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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/FMK/ro
5750
3 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) RegO 5750.1A

Encls: (1) ✓ 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology for the period of 8 May 1966 to 31 May 1966
(2) ✓ Chronological Sequence of Events/Situation Reports
(3) ✓ After Action Report for Operation Montgomery
(4) ✓ After Action Report for Operation Cheyenne
(5) ✓ After Action Report for Operation Cheyenne II

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosures (1) through (6) are submitted herewith.
2. This chronology includes all pertinent and significant information as defined in reference (a) and (b).

H. L. Coffman
H. L. COFFMAN

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FIRST BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1. The following organizational data is submitted.

a. Designator/Location. On 8 May 1966 BLT 1/5 moved from the USS Princeton to Chu Lai, Vietnam and was designated 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. At that time the Battalion was composed of Headquarters Company and four rifle companies.

b. Period Covered. 8 May 1966 to 31 May 1966.

c. Personnel Assignments/Attachments

(1) Commanding Officer	LtCol Harold L. COFFMAN
(2) Executive Officer	Maj Elmer H. HOLTHUS 8 May - 14 May 1966 Maj Bayard S. PICKETT 25 May - 31 May 1966
(3) S-1	1stLt James R. FURLEIGH 8 May - 25 May 1966 Capt Redding F. HICKS 25 May - 31 May 1966
(4) S-2	Capt George J. STREMLOW
(5) S-3	Maj Bayard S. PICKETT 8 May - 25 May 1966 Maj Francis RINEY 25 May - 31 May 1966
(6) S-4	Maj Francis RINEY 8 May - 25 May 1966 Capt Robert A. FREEMAN 25 May - 31 May 1966
(7) CO, H&S Company	Capt Mathew T. COOPER
(8) CO, Company A	Capt Robert A. FREEMAN 8 May - 25 May 1966 1stLt James R. FURLEIGH 25 May - 31 May 1966
(9) CO, Company B	1stLt J. P. T. SULLIVAN
(10) CO, Company C	1stLt Chris J. STANAT
(11) CO, Company D	Capt John F. KREBS

ENCLOSURE (1)

2. Sequential Listing of Significant Events.a. Personnel

(1) Average monthly strength:

(a) USMC	Officer	39
	Enlisted	987

(b) USN	Officer	3
	Enlisted	50

(2) Present on board strength:

(a) USMC	Officer	38
	Enlisted	959

(b) USN	Officer	3
	Enlisted	50

(3) Current critical shortages based on manning level are as follows:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
9999	E-8	2
0141	E-5	2
0239	E-7	1
0311	E-5	21
0369	E-8	1
0369	E-7	5
0369	E-6	4
3371	E-5	1

b. Administration. No changes were made during this reporting period.

c. Intelligence.

(1) During the period 8 May 1966 to 31 May 1966, the S-2 section effected liaison with the S-2 of 7th Marines for information concerning Operation Montgomery. The S-2 was provided with current Order of Battle, overlay of fortified positions and obstacles, plus interpreters to accompany the Battalion on the operation.

(2) From 9 May 1966 to 13 May 1966, the S-2 section participated in Operation Montgomery, a vertical assault in the Son Tinh district, Quang Ngai province. During operation Montgomery the S-2 section collected, processed and disseminated intelligence information as it became available. With the interpreters provided by 7th Marines the S-2 assisted in the interrogation of 53 VCS of which 23 were sent to ITT for further interrogation. The S-2 scouts provided security for the movement of the Command Group, in addition to the interior security of the perimeter when set up in night defensive positions. The S-2 section was helo-lifted

back to Chu Lai along with all elements of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on 13 May 1966.

(3) On 13 May 1966 the S-2 section began preparations for the Battalion's movement to the present Base Camp (Hill 54) by disseminating intelligence on the Order of Battle for the Battalion TAOR and distributing of maps of the area. Since the arrival of the S-2 section at its present location on 15 May 1966 an intensified program has begun in processing VCS, and compiling a Black List of known VC in the TAOR.

(4) Since arriving in our present TAOR the S-2 section has assisted in the screening and interrogation of some 100 VCS of which 32 were sent to ITT. A number of documents and assorted gear to include an M-1 rifle and a mortar base plate have been sent to the rear.

d. Logistics

(1) BLT 1/5 commenced debarkation from assigned shipping (USS Princeton LPH-5, USS Pickaway APA-222, USS Alamo LSD-33), commencing at 060630H May 1966 and completed debarkation at 092015H May 1966. The following supplies and equipment were brought ashore at Chu Lai:

(a) Class I - 10 days

(b) Class II - T/E allowance; plus 30 days CA replenishment (type 1 items); 30 days individual clothing; 30 days M/0 (type 2 items); 30 days dry cell batteries; 60 days operating stocks.

(c) Class III - Mogas - 2 days; Diesel - 4 days; special oil lubricants and packaged products - 30 days.

(d) Class IV - 30 days field fortifications.

(e) Class V - Basic allowance.

e. Communications

(1) Internal Battalion and Regimental communications for Operation Montgomery was dependent on FM and HF radio equipment. Voice radio nets were terminated at Battalion AN/PRC-10, AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-47. These same equipments terminated at Regiment. Reception was outstanding.

(2) Internal Battalion communications since the Battalion has been in country has been dependent on FM, HF, VHF and SHF. Voice radio nets are terminated at Battalion by AN/PRC-10, AN/PRC-25, AN/MC-38 and AN/TRC-27. Tele-type is terminated by AN/MC-62 and land lines. Reception and reliability is excellent.

(3) The Battalion Commander must have reliable communications at all times to maintain control. To achieve this it is felt that AN/PRC-25s must be issued to each infantry Battalion.

f. Air Support

(1) During Operation Montgomery, Cheyenne and Cheyenne II, air support is covered in the after action reports. During the remainder of the reporting period air support was handled in a normal manner. Helicopter support for administrative runs was very responsive when availability permitted. Response for medical evacuations has been excellent.

(2) Three fixed wing air strikes were requested during the remainder of the reporting period. All were performed in an outstanding manner by MAG-12 aircraft. One of the strikes was controlled by COTTAGE 14 while the other two were controlled by a TAC(a).

g. Medical

(1) The Battalion Aid Station moved ashore with the Battalion on 8 May 1966. Personnel included two doctors and 50 hospital corpsmen. Since moving to Hill 54, a medical civic action mission is in the early stages of development. Included in the prospective plans are the following:

(a) Daily sickcall at CP Main Gate.

(b) Daily sickcall at the village dispensary.

(c) Training program for the local population. The BAS personnel has thus far treated approximately 800 civilians.

(2) The general level of health of the Battalion has been good. Daily census of patients kept in BAS runs to approximate average of three. Most cases are admitted with intestinal problems.

h. Civil Affairs

(1) Medical civic action program was initiated near the Marine perimeter. Sick call is held three hours each morning for an average of 100 civilians per day.

(2) A family was evacuated from the Hamlet of Duc Bo coordinates BT 373147 at their request for security from the VC.

(3) Contact with the local officials and Hamlet Chiefs has been effected to explain the purpose of the Marines presence and what could be done to aid the local population against the VC.

(4) Clothing and soap has been made available for distribution. Lack of supplies limit the extent of these operations.

i. Psychological Warfare

(1) Extensive Psychological operations were conducted throughout

CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

060630H - Commenced debarkation from USS Alamo, USS Pickaway, and USS Princeton.

071400H - Chopped OPCON to III MAF.

071400H - Chopped OPCON/ADCON to CG 1st MarDiv.

071400H - BLT 1/5 deactivated. All attachments reverted to parent organization.

071400H - 1st Bn, 5th Mar reports ADCON 1st Marines and OPCON 7th Marines.

091200H - Departed for Operation Montgomery.

092015H - Completed debarkation from assigned shipping.

131400H - Returned from Operation Montgomery.

140800H - Chopped OPCON 1st Marines.

15 May 1966 - Arrived Hill 54. Assumed control of the TAOR.

151436H - Tanks and 107 Howtars arrived this position.

152200H - Company A chopped OPCON to 1st Marines.

160730H - Company C squad size patrol KIRIN BT 388154, received 15 rounds sniper fire from BT 388148; patrol returned 30 rounds small arms fire. Searched area found nothing, patrol continued on mission.

160900H - Reference SitRep # 1, Ten officers and staff NCO's from 1/5 accompanied Company E, 2/5 on search and destroy operation. During one encounter 1/5 sustained one WIA.

161245H - Company C BT 395145 received three rounds sniper fire from BT 393149, returned 20 rounds small arms fire; sent fire team patrol out, searched area and found nothing.

170807H - In vicinity of BT 396145, tanks and 107 Howtars fired three rounds 90mm and 12 rounds 107mm at VC outpost coordinates BT 378112. Probable two VC KIA.

172245H - H&S Company, coordinates BT 398145 heard movement at coordinates BT 401145 and fired eight rounds small arms fire. Checked area and found one black shirt.

180718H - Company C BT 375145 while returning from night ambush position received approximately 60 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from BT 374150. Company C returned fire with 300 7.62 rounds, 30 M72 and 16 60mm mortar rounds, tanks fired 24 rounds in support. VC broke contact, area was swept, 13 VCS were apprehended. VCS were screened and sent to ITT. Secondary explosions were heard from hut that caught fire during encounter. Company C sustained one USMC WIA.

190945H - 2d Platoon (-), Company D and one squad of Popular Forces with the information furnished by three female VCS who were apprehended.

181500H, located two tunnels at coordinates BT 428137. Both tunnels were approximately the same size, seven feet deep by five feet by five feet. Both tunnels were destroyed at 191015H.

191315H - LVT's, while returning from supply missions to Company D, at coordinates BT 425158, located two mortar rounds of a type unknown, partially buried. Traces of blood in the immediate area indicated that possibly other mortar rounds had exploded in the same area. Mortar rounds were destroyed in place

191430H - 3d Platoon (-), Company C observed 20 men working in a quarry coordinates BT 392138. All men fled except four who were apprehended, screened and sent to ITT as VCS. Area was searched for men who fled. Unable to locate same.

191500H - H&S Company's defensive position located one CHICOM grenade lying near perimeter at coordinates BT 397145. Grenade was destroyed in place.

200930H - Squad security patrol heard banging noises at coordinates BT 381143. This was evidently a warning. Patrol then received six rounds small arms, two eight round automatic rifle burst and approximately 175 rounds of machine gun fire from a large hut at BT 382143. Patrol returned 30 rounds of small arms fire, 40 rounds machine gun fire and one direct hit with a LAW. Firing ceased. Estimate two possible KIAs and four WIAs. Reinforcements of two tanks from 3d platoon, Company A, two Ontos from 1st platoon, Company B, and one additional squad from 1st platoon, Company B. With reinforcements a sweep was made. Tracked Vehicles received 30 rounds of automatic rifle fire and 12 rounds small arms fire. Tanks fired seven rounds HE, Ontos 200 rounds 30 caliber. Four substantial blood trails were found leading from the hut indicating four VC wounded. At BT 384143 one round of sniper fire was received from a hut. One WP grenade demolished the hut. No further firing. No evidence of VC WIA was found, presumed escaped. At BT 384141 four VCS and a short blood trail were found by a cave. Four suspects came out of cave and grenade thrown in. Cave was searched and nothing was found. VC broke contact, patrol withdrew to evacuate one female wounded during the previous fire fight. VCS were screened and released except for one who was evacuated to Chu Lai due to non-battle injuries.

202210H - Section squad Hamms coordinates BT 433170 sighted one small boat at coordinates BT 433172 without lights and two or three people aboard. People were challenged, but failed to halt. 20 rounds small arms were fired at boat. Boat escaped.

210515H - Fire team ambush patrol Mary from Company C, coordinates BT 497090 received three rounds 30 caliber fire from two snipers coordinates BT 498090, and sustained one USMC WIA. Patrol returned 40 rounds small arms fire and searched area. Found trail of blood but was unable to follow through wet rice field. One VC WIA.

210615H - Company C's mechanized sweep coordinates BT 392149 received two rounds small arms sniper fire from coordinates BT 390149. 20 rounds small arms fire were returned. Sniper fire ceased. Area was searched and nothing found.

210645H - 1st platoon, Company B, 1st AT Bn, at coordinates BT 391152 received 12 rounds small arms fire from hedge row coordinates BT 394158. Returned fire with six rounds 106mm HE, direct hit. Estimate one VC KIA possible. Unable to check area due to advancement of Company C's sweep of area.

210715H - 1st platoon, Company B, 1st AT Bn, at coordinates BT 383157 received four rounds small arms sniper fire from a hut at coordinates BT 378155. Returned fire, four rounds 106mm HE. Destroyed hut. Estimate one VC KIA possible. Unable to check area due to advancement of Company C's sweep of area.

ENCLOSURE (2)

210830H - 1st platoon, Company C coordinates BT 374149 received 40 rounds automatic weapons fire from hut coordinates BT 375153. Returned 86 rounds small arms fire, searched hut and found one VCS. Apprehended same. Checked area and located another VCS. Both were screened and sent to IIT.

210830H - Company C coordinates BT 375155 received six rounds sniper fire and occasional four to six round burst of automatic rifle fire, from village of Duc Bo at coordinates BT 374153. Villagers sounded warning by banging on tins when Marines were closing. Returned 93 rounds small arms fire. Searched area and found nothing.

210930H - 2d platoon, Company D located four VCS, one trying to enter cave coordinates BT 428145. Apprehended VCS and searched cave but found nothing. VCS are being retained overnight by Company D.

211050H - Company C received 15 rounds sniper fire from east side of Duc Bo village near hedge row coordinates BT 376148. Company returned 50 rounds automatic rifle fire. Four persons were observed running from hedge row. Search was conducted and one female body was discovered about 50 meters from hedge row. Body was recovered by local villagers.

211050H - Company C coordinates BT 367148 received four rounds small arms sniper fire from coordinates BT 361148. Sustained one USMC WIA. Returned 25 rounds small arms fire. Sniper fire ceased. Area swept and nothing found. WIA evacuated to Chu Lai.

211145H - 1st platoon, Company B, 1st AT Bn coordinates BT 382137 observed two VC firing a machine gun coordinates BT 378142. Approximately 60 rounds were fired at Company C. Ontos fired six rounds 106mm HE at enemy position. Checked area and found substantial amount of blood. Nothing else. Both VC probable KIA.

211240H - 2d squad, 2d platoon, Company C at coordinates BT 365145, received five rounds small arms sniper fire from hedge row coordinates BT 365143. Observed two persons wearing straw hats running on other side of hedge row. Fired one round 40mm HE. Checked area and located one Vietnamese boy, wounded, who was immediately evacuated to D Med, at Chu Lai. One dead cow was found 50 meters from boy. Nothing else was found.

221145H - Artillery forward observer at Battalion Out Post coordinates BT 397145, observed four VC wearing grey uniforms, carrying weapons and equipment at coordinates BT 364148. Artillery forward observer called in artillery fire. 28 rounds HE fired on target. Area was not searched due to distance. Estimate four VC probable KIA.

221410H - Artillery forward observer at Battalion Out Post at coordinates BT 397145 observed three camouflaged VC removing concealed equipment from brush along trail at coordinates BT 345148. Artillery forward observer called in artillery fire mission, Battery K fired four HE and two WP rounds on target. WP rounds marked target for air strike. One air strike

ENCLOSURE (2)

was conducted with two sorties. Fired approximately 16 five inch ZUNI rockets and 200 rounds 20mm. Area was completely covered. Three possible VC KIA. Area was not checked due to distance.

230720H - Company B coordinates BT 425105 received three rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 423105. Company B returned eight rounds small arms fire. Sniper fire ceased. Searched area and found nothing.

230815H - Company B coordinates BT 423103 in vicinity of objective One received ten rounds semi-automatic rifle fire from coordinates BT 424103. Returned 40 rounds small arms fire. Enemy ceased fire. Checked area and found nothing.

230853H - Company B coordinates BT 410093 secured objective One, pursued VC for 500 meters to coordinates BT 415093, VC broke contact. Company B returned to objective one and conducted complete search and clearing of area. Found nothing.

231420H - 3d platoon, Company B on patrol, coordinates BT 413097 received three eight round burst of automatic weapons fire from coordinates BT 411098. Returned 12 rounds small arms fire, two M79 rounds and one LAW. Commenced searching area at coordinates BT 411098 received eight more rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 412097 and returned 20 rounds small arms fire, two 60mm mortar rounds and one M79 round. Observed one VC running who fell down after being hit. VC disappeared and patrol was unable to locate him. One VC WIA probable.

231535 - Reinforcing patrol from Company B went to coordinates BT 415098 received two rounds small arms fire from huts at coordinates BT 416097. Returned fire with two M79, rounds and five rounds small arms fire. Three huts caught fire. Searched area and found clothing and papers in boxes which are being brought back. Also located one tunnel ten feet by four feet at coordinates BT 416097 containing three boxes of clothing. Boxes were booby-traped with a hand grenade. Boxes and clothing were destroyed with another hand grenade. Searched area and found nothing else.

240950H - The Battalion perimeter at coordinates BT 395145 received nine rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 393145. Returned ten rounds small arms fire. VC fire ceased. Displaced fire team patrol to search area. Found nothing.

241710H - The Battalion perimeter at coordinates BT 395145 received 15 rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 392149. Returned 150 rounds automatic weapons fire. Enemy fire ceased. Checked area but found nothing.

260655H - 3d platoon, Company A vicinity hill 186 coordinates BT 357135, observed 75 to 100 VC carrying weapons and moving in the open at coordinates BT 353148. Artillery fire was requested and fired spotting rounds. At 260735H artillery was fired for effect at BT 353148, artillery concentration covered area completely.

ENCLOSURE (2)

260750H - Company C coordinates BT 386146 received two rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 384146. No fire was returned. Company C sustained one WIA. Emergency helicopter evacuation was requested. Area was checked found nothing.

260815H - 3d platoon, Company A coordinates BT 357135 observed approximately 50 VC moving into a stream bed in the vicinity of coordinates BT 348142. Artillery fire was called on this position. Area was later searched in detail and a large number of blood stains were found. No bodies were found. It is estimated that 15 to 20 VC were KIA or WIA.

260832H - 3d platoon, Company A in blocking position coordinates BT 357135 observed four VC carrying weapons coming up hill. Approximately 43 rounds of machine gun fire was fired at VC. Area was checked but no bodies were found.

260845H - Company C coordinates BT 385146 received four rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 384146. Returned fire with one LAW. Checked area and found nothing.

260925H - Company C coordinates BT 376146 received approximately 100 rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 374146. Returned one WP 3.5 rocket, approximately 250 rounds small arms fire and 12 M79 rounds. Checked area and found nothing.

260940H - Cat killer TAC (a) observed approximately 15 VC running in the open at coordinates BT 355143. Air strike was conducted. Estimated five to ten VC KIA.

261015H - 3d platoon, Company A observed 30 VC in Thach Kieu (2) Village coordinates BT 357147. An airstrike was called. Two A-4 aircraft dropped eight 500 pound napalm bombs, fired eight ZUNI rockets and 300 20mm rounds. One building was completely destroyed and three buildings were partially destroyed. Area was later searched by Company C, but no bodies were found.

261645H - 3d platoon, Company A coordinates BT 380141 received five rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 370143, returned 15 rounds small arms fire and one M79 round. Checked area and found nothing.

262055H - One squad ambush from Company B was sprung on a VC patrol at BT 369159. Approximately 300 rounds small arms fire and four M79 rounds were fired at the VC patrol. The VC returned approximately 100 rounds automatic weapons fire and two rifle grenades. The VC sustained two KIA confirmed by body count and two more KIA possible and two WIA possible based on the amount of blood found in the area. One US carbine and one US M-1 rifle were captured along with some documents.

270854H - Company B coordinates BT 368147 located a tunnel 12 feet deep by two feet by six feet. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

ENCLOSURE (2)

270940H - Company B coordinates BT 360150 received one round sniper fire from coordinates BT 362150. No fire was returned. Dispatched fire team patrol to check area. Found nothing.

271025H - Company B, conducting search and destroy operations in vicinity of coordinates BT 374148, located four fresh graves and three blood stained shirts near-by.

281155H - Squad size patrol Baracuda from Company C at coordinates BT 386154 received ten rounds small arms fire from four VC coordinates BT 383156. Patrol returned 20 rounds small arms fire and approximately 30 rounds automatic weapons fire and observed one VC knocked down by the fire. The other three VC quickly grabbed the downed VC and dragged him out of sight. A strong effort to reestablish contact was made, but was negative. A thorough search of the area was made, which disclosed large spots of blood in the area of the downed VC. Estimate one VC KIA possible.

281200H - Security patrol from Company A coordinates BT 496081 located a small boat on the beach. They received six rounds automatic weapons fire while searching the boat. Due to the distance, no fire was returned and the area where fire came from was not checked. Nothing was found in the boat.

281415H - Squad patrol Baracuda at coordinates BT 388152, received approximately 20 rounds automatic weapons fire and 15 rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 390155. Patrol returned approximately ten rounds small arms fire and fired two LAW's. They also requested an 81mm mortar fire mission which fired 12 HE rounds. Patrol observed one VC fleeing, received a round in the back and fell down. Another VC who was returning fire was knocked backwards. 81mm mortar fire mission was on target. Patrol did not check area due to distance. Estimate two VC KIA possible.

281500H - Squad patrol Baracuda at coordinates BT 388152 received three rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 394156, patrol returned five rounds small arms fire. Sniper fire ceased. Area was not checked due to distance.

290855H - 2d platoon, 3d Amtrack Battalion returning from daily supply run to Company D hit an antitank mine at coordinates BT 411154 sustaining minor damage to the track of the vehicle and resulting in two minor USMC WIA's.

291300H - Company D received word from Popular Forces of the location of a cave at coordinates BT 433168. A squad patrol was dispatched to the cave. It was seven feet deep by two feet by two feet reinforced with bamboo. It was destroyed with demolitions. The Popular Forces also released one female VC to Company D who is being interrogated by interpreter and will be sent to ITT.

ENCLOSURE (2)

300700H - 3d platoon, Company A at coordinates BT 384092 observed five VC, two of them carrying weapons. The two carrying weapons disappeared. The three without weapons were apprehended, screened and sent to ITT.

300820H - Company C at coordinates BT 419103 stopped and questioned 16 suspects. All were released except for one who attempted to run while being interrogated. VCS was screened and sent to ITT.

300827H - 2d platoon, Company A conducting search and destroy operations on Island Than Tay GS 4712, located and destroyed two 81mm mortar shells and one 81mm mortar tail fin.

300840H - Squad patrol Iron from Company C at coordinates BT 384148 received ten rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 382148. Patrol returned 30 rounds small arms fire and requested 60mm mortar fire mission which fired 12 rounds. Patrol Iron sustained one USMC WIA and requested emergency helicopter evacuation. A reaction squad was dispatched to assist in conducting a thorough search of the area. One VCS was apprehended and screened and sent to ITT.

300910H - Company B at coordinates BT 392121, apprehended one female VC who was identified by the Hamlet Chief of Xuan Ngoc Hamlet as being a member of the Guerrilla Forces. She was screened and sent to ITT.

300930H - At coordinates BT 393117 Company B received 15 rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 393155. Company B returned 40 rounds small arms fire, approximately 50 rounds machine gun fire and four M79 rounds. VC broke contact. A thorough search of the area was made which disclosed one tunnel five feet wide by six feet deep by six feet. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions. Nothing else was found.

301120H - Company B at coordinates BT 392112 located a tunnel ten feet long by three feet wide by two feet high. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

301114H - Company B at coordinates 399144, located a tunnel 20 feet long by 11 feet wide by five feet. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

301228H - Patrol Chrysler from Company D at coordinates BT 438152, located a tunnel three feet by three feet by 30 feet. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

301240H - Company B at coordinates BT 399111, located a tunnel six feet by four feet by 15 feet. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

301315H - Company B at coordinates BT 375111 apprehended two VC who were identified as Guerrilla Forces by the Hamlet Chief of Xuan Ngoc Hamlet. The VC were screened and sent to ITT.

ENCLOSURE (2)

301430H - Company B at coordinates 407134, received two rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 405134. Fifteen rounds of small arms fire was returned. Area was checked but nothing was found.

301610H - Company D received information from Popular Forces of the location of a tunnel. A squad was dispatched to the tunnel at BT 418148. The tunnel was three feet by three feet by 90 feet. The tunnel was destroyed by demolitions.

301640H - Company B, 3d Amtrac Battalion (Rein), with one engineer squad from 1st Engineer Battalion, operating with one squad from Company D for security at coordinates BT 413158, while clearing a supply route from 1/5 Command post to Company D's Command Post, employed a snake demolitions charge. The rocket prematurely detonated. Company B, 3d Amtrac Battalion sustained one USMC KIA and one USMC WIA. The engineer squad from 1st Engineer Battalion sustained three USMC WIA's. The KIA and all WIA's were emergency helicopter evacuated to D Med, Chu Lai.


310945H - Company D received information from two Vietnamese of the location of a tunnel. A squad (Rein) was dispatched to the coordinates BT 416183. The tunnels dimensions were four feet by four feet by 100 feet, reinforced with wood. The tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.

311400H - Company D at coordinates BT 416153 located another tunnel. This tunnel was found after destroying an earlier tunnel at the same coordinates. The dimensions are 200 meters by four meters by four meters. The tunnel was destroyed.

311645H - Company D at coordinates BT 436161 apprehended one VC who was identified by Popular Forces when he was observed standing in sick call line. The VC was sent to gain information about Company D's position by VC organizer Le Gia. VC is being interrogated by interpreters and will be sent to ITT on 1 June 1966.

ENCLOSURE (2)

Operation Overlay for 9 to 10 May 1966




ENCLOSURE (1)

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
Operation Overlay for 10 May 1966

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Obj 1




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ENCLOSURE (2)

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
Operation Overlay for 12 May 1966




ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED

Operation Overlay for 13 May 1966



ENCLOSURE (4)



CAVE DISCOVERED


BY C CO. 12 MAY 66

135 497834

TUNNEL DIMENSIONS


3 X 4 FT FORTY FT
LONG

DESTROYED BY
DEMOLITIONS



TUNNEL APPROX
10 FEET UNDER
GROUND

DISCOVERED BY
'C' CO. 12 MAY 66
BS 497 838
DESTROYED BY
DEMOLITION
2-3 FT DIAMETER



Declassified by the Director of Marine Corps
History and Museums in accordance with the
provisions of CMC ltr Op-9420323 Joy, Ser:
10000 pg 2 of 12 October 1971.

P. C. Tiffey 3/9/77

Signature/date

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
5200.10

SECRET

1/5th Marines
Command Chronology
8 May - Dec 1971

HEADQUARTERS
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/FMK/rwc
 3480
 14 May 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation MONTGOMERY

Ref: (a) 7th Marines Regimental Frag Order #10-66 (Operation MONTGOMERY)
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L701, Sheet 6739 II (1:50,000)
 AMS Series L701, Sheet 6739 III (1:50,000)

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay, D+1 (10 May 1966)
 (2) Operation Overlay, D+2 (11 May 1966)
 (3) Operation Overlay, D+3 (12 May 1966)
 (4) Operation Overlay, D+4 (13 May 1966)
 (5) Diagrams of Tunnel Complexes

1. Code Name and Type of Operation. Operation MONTGOMERY (Search and Destroy).

2. Dates of Operation. 9-13 May 1966.

3. Location. SON TINH District, GUANG NGAI Province, RVN, on map sheet AMS Series L701, Sheets 6739 II and 6739 III (1:50,000).

4. Command Headquarters

CO, 1st Bn, 5th Mar	LtCol H. L. COFFMAN
CO, Co B	1stLt J. P. T. SULLIVAN
CO, Co C	1stLt C. W. J. STANAT
CO, Co D	Capt J. F. KREBS
81mm Mortar Plat	1stLt C. E. NEESEMAN
Det, H&S Co	1stLt H. HITT

5. Task Organization

<u>1stBn(-)(Rein), 5thMar</u>	LtCol COFFMAN
H&SCo(-)	
Det, BtryD, 2dBn, 11thMar	
Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm	
Det, 1stSPBn(HST)	
1stPlat(-), CoB, 1stEngrBn	

Enc # 3

Co B (Rein)

1st Lt SULLIVAN

Co B

Det, H&SCo

Det, MedPlat

Det, CommPlat

2dFOTm, 81mmPlat

FACTm

Det, 1stPlat, CoB, 1stEngrBn

FOTm, BtryD, 2dBn, 11thMar

Co C (Rein)

1st Lt STANAT

Co C

Det, H&SCo

Det, MedPlat

Det, CommPlat

3dFOTm, 81mmPlat

Det, 1stPlat, CoB, 1stEngrBn

FOTm, BtryD, 2dBn, 11thMar

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

Co D (Rein)

Capt KREBS

Co D

Det, H&SCo

Det, MedPlat

Det, CommPlat

4thFOTm, 81mmPlat

FACTm

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

Det, 1stPlat, CoB, 1stEngrBn

FOTm, BtryD, 2dBn, 11thMar

6. Supporting Armsa. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support. Three troop lifts were made during the Operation. The first was a Battalion size lift on the afternoon of D-Day. The second was a company size lift on D+2, and the third lift moved the Battalion back to Ky Ha on D+4. All lifts were made with MAG 36 aircraft. MAG 36 helicopters provided resupply on D+1, D+2, and D+3. All troop lifts were accompanied by armed UH-1E aircraft.

(2) Fixed Wing. Aircraft were requested and provided for HZ prep on D+2 in vicinity of 475847.

b. Artillery Support. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was supported by elements of 1st Bn, 3d Bn, and 4th Bn, 11th Marines. The only instance in which artillery was used directly by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was for prep fire on a helicopter landing zone. The batteries provided an excellent one half hour preparation of the area. Night defensive fires were planned every night, but were not needed by the battalion.

7. Intelligencea. Estimate of VC Strength, Location and Disposition in the Objective Area.(1) Forces Anticipated in the Immediate Objective Area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
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Confirmed

None

Probable

Hq, 1st VC Regt	BS 509773	260	UNK
60th Bn, 1st VC Regt	BS 509773	300	UNK
80th Bn, 1st VC Regt	BS 509773	400	UNK
90th Bn, 1st VC Regt	BS 509773	400	UNK
195th VC AirDef Bn	BS 499819	UNK	UNK
T-20 VC Co	BS 499819	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Bn	Pos Vic BS 450825	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Bn	Pos Vic BS 476836	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Bn	Vic BS 570855	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Regt	Vic BS 546796	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Co	Vic BS 569758	UNK	UNK
U/I VC Unit	Vic BS 450750	UNK	UNK
4th VC Regt	BS 490774	UNK	UNK
U/I	BS 494768	600	UNK
U/I	BS 450774	400	UNK
U/I	Vic BS 462788	300	UNK
U/I	Vic BS 486811	400	UNK

(2) Intelligence information was initially furnished to this unit on 6 May 1966.

(3) The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy any VC units in the assigned area and to locate and confiscate or destroy VC food and arms caches believed situated in the region.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually found as Operation was Conducted. With the exception of hostile sniper fire from several locations throughout the operation, and one VC killed by a Company C ambush in the early morning of 10 May, no solid contact was established with the enemy during the conduct of the Operation.

c. VC Units Identified. None

d. Significant Intelligence Gained

(1) People were initially afraid and suspicious. Later they were surprised that their animals were not taken. Most villages were deserted

except for a few people. The bulk of the populace was observed, on two occasions, to flee before the approach of units of 1/5.

(2) Hamlet located at BS 592849 was heavily fortified with barbed wire, trenches and bunkers. Most of the suspects apprehended were taken from this village.

(3) Tunnels and Caves. Many small complexes capable of holding three or four people were found. These were left unharmed, appearing to be individual family shelters of some 10' to 30'. Two large complexes were destroyed by Company C. One on 10 May ran some 170 feet in length with many side tunnels. Tunnel diameter was about five feet and the complex was located at BS 505825. The second complex located at BS 497838 was located on 12 May and consisted of two tunnels of 100 feet and 40 feet in length. These tunnels had a diameter of three to four feet.

(4) Demolitions Required. Approximately 25-50 pounds of demolitions were used to seal entrances of caves and tunnels. A total of 1000 pounds of explosives were used in sealing or destroying the larger complexes in the vicinity of BS 505825 and BS 497838.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

Hill 141	BS 474863
Hill 241	BS 476812
Hill 171	BS 517779

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The terrain was comparatively flat in the area of operation. It was interrupted by occasional hedgerows and offered excellent fields of fire for defender and attacker.

(3) Cover and Concealment. Both were sparse except for areas covered by hedgerows.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered.

8. Mission. 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines conducted search and destroy operations in western Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN in conjunction with 1st and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

9. Concept of Operations. On order, subsequent to L-Hour on D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines move via helicopter to LZ at coordinates BS 522840, east of the village of Phuong Dinh (3), search and clear southwest to the village of Xuan Hoa (1), BS 507805. Conduct further search and destroy operations as directed.

10. Chronological Sequence of Events

a. D-Day (9 May 1966): Company C commenced lift into LZ vicinity of BS 522840, 500 meters east of the town of Phuong Dinh (3), at 1430. The

battalion moved in accordance with reference (a). Company C picked up one VCS at 1550, in LZ, and by 1610 all companies were on the ground. Movement began in a southwesterly direction, and Companies B and D found and destroyed small tunnels, rice, and comm wire. At 1645, Company D fired on four VC carrying weapons at 514828. At 1710, Company D received sniper fire in the vicinity of 512826, returned fire with negative results, and cleared to the village of Phuong Dinh (4) at BS 512822. The Battalion then set in night defensive positions in the vicinity of BS 515826. Local ambushes were set up and H&I fires were fired by supporting artillery.

b. D+1 (10 May 1966): First contact came when Company C's ambush at BS 518334 was sprung at 0300. One VC confirmed KIA. At 0730, all companies moved in accordance with enclosure (1). All units again found rice and wheat, destroyed same, and at 0910, Company C found tools, brass and hand loading devices in vicinity of BS 502829 while clearing the village of Phuong Dinh (2). At the same time, Company B searched and cleared to BS 529822 (Binh Bac (2)), and then moved, under period sniper fire, through Xuan Hoa (BS 517812). Search and clear mission was completed by Company B at 1400. At 1150, Company C destroyed tunnels at BS 505825 and at 1400 all units moved toward night positions in the vicinity of BS 511813 (Xuan Hoa (2)) after clearing villages Phuong Dinh (4), (5) and Xuan Hoa. Local ambushes were set in, and artillery continued H&I fires throughout the night.

c. D+2 (11 May 1966): Company B moved a reinforced platoon through Xuan Hoa (1), BS 507805. Patrol returned at 1000. No contact. At 0805, Company D moved via helicopter in accordance with enclosure (2) to landing zone in the vicinity of BS 475837 in a sweep and destroy mission northeast to link up with the remainder of 1/5 in the vicinity of BS 499847. The lift was completed at 0905 with no contact. All other units moved out at 1105, searching and destroying through Phuong Dinh (3)(BS 515839) to Thach An Noi (1). By 1430, all units except Company D were establishing a perimeter at BS 499847. At 1540, Company D entered the perimeter and night positions were established. No contact was made. Local night ambushes were set up, and the hill at 502844 was outposted by Company C.

d. D+3 (12 May 1966): Patrols were sent out in accordance with enclosure (3), departing perimeter at 0530. At 0740, Company C located a large cave complex in the vicinity of 497842, and at 1000, Company D's patrol captured one VCS. All patrols returned by 1130 with no further contact. Two additional patrols were sent out at 1230. One from Company C to blow previously mentioned tunnel complex and Company D with interpreters to check VCS's statements concerning Thach An Noi (1)(BS 497847). All returned by 1600 with no contact. Night positions were set up, and the hill at 502844 was again outposted by Company C, Company D set up an ambush at 2000, in the vicinity of BS 494850, and Company B in the vicinity of BS 488842.

e. D+4 (13 May 1966): Ambushes returned at 0530 with no contact. All units moved out at 0615 in accordance with plan submitted in enclosure (4), searched and cleared villages of Thach An Noi (3) at BS 499853 and Thach Noi (2) at BS 509855. Company D secured Battalion Objective 1 (BS 532862) by 0940 with no contact, and Company C ran into sniper fire at 0915 at

coordinates BS 532856, detained 53 suspects, and secured its objective at 0940. 23 VCS subsequently displaced to LSA. At 1015, all units were within the defensive perimeter, and the Battalion CP was established at BS 533857. Units began helilift to Ky Ha at 1400. All units retracted without incident by 1600.

11. Results

a. Enemy Losses

- (1) VCK - 1
- (2) VCS - 31

b. Friendly Losses

- (1) KIA - None
- (2) WIA - None
- (3) Non-Battle Casualties - 4
- (4) Material Losses - None

12. Administrative Matters

a. Supply and Maintenance. No matters of an unusual nature occurred. Resupply was timely.

b. Casualties. Evacuation was excellent due to the immediate response of helicopters.

c. Communications. No communication problems ensued due to the excellent performance of the AN/PRC-25 radio.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. No special equipment was used. RVN interpreter teams which were attached proved to be exceptionally eager and able on their job. .. noteworthy improvement over this Battalion's past experience.

14. Commander's Analysis. Previous operations by this unit have demanded that long distances be covered in relatively short time periods. This was the first time that 1/5 was able to spend time moving through areas and thus effect more profitable searching techniques. This was also 1/5's first operation in relatively level, rice paddy land where movement was not restricted. Although circumstances prevented the immediate activation of this operation prior to the obvious exfiltration of the enemy, it did appear that this Battalion, as the reserve, and then as a random blocking force used as opportunities presented themselves, was effective in surprising 20 to 30 VCS of military age on the final day of the operation. It is believed that this was due to the failure of the VC to discover a definite direction of attack.

15. Recommendation. No specific recommendations are deemed worthy of note.

H. L. Coffman
H. L. COFFMAN

DISTRIBUTION: Special

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/FMK/rc
 3480
 27 May 1966

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; submission of

Ref: (a) Verbal order from Commanding Officer, 1st Marines
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L701, Sheet 6739 IV TRA BINH (1:50,000)
 AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6757 IV TRA BONG (1:50,000)

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay D-Day

1. Code Name. Operation CHEYENNE.

2. Date of Operation. 25 May 1966.

3. Location. Ly Tin District, Quang Ngai Province, Ky Chanh Village.

4. Command Headquarters

CO, 1st Bn, 5th Mar

LtCol H. L. COFFMAN

CO, Company C

1stLt C. W. J. STANAT

CO, Company D

Capt J. F. KREBS

81mm Mortar Plat (-)

1stLt R. H. BELKNAP

Btry D, 2/11

1stLt L. J. SCHUMACHER

5. Task Organization

1st Battalion, (-)(Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol H. L. COFFMAN

H&S Company (-)

Det, Btry D, 2/11

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

Company C (Rein)

1stLt C. W. J. STANAT

Company C

Det, H&S Company

Det, Med Plat

Det, Comm Plat

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

Company D (Rein)

Company D
 Det, M&S Company
 Det, Med Plat
 Det, Comm Plat
 Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

6. Supporting Armsa. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support. Two trooplifts were accomplished during the operation using 16 MAG 36 aircraft for each lift. The first lift moved Company C and the Command Group from Hill 54 to BT 443168. The second lift moved Company C and the Command Group from BT 385238 to Hill 54 and Company D from BT 383232 to BT 436161.

(2) Fixed Wing Support. Fixed wing aircraft were requested and provided for HLZ prep in the vicinity of BT 443168 and one air strike was requested on Phu Ngoc (2) (BT 372262). Two A4 aircraft conducted the air-strike under the control of a TAC(A).

b. Artillery Support. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was given direct support by Battery D, 2/11. Artillery fire was not utilized.

c. Naval Gunfire Support. Naval Gunfire fired eight rounds into Phu Ngoc (2) (BT 372262)

7. Intelligence

a. Estimate of VC strength, Location and Disposition in the Objective Area

(1) No intelligence information was supplied to this unit due to short term planning for Operation CHEYENNE.

(2) The objective of the operation was to sweep from south to north from grid line 17 to 24 on the east side of the Truong Giang inland waterway to destroy any VC units in the assigned area and to locate and confiscate or destroy VC food and arms caches.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted. With the exception of one VC suspect who was captured by Company C, and turned over to Dai Uy accompanying Company C, no solid contact was established with the enemy during this operation.

c. VC Units Identified

(1) The 6th ARVN Regiment, with supporting elements of Armored Cavalry, one company of Popular Forces and one company of Regional Forces operated jointly to the north of this Battalion's zone of operation and made contact with elements of the 72d Main Force unit in the vicinity of BT 326285. The unit was positively identified through interrogation, by Popular Forces, of wounded VC captured in the vicinity of BT 326285.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained

- (1) Populace of all hamlets were exceptionally friendly with no apparent fear of Marine Units.
- (2) Hamlets were not fortified with trenches, but did have individual family shelters near houses. Villagers appeared to be cleaner and better organized than those previously encountered by this unit.
- (3) Tunnels and Caves. Family shelters only.
- (4) Demolitions Required. None.

e. Terrain

- (1) Critical Terrain Features. The terrain throughout the area of operation was a gently rolling type with no critical terrain features.
- (2) Observation and Fields of Fire. Terrain was interrupted by occasional hedge rows and offered excellent fields of fire for defender and attacker.
- (3) Cover and Concealment. Both cover and concealment were sparse except for areas covered by hedge rows.
- (4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered.

8. Mission. 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines conducted search and destroy operations in a northerly direction in the Ky Trung Village area between grid lines 17 and 24 in conjunction with ARVN operations moving above grid line 26.

9. Concept of Operations. On order, Headquarters and Company C moved via helicopter to LZ in vicinity of BT 443168, moved to vicinity of BT 430178. Company D moved via LVT-5's to vicinity of BT 421178. Made contact with Company C and conducted search and destroy operations within ZOA.

10. Chronological Sequence of Events

a. D-Day - 24 May 1966: At approximately 0730, two platoons from Company G, 2/5 replaced Company D in position. At 0630, Battery D arrived at the Battalion CP (BT 397145) for a direct support role. At 0726, the first wave landed in the assigned LZ, at 0825, Company D was enroute to its splash point, and at 0840, both companies had visually linked up in the vicinity of BT 427178 and BT 423178.

b. Both companies moved in a northerly direction without contact to the east-west grid line 24. During this drive, numerous personnel were interrogated and released.

c. At 1630, helicopters began lifting units back to their respective CP's, Battery D returned to its parent unit, and by 1730, all phases of Operation Cheyenne were completed.

11. Resultsa. Enemy Losses

- (1) VC KBA - 16
- (2) VC KBA (POSS) - 10
- (3) VCC - 1

b. Friendly Losses

- (1) None

12. Administrative Matters

a. Supply and Maintenance. No resupply missions were called.

b. Casualties. There was no evacuation of USMC personnel.

c. Communications. Excellent throughout.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commander's Analysis. The expeditious use of intelligence resulted in surprising the enemy. Although no contact was made in 1/5's ZOA, it was clear that the Viet Cong had been sealed off from escaping south. They were forced to stand and fight against the ARVN units.



H. L. COFFMAN

DISTRIBUTION: Special

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/FMK/rc

3480

2 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF
 Via: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation CHEYENNE II

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L701, Sheet 6658 II (1:50,000) Thang Binh
 AMS Series L701, Sheet 6657 I (1:50,000) Tam Ky
 AMS Series L701, Sheet 6757 IV (1:50,000) Phu Nam

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay, D-Day (31 May 1966)

1. Code Name and Type of Operation. Operation CHEYENNE II (Search and Destroy).

2. Date of Operation. 31 May 1966.

3. Location. Tam Ky District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN on map sheets in reference (b).

4. Command Headquarters

CO, 1st Bn, 5th Mar LtCol H. L. COFFMAN

CO, Co B 1stLt J. P. T. SULLIVAN

CO, Co C 1stLt M. B. DARLING

CO, Co G Capt J. L. COOPER

81mm Mortar Plat 1stLt C. E. NASEMAN

5. Task Organization

1stBn(-)(Rein), 5th Mar LtCol H. L. COFFMAN

H&S Co(-)

Det, BtryD, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

1st Plat(-), CoA, 1st Engr Bn

NGF Ln and Spot Tm

Encl # 5

Co C (Rein)

1st Lt M. B. DARLING

Co C

Det, H&S Co

Det, MedPlat

Det, CommPlat

3d FOTm, 81mmPlat

FACTm

FOTm, Btry D, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tm

Co G (Rein)

Capt J. L. COOPER

Co G

Det, H&S Co

Det, MedPlat

Det, CommPlat

6. Supporting Armsa. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support. Two troop lifts were accomplished during this operation, utilizing 20 MAG-36 aircraft for each lift. The first lift moved Company B into LZ Hawk, followed by Company C, 81's and Command Group into LZ Eagle. This move commenced at Hill 54, coordinates BT 397145. The second lift commenced moving Company B from BT 342293 to Hill 54, followed by the Command Group, 81's and Company C from BT 348297 to Hill 54. Medical evacuations and prisoner evacuations were carried out without difficulty.

(2) Fixed Wing Support. The only fixed wing support required during the operation was the landing zone prep fires for Hawk and Eagle. These were carried out by MAG-12 aircraft and resulted in three VC KIA.

b. Artillery Support. Btry C, 1st Bn, 11th Mar, was given the mission of supporting 1st Bn, 5th Mar. Outside of registration fires, their support was not utilized.

7. Intelligencea. Estimate of VC Strength, Location and Disposition in the Objective Area(1) Forces Anticipated in the Immediate Objective AreaCONFIRMED: NonePROBABLE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
1 Co, 72d MF	BT 378250	100	UNK

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
1 Plat, A 16th Local Force	BT 342263	40	UNK
VC Training Camp	BT 362270	400	UNK
1 Co VC Local Force	BT 348291	150	UNK
Est Plat VC Local Force	BT 340268	UNK	UNK

(2) Intelligence information was initially furnished to this unit at a briefing held at Tam Ky District Headquarters.

(3) The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy any VC units in the assigned area and to destroy tunnel complexes and VC food and arms caches.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually found as Operation CHEYENNE II was Conducted. As a result of the operation, elements of 1/5 accounted for five VC KIA by body count, three VC WIA possible, 21 VCC, and 43 VCS. All VCC and VCS were sent to the ITT for further interrogation. With the exception of hostile sniper fire from several locations throughout the operation, no solid contact was established.

c. VC Units Identified. None.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained

(1) A shortage of interpreters, combined with speed of movement during the conduct of the operation, resulted in VCC and VCS not being interrogated at length. It is felt that thorough screening at ITT will uncover important intelligence concerning the area of operation.

(2) Hamlets and hedge rows in the area were laced with trench lines and punji stakes positioned along each trench. Punji traps were found throughout the area but were in no definite pattern.

(3) Tunnels and Caves. None.

(4) Demolitions Required. None.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features. Hill 26 BT 316338 and Hill 21 BT 322334.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The terrain is comparatively flat in the area of operation, but is interrupted by occasional hedge rows and sand hills. Throughout, it offered excellent fields of fire for defenders and attackers.

(3) Cover and Concealment. Excellent cover was provided by the sand hills, hedge rows and ironwood trees. Much of the normally flat, sandy stretches had good cover afforded by the many sand tombs. Vegetation was generally sparse except for areas covered by hedge rows and villages.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered.

8. Mission. 1st Bn (-)(Rein), 5th Mar conduct search and destroy operations in a southeasterly direction in the Ky Tung Village area between grid lines 36 and 26 in conjunction with ARVN operations moving into blocking positions to the west.

9. Concept of Operations. On order, Company B moved via helicopter into LZ Hawk in the vicinity of BT 285340 and Company C, 81's and the Command Group moved via helicopter into LZ Eagle, coordinates BT 305353. Companies made visual contact across the Truong Giang and commenced movement south. Company G, 2/5 was in reserve.

10. Chronological Sequence of Events. At 0700H, the Commanding Officer, Company G, 2/5 arrived at Hill 54 to receive initial briefing concerning role as Battalion reserve. The helo lift of Company B commenced at 0730H, and by 0915H, Company C, 81's and the Command Group completed the lift and all units began moving out. The subsequent sequence of events was as follows:

a. At 310950H, Company B at coordinates BT 302333 apprehended eight VCS and observed approximately 11 VC carrying weapons fleeing in the vicinity of BT 297336. Company B fired approximately 70 rounds of machine gun fire at the fleeing VC. One VC was observed knocked down by the fire, and the other VC carried him off. The eight VCS were screened and sent to ITT.

b. At 311000H, Company C at coordinates BT 314343 apprehended one VCS. The suspect had in his possession, a note concerning a VC meeting. The VCS was screened and sent to ITT.

c. At 311030H, Company B at coordinates BT 302333 apprehended 12 VCS who were identified as being associated with the VC by village guides operating with Company B. VCS were screened and sent to ITT.

d. At 311100H, Company C from coordinates BT 330320 to BT 338308 apprehended 15 VC who were identified as being members of VC guerrillas by village guides operating with Company C. All VCC were screened and screened and sent to ITT.

e. At 311245H, Company C at coordinates BT 325332 received 15 rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 326322. Company C returned five M79 rounds, and approximately 100 rounds of small arms fire. A thorough search of the area was made. Two VCS were apprehended, screened and sent to ITT.

f. At 311255H, Company C at coordinates BT 326332 observed six VC attempting to flee via a small boat. They were directed to stop but continued to flee. Three rounds small arms fire was fired. One VC was wounded. All VCC were apprehended and sent to ITT, except the wounded one who was helo evacuated to D Med, Chu Lai.

g. At 311315H, Company B coordinates BT 324302 received five rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 326302 from two snipers. 30 rounds small arms fire was returned. One sniper was confirmed killed by body count.

h. At 311415H, Company B at coordinates BT 325307 received ten rounds sniper fire from coordinates BT 322304. Company B returned 50 rounds machine gun fire, 20 rounds small arms fire and one M79 round.

i. At 311512H, Company C at coordinates BT 322327 received 40 rounds small arms fire from coordinates BT 323324. Approximately 100 rounds of machine gun fire and three M79 rounds were fired at the VC. One VC was observed knocked down by fire, and was carried off by other VC.

j. At 311550H, Company C at coordinates BT 336313 attempted to apprehend one VC. The VC failed to stop. One round was fired and the VC was killed. Company B at coordinates BT 341293 observed two VC running to a foxhole. Upon approaching the foxhole, the two VC jumped out and threw two hand grenades. Company B fired approximately 40 rounds small arms fire killing both VC. There were three USMC WIA's. The three USMC WIA's were helicopter evacuated to D Med, Chu Lai.

k. At 311600H, Company C at coordinates BT 337310 apprehended nine VCS who were attempting to flee during a sweep of the area. All VCS were screened and sent to IIT.

l. At 311650H, Company B at coordinates BT 341293 apprehended 11 VCS who were attempting to flee during a sweep of the area. All VCS were screened and sent to IIT.

m. At 311725H, Company B at coordinates BT 341293 received 17 rounds of sniper fire from coordinates BT 340292. Company B returned approximately 60 rounds small arms fire and four M79 rounds. One VC stood up to throw a grenade and was killed. The grenade exploded and Company B sustained one USMC WIA.

11. Results

a. Enemy Losses

(1)	VC KIA	3
(2)	VC KIA	5 confirmed
(3)	VCC	21
(4)	VCS	43
(5)	VC WIA	3

b. Friendly Losses

(1)	WIA	4
(2)	Evacuated non-battle	2


12. Administrative Matters

- a. Supply and Maintenance. No resupply missions were called.
- b. Casualties. Evacuation of USMC casualties was conducted in the prescribed manner with no problems.
- c. Communications. Generally, communications were very good throughout, and the value of the PRC-25 was proven again.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commander's Analysis. The rapid movement via helicopter again surprised the enemy. The value of such movement could have been enhanced by leaving at first light. This would give units another hour to move in the relative cool of the morning.


H. L. COFFMAN



1st Battalion, 5th Marines
OPERATION CHEYENNE II

31 May 1966

Map Series L701, Sheet 6658 II (1:50,000) THANG BINH
Map Series L701, Sheet 6657 I (1:50,000) TAM KY
Map Series L701, Sheet 6757 IV (1:50,000) PHU NAM

the island of Hoa Xuan in conjunction with Psychological Warfare Team from Province.

(2) Loud speakers and face to face communications were used to explain why Marines are present on the island, why the people should support the government against the VC and how the people should cooperate with Marine efforts against the VC.

(3) The open arms policy was explained in an effort to convert VC and VC sympathizers.

(4) Some 80,000 leaflets were dropped by air in conjunction with the above efforts.

(5) In addition, rewards were offered for information leading to the capture of VC or VC weapons.

j. Problems Encountered

(1) The only problem encountered was in fire support coordination here it took long periods of time, 30 to 40 minutes, to get artillery support on targets. This problem has been discussed, both with Regiment and the supporting Artillery Battalion. Fire support should be greatly improved in the future.

ENCLOSURE (1)