

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion
1st Marine Division
APO, San Francisco 96602

3/MTC/dah
5750
0062:67
1Mar67

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A030)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 5th Marines
(2) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1Feb67 to 28Feb67

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓ (1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

R. J. ALGER
R. J. ALGER
By direction

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5TH MAR S&C FILES

00230-67

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1ST BN/5TH MAR
CMD CHRON
FEB 1967

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5750
1Mar67

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96692

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 February 1967 to 28 February 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)
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PART I

ORGANIZATION DATA1. Designation

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Commander

LTCOL P. L. HILGARTNER

2. Location

1-28 February 1967: Hill 54, CHU LAI RVN

3. Staff Officers

Commanding Officer

LTCOL P. L. HILGARTNER

Executive Officer

MAJ. R. J. ALGER

S-1

2ndLt G. L. GORTON

S-2

1stLt W. F. GILLILAND

1-11 February 1967

2ndLt W. M. GORMAN

11-28 February 1967

S-3

MAJ. W. C. WARREN, JR.

S-4

CAPT G. J. STREMLOW

S-5

CAPT G. L. GUERTNER

CO, H&S Company

CAPT M. B. DARLING

CO, Company A

1stLt A. C. BLADES

1-13 February 1967

1stLt L. G. HUTCHESON

14-28 February 1967

CO, Company B

CAPT J. N. PETERSON

CO, Company C

CAPT R. J. CASWELL

CO, Company D

CAPT J. J. CARTY

4. Average Monthly Strength

USMC

USN

OFFENLOFFENL

38

1167

4

58

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PART II

NARRATIVE

During the month of February 1967, the Battalion conducted one Battalion(-) operation in the northwestern portion of the Battalion TAOR. Company A, Company C, Company D and Combined Action Company I were the participating units in operation "CLAY". The employment of CAC I in operation "CLAY" is considered significant, in as much as this company had only been operational for one month. Although their mission was limited in scope, the Combined Action Company successfully accomplished all assigned tasks. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) also participated in operations "RIO GRANDE" and "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI" during February. In addition to these three battalion size operations, seven company size operations were conducted within the Battalion TAOR.

Throughout the month a continuing emphasis was placed on night operations. Four of the seven company size operations were conducted during the hours of reduced visibility. The average ratio of night patrol activities to day patrol activities was 4 to 1.

Organic USMC units of this Battalion were repositioned from the combat bases on the islands of KY HOA and KY XUAN. The offensive operations on these islands is currently assigned to the Combined Action Platoon positioned at each location.

Psychological warfare efforts throughout the Battalion TAOR were continued during February. CHIU HOI leaflets, safe conduct pass leaflets and leaflets encouraging the Vietnamese to leave VC influenced areas were air dropped and hand delivered in the western portion of the TAOR. A degree of success achieved is reflected in the relocation of 25 refugees. Although statistics are nominal, the progress made is significant in that all refugees were originally from areas previously not receptive to psychological warfare endeavors.

Continuing emphasis was placed on the Battalion Civil Affairs program. Medical Civic Action Patrols (MEDCAP) assisted by five Vietnamese trainees, treated 3430 civilian patients during the month. 1500 prescriptions of vitamin capsules and 3000 bars of soap were distributed in conjunction with the MEDCAP activities. Additionally, 300 patients were treated or examined during Dental Civic Action Patrols conducted in the KY CHANH Village schools.

An outdoor movie theater was constructed at the Battalion Combat Base and dedicated to the people of KY CHANH Village. Movies were shown one night each week. 1753 Vietnamese attended during the month.

Self-help projects initiated during the month included:

- (1) Four truck loads of scrap lumber were delivered to the DUC PHO refugee hamlet for use in housing construction.
- (2) Lumber and cement were donated to the new DIEM PHO 1 Hamlet school, aiding in their endeavor to complete construction by 1 March 1967.
- (3) Lumber was made available to the KY CHANH Youth Group to be utilized in building a stage for drama and music presentations in KY CHANH Village.

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(4) Paper and stencils were provided to KY CHANH Village officials for publication of a Village Newspaper. The first issue was published in February and dedicated to the TET Holiday season.

(5) USAID Advisors from TAM KY were programmed to instruct members of the DIEM PHO pig cooperative in ways to improve the quality of their live stock. The 43 pigs held by the cooperative were inoculated. Lumber was provided to expand the feeding shelters in order to provide a more balanced atmosphere of shelter and sunlight. 300 lbs of refuse per day was provided to the cooperative from the Battalion Messhall.

The TET Holiday provided opportunities for increased contacts between Marines and Vietnamese. The Battalion activities included:

- (a) Gifts for GVN officials.
- (b) A flag pole for the KY CHANH Village office.
- (c) Additional MEDCAPS were deployed to outlying areas of the TAOR.

The Vietnamese Officials and local populace reciprocated with gifts for the Battalion, both individually and as an organization.

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TAMONG

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. 1Feb67 Company B OPCON CHU LAI Defense Command.
2. 010700H Operation "CLAY" LAW Battalion Frag Order 8-67 commenced. (Refer to Tab A and Tab B)
3. 2Feb67 Operation "CLAY" LAW Battalion Frag Order 8-67 continued. (Refer to Tab A and Tab B)
4. 021400H CAC I squad security patrol coordinates (BT 356165) received approximately 25 rounds sniper fire from one sniper at coordinates (BT 356168). Returned approximately 150 rounds small arms fire. Sniper fire ceased. Area was searched and nine VCS, five males and four females were apprehended. All VCS were identified by PF's as being VC sympathizers. VCS were taken to CAC I combat base and released after being identified by the Hamlet Chief.
5. 022215H Company A squad combat base coordinates (BT 488103) perimeter positions received 14 rounds small arms fire from approximately 50 meters north of defensive wire from three positions vicinity (BT 488104). Returned 25 rounds small arms fire, and one hand illumination grenade and six 81mm mortar illumination rounds. VC broke contact and withdrew. Approximately five minutes later, movement was observed approximately 200 meters east of position (BT 490103). Two rounds 81mm mortar illumination were fired and movement ceased. Area was searched from 030645H until 030800H from coordinates (BT 488103) to (BT 490103) with inconclusive results.
6. 031715H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines combat base coordinates (BT 395144). Fire team patrol inspecting wire along southwest perimeter of the combat base found the wire cut in three places. Each opening was large enough for one man to pass through. The wire was repaired.
7. 031800H Operation "CLAY" LAW Battalion Frag Order 8-67 terminated. (Refer to Tab A and Tab B).
8. 041445H Company C squad security patrol accompanied by Kit Carson coordinates (BT 366159) located a tunnel large enough to billet approximately 30 men. Tunnel had one entrance approximately 3 feet by 5 feet which was concealed by brush. Tunnel was located near stream vicinity (BT 366159). The tunnel was searched with inconclusive results. Entrance of tunnel led into a room approximately ten feet in diameter and branched off into two tunnels dimensions 3 feet high by 3 feet wide. Tunnel was destroyed with demolitions.
9. 041515H Company C squad security accompanied by Kit Carson coordinates (BT 366158) apprehended one female VCS age 18 who was carrying a burlap bag. Upon approach of patrol VCS attempted to hide bag. The bag contained rice, fish, cigarettes, paper, tobacco, and unidentified medicine in bottles. VCS was traveling west toward vicinity (BT 3612). The Kit Carson was a positive asset in this patrol by observing the VCS attempt to hide the bag.

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was taken to Battalion S-2 and interrogated. For suspicious nature and subsequent interrogation indicated he was a VC supply courier. VCS forwarded to 9th ITT.

10. 041550H CAC I squad security patrol coordinates (BT 311173) received approximately ten rounds small arms fire from an undetermined number of VC in a house approximately 50 meters west of patrol. Returned approximately 50 rounds small arms fire and one grenade. VC broke contact and withdrew to the west. Patrol searched area and found one VC KIA confirmed with one .30 caliber M-1 carbine serial #1739328, 70 rounds .30 caliber ammunition in five magazines and two suits of clothing, one gray and one black. While continuing the search, patrol apprehended one VCS in house who was attempting to flee with a suitcase containing 24,000 piasters. During interrogation, VCS stated four VC were attempting to have a pre-TET party in house prior to fire fight. VCS forwarded to 9th ITT. The 24,000 piasters forwarded to 7th Marines S-2. Information leading to the location of VC and VCS was provided by a Vietnamese civilian at 041530H. Vietnamese civilian stated that he did not want to be rewarded, although reward was offered.

11. 060120H CAC I combat base coordinates (BT 325181) received approximately 200 rounds small arms fire and approximately eight rifle grenades from an estimated 10-15 VC located at coordinates (BT 322179), (BT 326183) and (BT 322182). Some of the VC were armed with automatic weapons. CAC I returned approximately 1000 rounds small arms fire and 12 fragmentation grenades. Illumination was requested and a flare ship arrived on station. Enemy fire ceased and VC withdrew to southwest. Approximate length of contact was 20 minutes. Hand grenades were thrown because position felt that swimmers were coming across river due to noise in water. Three USMC WIA's sustained, one requiring medical evacuation. Medical Evacuation completed at 060740H. From 060615H until 060745H platoon size search was conducted from coordinates (BT 325181) to (BT 322179) to (BT 322182) and the following items were found: 6 homemade pull-pop grenades with aluminum casings and fuses, 4 chicom concussion grenades, 11 chicom fragmentation grenades pull-pop type, 12 M-79 rounds, 1 leather belt, 1 first aid pouch with 2 bandages, 3 expended 7.62mm rimless cartridges, 1 magazine from a French or chicom automatic weapon, 1 M-26 fragmentation grenade, 7 cartridges for 7.62mm assault rifle 1 canister of unknown type with the following data on it: "D-ATK-44-LOT-2-Y". In addition, the following blood covered clothing was found, 1 gray shirt with 3 bullet holes (Estimate one VC KIA Probable), 1 pair gray trousers, 2 pair white shorts, 1 green poncho, 1 homemade gas mask, and one parachute scarf. Items were forwarded to Battalion S-2 for further disposition.

12. 061400H 3rd Platoon Company C S&D coordinates (BT 367148) apprehended one male VCS. Suspect believed to be a VCS who escaped after being apprehended by Company C approximately six (6) months ago. Member of patrol identified VCS as being same man who escaped. VCS was approximately 25 years old. VCS had no I.D. card. VCS was forwarded to 9th ITT.

13. 061600H Company C squad security patrol coordinates (BT 382135) located and assisted EOD personnel in destroying a 155mm dud.

14. 070710H Company A(-) commenced search and clear operation on island of KY XUAN (BT 488103).

THRETE

15. 070740H CAC I commenced search and clear operation vicinity coordinates (BT 352165).

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Company A S&C operation coordinates (BT 485116). During sweep of area located six "National Liberation Front" propaganda leaflets on trail. All leaflets were printed in English and were directed towards US Armed Forces. Kit Carson scout attached to Company A questioned Vietnamese people in the area. All persons questioned denied who brought leaflets on the islands. The Vietnamese apparently paid little attention to the leaflets as very few of the islanders read English. Kit Carson scout believed that the Vietnamese were telling the truth, in saying that they knew nothing about the leaflets. Propaganda leaflets were forwarded to Battalion S-2.

17. 071435H CAC "I" terminated search and clear operation vicinity coordinates (BT 352165).

18. 071545H Company A(-) terminated search and clear operation on island of KY XUAN (BT 488103).

19. 071700H CAC I while conducting further search of area of enemy activity reported in spot report 060120H located one VC pull-pop type fragmentation grenade vicinity (BT 320187). Further search of area revealed a bundle of clothing with an extensive amount of dried blood on them. Clothing consisted of one man's black shirt with fragmentation tears and five bullet holes, one woman's shirt with fragmentation tears and one bullet hole over right breast, two men's trousers extensively torn and shredded from knees down, one bandage and one scarf. Human intestines were found 75 meters west of (BT 320187) in the Song Tam Ky River. Grenade was destroyed in place and all clothing was burned because of its bad condition and smell. The cumulative total of enemy casualties for spot reports 060120H is revised as follows: Two VC KIA Probable and Two VC WIA Probable.

20. 072134H CAC I platoon combat base coordinates (BT 333176) heard VC yelling propaganda from south and east sides of combat base. PF's stated VC were yelling that in two days they would like a truce for TET. At the same time the PF's thought they heard VC cutting defensive wire on the south side of combat base. PF's fired approximately four rounds small arms fire in direction of noise of wire cutting and three rounds 81mm mortar illumination were fired. Under illumination six VC were observed running in a southwest direction. PF's fired approximately 70 rounds small arms fire with inconclusive results. From 080645H until 080730H CAC I squad conducted a search from coordinates (BT 333176) to vicinity (BT 333178) with inconclusive results.

21. 090800H CAC I fire team security patrol coordinates (BT 488103) located approximately 140 propaganda leaflets distributed along road from vicinity (BT 487103) to vicinity (BT 487104). Leaflets were printed in English and stated "Happy New Year, Merry Christmas, and why are you fighting here". Approximately 150 meters north of CAC I platoon combat base coordinates (BT 488103) patrol located a mound of dirt in the road which appeared to be a mine. A North Vietnamese flag (Red and Blue background with a gold star) was found hanging from a tree in close proximity of the dirt mound. The mound of dirt was probed for possible mine and found to contain 12 small pieces of metal and numerous small rocks. The mound of dirt was destroyed. The flag and leaflets were forwarded to Battalion S-2.

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22. 090900H CAC I squad security patrol coordinates (BT 384149), located four bamboo stakes four inches in diameter, each stake approximately 12 inches above the ground. The stakes were placed in a diamond pointing towards an artillery gun position located at the Battalion combat base. The stakes which were in a defilade position were approximately 150 meters from the combat base. The position and configuration of the stakes indicated a possible mortar position. The stakes were forwarded to Battalion S-2.

23. 092000H CAC I squad ambush coordinates (BT 312174), was approaching ambush site when they received approximately six to ten rounds small arms fire from an estimated six VC coordinates (BT 312173). VC appeared to be moving to the same ambush site as CAC I squad. Returned approximately 180 rounds small arms fire and three rounds 81mm mortar illumination were fired. VC broke contact and withdrew in a westerly direction. VC were dressed in black and white clothing. From 100645H until 100730H area was searched by squad patrol from coordinates (BT 312174) to coordinates (BT 312173) with inconclusive results.

24. 101130H Company D squad security patrol encountered nine Vietnamese on trail at (BT 365129). The Vietnamese indicated they wanted to become refugees by holding refugee leaflets and pointing to the sky. By pointing the general direction of THON HAI (1) they indicated they were from that area. The refugees consisted of 3 males, one in his late 20's, the others in their 40's; two women, one in mid 20's and one approximately 50 years old; four children, one about 6 months old and three from eight to ten years old. After these Vietnamese and their personal effects were searched with nothing suspicious found, the refugees were escorted to the Battalion combat base and then to LY TIN District Headquarters.

25. 102145H CAC I squad ambush patrol while moving toward ambush site, coordinates (BT 321179) received one fragmentation grenade believed to have been thrown from 20 to 30 meters south of patrol position. Patrol returned approximately 50 rounds small arms fire and five rounds 81mm mortar illumination were fired. As area was illuminated patrol received another grenade from the same area. Patrol returned approximately 75 rounds small arms fire and moved out in a skirmish line towards area of enemy position. Patrol was directed to return to combat base and while enroute, received two more fragmentation grenades and ten rounds small arms fire, from the south. Patrol returned approximately 100 rounds small arms fire. VC fire ceased. Patrol returned to combat base. During debriefing the following was determined: Houses in area were not lighted as usual, the foot bridge crossing small stream vicinity (BT 322179) was missing, ambush site was near CAC combat base covering an avenue of approach to CAC position. It appeared VC were moving into a position to observe or establish an ambush and were surprised by CAC I patrol as they were proceeding to their ambush site. From 102330H until 110100H squad security patrol searched the area from vicinity (BT 321179) to a 300 meter radius with inconclusive results.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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26. 110935H Company A squad security patrol coordinates (BT 362145) observed five VC at a range of approximately 200 meters across river at coordinates (BT 364143), moving in a southwesterly direction. VC were black clothing and carried light colored packs and weapons. The patrol identified two of the weapons as being carbines and one as being an M-1. As the patrol moved in a southwesterly direction in order to facilitate closer observation the VC spotted the patrol and fled in a northeasterly direction. No rounds were fired by either patrol. Visual contact was lost and not regained of VC patrol. Other security patrols in area were alerted of VC patrol.

27. 111405H A mine clearing team from Company D, 9th Engineer Battalion coordinates (BT 399150) was clearing a mine field which was left in area by RVNs when one of the engineers set off two M-14 anti-personnel mines wounding himself in the legs and feet. Another engineer in area received fragments in the face. Two corpsmen from Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines rushed into the minefield to administer first aid. One of the corpsmen set off another anti-personnel mine wounding himself in the legs and feet, the other corpsman sustained fragments in the face. All four wounded personnel were medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion at 111425H.

28. 112315H Company A commenced 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

29. 120725H Company A squad security patrol coordinates (BT 381116) observed an estimated 15 VC wearing black clothing carrying weapons and moving northwest approximately 1000 meters away vicinity (BT 388117). At 120740H artillery and tank fire missions were initiated. A total of 100 rounds 105mm and 17 rounds 90mm were fired with good coverage of target area. From 120830H to 121045H a search was conducted from coordinates (BT 383124) to (BT 378118). One blood trail was found at coordinates (BT 379117). Estimate one VC KIA. Probable.

30. 120820H Company A squad security patrol at coordinates (BT 389111) received four rounds small arms fire from one sniper at a range of 400 meters from vicinity coordinates (BT 390114). Patrol returned ten rounds 7.62mm and maneuvered to envelope sniper. A subsequent search was conducted of enemy sniper activity area with inconclusive results.

31. 121345H Company A terminated 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

32. 122225H Company C commenced 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

33. 131245H Company C terminated 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

34. 132230H Company D squad ambush coordinates (BT 395178) received three rounds small arms fire from a southwesterly direction approximately 200 meters away vicinity (BT 394176). No fire was returned. No further fire was received. No movement or any unusual activity was noticed. Believed that rounds were fired at random from PF's located at bridge (BT 399174).

35. 14Feb67: Negative contact throughout the day.

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36. 150900H A Marine from 3rd Amphib Bn in support of Company A assisted by three PF's apprehended one VCS in hamlet adjacent to Company A platoon combat base at (BT 433162). VCS was caught in the process of beating a Vietnamese girl in a store. VCS attempted to flee upon observing Marine and PF's. When apprehended the VCS threatened Marine and PF's with a fragmentation grenade. PF's interrogated VCS and obtained signed statement pertaining to his past VC activities. VCS was interrogated by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines S-2 and denied everything including information contained in his written statement. VCS and statements were forwarded to 9th ITT.

37. 151305H Company D commenced 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

38. 151440H CMC I squad security patrol coordinates (BT 339168) while searching village observed a male VCS dressed in blue pajamas run from one house into another. Patrol pursued and apprehended VCS. VCS had no I.D. card and was approximately 17 to 20 years old. VCS was forwarded to 9th ITT.

39. 151500H Company D S&D operation coordinates (BT 373155) while searching hamlet platoon observed two VCS watching platoon's activities. Squad was dispatched to envelope VCS. As the squad moved forward the VCS ran in a southwesterly direction. The squad shouted halt three times in Vietnamese and VCS continued to run. Ten rounds small arms fire were fired as warning shots. After physically pursuing VCS for approximately 300 meters, patrol lost sight of VCS due to brush. Patrol stopped pursuing VCS and searched area and apprehended the VCS. He was very nervous and was breathing hard as if he had been running. VCS had an I.D. card which indicated he was 35 years old. However, VCS appeared to be only approximately 18-20 years old. VCS was forwarded to Battalion S-2 for further disposition to 9th ITT.

40. Company D terminated 12 hour search and destroy operation in Battalion TAOR.

41. 161130H 1st Plt Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

42. 161715H 1st Plt Company G, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

43. 161745H Company D(-), 1st Battalion, 26th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

44. 170120H Six villagers brought one wounded PF to 1st Platoon Company A combat base coordinates (BT 436161). Villagers stated that two VC fired five rounds small arms fire and threw an unknown type explosive believed to be a fragmentation grenade, killing one PF and wounding another. A squad security patrol conducted a search from 170630H to 170830H from coordinates (BT 436161) to coordinates (BT 434161) where incident occurred. Due to extensive damage to hut, it was believed explosion was caused by a homemade type bomb instead of fragmentation grenade. Expended cartridges found in area were smaller than .45 caliber and were possibly fired by a chicom automatic weapon. Questioning of a PF and woman who was inside of hut at time of incident revealed that a PF and the Hamlet Chief of HOA XUAN named (ANH-XUY) were

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present at time of the incident. These men could be located. Wounded PF was brought to 1st Batt 5th Marines aid station treated and forwarded to 1st Medical Battalion.

45. 170200H CAC I machine gun emplacement coord (BT 324181) received one incoming fragmentation grenade from direction of TAM KY River vicinity coord (BT 323182). CAC I returned ten rounds small arms fire and one grenade with unknown results. Search was made by squad from 170630H to 170730H from coordinates (BT 324181) to (BT 323182) with inconclusive results.

46. 170900H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) commenced operation "RIO GRANDE". (Refer to Tab C and Tab D)

47. 18Feb67, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) continued operation "RIO GRANDE". (Refer to Tab C and C and D)

48. 181700H Company A fire team security patrol at coordinates (BT 435162) apprehended one VCS. VCS attempted to flee when he observed patrol. VCS was approximately 17-20 years old and had no I.D. card. VCS was forwarded to Battalion S-2 for interrogation and further disposition to 9th ITT.

49. 19Feb67 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) continued operation "RIO GRANDE". (Refer to Tab C and D)

50. 20Feb67 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) continued operation "RIO GRANDE". (Refer to Tab C and D)

51. 200630H CAC I (-) commenced search and clear operation in Battalion TAO.

52. 201430H CAC I (-) terminated search and clear operation in Battalion TAO.

53. 21Feb67 1stBn, 5thMar (-)(Rein) continued operation "RIO GRANDE". (Refer to Tab C and D)

54. 221145H Company A platoon fire team security patrol (BT 425125) apprehended one male VCS approximately 35 years old. VCS dressed in blue shirt and black trousers, and had no I.D. card. VCS forwarded to Battalion S-2.

55. 22Feb67 Company G, 1st Plt, 2ndBn, 7th Marines returned to parent organization from OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

56. 22Feb67 Company D, 3rd platoon 1st Battalion, 7th Marines returned to parent organization from OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

57. 221930H Operation "RIO GRANDE" terminated. (Refer to Tab C and D)

58. 231400H Company A first platoon squad security patrol coordinates (BT 475124) located five shotguns, sixteen twelve gauge shells, one US caliber M3A1 submachine gun and four USM1 carbines concealed under matts in an unoccupied hut. Weapons were forwarded to Battalion S-2. Upon checking with LY TIN District Senior U.S. Advisor it was determined that weapons belonged to PF's of LY TIN District. Weapons were turned over to LY TIN District Headquarters.

59. 240910H Company A OPCON CHU LAI Defense Command.

60. 241110H Company B returned from OPCON CHU LAI Defense Command.

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61. 242200H Company C commenced 12 hour search and destroy operation in northwestern sector of the Battalion.

62. 250745H Company B S&D mission coordinates (BT 316144) received three rounds sniper fire from an estimated one sniper at coordinates (BT 313144). Sniper was unobserved. No fire was returned. A fire team security patrol was dispatched to search area. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

63. 251410H Company B terminated 12 hour search and destroy operation in northwestern sector of the Battalion TAOR.

64. 25Feb67 3rd platoon Company I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

65. 25Feb67 3rd platoon Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.


66. 26Feb67 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) commenced operation "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI" 1st Battalion Operation Order 10-67. (Refer to Tab B)

67. 261630H C&C I squad security patrol coordinates (BT 348160) received approximately twenty-five rounds small arms fire from an estimated one sniper approximately 300 meters south of patrol coordinates (BT 384157). Activity returned approximately one hundred rounds small arms fire in vicinity of sniper. Sniper could not be observed. A search of the area was made with inconclusive results.

68. 27Feb67 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) continued operation "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI". (Refer to Tab B)

69. 271545H Co D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines OPCON 1st Battalion, 5th Marines squad security patrol accompanied by CIT personnel and Vietnamese agent found and destroyed two tunnels, one 2' X 2' X 2' and one 6' X 6' X 6' at coordinates (BT 399114). Patrol apprehended two VCS, one male and one female without I.D. cards in house near tunnels. One Chicom grenade was found in house. Hamlet Chief said these people provided supplies for VC. Ages of VCS in the 60's. VCS and grenade returned to Battalion S-2 and forwarded to 9th ITF.

70. 28Feb67 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) continued operation "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI". (Refer to Tab B).



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SUPPORTING AIDS

- Tab A - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 8-67 (Operation CLAY)
- Tab B - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report (Operation CLAY)
- ✓ Tab C - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 9-67 (Operation RIO GRANDE)
- ✓ Tab D - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat After Action Report (Operation RIO GRANDE)
- ✓ Tab E - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 10-67 (Operation "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI")

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ENCLOSURE (1)

7 FXRAY 0080-67
22 of 30

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU IAI, RVN
S&C Ser. No. 033-67

Brig Order 8-67

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6639 I, 6640 II, 6740 III, 6740 III, and 6739 IV
(b) BnO 3300.1 Rules of Engagement
(c) BnO 3000.2A SOP for Operations
(d) BnO 2000.11B SOP for Communications

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. Situation

- a. Enemy Forces. See current Intsums
b. Friendly Forces

(1) 7th Marines continues operations within assigned TAOR.

(2) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines continues operations within assigned TAOR and conducts special operations from 29-31 in Southern portion of Battalion TAOR. (Area Southward East of (BT 5809)).

(3) CAC I continues operations in assigned Sub-TAOR.

(4) Artillery

(a) 2nd Bn(-), 11th Mar, direct support of 5th Marines.

(b) Element of 4th Bn(-), 11th Mar general support/reinforcing.

(5) Air. 1st MAW provides air support as required.

c. Attachments and Detachments

(1) Detachments

(a) One platoon Co A OPCON 1/5 rear.

(b) One platoon Co A OPCON 1/5 rear.

(c) One platoon Co D OPCON 1/5 rear.

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2. MISSION

Commencing H-Hour on D-Day 1stBn, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) conducts search and destroy operation in objective area to locate and destroy Local Forces VC.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. On D-1 1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) moves with two companies to attack positions. At H-Hour on D-Day, 1/5 encircles enemy in Phu Duc valley and conducts coordinated search and destroy operations for a period of three to five days.

b. Company C(-)(Rein)

(1) On order on D-1 move overland to attack position (See Annex B) (Operation Overlay).

(2) At H-Hour commence S&D operation IAW operation overlay and secure objectives 2 and 3 on order secure objectives 2 and 3.

(3) Be prepared on order to conduct other missions as assigned.

c. Company D(-)(Rein)

(1) On order on D-1 move overland to attack position (See Annex B) (Operation Overlay).

(2) At H-Hour commence S&D operations IAW operation overlay and secure objectives 5, 2, 3, and 4 as directed.

(3) Be prepared on order to conduct other missions as assigned.

d. Company A(-)(Rein)

(1) At L-Hour D-Day land in LZ CROW and secure perimeter.

(2) Commence S&D operations IAW operation overlay and secure objectives 1 and 5 as directed.

(3) Be prepared to execute other missions as assigned.

e. CAC "Y" (-)

(1) Commencing H-Hour on D-Day establish blocking positions IAW operation overlay.

(2) Be prepared to conduct other missions as assigned.

2. 81mm Mortar Plt(-). Direct Support Co A.

3. 1stBn. 5thMar (Rear).

(1) Conduct operation in areas of TAOR east of objective area.

(2) Position one squad OP with voice radio relay capability coordinates (BF 357130) on order

4. Battalion Reserve.

(1) Platoon Company C be prepared to reinforce operating units.

(2) One platoon Company D be prepared to reinforce operating units.

5. Company E. OPCON CLDC

6. Coordinating Instructions

(1) D-Day: On Order

(2) H-Hour: On order

(3) L-Hour: On order

(4) Rules of Engagement apply (Reference B).

(5) Report as follows will be submitted.

(a) Spot reports as occurring.

(b) Position reports hourly/reaching check points/phase lines/objective.

(c) Summary of activity by 1800 daily

(6) Psy-war operation

(a) Each company carry Chieu Hoi Leaflets.

(b) Each company carry TET Leaflets.

(c) Psy-war Officer coordinate Psy-war operation.

(7) Reference (c) applies.

(8) CO, 1/5 coordinates linking with blocking force.

(9) Wear helmets and upper body armor.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Carry 6 MCI
- b. Carry BA ammunition
- c. Carry rope for stream crossings.
- d. LSA at Combat Base.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

- a. Command group will move with Company C.
- b. Communications- Electronic. See Reference (d) (SOP for Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER



R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ANNEX A - Task Organization

B - Operation Overlay

Operation Order 8-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, RVN
282030H January 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 8-67

Time Zones H

(All Attachments effective on order)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein)

Major HILGARTER

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

Capt DARLING

Det, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqBtry, 1st MarDiv

Plt Co__ 1stSpBn

Det, HqBtry, 2/11

ARVN InO

Co A(-)(Rein)

1stLt BLADES

FO Tn, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Det, 1stEngBn

Det, ARVN Interpreter

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FAC

S-2 Scout

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

A-1

Co G (-)(Rein)

Capt. CASWELL

FO Tn, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Det, 1stEngBn

Det, ARVN Interpreter

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

CoD (-)(Rein)

FO Tn, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Det, 1stEngBn

Det, ARVN Interpreter

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

1stBn, 5thMar (Rein)

Major ALGER

H&S Co (-)

Plt, Co A

Plt, Co D

Plt Co C

Prov Plt, H&S Co, 1/5

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. Alger

R. J. ALGER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

Appendix 1 (Command Groups)

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution)
to Operation Order 8-67

ANNEX B (Operation Overlay to Bn. Reg Order 8-67)

$$\begin{array}{r} 29 \\ + 18 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

Ref: Map RVN 1:50,000
AMS Series L7014
Sheet 6739LV

Time Zone: H



11(-)
5
1(-)
5

BIRD

FCL

LZ
CROW

BY COMMAND OF MAJ. P. L. HILGARTNER

R. Allen

H. J. ALGER

Majors, U. S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

09
35

DISTRIBUTION: See Annex Z

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 3. All copies of this document
 4. All copies of this document

Annex 2 (Distribution List) to Operation Order 2-6)

Time 1000. 1

Distribution:	CC, 1stMarDiv	15
	CC, Task Force X-Ray	15
	CC, 7th Marines	15
	MAA-36	15
	MAA-12	15
	11th Marines	15
	CC, 5th Marines	15
	CC, Co A 1/5	15
	CC, Co B 1/5	15
	CC, Co C 1/5	15
	CC, 1stMgBn	15
	CC, 1stSpBn	15

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. Auer
 R. J. AUER

Major, US M. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, RVN
 SAC Sec. No. 034-67

Change No. 1 to Frag Order 8-67

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Make the following pen changes to Frag Order 8-67:

A. Basic Order

- (1) Delete para 1. b. (3)
- (2) Re-number para 1. b. (4) to 1.b(3).
- (3) Re-number para 1. b. (5) to 1.b.(4).
- (4) Para 3.d, insert new sub-para as follows (1) on order on D-1 move by motor convey to vicinity CAC "I" combat base. Re-number present 3.d (1) thru (3) to read (2) to (4).
- (5) Para 3.h (b) and (2). Change each sub-para to read-- reinforce/ assume mission of operating units."
- (6) Change para 3.j, to read:
 - (1) D-Day - 31Jan67 (For planning purposes)
 - (2) H-Hour - 310645H (For planning purposes)
 - (3) L-Hour - 310720H (For planning purposes)
- (7) Change para 3.j. (2) to read:
 - (a) Wear helmets, upper body armor and carry gas mask
- (8) Add: Sub-para 3.j. "(10) CS will be used only on order of CO, 1stBn, 5thMar." "(11) Motor convoy to CAC "I" combat base depart E11 54 at 301500H Jan67" on order.
- (9) Add: Sub-para 4.a.

"a. Each company carry 8 CS grenades.


B. Annex B

- (1) Remove and insert enclosure (1) to this change therefore.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR EILGARTNER

R. J. Alger
 R. J. ALGER
 Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

Time Zone: H



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TFXRAY 0163-67
5 of 25

7 of 60

7th Marines S&C No. 0013467
3/LID/jfs
3480
17 Feb 1967

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CO, 1st Bn, 5th Mar ltr 3/MTC/dab over 3480 Ser 0032-67 of 4 Feb 1967

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
VIA: Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation CLAY

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. The comments made in paragraph 14A of the basic report address a matter of continuing concern throughout this command: the ability of the individual Marine to effectively engage enemy targets with accurate small arms fire. Instructions on techniques of fire and utilization of existing range facilities will continue to be stressed during all marksmanship training.

C. C. CROSSFIELD

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, 1st Mar Div
CG, TF X-Ray
CO, 5th Mar
CO, MAG-36
CO, MAG-12
CO, MAG-13
CO, 1st FAG, 11th Mar
CO, 2nd Bn, 1st FAG, 11th Mar
CO, 4th Bn, 1st FAG, 11th Mar
CO, 1st SP Bn
CO, Co B, 1st SP Bn
CO, 1st Engr Bn
CO, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMP
FPO, San Francisco 95602

3/MTC/dah
3480
003267
4Feb1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Copy 7 of 75 copies.

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report; Operation "CLAY"

Ref: (a) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag 0 8-67
(b) DivO 3430.1
(c) Maps: Vietnamese AMS L7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6639IV
6640III, 6740III and 6739IV

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay D-1
(2) Operation Overlay D-Day
(3) Night Disposition and Activities D-Day
(4) Operation Overlay D+1
(5) Night Disposition and Activities D+1
(6) Operation Overlay D+2

1. Code name and type of operation.

Operation "CLAY" (Search and Destroy)

2. Dates of Operation.

311600H Jan67 to 031800H Feb67

3. Location. Vicinity of the Northwestern area of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
TAOR and adjacent RAOR, LY TEN and TAM KY District, QUANG TIN Province, RVN;
on map sheets AMS L7014, 1:50,000 sheets 6639I, 6640II, 6740III and 6739IV.

4. Command Headquarters.

CO, 1stBn, 5th Marines (-)

MAJ. P. L. HILGARTNER

CO, Co A, 1stBn, 5th Marines

1stLt L. G. HUTCHESON

CO, Co C, 1stBn, 5th Marines

Capt R. J. CASWELL

CO, Co D, 1stBn, 5th Marines

Capt J. J. CARTY

CO, CAC-I, 1stBn, 5thMarines

1stLt A. C. MULLINAX

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOB DIR 5200.10

TAB-B

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8. Mission. Commencing H-Hour on D-Day the 1stBn, 5th Marines conducted search and destroy operations in objective area to locate and destroy local force VC.

9. Concept of Operation.

(a) On D-1, two rifle companies, Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) moved overland to attack positions vicinity (BT 343112) and (BT 334153). Refer to enclosure (1).

(b) At H-Hour on D-Day Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) commenced search and destroy operations as the Combined Action Company (-) established two blocking positions vicinity (BT 312173) to (BT 318173) and (BT 323169) to (BT 326164). At L-Hour on D-Day Company A(-)(Rein) and the Battalion Command Group moved by helicopters to LZ vicinity (BT 315110), secured the LZ perimeter and established the Battalion Command Post. Company A(-)(Rein) then conducted search and destroy operations. Refer to enclosure (2).

10. Execution.

A. D-1 31 January 1967 (Refer enclosure (1)).

(1) 311600H Company C(Rein) commenced movement by foot to attack position vicinity (BT 343112).

(2) 311600H Company D(-)(Rein) commenced movement by foot to attack position vicinity (BT 334153).

(3) 311805H Company C(Rein) detached one rifle squad (Rein) with radio relay capability to proceed to vicinity (BT 357130) to establish a radio relay observation post.

(4) 311930H Squad (Rein) OP/radio relay in position vicinity (BT 357130)

(5) 312035H Company D(-)(Rein) in attack position.

(6) 312100H Company C(-)(Rein) in attack position.

B. D-Day 1 February 1967. Refer to enclosure (2) and (3).

(1) 010635H Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) commenced search and destroy operations vicinity objective 9 (BT 326113) and objective 3 (BT 304148), respectively.

(2) 010715H First Helicopter wave arrived LZ vicinity (BT 402147) and embarked initial elements of Company A(-)(Rein).

(3) 010715H Battery L, 4thBn, 11thMar commenced preparatory fires on LZ vicinity (BT 315110) and ceased firing at 010735H.

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(15) 011045H Company A(-)(Rein) found six booby trapped 60mm mortar rounds buried nose up vicinity (BT 313101). Booby traps removed and destroyed.

(16) 011050H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 325111) received 60 rounds small arms fire from approximately four VC at a range of approximately 200 meters vicinity (BT 323111) and (BT 321114). Company C(-)(Rein) returned 125 rounds small arms fire. VC broke contact and fled in a northwesterly direction. Area searched and machine gun position with twenty .30 cal expended rounds was located.

(17) 011055H Company A(-)(Rein) established platoon OP vicinity (BT 303117).

(18) 011110H Company D(-)(Rein) commenced movement from objective 3 vicinity (BT 305145) to objective 4 vicinity (BT 310135), continuing S&D operation.

(19) 011150H Company A(-)(Rein) located and destroyed Chicom AP mine vicinity (BT 315110).

(20) 011225H Company D(-)(Rein) established blocking positions at (BT 315128) and (BT 319126).

(21) 011330H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 327117) observed five VC at a distance of approximately 300 meters, carrying packs and carbines, wearing black pajamas moving west vicinity (BT 331115). Company C(-)(Rein) fired 125 rounds 7.62. VC fled in a southwesterly direction. While pursuing the five VC, Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 319115) received approximately 400 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 18-20 VC wearing black pajamas carrying weapons and packs from a range of approximately 350 meters vicinity (BT 328110). Company C(-)(Rein) returned fire with 1000 rounds 7.62, 18 rounds 60mm mortar H.E., 15 rounds M-79 and two rounds 81mm mortar W.P. VC broke contact and withdrew in a southwesterly direction. Company C(-)(Rein) pursued to vicinity (BT 328110) and conducted a search of the area, 500 meters in all directions and found blood trails leading in southwesterly direction. Results of contact, eight USMC WIA's and two VC WIA's probable and one VC KIA probable.

(22) 011515H Company A(-)(Rein) found one booby trapped American made MK-2 fragmentation grenade with a vine attached as a trip wire. Engineers disarmed and destroyed grenade.

(23) 011600H Combined Action Company I blocking forces withdrew and returned to combat base to resume assigned mission.

(24) 011600H One Marine from Company A while moving along a trail vicinity (BT 320103) to Recon for a better observation position, observed four VC moving southwest vicinity (BT 321104) wearing black trousers and gray shirts, carrying three packs and one rifle. Marine fired three rounds 7.62 wounding one VC. The other VC picked up the wounded VC and fled in a northwesterly direction. Result of contact, 1 VC WIA confirmed.

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(9) 021230H Company A(-)(Rein) coord (BT 310123) received approximately 30 rounds small arms fire from an unobserved VC sniper at a range of approximately 200 meters vicinity (BT 314118). Company A(-)(Rein) returned fire with approximately 300 rounds 7.62mm. VC broke contact and fled in an unknown direction. Area searched with inconclusive results. Results of contact, 1 USMC WIA.

(10) 021450H Company A(-)(Rein) and Battalion Command Group commenced movement from vicinity (BT 317122) to vicinity (BT 318129).

(11) 021500H Company D(-)(Rein) effected rendezvous with Combined Action Company I at coord (BT 320170) and turned refugees over to Combined Action Company I.

(12) 021515H Company D(-)(Rein) proceeded to vicinity (BT 353148) to conduct S&D operations.

(13) 021530H Company A(-)(Rein), Company C(-)(Rein) and Command Group established command post vicinity (BT 318129).

(14) 021735H 5th Marine scout/sniper team, attached to Company A (BT 319130) observed two VC at a range of approximately 1000 meters coord (BT 309124) one dressed in black and the other in green carrying a weapon. Scout sniper team fired one round 7.62mm at VC carrying weapon. VC fell into thick brush out of sight. The second VC ran to the fallen VC and disappeared into the brush. Due to approaching darkness and distance involved, no search was conducted. Results of contact, 1 VC WIA probable.

(15) 021800H Company D(-)(Rein) found 250 leaflets wrapped in plastic in an abandoned pagoda vicinity (BT 348156). The following day, civilians in the Duc Bo area, vicinity (BT 375155) verified that the leaflets were VC propaganda material. Leaflets forwarded to 9TH ITT.

(16) 021840H Squad ambush patrol Company D(-)(Rein) coord (BT 353159) while moving to ambush site received one round small arms fire from a sniper dressed in black pajamas wearing coolie hat and towel tied around neck. Round was fired from an estimated range of 75 meters vicinity (BT 354159). Patrol returned fire with 2 rounds M-79 and 50 rounds 7.62mm. VC appeared to be hit and fell to ground, got up and ran in a northerly direction. Patrol pursued, but lost contact with VC when he entered dense brush. Due to rapidly approaching darkness, patrol continued assigned mission. Results of contact, 1 VC WIA probable.

(17) 021900H Disposition of forces and night activities IAW enclosure (5).

D. D+2 3 February 1967. Refer to enclosure (6).

(1) 030715H All units commenced movement to conduct S&D operations IAW enclosure (6). Company C(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 318129) to (BT 358148) to (BT 397145); Company A(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 318129) to (BT 342155) to (BT 397145) and Company D(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 358148) to (BT 397145). Command Group moved out with Company C(-)(Rein).

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5. Task Organization.1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein)

MAJ. P. J. HILGARTNER

H&S Company (-)(Rein)

Capt M. B. DARLING

Det, Btry D, 2/11

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Co A(-)(Rein)

1stLt L. G. HUTCHESON

FO Tm, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Sqd, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Co C(-)(Rein)

Capt R. J. CASWELL

FO Tm, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Sqd Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Co B, 1stSP Bn

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Co D(-)(Rein)

Capt J. J. CARTY

FO Tm, Btry D, 2/11

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Sqd, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

CAC-I(-)

1stLt A. C. MULLINAX

6. Supporting Forces.

A. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support. Operation "CLAY" commenced on 1Feb67. On D-Day, six CH-46 helicopters transported 170 troops consisting of one rifle company and the Battalion Command Group from coordinates (BT 402147) to coordinates (BT 315110). The transport aircraft were escorted by two armed HU-1E helicopters and two fixed wing aircraft. The transport aircraft received light small arms fire during the final approach phase of the landing. The hostile fire was suppressed by the HU-1E aircraft. On touchdown in the LZ (BT 315110), the lead CH-46 activated a booby trapped 60mm mortar round resulting in moderate damage to the tail assembly of the aircraft. This aircraft was no longer capable of continuing the mission, and returned to KI HA Air Facility. Five CH-46 helicopters completed the mission without further incident.

On D-Day, two separate medical evacuation missions were conducted. Each mission consisted of one UH-34, and one armed HU-1E. Both medical evacuation missions were completed without incident. On D+2, one medical evacuation mission was conducted. The mission again consisted of one UH-34, and one armed HU-1E and was completed without incident.

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(2) Fixed Wing. Two fixed wing aircraft were on station for the troop lift on D-Day. Due to the prevailing weather, these aircraft could not be utilized. No other fixed wing aircraft were utilized in support of Operation "CLAY".

(3) General. Helicopter support was excellent.

B. Artillery.

(1) Artillery Support. Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of 1stBn, 5th Marines during Operation "CLAY". During the Operation artillery support provided fires for preparation of landing zones, observed missions, and H&I missions.

(a) On D-Day, landing zone artillery preparatory fires were fired at coordinates (BT 315110). One hundred and twenty rounds were fired.

(b) On D+1, the Forward Observer with Company A controlled a fire mission on seven VC moving along a trail. Seven rounds were fired on target and coverage was excellent. A search of the area was conducted and produced inconclusive results.

(c) H&I's were fired nightly throughout the operation. A total of nine concentrations and 61 rounds were fired in support of Operation "CLAY". H&I target surveillance was not feasible due to Battalion's assigned mission.

7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of VC strength, location and disposition in the objective area

(1) Forces anticipated in the immediate objective area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
Confirmed 14th LF Co	BT 3212	50-100	Unknown
Probable 706th LF Co	BT 3211	50-100	Unknown
Probable 74th LF Co	BT 3014	50-100	Unknown
Probable 201st Bn	Unknown	300	Unknown
Probable 409th Sapper Bn	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

(2) Agent reports indicated that the above units would combine to harass Marine positions prior to TBT.

(3) Intelligence gained from VCC and VCS confirmed that the 14th LF Co operates in the immediate objective area.

(4) Interrogation of VCC and VCS revealed that there are hamlet oriented guerrillas belonging to no military or para-military unit, operating in the immediate objective area.

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(5) The objective of this operation was to fix and destroy VC in this sector of the TAOR.

b. VC strength and situation actually found as operation was conducted.

(1) Light contact was made throughout the operation, with the exception of the contact made by Co C on D-Day with an estimated 13 to 20 VC.

c. VC units identified

14th Local-Force Company

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) Landing zones used frequently in this sector of the TAOR can be expected to be mined (e.g. LZ-hill 302, vicinity of BT 315110).

(2) VC units requisition rice from the immediate objective area and transport it west of the En TAOR.

(3) As evidenced by the 16 refugees requesting evacuation from this area, the VC are taxing the people heavily. More refugees can be expected as operations continue in the recently expanded portions of the Battalion TAOR.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

Hill 302

Hill 68

(2) The terrain in the immediate objective area is composed of narrow rice paddies bounded by thickly brush covered hills. Hill 302 dominates the main corridor in this valley and is an excellent observation post. Hill 68 divides the valley and is generally covered by dense undergrowth which averages six to ten feet in height. Movement across the many fingers of hill 68 is facilitated by the several footpaths. The thick brush covered hills limit fields of fire and observation and afford excellent withdrawal routes for the enemy.

(3) Obstacles

a None

b During the dry season it is felt that this area would be trafficable by tracked vehicles.

(4) Avenues of approach - trails into this valley from north, northeast, south and southeast are excellent for foot troops. Avenues of approach providing cover and concealment are limited as open rice paddies must be traversed.

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8. Mission. Commencing H-Hour on D-Day the 1stBn, 5th Marines conducted search and destroy operations in objective area to locate and destroy local force VC.

9. Concept of Operation.

(a) On D-1, two rifle companies, Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) moved overland to attack positions vicinity (BT 343112) and (BT 334153). Refer to enclosure (1).

(b) At H-Hour on D-Day Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) commenced search and destroy operations as the Combined Action Company (-) established two blocking positions vicinity (BT 312173) to (BT 318173) and (BT 323169) to (BT 326164). At L-Hour on D-Day Company A(-)(Rein) and the Battalion Command Group moved by helicopters to LZ vicinity (BT 315110), secured the LZ perimeter and established the Battalion Command Post. Company A(-)(Rein) then conducted search and destroy operations. Refer to enclosure (2).

10. Execution.

A. D-1 31 January 1967 (Refer enclosure (1)).

(1) 311600H Company C(Rein) commenced movement by foot to attack position vicinity (BT 343112).

(2) 311600H Company D(-)(Rein) commenced movement by foot to attack position vicinity (BT 334153).

(3) 311805H Company C(Rein) detached one rifle squad (Rein) with radio relay capability to proceed to vicinity (BT 357130) to establish a radio relay observation post.

(4) 311930H Squad (Rein) OP/radio relay in position vicinity (BT 35713

(5) 312035H Company D(-)(Rein) in attack position.

(6) 312100H Company C(-)(Rein) in attack position.

B. D-Day 1 February 1967. Refer to enclosure (2) and (3).

(1) 010635H Company C(-)(Rein) and Company D(-)(Rein) commenced search and destroy operations vicinity objective 9 (BT 326113) and objective 3 (BT 304148), respectively.

(2) 010715H First Helicopter wave arrived LZ vicinity (BT 402147) and embarked initial elements of Company A(-)(Rein).

(3) 010715H Battery L, 4thBn, 11thMar commenced preparatory fires on LZ vicinity (BT 315110) and ceased firing at 010735H.

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(4) 010745H two units from the Combined Action Company I were in assigned blocking positions vicinity (BT 312173) to (BT 316173) and (BT 323169) to (BT 326164).

(5) 010750H 1st wave of the heliborne forces (Company A(-)(Rein) landed in LZ vicinity (BT 315110). While landing in LZ, first helicopter received undetermined amount of small arms fire and detonated a booby trapped 60mm mortar round in the LZ. The helicopter was slightly damaged. Company A(-)(Rein) sustained three USMC WIA's.

(6) 010845H Company C(-)(Rein) (BT 335105) encountered one VC carrying a weapon, dressed in green clothing vicinity (BT 331106) at a range of approximately 200 meters moving in a southeasterly direction. Company C(-)(Rein) fired 2 rounds M-79 at VC who fled in a northeasterly direction. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

(7) 010850H Company A(-)(Rein) located three booby trapped 60mm mortar rounds buried nose up vicinity (BT 317109). Booby traps were removed and destroyed.

(8) 010900H Company D(-)(Rein) (BT 309145) received 10 rounds small arms fire from an estimated five VC from a range of approximately 200 meters, vicinity (BT 307145). VC were dressed in black PJ's and armed with carbines. Company D(-)(Rein) returned 50 rounds of 7.62mm and two M-79 rounds. VC broke contact, moving in a westerly direction. Area searched with inconclusive results.

(9) 010905H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 327108) received approximately 300 rounds small arms fire and approximately four rounds of .50 caliber fire from an undetermined number of VC, fired from a range of approximately 450 meters vicinity (BT 328116) to (BT 323113). Company C(-)(Rein) returned fire with 100 rounds 7.62, two rounds 3.5 W.P., seven rounds M-79 and eleven rounds 60mm mortar H.E. VC broke contact and withdrew in a southerly direction. Company C(-)(Rein) pursued VC and searched area with inconclusive results. Company C(-)(Rein) sustained one USMC WIA.

(10) 010930H Company A(-)(Rein) and Command Group in LZ (BT 315110). Command post was established vicinity (BT 318111).

(11) 010930H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 327107) observed one squad of VC at a range of approximately 600 meters vicinity (BT 328114). VC carried weapons. Three rounds 81mm mortar H.E. fired on target. Company C(-)(Rein) searched area with inconclusive results.

(12) 010930H Company D(-)(Rein) commenced S&D operation vicinity objective 3 coord (BT 308148) and established a company patrol base.

(13) 011000H Company C(-)(Rein) vicinity (BT 326117).

(14) 011010H Company D(-)(Rein) while continuing search and destroy operation vicinity (BT 305145), apprehended one male VCS, age 22, without I. D. card, wearing white pajamas. VCS was forwarded to 9th ITT for interrogation.

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(15) 011045H Company A(-)(Rein) found six booby trapped 60mm mortar rounds buried nose up vicinity (BT 313101). Booby traps removed and destroyed.

(16) 011050H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 325111) received 60 rounds small arms fire from approximately four VC at a range of approximately 200 meters vicinity (BT 323111) and (BT 321114). Company C(-)(Rein) returned 125 rounds small arms fire. VC broke contact and fled in a northwesterly direction. Area searched and machine gun position with twenty .30 cal expended rounds was located.

(17) 011055H Company A(-)(Rein) established platoon CP vicinity (BT 303117).

(18) 011110H Company D(-)(Rein) commenced movement from objective 3 vicinity (BT 305145) to objective 4 vicinity (BT 310135), continuing S&D operation.

(19) 011150H Company A(-)(Rein) located and destroyed Chicom AP mine vicinity (BT 315110).

(20) 011225H Company D(-)(Rein) established blocking positions at (BT 315128) and (BT 319126).

(21) 011330H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 327117) observed five VC at a distance of approximately 300 meters, carrying packs and carbines, wearing black pajamas moving west vicinity (BT 331115). Company C(-)(Rein) fired 125 rounds 7.62. VC fled in a southwesterly direction. While pursuing the five VC, Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 319115) received approximately 400 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 18-20 VC wearing black pajamas carrying weapons and packs from a range of approximately 350 meters vicinity (BT 328110). Company C(-)(Rein) returned fire with 1000 rounds 7.62, 18 rounds 60mm mortar H.E., 15 rounds M-79 and two rounds 81mm mortar W.P. VC broke contact and withdrew in a southwesterly direction. Company C(-)(Rein) pursued to vicinity (BT 328110) and conducted a search of the area, 500 meters in all directions and found blood trails leading in southwesterly direction. Results of contact, eight USMC WIA's and two VC WIA's probable and one VC KIA probable.

(22) 011515H Company A(-)(Rein) found one booby trapped American made MK-2 fragmentation grenade with a vine attached as a trip wire. Engineers disarmed and destroyed grenade.

(23) 011600H Combined Action Company I blocking forces withdrew and returned to combat base to resume assigned mission.

(24) 011600H One Marine from Company A while moving along a trail vicinity (BT 320103) to Recon for a better observation position, observed four VC moving southwest vicinity (BT 321104) wearing black trousers and gray shirts, carrying three packs and one rifle. Marine fired three rounds 7.62 wounding one VC. The other VC picked up the wounded VC and fled in a northwesterly direction. Result of contact, 1 VC WIA confirmed.

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c. D+1 2 February 1967. Refer to enclosure (4) and (5).

(1) 020300H Company C(-)(Rein) coord (BT 319121) received approximately 10-15 rounds carbine fire from an estimated 2-3 VC from a range of approximately 300 meters vicinity coord (BT 316121). Company C(-)(Rein) returned 25 rounds of 7.62mm and two M-79 rounds. VC broke contact and fled in an undetermined direction. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

(2) 020300H Squad ambush Company D(-)(Rein) coord (BT 318124) observed two VC leave trail and enter tree line at a range of approximately 200 meters vicinity coord (BT 320124). Ambush reoriented and when movement was heard again opened fire with two M-79 rounds and 30 rounds 7.62mm. VC returned 10 rounds small arms fire and fled in an unknown direction. Area was searched at 020645H with inconclusive results.

(3) 020810H Company C(-)(Rein) maintained GP vicinity (BT 317123) and dispatched patrols to conduct search and destroy operations vicinity (BT 318126 (BT 323124), (BT 317123) and (BT 330122).

(4) 020935H Company D(-)(Rein) escorted 16 refugees, who desired relocation to vicinity (BT 320170) where Combined Action Company I provided protection and assistance until arrival of GVN refugee officials.

(5) 020930H Company A(-)(Rein) coord (BT 311115) found and destroyed a VC shelter 3' X 3' X 5'. Shelter had not been recently used.

(6) 021045H Company C coord (BT 320122) received 10 rounds small arms fire from unobserved sniper at a range of 250 meters vicinity (BT 321123). Company C(-)(Rein) returned approximately 70 rounds 7.62, pursued VC, searched area and picked up one male, who admitted being a VC. Other VC in area, fled in unknown direction. VCC carried a bag containing two sets of clothing, one black and one blue.

(7) 201100H 2nd Platoon Company A(-)(Rein) vicinity (BT 299126) observed one VC in a ditch about 50 meters away. The point man fired three rounds 7.62 at VC as he attempted to run. One VC KIA confirmed. At the same time, point observed two other VC wearing black shirts and blue trousers carrying one weapon at a range of approximately 75-100 meters. The point man fired at the two VC, believing he hit one. The two VC disappeared into dense undergrowth in a westerly direction. Platoon searched the area, but due to the dense undergrowth, and the steep incline to the area where VC were observed, requiring considerable amount of time to reach area, search ended with inconclusive results. Result of contact, 1 VC KIA confirmed and 1 VC WIA probable.

(8) 021110H Company A(-)(Rein) (BT 313110) observed through binoculars seven VC, wearing black clothing with one VC carrying weapon moving along a trail vicinity (BT 300134). An artillery mission was fired consisting of nine rounds 155mm H.E. with good target coverage. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

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(9) 021230H Company A(-)(Rein) coord (BT 310123) received approximately 30 rounds small arms fire from an unobserved VC sniper at a range of approximately 200 meters vicinity (BT 314118). Company A(-)(Rein) returned fire with approximately 300 rounds 7.62mm. VC broke contact and fled in an unknown direction. Area searched with inconclusive results. Results of contact, 1 USMC WIA.

(10) 021450H Company A(-)(Rein) and Battalion Command Group commenced movement from vicinity (BT 317122) to vicinity (BT 318129).

(11) 021500H Company D(-)(Rein) effected rendezvous with Combined Action Company I at coord (BT 320170) and turned refugees over to Combined Action Company I.

(12) 021515H Company D(-)(Rein) proceeded to vicinity (BT 353148) to conduct S&D operations.

(13) 021530H Company A(-)(Rein), Company C(-)(Rein) and Command Group established command post vicinity (BT 318129).

(14) 021735H 5th Marine scout/sniper team, attached to Company A (BT 319130) observed two VC at a range of approximately 1000 meters coord (BT 309124) one dressed in black and the other in green carrying a weapon. Scout sniper team fired one round 7.62mm at VC carrying weapon. VC fell into thick brush out of sight. The second VC ran to the fallen VC and disappeared into the brush. Due to approaching darkness and distance involved, no search was conducted. Results of contact, 1 VC WIA probable.

(15) 021800H Company D(-)(Rein) found 250 leaflets wrapped in plastic in an abandoned pagoda vicinity (BT 348156). The following day, civilians in the Duc Bo area, vicinity (BT 375155) verified that the leaflets were VC propaganda material. Leaflets forwarded to 9TH ITT.

(16) 021840H Squad ambush patrol Company D(-)(Rein) coord (BT 353159) while moving to ambush site received one round small arms fire from a sniper dressed in black pajamas wearing coolie hat and towel tied around neck. Round was fired from an estimated range of 75 meters vicinity (BT 354159). Patrol returned fire with 2 rounds M-79 and 50 rounds 7.62mm. VC appeared to be hit and fell to ground, got up and ran in a northerly direction. Patrol pursued, but lost contact with VC when he entered dense brush. Due to rapidly approaching darkness, patrol continued assigned mission. Results of contact, 1 VC WIA probable.

(17) 021900H Disposition of forces and night activities IAW enclosure (5).

D. D+2 3 February 1967. Refer to enclosure (6).

(1) 030715H All units commenced movement to conduct S&D operations IAW enclosure (6). Company C(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 318129) to (BT 337126) to (BT 358148) to (BT 397145); Company A(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 318129) to (BT 342155) to (BT 397145) and Company D(-)(Rein) from vicinity (BT 358148) to (BT 397145). Command Group moved out with Company C(-)(Rein).

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(2) 031115H Squad OP/radio relay team commenced movement from vicinity (BT 357130) to (BT 397145).

(3) 031200H Company D(-)(Rein) arrived Company Combat Base (BT 401150)

(4) 031330H Command Group, squad OP/radio relay team arrived Battalion Combat Base (BT 397145).

(5) 031350H Company A(-)(Rein) arrived at Battalion Combat Base (BT 397145).

(7) 031800H Operation "CLAY" terminated.

11. Results

A. Personnel

(1) Enemy

(a) VCC	1
(b) VCS	1
(c) VC WIA Probable	5
(d) VC WIA confirmed	1
(e) VC KIA Probable	1
(f) VC KIA Confirmed	1

(2) Friendly

(a) WIA	13
(b) KIA	0
(c) DOW	0
(d) Non-Battle Casualties	4

(3) Refugees Relocated 16

B. Equipment and Materials Captured

250 VC propaganda leaflets
2 Sets of clothing, one blue and one gray
20 expended .30 cal rounds

Destroyed

1 Shelter 3' X 3' X 5'
9 Booby trapped mortar rounds
1 VC mine
1 Booby trapped fragmentation grenade

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12. Administrative Matters

A. Supply and Logistics

Each man carried six MCI and a BA and one half of ammunition. Only two meals were eaten per day. Resupply was not required during Operation "CLAY".

B. Maintenance

The Battalion experienced no difficulties maintaining equipment and weapons during Operation "CLAY". Each individual carried sufficient cleaning equipment to keep equipment, individual and crew served functional.

C. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization

Medical support in the field consisted on 8 corpsmen per line Company plus an additional 3 corpsmen with the Battalion Command Group. Minor casualties were evacuated to the BAS located at the Battalion Combat Base. Major casualties requiring more extensive care were evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion.

D. Transportation

In order to support the initial Scheme of Manuver and to subsequently effect medical evacuation, the only type of transportation required and utilized, was helicopters.

E. Communications

Battalion communications for Operation "CLAY" was excellent considering the terrain and weather. The Battalion CP was located on dominating terrain during the operation facilitating excellent communications. An automatic transmission was utilized on the Regimental Command net with excellent results. Wire communications was fair to excellent. The damp weather caused mechanical difficulties on the TA-1 and the problem was resolved by employing EE-8's. Throughout the operation the Battalion Command had positive communications with all units both in the field and in the rear.

F. Medical Evaluation

Sufficient medical supplies were carried to the field to support the operation, and no resupply was required. All requested helicopter medical evacuations was completed in a expeditious manner and consistent with the tactical operations.

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4 Feb 196713. Special Equipment and Techniques

A. The Battalion Command Post was established on a terrain feature commanding the objective area. Excellent observation from this post permitted the Battalion Commander to readily control the maneuver elements in the Battalion's endeavor to encircle VC forces. Apparent exodus of VC units prior to arrival of USMC forces prevented maximum exploitation.

14. Commanders AnalysisA. Lessons Learned.

It was determined during this operation that the individual Marine is shooting high, thereby precluding a more reasonable VC casualty rate. A concentrated effort within this Battalion has been made to employ correct battle sights, yet no appreciable increase in VC casualties has been realized. Observant Unit Commanders noted during Operation "CLAY" that VC fought from trenches or fighting holes and often times the range was less than 300 meters (Normal Battle Sights). Furthermore, too often Marines had a tendency to employ a large volume of fire, rather than well aimed fire. Emphasis must be placed on well aimed shots and pattern should be kept low.

B. Psychological Warfare.

(1) All personnel of the Battalion carried safe conduct passes and CHIEU HOI leaflets. These were passed out to civilians in the objective area in this units continuing endeavors to persuade the Viet Cong to rally to the GVN.

(2) The request of 16 refugees in the objective area for relocation is a definite indication of the effects of continuing Psychological Warfare operations in this area and the decrease in the influence of the VC.

15. Recommendations. That Battalion operations be conducted in this area on a continuing basis to prevent the Viet Cong freedom of action. Use of tracked vehicles in support of future infantry operations is a favorable possibility.


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OPERATION OVERLAY D-1

MARS: RVN; AMS L7014, 1:50,000
 Sheets 6639IV, 6640II, 6740III
 and 6739IV

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
ENCLOSURE (1)

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NIGHT DISPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES D+1



- A1 - Squad Ambush
- A2 - Squad Ambush
- A3 - Squad Ambush
- C1 - Squad Ambush
- C2 - Squad Ambush
- C3 - Squad Ambush
- C4 - Fireteam LP
- C5 - Fireteam LP
- C6 - Fireteam LP
- C7 - Fireteam LP
- D1 - Squad Ambush
- D2 - Squad Ambush
- D3 - Squad Ambush
- D4 - Fireteam LP
- D5 - Fireteam LP
- D6 - Fireteam LP


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OPERATION OVERLAY D+2



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+10

ENCLOSURE (6)


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- 501 - Squad Ambush
502 - Squad Ambush
501 - Squad Ambush
502 - Squad Ambush
5A1 - Platoon Ambush
5A2 - Combat OP



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ENCLOSURE (3)

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
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C1 - Sgd CBT Patrol
C2 - Sgd CBT Patrol
C3 - Sgd CBT Patrol

ENCLOSURE (4)

OPERATION OVERLAY D+L



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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHUOI, RVN
S&C Ser. No. 0506
134800H Feb1967

Operation Plan 9-67

Copy 75 of 94 copies.

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6734I-IV,
6739II, III, 6638I and 6639II
(b) 7thMar Frag O 2-67
(c) BnO 3300.1 Rules of Engagement
(d) BnO 3000.2A SOP for Operations

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 7th Marines (-)(Rein) commencing D-Day conducts coordinated search and destroy operations in objective area in conjunction with ROK and ARVN forces.

(2) Forces of 2nd ROKMC Brigade conduct coordinated operations in Zone of action east of and adjacent to 1stBn, 5thMar.

(3) Forces of 2nd ARVN Division conduct coordinated operations in zone of action south of and adjacent to 1stBn, 5thMar.

(4) CIDG Forces provide forces in area contiguous to area of operation.

(5) Supporting Arms. See Annex F, Fire Support.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

(1) Detachments

(a) One Plt Co A OPCON 1stBn, 5thMar rear

(b) Co B OPCON CLDG

2. MISSION

(1) At L-Hour, D-Day, 1stBn(-)(Rein), 5thMar lands by helicopter in selected landing zones and conducts coordinated search and destroy operations in assigned zone of action for a period of approximately seven days. (Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(2) Be prepared to establish blocking positions as directed to support other friendly forces.

(3) Conduct psy-war operations (Annex H Psychological Warfare Operations).

(4) Be prepared on order to displace by land and/or air to MO DUC/DUC PHO area to conduct operations as directed.

(5) Provide Command Group for forces assigned to defend present TAOR.

TAB-C

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay)

(1) Phase I. 1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) lands in a column in operation area at L-Hour on D-Day in selected landing zones, conducts coordinated search and destroy operations within assigned zones of action for a period of about seven (7) days.

(2) Phase II. 1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) displaces by land and/or air from Phase I operational area to selected sites vicinity MO DUC/DUC PHO area and conducts operations as directed.

b. Co D(Rein)

(1) At L-Hour on D-Day land in LZ BLUEJAY and secure LZ perimeter.

(2) On order commence search and destroy/clear operations in zone of action and secure objectives 2, 4 and 6 (See Operation Overlay).

(3) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

c. Co C (Rein)

(1) At L+50 on D-Day land in LZ ROBIN and secure LZ.

(2) On order commence search and destroy/clear operations in zone of action and secure objectives 2, 4, and 6.

(3) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

d. 81mm Mortar Plt (-). General Supporte. 106mm RR Plt (-). General Supportf. Flame Sec(-). General Supportg. Co A(-)(Rein)

(1) At L+25 on D-Day land in LZ CARDINAL and secure LZ perimeter.

(2) On order secure objective 7.

(3) On order establish blocking positions IAW Annex A (Operation Overlay).

(4) Be prepared to provide security for Command Group as directed.

(5) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

(6) Designated as Battalion Reserve for initial phase of operation.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day - TBA
- (2) L-Hour - TBA
- (3) Rules of Engagement apply (Ref (c))
- (4) Contact is from left to right
- (5) Companies not in contact will be prepared to assume mission as Battalion reserve on order.
- (6) Battalion Commanding Officer will coordinate firing in vicinity of the FCL.
- (7) Battalion Commanding Officer coordinates linkup
- (8) Psy-war operations IAW Annex H.
- (9) Reference (D) applies (Bn SOP for Operations)
- (10) Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
- (11) Rice destruction only upon specific authority this Headquarters. Report number of bags extracted.
- (12) Riot control agents employed only on authority this Headquarters. Personnel using RCA must be equipped with protective mask.
- (13) Landing Sequence:
 - (a) Co D(Rein) pick-up at departure zone at L-30 land L-Hour in LZ BLUEJAY.
 - (b) Co A(-)(Rein) pick-up at departure zone at L+10, land at L+25 in LZ CARDINAL.
 - (c) Command Group pick-up at departure zone at L+10 land in LZ CARDINAL at L+25.
 - (d) Co C (Rein) pick-up at departure zone at L+35 land in LZ ROBIN at L+50.
- (14) Departure zone is landing zone "DOVE" located at 2ndBn, 7thMar. Coordinates (BS 565956).
- (15) Following reports will be submitted:
 - (a) Spot Reports as occurring.
 - (b) Position reports hourly/reaching objectives/reaching phase line
 - (c) Lift off, touch down, and departures of LZ's.
 - (d) Summary of day's activities by 1730 daily.
- (16) Unclassified code name: Operation "RIO GRANDE".

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Annex D (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICSa. Command Post.

- (1) 1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) initially with Co A.

b. Communications - Electronics.

- (1) Communications - Electronics. Annex D.

(2) Infest Points:

BS 6475 Any Car
 BS 5285 Any Country
 BS 5073 Any Soup
 BS 4580 Any Soft Drink
 BS 5080 Any Girl's Name
 BS 5278 Any Pie
 BS 4892 Any President
 BS 4786 Any Color
 BS 4877 Any Relative

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR' HILGARTNER

R. J. Alger
 R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

ANNEXES. A - Task Organization
 B - Intelligence
 C - Operation Overlay
 D - Admin - Logistics
 E - Comm Elect
 F - Fire Support
 G - Movement Plan
 H - Psychological Warfare Operations
 Z - Distribution

DISPATCH: Annex Z (Distribution) to
 Operation Plan 9-67
 DISPATCH: - an disclosure (I)
 DISPATCH: (S)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU 5, VIETNAM
 130800 Feb 1967

Appendix 1 (Command Groups) to Annex A (Task Organization to Operation Plan 9-67).

COMMAND GROUPS

Group 1

CO, 1stBn, 5thMar (1)
 SgtMaj (1)
 Radio Operators (3)
 SQ2 Scout (1)
 S-2 (1)
 S-3 (1)
 S-3A (1)
 S-3B (1)
 Radio Operators (3)
 Arty Ln O (1)
 Radio Operators (1)
 Air Ln O (1)
 Radio Operators (2)

Group 2

Hq Cmdt (1)
 ARVN Jn Grp
 S-2 Scout (1)
 NBCD NCO (1)
 S-3 Admin Man (2)
 S-4 Rep (1)
 Air Radio Operator (1)
 Arty Radio Operator (1)
 Det, 81mm Mortar Plt (23)
 Coma Officer (1)
 Radio Chief (1)
 Radio Operator (3)
 Wire Chief (1)
 Wiremen (5)
 Medical Officer (1)
 Corpsmen (3)
 Chaplain (1)
 Chaplain Asst (1)
 Security Det, (12)
 Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv (2)
 Plt Hq, Co B, 1stAngBn (4)
 Plt Hq, Co B, 1stSPBn (4)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. ALGER
 R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to
 Operation Plan 9-67

Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
 S-2 Scout
 FAC Tm

Co D (Rein)

Capt CARTY

Co D

FO Tm, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tm

1stBn, 5thMar (Rear)

Maj R. J. ALGER

Det, H&S Co

Plt, Co A

2 Plts (Rein), 1stBn, 26thMar (3/5)

1 Plt (Rein), Co C, 2ndBn, 5thMar

1 Plt (Rein) Co A, 1stBn, 7thMar

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. Alger
 R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

Appendix 1 (Command Groups)
 Appendix 2 (Task Organization)
 to Operation Plan 9-67

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

CHU L. VIETNAM

130800 Feb 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Ruan 9-67

Time Zone: H

(All Attachments effective 150900H Feb 67)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Rein)

MAJ P. L. HILGARTNER

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt DARLING

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, Sub Unit #2 HqBn, 1stMarDiv

Det, Co E, 1stSP Bn

Plt Hqs, Co E, 1stBnBn

ARVN in Org

Co A (-) (Rein)

1stLt HUTCHERSON

Co A (-)

FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stBnBn

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout [REDACTED]

FAC Tn

Co G (Rein)

Capt CASWELL

Co G

FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar


Det, HqCo, 5thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stBnBn

Det, Co B 1stSP Bn

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

A-1

 **DISTRIBUTION:** Annex Z (Distribution) to
Operation Plan, 9-67

Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Vietnam
 130000H Feb 1967

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam Sheets: 6739I; 6739II; 6739III;
 6739IV

(b) BnO 3000.1D (SOP for Intelligence)

Time Zone: H

1. Summary of Enemy Situation.

a. Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).

b. Background. The Song Tra Khuc and Vinh Tuy Valley area are used extensively as Bau Areas and infiltration routes. The "Hook" of the Song Tra Khuc River is used by all Enemy Forces moving north or south between Northern and Southern Quang Ngai Province. This area is also used as a supply route and there has been a recent build up of enemy forces adjacent to the Song Tra Khuc.

c. Local Forces. The P-71st, T-20th and 8th Local Force Companies operate in the North Central portion of Quang Ngai Province.

d. Main Forces. The 21st NV Regt. has been reported in this area. The 1st VC Regt, 2nd VC Regt. and 22nd Regt are in striking distance within 24 to 96 hours. See Appendix 3, (Enemy Situation Overlay)

2. Essential Elements of Information

a. Determine if the enemy will attack Nui Tron O.P., or Tra Bong CIDG Camp. If so, when? Where and with which units?

b. Determine if the enemy will reinforce. If so, when? Where? In what strength? With which units?

c. Determine the current combat effectiveness of the Local Forces Companies, and the 21st Regt 2nd Div.

d. Determine enemy anti-aircraft, 105mm How, and 120mm Mortar capabilities.

e. Determine the attitude of civilians towards U. S. Forces, ARVN Forces, and VC/NVA.

f. Determine points and routes of infiltration into the area of operations, and route of infiltration from the mountainous areas and valleys of enemy personnel, their commodities and supplies.

g. Will the enemy attempt to counter attack our forces? If so, in what strength and when?

3. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions

a. Orders to subordinate units.

(1) 1st Battalion

(a) Be prepared to conduct observation and reconnaissance missions on order.

(b) Report any unusual observations

(c) Search out assigned areas of responsibility for hidden supply and arms caches.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units

(1) 3-2, 7th Marines

(a) Furnish weather forecast for period of operation.

(b) Provide aerial photo coverage as requested.

(c) Provide maps as required.

(d) Provide A. O support as requested.

(e) Provide current information on enemy movement.

4. Measures for Handling prisoners, captured Documents and Material.

a. Reference (b) applies

b. All captives will be tagged showing the date, place, time and circumstances of capture before evacuating to the Bn. S-2.

c. All captured documents and materials will be tagged showing the date, place, time and circumstances and evacuated to Bn S-2 (Documents and materials found on captives will be evacuated with the captive.)

5. Maps and Photographs

a. Reference (a) applies

b. Bn S-2 will provide maps

c. Bn S-2 will distribute photographs when available

6. Counterintelligence

a. Reference (b) applies

b. Password will be disseminated daily.

c. CIT personnel will operate from the regimental POW collection point.

7. Miscellaneous

- a. Make a maximum effort to take POWs.
- b. Captive personnel, equipment and document tags will be provided by the Bn S-2.
- c. Spot Reports will be submitted in accordance with existing instructions.
- d. Booby traps, mines and all ordinance will be reported and destroyed in place unless it has intelligence value.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. ALGER
R. J. ALGER

Major U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

- Appendix -- 1 -- Intelligence Estimate
- Appendix -- 2 -- Helicopter Landing Zones
- Appendix -- 3 -- Enemy Situation Overlay
- Appendix -- 4 -- Enemy Installations and Defensive Positions
- Appendix -- 5 -- Avenues of Approach
- Appendix -- 6 -- Cross Country Movement

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 to Operation ~~Plan~~ 9-67

Operation [REDACTED]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
CHU LAM, VIETNAM
130800 Feb [REDACTED]

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation
[REDACTED] 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series L7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam Sheets: 6739I; 6739II;
6739III; 6739IV.

(b) BnO 3800.1D CSOP for Intelligence)

Time Zone: H

1. Mission.

a. Basic Mission. To conduct operation in the vicinity of the Song Tra
Khuc (LS 4585).

b. Purpose of this estimate to determine the effects of characteristics
of the area and enemy capabilities on the accomplishment of assigned missions.

2. Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

a. Orientation. The area included in this estimate is in the North Central
portion of Quang Ngai Province. Specifically, the area is bounded by the
E-W grid line B S 87 on the north, N-S grid line B S 58 on the east, E-W
grid line B S 60 on the south, N-S grid B S 32 on the west.

b. Weather. The customary two season weather is associated with this area.

(1) Precipitation Feb through July is the dry season. Monthly ~~precipitation~~
rainfall during Feb and Mar varies from one to five inches. The ~~mean~~
number of days during Feb and Mar with measurable rainfall is Nine. There
is little thunderstorm activity during the dry season.

(2) Clouds From Feb to mid Mar. ceilings are from 1000 to 2000 feet.
These are accompanied by low visibility due to fog and drizzle with ceilings
as low as 500 feet in the morning. Afternoon ceilings can be expected at
3000-5000 feet.

(3) Visibility. From Feb to mid Mar visibility is normally less than
7 miles with periods of less than a mile during drizzle and fog.

(4) Temperatures. Monthly high temperatures are in the mid 80's and a
low in the mid 60's.

B-1-1

c. Terrain

(1) Relief

(a) Rolling plains comprise most of the eastern portion of the study area. Most of the area is composed paddy land and has an average elevation of less than 150 meters.

(b) The western portion of the study area is composed of mountains with local relief of 300 meters and slopes are greater than 14%. The mountains are extremely ragged. Most stream valleys are narrow, steep sided and of dense evergreen forest.

(c) The central portion is composed of rolling plains with elevation less than 250 meters. Much of this portion is paddy land interspersed with thickly forested areas.

(2) Drainage

(a) The principle stream of the study area is the Song Tra Khuc which has a width of 25 to 300 meters.

(b) The secondary waterways such as the Song Tam Rao have the same basic characteristics. Their width varies from 5-75 meters with the average being less than 25 meters. Bottom material normally consist of sand, silt and mud or sand, silt and gravel.

(3) Cross Country Movement See Appendix 5 (Avenues of Approach) and Appendix 6 (Cross Country Movement.)

(a) The northeastern portion of the study area is composed of marshes, perennially flooded or soft highly compartmentized rice paddies. Conditions for tanks are poor to unsuited at all times. For foot troops conditions are poor during dry weather and poor to unsuited during the wet season.

(b) The north western portion of the study area is densely covered and mountainous. Conditions are at all times unsuited for all types of vehicles and poor to unsuited for foot troops.

(4) Zones of Entry See Appendix 2 (HLZ List)

(5) Lines of Communication See Appendix 5 (Avenues of Approach)

3. Enemy Situation

a. Dispositions. See Appendix 3 (Enemy Situation Overlay)

b. Strengths and Combat Efficiency. The following estimate of enemy forces is based on confirmed and locally available and reinforcing units.

(1) Locally Available

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Combat Efficiency</u>	<u>Rptd. Loc.</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
21st Regt	NVA	Good	B.S.501 830	1800
20th Bn(Trans)	MF	Excellent	B.S.370635	450
1506th Bn(Engr)	MF	Excellent	B.S.280683	450
40th Co. 409th Bn(Engr)	MF	Excellent	B.S.330770	80
P-31st Co	LF	Excellent	B.S.510900	110
T-20th Co	LF	Excellent	B.S.560800	180
8th Co	LF	Excellent	B.S.400860	80
Total -				3070

(2) Reinforcements

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Combat Efficiency</u>	<u>Rptd. Loc.</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
24-48hrs 1st VC Regt	MF	Fair	B.S.290530	1600
48hrs 2nd VC Regt	MF	Unk	B.S.587416	1434
48hrs 409th Bn(-)	MF	Excellent	B.S.617358	370
96hrs 22nd Regt	MF	Unk	B.S.780180	1473
Total -				4877

(3) There are an estimated 810 hamlet oriented guerillas within the study area.

c. Arms and Armament. 82 mm mortars and 75 mm lhc's are the largest weapons reported with units within the study area. However the enemy could be reinforced within 96 to 120 hours by 820 mm mortars and by a 105 mm howitzer reportedly captured in 1965; neither of these weapons have been used in Quang Ngai Province.

Capabilities.

a. Attack within the operating area at anytime with a total force of 1 Regiment 2 Battalions and 4 separate Companies.

- b. Defend at a time and place of his choosing with a force of up to 1 regiment 2 battalions and 4 separate companies
- c. Withdraw to avoid contact and conserve his forces for more favorable circumstances
- d. Independently, or in conjunction with capabilities 2. b and c conduct limited attacks, ambushes and harassments within 24 to 96 hours after movement commences, with all or part of three regiments

5. Conclusions

- a. The enemy is in sufficient strength and if surprised or fixed in place will present a suitable objective for offensive action.
- b. Weather and terrain are generally suitable during the season for offensive operations
- c. If met and defeated the enemy will suffer a setback in his control over the populace
- d. If displaced, the enemy will become a prime target for superior fires and reaction capability
- e. If captured or destroyed, his losses in personnel material and supplies will be difficult to replace.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. ALGER
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Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 130800H Feb 1967

Appendix 2 (HLZ) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheets 6739 I, 6739 II, 6739 III, 6739 IV

Time Zone: H

1. BS 460807 500'x250' ABANDONED CROP AREA OVERGROWN WITH GRASS AND SCATTERED BRUSH, SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES BY BRUSH COVERED HILLS.
2. BS 452807 150'x480' GENTLE SLOPING ABANDONED DRY CROP AREA IN VALLEY SURROUNDED BY HILLS COVERED WITH OPEN FOREST.
3. BS 458814 700'x80' GRASSY AREA ON RIDGE LINE COVERED WITH SCATTERED BRUSH. BOMB CRATER TO NORTHWEST END OF AREA.
4. BS 473815 500'x300' OLD CROP AREA WHICH IS OVERGROWN WITH GRASS AND BRUSH. SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES BY HILLS COVERED WITH BRUSH AND OPEN FOREST. IN THE EAST PART OF THE AREA THERE ARE TWO BOMB CRATERS WHICH ARE 45' IN DIAMETER.
5. BS 479792 1100'x150' PACKED DIRT AIRSTRIP SURROUNDED BY WET AND DRY CROPS ON ALL SIDES BUT THE SOUTH WHERE THERE IS BRUSH AND GRASS.
6. BS 425891 600'x350' GRASS AND BRUSH COVERED AREA ON TOP OF HILL SURROUNDED BY TREES. SCATTERED TREES IN AREA.
7. BS 413897 150'x250' CROP AREA SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES EXCEPT THE NORTH BY TREES COVERED HILLS. THE NORTH EDGE IS BOUNDED BY A STREAM.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

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
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Operation Plan 9-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
130600 10 1967

Appendix 3 (Enemy Situation) Overlay to Annex B (Intelligence) to
Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheets: 6739 I,
6739 II, 6739 III, and 6739 IV



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Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 130000 Feb 1967

Appendix 4 (Enemy Installations and Defensive Positions) to Annex B
 (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheets: 6739 I,
 6739 II, 6739 III, and 6739 IV.

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Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAM, VIETNAM
 130800 Feb 1967


Appendix 5 (Avenues of Approach) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
 Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheets: 6739 I, 6739 II,
 6739 III and 6739 IV

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
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Operation Plan 9-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU 1 [REDACTED] VICTIM
130800Z Feb 1967

Ref: (a) Maps: Series I7014, 1:50,000 Vietnam, Sheets: 6739 I, 6739 II, 6739 III and 6739 IV

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Map	2 1/2		Foot	
	WET	DRY	WET	DRY
1	P_{T_0} U	F_{T_0} P	P_{T_0} U	G
3	U	U	F_{T_0} U	F_{T_0} P
4	P_{T_0} U	P_{T_0} U	P_{T_0} U	F

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OP PLAN 9-67
1st Bn. 5th Marines
Chu Lai, Viet Nam
130800Z Feb 67

Annex B Administration and Logistics to Operation HUKU 9-67

1. Supply

a. General

- (1) FLSG-B provides all classes of supply.
- (2) Regimental S-4 will inform FLSG Bravo of the amount and type of supplies required for the operation.
- (3) FLSG-Bravo will inform Regimental S-4 of any shortage of supplies requested for this operation.
- (4) The logistical support area for this operation will be located at QUANG NGAI.

b. Prescribed loads

- (1) 6 meals "C" rations (3 day supply/2 meals per day)
- (2) Extra set of utility trousers
- (3) Extra scivvies as prescribed by Company CO.
- (4) 3 pairs of socks
- (5) Foot powder
- (6) Insect repellent
- (7) Air mattress
- (8) Intrenching tool
- (9) Shaving gear
- (10) Basic allowance
- (11) Helmets
- (12) Packs
- (13) Flak jackets
- (14) Normal arms and equipment
- (15) Salt tablets
- (16) Medical supplies, initial allowance plus two days high usage items. All troops carry anti-malaria prophylaxis.

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- (17) 2 bottles halizone per individual
- (18) Gas Masks
- (19) Dog tags and Geneva Convention Cards
- (20) Rope for stream crossing
- (21) CS grenade per squad
- (22) Air panels
- (23) Green and Yellow smoke
- (24) Green star clusters
- (25) Two rice bags per man
- c. Supplies and Equipment Available

- (1) All classes of supply available to LSA

d. Resupply

- (1) Resupply of LSA will be provided by FLSG-B.
- (2) Units request resupply through attached Helicopter Support Team (HST) utilizing Shore Party Logistical Net.
- (3) Requests for morning resupply will be submitted by 2000.
- (4) Requests for evening resupply will be submitted between 1000-1100.
- (5) Normal resupply by air ceases at dark.
- (6) Helicopters will be requested for assignment to the LSA Commander for resupply and Med-Evac.

e. Captured Material. All captured material will be evacuated to the Battalion C.P. and turned over to the Intelligence Officer for evaluation. This material will be clearly tagged as to where found, under what circumstances, when and by whom. The material will in turn be evacuated to the Regimental C.P. No captured rice will be destroyed; request instructions from Battalion Commander.

f. Excess material. Any material determined to be in excess of units' needs will be returned to the LSA.

g. Salvage. The Battalion S-4 will be kept informed of all materials requiring salvage. When practicable, such materials will be returned to the LSA. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left abandoned or unguarded.

2. Medical

a. Medical units

- (1) Medical section of Organic unit

(2) Med Evacs will go directly to LT 24 (Det. 1st Med Bn)

(3) Medical evacuation policy 24 hours.

b. Sanitation and Preventive Medicine

(1) Unit Commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

(2) Unit Commanders ensure that all troops carry anti-malaria prophylaxis for a period of two (2) weeks. 2 bottles of halizone tablets and salt tablets for a minimum of two days.

c. Evacuations. The use of helicopters for rapid transportation of casualties has vastly decreased the mortality rate of personnel wounded in action. Because of this and the quick reaction time of helicopters there is a tendency to over state the urgency of medical evacuation requests. To aid in classifying the condition of casualties the following classification has been established:

(1) Routine: Evacuation of deceased personnel or evacuation of a patient with a minor injury or illness.

(2) Priority: Evacuation of seriously wounded, injured or ill personnel who require early hospitalization, but whose immediate hospitalization is not a matter of life or death.

(3) Emergency: Evacuation of critically wounded, injured or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death. This classification is justified when a case falls into one of the following categories:

(a) The casualty is unconscious from a head wound.

(b) The casualty is in severe shock.

(c) The casualty is actively bleeding.

(d) The casualty has suffered the loss of an arm or a leg, has an abdominal wound, or has a penetrating chest wound.

(4) Civilian and ARVN Casualties. Evacuation to ARVN medical facility at Quang Ngai. Serious injuries will be directed to the 1st Medical Battalion if so directed by a Medical Officer.

(5) Enemy Casualties. Evacuated (under guard) to the ISA or to 1st Medical Battalion.

(6) U.S. casualties have priority for evacuation.

(7) Emergency Helicopter evacuation of casualties (MED-VACS).
The following will be assessed by the Commander on the scene:

(a) Security of the landing site and freedom from interdicting enemy fire. If landing site is insecure, movement of evacuee to secure area will be attempted. If movement is impossible, every effort will be exerted to utilize suppressive fire by local unit small arms, artillery, aircraft, or a combination thereof while evacuation is in progress.

(b) Communications between the commander on the scene and the aircraft is essential to exchange pertinent information concerning landing approach, pickup point, and terrain characteristics.

(c) During a helicopter evacuation of casualties, supporting arms fire must be curtailed to ensure the safety of the helicopter from friendly fire.

3. Transportation

a. The Battalion will move by motor convoy to 2ndBn, 7thMar and at go for helo lift to operational area.

4. Service

a. Assignment of Responsibilities

(1) Attached units will provide support in accordance with the normal mission.

(2) Shore party will be prepared to provide an HST to this Battalion.

b. Maintenance

(1) Battery recharging capability will be located at the LSA.

(2) Critical items that cannot be repaired at the LSA will be evacuated to FLSG-B for priority repair.

5. Miscellaneous

a. A card showing the individuals name, rank, serial number and date of birth will be placed in the pack of each individual. Unit designation will not be shown.

b. The military and personal effects of all evacuated personnel will accompany the casualty to the evacuation point.

[REDACTED]

The Battalion supply representative will inventory and tag items with the individual's name, rank, serial number and unit. Personal effects will be turned over to the Battalion Supply Officer.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

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Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67

OpOrd 9-67
 1st Bn 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Viet Nam
 132000H Feb 67

Annex E (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 9-67

Ref: (a) FmFPacO P02000.2C
 (b) CG, 1st MarDiv P02000.2C
 (c) CG, 1st MarDiv P02000.2D
 (d) BnO 2000.11B

Time Zone: H

1. Situation.

(A) Enemy Forces

- (1) See annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) See current Intsums
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Intercept, monitor, employ imitative deception and jamming on any communication circuit.
 - (b) Ambush wire teams during initial installation and tactical trouble shooting.
 - (c) Cut and tap lines for the purpose of interception or deception
 - (d) Salvage, repair and use discarded communications equipment, especially dry cell batteries.

(B) Friendly forces

- (1) See annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) Command Posts
 - (a) 1/5 TBA
 - (b) Subordinate units report CP locations when established.

2. Mission

(a) Communications Platoon 1/5

- (1) Guard Regt Tac net #1 commencing H-1
- (2) Guard Bn Tac net #1 commencing H-1
- (3) Guard TACP Local commencing H-1
- (4) Provide one wireman and one field radio operator to each rifle company.

(B) Air Support Communications. See appendix 1 (radio plan)

(C) Shore Party Communications:

- (1) See appendix 1 (radio plan)
- (2) Establish wire lines within the landing zone and Bn CP.

E-1

(D) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Reference (b) through (d)

(2) Messenger service

- (a) Runner messenger will be established in accordance with reference (d) for units in physical contact with Bn CP.

(3) Radio

- (a) Radio nets. Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).
- (b) Call signs. Appendix 2 (Call Signs).
- (c) Commence guarding assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
- (d) Radio checks and test will be conducted only when necessary.
- (e) Used dry cell batteries will be destroyed by using units.
- (f) Batteries BB-451 will be replaced as indicated by weak transmission.
- (g) The proword "I spell" will be used only when doubt exist as to clarity of pronunciation of the word.
- (h) Time zone HOTEL will be used on all messages transmitted within the battalion.

(4) Wire.

- (a) All wire lines will be retrieved.
- (b) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the command post, after dusk.

(5) Visual and Sound. See appendix 3 (Visual and Sound)(6) Cryptographic instructions. See appendix 4 (Cryptographic inst)

4. Administration and Logistics

(A) See Administrative Order 9-67.

(B) All units will carry 2 dry cell batteries per radio.
Resupply will be coordinated with ammunition and ration replacement.

(C) Battery charging facility will be maintained at the LSA. Replacement will be on a one-for-one basis. All radios utilizing batteries BB-451 will be provided with two BB-451 batteries.

(D) The Bn Comm officer will be notified of failure of equipment and whether or not a replacement is necessary. The equipment must be tagged by the user, indicating trouble.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR RICHARD E. ALGER

R. J. Alger
R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Radio Plan
- 2 - Call Signs
- 3 - Visual and Sound
- 4 - Cryptographic Instructions

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 9-67

E-2

Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Bn 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Viet Nam
 130000H Feb 67

Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to annex Z (Communication-Electronics) to
 Operation Plan 9-67.

Time zone: H

C - Net CTI Sta.
 X - Guard
 O - Be prepared

	REG Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	REG Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	(P) Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	BO Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	Co A Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	Co C Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	Co D Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	SLM Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TAD Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707	TRIP Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707
BN CP	X	O	C	O											
Co A			X	O	C										
Co C			X	O	C										
Co D			X	O	C										
SLM Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707			X	O	C										
FAC Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707			O						X	X					
ALO Fm Net (S) 30.5 M-707			O						X	X	O	O	X	X	

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR MILGAMER

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Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67

1st Bn 5th Marines

Chu Lai, Viet Nam

130800H Feb 67

Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex 2 (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 9-67

UNITFUNCTION CALL

7th Marines

Computation

1st Bn 5th Marines

Artillery

3rd Bn 5th Marines

Communications

1st Bn 7th Marines

Construction

3rd Bn 7th Marines

Engineer Party

3rd Bn 11th Marines

Averaging

Shore Party

Drinking Water

Quang Ngai LSA

Fumigation

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR MILITARY

R. J. Ash
R. J. Ash

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

RECESSION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 9-67

Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Bn 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Viet Nam
 130800H Feb 67

Appendix 3 (Visual and Sound) to annex E (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 9-67.

1. All visual signals employed for air-ground coordination must be confirmed by voice radio communications. The helicopter common circuit will not be used by ground units except in an emergency.
2. Smoke signals will be as follows:

TYPE

Grenade, hand smoke
 green or yellow M-18

Grenade, hand, smoke
 red M-18

MEANING

Marking of friendly units positions
 or of a secure area for helo landing zone.

Enemy positions

3. Illumination signals will be as follows:

TYPE

Green star cluster

MEANING


Return of friendly units to lines or marking friendly positions.

4. Panel signals will be as follows:

A. Helicopter landing points identification.

(1) Daylight Marking

- (a) all landing points will be marked with an equilateral triangle constructed by utilizing three panel sets. The color selected must contrast with the surface of the landing point.
- (b) Type of unit will be designated by placing panels in the center of the triangle.
- (c) Example of infantry unit.



(2) Night signals

- (a) Night signals for helicopter landing sites will depend upon the tactical situation; however, lighting may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of the triangle site marker downwind of the site and illuminating the landing zone. During night operations, every effort will be made to utilize radio communications.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR BELGARDNER

R. J. Alger
 R. J. ALGER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z

E-3-1

Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Airborne Division
 150800H Feb 67

Appendix 4 (Cryptographic Instructions) to Annex 2 (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 9-67.

Time Zone: N

1. Effective Tables:

A. Effective edition tables of KAC-JJ

B. Authentication will be mandatory under the following circumstances:

- (1) when imitative reception is known or suspected.
- (2) when challenge or challenge.
- (3) when lifting or increasing radio silence.
- (4) when entering or leaving radio net.
- (5) when transmitting operational instructions that affect the military situation.
- (6) when transmitting contact or amplifying reports in plain language.

C. The use of authentication tables will be in accordance with operation instructions (i.e., time listed on tables are to be constructed as GMT time and/or then GMT time.)

2. Special Codes.

A. Effective edition and 24-hour tables of KAC-JJ.

B. This code offers minimum security and should not be used for encryption of information which requires protection for less than twelve hours.

C. This system will not be used to encode:

- (1) Coordinates of friendly positions known or suspected to be known by the enemy.
- (2) Coordinates of enemy positions.
- (3) Coordinates of target location for friendly supporting arms.
- (4) Radio frequencies.
- (5) Positional designators will be used at all times to refer to radio frequencies.

BY ORDER OF THE JCS: 1110 1111

R. J. M. H.

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 9-67

Operation Plan [REDACTED]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAM, VIETNAM
130800H January 1967

Annex F (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: L7614, Sheet 6739 I, II, III, and IV
(b) FMFM 7-4

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) See current (INTSUM)

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Appendix 1 (Air Support)
- (2) Appendix 2 (Artillery)

2. MISSION

a. Commencing L-Hour on D-Day, 1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) lands by helo in selected landing zones and conducts coordinated search and destroy operations as directed.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) CAS will be under the positive control of FAC or TAC(A).
- (2) CAS requests passed on the TAC net will be coordinated by the FSCC to be considered appropriate and safe. The request will only be honored on approval from FSCC.

F-1

c. Coordination of Artillery Fires

- (1) Effected by FSOC, including consideration of air activity.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Target List

- (1) Current target list, when required, will be maintained by FSOC.

b. Concentration Designation System

- (1) The concentration designation for artillery will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers.

Block numbers are assigned as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Block</u>
FO, Co A	100-199
FO, Co C	300-399
FO, Co D	400-499
FSOC	500-599

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

- a. Artillery/mortar forward observers will cease fire when it appears that the trajectory of artillery and/or mortars will endanger friendly aircraft.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. FSOC will coordinate supporting fires and friendly forces.
- b. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. See annex E (Communications - Electronics)

b. Command Post

- (1) To be announced.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. ALGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDIX: 1 - Air support
2 - Artillery

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution)
To Operation Plan 9-67

Operation Plan 9-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHUOI, VIETNAM
130000H January 1967

Appendix 1 (Air Support) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
To Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, Sheet 6739I, II, III, IV
(b) FMFM 7-4

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 1st MAF provides aircraft for support.

2. MISSION

Conduct air support operations in support of ground forces.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and HLZ preparation as required.

(2) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of FAC or TAC (A) at all times.

(3) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Military Grid Reference six digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.

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R. J. ALGER

Major U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX 2 (Distribution)
To Operation Plan 9-67

F-1--1

Operation Plan
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU, VIETNAM
130000H January 1967

Appendix B (Artillery) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
to Operation Plan 9-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, Sheet 6739I, II, III, IV
(b) FFM 7-4

Time Zone: R

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) See Current INTSUM
- (3) No known enemy artillery capability in the area of operations.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) See Appendix 1 (Air Support)

2. MISSION

Batteries (to be announced), 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, after occupying the firing positions, provide support conventional fires to 1stBn, 5thMar.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- (1) See Annex D (Administration and Logistics)(to Operation Plan 9-67)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

a. See Annex E (Communications/Electronics)

b. Command Posts.

- (1) (to be announced)

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R. J. NIGER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to
Operation Plan 9-67

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CH 101, VIETNAM
130500H Feb 1967

Annex G (Movement Plan) to Operation Plan: 9-67

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Refer to Operation Plan: 9-67

2. MISSION

1stBn, 5thMar(-)(Rein) moves by motor convoy from 1stBn, 5thMar Bn Combat Base to 2ndBn, 7thMar Combat Base.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Commencing 160500H, 1/5 displaces with three rifle companies and En Command Group from 1stBn, 5thMar Combat Base BT 397145 to assembly area vicinity 2ndBn, 7thMar Combat Base BS 565956.

b. Co D (Rein)

(1) At 160500H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram).

(2) On order embark aboard trucks assigned by S-4.

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (Assembly area diagram/debarkation point).

c. Co A (-)(Rein)

(1) At 160500H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging area diagram).

(2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4.

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) Assembly area diagram/debarkation point.

d. 1stBn, 5thMar Command Group

(1) At 160500H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging area diagram)

(2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4.

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (assembly area diagram/debarkation point).

e. Co G (Rein)

(1) At 160500H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging area diagram).

(2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4.

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble LAW Appendix (2) (assembly area diagram/debarkation point).

3. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Morning Meals on 16Feb will be served from 0300 thru 0430H.

(2) Truck Teams:

(a) M-54 - 25 men

(b) M-36 - 30 men

(3) Trucks will be tactically loaded

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. See Annex D

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

a. Command

See Operation Plan 9-67

b. Communications - Electronics

(1) See Annex E

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. Hilgarter
R. J. HILGARTNER

Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer


APPENDIX (1) Staging Area Diagram
(2) Assembly Area diagram

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Operation Plan 9-67

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
170800H Feb 1967

Appendix 1 (Staging Area Diagram) to Annex C (Movement Plan) to Operation
Cobra 3-67



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R. J. HILGER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67

G-1-1


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1st Battalion, 5th Marines

LAI, VIETNAM

1800H Feb 1967

Appendix 2 (Assembly Area Diagram) to Annex G (Movement Plan) to Operation
Plan 9-67



Order of Loading 2/7 (assembly area diagram/debarkation point)

- (1) Delta Co
- (2) Alpha Co & Bn Command Group
- (3) Charlie Co

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R. J. ALGER

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Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67

Operation Plan 9-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
130800H Feb1967

Annex H (Psychological Operations) to Operation Plan 9-67

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. See basic order.

2. MISSION

Psychological Warfare Operations will be conducted in support of the operation providing leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts within the area of operation.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Leaflets and taped broadcasts will contain "Reward for Mines and Booby Traps", "Do not run from Marines", and CHIEU HOI themes directed toward the VC, his family and friend.

b. A Psy-war team will be attached on order to exploit psy-warfare targets of opportunity.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) See Basic Order
- (2) Commencing L-Hour on D-Day, leaflets and aerial broadcasts will be employed in the target area.
- (3) Companies desiring Psychological operation assets to exploit targets of opportunity may submit requests to Battalion Psychological Warfare Officer.
- (4) All participating personnel will be briefed on the objectives of the psy-warfare themes prior to commencement of the operation.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. All Psychological Warfare support will be furnished by Task Force X-Ray

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION/ELECTRONICS. See Annex E.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR HILGARTNER

R. J. ALGER
R. J. ALGER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

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Operation Plan 9-67

H-1

Operation Plan 9-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 150800H Feb 1967

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 9-67

Time Zone: H

Distribution:	CG, 1st Mar Div	15
	CG, 1st X-Ray	15
	CO, 7th Mar	15
	CO, 5th Mar	5
	MSG - Bravo	1
	CO, 11th Mar	2
	CO, 1st SPBn	2
	CO, 1st Recon Bn	2
	CO, 1st Bn	2
	CO, 1st ADBn	2
	CO, 1st MMBn	2
	CO, 7th MMBn	2
	MAG-12	1
	MAG-13	1
	MAG-36	2
	CO, 7th Comm Bn	2
	CO, 1st Eng Bn	2
	HAC Co	2
	CO A	2
	CS C	2
	CO D	2
	File	10

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 Operation Plan 9-67

Z-1

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HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JNB/dah

3480

006167

28Feb67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation "RIO GRANDE"

Ref: (a) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 9-67
(b) 7th Marines Frag Order 2-67
(c) 7th Marines Frag Order 3-67
(d) DivO 3480.1
(e) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6739I-IV

Encl: ✓(1) Operation Overlay D-Day
✓(2) Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D-Day
✓(3) Operation Overlay D+1
✓(4) Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D+1
✓(5) Operation Overlay D+2
✓(6) Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D+2
✓(7) Operation Overlay D+3
✓(8) Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D+3
✓(9) Operation Overlay D+4
✓(10) Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D+4
✓(11) Operation Overlay D+5

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 4200.10

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TAB-D

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1. CODE NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION.

Operation RIO GRANDE (Search and Destroy)

2. Dates of Operation.

170900-221930 February 1967

3. Location. South of CHU LAI RAOR and west of 2ndROKMC RAOR in TRA BONG, SONG TINH, and BINH SON Districts, QUANG NGAI Province, RVN on map series L7014, Sheets 6739I-IV.4. Command Headquarters.

CO, 1stBn, 5thMar (+)

LTCOL P. L. HILGARTNER

CO, Co A(-), 1stBn, 5thMar

1stLt E. G. HUTCHESON

CO, Co C, 1stBn, 5thMar

CAPT R. J. CASWELL

CO, Co D, 1stBn, 5thMar

CAPT J. J. CARTY

CO, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

CAPT M. B. DARLING

5. Task Organization1stBn, 5th Marines (-)(Rein)

LTCOL HILGARTNER

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

CAPT DARLING

H&S Co(-)

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, Sub Unit #2, HqBn, 1stMarDiv

Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

ROKMC Ln Tm

Co A(-)(Rein)

1STLT HUTCHESON

Co A(-)

FO Tm, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, HqCo, 5thMar

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Squad, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, Co B, 1st SPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 5th Mar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tm

Co C (Rein)

CAPT CASWELL

Co C

FO Tm, Btry D, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

Squad, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, Co B, 1st SPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1st Bn, 5th Mar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tm

Co D (Rein)

CAPT DARTY

Co D

FO Tm, Btry D, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar

Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar

Squad, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

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Det, Co B, 1stSPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAG Tm

81mm Mortar Plt (-)

GySgt J. W. LISEBY

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6. Supporting Arms

A. Air Support

(1) Helicopter. At L-Hour, D-Day 170900H February 1967, ten CH-46 and ten UH-34 helicopters lifted 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines from LZ LYNX vicinity coordinates (BS 578785) to three pre-selected landing zones to commence Operation RIO GRANDE. The first wave was inserted into landing zone BLUEJAY coordinates (BS 431868). The helicopters encountered light sniper fire during the initial insertions, however, no hits were recorded. The second wave was inserted into landing zone CARDINAL at coordinates (BS 446842). The third wave was inserted into landing zone ROBIN, vicinity coordinates (BS 465874).

The Helicopter Support Team detachment from 1st Shore Party Battalion coordinated and controlled two helicopter resupply missions and five medical evacuation missions during the operation.

(2) Fixed Wing. On D-Day four fixed wing aircraft were utilized for conducting preparation fires on landing zones BLUEJAY and CARDINAL. The LZ preparation commenced at L-30 minutes and terminated at L-05 minutes. In addition, two fixed wing aircraft flew cover in support of the helicopter insertion.

On D+4 two fixed wing aircraft flew a close air support mission on enemy troops in a treeline at coordinates (BS 558805). The aircraft expended 35 2.75 rockets and 300 rounds of 20mm HE ammunition. A search of the target area at the completion of the air strike revealed no signs of casualties. The fixed wing were controlled by TACA in a USA O-1E. On D+5 four fixed wing aircraft flew a close air support mission for Company A on entrenched enemy troops in a treeline at coordinates (BS 557837). The aircraft expended 16 2.75 rockets and 1000 rounds of 20mm HE ammunition. A search of the area revealed heavy blood trails leading away from the trench line position. The air strike was controlled by USA TACA in an O-1E.

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(3) TACA

Throughout the operation, TACA's were on station during daylight hours. They rendered invaluable assistance in their observation of enemy movement and activity, aerial reconnaissance, adjusting artillery fires and controlling CAS.

(4) General. Air support, including fixed wing, medical evacuation helicopters, and TACA/AO's during RIO GRANDE was particularly noteworthy. Their prompt response to all requests, cooperative spirit and efficiency greatly enhanced the successful accomplishment of assigned missions.

B. Artillery Support

Artillery support for operation RIO GRANDE was provided by 4.2 inch mortars from Battery W, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines in direct support of the Battalion. Battery G, 4th Bn, 11th Marines was in general support/reinforcing from D-Day to D+3. On D+3, Btry K(-), 4th Bn, 11th Marines was in direct support of the Battalion. On D+3 and D+4 ROKMC 4.2 inch mortars located on NUI TRON (BS 515772) provided on call illumination for night activities.

At 181420H on D+1 an artillery mission was called on 10 VC with weapons moving in a tree line at coordinates (BS 465829). 19 HE rounds were fired by Btry W, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines with good target coverage. The area was searched with inconclusive results. At 182030H three rounds illumination were fired for Company D vicinity (BS 493830). On D+2 Company D requested seven rounds of 4.2 inch mortar illumination to investigate suspected VC movement at coordinates (BS 503834). Two rounds of 4.2 inch mortar illumination were fired for Company D on D+3 at suspected enemy movement. On D+5 at 220300H three rounds of illumination were fired by Battery K on suspected enemy movement at coordinates (BS 553816).

H&I fires were planned and fired by all supporting Batteries each night during the operation. A total of 331 H&I rounds were fired on suspected VC infiltration and supply routes and enemy mortar positions.

7. Intelligencea. Estimate of VC strength, location, and disposition in the objective area

(1) Forces anticipated in the immediate objective area:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TACTICAL DISPOSITION</u>
21st NVA Regt.	BS 5083	1800	Unknown
20th LF Bn	BS 3763	450	Unknown
506th MF Bn	BS 2868	450	Unknown
40th MF Co	BS 3377	80	Unknown
P-31 LF Co	BS 5190	110	Unknown
T-20th LF Co	BS 5680	100	Unknown
8th LF Co	BS 4086	80	Unknown

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(2) Intelligence information was initially provided to this unit by the 7th Marine Regiment and the 2nd ARVN Division.

b. VC strength and situation actually determined during the operation

As a result of the operation, elements of this Battalion accounted for seven VC KIA (confirmed), seven VC KIA (probable), eight VC WIA (probable). Seven VCS were forwarded to 9th ITF for interrogation. Throughout the operation, the Battalion encountered harrasing sniper fire from probable hamlet-oriented guerrillas.

c. VC units identified. None

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) It is believed as a result of information obtained from the Vietnamese populace and VCS's, that VC Main Forces had moved south of the Battalion objective area approximately three days prior to D-Day.

(2) Many freshly dug fighting holes and trenches were noted throughout the objective area.

(3) Interrogation of the VCS's indicated a strong VC infrastructure (e.g., Mother and Daughter's Association, Farmers Association, Youth Association).

(4) The populace and the suspects captured displayed extreme fear when approached by Marines.

(5) The objective of this operation was to fix and destroy the VC forces and supplies in the objective area.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

(a) NUI TRON (Hill 177)

(b) NUI TRUC (Hill 55)

(c) Hill 75

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(2) Terrain in the northwestern portion of the assigned objective area is composed of paddy land surrounded by densely forested mountains with local relief of 180 to 300 meters. Paddyland interspersed with thickly brush-covered hills comprised most of the central and southeastern portion of the objective area.

(3) Obstacles. None

(4) Avenues of approach. Trails in the operational area were good to excellent for foot troops.

(5) Cross Country Movement. Presented no problems at any time.

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8. Mission. 1stBn (-)(Rein), 5th Marines land by helicopter in operation area and conduct coordinated search and destroy operations for a period of approximately seven days.

9. Concept of Operation.

Commencing L-3 on D-Day, 1stBn, (-)(Rein), 5th Marines moved by motor convoy from Battalion Combat Base vicinity coordinates (BT 397145) to LZ LYNX (BS 578985). At L-Hour 1stBn (-)(Rein) landed in sequence in selected landing zones and conducted coordinated search and destroy operations in assigned zones of action. On D+5 1stBn, 5thMar moved from vicinity coordinates (BS 625853) to Battalion Combat Base.

10. Execution

A. D-1. 16 February 1967

(1) 161400H 1stBn (-)(Rein), 5th Mar attached and supporting units were issued operation order for RIO GRANDE.

B. D-Day. 17 February 1967. See Enclosure (1).

(1) 170600H 1stBn (-)(Rein) 5thMar departed combat base (BT 397145) by motor convoy.

(2) 170750H All units arrived LZ LYNX vicinity coordinates (BS 578985) for helicopter insertion into operation area.

(3) 170900H L-Hour. Co D(Rein) landed in LZ BLUEJAY vicinity coordinates (BS 437874) and commenced search and destroy operations to secure Battalion Objective 2.

(4) 170925H Co A (-)(Rein) and 1stBn Command Group landed in LZ CARDINAL vicinity coordinates (BS 447843) and commenced search and destroy operations toward Battalion Objective 7.

(5) 170940H Co C landed in LZ ROBIN vicinity coordinates (BS 468873) and commenced search and destroy operations to secure Battalion Objective 1.

(6) 171005H Co A at coordinates (BS 447841) received one round sniper fire from an unobserved position in a northerly direction vicinity coordinates (BS 447842). Returned two rounds M-79 in direction of fire. Squad searched the area with inconclusive results. Results of contact: One USMC WIA.

(7) 171005H Co C found fifteen 57mm RR dud projectiles and one 500 lb bomb vicinity coordinates (BS 460866). The 57mm duds and 500 lb. bomb were destroyed in place by engineer squad attached to Co C.

(8) 171033H Squad from Co A while searching area of air prep fires found one VC KIA vicinity coordinates (BS 443844). The VC KIA wore black clothing. It appeared that the body had been dragged to this location from a southerly direction.

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(9) 171055H Co D while conducting search and destroy operations in Objective 2 vicinity coordinates (BS 435873) and (BS 438873) found one machine gun tripod and one upper hand guard from M-1 carbine. Hand guard and tripod forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(10) 171100H Co D secured Objective 2.

(11) 171150H Co D secured Objective 4.

(12) 171200H Co A established blocking positions at Objective 7.

(13) 171230H Co C secured Objective 1.

(14) 171300H Co D secured Objective 6.

(15) 171330H Co A squad combat patrol vicinity Regimental Objective A coordinates (BS 453844) received approximately 100 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire simultaneously from three enemy locations (BS 455844), (BS 456842) and (BS 450844). The Co A squad deployed as base of fire as Co D advanced to secure Objective A. Co D searched areas of enemy activity with inconclusive results.

(16) 171340H Co C secured Objective 3.

(17) 171430H Lead elements of Co D moving through Objective A vicinity coordinates (BS 455844) observed one VC wearing black clothing and carrying a weapon at a range of 250 meters vicinity coordinates (BS 457843). Squad fired 20 rounds from M-14 at VC. VC fled into thick brush in southeast direction. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

(18) 171450H Co D secured Objective A.

(19) 171630H Bn Command Group, Co A, and Co C effected linkup with Co E at Objective A.

(20) 171635H Co D at coordinates (BS 460842) received 40 rounds automatic weapons fire from two VC wearing black clothing vicinity coordinates (BS 464844). Co C returned 95 rounds 7.62 and 10 M-79 rounds. VC broke contact and fled in a southwesterly direction. Two squads were dispatched to search the area. While searching the squads uncovered 2000 pounds of rice. The rice was bagged and extracted from the area. Search for enemy concluded with inconclusive results.

(21) 171640H Co C at vicinity coordinates (BS 459841) found one booby trapped M-26 grenade in a well with trip wire attached. Grenade was detonated in place by engineers attached to Co C.

(22) 171800H Battalion night defensive perimeter established vicinity Regimental Objective A. See Enclosure (2).

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C. D+1. 18 February 1967. See Enclosure (3)

(1) 180730H H&S Co found notebook containing VC propaganda in house vicinity coordinates (BS 457845). Notebook was forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(2) 180920H Co D secured Objective 2-A.

(3) 180930H Co C secured Objective 1-A.

(4) 181000H Co D platoon uncovered 2000-3000 pounds of rice hidden in false walls of house at coordinates (BS 457842). Rice was extracted by helicopter from the operational area.

(5) 181030H Co C using Wire Rudders found tunnel 5'X3'X15' with two entrances and two air vents at (BS 467840). Enemy movement was suspected in the tunnel. One gas grenade (CS) was thrown into tunnel. A subsequent search of the tunnel failed to uncover any enemy activity.

(6) 181040H Co D secured Objective 10-A.

(7) 181200H Co C secured Objective 3-A.

(8) 181200H Co C at (BS 474841) received 15 rounds of small arms fire from an unobserved sniper at a distance of approximately 350 meters vicinity (BS 474836). Co C returned 3 rounds of 60mm and 5 M-79 rounds. Area was searched with inconclusive results.

(9) 181215H Co D secured Objective 6-A.

(10) 181300H Co D secured Objective 4-A.

(11) 181315H Co C secured Objective 5-A.

(12) 181400H Co D vicinity (BS 463828) observed 11 VC carrying weapons moving to the west vicinity (BS 455835). One platoon was maneuvered to vicinity coordinates (BS 455835) to establish blocking position. Platoon occupied blocking positions from 1430 to 1500 with no VC sighted. Platoon swept area with inconclusive results.

(13) 181410H Co C vicinity coordinates (BS 471833) apprehended two middle-age male suspects wearing black clothing. The suspects were in vicinity of a house where the company had received sniper fire earlier. During initial interrogation the VCS's admitted being members of VC Farmer's Association. Both suspects were forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(14) 181440H Co D found a 3'X7'X50' tunnel and a dud 500 pound bomb at (BS 465835). Three I.D. cards, one can of sulphur, one canteen and a first aid kit were found in the tunnel. All items were forwarded to 7th Marines S-2. The bomb was destroyed in place by engineer squad attached to Co D.

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(15) 181500H All units effected linkup at Objective B.

(16) 181615H Co A(-) at coordinates (BS 466834) received eight rounds sniper fire from unobserved sniper vicinity (BS 466832). Co A returned 6 rounds 60mm mortar, 6 rounds M-79 and 50 rounds 7.62mm. Squad searched area with inconclusive results. Result of contact: One USMC WIA.

(17) 181700H Co C secured Objective C.

(18) 181740H Co A secured Objective E.

(19) 181745H Co D secured Objective D.

(20) 181830H All units establish night defensive positions. See enclosure (4).

(21) 182030H Co D squad patrol enroute to set up ambush observed one VC with a weapon moving south on a trail at coordinates (BS 491827). The patrol opened fire with ten rounds 7.62mm and observed the VC fall into the brush after he had returned one round small arms fire. Three rounds 4.2 inch mortar illumination were fired to assist patrol in search of the area. The squad searched the area with inconclusive results. One VC WIA probable.

(22) 182150H Commanding Officer, 7th Marines modified 1stBn (-)(Rein), 5th Marines operational area as indicated in enclosure (5).

D. D+2. 19 February 1967. See enclosure (5).

(1) 190600H Co C Listening Post coordinates (BS 504832) received one hand grenade and two rounds small arms fire from an undetermined number VC at an estimated range of 40-50 meters. One M-26 grenade was returned by Co Listening Post. Seven rounds 4.2 inch illumination fired for LP. A fire team searched the area in 100 meters radius of LP position for 30 minutes with inconclusive results.

(2) 190710H Co A commenced movement to Objectives 3-B; Co C commenced movement to Objective A-1 and Co D commenced movement to Objective C-1.

(3) 190740H Co A secured Objective 3-B, Co D secured Objective C-1, Co C secured Objective A-1 and Bn Command Group commenced movement to Objective C-1.

(4) 190840H Co A established blocking position at Objective 3-B, Co C secured Objective B-1. Co D secured Objective E-1. Command Group displaced from Objective C-1 to Objective D-1.

(5) 190910H Co C secured Objective 1-B and established blocking positions vicinity Objective 1-B. Co D and Command Group moved to Objective 1-1.

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(6) 190945H Co D secured Objective 2-B and established blocking positions.

(7) 191155H Helicopter landing vicinity coordinates (BS 516826) to effect resupply for Co C, received five rounds small arms sniper fire from the east at a distance of 200 meters vicinity (BS 518826). Squad observed one male VC, age 20-25 approach a well at (BS 517826) from direction of sniper fire. VC was challenged at a distance of approximately 100 meters in English and Vietnamese. As VC attempted to run away he was challenged again. When VC continued to run, squad fired 15 rounds 7.62mm killing the VC. A search of the area was conducted to find a weapon. Search was concluded with inconclusive results. Results of contact: 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(8) 191200H Extensive caves, tunnel complexes and freshly dug fighting holes and trench lines were found in vicinity Objective 1-B, 2-B and 3-B. All caves and tunnels were searched with inconclusive results.

(9) 191300H Command Group displaced from Objective E-1 to Objective 2-B. Co C departed Objective 1-B to Objective 8-B. Co D maintained position at Objective 2-B, Co A departed Objective 1-B moving to Objective 6-B.

(10) 191500H Co A vicinity coordinates (BS 505795) received 20 rounds small arms fire from an estimated 4 VC vicinity coordinates (BS 502796), a distance of approximately 350 meters. VC wore black pajamas and carried carbines. Co A returned 5 rounds of M-79 and 80 rounds 7.62. VC broke contact and fled to the west. Searched area with inconclusive results.

(11) 191600H All units at Objective 7-B.

(12) 191610H Co D sector of defensive perimeter at Objective 7-B vicinity coordinates (BS 511793) received 4 rounds small arms fire from an unobserved 2-3 VC at a range of 500 meters from across rice paddy vicinity coordinates (BS 517794). Co D returned fire with 60 rounds 7.62 and 4 M-79 rounds. Other assigned mission precluded search of area.

(13) 191725H All units commenced movement from Objective 7-B. Co A and Command Group to Objective H-1, Co D to Objective F-1 and Co C to Objective G-1.

(14) 191730H H&S Co vicinity coordinates (BS 511791) received one round sniper fire from an unobserved location vicinity (BS 511792). No friendly fire was returned. A squad searched the area without observing any signs of enemy activity.

(15) 191740H Co D found one VCS in a house at coordinates (BS 511792). During initial interrogation, VC suspect appeared highly suspicious and was evasive in his answers to the interrogator's questions. VCS was forwarded to 9th ITT for interrogation.

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(16) 191745H Co C apprehended one VCS vicinity (BS 532787). VCS was approximately 20 years old and had no identification. He wore black clothing and carried a small bag of rice. VCS forwarded to 9th ITT for interrogation.

(17) 191840H Co C vicinity (BS 534766) received one round small arms fire from sniper vicinity coordinates (BS 535164). VC wore green shirt and shorts with camouflaged brush on his back. Co C returned 25 rounds 7.62mm as VC broke contact and fled in a southeast direction. Area searched by squad with inconclusive results.

(18) 191930H Night defensive position was organized and patrol activities departed. See enclosure (6).

(19) 192040H One Vietnamese jumped from behind brush at distance 40 meters away from Co A patrol vicinity coordinates (BS 519792). Patrol fired 25 rounds 7.62 and maneuvered through area. Four aircraft illuminating flares were dropped. Patrol searched area with inconclusive results and continued to ambush site.

E. D+3. 20 February 1967. See enclosure (7).

(1) 200800H Companies A, C and D conducted patrol activities in vicinity of objectives F-1, G-1, H-1.

(2) 201045H Co A combat patrol in hamlet vicinity coordinates (BS 520793) received nine rounds small arms fire from 3 VC wearing black clothing. Rounds were fired from a westerly direction at a range of 100 meters. Patrol returned 60 rounds 7.62 as enemy attempted to break contact to the north. One VC was observed throwing an object into the brush. A fire team searched area and found one wounded VC, who later died of wounds. Prior to the VC's death, he was interrogated and admitted being the hamlet guerrilla leader. Two M-26 fragmentation grenades were found in the brush.

(3) 201130H Co A patrol vicinity coordinates (BS 519793) observed 6 VC at (BS 520787) wearing black clothing moving south. One VC was carrying a rifle. The patrol initiated action at a distance of 600 meters by firing 20 rounds 7.62. VC fled to south and melted into group of civilians vicinity (BS 516784).

(4) 201200H Co A found one male VCS age 26 hiding in a tunnel adjacent to house. VCS had I.D. card but acted suspicious when questioned. VCS forwarded to 9th ITT.

(5) 201230H Command Group departed Objective H-1 moving to Objective F-1 to effect linkup with Companies C and D. Co A departed Objective H-1 to secure Objective A-2. Co C moved from Objective G-1 to effect linkup with Co D at objective F-1.

(6) 201330H Command Group, Co D and Co C effected linkup at Objective F-1.

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(7) 201340H Co D and Co C commenced S&D operation to secure Objective 6-2 and B-2.

(8) 201420H Co A secured Objective A-2 and establishing blocking position to east and north.

(9) 201545H Co C and Co D secured Objective C-2.

(10) 201600H Co D while searching Objective C-2 found several strands of concertina wire strung throughout the hamlet. Old trench lines had been freshly cleaned out with many recently dug fighting positions. Co D searched caves and tunnels at the objective found one ChiCom hand grenade, one 20 guage ChiCom Shotgun shell and one 81mm mortar fuse. All items destroyed in place by engineer squad attached to Co D.

(11) 201610H Co C found one 155mm dud in rice paddy at coordinates (BS 516758). Engineers destroyed the dud in place.

(12) 201610H Co C and Co D secured Objective B-2.

(13) 201620H Co D while searching Objective B-2 at coordinates (BS 515757) found a cave concealed under a hut. A pack, 1 flashlight, small package rice, 1 pair trousers, 1 shirt, 1 poncho and other assorted rags were found and forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(14) 201630H Co D while searching Objective B-2 vicinity (BS 513758) found 4 homemade gas masks, 1 pair green uniform trousers, 4 carbine magazines 54 .30 caliber carbine rounds, 1 US cartridge belt, one canteen cover, 2 magazine pouches, 5 60mm ChiCom mortar rounds. All items were forwarded to 7th Marines S-2. The five 60mm mortar rounds were destroyed by engineers.

(15) 201715H Co A found one VCS wearing black pajamas hiding in a tunnel at coordinates (BS 525780). Fireteam searched tunnel and found assorted VC documents. VCS and documents forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(16) 201815H Co D search and destroy operation located a tunnel at coordinates (BS 514758). A Marine entered the tunnel and found two male Vietnamese at rear of tunnel. The Marine ordered the Vietnamese out in English and Vietnamese. The Marine came out of the tunnel followed by an old Vietnamese man. The Marine re-entered the tunnel and saw the remaining Vietnamese inside the tunnel holding a ChiCom grenade. The Marine fired one round .45 cal and left the tunnel. A gas (CS) grenade was thrown into the tunnel. Two young female children and one male came out of the tunnel, but the male quickly re-entered the tunnel. One M-26 frag grenade was thrown into the tunnel. A subsequent search of the tunnel revealed 2 VC KIA. Result of contact: 1 ChiCom grenade destroyed, one VCC forwarded to 9th ITT for interrogation and 2 VC KIA confirmed.

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(17) 201900H Night defensive positions and activities established.
See enclosure (8).

F. D+4. 21 February 1967. See enclosure (9).

(1) 210510H Co C, Co D and Bn Command Group commenced movement from objective C-2 to Objective A-2.

(2) 210700H 1stBn (-)(Rein), 5thMar commenced operation in accordance with 7th Marines Operation Order 3-67.

(3) 210735H Companies C, D and Bn Command Group arrived Objective A-2.

(4) 210830H ROKMC Liaison Team attached to Bn Command Group.

(5) 210950H Co A and C crossed Line of Departure commencing S&D operations to Objective B-3.

(6) 211050H Co A and C secured Objective B-3 and commenced extensive search of the Objective to locate cave and tunnel complexes.

(7) 211145H Command Group and Co D commenced movement toward Objective D-3. Co A and C commenced search and destroy operations toward Objective C-3.

(8) 211255H Co D vicinity coordinates (BS 528809) received 40-50 rounds of small arms fire from estimated 4 unobserved VC vicinity coordinates (BS 52780). Co D returned 400 rounds of small arms fire and searched area with inconclusive results.

(9) 211410H Co C vicinity coordinates (BS 546794) received approximately 300 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated 10 VC vicinity coordinates (BS 544796) and (BS 548796). VC wore black trousers and white shirts. Co C returned 800 rounds 7.62, 12 rounds M-79 and three 60mm mortar rounds. The enemy broke contact to the northeast. VC were observed again by AO vicinity (BS 548800). Six 81mm mortar rounds were fired in vicinity coordinates (BS 548800) with 2 VC KIA confirmed by AO. Air strike was called vicinity (BS 556806). Co C meticulously searched area where mortars were fired and the area of the air strike. The area of the initial contact of Co C found blood trails leading in a northeast direction. Searches made in the other areas concluded with inconclusive results. Results of contact: 1 USMC WIA; 2 VC KIA confirmed, one VC KIA probable and 2 VC WIA probable.

(10) 211530H Co C secured Objective C-3.

(11) 211540H Co D secured Objective D-3.

(12) 211650H Co A secured northern sector of Objective E-3.

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(13) 211710H Command Group displaced from (BS 535805) to Objective E-3. All units moved to consolidate at Objective E-3.

(14) 211945H Co A vicinity coordinates (BS 554817) received 75 rounds small arms fire, six M-79 rounds and four small caliber mortar rounds fired from vicinity (BS 557820) and (BS 550820) at an approximate range of 400 meters from an estimated 10-15 VC. Co A returned 450 rounds of small arms fire, eight 60mm mortar rounds and one round of 3.5 WP. VC broke contact and withdrew in a northerly direction. The area was searched with inconclusive results. Result of contact: 2 USMC WIA.

(15) 212000H Two ROKMC companies requested and were granted permission establish night defensive positions within 1st Battalion's zone of action vicinity (BS 557813).

(16) 212030H Companies A, C and D and Bn Command Group established night defensive position vicinity (BS 554817). See enclosure (10).

(17) 212310H Co D Listening Post at (BS 556816) relocated after LP position was compromised by illumination flare. The LP heard one fragmentation grenade detonate at the old LP position 50 meters away. The fire team fired 20 rounds 7.62 at suspected enemy position. Area subsequently searched with inconclusive results. Listening Post returned to defensive perimeter.

(18) 220210H Co C defensive perimeter at (BS 554815) received four 60mm HE rounds from unknown distance and direction. No action taken. Results of mortar attack: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA.

(19) 220255H Co C defensive perimeter at (BS 551816) received two rounds 60mm mortar rounds again from unknown distance and direction. Five USMC WIA's sustained. Evacuation completed at 220730H.

G. D+5. 22 February 1967. See enclosure (11).

(1) 220600H Crater analysis conducted at locations of mortar impact. (See 220210H and 220255H February entries). The craters at (BS 554815) and (BS 551816) indicated that small caliber US made mortars were fired from azimuth of 130 degrees and 170 degrees respectively. The points of origin were not determined.

(2) 220730H Co C squad located one pack containing miscellaneous medical supplies, gray clothing and a VC notebook at coordinates (BS 553817). Pack and contents were forwarded to 7th Marines S-2.

(3) 220930H Co D and C crossed LD enroute to objective F-3.

(4) 221000H Co A and Bn Command Group commenced movement to Objective F-3.

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(5) 221010H Co C and D secured Objective F-3 and continued search and destroy to Objective G-3.

(6) 221100H Co C and D secured Objective G-3.

(7) 221115H Co A, the Battalion rear guard, at (BS 569828) received approximately 500 rounds small arms and automatic weapons fire from vicinity (BS 560824), (BS 560824) and (BS 564827) at a range of 300-500 meters from the rear and left flank. The enemy force of 25 to 30 VC fired from a trench network concealed by heavy vegetation. Co A returned 1000 rounds 7.62, 20 M-79 rounds and 2 rounds 60mm H.E. An air strike was called on the entrenched enemy force. A subsequent search of the area revealed numerous blood trails leading from the trench line to the northwest. Estimate six VC KIA (probable) and 5 VC WIA (probable). The enemy contact resulted in 3 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA who were medically evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion at 221200H.

(8) 221415H All units commenced search and destroy from Objective G-3 to H-3.

(9) 221430H Co D squad at (BS 583838) detonated unknown type booby trap while attempting to break through a thick hedgerow. A fin assembly of 60mm mortar round was found in vicinity of explosion. Eight USMC were wounded as a result of the booby trap. Seven WIA's were medically evacuated. One USMC DOW upon arrival at 1st Medical Battalion.

(10) 221550H Co A secured Objective H-3, Co D secured Objective I-3.

(11) 221610H Co D crossed PL BLUE.

(12) 221640H Co D secured J-3.

(13) 221715H Co D arrived at (BS 625850) and embarked aboard motor convo

(14) 221750H 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines commenced movement to Battalion Combat Base via motor convoy.

(15) 221930H All units reached Battalion Combat Base (BT 397145).

(16) 221930H Operation RIO GRANDE terminated on order of CO, 7th Marines

11. Results

a. Personnel

WIA 6

WIA 17

KIA 4

DOW 1

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(2) Enemy

KIA Confirmed	7
KIA Probable	7
WIA Probable	8
VCS Apprehended	7

b. Equipment and Material(1) Captured

- (a) Front Handguard of Carbine
- (b) Machine Gun Tripod (homemade)
- (c) 5,000 pounds Rice (Non-USAID) evacuated
- (d) 2 VC notebooks with propaganda
- (e) 3 RVN Identification Cards
- (f) 1 #10 can of Sulphur
- (g) 2 US Canteens
- (h) 1 Canteen Cover
- (i) 1 First Aid Kit
- (j) 2 Packs
- (k) 4 Homemade Gas Masks
- (l) 4 Carbine Magazines
- (m) 2 Carbine Magazine Pouches
- (n) 54 Rounds .30 Cal Ammunition
- (o) 1 US Cartridge Belt

(2) Destroyed

- (a) 15 57mm RR Duds
- (b) 2 500 pound Bombs (US)
- (c) 1 M-26 Grenade (booby trapped)
- (d) 2 M-26 Grenades
- (e) 2 Chi Com Grenades
- (f) 1 20 Gauge Shotgun Shell
- (g) 1 81mm Mortar Fuse
- (h) 1 155mm Dud
- (i) 5 60mm Chi Com Mortar Rounds

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c. Search of Air Strike Areas

Following all CAC missions during operation RIO GRANDE the strike areas were searched by elements of the Battalion.

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12. Administrative Mattersa. Resupply and Logistics

After operation RIO GRANDE commenced the Battalion was supported by a Logistics Support Activity (LSA) at the QUANG NGAI Air Strip vicinity (BS 615719). The LSA was operated by Force Logistics Support Group - B and augmented by a detachment from Company B, 1st Shore Party Battalion in direct support of the Battalion. All resupply requests were coordinated by the Battalion S-4 at the LSA. All resupply and medical evacuation requests were processed through Helicopter Support Teams, attached to companies in the field, to the LSA. No problems were encountered in processing or meeting the supply requirements from units during the operation. All personnel carried normal arms and equipment in addition to a Basic Allowance of ammunition. Each man consumed an average of two meals per day during the operation.

b. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization

Initial treatment of casualties during RIO GRANDE was administered by eight corpsmen attached to each line company and the five corpsmen and Battalion Surgeon with the Command Group. USMC wounded who required evacuation were processed through HST/LSA channels to 1st Medical Battalion.

c. Communications. During RIO GRANDE, no communication problems were experienced within the Battalion. The radio relay teams established on AN HOA (BS 473864) and NUI TRON (BS 517778), by 7th Marines, greatly increased the communications capabilities.

Wire communications proved valuable in night defensive positions and facilitated longer radio battery utilization.

The following radio and wire communication equipment was used on Operation RIO GRANDE:

35 AN/PRC-25
3 AN/PRC-41
1 AN/PRC-47
4 EE-8

d. Maintenance. A radio technician team from the Battalion Communication Platoon performed up to, and including third echelon communication maintenance. The technician team facilitated maximum utilization of communication equipment during the operation.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Wire Rudders. The Battalion initiated use of metallic wire rudders for locating underground tunnels and caves during the operation as recommended by Commanding General, 1st Marine Division letter 4/ELC/ctb:3000: dated 1 February 1967. The wire rudders proved highly effective in locating sub-surface structures, especially in instances where the operational situation permitted a systematic, detailed search of possible cave and tunnel areas.

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b. Rice Bags. Each individual carried two light weight plastic rice bags during the operation. The bags were extremely beneficial in facilitating timely evacuation of large rice caches uncovered during RIO GRANDE.

c. CS GAS M7A2

CS gas grenades (M7A2) were successfully used to entice the enemy from his hiding place in tunnels and caves.

d. Air-Ground Marking Systems

During the initial helicopter insertions, the landing zones were marked with smoke for succeeding waves to facilitate maximum number of units into the landing zone in minimum amount of time.

In addition, thirty-six multi-color air panels were strategically placed to mark forward unit positions for close air support.

14. Commander's Analysis

a. Attachments to the Battalion were effected on D-2, permitting adequate time for briefings. It further facilitated detailed and comprehensive operational planning, and subsequent execution.

b. Exploitation of psychological warfare aerial leaflet drops and taped broadcasts were severely restricted as a result of obvious exfiltration of large enemy forces and civilian populace prior to the arrival of the Battalion in the operation area.

c. All assigned missions were accomplished.

15. Recommendations.

a. Liaison Officer. During the conduct of the operation a ROKMC Liaison Officer was attached to the Battalion. His presence greatly eased anticipated control problems. Supporting arms, coordination and attack plans were exchanged, thereby precluding any misinterpretation and subsequent failure of assigned missions. Employment of a liaison officer is considered desirable, when conducting coordinated joint operations with allied forces and is so recommended.

b. Wire Rudders. The utilization of the MATACIA RUDDER is highly recommended. The item required nominal training and is highly effective in locating tunnels, caves and false walls.

P. L. HILGARTNER

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4


ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

MAPS: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014,
Sheets 6739, I, II, III and IV

DECLASSIFIED

NIGHT ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION OVERLAY D-DAY



82 + 44

$$\begin{array}{r} 98 \\ + 48 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

UNCLASSIFIED


ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

MAFS: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014, Sheets 6739I, II, III, and IV

OPERATION ORBILAY D+1

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ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED


D+1 NIGHT ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION OVERLAY

MAPS: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014,
Sheets 6739I,II,III and IV

DECLASSIFIED

$$\begin{array}{r} 48 \\ + 86 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

UNCLASSIFIED



+ 81 \uparrow M A Z
48


ENCLOSURE (4)

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$$\begin{array}{r} 48 \\ 84 \end{array}$$

DECLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (5)

DECLASSIFIED

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Night Activity and Disposition Overlay D+2


A1 SA
A2 SA
A3 FT(-) LP
A4 FT(-) LP
D11 SA
D21 SA
D31 SA
C2 SA
C3 SA
C4 SA

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ENCLOSURE (6)

OPERATION OVERLAY D+3

UNCLASSIFIED



ENCLOSURE (7)

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$$\begin{array}{r} 54 \\ + 79 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

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Handwritten notes and diagrams on a lined notebook page:

- Top left: A1 with a downward arrow.
- Top center: A circled diagram with labels A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-6.
- Top right: A2 with an upward arrow.
- Middle left: A2 with a downward arrow.
- Middle center: A3 with a downward arrow.
- Middle right: A circled diagram with labels C-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5.
- Bottom left: D1A, B-2, and D31 with an upward arrow.
- Bottom center: A-3, A-4, and A-5 with a downward arrow.
- Bottom right: A circled diagram with labels C-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5, and A-6 with an upward arrow.
- Far right: 53 with a plus sign.

$$\begin{array}{r} 53 \\ + 75 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

[REDACTED]

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NIGHT ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION OVERLAP D+4


DECLASSIFIED

53

83+

PL RED

DECLASSIFIED



ENCLOSURE (9)

DECLASSIFIED


NIGHT ACTIVITY AND DISPOSITION OVERLAY D+4

MAPS: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014,
Sheets 6739I,II,III and IV

DECLASSIFIED

84 + 54

UNCLASSIFIED



79 + 58

ENCLOSURE (10)


DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MAFS: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014,
Sheets 6739I, II, III and IV

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OPERATION OVERLAY D+5



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ENCLOSURE (11)

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Operation Plan 10-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
241300H February 1967

060-67

Operation Plan 10-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L701: Sheets 6659II, III, IV;
AMS Series L7014: Sheets 6740III, 6739I, IV; 6738I, II; 6838 III, IV
(b) Task Force X-Ray Frag C 8-67
(c) DNO 3300.1 (Rules of Engagement)

Time Zone: H

Copy 72 of 80 copies.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) TF X-Ray(-)(Rein), in conjunction with ARVN forces assigned, conducts search and destroy operations in the DUC PHO area, QUANG NGAI Province, RVN for a period of six days.

(2) Two Battalions, 2nd ARVN Division conduct coordinated operation in zone of action north of and adjacent to 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines.

(3) 3rd Battalion (Rein), 7th Marines establishes blocking positions vicinity coordinates BS 765352 to BS 825405.

(4) SLF executes landing vicinity coordinates BS 8247 on D-1 and attacks to the south.

(5) Air. 1stMAW provides helicopter, fixed wing and air control support as required.

(6) CTO 76.5 provides NGF units in support of TF X-Ray.

2. MISSION

a. At L-Hour, D-Day 1st Battalion (-)(Rein), 5th Marines lands by helicopter in selected landing zone and conducts search and destroy operations as directed. (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

b. Establishes blocking positions as directed to support friendly forces in the operational area.

c. On order shifts direction of attack south along National Route #1.

d. Conduct psychological operations (Annex H (Psychological Warfare Operations)).

e. Provides Command Group for forces assigned to defend assigned TAOR in CHU LAI area.

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TAB-E

5. EXECUTION

a. Company A (Rain). Commencing at L-Hour on D-Day, ~~Boat~~ (-)(Rain), ~~Boat~~ ~~Boat~~ on land with three companies in designated landing zone and conducts coordinated search and destroy operations IAW operation overlay (Annex C).

b. Company B (Rain)

(1) On order on D-Day land in designated landing zone and secure LZ perimeter (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

(2) On order commence search and destroy operations and secure designated objectives. (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

(3) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

c. Company C (Rain)

(1) On order on D-Day land in designated landing zone and secure LZ perimeter (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

(2) On order commence search and destroy operation and secure designated objective (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

(3) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

d. Company D (-)(Rain)

(1) On order on D-Day land in designated landing zone and secure LZ perimeter (Annex C (Operation Overlay)).

(2) Be prepared to secure objective (1) on order.

(3) Be prepared to assume mission of Battalion reserve on order.

e. Blow Master Plt (-). General Support

f. Flame Section. General Support

g. Battalion Reserve.

(1) Company D (-)(Rain)

(a) Be prepared to assume mission of either attacking company.

(b) Be prepared to establish blocking positions as directed.

(c) Be prepared to provide security for Command Group as directed.

(d) Be prepared to accomplish other missions as directed.

h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-Day - 26 February 1967 (For planning purposes)
- (2) L-Hour - 1100H (For planning purposes)
- (3) Rules of Engagement apply as directed (ref (c)).
- (4) Contact right to left.
- (5) Rice destruction upon specific authorization CO, 1stBn, 5thMar. Report number of bags to be extracted.
- (6) Riot control agents employed on authority CO, 1stBn, 5thMar. Personnel using RCA must be equipped with protective masks.
- (7) Be alert for mines and booby traps. Use proper mine warfare procedures.
- (8) Unit Commanders ensure that troops use proper movement techniques and ensure that all troops are accounted for at all times.
- (9) All hands will dig in when forward movement has ceased.
- (10) Reports will be submitted as follows:
 - (a) Brief sitrep on arrival LZ then every six hours commencing 1700H to include positions, plans and cumulative casualties including enemy casualties.
 - (b) Spot reports on crossing phase lines, or significant occurrences, on contact with enemy forces, and on receiving or inflicting casualties.
 - (c) Hourly position report.
- (11) Landing Sequence
 - (a) Co C (Rein) pickup at departure zone at L-20 min; land LZ DOVE at L-Hour.
 - (b) Co B (Rein) pickup at departure zone at L-20 min; land LZ DOVE at L+3 min.
 - (c) Command Group 1 pickup at departure zone at L-20 min; land LZ DOVE at L+6 min.
 - (d) Co D (-)(Rein) pickup at departure zone at L-20 min; land LZ DOVE at L+9 min.
 - (e) Command Group 2 pickup at departure zone at L-20 min; land LZ DOVE at L+12 min.
- (12) Departure zone is XV HA Air Facility, CHU LAI, RVN.
- (13) Unclassified code name: Operation "DESOTO/DECKHOUSE VI".

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Annex D (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

a. Command

(1) 1stLt (-)(Rein), 5thMar CP initially with Co D.

b. Communications-Electronics

(1) See Annex E (Communications-Electronics)

(2) Thrust Points: BS 8030 Any Tool
 BS 9026 Any Bear
 BS 8534 Any State
 BS 7836 Any Disease
 BS 8040 Any Whiskey
 BS 7040 Any Coin
 BS 8545 Any Rank
 BS 8048 Any Ship
 BS 7545 Any Candy

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGAERTNER

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ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Administration and Logistics
- E - Communications-Electronics
- F - Fire Support
- G - Movement Plan
- H - Psychological Warfare Operation
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 10-67

Operation Plan 10-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marine
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
241300H February 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 10-67

Time Zone: E

(All attachments effective 231300H Feb 67)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rain)

LTCOL HILGARTNER

HAS Co (-)(Rain)

CAPT DARLING

HAS Co (-)

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Det, Sub Unit #2 HqBn, 1stMarDiv

Det, Co C, 1stSPBn

Plt, Hq, Co B, 1stEngBn

ARVN Lm O

Det, Hq Btry, 2ndBn, 11thMar

K-1 Carson Scout

Co B (Rain)

CAPT PETERSON

Co B

FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stEngBn

Det, Co C, 1stSPBn

Det, HqCo, 7thMar

Det, HAS Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Cam Flt

Det, Med Flt

FO Tn, Slim Mortar Plt

E-2 Scout

FAO Tn

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tn

A-1

Co C (Rein)

CAPT CASWELL

Company C

FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Co C, 1stSPBn

Det, HqCo, 7thMar

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tn

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tn

Co D (-)(Rein)

CAPT CARTY

Company D (-)

FO Tn, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

Squad, Co B, 1stEngr Bn

Det, Co C, 1stSPBn

Det, H&S Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Det, Comm Plt

Det, Med Plt

FO Tn, 81mm Mortar Plt

S-2 Scout

FAC Tn

Det, ARVN Interpreter Tn

1stBn, 5thMar (Rear)

MAJOR ALGER

Det, SAS Co, 1stBn, 5thMar

Co D, 1stBn, 26thMar

3rd Plt, Co D, 1stBn, 5thMar

1st Plt, Co I, 3rdBn, 5thMar

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ENDIX

1a (Command Groups)

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
241300H February 1967

Appendix 1 (Command Groups) to Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 10-67

COMMAND GROUPS

Group 1

CO, 1stBn, 5thMar (1)
SgtMaj (1)
Radio Operators (2)
S-2 Scout (1)
S-3 (1)
S-3A (1)
S-3 Admin Men (2)
Radio Operators (2)
Arty Ln O (1)
Radio Operators (2)
Ar Ln O (1)
Radio Operators (1)
NGF Ln Tn (2)

Group 2

Hq Cndt (1)
ARVN Ln Off (1)
S-2 Scout (1)
S-4 Rep (1)
Air Radio Operator (1)
Arty Radio Operator (1)
NGF Ln Tn (2)
Det, 81mm Mortar Plt (30)
Comm Officer (1)
Radio Chief (1)
Wire Chief (1)
Wiremen (5)
Medical Officer (1)
Corpsmen (3)
Chaplain (1)
Chaplain Asst (1)
Security Det. (25)
Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv (2)
Plt Hq, Co B, 1stIngrBn (4)
Plt Hq, Co C, 1stSP Bn (10)
Kit Carson Team (2)

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Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, RVN
 24300H February 1967

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 10-67

Ref: (a) Map: AMS L7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6738I, 6738II, 6838III and 6838IV.
 (b) BAO 1800:1D (SOP for Intelligence)

Time Zone: E

1. Summary of enemy Situation.

a. Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)

b. Background. The DUC PHO area is both an important economic center and a long standing reception point for infiltrated weapons, ammunition, medicine, and other material for use of the Viet Cong. The inhabitants have nick-named SA HUYNH the "International Contraband Post". Recent information reports a joint civilian military trade service in the area for all of Military Region 5. The imported products are transported along specific corridors into the mountains.

c. Local Forces. The 38th Provincial Mobile Battalion has been reported to be operating in the DUC PHO, HO DUC District. There is also a probable unit, the 19th Battalion which operates in this area. There is one confirmed Local Force Company the C-219th and two probable Local Force Companies the C-217th and the 506th.

d. Main Forces. The 2nd North Vietnamese Army Regiment of the 3rd North Vietnamese Division has been reported in the DUC PHO District. The 2nd NVA Regiment is composed of the 93rd, 95th, 97th and Headquarters and Service Battalions.

2. Essential Elements of Information.

- a. Determine if the enemy will attack NUI DAW, NUI DONG or DUC PHO District Headquarters. If so, when, where and in what strength.
- b. Determine the combat effectiveness of the Local Force Companies and Provincial Mobile Battalions.
- c. Determine enemy Anti-Aircraft and artillery capabilities.

- d. Determine the attitude of civilians toward U.S. Forces, Republic of Vietnam Forces and Viet Cong/NVA Forces.
- e. Determine points and routes of infiltration into the operational area and routes of exfiltration from the coast into the mountains of enemy personnel, their commodities and supplies.
- f. Determine if the enemy will defend this area, if so in what strength.
- g. Determine the assistance the indigenous populace in the objective area can provide us. How, and in what way.

3. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions.

a. Orders to subordinate units.

(1) All companies.

- (a) Be prepared to conduct observation and reconnaissance missions on order.
- (b) Report any unusual or suspicious observations.
- (c) Search out assigned areas thoroughly for hidden supply and arms caches.

b. Request to higher adjacent and supporting units.

(1) S-2, 7th Marines

- (a) Furnish Maps as required.
- (b) Provide aerial photo coverage as requested.
- (c) Provide AO support as requested.
- (d) Provide current information on enemy movement.
- (e) Furnish weather forecast for period of operation.

4. Measures for Handling Prisoners, Captured Documents and Materials.

a. Reference (b) applies.

b. All captives will be tagged showing date time, location and circumstances of capture.

c. All captured documents and materials will be tagged showing date time and location of capture. (Documents found on captives will be evacuated with captive).

5. Maps and Photographs.

- a. Reference (a) applies.
- b. Battalion S-2 will provide maps.
- c. Battalion S-2 will distribute photographs when available.

6. Counter-Intelligence.

- a. Reference (b) applies.
- b. Passwords will be disseminated daily.

8. Miscellaneous.

- a. Make a maximum effort to take POW's.
- b. Spot reports will be submitted in accordance with existing instructions.
- c. Booby traps/mines and all ordinance will be destroyed in place unless apparent intelligence value of the item is noted.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGERTNER

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APPENDIX: A Intelligence Estimate

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Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, RVN
 241300H February 1967

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence to Operation Plan 10-67)

Ref: (a) Map: AMS L7014, 1:50,000, Sheets 6738I, 6738II, 6838III and 6838IV.
 (b) BaO 3800, 1D (SOP for Intelligence)

Time Zone: H

1. Mission.

- a. Basic Mission. To be announced.
- b. Purpose of this estimate. To provide current intelligence for planning operations (Tactical in the MO DUC - DUC PHO Area).

2. Characteristics of the Area of Operation.

- a. Orientation. The area included in this estimate is the SE portion of QUANG NGAI Province. Specifically the area bounded by the SONG TRA KHUC River on the north, the I CTZ boundary on the south, the BS 55 north-south grid line on the west and the seacoast on the east. It includes all of MO DUC, DUC PHO and NGHIA HANH District and the majority of Ba TO Districts.
- b. Weather. The customary two season weather associated with I CTZ.
 - (1) April through August. The dry season. Characterized by, higher temperatures, clear skies and minimal precipitation. The precipitation remains reasonably constant, averaging about three inches per month. Skies are relatively clear with some coastal cloudiness (afternoon), usually scattered cumulus with bases 2000 to 3000 feet. Monthly mean maximums in the 70's. This season is considered more suitable for military operations. Governing considerations being the good flying weather, visibility and trafficability.
 - (2) September through March. The wet season. Dominated by the effects of the Northeastern monsoon. This period is characterized by the excess rainfall, maximum cloudiness and crashing. Greatest mean precipitation occurs in October with 23 inches, whereas September

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and November means are 16 inches. Crachin, a prolonged period of widespread fog and light rain with ceiling below 1000 feet and often below 500 feet, begins in December. The periods of crachin begin decreasing in January and disappearing by April. Monthly mean minimum temperatures are in the high 70's and mean minimums in the low 60's. This season is less desirable for military operations. Government consideration being the poor flying weather, poor visibility, flooding and unsuitable trafficability.

c. Terrain

(1) Relief

- (a) The coastal plain is relatively flat strip, six to ten miles in width, which parallels the coast line down to the NUI SANH Mountains in the southeastern corner. The plains are interspersed with isolated hills and ridges and are sectioned into rice paddies bounded by dikes two to five feet high and from one to several feet wide. The eastern edge of the plain consists of a belt of beach and sand dunes which average 200 meters in width and three to 20 meters in height.
- (b) There is very little piedmont and the remaining portion of the area is predominantly mountains and is covered by dense tropical rain forests. This mountainous area is dramatically compartmented by river valleys. The predominant one being the SONG TRA NO - SONG BA TO SONG BE River Valley Complex running generally from southwest to northeast, across the entire area.

(2) Drainage

- (a) The principal streams rise on the mountain slopes and flow generally northeast onto the coastal plains. In the mountains the rivers flow swiftly through deeply incised, steep-walled valleys and gullies. As they enter the coastal plains they tend to meander aimlessly into the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The streams and rivers become severe obstacles during the rainy seasons. The SONG VE river in the northern portion of the area is a major obstacle year around.

(3) Routes of Communications

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- (a) National Route 1 generally follows the coast line for the entire length of the area. South of Ho Duc (BS 7162) the route is habitually impassible due to enemy action and/or weather.
 - (b) A railroad generally parallels Route 1. Most of the bridges and overpasses (at least 30) are out. Under ideal conditions several months would be required to make the rail system operational.
 - (c) National Route 515 (Route 74 on some maps) extends from a junction with Route 1 (BS 7646) on the border of Ho Duc Duc PhO Districts and runs generally SW leaving the study area near Ba To CUC Camp (BS 5933). This road is in poor condition and has been closed for about one year.
 - (d) Numerous secondary roads and trails extend inland from Route 1 but after a few miles become impassible and/or have been cut by the enemy.
- (4) Helicopter Operations. Helicopter landing zones are abundant on the coastal plains and in the river valleys.
- (5) Hydrography. The study area is bordered on the east by approximately 37 miles of coast line. The northern 25 miles of which is nearly straight beach. The southern twelve miles is broken, irregular coast line at the base of Noi SAG mountains (BS 8825). This southern portion contains two concave beaches. The only favorable beach provides 19 miles of usable beach. The width of the beach varies from 100 to 300 meters. Off shore approaches are clear and the bottom sand. Tidal range four to five feet. Surf 4 feet or greater can be expected 54% of the time in winter, 18% in spring, 6% in summer and 24% in fall. The beach is backed by dune line extending as much as 1000 yards inland. Several lagoons, isolated hills, villages and streams restrict access from the beach. Beach exits for foot troops are good but poor for wheeling vehicles. Beach landing and engineering effort will most likely be required.

3. Enemy Situation (Ho Duc - Duc PhO)

a. Disposition and Strengths

- (1) Three VC/NVA base areas are located in the vicinity of the operating area.

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- (a) Base Area 124 located in NUI T.M. Mountains (BS 7435). Three food storage areas and one ordinance depot are reported in this area.
- (b) Base Area 225 located in upper AN LAO Valley (BS 7418). This is the home of the 22nd Regiment, 3rd NVA Division.
- (c) Base Area 123 located in NUI GOI Mountains (BS 6647). Eight logistics installations, two prisons, two training areas, three ordinance and one general installation are reported to be in this area.

(2) Estimate of enemy forces locally available and confirmed units.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
2nd Regt Hqs Bn	NVA	BS 7041	500
93rd Bn 2nd Regt	NVA	BS 8340	500
95th Bn 2nd Regt	NVA	BS 7443	500
97th Bn 2nd Regt	NVA	BS 8031	500
38th Bn	MF	BS 6857	400
C-219th Co	LF	BS 7740	100

(3) Estimate of unconfirmed enemy forces probably operating in the DUC HO area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
19th Bn	MF	BS 7753	400
C-217th Co	LF	BS 8626	100
506th Co	LF	BS 7756	100

(4) Guerrilla Force. 1,368 within local area.

b. Arms and Armament. 81 mortars and 75 RR are the largest weapons reported with units in this area.

c. Recent and Present Activities.

(1) Enemy Capabilities

- (a) The enemy is capable of attacking or defending at a time and place of his choosing with one Regiment, one Battalion and one separate company.

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- (b) Withdraw to avoid contact and conserve forces.
- (c) Conduct limited att cks, ambushes and harrassments in conjunction with above capabilities.

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
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241300Z February 1967

Annex Z (Operation Overlay) to Operation Plan 10-67




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 Date: 10/10/67
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OP Plan 10-67
1st Bn, 5th Marines
Chu Lai, Vietnam
241300H Feb 1967

Annex D Administration and Logistics to Operation Order 10-67

1. Supply

a. General

- (1) FLSG-B provides all classes of supply.
- (2) Regimental S-4 will inform FLSG Bravo of the amount and type of supplies required for the operation.
- (3) FLSG-Bravo will inform Regimental S-4 of any shortage of supplies requested for this operation.
- (4) The logistical support area for this operation will be located at Duc Pho.

b. Prescribed Loads

- (1) 6 meals "C" rations (3 day supply/2 meals per day)
- (2) Extra set of utility trousers
- (3) Extra scivvies as prescribed by Company CO
- (4) 3 pairs of socks
- (5) Foot powder
- (6) Insect repellent
- (7) Air mattress
- (8) Intrenching tool
- (9) Shaving gear
- (10) Basic allowance
- (11) Helmets
- (12) Packs
- (13) Flak jackets
- (14) Normal arms and equipment/3 canteens
- (15) Salt tablets
- (16) Medical supplies, initial allowance plus two days high usage items. All troops carry anti-malaria prophylaxis.
- (17) 2 bottles Kalizone per individual
- (18) Gas masks
- (19) Dog tags and Geneva Convention Cards

D -

- (20) Rope for stream crossing
- (21) CS grenade per squad
- (22) Air panels - 1 per fire team
- (23) Green star clusters
- (24) Green and Yellow smoke
- (25) Two rice bags per man

b. Supplies and Equipment Available

- (1) All classes of supply available to LSA

d. Resupply

- (1) Resupply of LSA will be provided by FLSG-B
- (2) Units request resupply through attached Helicopter Support Team (HST) utilizing Shore Party Logistical Net.
- (3) Requests for morning resupply will be submitted by 2000
- (4) Requests for evening resupply will be submitted between 1000-1100
- (5) Normal resupply by air ceases at dark
- (6) Helicopters will be requested for assignment to the LSA Commander for resupply and Med-Evac

e. Captured Material. All captured material will be evacuated to the Battalion C.P. and turned over to the Intelligence Officer for evaluation. This material will be clearly tagged as to where found, under what circumstances, when and by whom. The material will in turn be evacuated to the Regimental C.P. No captured rice will be destroyed; request instructions from Battalion Commander.

f. Excess Material. Any material determined to be in excess of unit's needs will be returned to the LSA.

g. Salvage. The Battalion S-4 will be kept informed of all materials requiring salvage. When practicable, such materials will be returned to the LSA. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left abandoned or unguarded.

2. Medical

a. Medical units

- (1) Medical section of Organic unit
- (2) Med-Evacs will go to collecting and clearing medical station at Duc Pho for further evacuation, if necessary, to USS TWO JIMA.

(3) Medical evacuation policy 24 hours

b. Sanitation and Preventive Medicine.

(1) Unit Commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

(2) Unit Commanders ensure that all troops carry anti-Malaria prophylaxis for a period of two (2) weeks. 2 bottles of Malizone tablets and salt tablets for a minimum of two days.

c. Evacuations. The use of helicopters for rapid transportation of casualties has vastly decreased the mortality rate of personnel wounded in action. Because of this and the quick reaction time of helicopters there is a tendency to over state the urgency of medical evacuation requests. To aid in classifying the condition of casualties the following classification has been established:

(1) Routine: Evacuation of deceased personnel or evacuation of a patient with a minor injury or illness.

(2) Priority: Evacuation of seriously wounded, injured or ill personnel who require early hospitalization, but whose immediate hospitalization is not a matter of life or death.

(3) Emergency: Evacuation of critically wounded, injured or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death. This classification is justified when a case falls into one of the following categories:

(a) The casualty is unconscious from a head wound

(b) The casualty is in severe shock

(c) The casualty is actively bleeding

(d) The casualty has suffered the loss of an arm or a leg, has an abdominal wound, or has a penetrating chest wound.

(4) Civilian and ARVN Casualties. Evacuation to ARVN medical facility at Quang Ngai. Serious injuries will be directed to the 1st Medical Battalion if so directed by a Medical Officer.

(5) Enemy Casualties. Evacuated (under guard) to the LSA or to 1st Medical Battalion.

(6) U.S. casualties have priority for evacuation

(7) Emergency helicopter evacuation of casualties (EMDEVACS). The following will be assessed by the Commander on the scene:

(a) Security of the landing site and freedom from interdicting enemy fire. If landing site is insecure, movement of evacuee to secure area will be attempted. If movement is impossible, every effort will be exerted to utilize suppressive fire by local unit small arms, artillery, aircraft, or a combination thereof while evacuation is in progress.

(b) Communications between the Commander on the scene and the aircraft is essential to exchange pertinent information concerning landing approach, pickup point, and terrain characteristics.

(c) During a helicopter evacuation of casualties, supporting arms fire must be curtailed to ensure the safety of the helicopter from friendly fire.

3. Transportation

a. The battalion will move by motor convoy to Ky Ha Air Field for hoist lift to operational area.

4. Service

a. Assignment of Responsibilities

(1) Attached units will provide support in accordance with the normal mission.

(2) Shore Party will be prepared to provide an LST to this Battalion.

b. Maintenance

(1) Battery recharging capability will be located at the LSA.

(2) Critical items that cannot be repaired at the LSA will be evacuated to FLSG-B for priority repair.

5. Miscellaneous

a. A tag showing the individual's name, rank, serial number and date of birth will be placed on the back of each individual. Unit designation will not be shown.

b. The military and personal effects of all evacuated personnel will accompany the casualty to the evacuation point.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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ANNEX E (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) to Operation Plan 10-57

- Ref: (A) FMFPAC PO2000.2C
 (B) CG, 1st MarDiv PO2000.2G
 (C) CG, 1st MarDiv PO2000.2I
 (D) BnO 2000.11B

Time Zone H

1. Situation.

(A) ENEMY FORCES

- (1) See Annex B (INTELLIGENCE)
- (2) See current intsums
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Intercept, monitor, employ initiative disruption and jamming on any communication activity.
 - (b) Ambush wire teams during initial installation and tactical trouble shooting.
 - (c) Cut and tap lines for the purpose of interception or deception.
 - (d) Salvage, repair and use discarded communications equipment, especially dry cell batteries.

(B) FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) See Annex A (TASK ORGANIZATION)
- (2) COMMAND POSTS
 - (a) 1/5 TRA
 - (b) Subordinate units report ep locations when established.

2. MISSION

(A) COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON 1/5

- (1) Guard Regt Tac Net #1 upon departure from Landing Beach.
- (2) Guard Bn Tac Net #1 upon departure from Landing Beach.
- (3) Guard TACP LOCAL upon departure from Landing Beach.
- (4) Provide one wireman and one field radio operator to each rifle company.

(B) AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS. See APPENDIX 1 (RADIO PLAN)

(C) SHORE PARTY COMMUNICATIONS.

- (1) See Appendix 1 (RADIO PLAN)
- (2) Establish wire lines within the Bn CP.

(B) COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) Reference (B) through (D)

(2) MESSENGER SERVICE

(A) Runner messenger will be established in accordance with reference (D) for units in physical contact with BN Q3.

(3) RADIO

- (a) Radio nets. Appendix 1 (RADIO PLAN).
- (b) Call signs. Appendix 2 (CALL SIGNS).
- (c) Radio checks and test will be conducted only when necessary.
- (d) Used dry cell batteries will be destroyed by using units.
- (e) Batteries BB-451 will be replaced as indicated by weak transmission.
- (f) The Proword "I SPELL" will be used only when doubt exists as to clarity of pronunciation of the word.
- (g) Time zone hotel will be used on all messages transmitted within the Battalion.

(4) WIRE

- (A) All wire lines will be retrieved.
- (B) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, internal of the Command post, after dusk.

(5) VISUAL AND SOUND. See Appendix 3 (VISUAL AND SOUND)(6) CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS. See Appendix 4 (CRYPTOGRAPHIC INST)

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

(A) See Administrative Order 10-67

(B) All units will carry 2 dry cell batteries per radio. Resupply will be coordinated with ammunition and ration replacement.

(C) Battery charging facility will be maintained at the BSA. Replacement will be on a one-for-one basis. All radios utilizing batteries BB-451 will be provided with two BB-451 batteries.

(D) The Bn Comm Officer will be notified of failure of equipment and whether or not a replacement is necessary. The equipment must be tagged by the user, indicating trouble.

(E) All evacuation of Communications Equipment must be accomplished on a one-for-one basis.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELBURNER

R.J. ALGER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES:

1. RADIO PLAN
2. VISUAL AND SOUND
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION ANNEX Z (DISTRIBUTION) to Operation Plan 10-67

E-3

Operation Plan 10-67
 1st MAB, 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Viet Nam
 241300H Feb 67

Appendix 1 (RADIO PLAN) to Annex 2 (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Plan 10-67

Time Zone: H

C- Net Control station

X- Guard

O- Be prepared to Guard

	(P) 66.5 Landing Force Tac #1 M-1016	(S) 44.7 Landing Force Tac #1 M-629	68.2 Landing Force Tac #2 M-1050	(P) 57.5 Bn Tac M-826	(S) 46.3 Bn Tac M-659	58.5 CO "B" Tac M-846	69.6 CO "C" Tac M1082	64.6 CO "D" Tac M-974	42.15 81MM C of F M-575	46.8 TAC LOCAL	TAD TBA	41 45.6 HST LOG #2 44.1	49.8 LZ CONTROL	TAR TBA
BN CL	X	O	O	O	O									
CO "B"				X	O	C								
CO "C"				X	O		C							
CO "D"				X	O			C						
81MM MORTAR PLATOON				X	O				C					
FAC TEAM				O						X	X			
ALO TEAM				O						X	X			O
106MM RR PLATOON				X	O									
HST				O								X	X	

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGERTER

R.J. Alger
 R.J. ALGER
 Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Distribution: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 10-67

Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Bn, 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Viet Nam
 241300H Feb 67

Appendix 2 (VISUAL and SOUND) to Annex 2 (Communications-Electronics) to
 Operation Plan 10-67.

1. All visual signals employed for air-ground coordination must be confirmed by voice radio communication. The helicopter common circuit will not be used by ground units except in an emergency.

2. Smoke signals will be as follows:

TYPE

Grenade, hand smoke
 green or yellow M-18

MEANING

Marking of friendly units positions
 or of a secure area for helo landing zone.

Grenade, hand, smoke,
 red M-18

Enemy positions

3. Illumination signals will be as follows:

TYPE

Green star cluster

MEANING

Return of friendly units to lines or
 marking friendly positions.

4. Panel signals will be as follows:

A. Helicopter landing points identification.

(1) Daylight Marking

(a) All landing points will be marked with an equilateral triangle constructed by utilizing three panel sets. The color selected must contrast with the surface of the landing point.

(b) Type of unit will be designated by placing panels in the center of the triangle.

1 Infantry one yellow panel

(c) Example of infantry unit.



(2) Night signals

(a) Night signals for helicopter landing sites will depend upon the tactical situation; however, lighting may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of the triangle site marker down-wind of the sight and illuminating the landing zone. During night operations, every effort will be made to utilize radio communications.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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 R.J. ALGER

Major, U.S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2

E-2-1

Operation Plan 10-67
1st Bn, 5th Marines
Chu Lai, Viet Nam
241300H Feb 67

Appendix 3 (Cryptographic Instructions) to Annex 2 (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 10-67.

Time Zone: H

1. AUTHENTICATION

A. Effective edition tables of KAC-JJ

B. Authentication will be mandatory under the following circumstances:

- (1) When imitative deception is known or suspected.
- (2) When challenging or challenged.
- (3) When lifting or imposing radio silence.
- (4) When entering or leaving a radio net.
- (5) When transmitting operation instructions that affect the military situation.
- (6) When transmitting contact or amplifying reports in plain language.

C. The use of authentication tables will be in accordance with operation instructions (i.e., time listed on tables are to be construed as HOTEL time rather than ZULU time.)

2. Coupling Codes.

A. Effective edition and 24 hour tables of KAC-JJ.

B. This code offers minimum security and should not be used for encryption of information which requires protection for longer than twelve hours.

C. This system will not be used to couple:

- (1) Coordinates of friendly positions known or suspected to be known by the enemy.
- (2) Coordinates of enemy positions.
- (3) Radio frequencies.
 - (a) Assigned designators will be used at all times to refer to radio frequencies.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MILGUTER

ROBERT W. MILGUTER
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 10-67

E-3-1

Operation Plan 10-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
241300H February 1967

Annex F (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Plan 10-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, Sheet 6738I, II, III
(b) FFM 7-4

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) See current INTSUM

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Appendix 1 (Air Support)
- (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire)
- (3) Appendix 3 (Artillery)

2. MISSION

a. The 1stBn, 5thMar FSCC will exercise overall responsibility for coordinating and planning conventional fires supporting 1stBn, 5th Marines.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation

- (1) Control and coordination of air and naval gunfire will remain with FSCC.
- (2) Control and coordination of ground supporting arms will remain with FSCC.

b. Coordination of Air Support

- (1) CAS will be under the positive control of FAC or TAC(a).
- (2) CAS requests passed on the TAR net will be coordinated by the FSCC to be considered appropriate and safe. The request will only be honored on approval from FSCC.

3. COORDINATION OF NAVAL ARTILLERY FIRES

- (1) The NGF Liaison Officer will give positive approval before the mission is fired.
- (2) NGF will be under the positive control of NGF spot team or Airborne Spotter (TAC)

d. Coordination of Artillery Fires

- (1) Effected by FSCC, including consideration of all air activity.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Target List

- (1) Current target list, when required, will be maintained by FSCC.

b. Concentration Designation System

- (1) The concentration designation for artillery will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers.

Followed

Block numbers are assigned as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number Block</u>
FO, Co B	200-299
FO, Co C	300-399
FO, Co D	400-499
FSCC	500-599

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

- ² Artillery/mortar forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease fire when it appears that the trajectory of artillery and/or support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. FSCC will coordinate supporting fires and friendly forces.
- b. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. See Annex E (Communications-Electronics)
- b. Command Post
 - (1) To be announced

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ELLIOTT

R. J. Alger

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APPENDIX: 1 - Air Support
2 - Naval Gunfire
3 - Artillery

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX 2 (Distribution)
to Operation Plan 10-67

F-3

Appendix 1 (Air Support) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
to Operation Plan 10-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series 47014, Sheet 67391, II, III and IV
(b) EFM 1-6

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces.
(1) 1st MAW provides aircraft for support.

2. MISSION

Conduct air support operations in support of ground forces.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
- b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and air preparation as required.

(2) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of FAC or TAC (A) at all times.

(3) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Military Grid Reference six digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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R. J. ALGER

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Executive Officer

1. Appendix 1 (Air Support) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination)
to Operation Plan 10-67

Operation Plan 2-67
 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry
 6th LIT, Vietnam
 241300H February 1967

Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Plan 20-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series 27014, Sheet 67391, II, III and IV
 (b) FMFM 7-4

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

This appendix provides for the coordination of naval gunfire in support of ground operations.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) See current INTSUM

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Naval Gunfire support ships to be provided by CFC 76.5.

2. MISSION

Conduct naval gunfire support of ground operations in the objective area.

3. EXECUTION

a. Designated naval vessels will provide NGF support for operating units.

b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Naval gunfire support will be under control of NGF Liaison Officer in FSCC.
- (2) Positive clearance must be given by FSCC and 7thMar FSCC prior to commencing fire.
- (3) Use Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system for target locations.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Annex D (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

Annex E (Communications - Electronics)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTENLE

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DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution) to
Operation Plan 10-67

F-2-2

Operation Plan 10-67
1st Battalion, 5th Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
241300H February 1967

Appendix 3 (Artillery) to Annex F (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Plan 10-67

Ref: (a) Maps: Series L7014, Sheet 6739I, II, III and IV
(b) FORM 7-4

Time Zone: II

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex E (Intelligence)
- (2) See Current INTSUM
- (3) No known enemy artillery capability in the area of operations.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) See Appendix 1 (Air Support)
- (3) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire)

2. MISSION

Batteries (to be announced), 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, occupy firing positions to provide support for 1stBn, 5th Marines.

3. EXECUTION

Batteries (to be announced), 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines provide support as required to 1stBn, 5thMar.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Annex D (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

See Annex E (Communications/Electronics)

F-3-1

JOINT STAFF OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

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DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX 2 (Distribution) to
Operation Plan 10-67

H-3-2

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Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Vietnam
 241300H Feb, 1967

Annex G. (Movement Plan) to Operation Plan 10-67

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Refer to Operation Plan 10-67

2. MISSION

1stBn, 5thMar(1)(Rein) moves by motor convoy from 1stBn, 5thMar Bn Combat Base to Ky Ha Air Facility, Chu Lai, RVN.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Commencing 260730H, 1/5 displaces with three rifle companies and Bn Command Group from 1stBn, 5thMar Combat Base BT397145 to assembly area vicinity Ky Ha Air Facility, Chu Lai, RVN.

b. Co D (Rein)

(1) At 260630H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram).

(2) On order embark aboard trucks assigned by S-4

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (Assembly Area Diagram/Debarcation Point)

c. Co. B (-)(Rein)

(1) At 260630H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram)

(2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (Assembly area diagram/debarcation point).

d. 1stBn, 5thMar Command Group

(1) At 260630H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram)

(2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4

(3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (Assembly area diagram/debarcation point)

e. Co.C (Rein)

(1) At 260630H be formed by truck teams IAW Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram)

G - 1

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area diagram)

- (2) On order embark aboard trucks as assigned by S-4
- (3) Upon arrival debarkation point, assemble IAW Appendix (2) (Assembly area diagram/debarkation point)

f. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Morning meals on 26 Feb will be served from 0500 thru 0630
- (2) Truck teams:
 - (a) M-54- 25 Men
 - (b) M-36- 30 Men
- (3) Trucks will be tactically loaded

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

See Annex D (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

a. Command

See Operation Plan 10-67

b. Communications - Electronics

- (1) See Annex E (Communications - Electronics)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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APPENDIX (1) Staging Area Diagram
(2) Assembly Area Diagram
DISTRIBUTION: Annex E (Distribution
to Operation Plan 10-67)


G - 2

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 Chu Lai, Vietnam
 241300H Feb 1967

Appendix (1) (Staging Area Diagram) to Annex G (Movement Plan) to Operation Plan 10-67.



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGANTNER


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 Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

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 to Operation Plan 10-67

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Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion, 3th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 241300H February 1967

Appendix 2 (Staging area diagram/debarkation point) to Annex G (Movement Plan)
 to Operation Plan 10-67



Group #1 - Co C (159 men)
 Co B (81 men)
 240 men

Group #2 - Co B (79 men)
 Cmd Grp #1 (18 men)
 Co D (144 men)
 241 men

Group #3 - Cmd Grp #2 (96)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 241300H February 1967

Annex H (Psychological Warfare Operations) To Operation Plan 10-67

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Friendly Forces. See basic order.

2. MISSION

Psychological Warfare Operations will be conducted in support of the operation providing leaflet drops and aerial broadcasts within the area of operation.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Leaflets and taped broadcasts will contain "Reward for Mine Booby Traps", "Do not run from Marines", and CHIEU HOI themes directed toward the VC, family and friend.

- b. A Pay-war team will be attached on order to exploit pay-warfare targets of opportunity.

- c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) See Basic Order

- (2) Commencing L-Hour on D-Day, leaflets and aerial broadcasts will be employed in the target area.

- (3) Companies desiring psychological operation assets to exploit targets of opportunity may submit requests to Battalion Psychological Warfare Officer.

- (4) All participating personnel will be briefed on the objectives of the pay-warfare themes prior to commencement of the operation.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. All Psychological Warfare support will be furnished by Task Force X-Ray.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION/ELECTRONICS. See Annex E.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) To Operation Plan 10-67

Operation Plan 10-67
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 241300H February 1967

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 10-67

Time Zones: H

Distribution:	CG, 1stMarDiv	15
	CG, TF, X-Ray	15
	CG, 7th Marines	15
	CG, 5th Marines	5
	CG, 11th Marines	2
	CG, 1stSPBn	2
	CO	1
	XO	1
	H&S Co	2
	Co B	2
	Co C	2
	Co D	2
	File	10

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HILGARTNER

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