



### HEADQUARTERS Battalion Landing Team 3/5 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF FPO San Francisco, California 96602



3/DGD/djg 5750 31 May 1966

Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronology Report for Feriod

1324992 May66 to 3116992 May66

(a) Div0 5750.2A Ref:

Enel: (1) BLT 3/5 Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events (S)

(2) BLT 3/5 Chronelogy of Events (8)
(4) BLT 3/5 Op 0 #330\_66, HILL TOP X.

1. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronelogy, consisting of enclosures (1) and (2), is submitted in accordance with the format contained in reference (a).

, (3) a/a HILLTOP I, 25-27 May 66

E. J. BRONARS





REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES (1) AND (2)

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10



# SECRET



COTY# 002 of 5 COPIES

### COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

- 1. Headquarters, Battalien Landing Team 3/5, 9th Marine Amphibieus Brigade, Fleet Marine Force.
  - a. Location: U.S.S. PRINCETON (LPH-5)
  - b. Period Covered: 1324002 May 1966 3116002 May 1966

LtCal E. J. BRONARS	Commanding Officer
Mej J. T. ELKINS	Executive Officer
2ndLt B. F. BEGGS	S <b>-1</b>
istLt J. M. SIMS	S-2
Maj R. A. MONFORT	S-3
Capt R. W. VORREYER	8-4
Capt H. S. HAUPT	H&S Company Commander
Capt S. S. GLAIZE	I Company Commander
Capt R. E. MARESCO	K Company Commander
Capt R. P. TATUM	L Company Commander
Capt H. D. PETTENGIL	M Company Commander
	Maj J. T. ELKINS  2ndLt B. F. BEGGS  1stLt J. M. SIMS  Maj R. A. MONFORT  Capt R. W. VORREYER  Capt H. S. HAUPT  Capt S. S. GLAIZE  Capt B. E. MARESCO  Capt R. P. TATUM

# 2. Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events

- a. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 terminated it's training at Camp Schwab, Okinawa the first week in May 1966. Upon departing Okinawa on 14 May, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 came under Operational Control of Commander, Task Group 79.5. Administrative Control was retained by Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- b. Typheen "IRMA" delayed the arrival of Battalien Landing Team 3/5 at USNB Subic Bay, PI until 20 May. Buring the next three days Battalien Landing Team 3/5 received supplies which had arrived from Okinawa and made pre-D-day transfers between the Special Landing Force shipping.
- c. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 conducted a rehearsal for HILLTOP V in the Zambales Training Area of USNB Subic Bay on 23 May. Co's L and N and H&S Co (-) were helelifted to the designated landing sohe from the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). Co K made a waterborne assault by LCVP from the USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) and Co I landed by LVT's from the USS ALAMO (LSD-33). The following day a test of ship-te-shere radio communications covering all Battalion Landing Team 3/5 radio equipment was conducted in the Zambales Training Area.

Inclosure 1

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- d. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 departed from USNB Subie Bay, PI en 24 May bound for Mindoro Island to conduct the exercise HILLTOP V. On D-day, 25 May, Battalien Landing Team 3/5 landed Co's K and I over RED Beach by LCVP and LVT. Co's L and M and H&S Co (-) were helelifted into landing Zone SPARBOW. Helicopter support was furnished by HHM-364. During the first and second days of the eperation companies conducted search and clear operations in their TAR's. On the third day, May 27, a tactical withdrawal was conducted back to the Special Landing Force Shipping.
- e. Battalien Landing Team 3/5 returned to USNB Subic Bay, PI on 28 May for a week of upkeep and training, Training consisting of four days of Jungle Environmental Indectrination for the rifle companies and attached units was begun on 31 May. Additional firing exercises for all Supporting Arms, Rifle Familiarisation Firing, Sniperscope Familiarisation, Demolition and Helicopter Support Team Training, parachute jumps and scuba requalification were also scheduled for this period.

Enclosure (1)





# BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- Battalien Landing Team 3/5 sailed aboard ARG USS PRINCETON (LPH-5), USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) and USS ALAMO (LSD-33) at White Beach, Buckner Bay, Okinawa and assumed rele as Special Landing Ferce. Destination Philippine Islands for "HTLLTOP V". Upon subarkation, Battalien Landing Team 3/5 chepped operational central to Commander Task Group 79.5 at 1324662 May 1966. \*6th Plateon 1st Ferce Reconnaissance Company Operational Control/Administrative Control Battalien Landing Team 3/5.\*\*
- 17 May Helicopter debark drill conducted aboard USS PRINCETON for embarked troops (Companies L, M & 81's). ARG cruising off Subic Bay because of bad weather.
- 20 May BLT 3/5 arrived USNB Subic Bay, Philippine Islands abourd Special Landing Ferce shipping.
- 23 May BLT 3/5 conducted rehearsal for "HILLTOP V" in Zambales area of Subis Bay.
- 24 May Battalien Landing Team 3/5 conducted an exercise of all communication equipment in the Zambales training area USMB Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. Battalien Landing Team 3/5 departed from USMB Subic Bay enroute aboard Special Landing Force shipping to the San Jose area of Mindore Island.
- 25-27 May Battalien Landing Team 3/5 conducted exercise "HILLTOF" in the San Jese area of Mindoro Island.
- 28 May Battalian Landing Team 3/5 returned USNB Subic Bay, Philippine Islands for seven days of upkeep and training.
- 31 May Battalien Landing Team 3/5 commenced Jungle Environmental Indoctrination for all rifle companies and attached units in Training Areas 1-6. USNB Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.

\*Commanding General 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade \$569222 May 1966 \*\*Commanding Officer Regimental Landing Team-5 \$6614\$2 May 1966

Anelesure (2)

Carrier Section

# CONFIDENTAL



SABIAL NO. 20131-66

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OPERATION ORDER 330-66

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ENCLOSURE (4)



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

# Operation Order 330-66/w CAI-IL

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose AMS S733-3256IV (1:50,000) Ambulong AMS S733-3257III (1:50,000) San Jose AMS S733-3157II (1:50,000) Adela


- (b) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 330,65
- (c) BnO 3000.4B

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

- 1. SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Forces.
    - (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
    - (2) Intelligence Summaries as issued,
  - b. Friendly Forces.
    - (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) conducts an amphibious assault for the purpose of establishing TU 79.5.2 ashore in order to:
      - (a) Destroy enemy forces thereon.
      - (b) Seize designated landing force objectives.
      - (c) Conduct search and destroy operations within assigned zones.
      - (d) Execute tactical withdrawal on order.
    - (2) <u>Air</u>.
      - (a) Close air support provided by CTG 79.3 in accordance with Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.
      - (b) Helicopter support provided by HMM-364 (TU 79.5.3).
    - (3) Naval Gunfire. NGF support provided by CTG 76.5 in accordance with Appendix 1 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66.





- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- 2. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H-hour and I-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to seize Objectives 1, 2 and 3 as prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conducts search and destroy missions within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawal on order.

### 3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operations.
  - (1) BLT 3/5 lands two companies with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zone SPARROW and secures Objective 3; conducts search and destroy operations as directed.
  - (2) BLT 3/5 lands two companies with designated supporting units by surface means over RED Beach, secures Objectives 1 and 2; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area.
  - (3) BLT 3/5 executes tactical withdrawal when directed.

### b. Company L (Rein).

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in Landing Fone SPARROW in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Attack and seize Objective 3.
- (3) Destroy enemy communications equipment, personnel, and supplies located on Objective 3.
- (4) Be prepared, on order, to conduct search and destroy operations.

### c. Company K (Rein).

- (1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, land by LVT in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Attack and seize Objective 1; destroy enemy facilities located on Objective 1.
- (3) After seizure of Objective 1, support the attack on Objective 2.
- (4) Be prepared on order to conduct search and destroy operations from vicinity of Objective 1 to phase line A within, assigned zone of action.





# d. Company I (Rein).

- (1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Attack and seize Objective 2; destroy enemy facilities located on Objective 2.
- (3) Be prepared on order to conduct search and destroy operation from vicinity of Objective 2 to Phase line A within assigned zone of action.

# e. 81mm Mort Plat (-)(Rein).

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) General Support BLT 3/5.

# f. 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d Amtrac Bn.

- (1) Land assault elements of BLT 3/5 in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) General support BLT 3/5.

# g. 3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn.


- (1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Heavy section, direct support Company K.

### h. 3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn.

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Be prepared to conduct engineer tasks on order.
- (2) General Support BLT 3/5.

# i. 2d Plat (-)(Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF.

- (1) Land on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) General support BLT 3/5.



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# To (1) Co M. (Rein) At 1 year on the conjugation of the second

- (a) Land by helicopter in Landing Zone SPARROW in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
  - (b) Be prepared, on order, to assume the mission of Company al de **la la de** la la la companya de la la companya de la company
  - (c) Be prepared, on order, to conduct search and destroy operations within AOA.


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### k. Coordinating Instructions.

- Marine English to the English (1) Essential elements of attack: Annex C (Operation Overlay) and Annex D (Landing Plan)
  - (2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
  - (3) D-day: 25 May 1966
  - (4) H-hour: 0800 mg/s and a second of the se
    - (5) L-hour: 0830
    - (6) W-hour (Withdrawal): To be designated.
    - (7) All units will have front line panel markers.
    - and the second of the second o (8) Code name for this operation - HILLTOP V.
    - (9) All precautions will be taken to avoid damage to Philippine property and injury to Philippine nationals.
  - (10) Unit Commanders will ensure that adequate security is maintained on all equipment to prevent expected attempts at pilferage by indigenous personnel.
  - (11) Location reported by reference point system. See Annex K (Reference Point Overlay).

# ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. 4.

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).
- COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. 5.
  - a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).



Command Posts.

(1) CTG 79.5

AFLOAT LPH-5

ASHORE

(2) CTU 79.5.2

LPH-5

To be designated

(3) CTU 79.5.3

LPH-5

(4) Subordinate units report location ashore when established.

# ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

E. J. Bromars

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding

### ANNEXES:

h - Task Organization

B - Intelligence

C - Operation Overlay

D - Landing Plan

E - Fire Support Coordination

F - Communications-Electronics

G - Reports

H - Withdrawal Plan

I - Logistics

J - Roherranl

K - Reference Point Overlay

X - Distribution



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective 120001 May 1966

# BLT 3/5

Lt Col BRONARS

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry F, 2d Bn, llth Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, llth Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
Det, Radio Relay Sec, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 5th Mar
Det, Hq Bn, lst Marine Division, FMF
Det, Radio Relay Plat, Comm Co
Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co
Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co
Det, Postal Unit, Adj Sec, Div Hq, Hq Co
Det, lst Dental Co, FMF

Det, lst Medical Bn
Det, Serv Sec, Co.Hq, 3d Coll Sec, Coll Plat
Logistic Support Unit
Det, Prov Serv Bn, 9th MAB
Det, Supply Sec
Det, Maint Sec
Det, H&S Co, 3d FSR
2d SP Tm, Co B, lst SP Bn
2d Landing Spt Plat
Det, H&S Co, lst SP Bn
Det, Beachmaster Unit-1
2d Plat (Rein), Co B, lst MT Bn
2d Plat
Det, Maint Sec, Co Hq, Co B, lst MT Bn

# Co I (Rein)

Capt GLAIZE


Co I
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar
1st Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn








A-l









Lt TOTH

3d Plat (-)
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein).

Lt CHRISTIANS

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plt Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF

Lt SKEY

2d Plat
Det, Hq Sec, Co Hq, Co C, 1st Tk Bn
Det, H&S Co, 1st Tk Bn

### BLT Reserve

# Co M (Rein)

Capt PETTENGILL

Co M
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
FO Tm, 8lmm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

E. D. Bronas E. D. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800 H May 1966

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS 8501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose AMS 8733-3256 IX (1:50,000) Ambuleng AMS 8733-3257 III (1:50,000) San Jose AMS 8733-3157 II (1:50,000) Adela

Time Zone: H

### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

### a. General

- (1) The United States Government, in carrying out its treaty agreements, has been engaged in in-country operations in direct support of Friendly Nation's military effort against communist insurgent forces of Enemy Nation. As a result, insurgency approaching Phase III (was of movement characterized by military organization and employment along conventional lines) has developed.
- (2) Current, usually reliable, intelligence sources have reported increased enemy buildup of supplies, equipment, and forces on the border between the belligerent nations. These same sources have also reported similar activity along certain coastal areas of Enemy Nation. There is growing evidence to support the contention that the insurgents are training organized combined armed units of battalion, regiment, and brigade size. The enemy has also stepped up conscription input, and increased his trained ground potential.
- (3) In order to cause the enemy to focus attention elsewhere so that his efforts to buildup his ready forces for commitment to large-scale operations are precluded, at least temperarily, the JCS have ordered amphibious raids to be executed on the enemy's homeland.
  - b. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
  - c. See current INTSUMS and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if the enemy will defend the costal area within the zone of action. If so, where and in what strength?
- b. Determine the location, strength, identification and composition of Enemy Nation Forces in the objective area.
- c. Determine if the enemy will reinforce. If so, when, where and in what strength?
- d. Determine if the enemy will exfiltrate from the area of operations. If so, over what routes?


- e. Determine the location and strength of enemy forces occupying the high ground north weast and northwest of Objective 3.
- f. Determine the load capability of the bridges located at the following coordinates: 891 667, 882718, 877733, 898742, 894721, and 890718.

### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND CESERVATION MISSIONS

- a. Orders to subordinate units
  - (1) All units
    - (a) Conduct aggressive reconnaissance patrols and make maximum use of observation and listening posts.
    - (b) Report all incidents of enemy use of crew served weapons with particular attention to heavy mortars (120mm) and recoiless rifles; include the type of weapons and location.
    - (c) Report all enemy contacts; including disposition, strength, and identification.
    - (d) Report all enemy obstacles and tunnels, including those destroyed by friendly troops.
    - (e) Report the civilian attitude toward troops and toward our operations.
    - (f) Requests for AC support will be forwarded to Battalian S-2.
- b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.
  - (1) Commander, Special Landing Force
    - (a) Provide aer at photography as requested.
    - (b) Provide current and predicted weather data.
    - (c) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.
    - (d) Provide Tactical Air Observer support as requested.
    - (e) Provide inland ground reconnaissance as requested.
- 4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.
  - a. Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war are lucrative sources of military information. Every effort must be made to capture prisoners. The term "POW" shall include military personnel of any enemy state, civilians bearing arms against our forces or serving their intrests.
  - b. Processing of POW's.

- (1) Capturing units will handle POW's in accordance with Ref:(b) emphasing the five S's Search, Segregate, Silence, Speed, and Safeguard. POW's will not be mistreated but will be handled so as to maintain the shock of being captured.
- (2) Capturing units will:
  - (a) Immediately disarm and search POW and enforce rigid silence.
  - (b) Prisoners should be segregated as soon as possible into four groups; Officer, NCO's, Enlisted men, and deserters.
  - (c) Tag segreated PCW's with standard PCW Tag as provided.
  - (d) Place documents removed from prisoners in appropriate Captured Document Envelopes as provided and identify with the prisoner.
- (3) Wounded captives will be given adequate medical treatment and will be evacuted through captive medical channels in accordance with the physical condition of the captive.

  Medical Officer will report to the BLT S-2 any informantion voluntarily disclosed by wounded captives.
- c. Interregation. Companies and subcrniate units will limit interrogation of POW's to developing that information which is of immediate tactial value to the capturing unit. POW's must be processed back to trained interregators as quickly as possible..
- d. Special Restrictions on Interrogation. The below listed categories of POW's are of special importance and interest and should be handled as such:
  - (1) Field Grade Officers
  - (2) Pilots and crew members
  - (3) NBC personnel
  - (4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel
  - (5) Communications/Electronics personnel
- e. Captured Documents. The primary sources of captured enemy documents are:
  - (1) POW's both military and civilians
  - (2) Captured enemy CP's and Installations
  - (3) Enemy dead
  - (4) Captured enemy vehicles and equipment
  - (5) All captured enemy documents from whatever sources will be placed in a Captured Document Envelope and immediately forwarded to the Ba S-2.
- f. Captured equipment. All captured enemy equipment will be tagged with a completed Captured Equipment Tag as provided and forwarded to the BLT S-2 as soon as possible.
  - (1) The below listed types of captured material and equipment of special intelligence interest and must be evacuated to the S-2 immediatly:
    - (a) Soviet and ChiCom/North Korean manufactured arms and equipment.



- (c) Aircraft and missles and/or their related components
- (d) NBC equipment.
- (2) Items of captured equipment will not be maintained as souveniers but will be forwarded to the S-2 for intelligence processing. When items cease to be of an intelligence value they will be returned to the capturing individual.

### 5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

- a. Standard Reference Maps: AMS Series S733 sheets 3256 IV, 3257 III, and 3157 II.
- b. Aerial photographs will be distributed as they become available.

# 6. CCUNTER INTELLIGENCE

- a. The following counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units:
  - (1) Utilize maximum concealment and maintain high standards of camouflage and march, light and noise discipline.
  - (2) Re-iterate Code of Conduct responsibilities for all personnel in case of possible capture.
  - (3) Maintain strict physical control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
  - (4) Comply with communications security measures.
  - (5) Immediately report to the S-2 the loss or compromise of classified material.

### b. Challenge and Password

- (1) Challenge and Passwords, unless compromised or otherwise changed will be in effect for a 24 hour period, normally 1200 to 1200 local time.
- (2) The BLT S-2 will be immediately notified when compromise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.
- (3) See Appendix 3.
- c. Only those civilian news correspondents and photographers specifically authorized by Commander Amphibicus Task Force will be allowed in the objective area.

# 7. REPORTS

- a. Reporting of any and all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous by all units to this headquarters (Attn S-2). Reports must be forwarded by the most expeditious means possible and be in the form of the key word SALUTE:
  - S size of enemy force in numbers.
  - A action that has taken place including direction of enemy withdrawl.
  - L location.
  - U enemy unit designation if known.
  - T time action took place.
  - E equipment of enemy.




b. Special reports will be submitted on request from this headquarters.

E./J. BRONARS
Lt. Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding

### APPENDIXES:

- Intelligence Estimate
- 2. Landing Beach Study
- 3. Challenge and Password
- Astronomical and Tidal Data



Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66, Hilltop V

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) San Jose AMS S733-3256 IV (1:50,000) Ambulong AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) San Jose AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) Adela

1. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H - hour and L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to sieze Objectives 1, 2, and 3 as prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawl on order.

### 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. <u>Weather</u>. Mindoro Island is located in the west central portion of the Phillippine Island Group. Weather is of a subtropical to tropical nature and is chiefly influenced by the monsoonal flow. Partly cloudy skies with associated light tropical showers will pervail the majority of the time. Exact weather conditions will be diseminated prior to D-Day and daily thereafter. See Appendix 4 for Astonamical data.

# b. Terrain.

- (1) Existing situation.
- (a) The area is lowland coastal plain that gently rises to the NE finally reaching a height of 20M. The only dominating terrain in the area is the small hill complex in grid square TP 9879 which is 448 meters.
- (b) The lowland area is flanked with sandy foothills, dry land crops and grass. Soil on the river beds is generally sandy with some coarse gravel. The area is primarily paddy (cultivated in wetland rice) interlaced with numerous streams, ditches, and canales. Ground is soft and miry when wet and firm when moist. When dry, sandy ground is firm, whereas clay ground is hard and may develope cracks. The soil in the area is wet and flooded during July-November; dry during February May; and moist during the intervening periods.
- (c) The primary road that runs through the area is an all weather, lightly surfaced road, two lanes wide with occasional one lane defiles. It is potholed and suffers from lack of maintenance. Several fair weather roads bisect the area and trails exist throughout.
- (d) San Jose airfield (TP 8767) has a single strip graded rolled runway 3600 feet in length. It is rated at C47 capacity.

- Off runway facilities consist of hardstands and gravel tax m-way is not lighted, and emergency equipment is not available. Maintenance buildings and hangers are not present. A radio beacon operating part time is the only navigational aid available. The airfield is used regularly by Philippine Airlines.
- (f) Abandoned fighter airstrips of World War II construction are located at TP 881705 and TP 930745. Their usefulness to fixed wing aircraft is negligible except in extreme emergencies.
- (g) Towns within the area include Progresso (TP 9073), La Curua (TP 8772), Bagong Sikat (TP 8968) and San Jose which is adjacent to the area of operations. All of the towns have populations of under 3,000 with the exception of San Jose which is over 4,000.
- (2) Effects on enemy operations. The generally uncovered terrain will afford the enemy excellent observation and fields of fire within the area. Although the terrain will pose no trafficability problem to the enemy, his movement will be hindered by the general absence of concealment.
- (3) Effects on our operations. The area will afford excellent observation and fields of fire and use of supporting arms. HIZs abound the area and will permit rapid massing of troops.

### 3. ENEMY SITUATION.

- . a. Installations that have been identified within the AOA include Tencham, a combined arms training camp, vic TP 9375 (IF Obj:1), Comm Chan, a vital radio station, vic TP 9375 (IF Obj:3), and a possible enemy command post in the village of Bagong Sikit, TP 8968 (IF Obj:2).
- b. Enemy force within the AOA consists of a Local Force Battalion of a strength of about 400. In addittion, Main Force elements of Enemy Nation have been identified in the general area contigious to the AOA. Units known to be in the general area include:
  - (1) 3rd Co, 71st Bn (MF 160 men)
  - (2) 2 Sep Cos (MF unconfirmed strength)
- c. The 21st Enemy Nation Regiment is known to be operating north of the AOA and is considered capable of reinforcing units within the objective area in 24 hours. The regiment has a strength of approximately 1500 men. Forces in the objective area are known to be equipped with 30 and 50 caliber weapons and probably possess 60 and 81 mm mortars, 57 mm Recoiless rifles, and assorted small arms.

### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

### a. Enumeration.

- (1) Attack any target within the objective area with a force of up to one Local Force Battalion and three seperate companies.
- (2) Defend at a time and place of their choosing with a force of up to one Local Force Battalion and three seperate companies.
- (3) Reinforce capabilities (1) and (2) above with all or part of the 21st Enemy Nation Regiment within 24 hours after movement commences.
- (4) Evade direct contact with superior US Forces and resort to small unit harassing attacks, ambushes, mining and the use of booby traps in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on US Forces and to decimate perating at extended distances from reinforcing elements.

operations.

### b. Analysis and Discussion.

- (1) Capability (1). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The superior knowledge that the enemy possesses of the terrain and his ability to have pre-registered fires plotted throughout the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the lack of cover and concealment there by making it difficult for the enemy to mass his forces for an attack.
- (2) Capability (2). Indications favoring the adoption of this capability consist again of his superior knowledge of the terrain in addition to the excellent fields of fire and observation that exist within the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the enemy's respect for our ability to employ supporting arms and his reluctance to be tied to a fixed position thus restricting his freedom of maneuver.
- (3) <u>Capability (3)</u>. Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are: The forces capable of reinforcing are readily available; the area is controlled by the enemy, thereby providing freedom of movement. Indications which militate against adoption of this capability include the risk of detection and possible attack by air, artillery, and naval gunfire during movement and the reluctance of the enemy to mass forces.
- (4) <u>Capability (4)</u>. Indications which favor the adoption of the capability are: This is a time tested enemy tactic which provides the enemy with the capability of inflicting significant damage on the opposing force. Under these conditions the enemy is least vulnerable to the effects of supporting fire. There are no indications which militate against the adoption of this capability.
- (5) <u>Capability (5)</u>. Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain and his desire to conserve his Main Force strength when opposed against superior forces. Militating against the adoption of this capability is the fact that the enemy's homeland is being jeopardized which may force him to fight tenaciously in place.

### 5. CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Probable courses of action, The probable courses of action are summarized below:
- (1) Against friendly operations of short term duration in the objective area the enemy would probably execute capability (4) and conduct small scale harassing attacks.
- (2) Should friendly forces attempt a major buildup or commence advancing out of the objective area the enemy would probably execute capabilities (2) and (3).
- b. <u>Vulnerabilities</u>. Enemy Nation Forces when concentrated are vulnerable to attack by air, naval gunfire, and artillery. Although little is yet known about the enemy's command and control capabilities, it is believed that communications are basic with only a minimal number of short range radios located at battalion and regimential headquarters. In the past Enemy Nation main force units have been known to break contact when confronted by a superior force.



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Appendix 2 (Landing Beach Study) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) AMS S733, 3257 III, 1:50,000 Central Philippines

#### 1. LOCATION.

a. Red One Center Left Flank Right Flank

TP 862678 TP 860680 TP 863677

- 2. OFFSHORE. (beyond 18 fathom curve).
- a. Hazard to Navigation. There are no uncharted hazards to navigation.
- b. Tides and Currents. Littoral current is generally South. Tide is chiefly diurnal and the tidel range is 3 3/4 feet.
  - c. Bottom Composition. Sand.
- 3. NEARSHORE. (18 fathom curve to low water mark).
  - a. Gradient.

Average distance from MLLW to 1 fathom curve: 20 yards.

Average distance from 1 fathom curve to 2 fathom curve: 65 yards.

Average distance from 2 fathom curve to 3 fathom curve: 120 yards.

Average distance from MLLW to 1 fathom curve: 1:10.

Average distance from 1 fathom curve to 2 fathom curve: 1:33.

Average distance from 2 fathom curve to 3 fathom curve: 1:60.

Average near shore gradient (DATUM line to 3 fathom curve): 1:34.

- b. Bottom Composition. Sandy with a few small pea sized rocks intermixed.
- c. Obstacles and Hazards. There are no coral heads or other obstacles.
  - 4. FCRESHCRE. (low water mark to dune line).
    - a. Gradient. 1:15
    - b. Shape of Beach. Slightly concave
    - c. Length of Beach. 500 yards
    - d. Width of Beach, 20 to 25 yards
- e. Beach Composition. Fine sand and a few scattered pea sized rocks.
- f. Beach Trafficability. Good; firmly packed base should support and personnel.

- g. Beach Obstacles. There are no observed beach obstacles other than fishing boats.
- 5. BACKSHCRE.
  - a. Character. There is no significant berm.
- b. Trafficability. Good for tracked vehicles, fair for wheeled vehicles.
- c. Exits. Access to a 15 foot wide gravel road that runs along most of the length of the beach can be gained at almost any point.

### 6. HINDERLAND.

- a. Terrain. Flat
- b. Vegetation. Sparsely covered with short vegetation.
- c. Roads. A 15 foot wide gravel road runs along most of the beach about 40 yards from the high water line.
- d. Buildings. Scattered native huts and several small villages composed of native huts.
- e. Towns. Several small villages. Town of San Jose just South of Beach.

#### 7. EVALUATION.

- a, <u>Landings</u>. All of this beach is considered excellent for any type landing craft up to and including LST's, which can expect a dry ramp.
- b. Paratroop and Helicopter Landing Zones. Excellent helicopter and paratroop landing sites are available as most of the area is flat and open.
  - c. Miscelleneous. Matting will not be required in most areas.

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Appendix 3 (Challenge and Password) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66.

	Primary		Alter	ne.te
Code	<u>Challenge</u>	Passiond	<u> Challenge</u>	Password
12,	Horse	Barn	Beaver	Fur
17	Island	Blue	Heuse	Warm
23	Laugh	Book	Boston	Gray
31	Ribbon	Paper	Yankee	Battle
44	Lion	Yellow	Charge	Rebel
56	Wagon	Mule	Jolly	Seattle
59	Ben jo	Tavern	Magazine	Picture

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Appendix 4 (Astonomical and Tidal Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 330-66.


# ASTRONOMICAL DATA:

DATE	BMNT	SUNRISE	SUNSET	BENT	MOCNRISE	MOCNSET	MOONPHASE
24	0439	0529	1815	1904	0348	2209	CRESENT
25	0438	0529	1815	1905	0940	2303	1st Qtr
26	0438	0529	1815	1905	1052	2355	1st Qtr
27	0438	0529	1815	1905	1151	وستؤليسيانوسي	1st Qtr
28	0438	0529	1815	1906	1248	0039	1st Qtr

# TIDAL DATA:

DATE	T THE STATE OF	HEIGTH (Feet)
25	1235 (High) 2206 (Low)	4.7 -0.8
26	1327 (High) 2303 (Low)	4.5 -0.6
27	1428 (High) 2352 (Low)	4.1 -0.4
28	1543 (High) 0032 (Low) 1708 (High)	3.7 -0.1 3.3

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Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

### 1. GENERAL.

- a. This plan provides for:
  - (1) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zone SPARROW.
  - (2) Land two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by surface means over RED Beach.
  - (3) See Appendixes for detailed instructions.
- 2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. TacLog Group representation will be provided in accordance with Annex I (Logistics).

#### APPENDIX IS:

1-Landing Craft Availability Table

2-Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table

3-Helicopter Availability Table

4-Landing Diagram

5-Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table

6-Serial Assignment Table

7-Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table

8-Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table

9-Helicopter Landing Diagram

10-Debarkation Schedule (to be published separately)

11-Assault Schedule

12-Pre-H-hour Transfer Schedule (To be published)

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Appendix 1 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)

to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

SHIP	LCPL	LCVP	ICM-6	ICM-8	ICU
APA 222	3	19	2	0	0
ISD 33	2	22	0	2	11
Total	5	21	2	2	1
Spares	2	2	0	0	0
Naval Requirement	3	3	1	0	0
Total Naval Requirement	5	5	11	0	0
Total Available to Landing Force	0	16	1	2	1

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Appendix 2 (Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(Λ)


Time Zone: H

SHIP	AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE UNIT	NUMBE AMPHIBI LVTP-5	AN VEH	ICLES	REMARKS
LSD-33	2d Plat, Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF	10	1	1	
Total		10	1	1	

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Appendix 3 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

kef: FMFM 3-3


Time Zone: H

HELICOPTER UNIT AND	NUMBER OF	A/C AVA	OTHER	mxr. I		DECK LAUNCH	PMALEKO
DESIGNATION	A/C	TRIP	TRIPS	TYPE	CARRIER	CAPACITY	REMARKS
HMM 364 (WHITEGOLD)	20	16	16	UH34	I.PH5	16	

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Appendix 4 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

H-hour:	0800	Beach Red
Wave 1 H-hour	Co K (Rein)	Ser: 103
	X X X X X & X X X X X X X X 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 1-10	
Wave H+4	Co I (Rein)	Ser: 100
***************************************	0 0 0 0 0* 0 0 0 2-8 2-6 2-4 2-2 2-1 2-3 2-5 2-7	and the survey of the State of
Wave 3 H+l0	Elms H&S Co Recon Pty, Btry F 2nd Ech, BAS SP Recon Pty	Ser: 125 110 120
	(0)* 3-1	
Wave 4 H+15	AT Plat (-) Elms BMU - Elms SP - Elms Engr Plat	Ser: 135
	0 0* 4-2 4-1	

### LEGEND:

X LVTP-5

O LCM-8

\* Wave Cdr

**₩** LVTC

(0) LCM-6

O LCVP


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
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


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Appendix 5 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

BUAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
	1ST WAVE		Column
1-1 LVTF-5	Plt Cdr, lst Plat, Co K Msgr, lst Plat, Co K Corpsman, lst Plat, Co K lst MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K lst Sqd, lst Plat, Co K 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K	1 1 9 14 2 28	X* 1-1 X 1-2 X 1-3 X 1-4
1-2 LVTP-5	Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co K Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co K Msgr, 1st Plat, Co K Corpsman, 1st Plat, Co K Msgr, Wpns Plat, Co K 1st Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co K 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K	1 1 1 1 7 14 2	X 1-5 X 1-6 X 1-7 X 1-8 X
1-3 LVTP-5	Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, Co K Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co K Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Wpns Plat, Co K Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co K Admin Clerk, Co K 2d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co K 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K	1 1 1 1 7 14 2	1-10
1-4 LVTP-5	Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co K Msgr, 2d Plat, Co K Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co K Admin Man, Co K Scout, S-2, H&S Co 3d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Flat, Co K lst Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K	1 1 1 1 7 14 2	

		BOAT	
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	SPACES	FORMATION
1-5 LVTP-5	Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co K Msgr, 2d Plat, Co K 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K Corpsman, Hq Sec, Co K FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co	1 1 14 1 2 19	
1-6 LVTC	CO, Cc K GySgt, Co K Msgr, Co K NGF Spot Tm	1 1 7 10	
1-7 LVTP-5	Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co K Corpsman, Wpns Plat, Co K FO Tm, Etry F Scout, S-2, H&S Co Supply Sgt, Co K 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K	1 5 1 1 14 23	
1-8 LVTP-5	XO, Co K Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co K IstSgt, Co K FAC Tm Chief Clerk, Co K Sec Ldr, 60mm Mort Sec, Co K lst Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K Magr, 3d Plat, Co K	1 1 5 1 1 1 1	
1-9 LVTP-5	Plat Sgt, 3d Plat, Co K Msgr, 3d Plat, Co K Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co K 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K	1 1 9 14 26	
1-10 LVTP-5	Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co K Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co K Sec Ldr, MG Sec, Wpns Plat, Co K 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K	1 1 9 14 26	





	•	BOAT	
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	SPACES	FORMATION
	2ND WAVE		Wedge
2-1 LCVP	Plt Cdr, lst Plat, Co I Msgr, lst Plat, Co I Corpsman, lst Plat, Co I 2d Sqd, lst Plat, Co I	1 2 1 14	0* 2-1 0 0 2-2 2-3
w 1	Corpsman, Hq Sec, Co I 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co I	1 9 28	0 0 2-4 2-5 0 0 2-6 2-7
2-2 LCVP	Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co I Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co I Corpsman, 1st Plat, Co I 1st Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I Scout, S-2, H&S Co 1st MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Co I	1 1 7 1 9 14 34	0 2 <b>-</b> 8
2-3 LCVP	CO, Co I Msgr, Hq Sec, Co I GySgt, Co I Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co I Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co 2d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I lst Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I FO Tm, 8lmm Mort Plat, H&S Co	1 1 1 1 4 7 14 2 32	
2-4 LCVP	Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I Engr Sqd, 3d Plat, Co B	1 14 12 28	
2-5 LCVP	Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co I Msgr, Wpns Plat, Co I Corpsman, Wpns Plat, Co I Plt Sgt, 3d Plat, Cn I 3d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I Sec Ldr, MG Sec, Wpns Plat, Co I 60mm Mort Sec, Co I	1 1 1 7 14 1 5	

		воат	
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	SPACES	FORMATION
2-6 LCVP	XO, Co I lst Sgt, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co I FO Tm, Btry F 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I	1 1 1 1 5 14 23	
2-7 LCVP	Plt Cdr, 3d Plat, Co I msgr, 3d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co I Scout, S-2, H&S Co Sqd Idr, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I lst MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, Co I 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I	1 2 1 1 4 1 14 25	
2-8 LCVP	Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co I Msgr, 2d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I Chief Clerk, Co I Admin Man, Co I Supply Sgt, Co I Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I lst Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I	1 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 14 26	
	3RD WAVE		
3-1 LCM-6	BAS, 2d Echelon Recon Pty, Shore Farty Recon Pty, Btry F CO, Etry F Fire Direction Officer Local Security Chief Fld Radio Opr Gun Guides Chaplain Chaplain Asst Mine Detector (P-153)	10 9 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 32	(0)* 3-1

		***	See Charles
BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
2-6 LCVP	XO, Co I lst Sgt, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co I FO Tm, Btry F 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I Det, 81mm Mort Plat	1 1 1 5 1 6	
2-7	Plt Cdr, 3d Plat, Co I Msgr, 3d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co I Scout, S-2, H&S Co Sqd Ldr, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Flat, Co I 1st MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Flat, Co I Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, Co I 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I Det, 81mm Mort Plat	1 2 1 1 1 14 5 30	
2-8 LCVP	Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co I Msgr, 2d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I Chief Clerk, Co I Admin Man, Co I Supply Sgt, Co I Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I lst Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I	1 2 1 1 1 1 4 14 26	
	3RD WAVE		
3-1 LCVP	Beach Jumper Unit Recon Pty, Btry F CO, Btry F Fire Direction Officer Local Security Chief Fld Radic Opr Gun Guides	7 1 1 1 6 17	0* 3-1 0* 3-2
3-2 LCVP	Recon Pty, Shore Party Mine Detector (P-153) Tank Plat (-)(Rein)	9 1 25 35	•

BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
	2ND WAVE		Wedge
2-1 LCVI	Plt Cdr, 1st Plat, Co I Msgr, 1st Plat, Co I Corpsman, 1st Plat, Co I 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co I Corpsman, Hq Sec, Co I 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co I Det, 81mm Mort Flat 81mm Mortar	1 2 1 1 1 9 6 1	0* 2-1 0 0 2-2 2-3 0 0 2-14 2-5 0 0 2-6 2-7
2-2 LCVP	Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co I Flat Guide, 1st Plat, Co I Corpsman, 1st Flat, Co I 1st Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I Sccut, S-2, H&S Co 1st MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Co I	1 1 7 1 9 14 34	2-8
2-3 LCVF	CO, Co I Msgr, Hq Sec, Co I GySgt, Co I Plat Guide, 3d Flat, Co I Sec Idr, Asslt Sec, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I lst Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co	1 1 1 1 4 7 14 2	
2-lı LCVP	Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co I Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co I 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co I Engr Sqd, 3d Plat, Co B Det, 81mm Mort Flat 81mm Mort	1 14 12 6 1	
2-5 LCVP	Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co I Msgr, Wpns Plat, Co I Corpsman, Wpns Plat, Co I Plt Sgt, 3d Plat, Co I 3d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co I 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co I Sec Ldr, MG Sec, Wpns Plat, Co I 60mm Mort Sec, Co I	1 1 1 7 14 1 5	

4	,		
3			l
			,

BOAT NO	PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT	BOAT SPACES	FORMATION
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	LTH WAVE		
4-1 LCM-8	AT Plat (-) 3 M50 Ontos	9 - 9	0* 4-1 0 4-2
4-2 LCM-8	Equipment Operators  1 MRC-37 (BMU)  1 TD-15 (Engineer)  1 TD-15 (Shore Earty)  Det, SP Tm  ON CALL	3 - 12 15	4-2
LCU Ser:140	Tank Plat (-) 3M48A3 Tk	15 15	
	Btry F (-) 3 105mm How	45	
	Btry F (-) 3 105mm How	45 - 45	

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Appendix 6 (Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

SERIAL			MATERIAL EQUIPMENT	CRAFT	A	rant toka
NUMBER	UNIT	PERS	VEHICLES	NO/TYPE	SHIP	REMARKS
100	Co I	239		8 LCVP	APA 222	2d Wave
103	Co K	241		9 LVTP 1 LVTC	LSD 33	1st Wave Pre H-hour Transfer from APA 222
110	Btry F	10	X .	1 LCM-6	LSD 33	3d Wave Land with ser: 120, 125
115	Btry F	90	6 105mm How	2 LCM-8	LSD 33	On Call
120	SP	9	1 P153 Mine Detector	1 LCM-6	LSD 33	3d Wave Land with Ser: 110, 125
125	H&S Co	12	والمرافق والمرافقة والمراف	1 LCM-6	AP 4 222	3d Wave land with Ser: 110, 120
130	AT Plat	9	3 M-50 Onto	1 LCM-8	LSD 33	4th Wave land with Ser: 135
135	Beachmaster Unit Shore Party	17	2 TD-15 1 MRC 37	1 LCM-8	LSD 33	4th Wave land with Ser: 130
140	Engr Plat Tk Plat	15	3 M48A3	1 LCU	LSD 33	On Call

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BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 7 (Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation
Order 330-66

	HELI UNIT		FROM '	TO		TIME		DESTINAT	ION .	TROOP U	
MIVE	& &	NO/TYPE	CARRIER		-LOAD	LAUNCH	LAND	LZ	LS	EQU IPME	
1417.0	FLIGHT NUMBER	A/C	Origin	Load	<b>-</b>	Production of the state	1			AND SER	IL
1 .	WHITEGOLD 1-0	16			L-30	L-15	L-hour	SPARROW			
* (	2-0	ин34 <b>р</b> :	LPH-5	LPH-5	L-30	L-16	L+1			Co L	
	3-0	Onjuga	. 112 ,	/	L-30	L-17	L+2			Co L	101
	4-0			:*	L-30		1 L+3			Co `L	
2	WHITEGOLD 1-0	16			L+7	L+9	L+16	SPARROW	The second second	Co L	
<i>ج</i>	2-0		. LPH-5	LPH-5	L+9	L+11	L+18	,		Co L	
	3-0	011)41			L+11	L+13	L+20			Co L	201
f = f	4-0	· 1 - 10 . 71			L+13	L+15	L+22	• .	-	Co L	
3	WHITEGOLD 1-0	16			L+23	L+25	L+32	SPARROW		Co L	
,	2-0	UH34D	LPH5	LPH-5	L+25	L+27	L+34			Co L & C	
	3-0				L+27	L+29	L+36		Remain	Co M	301
	4-0		•		L+29	L+31,L+35		4-3,4-4	<u> Airborne</u>	Co M-CMD	GRP"A"
1.	WHITEGOLD 1-0	14			L+39	L+41	L+48	SPARROW		Co M	
4	2.0	UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5	L+41	L+43	L+50			Co M	4
	3 <b>-</b> 0	טייונים.			L+4.3	L+45	L+52			Co M	401
	4-0,	1,-2	• .		L+45	L+47	L+54			Co M	
5	WHITEGOLD 1-0	14		······································	L+55	L+57	L+64	SPARROW		Co M	
7	2-0	UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5	L+57	L+59	L+66			Co M	
	3-0	01.540			L+59	L+61	L+68 .		•	Co M	50.1
	4-0,	l <sub>-2</sub>			L+61	L+63	L+70			Co M	
-6	WHITEGOLD 1-0	14			L+71	L+73	L+80	SPARROW		Co M, 81	Mort
Ü	2-0	UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5	L+73	L+75	L+82			81 Mort	101
	2 <u>-</u> 0 3 <u>-</u> 0	0117410	ל-11 וויו	11.117	L+75	L+77	L+84			81 Mort	601
	1-0				L+77	L+79	L+86			81 Mort	





										EDOAD HINTE
	HELI UNIT		FROM	TO		TIME		DESTINA		TROOP UNIT,
WAVE	&	NO/TYPE	CARRIER	REPORT	LOAD	LAUNCH	LAND	LZ	LS	TQUIPM ENT
(1111.0	FLIGHT NUMBER	Á/C	Origin	Load	<del></del>					AND SERIAL
7	WHITEGOLD 1-0	14			L+87	L+89	L+96	SPARROW		81 Mort CMGRP"A"
,	2-0	UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5	L+89	L+91	L+98			CMD GRP"A" 701
	3-0		,	-	L+91	L+93	L+100			CMDGRP"A"107Mort
	4-0,	h-2			L+93	L+95	L+102			107mm Mort Ext
8	WHITECOLD 1-0	8			L+103	L+105	L+112	SPARROW		CDM GRP "B" 801
U	2-0	UH34D	LF.H-5	LPH-5	L+105	L+107	. L+1.14			CDM GRP "B"
	PLAYBOY	1		:						man (man ( t )
		UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5		Н30	TBA	LPH-5		TAO/TAC(A)
	PEDRO	1			<del></del>					CIR
	•	UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5		H-30	H+15	LPH-5		SAR
ON .	WHITEGOLD 5-0,	5-2 2			•		i		•	MED EVAC
C/LL		UH34D	LPH-5	LPH-5	$\mathrm{TBA}$	TBi	TB <sub>i</sub>	TBA		. Man av.v

NOTE: 1. WHITEGOLD 4-3,4-4 will refuel to 1500# after 2d wave. WHITEGOLD 4-3 will load command Grp "A"(A) and 4-4 will fly wing/SAR.

E. J. Bronas
E. J. PRONIRS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

Appendix 8 (Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

1	10 77 70 70		<del>                                     </del>	<del></del>		<del> </del>		
	A/C FLIGHT NO.	DEDCOMMET				WEIGHT		1 -
	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				M DIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
1	WHITEGOLD 1-0		6		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 1-2 101-2	1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L	6		1500	r	1500	
	WHITEGOLD 1-3 101-3	1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L 1st Tm, 1st MG Sqd	2 4	1 MG Class V	1500	-95	1595	
	,		6					
	WHITEGOLD 1-4 101-4	2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 101-5	2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-2 101-6	Rad Opr	1 1	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	30	1530	1
		Msgr Corpsman 81mm FO Tm	2 6			) n.		

	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL					WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUI	IPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
1	WHITEGOLD 2-3	Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co L	1			1500		1500	TBA
	101–7	3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	5 6						
	WHITEGOLD 2-4 101-8	Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd, Co L 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	3 3 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V		<b>1</b> 500	134	1634	
	WHITEGOLD 3-0 101-9	Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co L Grenadier, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat MG Tm, 1st MG Sqd	1 1 4 6	1 MG Class V		1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 3-2 101-10	Plat Sqt, 1st Plat, Co L 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat Corpsman, 1st Plat	1 4 1 6			1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 3-3 101-11	Sqd Ldr, 1st Asslt Sqd, Co L Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec Plat Guide, 2d Plat	1 3 1 1 6	1 Fkt Lchr Class V	-	1500	134	1634	
	WHITEGOLD 3-4 101-12	1st Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L	6			1500		1500	·

	,							
	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING.
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NQ.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
1	WHITEGOLD 4-0 101-13	1st Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L	. 6 .		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 101-14	1st Tm, 2d MG Sqd, Co L Grenadier, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat Corpsman, 2d Plat Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd	3 1 1 1 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 4-3 101-15 WHITEGOLD 4-4 101-16	2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L 2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L	6		1500 1500		1500 1500	
2	WHITEGOLD 1-0 201-1	Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co L Rad Opr Corpsman Asslt Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd	1 1 3 6	1 AN/PRC-10 1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	165	1665	
	201–2	3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L  3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L	6 6		1500 1500		1500 1500	

D-8-3

<del></del>	A/C FLIGHT		· · · · ·					
	NO.	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		
	HELITEAM	THE GOOD	NO	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	FQUIP	TOTAL	ENPLANING STATION
W/VE	SERIAL NO. WHITEGOLD 1-4	TROOP UNIT	NO.	2015FTE2 & EMOTEMENT	1500	7/8∩TL	1500	TBA
	201–4				1,000		1,000	151
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 201-5	Co Cdr, Co L Co GySgt Rad Opr FO Tm (-), F Btry	1 1 1 2 6	2 AN/PRC-10 1 AN/PRC-9	1500	90	1590	
	WHITEGOLD 2- <b>4</b> 201-6	Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co L Sec Ldr, 60mm Mort Plat 1st 60mm Sqd Supply Sgt	1 1 3 1 6	1 60mm Mort Class V	1500	105	1605	
<b>)</b>	WHITEGOLD 2-3 201-7	Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co L Corpsman, 2d Plat Grenadier, 2d Plat MG Tm, 2d MG Sqd	1 1 1 3 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 2-4 201-8	Sqd Ldr, 2d Asslt Sqd, Co L Asslt Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd FO Tm (-), F Btry Corpsman, Wpns Plat	1 2 2 1 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	134	1634	
	WHITEGOLD 3-0 201-9	Engr (-)	6		1500		1500	٠.


D-8-4

	·							
	A/C FLIGHT	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		EMPLANING
11/11/2	HELITEAM	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
VAVE 2	SERIAL NO. WHITEGOLD 3-2 201-10		6	SOTTEMAS & EXCEPTION	1500	25,0211	1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 3-3 201-11	1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 3-4 201-12	1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd	2 <u>4</u> 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 4-0 201-13	2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 201-14	2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L	. 6		1500		1500	1:
	WHITEGOLD 4-3 201-15	Sqd Ldr, 3d Asslt Sqd, Co L Asslt Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd Corpsman Grenadier, 2d Sqd, 3d Plat	1 3 1 1 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1300	134	1634	
	WHITEGOLD 4-4 201-16	Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co L Rad Opr Msgr Corpsman Driver Clerk	1 1 1 1	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	30	1530	
	A Company of the Comp		6			<u> </u>		



	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM		PERSONNEL.	,			WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.		TROOP UNIT	NO.	SÚPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
3	WHITEGOLD 1 301-1		Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co L Sec Ldr, MG Sec MG Sqd Ldr, 3d MG Sqd	1 1 1 2	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	TBA
			MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd	3 6				. ,	
	WHITEGOLD 4 301-2	1-2	3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L	6	:	1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 1 301-3	. <u>-</u> 3	3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L	6	•	1500		1500	
!	WHITEGOLD 1 301-4	:	Plat Sqt, Wpns Plat, Co L Grenadier, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat 2d 60mm Sqd	1 1 4 6	1 60mm Mort Class V	1500	105	1605	
	WHITEGOLD 2 301-5	2 <b>–</b> 0	HST Tm	6		1.500		1500	• ;
; ; ,	WHITEGOLD 2 301-6		Plat Sgt, 3d Plat, Co L S-2 Scouts Asslt Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd	1 2 3 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	134	1634	

D-8-6




Annie Land	**********	
	****	

	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL	NO	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	WEIGHT EQUIP	TOTAL	ENPLANING STATION
MAVE 3	SERIAL NO. WHITEGOLD 2-3 301-7		NO. 1 1 4 6	1 AN/PRC-10 1 AN/PRC-41	1500	75	1575	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 2-4 301-8	Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat,Co M Grenadier 1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 3-0 301-9	Plat Cdr, 1st Plat, Co M Msgr 1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 1 4 6	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	30	1500	
	WHITEGOLD 3-2 301-10	Sqd Ldr, 1st MG Sqd, Co M Corpsman MG Tm, 1st MG Sqd	1 1 4 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 3-3 301-11	1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co M Gunner, Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd Asst Gunner, Asslt <b>Tm</b> 1st Asslt Sqd	4 1 1 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	74	1574	








	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
MAVE		TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
3	WHITEGOLD 3-4 301-12	Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co M Ammo Man, Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd 2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 4 6	Class V	1500	60	1560	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 4-0 301-13	Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M Grenadier, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat 2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 301-14	Sqd Ldr, 1st Asslt Sqd, Co M Corpsman 2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 1 4 6	•	1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 4-3 301-15	Cmd Grp A (A)  CO, BLT 3/5 S-3 S-2 Msgr/Rad Opr	1 1 1 1 1 4	1 AN/PRC-10	1000	30	<b>103</b> 0	
	WHITEGOLD 4-4 301-16	SAR						





	A/CFLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION -
4	WHITEGOLD 1-0 401-1	MG Tm, 1st MG Sqd, Co M Gunner, Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd Asst Gunner, Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt	1	1 Rkt Lchr 1 MG	1500	155	1655	TBA
		Sqd	6	Class V				
	WHITEGOLD 1-2 401-2	Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M Grenadier, 3d Sqd 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 4 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 1-3 401-3	Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co M Ammo Man, Asslt Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat	1 1 4 6	Class V	1500	75	1595	
		3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co M MG Tm, 2d MG Sqd	3 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	1
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 401-5	Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, CoM Grenadier, 2d Plat 1st Sqd (-), 2d Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	

		A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PIRSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
M	IAVE_	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
	4	WHITEGOLD 2-2	Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co M	1	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	· <b>3</b> 0	1530	${ m TBA}$
		401-6	$ ext{Msg}\mathbf{r}$	1	. :			r	
			1st Sqd (-), 2d Plat	6					
İ		WHITEGOLD 2-3		1	1 MG	1500	95	1595	
Ì		401–7	Corpsman MG Tm, 2d MG Sqd	1 7	Class V				
			rio III, za rio oqu	6		-			
		WHITEGOLD 2-4		4	1 Rkt Lchr	1500	74	1574	
		401-8	Asst Gunner, Asslt Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd	1	Class V				
			- J-	5					
	İ	WHITEGOLD 3-0	, ,	1				_	
		401–9	Grenadier, 2d Plat Ammo Man, Asslt Tm, 2d Asslt	1	Class V	1500	60	1560	
			Sqd Sqd	1					
T			2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat	3					
Ì				6					
		WHITEGOLD 3-2	Plat Guide, 2d Flat, Co M	1		1500		1500	
		401-10	Sqd Ldr, 2d Asslt Sqd	1	,				
			2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat	4					
				6					



	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSON <b>NEL</b>				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	. 1	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	LATOT	STATION
4	WHITEGOLD 3-3		6		1500		1500	TBA
A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O	WHITEGOLD 3-4 401-12	Co Cdr, Co M GySgt Rad Opr FO Tm, 81mm Mort	1 2 2 6	3 AN/PRC-10	1500	90	1590	
	WHITEGOLD 4-0 401-13	2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co M Asslt <b>T</b> m, 2d Asslt Sqd	3 3 6	1 Rkt Lchr	1500	74	1574	SF C
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 401-14	FO Tm, F Btry Corpsman	5 1 6	1 AN/PRC-9	1500	30	1530	·
5	WHITEGOLD 1-0 501-1	Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M Grenadier, 2d Plat 3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOED 1-2 501-2	Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co M Corpsman 3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	

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	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	MOITATE
5	WHITEGOLD 1-3 501-3	Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Co M Corpsman 3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 1-4 501-4	MG Tm, 2d MG Sqd, Co M Asslt Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd	3 3	1 MG 1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	229	1729	
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 501-5	Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat, Co M Grenadier, 1st Sqd 1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat	1 4 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-2 501-6	Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co M Msgr 1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat	1 1 4 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-3 501-7	Sqd Ldr, 3d MG Sqd, Co M Corpsman MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd	1 1 -4 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHITEGOLD 2-4 501-8	Sqd Ldr, 3d Asslt Sqd, Co M Asslt Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd 1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat	1 2 3 6	1 Rkt Lchr Class V	1500	74	1574	

D-8-12

		, e		a - 4 14				
	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITIAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
MAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	'DOUIP.	<del></del>	STALLON
5	WHITECOLD 3-0 501-9	Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co M Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 3d Plat 2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat Gronadder, 2d Sqd	1 3 1 6		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 3-2 501-10	2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co M	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 3-3 501-11	Plat Sqt, 3d Plat, Co M Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat Grenadier MG Tm, 3d MG Sqd	1 1 3 6	1 MG Class V	1500	95	1595	
	WHETEGOLD 3-4 501-12	3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co M	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 4-0 501-13	Sec Ldr, 60mm Mort Sqd Ldr, 60mm Mort Corpsman 1st Mort Tm	1 1 3 6	1 60mm Mort Class V	1500	105	1605	
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 501-14	3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co M 2d 60mm Mort Tm	3 3 6	1 60mm Mort Class V	1500	105	1605	
2								

	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITE/M	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLAN <b>ING</b>
WVE	SERAIL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	TQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
6	WHITEGOLD 1-0 601-1	XO, Co M 1stSgt Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat Sec Ldr, MG Sec Supply Sgt Ammo NCO, Wpns Plat	1 1 1 1 1 1		1500	-	1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 1-2 601-2	1st Sqd, 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort & Accessories	1250	165	1415	
	WHITEGOLD 1-3 601-3	2d Sqd, 1st Sec, 31mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort & Accessories	1250	165	1415	
	WHITEGOLD 1-4 601-4	Hdq Sec, 1st Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Corpsman	5 1 6	1 AN/PRC-10 1 EE 8 & Wire	1500	60	1560	
<b>)</b> .	WHITEGOLD 2-0 601-5	Plat Cdr, 81mm Mort Plat Rad Opr Ammo Men, 1st Sec	1 1 4 6	1 AN/PRC-10 Class V	1500	80	1580	
	WHITEGOLD 2-2 601-6	3d Sqd, 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort & Accessories	1250	165	1415	
-	WHITEGOLD 2-3 601-7	4th Sqd, 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort & Accessories	1250	165	1415	:



	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
IAVE		TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	TOUIP	TOTAL	STATION
6	WHITEGOLD 2-4	Plat Sgt, 81mm Mort Plat	1	1 AN/FRC-10	1500	80	1580	${ m TBA}$
	601-8	Ammo Sgt	1	Class V	ļ.			
		Rad Opr	1					
		Ammo Men, 2d Sec	3_					
1			6		1			
	·	·	1					
	WHITEGOLD 3-0	Hdq Sec, 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	60	1560	
	601-9	Driver	1	1 EE 8 & Wire		•		
			İ		l			
ļ	WHITEGOLD 3-2	5th Sqd, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort &	1250	165	1415	
	601–10	,	1	Accessories				
1		//			1050	4/5	4145	
1	WHITEGOLD 3-3	6th Sqd, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	5	1 81mm Mort &	1250	165	1415	
	601-11		1	Accessories				
1	IMITMIDAAT D. D. J.	T1. 0 010 44 . W. 4 D1 4	_	4 (11/1)00 40	1500	60	1560	
1		Hdq Sec, 3d Sec, 31mm Mort Plat	5	1 AN/PRC-10	1500	00.	1500	
	601–12	Ammo Man	6	1 EE 8 & Wire				
			0	}	ļ		·	
	MITTERCOLD / O	17th Cod 1th Con Olym Mont Dis		1 81mm Mort &	1250	165	1415	
	WHITEGOLD 4-0	7th Sqd, 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Pla	9 2	1	1200	10)	14!7	
	601–13		1	Accessories	l			•
	THE THEORY OF THE	Oth Sad Ith Sag Other Mart Dis	F .	1 81mm Mort &	1250	165	.1415	
i	601–14	8th Sqd, 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat	כוט	Accessories	المار	לטו	.1417	•
1	001-14	· .		WCCC99OL TOP		ĺ		

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TA 17-3	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL	110		5.250	WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE 7	SERIAL NO. WHITEGOLD 1-0	TROOF UNIT Had Sec, 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plat		SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT  1 AN/PRC-10	PERS 1500	EQUIP 60	TOT AL 1560	STATION TBA
	701–1	Ammo Man	6	1 EE 8 & Wire	.2			
	WHITEGOLD 1-2 70 <b>1-</b> 2	Ammo Men, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort Plat Ammo Men, 4th Sec Chief Scout	3 2 1 6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 1-3 701-3	Cmd Grp "A" (-) Comm Off Sgt Maj Intel Asst Msgr Ctr Man Fld Rad Oprs	1 1 1 1 2	2 AN/FRC-10	1500	60	<b>1</b> 560	
<b>,</b>	WHITEGOLD 1-4 701-4	Arty Ln Off, F Btry Ln Tm	1 5 6	1 AN/PRC-10 2 AN/PRC-9	1500	90	1590	
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 701-5	Asst S-3 TACP Pty	1 5 6	1 AN/PRC-10 1 AN/PRC-41 1 AN/PRC-47	1500	150	1650	



	. /2							
	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONN IL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
7	WHITEGOLD 2-2 701-6	Rad Chief, H&S Co Rad Telg Oprs Wire Chief Wireman	1 3 1 1 6	1 AN/PRC 47	1500	80	1580 \	TBA
	701–7	S-4, H&S Co S-1 Msgr NGF Ln Off Fld Rad Opr	1 1 1 1 1 1	1 AN/PRC-9 1 MG	1500	70	1570	
	ادر در چار العمد المدارية چار داريد الروايد	***	5					
	WHITEGOLD 2-4. 701-8	NGF Tm	6	1 AGR-9 1 AN/PRC-47	1500	150	1650	
	WHITEGOLD 3-0 701-9	GySgt, H&S Co Opn Chief Msgr S-3 Pers	1 1 3 6	1 MG	1500	40	1540	
	. 701–10	XO; 107mm Mort Btry GySgt FDO FDC	1 1 1	1 AN/FRC-9	1500	30	1530	
	۳.	Rad Opr	<u>2</u> 6				,	





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				<u> </u>				
	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL		<u> </u>		WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	SERIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQU IP	TOTAL	STATION
7	WHITEGOLD 3-3 701-11	1st Sec, 107mm Mort Btry	6		1500		1500	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 3-4 701-12	2d Sec, 107mm Mort Btry	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 4-0 701-13	107mm Mort Btry		107mm Howtar Ext		1300	1300	
	WHITEGOLD 4-2 701-14	107mm Mort Btry		107mm Howtar Ext		1300	1300	
8	WHITEGOLD 1-0 801-1	Cmd Grp B  XO, BLT 3/5 Ln Off, S-3 Log Chief Comm Chief Rad Opr	1 1 1 1 2 6	2 AN/PRC-10	1500	60	1560	
	WHITEGOLD 1-2 801-2	XO, H&S Co Msgr, S-3 Msg Ctr Chief In Off, S-3 Wiremen	1 1 1 1 2 6		1500		1500	





,	

									Change No. 1
		A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		enpt.anin <b>g</b>
	IAVE	STRIAL NO.	TROOP UNIT	МО°	SUPPLIES & FQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
	8	WHITEGOLD 1-3 801-3	NBC Spece Wiremen Corpsman	1 2 1 4	1 CP Tent	1000	250	1250	TBA
		WHITEGOLD 1-4 801-4	Wire Super Wiremen Corpsmen	1 2 1 4	1 CP Tent	1000	250	1250	
		WHITEGOLD 2-0 801-5	Engr Flat (-)	6		1500		1500	
-		WHITEGOLD 2-2 801-6	Engr Plat (-)	6	en en en en en en en en en en en en en e	1500		1500	
		WHITEGOLD 2-3 801-7	In Off, S.) Engr Plat (-)	1 5 6	,	1000		1000	,
***************************************		WHIT 5GOLD 2-4 801-8	Msg Cntr man Wiremen Radio Opr	1 2 3 6	1 AN/PRC-47 w/access 2 AN/PRC-10	1500	110	1610	
	<i>(</i>	WHITEGOLD 3-0 801-9	Admin Chief Admin Clerks (S-1) S&C Clerk	1 4 1 6		1500		1500	

Change	No.	1	

		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	<u> </u>		<u> </u>				mange wo.
W/NE-	A/C FLIGHT NO. HELITEAN SERIAL NO.	PERSO TROOP	<u>.</u>	NO.	SUPPLIES & FOUIPMENT.	PERS	WEIGHT	TOTAL	ENPLANING STATION
8	WHIT EGOLD 3-2 801-10	Msg Cntr Men Wiremen Radio Opr		2 2 6	2 AN/PRC-10 2 AN/GRA-6	1500	50	1550	TBA
grieden manageleiten bereiten	WHITEGOLD 3-3 801-11	Mag Cntr Men Wiremen Radio Opr	 	2 2 2 6	4 AN/PRC-10 Batteries	1500	100	1600	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 3-4 801-12	Radio Opr Wiremen	r	1 2 3	Batteries	750	50	800	

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
J. T. ELKINS


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Appendix 11 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(4)

Time Zone: H


В	each		Red '
Wave	Time	Craft/Vehicle Serial	Unit
1	H-hour	9 LVTP 1 LVTC Ser: 103	Co K (Rein)
2	H+4 min	8 LCVP Ser: 100	Co I (Rein)
. 3	H+10 min	1 LCM(6) Ser: 110, 120,	SP Recon Pty; Btry F, Redon Pty; 2d Echelon, BAS; Elms, H&S Co
4	H+15 min	2 LCM(8) Ser: 130, 135	AT Plat (-), Tims Engr Plat, Elms : SP Tm, Elms BMU
Rept	PCS at H-hou	r1 LCU Ser: 140	Tank Plat (-)
Rept min	PCS at H+75	2 LCM(8) Ser: 115	Btry F (-)

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Appendix 12 (Pre D-day Transfer Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

The following transfers will be effected prior to D-day:


SERTAL	PERS	VEHICLES EQUIPMENT	FROM	TO	UNIT	REMARKS
103 135 	226 12 2		APA-222 LPE-5 LPE-5	LSD-33 LSD-33 LSD-33	Co K Shore Pty Med Plat	Attached to Provisional Company
100 103	2 2		LPH-5 LPH-5	APA-222 LSD-33	S-2 S-2	

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	A/C FLIGHT  NO. HELITEAM	PERSONNEL				WEIGHT		ENPLANING
WAVE	1	· TROOP UNIT	NO.	SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	STATION
8	WHITEGOLD 1-3 801-3	NBC Spec Wiremen Corpsman	1 2 1 4	1 CP Tent	1000	250	1250	TBA
	WHITEGOLD 1-4 801-4	Wiremen Corpsmen	1 2 1 4	1 CP Tent	1000	250	1250	
	WHITEGOLD 2-0 801-5	Engr Plat (-)  Engr Plat (-)	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-2 801-6	Engr Plat (-)	6		1500		1500	
	WHITEGOLD 2-3 801-7	CO, 107mm Mort Btry Engr Plat (-)	1 5 6		1000		1000	

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BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) AMS S501-ND 51-13(1:250,000) SAN JOSE AMS S733 - 3256 II (1:50,000) ANTBULONG AMS S733 - 3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE AMS S733 - 3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA

- (b) NWIP 22-7A
- (c) FIFM 7-4
- (d) 1stMarDiv0 P3000.10
- (e) BnO 3000.3B

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

- 1. SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Forces.
    - (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
    - (2) See current intelligence summaries.
  - b. Friendly Forces.
    - (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery).
    - (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
    - (3) Appendix 3 (Air Support).
- 2. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H-hour and L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to seize Objective 1, 2, and 3 as prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay); destroys enemy troops, equipment, and supplies; conducts search and destroy operations within assigned area; and executes tactical withdrawal on order.
- EXECUTION.
  - a. Concept of Operations.
    - (1) Control and coordination of air and naval gunfire initially by CATF (SACC).
    - (2) Control and coordination of ground supporting arms by this Headquarters (FSCC) upon establishment of combat support units ashore.


E-1



- (3) Coordination and control of naval gunfire passes ashore upon approval by CATF of request submitted by this Headquarters through CLF.
- (4) Control and coordination of air remains with CATF.
- (5) Coordination of supporting arms will be returned to SACC prior to completion of withdrawal.
- b. Coordination of Air Support. Close air support requests passed on the TAR net will be coordinated by the FSCC to the extent that, if considered appropriate and safe, the ALO will state "GLOVE 14 Concurs" or "Disapproves". SACC must give positive approval before the request will be honored by TACC.
- c. Coordination of Naval Gunfire Support.
  - (1) During daylight hours, following a request, the NGF ship will obtain positive approval from NGLNO on the NGF control net before firing a mission.
  - (2) Planned night defensive fires will be submitted by the NGF liaison officer to FSCC for approval prior to darkness. Further approval of individual night firing missions is not required.
  - (3) All NGF call fire missions will be observed. There will be no free fire areas.
- d. Coordination of Artillery Fires.
  - (1) During daylight hours effected by FSCC, including consideration of all air activity.
  - (2) For night fires the procedure set forth in paragraph 3c(2) will be utilized.
- e. Coordinating Instructions.
  - (1) Preparation fires on objectives and HLZ will be planned; execution only on order CATF.
  - (2) Target location will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator GRID system, when practical.
- 4. TARGET INFORMATION.
  - a. Target List.
    - (1) Initial target lists will be maintained by the CATF. Target information will be published as required.







- (2) Current target list and information will be maintained by BLT ESCC in accordance with reference (e).
  - (3) Changes to target information will be published and promulgated as required.
- b. Concentration Designation System.
  - (1) The concentration designator for artillery and mortars will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers. The first letter will signify the controlling agency and the second letter will signify the weapon.
    - (a) S BLT FSCC.
    - (b) A 81mm Mortar; W 107mm Howtar; F 105mm Howitzer.
    - (c) The three numbers will signify the concentration number. Block numbers are assigned as follows:

Firing Unit	Number Block
81mm Mortan	100-399
107mm Howtar 105mm Howitzer	400–599 700–999

- (2) Naval Gunfire will use prefix "N" followed by two numbers.
- c. Restricted Targets.
  - (1) Class E Targets.

Religious buildings	Public utilities	Bridges
Nätional Shrines	Population Centers	Tunnels
Museums Hospitals	Railroads Highways	Medical Facilities

- (2) Destruction of Class E targets is prohibited except on approval of higher Headquarters, or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the BLT prior to the receipt of approval.
- (3) Class E targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this Headquarters.

#### 5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY.

a. Air sentries and Lookouts.



- (1) Sentries will be positioned at artillery/mortar positions and will cause the firing units to cease firing when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (2) Artillery/mortar forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

### b. Restrictive Fire Plan.

- (1) A restrictive fire plan will be employed when required. These plans will be numbered to provide a simple means of referencing a particular plan. Under these plans, all surface fires are prohibited between prescribed maximum and minimum altitudes within a specific rectangular area, or series of areas, during a stated time interval. The centerline of this area will be specified by two or more points along the axis of movement. The width of the area is specified by the distance either side of the centerline.
- (2) The restrictive plan, if it is required, will be established by this Headquarters. Orders for a restrictive fire plan will state the coordinates of the points delineating the centerline, minimum altitudes, and the time period. Each PLAN HOGAN will be numbered consecutively with each new series beginning at 0001 local time.

Example: "PLAN HOGAN ONE X 657289 to 647468 X 200 meters X 1000 to 10,000 feet X 031035H to 031400H X"

#### c. Helicopter Safety.

- (1) The Battalion ALO will keep the Fire Support Coordinator informed of the time and location of all scheduled and on call helicopter flights into the combat areas.
- (2) Unless special coordination procedures are prescribed or required fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopter using the route.

### 6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES.

- a. No Fire Line. Initial no fire line will be established by CATF as required. Changes to the initial no fire line, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.
- b. <u>Bombline</u>. Initial bomblines will be established by CATF as required. Changes to the initial bombline, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.







- c. Creeping Fires. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly nersonnel. Determination as to what constitutes "close proximity" is the responsibility of the infantry unit commander.
- d. Sight and Charge Check. Battery commanders and 81mm Fortar Platoon Commander will ensure that section chiefs verify elevation, deflection, charges and sight pictures on all fire missions.
- 7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
  - a. See Annex I (Communications Rectronics).
  - b. Command Posts.
    - (1) Afloat.
      - (a) CTG 79.5 LPH--5
      - (b) BLT 3/5 LPH-5
    - (2) Ashore.
      - (a) BLT 3/5 (To be announced).
      - (b) Subordinate units submit locations when established.

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
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#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Artillery
- 2 Naval Gunfire
- 3 Air Support

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66



3/5 USS PRINCETON (LEH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

### 1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.
  - (1) Target List (To be issued).
  - (2) See Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (3) See Current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
  - (2) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
  - (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).

### 2. MISSICN

- a. Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, lands by surface means on D-day in accordance with Annex E (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in general support of BLT 3/5.
- b. 107 mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalian, 12th Marines, lands by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in general support of DLT 3/5.


### 3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Artillery Employment.
  - (1) Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, will, after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 3/5 by providing direct support conventional fires.
  - (2) 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalian, 12th Marines will, after landing by helicopter in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 3/5 by providing direct support conventional fires.

E-1-1







(x) denoted bull-for a min 5/7.

c. 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalian, 12th Marines.

- (1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Creations (verlay).
- (2) General Support DLT 3/5.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
  - (1) Firing Chart, Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
  - (2) Survey. To be provided by Survey Party, Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines as required.
  - (3) Counter-battery/Counter-nortor. Tolicy semi-active.
  - (4) Concentration Numbers. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
  - (5) Meterological Data. To be premulated as available.
  - (6) No Fire Lines. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
  - (7) Restriction on Fires. See Annex 2 (Fire Support Goordination).
  - (8) Ammunition Restrictions. Units will not expend more than 80 percent of available supply rate without approval of MAT Commander.
  - (9) Target Information. See /nnex E (Fire Support Goordination).

	Compared the Control of the Control		TOOTCOTOC
4.	ADMINISTRATION	$_{\rm J}$ ,NE	1.CG !ST ICS.

b.	Available	Supply Rate	(Rds/Apn/Day)

a, See Annex I (Logistics)

105mm	Howitzer			80
107mm	Howtar			81

E-1-2



- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
  - a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).
  - b. Command Post.
    - (1) Afloat.
      - (a) BLT 3/5

LPH-5

(b) Battery F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar.

`LSD-33

(c) 107mm Howter Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar.
(2) Ashore. To be announced.

LPH-5


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BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 1908OOH May 1966

Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66


Ref: (a) FMFM 7-2

Time Zone: H

#### 1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.
  - (1) Target list (To be issued).
  - (2) See Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (3) See current ISUMS.
- b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) CTG 76.5 provides NGF support.
  - (2) See Appendix 1 (Artillery).
  - (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).
- 2. MISSION. Fire Support Unit supports the landing and operations ashore of BLT 3/5 with naval gunfire.
- 3. EXECUTION.
  - a. Ship Assignment. APD-130, Direct Support BLT 3/5
  - b. Coordinating Instructions.
    - (1) Fire support areas are as outlined in Tab A (NGF Support Operation Overlay).
    - (2) Priority of Fires.
      - (a) Defense of ship against counter-battery or air attack takes precedence over all other fires.
      - (b) Call fires take precedence over scheduled fires unless otherwise directed by FSCC or SACC.
    - (3) All fire missions will be observed and under positive control of the NGF spotter or TAC.





- (5) Safety Measures.
  - (a) Rounds will not be fired closer to friendly elements than the limits prescribed in reference (a).
  - (b) VT fuses will not be employed over friendly troops without permission of the Battalion Commander.
  - (c) Restrictive fire plans in accordance with Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (6) All illumination missions will be approved and coordinated by FSCC.
- (7) Smoke employed only on request of supported unit.
- (8) Target list to be published and promulgated as set forth in Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
  - a. Initial ammunition allocation to be published.
  - b. Details of ammunition replenishment to be published.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
  - a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

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#### TAB:

A - Naval Gunfire Support Operation Overlay

\* 9

BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966


Tab A (Fire Support Overlay) to Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: Maps: AMS S733 - 3256 II (1:50,000) AMS S733 - 3257 III (1:50,000) AMS S733 - 3157 II (1:50,000)

Time Zone: H

PT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	COORDINATES
Α.	12-25.5N	120-58.3E	TF 808735
В.	12-25.ON	120-57.7E	TP 795728
C.	12-21.25N	120-59.7E	TP 823663
D.	12-22.ON	121-01.0E	TP 848579
E.	12-20.6N	121-02.2E	TP 863651

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


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Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) SAN JOSE

AMS S733-3256 II (1:50,000) AMBULONG AMS S733-3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE AMS S733-3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA

(b) CTG 76.5 OpOrder 305-66

Time Zone: H

- 1. SITUATION.
  - a. Enemy Forces, Annex B (Intelligence)
  - b. Friendly Forces.
    - (1) Air support will be provided by CTG 79.3.
    - (2) CTG 76,5 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate, provides coordination and control of all aircraft which may be assigned to support operations, exercises air traffic control over all aircraft transiting the AOA.
- 2. MISSION. Conduct air operations in support of landing force,
- 3. EXECUTION.
  - a. Concept of Operations. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)
  - b. Coordinating Instructions.
    - (1) AOA (Aircraft Operating Area) defined as:
      - (a) An arc 10nm from coord TP8568 overland and 25nm seaward.
      - (b) The San Jose airstrip and area immediately adjacent will be excluded from the AOA.
    - (2) Restrictive Fire Plans, if employed, will be in accordance with N⊌IP 22-7(A).
    - (3) Control of air will not be passed ashore.
    - (4) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of either a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) at all times.







- (5) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), Military Grid Reference six (6) digit system for target designation will be used.
- (6) CATF will maintain communications with San Jose tower and civil aircraft on assigned frequency. No air strikes will be conducted during arrival or departure of aircraft.
- (7) General instructions, safety precautions and helicopter control and protection plan in accordance with Annex H to CTG 76.5 Operation Order 305-66.
- (8) Panels or a suitable substitute will be displayed prior to calling in air strikes to mark friendly front lines.
- (9) Helicopters will be available for medical evacuation and logistics resupply as the situation permits. Medical evacuation requests will be given a priority precedence.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Annex I (Logistics).
- 5. <u>COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS</u>. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

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#### TABS:

A - Aircraft Schedule

B - Aircraft Armament

C - Air Communications

D - Air Frequency Plan

E - Call Signs

F - Approach and Retirement



Tab A (Air Schedule) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

				100 mg		•	
EVENT NO.	MISSION	PROVIDED BY	NUMBER & TYPE A/C	TIME ON THE STATION	REPORT TO ON NET	ENTRY PT	REMARKS
			<u> </u>		ICEPACK		RELIEVE ON STATION
82	TAO/TAC(A)	HMM	1 UH34	н-30	GOLD	LPH	
110	MED EVAC	нум	2 UH34	COND III/IV	FAIRMONT BLACK	LPH	NOTE 1 & 2
171	SAR	HMM	4 111101	II ao mo Tilae	ICEPACK	TDE	NOTE A A C
1(1	LZ PREP/HELO	LIMIN	1 UH34	H-30 TO H+15	GOLD	LPH	NOTE 1 & 2
24		ama : no o	0 774	T 4 P M 0 TT 1 P	ICEPACK	SUE	
31	ESCORT	CTG 79.3	2 VA	L-15 TO H+45	GOLD	20,000	NOTE 3
j ma				H-15 TO	ICEPACK	SUE	RELIEVE ON STATION SUNRISE
51	CAS	CTG 79.3	2 VA	COMPLETION	GOLD	20,000	-SUNSET NOTE 3
	,				FAIRMONT	PENSACOLA	,
105	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	$\operatorname{BLACK}$	15001	NOTE 4
•	•				FAIRMONT	PENS ACOLA	
106	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	BLACK	15001	NOTE 4
					FAIRMONT	PENSACOLA	
107	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L-15	BLACK	1500 1	NOTE 4
			- Ton-		FAIRMONT	PENS ACOLA	
108	TROOP LIFT	HMM	4 UH34	L15	BLACK	1500 '	NOTE 4
					FAIRMONT	PENSACOLA	
109	TROOP LIFT	HMM	8 UH34	COND IV	BLACK	1500 !	NOTE 5
	*		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				

#### NOTES

- 1. All helicopters will be available for med evac-sunrise to sunset. COND III daylight hours, COND IV after sunset.
- 2. Airborne helicopters will be assigned SAR as necessary during daylight operations.
- 3. Aircraft reporting in at entry point will remain VFR.
- 4. Fig. 108 will be prepared for backloading on order.

- 5. This event becomes effective upon completion of events 105 thru 108.
- 6. Condition of aircraft readiness in accordance with NWP 41(A).
- 7. Time on station is the time that aircraft report to the controlling assigned orbit or entry point.

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USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Tab B (Aircraft Armament) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

#### 1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- a. All ordnance loading will be simulated.
- b. CTG 79.3 VMA Det assigned will simulate loading. Ordnance will be for missions against targets generally soft in nature.
- c. Pilots will report their simulated ordnance load to TACC using standard Seventh Fleet ordnance codes.
- d. After the completion of each Close Air Support Mission the flight leader will report to the controlling agency ordnance expended, damage assessment and enemy intelligence of immediate tactical importance.

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190800H May 1966

Tab C (Air Communication) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

#### GENERAL 1.

a. Air Communications in accordance with this Tab and Annex F.

#### FREQUENCY PLAN

- a. Air frequencies in accordance with Tab D and Annex F.
- b. Net activation times will be promulgated by separate messages.

### 3. CALL SIGNS

- a. Call signs in accordance with Tab E, Annex F, and JANAP 119F.
- b. Aircraft tactical voice call signs will be derived from squadron call sign, flight number, and flight position.

Example: Event 2 call signs

	First Flight	Second Flight
(Flight Leader)	Old Nick 1-1	Old Nick 2-1
Second Plane	Old Nick 1-2	Old Nick 2-2
Third Plane	Old Nick 1-3	Old Nick 2-3

#### AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES


- Authentication and Numeral Codes in accordance with Annex F.
- Zulu time will be used for authentication and numeral codes.

#### RECOGNITION

a. LFF/SLF in accordance with appropriate CINCPACFLT Instructions as indicated below:

AIRCRAFT	MODE 3/CODE
Strike and Air Support	Code 13 15 16
Helo	Code 10 17
Recon	Code 34
Troop Carrier and Itinerant	Code 20
Emergency	Code 77

Operation Order 330-66



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BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Tab D (Air Frequency Plan) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)

LEGEND			<b>-</b> T	7	-	_	٦	Т	T	7	T	T	*	-	T	T	T	
C-Net Control Station	CKT	 	H-2	E E	中田	H-5-			2	F-7		H-11-H	77-77	H-17				
W-When Directed or Required					1	Ì	(2)	!	1			1		- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1				
X-Guard			FIRE		IR (S)	/IAT'O	TATIC			SPOT	1		4 . 4	CIVIL	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Harri	EET.	
L-Listen	NET	TAC	RASPBF		TAR/H	TATC/	ان	TA CAL		TAO/A	一 日	NELO HELO			LPH	ì	- 1	
*-To be used only in case of actual SAR	EMIS- 1 SION	l					ļ			Ì	1					- }	i	
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HDC	1	1		X	W						C		M	C	Π		L	
LPH/LPH	<u> </u>	1	1			1						X		X		L	L L	i
HELO'S						W	W			W	X	W			W			1
HELO ESCORT		1_	1_	L_		IW	W	W	W		X	L	W	L	W	_	L	
CAS A/C			1	_	_	W	W	M	W	M	ļ.,	_	W	_	<b>-</b>	_	I.	Ì
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E-3-D-1

BLT 3/5 USS PPINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Tab E (Call Signs) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Air Support) to Operation Order 330-66

	COMMAND
TACC	ICEPACK
TADC	JOYRIDE
HDC	FAIRMONT
CTG 76.5	COMPANY STORE
CTU 76.5.1	APPLE BLOSSOM
CTU 76.5.2	LITUR/RY
CTG 76.5	HEARSAY
APD-130 USS COOK	CAPETOWN BRAVO
LPH-5 USS PRINCETON	BULLHORN
APA-222 USS PICKAWAY	KEYBROOK GULF
LSD-33 USS ALAMO	DIDDYBOX ALPHA
VMi. 224	OAK TREE
HMM 364	WHITEGOLD
TACP	GLOVE 14
BLT 3/5	GLOVE
TAC(A)	PL/.YBOY


E. J. BRONARS


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Tab F (Approach and Retirement) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 330-66

#### 1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. All inbound aircraft will report to their controlling agency on the net assigned when over the specified control point.
- b. Aircraft assigned an "as directed" entry point and altitude will contact their controlling agency as soon as possible after take-off and proceed in accordance with instructions.
- c. Communications in accordance with TAB C.
- d. Aircraft reporting inbound will give the following information:
  - (1) Voice call of flight leader.
  - (2) Event number.
  - (3) Number and type aircraft.
  - (4) Position and altitude.
  - (5) Estimated time of departure.
  - (6) Ordnance Load.
- e. Assault helos on ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Annex D.

#### 2. CONTROL POINTS AND HELICOPTER APPROACH LAMES.

- a. Aircraft entry and exit point "SUE" 270, degrees 10 NM LPH TACAN.
- b. Helicopter Wave Breakup and Rendezvous Point "PENSACOLA" TP 830630 (DONGON ISLAND).
- c. Helo Penetration Point "TAMPA" TP 890666.
- d. Helicopter Landing Zones (IZ) "Sparrow" TP 930745 (Primary), "Hawk" TP 884723 (Secondary).
- e. Helicopter Approach and Retirement Lane.
  - (1) "Florida" "Pensacola" to "Tampa" 050 degrees/3.7 NM, "Tampa" to Landing Zone "Sparrow" 025 degrees/4.7 NM: "Tampa" to IZ "Hawk" 355 degrees/3 NM.

E-3-F-1









- 3. SEARCH AND RESCUE REFERENCE POINT. Center of Red Beach TP 862678. The primary SAR ship is the LPH.
- 4. Available NAV Aids include LPH TACAN, Chan 5. IDENT XY.

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BLT 3/5 USS TRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) FMFPac0 P02000.20

- (b) CG, 1st MarDivO PO2000.2B
- (c) CG, 1st MarDivO P2000.2D
- (d) BnO 2000,1

Time Zone: H

#### 1. SITUATION.

#### a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
  - (a) Intercept, jam, or employ imitative deception on any communication circuit.
  - (b) Cut or tap wire lines for purposes of interception or deception.
  - (c) Ambush wire teams during initial wire installation and trouble shooting missions.

### b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Command Posts
  - (a) Afloat

1, CTG 79,5

LPH-5

2. BIF 3/5

LPH-5

3. Co I

APA-222

4. Co K

APA-222

5. Co L

LPH-5

6. Co M

LPH-5

7. Btry F 2/11

LSD-33

8. 107mm Mortar Btry 2/12

LPH-5

F-1

- 9. 2nd Plt Co C, 1st Tk Bn ISD-33
- 10. 2nd Plt Co B, 1st Amtrac Bn LSD-33
  - 11. 3rd Plt Co B, 1st AT Bn LSD-33
- (b) Ashore
  - 1. BLT 3/5

(To be designated)

- (3) Subordinate units report C.P. locations when established.
- 2. MISSICM: Provide communications and electronics support for the BLT in the amphibious operation and subsequent operations ashore.

#### 3. EXECUTION.

- a. Communications Platoon BIT 3/5
  - (1) Guard CLF Tact Net # 1 commencing H-1.
  - (2) Guard CLF Tact Net # 2 commencing H-1.
  - (3) Be prepared to augment organic and attached units with FM radio equipment.
  - (4) Be prepared to provide the following equipment and personnel for operation of the BLT TACLOG abound the LFM.
    - (a) One radio set AN/IRC 10
    - (b) One radio set AN/IRC 83
    - (c) Three radio operators 2531/2533
  - (5) Provide message center service for BLF elements embarked aboard the LFH.
  - (6) Be prepared, on order, to provide one radio AM/RC 47 and two radio operators to rifle companies.
  - (7) Provide one copy each of KAA-60 and KAC-138 to CLF for entire period of operation.
- b. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- c. Shore Party Communications.
  - (1) See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
  - (2) Establish wire line within the Landing Zone from the HST to BAS, S 4 and ALO.
  - (3) Be prepared to provide two radio operators 2531/2533 to operate the BLT TACLOG aboard the LSD.

#### d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (b) through (d).
- (2) Messenger Service
  - (a) Runner messenger will be established ashore in accordance with reference (d).
  - (b) Helicopter messenger between BLT Command Post ashore and the LPH will be announced.

#### (3) Radio

- (a) Radio Nets. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- (b) Call Signs. See Appendix 2 (Call Signs).
- (c) Commence guarding assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
- (d) Attached units will enter the BLT Tactical Net when other means of communications with this Headquarters fail.
- (e) Radio checks and test counts will be held to an absolute minimum.
- (f) All stations will tune to Net Control Stations.
- (g) All used dry cells will be returned to this Headquarters for disposal.
- (h) Immediately report to this Headquarters by other means, known or suspected enemy interference, imitative deception or jamming.
- (i) Local time will be used on all messages transmitted within the BIT.

#### (4) Wire

- (a) Telephone directory and switchboard names in accordance with Appendix 2. (Call Signs)
- (b) All wire lines will be retrieved when departing a position or when leaving the objective area under all circumstances.
- (c) Whenever a wire team leaves the BIT C.P. they will be accompanied by a fire team.
- (d) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the BLT C.P., after dusk.
- (c) Radio Relay Channelization in accordance with Appendix 4 (Radio Relay).

- (5) Visual Communications. See Appendix 3 (Visual Communications).
- (6) Cryptographic Operations. (4)
  - (a) Coordinates will be concealed in accordance with Annex K (Reference Point Overlay).
  - (b) Instructions for internal authentication and coupling to be distributed separately.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

See Annex I (Logistics).

Salar Salar

. b. Dry cell batteries and wire will be replenished on a daily requested basis by the BLT Supply Officer. All units will carry the following initial supply to operate for 24 hours:

required was promed to be a required to a supplication of the supp BA - 30 - - - - - - As required BA - 270- - - - - Three (3) per AN/RC - 6 A LA CO BA = 279 - - - - - - Three (3) per AN/FRC - 8 - 9 - 10

- c. BB 451 battery charging facilities will be maintained aboard the LPH. Replenishment will be on a one-for-one basis. Users will tag the battery being sent in for recharging. The users identity and location will be on the tag. Example: FAC #2 - Co "I".
- d. Second and third echelon maintenance will be available aboard the LIH. A limited second echelon maintenance capability will exist ashore.
- e. The BIT Communication Officer must be notified of equipment failure and whether or not a replacement is necessary. All evacuated equipment must be tagged by the user indicating the type of trouble.
  - f. A limited replacement float of communications equipment is available aboard the LFH and, when announced, ashore in the objective area.
    - g. All communications equipment will have preventive maintenance accomplished in accordance with reference (c).
  - (Haggir Street) at h. Communication equipment will be waterproofed prior to the landing, when crossing rivers and during rainy weather.

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commending

## APPENDIXES:

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- 1 Radio & Frequency Plan
- 2 Call Signs
  3 Visual Communications
  4 Radio Relay

BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 1 (Radio and Frequency Plan) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

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C - Net Control Sta.	1	F 50	M-30	M32	M-48	M-31	25.	M-44	11-43						M-46	M-39	M41	M-42	74.40	M-54	obigaje di	
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* - To be provided he the senior unit of the Provisional Co.	he	1-	IP TAC 2 (P)	2			CMD/TACLOG	BIM TAC (P)		7	ٰ ایک	Coe II e Tric	Z.	- 1	81 mm C.O.F.	ن • ﴿	107 mm . C.O.F. (S)	F 2/11 C.O.F.	LRITY CHO NET	τλαΡ τοάλι	e groede ett ett ek in Groede ek groed Groede ett ek in Groede ek in ek	•
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TACP	-	_		1	<u>.</u>	1	_	_	1	_	_	آــ	L	_	-	_	_	L	L	C		
NGF Team			-	Ļ		Ц				1						_	L_			L		
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<pre>C - Net Control Sta. X - Guard O - Be Prepared</pre>	2840	7710	349.0	315.4	262.6	47.5	2504	40.2	51.0	39.6	49.2	25,0	27.5	21.9	25.6	47.1	48.2	47.9	48.4
* To be provided by the senior unit of the Provisional Co.	<b>虹/R/HR (P)</b>	TMR/HR (S)	<u>(17.7)</u>	HD 1	HD 2	SPCP LOCAL	SEC SFOT	RECON PLT LOCAL	ENGR LOCAL	SP CONTROL	ANTRAC PIN CND	AT FIT CMD (P)	AT PLT CMD (S)	TK FIT CMD (E)	TK IN CID (S)	FOR REC FUN LOCAL	SPARE		SPAR
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TACP  NGF Team  Shore Party Team	X	b	X	X	O	C	C			-									
BLT TACLOG GRP Amtrac Plt	-						-	1			C						-	-	
AT Plt Engineer Plt Force Recon Plt	+	-					+	-	C	-		C.	0	-		C			
Recon Plt Tank Plt	-	+	+-	-	-	1-	+	٢	-	-	-	1	+	$\frac{1}{0}$	015		-	+	<u> </u>

E.J. BRONARS

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Commanding

BLT 3/5 USS RINCETON (LFH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

CTG 79.5 HEARSAY HMM 364 WHITE GOLD BLT 3/5 GLOVE BLC 3/5 REAR GLOVE REAR Co I GLOVE INDIA Co K GLOVE KILO Co I GLOVE LIMA Co M GLOVE MIKE Co N GLOVE NOVEMBER (Provisional Co) HQ CMDT GLOVE YANKEE 81mm Mortar Plt. GLOVE WHISKEY 106mm RR Plt GLOVE TANGO Flame Sec GLOVE FOXTROT FSCC GLOVE BAILEY NGF IN O GLOVE TWO SIX OSCAR NGF Spot TM GLOVE TWO SIX CHARLIE BLT TACLOG GLOVE HODUCT F Bury, 2,71 PROWL 107mm Mertar Btry BROWL WHISKEY 2/B/3rd Antrac Bn 3/B/1st AT Bn SLEEK DANCE CARD 3/B/1st Engr Bn BIG BUDDY 3/B/1st Recon Bn CHESTER WHITE 2/C/1st Tank Bn HAPPY AGE 6/1st Force Recon Co CHUCKLE 2nd SF Team CONSEQUENCE Beach Support Area CONSEQUENCE (Beach Color) HST CONSEQUENCE (LZ Name) BLT Collective CF.EWCUT

E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding

BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800 H May 1966

Appendix 3 (Visual Communications) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66

#### -1. - Smoke Signals Will Be As Follows:

#### TYE

#### MEANING

Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an

Rlease inform us of the enemy direc-

urgent or normal aircraft landing.

Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke, M-64

Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke

Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke M-18

Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M-65 or

Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M-18 OTC

Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke

Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke

Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke (When dropped by  $\Lambda/C$ )

Marking of the enemy position.

tion or position.

Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White)

Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.

#### 2. Illumination Signals Will Be As Follows:

Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (One signal is fired)

Encircled or attacked by the enemy. Request for support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio.

Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster Request for omergency illumination. (Cont. firing of three or more signal) (Radio Haison must be established)

Signal, Ground, Green Star Parachute Request armo resupply (Confirm type by radio).

Signal, Ground, Green Star M-125 Request for helo-evacuation.

Signal, Ground, White Star ANM-44A1

or Radio Breakdown.

Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute M-127 (Hand held)

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster Request for radio communications (Fire 1 signal) on the air-ground frequency.

F-3-1

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster (Cont. firing of three or more signal)

Request cease firing illumination.

M-126 (Hand held) We are withdrawing from this position Signal, Ground, Red Star Parachute

3. Panel Signals Will Bo As Follows:

a. Vehicular Identification

(1) Red panels will be used on odd dates.

(2) Yellow panels will be used on even dates.

b. Helo Landing Point Identification

- (1) All landing points will be marked with an equilateral triangle formed by using three panels from either Panel Set AP-300 or Ar-30D. The color selected will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft.
- (2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.

  (3) The type of unit will be identified by one or more panels in
- the center of the triangle as follows:

Identification Type of Unit Infantry/Recon One Yellow Panel (VS-6/U)
Artillery/Tanks One Red Fanel (VS-4/U)
Aviation Two Yellow Fanels (VS-6/U)
Service and Support Two Red Panels (VS-4/U)

(4) The size of the unit will be identified by one or more panels (AP-30C or AP-30D) placed directly above and centered on top of the triangle as follows:

Size of Unit Identification. Company/Battalion Roman Numeral One
Battalion/Squadron Roman Numeral Two


- (5) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically... feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of the triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.
- (6) Front Line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of Panels VS-6/U (Yellow) placed parallel to the front lines.

E./J. Bromars

Licutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 181200H May 1966

Appendix 4 (Radio Relay Plan) to Annex F (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 330-66



E.J. Bronars E.J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 1908OOH May 1966

Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

Ref: None

1. CENERAL. This Annex centains instructions for the submission of Operational Reports required by CTG 79.5.

### 2. REPORTS REQUIREE:

	REPORTS	FROM	TO	TIME	REFERENCE
a.,	ISUMS	BLT	CTG 79.5	Commencing at H plus 4 covering previous 4 hrs and every 6 hours thereafter.	See Annex B
þ.	SITUATION REPORTS	BLT	CTG 79.5	Same as a.	Appendix 1
c.	CASUALTY REPORTS	BLT	CTG 79.5	As Occuring	Annex E to CTG 79.5 201-YR
d.	SPOT REPORTS ·	BLT	CTG 79.5	As Occuring	Any Significant Item
e.	MAJOR ORDNANCE/ENGR EQUIPMENT LOSS/DAMAGE REPORT	BLT	CTG 79.5	As Occuring	Appendix 3
f.	MUSTER REPORTS	BLT	CTG 79.5	Upon re-embarkation after Opns ashore.	Message Report
g.	JAMMING	BLT	CTG 79.5	As Occuring	Annex F CTG 79.5 OPORD 201-YR

	REPORTS	FROM	TO	TIME	REFERENCE	
h.	REPORT OF SUPPLIES EXPENDED	BLT	CTG 79.5	5 days after completion of Hilltop.	Letter Format	
i.	OPSTAT	BLT	CTG 79.5	As Occuring	CG FMFPAC Order P0300.	5A
j.	AFTER ACTION REPORT	BLT	CTG 79.5	5 days after completion of Hilltop.	Appendix 2	
k.	FLASH REPORTS	BLT	S <b>-</b> 3	As Occuring	BNO 3000.4	
1.	CHANGE OF LINES	BLT	S-3	As Occuring	BNO 3000.4	
m.	SHELL REPORTS	BLT	S-2	As Occuring	BNO 3000.4	


E. J. Granars
E. D. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

#### APPENDIX:

- 1. Situation Report (BLT)
- 2. Major Ordance/Engr Equip Loss/Damage Report
- 3. After Action Report



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966


Appendix 1 (SITREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

- 1. REPORT TITLE: Situation Report
- 2. FORMAT: Message
  - a. Enemy
    - (1) Units in contact.
    - (2) Enemy activity during period.
  - b. Own Situation
    - (1) Location of CP at the end of the period.
    - (2) Front line position and boundaries.
    - (3) Own operations during period to include type and number of missions.
      - (a) Scheme of maneuver.
      - (b) Patrols routes, size, type.
      - (c) Ambushes location, size.
      - (d) Combat efficiency.
      - (e) Results of operations.
      - (f) Supporting arms employment to include type and number of missions fired.
  - c. Personnel
    - (1) Own.
      - (a) Strength at end of period.
      - (b) Casualties KIA, WIA, MIA.
    - (2) Enemy.
      - (a) Casualties.
      - (b) Captives.

G-1-1






- (1) Locations of administrative type troops and installations.
- (2) Status of supply and classes.
- (3) Equipment out of action give circumstances surrounding how and where.
- (4) Captured material and weapons by type and number.
- e. Civic Action Taken. Brief description.
- f. Any Unusual Events
- g. Intentions. Brief summary of contemplated operations.

4. J. Bronars E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 2 (After Action Report Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: After Action Report

2. Format: Formal Report

(HEADING)

(Date)

From: Commanding Officer, BLT 3/5

To: CTG 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation HILLTOP V)

Encl: (1) Overlay of the Operation (or overlays by day, if necessary)

- (1) Name of Identity and/or types of Operation.
- (2) Inclusive Dates and Locations of the Operation.
- (3) Command Headquarters.
- (4) Task Organization.
- (5) Intelligence. A brief estimate of enemy strength, location, disposition, and situation anticipated in the objective area prior to the operation. Make a brief statement of enemy strength found as the operation was conducted.
- (6) Mission. State the mission as directed by the higher authority.
- (7) Concept of the Operation. Include the who; what, when, where and how. Sketches and/or overlays are appropriate.
- (8) Execution. Give, in chronological order, a narrative of the order and end with the termination of the operation. Highlight significant actions and list losses to both sides as they occurred. Indicate duration of close contacts (fire fights) and results. Include techniques, tactics, deceptions, and decision utilized, State the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations activity. Include all other pertinent information.
- (9) Results. Summarize casualties, prisoners, apprehensions, equipment, material and weapons captured. On friendly losses indicate the number of personnel and equipment lost or destroyed.







- (10) Commander's Analysis. Statement by the commander as to the problems encountered and lessons learned. Include comments on CA/Psy War activities and planning or lack thereof. Include plans on actions taken with civilians, how controlled, evacuated, medically treated, relocated, etc.
- (11) <u>Lessons Learned</u>. Submit recommended solutions to problem areas encountered. Explanations and descriptions giving the background of these problems and action taken as desired.
- 3. Frequency: After Action Reports will be submitted by this Headquarters within five days after the operation ends. After Action Reports will be submitted in an original and twenty-five (25) copies.

L. J. Bronars E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding



BIR 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 3 (Major Ordnance/Engineer Equipment Loss/Damage Reports) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H


- 1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report
- 2. Format: Message
  - a. Item description.
  - b. Coordinates where lost/damaged.
  - c. DTG of occurence.
  - d. Extent of damage.
  - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
  - f. Replacement required (yes or no).
- 3. Frequency: As occurring.
- 4. Submitted by: Unit concerned.
- 5. Submitted to: CTG 79.5.

E.J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Coros

Commanding





USS PRINCETON TEAM 

Annex H (Plan for Withdrawal) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS S733 - 3256 II (1:50,000) AMBULONG AMS 5733 - 3257 III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE AMS 5733 - 3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA


Time Zone: H

# 1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces.

  (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (2) See Current ISUMS.
  - b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) CTG 79.3 provides CAS to cover withdrawal.
    - (2) CTU 76.5.3 provides NGF support.
    - (3) CTG 76.5 provides amphibious shipping and necessary landing craft for Intra-Task Force Transfers.
    - (4) TAC(A) provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance for withdrawal.
    - c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).
    - d. Assumptions. At the time of execution of the withdrawal, all elements of BLT 3/5 ashore will be participating in search and destroy operations in that portion of the AOA north of Objective
- 2. MISSION. To conduct a tactical withdrawal of the BLT from the objective area when ordered by the Landing Force Commander.
- EXECUTION.
  - a. Concept of Operations.
    - (1) Commencing W-hour, when directed, BLP 3/5 executes a tactical withdrawal from the objective area. Companies I and K and the Provisional Rifle Company will withdraw tactically to Landing Beach RED under the overall coordination of Bravo Command Group. The 107mm Mortar Section will be withdrawn by helicopter from its firing position in vicinity of LZ SPARROW. L and M Companies and elements of H&S Company







will proceed cross-country to vicinity LZ HAWK, and, when directed, will withdraw by helicopter to LPH-5.

#### b. Company L (Rein).

- (1) On order, conduct a tactical withdrawal from occupied positions to covering positions (to be designated) in vicinity LF Objective 3. Cover withdrawal of Companies I, K, and Provisional Company through LF Objective 3 and the helicopter withdrawal of the 107mm Mortar Section from LZ SPARHOW.
- (2) On order, conduct tactical withdrawal to LZ HAWX. In vicinity LZ SPARROW integrate the 81mm Mortar Platoon within tactical formation and continue movement to LZ HAWK.
- (3) When directed, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ HAWK.

#### c. Company M (Rein).

- (1) On order, conduct a tactical withdrawal from occupied positions to covering positions (to be designated) in vicinity of LF Objective 3. Cover withdrawal of Companies I, K, and Provisional Company through LF Objective 3 and the helicopter withdrawal of the 107mm Mortar Section from LZ SPARROW.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march to covering positions vicinity GC 875755 to 899755. Provide security for withdrawal of Company L and the 81mm Mortar Plateon from LZ HAWK.
- (3) On order proceed to LZ HAWK; withdraw via helicopter to LPH-5.

#### d. Company I (Rein).

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions by foot march to GS 9172.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march toward RED Beach, and occupy defensive positions vicinity RKD Beach.
- (3) On order, withdraw over RED Beach to AFA-222 by landing craft.

#### e. Company K (Rein).

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions by foot march to GS 9172.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march toward RED Beach, and occupy defensive positions vicinity of RED Beach.







(3) On order, withdraw over RED Beach to APA-222 by landing craft.

# f. Provisional Company.

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions by foot march to GS 9172.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march south toward RED Beach, and occupy defensive positions vicinity of RED Beach.
- (3) On order, withdraw over RED Beach to APA-222 by landing craft.

# g. 81mm Mort Plat (-).

- (1) On order, join Company L and tactically withdraw from occupied positions to vicinity of LZ HAWK; occupy firing positions and provide support for withdrawal.
- (2) When directed, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ HAWK.
- h. 107mm Mort Btry (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar. On order, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ SPARROW.
- i. 2d AmTrac Plat (-)(Rein), Company B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF.
  - (1) On order occupy defensive positions to cover the withdrawal of the Provisional Company and Companies I and K.
  - (2) When directed, after the withdrawal of the last infantry unit from the beach, withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33.

### j. H&S Company (-).


- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions to vicinity LZ SPARROW.
- (2) When directed, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ SPARROW.

### k. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) W-hour: To be announced.
- (2) All units will report to this Headquarters when commencing and completing withdrawal.
- (3) Equipment that cannot be recovered will be destroyed completely or damaged sufficiently to deny use by enemy forces (CON-STRUCTIVE).







- (4) Command Group Bravo will coordinate withdrawal of Companies I and K and the Provisional Rifle Company from GS 9172 to RED Beach and from RED Beach to assigned shipping.
- (5) On order, Command Group Bravo will withdraw by helicopter from vicinity of RED Beach to LPH-5.
- (6) Command Group Alpha will retain operational control over all BLT 3/5 elements during the withdrawal and will coordinate the withdrawal of forces from LZ SPARROW and LZ HAWK.
- (7) Command Group Alpha will withdraw by helicopter from LZ HAWK.
- (8) When coordination of supporting arms can no longer be effectively controlled by this Headquarters, return of coordination to SACC will be requested.


E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

DECLASSIFIED



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex I (Logistics) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1

(b) CTG 79.5, Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

### 1. SUPPLY

a. General. Supplies to be landed will be the minimum required to accomplish the mission.

### (1) Supply Source

- (a) LPH and APA will be the source of supply for all classes of supplies.
- (b) All supplies will be prepared and staged aboard assigned ships and ready for loading for helicopter or surface craft prior to D-Day.
- (c) The supply section BLT 3/5 and the Logistic Support Unit has the responsibility of preparing and staging all classes of supplies.

### (2) Prescribed Loads

- (a) Class I
  - 1 Meal Combat Individual 1 Day
  - 2 Fuel, Trioxane bar 1 Day

### (b) Class II

- 1 Minimum essential T/E and T/A items to accomplish the mission.
- 2 Dry cell batteries 1 Day


# (c) Class III

- 1 Vehicle gas tanks 3/4 full
- 2 All vehicles 3/4 ton or larger will carry one (1) 5 gallon can of MCGAS.
- 3 Special oils and lubrications as needed.









- (d) Class IV NONE
- (e) Class V. No live ammunition will be used.
- (f) Water. Two filled canteens per individual.
- (3) Uniform and Equipment. Light Marching Pack w/normal arms and equipment, utilities and helmet (green side out).

### b. Distribution and Control

- (1) TACLOG
  - (a) BLT 3/5 will establish TACLOG aboard the LPH and LSD.
  - (b) Resupply of all classes of supplies will be requested through the TACLOG.
- (2) Level of supplies within the objective area will not exceed one day of any class of supplies.
- (3) Custody, control, and distribution of supplies is a BLT responsibility.
- (4) Unit commanders will ensure that all supplies are safeguarded against damage, pilferage or waste both afloat and ashore.
- (5) All captured equipment/material will be reported to this Headquarters. Units will report the type, quantity, condition, location and time of capture of the equipment/material.
- (6) Use of captured equipment is prohibited unless approved by this Headquarters.

### 2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

### a. General

- (1) Sanitation and Preventative Medicine.
  - (a) The tropical climate and heavy rainfall in the operating area create special medical problems. Chief among these are heat exhaustion and tropical diseases. Foot infections from prolonged immersion in water are a distinct hazard. Use of local water or food products is prohibited.
  - (b) Unit commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.



### b. Evacuation

### (1) Movement


(a) Casualties occurring during shipboard phase will be evacuated as directed by CTG 79.5.


## (2) Assault

(a) Casualties occurring in landing craft or helicopters remain aboard if possible and be evacuated to medical facilities on the PRINCETON (LPH-5).

### (3) Ashore

- (a) Casualty classification Three classifications of casualties will be used:
  - 1 "Immediate" evacuation reserved for those cases which are considered immediately endangering life or limb. i.e. Shock, multiple serious wounds, hemorrhage, airway obstruction, etc., (but not limited to the examples given.)
  - 2 "Priority" evacuation reserved for those cases requiring the medical facilities afloat but not considered immediately life threatening. i.e. multiple superficial' lacerations requiring suturing, minor fractures, cellulitis or other infections, but not limited to these examples.
  - 3 "Routine" evacuation reserved for those cases of mild to moderate medical seriousness and who can be held ashore until sufficient numbers of cases accumulate to warrent dispatch of aircraft or surface craft to evacuate them, i.s., immersion foot, skin rashes, treated heat exhaustion cases, venereal disease cases, but not limited to these examples.
- (b) Casualties in the classification of "Immediate" and "Priority" will be evacuated direct to the LPH for treatment.
- (c) Casualties in the classification of "Routine" will be evacuated through the BAS for further treatment and/or further transportation to the LPH. If tactical considerations prevent evacuation to the BAS, these cases will be evacuated to the LPH,
- (d) Routine heat casualites will normally be treated at the BAS, and these cases may be evacuated to the BAS by helicopter.





### (4) Casualty Evacuation Control

- (a) The LPH-5, USS PRINCETON is designated the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS).
- (b) A medical officer on the LPH-5 will be designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

### c. <u>Hospitalization</u>

(1) As directed by the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

### d. Medical Administration

(1) Evacuation and Casualty reports will be in accordance with instructions contained in Battalion Order 3040.1.

### 3. TRANSPORTATION

- a. Air
  - (1) See Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 330-66
  - (2) All troop transportation requests will be submitted to the BLT S-3.


## b. Land

- (1) Control Measures
  - (a) Beach support areas Shore Party
  - (b) Zones of Action Unit Commanders

### (2) Circulation

- (a) MSR's and TCP's to be established ashore.
- (b) Marking of routes Units responsible in their areas of responsibility.
- (c) Traffic Priorities
  - 1 Ambulances
  - 2 Vehicles maintaining communications.
  - 3 Vehicles moving forward.
  - 4 Vehicles moving to the rear.

I-4



- 1 Black out lights during hours of darkness.
- 2 Speed limits in accordance with Para 704.3b of BnO 3000.4
- 3 Tracked vehicles avoid use of roads whenever practicable. Use of MSR only with express authority of this Headquarters.
- (e) All units submit reports on conditions of roads and bridges in respective zones to this Headquarters.

### 4. SERVICE

### a. Functions

- (1) Construction NONE
- (2) <u>Maintenance</u> <u>Maximum</u> use of contact teams and end item replacements.
- (3) Salvage
  - (a) All units report type, quantity, condition and location of salvage material to this Headquarters.
- 5. PERSONNEL. See Battalion Order 3040.1

### 6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Security of weapons and other highly negotiable items will be of the paramount importance. Pistols will not be issued to personnel prior to D-Day. Unit Commanders will ensure maximum security measures are maintained aboard ship and ashore.
- b. No equipment/material will be left ashore unattended.
- c. All empty water cans will be returned on available helicopters.
- d. Report all classes of supplies expended or consumed to this Headquarters upon completion of the operation.

E. J. Bronars

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex J (Rehearsal) to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS Series S711 NR 3064 III (1:50,000) Silanguin Island AMS Series S711 NR 3064 II (1:50,000) San Antonio


Time Zone: H

- 1. <u>SITUATION</u>. A rehearsal landing for Operation HILLTOP will be conducted at Green Beach and Landing Zone Swan, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.
  - a. Enemy Forces: None
  - b. Friendly Forces: Paragraph 1b, Operation Order 330-66
- 2. <u>MISSION</u>. BLT 3/5 conducts a rehearsal landing in order to test the landing plan, communications and control procedures, capability of supporting forces, and to ensure troop familiarity with orders,

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations
  - (1) BLT 3/5 conducts a rehearsal landing over Green Beach to include landing of scheduled surface waves and into Landing Zone Swan for scheduled helicopter waves.
  - (2) There will be no enemy situation and no tactical maneuver of troops ashore.
  - (3) Complete Pre-H-hour transfers will be carried out early on D-Day.
  - (4) LVT wave land over Green Beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
  - (5) LVT wave proceed inland to clear beach area and debark troops in an area to facilitate rapid turn around, but not to interfere with helicopter operations.
  - (6) Heliborne companies (approximately 60 men per company; 4 waves with 10 A/C per wave) in Landing Zone Swan.
  - (7) ICM-8's will touch down, but Ontos will not land.
  - (8) In backload, LVT's will return to LSD-33; troops will return via landing craft to APA 222.





- (1) No tactical play ashore.
- (2) Emphasize rapid and correct deplaning/debarking procedures and tactical deployment at the beach and landing zone.
- (3) Waterborne troops retain life jackets for return to parent ship.
- (4) Green Beach centered coordinates SS998400.
- (5) HLZ Swan centered coordinates SS 997404.
- (6) D-Day (Rehearsal)-To be designated.
- (7) H-hour To be designated
- (8) L-hour To be designated

# 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Annex I (Logistics) to Operation Order 330-66
- b. Medical evacuation from beach to PCS or from IZ to LPH as appropriate.

### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- a. Communications in accordance with Annex F. Call signs, radio and frequency plan will be issued separately.
- b. Command Posts: Paragraph 5 basic order.

E. J. Bronars


Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

### APPENDIXES:

1. Helicopter Employment

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Appendix 1 (Helicopter Employment) to Annex J (Rehearsal) to Operation Order 330-66

### 1. GENERAL

- a. Helicopter employment during the rehearsal for HILLTOP will be limited to four waves of ten (10) helicopters per wave.
- b. Two waves will simulate the landing of the assault elements of each rifle company.

### 2. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Wave rendezvous point (WRP/IP ALPHA) is designated the NW corner of Grande Island.
- b. Landing zone SWAN (located at SS 997404).
- c. SAR reference point will be LPH TACAN, 5 IDENT XY.
- d. Helicopters will be under the positive control of LPH or HDC at all times.
- e. Altitude assignments:
  - (1) From LPH to WRP/IP 5001.
  - (2) From WRP to LZ 5001.
  - (3) From LZ to WRP to LPH 1000'.

6. J. Bronars E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps


Commanding

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Annex K (Reference Point Overlay) to Operation Order 330-66



D


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Ref: (a) Maps: AMS 501-ND 51-13 (1:250,000) SAN JOSE AMS 3733-3256IV (1:50,000) AMBULONG AMS S733-3257III (1:50,000) SAN JOSE AMS S733-3157II (1:50,000) ADELA

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


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See J. M. See . .



BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 190800H May 1966

Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 330-66

Time Zone: H

CMC (Code AO3H) 2 CommO, BLT 3/5 1 CINCPAC 1 MedO, BLT 3/5 1 CG, FMFPac 1 MTO, BLT 3/5 1 Dir, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico 1 SupO, BLT 3/5 1 COWSELEVENTHFLT 1 Chaplain, BLT 3/5 1 CG, III MAF 1 CO, H&S Co, BLT 3/5 3	UNIT NO O	TES UNIT NO OF	COPIES
CTG 76 CTF 79 CG, lstMarDiv CG, lstMarDiv CG, 3rdMarDiv CO, Co L, BLT 3/5 CO, Go M, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, BLT 3/5 CO, Go M, BLT 3/5 CO,	CINCPAC CG, FMFPac CG, FMFPac Dir, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico COMSELEVENTHFLT CG, III MAF CTG 76 CTF 79 CG, lstMarDiv CG, 3rdMarDiv CG, 3rdMarDiv CO, 5th Mar CTG 76.5 CTG 79.5 CO, USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) CO, USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) CO, USS ALAMO (LSD-33) CO, HMM 364 CO, BLT 3/5 XO, BLT 3/5 S-1, BLT 3/5 S-2, BLT 3/5	MedO, BLT 3/5 MTO, BLT 3/5 SupO, BLT 3/5 Chaplain, BLT 3/5 CO, H&S Co, BLT 3/5 CO, Go I, BLT 3/5 CO, Co K, BLT 3/5 CO, Co L, BLT 3/5 CO, Co L, BLT 3/5 CO, Co M, BLT 3/5 CO, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar CO, 107 Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar 2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn 6th Plat (-)(Rein), lst Force Recon Co, FMF 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, lst Recon Bn 2d SPTm, Co B, 1st SP Bn Logistic Support Unit Det, Beachmaster Unit, Naval Beachgroup	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

[. ]. Bromars E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies BLT 3/5 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) 241500H May 1966

Change No. 1 to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. Substitute the following new page, attached hereto, for the original page, destroying the replaced page and reporting destruction to this headquarters:

a. Annex D, Appendix 8. Page D-8-19, D-8-20 Ch made w/o destruction

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRONARS

J. T. ELKINS

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

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Change No. 2 to Operation Order 330-66

Ref: None

Time Zone H

- 1. Make the following pen changes in Operation Order 330-66.
  - a. Annex C
    - (1) Change left grid coordinates "8573" to read "8671".
    - (2) Change center of LZ HAWK to coordinates 887716.
- b. Annex D, Appendix 9. Change center of LZ HAWK to coordinates 887716.
  - c. Annex K
    - √(1) Page K-1. Change top grid coordinates "9088" to read "8088".
    - '(2) Page K-2. Change bottom reference point "W" to read "K".

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL BROWARS

Major, U.S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

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HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco, California 96502

SERIAL NO.

0141-66

3/ACM/jec 3121

1 June 1966

COFY# 12 of 26 COPIES

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)

Subj: After Action Report for Operation HILLTOP V

Ref:

(a) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 330-66

(b) Maps: AMS S 501 - ND 51-13 (1:250,000) SAN JOSE AMS S 733 - 3256 IV (1:50,000) AMEULONG AMS S 733 - 3257 VI (1:50,000) SAN JOSE - AMS S 733 - 3157 II (1:50,000) ADELA

(c) BnO 3000.4.

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay of Area

- 1. Operation HILLTOP V was a training exercise that utilized surface borne and helicopter borne assault forces in an amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore.
- 2. D-day for this operation was 25 May 1966. HILLTOP V terminated on 27 May 1966. The target area for Operation HILLTOP V was the San Jose area of Mindoro, a lowland costal plain that gently rose to the NE finally reaching a height of 200 meters.
- 3. The BLT 3/5 Command Post initially was located on the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At L+30 minutes, the Command Group moved ashore by helicopter to 930745 in LZ SPARROW. At H+6 hours, the Command Post displaced to 934762, and remained at that location for the remainder of the operation.

# Task Organization

BLT 3/5

LtCol BRONARS

.H&S Co (-)

Det, Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm)

Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)

The constraint of

Det, Radio Relay Sec, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 5th Mar

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Marine Division, FMF

Det, Radio Relay Plat, Comm Co

Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co

Det, Postal Unit, Adj Sec, Div Hq, Hq Co


Det, 1st Dental Co, FMF

Det, 1st Medical Bn

Det, Serv Sec, Co Hq, 3d Coll Sec, Coll Plat

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.





Logistic Support Unit
Det, Prov Serv Bn, 9th MAB
Det, Supply Sec
Det, Maint Sec
Det, H/S Sec
Det, H/S Sec
Det, H&S Co, 3d FSR
2d SP Tm, Co B, 1st SP Bn
2d Landing Spt Plat
Det, H&S Co, 1st SP Bn
Det, Deachmanter Unit-1
2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st MT Bn
2d Plat
Det, Maint Sec, Co Hq, Co B, 1st MT Bn

## Co I (Rein)

Co I
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (3n Scouts)
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
lst Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, lst Engr Bn

### Co K (Rein)

Co K
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
FAC Tm
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Sccuts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn. 11th Mar
Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NCF Spot Tm)

### Co L (Rein)

Co L
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co
FAC Tm
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar
2d Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

### Btry F (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Btry F (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 11th Mar


### Capt GLAIZE

Capt MARESCO

Capt TATUM

· Capt HARRIS

2





3121 1 June 1,00

# 107mm Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mort Btry Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

# 81mm Mort Plat (-)(Rein)

Lt KIRSCHKE

81mm Mort Plat (-) Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

# 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

Lt GRESSIY

2d Plat Det, Co Hq, Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

# 3d Plat (Rein), Co B. 1st AT Bn

Lt EUCHANAN

3d Plat Det, Co Hq, Co B, 1st AT Bn

# 3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Lt TOTH

3d Plat (-)
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn

# 106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein)

Lt. CHRISTIANS

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

### 2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF

Lt. SKEY

2d Plat
Det, Hq Sec, Co Hq, Co C, lst Tk Bn
Det, H&S Co, lst Tk En


### BLT Reserve

Capt PETTENGILL

# Co M (Rein)

Co M
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Flat
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

3



### 5. Intelligence

- a. The area of operations is a lowland coastal plain. It is flanked on the east by low hills of 50 to 80 meters in height. The plain is flanked on the north some 9000 meters inland by the same chain of low hills. The area is predominantly paddy cultivated in wetland rice with extensive areas of grazing land. The area is interlaced with numerous streams, ditches and canals. Heavy rains prior to and throughout the operation caused extensive flooding in the objective area. All streams were flooded and running extremely fast and, as a result, were difficult to cross in many instances. The road network, only fair in good weather, was impaired considerably; both roads and bridges were washed out. These elements made all modes of overland movement, including foot, extremely difficult.
- b. Enemy sightings, contacts, intelligence, and interrogation results confirmed the following Order of Battle in the objective area:

UNIT	STRENGTH	LOCATION	
3rd Company, 71st Battalion 116th Special Defense Company 1st Provincial Rifle Brigade	160 105 435	978752 9278 and 9578 Unknown	

- c. Intelligence received prior to the commencement of the operation indicated the existence of 3 enemy installations; Tencham, a combined arms training camp located at TP 8768; Coam Chan, a radio relay station located in the village of Bagong Sikat at TP 8968. Tencham was in fact a temporary base and training camp and was destroyed when Objective 1 was taken. No enemy contact was made in Bagong Sikat and it is unlikely that a command post existed in that village.
- d. No substantial contact with elements of the above listed enemy units was made in the AOA. The original estimate that the enemy would fight small unit delaying and harassing engagements held true. Enemy contacts were limited to probes of small units of 3 to 20 men. Enemy units were limited to local units and the enemy was never reinforced by the 21st Regiment reportedly located north of the AOA.
- 6. Mission. As directed by the SLF Frag Order #1 for the HILLTOP V Operation, the mission assigned to BLT 3/5 was: "Commencing at H-hour and L-hour on D-day, land in the San Jose area of enemy nation and conduct an amphibious raid to attack and destroy specific enemy installations and eliminate enemy forces located therein. To conduct deliberate search and destroy operations to destroy enemy installations and capture or destroy enemy personnel in the remainder of the AOA.

7. Concept of the Operation. The BLT 3/5 scheme of maneuver in San Jose area during Operation HILLTOP V was scheduled to be conducted in three phases over a period of 3 days. In Phase I Companies I and K would be landed by surface craft over RFD Beach to attack and seize Objectives 1 and 2; Companies L and M would be landed by helicopter in LZ SPANROW to secure the LZ for subsequent landings and to attack and destroy enemy installations, equipment and personnel on Objective 3; Has Company and other combat support service elements would be introduced both in LZ SPARROW and over RFD Beach. In Phase II, Companies I and M would seize the high ground northeast of LZ SPARROW, while Companies I and K would conduct search and destroy operations from Objectives 1 and 2 to Phase Line Alpha. For Phase III, Company TAR's would be established in the area north of LZ SPARROW to search for and locate the anemy by extensive patrolling and to destroy him by ambushing and coordinated action when possible. The Provisional Company would be landed by surface craft on on D+l and then by helicopter in LZ SPARROW to provide five rifle maneuver elements ashore. Finally, on order, the BLT would conduct a tactical overland and helicopter withdrawal to assigned shipping.

### 8. Execution

- a. D-day 25 May 1966.
- (1) The first wave scheduled for RED Beach consisted of LVT's carrying Company K. The landing went smoothly with Company K hitting the beach at O8OOH. It immediately swept northeast toward Objective 1. It's landing was unopposed. At O815H, Company I came ashore in LCVP in trace of Company K; it's landing likewise was unopposed. Company I immediately swept to the right flank of Co K to seize and defend Objective 2. At O815H, F Battery and Shore Party Recon Parties came ashore with elements of H&S Co, followed by Shore Party, Engineer Platoon, AntiTank Platoon, and Beachmaster Unit at O834H. F Battery came ashore at 1015H and began moving into position.
- (2) L-hour was set for 0830H and the initial wave transporting Company L lifted off the LPH-5 at 0810H. Company L landed at 0830H and secured LZ SPARROW, established a defensive perimeter by 0935H and attacked north to destroy enemy installations, equipment, and personnel on Objective 3. After the Command Group arrived LZ SPARROW at 0900H, Company M was landed at 0910H and was designated the BLT Reserve. Co M secured the high ground to the east and northeast of LZ SPARROW. The 81mm Mortar Platoon was introduced by helicopter at 0930H and the 107mm Howtar Battery at 1000H; they were in position to support from LZ SPAR-ROW by 1015H and 1100H respectively. The 105mm Howitzer Battery (-) was landed at RED Beach at 1015H. However, due to difficulties encountered while attempting to cross a slue, F Battery (-) was forced to call on LVT's to transport them to suitable firing positions. This was not accomplished until 1630H. By nightfall the Battery was prepared to fire missions in general support of the BLT.



- (3) Moving from RED Beach to seize Objectives 1 and 2, Companies I and K met with sporadic enemy resistance from squad size units supported by automatic weapons. Company I sustained two casualties from other than enemy action. By sunset, Companies I and K had established defensive positions west and southwest of LZ SPARROW.
- (4) By nightfall, night defensive positions were established as follows:
- (a) Company I in defensive position at 922750. Perimeter extended 300 meters south and west of Go CP.
- (b) Company K in defensive position with Co CP located at 900703. Fositions extended from 899704 to 901702.
- (c) Company L in defensive perimeter north and northwest of LZ SPARROW with Co CP at 920735. Positions extended from 923767 to 921733.
- (d) Company M in defensive perimeter northeast and east of LZ SPARROW with Co CP at 960750. Positions extended from 957753 to 962748.
  - (e) 81mm Mortar Platoon at 960750 in firing positions.
  - (f) 107mm Howtar Battery at 923767 in firing positions.
  - (g) 105mm Howitzer Battery at 922750 in firing positions.
- (5) Company K reported light contact from an enemy force estimated to be a squad.
  - (6) Company L reported constant light probes of their position.
  - (7) Company M reported no contact.
- (8) Other activity the night of D-day consisted of one fire mission by F Battery on suspected enemy position vicinity 915716. 2 enemy KIA (possible).
  - b. D+1 26 May 1966.
- (1) At 0220H, Company I received probing fire from the enemy at 924755. They suffered no casualties and reported no enemy casualties.
- (2) At 0350H, Company I received 12 60mm Mortar rounds at coordinate 920747. There were no friendly casualties. At 0800, Company I received sniper fire in their CF. Six enemy were flushed by a patrol and one enemy was killed.







- (3) At first light on D+1, Companies I and K began search and destroy operations as they pushed out patrols from Phase Line Alpha. Resistance was light and no more than squad sized enemy units were encountered.
- (h) Backload of F Battery, Tank and AntiTank units, which were to be helilifted in on D+1 as the Provisional Company, began at 0930H and was completed by 1100. All units were reembarked aboard the USS ALAMO (LSD-33).
- (5) Company L, located north of LZ SPARROW during the daylight hours of D+1, had the mission of providing BLT CP security and protecting the 107mm Mortar Battery. Company L received a probe from an estimated enemy squad at 1230H. A patrol was dispatched to sweep the area. The patrol captured two enemy at 928758; the rest of the squad fled. At 1500H, Company L made contact with five enemy at 929751; the enemy fled but were pursued by fire resulting in 2 enemy KIA.
- (6) The 107mm Mortar Battery fired 13 missions in expending 90 rounds of the area confirmed 18 enemy KIA and 7 WIA.
- (7) Company M, located northeast of LZ SPARROW, was assigned a TAR and set up platoon/squad patrols to cover their TAR. During the daylight hours of D+1, contact was very light with vertually no contact during the day.
- (8) At 1500H, a patrol from Engineer Platoon, while on a recon to determine the fordability of the river ingrid square 9474, encountered 4 enemy. The patrol surprised and captured same.
- (9) At 1630H, elements of the Provisional Rifle Company were helilifted into positions north and northwest of LZ SPARROW to relieve Company L of its duty as CP security. At 1800H, the Provisional Rifle Company was in position at 936763.
- (10) By dusk on D+1, night defensive positions were established as follows:
- (a) Company I in defensive perimeter at 922750, west of LZ SPARROW, from 919751 to 923749.
- (b) Company K in defensive position at 900760, northwest of LZ SPARROW, from 898758 to 901761.
- (c) Company L in defensive position at 920765, northwest of LZ SPARROW, from 923765 to 918762.
- (d) Company M in defensive position at 960750, east of LZ SPARROW, from 968753 to 961748.



- (e) Provisional Company in defensive position at 963763, north of LZ SPARROW, from 960765 to 963760.
- (11) During the night of D+1, at 2000H a squad patrol from Company M encountered an enemy patrol of squad size in vicinity of 964768; 3 enemy KIA and 1 captured. At 2300H, Company M was probed by the enemy and a brief fire-fight ensued; Company M expended 40 rounds and the enemy broke contact. Results were unknown.
- (12) Companies I, K, L, and the Provisional Company sent out extensive patrols and laid ambushes but had regative contact.
- (13) Psychological Warfare operations conducted on the night of D+1 met with a slight degree of success. Pleas to the inhabitants of the village located at 929755 to turn in the enemy living among them led to a hostile reply and an attitude of hostility on the part of the villagers. This attitude reflected itself in the cool reception a Medical Civic Action team received upon entering the village to treat the sick. Psychological Warfare efforts on D+2, however, resulted in the surrender of 17 enemy requesting the hot meal and resettlement promised in team broadcasts.

### c. D+2 - 27 May 1966.

(1) At 0800H, the withdrawal plan was ordered executed. The withdrawal plan was conducted in twelve phases utilizing three L7's and RED Beach. Commencing at 0800H, Companies I, K, Provisional and the Bravo Command Group commenced a tactical withdrawal to RED Beach. At 0850H, H&S Company was withdrawn by helicopter from LZ CARDINAL to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At 0945H, the 107mm Howtar Battery was withdrawn by helicopter from LZ GOOSE to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At 1005H, Company M and the 81mm Mortar Platoon were withdrawn by helicopter from LZ FALCON to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At 1235H, Alpha Command Group was withdrawn by helicopter from LZ CARDINAL and remained airborn to control the withdrawal until all units except the Provisional Rifle Company and Bravo Command Group were withdrawn from the AOA. At 1235H, Company L withdrew from LZ CARDINAL to USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At 1310H, Companies I and K embarked on an LCU and were transported to the USS PICKAWAY (APA-222). The Alpha Command Group returned to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) at 1420H. At 1455H the Bravo Command. Group and the Provisional Company embarked on an LCU and were transported to USS ALAMO (LSD-33).

### 9. Results

### a. Bnemy

(1) The following is an assessment of enemy personnel casualties inflicted by BLT 3/5: KIA - 42, Possible KIA - 2; WIA - 7; Possible WIA 2; Captured - 24.



- (2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured by BLT 3/5:
  - (a) 1 AN/PRC-47 Radio.
  - (b) 34 M-14 Rifles.
  - (c) 1 .45 Cal Pistol.
  - (d) 2 AN/PRC-10 Radios.

# b. Friendly

- (1) Casualties sustained by BLT 3/5 are summarized below:
  - (a) Non-combat 2.
  - (b) KIA 0.
  - (c) WIA 0.
    - (d) MIA O.
- (2) Major items of equipment lost are listed below:
  - (a) AN/PRC-10 Radio #22998.
  - (b) M-14 Rifle #950014.
  - (c) M-14 Rifle #552799.
  - (d) M-14 Rifle #419164.
  - (e) M-14 Rifle #436365.
  - (f) M-14 Rifle #570084.
  - (g) Antenna, AT 271/PRC and Base.
  - (h) Antenna, AT 271/PRC and Base.
    - (i) Hand Set, H-33/PT.
  - (j) .45 Cal Pistol #1518608.
  - (k) .45 Cal Pistol #1949080;



- (1) Compass.
- (m) AN/PRC-9 Radio #6950.
- (n) 42 5-gal water cans.

### 10. Administrative Matters

- a, Combat Loads, Combat loads were considered adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.
- b. Maintenance. Since no vehicles were taken from the immediate area of RED Beach and none were utilized during Operation HILETOP V by inland units, maintenance was negligible. However, in an actual combat operation, the BLT would provide 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance while Detachment, 1st Service Battalion would provide 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance.
- c. Casualties. During Operation HILLTOP V, there were only three actual casualties, Two were minor injuries and were routed to the BAS located on RED Beach and from there to the USS PICKAWAY (APA-222). On D+2, a casualty was sustained from a blank M-14 round fired in the eye. The individual concerned was given immediate aid from a hospital corpsman and evacuated to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) by helicopter.
- d. Evacuation, A night evacuation by helicopter of one actual casualty was handled promptly and efficiently by all units concerned. The evaucation site was well marked and the ground unit concerned provided excellent terminal guidance; helicopter evacuation was accomplished promptly and professionally; processing and treatment aboard the LPH was expeditious and effective.
- e. Transportation and Resupply. The ship-to-shore movement and with-drawal were accomplished by helicopters and surface craft. Once ashore, resupply and evacuation was performed solely by helicopter. During the operation, adequate landing zones were established in the vicinity of all rifle companies and supporting units requiring helicopter resupply and evacuation support. Initially, the landing zones were not in all cases adequately marked; by the end of the exercise, however, this deficiency was corrected and all landing zones were well marked with appropriate panels. The prohibition on the use of pyrotechnics in the exercise, however, complicated resupply and evacuation by helicopter by denying one of the primary means for signalling approaching helicopters.
- f. Communications. Communications between BLT and SLF were almost completely dependent upon portable HF and FM radio equipment. The HF radios offered excellent communications for the entire operation and the BB-451 batteries usually a prime source of trouble, presented virtually no problem. A centralized battery float was operated aboard the LPH and batteries needing recharging were flown aboard and immediately replaced with fresh batteries. The single break in HF communications was due to the unavailability

3121 Tune 1966

of one AN/PRC-47 radio for Shore Party which prevented the Beach Support Area from entering the BLT Command/TACLOG net. This problem should not recur since the radio has been repaired and is back in operation, FM radios continue to cause trouble due to the limited ranges of the AN/PRC-8, 9 and 10 radios. Even with the use of an RC-292 antenna communications were often marginal. It is strongly recommended that the BLT be provided AN/PRC-25 radios to insure reliability. It is also recommended that the BLT be provided a UPM-48 signal generator to provide a capability for aligning FM radios.

One other means of communications was established when a brief radio relay shot was made providing channels between FSCC and SACC, BLT S-3 and SLF S-3, and BLT S-4 and BLT TACLOG.

Air to ground communications was never satisfactory. The only apparent reason is that the BLT radics and the equivalent helicopter radics were not accurately calibrated.

## 11. Special Techniques

a. A Provisional Rifle Company, composed of personnel from artillery, motor transport, tank and antitank units not directly involved in the scheme of maneuver, was activated. This provided valuable training for these supporting units in a mission they will likely be required to perform in the future. During this exercise, the introduction of the Provisional Company allowed a rifle company to be released from a mission to provide security around the BLT Command Post and the 107mm Howtar firing position.

### 12. Commander's Analysis.

a. General. Operation HILLTOP V was an excellent vehicle to test the combat readiness of BLT 3/5; to thoroughly familiarize the ELT Staff and Unit Commanders with operational procedures and techniques practiced during SLF operations; to test communications within the BLT, with the Special Landing Force, and with the Supporting Arms Coordinator; to familiarize the BLT Staff and Unit Commanders with the reporting and requesting procedures utilized during SLF operations. In the process of training objectives established for the exercise were satisfactorily accomplished. In retrospect, operation HILLTOP V is considered to have been highly successful in that great benefit was derived by all participants. Areas of weakness were uncovered and essential training was accomplished.

### b. Planning

(1) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 330-66 was received in adequate time to conduct the necessary detailed, joint planning required with all elements of the Landing Force. When necessary CTG 79.5 Frag Orders amplified the basic order and were again received in ample time to permit the BLT to prepare and issue timely orders to subordinate units.




- (2) Planning for the operation was adequate in all respects except for the failure to plan NGF preparations on assigned landing beaches, HLZ's, LF objectives and suspected enemy installations. This failure proved to be critical when weather conditions did not permit planned preparations by strike aricraft to be conducted.
- c. Command Relationship's. Command relationships were established as prescribed by amphibious doctrine and presented no problem.

### 13. Lessons learned and Recommendations.

- a. Overall Value. The monsoonal rains and the close similarity of the physical environment which exist makes this training area readily sulfed for realistically depicting environmental conditions which prevail in South Viet Nam.
- (1) Recommendation: that BLT's assigned to the SLF be scheduled for a Hillton Exercise as soon after assuming the SLF mission as possible.
- \* b. Communications. Based upon careful consideration of communications problems incountered during Operation HILLTOP V, the following recommendations are made:
- (1) That the FM radio equipment aboard ship undergo a thorough technical inspection and be repaired as necessary.
- (a) <u>Background</u>. The FM net between BLT and CLF was never dependable. As an example, on the morining of 27 May one set blew 12 tubes, another blew eight.
- (2) That the SLF procure an URM-48 Signal Generator to provide a capability for aligning FM radios.
- (a) <u>Background</u>. Many of the problems expericenced in FM communications within the <u>BLT</u>, between the <u>BLT</u> and the <u>SLF</u>, and between the <u>BLT</u> and the helicopter squadron can be attributed to radio allignment. A capability of properly aligning FM radio equipment should be organic to the <u>SLF</u> because of the independent nature of its operations.
- (3) That the BLT not be used to provide back-up radios for equipment used aboard ship to communications with the BLT ashore.
- (a) <u>Background</u>: Two AN/PRC-10 and two MRC-83 radios were used as back-up for ship radios communications with the BLT ashore. These radios are normally required by the BLT ashore and their planned use as back-up equipment for radios provided by the ship automatically reduces the BLT communication capability ashore.





- (a) <u>Background</u>, Air to ground communications were never satisfactory between company and supporting helicopters. Company tactical nets operate on set frequencies established by the platoon crystal-operated AN/PRC 6 radios. Helicopter FM radios should be calibrated to these set frequencies.
  - (5) That companies be assigned tactical frequencies which are compatible with helicopter FM equipment.
  - (a) <u>Background</u>. Helicopter resupply and evacuation support to infantry companies is most effectively coordinated by having the helicopter come up on the company tactical net whenever flying a resupply or evacuation mission in support of a company. Helicopter FM radio equipment was not compatible with some of the assigned company tactical net frequencies.
    - (6) That AN/PRC-25 radio sets be procured for the SLF BLT.
  - (a) <u>Background</u>. SLF operations frequently require extensive separation between companies. The limited ranges of the AN/PRC-8, 9 and 10 radios very often provide very marginal communications, particularly in heavily vegetated areas,

### c. Helicopter Resupply


- (1) That, if at all possible, the resupply helicopter should enter the company tactical net when flying a resupply mission to that particular company.
- (a) The initial instructions for resupply specified that the company would enter the HMM Tacnet when providing terminal guidance for helicopters to the company landing zone. This resulted in several units who were expecting resupply to enter the HMM Tacnet whenever a helicopter passed over the area.
- (2) That a simplified form for requesting resupply be adopted and published.
- (a) Background. Errors made in submitting requests for resupply resulted in unnecessary confusion.
  - d. Supporting Arms.


### (1) NGF and Artillery

(a) NGF missions approved almost immediately, whereas Artillery took from 40 secs to 15 minutes to get SACC approval.


- (b) Closer coordination with SACC will improve this; however, it appears that control will not pass ashore to the FSCC. This handicaps are tillery in the FSCC because they don't have sufficient personnel to man the nets or comm gear to get SACC control.
- c. Solution: establish a FSCC-SACC net for NGF/Artillery use. It would be primarily for artillery since NGF missions are approved from fire support ship to SACC.
- (1) In order to establish this net FSCC must be augmented with the comm gear necessary to establish the net and the personnel necessary to operate the gear (two operators) on a twenty-four hour basis.

E. J. Bronars









ENCLOSURE (1)

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