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HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 3/5  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, F&F  
APO San Francisco, California 96602

5750  
3 July 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronology Report for Period  
311000Z May66 to 020130Z July66

Ref: (a) CMC 5750.2A

Encl: ✓(1) BLT 3/5 Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events (5)  
(2) BLT 3/5 Chronology of Events (5)

(3) BLT 3/5 Combat After Action Rpt, DECKHOUSE I AND NATHAN HALE

1. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronology, consisting of enclosures (1) and (2), is submitted in accordance with the format contained in reference (a).

2. The time period of this report was expanded two days in order to encompass the completion of operations ashore.

E. J. BURGESS

2 (4) BLT 3/5 Operation Order 328-66.

SERIAL NO. 00143-66

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OF ENCLOSURES (1) AND (2)

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1. Headquarters, Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, Fleet Marine Force.

a. Location: U.S.S. PRINCETON (LPH-5)

b. Period Covered: 311600Z May66 - 020430Z July66.

c. LtCol E. J. BROWNE

Maj J. T. ELKINS

2ndLt B. F. BAGGS

1stLt J. W. SINS

Maj R. A. MONFORT

Capt R. W. VORREYER

Capt H. S. MAUPY

Capt S. S. GLAIZE

Capt R. E. MARESCO

Capt R. P. TATUM

Capt M. D. PATTENAIL

Commanding Officer

Executive Officer

S-1

S-2

S-3

S-4

NAS Company Commander

I Company Commander

K Company Commander

L Company Commander

M Company Commander

## 2. Commander's Narrative of Significant Events

a. Headquarters and Service Company (-), Communications Platoon and the Division Motor Transport Platoon commenced two days of Jungle Environmental Training in the USNB Subic Bay training areas on 1 June. Battery F, Second Battalion, Eleventh Marines, Naval Gunfire Liaison Team, 81mm Mortar Platoon and FSCC conducted a three day Firax at Zambales Impact Areas One and Two and GREEN Beach. The Shore Party and Engineer Platoons conducted a three day combined demolitions and Helicopter Support Team Training Course for designated rifle company personnel at GREEN Beach - Impact Area One, Zambales. Rifle Firax was accomplished for 90 personnel and a Sniperscope Firax for 20 rifle company personnel at the Boton Valley Rifle Range.

b. On 6 June Brigadier General RYAN, Commanding General 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, visited the Special Landing Force Training at USNB Subic Bay, P.I. Battery F, Second Battalion, Eleventh Marines, Anti-Tank Platoon, 107mm Mortar Battery, Engineer Platoon, Shore Party Platoon and Battalion Staff Section Personnel commenced two days of Jungle Environmental Training.

c. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 departed USNB Subic Bay, P.I. on 8 June aboard AMB shipping. For the next ten days Battalion Landing Team 3/5 was maintained in a ready status off the coast of the Republic of Vietnam. On 14 June planning was begun for operation "DECKHOUSE I".

Enclosure (1)

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BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 6 June Brigadier General RYAN, Commanding General 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, visited USNB Subic Bay and observed battalion Landing Team 3/5 in training.
- 8 June Battalion Landing Team 3/5 departed USNB Subic Bay, P.I. for operations as part of the Special Landing Force.
- 9-17 June Battalion Landing Team 3/5 was maintained in readiness as part of the Special Landing Force in waters off the coast of the Republic of Vietnam.
- 14 June Battalion Landing Team 3/5 commenced planning for Operation "DECKHOUSE I".
- 18 June Battalion Landing Team 3/5 landed near Song Cau, Phu Yen Province, Republic of Vietnam on Operation "DECKHOUSE I".
- 27 June Battalion Landing Team 3/5 terminated Operation "DECKHOUSE I" and commenced participation in Operation "NATHAN HALE". The Special Landing Force was placed under operational control of Commanding General, First Cavalry Division (Airmobile).\*
- 30 June The Special Landing Force reverted to operational control of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.\*\*
- 2 July Withdrawal of Special Landing Force from Amphibious Objective Area completed.

\*Commander, Seventh Fleet 270032Z June66

\*\*Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 301114Z June66

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Enclosure (2)

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4. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 commenced operation "DECKHOUSE I" on 18 June near Song Cam, Phu Yen province, Republic of Vietnam. Operation "DECKHOUSE I" was terminated on 27 June. On this same date the Special Landing Force, was placed under operational control of Commanding General, First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) as designated by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam for participation in operation "NATHAN HALE". Operational control of the Special Landing Force was returned to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet on 30 June and a withdrawal was conducted. Completion of the Special Landing Force withdrawal from the Amphibious Objective Area occurred at 0200Z July 1966.

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Enclosure (1)

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Battalion Landing Team 3/5  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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8 July 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)  
Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE I and  
Operation NATHAN HALE

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66  
(b) Maps: AMS L 701 - 6850 I (1:50,000) HOA DA (I)  
AMS L 701 - 6850 IV (1:50,000) NGAN-SON  
AMS L 701 - 6851 I (1:50,000) PHU HOI  
AMS L 701 - 6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM  
AMS L 701 - 6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI  
AMS L 701 - 6851 IV (1:50,000) THACK KHE

Encl: (1) Report of DECKHOUSE I  
Tab (a) Overlay of AOA

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(2) Report of NATHAN HALE  
Tab (b) Operations Overlay of NATHAN HALE

1. This report is submitted in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).

2. Operation DECKHOUSE I was an amphibious operation that utilized surface borne and helicopter borne assault forces. Operation NATHAN HALE was an extension of Operation DECKHOUSE I utilizing assault forces in an expanded TAR with SLF under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

3. D-day for Operation DECKHOUSE I was 18 June 1966. At 281200H Operation DECKHOUSE I terminated when operational control of the Special Landing Force was chopped from CINCPACFLT to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Operation NATHAN HALE commenced at 281200H and terminated at 010800H when operational control of the Special Landing Force reverted to CINCPACFLT.

4. The target area of Operation DECKHOUSE I and Operation NATHAN HALE was the Song Cau area of Phu Yen Province, an area of cultivated river valleys, terraced hills and steep, thickly vegetated mountains.

5. BLT 3/5 Command Post initially was located on the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At H+8 on D-day, the Command Post was established ashore at CQ 088788 in vicinity of Landing Force Objective ALPHA. On D+10, the

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Encl (5)

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Command Post displaced to CQ 073713, in the village of Chi Thank (1) for Operation NATHAN HALE. It remained at that location for the remainder of the operation.

6. Administrative Matters

a. Logistics

(1) Combat Loads

(a) The combat load was considered adequate to accomplish the mission. Armored vests were not worn. One meal combat per individual was also prescribed in an effort to keep the load carried by the individual marine as light as possible. Although an element of risk was involved, it is considered to be minor; the decisions were based on available intelligence and forecast of clear skies. Excellent flying conditions and a good helicopter resupply capability could be expected.

(2) Resupply

(a) Resupply for a unit on the move initially presented a problem. Resupply was planned for some time prior to dark when a stable tactical situation allowed a unit to secure a helicopter landing site and make distribution of water, rations and ammunition.

1 To facilitate resupply, units submitted requirements several hours in advance of the expected time of resupply. A unit unable to forecast time or location of resupply, nonetheless submitted a request for resupply early to allow supplies to be pulled from stock. Later reference to this request added only unit location and desired time of resupply. This system worked effectively and noticeably expedited resupply.

(b) Units, when possible, consolidated resupply requirements. Careful planning often resulted in satisfying a units needs with one resupply and much wasted time and effort was avoided.

(c) All resupply was, of necessity, accomplished by helicopter.

1 The greatest problem encountered in helicopter resupply was communication between the unit being supplied and the helicopter. Insofar as only one battalion net was established, much of this communication interfered with tactical traffic and detrimentally affected tactical control and coordination.

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2 The need for a second battalion net (Command) became clearly evident. This net, used to transmit routine messages of a non-tactical nature, could readily be used to request, coordinate, and control helicopter resupply without interfering with immediate tactical requirements.

3 The receipt of 67 PRC-25 radios will allow activation of a Battalion Command Net during future operations. Effective coordination and control of helicopter resupply should be realized over this net.

(d) A need for closer coordination between TACLOG (afloat) and TACLOG (ashore) became apparent. TACLOG (ashore) must be informed of the destination and cargo carried by helicopters departing the ship on a resupply mission. This would allow time for the unit being resupplied to be alerted and would keep the TACLOG (ashore) abreast of the status of resupply.

(e) When prolonged commitment ashore is required and the tactical situation permits, it is recommended that a Logistical Support Area (LSA) be set up ashore. The most desirable location would be in the Battalion CP complex. This would materially decrease the distance from resupply point to supported units and would result in more efficient helicopter resupply. Main control for most helicopter resupply missions could be established at the BLT level, thus eliminating the possibility of error and providing greater responsiveness of changing resupply requirements caused by the tactical situation. In order to accomplish daily resupply of line companies and attachments, the controlling logistical echelon must be constantly aware of each unit's tactical situation and location. This control can be best realized at the BLT level.

1 The maintenance of a level of supplies in the LSA can be accomplished by ship-to-shore helicopter lift as necessary. Stable items such as rations, batteries and ammunition could be replenished periodically. Water and perishable items would be replenished daily.

2 It is believed that the decreased distance from the resupply point to supported units would allow the daily resupply of subordinate units to be accomplished more efficiently in less time using fewer helicopters.

b. Maintenance. 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was accomplished by the using units. 3rd echelon maintenance was accomplished aboard the USS PRINCETON, whenever possible. Two 105mm Howitzers, damaged when transported by Army CH-47 helicopters, were repaired at an Army repair facility at Tuy Hoa.

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c. Casualty Reporting

(1) The S-1 Officer maintained an administrative section aboard the LPH. This section handled all administrative matters pertaining to casualties. The S-1 Officer and the remainder of the S-1 section deployed with the Battalion Command Post. Company/Battery administrative sections were also maintained aboard the LPH. This enabled the administrative section responsible for casualty reporting to obtain individual service records on short notice.

(2) Air Medevac requests were forwarded by the TACLOG (ashore) to the TACLOG (afloat). The S-1 section aboard the LPH maintained a log of evacuated personnel and recorded the disposition of all casualties. This system provided the SLF Commander and the BLT Commander with an accurate up to date account of all casualties.

d. Evacuation. Evacuation was accomplished entirely by helicopter. During the daylight hours LZ's were marked with smoke, mirrors, and/or panels. During night evacuations LZ's were marked with stobe lights or flashlights and flares.

e. Transportation.

(1) Initial ship-to-shore movement was accomplished by helicopters and surface craft. Once ashore, tactical and logistical movement was accomplished exclusively by helicopters.

(2) During Operation NATHAN HALE, U.S. Army helicopters were utilized to displace the 105mm Howitzer Btry from RED Beach to new firing positions. During the withdrawal, U.S. Army vehicles were used as prime movers to displace the 105mm Howitzer Battery and Provisional Rifle platoons to the beach at Tuy Hoa for further movement by surface means to assigned shipping.

f. Communications

(1) FM Radio

(a) Twenty-two AN/PRC-25 radios were made available to the BLT during Operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE. This number did not completely satisfy BLT needs. In addition to normal internal tactical and supporting arms nets, requirements to maintain radio communications with the Special Landing Force and adjacent Army units had to be met. AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-6 radios did not provide dependable communications at distances exceeding one kilometer.

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(b) The performance of the AN/PRC-25 radio was excellent. The BA-386 batteries lasted approximately 24 hours when stored in the shade. The best results were achieved by using an RC-292 antenna and remoting the radio to high ground. The only obstacle to continuous PRC-25 communications was interference by high land masses; however, communications with all subordinate units in all instances were continuously possible through relay.

(c) The supply of AN/PRC-25 radios allowed more AN/PRC-10's to be used at platoon level and AN/PRC-6's to be used at squad level. This capability satisfied a need for increased command and control down to the squad level and facilitated the utilization of small units in offensive missions.

(2) HF Radio. AN/PRC-41 and AN/PRC-47 radios performed satisfactorily for the most part. The only serious problem was caused by a shortage of BB-451 batteries and an inability to adequately recharge BB-451's on hand in the time available. The BLT rates 60 BB-451's, but only 30 were available for the operation because of a lack of mono-blocks. Utilizing a centralized battery charging facility, no problems were encountered during the first four days. As much as 24 hours of operation were received per battery initially, but the life span progressively decreased with the duration of the operation. Only 5 PP-3240 battery chargers were on hand and as the batteries failed more rapidly less time was available to recharge each battery. Finally, as little as 4 hours usage was received per battery. On the 8th day of the operation 18 additional BB-451's and 4 PP-3240's were acquired. This allowed more batteries to be charged at one time and a longer time on the charger for each battery. This completely alleviated the problem.

(3) Wire and Radio Relay. Local wire lines were laid within the CP and sound-powered loops were laid to the OP's and FO's. Three radio relay lines were laid from the CP to the radio relay facility on RED Beach. Once established, radio relay provided excellent communications. The channelization was as follows:

Channel #1 - Common user  
Channel #2 - FSCC to SACC  
Channel #3 - BLT S-3 to SLF S-3  
Channel #4 - BLT S-4 to TACLOG

(4) Message Center. The message center was established in the operations tent to facilitate handling and controlling the bulk of the message traffic from the Battalion TAC, Landing Force TAC #1 and Landing Force TAC #2 nets. This arrangement was satisfactory and expedited processing the more urgent operational messages. Internal CP messenger

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service allowed the BLT TACLOG net traffic over a radio physically located in the S-4 tent to be processed through message center.

(5) Lesson Learned. That there is a definite need for a Battalion Command Net to pass administrative traffic, periodic reports, resupply requests and to control and coordinate helicopter resupply missions. The establishment of this net will materially relieve the present heavy load carried over the Battalion Tac Net.

## 7. Supporting Arms

### a. Supporting Arms (General)

(1) Fire support for BLT 3/5 was provided by a 105mm Howitzer Battery and 107mm Howtar Battery, one 5"/38 Destroyer, one LSMR, one Heavy Cruiser, armed helicopters from MAG 36 and fixed wing aircraft from USS CONSTELLATION.

(2) In Operation DECKHOUSE I the 105mm Howitzers were landed by LCU and the 107mm Howtars were landed by helicopter. When BLT 3/5 joined the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Operation NATHAN HALE both artillery batteries were displaced by helicopter.

(3) Missions fired by supporting units included on call missions, preparation of objectives and landing zones, H and I fires, and night defensive fires. All missions except H and I fires were conducted under positive control of an FO, FAC or TAO.

(4) During Operation DECKHOUSE I control of air and NGF remained afloat whereas coordination of supporting arms and control of artillery was passed ashore. In Operation NATHAN HALE coordination and control of all supporting arms were passed ashore.

(5) Two factors limited the effective use of all fire support: the terrain and foliage in many cases severely limited ground observation; due to the extended area of operations, communications were often impossible with existing equipment. Availability would not allow all FO teams to be equipped with AN/PRC-25 radios.

### b. Fire Support Coordination Center

(1) During Operation DECKHOUSE I it was found that artillery HE missions fired under NGF illumination were practical and very effective. This type of mission overcame the problem caused by a lack of illumination projectiles in the basic allowance for artillery.

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(2) Communications equipment is at present unsatisfactory in that it does not have the power to transmit over a distance equal to the maximum range of such supporting arms as 105mm Howitzers, 5"/38 naval rifles and 8"/55 naval rifles. In an operation such as DECKHOUSE I this lack of satisfactory communications periodically deprived infantry units of an immediate supporting arms capability.

(3) Small unit commanders (Infantry Platoon Commanders and Squad Leaders) should be encouraged to call for fires by supporting arms in the absence of an artillery FO of NGF/ST. In both operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE several missions were fired successfully for Reconnaissance Teams and one mission was effectively adjusted by a Platoon Commander.

(4) During Operation DECKHOUSE I helicopters occasionally inadvertently flew through gun target lines of both artillery and naval gunfire. A need for closer control and coordination between controllers and airborne aircraft is required.

#### c. Naval Gun Fire

(1) NGF frequencies assigned to the SLF by IFFORV were the same as those assigned to 1st ANGLICO in the II Corps area. The additional traffic load caused by Operation DECKHOUSE I frequently overloaded these frequencies. On two occasions the BLT NGLO was unable to communicate with SACC for 45 minutes due to ANGLICO call fire missions on the net. It is recommended that separate NGF frequencies be assigned for SLF operations.

(2) The AN/PRC-47 has proven unsatisfactory for use as NGF spot net due to poor propagation in the Vietnam area, excessive weight, the inability to communicate on the move, and night atmospheric interference. Recommend the use of AN/PRC-25's with the spot teams and the AN/PRC-25 with an RC-292 antenna with the liaison team on the spot net. The AN/PRC-47 is satisfactory for use on the NGF control net; this equipment can be lifted into the CP with the initial resupply and equipment buildup. This also allows a back-up for the AN/PRC-25 by AN/PRC-47 relay if necessary. This arrangement would allow a NGF Spot Team to consist of 2 or 3 men and would facilitate its ability to keep up with the infantry unit it supports. During DECKHOUSE I, AN/PRC-25's could communicate between two locations when AN/PRC-47's were unable to.

(3) Other problems associated with the AN/PRC-47 are: an inability to tune to test counts satisfactorily; a power supply complicated by a variable battery life affected by heat, length of transmissions, frequency, and lapse time required to recharge. Recommend having afloat HF equipment tune to the AN/PRC-47 radio despite net control afloat.

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
(4) Problems involved with shipboard HF equipment are excessive line loss due to remote location of antennas and use of multi-couples. SACC was a weak HF station throughout DECKHOUSE I. Other NGF units were loud and clear even at greater range. When USS PRINCETON was conducting flight operations communications were minimal; flight deck whip antennas may be a major contributing factor.

(5) SLF FM frequencies did not have sufficient separation; NGF local was unusable insofar as it was 0.2 MCS from the Battalion TAC net frequency.

(6) Target clearance procedures were awkward and caused excessive delays. The planned system of NGF target clearance was to have NGF ships submit CANDY reports to SACC with silence being approval. Marginal communications and time delay on submission of CANDY reports forced SACC to switch to possible approval. This resulted in a delay of 10 to 15 minutes on every mission with close-in defensive fires frequently taking up to 40 minutes due to SACC's concern over the safety of the unit requesting fire. Recommend close-in targets cleared by BLT NGLO not be questioned by SACC since time delay must be kept to a minimum and the best information on friendly positions is available at the BLT CP.

(7) Helo/A/C coordination with Arty/NGF was not effective at any time during DECKHOUSE I. Frequently spotters on ships had to check fire due to A/C crossing GTL. It is recommended that the 1st MAPDIV SAVAPLANE System (SAVAPLANE - A. Grid square firing from; B. Grid square impact; C. Time commenced; D. Time cease fire; E. Max ordinate) be used or, as an alternate, that routes and check points be used and helos be required to report position to a controller while inland of NGF ships.

(8) Recommended SLF NGF Comm



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(a) Spot team/Spot net divided among available NGF support ships with NGLO on each Spot net. Each ship on the FM Spot frequency; NGLO assigns Spot teams to ship(s) as situation dictates.

d. Air

(1) Communications between the ALO and TACC were for the most part excellent. Communications between the FAC's and ALO were good until the companies moved inland. Because of the heat and terrain in Vietnam it would be desirable to have an extra enlisted man added to the FAC team. This would enable the team to split the loads and switch off more frequently.

(2) Use of armed HUIE aircraft proved the versatility and practicability of these aircraft.

8. Commander's Analysis

a. Operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE resulted in significant personnel and material losses. Viet Cong control over the population and agricultural resources in the area in which BLT 3/5 operated was seriously reduced during the operation. The presence of BLT 3/5 in strong positions north of the NATHAN HALE area of operations was a definite factor which contributed to the heavy personnel losses inflicted upon the enemy by U.S. Army units. The destruction of 210 tons of rice during search and destroy operations will have a prolonged affect on the enemy supply situation throughout Phu Yen Province.

b. Operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE proved equally successful as a training vehicle. The BLT combat capability was thoroughly tested and significantly improved. Rifle companies operating over extended areas relied heavily on small unit patrols and ambushes to search for and destroy the enemy who awarded meaningful contact and attempted to exfiltrate the area in small groups. Fire support coordination progressively improved and functioned smoothly towards the end of the operation. The individual Marine gained confidence and experience on which to draw in the future. The experience gained in establishing and maintaining control over widely separated units was invaluable. The techniques of population and resources control were effectively used in conjunction with a civic action program whenever possible.

c. The transition from DECKHOUSE I to NATHAN HALE was accomplished smoothly and expeditiously. Direct liaison with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was authorized. Direct communications with this Headquarters were established, liaison officers were assigned and full integration of all supporting arms was accomplished. The participation of Marine and Army units in joint operations which involved physical contact between these units occurred on two occasions. Control and coordination measures established in both instances were fully adequate and included common frequencies for direct contact between units, planned air preparations to support all maneuver elements and coordination of supporting arms to include armed helicopter, strike aircraft and artillery.

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d. Operations BECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE extended over two districts of Phu Yen Province. District Chiefs assigned intelligence personnel from their headquarters to the BLT. COMUSMACV provided an Interrogator/Translator Team (ITT) from Saigon. The district intelligence personnel were assigned to infantry units conducting search and destroy operations while the ITT established an Interrogation/Translation Center initially at the District Headquarters and later, when adequate facilities were available, at the BLT CP ashore. The location of the ITT at the BLT CP proved to be much more effective and expedited the receipt of intelligence. The method of employment of both District intelligence personnel and the Interrogator/Translator Team was, in retrospect, absolutely correct. Their contribution to the overall effort was substantial. It is strongly recommended that similar support from in-country resources be made available during all future SLF operations.

e. Both District Chiefs conducted supporting multi-company operations within the BLT TAR. A battalion of the ARVN 47th Regiment provided security for the BLT CP; the 105mm Howitzer Battery and the 107mm Mortar Battery during Operation NATHAN HALE. Although the coordination required varied in degree, a common purpose, close rapport and mutual respect was in all cases achieved. The integration of Vietnamese regular army units and regional/popular forces into SLF operations are highly desirable and should be encouraged whenever possible. Tactical and morale benefits derived by both U.S. and Vietnamese forces are well worth the effort. One such operation marked the first time that Regional Forces in this area conducted a helicopter-borne operation; the Regional Force company gained valuable experience and considerable prestige and pride of achievement.

f. Population and resources control measures include:

(1) Search of villages. Indigenous personnel accompanied Marine units conducting the searches and, whenever possible, assigned hamlet and/or village chiefs (normally residing on a permanent basis at District Headquarters) screened villagers and checked identification papers.

(2) Curfew hours were established and enforced. This measure was approved in each instance by the District Chief. Curfew hours were announced to the local populace by a Vietnamese interpreter assigned to the BLT utilizing the Beachjumper loudspeaker unit mounted in a helicopter.

(3) Rice and grain in excess of authorized amounts and obvious contraband found in the possession of the civilian populace was confiscated or destroyed. Guidance and concurrence of the District Chiefs relative to this measure was strictly adhered to.

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(4) Villages from which significant small arms and/or automatic weapons fire was delivered against Marine units were attacked by supporting arms whenever the tactical maneuver of these units was meaningfully affected. When the tactical situation permitted loudspeaker broadcasts warned the villagers to evacuate the village and arrangements were made to transport these refugees by helicopter to the District Refugee Center. Villages in the vicinity of the BLT Command Post and artillery battery positions from which small arms and automatic weapons fire was received on a frequent basis were destroyed and the villagers evacuated.

(5) Observation posts and extensive small unit ambushes and patrols limited the ability of the enemy to move through the area undetected.

g. Civic action teams, consisting of both medical and dental sub-teams, were effectively utilized on five occasions. Medical and dental sick call was held and hand-clasp items were distributed. A limited amount of medical and dental training for local technicians was conducted. In all cases an effort was made to emphasize the role of the local Vietnamese officials in arranging these services of the people for the Vietnamese government. On one occasion the civic action team operated in what is normally a Viet Cong controlled village. This type of operation has great potential and should receive greater emphasis in the future.

h. Problem areas encountered and recommendations relative to them have already been covered extensively elsewhere in this report. The following comments touch upon other problem areas and emphasize certain lessons which were learned.

(1) The enemy confronting the BLT was obviously avoiding contact and attempting to infiltrate the area. Under these circumstances the high ground normally considered to be key terrain had little tactical value other than for establishing observation posts. The most important terrain features became routes of movement which the enemy was likely to use and the villages in which he attempted to hide.

(2) Contact with the enemy was almost exclusively made by units smaller than company. A reinforced company cannot move unobserved. Reinforced fire teams and squads can. Greater risks are incurred through dispersion, but greater success is made possible. The enemy was certain to have known where a company-sized unit was, but on frequent occasions reconnaissance teams and rifle squads were able to surprise and ambush the enemy, observe enemy movement and/or call in supporting arms. The rifle company or platoon, under the conditions existing during Operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE rarely were able to find and/or fix the enemy. Under these circumstances the controlled use of squads and fire teams must be emphasized. This poses two problems which are difficult to overcome - communications and resupply. Communications can be solved by providing additional radios to the battalion.

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Resupply of dispersed units can be alleviated by carrying two or more days of rations and three or four canteens of water and possibly by substituting rice, raisins and other easily carried and easily prepared food for the normal combat ration.

(3) Resupply by helicopter is absolutely essential during SLF operations. There are, however, many attendant disadvantages. A resupply helicopter automatically pinpoints the location and disposition of all friendly units being resupplied.

(4) Ambushes are one of our most effective measures for inflicting personnel casualties on the enemy. The imaginative and skillful use of ambushes can also have a detrimental psychological impact. Aside from normal local security, ambushes should be at least 500 to 1,000 meters distant from unit night defensive positions. The tendency to make ambushes too large should be avoided; five to eight men is a good size. Occasionally daytime ambushes should be left in a unit position occupied during the night in order to take advantage of the tendency of local Viet Cong to search positions for material that might have been left behind.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

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8 July 1966REPORT OF DECKHOUSE I1. Task OrganizationBLT 3/5

Lt Col BRONARS

H&S Co (-)  
 Det, Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm)  
 Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)  
 Det, Radio Relay Sec, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 5th Mar  
 Det, Hq Bn, 1st Marine Division, FMF  
   Det, Radio Relay Plat, Comm Co  
   Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co  
   Det, Postal Unit, Adj Sec, Div Hq, Hq Co  
   Det, 1st Dental Co, FMF  
 Det, 1st Medical Bn  
 Det, Serv Sec, Co Hq, 3d Coll Sec, Coll Plat  
 Logistic Support Unit  
   Det, Prov Serv Bn, 9th MAB  
     Det, Supply Sec  
     Det, Maint Sec  
     Det, H/S Sec  
   Det, H&S Co, 3d FSR  
 2d SP Tm, Co B, 1st SP Bn  
   2d Landing Spt Plat  
   Det, H&S Co, 1st SP Bn  
   Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

Co I (Rein)

Capt GLAIZE

Co I  
 Det, H&S Co  
   Det, Med Plat  
   Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
   Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
 FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Co K (Rein)

Capt MARESCO

Co K  
 Det, H&S Co  
   Det, Med Plat  
   FAC Tm  
   Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
   Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
 FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)

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Co L (Rein)

Capt TATUM

Co L  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plat  
FAC Tm  
Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
2d Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar, (NGF Spot Tm)

Btry F (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Capt HARRIS

Btry F (-)  
Det, Hq Btry, 11th Mar

107mm Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mort Btry  
Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

2d Plat (Rein) Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

Lt GRESSLY

2d Plat  
Det, Co Hq, Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn

Lt BUCHANAN

3d Plat  
Det, Co Hq, Co B, 1st AT Bn

3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Lt TOTH

3d Plat (-)  
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn

2d Plat, Co B, 1st MT Bn

CWO HENSON

2d Plat  
Det, Maint Sec, Co Hq, Co B, 1st MT Bn

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein)

Lt CHRISTIANS

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat  
Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

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Lt O'DONNELL

6th Plat  
Det, Parachute Maint/Rpr Sec, Supply/Serv Plat3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Recon Bn

Lt GREEN

3d Plat  
Det, Medical Sec, Serv Plat, H/S Co, 1st Recon Bn2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF

Lt SKEY

2d Plat  
Det, Hq Sec, Co Hq, Co C, 1st Tk Bn  
Det, H&S Co, 1st Tk BnBLT Reserve

Capt PETTENGILL

Co M (Rein)Co M  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plat  
Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar2. Intelligence

a. It was impossible to accurately determine the exact strength, location, and disposition of enemy forces in the Song Cau area prior to the commencement of Operation DECKHOUSE I. This was due to the continuous movement of VC forces (both Main and Local Force) and to the wide range of accuracy and reliability in the reports of enemy sightings and contacts. Below are listed the enemy units sighted and contacted in the area of operations from 1 May 1966 until D-day:

| <u>UNIT</u>                    | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| 328th Battalion, 83rd Regiment | CQ 057805       |
| 31st Battalion, 83rd Regiment  | CQ 050820       |
| 85th Battalion                 | CQ 039957       |
| 41st Battalion                 | CQ 043868       |
| 2nd Battalion, 37th Regiment   | CQ 086805       |
| K 317th Battalion              | CQ 075618       |
| F 187th Battalion              | CQ 091916       |
| B 31st Battalion               | CQ 083789       |
| DK 11th Company                | CQ 097937       |
| DK 6th Company                 | CQ 010720       |

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|--|-----------|
| HQ I Company                                     | CQ 071805 |
| HQ 6th Company                                   | CQ 078941 |
| HD 7th Company                                   | CQ 045993 |
| 2 Unidentified Companies                         | CQ 052810 |
| C 212th, C 214th, C 216th Platoons (Local Force) | CQ 072962 |
| C 213th Platoon (Local Force)                    | CQ 050043 |
| C 215th Platoon (Local Force)                    | CQ 110953 |
| C 217th Platoon (Local Force)                    | CQ 066829 |

b. BLT 3/5 made no significant contact during DECKHOUSE I with an enemy force (either VC or NVA). It is estimated that BLT 3/5 forces were opposed and probed the first day and night by one VC Local Force Platoon. This platoon was identified by Song Cau District Headquarters as the C 217th LF Platoon. The BLT was opposed the next three days by a force of at least two LF platoons or perhaps a LF company. Contacts with small VC units continued and increased so that by D/5 it is estimated the BLT was opposed by elements of three VC companies. However, by D/7 almost all enemy contact had ceased. Interrogation reports and other intelligence received reported the movement of a number of VC units in the area of operations but despite reaction of BLT forces the VC were able to escape contact. On D/3 during interrogation a VC captured by BLT 3/5 identified his unit to be the C 385th Reconnaissance Element.

c. Prior to BLT 3/5 entering Operation NATHAN HALE units of the U.S. Army, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) had been in contact with the 18th B Regiment (NVA) for better than a week. It was estimated that by the time BLT 3/5 participated in Operation NATHAN HALE that all elements of the 18th B Regiment (NVA) had fled to the south, had broke up into small groups and were attempting to exfiltrate the area of operations to the north and east. On 30 June 1966 the 18th B Regiment (NVA) was estimated to be disposed as follows:

| <u>UNIT</u>                  | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| 18th B Regiment Headquarters | CQ 0457         |
| 7th Battalion                | CQ 0461         |
| 8th Battalion                | BQ 9957         |
| 9th Battalion                | CQ 0563         |

d. BLT 3/5 made no significant contact with elements of the 18th B Regiment (NVA) or with any other VC or NVA unit. BLT 3/5 did make frequent contacts with small enemy forces throughout the operations. Some of these forces were well armed and could have been NVA "regulars", but most forces were probably members of Local Force squads and platoons.

3. Mission. As directed by the SLF Frag Order #1 for the Song Cau Operation, the mission assigned to BLT 3/5 was:

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"Commencing at H and L-hours on D-day, land simultaneously by surface and helo assault over RED Beach and HLZ CROW to seize LF Objectives A, B, C, and D; on order conduct search and destroy operations within AOA; be prepared to conduct a tactical withdrawal on order."

4. Concept of Operations. The BLT 3/5 scheme of maneuver in the Song Cau area during Operation DECKHOUSE I was planned to be conducted in two phases over a period of about five days.

For Phase I the following concept was planned: Land Company I over RED Beach to attack and seize BLT Objective I; land Company K over RED Beach to attack and seize Landing Force Objective ALPHA; land Battery F over RED Beach to proceed to predesignated firing positions; land 2d Platoon, Company B, 3rd Amtrac Battalion over RED Beach to land elements of BLT 3/5, to assume beach defense and to position Battery F; land 3rd Platoon, Company B, 1st AT Battalion and 2nd Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion as provisional rifle platoons to provide security for Battery F and Amtracs; land Company L by helicopter in LZ CROW to attack and seize Landing Force Objective BRAVO; land 107mm Mortar Battery by helicopter in LZ ROBIN to proceed to predesignated firing positions; land 2nd Platoon, Company B, 1st MT Battalion by helicopter in LZ ROBIN as a provisional rifle platoon to provide security for 107mm Mortar Battery; maintain Company M aboard LPH-5 as BLT Reserve; land H&S Company and other combat service support elements in vicinity of Landing Force Objective ALPHA to establish CP and provide security for Command Group.

Phase II operations would consist of the securing of Landing Force Objectives CHARLIE and DELTA and BLT Objectives 2 and 3 on order and conduct further search and destroy operations within AOA. Finally, on order, the BLT would conduct a tactical withdrawal to assigned shipping.

#### 5. Execution

a. D-day - 18 June 1966.

(1) Company K landed by LVTP-5's over RED Beach at 0630H (1st hour) followed by Company I in LCVP's at 0635H. The landings took place without incident. Battery F, in a LCU, landed in ~~area on fall wave~~ ~~at 0630H~~ minutes. At 0815H, Company K reported the beach secured and clear. Company I commenced a search and destroy operation from the beach to attack and seize Landing Force Objective ALPHA. Battery F, with provisional platoons from AT's and Amtracs, moved into firing positions at CQ 103780.

(2) Company L was helilifted into LZ CROW at L-hour (0630H). The lift was completed by 0715H with no enemy contact. Company M was helilifted into LZ ROBIN commencing at 1130H, secured the LZ and sent two platoons sweeping south to seize and occupy BLT Objective 2. One platoon was left as security for the 107mm Mortar Battery which was helilifted into firing positions at CQ 058798. The 106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon was helilifted

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into the vicinity of Landing Force Objective ALPHA to provide security for the Command Group which arrived at 1430H. The remainder of H&S Company and its combat service support group followed the Command Group. By 1600H, all units had been helilifted into their respective areas.

(3) During the initial search and destroy operations, Company L sustained one friendly WIA who was evacuated by helicopter to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) at 0800H. They also captured and destroyed 500 lbs of rice at CQ 061803 while securing LZ CROW. Company K captured documents from a Vietnamese woman in the village at CQ 085782 and later observed two VC at CQ 082778 fleeing to the southwest while moving to secure Landing Force Objective ALPHA; Company K secured Landing Force Objective ALPHA at 181500H. Company M captured one VC suspect and discovered a tunnel containing one ton of rice, corn and wheat meal at CQ 060787 during their sweep to BLT Objective 2. Battery F captured 3 VC and 3 VC suspects in a village at CQ 103781 near their firing positions.

(4) By sunset, unit positions were established as follows:

(a) Battalion CP and H&S Company - CQ 088788

(b) Company I - CQ 097793.

(c) Company K - CQ 083787.

(d) Company L - CQ 063801.

(e) Company M (-) - CQ 058785.

(f) Battery F - CQ 103780 in firing positions.

(g) 107mm Mortar Battery - At CQ 158798 in firing positions with one platoon of Company M as security and a provisional rifle platoon from the 3d Plat, Co B, 1st MT Bn.

(5) Company I at 2000H destroyed one bunker at CQ 095783 and questioned 3 Vietnamese who reported existence on one VC squad in their area as well as a VC sleeping cave.

(6) Company K at 1810H, found 2 bunkers with ashes of recent fires at CQ 105785 and a tunnel in the same vicinity.

(7) Company L patrol received fire from 2 VC snipers at CQ 085055. They returned 10 rounds small arms with negative results. Suffered 1 friendly WIA.

(8) H&S Company detained 21 VC suspects at CQ 083781 who had many documents and considerable money.

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(9) An Amtracs patrol at 1935H was ambushed by unknown number of VC at CQ 102782. Fire returned with unknown results. Suffered one friendly KIA.

b. D+1 - 19 June 1966.

(1) At 190035H, Company K received 46 rounds of small arms fire in their Company CP from unknown number of VC. Fire was returned and VC withdrew. At 190305H, Company K again received small arms fire from unknown number of VC. Fire was returned with unknown results. Company I reported continual probes by estimated 10 VC from 182300H on. Fire was returned with results of 3 VC KIA (probable). Company M at 190100H, had a probe on their position by estimated 3 VC. VC taken under fire with 1 VC WIA (probable). At 190020H, Battalion CP received 50 rounds small arms fire from unknown number of VC. Fire returned with unknown results.

(2) By 0800H, Company I had began a search and destroy operation south toward Landing Force Objective ALPHA while Company K was conducting a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Landing Force ALPHA. Company L was sweeping to southwest toward Landing Force Objective CHARLIE and Company M was conducting a search and destroy operation towards Landing Force Objective BRAVO.

(3) Company L at 0720H reported discovering 1 ton of rice at CQ 062802 in a cave. The rice was destroyed. At 0900H, Company M destroyed one ton of food stuffs they had captured the previous day. At 0935H, Company K delivered 15 VC suspects to the Battalion CP. They were subsequently sent to Song Cau. Company I provided security for a downed UH-34D until it could be retrieved. During the afternoon all units continued toward assigned objectives with light enemy contact. At 1745H, the Battalion CP received 13 rounds small arms fire at CQ 085787. At 1600H NGF fired 25 rounds HE at suspected VC mortar position resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC). At 2000H, Company L received small arms fire at CQ 042790. 5 rounds returned with negative results. Company L also reported information from a Vietnamese woman that 300 VC had moved through the village of Hieu-Dank (I) southeast with 2 81mm Mortars and 1 Recoilless Rifle. At 2312H, Company I received 4 rounds of mortar fire from unknown direction. At 2250H Battalion CP was probed by estimated 6 VC with small arms and grenades. Fire returned with unknown results. At 2340H, Battery F was probed by 4 to 5 VC armed with automatic weapons at CQ 101783. VC withdrew under fire. At 2325H, Battalion CP observed two mortars at CQ 091797. They were taken under fire by artillery which resulted in a secondary explosion. Estimated 2 mortars destroyed (probable) and 4 VC KIA (probable).

c. D+2 - 20 June 1966.

(1) At 0020H, Battalion CP received small arms fire from 6 to 10 carbines at CQ 091789. Fire returned at muzzle blasts. 2 VC KIA (probable).

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At CQ 088788, unknown number VC tripped hand grenade and two claymores were fired resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC). For the next two hours VC probed Battalion CP in estimated platoon strength; ensuing exchange resulted in 10 VC KIA (BC) and 6 KIA (probable). Company I also reported continual probes and received automatic small arms fire. No known casualties were reported. Friendly casualties consisted of 1 WIA.

(2) By 0800H on D/2, Company I was conducting search and destroy operations toward Landing Force Objective DELTA and sweeping the villages at CQ 079771 and CQ 068768. Company K (BLT Reserve) was providing security for the Battalion CP and the 107mm Howtars. Company L was conducting a joint attack with Company M against an objective located at CQ 037798. After securing the objective they continued search and destroy operations toward Landing Force Objective CHARLIE. Company M, after the joint attack with Company L, continued search and destroy operations toward Landing Force Objective CHARLIE.

(3) At 0800H, Battalion CP called armed helicopter strikes against 4 VC running west from My Luong (2). Strafing resulted in 1 VC WIA. Sand-bagged bunkers were observed after the strafing run. At 0900H, 2 dud 60mm Mortar rounds were found in Battalion CP area and destroyed. At 1000H, Company M discovered a uniform and documents at CQ 042799 and forwarded them to Battalion CP. At 1030H, Company L captured documents in an enemy hut at CQ 032797. At 1140H 107's reported capturing 4 VC at LZ ROBIN. An hour later they received sniper fire in their position. They returned fire resulting in one VC WIA (probable).

(4) In the afternoon of D/2, Company I captured a Vietnamese in charge of supplies for a guerrilla squad in My Luong (2). At 1450H, Company K sent enemy documents and 4 VC suspects to Battalion CP. At 1535, Company M found a cache in a draw at CQ 039801 consisting of 10 tons of rice, wheat, uniforms, medical supplies and gasoline, which was later destroyed. At 1540H, Company I destroyed the village of My Luong (2). Many explosions confirmed that ammunition had been stored there. At 1645H, Company K reported 15 VC suspects captured and one ton of grain destroyed at CQ 060787. At 1845H, Battalion CP took under fire 1 VC at CQ 091789 resulting in one VC KIA (BC). They also destroyed one 55 gallon drum of rice at CQ 085783.

(5) The Battalion CP received probes from the VC all through the night of D/2 and infiltrators were heard several times. VC casualties were unknown. By nightfall Company L had seized Landing Force Objective CHARLIE and Company M had seized Landing Force Objective BRAVO. Company I was located in the vicinity of Battalion CP and the 107's. All rifle companies reported no enemy contact during the night of D/2 and early morning of D/3.

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d. D/3 - 21 June 1966.

(1) By 0700H, Company I was conducting a search and destroy operation towards Landing Force Objective DELTA. Company L was conducting a search and destroy operation from Landing Force Objective CHARLIE towards grid square BQ 9978. Company M was conducting a search and destroy operation from Landing Force Objective BRAVO at BLT Objective 3.

(2) At 0745H, Company K captured 250 lbs of rice at CQ 078792. Later it was evacuated to Song Cau. At 0910H the 107's captured 5000 lbs of rice and 2000 lbs of corn at CQ 061792. Through the morning there was no contact with the enemy.

(3) Company L at CQ 008775 fired on and killed one VC who failed to halt on command. At 1320H, HMM-364 helicopters were fired on at CQ 065772. One pilot was wounded. At 1445H, Company I received sniper fire from CQ 068767. Fire was returned with negative results. They also captured one VC who was evacuated to Song Cau. At 1450H, Force Recon Platoon ambushed 3 VC at CQ 004775 resulting in one VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC WIA and captured. The WIA was from the C 385th Reconnaissance Element. At 1700H Company I fired on 10 to 15 VC at CQ 078771 moving west with unknown results. At 1650H, Company K patrol returned to Battalion CP with two VC. They reported finding several tons of rice and corn at CQ 053810. At 1815H, Battalion CP outpost fired on 2 VC at CQ 073789 resulting in 1 VC WIA (possible). At the same time, Company K called mortar fire on 10 or more VC at CQ 065789 with 2 VC WIA (probable).

(4) By nightfall of D/3 unit positions were established and extensive night patrols and ambushes were conducted. Throughout the night of D/3, all units received light probes from the VC with no friendly casualties sustained.

e. D/4 - 22 June 1966.

(1) By 0800H on D/4 Company I was on the move to Landing Force Objective DELTA, searching My Lung (3) and Can Luong (1) enroute. Companies L and M were conducting a search and destroy operation to the northwest of Landing Force Objective CHARLIE and BLT Objective 3. Company K was conducting a search and destroy operation from LZ ROBIN towards grid square CQ 0581 to look for a reported .50 caliber machine gun.

(2) During the morning hours there was little VC contact. Company K captured 1 ton of grain at CQ 054806 which they later destroyed and killed 1 VC at CQ 054808. Company I captured 5 VC suspects at CQ 068761 and Battery F captured one VC at CQ 105782. In the afternoon Company K burned and destroyed the village at CQ 054811 after receiving continuous small arms fire from it. Later they took under fire and silenced a machine gun at CQ 069817. Company L received several reports from VC POW's of VC located at BQ 995778 and CQ 015795. At 1600H Company K received reports from villagers at CQ 053811 of a force of about 100 VC at CQ 015793.

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Earlier in the afternoon a reconnaissance outpost called an airstrike on 11 VC at CQ 056734 and estimated 11 VC KIA (probable). They also reported small groups of men moving east all afternoon.

(3) By late afternoon, Company M had captured 1 VC at BQ 991781 and evacuated him to Song Cau. HMM-364 helos were fired on at CQ 067811. Battery F had sighted 20 to 40 unarmed men moving into village at CQ 104781 with supplies. Fire mission called resulting in 3 VC WIA (confirmed) and 3 VC KIA (probable). Artillery fire against 10 to 15 VC in brush at CQ 092782 resulted in 4 VC WIA (probable).

(4) During the night of D/4, Battery F reported 200 persons crossed the Song Cai heading north. The village at CQ 104781 was destroyed because of a movement of relatively large numbers of men into the village and continuing reports of VC concentration therein. The village seriously threatened the 105mm Howitzer positions. All other units reported no contact.

f. D/5 - 23 June 1966.

(1) At 0600, Company L killed 2 VC at CQ 015765 crossing the river heading south. A Shore Party patrol at 0900H, reported much rice and numerous spider traps and trenches in the village previously destroyed by Battery F.

(2) During the morning of D/5, Company I remained stationary at CQ 053751 and patrolled extensively. Company K conducted search and destroy operations in grid squares CQ 0679 and CQ 0729. Company L conducted a search and destroy operation in grid squares CQ 0177 and CQ 0027; Company M conducted a search and destroy operation from BQ 9977 and BQ 9978.

(3) At 1127H, Company K captured 5 VC and documents at CQ 074783. Company M discovered about 12 tons of rice, 40 pounds of molasses, and documents at BQ 993800. Company K at CQ 080736 reported several stone bunkers and numerous foxholes which showed recent use. Company M fired on 12 VC crossing paddies at CQ 065755 about 1925H, resulting in at least one VC WIA.

(4) During the night of D/5, Company K outpost fired on and killed one VC at CQ 084788. Battalion CP outpost spotted several VC patrols and called artillery fire on them with unknown results. All other units had no contact.

g. D/6 - 24 June 1966.

(1) At 0110H, a Company K patrol at CQ 062794 was ambushed by an estimated 4 VC at CQ 062794. No casualties enemy or friendly.

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(2) Company I conducted search of villages west of CQ 0574 while Company K conducted search and destroy operations north-northeast of CQ 0974. Company L conducted search and destroy operations in 1000 meter square area from CQ 005805, while Company M conducted a vertical assault to the northwest of the search area at BQ 997817.

(3) In the morning hours, Company K at CQ 065730 found numerous punji traps, tunnels, trenches, and anti-helo stakes. Company I called artillery fire on 40 to 45 VC at CQ 037734 with 10 VC KIA (probable). Company L captured 1 VC as a result of an ambush at BQ 995807. Company K reported more bunkers, trenches and punji pits at CQ 056783. All afternoon Company L spotted numerous VC crossing the river at different places but effective fire could not be brought to bear except at 1635H when they killed one VC at CQ 007768 and captured 12 VC at CQ 000790. Company I also called fire on VC in the afternoon but only succeeded in dispersing them.

(4) By nightfall all units were established in unit positions with Company I at CQ 053751; Company K at CQ 061793; Company L at BQ 996786 and Company M at CQ 000818. All units conducted extensive patrols and ambushes in their assigned sectors. There was no enemy contact during the night.

h. D/7 - 25 June 1966.

(1) At first light Company I moved to establish OP's in the vicinity of CQ 006787 to observe movement from the south-southwest. Company K provided security for helilift of the 107 Battery. Company L was helilifted to an HLZ at BQ 990835. From there they moved northwest to an attack position centered on BQ 992843. From there they were to sweep through grid square BQ 9883, BQ 9983 and BQ 9982. Company M maintained a blocking position for Company L. The 107 Battery began to displace by helicopter from their old location to CQ 082784.

(2) In the afternoon, Recon Platoon called artillery fire against 12 VC at CQ 005785; the VC dispersed - casualties unknown. Both 107 Battery and Company K sighted VC during the afternoon.

(3) Company positions on the evening of D/7 were as follows:

- (a) Company I - CQ 034750.
- (b) Company K - CQ 085186.
- (c) Company L - BQ 987809.
- (d) Company M - CQ 000818.

There was no contact during the night of D/7.

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i. D/8 - 26 June 1966.

(1) During the early morning hours, the 107 Battery and Recon Platoon observed lights several times and brought artillery fire on same. There was no chance to confirm results.

(2) Company I remained in its present positions and established patrols and ambush positions. Company K (-) moved on a search and destroy operation in grid squares CQ 0879, CQ 0970, CQ 1079, CQ 1081 and CQ 0980 and searched the village of An-Bink-Thank. Company L conducted a search and destroy operation to search for the rice cache at BQ 984820 then continued south toward BQ 980780 to set up blocking position. Company M conducted search and destroy operations along ridge line in grid squares BQ 9981, BQ 9980, and CQ 0079; then set up blocking positions from BQ 980779 to BQ 990777.

(3) Recon Platoon called artillery fire on 3 VC at CQ 023778 resulting in one VC KIA. Company I reported 250 men at CQ 034725 which was outside of the AOA; before clearance to fire could be obtained the target disappeared. Company L reported VC crossing the river all morning in small groups. At 1320H, Company I captured and destroyed 400 bushels of rice and 125 lbs of salt. In addition they captured 9 VC suspects.

(4) Unit positions on the night of D/8 were as follows:

- (a) Company I - CQ 034750.
- (b) Company K - CQ 082786.
- (c) Company L - BQ 979790.
- (d) Company M - BQ 994230.

During the night there was no contact.

j. D/9 - 27 June 1966.

(1) A Company I ambush was taken under small arms and grenade fire while moving into position at BQ 032743. Fire was returned with 3 VC KIA (probable). There were two friendly WIA.

(2) During the morning hours Companies I, K, and L remained in their old locations and sent out patrols while Company M continued the search and destroy operation commenced on D/8. Company I reported groups of people moving along Route 6 all morning but they couldn't be positively identified as VC.

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(3) Company I called in NGF on a fortified bunker and 2 VC at CQ 107747 but there was little effect on the target. Company M continuing their sweep found the remains of a VC hospital at BQ 995843 and a probable POW compound at BQ 994828. While searching these areas, Company M received sporadic sniper fire. Late in the afternoon a HMM-364 helicopter was fired on at CQ 082743 while on a resupply mission.

(4) Unit positions on the night of D/9 were as follows:

- (a) Company I - CQ 034750
- (b) Company K - CQ 082786
- (c) Company L - BQ 979787.
- (d) Company M - BQ 990831.

There was no enemy contact during the night of D/9.

k. D/10 - 28 June 1966.

(1) Company I during the morning of D/10 maintained OP's and conducted extensive patrolling and ambushes south and east of Highway 1. At 0400H they killed 2 VC in an ambush at CQ 036754. Company K moved by foot from CQ 082786 to RED Beach and was subsequently returned to the USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) for the purpose of refurbishing. Later Company K returned and occupied positions held by Company I at CQ 034750 so the latter could return to the USS PICKAWAY for the same purpose. Company M was helilifted to the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) from BQ 990831 for the same purpose as Companies I and K. Upon their return to BQ 980716, Company L was helilifted to the USS PRINCETON where they remained overnight.

(2) At 1200H on D/10, SLF was chopped to operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for participation in Operation NATHAN HALE. At 0630H, the 105 Battery with attachments and the 107 Battery with its attachments were helilifted to CQ 070714. By 1500H, the Command Group had displaced to CQ 072714. Company M by 1600H was in new positions at BQ 980716. This ended Operation DECKHOUSE I.

## 6. Results

### a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by BLT 3/5:

|                   |    |
|-------------------|----|
| VC KIA BODY COUNT | 25 |
| VC KIA POSSIBLE   | 48 |
| VC WIA CONFIRMED  | 8  |

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|                 |     |
|-----------------|-----|
| VC WIA POSSIBLE | 12  |
| VC CAPTIVE      | 13  |
| VC SUSPECT      | 124 |
| VC RALLIER      | 0   |

Note: Interrogation reports of VCC and VCS indicated that many more VC were killed or wounded by supporting arms during this Operation.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured and/or destroyed by BLT 3/5:

CAPTURED AND EVACUATED:

3.5 TON RICE TO SONG CAU

DESTROYED:

|      |                                    |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 24.3 | TONS RICE                          |
| 1    | TON CORN                           |
| 1    | TON GRAIN                          |
| 30   | GALLONS GASOLINE                   |
| 2    | TONS UNIFORMS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES |
| 125  | POUNDS SALT                        |
| 3    | MORTARS (CALIBER UNKNOWN) POSSIBLE |

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by BLT 3/5 are summarized below:

(a) Killed in Action - 2.

1 Gunshot - 2.

(b) Died of Wounds - 2.

1 Shrapnel - 2.

(c) Wounded in Action - 19.

1 Gunshot - 10.

2 Shrapnel - 5.

3 Punji Stick - 4.

(d) Non-Battle Casualties - 125.

1 Heat - 69.

2 Injuries - 56.

3121  
8 July 1966

REPORT OF NATHAN HALE

1. Task Organization. Remained the same as for DECKHOUSE I. See enclosure (1).

2. Intelligence. See enclosure (1).

3. Mission. As directed by the CG, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Bn 3/5 was to provide a blocking force to the north and northwest of the area encompassed by NATHAN HALE in order to prevent exfiltration of VC/NVA units from the battle area, and to conduct search and destroy operations in assigned areas of responsibility.

4. Concept of Operation. BLT units were to establish blocking positions generally north of the 70th E-W grid line from the 93rd to the 01 N-S grid line, and conduct search and destroy operations within assigned area of responsibility.

5. Execution

a. D/10 - 28 June 1966.

(1) Operation NATHAN HALE began with Company I located north of the Song Cai River to the east of Highway 1. Co I continued to observe VC moving across the river and called artillery and NGF with negative results. They captured one VC suspect at CQ 035735.

(2) By nightfall all units except Company L were in new positions.

Company I at CQ 034750  
Company K in grid square CQ 0675  
Company M at BQ 982713  
105 Battery at CQ 068715  
107 Battery at CQ 064724

There was no enemy contact during the night of D/10.

b. D/11 - 29 June 1966.

(1) At first light Company I returned to assigned shipping for refurbishing with orders to return by 1500H and establish CP in the vicinity of CQ 100780 and patrol and ambush to the southeast of Highway 1. Second platoon of Company K was helilifted to CQ 075704 to carry out blocking mission for Reconnaissance Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion (ABN), 8th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Company L conducted a sweep south-southwest to search and destroy while Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) provided a blocking position for them. Company M remained

Enclosure (2)

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8 July 1966

in its previous positions and conducted patrols and ambushes.

(2) A swift boat apprehended 15 VC suspects in the mouth of the Song Cai River after the presence of 50 VC suspects was reported by a UD Team. Later patrol boats were fired on from CQ 147778 and CQ 155766. NGF was called in and completely neutralized both areas and destroyed 25 structures. Company M patrol at BQ 984714 found 2 Chi Com potato masher grenades and 4 partially decomposed bodies. Considerable amounts of US small arms ammo and ordnance were also found in the area. Another Company M patrol at CQ 011713 captured 5 VC suspects and found 1000 lbs of rice in addition to money and documents. Rice was later destroyed. Later this patrol found 1000 lbs of oats at CQ 013726 and destroyed it. Company M had several VC sightings and directed fire against them with unknown results.

(3) By nightfall of D/11 unit positions were as follows:

Company I - CQ 105785  
Company K (-) and 2d Platoon - CQ 036752, K (1) - CQ 061740,  
K (3) - CQ 035740  
Company L - CQ 045687  
Company M (-) and 2d Platoon - BQ 983713, M (1) - BQ 950699,  
M (3) CQ 003734

There was no enemy contact on the night of D/11.

c. D/12 - 30 June 1966.

(1) At 0045H, Company L recieved 10 rounds of mortar fire from the east. No friendly casualties were sustained. Company M at 0300H received 12 rounds of mortar fire from the northwest. Again there were no friendly casualties.

(2) At first light all rifle companies commenced search and destroy operations from their previous positions. Company M at BQ 945690 captured the VC and numerous documents. Company K at CQ 035740 captured one tone of rice and peanuts in a deep tunnel and destroyed it. An air strike was called at BQ 993447 on a suspected VC concentration. Company I captured 6 VC suspects at CQ 084766. Company M squad fired on 8 to 9 VC at CQ 008709 with 4 VC WIA (confirmed). The remaining two squads fired on about 15 VC at CQ 003017 and killing 7 and wounding 6. An air-strike was called into the village at CQ 003017 with bombs, rockets and napalm. No positive results. Company K patrol fired on 3 VC at CQ 045736 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC WIA and 1 VC captured. They also found a VC flag and documents.

Enclosure (2)



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8 July 1966

(3) In the afternoon there was moderate contact. Company I reported receiving small arms fire several times. At CQ 075760 Company I killed one VC. Company K found a French 30.06 bolt action rifle with a pack and documents, 2 AR-15 magazines and 2 .30 caliber carbine magazines at CQ 043733. Company M at CQ 000705 found large caches of food and ammunition. The rice was later destroyed as well as the ammunition.

(4) At nightfall of D-12 unit positions were as follows:

Company I - CQ 075760  
Company K - CQ 034737  
Company L - CQ 018773  
Company M (-) and 2d Platoon - BQ 982713, M (1) - BQ 952700,  
M (3) - CQ 007722

There was no enemy contact during the night.

d. D-13 - 01 July 1966.

(1) At 0800H, the SLF reverted to the operational control of CINCPACFLT; W-hour to commence at 0800H. BLT units continued to conduct limited search and destroy operations as units moved to designated areas from which to commence withdrawal.

(2) During the morning hours, Company L found a tension-release booby trap at CQ 018713 and a Chi Com grenade at CQ 018713. Company L also evacuated a VC rallier to Battalion CP. Later they captured 2 VC at CQ 021701 and evacuated them to Battalion CP. Company K at CQ 01722 killed 1 VC and captured 3.

(3) Early in the afternoon Company I commenced movement to Tuy Hoa in accordance with the withdrawal plan. Company M destroyed food stores and tunnels in the vicinity of CQ 010701.

(4) By nightfall Companies K, L, and M were in night defensive positions and prepared to commence withdrawal plan. There was no enemy contact during the night.

e. D-14 - 02 July 1966.

(1) At 0700H the withdrawal plan was executed. Company K was helilifted to Tuy Hoa at 0700H. Company M was helilifted to the USS PRINCETON simultaneously with Company K. At 0815H, Command Group BRAVO was helilifted to the USS PRINCETON followed by the 107 Battery at 0930H. Command Group ALPHA at 1030H and Company I at 1045H. The last

Enclosure (2)

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8 July 1966

lift to the USS PRINCETON was completed by 1130H. The 105 Battery and the provisional rifle platoon left by truck convoy for Tuy Hoa at 1030H; these units reached Tuy Hoa by 1230H and withdrawal to assigned shipping commenced. The withdrawal was completed by 1430H.

## 6. Results

### a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by BLT 3/5:

|                   |    |
|-------------------|----|
| VC KIA BODY COUNT | 13 |
| VC KIA POSSIBLE   | 0  |
| VC WIA CONFIRMED  | 12 |
| VC WIA POSSIBLE   | 0  |
| VC CAPTIVE        | 41 |
| VC SUSPECT        | 18 |
| VC RALLIER        | 1  |

Note: Interrogation reports of VCC and VCS indicated that many more VC were killed or wounded by supporting arms during this operation.

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured and/or destroyed by BLT 3/5:

CAPTURED AND EVACUATED:  
1 FRENCH 30.06 RIFLE  
2 CLAYMORE MINES  
2 AN/PRC 25 BATTERIES

DESTROYED:  
186.5 TONS RICE  
1020 ROUNDS S/A AMMO  
7 GRENADES  
1 SMALL FOOT MINE  
2 81mm MORTAR ROUNDS  
11 BOOBY TRAPS

### b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by BLT 3/5 are summarized below:

(a) Killed in action - 1

1 Gunshot - 1

Enclosure (2)

3121  
8 July 1966

(b) Wounded in Action - 14

1 Gunshot - 3

2 Shrapnel - 6

3 Punji Sticks - 5

(c) Non-Battle Casualties - 8

1 Heat - 3

2 Injuries - 3

3 Disease - 2

Enclosure (2)

SERIAL NO. 0142-66 1

SECRET-NOFORN  
SPECIAL HANDLING  
REQUIRED

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**DECKHOUSE****I****OPERATION ORDER****328-66**

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SPECIAL HANDLING  
REQUIRED

*Encl (4)**How 36 Command Chronology  
OPO 328-66, DECKHOUSE I**31 May - 2 June 66*

BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON  
150800H June 1966

Operation Order 328-66

- Ref: (a) NWP 22(A) (LFM 01)  
(b) AMS L701-6850 I (1:50,000) HOA DIA (I)  
AMS L701-6850 IV (1:50,000) NGAN-SON  
AMS L701-6851 I (1:50,000) PHU HOI  
AMS L701-6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM  
AMS L701-6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI  
AMS L701-6851 IV (1:50,000) THACH KHE  
(c) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66  
(d) BnO P3000.4

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) CTG 79.5 - Provides Civil Affairs Team.
- (2) CTG 76.5 - Provides transport and Naval Gunfire Support.

(3) Air.

- (a) Close air support provided in accordance with Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

(b) Helicopter support provided by HMM-364.

(c) CAP CAS provided by CTF 77.

- (4) Naval Gunfire. NGF support provided in accordance with Appendix 1 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H-hour and L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to conduct search and destroy operations in the Song Cau area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Commencing at H-hour, BLT 3/5 lands two companies with designated supporting units by surface means over RED Beach and one company with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zone HAWK at L-hour to conduct search and destroy operations; executes tactical withdrawal on order.

b. Company I (Rein).

- (1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Attack and seize Battalion Objective 1.
- (3) On order, conduct search of village located on right flank of RED Beach at coordinates 102803.
- (4) On order, conduct search and destroy operations within assigned zone of action.

c. Company K (Rein).

- (1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day, land by LVTP in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Attack and seize Landing Force Objective ALPHA.
- (3) On order, conduct search of village located on left flank of RED Beach at coordinates 103781.
- (4) On order, conduct search and destroy operations within assigned zone of action.

d. Company L (Rein).

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in Landing Zone HAWK in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) On order, attack and seize Landing Force Objective BRAVO.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

e. Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Marines.

(1) Land by landing craft on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Proceed to firing positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(2) Direct Support BLT 3/5.

f. 107mm Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Marines.

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Proceed to firing positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).

(2) Direct Support BLT 3/5.

g. 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d Amtrac Bn.

(1) Land assault elements of BLT 3/5 in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Be prepared to assume beach defense mission as directed.

(3) Be prepared to position 105mm howitzers as directed.

h. 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn.

(1) Land by surface means on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) as a provisional rifle platoon; provide security for Battery F as directed.

i. 3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn,

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan). Be prepared to conduct engineer tasks on order.

(2) Direct Support BLT 3/5.

j. 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st MT Bn,

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day as a provisional rifle platoon in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan); provide security for 107mm Mortar Battery as directed.

k. 106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein).

(1) Land by helicopter on D-day as a provisional rifle platoon in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan); provide CP security as directed.

1. 6th Plat (-)(Rein), 1st Force Recon Co, FMF.

(1) Be prepared on order to land by covert means at T-hour on S-day; perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions as directed.

(2) See Annex B (Intelligence).

m. 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Recon Bn.

(1) Be prepared on order to land by covert means at T-hour on S-day; perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions as directed.

(2) See Annex B (Intelligence).

n. 2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tank Bn, FMF.

(1) Land by LCVP on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) as a provisional rifle platoon; provide security for Amtrac Platoon as directed.

o. BLT Reserve.

(1) Company M (Rein).

(a) Land by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan); conduct search and destroy operations as directed.

p. Beach Jumper Unit.

(1) Be prepared to conduct psychological warfare broadcasts on order.

(2) Be prepared to conduct population control operations utilizing organic loudspeaker capability to control movement of Vietnamese civilians during village and hamlet search operations.

q. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Essential elements of attack - Annex C (Operation Overlay), and Annex D (Landing Plan).

(2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

(3) D-day: 18 June 1966 (To be confirmed).



- (4) H-hour: 0630 (To be confirmed).
- (5) L-hour: 0630 (To be confirmed).
- (6) W-hour: (To be announced)
- (7) S-day (Day reconnaissance elements land): To be designated.
- (8) T-hour (Hour reconnaissance elements land): To be designated.
- (9) AOA for DECKHOUSE I is the land area bounded:
- (a) On the west by the N-S gridline BR-BQ 8.
  - (b) On the north by E-W gridline BR-CR 1.
  - (c) On the south by E-W gridline BQ-CQ 6 and the seaward area within a 25 nautical mile radius from point CQ 1989 and the air space over the entire area to a height of 25,000 feet.
- (10) Fires will not be delivered into controlled fire areas without approval from the district chief, except in emergency. See Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (11) Use of Riot Control Agent CS is approved for use upon authorization by the BLT Commander. Agent DM (Vomiting) will not be issued or used.
- (12) All units carry front line panel markers.
- (13) Code name for this operation - DECKHOUSE I.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex K (Administration and Logistics).

#### 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

#### b. Command Posts.

|              | <u>AFLOAT</u> | <u>ASHORE</u>    |
|--------------|---------------|------------------|
| (1) CTG 79.5 | LPH-5         | -----            |
| (2) BLT 3/5  | LPH-5         | To be designated |

AFLOATASHORE

(3) HMM 364

LPH-5

-----

(4) Subordinate units report location ashore when established.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

ANNEXES:


- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Landing Plan
- E - Fire Support Coordination
- F - Communications-Electronics
- G - Reports
- H - Withdrawal Plan
- I - Reference Points
- J - Rules of Engagement
- K - Administration and Logistics
- L - Civil Affairs
- X - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

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Located at BT 162170

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UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (2a)

DECLASSIFIED

BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LHA-2) [REDACTED]  
 150800H June 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective 160001 June 1966)

BLT 3/5

Lt Col ERONARS

H&S Co (-)  
 Det, Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm)  
 Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)  
 Det, Radio Relay Sec, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 5th Mar  
 Det, Hq Bn, 1st Marine Division, FMF  
   Det, Radio Relay Plat, Comm Co  
   Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co  
   Det, Postal Unit, Adj Sec, Div Hq, Hq Co  
   Det, 1st Dental Co, FMF  
 Det, 1st Medical Bn  
 Det, Serv Sec, Co Hq, 3d Coll Sec, Coll Plat  
 Logistic Support Unit  
   Det, Prov Serv Bn, 9th MAB  
     Det, Supply Sec  
     Det, Maint Sec  
     Det, H/S Sec  
   Det, H&S Co, 3d FSR  
 2d SP Tm Co B, 1st SP Bn  
   2d Landing Spt Plat  
   Det, H&S Co, 1st SP Bn  
   Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

Co I (Rein)

Capt GLAIZE

Co I  
 Det, H&S Co  
   Det, Med Plat  
   Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
   Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
 FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 1st Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Co K (Rein)

Capt MARESCO

Co K  
 Det, H&S Co  
   Det, Med Plat  
   FAC Tm  
   Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
   Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
 FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)

Co L (Rein)

Capt TATUM

Co L  
 Det, H&S Co  
   Det, Med Plat  
   FAC Tm  
   Det, 81mm Mort Plat  
   Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)  
 FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 2d Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar, (NGF Spot Tm)

Btry F (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Capt HARRIS

Btry F (-)  
 Det, Hq Btry, 11th Mar

107mm Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERKITT

107mm Mort Btry  
 Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

Lt GRESSLY

2d Plat  
 Det, Co Hq, Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn

Lt BUCHANAN

3d Plat  
 Det, Co Hq, Co B, 1st AT Bn

3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Lt TOTH

3d Plat (-)  
 Det, Med Plat, H&S Co, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn

2d Plat, Co B, 1st MT Bn

CWO HENSON

2d Plat

Det, Maint Sec, Co Hq, Co B, 1st MT Bn

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat (Rein)

Lt CHEISTIANS

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plat

Det, Med Plat, H&S Co

6th Plat (-)(Rein), 1st Force Recon Co, FMF

Lt O'DONNELL

6th Plat

Det, Parachute Maint/Rpr Sect, Supply/Sew Plat

3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Recon Bn

Lt GREEN

3d Plat

Det, Medical Sec, Serv Plat, H/S Co, 1st Recon Bn

2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF

Lt SKEY

2d Plat

Det, Hq Sec, Co Hq, Co C, 1st Tk Bn

Det, H&S Co, 1st Tk Bn

BLT Reserve

Co M (Rein)

Capt PETTENGILL

Co M

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plat

Det, 81mm Mort Plat

Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)

FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

3/5  
PH-5)  
150800H June 1966

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701-6850 I HOA DIA  
AMS L701-6850 II NGAN-SON  
AMS L701-6851 I PHU HOI  
AMS L701-6851 II TU NHAM  
AMS L701-6851 III LONG HAI  
AMS L701-6851 IV THACH KHE

(b) BnO P3000.4 (SOP for Combat)

Time Zone: H

### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

#### a. General

1. During the past two months there has been considerable enemy activity within the Song Cau Area by both main force and local force Viet Cong units. There have been forty five sightings of Viet Cong Battalion and company sized units and one report of a larger unit within the Song Cau AOA. Viet Cong mining and sniper incidents occur almost daily. Twenty aircraft have been fired on. Five of these have been hit and one shot down.

b. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)

c. See current INTSUMS and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Determine if the enemy will defend Red Beach and the high ground immediately behind the beach. If so, where and in what strength?
- b. Determine if the enemy will defend in strength in the AOA. If so, where, and in what strength?
- c. Determine if the enemy will attack friendly units within the AOA. If so, where, when and in what strength?
- d. Determine if the enemy will exfiltrate the AOA. If so, over what route (s) ?
- e. Determine the extent and location of enemy mines, booby traps, tunnels and caves.

### 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

#### a. Orders to subordinate units.

##### (1) All units

- (a) Conduct aggressive reconnaissance patrols and make use of observation and listening posts.
- (b) Report all incidents of enemy use of crew served weapons with particular attention to heavy mortars (120mm) and recoilless rifles including the type of weapons and location.

- (c) Report all enemy contacts including disposition, strength and identification.
- (d) Report all enemy obstructions and tunnels including those destroyed by friendly troops.
- (e) Report the attitude of civilians toward our troops and operations.
- (f) Aerial Observer (AO) support will be available during day light hours. Mission requests will be forwarded through the BLT S-2.

(2) 3rd Plt, Co.B, 1st Reconnaissance Bn and 6th Team, 1st Force Reconnaissance Co.

(a) Be prepared on order to land by Junk in the vicinity of CQ 089830; 6th Team, 1st Force Recon. Co. will establish an observation post at that point. 3rd Plt., CoB, 1st Recon Bn., be prepared to proceed to CQ 022838 and establish observation posts at that point and on hill 502 at 015830.

- (b) Report all enemy activity within the AOA.
- (c) Report the condition of HLZ Hawk at D-1 and H-1.
- (d) Be prepared to conduct further reconnaissance missions upon order.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

(1) Commander, Special Landing Force

- (a) Provide current and predicted weather data.
- (b) Provide Tactical Air Observer support as requested.
- (c) Provide additional aerial photography as requested.
- (d) Provide information on the enemy situation as received from agencies and agents.
- (e) Provide interpreters/translators.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

- a. See reference (b) for detailed instructions.

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. Standard Reference Maps: See reference (a).
- b. Aerial photographs are available from the BLT S-2.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. The following counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units:

- (1) No letters, pictures or other identifying items will be taken into the AOA.
- (2) Unit commanders will reiterate Code of Conduct responsibilities for all personnel in case of capture.
- (3) Comply with communications security measures.
- (4) Maintain strict physical control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
- (5) Immediately report to the BLT S-2 the loss or compromise of classified material.

b. Challenge and Password.

- (1) Challenge and Password, unless compromised or otherwise changed, will normally be in effect from 1200 H to 1200 H.



- (2) The BLT S-2 will be notified immediately when compromise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.
- (3) See reference (b) for challenging procedures.
- (4) See Appendix 3.

#### 7. REPORTS

a. Reporting of any and all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous by all units to this headquarters (Attn S-2). Reports must be forwarded by the most expeditious means possible and be in the form of the key word SALUTE:

S - size of enemy unit (in numbers)

A - action that has taken place including the direction of enemy withdrawal if any.

L - location of action.

U - enemy unit designation if known.

T - time of action.

E - equipment of enemy.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

#### APPENDIXES:

1. Intelligence Estimate
2. Astronomical and Tidal Data
3. HLZ Study
4. Beach Study
5. Challenge and Password

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation. Order 323-66

UNCLASSIFIED

BLT 3/5  
 USS Princeton (LPH-5)  
 150800 H June 1966

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
 Operation 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701-6850 I HOA DIA  
 AMS L701-6850 II NGAN-SON  
 AMS L701-6851 I PHU HOI  
 AMS L701-6851 III LONG HAI  
 AMS L701-6851 IV THACH KHE

1. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H-hour and L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to conduct search and destroy operations in the Song Cau Area.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather:

(1) General: The Song Cau area is subject to the southwest monsoon. During this period of the year the AOA will experience a decrease in cloudiness and precipitation, however, there is an increase in thunderstorm activity. Generally the weather can be considered favorable for operations. It should be noted that the mountainous areas in the AOA do have slightly more precipitation than do the low areas. Fog is not a common occurrence but will form occasionally in the valleys and low areas. This fog will form during the early morning and will normally dissipate by 0900 H.

(2) Precipitation: Most local rainfall is produced by afternoon and evening rainshores or thunderstorms. Rain and thunderstorms occur on an average of one day in four.

(3) Temperature: There is a slight increase in temperature and relative humidity during the month of June. The mean maximum temperature will be 91 degrees and the mean minimum 75 degrees. The extreme maximum temperature recorded in the AOA is 103 degrees. The average relative humidity is 75%.

(4) Astronomical and Tidal Data: See Appendix 2.

(5) Effect on Enemy Courses of Action: Enemy activity will not be appreciably affected by the weather during the period of the operation. Showers and early morning fog will conceal his movement to some degree, but will not be a problem to friendly forces.

(6) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action: Good weather in the AOA will aid all operations including air operations and aerial observation.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing Situation:

(a) General: The eastern portion of the AOA borders on the South China Sea. The dominating feature is the Vung Chao Peninsula which runs in a NW-SE direction and forms Vung Chao Bay. The coastal area is characterized by lowland rice paddies and numerous villages. The peninsula has several high hills. Highway #1 runs N-S along the coast and Highway #6 runs NW-SE through the AOA. Vehicular movement both off and on the highways is difficult due to the rugged nature of the terrain and the cuts and road blocks along the highways.

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Moving west from the coast the terrain becomes gradually more rugged, giving way to thickly overgrown mountains in the center of the AOA. The valleys along which Highways 1 and 6 run are exceptionally rocky. Except for scattered outposts and the coastal area around Song Cau the AOA is considered to be under enemy control. Almost all hills in the AOA are terraced with rice paddies.

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- (b) Key Terrain: The high terrain on the Vung Chao Peninsula which overlooks Red Beach, hill 137 at 128765 which overlooks Red Beach, hills 278 and 271 overlooking Red Beach, hill 286 at 055782, hill 282 at 042836 overlooking HLZ Hawk, and hill 720 (MO GIA) are considered critical.
- (c) Avenues of Approach: The main avenues of approach into the AOA are the valleys which Highways 1 and 6 follow.
- (d) Beaches: See Appendix 4.
- (e) HLZ's: See Appendix 3.
- (2) Effects on Enemy Courses of Action: The high ground on either side of the roads canalizing 'friendly forces' subjects them to ambush situations. The high ground offers positions for enemy harassment of BLT troops and then provides withdraw routes to safe areas in the rugged terrain.
- (3) Effect on Our Course of Action: Since the terrain restricts ground movement, continuous surveillance will be necessary to prevent ambush.

### 3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. It is not possible to determine the exact enemy order of battle for the Song Cau area due to constant movement by Viet Cong forces and due to the wide range of accuracy and reliability of reports received. The latest reports of enemy sightings include the following units and locations:

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| 328 Bn., 83 Regt (C/3)                       | 057805 |
| 85 Bn.                                       | 039957 |
| 41 Bn. (C/3)                                 | 043868 |
| 2 Bn, 37 Regt (C/2)                          | 036805 |
| K 317 Bn                                     | 075618 |
| DK 11 Co                                     | 097937 |
| DK 6 Co                                      | 010720 |
| KQI Co                                       | 071805 |
| HD 7 Co (Security for District H.Q.) (C/3)   | 045993 |
| HD 6 Co (2 Plts) (C/3)                       | 078941 |
| 2 Unidentified Co's (B/3)                    | 052810 |
| C 217 Plt. (local Force) (C/3)               | 066829 |
| C 212, C 214, C 216 Pltns (Local Force (C/3) | 072967 |
| C 215 Plt (Local Force) (C/3)                | 110953 |
| C 213 Plt (Local Force) (C/3)                | 050043 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 049073 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 083938 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 048888 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 125922 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 150919 |
| Local Force Squad (C/3)                      | 165865 |

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b. The strength, arms, and equipment of these units is not available at this time. The strength of the normal Viet Cong Battalion is anywhere between 300 and 600 men. Arms include small arms of varied calibers and models, automatic weapons, 60, 81 and 82 mm mortars, and in some cases 57mm recoilless rifles.

c. Numerous enemy installations including trenches, foxholes, automatic weapons, bunkers, road blocks, caves and tunnels are present in the area of operations. The exact locations of these installations will be promulgated in overlay form.

#### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

##### a. Enumeration.

(1) Defend from prepared positions and dominating terrain features throughout the Song Cau AOA.

(2) Attack vulnerable units or installations with a force of from one to five battalions reinforced by local forces.

(3) Ambush friendly units along roads, trails and canalizing valleys.

(4) Harass BLT units by fire, booby traps and mines throughout the AOA.

(5) Avoid contact with BLT units and exfiltrate from the AOA.

##### b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Capability (1). Indications which favor the enemy adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain, his preparation of defensive positions and his ability to deliver pre-registered fires throughout the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the enemy's knowledge of the superior fire power of friendly forces and the lack of depth of existing prepared positions and roadblocks.

(2) Capability (2) Indications favoring the adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain and his ability to deliver pre-registered fires throughout the objective area. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the vulnerability of the enemy to aerial observation and the lack of adequate cover and concealment in some areas thereby making it difficult for the enemy to mass his forces for an attack.

(3) Capability (3). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain which will tend to canalizing forces because of extensive rice paddies and few existing trails. Excellent fields of fire and observation exist throughout the area and almost all rice paddies and trails are bordered by hedges of thick brush and trees. Indications militating against the adoption of this capability are the enemy's respect for our supporting arms and his reluctance to be tied to a fixed position thus restricting his movement.

(4) Capability (4). Indication which favors the enemy adoption of this capability is that this is a time tested enemy tactic which provides him with the capability of inflicting significant damage without exposing his own forces. Under these conditions the enemy is least vulnerable to the effects of our supporting fires. There are no indications which militate against the adoption of this capability.

(5) Capability (5). Indications which favor the adoption of this capability are the enemy's superior knowledge of the terrain and his desire to conserve his main and local force strength when opposed by forces possessing superior fire power.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Militating against the adoption of this capability is the fact that the enemy must inflict some casualties on friendly forces if he is to remain in control of the area he occupies.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Probable courses of action. The probable Viet Cong courses of action are as follows:

(1) The enemy will probably utilize a combination of capabilities (3) and (4) to inflict the maximum number of casualties on the BLT units.

(2) The enemy may exfiltrate from the Song Cau area as soon as he realizes he is being attacked by a force superior to his.

(3) Should the enemy be present in the AOA in significant strength in a force of two to five battalions he may choose to execute capability (2). This is not considered to be probable.

b. Vulnerabilities. Viet Cong forces when concentrated are vulnerable to attack by air, naval gunfire, mortar fire, and artillery. In the past Viet Cong units have often broken contact when confronted by a superior force.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

BLT 3/5  
 USS Princeton (LPH-5 )  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 2 (Astronomical and Tidal Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
 Operation Order 328-66

Astronomical and Tidal Data for the period 17-25 June 1966 for the  
 Song Cau Area is as follows:

ASTRONOMICAL DATA:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>BMT</u> | <u>SUNRISE</u> | <u>SUNSET</u> | <u>MOONRISE</u> | <u>MOONSET</u> | <u>MOONPHASE</u> |
|-------------|------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 17 June     | 0526       | 0616           | 1913          | 0352            |                | New              |
| 18 June     | 0526       | 0617           | 1913          | 0443            |                | New              |
| 19 June     | 0526       | 0617           | 1913          | 0539            | 1852           | New              |
| 20 June     | 0526       | 0617           | 1913          |                 | 2008           | New              |
| 21 June     | 0526       | 0618           | 1914          |                 | 2106           | 1st Qtr          |
| 22 June     | 0526       | 0618           | 1914          |                 | 2159           | 1st Qtr          |
| 23 June     | 0526       | 0618           | 1914          |                 | 2249           | 1st Qtr          |
| 24 June     | 0527       | 0618           | 1915          |                 | 2333           | 2d Qtr           |
| 25 June     | 0527       | 0618           | 1915          |                 |                |                  |

TIDAL DATA:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>TIME</u> | <u>HEIGHT (Feet)</u> |
|-------------|-------------|----------------------|
| 17 June     | 0038(Low)   | 3.0                  |
|             | 0823(High)  | 5.4                  |
|             | 1701(Low)   | 1.5                  |
| 18 June     | 0857(High)  | 5.8                  |
|             | 1749(Low)   | 1.1                  |
| 19 June     | 0935(High)  | 6.2                  |
|             | 1838(Low)   | 0.8                  |
| 20 June     | 1015(High)  | 6.4                  |
|             | 1928(Low)   | 0.7                  |
| 21 June     | 1101(High)  | 6.5                  |
|             | 2019(Low)   | 0.7                  |
| 22 June     | 1147(High)  | 6.4                  |
|             | 2109(Low)   | 0.8                  |
| 23 June     | 1237(High)  | 6.2                  |
|             | 2155(Low)   | 1.1                  |
| 24 June     | 1329(High)  | 5.8                  |
|             | 2237(Low)   | 1.4                  |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Height(feet)</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------|
| 25 June     | 1424(High)  | 5.2                 |
|             | 2311(Low)   | 1.9                 |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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REF 3/5  
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150800H 1706-100

Appendix 3(HLZ Study) to Annex B(Intelligence) to Operation Order  
328-66

HLZ HAWK

1. Location. Centered at coordinates CQ 054825.
2. Orientation and Landmarks. The long axis of the HLZ is oriented east and west at the base of hill 284.
3. Elevation. Approximately 100 meters.
4. Size. HLZ HAWK is about 560 meters in length. At its narrowest point the HLZ is approximately 260 meters wide. Its widest point is about 500 meters.
5. Surface Material. Sand and Clay.
6. Obstacles. There are numerous shrubs, trees and paddy dikes throughout the area.
7. Slope. 5%
8. Local Use. Rice fields.
9. Exits. Exits from this HLZ are unrestricted to troops.
10. Cover and Concealment. Cover is poor to fair, limited to natural terrain features and paddy dikes. Concealment is fair and is afforded by the trees, shrubs and the numerous paddy dikes.
11. Helicopter Routes. The most favorable approach is from the south-east. The HLZ is bordered to the north, west and south by hills 65, 284 and 80.

HLZ CROW

1. Location. Centered at coordinates CQ 061802
2. Orientation and landmarks. This HLZ is orientated east and west north of hill 286.
3. Elevation. Approximately 100 meters.
4. Size. HLZ Crow is about 200 meters long and 170 meters wide.
5. Surface Material. Sand and Clay.



6. Obstacles. Trees, shrubs and dikes throughout area.
7. Slope. 5%
8. Local Use. Rice fields.
9. Exits. Exits from this HLZ are unrestricted to foot troops.
10. Cover and Concealment. Cover is fair, limited to natural terrain features and paddy dikes. Concealment is fair and is afforded by the trees, shrubs and paddy dikes.
11. Helicopter Routes. The HLZ is unrestricted to the north, east and west. To the south hill 286 may restrict an approach.

HLZ ROBIN.

1. Location. Centered at coordinates CQ 060793.
2. Orientation and Landmarks. The long axis of HLZ Robin is orientated east and west. Hill 286 marks the south boundary and the town of PHU THO the east boundary.
3. Elevation. Approximately 200 meters.
4. Size. Length approximately 880 meters. Width at the narrowest point is 70 meters.
5. Surface Material. Sandy and clay.
6. Obstacles. Scattered shrubs, trees and numerous paddy dikes throughout the area.
7. Slope. 5%
8. Local Use. Rice fields.
9. Exits. Exits from this HLZ are unrestricted to troops.
10. Cover and Concealment. Cover is poor to fair, limited to natural terrain features and paddy dikes. Concealment is poor to fair and is afforded by trees, shrubs and paddy dikes throughout the HLZ.
11. Helicopter Routes. Helicopter approaches are unrestricted except by hill 286 to the south.

HLZ BUZZARD.

1. Location. Centered at coordinates CQ 040795.
2. Orientation and Landmarks. The long axis of HLZ Buzzard is oriented north and south. Hill 384 marks the north boundary; hill 286 the east; hills 114 and 268 the south; and hill 276 the west.
3. Elevation. Approximately 100 meters.
4. Size. 1,500 meters long and 400 meters wide at its narrowest point.
5. Surface Material. Sand and Clay.
6. Obstacles. There are numerous trees, shrubs and dikes throughout the area.
7. Slope. 5%
8. Local Use. Rice fields.
9. Exits. The only impediments to troops existing in this HLZ are the many hills in the adjacent area.
10. Cover and Concealment. Cover is fair to good because of the many surface irregularities of the terrain and dense undergrowth surrounding the zone. Concealment is also fair to good.
11. Helicopter Routes. Helicopter routes are obstructed from all sides by hill masses previously mentioned.
12. Remarks. Approximately 70% of this area is composed of flooded rice fields.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS Princeton (LHA-3)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 4 (Beach Study) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 328-66

BEACH STUDY: RED BEACH

1. Beach description and location.

Red Beach is a slightly concave beach located inland from the entrance of XUAN DAI BAY. A prominent rocky headland defines the right flank and a long, slender, sandy peninsula defines the left flank. A low berm line ranging from 3 to 6 feet in elevation backs the majority of the beach length. Two breaks, the only prominent breaks through the berm line, are located in the center third and the right third of the beach. The entire length of the beach is useable and suited for amphibious landings. The following coordinates locate the useable beach length:

- |                  |             |
|------------------|-------------|
| (1) Left flank   | CQ 10997790 |
| (2) Beach Center | CQ 10607910 |
| (3) Right flank  | CQ 10408030 |

2. Beach Length.

- (1) In yards - 2,065.
- (2) In miles - 1.2.

3. Beach Width.

- (1) 30-50 yards at Low Tide.
- (2) 15-25 yards at High Tide.

4. Beach Shape.

Slightly concave.

5. Beach Gradient.

The average beach gradient, low water to high water, for the beach length is 1:13. The gradient is steepest at the left flank (1:5), leveling to 1:13 near the beach center and remaining at this gradient for the remaining beach length.

6. Beach Approach.

(1) Offshore: The offshore approach is restricted to the channel of XUAN DAI BAY. The approach is partially obstructed by small island (HON YEN) and a rocky shoal (ROCHE de l' OCTANT). The following information locates these obstructions:

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## (a) Obstruction:

Direction from beach center:

Distance from beach center:

Small island

82° Magnetic Azimuth

4,200 yards

## (b) Obstruction:

Direction from the beach center:

Distance from beach center:

Rocky shoal

82° 30' Magnetic Azimuth

2,850 yards

2. Nearshore: The nearshore approach is clear but flanked on the north by a rocky headland (right flank boundary) and on the south by a sand bar/sandy peninsula (left flank boundary). A sand bar fronts the beach but presents no apparent hazard to amphibious landing craft or landing vehicles during high tide conditions. During low tide conditions, deep draft amphibious landing craft may run aground within 100 yards of the shore.

7. Surf Conditions.

Surf 4 feet or greater can be expected to occur 4% of the time during the period of operations.

8. Beach Material and Firmness.

The beach material is sand which will be firm in wetted areas and soft where dry.

9. Bottom Material.

(1) Offshore - Mud.

(2) Near shore - sand and mud.

10. Tidal Information.

(1) Direction and speed: Westward on the rising tide at about 1.5 knots, otherwise the current speed and current direction are primarily wind driven.

(2) Water rise in feet from low tide to high tide: Approximately 5 feet.

(3) Type Tide: Predominately diurnal.

11. Terrain behind the beach.

Left Third: The berm line is backed by brush covered dunes. The dunes in turn are backed by terraced cultivated fields and the base of foot hills. Highway #1 is located at the base of these hills and runs in a general north south direction. The terrace cultivated fields extend from the base of the foot hills to brush covered high ground. The brush covered high ground in turn is backed on a higher elevation by more terraced cultivated fields.

A lone hill, elevation 205 meters, dominates the terrain in this area. The elevation in the left third does not exceed 271 meters.

Center Third: The berm is broken at beach center by an intermittent stream mouth. The berm line is backed by brush covered dunes and the dunes in turn are backed by terrace cultivated fields and the base of brush covered foot hills. Highway #1 is located at the base of these foot hills and runs in north south direction. Small isolated terraced cultivated fields are found scattered throughout the brushy terrain and these fields are backed by a brush covered ridge. A lone hill, elevation 205 meters, dominates the terrain in this area. The elevation in the center third does not exceed 271 meters.

Right Third: The berm line is backed by barren to sparsely brush covered dunes and the out skirts of AN BINH THANH Village. The dunes and village out-skirts are backed by terraced cultivated fields. Highway #1 is located in this area and runs in a north and south direction. The terrace cultivated fields are backed by brush covered foot hills and these foot hills rise in elevation to meet isolated terraced cultivated fields and the large terraced cultivated area at the highest elevation at the hill mass. This area in turn is backed by a brush covered ridge. The elevation of the right third does not exceed 178 meters.

## 12. Beach Exits

(1) For troops: Troops can exit the beach directly over the berm line and through the dune areas to Highway #1. Highway #1 is the primary access road to the existing foot trails which lead inland to the high terrain behind the beach.

### (2) For Wheeled Vehicles.

Wheeled vehicles may exit the beach either at the beach center (CQ 10607910) through exit #1 to Highway #1 or at the right flank through exit #2 (CQ 10457984) to Highway #1. Matting will be required for both exits.

(3) For Tracked Vehicles: Tracked vehicles may exit the beach either at exit #1 or exit #2 to Highway #1. Matting will probably not be required at either exit for tracked vehicles.

## 13. Beach Fortifications.

Interpretation of aerial photography flown 8 June 1966, discloses the following enemy fortifications:

(1) The enemy fortifications on the beach could cause immediate danger to troops prior to, during, and after debarking from amphibious landing craft or vehicles:

(a) A sand bag bunker at coordinates 104794, located in the right third of the beach, was unoccupied as of 7 June 1966.

(b) At least twelve one man emplacements are located in a line from 104797 to 105791. Only 12 emplacements were actually seen and located on aerial photography, however, it is quite possible that more exist. These emplacements were unoccupied as of 8 June 1966.

These emplacements are located atop the berm line and forward of the brush line in the dune area. Additional emplacements are dug further back in the brush line and still have adequate fields of fire over the beach area. It is possible that more emplacements exist in the brushy area.

(c) Two mortar positions are located at 101792 and 099805. These positions were unoccupied as of 8 June 1966.

(2) The following enemy fortifications could cause immediate danger to troops after crossing the beach and inland across Highway #1:

(a) One one man emplacement located at 101798 and unoccupied as of 8 June 1966.

(b) Two strong points capable of accommodating automatic weapons are located at 099798 and 099805. Both were unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(c) One one man emplacement located at 099802 and unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(d) Trench lines recently dug or re-worked and located at 097023, 096802 and 096801.

(3) The following enemy fortifications could be of immediate danger to troops moving inland after crossing Highway #1:

(a) Two one man emplacements located side by side at 091786 were unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(b) Two trench lines are located at 088787. These trenches face east and one is behind the other. Both trenches were unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(c) Two trench lines facing east at 085787 and 085786 were unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(d) A trench line facing south is located from 085786 to 084786 and was unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(e) A trench line facing north is located from 085788 to 084786 and was unoccupied on 8 June 1966.

(f) A possible cave is located at 084786.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 5 (Challenge and Password) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
Operation Order 328-66

| <u>Code</u> | <u>Primary</u>   |                 | <u>Alternate</u> |                 |
|-------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
|             | <u>Challenge</u> | <u>Password</u> | <u>Challenge</u> | <u>Password</u> |
| 26          | Bottle           | Baby            | Bean             | Bag             |
| 38          | Cotton           | Candy           | White            | Horse           |
| 54          | Field            | Mouse           | Card             | Shark           |
| 93          | Hot              | Shot            | Rebel            | Yell            |
| 85          | Pistol           | Pete            | Jolly            | Roger           |
| 62          | Blue             | Canoe           | Hard             | Charger         |
| 47          | Beetle           | Bum             | Black            | Beauty          |
| 66          | Doll             | House           | Cracker          | Barrel          |
| 12          | Cat              | Call            | Paper            | Moon            |
| 75          | Buggy            | Whip            | Hard             | Tack            |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLP 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL.

a. This plan provides for:

- (1) Landing one reinforced company with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zone HAWK.
- (2) Landing one reinforced company with designated supporting units by helicopter in landing zone to be designated.
- (3) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by surface means over RED Beach.
- (4) See Appendixes for detailed instructions.

2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. TacLog Group representation will be provided in accordance with Annex K (Administration and Logistics).

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Landing Craft Availability Table
- 2 - Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table
- 3 - Helicopter Availability Table
- 4 - Landing Diagram
- 5 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table
- 6 - Serial Assignment Table
- 7 - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table
- 8 - Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table
- 9 - Helicopter Landing Diagram (Not published)
- 10 - Debarkation Schedule (To be published separately)
- 11 - Assault Schedule
- 12 - Pre-H-Hour Transfer Schedule

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 1 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)  
 to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

| SHIP                                | LCPL | LCVP | LCM-6 | LCM-8 | LCU |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|-------|-------|-----|
| APA 222                             | 3    | 19   | 2     | 0     | 0   |
| LSD 33                              | 2    | 2    | 0     | 2     | 1   |
| Total                               | 5    | 21   | 2     | 2     | 1   |
| Spares                              | 2    | 2    | 0     | 0     | 0   |
| Naval Requirement                   | 3    | 3    | 1     | 0     | 0   |
| Total Naval Requirement             | 5    | 5    | 1     | 0     | 0   |
| Total Available to<br>Landing Force | 0    | 16   | 1     | 2     | 1   |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 2 (Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

| SHIP   | AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE UNIT              | NUMBER & TYPE<br>AMPHIBIAN VEHICLES<br>LVT-5 LVTG DUKW |   |   | REMARKS |
|--------|-------------------------------------|--|---|---|---------|
| LSD-33 | 2d Plat, Co B, 3d AmTrac<br>En, FMF | 10   | 1 | 1 |         |
| Total  |                                     | 10   | 1 | 1 |         |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 3 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)  
to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: FMFM 3-3

Time Zone: H

| HELICOPTER<br>UNIT AND<br>DESIGNATION | NUMBER<br>OF<br>A/C | A/C AVAILABLE<br>FIRST<br>TRIP | OTHER<br>TRIPS | TYPE  | CARRIER | DECK<br>LAUNCH<br>CAPACITY | REMARKS |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|-------|---------|----------------------------|---------|
| HMM 364<br>(WHITEGOLD)                | 23                  | 18                             | 18             | UH-34 | LPH-5   | 16                         |         |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 4 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation  
 Order 328-66

H-hour: 0645

Beach RED

|        |             |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |      |
|--------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|
| Wave 1 | Co K (Rein) |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |      | Ser: |
| H-hour |             |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |      | 103  |
|        | X           | X   | X   | X   | X   | X*  | X   | X   | X   | X    |      |
|        | 1-1         | 1-2 | 1-3 | 1-4 | 1-5 | 1-6 | 1-7 | 1-8 | 1-9 | 1-10 |      |

|        |             |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |  |      |
|--------|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|------|
| Wave 2 | Co I (Rein) |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |  | Ser: |
| H+4    |             |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |  | 100  |
|        |             | O   | O   | O   | O   | O*  | O   | O   | O   |  |      |
|        |             | 2-8 | 2-6 | 2-4 | 2-2 | 2-1 | 2-3 | 2-5 | 2-7 |  |      |

|        |                                  |  |  |  |  |     |     |  |  |  |      |
|--------|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|-----|-----|--|--|--|------|
| Wave 3 | Beach Jumper Unit                |  |  |  |  |     |     |  |  |  | Ser: |
| H+10   | Btry F Recon Pty                 |  |  |  |  |     |     |  |  |  | 110  |
|        | Shore Party Recon Party, Tk Plat |  |  |  |  |     |     |  |  |  |      |
|        |                                  |  |  |  |  | O   | O*  |  |  |  |      |
|        |                                  |  |  |  |  | 3-2 | 3-1 |  |  |  |      |

LEGEND:

X LVTP-5                      O LCVF  
 @ LVTC                      \* WAVE CDR

NOTE: In the event of high surf, the following changes to the landing diagram will be effected:

1. Serial 100 will be landed in (2) LCM-8.
2. Serial 110 will be landed with Serial 115.

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Appendix 5 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table) to  
 Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

| BOAT NO | PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT             | BOAT<br>SPACES | FORMATION |
|---------|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
|         | 1st WAVE                            |                | Column    |
| 1-1     | Plt Cdr, 1st Plat, Co K             | 1              | X*        |
| LVTP-5  | Msgr, 1st Plat, Co K                | 1              | 1-1       |
|         | Corpsman, 1st Plat, Co K            | 1              | X         |
|         | 1st MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K         | 9              | 1-2       |
|         | 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Co K             | 14             | X         |
|         | 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K             | 2              | 1-3       |
|         |                                     | <u>28</u>      | X         |
|         |                                     |                | 1-4       |
| 1-2     | Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co K           | 1              | X         |
| LVTP-5  | Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co K            | 1              | 1-5       |
|         | Msgr, 1st Plat, Co K                | 1              | X         |
|         | Corpsman, 1st Plat, Co K            | 1              | 1-6       |
|         | Msgr, Wpns Plat, Co K               | 1              | X         |
|         | 1st Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K      | 7              | 1-7       |
|         | 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co K              | 14             | X         |
|         | 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K             | 2              | 1-8       |
|         |                                     | <u>28</u>      | X         |
|         |                                     |                | 1-9       |
| 1-3     | Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, Co K           | 1              | X         |
| LVTP-5  | Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co K          | 1              | 1-10      |
|         | Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Wpns Plat, Co K | 1              |           |
|         | Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co K             | 1              |           |
|         | Admin Clerk, Co K                   | 1              |           |
|         | 2d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K       | 7              |           |
|         | 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co K              | 14             |           |
|         | 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K             | 2              |           |
|         |                                     | <u>28</u>      |           |
| 1-4     | Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co K             | 1              |           |
| LVTP-5  | Msgr, 2d Plat, Co K                 | 1              |           |
|         | Corpsman, 2d Plat, Co K             | 1              |           |
|         | Admin Man, Co K                     | 1              |           |
|         | Scout, S-2, H&S Co                  | 1              |           |
|         | 3d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K       | 7              |           |
|         | 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K              | 14             |           |
|         | 60mm Mort Sec (-), Co K             | 2              |           |
|         |                                     | <u>28</u>      |           |

| BOAT NO | PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT          | BOAT SPACES | FORMATION |
|---------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| 1-5     | Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co K          | 1           |           |
| LVTP-5  | Msgr, 2d Plat, Co K              | 1           |           |
|         | 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K            | 14          |           |
|         | Corpsman, Hq Sec, Co K           | 1           |           |
|         | Det, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co      | 11          |           |
|         | 81mm Mort                        | 1           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>29</u>   |           |
| 1-6     | CO, Co K                         | 1           |           |
| LVTC    | GySgt, Co K                      | 1           |           |
|         | Msgr, Co K                       | 1           |           |
|         | NGF Spot Tm                      | 5           |           |
|         | Plt Cdr, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co  | 1           |           |
|         | Radio Op, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co | 1           |           |
|         | Msgr, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co     | 1           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>11</u>   |           |
| 1-7     | Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co K        | 1           |           |
| LVTP-5  | Corpsman, Wpns Plat, Co K        | 1           |           |
|         | FO Tm, Btry F                    | 5           |           |
|         | Scout, S-2, H&S Co               | 1           |           |
|         | Supply Sgt, Co K                 | 1           |           |
|         | 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co K            | 14          |           |
|         | Det, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co      | 5           |           |
|         | 81mm Mort                        | 1           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>29</u>   |           |
| 1-8     | XO, Co K                         | 1           |           |
| LVTP-5  | Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co K          | 1           |           |
|         | 1st Sgt, Co K                    | 1           |           |
|         | FAC Tm                           | 5           |           |
|         | Chief Clerk, Co K                | 1           |           |
|         | Sec Ldr, 60mm Mort Sec, Co K     | 1           |           |
|         | 1st Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K           | 14          |           |
|         | Msgr, 3d Plat, Co K              | 1           |           |
|         | Det, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co      | 4           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>29</u>   |           |
| 1-9     | Plat Sgt, 3d Plat, Co K          | 1           |           |
| LVTP-5  | Msgr, 3d Plat, Co K              | 1           |           |
|         | Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co K          | 1           |           |
|         | 2d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K       | 9           |           |
|         | 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K            | 14          |           |
|         | Det, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co      | 3           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>29</u>   |           |
| 1-10    | Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co K        | 1           |           |
| LVTP-5  | Corpsman, 3d Plat, Co K          | 1           |           |
|         | Sec Ldr, MG Sec, Wpns Plat, Co K | 1           |           |
|         | 3d MG Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co K       | 9           |           |
|         | 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co K            | 14          |           |
|         | Det, 81mm Mort Plat, H&S Co      | 2           |           |
|         |                                  | <u>28</u>   |           |

| <u>BOAT NO</u> | <u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u> | <u>BOAT<br/>SPACES</u> | <u>FORMATION</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| <u>ON CALL</u> |                                |                        |                  |
| LCM-6          | 2d Echelon, BAS                | 5                      |                  |
| Ser: 115       | AT Plat                        | 20                     |                  |
|                | Det, SP Tm                     | 17                     |                  |
|                |                                | <u>42</u>              |                  |
| LCU            | Btry F (-)                     | 100                    |                  |
| Ser: 115       | Det, Beachmaster Unit          | 5                      |                  |
|                | Det, Radio Relay               | 2                      |                  |
|                | Equipment Operators            | 5                      |                  |
|                | (2) TD-15 (Engr-Btry F)        | -                      |                  |
|                | (1) RFK 060                    | -                      |                  |
|                | (1) MRC-37 (BMU)               | -                      |                  |
|                | (1) MRC-62                     | -                      |                  |
|                | (6) 105mm Howitzer             | -                      |                  |
|                |                                | <u>112</u>             |                  |

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E. J. BRONARS

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Appendix 7 (Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation  
 Order 328-66

| WAVE | HELI UNIT<br>&<br>FLIGHT NUMBER | NO/TYPE<br>A/C | FROM TO        |       | TIME    |        |         | DESTINATION |    | TROOP UNIT,<br>EQUIPMENT<br>AND SERIAL |     |
|------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|---------|--------|---------|-------------|----|--|-----|
|      |                                 |                | CARRIER REPORT |       | LOAD    | LAUNCH | LAND    | LZ          | LS |  |     |
|      |                                 |                | Origin         | Load  |         |        |         |             |    |  |     |
| 1    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 16             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | L-30    | L-15   | L-hour  | CROW        |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       | L-30    | L-15   | L+2     |             |    | Co L 101                               |     |
|      | 3-0,4                           |                |                |       | L-30    | L-15   | L+4     |             |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | 4-0,4                           |                |                |       | L-30    | L-15   | L+6     |             |    | Co L                                   |     |
| 2    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 16             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | L+11    | L+13   | L+23    | CROW        |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       | L+13    | L+15   | L+25    |             |    | Co L 201                               |     |
|      | 3-0,4                           |                |                |       | L+15    | L+17   | L+27    |             |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | 4-0,4                           |                |                |       | L+17    | L+19   | L+29    |             |    | Co L                                   |     |
| 3    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 15             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | L+34    | L+36   | L+46    | CROW        |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       | L+36    | L+38   | L+48    |             |    | Co L 301                               |     |
|      | 3-0,3                           |                |                |       | L+38    | L+40   | L+50    |             |    | Co L                                   |     |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4                      | UH34D          |                |       | LPH-5   | LPH-5  | ON CALL |             |    | --                                     | --  |
| 4    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 16             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | --     | --      | TBA         |    | Co M                                   |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M 401                               |     |
|      | 3-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M                                   |     |
|      | 4-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M                                   |     |
| 5    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 16             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | --     | --      | TBA         |    | Co M                                   |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M 501                               |     |
|      | 3-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M                                   |     |
|      | 4-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | Co M                                   |     |
| 6    | DUNBAR 1-0,4                    | 16             | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | --     | --      | TBA         |    | Co M/107 Mort                          |     |
|      | 2-0,4                           | UH34D          |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | 107 Mort                               |     |
|      | 3-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | -do-                                   | 601 |
|      | 4-0,4                           |                |                |       |         |        |         |             |    | -do-                                   |     |



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| WAVE         | HELI UNIT<br>&<br>FLIGHT NUMBER         | NO/TYPE<br>A/C | FROM TO        |       | TIME    |        |      | DESTINATION |    | TROOP UNIT,<br>EQUIPMENT<br>AND SERIAL                  |
|--------------|---|----------------|----------------|-------|---------|--------|------|-------------|----|---|
|              |   |                | CARRIER REPORT |       | LOAD    | LAUNCH | LAND | LZ          | LS |   |
|              |   |                | Origin         | Load  |         |        |      |             |    |   |
| 7            | DUNBAR 1-0,4<br>2-0,4<br>3-0,4<br>4-0,4 | 16<br>UH34D    | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | ---    | ---  | TBA         |    | 107 Mort<br>Ext (107 Mort)<br>Ext -do- 701<br>Ext -do-  |
| 8            | DUNBAR 1-0,4<br>2-0,4<br>3-0,4<br>4-0,4 | 16<br>UH34D    | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | ---    | ---  | TBA         |    | Ext (107 Mort)<br>Ext -do-<br>106 Plat 801<br>Engr Plat |
| 9            | DUNBAR 1-0,4<br>2-0,4<br>3-0,4<br>4-0,4 | 16<br>UH34D    | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | ---    | ---  | TBA         |    | Cmd Grp "A" (-)<br>-do- 901<br>Cmd Grp "B"<br>-do-      |
| 10           | DUNBAR 1-0,4<br>2-0,4<br>3-0,3          | 15<br>UH34D    | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ON CALL | ---    | ---  | TBA         |    | Ext (Tents)<br>3d Recon 1001<br>Force Recon             |
| FREE<br>HELO |   | 1<br>UH1E      | LPH-5          | LPH-5 | ---     | ---    | ---  | ---         |    | CO, BLT   |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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Appendix 6 (Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

| SERIAL<br>NUMBER | UNIT   | PERS | MATERIAL<br>EQUIPMENT<br>VEHICLES  | CRAFT<br>NO/TYPE | SHIP       | REMARKS  |
|------------------|--|------|--|------------------|------------|----------|
| 100              | Co I   | 252  | (2) 81mm Mort  | 8 LCVP           | APA<br>222 | 2d Wave  |
| 103              | Co K   | 267  | (2) 81mm Mort  | 9 LVTP<br>1 LVTC | LSD<br>33  | 1st Wave |
| 110              | Btry F<br>Beach Jumper<br>Unit<br>Shore Party<br>Tank Plat                   | 52   | (1) P153 Mine<br>Detector  | 2 LCVP           | LSD<br>33  | 3d Wave  |
| 115              | 2d Echelon, BAS 152<br>AT Plat<br>Det, SP Tm<br>Btry F<br>Radio Relay<br>BMU |      | (2) TD-15<br>(1) RFK 060<br>(1) MRC-37<br>(1) MRC-62<br>(6) 105mm Howitzer | 1 LCU<br>1 LCM-6 | LSD<br>33  | On call  |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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Appendix 8 (Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                                   |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 1    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>101-1                         | 1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L   | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>101-2                         | 1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L   | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>101-3                         | Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co L<br>1st Sqd (-), 1st Plat<br>FAC Tm (-)                               | 1<br>2<br><u>3</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>101-4                         | 2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L  | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>101-5                         | 2d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L<br>Corpsman, 1st Plat  | 5<br><u>1</u><br>6                |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>101-6                         | Plat Ldr, 1st Plat, Co L<br>Rad Opr<br>Sqd Ldr, 1st Asslt Sqd<br>Asslt<br>1st Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>2</u><br>6 | 1Rkt Lcr Class V     | 1500   | 134   | 1634  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>101-7                         | Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co L<br>1st Tm, 1st MG Sqd  | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL   |                              | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | ENPLANING<br>STATION |       |       |
|------|---|---|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|
|      |   | TROOP UNIT  | NO.                          |                      | PERS                 | EQUIP | TOTAL |
| 1    | DUNBAR 2-4<br>101-8                         | 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L                                | 6                            |                      | 1500                 |       | 1500  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>101-9                         | 3d Sqd (-), 1st Plat, Co L<br>2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd           | 3<br><u>3</u><br>6           | 1 MG Class V         | 1500                 | 95    | 1595  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>101-10                        | 3d Sqd, (-), 1st Plat, Co L<br>2d Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd        | 4<br><u>2</u><br>6           | 1 Rkt Ldr Class V    | 1500                 | 134   | 1634  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>101-11                        | Co Cdr, Co L<br>Co Gy Sgt<br>Rad Opr<br>Fo Tm (-), F ltry | 1<br>1<br>2<br><u>2</u><br>6 |                      | 1500                 |       | 1500  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>101-12                        | 1st 60mm Mort Sqd, Co L<br>FO Tm (-), F ltry              | 4<br><u>2</u><br>6           | 1 60mm Mort Class V  | 1500                 | 105   | 1605  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>101-13                        | Plat Sgt, Wpns Plat, Co L<br>Corpsman<br>2d 60mm Mort Sqd | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      | 1 60mm Mort Class V  | 1500                 | 105   | 1605  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-2<br>101-14                        | 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, Co L                                    | 6                            |                      | 1500                 |       | 1500  |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                                   |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 1    | DUNBAR 4-3<br>101-15                        | 1st Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L  | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>101-16                        | Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd, Co L<br>Sec Ldr, MG Sec, Wpns Plat<br>1st Tm, 2d MG Sqd | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
| 2    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>201-1                         | Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co L<br>HST Tm<br>FAC Tm (-)                           | 1<br>3<br><u>2</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>201-2                         | Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co L<br>Rad Opr<br>Msgr<br>Corpsman<br>FO Tm, 81mm Mort  | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>2</u><br>6 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>201-3                         | 2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L   | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>201-4                         | 2d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L   | 6                                 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>201-5                         | Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co L<br>NGF Tm   | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   |   |                                   |                      |        |       |       |                      |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                   | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                       |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 2    | DUNBAR 2-2<br>201-6                         | 2d Asslt Sqd, Wpns Plat, Co L  | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>201-7                         | 3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L  | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>201-8                         | 3d Sqd (-), 2d Plat, Co L  | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>201-9                         | Plat Cdr, Wpns Plat, Co L<br>2d Tm, 2d MG Sqd<br>Co Clerks                             | 1<br>3<br>2<br>6      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>201-10                        | 1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L   | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>201-11                        | 1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L   | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>201-12                        | 3d Plat Guide, Co L<br>1st Sqd (-), 3d Plat<br>Sqd Ldr, 3d MG Sqd<br>1st Tm, 3d MG Sqd | 1<br>1<br>1<br>3<br>6 | 1 MG Class V         | 1500   | 95    | 1595  |                      |
|      |   |  |                       |                      |        |       |       |                      |

D-8-4

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                   | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|-----------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                       |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 2    | DUNBAR 4-0<br>201-13                        | 2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L   | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-2<br>201-14                        | 2d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L<br>Corpsman   | 5<br>1<br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>201-15                        | Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co L<br>Msgr<br>Rad Opr<br>2d Tm, 3d MG Sqd                    | 1<br>1<br>1<br>3<br>6 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>201-16                        | Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Co L<br>Sqd Ldr, 3d Asslt Sqd<br>1st Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd         | 1<br>1<br>4<br>6      | 1 Rkt Lchr Class V   | 1500   | 74    | 1574  |                      |
| 3    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>301-1                         | 3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L   | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>301-2                         | 3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat, Co L   | 6                     |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>301-3                         | Plat Sgt, 3d Plat, Co L<br>3d Sqd (-), 3d Plat<br>Corpsman<br>2d Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd | 1<br>1<br>1<br>3<br>6 | 1 Rkt Lchr Class V   | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |

D-8-5

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                             | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT         | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|---------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                                 |                              | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 3    | DUNBAR 1-4<br>301-4                         | Engr (-)   | 6                               |                              | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>301-5                         | Engr (-)   | 6                               |                              | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>301-6                         | Hq Sec, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort<br>Plat  | 5                               | 1 AN/PRC-10<br>1 EE & Wire   | 1500   | 60    | 1560  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>301-7                         | 5th Sqd, 3d Sec, 81mm Mort<br>Plat   | 5                               | 1 81mm Mort &<br>Accessories | 1250   | 165   | 1415  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>301-8                         | 5th Sqd (-), 3d Sec, 81mm<br>Mort Plat   | 5                               |                              | 1250   |       | 1250  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>301-9                         | 6th Sqd (-), 3d Sec, 81mm<br>Mort Plat   | 5                               | 1 81mm Mort &<br>Accessories | 1250   | 165   | 1415  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>301-10                        | 6th Sqd (-), 3d Sec, 81mm<br>Mort Plat<br>Corpsman                               | 4<br>1<br>5                     |                              | 1250   |       | 1250  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>301-11                        | XO, Co L<br>1st Sgt<br>Co Driver<br>Supply Sgt<br>Corpsman, Hq Sec<br>Co Armorer | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>6 |                              | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |

D-8-6

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                     | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                         |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 3    | DUNBAR 3-4<br>301-12                        | Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M<br>1st FT, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat<br>Grenadier, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat            | 1<br>4<br>1<br><u>6</u> |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>301-13                        | Plat Cdr, 1st Plat, Co M<br>Rad Opr/Msgr<br>2d FT, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat                                     | 1<br>1<br>4<br><u>6</u> |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-2<br>301-14                        | Sqd Ldr, 1st MG Sqd, Co M<br>1st Tm, 1st MG Sqd<br>Corpsman  | 1<br>4<br>1<br><u>6</u> | M-60 MG Class V      | 1500   | 95    | 1595  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>301-15                        | 3d FT, 1st Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M<br>Gunner, 1st Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd<br>Asst Gunner, 1st Tm, 1st Asslt<br>Sqd | 4<br>1<br><u>6</u>      | 1 Rkt Lehr Class V   | 1500   | 74    | 1574  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>301-16                        | Plat Guide, 1st Plat, Co M<br>Ammo Man, 1st Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd<br>1st FT, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat                | 1<br>1<br>4<br><u>6</u> |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
| 4    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>401-1                         | Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M<br>2d FT, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat<br>Grenadier, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat                | 1<br>4<br>1<br><u>6</u> |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |

D-8-7

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>WAVE SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO. | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|--|--|-----|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|  |  |     |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 4<br>DUNBAR 1-2<br>401-2                         | Sqd Ldr, 1st Asslt Sqd, Co M<br>3d FT, 2d Sqd, 1st Plat<br>Corpsman, 1st Plat                | 1   |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|  |  | 4   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 1   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| DUNBAR 1-3<br>401-3                              | 2d Tm, 1st MG Sqd, Co M<br>Gunner, 2d Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd<br>Asst Gunner, 2d Tm, 1st Asslt Sqd | 4   | 1 M-60 MG            | 1500   | 169   | 1669  |                      |
|  |  | 1   | 1 Hkt Lchr           |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 1   | Class V              |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| DUNBAR 1-4<br>401-4                              | 1st FT, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M<br>Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat<br>Grenadier, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat   | 4   |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|  |  | 1   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 1   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| DUNBAR 2-0<br>401-5                              | Plat Sgt, 1st Plat, Co M<br>Riflemen, 3d FT, 3d Sqd<br>2d FT, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat               | 1   |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|  |  | 1   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 4   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| DUNBAR 2-2<br>401-6                              | 3d FT, 3d Sqd, 1st Plat, Co M<br>2d Tm, 60mm Mort  | 3   | 1 60mm Mort Class V  | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|  |  | 3   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| DUNBAR 2-3<br>401-7                              | Co Cdr, Co M<br>Co GySgt<br>Rad Opr<br>S-2 Scouts  | 1   |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|  |  | 1   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 2   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 2   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  | 6   |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|  |  |     |                      |        |       |       |                      |

D-8-8

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT           | NO.      | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|-----------------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |                                   |          |                      | PEPS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 4    | DUNBAR 2-4<br>401-8                         | Sqd Ldr, 60mm Mort, Co M          | 1        | 1 60mm Mort Class V  | 1500   | 105   | 1605  | TBA                  |
|      |   | Sec Ldr, 60mm Mort                | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | 1st Tm, 60mm Mort                 | 3        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Corpsman                          | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>401-9                         | FO Tm, Btry F                     | 4        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Ammo NCO, Wpns Plat, Co M         | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Corpsman, Hq Sec                  | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>401-10                        | Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M   | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Grenadier, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat       | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | 1st FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat          | 4        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>401-11                        | Plat Cdr, 2d Plat, Co M           | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr/Msgr                      | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | 2d FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat           | 4        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>401-12                        | Sqd Ldr, 2d MG Sqd, Co M          | 1        | 1 M-60 MG Class V    | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      |   | 1st Tm, 2d MG Sqd                 | 4        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Corpsman                          | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>401-13                        | 3d FT, 1st Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M     | 4        | 1 Rkt Lchr Class V   | 1500   | 74    | 1574  |                      |
|      |   | Gunner, 1st Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd      | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Asst Gunner, 1st Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                                   |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                          | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                              |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 4    | DUNBAR 4-2<br>401-14                        | Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M<br>Grenadier, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat<br>Ammo Man, 1st Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd<br>1st FT, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>401-15                        | Plat Guide, 2d Plat, Co M<br>2d FT, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat<br>Sqd Ldr, 2d Asslt Sqd  | 1<br>4<br><u>1</u><br>6      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>401-16                        | 3d FT, 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M<br>2d Tm, 2d Asslt Sqd   | 3<br><u>3</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   | 74    | 1574  |                      |
| 5    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>501-1                         | Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat, Co M<br>Grenadier, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat<br>1st FT, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat                                   | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>501-2                         | Plat Sgt, 2d Plat, Co M<br>Corpsman, 2d Plat<br>2d FT, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat  | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>501-3                         | Sec Ldr, Asslt Sec, Co M<br>3d FT, 3d Sqd, 2d Plat<br>2d Tm, 2d MG Sqd  | 1<br>2<br><u>3</u><br>6      |                      | 1500   | 95    | 1595  |                      |

D-8-10

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                          | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |      | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|------|----------------------|
|      |   | PERS  |                              |                      | EQUIP  | TOTAL |      |                      |
| 5    | DUNBAR 1-4<br>501-4                         | 1st Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd<br>FO Tm, 81mm Mort<br>Corpsman, 3d Plat   | 3<br>2<br>1<br><u>6</u>      | 1 Rkt Lchr Class V   | 1500   | 74    | 1574 | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>501-5                         | Plat Guide, 3d Plat, Co M<br>Grenadier, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat<br>Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat<br>1st FT, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat | 1<br>1<br>1<br>3<br><u>6</u> |                      | 1500   |       | 1500 |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>501-6                         | Plat Cdr, 3d Plat, Co M<br>Rad Opr/Msgr<br>2d FT, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat  | 1<br>1<br>4<br><u>6</u>      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500 |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>501-7                         | Sqd Ldr, 3d MG Sqd, Co M<br>1st Tm, 3d MG Sqd<br>Corpsman, 3d Plat  | 1<br>4<br>1<br><u>6</u>      | 1 M-60 MG Class V    | 1500   | 95    | 1595 |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>501-8                         | Sqd Ldr, 3d Asslt Sqd, Co M<br>2d Tm, 3d Asslt Sqd<br>3d FT, 1st Sqd, 3d Plat                                     | 1<br>2<br>3<br><u>6</u>      | 1 Rkt Lchr Class V   | 1500   | 74    | 1574 |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>501-9                         | Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co M<br>Grenadier, 2d Sqd, 3d Plat<br>1st FT, 2d Sqd, 3d Plat                           | 1<br>1<br>4<br><u>6</u>      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500 |                      |

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                          | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                              |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 5    | DUNBAR 3-2<br>501-10                        | Sco Ldr, MG Sec, Co M<br>Rad Opr/Msgr<br>2d FT, 2d Plat  | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      | 1 M-60 MG Class V    | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>501-11                        | Plat Sgt, 3d Plat, Co M<br>Sqd Ldr, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat<br>Grenadier, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat<br>2d Tm, 3d MG Sqd                    | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6 |                      | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>501-12                        | 1st FT, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co M<br>2d FT, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat  | 3<br><u>3</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>501-13                        | 3d FT, 3d Sqd, 3d Plat, Co M<br>HST Tm   | 3<br><u>3</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-2<br>501-14                        | Sqd Ldr, 7th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Gunner, 7th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Asst Gunner, 7th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Ammo Man, 7th 81mm Mort Sqd | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>2</u><br>5 | 1 81mm Mort Class V  | 1250   | 246   | 1496  |                      |

D-8-12

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                        | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT             | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                            |                                  | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 5    | DUNBAR 4-3<br>501-15                        | Sqd Ldr, 8th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Gunner, 8th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Asst Gunner, 8th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Ammo Man, 8th 81mm Mort Sqd        | 1<br>1<br>1<br>2<br>5      | 1 81mm Mort Class V              | 1250   | 246   | 1495  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>501-16                        | Sec Ldr, 4th 81mm Mort Sec<br>Ammo Sgt, 4th 81mm Mort Sec<br>Ammo Cpl, 4th 81mm Mort Sec<br>Rad Opr<br>Wireman<br>1st Sgt, Co M | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>6 | Wire (extra)                     | 500    | 50    | 1550  |                      |
| 6    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>601-1                         | XO, Co M<br>Msgr<br>Ammo Man, 7th 81mm Mort Sqd<br>Ammo Man, 8th 81mm Mort Sqd  | 1<br>1<br>2<br>2<br>6      | 81mm Mort Accessories<br>Class V | 500    | 194   | 1694  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>601-2                         | Local Security Chief<br>MT  | 1<br>5<br>6                | 1 M-60 MG Class V                | 500    | 95    | 1595  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>601-3                         | XO, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Rad Opr<br>MT  | 1<br>1<br>4<br>6           | Aiming Circle<br>1 AN/PRC-10     | 500    | 60    | 1560  |                      |

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT        | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                                   |                             | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 6    | DUNBAR 1-4<br>601-4                         | Corpsman<br>MT   | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                | 1 M-60 MG Class V           | 1500   | 105   | 1605  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>601-5                         | HST<br>MT  | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                | 1 M-60 MG Class V           | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>601-6                         | HST<br>MT  | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                | 1 M-60 MG Class V           | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>601-7                         | HST<br>MT  | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6                | 1 M-60 MG Class V           | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>601-8                         | GySgt, 107mm Mort Btry<br>MT Off<br>Recorder<br>MT                   | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6      | 1 M-60 MG Class V           | 1500   | 105   | 1605  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>601-9                         | Btry Cdr, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Driver<br>FDC Man<br>Rad Opr<br>Ord Man | 1<br>1<br>1<br>2<br>1<br><u>6</u> | Aiming Circle<br>1 AN/PRC-9 | 1500   | 60    | 1560  |                      |

D-8-14

DECLASSIFIED



| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HEILTEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT    | NO.      | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|----------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |                            |          |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 6    | DUNBAR 3-2<br>601-10                        | Corpsman, 107mm Mort Btry  | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      |   | MT NCO                     | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Mechanic                   | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Driver                     | 3        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                            | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>601-11                        | Driver                     | 6        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   |                            |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>601-12                        | OP Chief, 107mm Mort Btry  | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-9           | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      |   | Rad Chief                  | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | FDC Man                    | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Ammo Tech                  | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Wireman                    | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                            | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>601-13                        | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-9           | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      |   | Gunner                     | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Cannoneer                  | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | FDC Man                    | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                    | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                            | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-2<br>601-14                        | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-9           | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      |   | Gunner                     | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Cannoneer                  | 3        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                    | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                            | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                                   |                      | PERK   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 6    | DUNBAR 4-3<br>601-15                        | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Gunner<br>Cannoneer<br>FDC Man           | 1<br>1<br>3<br><u>1</u><br>6      |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>601-16                        | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Gunner<br>Cannoneer                      | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
| 7    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>701-1                         | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Gunner<br>Cannoneer                      | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>701-2                         | Sec Chief, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Gunner<br>Cannoneer                      | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6           |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>701-3                         | FDO, 107mm Mort Btry<br>FDC Man<br>Rad Opr                             | 1<br>2<br><u>3</u><br>6           | 1 AN/PRC-9           | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>701-4                         | Cook, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Clerk<br>Ordnance Man<br>Mechanic<br>Rad Tech | 2<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>6 |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |

D-8-16

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT                          | NO.                     | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT      | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                         |                           | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 7    | DUNBAR 2-0<br>701-5                         | Ordnance Man, 107mm Mort Btry<br>Driver<br>Guide | 1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>3 |                           | 750    |       | 750   | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>701-6                         | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>701-7                         | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>701-8                         | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Ammunition External |        | 910   | 910   |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>701-9                         | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Ammunition External |        | 910   | 910   |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>701-10                        | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>701-11                        | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>701-12                        | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>701-13                        | 107mm Mort Btry                                  |                         | 107mm Howtar External     |        | 1465  | 1465  |                      |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT | NO. | WEIGHT                                 |      |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |       |
|------|---|-------------------------|-----|--|------|-------|----------------------|-------|
|      |   |                         |     | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT                   | PERS | EQUIP |                      | TOTAL |
| 7    | DUNBAR 4-2<br>701-14                        | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  | TBA   |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>701-15                        | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>701-16                        | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
| 8    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>801-1                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>801-2                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>801-3                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>801-4                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>801-5                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | 107mm Ammunition External              |      | 910   | 910                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>801-6                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | Trailer w/Comm & FDC<br>Equip External |      | 900   | 900                  |       |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>801-7                         | 107mm Mort Btry         |     | Trailer w/Comm & FDC<br>Equip External |      | 900   | 900                  |       |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                          | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT            | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                              |                                 | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 8    | DUNBAR 2-4<br>801-8                         | Sec Ldr, 1st Sec, 106mm RR Plat<br>2d Sqd (+), 1st Sec                        | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6           | 1 M-60 MG<br>1 Rkt Lchr         | 1500   | 169   | 1669  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>801-9                         | Plat Cdr, 106mm RR Plat<br>Rad Opr<br>Msgr<br>1st Sqd (-), 1st Sec            | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6 |                                 | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-2<br>801-10                        | Sec Ldr, 2d Sec, 106mm RR Plat<br>1st Sqd, 2d Sec<br>2d Sqd, 2d Sec (-)       | 1<br>3<br>2<br><u>6</u>      | 2 Rkt Lchr Class V              | 1500   | 148   | 1648  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>801-11                        | Sec Ldr, 3d Sec, 106mm RR Plat<br>1st Sqd, 3d Sec (+)                         | 1<br><u>5</u><br>6           | 2 Rkt Lchr Class V              | 1500   | 148   | 1648  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>801-12                        | Sec Ldr, 4th Sec, 106mm RR Plat<br>2d Sqd, 3d Sec (-)<br>1st Sqd, 4th Sec (-) | 1<br>2<br>3<br><u>6</u>      | 2 Rkt Lchr Class V              | 1500   | 148   | 1648  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>801-13                        | Plat Sgt, 106mm RR Plat<br>2d Sqd, 4th Sec                                    | 1<br><u>4</u><br>5           | 1 M-60 MG<br>1 Rkt Lchr Class V | 1500   | 169   | 1669  |                      |

D-8-19

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT             | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                                   |                                  | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 8    | DUNBAR 4-2<br>801-14                        | Engr Plat (-)   | 6                                 |                                  | 1500   |       | 1500  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>801-15                        | Engr Plat (-)   | 6                                 |                                  | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>801-16                        | Engr Plat (-)   | 5                                 |                                  | 1250   |       | 1250  |                      |
| 9    | DUNBAR 1-0<br>901-1                         | Cmd Grp "A" (-)<br><br>Comm Off<br>Sgt Maj<br>Msgr<br>Msgr Ctr Chief<br>FLD Rad Opr | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>2</u><br>6 | 1 AN/PRC-10<br>1 AN/PRC-47       | 1500   | 60    | 1560  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>901-2                         | S-1<br>Hq Cndt<br>Msgr<br>Arty Ln Tm  | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6      | 2 AN/PRC-9                       | 1500   | 60    | 1560  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-3<br>901-3                         | TACP Pty  | 5                                 | 1 AN/PRC-41<br>1 AN/PRC-47       | 1250   | 120   | 1370  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>901-4                         | GySgt, H&S Co<br>Msgr<br>Intel Asst<br>Corpsmen                                     | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>2</u><br>5      | 1 Sick Call Chest<br>1 Beach Bag | 1250   | 105   | 1355  |                      |

D-8-20

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT  | NO.                               | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |  |                                   |                      | PERS.  | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 9    | DUNBAR 2-0<br>901-5                         | S-3A<br>Rad Opr<br>Arty Ln Off<br>Arty Ln Tm (-)                       | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>3</u><br>6      | 2 AN/PRC-10          | 1500   | 60    | 1560  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>901-6                         | Opns Chief<br>MsgR/Drvr S-3<br>Clerks S-3<br>NBC Specialist<br>Rad Opr | 1<br>1<br>2<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>6 | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>901-7                         | NGF Tm (-)<br>HST  | 3<br><u>3</u><br>6                | 1 AN/PRC-47          | 1500   | 80    | 1580  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>901-8                         | NGF Tm (-)<br>S-4<br>Clerk S-4<br>Rad Chief                            | 3<br>1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>6      | 1 AN/PRC-47          | 1500   | 80    | 1580  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>901-9                         | Wire Chief<br>Rad Opr<br>Wiremen                                       | 1<br>3<br><u>2</u><br>6           | 2 RC-299<br>1 SB-22  | 1500   | 80    | 1580  |                      |

D-8-21

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT | NO.      | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|-------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |                         |          |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 9    | DUNBAR 3-2<br>901-10                        | Cmd Grp "B"             |          |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Bn XO                   | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1500   | 30    | 1530  | TBA                  |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Ln Off, S-3             | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Asst Opns Chief         | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Draftsman, S-3          | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Comm Chief              | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>901-11                        | Intell Chief            | 1        | 1 SB-22              | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      |   | Chief Scout             | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Wireman                 | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Wire Supervisor         | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-4<br>901-12                        | Admin Chief             | 1        | 1 RC-292             | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      |   | Admin Man               | 3        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | S&C Clerk               | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-0<br>901-13                        | XO, H&S Co              | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Msgr, H&S Co            | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | 1st Sgt, H&S Co         | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Chief Clerk, H&S Co     | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Admin Men, H&S Co       | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |

D-8-22

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT | NO.      | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|-------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |                         |          |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 9    | DUNBAR 4-2<br>901-14                        | Chaplain                | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1500   | 110   | 1610  | TBA                  |
|      |   | Chaplains Asst          | 1        | 1 AN/PRC-47          |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Supervisor          | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Msg Ctr Supervisor      | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-3<br>901-15                        | LSU Off                 | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Ammo Team               | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Supply Warehouse men    | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Ration Man              | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Supply Clerks           | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 4-4<br>901-16                        | Msg Cen Man             | 2        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Wireman                 | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
| 10   | DUNBAR 1-0<br>1001-1                        | Msg Cen Man             | 2        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Rad Opr                 | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Wireman                 | 3        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 1-2<br>1001-2                        | Ammo Tech               | 1        |                      | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      |   | Bulk Fuel Man           | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Ration Man              | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Supply Clerks           | 2        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   | Ln Off, S-3             | 1        |                      |        |       |       |                      |
|      |   |                         | <u>6</u> |                      |        |       |       |                      |

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                          | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT                    | WEIGHT |       |       | ENPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|------------------------------|---|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |                              |   | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 10   | DUNBAR 1-3<br>1001-3                        | Cmd Grp "B"   |                              | Basket (GP Tent w/poles)<br>External    |        | 900   | 900   | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 1-4<br>1001-4                        | Cmd Grp "B"   |                              | Basket (2 CP Tents<br>w/poles) External |        | 900   | 900   |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-0<br>1001-5                        | Cmd Grp "B"   |                              | Basket (2 CP Tents<br>w/poles) External |        | 900   | 900   |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-2<br>1001-6                        | Plat Cdr, 3d Recon Plat<br>Rad Op<br>2d Tm, 1st Sqd<br>Corpsman | 1<br>1<br>3<br><u>1</u><br>6 | 1 AN/PRC 10                             | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-3<br>1001-7                        | Sqd Ldr, 1st Sqd, 3d Recon Plat<br>Rad Opr<br>1st Tm, 1st Sqd   | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      | 1 AN/PRC 10                             | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 2-4<br>1001-8                        | Plat Sgt, 3d Recon Plat<br>Sqd Ldr, 2d Sqd<br>1st Tm, 2d Sqd    | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      |   | 1500   |       | 1500  |                      |
|      | DUNBAR 3-0<br>1001-9                        | Plat Guide, 3d Recon Plat<br>Rad Opr<br>2d Tm, 2d Sqd           | 1<br>1<br><u>4</u><br>6      | 1 AN/PRC-10                             | 1500   | 30    | 1530  |                      |

D-8-24

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| WAVE | A/C FLIGHT<br>NO.<br>HELITEAM<br>SERIAL NO. | PERSONNEL<br>TROOP UNIT   | NO.                                    | SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT | WEIGHT |       |       | EXPLANING<br>STATION |
|------|---|---|--|----------------------|--------|-------|-------|----------------------|
|      |   |   |  |                      | PERS   | EQUIP | TOTAL |                      |
| 10   | DUNBAR 3-2<br>1001-10                       | Plat Cdr, Force Recon Plat<br>Tm Ldr<br>Asst Tm Ldr<br>Scout<br>Rad Opr<br>Comm Chief | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>6 | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1500   | 30    | 1530  | TBA                  |
|      | DUNBAR 3-3<br>1001-11                       | Plat Sgt, Force Recon Plat<br>Tm Ldr<br>Asst Tm Ldr<br>Scout<br>Rad Opr               | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>5      | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1250   | 30    | 1280  |                      |
|      | FREE HELO                                   | (COMMAND)<br><br>CO, BLT<br>Rad Opr<br>S-2<br>S-3                                     | 1<br>1<br>1<br><u>1</u><br>4           | 1 AN/PRC-10          | 1000   | 30    | 1030  |                      |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

BLT 3/5  
 USS BRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 11 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation  
 Order 328-66

Ref: NWIP 22-6(4)

Time Zone: H

| Beach              |          | RED                          |  |
|--------------------|----------|------------------------------|--|
| Wave               | Time     | Craft/Vehicle<br>Serial      | Unit   |
| 1                  | H-hour   | 9 LVTP<br>1 LVTC<br>Ser: 103 | Co K (Rein)  |
| 2                  | H+4 Min  | 8 LCVP<br>Ser: 100           | Co I (Rein)  |
| 3                  | H+10 Min | 2 LCVP<br>Ser: 110           | SF Recon Pty; Btry F Recon Pty;<br>Tank Plt; Beach Jumper Unit |
| Rept RCS at H-hour |          | LCU<br>1 LCM-6<br>Ser: 115   | AT Plt; BAS; Shore Pty; Btry F;<br>BMU; Radio Relay            |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

D-11-1

LT 3/5

USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)

150800H June 1966

Appendix 12 (Pre D-day Transfer Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to  
Operation Order 328-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

The following transfers will be effected prior to D-day:

| SERIAL   | PERS | VEHICLES<br>EQUIPMENT | FROM    | TO      | UNIT                    | REMARKS |
|----------|------|-----------------------|---------|---------|-------------------------|---------|
| 103      | 217  |                       | APA-222 | LSD-33  | Co K                    |         |
| 115      | 5    | Med Equip             | APA-222 | LSD-33  | BAS                     |         |
| TOTAL    | 222  |                       |         |         |                         |         |
| 103      | 25   | (2) 81mm Mort         | LPH-5   | LSD-33  | 81mm Mort Plat          |         |
| 115      | 3    |                       | LPH-5   | LSD-33  | Btry F                  |         |
| 103      | 1    |                       | LPH-5   | LSD-33  | BAS                     |         |
| 110; 115 | 15   |                       | LPH-5   | LSD-33  | Shore Pty               |         |
| 103      | 2    |                       | LPH-5   | LSD-33  | S-2 Scouts              |         |
| TOTAL    | 46   |                       |         |         |                         |         |
| 100      | 23   | (2) 81mm Mort         | LPH-5   | APA-222 | 81mm Mort Plat          |         |
| 100      | 2    |                       | LPH-5   | APA-222 | S-2 Scouts              |         |
| 115      | 7    |                       | LPH-5   | APA-222 | Beach Jumper            |         |
| TOTAL    | 32   |                       |         |         |                         |         |
| —        | 2    |                       | APA-222 | LPH-5   | NGF                     |         |
| —        | 2    |                       | APA-222 | LPH-5   | Chaplain; Chaplain Asst |         |
| —        | 11   |                       | APA-222 | LPH-5   | MT Plat                 |         |
| TOTAL    | 15   |                       |         |         |                         |         |
| —        | 1    | Service               | LSD-33  | LPH-5   | Btry F                  |         |
| —        |      | Records               |         |         |                         |         |
| —        | 16   | (2) .50 Cal MG        | LSD-33  | LPH-5   | MT Plat                 |         |
| —        | 11   |                       | LSD-33  | LPH-5   | 107mm Mort Btry         |         |
| TOTAL    | 28   |                       |         |         |                         |         |

E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

- Ref: (a) AMS L701 - 6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM  
AMS L701 - 6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI  
AMS L701 - 6851 IV (1:50,000) THACH KHE  
(b) NWIP 22-7A  
(c) FMFM 7-4  
(d) 1st MarDivO E3000.3B  
(e) BnO 3000.3B  
(f) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current intelligence summaries.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery).
- (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- (3) Appendix 3 (Air Support).

2. MISSION. BLT 3/5 lands at H-Hour and L-Hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to conduct search and destroy operations in the Song Cau area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Fire support coordination afloat will be controlled by SACC aboard LPH.
- (2) Control of air and NGF in accordance with NWIP 22-7(A).  
Control of air and NGF will not be passed ashore.

- (3) CAS and NGF preparation of beaches and HLZ's: All fires will be controlled and fired only in areas not normally occupied by Vietnamese in the normal business of the day. There will be no preparation fires in villages or hamlets.
  - (4) Controlled pre-H-Hour fires will be planned and may be directed on HLZ's and beaches.
  - (5) There ~~are~~ no free fire areas.
  - (6) BLT will establish an FSOC ashore for coordination of supporting arms and control of artillery. Coordination of supporting arms and control of artillery may be passed ashore when requested by the BLT Commander and approved by CATF.
  - (7) Coordination and control will be passed back to SACC prior to withdrawal.
- b. Coordination of Air Support. Close air support requests passed on the TAR net will be coordinated by the FSOC to the extent that, if considered appropriate and safe, the AIO will state "Glimmer 14 Concurs" or "Disapproves". SACC must give positive approval before the request will be honored by TACC.
- c. Coordination of Naval Gunfire Support.
- (1) During daylight hours, following a request, the NGF ship will obtain positive approval from NGF/LNO on the NGF control net before firing a mission.
  - (2) Planned night defensive fires will be submitted by the NGF/LNO to the FSC for approval prior to darkness.
  - (3) All NGF call fire missions will be observed.
  - (4) All NGF will be controlled by SACC.
- d. Coordination of Artillery Fires.
- (1) During daylight hours effected by FSOC, including consideration of all air activity.
  - (2) For night fires the procedure set forth in paragraph 3c(2) will be utilized.
  - (3) Coordination with SACC.

- (a) Upon FSCC's approval of a fire mission, FSCC will report the time the mission began, the coordinates of the mission and the concentration number to SACC.
- (b) Upon completion of the mission FSCC will report to SACC using the concentration number that the mission has ended.

e. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Preparation fires on objectives, beaches and HLZ's will be planned; execution only on approval of CATF.
- (2) Target location will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid system, when practical.

4. TARGET INFORMATION.

a. Target List.

- (1) Initial target lists will be maintained by the CATF. Target information will be published as required.
- (2) Current target list and information will be maintained by BLT FSCC in accordance with reference (c).
- (3) Changes to target information will be published and promulgated as required.

b. Concentration Designation System.

- (1) The concentration designator for artillery and 81mm Mortars will be made up of two letters followed by three digits for artillery and two digits for 81mm Mortars. The first letter will signify the weapon. NGF will use the prefix "N" followed by three digits.

(a) S - BLT FSCC

(b) A - 81mm Mortars; W - 107mm Mortar; F - 105mm Howitzer.

- (c) The digits will signify the concentration number. Block numbers are assigned as follows:

| <u>Firing Unit</u> | <u>Number Block</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| 81mm Mortar        | 01-99               |
| 107mm Mortar       | 100-299             |
| 105mm Howitzer     | 300-499             |
| Naval Gunfire      | 500-699             |



- (2) The last twenty-five numbers of each number block are reserved for the use of FSCC only.

c. Restricted Targets.

(1) Class E Targets.

|                     |                    |                    |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Religious buildings | Public utilities   | Bridges            |
| National Shrines    | Population Centers | Tunnels            |
| Museums             | Railroads          | Medical Facilities |
| Hospitals           | Highways           |                    |

- (2) Destruction of Class E targets is prohibited except on approval of higher Headquarters, or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the BMT prior to the receipt of approval.

- (3) Class E targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this Headquarters.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY.

a. Air sentries and Lookouts.

- (1) Sentries will be positioned at artillery/mortar positions and will cause the firing units to cease firing when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (2) Artillery/mortar forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plan.

- (1) A restrictive fire plan will be employed when required. These plans will be numbered to provide a simple means of referencing a particular plan. Under these plans, all surface fires are prohibited between prescribed maximum and minimum altitudes within a specific rectangular area, or series of areas, during a stated time interval. The centerline of this area will be specified by two or more points along the axis of movement. The width of the area is specified by the distance either side of the centerline.
- (2) The restrictive plan, if it is required, will be established by this Headquarters. Orders for a restrictive fire plan will state the coordinates of the points delineating the

centerline, minimum altitudes, and the time period. Each PLAN HANGNAIL will be numbered consecutively with each new series beginning at 0001 local time.

Example: "PLAN HANGNAIL ONE X 657289 to 647468 X 200 meters  
1000 to 10,000 feet X 031035H to 031400H X"

c. Helicopter Safety.

- (1) The Battalion ALO will keep the Fire Support Coordinator informed of the time and location of all scheduled and on call helicopter flights into the combat areas.
- (2) Unless special coordination procedures are prescribed or required fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopter using the route.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES.

- a. No Fire Line. Initial no fire line will be established by GATF as required. Changes to the initial no fire line, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.
- b. Bomblines. Initial bomblines will be established by GATF as required. Changes to the initial bomblines, after approval, will be promulgated by FSCC.
- c. Creeping Fires. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel. Determination as to what constitutes "close proximity" is the responsibility of the infantry unit commander.
- d. Sight and Charge Check. Battery commanders and 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander will ensure that section chiefs verify elevation, deflection, charges and sight pictures on all fire missions.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).
- b. Command Posts.

(1) Afloat.

- |              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| (a) CTG 79.5 | LEH-5 |
| (b) BLT 3/5  | LEH-5 |

(2) Ashore.

(a) BLT 3/5 (To be announced).

(b) Subordinate units submit locations when established.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Artillery
- 2 - Naval Gunfire
- 3 - Air Support

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

BLT 3/5

USS PRINCETON (LST-1196)  
150800H June 1966Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to  
Operation Order 328-66

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) Target List (To be issued).
- (2) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (3) See Current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).

2. MISSION

- a. Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, lands by surface means on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in general support of BLT 3/5.
- b. 107mm Mortar Btry, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, lands by helicopter on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in general support of BLT 3/5.

3. EXECUTION.a. Concept of Artillery Employment.

- (1) Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, will, after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 3/5 by providing direct support conventional fires.
- (2) 107mm Mortar Btry, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines will after landing by helicopter in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), support BLT 3/5 by providing direct support conventional fires.

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b. Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.

- (1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Operation Overlay).
- (2) Direct Support BLT 3/5.

c. 107mm Mortar Btry, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines.

- (1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and occupy positions prescribed in Annex C (Operations Overlay).
- (2) Direct Support BLT 3/5.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Firing Chart. Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
- (2) Survey. To be provided by Survey Party, Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines as required.
- (3) Counter-battery/Counter-mortar. Policy semi-active.
- (4) Concentration Numbers. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (5) Meteorological Data. To be promulgated as available.
- (6) No Fire Lines. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (7) Restriction on Fires. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (8) Ammunition Restrictions. Units will not expend more than 80 percent of available supply rate without approval of BLT Commander.
- (9) Target Information. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Annex K (Administration and Logistics)

b. Available Supply Rate (Rds/Wpn/Day).

|                |           |
|----------------|-----------|
| 105mm Howitzer | <u>80</u> |
| 107mm Howtar   | <u>81</u> |

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

b. Command Post.(1) Afloat.

- |   |        |
|---|--------|
| (a) BLT 3/5                             | LPH-5  |
| (b) Battery F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar         | LSD-33 |
| (c) 107mm Mortar Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar | LPH-5  |

(2) Ashore. To be announced.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to  
Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See target list (To be issued).
- (2) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (3) See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) CTG 76.5 provides NGF support.
- (2) See Appendix 1 (Artillery).
- (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).

2. MISSION. Fire Support Units support landings and operations ashore of BLT 3/5 with naval gunfire.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Ship Assignment. As provided by CTF 76.5, who has set forth the requirement for 2 DDS and 1 LSMR.

b. Control. Naval gunfire to be under positive control of the Landing Force SFCP or airborne spotters through the CATF.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) CATF will establish a Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) to control and coordinate naval gunfire with other supporting arms within the AOA. Control of naval gunfire will not be passed ashore.
- (2) Control of naval gunfire missions will be effected by the SACC/FSCC in the following manner:
  - (a) During daylight hours, the SFCP submits the request in standard call fire format. The ship obtains clearance by submitting a CANDY Report to SACC via the NGF Control Net, with silence indicating approval.

(b) Night defensive fires will be submitted by FSCC to SACC prior to darkness. Approval for individual missions is not required, however, the ship will submit separate CANDY reports. Observed night illumination missions will be cleared by the daylight procedure.

- (3) Priority of attack of NGF targets will be in accordance with Article 175, NWIP 22-2.
- (4) The SFCP will report friendly front lines at least once every hour or whenever significant change occurs.
- (5) All illumination missions will be coordinated and approved by FSCC prior to being final.
- (6) Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system will be used for target locations.

d. Safety Measures.

- (1) The SFCP spotters will use the creep method of adjustment for all Danger/Danger Close missions fired.
- (2) VT and MT fused projectiles not set on safe will not be fired over the heads of friendly troops or landing craft unless specifically approved by FSCC.
- (3) The SFCP will be alert for aircraft approaching the line of fire to order check/cease fire.
- (4) Restrictive Fire Plans in accordance with Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. Initial ammunition availability to be determined by PEPPER Report to CTF 76.5 on assumption of OPCON.
- b. CTF 76.5 to coordination replenishment of ammunition.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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TABS:

- A - Naval Gunfire Support Operations Overlay (To be published)
- B - On Call Concentrations List (To be published)

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AT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Tab A (Naval Gunfire Support Operation Overlay) to Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66.

The Fire Support Areas are delineated by coordinates as:

FSA I The area north of line 104804 to 130830.

FSA II 130830 to 110810 to 120804 to 180804 to 175831 and coast line.

FSA III 131778 to 120804 to 180804 to 180778 to 157778 and coast line.

FSA IV 163745 to 340744 to 340670 to 178670 and coast line.

FSA V 180910 to 260910 to 260970 to 200970 to 170930 to 180910.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5

SS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800Z June 1966

Tab B (On Call Concentration List) to Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to  
Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

1. GENERAL. The listed concentrations are designed to provide the amphibious and helo-borne assault units with a rapid means of obtaining NGF support via the SFCP Spot Team in the event they receive fire during the critical early stages of the operation.
2. BEACH NEUTRALIZATION. The concentrations are defined by the coordinates of the long axis of a 400 meter wide rectangle. Requests for these concentrations (N500 through N514) will be directed to SACC who will clear and assign appropriate NGF Support Ship (DD or LSMR) considering troop advance.
3. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE PREP. On call by SACC in event air prep indicates additional ordnance is required. SACC coordinate and assign air observer to LSMR for positive control.

NGF ON CALL CONCENTRATIONS

| <u>NO</u>                         | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u>  | <u>HT(METERS)</u> | <u>REMARKS, ADJUSTMENT,<br/>FIRE FOR EFFECT</u>  |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--|
| <u>BEACH NEUTRALIZATION AREAS</u> |                    |                     |                   |  |
| N500                              | #1 North           | 100805 to<br>100795 | 50                | LSMR 2 Lchrs, 20 Rkts<br>per FFE (Fire for Ef-<br>fect) or DD 2 Gun Ad-<br>justment, 20 Rds FFE. |
| N501                              | #1 Center          | 100795 to<br>101786 | 40                | -do-   |
| N502                              | #1 South           | 101786 to<br>101778 | 40                | -do-   |
| N503                              | #2 North           | 096804 to<br>096793 | 100               | -do-   |
| N504                              | #2 Center          | 096796 to<br>096786 | 80                | -do-   |
| N505                              | #2 South           | 096786 to<br>097777 | 110               | -do-   |
| N506                              | #3 North           | 092804 to<br>092793 | 120               | -do-   |

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| <u>NO</u>                                  | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u>  | <u>HT(METERS)</u> | <u>REMARKS, ADJUSTMENT,<br/>FIRE FOR EFFECT</u> |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|
| <u>BEACH NEUTRALIZATION AREAS (CONT'D)</u> |                    |                     |                   |   |
| N507                                       | #3 Center          | 092793 to<br>093786 | 170               | -do-  |
| N508                                       | #3 South           | 093786 to<br>093777 | 100               | -do-  |
| N509                                       | #4 North           | 088803 to<br>089793 | 130               | -do-  |
| N510                                       | #4 Center          | 089793 to<br>089786 | 200               | -do-  |
| N511                                       | #4 South           | 089786 to<br>089776 | 140               | -do-  |
| N512                                       | #5 North           | 085802 to<br>085793 | 50                | -do-  |
| N513                                       | #5 Center          | 085793 to<br>085786 | 200               | -do-  |
| N514                                       | #5 South           | 085786 to<br>085775 | 240               | -do-  |
| <u>DEFENSIVE POSITIONS</u>                 |                    |                     |                   |   |
| N515                                       | Strong Pt          | 099806              | 20                | DD 1 gun, 6 rds HEQ                             |
| N516                                       | Trench Line        | 100801              | 10                | DD 2 guns, 10 rds HEQ                           |
| N517                                       | Trench Line        | 095801              | 100               | -do-  |
| N518                                       | Strong Point       | 096794              | 180               | -do-  |
| N519                                       | Mortar Position    | 103781              | 30                | DD 2 guns, 4 guns - 4<br>salvoes HEQ            |
| N520                                       | Trench Line        | 085787              | 230               | DD 2 guns, 5 rds HEQ                            |
| N521                                       | Trench Line        | 083791              | 190               | -do-  |
| N522                                       | Trench             | 080789              | 250               | -do-  |
| N523                                       | Trench             | 075791              | 220               | -do-  |
| N524                                       | Trench             | 085781              | 190               | -do-  |

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| <u>NO</u>                           | <u>DESCRIPTION</u>                    | <u>COORDINATES</u>  | <u>HT(METERS)</u> | <u>REMARKS, ADJUSTMENT,<br/>FIRE FOR EFFECT</u> |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|
| <u>DEFENSIVE POSITIONS (CONT'D)</u> |                                       |                     |                   |   |
| N525                                | Trench                                | 081779              | 170               | DD 2 guns, 5 rds HEQ                            |
| N526                                | Strong Point                          | 096678              | 2                 | DD 1 gun, 6 rds HEQ                             |
| N527                                | Prep LZ HAWK<br>(300 meter radius)    | 054825              | 80                | LSMR 2 lchrs, 50 rds                            |
| N528                                | High ground north-<br>west of LZ HAWK | 050833 to<br>049827 | 110               | DD 2 guns, 60 rds HEQ                           |
| N529                                | High ground south-<br>west of LZ HAWK | 045820 to<br>046815 | 100               | -do-  |
| N530                                | Prep LZ CROW<br>(600 meter radius)    | 061802              | 140               | LSMR 2 lchrs, 200 rds                           |
| N531                                | Bn Objective 1<br>(200 meter radius)  | 090797              | 180               | DD 2 guns, 20 rds HEQ                           |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Tab B (Aircraft Armament) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E  
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. CTF 77 will control and coordinate aircraft loading using available ordnance. Ordnance carried will be for missions against targets generally soft in nature. This applies to CAS/Helo escort fixed wing aircraft only.
- b. After the completion of each Close Air Support Mission the flight leader will report to the controlling agency ordnance expended, damage assessment and enemy intelligence of immediate tactical importance.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Tab C (Air Communications) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

1. GENERAL.

a. Air Communications in accordance with this Tab and Annex F.

2. FREQUENCY PLAN.

a. Air frequencies in accordance with Tab D and Annex F.

b. Net activation time will be promulgated by separate messages.

3. SAR COMMUNICATIONS.

a. SAR frequencies in accordance with Tab D.

4. CALL SIGNS.

a. Call signs in accordance with Tab E, Annex F and JANAP 119(F).

b. Aircraft tactical voice call signs will be derived from squadron call sign, flight number, and flight position.

Example:

|                   | <u>FIRST FLIGHT</u> | <u>SECOND FLIGHT</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| (Flight Leader)   | ARAB 1-1            | ARAB 2-1             |
| (Second Aircraft) | ARAB 1-2            | ARAB 2-2             |
| (Third Aircraft)  | ARAB 1-3            | ARAB 2-3             |

5. AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERAL CODES.

a. Authentication and Numeral Codes in accordance with Annex F.

b. Zulu time will be used for authentication and numeral codes.

6. RECOGNITION.

a. IFF/SIF in accordance with appropriate CINCPACFLT instructions as indicated below.

| <u>AIRCRAFT</u>             | <u>MODE 3/CODE</u> |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| Strike and Air Support      | Code 13 15 16      |
| Helo                        | Code 10 17         |
| Recon                       | Code 34            |
| Troop Carrier and Itinerant | Code 20            |
| Emergency                   | Code 77            |

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7. INTERFERENCE, JAMMING AND DECEPTION.

- a. The possibilities of enemy electronics warfare will be determined from Electronics Order of Battle and current intelligence. Measures will be taken in accordance with NWP 16A, Article 360, NWP 33, and Annex F.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Tab D (Air Frequency Plan) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E  
 (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-66

LEGEND

C - Control  
 X - Guard  
 W - When required  
     or directed  
 L - Listen

|                      | NET  | EMISSION            | FREQ  | COLOR<br>CODE |
|----------------------|------|---------------------|-------|---------------|
|                      | H-1  | TAC (P)             | 4358  |               |
|                      | H-2  | RASIBERRY/TAC (S)   | 6723  |               |
|                      | H-3  | TAR/HR (P)          | 5038  |               |
|                      | H-4  | TAR/HR (S)          | 9048  |               |
|                      | H-5  | TATC (P)/TATC (P)   | 289.8 | GOLD          |
|                      | H-6  | TATC (S)/TATC (S)   | 236.2 | BLUE          |
|                      | H-7  | TAD-1               | 312.2 | RED           |
|                      | H-8  | TAD-2               | 325.0 | GREEN         |
|                      | H-9  | TAC/A SPOT          | 285.8 | PURPLE        |
|                      | H-10 | HD-1                | 357.0 | BLACK         |
|                      | H-11 | HELLO COMMON        | 280.2 | MARCON        |
|                      | H-12 | SAR                 | 364.2 |               |
|                      |      | UHF EMERGENCY       | 243.0 |               |
|                      |      | VHF EMERGENCY       | 121.5 |               |
|                      | H-13 | VHF ITINERANT (P)   | 118.3 |               |
|                      | H-14 | VHF ITINERANT (S)   | 118.7 |               |
| TAC/TADC             |      | C X C W C C C C C C |       |               |
| HDC                  |      | W X X W             |       |               |
| CVA                  |      | X X                 |       |               |
| LPH/LHD              |      |                     |       |               |
| HELLO'S/HELLO ESCORT |      |                     | W     |               |
| CAS A/C              |      |                     | W W   |               |
| AIR BASES            |      | X                   |       |               |
| TACFIS/FAC           |      | X W                 | X W   |               |
| ARMY A/C             |      |                     | X W   |               |
| TAO/TAC (A)          |      |                     | W W X |               |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
 USS BRINCETON (LH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Tab E (Call Signs) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Air Support)  
 to Operation Order 328-66

|               | <u>COMMAND</u>  | <u>COLLECTIVE</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| TACC          | ICEPACK         |                   |
| TAFG          | JOYRIDE         |                   |
| HDC           | FAIRMONT        |                   |
| TAC (A)       | PLAYBOY         |                   |
| CTG 76.5      | COMBANY STORE   | GRUDGE            |
| CTU 76.5.1    | AZALEA BLOSSOM  | KNOCK             |
| CTU 76.5.2    | LITERARY        | SEROCKET          |
| CTG 79.5      | HEARSAY         | POSITIVE          |
| CTU 79.5.1    | MISS FORTER     | MODEL CITY        |
| CTU 79.5.2    | SWEET REWARD    | REFORM            |
| CTU 79.5.3    | TANDEM          | TEXAS SCORE       |
| CVA           | _____           |                   |
| LH/LD         | BULLHORN        |                   |
| ARA           | DEDDY BOX ALPHA |                   |
| LSD           | KEYBROCK GULF   |                   |
| DD's          | _____           |                   |
| VA Squadrons  | _____           |                   |
| VEF Squadrons | _____           |                   |
| TACF's        | GLIMMER 14      |                   |
| BLT           | GLIMMER         | INVESTMENT        |
| FAC's         | GLIMMER 14A, B  |                   |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

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BLT 3/5

USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)

150800H June 1966

Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to  
Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps and Charts: AMS L 701 - 6851 I (1:50,000) LHU HOI  
AMS L 701 - 6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM  
AMS L 701 - 6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI  
AMS L 701 - 6851 IV (1:50,000) THACH KHE

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) See Annex A (Task Organization).

(2) TF 77 provides aircraft for support.

(3) TE 76.5.0.2 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate; provides coordination and control of all aircraft assigned to support the operation. Coordinates and controls air search and rescue operations; exercises air traffic control of all friendly air operations within the AOA.

2. MISSION. Conduct Air Support operations in support of amphibious operations of BLT 3/5.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Specific information pertaining to selected amphibious raid objectives will be issued as necessary. (See Operation Order 328-66)

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The minimum amphibious objective area is defined as:

(a) On the west by the N-S gridline BR-BQ 8; on the north by E-W gridline BR-CR 1; on the south by E-W gridline BQ-CQ 6 and the seaward area within a 25 nautical mile radius from point CQ 1989 and the air space over the entire area to the height of 25,000 feet.

(b) When required, there will be a "tunnel" for civil airways 10 nautical miles in width from 7,000 feet through 11,000 feet, along established routes.

- (2) Restrictive fire plans in accordance with NWIP 22-7(A) and Annex E. (Fire Support Coordination)
  - (3) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings prepared to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and HLZ preparation as required.
  - (4) CAS will be under positive control of TACF or TAC(A). TAO will be under control of CLF.
  - (5) General instructions, safety precautions and helicopter control and protection plan in accordance with Annex E to CTF 76 Operation Plan 202-64.
  - (6) Control of air will not be passed ashore.
  - (7) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Military Grid Reference six digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.
  - (8) CATF must have the capability to communicate with civilian and Army aircraft who may desire to transit the area. Necessary frequencies are 118.3 and 118.7 - VHF, and 289.8 UHF. Aircraft may use standard emergency frequencies if unable to contact CATF on primary frequencies.
  - (9) In the event that the transit of B-52's should coincide with the time and place of the raid, the CATF will be advised and will accommodate the transit.
  - (10) No reconnaissance aircraft will fly over land prior to H-hour.
  - (11) CAS aircraft will be briefed by CTF 77 for secondary targets prior to launch in order to avoid dumping ordnance if not used in AOA or free fire zone.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. In accordance with Annex K (Logistics)
  - 5. COMLAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.
    - a. Communications in accordance with Annex F (Communications-Electronics).

b. Local time zone will be used in all tactical messages.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

TABS:

- A - Aircraft Schedules (To be published)
- B - Aircraft Armament
- C - Air Communications
- D - Air Frequency Plan
- E - Call Signs

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

BLT 3/5

USS PRINCETON  
150800H June 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) FMFPacO P02000.2C  
 (b) CG, 1st MarDivO P02000.2B  
 (c) CG, 1st MarDivO P2000.2D  
 (d) BnO 2000.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
  - (a) Intercept, jam, or employ imitative deception on any communication circuit.
  - (b) Cut or tap wire lines for purposes of interception or deception.
  - (c) Ambush wire teams during initial wire installation and trouble shooting missions.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).

(2) Command Posts(a) Afloat

CTG 79.5  
 BLT 3/5

LPH-5  
 LPH-5

(b) Ashore

BLT 3/5

To be designated  
 Subordinate units report C.P. locations when established.

2. MISSION. Provide communications and electronics support for the BLT in the amphibious operation and subsequent operations ashore.

### 3. EXECUTION

#### a. Communications Platoon BLT 3/5.

- (1) Guard CLF Tact Net #1 commencing H-1.
- (2) Guard CLF Tact Net #2 commencing H-1.
- (3) Be prepared to augment organic and attached units with FM radio equipment.
- (4) Be prepared to provide the following equipment and personnel for operation of the BLT TACLOG aboard the LPH.
  - (a) One radio set AN/PRC - 10 or AN/PRC - 25
  - (b) One radio set AN/PRC - 83
  - (c) Four radio operators 2531/2533
- (5) Provide message center service for BLT elements embarked aboard the LPH.
- (6) Provide one copy each of KAA-60 and KAC-138 to CLF for entire period of operation.

#### b. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).

#### c. Shore Party Communications.

- (1) See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- (2) Establish wire line within the Landing Zone from the HST to BAS, S-4 and ALO.
- (3) Establish wire line from the Beach Support Area to the BAS on Red Beach.

#### d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (b) through (d).
- (2) Messenger Service.
  - (a) Each Rifle Company will send two (2) runner messengers to the BLT CP ashore. They will report to and be controlled by the Battalion Message Center.

- (b) Helicopter messenger between BLT CP ashore and the LPH will be announced.

(3) Radio.

- (a) Radio Nets. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- (b) Call Signs. See Appendix 2 (Call Signs).
- (c) Commence guarding assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
- (d) Attached units will enter the BLT Tactical Net when other means of communications with this Headquarters fail.
- (e) Radio checks and test counts will be held to an absolute minimum.
- (f) All stations will tune to Net Control Stations.
- (g) All used dry cells will be returned to this Headquarters for disposal.
- (h) Immediately report to this Headquarters by other means, known or suspected enemy interference, imitative deception or jamming.
- (i) Local time will be used on all messages transmitted within the BLT.

(4) Wire.

- (a) Switchboard names in accordance with Appendix 2. (Call Signs)
- (b) All wire lines will be retrieved when departing a position or when leaving the objective area under all circumstances.
- (c) Whenever a wire team leaves the BLT CP they will be accompanied by at least one fire team.
- (d) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the BLT CP after dusk.
- (e) Radio Relay Channelization in accordance with Appendix 4 (Radio Relay).

(5) Visual Communications. See Appendix 3 (Visual Communications).



(6) Cryptographic Operations.

- (a) Internal authentication and coupling will be in accordance with KAC-JJ if available.
- (b) If KAC-JJ is not available, coordinates will be concealed in accordance with Annex K (Reference Point Overlay).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex I (Logistics).
- b. Dry cell batteries and wire will be replenished on a daily requested basis by the BLT Supply Officer. All units will carry the following initial supply to operate for 24 hours:
 

|        |           |                             |
|--------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| WIRE   | - - - - - | As required                 |
| BA-30  | - - - - - | As required                 |
| BA-270 | - - - - - | Three (3) per AN/PRC-6      |
| BA-279 | - - - - - | Three (3) per AN/PRC-8-9-10 |
| BA-386 | - - - - - | Two (2) per AN/PRC-25       |
- c. BB-451 battery charging facilities will be maintained aboard the LPH. Replenishment will be on a one-for-one basis. Users will tag the battery being sent in for recharging. The users identity and location will be on the tag. Example:  
FAC #2 - Co "I".
- d. Second and third echelon maintenance will be available aboard the LPH.
- e. A limited replacement float of communication equipment is available aboard the LPH. All equipment evacuated to the LPH for repair or replacement will be tagged as follows:
  - (1) Type trouble
  - (2) Users identity and location
- f. All communications equipment will have preventive maintenance performed daily during the operation.

- g. Communication equipment will be waterproofed prior to the landing, when crossing rivers and during rainy weather. Any equipment that becomes internally wet will have the battery removed and be evacuated immediately.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Radio & Frequency Plan
- 2 - Call Signs
- 3 - Visual Communications
- 4 - Radio Relay

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
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Appendix 1 (Radio and Frequency Plan) to Annex F (Communications-  
 Electronics) to Operation Order 326-66

C - Net Control Sta  
 X - Guard  
 O - Be Prepared

|                   |   |                    |       |       |
|-------------------|---|--------------------|-------|-------|
| BLT 3/5           | X | CLF TACT #1 (P)    | 40.2  | M-29  |
|                   | O | CLF TACT #1 (S)    | 45.6  | M-38  |
|                   | X | CLF TACT #2 (P)    | 2675  | M-20A |
|                   | O | CLF TACT #2 (S)    | 3143  | M-21A |
|                   | O | CLF TACT #2 (S)    | 6269  | M-21B |
|                   | O | CLF TACT #2 (S)    | 10894 | N-9K  |
|                   | O | HMM TACT           | 41.1  | M-30  |
|                   | C | BLT CMD/TACLOG (P) | 4613  | M-20B |
|                   | O | BLT CMD/TACLOG (S) | 6200  | M-9E  |
|                   | C | BLT TACT (P)       | 42.0  | M-34  |
|                   | O | BLT TACT (S)       | 41.5  | M-31  |
|                   |   | I                  | 51.0  |       |
|                   |   | K                  | 54.4  |       |
|                   |   | L                  | 54.8  |       |
|                   |   | M                  | 47.0  |       |
|                   |   | 81mm PLT COF       | 42.3  | M-36  |
|                   |   | 105 HOW BTRY COF   | 27.7  | M-26  |
|                   |   | 107 HOWTAR COF     | 35.2  | M-27  |
|                   |   | ARTY COMMON        | 37.7  | M-39  |
| Co I              | X |                    |       |       |
| Co K              |   |                    |       |       |
| Co L              | X |                    |       |       |
| Co M              | X |                    |       |       |
| 81mm PLT          |   |                    |       |       |
| 107mm HOWTAR BTRY |   |                    |       |       |
| BTRY F 2/11       |   |                    |       |       |
| TACOP             |   |                    |       |       |
| NGF TEAM          |   |                    |       |       |
| SHORE PARTY TEAM  |   |                    |       |       |
| BLT TACLOG GRP    |   |                    |       |       |
| AMTRAC PLT        |   |                    |       |       |
| AT PLT            |   |                    |       |       |
| FORCE RECON PLT   |   |                    |       |       |
| RECON PLT         |   |                    |       |       |
| LINK PLT          |   |                    |       |       |

C - Net Control Sta  
X - Guard  
O - Be prepared

|                   |                     |       |      |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------|------|
|                   | TACP LOCAL          | 41.7  | M-32 |
|                   | TAR/HR (P)          | 5038  | H-3  |
|                   | TAR/HR (S)          | 9048  | H-4  |
|                   | TAD #1 (RED)        | 312.2 | H-7  |
|                   | TAD #2 (GREEN)      | 325.0 | H-8  |
|                   | HD-1 (BLACK)        | 357.0 | H-10 |
|                   | TAD/A SPOT (PURPLE) | 339.6 | H-9  |
|                   | SFCF LOCAL          | 42.1  | M-35 |
|                   | NGF CONTROL         | 3319  | C-6  |
|                   | NGF SPOT            | 7361  | C-7  |
|                   | RECON LOCAL         | 42.6  | M-37 |
|                   | SP CONTROL          | 39.2  | N-28 |
|                   | AMTRAC PLT CMD      | 41.8  | M-33 |
|                   | AT PLT CMD (P)      | 21.6  | M-22 |
|                   | AT PLT CMD (S)      | 23.1  | N-24 |
|                   | TK PLT CMD (P)      | 22.5  | M-23 |
|                   | TK PLT CMD (S)      | 25.7  | M-25 |
| BLT 3/5           |                     |       |      |
| Co I              |                     |       |      |
| Co K              |                     |       |      |
| Co L              |                     |       |      |
| Co M              |                     |       |      |
| 81mm PLT          |                     |       |      |
| 107mm MORTAR BTRY |                     |       |      |
| BTRY F 2/11       |                     |       |      |
| TACP              | C                   | X     | O    |
| NGF TEAM          |                     |       |      |
| SHORE PARTY TEAM  |                     |       |      |
| BLT TACLOG GRP    |                     |       |      |
| AMTRAC PLT        |                     |       |      |
| AT PLT            |                     |       |      |
| FORCE RECON PLT   |                     |       |      |
| RECON PLT         |                     |       |      |
| TANK PLT          |                     |       |      |

NOTE: All units involved with calling in helicopters will temporarily come up on M-31 during the lift or drop. Ground units will wait for the helicopter to contact them on M-34 and direct them to switch frequency to M-31.

E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to  
 Operation Order 328-66

| UNIT                    | VOICE CALL              |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| CTG 76.5                | COMPANY STORY           |
| TG 76.5                 | GRUDGE                  |
| CTG 79.5                | HEARSAY                 |
| TG 79.5                 | POSITIVE                |
| HMM 364                 | DUNBAR                  |
| HMM 364 (Collective)    | ILLINOIS                |
| BLT 3/5                 | GLIMMER                 |
| BLT 3/5 (Collective)    | INVESTMENT              |
| Co I                    | GLIMMER INDIA           |
| Co K                    | GLIMMER KILO            |
| Co L                    | GLIMMER LIMA            |
| Co M                    | GLIMMER MIKE            |
| Headquarters Commandant | GLIMMER YANKEE          |
| 81 MM Platoon           | GLIMMER WHISKEY         |
| FSCC                    | GLIMMER BAILEY          |
| NGF LNO                 | GLIMMER TWO SIX OSCAR   |
| NGF Spot Tm             | GLIMMER TWO SIX CHARLIE |
| BLT TACLOG              | GLIMMER PRODUCT         |
| Air LNO                 | GLIMMER ONE FOUR        |
| TACC                    | ICEPACK                 |
| TADC                    | JOYRIDE                 |
| HDC                     | FAIRMOUNT               |
| TAC (A)                 | PLAYBOY                 |
| 105 MM How Battery      | KALAMAZOO               |
| 107 HOWTAR Battery      | HENPECKED               |
| Amtrac Platoon          | CHURCHILL               |
| AT Platoon              | FOOLS CAP               |
| Engineer Detachment     | GRUB WORM               |
| Recon TM 1              | CHEMICAL                |
| Recon TM 2              | FERVENT                 |
| Recon TM 3              | BROADMINDED             |
| Det SP Bn               | LUCKYBAG                |
| Tank Platoon            | COWGIRL                 |
| BAS                     | LUCKYBAG RED            |
| HST                     | LUCKYBAG (LZ Name)      |

*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Appendix 3 (Visual Communications) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 328-66

1. Smoke Signals Will Be As Follows:

| <u>TYPE</u>  | <u>MEANING</u>   |
|--|--|
| Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke, H-64<br>or<br>Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke<br>or<br>Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke M-18 | Marking of the friendly units' position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing. |
| Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M-65<br>or<br>Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M-18<br>or<br>Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke    | Please inform us of the enemy direction or position.   |
| Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke<br>or<br>Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke<br>(When dropped by A/C)                               | Marking of the enemy position.   |
| Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White)<br>ANM 8  | Only to mark enemy targets.  |

2. Illumination Signals Will Be As Follows:

| <u>TYPE</u>  | <u>MEANING</u>  |
|--|---|
| Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster<br>(One signal is fired)                  | Encircled or attacked by the enemy. Request for support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio. |
| Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster<br>(Cont. firing of three or more signal) | Request for emergency illumination. (Radio Liaison must be established)                             |
| Signal, Ground, Green Star Parachute                                       | Request ammo resupply (Confirm type by radio)   |
| Signal, Ground, Green Star M-125<br>(Hand held)                            | Request for helo-evacuation.  |

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Signal, Ground, White Star ANM-44A1  
or  
Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute  
M-127 (Hand held)

Radio Breakdown.

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster  
(Fire 1 signal)

Request for radio communi-  
cations on the air-  
ground frequency.

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster  
(Cont firing of three or more signals)

Request cease firing  
illumination.

Signal, Ground, Red Star Parachute  
M-126 (Hand Held)

We are withdrawing from  
this position.

3. Panel Signals Will Be As Follows:

a. Vehicular Identification.

- (1) Red panels will be used on odd dates.
- (2) Yellow panels will be used on even dates.

b. Helo Landing Point Identification.

- (1) All landing points will be marked with an equilateral triangle formed by using three panels from either Panel Set AP-30C or AP-30D. The color selected will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft.
- (2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.
- (3) The type of unit will be identified by one or more panels in the center of the triangle as follows:

Type of Unit

Identification

Infantry/Recon  
Artillery/Tanks  
Aviation  
Service and Support

One Yellow Panel (VS-6/U)  
One Red Panel (VS-4/U)  
Two Yellow Panels (VS-6/U)  
Two Red Panels (VS-4/U)

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- [REDACTED]
- (4) The size of the unit will be identified by one or more panels (AP-30C or AP-30D) placed directly above and centered on top of the triangle as follows:

| <u>Size of Unit</u> | <u>Identification</u> |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Company/Battalion   | Roman Numeral One     |
| Battalion/Squadron  | Roman Numeral Two     |

- (5) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of the triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.
- (6) Front Line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of Panels VS-6/U (Yellow) placed parallel to the front lines.

*E. J. Eronars*  
E. J. ERONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps


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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 4 (Radio Relay Plan) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to  
Operation Order 328-66



BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

| REPORT                     | TO  | BY        | METHOD           | PERIOD COVERED  | REPORT DUE   | FIRST REPORT DUE | REFERENCE  | REMARKS   |
|----------------------------|-----|-----------|------------------|---|--|------------------|------------|---|
| Situation Report           | S-3 | All Units | Msg*             | H+4 and every 6hrs  | 30 min prior end of period   | H+4 minus 30 min | Appendix 1 |   |
| Front line positions       | S-3 | All Units | Msg              | N/A   | Every 30 min during offensive operations; upon establishing defensive positions and changes there-to | N/A              |            | Includes perimeter, when established.   |
| Night Defensive Fire Plans | S-3 | All Units | Overlay*         | 1800 to 0700  | 1700 daily   | 1700 D-day       |            | Separate overlays for organic weapons and for supporting arms concentrations and barrages desired       |
| Security Elements          | S-3 | All Units | Msg &/or overlay | Each night and upon establishing or changing defensive positions. | 1700 and as required   | 1700 D-day       |            | Includes OPs, listening posts, patrol routes & ambush routes and sites. Indicate times when applicable. |

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| REPORT                           | TO  | BY                | METHOD       | PERIOD COVERED | REPORT DUE | FIRST REPORT DUE | REFERENCE                                       | REMARKS  |
|----------------------------------|-----|-------------------|--------------|----------------|------------|------------------|---|--|
| Enemy Activity                   | S-2 | All Units         | Msg          | N/A            | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO P3000.4, S-A-I-L-U-T-E Section II, Para 201 |  |
| ShelRep                          | S-2 | All Units         | Msg          | N/A            | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO P3000.4 Appendix B                          |  |
| EEI                              | S-2 | All Units         | Msg          | N/A            | ASAP       | N/A              | Annex B, Para 2                                 |  |
| Patrol Debriefing                | S-2 | All Units         | Msg*         | Each patrol    | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO 3800.1F                                     | Reports Submitted upon completion of patrols & ambushes assigned by this Hq. |
| Capture of Documents or Material | S-2 | All Units         | Msg          | N/A            | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO P3000.4 Section II, Para 205                | Reply will give disposition instructions                                     |
| Capture of POW                   | S-1 | All Units         | Msg          | N/A            | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO P3000.4 Section II, Para 205                | Reply will give disposition instructions                                     |
| Combat Casualty                  | S-1 | All Units/<br>BAS | Form/<br>Msg | Each incident  | ASAP       | N/A              | BnO P3000.4, Section I, Para 105                |  |

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[REDACTED]

| REPORT                | TO  | BY        | METHOD | PERIOD COVERED   | REPORT DUE                            | FIRST REPORT DUE | REFERENCE | REMARKS |
|-----------------------|-----|-----------|--------|------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|
| Logistics Expenditure | S-4 | All Units |        | Entire Operation | 24 hrs after termination of operation | N/A              |           |         |

Note:\* If distance makes use of messenger impractical, use radio.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Unit Situation Report
- 2 - Major Ordnance/Engr Equip: Loss/Damage Report
- 3 - After Action Report
- 4 - Operational Reports (BLT)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66 .

BLT 2/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Appendix 1 (Unit SITREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order  
328-66

Time Zone: H

UNIT SITREP FORMAT

1. SITREP NO \_\_\_\_\_ as of \_\_\_\_\_ (Date-Time Group).
  2. ENEMY.
    - a. Units in contact (when, where, how many VC or unit size).
    - b. Enemy activity during period. (Summary of incidents)
  3. CP LOCATIONS
    - a. Reporting Unit CP.
  4. OPERATIONS. (Narrative - who, what, when, where).
    - a. Unit. (Search and destroy opns; sweeps; BLT cbjs; night defensive positions; ambushes and patrols (number and size); details of enemy contact; USMC and VC KIA, WIA, MIA, captured; weapons captured; use of supporting arms.)
  5. PERSONNEL.
    - a. Unit.
      - (1) USMC Officers at end of reporting period.
      - (2) USMC enlisted at end of reporting period.
      - (3) USN Officers at end of reporting period.
      - (4) USN enlisted at end of reporting period.
    - b. Attachments and Direct Support Units.
      - (1) List attachments and direct support units using title, i.e.:
        - (a) Det 81mm Mort - 7 USMC enl.
        - (b) FAC Tm - 1 USMC Off; 4 USMC enl.
- Note: These figures are not to be included in Para "a" above.

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- c. Casualties. (Own).
- (1) KIA.
  - (2) WIA.
  - (3) MIA.
- d. Casualties. (Enemy).
- (1) KIA.
  - (2) Captives.
6. LOGISTICS.
- a. Location of HST or SP personnel. (If applicable)
  - b. Status of supply by classes.
  - c. Equipment out of action - circumstances.
  - d. Captured materials and weapons by type and number-action taken.
7. CIVIC ACTION TAKEN. (When applicable).
8. ANY UNUSUAL EVENTS.
9. INTENTIONS. (Brief Description).

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
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Appendix 2 (After Action Report Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation  
Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: After Action Report
2. Format: Formal Report

(HEADING)

(Date)

From: Commanding Officer, BLT 3/5  
To: CTG 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation DECKHOUSE I)

Encl: (1) Overlay of the Operation (or overlays by day, if necessary)

- (1) Name of Identity and/or types of Operation.
- (2) Inclusive Dates and Locations of the Operation.
- (3) Command Headquarters.
- (4) Task Organization.
- (5) Intelligence. A brief estimate of enemy strength, location, disposition, and situation anticipated in the objective area prior to the operation. Make a brief statement of enemy strength found as the operation was conducted.
- (6) Mission. State the mission as directed by the higher authority.
- (7) Concept of the Operation. Include the who, what, when, where and how. Sketches and/or overlays are appropriate.
- (8) Execution. Give, in chronological order, a narrative of the order and end with the termination of the operation. Highlight significant actions and list losses to both sides as they occurred. Indicate duration of close contacts (fire fights) and results. Include techniques, tactics, deceptions, and decision utilized. State the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations activity. Include all other pertinent information.
- (9) Results. Summarize casualties, prisoners, apprehensions, equipment, material and weapons captured. On friendly losses indicate the number of personnel and equipment lost or destroyed.

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- (10) Commander's Analysis. Statement by the commander as to the problems encountered and lessons learned. Include comments on CA/Psy War activities and planning or lack thereof. Include plans on actions taken with civilians, how controlled, evacuated, medically treated, relocated, etc.
- (11) Lessons Learned. Submit recommended solutions to problem areas encountered. Explanations and descriptions giving the background of these problems and action taken as desired.
3. Frequency: After Action Reports will be submitted by this Headquarters within five days after the operation ends. After Action Reports will be submitted in an original and twenty-five (25) copies.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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BLT 3/5  
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Appendix 3 (Major Ordnance/Engineer Equipment Loss/Damage Reports) to  
Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report
2. Format: Message
  - a. Item description.
  - b. Coordinates where lost/damaged.
  - c. DTG of occurrence.
  - d. Extent of damage.
  - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
  - f. Replacement required (yes or no).
3. Frequency: As occurring.
4. Submitted by: Unit concerned.
5. Submitted to: CTG 79.5.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
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Appendix 4 (Operational Reports (BLT)) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. General. This Appendix contains instructions for the submission of Operational Reports required by CTG 79.5.
2. Reports Required:

| <u>REPORTS</u>                               | <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u> | <u>TIME</u>  | <u>REMARKS/REFERENCE</u>   |
|--|-------------|-----------|--|--|
| a. ISUMS                                     | BLT         | CTG 79.5  | Commencing at H Plus 4<br>covering the previous 4 hours<br>and every 6 hours thereafter    | See Annex B  |
| b. CASUALTY RPTS                             | BLT         | CTG 79.5  | As occurring   | See Appendix 2 (Casualty reporting)<br>to Annex E (Personnel and Admin) to<br>CTG 79.5 OPORD 201-YR  |
| c. SURVEILLANCE/RECON-<br>NAISSANCE TEAM RPT | BLT         | CTG 79.5  | As scheduled   | Annex F (Reconnaissance and UDT<br>Operations) to CTG 79.5 OpOrder<br>328-66   |
| d. SITUATION RPTS                            | BLT         | CTG 79.5  | Commencing at H plus 4<br>covering the previous 4<br>hours and every 6 hours<br>thereafter | See Appendix 1 and 2, Annex U<br>(Reports) to OpOrder 328-66   |
| e. SPOT RPTS                                 | BLT         | CTG 79.5  | As Occurring   | Submit by most expeditious means<br>on significant events, initial<br>contacts or major contacts to in-<br>clude who, what, when, where and<br>why |

|    | <u>REPORTS</u>   | <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u>                         | <u>TIME</u>                               | <u>REMARKS/REFERENCE</u>  |
|----|--|-------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| f. | DAILY SUMMARY HELLO<br>OPN                                 | BLT         | CTG 76.5<br>w/copy to<br>CTG 79.5 | Daily                                     | Appendix IX to Annex H (Air<br>Operation Reports) to CTG 76.5<br>OpOrder 201-YR |
| g. | AFTER ACTION RPT   | BLT         | CTG 79.5                          | 5 days after completion of<br>DECKHOUSE I | See Appendix 3, Annex U (Reports)<br>to OpOrder 328-66                          |
| h. | MAJOR ORDNANCE ENG-<br>INEER/EQUIPMENT LOSS/<br>DAMAGE RPT | BLT         | CTG 79.5                          | As occurring                              | See Appendix 2, Annex G of this<br>Order.                                       |
| i. | REPORT OF SUPPLIES<br>EXPENDED                             | BLT         | CTG 79.5                          | 5 days after completion of<br>DECKHOUSE I | Letter Format   |
| j. | JAMMING  | BLT         | CTG 79.5                          | As occurring                              | See Annex F CTG 79.5 OPORD 201-YR   |
| k. | MUSTER REPORT  | BLT         | CTG 79.5                          | Upon reembarkation after<br>DECKHOUSE I   | Message Report  |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex H (Plan for Withdrawal) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701 - 6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM  
AMS L701 - 6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI  
AMS L701 - 6851 IV (1:50,000) THACH KHE

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See Current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) CTF 77 provides CMS to cover withdrawal.
- (2) CTG 70.8 provides NGF support.
- (3) CTG 76.5 provides amphibious shipping and necessary landing craft for Intra-Task Force Transfers.
- (4) TAC(A) provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance for withdrawal.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

d. Assumptions. At the time of execution of the withdrawal, all elements of BLT 3/5 ashore will be participating in search and destroy operations in that portion of the AOA west of landing Force Objective C.

2. MISSION. To conduct a tactical withdrawal of the BLT from the objective area when ordered by the Landing Force Commander.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations.

- (1) Commencing at W-hour and when directed by the Landing Force Commander, BLT 3/5 executes a tactical withdrawal from the objective area. Companies I and K will withdraw tactically by foot movement to Landing Beach RED under the overall control and coordination of Bravo Command Group. The 107mm Mortar Battery will be withdrawn by helicopter from its

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firing position in vicinity of LZ ROBIN. Companies L and M and elements of H&S Company will proceed cross-country to vicinity LZ ROBIN and when directed, will withdraw by helicopter to LPH-5.

b. Company L (Rein).

- (1) On order, conduct a tactical withdrawal from occupied positions in vicinity LF Objective C. Cover withdrawal of the 107mm Mortar Battery from LZ ROBIN.
- (2) When directed, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ ROBIN.

c. Company M (Rein).

- (1) On order, conduct a tactical withdrawal from occupied positions in vicinity of LF Objective B. Cover withdrawal of Company L from LZ ROBIN.
- (2) On order proceed to LZ ROBIN; withdraw via helicopter to LPH-5.

d. Company I (Rein).

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions by foot march to the vicinity of LF Objective A.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march and established defensive positions in vicinity of RED Beach.
- (3) On order, withdraw over RED Beach to APA-222 by landing craft.

e. Company K (Rein).

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions by foot march to the vicinity of LF Objective A.
- (2) When directed, conduct tactical withdrawal by foot march and established defensive positions in vicinity of RED Beach.
- (3) On order, withdraw over RED Beach to APA-22 by landing craft.

f. 3d Plat, Company B, 1st Antitank Bn.

- (1) When directed, by Bravo Command Group Commander withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33 by landing craft.

g. 2d Plat, Company C, 1st Tk Bn.

- (1) When directed, by Bravo Command Group Commander withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33 in LVTP-5.

h. 2d Plat, Company B, 1st MT Bn.

- (1) On order, join Company I and tactically withdraw on foot to RED Beach.
- (2) When directed, by Bravo Command Group Commander withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33 in landing craft.

i. 81mm Mort Plat (-).

- (1) On order, from Bravo Command Group Commander 81mm Mort Sections attached to Companies I & K will be detached. Establish firing positions in RED Beach Area as directed to support withdrawing units.
- (2) When directed, withdraw via helicopter to LPH-5.

j. 107mm Mort Btry (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar.

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions to LZ ROBIN.
- (2) When directed, withdraw via helicopter to LPH-5.

k. 2d Amtrac Plat (-)(Rein), Company B, 3d Amtrac Bn, FMF.

- (1) On order occupy defensive positions to cover the waterborne withdrawal of Companies I and K, and F Btry and other elements of the BLT.
- (2) Provide backloading support for withdrawal of 105 Btry.
- (3) When directed, after the withdrawal of the last unit from the beach, withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33.

l. Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar.

- (1) On order from Bravo Command Group Commander, tactically withdraw from occupied positions to RED Beach.
- (2) When directed, withdraw over RED Beach to LSD-33 by landing craft.

m. H&S Company (-).

- (1) On order, tactically withdraw from occupied positions to vicinity LZ ROBIN.
- (2) When directed, withdraw to LPH-5 via helicopter from LZ ROBIN.

n. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) W-hour: To be announced.
- (2) All units will report to this Headquarters when commencing and completing withdrawal.
- (3) Equipment that cannot be recovered will be destroyed completely or damaged sufficiently to deny use by enemy forces.
- (4) Command Group Bravo will coordinate withdrawal of Companies I and K from LF Objective A to RED Beach and from RED Beach to assigned shipping.
- (5) On order, Command Group Bravo will withdraw by surface means from vicinity of RED Beach with two sections of 81mm Mortars previously attached to Companies I & K.
- (6) Command Group Alpha will retain operational control over all BLT 3/5 elements during the withdrawal and will coordinate the withdrawal of forces from LZ ROBIN.
- (7) Command Group Alpha will withdraw by helicopter from LZ HAWK.
- (8) When coordination of supporting arms can no longer be effectively controlled by this Headquarters, return of coordination to SACC will be requested.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
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Annex I (Reference Points) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS L701-6850 IV NGAN SON  
AMS L701-6851 III LONG HAI

TIME ZONE: H

| <u>REFERENCE POINT</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>REFERENCE POINT</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> |
|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| E (ECHO)               | 0779               | F (PAPA)               | 9978               |
| F (FOXTROT)            | 0582               | Q (QUEBEC)             | 0284               |
| G (GOLF)               | 0979               | R (ROMEO)              | 0773               |
| H (HOTEL)              | 0574               | S (SIERRA)             | 0279               |
| I (INDIA)              | 1078               | T (TANGO)              | 0381               |
| J (JULIET)             | 0377               | U (UNIFORM)            | 0876               |
| K (KILO)               | 0586               | V (VICTOR)             | 0275               |
| L (LIMA)               | 1080               | W (WHISKEY)            | 0579               |
| M (MIKE)               | 0878               | X (X-RAY)              | 0373               |
| N (NOVEMBER)           | 0576               | Y (YANKEE)             | 0784               |
| O (OSCAR)              | 0781               | Z (ZULU)               | 0082               |

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex J (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 95-2, 20 December 1965  
(b) COMUSMACV msg O 261030Z Dec65  
(c) SLF Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL.

- a. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of the individual Marine to defend himself against attack. In the event of attack, the individual concerned may take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force by any means available.
- b. In order to avoid embittering the Vietnamese population against U. S. Forces in Vietnam, unit commanders must avoid the use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties.
- c. Maximum use will be made of competent Vietnamese (VN liaison personnel) during the conduct of operations in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact and identification of civilians.

2. MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES. Unit Commanders will hold troop indoctrination briefings prior to the operation to emphasize the importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

- a. In cases where defensive fire is undertaken, care will be exercised to ensure that friendly or innocent personnel are not endangered.
- b. In situations where light small arms fire is received from a populated area, every effort will be made to identify the exact target before engagement.
- c. The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.

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- d. Forward air controllers will be briefed by Unit Commanders on areas to be avoided due to the presence of a friendly or potentially friendly population.
- e. Use of riot control agents CS and CN may be employed in appropriate situations. Prior approval by the BLT Commander is required.

3. SAFE GUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES.

- a. Marines engaged in search and destroy operations will take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of Vietnamese property. The destruction of dwellings and livestock by U. S. Forces as a denial measure is prohibited. Such actions must be performed by RVNAF Units.
- b. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of U. S. Forces to destroy Vietnamese property, including livestock, will be referred to the BLT Commander.
- c. Large food caches discovered or captured will be reported to the BLT CP for extraction and redistribution by local GVN officials.

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

- a. Unit commanders will instruct troops to fire only under the following circumstances:
  - (1) When they observe and identify a person or persons as enemy.
  - (2) When fire is being delivered on friendly troops.
  - (3) When personnel are attempting, by hasty or suspicious acts, obviously to avoid contact with friendly troops.
  - (4) When requested to fire by friendly RVNAF commanders after approval from the BLT Commander.
- b. Artillery and naval gunfire missions are authorized to be conducted in accordance with the following:
  - (1) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in accordance with normal fire direction procedures.
  - (2) Unobserved artillery fire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U. S. TAC(A), TAO is available and then only if targets declared hostile by GVN or VN liaison personnel.

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- (3) Unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U. S. TAC(A), TAO or SFCP is available and then only at targets declared hostile by GVN or VN Liaison personnel. Use of naval gunfire in this manner will be employed only when absolutely required and will not be considered as normal procedure.
- (4) Missions against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants will be conducted as follows:
- (a) All fire missions on hamlets or villages will be controlled by a TAO(A) or a ground forward observer (FO) and will be executed only after GVN/RVNAF approval as appropriate. Approval will be requested through the BLT Commander.
  - (b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked by gunfire without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them. Instructions will be requested from the BLT CP under these circumstances.
  - (c) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning. If practical, approval to attack will be requested from the BLT Commander under these circumstances.
- c. Reference (d) authorizes close air support missions to be conducted in accordance with the following:
- (1) Strike aircraft will normally be controlled by a U. S. TAC(A), FAC, ALO, or TAO.
  - (2) Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the commander of a ground unit engaged with the enemy may designate the target for aircraft, except when the target is in a hamlet or village or when the target is not in a "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE". In such cases, the request to attack a village or hamlet with CAS will be made to the BLT Commander.
  - (3) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages will normally be controlled by an TAC(A) or TACP.

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Such an attack will be executed only after GVN and RVNAF approval, as appropriate. It is the responsibility of the ground commander to request the air strike from the BLT Commander who will seek approval from the appropriate authority, and notify the ground commander of the decision. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the BLT Commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

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- (4) The TAC(A) or TACP or other controllers of close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops are known and that the information is passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits, the controller will be briefed on the scheme of maneuver, and the friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strikes.
- (5) SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES (Formerly referred to as FREE BOMB ZONES or FREE STRIKE ZONES) are defined as those areas where air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire may be conducted without further approval by the province chief.

##### 5. CONDUCT OF LANDING FORCE PERSONNEL.

- a. In order to win and maintain the support of the Vietnamese people in assisting U. S. Forces in the struggle against the VC and NVA forces, all troops will be indoctrinated in the following rules of conduct while ashore:
  - (1) They are guests of the Vietnamese and should act as such.
  - (2) They should join with the people and try to help them in any way possible.
  - (3) They should be particularly polite to Vietnamese women and children.
  - (4) They should make friends with their Vietnamese counterparts.
  - (5) They should be alert at all times.
  - (6) They should not be loud and boisterous.

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(7) They should reflect honor on themselves and their country.  
at all times.

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*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex K (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 328-66

Ref: (a) Loading Plans for assigned shipping  
(b) FMFM 3-1  
(c) CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY.a. General.

- (1) During the combat operation the source of supply for Classes I through V will be the assigned shipping.
- (2) Supplies will be prepared and staged aboard assigned shipping and be ready for loading for helicopter or surface craft prior to D-day.
- (3) Supply Section and Logistical Support Unit has the responsibility of preparing and staging all classes of supplies located aboard LPH-5.

b. Prescribed Loads.(1) Class I.

- (a) Meal Combat Individual - 1 meal.
- (b) Fuel Trioxane - 1 bar.
- (c) Salt Tablets - minimum of 12 per individual/day.

(2) Class II.

- (a) Minimum essential T/E and T/A items to accomplish the mission.
- (b) Dry cell batteries - 2 days.
- (c) Rifle oil - one 4 ounce can per four men.
- (d) Rifle patches - 4 per man/day.

(3) Class III.

- (a) Vehicle gas tanks - 3/4 full.

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- (b) All vehicles will carry one (1) 5 gallon can of MOGAS.
- (c) Special oils and lubricants - as required.
- (d) AmTracs to utilize bulk fuel aboard LSD-33.
- (4) Class IV. As required.
- (5) Class V. Basic Allowance per weapon will be taken ashore.
- (6) Water.
  - (a) Two filled canteens per individual,
  - (b) Water purification tablets - 8 per man/day.
  - (c) Vehicles will carry two (2) 5 gallon water cans.
- c. Control and Equipment.
  - (1) Control.
    - (a) A TACLOG group will be established aboard the LPH-5. When required, a TACLOG will be established aboard the LSD-33. TACLOG will operate in accordance with reference (b).
    - (b) Resupply of all classes of supplies is a BLT responsibility.
    - (c) Custody, control, and distribution of supplies is a BLT responsibility.
    - (d) Unit Commanders will ensure that all supplies are safeguarded against damage, destruction or capture, and/or pilferage or waste by friendly units.
  - (2) Distribution.
    - (a) Unit distribution.
    - (b) Level of supplies within the objective area will not exceed one day of any class of supplies unless authorized by this Headquarters.
  - (3) Captured Material.
    - (a) All captured equipment/material will be promptly tagged and evacuated to this Headquarters for intelligence evaluation.

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- (b) Units will report type, quantity, condition and time and date of the equipment.
- (c) Captured rice will not be destroyed but will be reported to this Headquarters. Tactical situation permitting, the rice will be redistributed to friendly populace.
- (d) If the tactical situation necessitated destroying the rice, a report as to the amount and location of destruction will be sent to this Headquarters.

(4) Resupply

- (a) Resupply of all classes will be in accordance with Appendix 1.
- (b) Requests for resupply will be submitted to this Headquarters four (4) hours prior to the time desired.
- (c) Emergencies will be submitted any time.
- (d) Routine daily resupply will normally be accomplished by helicopter between 1600-1800.

d. Salvage.

- (1) All material requiring salvage will be reported to this Headquarters.
- (2) No material of potential use to the enemy will be left unguarded or abandoned.

- e. Uniform and Equipment. Light marching pack (include entrenching tool), utilities, normal arms and equipment, helmet (green side out), ID tags, ID Cards and Geneva Convention Card. U. S. Currency will not be taken ashore by troops.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.

a. General.

(1) Sanitation and Preventative Medicine.

- (a) The tropical climate and possible heavy rainfall in the operating area create special medical problems. Among these are heat exhaustion and tropical diseases. Foot infections from prolonged immersion in water is a distinct hazard. Use of local food products is prohibited. Water will be treated with water purification tablets before being consumed.
- (b) Unit Commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

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b. Evacuation.(1) Movement.

- (a) Casualties occurring during shipboard phase will be evacuated as directed by CTG 79.5.

(2) Assault.

- (a) Casualties occurring in the landing craft or helicopters will remain aboard and be evacuated to medical facilities on the PRINCETON (LPH-5).

(3) Ashore.

- (a) Casualty classification. Three classifications of casualties will be used:

1 "Emergency" Evacuation. Reserved for those cases which are considered immediately endangering to life or limb, i.e., shock, multiple serious wounds, hemorrhage, airway obstruction, etc, but not limited to the examples given.

2 "Priority" Evacuation. Reserved for those cases requiring the medical facilities afloat but not considered immediately life threatening, i.e., multiple superficial lacerations requiring suturing, minor fractures, cellulitis or other infections, but not limited to these examples.

3 "Routine" Evacuation. Reserved for those cases of mild to moderate medical seriousness and who can be held ashore until sufficient numbers of cases accumulate to warrant dispatch of aircraft or surface craft to evacuate them, i.e., immersion foot, skin rashes, treated heat exhaustion cases, venereal disease cases, but not limited to these examples.

- (b) Casualties in the classification of "Emergency" and "Priority" will be evacuated direct to the LPH-5 for treatment.

- (c) Casualties in the classification of "Routine" normally will be evacuated through the BAS for further treatment. If tactical considerations prevent evacuation to the BAS, these cases will be evacuated to the LPH-5.

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- (d) Routine heat casualties will be treated at the Beach BAS during daylight hours; these cases may be evacuated to the Beach BAS by helicopter.

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(4) Casualty Evacuation Control.

- (a) The USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) is designated the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS).
- (b) A Medical Officer on the LPH-5 will be designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

c. Hospitalization.

- (1) As directed by the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

d. Medical Administration.

- (1) Evacuation and Casualty reports will be in accordance with instructions contained in Battalion Order 2040.1.

3. TRANSPORTATION.

- a. Surface and air transportation to be provided in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-66.
- b. All troop transportation requests will be submitted to the BLT S-3.

4. SERVICE.

a. Function.

- (1) Construction. Minimum essential to the accomplishment of the mission of the BLT.

(2) Maintenance.

- (a) Maximum use of contact teams and end item replacements.
- (b) Organization of maintenance (1st and 2nd echelon) performed by BLT personnel.
- (c) Detachment, Logistics Support Unit located aboard the LPH-5 will provide 2nd and 3rd and limited 4th echelon maintenance.

5. PERSONNEL.

- a. Personnel Summary Reports will be submitted as a section of and at the time prescribed for the Unit SITREP. (See Appendix 1 of Annex G)
- b. Personnel Summary Reports will be submitted IAW the format indicated in Paragraph 5, Appendix 1 of Annex G (Reports). Company Commanders will ensure that all attachments and units in direct support of their company are included in their report.

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- c. Units in general support will be reported by their parent organization.
- d. Casualty reporting procedure will be in accordance with Battalion Order 3040.1.
- e. POW collection point and POW compounds will be designated upon landing.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. Security of all supplies, equipment and personal effects while aboard assigned shipping is the responsibility of Unit Commanders.
- b. No equipment/material will be left ashore unattended.
- c. Units will return all class I, II, III, IV and V aboard assigned shipping. It is of paramount importance that all batteries will not be discarded but will be returned to the ships by available helicopter.
- d. All empty water cans will be returned to the LPH-5 by available helicopter.
- e. Upon termination of the operation and return of troops to assigned shipping, all ammunition will be collected on deck prior to troops going below to compartments.

7. REPORTS.

- a. All deadlined equipment will be reported to this Headquarters immediately.
- b. The BLT Supply Officer will submit to the S-4 an expenditure report of all classes of supplies within 72 hours after the termination of the operation.
- c. Units will report all lost and unserviceable equipment (782 gear and custodial items) to the S-4 within 72 hours after the termination of the operation.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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APPENDIXES:

1 - Rapid Request Format

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Appendix 1 (Rapid Request) to Annex K (Logistics) to Operation Order  
328-66

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Units will request all supplies, maintenance, and logistical support from Battalion S-4.
- b. Units will utilize the Rapid Request format, transmitting it direct to Battalion via the most rapid means available.
- c. Requests for routine resupply will be submitted by 1200 of the day required.
- d. Emergency requests will be submitted at anytime.
- e. The format for submitting Rapid Requests is:

ALPHA - Class I

- 1. Number of rations by type
- 2. Cans of water

BRAVO - Class II

- 1. By item as required

CHARLIE - Class III and IIIA

- 1. Number of gallons (MOGAS, AVGAS OR DIESEL)
- 2. Other items by quantity

DELTA - Class IV

- 1. By item as required

ECHO - Class V

- 1. Number of rounds by type

FOXTROT - SERVICE REQUIRED. If maintenance contact team, specify nature of repairs, parts and equipment and location of job.

GOLF - EVACUATION OF EQUIPMENT. Salvage and captured equipment. Give location

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HOTEL - Number of casualties to be evacuated and location.

INDIA - Delivery point if unit distribution or air delivery is requested. (By reference point)

KILO - Desired time of delivery

MIKE - Method of marking delivery point (panels, pyrotechnics, smoke)

OSCAR - DEADLINE delivery time

NOTE: If items are not applicable leave out - do not include or indicate "NEGATIVE"

f. Examples of rapid request messages:

SAMPLE #1 REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES.

BT Rapid Request X ALPHA ONE - 600 X ALPHA. TWO - 20 X BRAVO - 6 rifles M-14 X CHARLIE - 50 MOGAS X ECHO - 5,000 ROUNDS 7.62mm linked X INDIA - reference point BRAVO right 200 up 500 X KILO - 201600 X MIKE RED PANELS - GREEN SMOKE.

EXPLANATION

"L" Company has requested 600 meals, combat individual, 20 cans of water, 6 M-14's, 50 gallons of gasoline, 5,000 rounds of 7.62mm linked ammunition at 200 right and 500 up from reference point BRAVO at 1600 on the 20th day of the month. They will mark the landing site with red air panels and green smoke.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

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BLT 3/5  
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
150800H June 1966

Annex L (Civil Affairs) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See BLT Operation Order 328-66.

2. MISSION. To minimize civilian interference with the landing force and to provide limited military civil action to local civilians consistent with available resources.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operation. Medical aid and other available assistance will be given to the local civilian population as the tactical situation permits and at the specific direction of the SLF Commander.
- b. Civil Affairs Officer. Advise the BLT Commander in all matters concerning civil affairs and military civic affairs as required. Establish contact with local officials and supervise military civic action as directed.
- c. BLT BAS. Provide dental team consisting of one dental officer and technician to SLF Civil Affairs Team when directed.
- d. Coordinating Instructions.
  - (1) All assistance to the local population will be coordinated by the BLT Civil Affairs Officer.
  - (2) Every effort will be made to preserve local property consistent with the tactical situation.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics) and Annex D (Administration and Logistics).

- b. No military supplies other than limited medical and "Hand Clasp" items are to be available for the civil affairs program. However empty wooden ammunition boxes may be distributed to local civilians upon approval of BLT Commander.

*E. J. Bronars*  
E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps


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3121  
1 August 1966

Tab (a) Operations Overlay of Operation  
HASTINGS (Part 1)

SHEET #6342 I  
SERIES L701




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
MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000  
 SHEET 6739 IV  
 PANTHER S&C  
 CO K, 3RD BN, 5TH MARINES, *Opn. Point 116 K*  
 TOD 270630H TOR 301200H DEC 1966

7-10-69

3121  
1 August 1966

SHEET #6442 IV  
SERIES L701

Tab (a) to Enclosure (1)  
Overlay of AOA  
Operation  
DECKHOUSE II



3121  
1 August 1966

Tab (a) to Enclosure (1),  
Overlay of AOA,  
Operation DECKHOUSE II

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3121  
1 August 1966

Tab (a) to Enclosure (1), Overlay of AOA,  
Operation DECKHOUSE II

SHEET #6442 IV  
SERIES L701

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
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1 August 1966

Tab (b) Operations Overlay of Operation HASTINGS (Part 2)

SHEET #6342 I  
SERIES L701

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BLUEJAY




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Located at: BT-164171

Tunnel slants from 8' down up to surface level.



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Enclosure (2b)

BLT 3/5  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 150800H June 1966

Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-66

Time Zone: H

| <u>UNIT</u>                | <u>NO OF COPIES</u> | <u>UNIT</u>                                 | <u>NO OF COPIES</u> |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|
| CMC (Code AO3H)            | 2                   | CommO, BLT 3/5                              | 1                   |
| CINCPAC                    | 1                   | MedO, BLT 3/5                               | 1                   |
| CG, FMFPac                 | 1                   | MTO, BLT 3/5                                | 1                   |
| Dir, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico | 1                   | SupO, BLT 3/5                               | 1                   |
| COMSELEVENTHFLT            | 1                   | Chaplain, BLT 3/5                           | 1                   |
| CG, III MAF                | 1                   | CO, H&S Co, BLT 3/5                         | 3                   |
| CTG 76                     | 7                   | CO, Co I, BLT 3/5                           | 1                   |
| CTF 79                     | 1                   | CO, Co K, BLT 3/5                           | 1                   |
| CG, 1stMarDiv              | 1                   | CO, Co L, BLT 3/5                           | 1                   |
| CG, 3rdMarDiv              | 1                   | CO, Co M, BLT 3/5                           | 1                   |
| CO, 5th Mar                | 1                   | CO, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar          | 1                   |
| CTG 76.5                   | 1                   | CO, 107 Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar   | 1                   |
| CTG 79.5                   | 1                   | 2d Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn, FMF        | 1                   |
| CO, USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  | 1                   | 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF     | 1                   |
| CO, USS PICKAWAY (APA-222) | 1                   | 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn             | 1                   |
| CO, USS ALAMO (LSD-33)     | 2                   | 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn           | 1                   |
| CO, HMM 364                | 5                   | 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st MT Bn             | 1                   |
| CO, BLT 3/5                | 1                   | 6th Plat (-)(Rein), 1st Force Recon Co, FMF | 1                   |
| XO, BLT 3/5                | 1                   | 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Recon Bn          | 1                   |
| S-1, BLT 3/5               | 1                   | 2d SPTm, Co B, 1st SP Bn                    | 1                   |
| S-2, BLT 3/5               | 1                   | Logistic Support Unit                       | 1                   |
| S-3, BLT 3/5               | 4                   | Det, Beachmaster Unit, Naval Beachgroup     | 1                   |
| S-4, BLT 3/5               | 2                   | S&C Files, BLT 3/5                          | 12                  |
|                            |                     |   | <u>75</u>           |


*E. J. Bronars*  
 E. J. BRONARS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS 1701-6851 II (1:50,000) TU NHAM 4.2 MORTAR NFL  
AMS 1701-6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI




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SECRET



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AMS L701-6851 III (1:50,000) LONG HAI



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