

## HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/LAW/wre

5750

1 December 1967

00389-67

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division  
 Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-30 November 1967

Ref: (a) MC0 5750.2A  
 (b) FMF PAC O 5750.8  
 (c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓(1) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a),  
 (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

*O. W. van den Berg*  
 O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

DOWN GRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DR 5200.10

COPY NO 2 OF 8 COPIES

~~SECRET~~  
 UNCLASSIFIED

5TH MAR S&C FILES

801272-67

COPY NO. 1 OF 6

HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY  
1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

INDEX

- PART I ORGANIZATION DATA
- PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

1

ENCLOSURE (1)

## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DesignationCommander

1st Battalion, 5th Marines LTCOL O. W. VAN DEN BERG JR.

1-30 November 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

## H&amp;S Company

CAPT T. B. BAGLEY  
1-14 November 1967

## Company A

CAPT D. L. MCINTURFF  
14-30 November 1967

## Company B

CAPT F. S. GIORDANI  
1-26 November 1967CAPT T. B. BAGLEY  
26-30 November 1967

## Company C

CAPT D. D. DROBNY  
1-30 November 1967

## Company D

CAPT E. B. BURROW  
1-30 November 1967CAPT R. K. KIRKPATRICK  
1-30 November 1967ATTACHED UNITS

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar 1STLT R. K. REDLIN

3rd Platoon, Co B, 3rd AmtracBn 1STLT J. A. MASON

Det, 1st Dental Co, FMF LT J. C. BOND

2nd Plt, Co B, 1stEngrBn 2NDLT R. D. CLEARFIELD

Det, 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Co L/CPL K. B. ORNDORFF

Det, 13TH ITT CAPT L. R. DEANGELIS

Det, HqCo, 1stMPBn L/CPL A. R. ARVIZU

UNCLASSIFIED

1st

ENCLOSURE (1)

Det., Scout Sniper Flt,  
EqCo, 5thMar

L/CPL A. J. DRAPER

2nd Plt, Co D, 1st MTBn

SGT D. F. LAUDENSLAGER

2nd Plt, Co C, 1st TankBn

2NDLT C. HILL

2. Locations.

1-17 November 1967, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein)  
Combat Base located at Triem Trung (2), (BT 104503), Hieu  
Nhon, RVN.

18 November 1967, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein)  
participated in unnamed search and destroy ("Hole Hunting")  
operation.

19-30 November 1967, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein)  
Combat Base located at Triem Trung (2), (BT 104503), Hieu  
Nhon, RVN.

3. Staff Officers.

Executive Officer MAJ H. J. McMILLEN  
1-30 November 1967

S-1 Officer/Adjutant 1STLT W. P. VACCA  
1-30 November 1967

Asst S-1 Officer/Adjutant 2NDLT W. A. THORNTON  
3-30 November 1967

S-2 Officer CAPT H. L. JOHNSTON  
1-13 November 1967

GY/SGT C. E. GRIGGS  
13-28 November 1967

1STLT G. L. ALVAREZ  
28-30 November 1967

MAJ L. A. WUNDERLICH  
1-30 November 1967

CAPT E. A. GRIMM  
1-14 November 1967

CAPT T. B. BAGBY  
14-26 November 1967

1-2

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

S-5 Officer

1STLT E. A. RAYMOND  
26-30 November 1967

Medical Officer

1STLT J. D. JEWELL  
1-30 November 1967

Supply Officer

LT J. E. PILON (USNR)  
1-30 November 1967

Communications Officer

2NDLT L. MALL  
1-30 November 1967

Motor Transport Officer

CAPT H. G. DUNCAN  
1-30 November 1967

Legal Officer

1STLT A. DESCHAMPS  
1-30 November 1967

Chaplain

1STLT W. P. VACCA  
1-30 November 1967

Air Liaison Officer

LT C. K. PARKER (USNR)  
1-30 November 19674. Average Monthly Strength.

	USMC		USN
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
30	1030	3	45

UNCLASSIFIED

1-3

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY1. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

a. Strength. On board strength reached a high of 1086 Marine Enlisted with the input of 51 "Short Timers" from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines on the 25th of the month. Marine Officer strength decreased to 33. During the month the Battalion lost 1 Major, 4 Captains and 2 Lieutenants, and gained only 4 Lieutenants. Navy Officer strength remained constant while Navy Enlisted strength has decreased drastically.

b. Replacements. The flow of replacements into the Battalion totaled 218 for the month. 51 of these will rotate within 30 days, and 14 are non-effective, joined by SRB only.

c. Discipline, Law and Legal. During the month of November, 9 Special Courts-Martial and 3 Summary Courts-Martial were held. The principle offense continues to be unauthorized absence. 1 Special Court-Martial was pending as of 30 November.

d. POW/Detainees. During the month of November, 40 detainees were processed. Of these, 31 were later released as innocent civilians, 7 were turned over to Vietnamese authorities as civil defendants and 2 cases are pending. The addition of one Officer and one Staff NCO in occupational field 02 should enhance the detainee processing.

e. Morale and Personal Services. The morale of the Battalion has consistently been high. The addition of hot showers and a nightly movie are factors which are envisioned to help maintain the morale of the Unit. Patronage of the PX and Vietnamese Concession continue to provide the necessities and extras with which the troops improve their off duty living conditions.

f. Interior Management. The addition of one Lieutenant 0130 to the Adjutant/S-1 section has improved the quality and quantity of reporting and overall proficiency of the section. The inauguration of the Battalion School for Unit Diary Clerks should show a marked improvement in the overall Unit Diary reporting of the Battalion.

SECRET

2. Enemy, Weather and Terrain.

a. Enemy. During this reporting period the enemy continued his sniping activities by individuals and/or small units, the placing of mines and booby traps, daylight contacts and also conducted two probes of significant intensity against CAP S-1 as well as a mortar attack on Charlie Company Combat Base.

(1) Mines and Booby Traps. On two occasions vehicles moving along Route 538 were destroyed by command detonated mines resulting in friendly casualties. Enemy fire was received both times by reactionary forces as they approached the area. On 10 November, patrols found mines wired in series at two different locations in the vicinity of the Company A Combat Base at (BT 120634). These consisted of 105mm rounds, M18s, and 7Pmine and homemade mines. One group was wired for command detonation with the mines buried 10-15 meters apart. An unusually heavy concentration of anti-personnel mines were encountered during a cordon and search operation conducted in Tan My (1) vicinity (BT 082593) on 18 November 1967.

(2) Sightings. Several small unit contacts ranging in number from 5-10 VC were made during the daylight hours between 15 and 30 November. This was a marked increase in sightings over those made during the first half of the month. In all instances the enemy was taken under fire with small arms and supporting arms. In addition to 1 VC KIA (confirmed) and 11 VC KIA (probable), it is significant to note that one VC, claiming to be a Lieutenant Platoon Commander was wounded, captured and evacuated.

(3) Probes. On the night of 16 November CAP S-1 received approximately 200 rounds of automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. On the night of the 17th CAP S-1 again received 300 rounds of semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire with approximately 25 grenades. Search of the area the next morning revealed 2 VC KIA confirmed as a result of artillery and Spooky missions.

(4) Mortar Attack. At 262030H the Charlie Company CP received 5 incoming mortar rounds from the north of the combat base. Of the 5 rounds, 3 impacted approximately 150 meters north of the combat base. The remaining rounds impacted within the perimeter resulting in 12 friendly WIA (11 Med-evaccd).

(5) Caches. At 291545H a patrol from Alpha Company and a Kit Carson Scout uncovered a total of approximately 3200 pounds of rice hidden in containers buried in the ground. Interrogation of Vietnamese civilians in the area revealed that the site (BT 116628) is a probable VC storage area. The rice was reported to Vietnamese authorities who had it picked

SECRET

up and turned over to refugee centers.

(6) Enemy Units. No major units have been positively identified through contact as working in this TAOR. Reports have been received indicating the presence of several units operating in the adjacent areas however. They are the R-20th Battalion to the north, the 41st Draftee Battalion to the west, the 70th Battalion to the south, the U-25th Battalion to the south and southeast, the F-14th Battalion to the Southeast, the Q-15th Company to the northwest and the Q-12th Company to the southeast.

b. Weather. The weather during the reporting period was warm and humid with an average high and low of 84 degrees and 73 degrees respectively. There were occasional afternoon and evening showers as well as moderate early morning showers during the month. Weather conditions throughout the month were most favorable and enhanced the conduct of operational activities within the TAOR.

c. Terrain. The TAOR covers a flat coastal plain varying from two to ten meters in elevation. Rivers and other waterways surrounding and within the TAOR afford excellent lines of communication for the enemy. Highway 1 and Route 538 are extremely vital as the only means by which wheeled vehicular traffic can move within the TAOR. Route 1 is an all weather bituminous road in fair to good repair. Route 538 is a limited all weather intermediate bituminous road in fair condition. Short term flooding can be expected along these roads during the rainy season.

Large rice paddies predominate in the western, eastern and southern sectors of the TAOR and can be expected to be flooded during the monsoon. Troop movement through these areas will be difficult, but possible in most cases. The large open sandy area running northwest through the central portion of the TAOR affords good drainage and should retain good foot and tracked vehicle trafficability even during the rainy season. The island complex in the southeast is predominantly paddy area with moderate undergrowth. This area presents very difficult movement during the monsoons. The northern portion of the TAOR is primarily an area spotted with light to moderate treelines and paddies. This area is an excellent area of operation for snipers, a fact substantiated by the large concentration of sniper incidents occurring in this locale during the month.

### 3. Organization and Operations.

#### a. Organization.

(1) The organization of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines remained substantially the same throughout the month of

SECRET

November with the exception of temporary detachments of units to adjacent and higher headquarters for specific operations and temporary attachments of company sized units from other Battalions, organic to the Regiment, for short Battalion Search and Cordon Operations.

(2) On 22 November 1967 the Company A Combat Base at (BT 120634) was closed and the company moved to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

(3) On 16 November 1967, Company C relieved Company B at the Hieu Nhon Combat Base. Company B moved to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

b. Operations.

(1) During the month of November, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducted two battalion operations.

(a) On 1-3 November, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines continued a Search and Cordon Operation in AO 2 in accordance with Regimental Operation Plan 1-67. The results of the operation are contained in Tab E to Enclosure (1), see also Battalion Frag Order 132-67.

(2) The Battalion conducted 2 Quick Reaction Packages in accordance with Regimental Frag Order 68-67 (Quick Reaction Package). Minor difficulties were encountered in the area of air to ground communications and helicopter availability, however, it is felt that the concept is valid and more significant results will be obtained in future operations as all units become more familiar with the concept.

(3) The Battalion conducted Waterway Denial Operations in accordance with Battalion Operation Order 2-67, throughout the month. In support of the waterway denial plan, 19 AO missions and 6 Firefly missions were requested. In addition, numerous patrol/ambush squad size and platoon size waterway denial activities were conducted. The following waterway interdiction results were obtained; 16 boats sunk and 7 boats damaged.

(4) The Battalion conducted numerous company and smaller unit activities on a daily basis throughout the month.

(a) Day activities for the month totalled 96 fire team activities, 239 squad activities, 89 platoon activities and 9 company operations.

(b) Night activities included 382 fire team activities, 549 squad activities, 16 platoon activities and 3 company operations.

(5) The Battalion was relieved of the squad reinforcement requirement to CAP (4) on 22 November. The Battalion provided one company to the 7th Marines from 19 through 30 November for security of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines Combat Base. Also the Battalion provided one platoon for Regimental CP Security from 21-30 November. The Battalion provided a company sized unit OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on 5 November, 11 November and 24 November 1967 for Cordon and Search operations. In addition Company D was OPCON to

SECRET

2nd Battalion, 5th Marines for Operation ESSEX from 5-17 November 1967. Company A was OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines in conjunction with Operation DENVER from 25-27 November 1967. A platoon was provided to the Division for convoy security from 15-18 November 1967. The Battalion supplied the "Bald Eagle" reaction force from 051845H to 091400H November 1967 and again commencing at 300600H November 1967.

c. Supporting Arms.

(1) Air. During this period, 56 missions were flown by Marine TAC/TAO teams within our TAOR, controlling 29 flights of fixed wing and providing invaluable aerial observation in support of the Battalion's missions of routine patrolling, special operations and the waterway denial plan. Other missions completed included 2 quick reaction packages, 3 visual reconnaissance missions, 37 Med Evacs and one Flareship. Also requested with unknown results were 6 Firefly missions in accordance with instructions contained in the Regimental Waterway Denial Plan.

(2) Artillery. During November, Delta Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The Battery fired 292 missions in support of units within the Battalion TAOR and the Supplementary Operations Area supporting Battalion units from fire team through company size, Combined Action Platoons and adjacent units. Artillery was used to great effect through coordination with air observers throughout the month. Night defensive fires were registered at each of the Combined Action Platoon sites.

4. Training.

a. Training was conducted on Battalion and Company level with continuing emphasis on care and cleaning of M-16 rifle, familiarization firing, weapons safety, fire control, discipline and distribution, scouting and patrolling, map reading, small unit tactics, NCO leadership, sanitation and hygiene and customs of the Vietnamese people.

b. Continued emphasis was placed on land mine warfare and destruction of enemy mines and booby traps.

c. The command continued to utilize schools provided by higher headquarters. During the month 42 Marines from this unit attended school in Da Nang RVN, Saigon RVN, Japan and Okinawa.

SECRET

5. Logistics.

a. Supply. A build-up of logistics supply stocks has been continued during the month of November 1967. Emphasis has been directed toward providing better facilities for handling and maintenance of Bulk Storage items and weapons.

b. Medical/Dental.

(1) Civic Action. 1295 civilian personnel were provided medical treatment in Triem Trung (2).

(2) Sanitation. Preventive Medicine Section of 1st Medical Battalion held inspection of the Combat Base on 15 November 1967. Results were graded as excellent and defects are being corrected.

(3) Foot Ointment Program MDX 4-4056. Program cancelled because of complications from use of ointment in sandy terrain. Approximately twenty cases of severe immersion foot from Delta Company, which participated in operation ESSEX, were transferred to 1st Medical Battalion, for evaluation and treatment.

(4) Malaria. Nine cases of suspected Malaria were evacuated from Delta Company. Three other suspected cases were also evacuated.

(5) The dental clinic provided dental care for over 400 Marines during the Month of November.

c. Services.

(1) 5 Boats, fiberglass, with five 35hp Mercury motors were delivered to the Battalion for Waterway Surveillance. Since arrival of this equipment, the motors have been uncrated and run intermittently. Proper operation has not been achieved due to the lack of trained personnel to tune and adjust the motors. This problem is of a temporary nature and should be overcome in the near future with organic assets.

(2) During November a Material Management Inspection Team inspected the Battalion in the areas of Ordnance, Mess, Motor Pool, Communications and Embarkation with an overall mark of satisfactory with discrepancies. Corrective action is being taken in those areas where discrepancies were noted.

SECRET

(3) On 24 and 25 November, the ARVN 102nd Combat Engineer Battalion rebuilt the bridge at Triem Trung (2), (BT 096533) upgrading its capacity from 12 to 60 tons.

(4) The 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Engineer Battalion remained in direct support of the Battalion. Their projects for the month included completion of perimeter bunkers and the construction of an alternate COC. In addition they supported the Battalion by providing engineering capabilities to squad size and larger activities for the purpose of detecting and detonating mines and booby traps. The Engineers also held school for selected rifle company personnel in the use of demolitions.

#### 6. Civil Affairs.

a. MED CAP. During the month a total of 1295 Vietnamese civilians were treated at MED CAP in Triem Trung (2) (BT 102 582). Seven Vietnamese were Med Evacated to Danang and 20 were Med Evacated to Hoi An for wounds as a result of various actions. Partitions were erected in the MED CAP facility.

b. Projects. Liaison was established with area officials for the following projects of the month.

(1) Seven cribs were made for the Catholic Orphanage in Hoi An.

(2) Grain was distributed to the two orphanages in Hoi An and to Hieu Nhon District as payment for laborers working on a school in Hoi An.

(3) Contracts for a bridge in Cam Ha Village were drawn up.

(4) Materials were ordered to repair a Vietnamese Information Service building in Hieu Nhon District.

#### 7. Psychological Operations.

a. Psy Ops broadcasts were made throughout the TAOR during the month. A total of 90 hours of broadcast time was logged on various Psy Ops themes.

b. Leaflets were distributed by prearranged air drops and also by person to person contact.

c. On 13 November 1967, a Psy Ops team showed cartoons and movies of an educational and informative nature in Hoi An. Approximately 2000 persons attended.

#### 8. Comptrollers Activities.

a. The Battalion started the month with \$57,016.00.

SECRET

On 18 November 1967 an additional \$50,000.00 was allocated to the Battalion to purchase needed Combat Essential Equipment. The bulk of these funds were expended on 782 gear, individual clothing and repair parts for Combat Essential Equipment. The balance on hand at the end of November is \$20,664.51.

9. Communications.

a. Construction of the 25 pair cable from the Triem Trung (2) combat base to Dien Ban, and the five pair cable to Hoi An has been completed. The Battalion has land line communications with the MACV Sector Headquarters in Hoi An, the Sub-Sector Headquarters in Dien Ban, and the CAP Headquarters in Dien Ban.

b. The Battalion held two classes in Field Radio Procedures with the aim of training Company Radio Operators. A total of 18 Marines were trained in the principles necessary to enable them to act effectively as field radio operators.

10. Significant Casualties Inflicted or Sustained: VC  
Captured.\*

a. Friendly Casualties (USMC).

KIA	8
DOW	0
WIAE	46
WIAME	19
NBCE	3
NBCNE	20

b. Enemy Casualties.

KIA confirmed	12
KIA probable	14
Detainees	40
VC Captives	1

11. Significant Enemy Ordnance Captured During the Month  
of November 1967.\*

a. Weapons Captured.

2 M-1 Rifles Serial # 4789601 and 3846313  
 1 SKS Russian Carbine Serial # 301863  
 3 AK-47 Serial # 9002100, 947658 and 9772224  
 1 M-14 Rifle Serial # 448616

SECRET

b. Ordnance Equipment Captured.

1 M18 Claymore Mine  
 7 M-26 grenades  
 6 ChiCom grenades  
 8 Blasting Caps

12. Significant Munitions Captured/Found and Destroyed During the Month of November 1967.\*

3 ChiCom grenades  
 5 M-26 grenades  
 10 rounds 105mm  
 1 round 106mm  
 1 round 60mm  
 1 anti-personnel mine  
 4 M18 Claymore mines  
 7 Homemade mines  
 70 pounds TNT

13. Significant Enemy Equipment Captured During the Month of November 1967.\*

7 Cartridge belts  
 5 Magazines, AK-47  
 6 Magazines M-14  
 7 Magazine Pouches, M-14  
 1 Medical Kit  
 3 Bundles Assorted Documents  
 1 Bundle Assorted Clothing  
 2 Hats  
 1 Pair Boots  
 1 Pair Belt Suspender Straps  
 1 Gas Mask  
 1 Early Warning Device  
 31 D-Cell Batteries  
 4 C-Cell Batteries  
 1 Oil Can  
 1 Whistle  
 4 Wallets

14. Significant Enemy Caves, Tunnels, Buildings and Fortifications Destroyed During the Month of November 1967.\*

2 Caves 3'X3'X8' and 3'X3'X10'  
 2 Underground Personnel Hiding areas 6'X4'X4'

15. Significant U.S. Government Property Lost During the Month of November 1967 While Engaged in Combat with the Enemy.

None

\* Included in these figures are some items also reported in Tabs A and E.

SECRET

PART III  
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- (1) 010001H Company D continued to conduct company size search and destroy ("Hole Hunting") operation in AO 2 (BT 133614). See Tab A to Enclosure (1).
- (2) 010900H Company B Squad Engineer Security at (BT 087543) found mine consisting of 25 lbs of TNT with pressure release fuse made of wood. Mine forwarded to 1st Engineer Battalion S-2 for study.
- (3) 010927H OPCON of Company I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines returned to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (4) 011000H MED CAP held in Triem Trung (2) at (BT 102582). 63 Vietnamese civilians were treated.
- (5) 011115H Company B Squad Engineer Security at (BT 089538) found a pressure type mine. Mine was destroyed in place.
- (6) 011130H Company D at (BT 133611) apprehended 1 Vietnamese male, age 26-30, wearing black clothing with ID card. Search of area uncovered 1 Russian carbine, ser. no. 301863, 8 rounds 7.62mm ammunition and 1 Claymore mine. Detainee, rifle, ammunition, and mine were forwarded to Battalion S-2. Detainee was later released as civil defendant.
- (7) 011145H Squad Patrol 5A3 at (BT 128632) apprehended a Vietnamese male, age 65, wearing white clothing and possessing two ID cards with different pictures. Detainee was later released as an innocent civilian upon interrogation by 13th ITT.
- (8) 011415H Company D at (BT 133614) apprehended 2 Vietnamese males, ages 46 and 52, wearing black clothing hiding in a bomb shelter. Detainees were forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and later released as civil defendants.
- (9) 011445H Company D at (BT 133614) apprehended a Vietnamese male, age 47, wearing white clothing with ID card. Detainee was forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and released as an innocent civilian.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(10) 011545H Company D at (BT 133614) received 2 ChiCom grenades from 2 VC. Company returned 2 M-79 rounds, threw 2 M-26 grenades and 3 CS grenades. Search of cave uncovered 1 M1 Rifle, ser. no. 4789601, 48 rounds 30 caliber ammunition, 3 cartridge bolts and 3 M14 magazine pouches. Captured equipment was forwarded to 5th Marines S-2. Results: 2 VC KIA confirmed and one cave destroyed.

(11) 011650H Company D Search Squad at (BT 133614) received 1 ChiCom grenade from 1 unobserved VC near cave. Squad returned 15-20 rounds small arms fire. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(12) 020001H Company D continued to conduct search and destroy ("Hole Hunting") Operation in A0 2.

(13) 2 November 1967 1st Platoon, Company C conducted search and destroy operation in central portion of TAOR.

(14) 020805H LVT on supply run to Company A struck a mine of unknown size at (BT 096612). Results: Heavy damage to LVT and 4 USMC WIANE.

(15) 021000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 71 Vietnamese treated.

(16) 021400H Company B Platoon (+) Patrol at (BT 173593) found a booby-trapped ChiCom grenade with pressure fuse. Grenade was blown in place.

(17) 021515H Company B Platoon (+) Patrol at (BT 172595) found old ammunition cache, consisting of 100-120 rounds 30 cal. M1 ammunition and 2 ChiCom grenades. All ordnance blown in place.

(18) 021800H Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines M-35 truck struck a mine at (BT 087584) and received 75-85 rounds small arms fire from estimated 6 VC at (BT 083587). Troops on truck returned 100-110 rounds small arms fire. Enemy broke contact. Search not conducted due to darkness and distance. Tow truck with reaction squad was dispatched and disabled vehicle was towed to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base. Results: 6 USMC WIANE and extensive damage to suspension and engine of truck.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(19) 021930H Company D at (BT 137608) observed enemy craft on river at (BT 135603) with use of starlight scope. Called for and received artillery mission. Results: 1 enemy craft destroyed.

(20) 030001H Company D continued to conduct search and destroy ("Hole Hunting") operation in AO 2.

(21) 3 November 1967 1st Platoon, Company C continued search and destroy in central area of TAOR.

(22) 3 November 1967 Battalion S-5 completed and delivered six cribs for the Catholic Orphanage at Hoi An.

(23) 031000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 61 Vietnamese treated.

(24) 031115H Squad Patrol 5A3 at (BT 107637) apprehended one Vietnamese male, age 10-16, wearing black and white clothing with no ID card. Detainee was forwarded to Battalion S-2 and later released as an innocent civilian.

(25) 031438H Company D returned to Combat Base from "Hole Hunting" operation.

(26) 031540H Company A Squad Patrol at (BT 094646) found booby-trapped 105mm round which was blown in place.

(27) 041000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 52 Vietnamese were treated.

(28) 041100H Company A Squad Combat Patrol at (BT 097625) apprehended 2 Vietnamese males, ages 40 and 55, wearing black and white clothing with ID cards. Forwarded to Battalion S-2, and later released as civil defendants upon interrogation by 13th ITT.

(29) 041115H Company C Squad Combat Patrol at (BT 090537) found a pressure release mine consisting of approximately 70 pounds TNT. Mine was blown in place.

(30) 041120H Company B, 3rd Amtrac Battalion at (BT 108623) found 105mm RR dud, not booby-trapped. Round was blown in place.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(31) 041315H Company A Squad Combat Patrol at (BT 099618) received 6 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 095615). Patrol returned fire with 35-45 rounds small arms fire and 2 M-79 rounds. Search not conducted due to distance from patrol route.

(32) 041655H Company A Platoon Combat Patrol at (BT 103628) observed 2 VC males and simultaneously received 25-30 rounds small arms fire from (BT 102625). Patrol returned 50-55 rounds small arms fire and 5 M-79 rounds, called for and received 81mm mortar mission of 3 WP and 12 HE rounds. Area was searched with negative results.

(33) 041916H Company B Squad Ambush at (BT 122618) received 100-120 rounds small arms fire, 1 concussion and 2 fragmentation grenades from 10-12 VC at (BT 123618). Squad returned 75 rounds small arms fire, 3 M-79 rounds, 1 LAAW and 5 M-26 grenades. Artillery mission requested and received. Search of area revealed forearm assembly for US Carbine, M1, 30 rounds 30 caliber and 7.62mm ammunition and a blood trail. Squad continued mission to establish ambush. Results: 1 VC KIA probable.

(34) 042030H Company D OP at (BT 114584), observed 4 VC with weapons wearing dark clothing at (BT 115584). OP fired 325-350 rounds small arms fire and 12 M-79 rounds observing 1 VC fall. Illumination called for and received. OP received 15-20 rounds small arms fire. Reaction platoon swept area with negative results.

(35) 050400H Company C (-) OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.

(36) 050910H Company A Platoon Patrol found 4 105mm duds at (BT 113644), (BT 113647), (BT 113648) and (BT 117629). All ordnance were blown in place.

(37) 050940H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 117639) found one 60mm mortar illumination dud. Round was blown in place.

(38) 051000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 58 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(39) 051025H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 120637) found 105mm dud. Round blown in place.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

(40) 051110H Company A at (BT 117638) received 2 rounds small arms fire from (BT 116637). Company returned 20-25 rounds small arms fire. Area searched with negative results.

(41) 051230H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 121641) found 105mm dud. Round blown in place.

(42) 051250H Company C OPCON returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.

(43) 051300H Company D OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines for participation in Operation ESSEX.

(44) 051845H Company C assumed Bald Eagle commitment.

(45) 6 November 1967 Company A at (BT 097633) conducted a search and destroy ("Hole Hunting") Operation in coordination with Company C (-) providing blocking and search forces. In addition, Company A was reinforced with 13 members of National Police Force.

(46) 060125H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines perimeter posts 20, 21 and 22 at (BT 108584) received 15 rounds small arms fire from (BT 109584). Called for and received 81mm mortar illumination. No enemy movement was observed. Combat Base established Red Alert condition. Red Alert secured at 060237H.

(47) 060845H Company C (-), while moving to link up with Company A at (BT 103628), found booby-trapped gate with trip wire leading into ground. Explosive device unknown. Booby trap was blown in place.

(48) 060850H Company C (-), while moving to link with Company A at (BT 103628), found booby trap in rice paddy with trip wire leading to tin can. Unknown explosive in can. Booby trap was blown in place.

(49) 061315H Company C (-) recalled from blocking positions to standby for Sparrowhawk commitment.

(50) 061320H 1st Platoon, Company C, in response to Sparrowhawk commitment, landed by helicopter at (BT 004554) to search for suspected enemy radio antenna, thought to be in the area.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(51) 061430H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 101635) received 5 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 103635). Patrol returned fire with 100 rounds small arms fire, 4 M-79 rounds and 8 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Searched area with negative results.

(52) 061845H 1st Platoon, Company C returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base from Sparrowhawk mission (See Significant Event 061320H). Radio antenna not found, although platform suspected of being supporting structure for antenna was found and destroyed.

(53) 070900H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 123628) found NVA flag on staff in ground. Staff was booby-trapped with ChiCom grenade. Booby trap was blown in place.

(54) 070930H Company B, Squad Engineer Security at (BT 164578) found dud 105mm round. Round was blown in place.

(55) 071000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 61 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(56) 071335H Squad Patrol 5C3 at (BT 094597) found one Vietnamese male, age 20, wearing green and white clothing, chained to pole in house. Detainee forwarded to Battalion S-2 for disposition. Village Chief identified man as being mentally retarded, thus his father chains him up. Detainee was released as an innocent civilian.

(57) 080730H Company C Squad Mine Sweep Security at (BT 083584) found road block consisting of six large piles of dirt covering tar barrels and telephone poles that had been cut down across road. Checked area for booby traps and road cleared for traffic at 080945H.

(58) 081145H Company A Platoon Security Patrol at (BT 135625) apprehended 10 Vietnamese males who started running as patrol entered village. Detainees forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th IIT, and later released as innocent civilians.

(59) 081150H Squad Mine Sweep Security at (BT 080567) reported road cut by 3 ditches 1 foot wide and 2 feet deep. Squad questioned troops at CAP (4) who reported they had dug up 3 box type mines. Mines were disarmed and destroyed.

(60) 090720H Man from Company C Platoon Patrol at (BT 082592) detonated a booby-trapped M-26 grenade. Results: 1 USMC WIANE.

(61) 090745H Company C Engineer Security and Engineer detail

SECRET

moving to Cau Lau Bridge at (BT 090584) received 8-10 rounds automatic small arms fire from approximately 2 unobserved VC at (BT 087587). No fire returned due to friendly troops in area. Area searched with negative results.

(62) 091000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 57 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(63) 091325H Company A Platoon Patrol 5A2 at (BT 125604) apprehended 1 Vietnamese male, age 45, wearing white clothing and no ID card. Search of area revealed 1st Marine Division Zulu reports. Detainee forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and later released as an innocent civilian.

(64) 091345H Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines departed Combat Base for 5th Marine Regiment and returned at 091615H.

(65) 091415H Company C relieved of Bald Eagle standby.

(66) 091430H Company C Platoon Patrol at (BT 085590) surprised 7 VC eating in house. VC were wearing black and green uniform type clothing and carrying weapons. Patrol fired 20-40 rounds small arms fire as VC attempted to flee area. Results: 4 VC KIA confirmed, 2 VC KIA probable, captured: 2 ChiCom AK-47 assault weapons, serial numbers 947658 and 947224; 1 M-14 rifle, serial number 448616; 1 M-1 Garand rifle, serial number 3846313; 6 ChiCom and 4 M-26 grenades, and 5 AK-47 and 2 M-14 magazines and 3 M-14 cartridge belts. All captured equipment forwarded to 5th Marines S-2 except grenades which were blown by engineers.

(67) 091600H Platoon Patrol 5B2 at (BT 165590) received 10 rounds small arms fire from 1 unobserved VC at (BT 163590). Patrol returned 20-25 rounds small arms fire. Searched area with negative results.

(68) 100015H Company B Listening Post at (BT 162581) heard movement and threw 4 M-26 grenades. Searched area with negative results.

(69) 101305H Member of Company A Squad Patrol at (BT 100624) detonated a booby trap and patrol was taken under fire by 7-10 VC in L-shaped ambush. Patrol returned 175-200 rounds small arms fire and 10 M-79 rounds. Company A reinforced platoon dispatched to assist in consolidation and to secure LZ for emergency med-evac. Results: 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIAE.

(70) 101350H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 100624) to (BT 105627) discovered a series of command controlled mines

SECRET

consisting of 3 105mm rounds, 3 M-18 and 8 homemade mines. Samples of M-18 and homemade mines forwarded to Battalion S-2 for study, all other ordnance destroyed.

(71) 101400H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 111633) discovered a series of command controlled mines consisting of 4 105mm rounds and 1 anti-personnel mine made out of air illumination canister. Mine made of canister forwarded to Battalion S-2 for study. All other ordnance destroyed.

(72) 110730H Company D mine sweep squad security at (BT 104584) discovered a booby trapped M-26 grenade with trip wire across trail. Grenade blown in place.

(73) 110815H Company A Platoon OP at (BT 102624) observed 3 VC with weapons at (BT 103620). OP fired 200-225 rounds small arms and 2 M-79 rounds, OP received 20-25 rounds small arms fire. 81mm mortar mission called for and received. Area searched with negative results.

(74) 111000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 63 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(75) 111315H Company C OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines for "hole hunting" operation in accordance with 5th Marines OPCON Operation Order 1-67.

(76) 111715H Company C returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(77) 12 November 1967 Company C participated in Quick Reaction Package in accordance with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Plan 1-67. See Tab B to Enclosure (1).

(78) 121000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2). 63 Vietnamese civilians treated.

(79) 121215H Company B reported U.S. Army Personnel Carrier detonated large mine at (BT 177584). Dispatched a reaction squad from Company B to lend assistance.

(80) 121230H Company B Platoon Patrol at (BT 153612) apprehended, upon recommendation of Kit Carson, 2 Vietnamese males, ages 33 and 40, wearing blue and white clothing. Both had ID cards, one was not valid. Forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and released as innocent civilians.

(81) 121230H Company B Reaction Squad at (BT 177584) received 30-35 rounds automatic and small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 177581) upon arrival at the scene of the mine incident (See Significant Event 121215H). Squad returned

SECRET

T-2000

375-400 rounds small arms fire and 2 M-79 rounds. Conducted search of area with negative results. It was learned that six Army personnel were KIA as a result of detonation of what is believed to have been a 500 pound bomb.

(82) 121325H Member of Company C Engineer Security Pat (BT 091556) accidentally discharged an M-79, resulting in shrapnel wounds to a Vietnamese girl. Med Evac called for and received. Girl and parents medevaced. SIR completed by Battalion S-5.

(83) 130645H Company A Squad Patrol at (BT 121627) received 15-20 rounds small arms fire from one unobserved VC at (BT 121625). Squad returned 75-100 rounds small arms fire and 5 M-79 rounds. Searched area with negative results. Results: 1 USMC WIAE.

(84) 131400H Company C Platoon Patrol at (BT 079612) received 5 rounds small arms fire from one unobserved VC at (BT 080613). Platoon returned 15-20 rounds small arms fire. Searched area with negative results.

(85) 131450H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 101623) received 60-90 rounds small arms fire from 6-10 VC at (BT 101621). Platoon returned 200-250 rounds small arms fire, 3 M-79 rounds and 5 60mm mortar rounds. Searched area with negative results.

(86) 131630H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 101623) observed 12 VC at (BT 101620) wearing black clothing. Platoon fired 700-850 rounds small arms fire, 5 M-79 rounds and called for and received 81mm mortar mission. Searched area with negative results.

(87) 131745H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 101623) received 100-150 rounds automatic weapons fire from an estimated 20 unobserved VC in treeline at (BT 101621). Platoon returned 350 rounds small arms fire and 12 M-79 rounds. Called for and received 81mm mortar and artillery missions and med-evac. Enemy maintained positions and fired on med-evac aircraft. Platoon maneuvered to maintain contact and provide security for med-evac aircraft at which time enemy broke contact. Searched area with negative results. Results: 1 USMC WIAE.

(88) 132000H Company B Squad Ambush at (BT 135699) apprehended one Vietnamese male, age 53, wearing black clothing with ID card. Detainee had documents and 2,208 piasters in his possession. Detainee forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and later released as an innocent civilian.

SECRET

(89) 132250H Company A Squad Ambush at (BT 125631) discovered a booby-trapped M-26 grenade. Grenade was blown in place.

(90) 14 November 1967 1st Battalion, 5th Marines established surveillance means and Waterway Denial Plan (See Tab B to Enc. 1)

(91) 141040H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 102627) discovered 2 M-18 Claymore mines with 100 meters of Communications wire attached. Patrol determined mines were safe for use and removed them.

(92) 15 November 1967 Division Logistics Readiness Inspection Team arrived to inspect the Battalion. Inspection Team departed at 151600H. Overall results for the Battalion were satisfactory with discrepancies.

(93) 151000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 54 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(94) 151600H 3rd Platoon, Company B OPCON to 5th Marines for Rough Rider security.

(95) 16 November 1967 Company C relieved Company B at their combat base at (BT 163576) and Company B returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

(96) 161000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 33 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(97) 161620H Company B Squad # Patrol at (BT 085583) dispatched to (BT 085584) where M-35 truck from Btry D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines struck a command-detonated 200-250 pound mine resulting in 1 KIA and 4 WIA. Platoon received 60-70 rounds small arms fire from 6-7 VC at (BT 087576). Platoon returned 110-120 rounds small arms fire, 2 M-72 LAWS and 3 M-79 rounds, observing 2 VC fall. Platoon searched area with negative results. Results of incident: 2 M-35 trucks extensively damaged, 1 105mm howitzer extensively damaged, 1 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA and 2 VC KIA probable.

(98) 170745H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 096625) observed 6 VC at (BT 101627) wearing green clothing and carrying weapons. Platoon fired 70-80 rounds small arms fire and 2 M-79 rounds. VC returned 15-20 rounds small arms fire wounding one Marine and fled area. Platoon swept area discovering 1 VC KIA confirmed and captured 1 AK-47 rifle, serial number 9002100, 1 poncho, 3 AK-47 magazines with pouches and 7.62mm ammunition and 1 cartridge belt. All items of captured gear forwarded to 5th Marines S-2. Results: 1 USMC WIA and 1 VC KIA confirmed.

3-10

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(99) 171000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 55 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(100) 171730H Company D returned from OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(101) 180700H Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines OPCON to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(102) 180730H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) commenced search and destroy ("Hole Hunting") operation in accordance with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 132-67. See Tab (D) to Enclosure (1).

(103) 180855H Member of Company D at (BT 084587) detonated a booby-trapped ChiCom concussion grenade. Searched area for other booby traps and continued with mission. Results: 1 USMC WIAE.

(104) 180910H Member of 1st Platoon, Company B at (BT 081597) detonated a booby-trapped M-26 grenade. Called for and received med-evac and continued with mission. Results: 1 USMC WIAE.

(105) 180920H Company B at (BT 083596) discovered 2 box type mines. Mines were blown in place.

(106) 180950H 3rd Platoon, Company B OPCON from 5th Marines to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(107) 180950H Company D at (BT 085588) discovered a home-made electrical firing device made of bamboo and 17 flashlight batteries. Device forwarded to 5th Marines S-2.

(108) 180959H Member of Company B at (BT 083591) detonated a booby trap consisting of approximately 40 pounds Composition "B". Called for and received med-evac. Results: 5 USMC WIAE.

(109) 181025H Company B at (BT 083594) discovered a booby-trapped M-79 round which was blown in place.

(110) 181100H Members of Company D at (BT 081592) and at (BT 083592) detonated 2 booby-trapped grenades of unknown origin. Called for and received med-evac. Results: 5 USMC WIAE.

(111) 181110H Company B at (BT 082594) discovered a booby-trapped M-26 grenade which was blown in place.

SECRET

(112) 181300H Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines at (BT 082594) discovered a tunnel 3 feet by 3 feet by 8 feet. Tunnel was searched with negative results and destroyed.

(113) 181315H Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines at (BT 079594) discovered a booby trap consisting of 5 pounds TNT under a brick. Booby trap was blown in place.

(114) 181345H Company B at (BT 082593) discovered a cave 3 feet by 3 feet by 10 feet. Cave was searched with negative results and destroyed.

(115) 181515H Company B at (BT 082594) discovered a booby-trapped 60mm mortar round. Round was blown in place.

(116) 181600H 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) and attachments secured cordon and search operation, returning to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base at 181700H (See Tab E to Enc (1))

(117) 181615H Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines chopped from OPCON of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(118) 181620H Company A Squad Patrol at (BT 130632) was approached by 25-30 Vietnamese children. Children crowded around patrol and one Vietnamese male, age 14, grabbed one M-26 grenade from a Marine's cartridge belt. Marines repeatedly shouted "halt" in Vietnamese and fired one warning shot in air. Vietnamese male with grenade continued to run, and was 50 meters away when patrol shot him. As male fell, the grenade exploded. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(119) 190900H Company B OPCON to 7th Marines for security of 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines Combat Base.

(120) 191000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 64 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(121) 191440H Company A Squad Patrol at (BT 112628) received 6-8 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 102635). Squad returned 150-160 rounds small arms fire. Searched area with negative results and continued with mission.

(122) 20 November 1967 All units conducted normal activities within TAOR with no significant events reported.

(123) 211000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 47 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(124) 211200H The 2nd Platoon, Company D OPCON to 5th Marines for Regimental CP security.

SECRET

(125) 211830H Company D, Platoon Patrol at (BT 095617) observed 1 VC with weapon. Patrol fired 10 rounds small arms fire and upon checking area, received 20-25 rounds small arms fire. Patrol returned 40-50 rounds small arms fire and 5 M-79 rounds observing 1 VC fall. Searched area with negative results. Results: 1 VC KIA probable.

(126) 212000H Company D, Platoon Patrol at (BT 095622) discovered 2 VC; 1 male and 1 female at (BT 094623). VCS ran from patrol and were told to halt in Vietnamese but continued to run. Patrol fired 90-100 rounds small arms fire and observed both VCS fall. Patrol searched area and found one VC female KIA. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed and 1 VC KIA probable.

(127) 221110H Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines departed Combat Base for Regimental Headquarters, returning at 221615H.

(128) 221135H Company A closed company combat base at (BT 120634) and returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

(129) 230950H Company C Squad Patrol at (BT 149603) apprehended 1 Vietnamese male, age 20-25, wearing black clothing with ID card. Detainee was forwarded to Battalion S-2, interrogated by 13th ITT and later released as an innocent civilian.

(130) 231000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT102582). 46 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(131) 231005H Company A, Squad Patrol at (BT 078607) received 15-20 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 075605). Patrol returned 150-170 rounds small arms fire, 2 M-79 rounds and 3 60mm mortar rounds. Patrol searched area with negative results.

(132) 231040H Member of Company C Squad Patrol at (BT 168588) detonated a booby-trapped ChiCom grenade while searching house. Results: 1 USMC WIANE.

(133) 231245H Company D Platoon Patrol at (BT 075605) received 2 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 077604). Patrol returned 50 rounds small arms fire and 2 M-79 rounds. Searched area with negative results and continued on mission.

3-13

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

(134) 231300H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 108627) observed 3 VC with weapons, wearing black clothing at (BT 108620). Patrol fired 40 rounds small arms fire, 4 M-79 rounds, 6 60mm mortar rounds and maneuvered unit in conjunction with base of fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA from friendly shell fragment. Searched area with negative results and continued on mission.

(135) 231345H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 120598) reacted to vicinity (BT 112608) where air observer spotted 10-12 VC setting in ambush. Artillery mission consisting of 16 rounds of HE and air strike consisting of 20mm cannon fire and napalm were called. Patrol searched area immediately following air strike with negative results.

(136) 24 November 1967 Company D (-) participated in Quick Reaction Package in accordance with Battalion Operation Order 1-67. See Tab B to Enclosure (1).

(137) 240840H Company C Squad Patrol at (BT 126623) discovered a booby-trapped M-26 grenade which was blown in place.

(138) 240900H Company A OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines for cordon and search operation.

(139) 241420H Company D (-) at (BT 124623) observed 4 VC at (BT 122627) carrying weapons. Company fired 70-75 rounds small arms fire and pursued by fire as enemy fled to northwest. Search of area revealed 1 VC KIA. Patrol captured 1 M-26 grenade, 80 rounds 7.62mm ammunition, 1 M-14 cartridge belt, 4 M-14 magazines and 1 pair of suspender straps. All captured items forwarded to 5th Marines S-2. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(140) 241500H Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines visited Company C combat base at (BT 163577) and returned at 241715H.

(141) 241615H Company A returned from OPCON 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(142) 241730H Company D at (BT 120635) observed 4 VC at (BT 115633). Company fired 20-25 rounds small arms fire and 4 60mm mortar rounds observing 2 VC fall. Called for and received artillery mission consisting of 15 rounds HE as blocking force. Search of area revealed 1 VC WIA with 1 M-26 and 6 Mk 2 grenades, 1 cartridge belt with pouch containing documents, 1 poncho, 1 nylon shirt, and photos of 10 other VC.

3-14

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

All captured items forwarded to 5th Marines S-2. Called for and received med-evac for POW/WIA. Results: 1 VC KIA probable and 1 VC captured/WIA.

(143) 251000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 53 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(144) 251700H Company D secured from Quick Reaction Package and returned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.

(145) 252130H Company C Platoon Patrol at (BT 140598) received 8 rounds of 81mm mortar and stray small arms fire believed to have been from friendly unit to the south. Results: 5 USMC WIAE. Evacuation completed. Investigation to be completed.

(146) 261000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 53 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(147) 261500H Company A OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines for Operation DENVER.

(148) 261600H Company A, Platoon Patrol at (BT 075605) observed 2 VC wearing green clothing and carrying weapons. Point man fired 10-15 rounds as VC fled to the south. Patrol checked area with negative results.

(149) 261655H Member of Company C, Platoon Patrol at (BT 154605) detonated an unknown pressure type mine. Called for and received med-evac. Further search of area revealed 3 booby-trapped 105mm rounds and 3 punji pits. Booby traps were blown in place and punji pits were destroyed. Results: 1 USN KIA and 3 USMC WIAE.

(150) 262015H Company C at their company combat base at (BT 164576) received 3 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the north or northeast. Company treated casualties and a truck was dispatched from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base to transport casualties to a suitable landing zone for med-evac. Results: 6 USMC WIAE and 6 USMC WIANE.

(151) 271200H Company A returned from OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(152) 271413H Company C, Squad Patrol at (BT 140608) received 20-30 rounds small arms fire from 6-8 VC at (BT 139607). Squad returned 100-150 rounds small arms fire and called artillery mission with good coverage. Called for and received med-evac. Check of area revealed no enemy casualties and 4 Vietnamese KIA due to artillery mission. Results: 1 USMC WIAE and 4 Vietnamese KIA.

SECRET

(153) 271700H Company C, Platoon Patrol at (BT 145650) observed 6-7 VC with weapons at (BT 145600). Patrol fired 300 rounds small arms fire, observing 4 VC fall and called artillery mission of 6 rounds 105mm HE with good coverage. Did not check area due to river. Results: 4 VC KIA probable.

(154) 271700H Company A, Platoon Patrol at (BT 093603) received 10-15 rounds small arms fire from unobserved VC at (BT 093608). Patrol returned 300 rounds small arms fire and 4 M-79 rounds. Maneuvered squad to check area and spotted 6-8 VC fleeing west at (BT 083610). Patrol fired 90-100 rounds small arms fire. Patrol did not check area due to distance, and continued on mission. Results: 1 USMC WIA.

(155) 28 November 1967 Company A conducted a Company size Search and Destroy Operation in the northern portion of the TAOR.

(156) 281000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 58 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(157) 281435H Commanding Officer, 5th Marines visited 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base, departing at 281600H.

(158) 290800H Company A at (BT 103627) checked area (BT 102628) where air observer spotted 3 VC and called artillery mission of 10 rounds HE. Company discovered 1 VC KIA and blood trail, followed blood trail with negative results. Results: 1 VC KIA confirmed and 1 VC KIA probable.

(159) 291000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 56 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(160) 291245H Company D Platoon Patrol at (BT 113617) apprehended 1 Vietnamese male, age 38 with expired temporary ID card. Detainee forwarded to Battalion S-2 and later released as an innocent civilian upon interrogation by 13th ITT.

(161) 291330H Company A at (BT 102624) received 5 rounds small arms fire from 6 VC, wearing black clothing at (BT 101625). Company returned 75-85 rounds small arms fire and 8 M-79 rounds. Maneuvered squad to check area with negative results.

(162) Company A at (BT 116628) discovered several urns and caskets filled with rice and buried in ground totaling approximately 3700 pounds. Rice was left in place for night and ambushed with negative results. On 30 November 1967 the rice was brought to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base in Amtracs by ARVN soldiers and transported to Hoi An for distribution.

3416

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

(163) 301000H MED CAP held at Triem Trung (2), (BT 102582). 41 Vietnamese civilians were treated.

(164) 301720H Company A, Platoon Patrol at (BT 072623) received 50-75 rounds small arms automatic and semi-automatic fire from unobserved VC at (BT 071623). Patrol returned 140-150 rounds small arms fire and 10 rounds M-79 and maneuvered to maintain contact. Enemy broke contact. Area was searched with negative results. Results: 1 USMC KIA.

(165) 301830H Company A Platoon Patrol at (BT 085605) observed 3 VC wearing black clothing at (BT 084604). Patrol fired 40-50 rounds small arms fire. Searched area and apprehended 1 Vietnamese female, age 37, wearing black and white clothing with no ID card. Detainee forwarded to Battalion S-2. Disposition has not been made as of 302400H.

(166) 302000H Company A Platoon at (BT 070610) received 100-125 rounds small arms fire and 6 rounds 60mm mortar fire. Patrol did not return fire to prevent disclosure of their positions. As patrol fired WP rifle grenade to mark enemy position for "Spooky" gun ship, the grenade exploded, resulting in 3 USMC WIA. Med Evac called for and received. Searched enemy position with negative results from "Spooky" fire. Results: 3 USMC WIAE.

(167) 302145H Company C at (BT 165578) fired 60mm mortar H&I round at (BT 171578). Round impacted short at (BT 169579). Popular Forces corpsman and security element were dispatched to check area and discovered 3 Vietnamese civilians KIA and 7 Vietnamese civilians WIA. Check of mortar revealed that firing data was correct. WIA Vietnamese were Med Evacated to Hoi An hospital. SIR to be completed by Battalion S-5. Results: 3 Vietnamese KIA and 7 Vietnamese WIAE.

3-17

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ Tab A 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operational Summary of Cordon and Search Operation conducted 31 October through 3 November 1967.
- ✓ Tab B 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 1-67 (Quick Reaction Company).
- ✓ Tab C 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operation Order 2-67 (Warfare Denial Plan).
- ✓ Tab D 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 132-67.
- ✓ Tab E 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Operational Summary of Cordon and Search Operation conducted 18 November 1967.

4-1

ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS**

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/LAW/wrc  
03000

20 November 1967

**SECRET**  
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Operational Summary of Cordon and Search Operation conducted 31 October through 3 November 1967

Ref: (a) Verbal instructions of Regimental S-3 on 3 November 1967  
(b) 5th Marines Operation Plan 1-67  
(c) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 131-67  
dated 30 October 1967

Encl: ✓(1) Operations overlay

1. Dates of operation 310700H October 1967 to 031530H November 1967.

## 2. Task organization. See reference (c).

### 3. Supporting Forces.

(a) Artillery. Artillery support was available on call but was not employed during the operation. Prep fires were not used so that the element of surprise would be retained to the maximum degree possible. Due to limited contact no suitable targets for "on call" missions were noted.

(b) Air. Air support was confined to the use of eight H-34s and two UH1E gunships to lift 2 companies from the combat base to the objective area. The landing zone was secured by a platoon from Bravo Company. The lift was completed without complications. The limited area, missions and large number of non-combatants made the use of fixed wing CAS inadvisable and unnecessary.

#### 4. Intelligence

(a) Enemy situation

1. Prior to the operation, enemy activity within the area of operations was believed to be restricted to employment of mines and booby traps and cells of three and four man local force sniper teams. A company sweep of the same area the day

~~SECRET~~

Tab A to ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~

prior to the operation was conducted without incident, except for the discovery of one booby trap. The only enemy contact made during the four (4) day operation was with a team of three local VC who threw three grenades at the searching unit. All three were killed. A U.S. M-1 rifle and an AKS Russian carbine were found in the cave they had occupied.

(b) Summary of Significant Intelligence Activities and Collections

(1) After the initial sweep of the entire area of operations, the maximum effort was devoted to a deliberate hole hunting search of small areas (one area 200 meters in diameter was searched for two days resulting in the most significant finds).

(2) Eight detainees were apprehended in one small search area. Three were found hiding in a well camouflaged underground tunnel, one hiding atop a haystack in the rafters of a hut, and one hiding in a bomb shelter. All five were discovered by use of the deliberate search method. Interrogation of all eight detainees by the ITT attached to the searching unit revealed that, although none of the detainees were bona fide VC, all were civil defendants by virtue of belonging to the VC political infrastructure. The five detainees that were found hiding claimed that they had done so because of VC indoctrination that US Marines would either kill or beat all young men found. This claim was corroborated by the villagers in the area.

(3) Villagers in the area were questioned by the ITT and the Kit Carson Teams. All villagers claimed no specific knowledge of enemy activities although some did volunteer names of VC in the general area. The villagers claimed that the VC no longer inform them of locations of mines or booby traps because some of these villagers have reported previous locations to US Marines in return for rewards. Instructions are given by the VC only to stay out of a general area.

(c) Captured, Hidden Enemy Equipment and Material

(1) One (1) three-band transistor radio found under a loose board in the floor of a house.

(2) One manually operated sewing machine in good condition, believed to be used in making VC uniforms as grey and black clothing material was found along with the sewing machine. This machine was found in a large crock with camouflage cover buried in the ground in the middle of a yard.

(3) One U.S. M-1 rifle, 48 rounds .30 caliber ammunition, 3 cartridge belts, 3 M-1 pouches - all found in one of the two tunnels that the 3 VC KIA's had occupied.

~~SECRET~~

Tab A to ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(4) One 2.75 inch airborne rocket launcher with WP round buried along trail.

(5) One Russian carbine.

(6) 8 rounds 7.62mm ammunition, 1 U.S. Claymore mine found hidden in hedgerow and other miscellaneous small items such as LAAW detonators and punji spikes.

(d) Method of Search.

(1) The company conducting the detailed search assigned small areas to four-man teams. Two men provided security while the others got down on their hands and knees probing the ground with bayonets or steel rods and literally covered every inch of the assigned search area. The search was concentrated in and around houses and out buildings, along hedgerows, along streams and high areas where tunnels would not be apt to fill with water during the rainy season.

(e) Vietnamese Attachments.

(1) Three Vietnamese guides were obtained from the Conus Grievance organization for the operation. These guides supposedly know the area of operation and its villagers well. It is interesting to note that two of these guides were also supplied previously for two other widely separated areas of operation. These guides did not appear to be any more familiar with the people than the Marines to whom they were attached.

(2) Their method of identifying villagers as VC was to check a villager's name against a blacklist they carried.

(3) The guides were cooperative and participated in the search. One guide did discover the tunnel in which three detainees had been hiding. It is believed that this was by chance, however, as the company to which he was attached had been in the area for considerable time before the find was made.

(4) This was the third operation in which guides had been employed, and during each operation, the guides have appeared unfamiliar with the people or the area.

(f) Employment of the ITT.

(1) The attachment of the ITT to the detailed searching unit proved invaluable. Although no significant tactical information was obtained by interviewing villagers or detainees on the spot, the ITT enabled the company to make quick disposition of suspects. A determination could then be made on the spot, in many cases as to whether the individual should be detained or released as an innocent civilian.

~~SECRET~~  
Tab A to ~~ENCLOSURE~~ (1)

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Mission: Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day 1st Battalion, 5th Marines will conduct Search and Destroy operation within AO 2 emphasizing three step principle of first quickly isolating area and enemy within, secondly segregate and remove enemy infrastructure and finally conduct intensive, detailed "Hole Hunting" operation to uncover enemy cache sites and logistical installations.

6. Concept of Operation: At H-Hour on D-Day 1st Battalion, 5th Marines commences a multi-directional closely coordinated movement utilizing mechanized and helicopter troop transportation means to quickly and simultaneously seal off Area of Operation 2. Upon securing blocking positions at Objectives 1 and 2, conducts a rapid two company sweep of Area of Operation followed by a detailed company search and destroy, "Hole Hunting" operation of undetermined duration.

7. Lessons Learned.

a. Item 1 - Segregation of civilians within the area to be searched.

(1) Discussion - Upon cordoning off of the area to be searched no means of rapidly assembling persons within the area for interrogation was available. This made necessary the requirement for ITT personnel, Kit Carson personnel and Vietnamese agents to move from house to house to assemble persons in a central area. This caused an unnecessary delay in commencement of the search.

(2) Recommendation. That the company to conduct the search carry a portable loudspeaker for the purpose of expediting the assembly of persons within the area.

b. Item 2 - Reactions of Villagers.

(1) Discussion - A well-hidden harbor sight yielded three detainees. Only a careful search of each square foot of this particular house would have disclosed the location of the trap door. A woman's anxiety and nervousness was the clue which caused this house to receive a particularly close search.

(2) Recommendation - That security personnel with the search team observe the reactions of the villagers. Give special attention to areas that cause nervousness or other unusual emotions.

c. Item 3 - Maintenance of interest in "hole hunting."

(1) Discussion - It was noted that after the initial success of the detailed search effort during the first day, interest lagged noticeably. It was felt that this was caused by circulation of a report that there were only 4 VC in the

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

hamlet and 3 had been killed during the first day of detailed searching. After a brief flurry of effort in hopes of locating the missing VC, the searchers became apathetic and no amount of exhortation could revive their interest. On the second day, a move to another area did not revive interest, as the troops felt that any VC in the new area would have left the area at night after being alerted to the nature of the search.

(2) Recommendation - That the officers and NCOs in the area keep the momentum of the search going by keeping the persons under their control aware of successes throughout the area being searched. In addition, searching small areas followed by an analysis of the findings and significant occurrences along with reminders such as techniques of search, where to look, what to look for, and tell-tale signs prior to beginning the search of another small area is considered desirable. In short, persons cannot be driven to search effectively but a continuous effort should be made to maintain the interest using motivation techniques common to any term effort. Finally when the search begins to fail to turn up anything significant it is time to find a new area. One full day of searching seems to be the maximum time that should be spent in one search area unless results indicate more time is needed. Adjacent areas left uncordoned for one night may produce enemy material, but are considered unlikely to produce suspect persons, as they will have fled the area upon learning the nature of the search.

d. Item 4 - Employment of CS and fragmentation grenades.

(1) Discussion - In an area that has been cordoned off, use of the normal TO weapon can be a dangerous choice due to the close proximity and density of other Marine search parties within the area.

(2) Recommendation - That each Marine carry, in addition to his TO weapon, at least two fragmentation grenades and one CS or smoke grenade and that he be encouraged to use grenades in lieu of small arms fire within the perimeter.

e. Item 5 - Cotton Ropes

(1) Discussion - It was discovered during this operation that the issue cotton rope in use in this command rots quickly and is unsafe for stream crossings after limited exposure to the elements. Cotton rope broke under stream crossing conditions and nearly resulted in a tragic accident.

(2) Recommendation - That consideration be given to the purchase of nylon rope as a replacement item for the cotton rope currently in use.

f. Item 6 - Use of the Starlight Scope

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab A to Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1) Discussion - While using the Starlight Scope, the user took a target under fire unknowingly with tracer ammunition. It was noted that this blinded the user and made the scope unusable for at least 30 seconds. In addition, continued use could damage the scope.

(2) Recommendation - That action be taken to specifically preclude the use of tracer ammunition in conjunction with the Starlight Scope. The scope can follow the heat from regular ball ammunition for 300 to 400 meters.

g. Item 7 - Search of hedgerows and bushy areas.

(1) Discussion - During the course of the search, a VC was discovered in a hedgerow which had been thoroughly searched earlier in the day. It was immediately clear that he had moved to this area after observing the completion of the search of this hedgerow.

(2) Recommendation - That hedgerows and bushy areas be checked periodically after the initial search as the VC can and do move in areas that they know have been previously searched.

h. Item 8 - Ambushing of VC (KIA) graves.

(1) Discussion - After leaving the area where the three VC KIAs were buried, a patrol was sent back into the area several hours later. They noted that the graves had been dug up and the bodies removed.

(2) Recommendation - That consideration be given to placing an ambush overlooking VC graves when the unit leaves the area. This lesson has been stated before but the experience of this company reemphasizes the validity of such a practice.

i. Item 9 - Active employment of blocking force.

(1) Discussion - Upon establishment of blocking positions, it was noted that a minimum number of personnel could maintain adequate surveillance of the possible avenues of egress from the Area of Operations. It was found provident to cordon off a likely area in the vicinity of each blocking force and conduct hole hunting searches therein. This proved to be a good practical application period for those persons not actually involved in sweeping the area and several significant items were discovered.

8. Commander's Comment - The results obtained speak for themselves as to the success of the hole hunting portion of the operation. Although the effort to block the area of operations was reasonably well coordinated, the initial sweep

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab A to ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

produced no contact. This fact and the number of VC and NVA turned up during Phase 3, indicates the tendency of the enemy in this area was not to run but to hide. This indicates the validity of the "hole hunting" theory and may also indicate the effectiveness of the block. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the number of personnel involved, this area produced no booby traps. This is contrary to almost all other areas in this TACR. The possibility that this area is a living area of the VC and therefore has not been booby trapped for that reason seems good. The use of Psy Ops and MED CAP teams in conjunction with the blocking forces and later with the "hole hunting" company is highly desirable.


*O. W. van den Berg*  
O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab A to ENCLOSURE (1)

**SECRET**

Annex A: Operation Overlay to Frag Order 131-67  
Ref: Map, RWF: 1:60,000 Series 17014, Sheets 6640 X



CONTINUATION

2. *Leucosia* *leucostoma* *leucostoma*  
3. *Leucosia* *leucostoma* *leucostoma*

C. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant-Colonel  
Commanding

**S E C R E T**  
ENCLOSURE (3)  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 Hoi An, RVN  
 9 November 1967

Operation Order 1-67

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014, Sheet 6640 I

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

Quick Reaction Company  
 Company (Rein)

Quick Reaction Rifle Platoon (Rein)

Heavy Element "Thunder" (5 six man Heliteams)

Platoon Headquarters

Two Squads (Rein)

MG Squad

LAAW Tm

Det, National Police

Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar (FO)

Det, Med Plt

FAC Tm

Kit Carson Tm

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Light Element "Lightning" (3 six man Heliteams)

Asst. Plt Cmdr &amp; Radio Operator

One Squad (Rein)

MG Squad

LAAW Tm

Company (-) Standby

Two Rifle Platoons (Rein)

Det, H&amp;S Company

Det, Med Platoon

Det, 61 Mortar Platoon (FO)

Det, Comm Platoon

1. Situation.

a. Enemy Forces. See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines provides Artillery support as requested.

(2) Commanding General, 1st MAW provides helicopter support as requested.

c. Attachments. Two National Police with Quick Reaction Platoon.

2. Mission. At H-Hour, D-Day 1st Battalion, 5th Marines

SECRET

Tab B to ENCL000001 (1)

SECRET

conducts a quick reaction operation within TAOR, attacks and destroys targets of opportunity to disrupt enemy tactical and logistical operations.

**3. Execution.**

a. Concept: At H-Hour, on D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducts a platoon sized vertical assault on targets of opportunity within TAOR. Lands in two zones to surprise, gain quick contact with and encircle the enemy, employing sweeping/blocking tactics. Upon landing, the platoon will overcome any resistance and then screen and interrogate persons within the immediate area, capture weapons and supplies and destroy fortifications. The remainder of the company is on standby for reinforcement or exploitation as required.

(1) The quick reaction platoon will be divided into a heavy and light element, each capable of operating independently for short periods. The light element will be comprised of a reinforced squad called the "LIGHTNING" element. The platoon headquarters and two reinforced squads will be designated the "THUNDER" element.

(2) If the tactical situation warrants, a second unit consisting of the company headquarters and a reinforced platoon will board helicopters and move to the area of contact on order.

(3) The remaining platoon of the company will be prepared to move by helicopter to the AG on order.

**b. Quick Reaction Company**

(1) At H-Hour + 30 minutes locate one platoon at LZ 411 for loading, launching and employment as directed by Battalion Commander.

(2) Have remainder of Company on 10 minute standby prepared to reinforce reaction platoon on order.

(3) Be prepared to resume OPCON of Quick Reaction Platoon on order.

(4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

**c. Quick Reaction Platoon**

(1) At H-Hour, on D-Day organized helicopters from assigned helicopters at LZ 411 (1/5 combat base Holo and),

Tab B to ENCLURE (1)

SECRET

(2) Be prepared to receive briefing at landing zone or in flight.

(3) Upon debarkation, immediately move to gain contact or surround enemy forces.

(4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) D-Day, H-Hour as designated by Battalion Commander.

(2) Frag Order to be issued by Battalion Commander enroute to landing zone, or to be issued by Battalion S-3 immediately prior to launching of Quick Reaction Platoon as instructed by Battalion Commander.

(3) Rules of Engagement apply.

(4) Be alert for mines and booby traps.

(5) Supporting fires on call.

(6) Battalion S-3 will brief platoon commander, platoon sergeant and flight leaders of the operational concept.

(7) All unit leaders will be briefed that tactical movement and control will be initially directed from the air utilizing the clock and compass reference system, 12 o'clock will coincide with grid north.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Insure weapons are maintained in constant state of cleanliness for immediate employment.

b. Basic Load:

(1) One MCI per man.

(2) Three canteens and three days salt and halizone per man.

(3) One protective mask.

(4) Basic allowance of ammunition.

Tab B to ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

(a)	5.56mm	240 rounds per man
(b)	7.62mm	1000 rounds per gun
(c)	40mm	12 rounds per M-79
(d)	LA/W	4 per squad
(e)	Smoke Grenades	2 red, 2 yellow 2 green per squad

- (5) One Demolitions Kit per engineer
- (6) 50 feet of rope per squad.
- (7) All personnel wear flack jackets.

5. Command and Communications.

a. Command.

(1) Battalion Commander will remain in control while airborne. Control may be passed to Company Commander as situation develops.

(2) Display air panels, three per squad, securely fastened to back of flack jackets.

b. Communications.

(1) Both elements of Quick Reaction Platoon will be up on Battalion TAC Net. Report to Company TAC Net only on return to company OCON.

(2) Frequencies to be passed separately as required.

(3) Call Signs.

(a) Heavy element, Quick Reaction Platoon, "Nailbrush Thunder".

(b) Light element, Quick Reaction Platoon, "Nailbrush Lightning".

(c) Assume regular call signs upon return to company OCON.

(4) Landing Zones and friendly lines to be marked with yellow or green smoke. Green smoke will mark the LZ for the "Thunder" element and yellow smoke will mark the LZ

Tab B to ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

for the "Lightning" element.

(5) Red smoke or WP will be used to mark targets.

*O. W. van den Berg*  
O. W. VAN DEN BERG JR.  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

Tab B to ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 Hoi An, RVN  
 14 November 1967

## Operation Order 2-67 (Waterway Denial Plan)

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014, Sheet 6640I  
 (b) 1st Mar Div Operation Order 91-67 (Waterway Control)  
 (c) 1st Mar Div Operation Plan 126-67 (Operation TATBOO)  
 (d) 5th Marine Regiment Operation Order 4-67 (Waterway Control)  
 (e) 1st Mar Div CICOT P02000.2C

Time Zone: H

Task Organization - Annex A (Task Organization)

## 1. Situation.

a. Enemy Forces. See current ISUMS and PERINTREPS  
 b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 5th Marine Regiment participates in the defense of the Da Nang vital area by achieving and maintaining positive control over the rivers and waterways entering and flowing through the Regimental TAOR and assigned areas of the Division AOR by denying the enemy freedom of movement and the capability of utilizing rivers and waterways as routes of ingress and egress to the TAOR and (AOR).

(2) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines establishes surveillance means and patrol activities astride the SONG VINH DIEN from coordinates (BT 041570) to (BT 057618) adjacent to Battalion TAOR.

## (3) Artillery.

a. Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines provides direct support.

b. Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines provides general support.

## (4) Air.

## a. U.S. Army.

(I) Provides Firefly missions as required.  
 (II) Provides SLAR/IR aircraft as required.

## b. 1st MAW.

(I) Provides rotary and fixed wing surveillance of rivers and waterways as requested.

SECRET  
 Tab C to INCL 2/4A (1)

SECRET

(II) Provides illumination and aerial photo coverage as required.

(5) Naval Support.

a. CTG 115.1 provides coastal surveillance.  
 b. Commander, Coastal Group 14 (Junk Fleet) provides surveillance and operates check point at the mouth of the SONG CAU DI I and controls all water craft traffic thereto. Provides coastal surveillance within capability.

(6) GVN Support.

a. District Chiefs register watercraft within their districts.

2. Mission. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines establishes surveillance means and conducts daily waterway surveillance and denial activities through vigorous patrolling, ambushes and use of available air surveillance.

3. Execution.

a. Concept: The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in coordination with Combined Action Platoons (4), (5) and (6), PF and RF units, elements of 1/51st ARVN Regiment and the 2/4 APCs conducts waterway denial activities within and adjacent to the Battalion TAOR by continuous patrolling and ambushes, coordinated with available waterway surveillance and denial means including Firefly, SLAR/IR and Coastal Group 14 (Junk Fleet).

b. Company A.

Company B.

Company C.

Company D.

(1) Conduct aggressive continuous patrolling within the Battalion TAOR as directed. Day and night activities will always include one unit assigned to provide observation and ambushes on waterways. See Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan).

c. H&S Company.

(1) General support of rifle company operations as directed.

d. 3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Amtrac Battalion.

(1) General support as directed.

Tab C to ENCLOSURE 1  
SECRET

SECRET

e. 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion.

(1) General support as directed.

f. S-3 Officer.

(1) Coordinate dissemination of the Waterway Denial Plan and curfew instructions.

(2) Coordinate with GVN authorities for establishment of waterway check points as requested and deemed advisable.

(3) Coordinate with appropriate supporting agencies for assistance in conducting surveillance and maintaining control of waterways leading into the Battalion TAOR, including periodic requests for Firefly, SLAR/IR and aerial observation missions.

(4) Conduct daily liaison with MACV advisory staff to insure coordination of the Battalion waterway control effort with other agencies within this AO.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Emphasize patrol activities and surveillance means on those waterways leading into the Rocket Belt with particular emphasis on the SONG HA XAU, SONG HIEP and the SONG DE VCNG.

(2) Deny water craft movement on all waterways in TAOR between the hours of 1800 and 0600. See Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan).

(3) Deny water craft movement at all times in unauthorized areas. See Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan).

(4) Direct attention toward areas adjacent to waterways for discovery of enemy cache sites, exit trails and boat assembly areas.

(5) Include plans for all waterway control activities with normal daily plans submission to this headquarters (Attn: S-3).

(6) Unit Commanders may challenge, board and search any suspicious looking craft at any time. Any craft that does not respond to challenge or attempts to evade may be taken under fire.

(7) Notify this Headquarters immediately (Attn: S-3) when conflicts arise with local citizens or officials regarding implementation or understanding of this order.

(8) Conduct activities as scheduled. Prior approval for deletion or change of routes must be approved by this Headquarters.

h. Administration and Logistics.

a. To be promulgated as the situation requires.

Tab C to ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ 1  
SECRET

SECRET

5. Command and Communications.

- a. Communications in accordance with References (b), (e) and Regimental CEOI.
- b. Frequencies and call signs other than as designated in References (b) and (e) are contained in Headquarters, I Corps Advisor Group SOI, Quang Da Sector Nets which change monthly. These are furnished to this command as required.

*O.W. van den Berg*  
O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

## Annexes:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Waterway Denial Plan

Distribution: Special

Tab C to ENCLURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
Hoi An, REDACTED  
14 November 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
Operation Order 2-67 (Waterway Denial Plan)

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Rein)      LtCol O. W. VAN DEN BERG

Company A (Rein)

CAPT GIORDANI

Company A  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
Det, HQs Co, 5thMar (Sniper Tm)  
Det, H&S Co  
    Det, FO Tm  
    Det, Med Plt  
    Det, Comm Plt  
    FAC Tm  
    Kit Carson Tm

Company B (Rein)

CAPT DROBNY

Company B  
Det, Co B, 1stEngRgrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
Det, HQs Co, 5thMar (Sniper Tm)  
Det, H&S Co  
    Det, FO Tm  
    Det, Med Plt  
    Det, Comm Plt  
    FAC Tm  
    Kit Carson Tm

Company C (Rein)

CAPT BURROW

Company C  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
Det, H&S Co  
    Det, FO Tm  
    Det, Med Plt  
    Det, Comm Plt  
    FAC Tm  
    Kit Carson Tm

Company D (Rein)

CAPT KIRKPATRICK

Company D  
Det, Co B, 1stEngRgrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
Det, H&S Co  
    Det, FO Tm  
    Det, Med Plt

Tab C to ENCLOSURE 1  
SECRET

SECRET

Det, Comm Plt  
FAC Tm  
Kit Carson Tm

H&amp;S Company (Rein)

CAPT BAGLEY

H&amp;S Company

Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn

Det, Fury D, 2ndBn, 11thMar

3rd Plt, Co B, 3rd AmtracBn

LT MASON

1st Plt, Co C, 1st TankBn

LT HILL

*O.W. van den Berg*  
O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

Distribution: Special

Tab C to INCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan) to Operati-  
on Order 2

Waterway traffic in segments of waterways shown in black is unauthorized at any time. In all unmarked segments of waterways, traffic is unauthorized between 1800 and 0600.

OFF  
LIMITS  
AREA

60  
16

FREE BOAT  
& FISHING TRAFFIC

0500H-2000H

OFF  
LIMITS  
AREA

53  
20

OFFICIAL

*John S. Wunderlich*  
J. S. Wunderlich  
MAJOR USMC  
B-3

C. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

TAB C to Encl (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

Annex B (Waterway Denial Plan) to  
Operation Order 2-67

Waterway traffic in segments of waterways shown in black is unauthorized at any time. In all unmarked segments of waterways, traffic is unauthorized between 1800 and 0600.

61 +  
10

12  
+ 55

OFFICIAL

L. A. WUNDERLICH  
Major USMC  
S-3

O. W. VAN LEEUWEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding  
TAD C to Encl (1)

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 Hoi An, RVN  
 17 November 1967

Frag Order 132-67

Ref: (a) Maps: RVN, 1:50,000; Series L7014, Sheet 6640I  
 (b) Regt Operation Plan 1-67

Time Zone: H-Hour, D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Task Organization: Annex A

1. SITUATION. See current ISUMS and PERINTREPS.
2. MISSION: Commencing at H-Hour, D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines will conduct Search and Destroy within AO 3 emphasizing the three step principles of first, quickly isolating the area and enemy within, secondly, segregate and remove enemy infrastructure and finally conduct an intensive, detailed "Hole Hunting" operation to uncover enemy personnel and cache sites.
3. EXECUTION

A. Concept: At H-Hour on D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducts a coordinated, multi-directional movement utilizing mechanized, helicopter and foot movement to simultaneously establish a cordon around Tan My (1) in AO 3. Upon securing of blocking positions 1, 2, and 3, one company conducts a rapid sweep of the cordoned area followed by a detailed search and destroy "Hole Hunting" operation of 48-72 hours duration. See Annex B (Operation Overlay).

B. PF Company.

(1) On order conduct tactical foot march east along Route 538 to vicinity (BT 077583), swing to the north and sweep rapidly to secure assigned blocking positions. See Annex B (Operation Overlay).

- (2) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.
- (3) Be prepared to retire from area of operations on order the afternoon of D-Day and return to parent organization combat base.

C. Company D.

(1) On order commence motorized movement to vicinity (BT 082583). Upon arrival, dismount and sweep rapidly to secure blocking position as assigned. See Annex B (Operation Overlay).

- (2) Be prepared to conduct thorough search in vicinity of blocking position.

Tab (D) to ENCLOSURE (1)  
 SECRET

SECRET

- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.
- (4) Be prepared to return to combat base on order.

D. Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.

(1) At H-Hour commence helilift to LZ Raven, debark immediately and move to secure blocking position as assigned (See Operation Overlay). Deny enemy egress from A0 through your position.

(2) Be prepared on order to conduct thorough search of Co. Lu (2) vicinity (BT 077602) while maintaining sufficient blocking force.

(3) Be prepared to conduct MED CAP at Co Lu (2) on order.

(4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

(5) Be prepared to commence movement to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base on order.

E. Company B.

(1) On order commence mechanized march to vicinity (BT 103597). On arrival, execute a flanking movement to the left and move on line to dismount at point of limit of advance for tanks. Dismount and immediately commence sweep through cordoned area. See Annex C (Order of March/Loading Plan).

(2) Be prepared to reverse direction and sweep back through cordoned area on order.

(3) Be prepared to select an area and commence a detailed "Hole Hunting" search on order.

(4) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

F. 3rd Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion.

(1) Provide covering fires for ground units on order.

(2) Provide mechanized transportation for elements of Company B as assigned. See Annex C (Order of March/Loading Plan).

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

(4) Be prepared to commence movement to combat base on order.

G. 3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Amtrac Battalion.

(1) General Support.

(2) Provide mechanized transportation for elements of Company B and H&S Company as assigned. See Annex C (Order of March/Loading Plan).

(3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.

(4) Be prepared to commence return movement to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base on order.

SECRET

H. H&S Company (-).

- (1) General Support.
- (2) Move as part of mechanized column to debarkation point.
- (3) Be prepared to assume other missions on order.
- (4) Be prepared to return to the combat base on order.

I. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) H-Hour on order. To be announced to coincide with helicopter lift off at 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Be ready to move out at 0700 on order.
- (2) D-Day 18 November 1967.
- (3) Companies D and B and CP be loaded on vehicles by 0645.
- (4) Be alert for mines and booby traps.
- (5) Rules of engagement apply.
- (6) See Annex B (Operation Overlay).
- (7) Tracked vehicle loading plan. See Annex C (Order of Movement/Loading Plan).
- (8) Estimated duration of operation - 3 days.
- (9) RCA authorized only on order of Battalion Commander.
- (10) Blocking Position Boundaries.
  - a. Between PF company and L/3/1 - Trail at (BT 076595). Trail responsibility of Company L.
  - b. Between PF company and Company D - Stream at (BT 079588). Stream responsibility of Company D.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

## A. Prescribed Load.

- (1) All companies carry demolition materials.
- (2) 2 MCIs per man except Company B to carry 6 MCIs per man.
- (3) 3 canteens per man.
- (4) 3 days supply salt and halizone.
- (5) Every man wear flak jacket.
- (6) Every man carry field protective mask.
- (7) Every man carry weapons cleaning gear.
- (8) Basic allowance of ammunition.
  - a. 240 rounds 5.56 or 7.62 ball per rifle.
  - b. 21 rounds .45 caliber ball per pistol.
  - c. 1000 rounds 7.62 linked per M-60 MG.
  - d. 12 rounds per M-79.
  - e. Tanks and LVTs carry basic load.
  - f. 25 rounds 60mm HE per tube.
  - g. 5 rounds 60mm WP per tube.
  - h. 2 M-26 grenades per man.

SECRET

## (9) Following supply and equippage per squad:

- a. Two air panels.
- b. Three yellow smoke grenades.
- c. Four LAWS.
- d. Two hand illumination green star cluster.
- e. 50 feet of rope.

## B. Resupply.

- (1) As requested by LVTP-5.

## C. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) By helicopter when possible.
- (2) Secondary evacuation by LVTP-5.
- (3) Casualty reporting IAW Div 0 3040.1B.

## D. Transportation.

- (1) Seven LVTP-5s.
- (2) Three 48A1 Tanks.
- (3) 8 M35 Trucks.
- (4) 8 H-34 Helicopters.

## E. Unit Commanders.

- (1) Insure weapons are cleaned daily.
- (2) Supervise the consumption of salt tablets.
- (3) Require and supervise purification of water.
- (4) Supervise care of the feet.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

## A. Command.

- (1) Command Post move with Company B initially.  
Remain with tracked vehicles.
- (2) Position reports every hour.
- (3) Display air panels, 2 per squad/mark forward blocking positions.
- (4) Yellow smoke to mark helo zones.

## B. Communications.

- (1) Frequencies and call signs in accordance with Annex D (Radio Plan).
- (2) Medicac request will be requested by Battalion Air Officer.
- (3) All operators carry one spare battery (BA-386),

SECRET

except Company B, whose operators will carry two batteries.

O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

Annex A: Task Organization  
B: Operation Overlay  
C: Order of March/Loading Plan  
D: Radio Plan

OFFICIAL

L. A. WUNDERLICH  
MAJOR USMC  
S-3

-5- Tab (D) to ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
Hoi An, RVN  
17 November 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Frag Order 132-67

Time Zone: H

1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) (Rein) LtCol O. W. VAN DEN BERG

PF Company

Company D (Rein)

CAPT KIRKPATRICK

Company D  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11th Mar  
Det, H&S Company  
Det, 81 Mortar Plt (FO)  
Det, Comm Plt  
Det, Med Plt  
FAC Tm  
S-2 Scout  
Kit Carson Tm

Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (Rein) CAPT HUBLE

Company L  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry C, 1stBn, 11thMar (FO)  
Det, H&S Company  
Det, 81 Mortar Plt (FO)  
Det, Comm Plt  
Det, Med Plt  
FAC Tm  
S-2 Scout  
Kit Carson Tm

Company B (Rein)

CAPT DROBNY

Company B  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar (FO)  
Det, H&S Company  
Det, 81 Mortar Plt (FO)  
Det, Comm Plt  
Det, Med Plt  
FAC Tm  
S-2 Scout  
Kit Carson Tm  
Det, RF Security Plt

Tab (D) to ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

H&S Company (-) (Rein)

CAPT MCINTYRE

H&S Company (-)  
Det, Comm Plt  
Det, Med Plt  
TACP  
Det, Co B, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Btry D, 2ndBn, 11thMar  
Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv (13th ITT)

3rd Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion LT HILL3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Amtrac Battalion LT MASON

O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding


OFFICIAL

L. A. WUNDERLICH  
MAJOR USMC  
S-3

SECRET


Annex B (Operation Overlay) to  
 Frag Order 132-67  
 Ref: Map, RVN; 1:50,000  
 Series L7014, Sheet 6640 I

P-1



SECRET

Annex C (Order of March/Loading  
Plan) to Frag Order 132-67



OFFICIAL

*Sgt. Major*

L. A. WILHELMUS  
MAJOR U.S.M.C  
S-3

O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding

Tab (D) to ENCLURE (1)  
SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX D (Communications- Rerunetics) (Page Index 1306)

Reft: (a) 1st Mar Div Order R2000.20

Time Zone: Hotel

## LEGEND:

- O - Net Control
- X - Guard
- O - Guard or  
Directed

## ONCALLS

	DESIGN	TYPE	CIRCUIT	ONCALLS	CALLINGS
5TH MAINTENANCE	X	NET	NET		OUTSPRING
1/5 PIPES	X	NET	NET		WALL HOUSE
1/6 REAR	X	NET	NET		WALL MUSKET
1/6 CO 1/5	X	NET	NET		WALL TOWER
2/6 CO 1/5	X	NET	NET		WALL TOWER
3/6 CO 5/5	X	NET	NET		WALL TOWER
4/6 CO SECURITY					WALL TOWER
5/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
6/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
7/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
8/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
9/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
10/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
11/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
12/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
13/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
14/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
15/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
16/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
17/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
18/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
19/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
20/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
21/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
22/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
23/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
24/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
25/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
26/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
27/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
28/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
29/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
30/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
31/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
32/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
33/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
34/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
35/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
36/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
37/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
38/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
39/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
40/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
41/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
42/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
43/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
44/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
45/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
46/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
47/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
48/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
49/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
50/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
51/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
52/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
53/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
54/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
55/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
56/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
57/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
58/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
59/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
60/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
61/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
62/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
63/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
64/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
65/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
66/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
67/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
68/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
69/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
70/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
71/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
72/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
73/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
74/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
75/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
76/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
77/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
78/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
79/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
80/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
81/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
82/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
83/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
84/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
85/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
86/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
87/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
88/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
89/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
90/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
91/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
92/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
93/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
94/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
95/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
96/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
97/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
98/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
99/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
100/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
101/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
102/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
103/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
104/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
105/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
106/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
107/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
108/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
109/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
110/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
111/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
112/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
113/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
114/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
115/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
116/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
117/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
118/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
119/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
120/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
121/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
122/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
123/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
124/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
125/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
126/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
127/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
128/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
129/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
130/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
131/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
132/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
133/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
134/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
135/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
136/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
137/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
138/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
139/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
140/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
141/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
142/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
143/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
144/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
145/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
146/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
147/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
148/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
149/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
150/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
151/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
152/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
153/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
154/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
155/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
156/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
157/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
158/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
159/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
160/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
161/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
162/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
163/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
164/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
165/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
166/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
167/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
168/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
169/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
170/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
171/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
172/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
173/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
174/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
175/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
176/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
177/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
178/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
179/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
180/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
181/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
182/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
183/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
184/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
185/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
186/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
187/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
188/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
189/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
190/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
191/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
192/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
193/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
194/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
195/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
196/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
197/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
198/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
199/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
200/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
201/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
202/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
203/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
204/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
205/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
206/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
207/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
208/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
209/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
210/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
211/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
212/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
213/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
214/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
215/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
216/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
217/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
218/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
219/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
220/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
221/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
222/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
223/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
224/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
225/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
226/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
227/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
228/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
229/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
230/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
231/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
232/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
233/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
234/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
235/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
236/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
237/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
238/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
239/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
240/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
241/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
242/6 CO 1/5					WALL TOWER
243/6 CO 1/5					W

HEADQUARTERS  
 1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco, 96602

3/LAW/wre  
 21 November 1967

**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy 15 of 27 copies

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines  
 Subj: Operational Summary of Cordon and Search Operation  
 Conducted 18 November 1967  
 Ref: (a) 5th Marines Op Plan 1-67  
 (b) 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 132-67

0360-67

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay

1. Date of Operation - 180700H November 1967
2. Task Organization - See Annex A to Reference (b)
3. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery - Artillery was not employed during the operation for reasons enumerated in previous cordon and search reports.

b. Air - Use of air was restricted to an AO mission during the movement to blocking positions and the early stages of the sweep through the objective area and med-evac missions. The AO was very helpful in coordinating the closing of the blocking force and was in an excellent position to point out persons attempting to flee from the area. The med-evacs were efficient and timely.

4. Intelligence

a. Summary of Significant Intelligence Activities and Collection

(1) Recent activities in the vicinity of Tam My (1) (BT 082593) indicated the hamlet was being used as a VC refuge and harboring site. There have been several mining incidents on route 538 immediately to the south of the hamlet and friendly patrols have received harassing small arms fire in the near vicinity. In reaction to one of the sniping incidents, a platoon patrol surprised seven VC, approximately two weeks prior to this operation, killing four and wounding

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SECRET**

TABLE to ENCLOSURE (1)

**SECRET**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

two. During this "hole hunt", no contact with either peasants or VC was made.

(2) Planning for the operation included a request for an aerial photograph of the area and an airborne visual reconnaissance the day prior to the operation. Both proved valuable aids in gaining a better understanding of the terrain in the area of operations. The aerial photo was particularly useful to point out blocking positions, routes of approach and obstacles to respective commanders.

(3) The results of the intelligence collection effort were primarily confined to gaining a better understanding of the objective area and routes of approach thereto. No civilians were found in the area of operations. Apparently the area has not been inhabited by civilians for some time, as houses in the area show no signs of having been lived in except three or four partially destroyed buildings that showed evidence of having been occupied occasionally during the week prior to the operation. It is interesting to note that, despite the lack of indications of home occupation, many garden areas were well cared for. This indicates that supporting arms use in the past has caused the villagers to leave the area but that they return periodically to tend to their gardens.

(4) As a result of this operation and contacts prior to this time it is concluded that this area is excellent for assembly and harboring, as well as a good location from which to snipe. The area is grown over as a result of the lack of habitation and provides excellent concealment. However, it is apparently not a storage or cache area nor an area occupied by the enemy for extended periods of time.

b. Enemy Equipment Destroyed or Captured.

(1) 1 homemade concussion type grenade with trip wire destroyed.

(2) 2 M-26 grenades, 1 set with trip wire, 1 buried with pressure release device, both destroyed.

(3) 1 booby trap with 40 pounds Composition "B", with pressure release device, destroyed.

(4) 2 unidentified type booby traps, 1 with trip wire, 1 with pressure release device, both destroyed.

(5) 3 box type mines, pressure release type, all destroyed.

(6) 2 homemade booby trap devices, 1 with 17 flashlight batteries inserted in a bamboo stalk as a firing device, found behind an altar, captured. Will be forwarded to Regimental S-2.

**SECRET**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(7) 2 caves, one 8 feet by 2 foot by 2 foot with metal sides held up by engineer stakes, destroyed; and another 10 feet by 3 feet by 3 feet, destroyed.

5. Mission. Commencing at H-Hour, D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines will conduct search and destroy within AO 3 emphasizing the three step principles of first, quickly isolating the area and enemy within, secondly, segregate and remove enemy infrastructure and finally conduct an intensive, detailed "Hole Hunting" operation to uncover enemy personnel and cache sites.

6. Concept. At H-Hour on D-Day, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines conducts a coordinated, multi-directional movement utilizing mechanized, helicopter and foot movement to simultaneously establish a cordon around Tan My (2) in AO 3. Upon securing of blocking positions 1, 2, and 3, one company conducts a rapid sweep of the cordoned area followed by a detailed search and destroy "Hole Hunting" operation of 48-72 hours duration. See Enclosure (1). (Operation Overlay)

#### 7. Lessons Learned

##### a. Item - Use of Popular Forces and Regional Forces Troops.

(1) Discussion - One company of Popular Forces and one platoon of Regional Forces were employed on this operation. The Popular Forces company was employed as the western blocking force. They moved in and secured their portion of the cordon without difficulty and were timely in their execution. The RF platoon was integrated into the sweep company to assist in the search for hiding places and caches. They were quite helpful during the conduct of the search. The company commander noted that they pointed out several booby traps which were cleverly hidden. There is no positive way to assess the possible compromise of plans in this operation. Every effort was made to insure that only key advisors and commanders of the allied units were apprised of the general nature and area of the operation.

(2) Lesson Learned - Coordination on a Cordon and Search operation in itself must be detailed. Use of allied forces requires coordination to insure a complete understanding of the concept without unnecessary disclosure of details to other than key advisors and entrusted commanders. Regional Force employment as part of the search force seems desirable, however, here again, little is to be gained by pre-operation disclosure of the area of operations or details of the operation.

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab B to ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. Item - Sweep of a heavily booby-trapped area.

(1) Discussion - Within 30 minutes of the commencement of the sweep of the cordoned area, three booby trap incidents had caused 7 WIAE and one WIAME. It became obvious that to continue the rapid sweep involved a high risk of further injuries resulting therefrom. The sweep force was temporarily held up and advised to continue the sweep but to carefully search for booby traps before sweeping through an area. When the sweep was slowed, several booby traps were discovered which otherwise would have probably been detonated causing further casualties.

(2) Lesson Learned - There will be times such as noted in sub-paragraph (1) above when it is not advisable to sweep rapidly through the objective area.

c. Item - Use of blocking forces to assist in the "Hole Hunting" effort.

(1) Discussion - Previous "Hole Hunting" operations had indicated that the blocking forces, upon completion of the sweep, could be effectively employed to "Hole Hunt" their blocking position and/or to conduct MED CAP and Psy Ops missions in the area of the block, while still maintaining sufficient forces to deny the enemy egress from the area. In this case, since there were no civilians inhabiting the area, the blocking forces were moved forward to tighten the cordon and then each force conducted "Hole Hunting" within an area consistent with the size that a company should search. This proved to be a means to obtain maximum utilization of personnel and increased the area that could be searched in detail three fold in the same time frame.

(2) Lesson Learned - The full employment of the blocking force is limited only by the imagination of the officers commanding them. A maximum effort should be made to insure one hundred percent employment of forces throughout the operation.

d. Item - Channelization and bunching up.

(1) Discussion - Thick foliage with many hedgerows made control very difficult when the company was employed on line in the course of the sweep. In addition these hedgerows caused channelizing and bunching up thus risking the possibility of multiple casualties from a single booby trap.

(2) Recommendation - That consideration be given to use of company and platoons on line, squads in column when faced with terrain such as described. Emphasis can

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**SECRET**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

be placed on individual separation and alternating members of the squad observing opposite sides of the column. In addition, when faced with a heavily booby-trapped area, such a formation should cut down the possibility of detonation of booby traps and allow a more rapid sweep with a negligible loss of area coverage.

8. Commander's Analysis - The operation was a disappointment in terms of results - 75 casualties; however, it proved interesting and educational in terms of coordination. The movement to cordon the area was well executed, particularly considering the requirement for moving four units into prescribed positions simultaneously. This was accomplished despite disapproval of the helilift request necessitating use of amtracs to move Company E, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Base Camp and continued juggling of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines personnel to assure sufficient units to conduct the operation.

The actual "Hole Hunt" of the area was detailed and utilized the full assets of the three Marine companies. It is felt that the area is not worthy of further "Hole Hunting" activity and therefore should be withdrawn from consideration for this type of operation for four to six months. Due to the large number of booby traps, the possible use of the area as an assembly or a harboring site, and the lack of civilian population, this area is considered to be an excellent target for use of close air support missions utilizing "Daisy Cutters" to destroy mines and booby traps and possibly to disrupt VC activity.

*O. W. van den Berg*  
 O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
 Lieutenant Colonel  
 Commanding

**SECRET**

Tab E to ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED


Annex B (Operation Overlay)  
to Frag Order 132-67

Ref: Map, RVN;  
1:50,000 Series  
L7011, Sheets

640 I

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PF



3C

1/FMF

3/FMF

10

56



11

61



ENCLOSURE (2)  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL

L. A. WUNDERLICH  
Major  
S-3

O. W. VAN DEN BERG  
Lieutenant Colonel  
Commanding