mortar positions were located and destroyed.

Toward the end of the month, the First Battalion moved north to the Phu Bai Area of Operation, and plans were begun to conduct operations in the new area.

5. Fire Support.

a. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines continues to be in direct support of the 5th Marines. During the month of March the principle effort of the battalion was directed to the support of Operation Houston. The following missions were fired in support of the Fifth Marine Regiment:

OPERATION HOUSTON

MISSIONS FIRED

WEAPON	OBS	UNOBS	H&I	TOTAL
155 How	5	10	81	96

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

WEAPON	OBS	UNOBS	H&I	TOTAL
105	220	186	1657	2065
4.2" Mtr	1		2	3

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

WEAPON	HE	ILL	MP	OTHER	TOTAL
155 How	370		1		371
105 How	10,730	321	544		11,595
4.2" Mtr	36	5			41

OTHERMISSIONS FIRED

WEAPON	OBS	UNOBS	H&I	TOTAL
155 How	10	30	38	78
105 How	70	40	515	625
4.2" Mtr	18	2	20	40

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

WEAPON	HE	ILL	MP	OTHER	TOTAL
155 How	372	37	4		413
105 How	2956	244	401	15	3316
4.2" Mtr	318	32	10		360

Total Missions fired and total ammunition expenditure for the month of March are as follows:

TOTAL MISSIONS FIRED - 2907 missions.

TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE - 16,096 rounds.

6. Air Support. The following missions were flown in support of the Regiment during the month of March:

Medical Evacuation	101
Tactical Air Strikes	22
Flare Ships	4
Aerial Observers	34
Troop Lifts (totalling 415 troops)	5
Logistics (totalling 174,340 lbs)	65
Gunships	9
Command and Control	31
Administration	69
Visual Reconnaissance	21
Unit Commander	31
 Total Missions	 412

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

7. Logistics. Operation Houston continued throughout the month of March. With the end of the TET Offensive and Operation Hue City, a series of unit moves began which over a 10 day period saw 1/327 and 2/502 returned to Army control. 2/3 chopped to 1st Marines and 1/5 and 2/5 chopped back to 5th Marines. These moves were all made with limited motor transport assets and a maximum of coordination was required.

The Logistic Support Area established at Cau Doi in conjunction with the Fifth Marines Forward CP proved an extremely valuable asset through the month. Shore Party and PLBG-Alpha Support was excellent, contributing significantly to the Regiment's ability to move.

The assignment of 12 trucks from 1st MT Bn and daily availability of CAC helicopters permitted maximum flexibility and capability of moving troops and supplies throughout an AO extending over 60 kilometers of Route 1.

Arrangements were made for the battalion located at Hai Van Pass to be supported from Danang, and this proved very successful.

Operations in the canopy in March introduced several innovations for the Regiment and showed need for jungle equipment. Long Range Patrol Rations were used for the first time and proved very satisfactory for companies operating in canopy where resupply is difficult. It was found that 1 LRR and 1 MCI meal was adequate for 1 day's food for a Marine. In addition the squad water container was used extensively on resupply, but could not be dropped without bursting. Machetes and other jungle tools were needed in large numbers for canopy operations, and lengths of ½ inch line became a necessity in the hills. Four one-man chain saws were received on temporary loan from 1st Engineer Battalion and they were used extensively by 2/5 at Bach Ma in cutting LZ's. Seven .50 Cal. machine guns were received on temporary loan from 11th Motor Transport Battalion. The desirability of requesting a change to T/E to add eight .50 Cal. machine guns is under consideration.

The upgrading of Route 1 proceeded apace even though convoy and tactical traffic was extremely heavy and much congestion occurred at bridges and other choke points. Damage inflicted at Troui River Bridge and Bridge #4 was repaired in 36 hours by 35th Engineer Battalion, USA and by MCB 121.

8. Communications. During the month of March the communications platoon provided support for the 5th Marines Headquarters in the field during Operation Houston.

In addition to normal regimental communications circuits the following radio relay circuits were established:

6 Mar - AN/MRC-62 from 1st Bn 5th Marines CP at Hai Van Pass (vic AT038915) to 5th Marines Rear at Phu Bai Base.

9 Mar - AN/TRC-27 from 2d Bn 5th Marines CP at Cau Doi (vic ZD052025) to 5th Marines Rear at Phu Bai Base.

5750
7 April 1968

11 Mar - AN/MRC-62 from 3d Bn 5th Marines (various locations on the vicinity of route 1) to 5th Marines Rear at Phu Bai Base.

30 Mar - AN/TRC-27 from Regimental CP at Hill 230 (vic YD848085) to 5th Marines CP at Phu Bai Base.

9. Medical. During the month of March a total of 390 patients were treated at the Regimental Aid Station of which 326 were referrals from battalions or other units located in Phu Bai. A total of 495 immunizations were administered during the month of March. The majority of these immunizations were administered to Headquarters Company personnel. A Regimental Aid Station was established with the Forward CP at Cau Doi and adequately provided medical support for Regimental elements at Cau Doi.

10. Dental. During the month of March a total of 234 Marines were treated at the dental clinic. All but 15 were referrals from battalions who were treated during individual company refurbishment periods in Phu Bai.

11. Civil Affairs. During the month of March, a total of 17,765 pounds of rolled oats, bulgar wheat and corn meal was distributed to the refugees of the Phu Loc District by the District Chief. The materials were supplied by Headquarters Company, 5th Marines from the Task Force X-RAY warehouse in Phu Bai. Refugees were also supported in the Phu Luong Village where a total of 1,000 pounds of food was delivered by Headquarters Company, 5th Marines from surpluses of spoilable food from the 5th Marines Mess Hall.

A total of 200 bags of cement, 100 sheets of roofing tin and 150 pieces of rebar were delivered to the Phu Loc District to aid in the rebuilding of a Catholic orphanage and a CVN school which were destroyed during the '72 offensive.

A general support of the refugees of the Phu Loc District has resulted in the gathering of intelligence information and also as a positive answer to the adverse reaction to the T-3 offensive by the VC. The attitudes of the people of the supported areas is expected to bring valuable information as well as a more overt support for the Government of Vietnam.

12. Psychological Operations. During the month of March, extensive use of aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops supported Operation Houston in the 5th Marines Area of Operation. During that Operation, ID/3, attached to the 5th Marines, contributed to the Regimental PsyOps program and because of their efforts several Hoi Chans (Ralliers) returned to the Government of Vietnam under the Chieu Hoi program.

Hand distributed leaflets were distributed throughout the CMOR by Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and ID/3. Armed Propaganda teams were utilized by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and helped to exploit the Hoi Chans (Ralliers) to convince other VC to "Chieu Hoi".

UNCLASSIFIED

5750
7 April 1968

13. Chaplain. During the month of March the Regimental Chaplain provided Services for the Regiment, adjacent units located in Phu Bai, battalions participating in Operation Houston, combined action platoons and bridge security units located along Hwy 1.

SECRET

5750
7 April 1968PART IVCHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDSAND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Enclosure

- ✓(2) Headquarters Company, 5th Marines Command Chronology
- ✓(3) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
- ✓(4) 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
- ✓(5) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology
- ✓(6) Fifth Marines Frag Order 17-68
- ✓(7) Fifth Marines Frag Order 18-68
- ✓(8) Fifth Marines Frag Order 19-68
- ✓(9) Fifth Marines Frag Order 20-68
- ✓(10) Fifth Marines Frag Order 21-68
- ✓(11) Fifth Marines Frag Order 22-68
- ✓(12) Fifth Marines Frag Order 23-68
- ✓(13) Fifth Marines Frag Order 24-68
- ✓(14) Fifth Marines Op Order 301-68 (6 Mar 1968)
- ✓(15) Fifth Marines Op Order 301-68 Ch #1 (11 Mar 1968)
- ✓(16) Fifth Marines Daily Situation Report 1-31 Mar 1968

Filed
Dep

Filed

w/

cmd

Chron

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
~~FIRST BN THREE TWENTY SEVENTH ABN INF~~
FIRST BN THREE TWENTY SEVENTH ABN INF
SECOND BN THIRD MARINES
SECOND BN FIVE HUNDRED SECOND ABN INF

INFO: CG, TF XRAY
FIRST BRIGADE ONE HUNDRED FIRST ABN DIV
FIRST MARINES
ELSG ALPHA
SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG O 17-68 (HOUSTON) (S)

- A. CG TF XRAY OP 011605Z FEB 68 (S)
- B. CG TF XRAY O 021730Z FEB 68 (S)
- C. FIFTH MARINES OPO 4-68 (HOUSTON) (S)
- D. FIFTH MAR FRAG O 16-68 (HOUSTON) (S)

1. SITUATION: NO CHANGE.

2. MISSION: NO CHANGE.

3. EXECUTION:

A. CONCEPT: FIFTH MARINES CONTINUES OFFENSIVE OPNS IN AO WITH RELIEF IN PLACE OF TWO BNS AND RELIEF WITHOUT REPLACEMENT OF ONE BN. THREE BNS EXPAND TO COVER AO.

B. EFF 3 MAR 68.

(1) CO B 1/5 CHOP TO FIFTH MARINES 0001H.

(2) CO B 1/5 RELIEVES CO E 2/5 IN PLACE. CO B REMAINS OPCON FIFTH MARINES.

(3) CO E 2/5 MOVES TO PHU LOC FIRE BASE. ON ARRIVAL CHOP TO 1/327.

(4) CO C 1/5 CHOP TO FIFTH MARINES 1200H. MOVE TO FIFTH MARINES REAR. PHU BAI.

FOR REHAB.

(5) CO L 3/5 CHOP FROM 1/5 TO FIFTH MARINES 1200H. MOVE TO CLAYMORE PASS. ON ARRIVAL CHOP TO 1/327.

C. FOR PLANNING 4 MAR 68. EXECUTE ON ORDER.

(1) 2/5 LESS CO F CHOP TO FIFTH MARINES ON ORDER. MOVE BN CMD GRP AND CO H TO CAU DOI PREPARE TO RELIEVE 1/327 OF PHU LOC TAOR.

(2) CO G 2/5 MOVES TO PHU LOC FIRE BASE. ON ARRIVAL CHOP TO 1/327.

D. EFF 4 MAR 68.

(1) 1/5 CHOP TO FIFTH MARINES 1200H. MOVE BN CMD GRP, CO A, AND CO D TO CAU DOI.

E. EFF 5 MAR 68.

(1) CO H 2/5 RELIEVES CO B 1/5 IN PLACE. CO H REMAINS OPCON 2/5.

(2) CO B 1/5 MOVES TO CAU DOI. CHOP FROM FIFTH MARINES TO 1/5 ON ARRIVAL.

(3) 1/5 CMD GRP. CO A, CO B, AND CO D MOVE TO HAI VAN TAOR. PREPARE TO RELIEVE 2/502 IN PLACE.

(4) CO L 3/5 CHOP FROM 1/327 TO 3/5 1200H. REMAIN IN PLACE. 3/5 EXPANDS AO TO INCLUDE CLAYMORE PASS.

(5) 2/5 RELIEVES 1/327 OF PHU LOC TAOR IN PLACE AT 1200H. 2/5 REMAINS IN PLACE.

(6) 1/327 MOVES FROM PHU LOC TAOR COMMENCING 1200H. CHOP FROM FIFTH MARINES TO FIRST BRIGADE ONE HUNDRED FIRST ABN DIV AT 1800H.

F. EFF 6 MAR 68.

- (1) 1/5 RELIEVES 2/502 OF HAI VAN TAOR IN PLACE AT 1200H.
- (2) 2/502 MOVES FROM HAI VAN TAOR COMMENCING 1200H. CHOP FROM FIFTH MARINES TO FIRST DE ONE HUNDRED FIRST ABN DIV AT 1800H.
- C. FOR PLANNING 7 MAR 68. EXECUTE ON ORDER.
- (1) 2/3 RELIEVED OF AO, MOVE TO PHU BAI, CHOP FROM FIFTH MARINES TO FIRST MARINES ON ORDER.
- (2) 3/5 EXPANDS AO TO RELIEVE 2/3 ON ORDER.
- H. EFF 8 MAR 68.
- (1) CO F 2/5 CHOP FROM FIRST MARINES TO FIFTH MARINES TO 2/5 AND MOVE TO PHU LOC TAOR ON ORDER.
- 4. ADMIN-LOG:
 - A. RELIEVED AND RELIEVING UNITS COORDINATE TO LEAVE MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF CLASSES, ONE, THREE, AND FIVE SUPPLIES IN PLACE.
 - B. POLICE AND ACCEPTANCE OF AREAS TO BE COORDINATED BY RELIEVED AND RELIEVING UNITS.
 - C. TRANSPORTATION SCHEDULE TO BE ANNOUNCED.
- 5. COMM-ELEC: NO CHANGE.

GP-4

BT

SECRET

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

INF: CG, TF XRAY

- A. FIFTH MAR OPO 301-68 (S)
- B. FIFTH MAR OPO 4-68 (HOUSTON) (S)
- C. HOUSTON OVERLAY

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 18-68 (HOUSTON)

TASK ORGANIZATION: CHANGE TO READ:

FIFTH MARINES COL BOHN
FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES MAJ THOMPSON

H AND S CO 1/5

CO A 1/5

CO B 1/5

CO C 1/5

CO D 1/5

SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES LTCOL CHEATHAM

H AND S CO 2/5

CO E 2/5

CO F 2/5

CO G 2/5

CO H 2/5

THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES LTCOL ROCKEY

CO I 3/5

CO K 3/5

CO L 3/5

CO M 3/5

1. SITUATION: NO CHANGE.

2. MISSION? NO CHANGE.

3. EXECUTION:

A. CONCEPT: NO CHANGE.

B. FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES:

(1) CONTINUE S AND D OPNS IN ASSIGNED TAOR AND IN REGT AO COVERING REGT OBJS BEGINNING WITH NUMERAL ONE.

(2) CHOP ONE RIFLE CO TO THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES 14 MAR AT A TIME AGREED WITH THAT BN.

C. SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES:

(1) CONTINUE S AND D OPNS IN ASSIGNED TAOR.

(2) COMMENCING 13 MAR CONDUCT S AND D OPNS IN REGT AO COVERING REGT OBJS BEGINNING WITH NUMERAL TWO.

D. THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES:

- (1) CONTINUE S AND D OPNS IN ASSIGNED TAOR.
- (2) ASSUME OPCON ONE RIFLE CO FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES 14 MAR AT A TIME AGREED WITH THAT BN.
- (3) COMMENCING 14 MAR CONDUCT MULTI-CO S AND D OPNS ON NUI VINH PHONG PENINSULA COVERING REGT OBJS BEGINNING WITH NUMERAL FIVE.

E. COORD INST.

- (1) FURNISH SUPPORTING FRAG ORDERS TO THIS HQ ASAP.
- (2) Dirlavth.

4. ADMIN - LOG: NO CHANGE.

5. COMM - ELEC: NO CHANGE.

SECRET

BT

GP-4

PREC: OP IMMEDIATE

FM: OFFSPRING
TO: ROCKMAT
INF: SANDHURST

FRAG ORDER 19-68 (HOUSTON)

1. SITUATION: BASE AREA OF POSSIBLE NVA BN LOCATED EAST BRANCH TRUOI.

ONE COMPANY REPORTED OPERATING VIC ZC0396. TARGET LIST:

- A. BUNKER SERVED BY TRAIL ZC013967.
- B. TRIANGLE DEFENSIVE POSITION ZC013968.
- C. BASE AREA ZC011964.
- D. SUPPLY POINT ZC018961.
- E. ELEPHANT OR TRUCK PARKED ZC024960.

2. MISSION: CONDUCT SEARCH OF OFFSPRING OBJECTIVES TWENTY-SIX, TWENTY-SEVEN, AND TWENTY-EIGHT TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND MATERIAL.

3. EXECUTION:

- A. SEARCH FOR AND LOCATE EAST-WEST TRAIL. SWEEP WEST ON AXIS OF TRAIL TO CONDUCT S AND D OF TRAIL AND OBJECTIVES TWENTY-SIX, TWENTY-SEVEN, AND TWENTY-EIGHT.
- B. BE PREPARED TO SWEEP OBJECTIVE TWENTY-NINE ON ORDER.
- C. AT YOUR DISCRETION CONDUCT RECON WITH NO MORE THAN ONE LETTER TO OBJECTIVE TWO-ZERO-SIX.

4. NO CHANGE.

5. NO CHANGE.

DTG SIGNED: 152300H MAR 68

PRECEDENCE: OP IMMED

FM OFFSPRING
TO NAILBRUSH
TERRAPIN

INF SANDHURST

FRAG ORDER 20-68 (HOUSTON)

TASK ORGANIZATION:

NAULBRUSH
NAILBRUSH CHARLIE
TERRAPIN MIKE

1. SITUATION:

- A. ENEMY: ONE LOCAL VC PLAT EST STRENGTH THIRTY-SIX ARMED WITH SA AND ONE 60MM. POSSIBLE HARBOR SITE VIC ZC147962. KAB MAIN FORCE BN EST STRENGTH TWO-SEVENTY-FIVE ARMED WITH SA 82MM, 60MM, 12.7MM MG, AND B-40. KNOWN TO OPERATE VIC ZC1697. INDICATIONS THIS BN RETURNED FROM HUE TO RECRUIT AND TRAIN REPLACEMENTS IN MID FEB.
- B. FRIENDLY: ~~HEAD~~COLD FOXTROT SUPPORTS.
- C. ATTACH-DETACH: TERRAPIN MIKE CHOP TO NAILBRUSH ON ARRIVAL ASSY AREA.

2. MISSION: CONDUCT SEARCH OF DESIGNATED OFFSPRING OBJECTIVES TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND MATERIAL.

3. EXECUTION:

- A. NAILBRUSH:
 - (1) MOVE COMMAND GROUP AND CHARLIE TO TERRAPIN CP, FROM ROSE: R-2.2 D-0.5; AT 181400H MAR. ASSUME OPCON TERRAPIN MIKE ON ARRIVAL AND RON VIC THAT POSIT.
 - (2) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY BEGIN SEARCH FOR AND LOCATE TRAILS. SWEEP SOUTH EAST ON AXIS OF TRAIL TO CONDUCT S AND D OF OBJECTIVES THIRTY-NINE AND THREE-ZERO-ONE. ON ORDER CONTINUE TO S AND D OBJECTIVES THREE-ZERO-TWO AND THIRTY SEVEN.
 - (3) YOUR SOA BEGINNING H MINUS ONE HOUR, FROM ROSE: D-3.0, EAST TO D-3.0 R-6.0, SOUTH TO D-10.0 R-6.0, WEST ON COMMON LINE TO D-6.4, AND NORTH TO D-3.0.
- B. TERRAPIN:
 - (1) CHOP TERRAPIN MIKE TO NAILBRUSH ON ARRIVAL YOUR CP.
 - (2) RETRACT ALL FORCES TO WITHIN YOUR OWN TAOR NLT H MINUS TWO HOURS.

DECLASSIFIED

C. COORDINATING INST:

- (1) D-DAY AND H-HOUR: (BRPLJQE).
- (2) NAILBRUSH SOA NFZ FOR ALL OTHER UNITS.

4. NO CHANGE.

5. NO CHANGE.

DTG SIGNED: 182302H MAR 1968

DECLASSIFIED

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: HAND DELIVER TO SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES AND SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES. TELETYPE TO TF XRAY.

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
INF: CG TF XRAY

BT
S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 21-68 (HOUSTON)

1. SITUATION:

A. ENEMY:

- (1) ONE NVA CO (POSSIBLE ELEMENT OF K4C BN) REIN WITH 60MM, 82MM B-40, AND LMGS OPERATES IN VIC ZC1195.
- (2) FOURTH NVA REGT MAINTAINS A BASE CAPT VIC ZC1192, POSSIBLY REOCCUPIED SINCE 14 MAR.
- (3) PRINCIPAL NORTH*SOUTH TRAIL (ENEMY MSR) FOLLOWS RIDGE LINE FROM ZC118947 TO ZC103937, THEN SOUTH ALONG SONG CHA NAY.

B. NO CHANGE.

2. MISSION: CONDUCT SEARCH OF DESIGNATED REGT OBJS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND MATERIAL.

3. EXECUTION:

A. CONCEPT: ONE BN CONDUCTS ~~SEARCH~~ S AND D OPNS WITH TWO COMPANIES IN CANOPY SOUTH OF PHU LOC FIRE ~~BASE~~.

B. SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES:

- (1) AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY COMMENCE SEARCH FOR AND LOCATE ENEMY TRAILS, FEEDER TRAILS, CACHE SITES, AND POSITIONS IN REGT OBJS TWO-ONE-THREE AND TWO-ONE-TWO.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT TRAILS AND EXTEND OPNS TO REGT OBJS TWO-ONE-FOUR AND TWO-ONE-FIVE.
- (3) ON ORDER SIEZE REGT OBJ TWO-ONE-ONE.

C. COORD INST:

- (1) D-DAY AND H-HOUR: 212000H.
- (2) SOA EAST BDRY FROM ZC120980 SOUTH TO ZC120945. SOA CONSISTS OF ALL REGT AO WEST OF BDRY.
- (3) SOA EAST BDRY DESIGNATED FCL.

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

INF: CG FIRST MAR DIV
CG TF XRAY
FIRST MARINES
SEVENTH MARINES
ELEVENTH MARINES
FIRST BN FIRST MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES

BT
S E C R E T

A. CG TF XRAY O 261501Z MAR 68 FRAG O 19-68 (U)

FRAG O 22-68 (U)

1. SITUATION:

- A. 1/5 RELIEVES 1/1 IN PLACE 27 MAR. FIRST MARINES PROVIDES LIMITED HELO AND VEH TRANSPORT TO POSITIONS TO BE RELIEVED.
- B. 2/7 RELIEVES 1/5 IN PLACE OF HAI VAN TAOR 28 MAR.
- C. 2/11 SUPPORTS.

2. MISSION. RELIEVE 1/1 IN PLACE OF PHU BAI AO AND ALL HOLDING POSITIONS ON SELECTED BRIDGES AND OPS IN THAT AO.

3. EXECUTION:

A. FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES:

- (1) 27 MAR: DISPLACE TWO RIFLE COMPANIES TO PHU BAI. RELIEVE 1/1 IN PLACE ON BRIDGES, TWO, THREE, AND FOUR: AND ON OPS TWO-THREE-ZERO AND ONE-EIGHTY-ZERO.
- (2) ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PHU BAI AO ON COMPLETION OF RELIEF OF HOLDING POSITIONS.
- (3) 28 MAR:
 - (A) ONE RIFLE COMPANY ASSUMES BALD EAGLE 0900H.
 - (B) ON RELIEF OF HAI VAN TAOR BY 2/7 DISPLACE REMAINDER OF 1/5 TO PHU BAI.
 - (C) BE PREPARED TO CHOP TO CG TF XRAY ON ORDER.

DECLASSIFIED

B. THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES: ON ORDER ABOUT 28 MAR EXPAND PRESENT TAOR TO SOUTH EAST. ~~EEEMX~~ BDRY TO BE FROM AT885975 SOUTH WEST TO AT8709960. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL AREA TO NEW BDRY.

C. COORD INST:

- (1) DIRLAUTH.
- (2) REPORT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF EACH TASK TO THIS HQ IMMED.

S E C R E T
BT

GP-4

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

INF: CG. TF XRAY
SEVENTH MARINES
CAG THREE
SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES
SECOND BN SEVENTH MARINES
THIRTY FIFTH BN ARMY ENG BN

BT

FRAG ORDER 23-68

1. FIFTH MARINES EXPANDS AO NORTH AND WEST TO INCLUDE PHU BAI, AND SOUTH AND EAST TO INCLUDE HAI VAN PASS.

2. EXECUTION:

A. FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES:

- (1) 300800H MAR DISPLACE ELEMENTS TO AND RELIEVE ELEMENTS OF 2/5 IN PLACE OF BRIDGES FIVE, SIX, AND SEVEN.
- (2) ON RELIEF OF 2/5 EXPAND PRESENT TAOR SOUTH EAST TO BDRY FROM 008036 SOUTH ON HOI ONG LAI TO 000016; THEN SOUTH ON GL 00 TO 000000.

B. SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES:

(1) 30 MAR AND WHEN RELIEVED BY 1/5:

- (A) PROVIDE LNO TO FAM RELIEVING ELEMENTS OF 1/5 WITH TASKS AND AREA.
- (B) ON RELIEF IN PLACE OF BRIDGES FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, AND DESIG PORTION OF TAOR BY 1/5 SHIFT EAST BDRY OF PRESENT TAOR TO WEST BDRY PRESCRIBED FOR 1/5 IN THIS ORDER.

(C) DISPLACE ONE CO TO, AND RELIEVE ELEMENTS OF 3/5 IN PLACE OF CLAYMORE PASS.

(D) ON RELIEF OF 3/5 EXPAND PRESENT TAOR EAST TO BDRY FROM 192040 SOUTH ON EAST SIDE OF ROAD TO 199023: THEN WEST ON NORTH SIDE OF STREAM TO 196020: THEN SOUTH ON WEST SIDE OF SONG THURA LUU TO 201980.

(2) 01 AP: ESTAB ONE ~~REIN~~ PLAT AS HOLDING GARRISON AT BACH MA LZ 061923, AND RETURN ALL OTHER FORCES TO TAOR.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

C. THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES: ON 30 MAR AND WHEN RELIEVED IN PLACE OF CLAYMORE PASS AND DESIG PORTION OF TAOR BY 2/5:

- (1) PROVIDE LNO TO FAM RELIEVING ELEMENTS OF 2/5 WITH TASKS AND AREA.
- (2) SHIFT WEST BDRY OF PRESENT TAOR TO EAST BDRY PRESCRIBED FOR 2/5 IN THIS ORDER.
- (3) DISPLACE TWO CO AND BN CP TO, AND RELIEVE ELEMENTS OF 2/7 IN PLACE OF LANG CO BRIDGE AND HAI VAN PASS.
- (4) ON RELIEF OF 2/7 EXPAND PRESENT TAOR EAST AND SOUTH TO BDRY FROM 944883 WEST TO 900890; THEN NORTHWEST TO 874915; THEN NORTH ALONG STREAM TO 864955.

3. REPORT ALL ASSUMPTIONS OF OPCON, RELIEFS, DISPLACEMENTS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF TASKS BY DTG TO THIS HQ.

[REDACTED]
BT
GP-4

UNCLASSIFIED

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

INF: SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES
CAG THREE
CG TF XRAY

BT

A. FIFTH MARINES OPO 301-68

FRAG ORDER 24-68

1. SITUATION: ENEMY THREAT TO ROUTE ON EXTREMELY HIGH. INDICATIONS ARE THAT ENEMY WILL CONTINUE MAJOR EFFORT TO DESTROY BRIDGES AND HOLDING POSITIONS ON MSR TO ISOLATE HUE-PHU BAI.
2. MISSION: KEEP ROUTE ONE OPEN.
3. EXECUTION:
 - A. INCREASE HOLDING GARRISONS AS REQUIRED IN TAOR TO PROTECT KEY BRIDGES.
 - B. CONDUCT SATURATION AMBUSHES IN STRENGTH ALONG AVENUES OF APPROACH TO MSR.
 - C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN MOBILE READY REACTION FORCES TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY THREATENING ENEMY FORCES.
 - D. ESTAB AND MAINTAIN POSITIVE LN WITH CAPS IN TAOR.
 - E. BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT COUNTERATTACK PLAN OF REF A.

BT
GP-4

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

Operation Order 301-68

5TH MAW SEC FILES

00162-68

COPY NO. 7 OF 50

Copy 7 of 50 Copies
 Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6641 III, IV; 6541 I, II, III, IV
 Vietnam 1:25,000 AMS Series 1501 (JOG A/G) Sheets NE 48-16; NE 49-13; ND 48-4; ND 49-1.

- (b) 1st MarDiv OpO 301-68
- (c) 1st MarDiv OpO 309-68
- (d) DivO 5400.3 w/Ch/1
- (e) DivO P02000.2 (CEOI)
- (f) TF XRAY OpO 301-68
- (g) 5thMar AdminO 301-68
- (h) TF XRAY AdminO 11-68 to FragO 11-68

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Situation

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) Current INTSUMS

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 2d Bn, 11th Marines direct support.
- (2) 1st MAW provides fixed and rotary wing support.
- (3) Elements of CAG 3 with RVN PT units interdicts route #7 and guards designated key bridges.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION

In the assigned AO: Keep the MSR open by protecting Route #1 and supporting bridges, culverts, and passes. Support and protect friendly installations, units, convoys, and road repair parties. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, material, and positions.

00-1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED IN 2022 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Within assigned AO establish a regimental TAOR along the axis of the MSR from the northwest boundary to the southwest boundary extending laterally from Route #1 to include commanding terrain and key installations and villages; and possible enemy mortar and ambush sites. Establish 3 battalion TAORs within the regimental TAOR to affect equal distribution of tactical responsibility in carrying out assigned mission. Use minimum of forces to conduct local offensive operations in battalion TAORs, and individual and multi-battalion offensive operations in the regimental AO to destroy threatening enemy forces and deny use of terrain for bases and cache sites.
- b. 1st Bn, 5th Marines.
 - (1) Establish in the Hai Van TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
 - (2) Establish holding positions to defend Lang Co Bridge and Sandbox Fire Base; and designated key bridges.
 - (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, material, and positions.
 - (4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist CAP-H-9 and all other friendly forces and installations in assigned TAOR in the event of enemy attack.
- c. 2d Bn, 5th Marines.
 - (1) Establish in the Phu Loc TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
 - (2) Establish holding positions to defend the Truoi, Te Xuan, and Dap Dinh bridges; the CB Rock Crusher Site; and Phu Loc Fire Base.
 - (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, material, and positions.
 - (4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist CAP-H-4, CAP-H-5, CAP-H-8, Phu Loc District Headquarters, Peaceful Valley Fire Base, Cau Doi LSA, and all other friendly units and installations in assigned TAOR in the event of enemy attack.
- d. 3d Bn, 5th Marines.
 - (1) Establish in the Bowling Alley TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
 - (2) Establish holding positions to defend Claymore Pass, Nuroc Ngot Bridge, and Tombstone Fire Base.

~~SECRET~~

- ✓ (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, material, and positions.
- ✓ (4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist CAP-H-6, CAP-H-7, and all other friendly forces and installations in assigned TAOR in the event of enemy attack.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) This order effective for planning immediately, execute on order.
- (2) All units will be prepared to accomplish the following tasks in accordance with Annex C (Concept of Operations).
 - (a) Protect and assist friendly convoys moving on MSR through assigned TAOR.
 - (b) Provide security for road and bridge repair parties in assigned TAOR.
 - (c) Support mine sweep operations on MSR in assigned TAOR.
 - (d) Chop reaction forces to any point in the regimental AO.
 - (e) Conduct offensive operations as a battalion or as part of a multi-battalion force in any area of the regimental AO.
- (3) Bn CPs, and companies separated from Bn CPs will have HST capabilities at all times.
- (4) All damage or suspected damage to Route #1 will be reported immediately. During hours of reduced visibility and on sections of Route #1 not under direct observation, all sounds of detonation or suspected detonation in the vicinity of the road will be reported, investigation will be made as soon as possible, and a follow up report will be submitted.
- (5) Rifle companies will be rotated to 5th Marines rear for unit training and rehabilitation on order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See reference (g) and (h)
- b. FLSG ALPHAS has established a LSA vicinity ZD052027 as the primary supply source for Class I, III, IV and V for operating units. FLSG ALPHA at Phu Bai remains the supply point for Class II for operating units and for all classes of supply for the Regimental Rear.
- c. Resupply. By shopping list to LSA via MST or by direct pickup.

00-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Clothing and Equipment requests will be passed to the Regimental Rear for completion. Surface delivery will be used where possible. Air resupply requests will be submitted to this headquarters by 1200 of day prior to delivery date for late afternoon delivery of normal resupply. Emergency resupply requested will be met as soon as possible, but should be held to a minimum by proper planning.

d. Transportation. Administrative runs to Phu Bai will depart Cao Doi at 0900 and 1330 with return leaving Phu Bai (5th Marines S-4) at 1200 and 1600 daily. Units will coordinate all admin runs with Regiment for best use of vehicle assets.

e. Service

(1) Maintenance. LSA has limited 3d echelon maintenance capability on ordnance and electronics items. Maintenance floats will be held at FLSG ALPHA in Phu Bai. Contact teams available on request. Requesting unit provide as much information as possible about difficulty. Units are responsible for evacuation and turn in to FLSG ALPHA equipment needing repair beyond capability of LSA.

(2) Shore Party. Units assigned HST personnel will insure that HSTs are kept with companies working in canopy or in areas inaccessible by road. Maximum utilization will be made of HST teams.

(3) Motor Transport. Detachment of 1st Motor Transport Battalion in direct support of 5th Marines. Units with truck requirements submit requests to this headquarters as far in advance as possible. Hai Van battalion will normally have 2 trucks attached.

f. Units operating in canopy are urged to request and use Long Range Patrol Rations when available, and are reminded of the need for special attention to demolition needs, and of requirement for lengths of $\frac{1}{2}$ inch line. One man chain saws will be distributed when and as available. Portable water containers should be retained for re-use whenever possible.

g. Personnel

Special personnel reporting must be accomplished accurately and promptly. Command attention is directed.

~~SECRET~~

5. COMMAND AND COMM-ELEC

Annex F (Comm-Elec).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN


G. McNaughton
MCNAUGHTON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support
- E - Air Support
- F - Comm-Elec
- G - Civic Action
- H - Psy Ops
- X - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

00-5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Eq., 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

5th Marines (Rein)

HqCo, 5th Marines
 Co C, 1st Recon Bn

Col BOHN

1st Bn, 5th Marines

H&S Co
 Co A
 Co B
 Co C
 Co D

Maj THOMPSON

2nd Bn, 5th Marines

H&S Co
 Co E
 Co F
 Co G
 Co H

LtCol CHEATHAM

3rd Bn, 5th Marines

H&S Co
 Co I
 Co K
 Co L
 Co M

LtCol ROCKEY

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

G. C. McNaughton

G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

A-1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Pg. 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200 March 1968

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6641 III, IV, 6541 I, II, III, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
- (2) PW's, captured documents and recent enemy activities indicate that the most probable course of action to be taken by the enemy is the continuing interdiction of Highway 1 by a combination of mining, explosive devices, mortar/rocket attacks, sapper attacks on bridges, culverts and CAP units, and ambushes of convoys. The enemy can also be expected to use his capability to export rice and foodstuffs from the lowlands across Highway 1 into the mountainous area base camps. The enemy has the capability to conduct attacks of up to reinforced Regimental strength on friendly units and installations throughout the Area of Operations.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information

- (1) Determine if the enemy will attack friendly forces and/or installations. If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what forces?
- (2) Determine if the enemy will defend enemy held or controlled areas against friendly operations. If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what forces?
- (3) Determine if the enemy will reinforce units in or near the 5th Marines AO. If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what forces?
- (4) Determine if the enemy will withdraw. If so, when, where, with what forces, and to what new location?

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED

- (5) Determine if the enemy will delay. If so, when, where, in what strength, and with what forces?
- (6) Determine if the enemy will employ supporting arms, if so, when, where, in what types, and how many.
- (7) Determine if the enemy will employ NBC weapons. If so what types, when, where, by what units, with what delivery means, and how many?
- (8) Determine the current locations of enemy units, strengths, and numbers and types of weapons.
- (9) Determine the location of all landing zones, roads, trails, river fords, and bridges not shown on the map and the condition of all roads, trails, fords, and bridges within the AO.
- (10) Determine the enemy's combat effectiveness to evaluate morale, discipline, training, and status of supplies and personnel replacements.

b. Other Intelligence Requirements

- (1) Determine VC/NVA land and water routes for the infiltration and withdrawal of personnel and material into and through the Regiment's area of operations.
- (2) Determine the effect of friendly supporting arms on enemy emplacements with regard to material damage, casualties, and the morale of both VC and civilian population?
- (3) Determine the enemy's capability of employing and/or defending against NBC warfare.
- (4) Determine which friendly controlled routes, bridges, and installations are of interest to the enemy.
- (5) Determine which areas are controlled by the enemy; the extent of this control, and how it is maintained.
- (6) Determine the enemy's logistic capabilities, to include methods of transport, locations of transportation units, status of supply, and locations of supply caches, hospitals, armories, and other facilities.
- (7) Determine the location, strength and weaknesses of enemy fortifications.

UNCLASSIFIED

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION

a. Area of collection responsibility

- (1) Each subordinate battalion is responsible for the overall collection effort within its assigned area of operations.
- (2) All other organic and assigned units to the 5th Marines are responsible for the collection effort within their respective areas of responsibility.

b. Orders for Subordinate Commands

- (1) All units make maximum aggressive use of organic and attached reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to include scout dogs and AN/PPS-6 to find and fix the enemy.
- (2) All units report immediately:
 - (a) All VC/NVA sightings and contacts.
 - (b) The size, direction and location of all VC/NVA movements.
 - (c) All fighting holes, tunnels, bunkers, caves and other fortifications discovered, and to include dimensions, construction materials, firing ports tactical arrangement.
 - (d) Any sudden increase/decrease in attendance at market place.
 - (e) Any trails, paths or areas which VN civilians avoid using.
 - (f) Any sudden increase/decrease in attendance at MEDCAP.
 - (g) All supply and arms caches found.
 - (h) All secondary explosions noted.
 - (i) All suspicious or unusual river or road traffic.
 - (j) All instances of VC/NVA warning measures and devices.
 - (k) Water cache basins and availability of potable water.
 - (l) Any other information obtained to satisfy the intelligence requirements.

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Requests to Higher and Adjacent Headquarters(1) G-2, 1st Mar Div/Task Force X-Ray

- (a) Provide, as requested, photo imagery and APD interpretations.
- (b) Provide additional intelligence studies as developed.
- (c) Provide technical intelligence assistance as required.
- (d) Provide Special intelligence.
- (e) Coordinate exchange of pertinent intelligence information with 2nd ARVN Division elements as developed.

(2) 1st CI Team, FMF

- (a) Provide up to date black lists with diacritical markings - 6 copies.
- (b) Provide agent reports as obtained.

(3) Thua Thien Province Headquarters

- (a) Provide Gazetteer of GVN/VC names for hamlets and villages - 6 copies.
- (b) Exchange pertinent intelligence information as developed.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL

- a. Regimental PW collection point is initially at Cau Doi. Subsequent collection points as announced.
- b. Captured Materials. Routine processing of captured material will be effected through normal channels to include Task Force X-Ray.

5. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND AREA STUDIES

a. Maps

- (1) The standard tactical map for operations in Vietnam is Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. The following sheets are required for 5th Marines TAOH: 6541 I, II, III, IV, 6641 III, IV.
- (2) Requisition and distribution. Requisition and distribution will be made on an as required basis via the chain of command.

UNCLASSIFIED

6. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Reports

- (1) Spot Reports. All contacts, sightings and other intelligence information of an urgent nature will be immediately reported to this headquarters by Spot Report. All such information will be reported through COC channels by the most expeditious means. The Spot Report will answer the questions Who, What, Where, When, and How. See CG, 1st MarDiv msg 291029Z August 1967 title "COC Reporting Procedures".
- (2) Shell Reports/Mortar Reports (Shel/Rep/Mort/Rep)
 - (a) See Division Order P 3800.1F
 - (b) VC/NVA use of rockets/artillery/mortars will be reported immediately.
 - (c) Crater analysis will be performed as soon as practicable and the results reported to this headquarters.
- (3) Intsum's. Battalions OPCON 5th Marines are not required to prepare a daily INTSUM. Regiment will complete and distribute INTSUM for the period 0600-0600 to reach headquarters Task Force X-Ray by 1200 daily.

b. Distribution of Intelligence Reports

- (1) Intsum's Regiment will distribute to higher, adjacent and subordinate headquarters the daily INTSUM.

7. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

a. Auxillary Agencies

- (1) Interrogator-Translator Teams, assigned to Battalion and Regimental Hq will interrogate and classify detainees/PW's in accordance with current Division and III MAF SOP's.

b. Target Information

- (1) See Appendix 1 (Target List)

c. Weather Information

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Tide, sunrise and sunset tables and climatic conditions, see Division G-2, Astronomical Data for Year 1968.

(2) Weather see 1st Weather Wing Special Study 105-9/2.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOIN

GCMcNaughton

G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- ✓1 - Intelligence Estimate
- ✓2 - Area Study
- ✓3 - Bridge Study, Route #1
- ✓4 - Target List (to be published)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operations Order 301-68

UNCLASSIFIED

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200 March 1968

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6541 I, II, III, IV, 6641 III, IV.
 Vietnam 1:25,000 AMS Series 1501 (JOG A/G) Sheets NE 48-16, NE 49-13, ND 48-4, ND 49-1.
 (b) III MAF Intelligence Estimate 13-67 (ICTZ) of 1 Aug 1967
 (c) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Estimate Hai Van Pass/Phu Loc of 10 Oct 1967.
 (d) III MAF PERINTREP Number 52 of 31 Dec 1967
 (e) 1st MarDiv Intelligence Study (Phu Bai Base Area) of 15 Nov 1967
 (f) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 2-67 of 16 Nov 1967
 (g) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 2-67A of 16 Nov 1967
 (h) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 4-67 of 16 Nov 1967
 (i) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 10-67 of 16 Nov 1967
 (j) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 13-67 (Phu Loc) of 17 Nov 1967
 (k) 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Study 17-67 (Nam Dong) of 11 Nov 1967

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION

- a. Basic Mission. Keep MSR along Route #1 in assigned AO open. In conjunction with friendly forces protect U.S. and GVN installations, bridges, overpasses, vehicles, equipment, supplies and personnel by destroying threatening enemy forces in assigned AO. Conduct offensive operations in AO to kill or capture enemy personnel and destroy enemy weapons, material and positions.
- b. Purpose of this Estimate. To provide sufficient intelligence information to plan and prepare to carry out the basic mission.

2. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Characteristics of Area of Operations.

- (1) Military Geography. The TJOR, located in the eastern and southern portion of Thua Thien Province, ICTZ, is divided topographically into the western mountains and the central piedmont and the small coastal plain.

B-1-1

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) The mountains which extend in a general north-south belt along the western boundary, and an east-west belt along the southern boundary, are heavily dissected and rugged with slopes ranging from 30 to 40 degrees. Evergreen secondary forests are predominant, trees range in height from 25-30 meters with some as high as 50 meters. The canopy is continuous and dark green. Tree trunks are straight, commonly 2 to 16 meters apart and unbranched to great heights. Secondary forests consist of smaller trees with a discontinuous canopy and more dense undergrowth.

(b) The narrow piedmont, west of route #1, consists of undulating hills which are cut by numerous river valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from the western highlands, through the piedmont. Hills in the piedmont range from 30 to 70 meters in elevation with slopes between 10 and 20 degrees. The piedmont is predominantly secondary, broadleaf forest with some dense evergreen forest. Dense undergrowth is more abundant than in the mountains, with 15-30 foot high bamboo and palm thickets very common. There are some grass areas, growing as high as five feet, as well as small cultivated areas of dry crops.

(c) Good observation and fields of fire in the mountains are restricted to those areas where slopes abut open valleys. Aerial observation is severely limited by the dense vegetation. In the piedmont good observation and fields of fire can be found in the low hills and the open areas on the valley floors. Aerial observation is improved by a decrease in vegetation density but remains locally restricted by areas of dense undergrowth. In the coastal area observation and fields of fire are generally good but impeded by local irregularities and hedges in built up areas. Air observation is good.

(d) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment in the mountains and in the piedmont are excellent. In the coastal area some cover is provided by paddy dikes and occasional sand dunes. Concealment is limited to that available in the built up areas and in the dense, mature rice fields at certain times of the year.

(e) Avenues of Approach. Avenues of approach are restricted to the existing very limited road net; helicopter landing zones which vary from plentiful in the coastal area to infrequent and easily interdicted in the mountains; the navigable waterways of the coastal area the minor valley systems with gradual gradients; and an extensive trail net.

UNCLASSIFIED

(f) Key Terrain

1. Route #1, the MSR, throughout the TAOR, but particularly in the Hai Van Pass area, the Troui and Lang Co bridges, and the Da Bao, Hoc Rai and Phu Gia passes where it can be most easily interdicted.
2. Small hills, stream valley and trail junctions along the piedmont which control avenues of approach from the west and south.
3. The Cau Tso Hion which provides water access to the Dam Cau Hai, controlling a major water infiltration route.
4. Control of rice producing areas will seriously hinder the enemy's food supplies.

(g) Effect on enemy capabilities. The mountains and piedmont favor the enemy tactically. Irregular terrain and dense vegetation offer excellent concealment, routes of infiltration and defensive positions. The coastal areas do not favor sustained attacks by large forces.

(h) Effect of friendly forces. The steep, rugged, heavily forested mountains in the west and south of our TAOR will seriously hinder overland mobility. Short fields of fire, restricted observation, and limited LOC and helicopter LZ's make forces operating in those areas particularly vulnerable to ambushes and difficult to support logistically. The piedmont area is less restrictive. It contains more LOC and helicopter LZ's as well as numerous areas where observation and fields of fire are much better than in the mountains. Dense undergrowth throughout much of the piedmont, however, will impose definite restrictions on friendly operations. In the coastal area during the monsoon season, flooded rice paddies and the extensive waterway system will impede foot movement and seriously restrict motorized/mechanized movement. During the dry season, however, these areas will favor our operations.

(2) Hydrography

(a) The Dam Cau Hai, the large lagoon along the coast, is approximately 8 kilometers wide and has a depth of 12 meters at its deepest point. This lagoon is connected by a series of lagoons to form an inland waterway running North from the AO approximately 64 kilometers.

(b) Surf and tide conditions are affected by the season of the year. During the period November through March, surf 4 feet or higher occurs along the exposed beaches up to 55% of the time. During the period June through September surf 4 feet or higher occurs 26% of the time. Average tidal range for this area is two feet.

(c) Numerous landing beaches exist along the entire length of the TAOR. Beach approaches near shore are clear. Near shore slopes range from steep to flat but relatively few steep slopes front the beaches. The primary near shore bottom material is sand. Beach gradients are predominantly steep to moderate in the low water to high water and mostly steep in the high water zone. Exits from the beaches are almost nonexistent, presenting a major difficulty to sustained amphibious landings.

(3) Climate and Weather. See area hand-book, Tab A to area study.

(4) Transportation

(a) Highway. The main north-south route is Highway #1. The road bed is built up; however, the foundation is weak and has not held up under heavy traffic. The surface is bituminous macadam and varies in width from three to seven meters. The overall rating is class 15, though it is possible to sustain up to class 25 traffic by exercising caution, accepting risk crossing of certain bridges and utilizing bypasses during the dry season. Highways are easily interdicted and keeping them open is an important indication of controlling ICTZ. Replacement of timber-trestle bridges washed out during the past monsoon with pile-bent bridges is expected to impede further washouts. On the southeastern edge of the TAOR, Highway #1 cuts through a mountainous section (Hai Van Pass) where the road is so narrow that traffic must be monitored at terminal points to permit only one way traffic.

(b) Railroads. The national railroad parallels Highway #1 throughout the TAOR; however, enemy interdiction has made the use of rail facilities impossible.

(c) Waterways. Streams flow swiftly in the highlands but as they reach the piedmont they widen into rivers and flow more slowly. In the coastland they become sluggish and subject to silting. Consequently the utility of the rivers and the inland waterways is largely limited to shallow draft ships or craft. There are three principal waterways within the TAOR: the Cau Hai, at the Truc, the Song Bu Lu, and the Dam Lap An. These are navigable only to small native craft, and have a safe draft of 3.3 meters at high water and 1.5 meters at low water.

UNCLASSIFIED

French is understood by a large percentage of the population.

- (b) Religion. The majority of the Vietnamese are nominal Buddhist. The activist element of the Buddhist Hierarchy is located in Hue. In the past, a militant Buddhist element has had considerable influence upon the GVN. The most important minority religion is Catholic, and Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects are found in small numbers.
- (c) Education. The schools are patterned after the French system with 5 primary and 7 secondary grades. Since many rural dwellers spend no more than 3 years in school, the literacy rate is generally low.
- (d) Overall. Social unrest is aggravated by economic, political and military dislocation of Vietnamese life. Family and village groupings continue as the basic social and economic units, hampering efforts toward achieving national identity.
- (e) Public Health. Public health is plagued by dietary diseases, inadequate GVN medical services, lack of potable water, and primitive sanitation and hygiene standards. This is due to a low level of health education and a prevailing philosophy which accepts diseases as the normal condition.
- (f) Effects on enemy capabilities. The relative homogeneity of the society limits the enemy's capability to exploit antagonisms between ethnic groups. The issues of relative poverty and national loyalty are exploitable.
- (g) Effects on friendly capabilities. Social conditions in areas under GVN control favor the maintenance of large numbers of U.S. forces. These conditions will prevail as long as social progress brings increased benefits to the masses. Non-indigenous troops, however, are particularly susceptible to the health hazards of the area. Extensive education and training programs are essential to the long range nation-building processes within the TAOR. Conditions are particularly good for an extensive civic action program to win the confidence and support of the people. School aid, public health and technical training programs are prime CI targets.

(9) Science and Technology. Capabilities in these endeavors appear to be virtually nonexistent at present. This favors the enemy in that it hampers GVN economic, health and education projects.

- (d) Although friendly forces seldom use the inland highways, the VC are continuously using them in conjunction with the trail system and waterways, as primary transportation routes.
- (e) The main roads are easily interdicted, but cuts are usually repaired or bypassed within 24 hours. Increased bridge and road security measures will be required to improve the reliability of land travel. Accordingly, a heavy dependence on air and sea LOC is anticipated. The only significant airfield is located at Phu Bai (YD8814). Waterways in the coastal plain may be of some use provided adequate small craft are available.

(5) Telecommunications

- (a) The military network includes a major switchboard at Phu Bai which connects to a switchboard at Hue. This system links Hue ----Phu Bai with DaNang, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai, Chu Lai, Hoi An, and various stations outside ICTZ with both voice and teletype circuits.
- (b) The Northern Toll System of the Post Telephone and Telegraph Company links Hue and DaNang by HF. This net is too insecure for most friendly traffic, however, it is used during emergencies, and by ARVN. It also enables a shrewd enemy to pass his own traffic.

(6) Politics. The political situation within the TAOR is much the same as is found elsewhere in ICTZ.

(7) Economy. Agriculture is the area's basic industry with rice culture in the coastal area principal. Fishing is the second most important industry. However, security restrictions have severely hampered its exploitation. Some light industries exist near the cities, however, most manufactured items must be imported. Despite two rice crops annually, the area remains a food deficit area. The current economic situation favors VC economic and propaganda warfare. Effective security on the rice production areas, on the other hand, will destroy a vital element of the enemy's logistics base.

(8) Sociology.

- (a) Language. Central dialect Vietnamese, understood by both Northerners and Southerners is the most important language.

limited underwater mining and swimmer capability which they have used occasionally in river operations.

(b) Air Defense. Enemy AA weaponry consists primarily of captured U.S. and French machine guns, plus assorted Communist bloc and Chicom 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns. 20 mm aircraft cannon recovered from downed aircraft have also probably been modified for use in an AA role. Reports indicate that all weapons, including mortars, shaped charges and small arms are used against aircraft. The increased number of hits sustained by U.S. aircraft throughout ICTZ indicates emphasis on AA training.

(6) Logistics

- (a) The enemy logistics system rests on three bases: support from the population, the resources of North Vietnam, and battle booty, particularly arms and ammunition. Principle items provided by the population are food, clothing, some medicine and some communication equipment. North Vietnamese material support which depends upon land and sea infiltration routes, consists principally of weapons and ammunition.
- (b) Infiltration routes are primarily overland, but include one intra-province sea route which terminates on the Phu Loc beaches between ZD1806 and AU8206.
- (c) The base area concept is fundamental to the Viet Cong logistics system. The nearest accepted base areas (114 and 607) are located to the north and west of our TAOR. Base areas are supplemented by "combat villages" which have been fortified with both active and passive defensives. One VC/NVA objective is to maintain secure corridors between these areas.
- (d) For operations in forward areas, the enemy depends on materials moved to and cached in the intended area of operations.
- (e) The VC exercise close control over medical supplies, which are inadequate by Western standards, and frequently in short supply. A substantial amount of the drugs are purchased on the local markets in Hue, DaNang and Saigon, and transported into the AOR. Medical supplies are also infiltrated from North Vietnam. The medical support system, while austere, is apparently capable of providing the minimum support necessary to sustain VC/NVA operations.

B-1-8

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Enemy Military Situation

- (1) See Tab 1 (Enemy Order of Battle, 5th Marines Regimental Area of Operations).
- (2) Composition. Headquarters Northern Front (also known as Tri-Tien Military Region Headquarters) controls both the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, and is directly subordinate to the High Command in Hanoi. Main force and NVA units are subordinate to Headquarters Northern Front, while local force units and guerrillas are subordinate to province, district and village committees.

(3) Availability of reinforcements

- (a) The 6th NVA Regiment consisting of a Hq, the C-4 Recon Co, the C-5th Signal Co (located at Base 114); the 800th MF Bn (YD6122) on 16 Dec 67; the 806th NVA Bn (YD5642); and the 802nd NVA Bn mentioned above, is considered locally available with additional strength of 1500 and weapons similar to those mentioned in Tab 1. It is estimated that additional specialist reinforcements from the Northern Front Headquarters are also available. These include the C11th NVA Intelligence Co, the C12th NVA Sapper Co, the C13th NVA Communications Co, the C14th NVA Engineer Co, the C15th NVA AA Co, the C16th NVA Mortar Co, and the C17th NVA RR Co with strengths totaling 710.
- (b) The enemy is capable of reinforcing his present forces in Thua Thien with forces from a neighboring province.

- (4) Movement and Activities. Enemy activities in the TAOR during the nine week period 23 December 67 through 1 March 68 has consisted of mortar and rocket attacks and large scale actions from Troui Bridge (YD968062) southeast to Hai Van Pass (AT938916), with two large attacks of estimated two battalion size on the Phu Loc District Headquarters, Phu Loc combat base and CAP units H-6 and H-7. The enemy has continued to employ mines and booby traps throughout the TAOR, a large portion of which are being placed on or near Route #1.
- (5) VC Naval/Air Defense Forces

- (a) Naval. The VC have no Navy and constitute no naval threat to operations in our TAOR other than small arms and mortar fire from junks, a rarely used tactic. The VC do have a

UNCLASSIFIED

(f) Transportation. The VC/NVA forces rely heavily upon human transporters, pack animals and bicycles for movement of their supplies. Two transportation battalions consisting of a large number of porters, are reported active near the Laotian border. In addition, local villagers are often recruited for logistics movements.

(7) Signal and Communications Equipment. In the area of signal equipment, the VC have developed a reliable communications system. They also have the capability to build their own equipment from locally purchased materials. VC signal equipment in use is of U.S., Chinese, Japanese and French manufacture. One prime source of VC communications equipment has been captured friendly equipment. Because of the significant amount of captured equipment, it must be presumed that the enemy is capable of monitoring any and all friendly transmissions.

(8) Combat Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The enemy has an unsophisticated but well-organized and effective intelligence and counterintelligence system. Combat intelligence is usually provided by local guerrillas and MF/NVA intelligence companies. Counterintelligence agents include children, vendors and U.S. base employees.

(9) Chemical Warfare

(a) A captured document indicates that one unit has issued protective suits and masks in anticipation of U.S. initiated chemical warfare. One protective suit and many gas masks have been captured. The majority of these captured masks were simple, homemade devices with charcoal filters. NVA units have an effective tow-piece mask of Chicom manufacture, consisting of goggles and a separate face-piece with an activated-charcoal-filter canister. This is similar to those used by U.S. policemen in riot control.

(b) Chemical capabilities

1. VC are capable of employing homemade and captured smoke and riot-control munitions.
2. VC are capable of making use of locally available poisons.
3. The use of CS by NVA units has been reported in this area.

(c) Vulnerabilities. The VC are vulnerable to all types of currently authorized chemical agents.

(10) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses(a) Strengths

1. The VC control the western highlands, which gives them free access to infiltration/resupply routes from Laos.
2. The VC developed a highly effective population control system, which enables them to obtain manpower, money, shelter, and supplies to sustain their operations.
3. The VC have an excellent, well established intelligence system.
4. Being of the same ethnic origin as the people of SVN, the VC have little difficulty, except in definitely anti-VC areas, of gaining concealment by intermingling with the populace.
5. VC/NVA forces generally have available combat experienced leaders, and in most units, combat experienced troops.
6. VC/NVA forces have the capability of employing both conventional and guerrilla warfare.
7. VC/NVA forces possess a capability of rapid cross-country mobility.

(b) Weaknesses

1. VC/NVA forces in our AOR possess no air support and only limited artillery support.
2. The VC rely heavily upon external support for arms and ammunition. This support is dependent upon infiltration routes subject to interdiction, thus necessitating long lead times and caches to insure availability.
3. The VC rely heavily upon the local population who may become disenchanted by heavy taxes, conscription of manpower, and death and destruction.
4. Animosity between NVA and VC, due to the NVA attitude of superiority, has been known to affect discipline, tactics and chains of command.

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) Peculiarities1. Offensive Combat

- a. VC/NVA attacks are thoroughly planned and quickly executed with a high element of surprise and maximum fire at the onset. After the attack, contact is broken quickly, and the battlefield is normally carefully policed.
- b. VC/NVA offensives normally have only the objectives of inflicting casualties and destroying installations. However, captured documents and defectors have indicated that the mission of the 324B Division is to seize, control, and defend Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
- c. Withdrawals are usually covered, and normal withdrawal routes are along the axis of the attack.
- d. Contact is most often established in the evening or late at night to restrict friendly maneuver, while providing time for withdrawal under cover of darkness.
- e. Doctrinally, the enemy does not commit reinforcements to save trapped units or to insure the accomplishment of a mission for which presumably adequate forces have already been allocated.

2. Defensive positions are characterized by mutually supporting bunkers, concealment under hedgerows, with narrow firing ports 8-12 inches in diameter and 6-8 inches above the ground. This makes them very difficult to see or hit. Connected by deep, narrow communications trenches, these positions are relatively invulnerable to mortar or light artillery fire, which facilitates the enemy's delivery of close supporting fires. Fire discipline has been excellent with most engagements initiated at ranges of less than 100 meters.
3. Others. One recent tactic employed by VC/NVA forces has been "Hugging". The technique is to attempt to maintain as close a contact with friendly forces as possible to minimize the effect of friendly supporting arms.

REF ID: B-1-14

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare.

(1) Guerrillas. The guerrilla continues to be the base for the VC effort in SVN, providing the military force required for successful support of the VC infrastructure; harrassment of friendly LOC, installations and troop concentrations; and guides for MF/NVA units.

(2) Psychological

(a) Since the beginning of the VC insurgency, the conversion of friendly troops has been given a priority equal to military and political actions. Three to five member cells, predominately women, are organized for this purpose. Results are lowered morale and reduced combat effectiveness of allied units, and occasionally a propaganda or intelligence agent won at a very low cost.

(b) Propaganda has been disseminated by leaflet, indoctrination courses, political lectures, newspapers, magazines and whisper campaigns. The most prevalent themes are divisive ones, aimed at exploiting disaffection among U.S. forces, and VN civilians. English language themes stressing the lack of support at home and racial strife have recently been aimed at U.S. forces.

(c) Psychological Warfare. Targeting of American servicemen, ARVN and the civilian population of various hamlets and villages is expected to continue.

(3) Sabotage

(a) Sabotage units are known to be operating throughout the area. These units usually operate as cells; however, all military and guerrilla units are considered capable of sabotage activities.

(b) The vast majority of these acts have been conducted with explosive devices. Principal targets have been unguarded LOC and lightly defended installations.

(c) The majority of operations appear to be crude, conducted by inexperienced persons, and sometimes ineffective. They have enjoyed considerable success against LOC however.

B-1-12

UNCLASSIFIED

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES**a. Attack**

- (1) Attack installations in the Phu Loc AO with up to 1 reinforced regiment (4th NVA consisting of the 802nd NVA, the K4B MF Bn, the 1st Bn, 4th Regt, C19 and C21 Engr Support Co's, and the C118 LF Co) with an aggregate strength of about 1400.
- (2) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one reinforced regiment.
- (3) Attack selected key installations with medium and/or heavy mortars, artillery and rockets.

b. Defend. Defend isolated positions anywhere within our TAOA with forces locally available.

c. Delay. Delay in present operating areas with forces locally available.

d. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare. Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks, ambushes, interdiction of LOC, terrorism, sabotage, propaganda activities, the use of mines and booby traps, and the use of nontoxic chemical capabilities.

4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES**a. Attack**

- (1) Attack the Phu Loc area with one regiment reinforced.
 - (a) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability.
 1. The enemy's knowledge of our situation and the terrain, based on extensive reconnaissance activities.
 2. The enemy's desire to achieve tactical success.
 3. The Phu Loc area is strategically an ideal place to sever the country and, if successfully held, would provide a tactical as well as political advantage.
 4. The enemy has demonstrated capabilities of interdicting Highway #1 and carrying out battalion-sized operations within the Phu Loc area.

5. The terrain, coupled with low overcasts expected during the monsoon season which would restrict the use of air support favors the enemy's normal sapper tactics as well as a subsequent defense in strength.
- (b) The following factors militate against this capability.
 1. Recent improvements on friendly positions.
 2. Recent build-up of friendly forces throughout the AO.
 3. Fear of supporting arms.
 4. Possibility of large losses.
 5. Limitations of enemy supporting arms.
- (c) The following are indicators of the adoption of this capability.
 1. Presence of reconnaissance elements in the vicinity of key targets.
 2. Introduction of new longer range supporting arms.
 3. Concerted efforts to isolate the battle field.
 4. In addition, the preparation of defensive positions on key terrain would indicate the enemy's intention to subsequently hold terrain.

(2) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one reinforced regiment.

(a) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability.

1. The enemy's knowledge of our situation and the terrain based on extensive reconnaissance activities.
2. Isolated units and outposts offer the best targets at the least risk.
3. The enemy's past successes against isolated targets.
4. Many outposts lie astride main infiltration routes where the enemy may achieve temporary superiority.

1. The enemy may adopt a hasty defense in order to delay while command posts, vital installations, and caches are displaced, concealed or dispersed.
2. The enemy's need to protect vital base areas which may have been established or may be establishing within our TAOR.
3. The enemy's desire to conserve forces in our area while exploiting an opportunity elsewhere.
4. Political and propaganda advantages.

(b) The following factors militate against adoption of this capability:

1. Reluctance to stand and fight except under the most favorable conditions.
2. Enemy doctrine dictates against defending occupied terrain unless it is absolutely vital.
3. The enemy's limited in-country supporting arms capability.
4. The achievement of a much-needed victory is unlikely by defensive actions.

(c) The enemy's losses in recent operations throughout ICTZ is an indicator of adoption of this capability.

c. Delay

(1) Delay in present operating areas with forces locally available.

(a) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability.

1. The enemy's desire to conserve forces and await conditions more favorable to him.
2. The enemy's desire to prevent expansion of the GVN RD program.
3. Delay of friendly operations would enhance the enemy's prestige with the local populace.

(b) There are no factors which militate against this capability.

UNCLASSIFIED

5. Enemy doctrine dictates the attack of relatively weak targets under the most favorable conditions.
6. The enemy's desire to achieve tactical success.

(b) The following factors militate against this capability.

1. The enemy's reluctance to mass his forces.
2. The demonstrated friendly ability to detect enemy build-ups and to react rapidly to destroy them by supporting arms and ground attacks.

(c) The following factors are indicators of adoption of this capability.

1. Interrogation reports, captured documents, and low level agent reports continue to indicate the possibility of such attacks.
2. The enemy's known desire to disrupt the GVN RD program.

(3) Attacks on selected key installations with medium and/or heavy mortars, artillery and rockets.

(a) The following factors favor adoption of this capability:

1. Lucrative targets can be hit from a distance with less risk than ground attacks.
2. The practice of striking quickly under the most favorable conditions is a basic enemy tactic.
3. The enemy's past limited successes in such attacks.
4. The enemy's desire to achieve tactical success.

(b) There are no factors which militate against the adoption of this capability.

(c) The fact that the enemy is currently exploiting this capability throughout ICTZ indicates continued adoption of this capability.

b. Defense

(1) Defend isolated positions anywhere within the AO with forces locally available.

(a) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability:

[REDACTED]

sabotage, propaganda activities, the use of mines and booby traps and the use of nontoxic chemical munitions.

- (2) Capability 4.a.(4). Attack selected key installations with medium and/or heavy mortar, artillery and rockets.
- (3) Capability 4.a.(3) Attack isolated units and outposts with up to one reinforced regiment.
- (4) Capability 4.a.(2). Attack the Phu Loc area with one regiment (reinforced).
- (5) Capability 4.b.(1). Defend isolated positions anywhere within our TAOR with forces locally available.
- (6) Capability 4.c.(1). Delay in present operating areas with forces locally available.

b. Enemy Vulnerabilities

- (1) Enemy forces, installations, and LOC are vulnerable to air, artillery and naval gunfire attack.
- (2) Rigid tactical doctrine and dependence upon detailed planning render the enemy vulnerable to surprise.
- (3) The recent drop in overall combat effectiveness of enemy forces has increased his vulnerability to psychological warfare operations. Contributing factors include: recent decisive defeats; increased reliance upon conscripted personnel; reduced training time; lower morale due to shortages of food and medicine, sickness, general hardships and fear of our supporting arms; and our increased psychological warfare operations.
- (4) Enemy forces are becoming more dependent upon local resources, especially food, for support. The resulting increased pressures on these resources have served to jeopardize the enemy's standing with the local populace.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

G. C. McNaughton
G. C. McNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Tabs

- Order of Battle

Distribution: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-6
B-1-18

UNCLASSIFIED

(c) The enemy's need for the support of the local populace, primarily as a source of food, recruits, and intelligence is an indicator of the adoption of this capability in conjunction with obtaining the local required support.

d. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare

(1) Conduct unconventional and psychological warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda activities, the use of mines and booby traps, and the use of nonlethal munitions.

(a) The following factors favor the adoption of this capability:

1. This capability is a basic enemy tactic.
2. It provides the enemy an opportunity to inflict damage on friendly forces while minimizing the effects of friendly supporting arms.
3. VC knowledge of the terrain and local populace.
4. The enemy's belief that successful exploitation of this capability will wear down friendly forces.
5. Guerrilla and local force VC units hope to tie down friendly forces with static defense and local reaction missions while VC main force and NVA units conduct large scale operations.

(b) There are no factors which militate against this capability.


(c) The following facts are indicators of the adoption of this capability:

1. The enemy is currently exploiting this capability.
2. Interrogation reports, captured documents, and low level agent reports continue to indicate that the enemy will emphasize this tactic.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Enemy capabilities in relative probability of adoption:

(1) Capability 4.d.(1). Conduct unconventional warfare to include small scale attacks and ambushes, interdiction of LOC, terrorism,



Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H Mar 1968

Tab A (Order of Battle) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B
 (Intelligence) to Operations Order 301-68

Enemy Order of Battle, 5th Marines Regimental Area of Operations

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>CAT</u>	<u>Est Str</u>	<u>Accepted Location</u>	<u>Last Rptd Location</u>	<u>Date</u>
C19th Eng/Sapper-AKAC14 Co	NVA	PR	150	Phu Loc (D)	AT6894	3Feb68
C24th Sapper Co	NVA	PR	90	Phu Loc (D)	ZC1797	29Jan68
C16th Mortar Co	NVA	C	70	BA 114	ZC117938	3Feb68
202nd Bn	NVA	PO	350	Phu Loc (D)	YD3806	13Jan68
C118th Co	LF	C	60	Phu Loc (D)	AU1505	1Mar68
4th Regiment	NVA	PR	UNK	Phu Loc (D)	YC937993	6Mar68
1st Bn 4th Regt	NVA	PR	470	Phu Loc (D)	ZC0999	21Feb68
U/I Bn 4th Regt	NVA	PO	400	Phu Loc (D)	Phu Loc (D)	10Jan68

(PO - Possible, PR - Probable, C - Confirmed)

Total Strength of Enemy Units in 1/5 AO

<u>Confirmed Units</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
KAB Bn MF	275
C118th Co LF	60
	<u>335</u>

<u>Probable Units</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
4th Regt, Hq & Supt NVA	200
1st Bn, 4th Regt NVA	470
C19th Engr Co NVA	150
C24th Sapper Co NVA	90
	<u>910</u>

<u>Possible Units</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
U/I Bn, 4th Regt NVA	400
	<u>400</u>

Totals

Confirmed Units -	335
Probable Units -	910
Possible Units -	400
Total -	<u>1645</u>

B-1-A-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

NVA Forces	-	1310
Main Force	-	275
Local Force	-	60
Total	-	1645

Weapons

NVA Units: 81mm, 82mm mortars, RPG-2/B-40/RPG-7 rocket launchers, MG's, 57mm RR's

MF Units: 81mm, 82mm, 60mm mortars, RPG-2/B-40's, MG's & 57mm RR's

LF Units: Poss 82mm, 60mm mortars, MG's

Total Strength of Enemy Units in 2/5 AOConfirmed Units Estimated Strength

802nd Bn NVA	345
804th Bn MF	380
	725

Probable Units Estimated Strength

2 U/I Co's LF	200
---------------	-----

Possible Units Estimated Strength

202nd Bn NVA	350
--------------	-----

Totals

Confirmed Units	-	725
Probable Units	-	200
Possible Units	-	350
Total	-	1275

NVA Forces	-	695
Main Forces	-	380
Local Forces	-	200
Total	-	1275

Weapons: Same as in 1/5 AO

Enemy Units Adjacent to 5th Marines AOConfirmed Units Estimated Strength

800th Bn NVA	265
806th Bn NVA	275
810th Bn LF	400

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1-A-2

DECLASSIFIED

C114th Co LF	75
C116th Co LF	75
C117th Co LF	60
Total	1150

<u>Probable Units</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
Hue City Sapper Bn NVA	225
C115th Co LF	100
C119th Co LF	100
Total	425

<u>Possible Units</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
202nd Bn NVA	350
12th Sapper Bn MF	250
Total	600

Totals

Confirmed Units -	1150
Probable Units -	425
Possible Units -	600
Total -	2175

NVA Forces -	1115
Main Forces -	250
Local Forces -	810
Total -	2175

Weapons: Same as in 1/5 AO

Enemy Units in Base Area 114

(All confirmed NVA Units)	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
6th Regiment	1365
Hq & Supt	400
C11th Intelligence Co	105
C12th Sapper Co	100
C13th Communications Co	130
C14th Engineer Co	140
C15th Anti-Aircraft Co	80
C16th Mortar Co	70
C17th Recoilless Rifle Co	90
Total	2480

B-1-A-3


UNCLASSIFIED

Totals

	Estimated Strength
Confirmed Units -	2480
Probable Units -	-
Possible Units -	-
Total -	2480
NVA Forces -	2480
Main Forces -	-
Local Forces -	-
Total -	2480

Weapons: Unknown

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive OfficerDISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68
UNCLASSIFIED

B-1-A-4

~~SECRET~~

Eq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, ARVN
 061200H Mar 1968

Appendix 2 (Area Study, Phu Loc AO) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) 1st Mar Div Special Intelligence Study 13-67 (Phu Loc) dtd 17 November 1967.
 (b) 1st Weather Wing Special Study 105-9/2.

1. WEATHER

a. See Tab A.

2. TOPOGRAPHY

a. General. The area of operations is divided into three distinct areas, the coastal area generally east of National Route 1, the piedmont region south of National Route 1, and the mountainous area generally south of the area. The dominant terrain features in the area are the BACH MA mountain (1488 meters) located at ZC039901; TROUI mountain (1170 meters) located at YC945968; the SONG TROUI River running generally on a north to south axis in the valley between BACH MA and TROUI mountains; the SONG NONG River, running generally on a north to south axis to the west of TROUI mountains; National Route 1 which bisects the area on a northwest to southeast axis; and the HAI VAN PASS located at AT937915 and the SONG CU DE River at the southern boundary.

b. Relief. The mountains are highly bisected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams. Slopes are generally between 40 and 60 percent in the piedmont, but are often 100 percent or steeper in the mountains. The only regions characterized by gentle slopes are the predominately flat paddy land.

c. Drainage. The study area is well drained by numerous rivers except during the Northeast Monsoon when the paddy area and Highway 1 are frequently inundated. Terrain configurations and the mountains cause drainage to flow from the South to the North. The southern portion of the study area drains into the SONG TROUI - SONG BU LU River. The low water period occurs from mid-February through May. During this period the upper courses of many streams flow only intermittently.

d. Vegetation.

(1) Coastal. The area is predominately wet-land rice paddies, partly irrigated and partly dependent on rainfall. These areas are open, seasonally inundated fields which are surrounded by dykes. Individual rice paddies are commonly 400 to 4,000 square meters.

~~SECRET~~

Along the coast sand dunes are either barren or covered with brushwood and short clumps of junc grass. The remainder of the coastal lowland is grassland, brushwood thickets, and stands of bamboo immediately adjacent to waterways and built up areas are commonly separated by thick hedgerows.

(2) Mountains. The mountains are covered by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest. Tallest trees are mostly 75 to 90 feet high, with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous. Trees have shallow roots, trunks are commonly straight and average 0.3 meters in diameter, increasing somewhat in the higher elevations. Trees are commonly 2 to 3 meters apart. In areas of discontinuous canopy, a much thicker undergrowth has developed with spiny rattans, full bushes, vines and briars generally interwound around trees and between bushes.

c. Surface Materials.

(1) Soils. The soil consists of sand, silt and clay mixtures. Surface soils are silty sand, silt and silty clay. The deposits of deeper and more clay like soils are found on the coastal areas.

(2) Rock. The base material consists of granite, slate, and quartzite rock in the mountains. These bed materials underlie relatively shallow soils on the upper slopes, but are progressively buried deeper under alluvium deposits in basins. Exposed rock is evidenced on the upper slopes and in drainage defiles. The rocks are predominantly coarse and medium grained. Fragments weather rapidly.

f. Cultural Features

(1) The population of the study area ranges between 100 to 150 people per square mile. It is predominately a Vietnamese ethnic-linguistic group and a Katu tribal area. The primary cultural feature in the area is the Phu Loc District Headquarters at ZD097006.

(2) Village type rural hamlets are located along National Route 1 with one village located on the coast. The majority of hamlets indicated on the map are accurate.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Observation and Fields of Fire.

(1) Short range observation will be mostly good throughout the coastal area except in isolated stands of brushwood and in built up areas. Long range observation is limited only by the relatively few elevated vantage points from which to obtain observation. The dense undergrowth of the southern forests will provide poor short range observation. In elevated areas of discontinuous canopy, long observation will be good. The elevated brushwood hills in the study area will provide good long and short range observation.

~~SECRET~~

(2) Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons will be poor in the south, and fair to good in the lowlands area. Fields of fire for high trajectory weapons will be fair to good in the southern forest, and good to excellent in the piedmont and coastal areas.

b. Concealment and Cover. In the coastal areas cover will be localized to irrigation ditches, rice paddy dykes and stream and river banks. Cover will also be afforded, but to a lesser degree, in the brushweed covered slopes located in the eastern portion of the area. Concealment will be good to excellent in the dense forest in the southern region. In the coastal areas concealment is available only in isolated stands of trees along waterways and among maturing rice crops. Coastal concealment is generally poor.

c. Obstacles

(1) Natural. Wetland cultivation, soft soil conditions in coastal areas, isolated stands of brushweed in the coastal and thick jungle in the mountain areas will serve as effective obstacles to vehicular and foot traffic. In addition, numerous waterways throughout the coastal area cannot be forded by vehicular or foot traffic.

(2) Artificial. Artificial obstacles in the area would be roads unsuitable for vehicular traffic, incidents of bridge and culvert destruction, and mining incidents along National Route 1, and foot trails throughout the AO.

4. KEY TERRAIN. (See Appendix 1, paragraph 2.a(1)(s).

5. AVENUES OF APPROACH.

a. The major avenues of approach into the study area is Route 1 which enters the area from the east and west.

b. The only other improved road is an unnamed highway which joins Route 1 at ZD0800 and continues south to BACH MA.

c. Bridge classification: (See Appendix 4).

d. Trails and infiltration routes: (See Tab 2 to Appendix 1).

6. ZONES OF ENTRY.

a. The coastal regions surrounding the study area provide numerous landing beaches suitable for amphibious operations. (See Tab D)

b. Helicopter landing areas are easily obtainable throughout the flatlands. A list of available landing areas is contained in Tab C.

~~SECRET~~


7. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

- a. The primary line of communication in the study area is National Highway 1, which is an all weather, hard surface, two lane road. Highway 1 enters the study area from the east at AT927843 and exits the area in the west at YD968063.
- b. The secondary line of communication is a one lane, all weather, hard surface road branching off from Highway 1 at ZD084007 and which travels south to BACH MA Mountain Resort (abandoned at ZC053916).
- c. The area is also serviced by the National Railroad which parallels Highway 1 throughout most of the study area. This railroad has been closed by enemy interdiction.
- d. Numerous trails are found throughout the study area.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Weather Information. See 1st Weather Wing Special Study.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

TABS: A Helicopter Landing Zones
 B MIS Beach Study #3
 C Trails Overlay
 D. Enemy Installations

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

SECRET

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Tab A (Helicopter Landing Zones) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B
 (Intelligence) to Operation Order 301-68

1. ZD122097 700x350 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded by small trees and brush on N, E, and S sides, and by the Dam Cau Hai Bay on the W. Trail leaving southern tip and heads S down coast.
2. ZD124088 600x500 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded by small trees on the E and S, by sloping dry crop on the N, and the Dam Cau Hai Bay on the W. Trails leave N and S tips going N and S along coast.
3. ZD124082 400x200 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented E to W. Bounded on N, E, and S sides by small trees, on W by Dam Cau Hai Bay. Trails leave N and S and run along coast. Trail leaves W side and goes inland.
4. ZD129075 5000x750 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N, NE, S sides by small trees, E side by cultivated area, and W side by Dam Cau Hai Bay. Numerous trails leave area.
5. ZD128053 2500x800 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N, E, and S sides by small trees, on W by Dam Cau Hai Bay.
 ZD127048 Numerous trails leave area.
6. ZD123040 2300x1000 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded N, E, and S sides by small trees, on W by Dam Cau Hai Bay. Road running N to S along N, E, and S sides. Numerous trails running W.
7. ZD130026 5000x400 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N and W sides by trees, E and S sides by cleared and cultivated areas. Numerous trails on N, E, and S sides.
8. ZD123010 4500x800 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N, E, and W sides by cleared cultivated area, on S side by small trees. Numerous trails and National Highway 1 running across northern side.
9. ZD144030 5500x4000 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented E to W. Bounded by trees on N and rivers on E, S, and W sides. Trails running across N side.
 ZD149020 to
 ZD159034

B-2-A-1

SECRET

SECRET

10. ZD164073 1900x800 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented NW to SE. Bounded on W, N, and NW sides by small trees, W and S by cultivated area. Numerous trails leaving area.

11. ZD161001 1700x800 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N, S, and E by hedgerows, and on W side by cultivated area. Numerous trails leaving area.

12. ZD169028 5000x2500 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented E to W. Bounded by river on W, N, and E sides. Wet area S. Trail leaving SE corner.
to
ZD177037
to
ZD186032

13. ZD174053 3000x2000 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N and W sides by trees, on W side by cleared area, and S by river. Numerous trails.
to
ZD173043

14. AU845026 2000x300 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented E to W. Bounded by small trees on N, W, and S side, cleared area on E side. Trail running NW to SE across northern side.
to
AU851025

15. AU829069 1000x200 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on E side by trees, and on N and S sides by river. Trails run N, E, and W.

16. AU826036 2000x750 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented N to S. Bounded on N and E sides by small trees, S and W sides by river. Trail running SE from SE corner.
to
AU830030

17. AU813050 2000x1800 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented E to W. Bounded by river on N and E sides. W and S sides by cultivated area.
to
AU820052 Numerous trails from W to S side.

18. AU833046 500x350 feet. Cultivated area. Oriented NW to SE. Bounded by river on N and S sides, by cultivated area on E and W sides. Footbridge across river at SE corner. Trail heading W from NW corner.

19. AU816029 Cleared area. Oriented E to W. Bounded on all sides by cleared and cultivated area. Trails passing E to W, and N to S throughout area.
to
AU823034
to
AU825030

HLZ SOURCE RECON REPORTS


20. YC989997 3 to 4 HELOs.

21. AU834061 1/CH-46 "Good Zone". Elephant grass up to 4 feet high.

SECRET

22. AU838060 "Good" 1/CH-46 Elephant grass knee high.
23. ZC118994 Good multi-bird LZ of elephant grass.
24. ZD110000 Good 3/CH-46s in old rice paddy.
25. AU835060 "very good" 2/CH-46 LZ. 6" grass on LZ.
26. AU825085 Good LZ.
27. AU835072 Good LZ.
28. ZD052003 Good 2/CH-46 zone of 2' high grass.
29. ZC059997 Good 2/CH-46 zone in rice paddy.
30. ZD055003 Good 2 bird LZ of low grass.
31. ZC056963 Small 1/CH-46 zone.
32. ZD161069 Good multi-bird zone in rice paddies.
33. ZD176052 Good multi-bird zone in rice paddies.
34. ZD152062 Good LZ.
35. ZD157055 Good LZ.
36. AU835062 Good 1 bird zone of foot high grass.
37. AU834060 Good 1 bird zone of foot high grass.
38. AU837038 Good multi-bird zone in old rice paddies.
39. AU825037 Good 1/CH-46 in scrubs up to 3 feet high.
40. AU831031 Good 1/CH-46 zone in 3 feet high elephant grass.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
Task Force X-Ray
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200H March 1968

Tab B (NIS Landing Beach #3) To Appendix 2 (Area Study Phu Loc/Phu Bai AO)
To ANNEX B (Intelligence) To Operation Order 301-68

a. Beach Location

Centered 3.25 miles SW of Cap Chon May Est, between 16 20 15N, 107 57 30E and 16 18 45N, 108 01 00E. (Reliability: GOOD)

b. Length and Usable Length

4.5 miles; concave beach, terminated to NW by rock-fringed headland and to SE at base of sandpit; separated in central part by stream mouth; 4 miles usable.

c. Widths

40 to 200 yd at L. W.; 20 to 100 at H. W.

d. Beach Gradients

1 on 30 to 1 on 50, L. W. to H. W.; 1 on 15, H. W. zone.

e. Approach

Nearshore bottom slopes gentle to mild shoreward of 6 ft depth contour 90 to 285 yds of H.W. line; 18 ft depth contour 420 to 750 yds off H. W. line; 30 ft depth contour 1,200 yds to 1 nm off H.W. line; offshore approach clear; nearshore approach flanked by rocky headlands; bottom sand and mud; anchorage in 42 ft depth 1.5 nm off SE end of beach; anchorage bottom unknown.

f. Surf and Tidal Range

Surf 4 ft or greater can be expected to occur 29% of the time in winter, 11% in spring, and 19% in fall, but is infrequent in summer; tidal range 2 ft, tropic.

g. Material and Firmness

Sand; firm in wetted area, soft where dry.

~~SECRET~~h. Terrain Immediately Behind Beach

Beach backed by partly brush-covered dunes extending 150 to 300 yds inland; in turn backed by lowland mostly covered with ricefields, traversed by streams, and extending 150 to 700 yds inland behind NW part and far as 7.5 miles inland behind remainder of beach, all in turn backed by forested mountains; tidal lagoon 250 to 600 yds behind SE part of beach; villages on lowland.

i. Exits and Communications Inland

Exit cross country to coastal trail 330 to 500 yds inland; movement farther inland by trails to surfaced coastal road 2 to 4.5 miles inland; meter gauge RR 2.75 to 5 miles inland.

NIS LANDING BEACH #4

a. Centered 5.75 miles SE of Cap Chon May Est, between 16 18 30N, 108 02 30E and 16 13 45N, 108 05 45E. (Reliability: GOOD)

b. Length and Usable Length

6.75 miles straight beach, terminated to NW by rocky headland and to SE by lagoon inlet; all usable.

c. Widths

40 to 70 yds at L.W.; 20 to 50 yds at H.W.

d. Beach Gradients

1 on 25, L.W. to H.W.; 1 on 10, H.W. zone.

e. Approach

Nearshore bottom slopes mild to flat shoreward of 36 ft depth contour 960 to 1,650 yds off H.W. line; off shore approach partly obstructed by wreck 2.5nm ESE of NW end of beach; nearshore approach clear but blanked to NW by rocky headland; bottom sand; anchorage in 42 ft depth 2.75 miles NW of NW end of beach anchorage; bottom unknown.

f. Surf and Tidal Range

Surf 4 ft or greater can be expected to occur 55% of the time in winter, 21% in spring, 5% in summer, and 36% in fall; tidal range 2.5 ft, tropic.

~~SECRET~~g. Material and Firmness

Sand; firm in wetted area, soft where dry.


h. Terrain Immediately Behind Beach

NW three-fourths of beach backed by mostly barren dunes extending as far as 200 yds inland; dunes and remainder of beach backed by lowland covered with brush and ricefields and extending 600 to 1,400 yds inland to wooded hills behind NW part of beach and 250 to 1,600 yds inland across peninsula to lagoon behind SE part; small lagoons on peninsula behind central part of beach; hills and NW end of beach backed by lowland mostly covered with ricefields, traversed by streams and extending as far as 7.5 miles inland to mountains; rocky headland at NW end of beach flanked to NW by bay; villages on lowlands.

i. Exits and Communications Inland

Exit across country to coastal trail 200 to 1,000 yds inland paralleling NW half of beach or to surfaced coastal road 175 yds to 1 mile inland paralleling remainder of beach and leading W behind central part of beach and S over bridge across lagoon inlet behind SE end of beach; other trails lead from coastal trail; meter-gauge RR 1,500 yds to 3 miles inland and bordering W shore of lagoon.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

B-2-B-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Viet Nam
 061200H Mar 1968

Appendix 3 (Bridge Classification) To Annex B (Intelligence) to
 Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (A) 1st Marine Division Ltr 2/REC/inh of 7 March 1968 (Bridge Data,
 Long Co South To Nam-O

NO	TYPE	COORD	CAPACITY	STATUS	BY PASS (+)
133	Bridge	YD968063	100	Good	
134	Flat Culvert	975056	975056	Good	Good
135	Quo Chu	980053	60	Good	+
136	Round Culvert	985048		20% Dest	+
137	Huong Dien	986048	21	Good	
138	Round Culvert	988046		Good	
139	Round Culvert	992045	9	Good	
140	Arch Bridge	999040	100	Good	
141	Round Culvert	ZD003038		Good	
142	Round Culvert	004037		Good	
143	Bridge	006035		Dest	+
144	Flat Culvert	008034		Dest	
145	Bridge	012030	100	Dest	
146	Bridge	015027	5	Fair	+
147	Round Culvert	017027		Good	+
148	Bridge	021026	20	Fair	+
149	Round Culvert	025026		Good	+
150	Culvert	031026		Good	+
151	Round Culvert	032026		Good	
152	Double Round Culvert	035026		Good	
153	Canopy Culvert	036026		Good	
154	Culvert	037026	100	Good	
155	Da Bao	039025	21	Fair	
156	Canopy Culvert	045024		Good	
157	Canopy Culvert	058022		Good	
158	Flat Culvert	059060	100	Good	
159	Round Culvert	060019	100	Good	
160	Round Culvert	063017	100	Good	
161	Round Culvert	066013		Good	
162	Bridge	069012		Good	
163	Bridge	072010	40	Good	
164	Bridge	073010	21	Good	
165	Bridge	076009	30	Good	
166	Canopy Culvert	081009		Good	
167	Arch Bridge	084008		Good	
168	Hai Bridge	086007	150	Good	
169	Round Culvert	089006		Good	
170	Round Culvert	091006		Fair	
171	Double Round Culvert	093005	100	Good	

~~SECRET~~

B-3-1

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NO	TYPE	COORD	CAPACITY	STATUS	BY PASS (+)
172	Culvert	ZD095006		Good	
173	Phu Loc Bridge	099006		Dest	
174	Culvert	103012		Good	
175	Culvert	105015		Good	
176	Round Culvert	106016		Good	
177	Round Culvert	113019		Good	
178	Round Culvert	115013		Good	
179	Bridge	120012		Dest	
180	Bridge	137010		Good	+
181	Canopy Culvert	142010		Good	
182	Vau Son	148010		Good	
183	Bridge	153010		Fair	
184	Flat Culvert	160010		Good	
185	Culvert	164010		Good	
186	Bridge	167010		Good	+
187	Culvert	175010		Good	
188	Flat Culvert	178010		Good	
189	Canopy Culvert	182010		Good	
190	Bridge	198010	80	Fair	
191	Bridge	205010		Good	
192	Bridge	AU797009	80	Good	
193	Culvert	805009	100	Good	
194	Culvert	807009		Good	
195	Bridge	808009		Good	
196	Bridge	814009	30	Fair	+
197	Bridge	815008	100	Fair	
198	Bridge	819008		Fair	
199	Bridge	823008	50		
200	Culvert	828008	80	Good	
201	Canopy Culvert	849002		Good	
202	Culvert	849002		Fair	
203	Canopy Culvert	852001			
204	Canopy Culvert	856001		Good	
205	Lang Co Bridge	888951	18	Good	
BT					

BRIDGES AND CULVERTS


BRIDGE AND CULVERT LOCATIONS FROM LANG CO BRIDGE TO SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF 5TH MARINES AC.

COORDINATES	TYPE	COORDINATES	TYPE
92209285	Culvert	93419187	Culvert
92209275	Culvert	93609219	Culvert
92259280	Culvert	93659160	Bridge

~~SECRET~~

<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
92289266	Culvert	93659180	Culvert
92309283	Culvert	93699191	Culvert
92409259	Bridge	93699208	Culvert
92409250	Culvert	93779189	Culvert
92519235	Culvert	93789180	Culvert
92709220	Bridge	93799219	Culvert
92959219	Bridge	93799209	Culvert
93139210	Bridge	93799169	Culvert
93259250	Bridge	93809199	Culvert
93359195	Culvert		
88609540	Culvert	90209542	Culvert
88699540	Culvert	90209530	Culvert
88989526	Culvert	90309535	Culvert
09129520	Culvert	90499511	Culvert
89299527	Bridge	90609510	Bridge
89509530	Bridge	90699510	Bridge
89749576	Culvert	90809485	Culvert
89889582	Culvert	90819495	Culvert
89919560	Culvert		
90999478	Bridge	914939	Culvert
911948	Culvert	914939	Culvert
912944	Culvert	914936	Culvert
91219428	Bridge	91519350	Bridge
913948	Culvert	91669335	Bridge
913942	Culvert	917933	Culvert
913941	Culvert	91859282	Bridge
914940	Culvert		

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) To Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200H March 1968

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6641 III, IV;
6541 I, II, III, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION

In the assigned AO: Keep the MSR open by protecting Route #1 and supporting bridges, culverts, and passes. Support and protect friendly installations, units, convoys, and road repair parties. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Areas of Operation

- (1) Regt Area of Operations. The Regt AO generally coincides with the Phu Loc District. The area not specifically within any TAOR in the Regt AO is a free fire/maneuver zone. Clearance to fire or conduct operations within that area rests with the Regimental Commander.
- (2) Regt Tactical Area of Responsibility. The Regt TAOR runs along the axis of the MSR and stretches laterally to cover key installations, villages, and possible enemy mortar sites. The Regt TAOR is further divided into Bn TAORs. Bn TAOR boundaries serve as Fire Control Lines. Bns may fire/maneuver within their own TAOR's to carry out their assigned missions.

b. Protection of Route #1

- (1) Establish holding positions at key bridges and installations as required.
- (2) Conduct maximum patrolling and ambush operations at or near obvious targets for attack or destruction by utilizing preplanned and observed artillery and mortar fires, command detonated mines, and organic infantry weapons.
- (3) Deny less critical targets by maximum but well controlled use of mines and booby traps, and H&I artillery fires taking full advantage of the antipersonnel but nondestructive effects of VT on bridges and culverts.

~~SECRET~~

(4) Plan and conduct continuing offensive operations well away from and parallel to the MSR to destroy and interdict threatening enemy forces.

c. Road Clearance and Mine Sweeps

(1) Protect mine sweep parties by furnishing physical security where required, and maintaining constant observation over such parties prepared to assist and direct artillery and mortar fire in their protection.

(2) Be prepared to conduct road clearance and mine sweep operations on order.

d. Convoy Protection

(1) Keep all friendly vehicles and convoys passing through assigned TAOR under constant observation prepared to assist with reaction forces and protective artillery and mortar fire.

(2) Monitor convoy radio net as required.

e. Protection of Road and Bridge Repair Parties

(1) Protect R&B repair parties by furnishing physical security where required, and maintaining constant observation over such parties, prepared to assist with reaction forces and protective artillery and mortar fire.

(2) Monitor R&B repair party net as required.

f. Counterattack Plan

(1) Contact and destroy threatening enemy forces by engaging and attacking approaching enemy columns in decisive combat, and by fire from designated holding positions.

(2) Bns will consolidate holding positions at key points within their assigned TAOR's:

(a) ~~Song River Bridge~~ Bridge #6

(b) Phu Loc Combat Base

(c) Claymore Pass

(d) ~~Ngoc Nget Bridge~~ Bridge #10

(e) ~~Cambox Fire Base~~

~~SECRET~~(f) ~~Long Range~~ Bridge # 12~~(g) Short Range~~ Bridge # 13

(3) Each Bn will establish a multi-company reaction force at a central location within assigned TAOR prepared to move by foot, vehicle, or helicopter to any point of enemy contact to engage and attack enemy forces.

(4) By prior agreement with SAG 3, and on order, CAP and PR units will displace to the nearest friendly holding position or reaction force to reinforce and operate with those units.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

~~G. C. McNaughton~~

G. C. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer


APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Phu Loc TAOR
- 2 - Bowling Alley TAOR
- 3 - Hai Van TAOR

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~CHANGE #1

- 5 As requested, act as blocking forces in combined operations with the local Bn in and near villages and areas in assigned SOR.
- 6 Prepare and submit for approval defensive fire plans to the local Bn.



R. D. BOHN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Hai Van TAOR
- 2 - Phu Loc TAOR
- 3 - Phu Bai TAOR

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

CHANGE #1

C-4

~~SECRET~~

SECRETCHANGE #1

(3) Each Bn will establish a multi-company reaction force at a control location within assigned TAOR prepared to move by foot, vehicle, or helicopter to any point of enemy contact to engage and attack enemy forces.

g. Joint Operations with Combined Action Forces

(1) There are a total of 11 Combined Action Platoons in the Regt AO. All CAPs are organic to CAG 3, III MAF. The presence of these forces adds the strength one one battalion along the MSR in the Regt AO. Through liaison, coordination, and cooperation, these forces can do much to release units of this Regt to operate deep to the south and north by performing more routine security tasks along Route #1.

(2) By joint agreement with the Commanding Officer, CAG 3, CAPs of that organization and units of this Regt will execute the following tasks:

(a) Each Inf Bn, 5th Marines

- 1 Provide and establish a Liaison NCO with radio at each CAP position within assigned Bn TAOR.
- 2 Plan and clear all artillery, NGF, and air support for CAPs within assigned TAOR.
- 3 Integrate all CAP day and night ambush and patrol activities with Bn activities in assigned TAOR.
- 4 Prepare reaction plans and designate reaction forces to assist CAPs under enemy attack in assigned TAOR.
- 5 In cooperation and coordination plan for and utilize CAPs as blocking forces in combined operations in and near villages and areas in CAP SORs.
- 6 Plot and respect assigned CAP SORs as assigned by CAG 3.

(b) Each CAP, CAG 3

- 1 Maintain constant communications with local Bn through that Bn's Liaison NCO.
- 2 Request and clear all supporting fires through local Bn.
- 3 Clear all ARVN supporting fires through local Bn.
- 4 Submit day and night ambush and patrol activities by 1300 of the afternoon preceding those activities.

CHANGE #1

C-3

SECRET

~~SECRET~~~~CHANGE #1~~c. Road Clearance and Mine Sweeps

- (1) Protect mine sweep parties by furnishing physical security where required, and maintaining constant observation over such parties prepared to assist and direct artillery and mortar fire in their protection.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct road clearance and mine sweep operations on order.

d. Convoy Protection

- (1) Keep all friendly vehicles and convoys passing through assigned TAOR under constant observation prepared to assist with reaction forces and protective artillery and mortar fire.
- (2) Monitor convoy radio net as required.

e. Protection of Road and Bridge Repair Parties

- (1) Protect R&B repair parties by furnishing physical security where required, and maintaining constant observation over such parties, prepared to assist with reaction forces and protective artillery and mortar fire.
- (2) Monitor R&B repair party net as required.

f. Counterattack Plan

- (1) Contact and destroy threatening enemy forces by engaging and attacking approaching enemy columns in decisive combat, and fire from designated holding positions.
- (2) The will consolidate holding positions at key points within their assigned TAOR's:
 - (a) Bridge #6.
 - (b) Phu Loc Combat Base.
 - (c) Claymore Pass.
 - (d) Bridge #10.
 - (e) Bridge #12.
 - (f) Bridge #13.

~~CHANGE #1~~

C-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~CHANGE #1

Hq, 5th Marine
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 011200 Apr 1968

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN AMS Ser L7014 1:50,000 Sheets 6641 I, II, III, & IV; Sheets 6542 I, II, III, & IV.

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION

In the assigned AO: Keep the MSR open by protecting Route #1 and supporting bridges, culverts, and passes. Support and protect friendly installations, units, convoys, and road repair parties. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Areas of Operations

(1) Regt Area of Operations. The Regt AO generally coincides with the Phu Loc District. The area not specifically within any TAOR in the Regt AO is a free fire/maneuver zone. Clearance to fire or conduct operations within that area rests with the Regimental Commander.

(2) Regt Tactical Area of Responsibility. The Regt TAOR runs along the axis of the MSR and stretches laterally to cover key installations, villages, and possible enemy mortar sites. The Regt TAOR is further divided into Bn TAORs. Bn TAOR boundaries serve as Fire Control Lines. Bns may fire/maneuver within their own TAORs to carry out their assigned mission.

b. Protection of Route #1

- (1) Establish holding positions at key bridges and installations as required.
- (2) Conduct maximum patrolling and ambush operations at or near obvious targets for attack or destruction by utilizing pre-planned and observed artillery and mortar fires, command detonated mines, and organic infantry weapons.
- (3) Deny less critical targets by maximum but well controlled use of mines, booby traps, and H&I artillery fires taking full advantage of the antipersonnel but nondestructive effects of VT on bridges and culverts.
- (4) Plan and conduct continuing offensive operations well away from parallel to the MSR to destroy and interdict threatening enemy forces.

CHANGE #1

C-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~CHANGE #1Copy of 50 Copies

Hq, 5th Marines

Task Force XRAY

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam

011200H Apr 1968

Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN AMS Ser L7014 1:50,000 Sheets 6641 I, II, III, & IV;
 Sheets 6543 I, II, III, & IV.

- (b) 1st MarDiv OpO 301-68
- (c) 1st MarDiv OpO 309-68
- (d) DivO 5400.3 w/Ch#1
- (e) DivO P02000.2 (CEOI)
- (f) TF XRAY OpO 301-68
- (g) 5th Mar AdO 301-68
- (h) TF XRAY AdO 11-68
- (i) 5th Mar CEOI

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization).1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Situation

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Current INTSUMs.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 2d Bn, 11th Marines direct support.
- (2) 1st MAW provides fixed and rotary wing support.
- (3) Elements of CAG 3 with RVN PF units interdicts Route #1 and guards designated key bridges and installations.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).2. MISSION

In the assigned AO: Keep the MSR open by protecting Route #1 and supporting bridges, culverts, and passes. Support and protect friendly installations, units, convoys, and road repair parties. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Within assigned AO establish a regimental TAOR along the axis of the MSR from the northwest boundary to the

CHANGE #1

00-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~CHANGE #1

southwest boundary extending laterally from Route #1 to include commanding terrain and key installations and villages; and possible enemy mortar and ambush sites. Establish 3 Bn TAORs within the Regt TAOR to affect equal distribution of tactical responsibilities in carrying out the assigned mission. Use maximum of forces to conduct local offensive operation in the Bn TAORs, and individual and multi-battalion offensive operations in the Regt AO to destroy threatening enemy forces and deny use of terrain for bases and cache sites.

b. Bn, 5th Marines

- (1) Establish in the Hai Van TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
- (2) Establish holding positions to defend Bridges 11, 12, and 13.
- (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, materiel, and positions.
- (4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist CAP-H-7 and CAP-H-9, and all other friendly forces and installations in the Hai Van TAOR in the event of enemy attack.

c. Bn, 5th Marines

- (1) Establish in the Phu Loc TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
- (2) Establish holding positions to defend the Rockcrusher, Cau Bei LSÅ, Phu Loc Fire Base, Claymore Pass, and Bridge 10.
- (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, materiel, and positions.
- (4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist the Phu Loc District Hq, CAP-H-4, CAP-H-5, and CAP-H-6 and all other friendly forces and installations in the Phu Loc TAOR in the event of enemy attack.

d. Bn, 5th Marines

- (1) Establish in the Phu Bai TAOR to keep Route #1 and all supporting bridges, culverts, and passes open.
- (2) Establish holding positions to defend OP 180, OP 230, and Bridges 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
- (3) Conduct offensive operations in assigned TAOR to destroy threatening enemy forces, materiel, and positions.

CHANGE #1

00-2

~~SECRET~~

SECRETCHANGE #1

(4) Plan for and be prepared to support and assist CAP-A-2, CAP-A-3, CAP-H-1, CAP-H-2, CAP-H-3, and CAP-H-8, and all other friendly forces and installations in the Phu Bai TAOR in the event of enemy attack.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) All units will be prepared to accomplish the following tasks in accordance with Annex C (Concept of Operations).

- (a) Protect and assist friendly convoys moving on the MSR.
- (b) Provide security for road and bridge repair parties.
- (c) Support mine sweep operations on the MSR.
- (d) CHOP reaction forces to any point in the Regt AO.
- (e) Conduct offensive operations as a battalion or as part of a multi-battalion force in any area of the Regt AO.
- (f) All units will make liaison with and conduct joint operations with units of CAG 3 as specified in Annex C (Concept of Operations).
- (g) All damage or suspected damage to Route #1 will be reported immediately. During hours of reduced visibility and on sections of Route #1 not under direct observation, all possible sounds of detonation in the vicinity of the road will be reported. Investigation will be made as soon as possible, and a follow-up report will be submitted.
- (h) Bn CPs, and companies separated from Bn CPs will have HST capabilities at all times.
- (i) Rifle companies will be rotated to 5th Marines rear for unit training and rehabilitation on order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Admin Order 301-68.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Annex F (Comm-Elec)

R. D. Bohn

R. D. BOHN
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

CHANGE #1

00-3

SECRET

SECRET

CHANGE #1

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Artillery and NGF Support
- E - Air Support
- F - Comm-Elec
- G - Civic Action
- H - Psy Ops
- X - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

CHANGE #1

00-4

SECRET

SECTION

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (REIN), FMF
 Chu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200 Mar 1968

Annex D (Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) Maps; Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6641 III, IV;
 6541 I, II, III, IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Hq, 1st Field Artillery Group

a. 1st 155mm Gun Btry

b. 2nd Platoon, 3d 8" How Btry

c. Btry L, 4th Bn, 11th Marines

(2) 2nd Plat, Btry B, 12th ARVN Bn (Phu Loc)

(3) Btry B, 8th Bn, 4th Arty (Danang-TAOR)

(4) Plat, 3d 155mm Gun Btry (Danang-TAOR)

2. MISSION

2d Bn, 11th Marines provides direct support for the 5th Marine Regiment in the Reginalent Area of Operations. In addition, artillery support will be provided in support of convoy operations, recon inserts, CAG units, reinforcement of ARVN artillery and counter rocket/battery/mortar fires. Available Naval Gunfire Ships provide support as required.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support

(1) 2d Bn, 11th Marines positions its organic firing units within the 5th Marines Area of Operations to provide direct support for offensive and defensive operations as required. Direct support will normally be provided from the following bases:

~~SECRET~~

- (1) Peaceful Valley, grid square ZD0202; (2) Phu Loc, grid Square ZD0798; (3) Plantation Palace, grid square ZD1601; (4) Tombstone, grid square AU8101; (5) Sandbox, grid square AT9798.
- (2) Btry D: Reinforcing support Btry F.
- (3) Btry E: D/S 2d Bn, 5th Marines
- (4) Btry F: D/S 3d Bn, 5th Marines
- (5) Btry L: G/S, Reinforcing 2d Bn, 11th Marines
- (6) General support/reinforcing fires from units positioned outside the 5th Marines AO will be available through the 1st Field Artillery Group.
- (7) Naval Gunfire Support available through Task Force XRAY. (Appendix 1).

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Fire support coordination will be accomplished at the battalion level for organic units whenever possible. Battalion TAOR boundaries within the 5th Marines AO will be utilized as fire coordination lines between resident battalions. Any mission or impact that falls within 500 meters of any boundary or intermediate boundary will be cleared with the adjacent battalion or unit prior to sending the mission to the Regimental FSCC for final clearance and assignment of Sav-A-Plane designator.
- (2) Clearance of missions in the area outside the Battalion TAORS but contained within the Regimental AO is the responsibility of the Regimental FSCC. Fire control measures for multi-battalion operations outside the battalion TAORS but within the Regimental AO will be instituted as the operations occur.
- (3) Clearance of missions with the Phu Loc District Chief will be accomplished as required by the Regimental FSCC.
- (4) Fire missions (exclusive of H & I's and on call fires) sent to the Regimental FSCC will conform to the Sav-A-Plane format as indicated in Appendix 3.
- (5) H&I fires in the Regimental AO, exclusive of H&I fires in conjunction with multi-battalion or other operations outside the Battalion TAOR's, will be submitted to the Regimental FSCC by 1700 daily.

~~SECRET~~

- (6) At the present time, restrictive fire plan NOVEMBER provides an air lane for friendly aircraft to negotiate Hwy 1 from Hué to Phu Loc. This restrictive fire plan encompasses an area 350 meters either side of Hwy 1 from sea level to 2000' from Hué to Phu Loc. No artillery fire will pass through this restrictive zone with a maximum ordnance under 2000' without clearance from the Regimental FSCC. In the event the volume of air traffic necessitates extending the restrictive fire plan east of Phu Loc along Hwy 1, this will be accomplished at the discretion of the Regimental FSC.
- (7) All firing units will insure that air sentries are posted in their respective firing positions at any time firing is being conducted. These sentries will be in a position to observe the gun target line, as terrain and visibility conditions permit, to assist in reducing hazards to friendly aircraft from artillery fire.
- (8) Battalion Liaison Officers will insure that the artillery forward observers with their battalion are properly instructed in the utilization of artillery for canopy operations. The density and height of the vegetation in a majority of the Regimental AO dictates a thorough understanding and utilization of preplanned concentrations, resection from air bursts on known locations, etc., to assist the forward observer in accurately locating his position.

4. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

- a. Admin Order 301-68

- *b. Ammunition availability per day (HE)

WEAPON	DENSITY	ASR	ROUNDS/DAY
4.2" Mortar	2	26	52
105mm How	18	30	540
155mm How	8	31.7	254
155mm Gun	6	18	108
8" How	2	40	80

*Supply rates govern firing over a period of days rather than a single day. Rates may be exceeded when required. ASR is as of date of this order and is subject to change. Changes will be promulgated as ammo status warrants.

- c. ASP is located within the Phu Bai vital area. Resupply is effected by supply point distribution.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

- a. 2d Bn, 11th Marines CP is located at Grid ZD025024.

~~SECRET~~b. Communications/Electronics. Annex F.

(1) The frequency and mike designator for the Regimental Liaison Net are as listed ref (a), frequency 60.05, M 509.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. O. MCNAUGHTON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

APPENDICES:

✓ (1) - Naval Gunfire Support
✓ (2) - Position Area and Firecap Overlay (to be published)
✓ (3) - Sav-A-Plane Format

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X(DISTRIBUTION) to Operation Order 301-68

D-4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (REIN) MIF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200 Mar 1968

Appendix 1 (Naval Gunfire Support) to Annex D (Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION

Units of the U. S. Seventh Fleet will provide Naval Gunfire Support for 1st Marine Division.

2. EXECUTION

a. The Naval Gunfire Units (TU 70.8.9) will:

- (1) Be responsive to COMUSMACV requirements and provide NGFS as requested.
- (2) When directed, provide NGFS for specific amphibious operations in accordance with instructions provided by Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).


b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Requests for NGF ships in direct support of 5th Marines will be submitted by the 5th Marines Naval Gunfire Officer to Task Force XRAY. Ships available for support will be turned over to the control of the 5th Marines NGFO.
- (2) If a ship is not available to Task Force XRAY the request will be forwarded to the 1st MarDiv NGFO who will request a ship be assigned by III MAF.
- (3) Ships normally available will be 5"/38 direct support destroyers.
- (4) Heavy cruisers - 8"/55, Light cruisers - 6"47, and destroyers - 5"/54 will normally operate in the immediate vicinity of the DMZ.
- (5) IFS and LSMR rocket ships are normally used only in general support in sparsely inhabited areas.
- (6) Heavier support ships may be requested for a specific operation or commitment, subject to approval and assignment by III MAF.

~~SECRET~~

- c. Upon assignment to the 5th Marines, the ship(s) will be controlled by the 5th Marines NGFO as directed by the Regimental Commander.
- d. Amplifying instructions for Naval Gunfire Support and communications can be found in the publication, Gun 12.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (DISTRIBUTION) to Operation Order 301-68

SECRET

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Appendix 3 (Save-A-Plane Format) to Annex D (Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

SAVE-A-PLANE

Date _____

DESIGNATOR	CANCEL-LATION	A	B	C	D	E	F	G

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

D-3-1

SECRET

SECRET

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XIAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Annex E (Air Support) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. In this area of operation fixed wing for close air support are on call with 250 pound snakeye bombs and 500 pound napalm bombs. Elapse time from request to aircraft on station will be approximately 30 minutes.
- b. Tactical air controllers airborne/aerial observers are available as needed to control airstrikes, adjust artillery and conduct aerial reconnaissance of the area.
- c. Helicopters are on a standby alert to conduct medevacs from units in the field.

2. PROCEDURES

- a. Airstrikes will be under positive control of TAC(A), ASRT or TACP.
- b. Mark targets with white phosphorous if possible.
- c. Units will display panels to mark friendly positions and have colored smoke available to mark landing zones and friendly positions on call from pilot who will identify the color of smoke.
- d. Submit preplanned missions prior to 0900 on the day prior for routine missions and prior to 1500 for priority missions. Emergencies can be requested anytime, however for special ordnance a delay should be expected.
- e. Medevac requests will be submitted by TACP of subordinate units on TACP local and then submitted by this headquarters to DASC.
- f. Helicopter support teams assigned to units will control all helicopters for resupply, and where possible all medevacs.

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Reference (e) and Annex F (Comm-Elect).
 - (1) TACP Local net will be continually guarded by this headquarters and by subordinate units as necessary to submit requests and control aircraft with FM capability.

~~SECRET~~

- (2) TAR net will be continually monitored by this headquarters to receive, request, and maintain communications with DASC.
- (3) Landing Zone Common will be guarded by HST to control all landing zones.
- (4) Medevac frequencies. All subordinate units will be prepared to establish communications with Medevac Helicopter as necessary.
- (5) Subordinate units will be prepared to guard TAD nets to control fixed wing using close support aircraft.


b. Controlling Agencies

{ 1} TACC	DaNang	Joyride
{ 2} DASC	Phu Bai	Plutocrat Two
{ 3} ASRT	Phu Bai	Plutocrat Bravo

4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS AND CANOPY

- a. In canopy operations every effort should be made to get medevacs and resupply in a cleared secure zone. Clear a zone 125 feet by 125 feet. Use of slings should be kept to a minimum because of the extreme vulnerability of helicopters hovering at tree top level.
- b. In mountainous terrain the maximum slope that a helicopter can land on is 30 percent.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) DivO 02000.1C (CEOI)
 (b) 1st MarDiv OpO 309-68
 (c) 5th Marines CEOI dtd 14 Jan 1968

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Conduct electronics countermeasures (Jamming).
 - (b) Conduct wire tapping and monitor radio transmissions.
 - (c) Insert deceptive traffic on radio and wire circuits.
 - (d) Booby trap abandoned equipment.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Command Posts

Hq, 5th Marines	vic ZD052029
5th Marines (Rear)	vic YD885135
1st Bn, 5th Marines	vic ZC944919
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	vic ZD053026
3rd Bn, 5th Marines	vic ZD810020
2nd Bn, 11th Marines	vic ZD025024
Logistics Support Area	vic ZD051026

Report changes to CP locations as they occur.

2. MISSION

Communications-electronics elements provide support to the 5th Marines (Rein) within the Phu Loc area of operations.

~~SECRET~~

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. To conduct operations within the Phu Loc AO necessitating displacement of regimental and battalion command elements into the field in order to establish command posts capable of coordination and control.
- b. Headquarters, 5th Marines
 - (1) Establish and maintain communications-electronics facilities in the field for tactical coordination and control of 5th Marines (Rein).
 - (2) Provide communications-electronics facilities at the 5th Marines (Rear) for administrative control and coordination of Headquarters, 5th Marines and battalion rear elements.
 - (3) Be prepared on order to provide attachments as necessary to support radio relay, or furnish technical assistance to subordinate organizations.
 - (4) See appendix 1 and 2.
- c. Infantry Battalions, 5th Marines
 - (1) Maintain external communications as directed by this headquarters and internal communications to support assigned mission.
 - (2) Establish rear command post communication facilities for administrative and logistics coordination with elements in the field.
 - (3) See appendix 1 and 2.
- d. Supporting Organizations
 - (1) Maintain external and internal communications to support assigned mission.
 - (2) Enter Regimental Tactical Net #2 when required for coordination with this headquarters.
- e. Detachment Radio-Relay HqBn and 7th Comm Bn
 - (1) Maintain and operate AN/MRC-62 circuits for 5th Marines (Rein) as indicated in appendix 1.
 - (2) Be prepared on order, to displace with organization to which attached and reestablish radio relay circuits.

~~SECRET~~f. Coordinating Instructions

(1) See references (a), (b), and (c).

(2) Radio

(a) See appendix 2.

(b) HF and UHF capabilities will be always available in the field to enter prescribed circuits, when directed, in the event of VHF radio difficulties.

(c) Antennas RG-292 will be carried into the field and utilized as necessary to establish the most effective radio circuits possible. Employment of these antennas will be especially necessary for operations in the canopy.

(d) All command posts less battalion rears, will maintain a secure voice (KY-8) capability while in the field.

(e) Infantry battalions will establish radio communications for administrative and logistics to rear elements. Facilities at 5th Marines (Rear) are available for installation of radio equipment and will provide operating space necessary.

(3) Wire and Radio Relay

(a) See appendix 1.

(b) Infantry battalions will provide following augmentation to Headquarters, 5th Marines (Rear) to assist in maintaining regimental rear wire facilities.

Two (2) Wireman - MOS 2511

One (1) Switchboard - SB-22

Ten (10) Telephones - TA-312 or EE-8

(c) Install internal wire as required.

(d) Submit telephone directories and changes as they occur to this headquarters.

(4) Message Center

(a) Headquarters, 5th Marines (Rear) will operate a message center to accomodate the requirements of the regimental and battalion rear headquarters. Delivery to/from message center to battalion rear will be by battalion messenger pick-up.

~~SECRET~~

- (b) Operational traffic necessary for tactical operations will be readressed by regimental rear headquarters and transmitted by electrical means to this headquarters.
- (c) Courier service will be established for delivery of "information" messages from the regimental rear to this headquarters utilizing scheduled convoys.
- (d) In order to maintain maximum mobility, teletype circuits will not be established to battalion command posts. Radio and courier will be utilized as necessary.
- (e) Each infantry battalion will provide one (1) message center man, MOS-2542 to Headquarters, 5th Marines (Rear) to assist in the operation of the regimental rear message center.

(5) Cryptographic

- (a) See references (a) and (c) and KAG-1.
- (b) A secure voice (KY-8) capability will be maintained at all battalion command posts in the field.
- (c) Effective editions of KAC-QX (numeral code) and KAG-P (brevity code) will be available at all times with the battalion command groups. These codes will be utilized as necessary.

(6) Artillery and Naval Gunfire Communications

Annex D (Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support).

(7) Air Support Communications

Annex E (Air Support).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Admin Order 301-68.
- b. See Frag Orders as issued.
- c. Reports in accordance with reference (c).
- d. LSA has limited technical inspection tuning and alignment capability for communications-electronics equipment. Equipment requiring repair parts will be evacuated via the units rear echelon.

SECRET

e. A four (4) day supply of batteries will be maintained in the field by operating units.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

1 - Wire-Radio Relay
 2 - Radio


DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200N March 1968

Appendix 1 (Wire-Radio Relay) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to
Operation Order 201-68

9.e. Normal wire-radio relay equipment:



BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

McNaughton
P. MCNAUGHTON
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X. (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

F=1<1

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Eq. 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200H March 1968

Appendix 2 (Radio Communications) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 301-68

1. Radio Communications Instructions:

C-Net Control
X-Guard
M-Monitor
W-When Directed
A-As required

NETS	TREQ	TFX TAC 1	TFX TAC 2	TFX CONVOY CONTROL	Regt Cmd	Regt Tac 1	Regt Tac 1 (Status)	Regt Tac 2	TACP Local	Ates Defense Coord	CAG Common
		IAW RECT CROI									
Task Force Xray	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	SANDHURST
5th Mar	W	X	C	W	X	W	W	W	X	A	OFFSPRING
5th Mar Rear										A	OFFSPRING REAR
1st Bn 5th Mar										A	NAILBRUSH
1st Bn 5th Mar Rear										A	NAILBRUSH REAR
2nd Bn 5th Mar										A	ROCKMAT
2nd Bn 5th Mar Rear										A	ROCKMAT REAR
3rd Bn 5th Mar										A	TERRAPIN
3rd Bn 5th Mar Rear										A	TERRAPIN REAR
2nd Bn 11th Mar										A	HEADCOLD
C Co 1st Recon Bn										A	NIGHT SCHOLAR
B Co 1st Engr Bn										A	MOVEABLE
Plt 1st MT BN										A	RAZOR BILL
35 Engr Bn USA										A	WAXEN MERCY
MCB 121										A	POLL TAX
DET MCB 9										A	ORDERLY
Div Convoy										A	(as assigned)
Regt Convoy										A	OFFSPRING ZULU
CAG 3										C	PAGE TITLE
CAC-H										X	REAPPOINT

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL JOHN

John C. McNaughton
John C. McNaughton

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200 Mar 1968

Annex G (Civic Action) to Operation 301-68

Ref: (a) TF XRAY OpO 301-68
 (b) RegtO P5080.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Annex A (Task Organization).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None

2. MISSION

To conduct civic action in the assigned AO in support of the Government of Vietnam Nation building effort.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. The Commanding Officer, 5th Marines (Rein), has been assigned as the civic action coordinator and as such will be responsible for civic action in Thua Thien Province to include that portion of Nam Hoa District east of Song Huong, the Districts of Phu Vang, Huong Thy, Phu Thu, Vinh Loc and Phu Loc less the city of Eue and those areas outlined as Province Priority Areas and the hamlets occupied by Combined Action Units and the villages assigned to 1st FAU, 1st MT Bn and 1st Med Bn. (Appendixes (1) and (3)).

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) During the turn over of areas of operations, maximum coordination and liaison must be effected between relieving and relieved units.
- (2) During the clearing phase of operations in assigned areas of operations, civic action will be confined to high impact short term type projects.
- (3) All projects must be coordinated with CORD, GVN and other RVNAF units in assigned AO's.
- (4) Duplication of civic action efforts must be avoided where possible.

G-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(5) Hamlets with Combined Action Units will be excluded from civic action activities by 5th Marine units except for providing assistance when specifically requested by Combined Action Units. (Appendix (3)).


4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Requests for civic action material that cannot be obtained through GVN sources will be requisitioned through Task Force XRAY via the administrative chain of command and be issued from the Civic Action Warehouse in Phu Bai. Forms for requisitioning may be obtained from this Headquarters.
- b. A Project Request Record is used to obtain Civic Action Commodity Support through GVN channels. Project Request Record forms are available at this Headquarters.
- c. Reporting will be in accordance with reference (c) with an information copy to Task Force XRAY.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



G. C. McLAUGHLIN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

G-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIXES:

- ~1 - Overlay of Province Priority Areas and Village Boundaries in Phu Bai AO (to be published).
- ~2 - Overlay of Village Boundaries in Phu Loc AO (to be published).
- ~3 - Location of Combined Action Units.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), RMT
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200 Mar 1968

Appendix 3 (Location of Combined Action Units) to Annex I (Civic Action)
 to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. The below listed Combined Action Units are located in the 5th Marines CAMOR.

<u>CAP</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>NEAREST VILLAGE</u>
A-1	YD882174	Thu Luong
A-2	YD910150	Thuy Tan
A-3	YD912118	Loc Bon
A-6, 9	YD820181	Thuy Duong
A-7	YD797194	Thuy Duong
H-1	YD925104	Loc Bon
H-2	YD934084	Loc Bon
H-3	YD967063	Loc An
H-4	ZD038024	Loc Dion
H-5	ZD086007	Loc Tri
H-6	ZD139009	Loc Thuy
H-7	ZD201011	Loc Tu
H-8	YD971059	Loc Dion
H-9	AT873991	An Hao

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

GCM/laughton
 G. C. MC LAUGHLIN
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

G-3-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
061200 Mar 1968

Annex H (Psychological Operations) to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) ForceO 3410.1A
(b) RgtO 3410.1 (to be published)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Annex A (Task Organization).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION

Support combat operations within the 5th Marines AO and to win the support of the people toward the Government of Vietnam.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Psychological operations will be conducted in three phases throughout the 5th Marines AO. The first phase of psychological operations will be conducted during the clearing phase. All units of the 5th Marines will conduct concurrent PsyOps campaigns to persuade local citizens to quit supporting VC and NVA. Propaganda themes will be designed to create discontent, (food shortages, poor medical care), demoralize enemy, (allied power, hopelessness of his cause) and create support for national government, (what government and people can do together and what their government is doing for them). During the second phase PsyOps objectives will continue to undermine the remaining VC influence and build support for establishing a local government. Emphasis of Chieu Hoi appeals will shift from the individual to his family. All supporting equipment will be used to keep the populace informed of what their government has done and is trying to do. PsyOps objectives in the last phase will be essentially the same as in phase two. The difference being in the refinement of the program. More sophisticated methods of keeping the populace informed will be employed, such as radios, newspapers and television. Psychological objectives and themes will be designed and stressed in accordance with the insurgency phase in specified areas. (Appendix 1 (Psychological Operations Overlay)). Tactical operations being conducted will have priority of Psychological support.

~~SECRET~~**b. Coordinating Instructions**

- (1) Coordinated PsyOps will be conducted during all tactical operations. Local VC, Hardcore NVA and the Vietnamese citizens are the major target groups within the 5th Marines AO. PsyOps themes will be directed toward and determined by target groups vulnerabilities. (Appendix 1, Psychological Operations Overlay). Themes will change depending on the phase of insurgency. Currently it is believed the major target groups are vulnerable to the following themes. (Annex B (Intelligence)).
 - (a) Local citizens - They must pay taxes.
 - Suffer consequences of VC/NVA acts.
 - Members of their families may have been killed by VC/NVA.
 - Sons may have been impressed into service.
 - (b) Local VC - Know they are considered to be inferior by NVA.
 - Some impressed into service.
 - Subject to influence of their families.
 - Superiority of allied forces.
 - (c) Hardcore NVA - Long way from home.
 - Bad living conditions.
 - Medical treatment bad.
 - Food shortages.
 - Superiority of allied forces.
- (2) The following supporting PsyOps units are available to support tactical operations:
 - (a) Ground Broadcast Teams
 - (b) Aerial Broadcast
 - (c) Leaflet Drops
 - (d) Armed Propoganda Teams
 - (e) Psychological Exploitation Teams
- (3) Supporting PsyOps units available to support non-tactical operations are:
 - (a) HE Jeepster (Movies)
 - (b) Cultural Drama Teams

~~SECRET~~

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. All requests for Psychological Operation teams and equipment will be directed to this Headquarters.
- b. All reporting will be done in accordance with reference (b).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN



MCNAUGHTON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Psychological Operations Overlay (to be issued)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 061200H March 1968

Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order will be as follows:

CG, 1st MarDiv (Rein), FMF	2
CG, Task Force XRAY	4
5th Marines	15
1st Bn, 5th Marines	4
2nd Bn, 5th Marines	4
3rd Bn, 5th Marines	4
2nd Bn, 11th Marines	4
1st Marines	2
7th Marines	2
1st Recon Bn	1
Command Chronology	1
File	7

Total Copies 50

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL BOHN

GCM McNaughton
 G. C. MCNAUGHTON
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

~~SECRET~~

Copy of 50 Copies
 Hq, 5th Marines
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 011200H Apr 1968

Change #1 to Operation Order 301-68

Ref: (a) 5th Mar OpO 301-68

Time Zone: H

1. PURPOSE. To promulgate Change #1 to ref (a).
2. ACTION. On receipt of this document and attendant annexes, remove the portions of ref (a) indicated, destroy, and replace with the attached changes:
 - a. Basic operation order.
 - b. Annex C (Concept of Operations).
 - c. Annex X (Distribution).
 - d. Place this change sheet as the cover to ref (a).
3. REPORT. 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines report by message when changes have been accomplished. No report required by the remainder of the distribution list.

R. D. Bohn 5TH MAR S&C FILES
 R. D. BOHN
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

0226-68
COPY NO. 8 OF 52

ATTACHED CHANGES:

- Operation Order 301-68
- Annex C (Concept of Operations)
- Annex X (Distribution)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

Ch#1-1

~~SECRET~~

SECRETCHANGE #1

Hq, 5th Marine
 Task Force XRAY
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam
 011200H Apr 1968

Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

Time Zone: H

CG 1st MarDiv	2
CG TF XRAY	4
1st Bn, 5th Marines	4
2d Bn, 5th Marines	4
3d Bn, 5th Marines	4
Hq Co, 5th Marines	1
2d Bn, 11th Marines	4
CAG 3	2
1st Force Recon Co	1
5th Marines	24
CEO	(1)
S-2	(1)
S-3	(4)
S-4	(1)
FSCC	(1)
Command Chron	(1)
S&C Files	(15)

TOTALS

50

R. D. Bohn
 R. D. BOHN
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 301-68

CHANGE #1

X-1

SECRET

OR 011615Z

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN TELAB MARINES
 FIRST BN 327 INF
 SECOND BN 502 INF

DEAFTER: P. H. MCWILLIAMS, CPL
8 Aug 68
 RELEASER: G. C. MCNAUGHTON, LTCOL
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 PREG: OP IMMEDIATE
 ROUTINE

//COPY 5 OF 23 COPIES//

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 010001H TO 012400H MAR 68**'CONFIDENTIAL'**

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS: OPERATION HOUSTON.
2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NONE.
3. PLANS SUMMARY:
 - A. 1/5 - OPCON FIRST MARINES.
 - B. 2/5 - 2/5(-) OPCON FIRST MARINES. CO E - OPERATION HOUSTON.
 - C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON.
 - D. 2/3 - OPERATION HOUSTON.
 - E. 1/327 - OPERATION HOUSTON.
 - F. 2/502 - OPERATION HOUSTON.

'CONFIDENTIAL'

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS:

- A. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:
 - (1) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NONE.
 - (2) COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS: NONE.

30
2C

TOD: 1/MAR68/TFX-RUNNER/CCN103/GTE
 S&C MSG PICKUP
 1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR
 2/3 1/327 2/502 FILE SUPVR SLS

011615Z

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

OR 21610Z MAR 68

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG Task Force XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN THIRD MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FORWARD
 FIRST BN 327TH ABN INF
 SECOND BN 502ND ABN INF

DRAFTER: S-3 MSGP J. A. WEP

RELEASER: 1STLT G. A. MCNAUL
 PRECLENCE: OP IMMEDIATE
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 00001H TO 022400H MAR 68

COPY 5 OF 23 COPIES

A. D TO 3480,1A

1. D FOR OPERATION SUMMARY.

A OPERATION HOUSTON

B THROUGH J, NO CHANGE

F RECAP OF OPERATIONS

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CC	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPER
	2/5	3/5	4/5	FT	SD	PLAT			
CO E	D 0	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	4
3/5	D 0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	0
	N 0	0	0	0	10	0	3	7	7
2/5	D 0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
	N 0	0	0	0	5	2	3	10	10
1/327	D 0	1	4	0	0	0	2	0	0
	N 0	1	3	0	3	0	2	9	9
2/501	D 0	0	20	4	0	0	0	1	0
	N 0	0	0	0	24	5	1	0	0

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. IAMS SUMMARY

1. 1/5 - OPCON FIRST MARINES

2. 2/5 (-) - OPCON FIRST MARINES

0216 0Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- C. CO E 2/5 - OPCON FIFTH MARINES
- D. 3/5 -) - OPERATION HOUSTON
- E. CO L 3/5 - OPCON FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
- F. 2/3 -) - OPERATION HOUSTON
- G. 1/32 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- H. 2/50 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS: NEGATIVE

TOD:TFX H/MAR68/CCN:204/DRH
S&C MSG PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 2-3 MSG PICK UP
1-327 2-502 MSG PICK UP

SUPVR BBS

#21610Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CO, 1/327 REGT, 1/5
 INFO: FIRST BATTALION
 SECURE IN WEST MARINES
 THIRD BATTALION MARINES
 SECOND BATTALION MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FORWARD
 FIRST BN 327 INF
 SECOND BN 502 INF

RECD BY: 660, 1000 HRS, 10/10/68
 REC'D BY: 660, 1000 HRS, 10/10/68
 CLASS: COMMUNICATIONAL
 PREC: ON THE EDITED
 ROUTINE

TO: COMINT INFL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY GROUP (3)
 FROM: 030000Z TO 032400Z MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY 4 OF 25 COPIES

A. DIVO 3400.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATING SUMMARY:

A. OPERATIONS HOUSSON.

B. MARSHAL: NO CHANGE.

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS	LIST	SCOUT	SUICIDE
	IN	OUT	PLAT	FT	S&D	PLAT				
CO B 2/5	D 0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	2	1	0	2	0	0	4		
3/5	D 0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0	5 PLAT	
	N 0	0	1	0	13	0	3	10		
2/3	D 0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	
	N 0	0	1	0	4	1	2	15		
1/327	D 0	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	
	N 0	0	2	0	0	2	2	5		
2/502	D 0	20	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	N 0	0	0	24	3	1	1	0		

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE.

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - 1/5(-) OPGON FIRST MARINES. CO B - OPERATION HOUSSON. CO C OPGON FIFTH MARINES.

B. 2/5 - 2/5(-) OPGON FIRST MARINES. CO B - OPERATION HOUSSON.

131615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MARSHAL

DECLASSIFIED

C. 3/5 - 3/5(4) OPERATIONS HOUSTON. CH 100000 - 100000 PUMP 100 LBS.

D. 2/3 - 00 OPERATION HOUSTON.

E. 1/327 - OP 1 ANNUAL HOUSTON.

F. 2/502 - OPERATION HOUSTON.

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE.

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS: NEGATIVE.

TOR: 040115H/5TH MAR REPR/MAR 68/CCN: 336/DRH

SUPVR SEH

S&C MSG PICK UP

1-5 2-5 3-5 2-3 MSG PICK UP

1-327 2-572 MSG PICK UP

1645Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

DRAPER: J. R. BRIGHAM JR.
RELEASER: 13 TH C. . EDITOR
PUBLISHING: O'LEARY
CLASSIFIED TYPE: C AND DIAL

34

CONTINUATION

PITTM NATION DREW SIEGEL (c)
2011 050001H T# 052400H MAR 68

16 PINE 3430-11

1-7446-021-000-000-000-000

A HISTORY OF THE BAPTIST CHURCH

THE USES OF THE STAGE

3. READING OBJECT 32

FID	PATENTS			ALBUMS			S-1 OPS		LIST		ACCT	
	PT	S.D.	P.W.	PT	1320	PT	PT	PT	PT	PT	PT	PT
2/5	D 0	7	1	70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	H 0	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	0
2/15	D 0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	H 0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
3/5	D 0	7	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
	H 0	9	1	0	10	0	0	0	12	0	0	0
2/5	D 0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	H 0	0	0	0	14	1	0	0	16	0	0	0
2/502	D 6	8	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	H 0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	12	0	0	0
1/3-7	D 0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
	H 0	0	3	0	0	2	3	3	12	0	0	0

2. HIGH-LEVEL LANGUAGE DESIGN

3. P. 13. 25. 1. 1922

$\therefore 1/5 = 1/5 (-) 0$. $D = 0$ i.e. $\sqrt{5} = 0$ is not possible.

2/3 = 2/5 (-) 0.25 = 0.125 (0.125) 2 = 0.25 (0.25) 2 = 0.50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. 3/5 - 3/5 (-) O'FARRELL HOUSTON. CO 10000 PICK UP TIME.

D. 2/3 - 2/3 (-) O'FARRELL HOUSTON.

E. 1/327 - O'FARRELL HOUSTON.

F. 2/502 - O'FARRELL HOUSTON.

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: SEE APPENDIX.

5. COMMAND ACTIVITIES:

A. CONTACTS:

(1) 050600H MAR 14 142010 RECEIVED IN FALCON HILL RD 10000 CMC TO
BCI. 6 100000Z MAR 14 COORDINATES. 13 DEGREE 10' N 106
DEGREE 45' E. 100000Z MAR 14, 100000Z MAR 14, 100000Z MAR 14
VC MSG (CTC). REG 13 DEGREE 10'.

(2) 051530H MAR 14 139009 2 ARMY DISMEMBER 6 100000Z MAR 14
PICKED BY 100000Z MAR 14. VC MSG 100000Z MAR 14 DISTRICT 10.
REG 2 DEGREE 10'.

BP
CENCO SERIAL

TOD:TFX&5TH MAR FWD 060255H/MAR68/CON:556/DRH SUPVR SEH
S&C MSG PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 2-3 MSG PICK UP
1-327 2-502 MSG PICK UP

051729Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

O 061619Z MAR 68

FROM: 101ST INFANTRY
 TO: 327TH INF
 SUBJ: FIRST 100 DIVISION INFANTRY
 101ST INF DIVISION INFANTRY
 FIRST 100 DIVISION INFANTRY
 FIRST 100 DIVISION INFANTRY

DRAGO R: 327TH INFANTRY
 DRAGO R: 327TH INFANTRY
 DRAGO R: 327TH INFANTRY
 DRAGO R: 327TH INFANTRY

RE
 CONFIDENTIAL
 DIVISIONAL DRAFT 061619Z MAR 68
 060000Z MAR 68

1. DRAGO 3480.1A

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY 4 OF 23 COPIES

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

- OPERATION IN RUMBLE.
- INTELLIGENCE IN CHARGE
- 061030Z MAR 2/502 CHANGED TO DRAGO
- INTELLIGENCE IN CHARGE

2. REG'D OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PARADES			ABANDONED			REG'D	DET	LOSS
	D	O	D	D	O	D			
CO B 2/5	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	N	0	3	1	2	0	1	0	4
CO B 1/5	D	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0
1/5 (-)	D	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
	N	0	0	1	11	4	0	3	15
3/5 (-)	D	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	3
	N	0	5	1	0	10	0	3	15
2/3 (-)	D	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	1	0	13	1	2	11
1/327	D	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	12

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- 1/5 & 1/5 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON. CO B & OPERATION HOUSTON.
- 2/5 & 3/5 (-) DIVISIONAL INFANTRY. CO B & OPERATION HOUSTON
 OPERATION HOUSTON

6647897

CONFIDENTIAL

MAP 6

CONFIDENTIAL

C. 3/5 ~ 3/5 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON. CO L OPCON FIRST MARINES.

D. 2/3 ~ 2/3 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON.

E. 1/327 ~ OPERATION HOUSTON.

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS:

(1) 060015H CAP H-6 SQD CBT PTL ZD139009 REC'D APPROX 20 RDS 60MM MORTAR FIRE FROM ZD140005. REQ AND REC'D ARTY MISSION OF 60 RDS 155 MM HE. SEARCHED AREA WITH NEG RESULTS ENEMY CASUALTIES.

EE
GP-4

100:TFX ~~070150H/MAR68/CBN:671/DPH~~
100:5TH MDP FWD ~~070124H/MAR 68/~~
S&C MSC P-3 2-5 3-5 2-3 MSC PICK UP
1-327 VSHG PICK UP

SUPVR SEH

081610Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY CCCCC
 0 071610Z MAR 68
 FM FIFTH MARINES
 TO CG TF XRAY
 INFO ZEN/FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/FIFTH MARINES FWD
 FIRST BN 327TH INF
 ZEN/SECOND BN THIRD MARINES
 ET

CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 070001H TO 072400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3480.1A
 1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:
 A. OPERATION HOUSTON.
 B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE
 P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LIST POST	SCOUT NIFER
	FT	SQD	PLAT	FT	SQB	PLAT			
CO E2/5	D	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
CO B 1/5	N	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	D	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1/5 (-)	N	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0
	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EXT KAL	N	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	D	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0
2/3 (-)	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	D	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
1/327 (-)	N	0	0	0	0	2	0	12	0
	B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

EM PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - 1/5 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON. CO B - OPERATION HOUSTON.
 B. 2/5 - 2/5 (-) OPCON FIRST MARINES. CO E - OPCON FIFTH MARINES
 C. 3/5 - 3/5 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON. CO L OPCON FIRST MARINES.
 D. 2/3 - 2/3 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON.

PAGE TWO CONFIDENTIAL

E. 1/327 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON.
 F. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE
 G. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:
 H. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

21

30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

061500Z
 FROM FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CO, 1ST ARMY
 APP: FIFTH IN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BY FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD IN FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES 2ND
 BATTALION 327TH INF

DRAFTED: 061500Z CPT
 RELEASED: 061500Z MAR 68
 PRIORITY: 061500Z MAR 68
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SUMMARY (C)
 FROM 080000Z TO 082400Z MAR 68

COPY 5 OF 18 COPIES

A. INFO 3480-1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH D: NO CHANGE

B. 081200Z CO E 2/5 CHOPPED TO 1ST MARINES:

081700Z 1/327 CHOPPED TO TASK FORCE XRAY:

081630Z CO E 1/5, CO E 2/5, & CO F 2/5 CHOPPED TO 2/5 INF.

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

B. REGAR OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LIST PCT	SCOUT SNIFERS
	CO	SD	PLAT	CO	SD	PLAT			
CO E 2/5	D	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
	E	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
CO F 1/5	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	E	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
1/5(-)	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	E	0	0	2	8	0	0	9	0
2/5	D	0	4	1	0	0	0	2	0
	E	0	0	1	0	9	0	12	1
2/5(-)	D	0	0	3	0	2	0	1	0
	E	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVES

3. MEANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5(-) 1/5 (-) OR BATTALION MONITOR.

B. 1/5(-) 1/5 (-) OR BATTALION MONITOR.

1615 5-22

CONFIDENTIAL

30
20

DECLASSIFIED

- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON.
- D. 2/3 - 2/3 (-) OPERATION HOUSTON.
- 4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE
- 5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. COMBINED: NEGATIVE

BP
GP-4

TOP: TFK C1200N QH/MAR68/CON:855/DRH
980 MSG PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 2-3 MSG PICK UP,

SUPVR: SEH

081529Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

DECLASSIFIED

1091630 MAR 68
 FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, 2/5 XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BY FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BY FIFTH MARINES XRAY
 THIRD BY FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BY THIRD MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FAD

TRF DR: 1091630 MAR 68
 REC'D BY: G. C. MCNAUL, RIC
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SHREP (C)
 FROM 090001H TO 092400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3400.14

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LIST POST	SC WT GTR PG
	D	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT		
1/5(-)	D 0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
	H 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
2/5XRAY	D 0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
	H 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0
3/5	D 0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
	H 0	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	0
2/3(-)	D 0	3	1	0	0	2	0	0	0
	H 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5-1/5(-) OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 XRAY OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- D. 2/3-2/3(-) OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

BT
 SP-4

NOV 1967
 1091630 MAR 68
 1/5XRAY//

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RR WMBT

DEK 167 0701681

ZNY 000001

R 101601Z MAR 68

FM FIFTH MARINES

TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY

INFO ZEN/FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES

ZEN/THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

SECOND BN THIRD MARINES

ZEN/FIFTH MARINES FWD

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)

FROM 100000H TO 102400H MAR 68

A DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS		AMBUSHES		S&D OPS		LIST	SCOUT	
	FT	SBD	PLT	FT	SBD	PLT			CO
1/5	D 0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0

PAGE TWO K167 CONFIDENTIAL

2/5XRAY	D 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
	N 0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	0
3/5	D 1 0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
	N 0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0
2/3(-)	D 1 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5-OPERATION HOUSTON

B. 2/5 XRAY OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/5-OPERATION HOUSTON

D. 2/3+2/3(-) OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

GP-W

BT

101601Z

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

30
21

52

"CONFIDENTIAL"**R 111630Z MAR 68**

FROM: VIETNAM
 TO: CG, TF XRAY
 INFO: VIETNAM FIFTH MARINES
 2ND ID IN FIFTH MARINES
 THREE TO FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES IMD

DRIVER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
C.W. Fulford
 RELIEVER: C. J. MULFORD SFC
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAIRY STRIP (C) FROM 110001H TO 112400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3480.14

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON
 B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
 B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
 C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
 D. 2/3 - CHOPPED TO 1ST MARINES 111200H

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTIVITIES:

A. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

BT

GP-4

TAB: H/MAR68/TFX-COURIER GPC
 TTD: 110345Z MAR 68 XXXX5THMA FWD-TT/
 9&G MSG 21CKUP
 1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR SUPVDO STF

111630Z

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 68

82

121531Z
O 121531Z
FROM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: CG, TF XRAY

INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
FIFTH MARINES FWD

DRAFTER: J. R. MIGMAN CPL
C. W. Fulford 1STLT
RELEASER: C. W. FULFORD 1STLT
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
PREC: OP IMMEDIATE

BT
CONFIDENTIAL
FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
FROM 120001H TO 122400H MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

1/1 COPY 5 OF 14 COPIES //

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS:

(1) 120001H CAP H-6 SQD AMB LOC ZC142001 H-6 HEARD DOGS BARKING & OBSERVED 3 VC MOVE AWAY FROM AMBUSH. OPENED FIRE ON VC & PURSUED BY FIRE, SWEEP AREA & RECEIVED 50 SMALL ARMS FIRE. PATROL EXPENDED 250 RDS OF M16 & 4 M79. CONTINUED SWEEP WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. FOUND TRACES OF BLOOD & AK-47 RDS.

(2) 121200H CAP H-6 SQD CMB LOC ZD139009 PF'S DETAILED 6 VC SUSPECTS ON INFORMATION FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS. INTERROGATED SUSPECTS AND FORWARDED TO DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. DMT 6.

GP-4

BT

TOD: H/MAR68/TFX-COUP1FP/CON1964/CTF

TOD: H/MAR 68/5THM+F EXPL-TR

S&C MSG PICKUP

1/F 2/F 3/F PEAR SUYU CTF

121531Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 68

30
21

129

'CONFIDENTIAL'

O 0 MBT
 DE K167 0131602
 ZNY CCVGY
 O 1 1602Z MAR 60
 FM PI FIFTH MARINES

TO: CG, #T4SK, FOR MEH XR-4Y!!
 INFO: ZEM/FIFTH MARINES AND 1.
 HQ: 1ZEN/FPRST, O-1 FIFTH MAGINE.
 HQ: 1ZEN/SZCOND, 13NHF, 1 FTHM, RPNZSO
 ZEN/THIRD BN, FPT, MARINES.
 BT
 C: O-N: F12, D: E-N: T-1, U
 FPT, HHM, MARINES, SHJ, ALL HSH, TREP, (C)
 BROM 130001HHTO 1"2&00H MAR 60
 A, WO, HMOH 3480, 1A
 1. #MJD, OR, OPERATIONS, SH, SUMMARY;
 HA, OPERATIONS, HOUSTON
 B, #THG, GOUGH, JI, #NO, VHANGE
 2. #S, GNF, CANT, SMALL, UNIT, H, CNT, WCTS, #NEGATIVE
 3. #PLNS, SUMMARY, 9.
 4. #W1/5, OPERATIONS, HOUSTON
 B, #2/5, OPERATIONS, HOUSTON
 HC, #3/5, OPZR, WTH, O, HOUSTON
 4. #SMALL, UNIT, OPERATIONS, #NEGATIVE

PAGE TWO, K161, CG, N, F12, D: E-N: T-1, U
 5. #COMBINZD, ACT, ON, UNITY;
 HA, #VONTACTY, #NEGATIVE
 GP, 4.
 BT

U 0131602Z

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 168

161

'CONFIDENTIAL'

"CONFIDENTIAL"

ZNY CCCCC

O 141545Z MAR 68
 FM FIFTH MARINES
 TO CG TASK FORCE X-RAY
 INFO FIFTH MARINES FWD
 FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 140200H TO 142400H MAR 68

A* DIVO 3460-1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH 14: NO CHANGE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

141646Z

CONFIDENTIAL
 //HAS//**CONFIDENTIAL**//

MAR 68

21
30
CONFIDENTIAL
210

CONFIDENTIAL

00 8MBT
 DE K157 0751601
 ZNY CCCCC
 0 151501Z MAR 68
 FM FIFTH MARINES
 TO CG TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO ZEN/FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 ZEN/FIFTH MARINES FWD

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 1500014 TO 152400H MAR 68

A• DIVO 3480•1A

1• MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

- A• OPERATION HOUSTON
- B• THROUGH J: NO CHANGE
- P• RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS			LIST SCOUT	
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	SNIPERS		
1/5	D 0	14	14	0	0	0	0	15	0		
	N 6	38	0	3	19	0	0	4	0		
2/5	D 0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0		
	N 0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0	0		

PAGE TWO K157 CONFIDENTIAL

3/5	D 0	8	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
	N 6	38	0	3	19	0	0	0	0

2• SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

3• PLANS SUMMARY:

- A• 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B• 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C• 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4• SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5• COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A• CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

CONFIDENTIAL
 //HAS BEEN SENT//

MAR 68

250

161615 Z MAR 68
 FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES IWD

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
 P. W. Fulford
 RELEASED: C. W. FULFORD 18
 PREC: OF IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 160001H TO 162400H MAR 68

COPY 5 OF 4 COPIES

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECALL OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPERS
	FT	SQD	PIT	FT	SQD	PIT			
1/5	D 0	19	3	0	4	0	1	6	5
	N 26	28	0	13	14	0	1	5	0
2/5	D 0	4	1	0	1	0	3	0	0
	N 0	5	1	0	1	1	3	5	0
3/5	D 0	4	7	0	0	0	2	0	1
	N 0	13	0	3	13	0	2	7	0

KET CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	8	4(4 UA)	1-CO'S A, B, C&D	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	5(1 UA)	2-CO G, 1- CO'S F&H, 1-REAR CP	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2(1 UA)	1-CO'S K&M	NEGATIVE

30
21

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	5	0	CP	NEGATIVE
2/5	0	0		NEGATIVE
3/5	4	1	1-CO K	NEGATIVE

30
21

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL
 MAR 68
 285

1616157

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

GP-4
BTTOD: 4/MAR68/TFX PUNNED/CON:1670/DPH SUPVP_SLS
S&P MSG PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 PFT'R

161616Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FWD

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
C. W. Fulford
 RELEASER: C. W. FULFORD 1STLT
 PREC: OP IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 170001H TO 172400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO.	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPERS
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	D 0	8	3	0	0	0	1	9	0
	N 0	24	0	0	12	0	0	17	0
2/5	D 0	4	4	0	0	0	1	6	0
	N 0	24	0	0	12	0	0	14	0
3/5	D 0	8	4	0	0	0	1	14	0
	N 0	16	0	0	8	0	0	17	0

UNIT	KIT CARSON REPORT:		EMPL EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS NEGATIVE
	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED		
1/5	4	4	1-CO'S A,B,C& D	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	5(1UA)	2-CO G, 1-CO'S F&H, 1-REAR CP	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2(1UA)	1-CO'S K&M	NEGATIVE

UNIT	SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:		EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS NEGATIVE
	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED		
1/5	2	2	CG'S C&D	NEGATIVE
2/5	0	0		NEGATIVE
3/5	4	1	1-CO K	NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL 330

'CONFIDENTIAL'

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. CONTACTS:

(1) 171730H H-8 CAG H SQD CMB LOC YD966046 RECEIVED INFO FROM VILLAGERS OF VC SLEEPING IN BUNKER AT ABOVE COORD. H-8 DISPATCHED SQD COMBAT PATROL AT SAME TIME. FOUND 2 LARGE BUNKERS AND GRAVES SUSPECTED OF HOLDING VC AND SPIDER HOLES IN THE SAME AREA. VILLAGERS SHOWED PATROL WHERE THERE WERE BURIED MORTAR ROUNDS. PATROL FOUND NEGATIVE VC, BUT FOUND 4 WP ROUNDS AND 11 BE 60MM MORTAR ROUNDS.

'CONFIDENTIAL'

GP-4

BT

TOD: 170552A H/MARF8/TFX TT/CON:1768/DRH
 TOD: 180406 H/5TH MAR FWD
 S&C MSG PICK UP
 1-5 2-5 3-5 REAP

SUPVR_SLS

171730Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0181555Z MAR 68

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FWD

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
C. W. Fulford
 RELEASER: C. W. FULFORD 1STLT
 PREC: OP IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 180001H TO 182400H MAR 68

//COPY ~~A~~ OF FIVE COPIES//

A. DIVO 3480.9A

//PAGE ONE OF TWO//

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

~~COC~~ ~~TIME~~ ~~H~~

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LMT POST	SCOUT SNIPERS
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	D 0	4	3	0	0	0	0	5	2
	N 24	20	0	12	10	0	0	6	0
2/5	D 0	4	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
	N 0	8	2	0	4	1	0	6	0
3/5	D 0	4	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
	N 0	44	0	0	22	0	1	6	0

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	5 (1UA)	1-RCF, 2-CO G, 1-CO H, 1-CO F,	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2	1-CO K, 1-CO M	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	2	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	0	0		NEGATIVE
3/5	3	1	1-CO K	NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. PLANS SUBDIVISIONS:

A. 1/3 - OPERATION HURON

B. 2/3 - OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/3 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL TIME OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMINT SUBDIVISIONS:

A. COMINTS: NEGATIVE

GP-4

RT

FINAL PAGE OF TWO//

TOD: 11 MAR 68/TFX-RUNNER/0001:1827/DLS
TOD: 11 MAR 68/STAWAR READY/TY
1-3, 2-3, 3-3, 4-3, 5-3
SAC NO C PDR 10

SUPPLY 100%

100%

COMINTS: NEGATIVE

100%

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: CG, 1ST FORCE XRAY

INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
FIFTH MARINES FWD

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
C. W. Fulford
RELEASER: C. W. FULFORD 4SPLT
PREC: OP IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
CONFIDENTIAL
FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
FROM 190000H TO 092400H MAR 68

//COPY 5 OF FOURTEEN COPIES//

A. DIVO 7400.3A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

PL RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D CPS CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPERS
	D	IP	S&D	PT	FT	SQD			
1/5	D 0	10	3	0	0	0	2	13	2
	N 30	14	0	15	7	0	0	14	0
2/5	D 0	9	4	0	0	0	0	7	0
	N 0	15	0	12	6	2	0	10	0
3/5	D 0	7	3	0	0	0	0	4	3
	N 8	40	0	4	20	0	0	8	0

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	5(1UA)	1-ICP, 2-CO G, 1-CO H, 1-CO I	NEGATIVE
3/5	5	2(1UA)	1-CO K, 1-CO M	NEGATIVE

25
30

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	2	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	0	0		NEGATIVE
3/5	3	0		NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

//PAGE ONE OF TWO//

191615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

390

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

//FINAL PAGE OF TWO//

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. 191530H H-9 CAG HQ PLT COMBINED ACTION LOC AF817049 CHU HOI TURNED HIMSELF IN TO H-9. CHU HOI GAVE INFO ABOUT 60 VC TRAINED AND EQUIPPED WITH 60MM MORTAR, 6 M-16, 32 AK-47, 2 BAR'S, 20 K-44'S & 2 L-50'S. VC MENTIONED WAS CAPTURED ON 20 JAN FROM VILLAGE OF NUOC HOA. WAS TAKEN TO HILLS FOR TRAINING. FINISHED TRAINING AND WAS READY TO BEGIN MISSION. CHU HOI DOES NOT KNOW WHAT MISSION IS. CHU HOI IS FROM 1ST PLATOON DESTRUCTION. CHU HOI WAS QUESTIONED. 2 M-26 A1'S WERE CAPTURED.

GP-4
BT

TOD: H/MAR 68/TFX(RNR)/CCN:1906/8LS
 TOD: H/MAR 68/5TH MAR(FWD)
 S&C MSG PICK-UP
 1-5, 2-5, 3-5 REAR SUPVR QLS

191615Z

CONFIDENTIAL
//HAS BEEN SENT//

MAR 68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

O 0410 77

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
 FIFTH MARINES FWD

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
 C.W. Fulford
 RELEASER: C.W. FULFORD 1STLT
 PREC: OP IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT
 CONFIDENTIAL
 FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C)
 FROM 200001H TO 202400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS CO	LIST POST	SCOUT ENX SNIPERS
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	D 0	7	2	3	2	0	2	2	0
	N 0	7	8	17	14	0	0	1	0
2/5	D 0	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	2	0	4	2	0	0	0
3/5	D 0	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	2	7	17	0	0	0	0

UNIT	KIT CARSON REPORT:		EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED		
1/5	4	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	5(1UA)	1-RCF, 2-CO G, 1-CO H, 1-CO F	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2(1UA)	1-CO K, 1-CO M	NEGATIVE

UNIT	SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:		EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED		
1/5	2	2	1-CO A, 1-CO B	NEGATIVE
2/5	1	1	1-CO E	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	0		NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. NEGATIVE

GP-4
BT

TOB: H/MAR68/TFX RUNNER/OPN:1004/NOH
TOD: 5TH MAR FWD _____ H
S&C MSG. PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 REAP

SUPVR GTF

201640Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR68

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: BUDWEISER BIER
TO: CO. 1, 3RD BATTALION

INFO: BUDWEISER BIER
FROM: CO. 1, 3RD BATTALION
REASON: BUDWEISER BIER
TO: CO. 1, 3RD BATTALION

RE: CONFIDENTIAL
WORLD MARKET BUDWEISER BIER (C)
FROM 210000Z TO 212400Z MAR 68

DRAFTER: J. R. BRUGMAN CIL

C.W. C. V. P.

RELEASER: C. V. P.

PREC: OP IMMEDIATE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A. DIVISION

B. MAJOR COMMAND OR SUBORDINATE:

C. CHIEF OF STAFF OR HIGHEST

D. TERRITORY TO CHANGE

E. REGIONS OR OPERATIONS:

UNIT	FACILITIES			ANGUSIES			S&D OPS		LIST	SCOUT	SNIPERS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	CO	PLT			
1/5	D	0	7	3	3	2	0	2	2	0	0
	B	0	7	8	17	14	0	0	1	0	0
2/5	D	0	4	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	B	0	7	2	0	4	2	1	0	0	0
3/5	D	0	2	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	B	0	2	2	7	17	0	0	0	0	0

UNIT	MATERIALS			PERSONNEL			EMPLOYED		RESCUE	RESCUE
	1	2	3	4	5	6	CO	PLT		
1/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	1-00 A, 1-00 B,	1-00 C, 1-00 D,	RESCUE	RESCUE
2/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	1-00 E, 1-00 F,	1-00 G, 1-00 H,	RESCUE	RESCUE
3/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	1-00 I, 1-00 J,	1-00 K, 1-00 L,	RESCUE	RESCUE

UNIT	PERSONNEL			MATERIALS			EMPLOYED		RESCUE	RESCUE
	1	2	3	4	5	6	CO	PLT		
1/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	2-00 A, B,	2-00 C, D,	RESCUE	RESCUE
2/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	2-00 E, F,	2-00 G, H,	RESCUE	RESCUE
3/5	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	100000	2-00 I, J,	2-00 K, L,	RESCUE	RESCUE

CONFIDENTIAL

456

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. NEGATIVE

②/FINAL PAGE OF TWO/

GP-4

BT

TOD: H/MAR68/TFX-RUNNER/CON:1988/DLS SUPVR: GDF
TOD: H/MAR68/5THM/R RE/R-RT
1-5, 2-5, 3-5, REAR
S&C MSG PICK UP

211630Z

CONFIDENTIAL
//HAS BEEN SENT//

MVR68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

O 2216 30Z MAR 68

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIFTH MARINES FWD
 FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN
C. W. Fulford
 RELEASED: C. W. FULFORD 1STLT
 PREC: OP IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C) FROM 220001H TO 222400H MAR 68

A. DIVO 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE

P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS		LIST	SCOUT SNIFERS
	6 FT	8 SQD	10 PFT	5 FT	8 SQD	10 PFT	CO	POST		
1/5	D 0	4	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
	N 0	0	2	0	5	0	0	12	0	0
2/5	D 0	4	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
	N 0	2	0	0	5	0	0	10	0	0
3/5	D 0	7	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	N 0	0	2	15	7	0	0	7	0	0

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	3(1 MED(E))	1-CO B, 1-CO C	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	3	1-CO D	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2(1UA)	1-CO F, 1-CO G 1-CO H 1-CO K, 1-CO M	NEGATIVE

S15

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	2	0		NEGATIVE
2/5	1	1	30 1-CO E	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	0		NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT ENEMY UNIT CONTACTS: NEGATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. NEGATIVE

GP-4

BT

TOD: 15TH MAR FWD
TOD: H/MAR68/TFX RUNNER/CON:2493/DOH SUPVO_GTF
SAC MSG PICK UP
1-5 2-5 3-5 REAR

221630Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1316 042

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: 3D, 1332400H MAR 68
INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
FIFTH MARINES IND

CALL SIGN: J. E. BRIGADE
BRIEFING: 3D, 1332400H MAR 68
REC'D: OP IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAY 1 REPORT (C) FROM 13000H TO 232400H MAR 68

A. LIV/ 3430.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J, NO CHARGE

C. RECORD OF OPERATIONS:

TO: 4/MAR68/PAK/COMPAK/3D, 1332400H MAR 68
FROM: 4/MAR68/PAK/COMPAK/3D, 1332400H MAR 68
RE: THIS BRIEFING IS SHOWN AT
1/2 S/2 042 DEAD

COPY 5 OF 14 COPIES

UNIT	PARADE	ABDUCTIONS	S&D OPS	HIST	SCOUT
1/5	D 0 0 0 0	3 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	13 2	0 0
2/5	D 0 0 0 0	3 0 0 0	3 3 0 0	0 0	0 0
3/5	D 0 0 0 0	6 0 0 0	4 4 0 0	7 11	0 0

UNIT	ADY/ ABD/ KILLED	TIME/ E-PICTED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULT
1/5	4	3	1-00 B, 1-00 G	REASONABLE
2/5	6	3(EA)	1-00 F, 2-00 G	REASONABLE
3/5	3	2(EA)	1-00 H, 1-00 M	REASONABLE

UNIT	SCOUT SNIPER REPORT	TIME/ E-PICTED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULT
1/5	0	0		REASONABLE
2/5	1	1	1-00 E	REASONABLE
3/5	3	0		REASONABLE

C. DIRECTORIAL STATEMENT: NEGATIVE

PAGE ONE OF TWO

22 CONFIDENTIAL
50
539

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PHASE SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- C. 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- D. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE

4. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

- A. NEGATIVE

02-4

ET

231626Z

PAGE TWO OF TWO

CONFIDENTIAL
(HAS BEEN SENT)

MAPS

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

67-2074-178.

CONFIRMED
FIFTH MARINES DAIRY STRIP (2) UPON ESCAPE TO 242400H MARCH 1968.

Ac. DIV0 3480.1A

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY

A. OPERATION FOR SIGHT

BE, THROUGH IT NO CHANGE.

Part B: RECAP OF DECLARATIONS

5-2

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE	PKL OPS			AMM OPS			S&P OPS		LAST POST	SCOPE
	PKL	S/P	PKL	PKL	100%	PKL	CO	1		
1/5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	4
	0	0	0	28	6	2	0	0	13	4
2/5	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	6
	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	10	6
3/5	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	6	2	14	0	0	0	10	0

X-100 GARNER REPORT

UNIT	INIV ATTACHED	INIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
3/5	4	3	CO B-1, CO C-1, CO D-1	NEGATIV
2/5	5	3	CO G-1, CO F-2, 1 GRAVE, 1 BAS, 1 UA	NEGATIV
3/5	3	2	CO K-1, CO M-1, 1 US	NEGATIV

SCOUT SIGHTER READER

UNITS	SCAMS ATTACHED	SCAMS DEPICTED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
2/5	6	4	CO R-2, CO G-2	NEGATIVE
3/1	3	0	SCHOOL DRG	NEGATIVE

PAGE ONE OF TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

674

CONFIDENTIAL

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT COMBATS: - NONE.

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: - NEGATIVE

5. COMBINED ACTION GROUPS:

A. NEGATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

GP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

BT

TOD:250230H/MAR06/00N:2658Z/JTH
S&C MSG PICK-UP SUPVR PRC
1/5 2/5 3/5

241615Z

CONFIDENTIAL
(HAS BEEN SENT)

MAP 68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
1600, DARK HORSE DAY

INF: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES
FIFTH MARINES FWD

RELEASER: C.W. FULKORD ASTUR
SIP: *Classified*

PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

RP

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SHREP FROM 250001H TO 252400H MARCH 1968.

TOD: 250150H/M R6 /5TH(FWD)-TT

A. DIVO 3480.7A TOD: H/MAR68/TFX-COURTER/CON 2731/GA
S&C MSG PTCK-UP SUPVR CTE

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY: 1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR

A. OPERATION HOUSTON COPY 9 OF 14 COPIES

B. THROUGH J: NO CHANGE.

P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPNS	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	D 0	10	4	0	0	0	0	12	4
	N 0	0	0	0	8	0	0	10	4
2/5	D 0	3	3	0	0	0	2	0	3
	N 0	0	3	0	2	0	2	11	3
3/5	D 0	6	4	0	10	0	0	0	0
	N 0	0	4	7	15	0	0	0	0

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	3	CO D-1	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	3	CO G-1, CO F-2, 1 LEAVE, 1 BAS,	
3/5	3	2	1 UA	NEGATIVE
			CO K-1, CO M-1, 1 UA	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	3	CO E-1, CO F-1	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	0	SCHOOL DNG	NEGATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE ONE OF TWO

611 CONFIDENTIAL
27
30

3. PLANS SUMMARY:
A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE.

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS

A. NEGATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

RP

GP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO

251630Z

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 68
/HAS BEEN SENT/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OR 26 1650Z MAR 68

REF ID: A2213

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAYDRAFTER: L.J. JOHNS SGT
C.W. Fulford
RELEASER: C.W. FULFORD ESTDINF: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINESPRECEDENCE: ACTION: OP IMMEDIATE
INF: ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C) FROM 260001H TO 262400H MARCH 1968.

A. DIVO 5480.1A

TOD: 270213H/MAR68/TFX-TT

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

TOR: 270030H/MAR68/TFX-TT/CON: 2123/GAB

A. OP RATION HOUSTON S&C MSG PICK-UP SUPVR CTE
1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR

B. THROUGH J. NO CHANGE.

COPY 5 OF X 14 COPIES

P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPSNS		LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PFT	FT	SQD	PFT	CO	POST		
1/5	D 0	5	2	0	0	0	0	20		0
	N 0	0	5	20	0	0	0	9		0
2/5	D 0	7	2	0	0	0	2	0		3
	N 0	0	2	0	7	0	2	11		3
3/5	D 0	8	3	0	0	0	1	0		0
	N 0	5	0	5	27	0	0	10		0

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	3	CO B-1, CO C-1, CO D-1.	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	3	CO G-1, CO F-2	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	2	CO K-1, CO M-1	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
2/5	3	3	CO E-1, CO G-1, HMS CO-1	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	0	SCHOOL DNG	NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NONE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE ONE OF TWO

PAGE ONE OF TWO

647
22
30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NEGATIVE.

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS

A. NEGATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

ME

GP-4

PAGE TWO OF TWO

PAGE TWO OF TWO

261656Z

CONFIDENTIAL
/HAS BEEN SENT/

MAR66

CONFIDENTIAL

O 271601Z

TOR13719373/778-778

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAYINF: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINESDRAFTER: L.J. JUHNE SGT
C.W. Fulford
RELEASER: C.W. FULFORD 1STLT
PRECEDENCE: ACTION
OP IMMEDIATE
INFO
ROUTINE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C) FROM 270001H TO 272400H MARCH 1968.

A. DIVO 3480.1A TO: 271637Z/MAR68/TFX-T/CON: 4866/GAB
S&C MSG PICK-UP SUPVR: G7E

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY: 1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

COPY 5 OF 14 COPIES

B. THROUGH J. NO CHANGE.

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

"CONFIDENTIAL"

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPNS CO	LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPERS
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	D 0	4	4	0	0	0	0	12	0
	N 0	0	0	0	8	0	0	4	0
2/5	D 0	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	3
	N 0	2	2	0	4	0	2	11	3
3/5	D 0	1	3	0	2	0	1	0	4
	N 0	1	3	15	11	0	0	10	4

KIT CARSON REPORT:

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	3	CO B-1, CO C-1, CO D-1.	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	3	CO G-1, CO F-2.	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	1	CO K-1, 1 LEAVE, 1 UA	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
2/5	3	3	CO E-1, CO G-1.	NEGATIVE
3/5	6	4	BN GP-4.	NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NONE.

"CONFIDENTIAL"

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE ONE OF TWO

21
30

666

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- 2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- 3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON
- 4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NONE.
- 5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. 271845H, CAP H-3 PERIMETER DEFENSE LOC YD 963067 WHILE DESTROYING OBSTACLES AROUND POSITIONS, DETONATED UNKNOWN TYPE MINE. SEARCHED AREA FOR ADDITIONAL MINES WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. 2 USMC WIA EVAC.

"CONFIDENTIAL"

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO OF TWO

BT

271601Z
GP-4

CONFIDENTIAL
/HAS BEEN SENT/

MAR68

"CONFIDENTIAL"

DECLASSIFIED

CONGENITAL

701204 10

卷之三

TO: FIFTH MARINES
CC, TASK FORCE KRAV
INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

DRAFTER: L.J. JONES SOR
REVISER: G.W. FULFORD/STP
PRINCIPLE: ACTION OF IMMEDIATE
INFO: ROUTINE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

四

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SUMMARY (C) FROM 230001H TO 232400H MARCH 1958.

A. MVO 3480, 1A

1.2. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J. NO CHARGE.

P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS

HWT	PATHOLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPS		LIST	SCOUT
	PT	SQD	PLT	PT	SQD	PLT	CO	POST	0	SNIPPER
2/5	D	0	2	2	6	0	0	3	0	0
	X	0	2	2	6	3	0	3	10	2
3/5	D	0	6	6	0	2	0	1	2	6
	X	0	0	0	6	10	0	0	10	8

KTP CAPTION REPORT

3/5 3 1 100 Kmt, I LEAVE,
I UA NEGALY.

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT:

UNITS 273 3/5	TEAMS ATTACHED 1	ON MS EMPLOYED 0	EMPLOYED WITH N/A BN CP-A	RESULTS N/A NEGATIVE
---------------------	---------------------	---------------------	---------------------------------	----------------------------

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTRACTS: NONE

GOVERNMENTAL

1/8 8/8/88 00 10
0905 08 14 000100

ט' ט' ט' ט'

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2000

692

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PLANS SUMMARY

A. 1/5 - OPOON TASK FORCE XRAY

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NONE.

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. 282030H CAP H-8 BUD AMB LOC YD 973045 HEARD MOVEMENT WHILE IN ROUTE TO AMBUSH SITE. CLEARED AREA WITH 2/5 RMR. FIRED SMALL ARMS AND 4 HANL GRANADES. SEARCHED AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. AMBUSH MOVED TO ALTERNATE SITE.

CONFIDENTIAL

BT

PAGE TWO OF TWO

GP-4
281765ZCONFIDENTIAL
/HAS BEEN SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

291630Z

FIFTH MARINES
66, TASK FORCE IRAY200: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINESDRAFTER: L.J. JONES BGT
C.W. Fulford
RELEASER: C.W. FULFORD 1STLT
PRECEDENCE: ACTION
OP IMMEDIATE
INFO: ROUTINE
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

REF

CONFIDENTIAL
FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C) FROM 290000H TO 292400H MARCH 1968.

A. DIVO 3480.1A

TOD: 290000Z MARCH 1968 / TFX-11 / RCH: 3480 / GARS

S6: MCH, RICHTH, SMCVR, GTE

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY: 1/5 9/5 1/5 REAR

A. OPERATION HOUSTON 0200Z OF 14 PROFILES

B. THROUGH J. NO CHANGE.

C. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

HHR	PATROLS			AMMUNITIONS			S&D OPNS		LIST POST	SCOUT SNIPERS	
	FT	SGD	PIT	FT	SGD	PIT	CO	3		0	0
7/5	7	5	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
	X	0	7	5	5	9	0	3	12	3	0
8/5	0	9	6	0	2	1	1	1	2	4	4
	X	0	3	0	7	6	1	1	10	3	4

KIT CARSON REPORT

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
2/5	6	4	CO G-1, CO F-1, CO H-2, 1 BAS, 1 UA	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	1	CO K-1, 1 LEAVE, 1 UA	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
2/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
3/5	6	4	BN CP-4	NEGATIVE

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS: NONE.

CONFIDENTIAL

726

27
22

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NONE.

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. NEGATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

IR

CPA
9-16347

CONFIDENTIAL MADE
/HAS BEEN SENT/

CONFIDENTIAL

P 30 1650Z

FM: FIFTH MARINES
TO: CO, TASK FORCE XRAYINFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES310140
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFTER: L.J. JONES SGT
C.W. Fulford
RELEASED: C.W. FULFORD 1STLT

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP (C) FROM 300001Z TO 302400Z MARCH 1968.

A. DIVISION

1. MAJOR OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

A. OPERATION HOUSTON

B. THROUGH J. NO CHANGE.

P. RECAP OF OPERATIONS:

11004 - OF FOURTEEN

UNIT	PATROLS			AMBUSHES			S&D OPNS	LIST	SCOUT
	FT	SQD	PLT	FT	SQD	PLT			
1/5	5	0	6	4	2	0	0	1	0
	N	0	0	0	2	11	0	0	0
2/5	D	0	4	2	0	0	0	5	7
	N	0	0	1	4	7	0	3	10
3/5	D	0	12	5	0	0	0	0	8
	N	0	3	2	5	14	0	0	8

KIT CARSON REPORT

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	4	0	4 BN CP	NEGATIVE
2/5	6	4	CO F-1, CO G-1, CO H-2, 1 HOSP, 1 UA	NEGATIVE
3/5	5	1	CO X-1, 1 LEAVE, 1 UA	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
2/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
3/5	8	8	CO I-2, CO K-2, CO X-2, CO M-2	NEGATIVE

P. DRAFTED 30 MAR 1968 BY 1STLT C.W. FULFORD

21
30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

A. 1/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

2/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

3/5 - OPERATION HOUSTON

4. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS: NONE

5. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. NEGATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL**//FINAL PAGE OF TWO//**

BT

GP-4 TOR: 310140H/MAR68/TFX-TT/CON:3086/DLS
S&C MSG PICK UP
1-5, 2-5, 3-5, REARSUPVR SEH

301650Z

CONFIDENTIAL
//HAS BEEN SERIALIZED//

MAR68

263

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: FIFTH MARINES
 TO: CG, TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES

DRAFTER: J. R. BRIGMAN CPL
C. W. Fulford
 RELEASED: C. W. FULFORD 1STLT
 PREC: ACTION
 OP: IMMEDIATE
 INFO
 ROUTINE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

EP

CONFIDENTIAL

FIFTH MARINES DAILY SITREP(C) FROM 010001H TO 012400H MAR 68

4. DIVO 3480.1A

TOD: 010645H

1. MAJOR OPERATION SUMMARY:

- A. OPERATION HOUSTON
- B. THROUGH G: NO CHANGE.
- H. DTG TERMINATED 012400H.
- I. NO CHANGE.
- J. NO CHANGE.

COPY _____ OF 16 COPIES

K. CUMULATIVE RESULTS:

FRIENDLY	ENEMY	SUPVR	SEH
USMC KIA 4 38	NVA KIA 2 52		
" WIAE 7 63	VC KIA 21		
" WIAME 53	NVA POW 0		
" NBCE 3 21	VC POW 3		
" NBCNE 5	DMI 75		
" NBCX 1	INN CIV 44		
USA KIA 2	CIV DEF 3		
" WIAE 23	IWC 2030		
" WIAME 15	CSWC 4		
USN WIAE 4 5	NVA RET 0		
" NBCE 1 1	VC RET 17		

21
31

2. SIGNIFICANT SMALL UNIT CONTACTS:

- A. 010316H MCB-9 ROCK CRUSHER LOC ZD022022 RECEIVED 25-30 RDS 82MM FIRE, 10 RDS 57 RR FIRE OR ROCKETS. RETURNED 30 RDS 90MM FIRE, 15-20 RDS 8 INCH FIRE. 5 USN KIA, 8 USN WIAE, 3 USMC WIAE, 1 USMCNE.

3. PLANS SUMMARY:

- A. 1/5 CO A RETURN TO PHU BAI AND ASSUME BALD EAGLE STATUS. CO D REPLACE CO A ON BRIDGES IN PHU BAI AO. CO B CONDUCTS S&D SOUTH OF TROUT RIVER BRIDGE. CO C CONDUCTS COMBAT PATROLS VICINITY BRIDGES 2&33 H&S COMPANY MAN OP'S ON HILL 230 AND HILL 180.

010655Z

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

0. 1/5 CO 2 CONDUCTS SECURITY PATROLS ALONG HWY 1 TOWARD HAT GROVE. NO H. PROVIDES SECURITY FOR 1/5 CO BRIDGE. CO 3 L 4 CONDUCTS SECURITY PATROLS FOR HWY 1 IN THE LA PASS.

5. SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS:

A. CONTROL H.Q. OPERATIONS

(1) INFANTRY BATTALIONS

(A) 310316Z MAY 9 ROCK CRUSHER LOC ZD022022 RECEIVED 25-30 RDS 32MM FIRE TO LA 57 BR FIRE OR ROCKETS. RETURNED 30 RDS 82MM FIRE, 15-20 RDS 8 INCH FIRE. 5 USN KIA, 6 USN WIAE, 3 USMC WIAE, 4 USMC WIAE.

(B) 310820H 35TH ENGINEER BATTALION LOC ZD170011 LOW BED VEHICLE CARRYING DOZER HIT MINE BELIEVED TO BE 20 LBS CHICOM TYPE, DAMAGE LOW BED BUT NOT DOZER. VEHICLE CALLED TO TOW LOW BOY AWAY.

(6) GENERAL: WEATHER HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS THIS DATE.

(7) RECAP OF BATTALION OPERATIONS

UNIT	12 PATROLS		AMBUSHES		S&D OPS		LIST POST	SCOUT SNIFERS
	PT	SOD	PT	IV	SQD	PT		
1/5	D	0	3	3	3	0	0	0
	N	0	7	3	0	14	1	0
2/5	D	0	8	5	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	1	0	21	0	7
3/5	D	0	12	2	0	0	0	0
	N	0	0	2	21	15	0	8

KIT CARSON REPORT

UNIT	INDIV ATTACHED	INDIV EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	3	1	1 USN CP	1 KIA 30 WAR
2/5	6	4	1 CO I-1, 1 CO G-1 1 CO H-2, 1 HOSP.	NEGATIVE
3/5	3	1	1 CO I-1, 1 LEAVE, 1 UA	NEGATIVE

SCOUT SNIPER REPORT

UNIT	TEAMS ATTACHED	TEAMS EMPLOYED	EMPLOYED WITH	RESULTS
1/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
2/5	0	0	N/A	N/A
3/5	8	8	CO I-2, CO K-2 CO I-2, CO K-2	NEGATIVE

PAGE TWO OF THREE PAGES

(8) SMALL UNIT CONTACTS

PROVINCE	DATE	ACTION	FRND UNIT	EN UNIT	INIT BY
COORDINATES	TIME	SIZE TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES	US VC
THUA THIEN					
ZD022022	5 310316H	DEF PERIM	5 USN KIA 8 USN WIAE 3 USMC WIAE 1 USMC WIANE	NONE	VC

THUA THIEN					
ZD170011	5 310820H	RD CONST.	1 LOW BOY DAM	NONE	VC

6. COMBINED ACTION UNITS:

A. NEGATIVE

B. CONTACTS:

- (1) CAP H-3 SECURITY LOC YD 912063 ENEMY ATTACKED CAP H-3 SIMULTANEOUSLY AT BRIDGES 4 AND 5. CAP H-3 WITH APPROX 100 82MM MORTARS AND B-40 ROCKETS. RETURNED SMALL ARMS AND ARTILLERY. IMMEDIATE SEARCH OF AREA REVEALED 3 VC KIA AND 1 POW.
- (2) CAP H-4 DEFENSIVE PERIMETER LOC ZD 020010 OBSERVED MED EVAC HALO CRASH INTO SIDE OF HILL AT ABOVE COORDINATES. WILL SEARCH AT FIRST LIGHT.
- (3) CAP H-4 SQD GMB LOC ZD 024013 SIGHTED FLARE BEING FIRED FROM HELO CRASH SITE. DISPATCHED PATROL LOCATED AND EVACUED 2 SURVIVORS AND 1 KIA. SALVAGED AND EVACUED 2 M-60 MACHINE GUNS. AFTER EXTENSIVE SEARCH PATROL COULD NOT LOCATE MIA. 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA, 1 USMC MIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
BT

FINAL PAGE OF THREE PAGES

CP-4

TOD 010645H/APRIL 68/T55TH M-R -TT/RO/CCW/324
S&C MSG PICK UP 1/5 2/5 3/5 REAR

311815Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 68