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HEADQUARTERS
Task Force XRay
1st Marine Division (Rein), FIF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

SUGGESTION

3/DKP/rhb

5750

26 Jun 1968

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Fifth Marines Command Chronology, 1-31 May 1968.

Ref: (a) NCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓ (1) Fifth Marines Command Chronology, 1-31 May 1968.

1. In accordance with references (a), (b) and (c) enclosure (1) is forwarded.

George D. Webster
GEORGE D. WEBSTER

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MRD CHRON

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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES

1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

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3/MPD/jrb
5750
23 June 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Via: Commanding General, Task Force XRAY
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 May 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A w/ch 1
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B w/ch

Encl: ✓(1) Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓(2) Headquarters Co, Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓(3) First Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓(4) Second Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology
✓(5) Third Battalion Fifth Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b) and (c), enclosures (1) through (5) are submitted as the Command Chronology for the Fifth Marine Regiment for the period 1-31 May 1968.

Paul G. Graham
PAUL G. GRAHAM

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5750
23 June 1968

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
1st Marine Division (Rein), Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 May to 31 May 1968

INDEX

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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5750
23 June 1968PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation

5th Marine Regiment

Colonel P. G. GRAHAM

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company, 5th Marines

1stLt W. J. ARANT

(1-28 May 1968)

1stLt B. T. POLENTZ

(29-31 May 1968)

1st Battalion

LtCol R. H. THOMPSON

2nd Battalion

LtCol E. C. CHEATHAM JR.

3rd Battalion

LtCol D. N. REXROAD

ATTACHED UNITS

None

2. Location

Thua Thien Province, Phu Bai, RVN Regimental C.P.

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

LtCol G. C. McNAUGHTON

S-1

Capt B. J. MULHERIN

S-2

Capt P. A. DUFFY

S-3

Maj J. F. CODY

S-4

Maj S. K. MCKEE

S-5

1stLt G. E. OWSLEY

(1-14 May 1968)

CommO

1stLt D. L. NEWMAN

MTO

(15-31 May 1968)

SupplyO

Maj E. R. PIERCE

Regimental Chaplain

1stLt D. G. WILKIE

Regimental Surgeon

1stLt R. L. CAREY

Regimental Sergeant Major

LTCdr R. F. BECK CHC, USN

Regimental Dental Officer

Lt R. L. HARRISON MC, USN

(1-28 May 1968)

Lt J. F. BROCK ML, USN

SgtMaj K. CHASE

Lt D. GUESS DC, USN

(1-15 May 1968)

4. Average Monthly Strength

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>ENL</u>
113		3406

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>ENL</u>
11		158

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23 June 1968PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-31 May 1968, the Fifth Marines continued Operation Houston (Phase II) throughout the regimental area of operation. Emphasis was placed on protecting Key bridges and installations along Highway one from enemy interdiction and denying enemy access to rice growing and storage areas.

An increase in enemy mining activity in the highly vulnerable Hai Van Pass area was encountered during the first week of May. The use of night-time, saturation fire team size ambushes in the vicinity of the many culverts and daylight squad size combat patrols into the high ground proved successful in frustrating these mining efforts during the last three weeks of the month.

The chop of the 3rd Battalion to the 7th Marines on 17 May limited the regiment's capability to conduct deep penetrations into the canopied high ground. Maximum use was made of supporting arms to attack these targets. In addition, quick reaction, short duration, company size spoiling attacks in the edge of the canopy were utilized to keep the enemy off balance.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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5750
23 June 1968PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Personnel and Administration.

- a. The command received an input of 7 officers and 280 enlisted personnel during the month of May 1968.
- b. A total of 2 officers and 149 enlisted personnel were medically evacuated out of RVN during the month.
- c. The average chargeable strength for the Regiment was 111 Marine officer , 3260 Marine enlisted, 10 Naval officer and 150 Naval enlisted personnel.

CASUALTIES FOR THE MONTH OF MAY

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIAE</u>	<u>WEAN</u>	<u>NBCM</u>	<u>NBCNE</u>	<u>NBCK</u>
35	110	44	16	19	2

MED-EVACS FROM RVN

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>ENL</u>
2		147	0		2

2. Intelligence

- a. General. During the month of May, the S-2 section continued collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information in support of Operation Houston. The volume and pertinency of information received increased as the number of returnees and prisoners in and adjacent to the Regimental Area of Operation exceeded recent totals.

(1) Liaison with intelligence gathering agencies of GVN was re-established and intensified, specifically with Provincial agencies that had been previously directing their efforts towards infrastructure intelligence in the immediate vicinity of Hue City. The techniques employed by these agencies produced valuable information concerning the efforts of the enemy in procuring foodstuffs and other material from villagers within the Area of Operation and yielded successful tactical response.

(2) Continued close liaison with the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company permitted maximum surveillance of areas of likely enemy movement.

- b. Cumulative enemy losses during the reporting period.

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ENCLOSURE (1)
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- (1) 93 NVA/41 VC KIA
- (2) 27 DETAINEES
 - (a) NVA PW 9
 - (b) VC PW 0
 - (c) NVA RETURNEE 0
 - (d) VC RETURNEE 5
 - (e) CIVILIAN DEFENDANTS 1
 - (f) INNOCENT CIVILIANS 12
- (3) WEAPONS CAPTURED
 - (a) INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS 62
 - (b) CREW SERVED WEAPONS 6

(4) CAG Units in the 5th Marines AO received 7 HOI CHANH during the reporting period.

c. Significant Aspects of Enemy, Weather and Terrain.

(1) Enemy

(a) The pattern of enemy movement in the AO during May was again primarily dictated by logistic considerations. The normal traffic adhered to a north-south axis between the populous and rice producing northern coastal lowlands and the southern mountainous base areas. Interrogation of Hoi Chanh and PW's revealed that the enemy exercised great tactical caution during these moves making every effort to prevent the main body from making contact. The use of advance reconnaissance teams was characteristic of all enemy movement.

(b) The quality of troop encountered was generally below standard. Prisoners and Hoi Chanh were, for the greater part, young and poorly trained conscriptees. Although this is not considered to indicate that the whole of the enemy force within the AO is at a minimal state of combat efficiency, it does indicate that the enemy has further training and organizing to accomplish before he can hope to mount a successful major offensive.

(c) The enemy employed diversionary actions, such as mortar

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23 June 1968

attacks, emplacement of mines and booby traps, and contacts by small units in attempts to draw attention away from rice resupply routes.

(d) The determination of the enemy to retain control over his mountainous base areas was apparent in the aggressive reaction he employed against all friendly presence in areas considered his domain. Marine Reconnaissance patrols were forced to extract under intensive enemy pressure 7 times during May. This information provided excellent targets for application of artillery and air delivered firepower.

(e) Indicators of enemy morale varied from poor and homesick to high and motivated. The most frequently reported reasons for deterioration of morale were lack of food, hardship, homesickness and fear of death.

(f) Intelligence information provided targets for 4 company size fast reaction operations during the month, resulting in the destruction of rocket sites, caches, ~~harbor sites~~ and enemy forces.

(2) Weather. Throughout the month, the weather was clear to partly cloudy with occasional afternoon thunder showers. The predominance of good weather enhanced the capability of support provided by the 1st Marine Air Wing.

(3) Terrain. Continuing compilation of terrain intelligence by the operating forces contributed to the store of information that could be readily provided to the unit commanders. Helicopter Landing Zones, trails, fortifications, enemy routes of movement and any unusual features were recorded.

d. Miscellaneous.

(1) An increasing amount of ordnance was turned over to friendly units by indigenous people.

(2) Previously received reports concerning the existence of 22d Regiment and its subordinate units being within the AO were verified during the month as contact was made with units under its control. Interrogation and agent reports further substantiated this revision of enemy forces.

3. Training.

a. During the period 1-31 May 1968, the following schools were attended by personnel of this Command.

(1)	Officers Ldrshp school	6
(2)	Staff NCO school	6
(3)	NCO school	16
(4)	Viet Lang school (Okinawa)	4
(5)	Viet Lang school (III MAF)	4
(6)	Embark school (Okinawa)	3
(7)	Embark school (III MAF)	4
(8)	Registered Publication school	1

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(9)	PSYOP Orientation school	1
(10)	Div Scout Sniper school	16
(11)	Basic Organic Supply Accounting	1
(12)	Basic Ammon Tech school	1
	TOTAL	62

B. The Regiment continued its indoctrination training for all newly assigned personnel.

4. Operations. During the month of May all operational activities of the Fifth Marines were included in operation Houston (Phase II). See Part IV Combat After Action Report for Operation Houston II.

5. Fire Support. Artillery, Air and Naval Gunfire support was as indicated in Part IV, Combat After Action Report for Houston II.

6. Logistics. Operation HOUSTON continued through the month with no changes to logistic procedures.

A. The arrival of "B" Company, 9th Engineers in direct support of Task Force X-Ray saw the initiation of many delayed projects. A concrete apron $2\frac{1}{2}'$ wide was laid around mess hall #1 and work was begun on establishing proper drainage for the area. "B" Company, 9th Engineers also delivered and supervised construction of culvert-type bunkers for personnel. In addition "B" Company, 1st Engineers constructed five strong back tent decks and two SEA Huts.

B. "B" Company, 1st Engineers commenced laying M-16 mines at bridge #4, and requested that the entire job be named "Project Porcupine". Construction of defensive positions around all bridges continued.

C. Phu Loc Combat Base was closed out with usable materials being retrograded for use elsewhere as time allowed. All bunkers, trenches and holes were bulldozed flat. The engineer water point was moved initially to Cao Doi LSA and then to Thua Luu Bridge.

D. Upgrading of Route #1 continued. The tactical span at Bridge #2 was extracted and a timber trestle is almost completed.

E. Butler Buildings were made available to Headquarters Company Supply and 2nd Battalion Supply. These facilities immediately allowed improvement of supply functions-particularly management.

F. M151A1 vehicles were issued to the entire Regiment, replacing the M422A1s which were then deadlined administratively pending turn-in.

G. Third Battalion displaced operational elements by convoy to the Da Nang TAOR. Their Rear remains in Phu Bai.

H. Resupply for a two company and command group operation on a razor back west of Hai Van Pass was run by air drop from CH-34. This was the only means of resupply because of altitude, no LZ, enemy fire and the

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emergency nature of the situation. When an LZ was cleared some med-evacs were brought out by an Army HUEY, some by USMC CH-46 and the largest number by USAF "jolly green giants". One CH-46 crashed in the zone and was destroyed.

I. The 4 one-man chain saws on temporary loan from 1st Engineer Battalion were returned to the owner as directed.

7. Communications. During the month of May 1968 the Regimental Command Post operated at Phu Bai. The following significant events occurred as concerns communications.

A. 9-13 May an automatic retransmission circuit was established at Phu Gia (AT834999) to the 2nd Battalion when operating in the vicinity south of ridge line (AT860906) to (AT8696908).

B. 18 May relocated the AN/MRC-62 radio relay circuit from Hai Van Pass (AT945920) to Phu Gia (AT834999).

C. 20 May furnished a AN/TRC-27 radio relay channel to 1st Field Artillery Group for teletype Communications to 2nd Battalion, 11 th Marines.

D. 26 May installed a public address system throughout the 5th Marines complex at Phu Bai in order to pass alert warnings to all elements.

8. Medical. During the month of May a total of 247 patients were treated at the Regimental Aid Station of which 200 were referrals from battalions or other units located at Phu Bai. A total of 845 inoculations were administered during the month. On 29 May, Lt James P. Brock, Jr. MC, USNR relieved Lt Ronald A. Harrison, MC, USNR as Regimental Surgeon 5th Marines.

9. Dental. In order that optimum use be made of all dental officers in the Phu Bai area, the Regimental dental officer was withdrawn from the 5th Marines and returned to the 1st Dental Company on 15 May 1968. Dental coverage for all Marine units in the Phu Bai area is now being handled in a satisfactory manner by the 1st Dental Company.

10. Civil Affairs.

A. During May a follow - up medcap/dentcap was conducted at the Vinh Loc District Headquarters with great success. 50 persons were treated by the dentist and his assistant and 200 persons were treated by the doctor and corpsmen present. The villagers were entertained by a Vietnamese Cult Drama Team flown in from Hue. 150 bars of soap were also distributed during the medcap.

B. 200 bars of soap and 500 packets of Kool-Aid were delivered to the orphanage near CAP 3-2-6. Also 610 lbs. of food was delivered to the orphanage in Phu Luong. A truckload of sand, one of gravel, plus 40 pieces of roofing tin were delivered to the widow of a PF squad leader who received the U.S. Silver Star award.

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8. Transportation was provided and arrangements made for a Vietnamese boy from Phu Loc to have an operation at 1st Med Bn, Phu Bai to correct a hairlip. Transportation was also provided for 12 pallets of cement from Hue to Phu Loc District Headquarters by the 5th Marines.

11. Psychological Operation.

A. During the month of May extensive aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops were used in conjunction with the rice harvest in the 5th Marines AO. In addition the ground broadcast team was used frequently to assist in the rice harvest program.

B. PsyOps material used was 1500 leaflets hand distributed plus 300 Chieu Hoi balls, 2872 Chieu Hoi pens and 7800 Tu Do newspapers. The Chieu Hoi pens were delivered to the schools of Phu Loc District by the District Chief. The newspapers were delivered to the CMR units for distribution in their immediate vicinity.

12. Chaplain. During the month of May, the Regimental Chaplain continued to provide services for the Regiment units participating in Operation Houston, combined action platoons and bridge security units located along Highway 1.

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PART IV
Supporting Documents

1. Combat After Action Report for Operation Houston II.

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ENCLOSURE (1)
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HEADQUARTERS, 5TH MARINES
 1st Marine Division (Rein) Fleet Marine Force
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California 96602

3/MED/jrb
 3000
 14 June 1968

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Task Force XRAY
 Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation HOUSTON II

Ref: (a) 1stMar DivO 3480.1A
 (b) 5th Marines Opo 4-68
 (c) 5th Marines FragO 32-68
 (d) 5th Marines FragO 33-68
 (e) 5th Marines FragO 34-68
 (f) 5th Marines FragO 35-68
 (g) 5th Marines FragO 36-68
 (h) 5th Marines FragO 37-68
 (i) 5th Marines FragO 38-68
 (j) 5th Marines FragO 39-68
 (k) 5th Marines FragO 40-68
 (l) 5th Marines FragO 41-68
 (m) 5th Marines FragO 42-68
 (n) 5th Marines FragO 43-68
 (o) 5th Marines FragO 44-68
 (p) 5th Marines FragO 45-68

Encl: -(1) First Battalion, Fifth Marines After Action Report } Filed
 -(2) Second Battalion, Fifth Marines After Action Report } Sep
 -(3) Third Battalion, Fifth Marines After Action Report }

1. Code Name. Operation HOUSTON (Phase II).

2. Dates of Operation. 010001H May 1968 to 312400H May 1968.

3. Location of Operation. Phu Loc, Vinh Loc, Phu Thu, and Huong Thuy Districts, Thua Thien Province, Republic of Vietnam.

4. Command Headquarters.

Fifth Marine Regiment

COL P. G. GRAHAM

5. Task Organization

Fifth Marines

COL P. G. GRAHAM

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1st Bn 5th Marines (010001H to 312400H May 1968)
LTCOL R. H. THOMPSON
H&S Co, 1st Bn 5th Marines
Co A, 1st Bn 5th Marines
Co B, 1st Bn 5th Marines
Co C, 1st Bn 5th Marines
Co D, 1st Bn 5th Marines

2nd Bn 5th Marines (010001H to 312400H May 1968)
ITCOL R. C. CHEATHAM JR.
H&S Co, 2nd Bn 5th Marines
Co E, 2nd Bn 5th Marines
Co F, 2nd Bn 5th Marines
Co G, 2nd Bn 5th Marines
Co H, 2nd Bn 5th Marines

3rd Bn 5th Marines (010001H to 171330H May 1968)
H&S Co, 3rd Bn 5th Marines
Co I, 3rd Bn 5th Marines
Co K, 3rd Bn 5th Marines
Co L, 3rd Bn 5th Marines
Co M, 3rd Bn 5th Marines

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery.

(1) During the period 1-31 May 1968, the 2nd Bn 11th Marines (-) (Rein) supported the 5th Marine Regiment. On 17 May 1968, Foxtrot Battery, 2nd Bn 11th Marines was chopped to the First Marine Division and was replaced by Bravo Battery, 1st Bn 11th Marines. This replacement resulted in the loss of 2 105mm (How) as Bravo Battery only had four tubes available. In addition, mortar battery, 2nd Bn 13th Marines was chopped to the First Marine Division on 17 May 1968 with no replacement.

(2) The following is a recapitulation of artillery fire support provided the Fifth Marines for Operation HOUSTON (Phase II):

MISSIONS FIRED

<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOBS</u>	<u>H&I</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
606	274	4857	5737

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
105mm How	21424
155mm How	3414
4.2" Mtr	1424
TOTAL	<u>26262</u>

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(3) Artillery fires were timely and effective with no fire support coordination problems encountered.

b. Naval Gunfire.

(1) The USS PICKING (DD-685) supported 5th Marines units from 070630H to 100600H May 1968 and the USS KRETCHMER (DER 329) supported 5th Marines units from 230630H to 241055H and from 250910H to 251135H May 1968.

(2) The following is a recapitulation of Naval Gunfire support provided the Fifth Marines for Operation HOUSTON (Phase II):

MISSIONS FIRED

<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOBS</u>	<u>H&I</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
18	1	58	77

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>AP</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
5"38	438	6			444
3"50	278	—	26	78	382
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>716</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>826</u>

(3) Naval Gunfire was both timely and effective. The targets consisted of bunker positions, caves, enemy troop movement and suspected enemy assembly areas. Six bunkers were destroyed, 4 caves were damaged and 1 secondary explosion was observed.

c. Air Support.

(1) General.

(a) During the month of May 1968 MAG 36 furnished the 5th Marines two UH-34 command and control-direct support aircraft on a daily basis. These aircraft completed 190 support missions lifting a total of 2035 troops and 35.9 tons of cargo as follows:

- (1) 98 Administrative missions lifting 945 troops.
- (2) 7 Tactical missions lifting 900 troops.
- (3) 25 Visual reconnaissance missions lifting 140 troops.
- (4) 18 Unit commander missions lifting 50 troops.
- (5) 42 Logistic missions lifting 35.9 tons of cargo.

(b) During this period approximately 178 fixed wing close air support sorties, 364 Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) controlled sorties and 22 helicopter gunship sorties were provided in support of operations within the 5th Marines area of operations, expending approximately 1268 tons of aviation ordnance against the enemy. 115 AO/TAC(A) sorties provided an average of 5.14 hours of visual reconnaissance per day while 21 flarestrip sorties provided an average of 1.4 hours of illumination per night.

(c) 104 medevac missions extracted 27 KIA's, 148 WIA's and 34 NBCEVAC casualties.

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(2) Quick Reaction Package. The 5th Marines executed 1 Sparrow Hawk (Platoon) and 3 Bald Eagle (Company) quick reaction operations. 490 combat troops were inserted and extracted as follows:

a. 3 May - 1st Plat, C Co, 1/5 (55 troops) inserted/extracted by CH46 transport/UH1E gunships at ZD014188 to provide security for a disabled USA 1U1D A/C.

b. 9 May - A Co, 1/5 (135 troops) inserted/extracted by CH46 transport/UH1E gunships at ZC085965 to relieve and extract Recon Team Veal Stew.

c. 16 May - B Co, 1/5 (150 troops) inserted/extracted by UH34 at YD898186 to provide security for CG TFXRAY on a visit to the field.

d. 23 May - D Co, 1/5 (140 troops) inserted/extracted by CH46 transport/UH1E gunships at ZC134969 to relieve and extract Recon Team Veal Stew.

(3) Special Operations. The month of May was characterized by air lifted/air supported spoiling attacks aimed at interdicting enemy capabilities within the 5th Marines AO.

a. 8 May - A Co, 1/5 (Rein) executed a helicopterborne assault against suspected enemy rocket storage and launching positions vic YD834065. The landing in the designated LZ was proceeded by a feint into a false LZ. Both LZ's were subjected to extensive fixed wing strikes prior to the troop insertion by MAG 36 CH46 transports/UH1E gunships.

b. Extensive air support was provided M Co, 3/5; E Co, 2/5; and the Bn Command Group of 2/5 between 8 and 16 May in operations vicinity AT875905. This site (at 3000' elevation) was located in a ravine surrounded by precipitous terrain and covered by dense jungle canopy reaching up to 140 feet. The slope was inclined as much as 60-70°; no LZ was available in this steep, remote area. On 9 May, MAG 36 medevac helicopters attempted a hovering extraction of M Co's casualties but were forced to discontinue the mission due to heavy enemy fire. At 1300H 9 May the 2/5 command group plus E Co (Rein), 2/5 were helilifted into AT838962 to effect link up with M Co by foot movement. Meanwhile CH46's attempted to air drop 1000 pounds of supplies to M Co. These supplies fell outside the friendly perimeter. At first light on 10 May another medevac was attempted but intense enemy fire drove the helicopters from the area. During this day 2 UH34 A/C free dropped 4800 pounds of cargo (ammo, food, med supplies, and C4 to blow an LZ) to M Co. Approximately half of the drops were retrieved and M Co stockpiled 48 hours of supplies. Weather prevented further medevac attempts on 10 May. On the morning of 11 May MAG 36 CH46's again attempted hovering medevacs under heavy air support but were forced from the zone with 1 pilot and 1 crew WIA. During the day UH34 A/C dropped 2200 pounds (C4 and med supplies) half was retrieved plus 6 packages from the 10 May drop. At 1300H 11 May the Bn Command Group 2/5 and E Co, 2/5 effected link up with M Co. At 1900H 11 May CH-46 A/C attempted another hovering medevac. Both A/C were hit and forced to withdraw with 1 crew WIA. One A/C made an emergency landing at Danang and the second was forced down at AT872992. On the morning of 12 May limited drops of C4 continued while the LZ was being enlarged. At 1500H, 12 May the LZ was considered large enough to receive helicopters.

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At 1600H a combined medevac/fixed wing package arrived on scene. The fixed wing support was discontinued after the first rocket impacted among friendly troops concealed in the jungle. At 1700H USA UH1H A/C were able to land in the LZ and extract 4 critical WIA. At 1705H 1 CH46 landed and embarked 12 WIA; on takeoff the A/C struck trees and crashed with only minor injury to the crew or embarked WIA's. At 1830H 2 USAF CH 53 (Jolly Green Giants) began evac of WIA's; all WIA's were evacuated except walking wounded. At 0730H 13 May CH 46 A/C medevaced all KIA and remaining WIA. Helicopter resupply was effected without event. On 14 and 15 May the combined force continued the attack to the south east. On 16 May the combined force was extracted by helicopter from AT910850.

(c) 28 May - D Co (Rein), 1/5 executed a helicopterborne assault against suspected enemy harboring sites vic YD979040. The landing in the designated LZ was preceded by a feint into a false LZ. Both LZ's were subjected to extensive fixed wing strikes prior to the troop insertion by MAG 36 CH 46 transports/UH1E gunships.

7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of enemy strength, location, disposition and situation prior to operations.

Enemy Order of Battle information maintained at the conclusion of Operation HOUSTON (Phase I):

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST. STRENGTH</u>
C118 Co	LF	Vic ZD0814	100
K4C Bn	NVA	YC9596	350
804 Bn	MF	YD9715	450
802 Bn	NVA	YD8600	500
K10 Bn	LF	YD8503	400

This OOB information was that actually developed during Operation HOUSTON (Phase I), through contact, interrogation of detainees, translation of captured documents and various agent reports. Other units subordinate to the 4th Regiment and the newly reported 22d Regiment were considered to be operating within the AO but no timely intelligence existed concerning these units at the commencement of Operation HOUSTON (Phase II).

It was considered that the enemy, during Operation HOUSTON (Phase II) would continue his refurbishing activities and probably near completion of these logistical and training necessities. Thus, it was anticipated that the enemy would retain the majority of his forces within his mountain base areas and conduct only limited forays into the low ground, primarily dictated by his continuing efforts to obtain rice and other foodstuffs. The possibility of limited harassing activities was also anticipated. Courses of enemy action expected included protection of rice resupply routes, preparation to reinforce any major offensive initiated; the conduct of limited unconventional warfare, to include probes and ambushes, interdiction of Route 1, and the use of mines and booby traps throughout the area of Operation.

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b. Enemy strength, location, disposition and situation actually found.

(1) The receipt of intelligence developed through contact, interrogation of detainees, translation of captured documents and various agent reports indicated that the following units were operating within the Area of Operation:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>EST. STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
F116 Co	LF	75	YD8323
C117 Co	LF	100	YD8425
C118 Co	LF	64	ZD0713
K4 Bn	NVA	250	YD9122
K5 Bn	MF	400	AT8993
K4B Bn	MF	275	ZC1096
K4C Bn	MF	260	YC9298
802 Bn	NVA	500	YD8420
804 Bn	MF	450	YD8501
810 Bn	MF	260	YD8400
K15 Bn	NVA	375	Troui Mtn

(2) The locations listed above indicate a dispersion of enemy strength in 2 main areas, the mountainous base areas and the populous coastal lowlands in Phu Thu and Vinh Loc districts.

(3) The primary pattern of enemy movement was traffic on a north-south axis between these 2 areas, and generally seemed motivated by logistical requirements. Interrogation of Hoi Chanh and PW's revealed that the enemy exercised great tactical caution during these moves making every effort to avoid contact. The use of advance reconnaissance teams was characteristic of all enemy movement.

(4) The quality of troop encountered was generally below standard. Prisoners and Hoi Chanh were, for the greater part, young and poorly trained conscriptees. Although this is not considered to indicate that the whole of the enemy force within the Area of Operation is at a minimal state of combat efficiency, it does indicate that the enemy has further training and organizing to accomplish before he can hope to mount a successful major offensive.

(5) Reports of the intention of the enemy to launch large scale attacks against Hue City and to interdict Route 1 from Hai Van to Phu Bai continued to be received. No sound information could be elicited concerning the planned date or period the enemy anticipates initiating this offensive, but it is safe to assume that it remains a projected goal of the enemy. Specific targets recurrent in information concerning this offensive are the Lang Co Bridge (AT8895), Phu Loc District Headquarters (ZD0900), and the Troui River Bridge (YD9606).

(6) Indicators of enemy morale varied from poor and homesick to high and motivated. Variance was apparent in both NVA and VC statements and although the majority of reports indicate low morale, it is not con-

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sidered to be dominant enough to be of major importance. The most frequently reported reasons for deterioration of morale were lack of food, hardship, homesickness and fear of death.

c. Population attitudes. A general appearance of cooperation and friendliness was evident among those who lived in close proximity to areas of heavy friendly traffic. A contact on 29 May that resulted in the virtual destruction of a hamlet was met by an understanding attitude of the residents and a pronounced assignment of blame on the enemy. Areas further from constant friendly presence were more hostile and uncooperative. The existence of a functioning NLF infrastructure in these areas was reported by various agents.

d. Mine incidents. A total of 61 mine/booby traps were encountered during Operation HOUSTON (Phase II). Of these, 38 were detonated and 23 were destroyed in place or otherwise neutralized. Mine/booby trap employment by the enemy ranged from harassment and nuisance tactics in the coastal areas to employment as early warning and tactical delaying devices in the canopy area.

8. Mission. In the assigned AO: Keep the MSR open by protecting Route #1 and supporting bridges, culverts and passes. Support and protect friendly installations, units, convoys, and road repair parties. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy forces, materiel, and positions.

9. Concept of operations. Establish Bn AO's within the Regimental AO to affect equal distribution of tactical responsibility. Keep Route #1 open and protect key installations by physical security and small unit ambush/combat operations. Use maximum forces to conduct offensive operations in the Regimental AO to destroy threatening enemy forces and deny use of terrain for bases and cache sites.

10. Execution. a. General. In general, the major task of a regimental or divisional commander is to plan and direct the employment of his forces to accomplish the mission.

a. See enclosures (1) through (3). They were recorded on the attached maps and are located in the rear of this memorandum.

b. 1 May 1968. The beginning of the month, 1 May 1968.

(1) 011900H. Co I 3/5 FT Cmb Loc ZC202998 While moving to ambush site unit made contact with unknown number of enemy loc ZC202997. Enemy fired approximately 30-40 rds small arms and broke contact. Unit returned 150 rds s/a fire and had casualties medevaced. Result: 2 USMC WIAE.

(2) 011949H. Co I 3/5 FT Cmb Loc ZD201018 While moving to ambush site made contact with approximately 6 VC's. Enemy fired 50 rds s/a and threw 3 grenades. Unit returned 50 rds s/a, 2 rds M-79, 5 M-26 grenades and fired 3 rds of Arty illum. Conducted search of area. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(3) 012220H. Co C 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD912094 Received s/a fire from estimated 3 enemy. Returned s/a and M-79 fire. Enemy broke contact and fled south. Result: 2 USMC WIAE. Conducted search of area. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

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c. 2 May 1968

(1) 022050H. Co K 3/5 FT Amb Loc AT883955 Heard movement in brush to the front. Illumination fired and observed est 4 enemy in light colored uniforms with cartridge belts, packs and helmets. Fired approximately 250 rds s/a and 3 M-33 grenades killing 3 enemy. Additional enemy ret 40-50 rds s/a and attempted to envelope. Ambush pulled back to avoid envelopment and dispatched runner to get adjacent fire team for reinforcement. Units linked up and commenced movement to scene of contact. Heavy movement was heard and illumination was fired. 1 Marine moved out of assigned position and was killed by friendly fire. Approximately 18-20 enemy observed moving north down stream bed (AT883955). Arty mission was called on contact area and egress routes. Search at first light revealed 1 AK-47 with 3 magazines and blood trails in brush and paddy areas. Debriefing of patrol by K Co Cmdr attributed 1 NVA KIA to M-33 hand grenades. All personnel were greatly impressed with the explosive power and fragmentation radius of grenade. Result: 1 USMC KIA, 4 NVA Confirmed and 1 AK-47 Captured.

(2) 022331H Co B 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD942069 Observed 2 NVA on north side of Route #1 and took under fire. An additional estimated 20 enemy opened fire with approximately 10-15 rds s/a from YD942069. Returned s/a and M-79 fire. Enemy broke contact and fled to the south. 81 and arty missions fired on egress routes. Searched area at first light. Results: 2 USMC KIA, 2 NVA Confirmed, and 1 CWSC.

d. 3 May 1968

(1) 031100H Co L 3/5 Sqd Amb Loc AT936917 Found 1 VC Confirmed with bullet hole in head. Body looks to be a month old. Result: 1 VC Confirmed.

(2) 031255H. Co E Sqd Amb Loc ZC123953 Observed 1 NVA walking into ambush site. Sqd fired 20 rounds mg fire and 20 rds s/a. Searched area and found 1 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 1 ChiCom grenade, 3 AK-47 magazines and assorted 782 gear. Result 1 NVA Confirmed.

(3) 031510H Co E 2/5 Sqd Amb Loc ZC115957 Had est 10-15 enemy walk into ambush site. Sqd opened fire with 200 rds s/a and fired artillery blocking fires. Enemy returned s/a and fled to the north. Conducted search of area. Results: 1 USMC KIA, 7 USMC WIA, 10 VC Confirmed, and 1 CSWC.

e. 4 May 1968

(1) 040630H Co B 1/5 Def Posit Loc YD937051 Thought they heard movement outside lines. Fired 6 rds 60mm illum and saw nothing. After illum ceased more movement was heard. Fired 10 rds 60mm and 7 rds 105mm illum with negative results. At approximately 040700H 5 enemy surrendered to CP. Results 5 DETAINEES AND 7 IVC.

(2) 041445H Co D 1/5 Co S&C Loc YD928022 Spotted 3 VC coming out of canopy. Fired 50 rounds s/a and searched area. Result: 1 VC KIA & 1 SKS captured.

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f. 5 May 1968

(1) 051145H Co B 1/5 Loc YD928072 Had farmer turn in 1 SKS rifle which he found near his home. Unit paid farmer 1000 piastas as reward. Results: 1 SKS Captured.

(2) 052045H Co F 2/5 Plat Cmb Ptl Loc ZD168006 Observed 20-25 enemy. Attempted to establish hasty ambush but were observed. S/A rounds were exchanged, unit pursued with grenades and s/a. Arty was fired on egress routes of enemy. Result: 5 USMC NBCNE from friendly grenades.

(3) 052305H Co I 3/5 Perim Def Loc AT874998 Co I, 35th Eng Bn and Btry F 2/11 received incoming 82mm mortar fire simultaneously from enemy located AU860009 and AT815993. Co I received 4 rds and other units received approximately 75 rds along with some RR and s/a fire. Returned 30 81mm HE, 22 rds 105mm HE and 20 rds 4.2 Mtr HE. Enemy firing ceased. Result: 10 USMC WIAE

g. 6 May 1968

(1) 060430H Co E 2/5 Loc ZC078968 Received 12 rds 82mm and 12 rds B-40 rocket fire from enemy loc ZC076988. Returned counter Mtr fire. Searched at first light and apprehended 1 Vietnamese female who indicated knowledge of enemy positions. Result: 2 USMC WIAE, 1 DFT.

(2) 060525H Co H 2/5 Co Def Posit Loc ZC078986 Received 40 rds 82mm mortars. Returned counter mtr fire and searched area of suspected enemy positions. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(3) 062325H Co B 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD922116 Observed 12 enemy approaching from the north, fired 60 rds s/a, 6 grenades, 38 rds 105mm HE and 16 rds 105mm illum. Enemy broke contact while firing 10 rds s/a and throwing 4 grenades. Result: 6 USMC WIAE, 4 NVA Confirmed AND 2 IWC.

h. 7 May 1968

(1) 071145H Co A 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD757062 While searching village detonated chicom grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(2) 071955H Co C 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD976068 Observed 3 NVA while enroute to ambush site. Fired s/a and searched area. Result: 3 NVA Confirmed and 2 IWC.

(3) 072100H Co I 3/5 FT Cmb Loc ZD198009 While moving to LP Site encountered 7-8 enemy at ZD198007. Enemy fired s/a. S/A and M-79 rds were returned. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

i. 8 May 1968

(1) 081900H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT875895 Received approximately 100 rds small arms from estimated 4-5 enemy. Returned s/a and enemy withdrew to west. During search of area received additional s/a and grenades. Returned s/a and continued search. Result: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIAE, 1 USMC NBCNE and 3 NVA Confirmed.

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j. 9 May 1968

(1) 090015H Co I 3/5 Sqd Amb Loc AU825011 Apprehended 2 VN males moving in village after curfew. Result: 2 DETAINEE.

(2) 090500H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT869907 Received s/a and B-40 rds from estimated 2 companies of NVA in predawn attack. Returned fire with s/a, M-79, hand grenades and artillery. Result: 7 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIAE, 1 USMC NBC, 1 NBCNE and 4 VC KIA Confirmed.

(3) 091600H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT869907 Encountered an estimated platoon of enemy. Fired s/a and encountered heavy enemy resistance to the southeast. Maneuvered and secured high ground and fired arty blocking fires all around position. Result: 1 USMC KIA, 17 USMC WIAE, 1 USMC WIAME, 2 USN KIA, 2 USN WIAE and 5 NVA Confirmed.

(4) 091610H Co I 3/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZD205015 Detonated 1 grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device. Result: 2 USMC WIAE.

(5) 091800H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT869906 Had supplies air dropped southeast of position. A patrol was sent to retrieve supplies and encountered an estimated platoon of enemy. Engaged with s/a and arty, but were unable to retrieve supplies. Result: 6 USMC WIAE.

(6) 091900H Co I 3/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AU855007 Observed 1 enemy with pack. Sniper fired 3 rds s/a. Searched area and found 1 VN male with pack wounded. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(7) 092330H Co F 2/5 Plat Amb Loc ZC160996 Observed 3 enemy. Fired s/a and M-79 rds and then received s/a from estimated 15 enemy located ZC 163997. Returned s/a and 105mm mission. Result: 3 VC Confirmed and 2 IWC.

k. 10 May 1968

(1) 100300H Co C 1/5 Plat Bridge Sec Loc YD966064 Received 40 rds 82mm HE and 1500 rds s/a. Returned s/a and artillery. Searched area. Result: 1 USMC WIAE, 2 NVA Confirmed and 2 AK-47's Captured.

(2) 100800H Co M 3/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AT869907 Received s/a and automatic weapons fire from an estimated platoon (-) of enemy. Returned s/a and fired an artillery mission. Result 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIAE and 3 NVA Confirmed.

(3) 101025H Co F 2/5 Plat Cmb Loc ZC175996 Had 1 VN male turn himself in. Forwarded to 13th ITT. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(4) 101525H Co M 3/5 Co Def Posit Loc AT869907 Received s/a from enemy on high ground west of position. Returned fire and searched area. Result: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIAE and 1 NVA Confirmed.

l. 11 May 1968

(1) 110255H Co H 2/5 Plat Def Posit Loc ZC079998 Received 82mm fire. Returned counter battery fire. Result: 9 USMC WIAE and 12 USMC WIAME.

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(2) 111005H Co F 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZG171984 Detonated chicom type claymore mine. Result: 4 USMC WIAE.

(3) 111300H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT868908 While attempting medevac and resupply mission, helos received approximately 1000 rds s/a. Pilot and gunner of one helo were wounded. Result: 2 USMC WIAE.

(4) 111840H Co F 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZG153997 Apprehended 1 VN male with no ID card. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(5) 111940H Co M 3/5 Co S&C Loc AT968908 While attempting a medevac, two helos received s/a fire damaging 1 helo extensively. Helo was forced to land at 35th Engineers compound. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(6) 112147H Co F 2/5 Plat Def Posit Loc ZD118014. Marine threw hand grenade at suspected enemy movement wounding 1 Marine. Result: 1 USMC NBCNE.

m. 12 May 1968

(1) 120130H Co I 3/5 Plat Def Posit Loc ZD197010 Received 3 rds 60mm mortar fire from unknown enemy position. Result: 3 USMC WIAE.

(2) 121100H Co E 2/5 Plat Cmb Loc AT866905 While sweeping area received approximately 20 rounds of s/a fire. Returned s/a, M-79 and artillery fire on suspected enemy position. Enemy ceased firing and area was searched. Result: 1 USMC KIA.

(3) 121145H Co M 3/5 Plat Cmb Loc AT869907 While sweeping southeast received s/a fire from approximately 4 enemy. Returned s/a fire and searched area. Results: 5 USMC WIAE and 6 NVA Confirmed.

(4) 121550H Co E 2/5 Co S&C Loc AT869907 Medevaced 3 NBC casualties. Result: 2 USMC NBCE and 1 USMC NBCNE.

(5) 121610H Co E 2/5 Co S&C Loc AT868902 Received 1 air to ground rocket from friendly aircraft conducting air strike in area. Remaining fixed wing aircraft diverted. Result: 1 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIAE.

(6) 121645H CP 2/5 Loc AT869907 1 CH-46 with 12 medical evacuation cases and 5 crew members on board crashed on takeoff. No enemy fire was involved. All personnel on board rescued and all classified equipment and armament retrieved. Result: 3 USMC NBCE and 2 USMC NBCNE.

n. 13 May 1968

(1) 131110H Co F 2/5 Def Posit Loc ZD1510H While cleaning pistol, 1 Marine shot himself in right calf. Result: 1 USMC NBCE.

(2) 131200H Co E 2/5 Co S&C Loc AT872902 Found 2 graves containing 2 NVA KIA approximately 2 days old. Result: 2 NVA Confirmed.

(3) 131240H Co E 2/5 Co S&C Loc AT866905 Received small arms fire from estimated 3 enemy. Returned fire with s/a and M-79. Searched area and found blood trails. Result: 1 USMC KIA.

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(4) 131500H Co E 2/5 Co Cmb Opn Loc AT859907 Sustained 4 NBC casualties. Result: 2 NBC and 2 USMC NBCME.

(5) 131955H Co D 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD928024 Observed 4 enemy moving toward position. Fired small arms and enemy fled. Fired artillery mission on routes of egress. Searched Area. Result: 1 NVA Confirmed and 1 AK-47 captured.

(6) 132030H Co C 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD981073 Observed boat floating down river. Fired small arms and maneuvered on enemy beaching site. Result: 1 VC Confirmed and 1 VN WIA Civilian.

o. 14 May 1968

(1) 141115H Co H 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZC060968 1 Marine discharged his weapon wounding himself. Result: 1 USMC NBCME.

(2) 141120H Co H 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZD012028 Apprehended 1 VN male with 2 ID cards. Forwarded suspect to LSA POW compound. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(3) 141210H Co E 2/5 Co S&C Loc AT879893 Found 3 structures 8 ft by 10 ft. Searched area and found assorted ammo, 782 gear, blasting equipment and 2 individual weapons. Result: 2 IWC.

(4) 142345H Co L 3/5 Sqd Amb Loc AT960895 Apprehended 1 VN male for curfew violation. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(5) 142345H Co I 3/5 FT Cmb Loc ZD193007 Received s/a from approximately 30 enemy loc ZC190995 and 6 rds 60mm mortar fire from enemy loc ZC187994. Returned fire with s/a, M-79, LAW's and artillery. Enemy firing ceased. Result: 2 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIAE.

p. 15 May 1968

(1) 150925H Co F 2/5 Plat Cmb Loc ZC155992 Received 1 command detonated claymore mine and 2 rounds 82mm mortar from enemy loc ZC166965. Swept area with negative results. Result: 1 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIAE.

(2) 151300H Co K 3/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AT902947 Received sniper fire from 1 enemy. Returned fire and maneuvered to search area. During movement detonated a chain of M-16 mines linked together on trail. Result: 1 USMC KIA and 7 USMC WIAE.

(3) 151840H Co A 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD903093 Observed 28 enemy during movement to ambush site. Fired s/a and enemy returned s/a. Fired artillery missions on enemy positions and firing ceased. Gunships and flareships utilized. Result: 2 USMC KIA, 1 VC Confirmed and 1 IWC.

q. 16 May 1968

(1) 161700H Co M 3/5 Co Def Posit Loc AT885954 1 3.5 rocket launcher was discharged accidentally. Result: 1 USMC NBCME.

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(2) 162150H Co I 3/5 Sqd Cmb Loc NU817009 Received small arms fire from estimated 2 enemy. Returned small arms, 3 grenades and 1 LAW. Searched area under 81mm illumination with negative results. Result: 3 USMC WIAE.

r. 17 May 1968

(1) 171330H 3/5 Chopped to 7th Marines.

s. 18 May 1968

(1) 180010H Co C 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD977052 Heard movement and threw grenades. 1 Marine wounded by friendly fragments. Result: 1 USMC NBCE.

(2) 181854H Co E 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AT902952 Detonated unknown type AF mine rigged with trip wire. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

t. 19 May 1968: No significant contact.

u. 20 May 1968

(1) 200307H Co A 1/5 FT Amb Loc YD917167 Observed 6 enemy moving southeast. Fired s/a and enemy returned fire with s/a. Fired 60 and 81mm mortar fires and 105mm artillery. Searched area and found 1 VN male in fighting hole near scene of action with SKS rifle. Result: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIAE, 1 DETAINEE and 1 IWC.

(2) 201420H Co H 2/5 Sqd Sec Loc ZD197024 While in process of fam firing LAW malfunctioned. Marine tried to recock LAW, weapon fired inflicting wound to man's hand. Result: 1 USMC NBCE.

(3) 202205H Co A 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD900088 Observed approximately 25 enemy moving in wedge formation followed by a large column of enemy moving east at a fast run. Unit allowed point to pass then commenced firing on main body of enemy. Fired small arms, M-26, 105mm artillery and 81mm mortar. Result: 2 USMC WIAE and 3 VC KIA.

v. 21 May 1968

(1) 210215H Co D 1/5 Sqd Amb Loc YD975035 Initiated ambush on column of enemy. Fired s/a and claymore mines. Enemy returned s/a and broke contact. Searched area. Result: 1 USMC WIAE, 7 VC Confirmed, 6 NVA Confirmed, 7 IWC Captured and 1 CSWC.

(2) 210630H Co D 1/5 Plat Cmb Loc YD877038 Received s/a fire from 1 enemy. Returned s/a and searched area. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(3) 210730H Co D 1/5 Plat OP Loc YD939051 Observed 2 enemy moving along ridge line. Fired arty and observed enemy fall and remain motionless. Result: 2 VC Confirmed.

(4) 210630H Co A 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD908094 Found 1 fresh grave containing 1 VC KIA. Result: 1 VC Confirmed.

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w. 22 May 1968

(1) 220525H Co H 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZD197005 Received 1 incoming grenade. Returned small arms. Searched area. Result: 3 USMC WIAE.

(2) 221115H Co F 2/5 Co (-) S&C Loc ZD185055 Apprehended 1 female detainee. Result: 1 DETAINEE.

(3) 221430H Co F 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AU805049 Detonated release type explosive device of unknown type and size. Called and completed med-evacs. Result: 2 USMC KIA and 1 USMC WIAE.

(4) 222005H Co F 2/5 Plat Cmb Loc AU818046 Observed 6 enemy moving east at a range of approximately 50 meters. Engaged enemy with small arms. Searched area. Result: 3 USMC WIAE, 3 VC Confirmed, 1 US M-1 Garbino and 1 CSWC Captured.

x. 23 May 1968

(1) 232015H Co C 1/5 FT OP Loc YD988039 Heard movement in immediate vicinity. Fired small arms and 1 M-26 grenade. 2 Marines were wounded by friendly shrapnel. Result: 1 USMC NBCE and 1 USMC NBCNE.

y. 24 May 1968

(1) 242230H Co D 1/5 Plat Cmb Loc YD945046 Engaged unknown number of enemy moving down trail. Enemy initiated contact with small arms and chicom grenades. Returned fire with small arms and grenades. Artillery, 81mm mortar and Spooky flareships utilized. Search of area conducted. Results: 2 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIAE, 4 USMC WIAE, 10 NVA Confirmed, 4 IVC and 1 CSWC.

z. 25 May 1968

(1) 251910H Co F 2/5 Plat Def Posit Loc ZD153013 Observed 5 enemy carrying weapons moving into village loc ZD154017. Dispatched patrol to investigate. Established contact with enemy firing small arms and killing 1 enemy. Apprehended 4 VN males in immediate vicinity. Result: 1 VC KIA Confirmed and 4 DETAINNEES.

(2) 252000H Co H 2/5 Plat (-) Cmb Loc ZC190990 Encountered 5 enemy in meeting engagement. Enemy fired small arms and threw grenades. Returned small arms and enemy broke contact. Result: 1 VC Confirmed.

aa. 26 May 1968

(1) 260615H Co E 1/5 Plat Cmb Loc YD092988 While leaving ambush site received 15 to 20 rounds 60mm mortar fire from enemy loc YD093998. Fired arty mission on enemy position and searched area. During search 1 Marine pulled a length of comm wire detonating an AP mine. Result: 1 USMC WIAE.

(2) 261815H Co B 1/5 Plat Cmb Loc ZD005004 Received small arms fire from enemy located ZD010004. Fired small arms and searched area. Results: 1 USMC WIAE.

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bb. 27 May 1968: No significant contact.

cc. 28 May 1968

(1) 281410H Co H 2/5 Plat Working Party Loc ZD198010 1 Marine detonated a friendly bouncing betty type mine while clearing brush at above coord. Result: 2 NBCK and 3 NBCE.

dd. 29 May 1968

(1) 290615H Co C 1/5 Sqd Cmb Loc YD954052 Observed large group of enemy located YD945052. Fired arty mission and enemy broke contact. Gunships and AO requested. 2 tanks were dispatched with infantry unit in an attempt to close with enemy. Estimated NVA company encountered in Grid Square YD9506. Additional troops committed. Blocking force set up around enemy unit (center of mass YD961062). At 1500H Co's B and D commenced attack southeast against moderate to heavy resistance. Fixed wing and artillery used extensively throughout contact. Result: 4 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIAE, 47 NVA Confirmed, 9 POW, 27 IWC and 1 CSWC.

(2) 290700H Co G 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AT908950 While returning from ambush site was fired upon with 5 chicom type claymores. Result: 2 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIAE.

ee. 30 May 1968

(1) 301615H Co G 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc AT903947 Observed 4 enemy carrying demolition charges. Fired small arms and 1 LAW. Result: 1 VC Confirmed.

ff. 31 May 1968

(1) 311245H Co G 2/5 Plat Cmb Loc AT906944 Found 1 fresh grave containing 1 VC KIA. Grave approximately 3 days old. Result: 1 VC Confirmed.

(2) 311415H Co H 2/5 Sqd Cmb Loc ZD208000 Detonated a M-26 grenade rigged as a surprise explosive device. Result: 2 USMC WIAE.

11. Results.

a. These figures reflect cumulative figures for Operation HOUSTON Phase I and Phase II.

b. U. S. Marine Corps Personnel

KIA	81
WIAE	307
WIAE	118
NBCK	5
NBCE	49
NBCNE	24

c. U. S. Army Personnel

KIA	2
WIAE	23
WIAE	15

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d. U. S. Navy Personnel

KIA	2
WIAE	7
NBOE	1

e. Enemy Personnel

NVA CONFIRMED	188
VC CONFIRMED	165
NVA POW'S	10
VC POW'S	5
DETAINES	127
INNOCENT CIVILIANS	82
CIVILIAN DEFENDANTS	4
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS	
CAPTURED	109
CREW SERVED WEAPONS	
CAPTURED	11
VC RETURNEES	23

12. Administrative matters

a. Resupply. Three days supply of Class I, III and V was maintained at the Cao Doi LSA by FLSG "A". Resupply was accomplished primarily by road as improvement of Route 1 continued.

b. Maintenance. First and second echelon performed by units. Contact teams were furnished by FLSG "A" on request.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. Battalions maintained light BAS's in the field. Evacuation was to 3rd Medical Battalion, (Phu Bai), 1st Medical Battalion (Phu Bai) or to 1st Hospital Company (Da Nang) depending on weather, distance and patient load.

d. Transportation. C&C helicopters continued to be heavily used, but the trucks assigned by 1st Motor Transport Battalion became increasingly important as heavier loads were moved and the road improved.

e. Communications.

(1) Radio communications throughout Houston II were adequate. Once again AN/PRC-25 radio equipment proved to be highly reliable with minimum maintenance required. Antennas RC-292 were necessary and utilized throughout the area of Operations at regimental, battalion, and company levels.

(2) During the period 9-16 May, operations were conducted North and South of ridge line (AT860906) to (AT896908) by Companies M and E with the 2nd Battalion Command Group. In order to insure communications with these units automatic retransmission stations utilizing AN/ARC-110 equipment were established by Headquarters Company 5th Marines at Phu Gia (AT834000) and by Communications Company, 1st Marine Division at Da Nang (AT954745). Two stations were necessary in order to service units when North and South of the ridge line. The only difficulty encountered was mutual interference of frequencies with friendly units. As a result communications were disrupted while procuring other frequencies for utilization. On 13 May it was necessary to

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establish a double automatic retransmission circuit due to non-availability of a long range FM frequency from Phu Bai to Da Nang. This circuit was established from 5th Marines at Phu Bai (YD858131) through Phu Gia relay (AT-834000) through Da Nang relay (AT954745) to 2nd Battalion, South of ridge line. This circuit operated very satisfactorily in excess of 24 hours.

(3) Radio Relay operations were considered satisfactory. The inadequacy of a reliable generator for use with AN/FRT-27 equipment remains a critical problem. The AN/MRC-62 circuit servicing the 3rd Battalion at Hai Van Pass (AT944921) was re-established at Phu Gia (AT834000) to support 2nd Battalion.

(4) Frequency interference in the VHF range continues to be a problem throughout the area of operations. Assignment of "Sole User" frequencies is considered necessary for Regiment and Battalion Tactical Nets, and, TACP locals.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commanders Analysis

a. This operation was characterized by:

(1) Quick reaction, short duration, company size spoiling attacks against limited objectives designed to keep the enemy off balance.

(2) Deep penetration into the canopied high ground to destroy enemy forces, material and harbor sites.

(3) Ambushes and patrols interdicting known enemy rice transportation routes and growing and storage areas.

(4) Coordinated operations with ARVN/CAPS/NATIONAL POLICE to provide protection for friendly rice harvest and to encourage voluntary turn-in of rice to secure storage areas.

(5) Static defensive positions at key bridges and installations along route #1 complimented by aggressive small unit ambushes/combat patrols along likely avenues of approach.

b. The Quick Reaction. Company size spoiling attacks utilized helicopters for insertion and extraction in the western part of the AO but, due to a lack of adequate landing zones in close proximity to selected targets, night foot marches were used in the eastern portion of the AO. These attacks were pointed toward enemy mortar/rocket positions, assembly areas and ammo and food caches at the edge of the canopy. The Regiments capability to conduct deep penetrations against enemy harbor sites and lines of communication was greatly reduced on 17 May when the 3rd Battalion was chopped to the 7th Marines. Due to this lack of adequate forces maximum use was made of artillery, Naval Gunfire and air to attack these targets.

(6) Quick Reaction, short duration, company size spoiling attacks against limited objectives designed to keep the enemy off balance.

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c. Returnee and PW reports indicate that friendly combat patrols in the principle rice growing areas and saturation ambushes on known enemy rice routes were successful in thwarting the enemy's attempt to obtain and transport rice. The coordinated operations with ARVN/CAPS/ NATIONAL POLICE resulted in over 200 tons of rice being placed in secure storage areas.

d. Static positions at key bridges and installations were improved through the use of protective mine fields, additional clearance of fields of fire and the construction of new emplacements. In the highly vulnerable Hai Van Pass area a heavy saturation of fire team size ambushes along the road at night and squad size patrolling into the high ground during the day has proved effective in frustrating enemy attempts at damaging/destroying the road. Efforts continue to be made to have ARVN/PF/RF forces assume a greater responsibility for the protection of the bridges in order that more Marines can be freed for offensive operations. These efforts are meeting with limited success.

15. Recommendations: It is considered imperative that Battalion size operations be conducted against the enemy's known area of concentration before he finishes his present training and food gathering processes and initiates large scale attacks. It is therefore recommended that the 3rd Bn 5th Marines be returned to regimental control as soon as practicable.

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