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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES  
1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California 96602

3/CWF/jrb  
5750  
7 May 1968

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 - 30 April 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A Ch 1  
(b) TMFPACO 5750.6  
(c) DivO 5750.2B Ch 1

Encl: (1) Fifth Marines Command Chronology  
(2) Headquarters Company Fifth Marines Command Chronology  
(3) First Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology  
(4) Second Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology  
(5) Third Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b) and (c), enclosures (1) through (5) are submitted as the Command Chronology from the Fifth Marine Regiment for the period 1 - 30 April 1968.

*Paul G. Graham*  
PAUL G. GRAHAM

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7 May 1968

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES  
1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California 96602

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## COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

*Apr* to *Apr*  
1 ~~1968~~ to 30 ~~1968~~ 1968

## INDEX

- PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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ENCLOSURE (1)  
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7 May 1968PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein) Colonel R. D. BOHN

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines	Capt R. H. KIRKPATRICK (1-5 Apr 1968)
1st Battalion, 5th Marines	1stLt W. J. ARANT (6-30 Apr 1968)
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol R. H. THOMPSON
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol E. C. CHEATHAM JR.
	LtCol D. W. REXROAD

ATTACHED UNITS

NONE

2. Location

Thua Thien Province, Phu Bai, RVN Regimental CP

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	LtCol G. C. McNAULTON
S-1	Capt B. J. MULHERIN
S-2	Major C. M. WOGAN (4-9 Apr 1968)
S-3	Capt P. A. DUFFY (10-30 Apr 1968)
S-4	Major J. F. CODY
S-5	Capt S. K. MCKEE
ComMO	1stLt G. E. O' BILLY
MTO	Major E. R. PIERCE
Supply	1stLt D. G. WILKIE
	1stLt J. T. LOVELL (1-12 Apr 1968)
	1stLt R. L. CAREY (13-30 Apr 1968)
Regimental Chaplain	LtCdr R. P. BECK, USM
Regimental Surgeon	Lt R. A. MURRISON MC, USM
Regimental Sergeant Major	SgtMaj K. CHASE
Regimental Dental Officer	Lt D. CUBBS DC, USM

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5750  
7 May 19684. Average Monthly Strength

USMC		VN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
121	3440	10	168

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7 May 1968PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-30 April, the Fifth Marines continued Operation Houston throughout the Regimental Area of Operations. Emphasis was placed on securing Highway 1 against enemy interdiction and on denial operations in all rice producing areas within the Regimental AO.

Following a coordinated enemy attack on several key bridges on 31 March, all units intensified efforts to secure the MSR. Troop strength was increased at several points along Route 1, improvements were made in early warning and ambushing techniques and bridge defensive positions were strengthened.

On 19 April, the First and Second Battalions of the Regiment began Operation Baxter Garden, a combat operation to locate, close with, and destroy enemy units located in the Phu Thu District north of Phu Bai. Contact on this operation can be described as moderate to light with engagements against small groups of VC and NVA. Operation Baxter Garden terminated on the 26th of the month. Throughout this period, the Third Battalion and elements of the First and Second Battalion continued Operation Houston.

During April all facets of the administrative processes at all levels of Command within the regiment were inspected by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Task Force X-Ray.

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b. Cumulative enemy losses during the reporting period,

- (1) 51 NVA/114 VC KIA'S
- (2) 39 DETAINEES
  - (a) 1 NVA/2 VC PW'S
  - (b) 1 VC REPURCHASE
  - (c) 4 CIV DTF
  - (d) 29 I.D.C. CIV
  - (e) 2 UNCLASSIFIED
- (3) 35 Weapons Captured
  - (a) 31 Ind. Wpns
  - (b) 4 Crew Served Wpns
- (4) CAP and ARVN Units in the 5th Marines AO received 7 "HOI CHANNELS" during the reporting period.

c. Significant Aspects of Enemy, Weather and Terrain.

(1) Enemy

(a) The pattern of enemy movement in the AO during April was primarily dictated by logistic considerations, specifically, the gathering of rice. Frequent contact, augmented by interrogation and agent reports showed the enemy to be involved in nearly nightly attempts to traverse Route 11 from the mountain base areas to the rich rice fields of the coast. The effort of the enemy met with many difficulties as elements of the 5th Marines reacted to intelligence and interdicted his movement.

(b) The majority of contacts with the enemy during April showed him to be reluctant to sustain any engagement and to be in fact, avoiding contact as much as possible.

(c) Contacts made on search and clear missions performed as part of Operation HOUSTON, and the contact incidents of Reconnaissance elements indicated that the enemy was moving north from his deep mountain bases towards the edge of the canopy. The targets developed by these isolated contacts were quickly exploited and apparent attempts by the enemy to consolidate усилия and consistently.

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7 May 1968

(d) Operation BAXTER GARDEN was conducted to disrupt the enemy's supposed intention to mass in the coastal lowland area of Phu Thu (D). The extent of the enemy's influence in the area was reflected in the uncooperative, sullen reaction of the natives to the presence of Marines. Numerous mines and booby traps were encountered.

(2) Weather. Throughout the month, the weather was clear to partly cloudy, with occasional light rain. Support provided by the 1st Marine Air Wing was enhanced by the favorable conditions.

(3) Terrain. Continuing compilation of terrain intelligence by the operating forces contributed to the increasing store of information that can be readily provided to unit commanders. Helicopter Landing Zones, trails, fortifications and any unusual terrain features were recorded.

(d) Miscellaneous.

(1) First reports were received of the existence of the 22d NVA Regiment in the western sector of the AO. Information available indicated that this unit is the former Hue Municipal Unit, enlarged in both strength and scope of mission.

(2) Intelligence received from local village and hamlet sources testified to the increasing effectiveness of both the tactical and intelligence gathering activities of the Regiment.

3. Training. During the period 1 April through 30 April the following schools were attended by personnel of this command.

Basic Organic Supply Accounting	Danang	3
Basic Infantry Weapons Repair	Okinawa	3
Basic Arms Tech	Okinawa	2
Vietnamese Language	Danang	4
Vietnamese Language	Okinawa	2
Embarcation (Enlisted)	Danang	4
KY 23/33 Maintenance	Danang	1
Embarcation Course (Officer)	Okinawa	1
Projection Operator Course	Danang	4

The Regiment continued its 5 day Indoctrination Training for all personnel assigned to the 5th Marines.

4. Operations. During the month of April, all operational efforts of the regiment were included in two named Operations, Operation HOUSTON and Operation BAXTER GARDEN.

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In Operation HOUSTON, engineers continued improvement of the highway for convoy traffic, and the Regiment conducted numerous small unit operations to prevent enemy from massing and conducting coordinated attacks on bridges and to provide security for the engineer units repairing and improving Route 1. (Ref: PART IV HOUSTON After Action Report)

In coordination with RVN representatives, the Regiment began an extensive Rice Denial Operation. All units conducted patrols and surveillance activities throughout rice growing areas. All known supply routes and access routes to the rice areas were heavily ambushed. Small unit search and clear operations were conducted to locate enemy rice caches throughout the AO.

On 19 April Operation BAXTER GARDEN commenced along the sandy peninsula in Phu Tho Province north of Phu Bai (Ref: PART IV BAXTER GARDEN After Action Report).

Enemy contact throughout the area of operations continued to be light, however enemy movement did increase, particularly rice carrier parties attempting to reach the fertile rice growing areas.

Intelligence sources indicated that enemy units were massing for possible attacks on bridges and fixed enemy installations within the Regimental Area of Operations, however no significant large engagements were encountered during April.

#### 5. Fire Support.

a. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines continued to be in direct support of the 5th Marines. During the month of April the principle effort of the battalion was directed to the support of Operations HOUSTON AND BAXTER GARDEN. The following missions were fired in support of the Fifth Marine Regiment:

#### MISSIONS FIRED

<u>OBS</u>	<u>UMOBS</u>	<u>H&amp;I</u>
456	468	4413

#### AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>5TH MARINES</u>	<u>RECON</u>	<u>1ST FID</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
105mm How	1265	124	592	0
105mm How	14417	1291	5448	98
4.2" Mortar	2914	0	0	0

During the month of April elements of the 2d Battalion was credited with 56 enemy KIA, 25 enemy WIA, 2 enemy forced to surrender, 6 concrete emplacements destroyed, 8 other structures destroyed, 3 structures damaged, and 6 secondary explosions. Afore listed surveillances confirmed by Marine forward observers, recon inserts and U. S. Army advisors operating with the ARVN.

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6. Air Support. The following missions were flown in support of the Regiment during the month of April:

Medical Evacuation	74
Tactical Air Strikes	84
Flare Ships	13
Aerial Observers	84
Troop Lifts (totalling 1,864 troops)	11
Logistics (totalling 185,700 lbs)	17
Gunships	100
Command and Control	30
Administration	50
Visual Reconnaissance	18
Unit Commander	15
 Total Missions	 496

7. Logistics. Operation HOUSTON continued through the month with procedures as established over the previous two months. No innovations were realized.

Concurrently with HOUSTON, Operation BAXTER GARDEN was run from 19-26 April. To support it an HST and supply point was set up at LZ 405 (Phu Bai Ball Park) to shorten supply lines. Heavy ammo was flown from the LZ at ASF-1 until 24 April at which time a fire and resultant explosions closed the ASF. Resupply for those items of ammo was shifted to Cau Doi without incident.

Large amounts of Class IV are being used to establish defensive positions around key bridges.

A requested change of allowance of Regiment to include 8 .50 Caliber Machine Guns was disapproved by the Commanding General.

The supply system has reacted to meet Regiment's request for 13680 meals of LRP's monthly. During April 150 cases (3608 meals) were drawn.

Upgrading of Route 1 continued, with completion of timber trestle bridges on the Troui River, Nuoc Ngot River and Thua Luu River.

8. Communications. During the month of April 1968 the Regimental Command Post displaced from Phu Bai (YDS58131) to Cau Doi Peninsula (ZD055029) to enhance command and control of tactical units during Operation HOUSTON. The communications facilities required were established by the advance party on 3 April, and closed on 15 April, on return to Phu Bai.

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A AM/TRC-27 radio relay circuit was installed between Phu Bai (ZD050131) and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (ZD929073) on, 2 April.

The AM/TRC-27 radio relay circuit supporting 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines was displaced from the old command post (ZD028021) and reestablished at Cau Doi (ZD055029) when the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced its Command Post on 5 April. This circuit also provides service to the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Post (ZD051021).

9. Medical. During the month of April a total of 356 patients were treated at the Regimental Aid Station of which 281 were referrals from battalions or other units located in Phu Bai. A total of 3057 immunizations were administered during the month of April. The majority of these immunizations were not administered to Headquarters Company personnel. A Regimental Aid Station was established with the Forward CP at Cau Doi and adequately provided medical support for Regimental elements at that location.

10. Dental. During the month of April the Regimental Dental Clinic operated in conjunction with Task Force XRAY Dentist to give coverage to all Marine units in the Phu Bai area, in addition all companies returning to Phu Bai for short refurbishment periods were checked and treated in the combined dental clinic.

11. Civil Affairs. During April, a pilot medcap was held at Vinh Loc District Headquarters and 3000 pounds of rolled oats, bulgur wheat, and corn meal were provided by the 5th Marines and were distributed to the people by the district chief. In addition to the food, 25 gallons of salad oil was delivered. 144 bags of soap were passed out during the medcap and 110 people were medically treated. One child with a severe head injury was medevaced by Marine helicopter to the Vietnamese hospital in Hue.

In the vicinity of CAP H-6, 70 lbs of soap, 25 lbs of clothes and 20 lbs of toys were distributed to children in a Catholic orphanage.

Near the end of April, 80 bags of cement were delivered to the widow of a Popular Forces squad leader who received the U. S. Silver Star award. This cement will be used along with subsequent materials to rebuild her home.

Transportation was also made available to the Phu Loc district chief to transport cement from Hue to Phu Loc by the 5th Marines.

12. Psychological Operations. Extensive use of aerial broadcast and leaflet drops in the 5th Marines area of operations bolstered the program of the ground broadcast team assigned to 5th Marines, KB 3. As a result, 6 Hoi Chans returned to the Government of Vietnam under the Chieu Hoi program. An extensive aerial broadcast and leaflet drop was planned in conjunction with the upcoming rice harvest.

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7 May 1968

Chieu Hoi pens and plastic balls were distributed by HqCo and 3rd Bn, 5th Marines. Leaflet distribution was activated on a larger scale near the end of the month with all battalions including 2nd Bn, 11th Marines participating. The armed propaganda team was used to support 5th Marines activities.

13. Chaplain. During the month of April the Regimental Chaplain provided services for the Regiment, adjacent units located in Phu Bai, battalions participating in Operation HOUSTON, combined action platoons and bridge security units located along Hwy 1.

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 Task Force XRay  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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 3480  
 8 May 1968

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From: Commanding General

To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
 (Attn: MACJ 343), APO U.S. Forces, 96222Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 (2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BAXTER GARDEN

Ref: (a) MACV DIR 335-8 of 1 Sep 67  
 (b) 1st MarDiv O 3480.1A

Encl: (1) 5th Marines Combat After Action Report, Operation BAXTER GARDEN

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b).

2. Several problems were encountered during the operation concerning low-flying aircraft and existing air corridors over the operating area as stated in paragraph 6(b) of Enclosure (2) to Enclosure (1). The proximity of the Phu Bai airfield to the operating area and its approach corridors, which passed over the operating area, caused naval gunfire and artillery checkfires due to aircraft flying in these corridors. In the future, requests will be made to Phu Bai Airbase Operations to adjust the approach corridors to the airfield during planned operations in the BAXTER GARDEN area when it is anticipated that existing corridors will interfere with the employment of supporting arms. Artillery and naval gunfire checkfires were also necessary during the operation due to low-flying aircraft that appeared to disregard existing procedures for SAVAPLANES. At the time of Operation BAXTER GARDEN, U.S. Army aircraft in the Phu Bai area did not use the SAVAPLANE system. Since that time, liaison has been effected between Marine Corps and Army headquarters in the Phu Bai area and Army aviation units are now using the SAVAPLANE system. This should prevent the problems encountered during the operation from recurring in the future.

*John N. McLaughlin*  
 JOHN N. MC LAUGHLIN

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 1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force  
 c/o Fleet Post Office  
 San Francisco, California 96602

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 29 April 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, Task Force XRAY  
 Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation BANTER GARDEN

Ref: (a) 1stMarDivO 3480.1A  
 (b) 5th Marines OpO 5-68  
 (c) 5th Marines FragO 20-68  
 (d) 5th Marines FragO 30-68

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Encl: (1) First Battalion, Fifth Marines After Action Report *Filed*  
 (2) Second Battalion, Fifth Marines After Action Report *As per*  
 (3) Fifth Marines OpO 5-68  
 (4) Fifth Marines FragO 20-68  
 (5) Fifth Marines FragO 30-68

1. Code Name. Operation BANTER GARDEN.
2. Dates of Operation. 190800H April 1968 to 261200H April 1968.
3. Location of Operation. Thu Thu District, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.

4. Command Headquarters.

Fifth Marine Regiment

COL R. D. BOHN

5. Task Organization

a. 190800H April 1968 to 211400H April 1968


Fifth Marines  
 2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines  
 H&S Co (-), 2/5  
 Co A, 2/5  
 Co H, 2/5  
 Co C, 1/27  
 Co B, 1/27

COL R. D. BOHN  
 1ST COL R. D. BOHN, JR.  
 2D COL R. D. BOHN

b. 211900H April 1968 to 261200H April 1968

Fifth Marines

COL R. D. BOHN



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First Bn (-), 5th Marines  
 H&S Co (-), 1/5  
 Co E 1/5  
 Co M 3/5

LTCOL R. H. THOMSON

Second Bn (-) 5th Marines  
 H&S Co (-) 2/5  
 Co E, 2/5  
 Co H, 2/5

LTCOL B. C. CLEATHAM JR.

#### 6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery. On D-1 Day (18 April 1968) a provisional battery consisting of four 105mm Howitzers was formed and displaced to the northern side of Phu Bai (Grid 0915) to provide a direct support battery for Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. On D-Day, Whiskey Battery, 2d Battalion, 13th Marines was displaced to Combined Action Company Alpha's position (Grid Square 8717), to provide direct support for 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Delta Battery, 11th Marines was also placed in direct support of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines during the southern portion of the operation from Delta Battery permanent position (Grid Square 9307). The provisional 8" Howitzer Battery located at Phu Bai provided reinforcing fires for both Battalions during the operation.

On D+3 (Phase II), Delta Battery was tasked with supporting Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines when a helicopter lift was made to the southern portion of the operating area.

The U.S.S. Cone provided direct support for 2d Battalion, 5th Marines during the period 22 April 1968 through 25 April 1968.

Throughout the operation communication difficulties with the conduct of fire net necessitated putting Whiskey Battery and the Provisional Howitzer Battery on a common Conduct of Fire Net to answer calls of fire for both battalions.

Timeliness of artillery support proved to be very good, in that permanent SAVE-A-PLANES were established prior to commencement of the operation, and a liaison team from 5th Marines FSCC was established with the District Chief to insure quick clearance of all missions. Contact missions averaged 3-5 minutes from request to impact, and routine missions averaged 10-15 minutes.

b. Air Support. During Operation Baxter Garden weather was generally good, and therefore air support was constantly available.

The operation was primarily supported by air with Marine helicopters making six tactical troop lifts of 1860 combat Marines and 49000 pounds of equipment. Marine TACA/AO's controlled six flights of preplanned fixed wing strikes preparing the landing zones, eight on call flights with special ordnance and 21 flights off the hot pad. Three flights of gunships were utilized as escort for assault aircraft while an additional 18 flights were utilized in close support.

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On call request were submitted by controlling units via the FM TACP net and forwarded to DASC via telephone with reaction time of 15 to 30 minutes for both fixed wing and gunships. Overall effectiveness was considered outstanding with 17 confirmed kills, several secondary explosions, and several fortified positions destroyed.

Direct support helicopters were utilized to lift the majority of the 15000 pound per day resupply requirement.

c. Tanks and Ontos. Tanks and Ontos were employed on Phase II of the operation and proved to be an effective direct fire support. The Ontos encountered problem traversing flooded rice paddies, and were stuck on several occasions, delaying the movement of the units. Tanks had no trouble in movement, and were credited with 6 enemy kills.

d. ARVN FORCES. The ARVN forces were not supporting forces for operation Baxter Garden, but the operation LAM SON 214 conducted by the 21st and 39th Ranger Battalion in conjunction with Operation Baxter Garden did effect the operation and should be mentioned herein. The ARVN Ranger Battalions conducted sweeps for 48 hours of the operation in the northern portion of the AO, and the two operations served as blocking forces for each other. Lam Son 214 resulted in 36 enemy killed, 13 individual weapons captured, and 1 crew served weapon captured.

#### 7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of enemy strength, location, disposition and situation prior to operation.

The intelligence available on the area of operation was sparse and essentially limited to information developed during Operation Ford and some low level agent reports. Traditional enemy presence in the area indicated that elements of the C117 LF Company would be encountered. Patterns of enemy movement during the retrograde following the Tet Offensive indicated that the 802d and 804th Battalions had operated in the area briefly during March and the possibility existed that elements of these units were still in the area.

The string of villages extending SE from grid YD880232 to YD930207 were considered to contain enemy units and to be fortified to some degree. Sporadic contact was anticipated with units ranging from fire team to platoon size in the larger villages as the route of march progressed. Extensive use of mines and booby traps was also expected.

The enemy situation and mission was considered to be the performance of housekeeping tasks, i.e., maintenance of fortified villages, caches, and training cadres.

b. Enemy strength and situation actually found.

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The enemy strength and disposition encountered was fairly close to that expected. Mine and booby trap incidents were frequent and fortified villages were located throughout. The enemy tactics consisted primarily of sniping and harassing with only one large engagement, and that not being of the enemy's choosing. It is possible that the contacts made were, for the most part, delaying actions to cover the movement of larger units to the enemy rear, although aerial observation did not note movement of this sort.

Documents and prisoners indicated the presence of units not previously encountered and expected in the area. Interrogation revealed that a new unit, the Phu Vang (d) Armed Ranger Platoon was located in the vicinity of grid square YD0822. An agent report received the same day, 19 April, by 1st CIP reported the presence of the F116 Ranger Company in vicinity grid square YD8222. It is possible that this unit is a redesignation of the C116 LF Company, but may be a newly organized unit. Document interpretation indicated the presence of elements of the K3 Bn. No evidence was developed to verify the presence of the C117 LF Company.

The terrain is as indicated on the map, flat, sandy, and punctuated by treelines and villages. Trafficability for tracked vehicles is good; for wheeled vehicles, poor.

The attitude of the populace was sullen and uncooperative, indicative of the considerable extent of enemy domination in the area. Captured documents revealed a well established and organized NLF apparatus in the area, operating as the effective government in the villages.

8. Mission. On L-Hour of D-Day land in designated LZ'S and search to locate and destroy enemy forces, material, and positions; and block to support other allied forces conducting search and destroy operations in assigned AO.

9. Concept of Operations.

a. On D-1 Day two companies establish blocking positions on south and north flanks of AO. At L-hour on D-Day three companies landed in three LZ'S in eastern portion of AO and attacked to blocking positions to support sweep from the west to east by two ARVN Battalions. On about D+1 day blocks athwart AO were disestablished and flanking blocks were established to south and east. One battalion then attacked south.

b. On D+2 days two battalions attacked southeast in SOA employing intermediate blocks and sweeps. Friendly Naval units blocked enemy egress north on Thuy Thu Bay and south on Cau Hai Bay. Elements of Fifth Marines; PF and CAG units blocked enemy egress southeast. On D+4 days the two battalions continued attack southeast to Phase Line Peach and held at that position. Early morning of D+5 battalions reversed direction and conducted night march to northwest to reach Phase Line Apple by first light. At first light both battalions conducted day attack to stream winding along axis of grid line YD83.

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10. Execution

- a. See Enclosures (1) and (2).
- b. Operation BAXTER GARDEN commenced 190800H with the helo lift of the 2nd Bn 5th Marines (Rein) into LZ DODO YD885235, LZ QUAIL YD880220, and LZ GROUSE YD870210. Troop lift was completed without incident.
- c. ARVN sweep commenced from west to east in northern AO at about 190900H and encountered moderate small arms contact.
- d. At 190900H Co E 2/5 vicinity YD884226 began receiving small arms fire from enemy entrenched in treeline. Company E returned small arms and maneuvered on enemy. Position was taken and in addition to 1 VC KIA, and 3 individual weapons, several maps and assorted documents were found. 1 Marine was killed in the action. As Company E continued to move toward objectives, they received moderate harassing fire with no casualties resulting on either side.
- e. At 191520H Co E received small arms and B-40 rocket fire from an estimated platoon of enemy located at YD845234. Company returned small arms and 60MM mortar fire and maneuvered on enemy. Co E swept through enemy position finding 4 VC KIA, 3 Detainees, 5 individual weapons, and 1 crew served weapon. One Marine was killed and 6 wounded and evacuated.
- f. At 191800H all units began establishing night defensive positions and numerous ambushes employed, but no enemy movement was detected.
- g. At 192000H Company D 1/5 received 20 rounds 60MM mortar fire from enemy located at YD864218. Counter mortar fire was returned, however sweep of area the next morning was conducted with negative results. Seven Marines were wounded and evacuated.
- h. On 19 April in addition to those casualties listed above, 1 USMC was wounded and evacuated, 7 USMC were wounded but not evacuated, and 1 USMC was evacuated as a non battle casualty, an additional Detainee was picked up by 2nd Battalion
- i. At 200505H Company B 1/5 received small arms, 82MM mortar fire, and CS gas grenades from a platoon of enemy located in treeline at YD868233. Co B returned small arms called and received artillery support, air strikes, and gunship support. CS was employed by enemy, but had negative effect as compared to their gas masks and assaulted the enemy position. Search of area revealed 3 individual weapons, 2 crew served weapons, and 9 NVA KIA. 1 Marine was killed and 11 wounded and evacuated. Co B continued to pursue enemy and engaged them again at 1420H vicinity YD881231. Air strikes were again employed and a search revealed 11 NVA killed by air, 3 VC KIA, and various kinds of ammunition. 2 Marines were killed and 2 wounded and evacuated.
- j. At 201830H Company E 2/5 while establishing night defensive position received 23 rounds 82MM mortar fire from enemy located at YD864218. Counter mortar fire was called from artillery and mortar fire ceased. 2 Marines were killed and 12 wounded and evacuated. Search of area at first light revealed 2 VC KIA.

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k. On 20 April an additional 5 Marines were killed and 6 were wounded and evacuated primarily from surprise explosive devices and scattered contacts. 9 additional USMC were wounded but not evacuated and 1 Marine was evacuated as a non battle casualty, 1 additional Detainee was picked up and 2 additional individual weapon was captured.

l. At 210800H Companies C&D 1/27 were released from the blocking positions and returned to the operational control of their parent unit. The two ARVN Ranger Bns also completed Tam Son 214 and returned to ARVN CP.

m. At 211335H Co H 2/5 detected 1 VC in a spider hole. Co H killed VC and captured 1 individual weapon.

n. At 211400H 1/5 (-) & 2/5 (-) began an attack southeast down the peninsula. The enemy had employed extensive surprise explosive devices in the area and several Marines were wounded and evacuated as a result.

o. On 21 April 3 NVA were killed and 1 Detainee was picked up in scattered contacts. 6 additional Marines were wounded and evacuated.

p. At 220600H all units continued attack southeast toward Phase Line Apple. Again extensive explosive devices were encountered and at 0615H Co E 2/5 suffered 7 Marines wounded and evacuated from a chain of M-26 grenades detonated by a Marine. 2/5 (-) continued to encounter surprise explosive devices throughout the day.

q. On 22 April an additional 14 USMC were wounded and evacuated and 5 USM were wounded but not evacuated. 3 additional Detainees were picked up, and 1 reclassified 3 Detainees as Innocent Civilians, 5 as Civil Defendants and 1 as a VC Returnee, 1 USMC was evacuated as an NBC.

r. At 231015H a squad from Co H 2/5 received small arms fire from 5 VC. Squad returned fire and maneuvered on enemy. A sweep of area revealed 1 VC KIA. An additional 1 VC KIA was discovered having been killed while setting a surprise explosive device, 8 USMC were wounded and evacuated, 2 received minor wounds and 2 Vietnamese were detained.

s. At 240001H Co M began night march north from Phase Line Peach, followed by 1/5 (-) and 2/5 (-) at 240200H. Night march was made quickly and efficiently, and at first light, all units were on Phase Line Apple and prepared to attack north. Light contact resulted and 1 VC was killed by Co M 3/5, and 1 VC was killed by Co B 1/5. 6 Marines were wounded and evacuated.

t. At 240930H it was discovered that two Marines had been lost in night march and ARVN reported that the 2 Marines had been captured. 1 Platoon and tanks were dispatched to find Marines. Co E was helilifted into area and began search for MIA's.

u. At 250600H 1/5 (-) returned to LZ and prepared for extraction from AO. Co E 2/5 continued search for MIA's with negative results, and began sweep north up the peninsula to link up with 2/5 (-).

v. At 251830H Co E 2/5 discovered enemy ambush at YD945200. At approximately the same time the enemy ambush began firing on Co E, tanks and LVT's that were moving south to meet Co E sighted the ambush. Together tanks and infantry ambushed enemy with support from HUEY gunbirds. 17 NVA were killed.

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
APO, San Francisco, California 96602

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JUN 2 1968

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
(Attn: MACV 343), APO, U. S. Forces 96222  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BAXTER GARDEN  
Ref: (a) MACV Dir No 335-8  
Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. Operation BAXTER GARDEN was a two phase combat sweep conducted in PKU THU District THUA THIEN Province, RVN from 190000N until 261200N April 1968. The 2nd and 3rd ARVN Ranger Battalion conducted operation LAM SON 2/4 in conjunction with BAXTER GARDEN. Participating units were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines and the 5th Marines Command Group, 1st Field Artillery Group, 1st Marine Air Wing and the USS COME provided supporting fires.
3. The enemy avoided significant contact except for one engagement on the last day of the operation with Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Both NVA and VC units were encountered. The NVA units withdrew covered by the local Viet Cong's harassing and sniping fires.

R. D. BOHN  
By direction

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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TAB A

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16 Marines received minor wounds. In addition ITT reclassified 7 Detainees as Innocent Civilians and 1 as Civil Defendant.

w. At 261200H 2/5(-) was extracted from AO and Operation Baxter Garden terminated.

## 11. Results

a. U. S. Marine Corps Personnel b. Enemy Personnel

KIA	13
WIAE	86
WIAME	39
MLA	2
NBCE	3

NVA KIA	42
VC KIA	15
DETAINEES	15
INNOCENT CIVILIANS	10
CIVIL DEFENDENTS	6
VC RETURNEES	1
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED	14
CREW SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED	3

## 12. Administrative matters

a. Resupply. Three days of Class I, high usage Class II and Class V (5.56mm, 7.62mm, M-26 grenades and M-79 rounds) was prestaged at LZ 405. Three days of Class V (60mm, 81mm, 106mm, 90mm, 3.5", LAAM) were staged at ASR/1 LZ. Both 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion, Fifth Marines drew additional hard dollar items from stock as required. Class III resupplies were provided by the supporting unit with exception of Amtracs for whom the battalions drew POL. All ammo staged at ASR/1 LZ was destroyed by fire on 24 April and ammo of those types was drawn from Cau Doi LSA until completion of operation. All resupply requests were made by HST and all resupply was effected by helicopter.

b. Maintenance. First and second echelon performed by units. Contact teams for ordnance and electronics were on call from NLSC-A, however, they were not needed.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. Second Battalion, 5th Marines established BAS in the field. Helicopter evacuations were utilized whenever necessary.

d. Transportation. Helicopters were utilized to transport troops during all phases of the operation.

e. Communications.

(1) During the entire period of Operation BAXTER GARDEN communications was satisfactory. The AN/PRC-25 and RT-524 radio equipment once again proved highly reliable for tactical communications.

(2) Due to the large amount of friendly forces in the Northern Sector of I Corps frequency interference problems with other units were common.

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and excessive changing of frequency assignments for use by tactical units was necessary. The assignment of "SOLE USER" frequency assignments for Regimental and Battalion Tactical Nets would greatly alleviate this problem.

(3) Terrain was poor in the BAXTER GARDEN area for wheeled vehicles and when helilift of the AN/MRC-109 radio vehicle became impracticable the equipment was returned to the rear headquarters. In order to continue to maintain a secure radio circuit capability, KY-8 cryptographic equipment was easily installed in a LVT-5 Amphibious Tractors which were assigned to both 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th Marines.

(4) Due to the tactical requirement for rapid mobility of the maneuver battalions radio relay circuits were not installed and radio was the primary means of communications.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commanders Analysis

On D-Day the Second Battalion (-) (Rein) commenced Operation BAXTER GARDEN by helo lift and swept west with blocks provided by 2 companies to the north and south. Initial contact was light, encountering only sporadic sniper fire, indicative of local VC harassing tactics. In the early afternoon, however, a disciplined platoon size unit employing both B-40 rockets and 60mm mortars was encountered, indicating that NVA elements were also in the area.

Throughout the remainder of D-Day and into D+1, contact continued to be moderate with enemy units of platoon size or smaller. Enemy seemed to be using delaying tactics and it is a possibility they were screening for larger units as they moved out of the area.

On D+2, the First Battalion (-) was introduced into Operation BAXTER GARDEN and the two battalions began sweeps southeast along the Peninsula. Throughout the remainder of the operation, until D+6, contact continued to be very light, indicating the enemy had either left the area entirely or hidden underground. Numerous tunnels were discovered and searched with negative results.

The enemy did employ extensive surprise explosive devices which hampered movement of both battalions and resulted in several casualties.

On D+6, the enemy attempted an ambush of one company as it returned north up the peninsula. Tanks and LVT's were employed along with HUEY gunships. This resulted in 17 NVA confirmed kills with no serious friendly casualties and was the most significant contact of the operation.

This command concurs with para. 13 of ref (b) in that terrain is unsuitable for large units to operate in the area for extended periods of time. It appears enemy units move through the area to gather rice, and are hesitant to engage large units. Fortified treelines and villages were discovered, however they appeared to be old and unused.

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
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Tracked vehicles provided units with flexibility and immediate support to react to any enemy contact. The Ontos had a few problems crossing flooded terrain, ditches, and streams. Tanks and LVT's proved to be a great asset.

Air and artillery support was quick and effective due to preplanned missions, precleared areas, and direct liaison with the district chief to clear areas for contact missions. Units could count on supporting arms in a matter of minutes. Air support was the best I have encountered. Helicopter support, in particular was outstanding. This was due in part to the excellent cooperation between MAG 36 and the 5th Marines and further to the briefing helicopter elements received prior to participation. Eye to eye briefing and contact with helicopter units is essential if their capability is to be fully exploited.

15. Recommendations: None.

  
R. D. Bohn

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HQ, 5th Marines

Task Force XRAY

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam

181000H Apr 1968

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## Operation Order 5-68 ( )

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 IAMS Series L7014 Sheets 6541 I and IV; and 6542 III  
 (b) CG TF XRAY Frag0 21-68  
 (c) 5th Mar OpO 301-68  
 (d) 5th Mar AdO 301-68  
 (e) 5th Mar CEOI

5TH MAR S&amp;C FILES

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## 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Annex B (Intelligence).  
 (2) Current INTSUMs.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Air Support. 1st MAW provides fixed and rotary wing and AO support.

(2) Artillery Support(a) 1st FAG, General Support

1 Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Marines  
 2 2d Plat, 3d 8 Inch How Btry  
 3 1st 155mm Gun Btry  
 4 Prov 105mm How Btry (assigned DS mission.)

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 DOD DIR 5200.10

(b) 2d Bn (Rein), 11th Marines, Direct Support

(3) Tank and AT Support. On about D+3 days to link up with elements of 5th Marines:

(a) 2d Plat, Co A, 1st Tk Bn, Direct Support(b) 2d Plat, Co A AT, 1st Tk Bn, Direct Support

(4) 1st ARVN Div. Elements of the 1st ARVN Div sweep from west to east in AO to search, locate, and destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions. Annex C (Operations Overlay).

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Co B, 1st Bn, 5th Marines CHOPS to 2d Bn, 5th Marines at 181200H Apr 1968

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(2) Co A and Co B, 1st Bn, 27th Marines CHOP to 5th Marines and concurrently CHOP to 2d Bn, 5th Marines at 181200H Apr 1968.

## 2. MISSION

On D-Day at L-Hour land in designated LZs and search to locate and destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions; and block to support other allied forces conducting search and destroy operations in assigned AO.

## 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. On D-1 day two companies establish blocking positions on south and north flanks of AO. At L-Hour on D-Day three companies land in three LZs in eastern portion of AO and attack to blocking positions to support sweep from west to east by three ARVN battalions. On about D+3 days disestablish blocks athwart AO and reestablish flanking blocks further to south and east. One battalion then attacks south.

b. 1st Bn (-), 5th Marines

- (1) Continue mission assigned by ref (c).
- (2) At about 181200H Apr 68 CHOP Co B 1/5 to 2d Bn, 5th Marines.
- (3) On about D+3 be prepared to resume OPCON of Co B 1/5 and commence operations in Phu Thu area.

c. 2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines

- (1) On D-1 day establish blocking positions with two companies on the north and south flanks of the AO to channelize and block enemy forces.
- (2) At L-Hour on D-Day land three companies in designated LZs by helicopter and attack west to blocking positions to block enemy movement.
- (3) On about D+3 days be prepared to CHOP attached rifle companies out and continue to conduct operations south and east in the Phu Thu area.

d. XRAY, 2d Bn, 5th Marines. Continue mission assigned 2d Bn, 5th Marines by ref (c).

e. 3d Bn (-), 5th Marines. Continue mission assigned by ref (c).

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-Day and H/L-Hour. 190800H Apr 1968.

~~SECRET~~(2) Landing Zones

- (a) BOBO YD885235.
- (b) QUAIL YD880220.
- (c) GROUSE YD870210.

(3) Thrust Points

- (a) Any River: YD9023.
- (b) Any Dog: YD9320.
- (c) Any Tree: YD9515.

(4) Phase Lines

- (a) PL RED: GL YD84.
- (b) PL WHITE: GL YD85.
- (c) PL BLUE: GL YD86.
- (d) PL GREEN: GL YD87.

(5) Fire Support Coordination

- (a) Phase Lines will be utilized as Fire Control Lines.
- (b) Fire clearance in AO by Regt FSCC, in coordination with ARVN liaison.
- (c) FFZ for ARVN NFZ for 5th Marines: Area bounded on north by GL YD25.5, south by GL YD21, east by GL YD84.

## 4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

- a. Ref (d).
- b. 5th Marines establishes a supply point at Phu Bai Ballpark LZ to stock limited amounts of Class I, water, and Class V (5.56mm, 7.62mm linked, M-79, and M-26). Other Class V will be drawn from ASP-1, Phu Bai.
- c. Resupply. Requests by shopping list to HST or by telephone to battalions rears, or to 5th Marines S-4. Class V drawn from ASP-1 must be requisitioned and approved by TF XRAY G-4.
- d. Service. Shore Party will establish LZ Control Team at Phu Bai Ball park.

e. Observe water discipline and carry substantial supply of halazone.

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## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Refs (c) and (e).
- b. Command Posts. Units report CP locations as established.
- c. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Radio
    - (a) Annex C (Radio Freq and Call Signs).
    - (b) Units not participating in operations in Phu Thu area continue normal.
    - (c) 2d Bn, 5th Marines command group at Cau Doi suffix call sign with "XRAY". Other call signs normal.
  - (2) Cryptographic. KAC-Q and KAC-P effective editions will be utilized as necessary. Battalion command groups will possess KY-8 capability.
  - (3) Radio Relay, Wire, and Message Center. Normal within Regt TAOR. Helicopter messenger will be utilized as necessary.
- d. Command Relationships
  - (1) Control of activities within 5th Marines TAOR normal. On displacement of Regt Command Group to Phu Thu area, coordination of units on Route #1 will be by 5th Marines Rear.
  - (2) Liaison with friendly forces external to 5th Marines in Phu Thu area will be at regimental level, unless otherwise directed.

*R D Bohn*

R. D. BOHN  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

## ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operations Overlay
- D - Radio Frequencies and Call Signs
- X - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 5-68

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Hq, 5th Marines  
 Task Force XRAY  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam  
 181000H Apr 1968

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 5-68 ( )

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION

5th Marines (Rein)

Col BOHN

1st Bn (-), 5th Marines  
 H&S Co, 1/5  
 Co A, 1/5  
 Co C, 1/5  
 Co D, 1/5

LtCol THOMPSON

2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines  
 H&S Co (-), 2/5  
 Co E, 2/5  
 Co H, 2/5  
 Co B, 1/5  
 Co L, 1/27  
 Co B, 1/27

LtCol CHEATHAM

3d Bn (-), 5th Marines  
 H&S Co, 3/5  
 Co I, 3/5  
 Co K, 3/5  
 Co L (-), 3/5

LtCol REXROAD

XRAY 2d Bn, 5th Marines  
 Det, H&S Co, 2/5  
 Co F, 2/5  
 Co G, 2/5

Maj STEELE

BALD EAGLE  
 Co M, 3/5

ROUGH RIDER SECURITY  
 3d Plat (Rein), Co L, 3/5

*R. D. Bohn*  
 R. D. BOHN  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

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Hq, 5th Marines  
 Task Force X-Ray  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam  
 181000H April 1968

## Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 5-68 (Operation )

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6541 I & IV, 6542 III.  
 (b) III MAF Intelligence Estimate 13-67 (KTZ) of 1 August 1967.  
 (c) DivO 3451.2A, Processing, Exploiting, Evacuating, and Accounting for Detainees.  
 (d) DivO 7000.4A: Rewards Fund  
 (e) 1st MarDiv Intelligence Study (Phu Bai Base Area) of 15 November 1967.  
 (f) Annex C (Operations Overlay)

Time Zone: H

## MISSION

a. Basic Mission. Keep MSR along Route #1 in assigned AO open. In conjunction with friendly forces protect U.S. and GVN installations, bridges, overpasses vehicles, equipment, supplies and personnel by destroying threatening enemy forces in assigned AO. Conduct offensive operations in AO to kill or capture enemy personnel and destroy enemy weapons, material and positions.

b. Purpose of this Estimate. To provide sufficient intelligence information to plan and prepare to carry out the basic mission.

## ENEMY SITUATION

## a. Characteristics of Area of Operation

(a) Military Geography. The AO is located in central Thua Thien Province immediately East of HUE City in Phu Vang District.

(a) The large portion of the AO consist of rice lands which are open areas of cultivation and seasonally inundated either by irrigation or natural flooding. The rice fields are surrounded by low dikes 0.5 to 1.0 meters high and 0.3 to 0.6 meters wide. During April and May the fields are drained in order to harvest the rice crop.

(b) The area is interlaced with streams and rivers. The two main rivers are the Song Loi Dang located in the Southern portion of the AO, and the Phat Lac located mainly in the northern and central portion of the AO.

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(c) Villages are located throughout the AO with the major population along the Phat Lac River.

(d) Cover and Concealment is generally good along the rivers and in the populated areas but limited to rice paddy dikes in the cultivated areas.

(2) Summary of Enemy Military Situation

(a) Phu Vang District is the normal operating area of the C-117 and C-116 Local Force Companies and the K4B Main Force Battalion. In addition the 802 NVA Battalion and possibly elements of the 804 Battalion are believed to have operated recently in the AO. While not currently located in the AO the 4TH NVA Regimental Headquarters displaced into the AO during March for a brief period. All enemy units in the AO participated in the occupation of HUE, and all suffered some loss in combat effectiveness as a result of the operation.

(b) Contacts with enemy elements up to battalion size are possible. Enemy activities however, are likely to consist primarily of harassing, delaying, sniping and mining operations, rather than conventional defense of the area or counter attack.

(c) In addition to main and local force units, local village self defense cadres are present in some villages and hamlets.

(d) Extensive use of surprise explosive devices and mine particularly in areas with local self defense cadres should be expected.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine general attitude of population in villages and hamlets towards USMC operations.
- b. Determine location of fords and bridges on waterways in the AO.
- c. Determine the suitability of the terrain in the AO for employment of tanks.
- d. Determine location of trails, roads and other significant features not listed on standard maps of the area.
- e. Determine the type, extent, and usual method of employment of mines and surprise explosive devices, and enemy indicators for such devices.

4. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

- a. Orders to subordinate and attached units.

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- (1) 2nd Battalion 5th Marines with detachments conduct normal combat intelligence within assigned area.
- (2) Company B, 1st Engineers be prepared to provide information on types of surprise explosive devices and mines encountered in the AO and complete standard reports on all explosive devices discovered.
- b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.
  - (1) CG, Task Force X-Ray:
    - (a) Provide aerial observation and surveillance as requested.
    - (b) Provide aerial imagery of objective area as requested.
    - (c) Provide information as obtained of enemy movements within, to and from the area of operations.
  - (2) 1st GIT; Provide detachment of GIT for attachment to 2nd Bn, 5th Marines.
- c. Detainees will be handled in accordance with DivO 3161.2Z. Detainees will be initially screened and classified in the field by ITT. After initial field interrogation, detainees, other than innocent civilians will be returned to Regimental POW collection point (1st MP Company, Phu Bai).
- d. Captured material will be evacuated to the S-2 5th Marines. Care will be taken to insure proper tagging of captured material.

e. ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

- a. The following sites of fortifications and enemy strong points were encountered in recent operations in the AO.

<u>ENEMY GRID</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
(1) YD917215	60MM Mortar and Small Arms Fire
(2) YD916215	Small Arms Fire
(3) YD923200	60MM Mortar and Small Arms Fire
(4) YD916216	Trenches & Bunkers, Plt size 60MM Mortar positions to rear
(5) YD890200	60MM Mortar and Small Arms Fire
(6) YD923204	Covered fighting hole
(7) YD957146	Squad Sized Position

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<u>ENEMY GRID (cont)</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION (cont)</u>
(8) YD960177	Automatic Weapons Fire
(9) YD958177	Small Arms Fire
(10) YD955155	60MM Mortar Site
(11) YD967172	Covered fighting hole
(12) YD968137	Covered fighting hole
(13) ZD000135 (VIC)	60MM Mortar and Automatic Weapons fire
(14) YD948191	82MM and 60MM Mortar and Automatic Weapons fire
(15) YD978166	Small Arms Fire
(16) YD947197	CO(+) Position, Small Arms, B-40 Rkt, and 60MM Mortar fire
(17) YD951187	Fortified Position, 60MM and 82MM Mortars, and Small Arms Fire.
(18) YD931182	Tunnel
(19) YD935195	Bunker
(20) YD943193	Fortified treeline
(21) YD956157 (VIC)	Fortified Graveyard and treeline Plt size.

b. The following mine and booby trap sites were recently encountered:

<u>MINE INCIDENTS GRID</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
(1) YD918217	2/M-26 Grenades with trip wire
(2) YD959177	2/Chicom Grenades with trip wire
(3) YD965141	Unidentified Device
(4) YD963171	Unidentified Device
(5) YD957183	Unidentified Device
(6) YD949188	Chicom Grenade with trip wire

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~~SECRET~~MINE INCIDENT GRIDS (cont)

	<u>DESCRIPTION (cont)</u>
(7) YD915216	M-26 Grenade with trip wire
(8) YD905229	Unidentified Device
(9) YD942195	Unidentified Device
(10) YD904227	Box Mine, pressure detonated



R. D. BOHN  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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1. EFFECTIVE. Above frequencies and call signs effective L-24 hours.

*R. D. Bohn*  
R. D. Bohn  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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Hq, 5th Marines  
 Task Force XRAY  
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam  
 181000H Apr 1968

Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 5-68 ( )

Time Zone: H

CG 1st MarDiv	2
CG TF XRAY	2
1st Bn, 5th Marines	2
2d Bn, 5th Marines	7
3d Bn, 5th Marines	2
Hq Co, 5th Marines	1
2d Bn, 11th Marines	4
CAG 3	2
1st Force Recon Co	1
1st Bn, 27th Marines	1
1st NVN Div Advisor	2
NVN Junk Fleet Advisor	1
1st FAG	1
5th Marines	22
CEO	(1)
S-2	(1)
S-3	(4)
S-4	(1)
FSCC	(1)
ALO	(1)
Command Chron	(1)
S&C Files	(12)
<hr/> Total	50

*R. D. Bohn*  
 R. D. Bohn  
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

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FM FIFTH MARINES  
 TO FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES  
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES  
 INF CG, TF XRAY  
 MAG THIRTY SIX  
 CAG THREE  
 HUE RIVER SECURITY GROUP  
 FIRST BN TWENTY SEVENTH MARINES  
 FIRST TK BN  
 FIRST AMTRAC BN

BT

S E C R E T

FRAG ORDER 28-68(BAXTER GARDEN)

## A. FIFTH MAR OPO 5-68(BAXTER GARDEN)

## TASK ORGANIZATION

FIFTH MARINES

FIRST BN(-) FIFTH MARINES  
 H&S CO(-) 1/5  
 CO B 1/5  
 CO M 3/5  
 SECOND BN(-) FIFTH MARINES  
 H&S CO(-) 2/5  
 CO E 2/5  
 CO H 2/5

## SITUATION:

## A. ENEMY: NO CHANGE.

## B. FRIENDLY:

- (1) ARVN FORCES COMPLETE MISSION AND WITHDRAW FROM SOA.
- (2) CO C 1/27 RELIEVES CO M 3/5 OF BALDEAGLE 211200 APR 68.
- (3) PF UNITS AND ELEMENTS OF CAG THREE PROVIDE BLOCKS SOUTH OF SOA.
- (4) ELEMENTS OF CO A FIRST TK BN(TANKS AND QMOS) AND OF CO B FIRST AMTRAC BN DIRECT SUPPORT. ALL TRK VEH WILL ASSEMBLE VIC 1/27 CP H MINUS FOUR HOURS AND MOVE BY ARVN CCL TO 2/5 CP TO ARRIVE NLT H MINUS TWO HOURS.
- (5) ELEMENTS OF RIVSEC FIVE TWENTY ONE OF COMHUE/RIVSECGRU BLOCKS ENEMY EGRESS NORTH OF SOA ON DAM TRUY THU.
- (6) ALL OTHER SUPPORT NO CHANGE.

## C. ATTACH-DETACH:

- (1) CO C AND CO D 1/27 CHOP FM SECOND BN FIFTH MAR TO FIRST BN TWENTY SEVENTH MAR 211000H APR 68.
- (2) CO B 1/5 CHOP FM SECOND BN FIFTH MAR TO FIRST BN FIFTH MAR 211000H APR 68.

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ENCLOSURE (4)  
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SECRET

(3) CO M 3/5 CHOP TO FIRST BN FIFTH MAR 211200H APR 68.

2. MISSION: ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR FIFTH MARINES ATTACKS SOUTHEAST TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, POSITIONS, AND MATERIAL IN SOA.

## 3. EXECUTION:

- A. CONCEPT: TWO BNS ATTACK SOUTHEAST IN SOA EMPLOYING INTERMEDIATE BLOCKS AND SWEEPS. FRIENDLY NAVAL UNITS BLOCK ENEMY EGRESS NORTH ON THUY THU BAY AND SOUTH ON CAU HAI BAY. ELEMENTS OF FIFTH MAR AND PF AND CAG UNITS BLOCK ENEMY EGRESS SOUTHWEST.
- B. FIRST BN(-) FIFTH MAR: ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR ATTACK SOUTHEAST IN ZA EMPLOYING INTERMEDIATE BLOCKS AND SWEEPS TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES.
- C. SECOND BN(-) FIFTH MAR: ON D-DAY AT H-HOUR ATTACK SOUTHEAST IN ZA EMPLOYING INTERMEDIATE BLOCKS AND SWEEPS TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES.
- D. THIRD BN(-) FIFTH MAR: NO CHANGE.
- E. 1/5 XRAY: NO CHANGE.
- F. 2/5 XRAY: NO CHANGE.
- G. COORD INST:

(1) D-DAY AND H-HOUR: 211400H APR 68.

(2) SOA: NE BDRY FM YD901241 ALONG SW SHORE DAM THUY THU TO ZD030110, SE BDRY FM ZD 030110 ALONG NW SHORE DAM CAU HAI TO YD971100. SW BDRY FM YD 971100 ALONG SW SHORE SONG DAI GIANG/IA/CAO NGUAN TO YD 853195. NW BDRY FM YD853195 ALONG ROAD TO YD901241.

(3) LOD: NW BDRY. IMA: SW BDRY.

(4) BASE LINES:

(A) TL MIL: FM YD898136 NE ON ROAD TO YD950195.

(B) TL CIGMANY: FM YD944146 ALONG STREAM AND TRAIL TO YD974170.

(C) TL BEACH: FM YD902130 NE ON TRAIL TO YD990140.

(5) FCIS: BDRY AND ILS.

(6) THROST POINTS NO CHANGE.

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ENCLOSURE (4)  
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(7) LZ ROBIN: YD867234

4. ADMIN-LOG: NO CHANGES

5. COMM-LOG:

A. SEE REF A.

B. FOLLOWING CHANGES APPLY TO ANNEX D OF REF A:

- (1) UNDER REGT TAC ONE ADD 1/5 XRAY (GUARD).
- (2) CHANGE REGT TAC TWO FREQ TO 44.75 (M-454) VICE 35.0 (M-734).
- (3) UNDER REGT TAC THREE ADD 1/5 (GUARD).
- (4) DELETE REF TO 1/27 UNITS, ARVN INC, AND ARVN ~~2nd~~.
- (5) UNDER FSCORD ADD (S) 50.00 (M-666).
- (6) ADD 4.2 MORT BTRY CPT (VOICE CALL RUMFAGE WHISKEY) AND 105MM PROV BTRY (VOICE CALL RAZOR BILL) FREQ 60.65 (M792).
- (7) ADD NAVY PGM (VOICE CALL PISTOL BILL) (1) 37.5 (M-179).

C. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS NO CHANGES.

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

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ENCLOSURE (4)


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LE ROBIN



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SECRET

FM: FIFTH MARINES  
 TO: FIRST BN FIFTH MARINES  
 SECOND BN FIFTH MARINES

INF: CG TF XRAY  
 THIRD BN FIFTH MARINES  
 SECOND BN ELEVENTH MARINES  
 FIRST BN TWENTY SEVENTH MARINES

HT  
 S E C R E T

## FRAG ORDER 30-68 (BAXTER GARDEN)

## A. FIFTH MAR OPO 5-68 (BAXTER GARDEN)

## 1. SITUATION:

- A. ENEMY: INDICATIONS THAT ENFOR HAVE REOC VILS CLEARED BY SWEEP SE IN AO BY FIFTH MARINES.
- B. FRIENDLY: SPECIAL FIREFLY WILL BE OPERATING OVER AO. OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES NO CHANGE.

## 2. MISSION: NO CHANGE

## 3. EXECUTION:

- A. CONCEPT: TWO BNS CONT ATTACK SE TO PL PEACH AND HOLD AT THAT POSIT. ON ORDER WHEEL AND CONDUCT NIGHT MOVE TO NW TO REACH PL APPLE ASAP. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT DAY ATTACK NW FROM THAT POSIT TO STREAM WINDING ALONG AXIS OF GL YD83.
- B. FIRST BN (-) FIFTH MAR: CONT ATTACK IN ZA TO PL PEACH, HOLD AT THAT POSIT. ON ORDER WHEEL AND CONDUCT NIGHT MOVE IN ZA NW TO PL APPLE.
- C. SECOND BN (-) FIFTH MAR: CONT ATTACK IN ZA TO PL PEACH, HOLD AT THAT POSIT. ON ORDER WHEEL AND CONDUCT NIGHT MOVE IN ZA NW TO PL APPLE.

## D. COORD INST:

- (1) INCREASE RATE OF MOVE TO REACH PL PEACH BEFORE DARK.
- (2) EST TIME OF NIGHT MOVE NW TO COMMENCE 240100H APR. BNS MAKE RECON TO THIS HQ NLT 232100H APR AS TO ACTUAL TIME TO COMMENCE NIGHT MOVE.
- (3) NO CHANGE TO BOUNDARIES OR ZA'S TO PL PEACH AND ON RETURN NIGHT MOVE TO PL APPLE. BOUNDARIES AND ZA'S TO STREAM ON GL YD83 TBA.
- (4) PLAN OPNS TO REACH PL APPLE AS CLOSE TO FIRST LIGHT OF 24 APR AS POSSIBLE.
- (5) SECURE ILLUM PLANS WITH ADJ BNS.