

Pattalion Landing Team 3/5 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF FFO San Francisco, California 96602



5750 1 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer

To:

Commander, Task Group 79.5

Subj: Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronology Report for period

\$2\$43\$\frac{3}{2}\$ July 66 to \$123\$\$\frac{3}{2}\$ Aug 66.

kef: (a) Divo 5750.2A

Encl: √(1)-HET 3/5 Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events (S)

(2)-BLT 3/5 Chronology of Events (S)

√(3)-Combat After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE II and

Operation HASTINGS (S)

1. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Command Chronology, consisting of enclosures (1), (2) and (3), is submitted in accordance with the format contained in reference (a).

E. J. BRONARS

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF EMCLOSURES (1), (2) AMD (3)





Battalion Landing Team 3/5 9th Marine Amphibious Erigade, FMF FFO San Francisco, California 96602



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MAND CHRONOLOGY

1. Headquarters, Battalion Landing Team 3/5, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, Fleet Marine Force.

- a. Location: U.S.S. PRINCETON (LPH-5).
- b. Period covered: \$2\$\psi\_43\$\psi\_2\$ July 66 \$123\$\$\psi\_2\$ Aug 66.

c.	LtCol E. J. BRONARS
	Maj J. T. ELKINS
	2ndLt B. F. BEGGS
	1stLt J. M. SIMS
	Maj R. A. MONFORT
	Capt R. W. VORREYER
	Capt H. S. HAUPT
	Capt S. S. GLAIZE
	Capt R. E. MARESCO
	Capt R. P. TATUM
	Capt H. D. PETTENGILL

/ was rie

Executive Officer
S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
H&S Company Commander
Company I Commander
Company K Commander
Company L Commander
Company M Commander

Commanding Officer

### 2. Commander's Narrative of Significant Events

- a. Upon completion of Operation NATHAN HALE, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 returned to USNB Subic Bay, R.P. for ten days of training. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 arrived at USNB Subic Bay, R.P. on 5 July. On 8 July Brigadier General Ryan, Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade visited Battalion Landing Team 3/5 and attended memorial services for BIT 3/5 personnel who died during Operations DECKHOUSE I and NATHAN HALE.
- b. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 departed USNB Subic Bay, R.P. on 13 July and on the following day commenced planning for Operation DECKHOUSE II. Operation DECKHOUSE II commenced on 16 July with a combined helicopter and surface landing of Battalion Landing Team 3/5 into the assigned AOA located in Gio linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. Operation DECKHOUSE II was conducted until 18 July 1966. (see Enclosure 3)
- c. On 18 July 1966 the Special Landing Force was placed under Operational Control of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force to participate in Operation HASTINGS in Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. A withdrawal was commenced from the assigned TAOR on 29 July. The withdrawal was completed on 30 July 1966. (For detailed account see Enclosure (3)) Operational Control of the Special Landing Force reverted to CTG 76.5 on 30 July 1966.
- d. Special Landing Force arrived Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam on 31 July and commenced off-loading of Battalion Landing Team 3/5. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 came under Operational Control of Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force at \$2\$77\$\$\text{0}\$\$H\$ 1966.





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### BATTALION LANDING TEAM 3/5 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 5 July Battalion Landing Team 3/5 arrived at USNB Subic Bay, R.P. for ten days of training.
- 13 July Battalion Landing Team 3/5 departed from USNB Subic Bay, R.P.
- 14 July Battalion Landing Team 3/5 commenced planning for Operation DECKHOUSE II.
- 16 July Battalion Landing Team 3/5 commenced Operation DECKHOUSE II in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- Battalion Landing Team 3/5 terminated Operation DECKHOUSE II and at 180700H commenced Operation HASTINGS in Com Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam. The Special Landing Force was placed under Operational Control of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.\*
- General WESTMORELAND Commander, Unites States Military Ast sistance Command, Vietnam, LtGen L. WALT, Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and MajGen W. B. KYLE, Commanding General, Third Marine Division, visited Battalion Landing Team 3/5 in the field.
- 30 July The Special Landing Force reverted to Operational Control of CTG 76.5 on 301915H. Withdrawal of Special Landing Force from Cperation HASTINGS TAOR completed.\*\*\*
- 2 Aug Battalion Landing Team 3/5 OPCON Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force.
- \* CG Task Force Delta 1721152 (S)
- \*\* CG Task Force Delta 300715Z (S)






HEADQUARTERS.

Battalion Landing Team 3/5

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF FPO San Francisco, California 96602



From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (Commander Task Group

79.5)

Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE II and Operation HASTINGS

Ref: (a) Commander Task Group 79.5 Operation Order 328-66

(b) Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Operation Order 328-66 (Operation DECKHOUSE I)

(c) Battalion Landing Team 3/5 Frag Order #1 (Operation DECKHOUSE II).

(d) Maps: AMS Series L701 - 6342 I (1:50,000)

AMS Series L701 - 6342 II (1:50,000)

AMS Series L701 - 6442 I (1:50,000)

AMS Series L701 - 6442 IV (1:50,000)

AMS Series L701 - 6442 IV (1:50,000)

Encl: (1) Report of Operation DECKHOUSE II

Tab (a) Overlay of AOA, Operation DECKHOUSE II

V(2) Report of Operation HASTINGS
Tab (a) Operations Overlay of Operation HASTINGS (Part 1)
Tab (b) Operations Overlay of Operation HASTINGS (Part 2)

- 1. This report is submitted in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a).
- 2. Operation DECKHOUSE II was an amphibious operation which utilized surface borne and helicopter borne assault forces. Operation HASTINGS employed the Special Landing Force by assigning the Battalion Landing Team the mission of search and destroy in a designated TAOR; the Special Landing Force was placed under the operational control of Task Force Delta.
- 3. D-day for Operation DECKHOUSE II was 16 July 1966. At 180800H Operation DECKHOUSE II terminated when operational control of the Special Landing Force was chopped from Commander Task Group 76.5 (Commander Amphibious Task Force) to the III Marine Amphibious Force (Task Force Delta). Operation HASTINGS commenced at 180800H and terminated at 301515H when operational control of the Special Landing Force reverted to Commander Task Group 76.5.
- 4. The target area for Operation DECKHOUSE II was the northeastern third of Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province—a region of flat, poorly drained land with sand dunes stretching 3000 to 3500 meters from the beach. The target area for Operation HASTINGS was the Cam Lo area of the same province—an area of uncultivated, heavily vegetated, rolling valleys and steep, thick—ly vegetated mountains.





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5. Battalien Landing Team 3/5 Command Post initially was located outside USS PRINCETON (LPH-5). At H+5 on D-day, the Command Post was established ashore at YD 307727 in the vicinity of Landing Force Objective ALPHA. On D+2, the Command Post displaced to YD 803604 for Operation HASTINGS. On D+11 it displaced to XD 979585. The Command Post was located at this location for the remainder of the operation.

### 6. Administrative Matters

### a. Resupply

(1) Operation DECKHOUSE II. Unit resupply was accomplished entirely by helicopter. In order to facilitate resupply, units submitted requests during the evening for the following day's resupply. This allowed the Logistic Support Unit the opportunity to pull and stage the supplies during the evening and early morning hours. Reaction to a unit's announcement that it was prepared to receive resupply at a specific landing site was accomplished promptly; the time-consuming job of pulling and staging supplies had already been accomplished.

### (2) Operation HASTINGS

- (a) Unit resupply during Operation HASTINGS was initially seriously deficient. Phasing in the Battalion Landing Team into the operation overburdened the unit resupply function of the Landing Support Area. This temporary deficiency was overcome by providing a logistic team from the Battalion Landing Team at the Logistic Support Area. This team, consisting of the Battalion Landing Team Supply Officer or Supply Chief, medical representatives, communication technicians and selected supply personnel, greatly relieved the Logistic Support Area by processing Battalion Landing Team requirements. This arrangement ensured that Battalion Landing Team resupply requests received prompt and careful attention and provided adequate personnel to process casualties and to recover weapons and equipment.
- (b) Communications between the Logistic Support Area and the Battalion Landing Team S-4 was accomplished over the Battalion Landing Team Administrative Net. Traffic on the Task Force Delta Logistics Support Net, which was utilized by all pattalions in submitting resupply requests, was generally heavy and the availablitity of independent Battalion Landing Team communications to the Logistic Support Area proved very beneficial.
- b. Casualty Reporting. Reporting by the units during Operation HASTINGS was in most cases excellent; however, there were several errors in encoding. In some cases this caused lengthy delays in obtaining accurate information and delayed reporting to higher headquarters. It is recommended that a coded casualty reporting format utilizing code words should be standardized and adopted for use on operations.

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c. Evacuation. Casualty evacuation was accomplished utilizing the facilities of Company D, lst Medical Battalion, at Dong Ha. During the first two days of Operation HASTENDS, the Battalion Landing Team S-1 did not maintain a liaison section at this facility, resulting in confusion when casualties were evacuated. Further, the destination of casualties leaving Dong Ha was not known. On the 20th of July the Battalion Landing Team S-1 sent a representative to Dong Ha to assist in accounting for our casualties. This system proved to be effective and resulted in accurate casualty reporting.


### d. Communications

### (1) Radio

- (a) General. FM radio communications on Operation DECKHOUSE II and Operation HASTINGS were improved immeasureably by the acquisition of the AN/PRC-25 family of radios. Not only were positive communications with organic units and higher headquarters maintained throughout, but the greater capabilities of this radio enabled the Battalion Landing Team Commander to maneuver his companies at distances previously impossible.
- (b) Radio Distribution. The Battalion Landing Team was issued a total of seventy-four AN/PRC-25 (of which seven are the radio componets to the AN/GRC-125's that were issued). However, since the attached units and Special Landing Force had not received the AN/PRC-25's, it was necessary for the Battalion Landing Team to provide them with sets. Distribution was made as follows:

Rifle Companies (8 each)	32
81mm Mortar Platoon	10
Battalion Landing Team Command Post	9
Battalion Landing Team Commander	l
Special Landing Force	3
Tactical Air Control Party/	
Forward Air Control Teams	3 .
Artillery Liaison Officer/	
Forward Observers	5 2
105mm Howitzer Battery	
107mm Mortar Battery	2
Naval Gun Fire Liaison Officer/	
Spot Teams	3
Reconnaissance Teams	3
Shore Party Team	l
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Since three radios were deadlined for repair early in the operation, the Battalion Landing Team Command Post was left with only six radios and was forced to secure two of their five nets (Tactical Logistics Net and Administrative Net) temporarily in order to displace.





(c) Maintenance and Supply. The only maintenance and supply problem encountered with the AN/PRC-25 radio was that no spare parts were issued with the sets. Although excellent turn-around service was provided at the Logistics Support Area during Operation HASTINGS, it is most desireable when a component part, such as a handset or an antenna base, is lost or broken during an operation that an immediate replacement be available. The BA-386 batteries performed most satisfactorily, offering as much as thirty-six to forty-eight hours of service.

### (d) Radio Nets

### 1 External

a Operation DECKHOUSE II. Radio nets to higher head-quarters on Operation DECKHOUSE II were an FM tactical net and a HF tactical net. Communications on these nets was sporadic due to the constantly shifting position of the ship and due to the fact that the ship's radio equipment was not working properly. However, when the FM net was switched from the ship's radio to the back-up AN/PRC-25 provided to Special Landing Force by the Battalion Landing Team, a marked improvement was noted. Traffic over these nets was moderate during the day, but after 2000 hours traffic over the HF net was reduced to hourly radio checks.

b Operation HASTINGS. Radio communications from Battalion Landing Team 3/5 to Task Force Delta on Operation HASTINGS was superior to that experienced with Special Landing Force on Operation DECKHOUSE II. This is probably due to the fact that Task Force Delta was a fixed land station. Radio nets from Battalion Landing Team 3/5 to Task Force Delta consisted of an FM Tactical Net and an FM Command Net. An HF Command Net existed for back-up purposes, but this was never used by Battalion Landing Team 3/5 since FM communications was outstanding at all times.


### 2 Internal

a Communications from the Battalion Landing Team down to its subordinate units was excellent on both Operation DECKHOUSE II and Operation HASTINGS. Only when the companies were on the move and passing under heavy canopy did communications become marginal. However, at all times one company was in a position to relay traffic to another.

b The activation of an FM Battalion Landing Team Administrative Net to handle resupply requests, medical evacuations, lengthy situation reports, logistical landing zone control and all other administrative traffic proved very satisfactory. Overburdening the Battalion Landing Team Tactical Net with routine and logistical traffic was avoided and urgent tactical traffic was not delayed. It is strongly recommended that a Battalion Landing Team Administrative Net be activated in all future Special Landing Force operations.
















- (e) Frequencies and Call Signs. Frequency designators of a number of the frequencies assigned to the Battalion Landing Team for use on Operation DECKHOUSE II were changed by the Special Landing Force prior to the operation. Although this was done to simplify identification of frequencies within the Special Landing Force, confussion arose during Operation HASTINGS since Task Force Delta had different designators for many of the same frequencies. Other minor problems arose because a complete list of call signs and frequencies utilized by Task Force Delta was never provided.
- (f) Comments. A final comment must be made to emphasize the outstanding results with the AN/PRC-25 radio. The AN/PRC-25 radio provided flexibility in maneuvering the rifle companies and in exercising supporting arms. Artillery Forward Observers, Forward Air Control Teams and Maval Gun Fire Spot Teams maintained positive communications with the Fire Support Coordination Center at all times. Results certainly justify assigning AN/PRC-25 radios to exercise these supporting arms. It is also recommended that all HF nets be replaced by FM nets—the range of the AN/PRC-25 is equal to that of the AN/PRC-47; the weight and bult of the AN/PRC-47 makes it difficult for supporting arms teams to keep up with the infantry units to which assigned; maintenance and resupply problems inherent in the use of the BB-451 battery are significant; atmospheric, climatic and terrain conditions in South Vietnam adversly affect the effectiveness of the AN/PRC-47 radio.
- (2) Wire/Radio Relay. Nothing new was encountered with wire or radio relay on Operation DECKHOUSE II or Operation HASTINGS. Once again a radio relay shot was made from the Battalion Landing Team to the Special Landing Force on Operation DECKHOUSE II. Radio relay was effective and afforded outstanding communications.

### (3) Recommendations

- (a) The Battalion Landing Team assigned to the Special Landing Force should be equipped with a full allowance of AN/PRC-25 radios.
- (b) AN/PRC-47 radios are too heavy to carry in the rugged terrain and intense heat experienced in South Vietnam; battery recharging and resupply causes additional complications. The AN/PRC-47 radio should be replaced by the AN/PRC-25 radio if at all possible.
- (c) Thorough communications coordination prior to the commencement of combined operations is essential.

### 7. Supporting Arms

### a. Artillery

(1) Operation DECKHOUSE II. In this operation the 105mm Howitzers were landed by LCU and the 107mm Howters were landed by helicopter. No problems were encountered. Communications and observation were excellent.







### (2) Operation HASTINGS

- (a) The 105mm Howitzers were displaced by helicopter to new gun positions at the commencement of Operation HASTINGS.
- (b) No major problems were encountered. At times observation was limited by terrain and/or vegetation; however, adequate support was possible at all times. Communications were satisfactory at all times due primarily to the use of the AN/PRC-25.
- (c) Reaction times were excellent on most missions and acceptable on all missions. Fires were quick and accurate. Clearance of missions requested outside of the Battalion Landing Team TAOR was granted promptly.
- (d) At times the Conduct of Fire Net tended to become overloaded due to the passing of administrative traffic.

### b. Naval Gun Fire

- (1) Operation DECKHOUSE II. The support of the USS OKLAHOMA CITY, USS LOFBERY and USS WHITE RIVER were used only for three rounds of illumination for Company I due to negligible enemy contact. The use of two spot teams and AN/PRC-25 radios for the spot net proved highly effective. The AN/PRC-47 control net provided borderline communications throughout, Recommend further use of the AN/PRC-25 for the Naval Gun Fire nets with small, two or three man, spot teams.
- (2) Operation HASTINGS. No naval gunfire support was used due to range. The Shore Fire Control Farty was used as artillery forward observers for HaS Company patrols and for manning artillery observation posts within the TAOR.


### c. Air

### (1) DECKHOUSE II

(a) During Operation DECKHOUSE II only three (3) helicopter requests were submitted by the Tactical Air Control Party for support. Battalion Landing Team 3/5 was directly supported by HMM-363. Tactical Air Control Center was subordinate to Commander Task Group 76.5. One request for helicopter observation for retreating VC elements was submitted requesting support as soon as possible. The helicopter was on station one hour later. Flight time from the LPH-5 to the objective area was approximately ten minutes. A fifty minute delay in approval and communications is indicated. The second request for helicopter observation of artillery fires for registration was approved and the helicopters were on station within








Forward Air Control Team and the Ai/ RC-41 racto required to communicate with fixed wing aircraft. The response time recuired to get air on station from strip alert status is unsatisfactory; too often the twenty to sixty minute delay experienced is simply twenty to sixty minutes too late.

- e. Civic action and population and resources control measures in the TAOR's assigned to Battalion Landing Team 3/5 during Operation HASTINGS were not required. This was a battlefield unencumbered by a civilian population.
- f. The AN/PRC-25 radio is a fabulous piece of equipment. It provides dependable communications over distances in excess of 12,000 meters in a physical environment of terrain and vegetation which would have precluded the use of the AN/PRC-10 radio at 1,000 meters.
- g. Problem areas encountered and recommendations relative to them have already been covered extensively elsewhere in this report. The following comments are designed to emphasize certain lessons learned not accountely covered elsewhere.
- (1) The enemy confronting the Sattalian Landing Team was not active—
  ly seeking contact. He was, however, prepared to take advantage of his
  strongly entrenched positions in densely vegetated, steep-sided draws and
  rugged mountainous terrain to inflict maximum casualties against an enemy
  maneuvering against him. Under these conditions it is imperative that supporting arms to liberally used against suspected enemy positions or along
  dangerous avenues of movement. Whenever contact is established and the
  situation permits, unit commanders should conduct intensive antillery and/er
  air strikes against the fixed enemy positions before trying to averym them.
- (2) The nature of the enemy's tactics and the physical nature of the operating area made air on station with a factical Air Central (Airborne) to control the most desirable, and sometimes the only, form of supporting arms which a maneuvering unit in contact with the energy could use.
- (3) The danger of amough in this environment is ever-present. The use of security to the front and flank, however, is inch always effective in avoiding well-prepared and well-executed arbushes. Reaction to an ambush must be automatic and must be based on extensive quick-reaction duffls.
- (h) Resupply by helicopter is hindoubtedly necessary and unaveidable. Every effort should be made to reduce the number of resupplies in order to minimize the attendant disadvantage of pinpointing the Hosetien and disposition of all friendly units being resupplied.









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
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(5) Ambushes, both day and night, are one of the most effective means of inflicting personnel casualties on the enemy. Ambushes should be at less 500 to 1000 meters distant from unit night defensive positions.


E./J. BRONARS S











### REPORT OF OPERATION DECKHOUSE II

### 1. Task Organization

### H&S Co (-) Det, Btry F, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm) Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF In Tm) Det, Radio Relay Sec, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 5th Mar Det, Hq Bn, 1st Marine Division, FMF Det, Radio Relay Plat, Comm Co Det, Disbursing Plat, Serv Co Det, Postal Unit, Adj Sec, Div Hq, Hq Co Det, 1st Dental Co, FMF Det, Ist Medical Bn Det, Serv Sec, Co Hq, 3d Coll Sec, Coll Plat Logistic Support Unit Det, Prov Serv Bn, 9th MAB missile fallet, Supply Sec 1970 Det, Maint Sec Det, H/S Sec Det, H&S Co, 3d FSR 22 2d SP Tm, Co B, 1st SP Bn 30 2d Landing Spt Plat

## Co I (Rein)

Co I
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
Det, 8lmm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d En, 11th Mar
1st Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, H&S Co, 1st SP Bn Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

### Co K (Rein)

Co K
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
FAC Tm
Det, 81mm Mort Plat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FO Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar
Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)

Lt Col BRONARS

Capt GLAIZE

Capt MARESCO

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Enclosure (1)



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### Co L (Rein)

Co L
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plat
FAC Tm
Det, 8lmm Mort Flat
Det, S-2 (Bn Scouts)
FC Tm, Btry F (Rein), 2d Bn, 1lth Mar
2d Sqd, 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 1lth Mar, (NGF Spot Tm)

### Btry F (-)(Rein), 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Btry F (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 11th Mar

### 107mm Mort Btry (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Det, Mess Sec, Serv Plat, Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

### 2d Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn, FMF

2d Plat Det, Co Hq, Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

### 3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st AT Bn

ere 3d Plat Par Det, Co Hq, Co B, 1st AT Bn

### 3d Plat (-)(Rein), Co B, 1st Engr Bn

3d Plat (-)
Det, Med Plat, Has Co, 1st Engr Bn
Det, Engr Spt Co, 1st Engr Bn

### 2d Plat, Co B, 1st MT Bn

Det, Main's Sec, Co Hq, Co B, 1st MT Bn

### 106mm Reccilless Rifle Plat (Rein)

100mm Recoilless Rifle Plat Det, ed Plat, H&S Co

### ant TATUM

ি কোনা চিত্র প্রতিক্রণ করি Capt HARRIS

Capt MERRITT

the gard land agent and

Lt CRESSLY

L+ BUCHANAN

Lt TOTH

CWO HENSON

Lt CHRISTIAMS

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5th Plat (-)(Rein), 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF

Lt O'DONNELL

and StheRlet gave solid anibogic deal with the control of The Deton Perachute Maint/Rpr Sec & Supply/Serv Plat

3d Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Recon Bn

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and anther ment to describe a describe and another ano Tri- Province of the Republic of Vietnam. The area of operations was a pre-Adminately Flat sandy area. All terrain features were as predicted prion to consencement of the operation with the exception of the area adjacent to the stream 6000 meters inland from the beach. This was reported to be cultivated in wetland rice whereas in actuality the area was farmed in dry crops. The beach report of BIUE Beach stated that the inner sand bar, 40 to 60 yards off the beach, might cause LCVP to ground. Although the landing took placesso three hours after law tide, poats did ground and assault troops were forced ev to the beach. An opposed landing would have grows red more extensive preparations of the beach.

end. Enemy Situation. Prior to the landing it was estimated that only withing the 494. local force Viet Cong (VC) units were present in the area of operation. Wery little actual contact was made during the operation. However, the installations discovered and equipment captured verified reports by Vietnamese civilians that a local force VC company operated in the AOA. In addition, the three VC MEA were identified by local officials as being local force VC members, of the company on the members, of this unit evidently fled the area and one of operations and for went into hiding when friendly forces arrived. ACLT TA . THE STATE OF THE STAT


Enclosure (1)

Enclose e (1)

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3. Mission. As directed by the Special Landing Force Frag Order #1 for Operation DECKHOUSE II, the mission assigned to Battalion Landing Team 3/5 was:

"Commencing at H and L-hours on D-day, land simultaneously by surface and helo assault over BLUE Beach and HLZ STORK to seize LF Objectives A, B, C, D, E, and F; on order conduct search and destroy operations in the Dong Ha area and establish a Beach Support Area to assist the Commanding General, III Amphibious Force within the I Corps tactical zone."

4. Concept of Operations. The Battalion Landing Team 3/5 scheme of maneuver in the Dong Ha area during Operation DECKHOUSE II was planned to be conducted in two phases over a period of seven to ten days.

- a. Phase I. In the conduct of Phase I, plans were made to: land Company K over BLUE Beach to attack and seize Landing Force Objective ALPHA; land Company I over BLUE Beach to attack and seize Landing Force Objective BRAVO; land Battery F over BLUE Beach to proceed to predesignated firing positions; land 2d Platoon, Company B, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion over BLUE Beach to land elements of Battalion Landing Team 3/5, to assume beach defense and to position Battery F; land 3rd Platoon, Company B, 1st Antitank Battalion and 2d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion as provisional rifle platoons to provide security for Battery F and Amphibian Tractor Platoon; land Company L by helicopter in Landing Zone STORK to attack and seize Landing Force Objective DELTA; land 107mm Mortar Battery by helicopter in Landing Zone STORK to set up firing positions in the vicinity of the landing zone; land 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Motor Transport Battalion by helicopter in Landing Zone STORK as a provisional rifle platoon to provide security for 107mm Mortar Battery; maintain Company M aboard LPH-5 as Battalion Landing Team Reserve; land H&S Company and other combat service support elements by helicopter in vicinity of Landing Force Objective BRAVO to establish the Command Post and provide security for Command Group.
- b. Phase II. Phase II of Operation DECKHOUSE II was planned as follows: Company I was to attack and seize Landing Force Objective ECHO; Company I was to revert to Battalion Landing Team Reserve; Company M was to be landed by helicopter in Landing Zone JAY to attack and seize Landing Force Objective FOXTROT. Companies K, I, and M were to conduct search and destroy operations within the AOA.

### 5. Execution

### a. D-day - 16 July 1966

(1) Company K landed by LVTP-5 over BLUE Beach at 0630H (H-hour), followed by Company I in LCVP at 0635H. The landings took place without incident; both companies reported the beach secured and clear. At 0710H,



Company I commenced movement to attack and seize Landing Force Objective BRAVO, while Company K moved southwest toward Landing Force Objective ALPHA. Company I was helilifted at 0630H (L-hour) into Landing Zone STORK; no enemy contact was made and the Landing Zone was reported secured. At 0715H, the 107mm Mortar Battery was helilifted into Landing Zone STORK and assumed firing positions at YD 290701; once this was accomplished, Company L moved northwest to secure Landing Force Objective DELTA. The Command Group was helilifted to YD 307727 at 1100H and fifty minutes later control of navai gun fire and artillery was passed ashore. At 1530H Battery F landed across BLME Beach by LVTP-5 and proceeded to designated firing positions at ID 302727; at the same time, Company M was helilifted into Landing Zone STORK. Company M (=) moved into positions at YD 281695, leaving one platoon at Landing Zone STORK as local security for the 107mm Mortar Battery.

- (2) Operations on D-day consisted of search and destroy operations by Companies I, K, and L. Company I swept north from Landing Force Objective BRAVO to within 2000 meters of the Demilitarized Zone, where the company immediately took up defensive positions. Company K conducted search and destroy operations southwest of Landing Force Objective ALPHA and Battalion Landing Team Objective 1. Company L moved north and northeast from Landing Force Objective DELTA to secure Landing Force Objective ECHO and FOXTROT. There was no enemy contact on D-day.
- Force Objective ALPHA, discovered a cache at YD 322720. This included amountation, maps, documents, packs, one .38 cal pistol and four blocks of TNT. Company K also found and destroyed two booby traps in this same area. At 1055H, Company I found two freshly dug foxholes, diging tools, rice, .30 caliber brass, two canteens and a smoldering fire at YD 304735. At 1125H, Company L talked to an English speaking priest in the village of Xan Phong who, told of VC operating out of the village at YD 280690. He also told of mines and booby traps in the vicinity of Battalion Landing Team Objective 2.
  - (4) At 1150H, Company I discovered one 9.8 Mauser rifle, ninety rounds of assorted ammunition, one block of TNT and one friction-pole grande at YD 295750.
  - (5) By nightfall of D-day all Landing Force Objectives had been secured except for Landing Force Objective CHARLIE. Night defensive positiona were located as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post ND 307727.
    - (b) Company I YD 292753.
    - (c) Company K YD 316706.
    - (d) Company L YD 263747.

Enclosure (1)








- (e) Company M (-) YD 281695.
- (f) 107mm Mortar Battery, reinforced with one platoon of Company M YD 290701.
  - (g) Battery F YD 302727.
  - (h) Shore Party YD 320723.
- (6) During the night of D-day and early morning of D+1, Companies I and K made contact with the enemy. At 1855H, Company K received small arms fire and grenades from three VC located at YD 316706 who were hidden within their perimeter. All three VC were killed and two Chinese burp guns were taken. At 2300H, Company I fired on three groups of three VC moving along the beach area. On the morning of D+1, one Mauser rifle was found on the beach near where the VC were fired upon. Company K also reported finding an additional Chinese submachine gun and magazine on the same morning.

### b. D+1 - 17 July 1966

- (1) At first light on D+1, all Battalion Landing Team 3/5 units were engaged in search and destroy operations within the assigned ACA. Company I conducted their search and destroy operation up to the Demilitarized Zone, then returned to the south. Operating with Company I were three tanks from the 2d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion; no enemy contact was made during the day.
- (2) Company K conducted a search and destroy operation south and southwest from Landing Force Objective ALPHA to Landing Force Objective CHARLIE. Both companies primarily were concerned with searching villages in their assigned area of operation. Neither company reported enemy contact.
- (3) On D+1 Company L (-) was helilifted from YD 262752 to YD 279719; one plateon was lifted separately to YD 285711 to establish a blocking position. Company L (-) conducted a search and destroy operation toward the blocking force. After completing the sweep, Company L (-) moved on towards Landing Force Objective CHARLIE; no enemy contact was reported.
- (4) Company M conducted a search and destroy operation to the southern boundary of the Battalion Landing Team 3/5 AOA at YD 264635. There was no enemy contact in this operation.
  - (5) Night defensive positions on D+1 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 307727.
    - (b) Company I YD 325699.







- (c) Company K YD 305683.
- (d) Company L YD 283706.
- (e) Company M YD 264635.
- (f) 107mm Mortar Battery YD 290701.
- (g) Reconnaissance Platoon (Division) YD 302688.
- (h) Reconnaissance Platoon (Force) YD 260754
- (i) Battery F YD 302727.
- (6) During the night of D+1, there was no enemy contact reported by units of the Battalion Landing Team.

### c. D+2 - 18 July 1966

(a) At OSOOH on D+2 the Special Landing Force came under operational control of the III Marine Amphibious Force (Task Force Delta). This ended Operation DECKHOUSE II.

### 6. Results

# -cignomic Enemy

- (1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted by Battalion Landing Team 3/5:
  - (a) 3 VC KIA (Body Count).
- (2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured and/or destroyed by Battalion Landing Team 3/5:
  - (a) 1 .38 cal Smith and Wesson revolver.
  - (b) 2 German 9.8 Mauser rifles.
  - (c) 1 U.S. .30 cal submachine gun.
  - (d) 1 French 9mm submachine gun.
  - (e) 1 Chinese burp gun.
  - (f) 4 Wooden handle hand grenades.
  - (g) 1 Large signal drum.













- (h) 1 Burp gun magazine with 150 rounds.
- (i) 20 .30 cal rounds.
- (j) 1 7.62mm clip with ten rounds.
- (k) I Brown beret with insignia.
- (1) 2 Bushel of rice.
- (m) 1 Bushel of sweet potatoes.
- (n) Numerous packs and equipment, both U.S. and foreign.
  - (o) Numerous documents, maps and notebooks.
  - (p) 5 Blocks of Chinese explosives.
  - (q) 2 Booby traps.

### b. Friendly

- (1) Casualties sustained by Battalion Landing Team 3/5 are summarized below:
  - (a) Non-Battle Casualties 17.
    - 1 Heat 8.
    - 2 Injuries 9.













### REPORT OF OPERATION HASTINGS

1. Task Organization. Remained the same except for the 81mm Mortar Platoon which was placed in general support of the Battalion Landing Team.

### 2. Intelligence

a. Operation HASTINGS was conducted by U.S. Marine Forces in the mountains of western Quang Tri Province. The zone of action in which Battalion Landing Team 3/5 operated was bordered generally on the north by east west grid line 63, on the west on a line from YD 105630 to YD 116597, on the south along the Song Cam Lo River, up north south grid line 01 to 585 and east to XD 930585, and on the east along north

is dominated by a horseshoe shaped hill mass with Dong 091593 at the apex. This forms the three main valleys lion Landing Team 3/5 operated. The canopy formed by the is 60 to 90 feet high and makes observation of the ground from air impossible in 90 to 95 percent of the area. Trails abound the area, are well marked and well used. There are a number of streams in the area not indicated on the map which are suitable for drinking, cooking and sustaining large numbers of personnel.

- c. Weather conditions, influenced by typhoon Ora, turned windy and overcast the afternoon of 24 July. High winds made flying conditions marginal for the next three days causing a number of delays in medical evacuation, resupply and close air support.
- d. No friendly forces had operated in Battalion Landing Team 3/5's initial zone of action prior to its entry. A B-52 strike had been conducted in the western portion of the area prior to our arrival, but specific intelligence as to what was to be expected was not available. It was suspected, however, that the area might include a regimental size command post, and perhaps even the Command Post of the 324B North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division.
- e. Company M made contact with the enemy immediately upon landing in Landing Zone CROW at YD 043623. Company M came under fire from an estimated reinforced NVA Platoon. Small arms fire was returned and supporting arms called in on the enemy resulting in twenty-one NVA KIA (Body Count), two NVA WIA confirmed, fifteen NVA WIA (Possible) and fourteen weapons captured including one 12.7mm machine gun and one 30 callber machine gun. This action set the stage for the rest of the operation as it was apparent that the enemy was present in our zone of action and would fight to protect the area.

Enclosure (2)



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
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- f. Contact with the enemy was limited, except in two encounters, to units of under twenty or thirty NVA. Actions with five or ten NVA predominated the action. The small units appeared to be one of two types: those who were assigned to delay and harass friendly units and those who had become separated from their present units and stumbled into contact with Battalion Landing Team 3/5.
  - g. The most significant encounters with NVA forces occured on 22 July and 24 July. Company M moved out on the morning of 22 July in reaction to a report by an NVA captive who reported a regimental headquarters site to be in the vicinity of Hill 314 in grid square YD 0262. Compare the area discovering 200 to 300 reinforced bunkers. These covered by fresh foliage and had recently been abandor tinued its search around Hill 314 and at YD 034625 came matic weapons fire and grenade bombardment from an estimate five NVA. The NVA were positioned in bunkers reinforced by the occupying high ground above Company M, who was then in a draw. Some NVA were bandaged from previous wounds. An Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) interperter with Company M repeatedly called for the NVA to surrender but they refused to do so. Company M then returned fifte, maneuvered against and overran the NVA position. The results of the action were seventeen NVA KIA (Body Count) and seven weapons captured.
  - h. The most significant contact of the operation took place 1215H 24 July when Company I encountered strong enemy positions at YD 013616. Company I was moving along a ridge line on a narrow trail when the lead element of the company came under heavy automatic weapons fire and grenade bombardment. Within minutes the lead elements of the company were pinned down by fire. The jungle was so thick at the point of contact that often muzzle flashes could not be seen when enemy forces were firing at point blank range. Company I was then taken under fire by mortars. Artillery and air strikes were called in and automatic weapons fire slowed down and the mortar fire temporarily ceased. By this time the Commanding Officer of Company I estimated that he was under attack by two NVA Companies. At 1640H Company I attempted medical evacuation of the wounded but the helicopters received an intense volume of fire and were forced out of the area. At about 1700H the mortar fire on Company I positions resumed.
  - i. At 1735H Company K, moving toward Company I from the southeast, made contact with an estimated forty to fifty NVA in the vicinity of YD 01861h. The NVA were positioned in bunkers reinforced with logs. Company K returned fire, maneuvered and then withdrew a short distance to bring in artillery and air strikes. The fire was called in and the results of the action were seven NVA KIA (Body Count) and an estimated thirty-five NVA KIA (Probable).













- j: Company I continued to receive mortar and automatic Weapons fire until about 2010H when artillery fire was directed at suspected mortar positions in the vicinity of YD 021628. Two secondary explosions resulted and Company I received no more incoming mortar fire. Company I did receive heavy small arms fire during the rest of the night and during most of the following day:
- k. Reports by the company commanders and reports from NVA captives definitely established the enemy force facing those companies was an NVA Battalion: NVA captives identified the unit as the 6th Battalion, 812th Regiment of the 324B NVA Division. This battalion was composed on three rifle companies of a strength of ninety to ninety-five each and a heavy weapons company armed with four 82mm mortars and four 57mm recoilless rifles.
- 1. When the action ceased and an evaluation of the battle area could be accomplished, the following enemy losses were assessed: twenty-five NVA KIA (Body Count); one hundred twenty-one NVA KIA (Probable); thirty NVA WIA (Possible); three mortars captured or destroyed; twenty-seven rifles and submachine guns captured; one 57mm recoilless rifle destroyed; one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed; over two hundred grenades destroyed; over 15,500 rounds of ammo captured; over fafty-two mortar and AT rounds destroyed; and numerous packs and uniforms captured and destroyed.
- m. Eight major enemy installations were discovered by Battalion Landing Team 3/5 in the zone of action. Six of these installations could each accomadate a battalion size or larger unit. A number of smaller living areas were also discovered. The major installations were:
- (1) 191625H Company L discovered at YD 040620 what appeared to be a battalion size Command Post: Eight huts were found, over one hundred and forty prepared bunkers and holes and about twenty pigs and chickens. No documents or items of equipment were found, but the area had been evacuated quite recently.
- (2) 201300H A patrol from the 100mm RR Flatoon discovered at YD 098619 what appeared to be a political reception center for the new North Vietnamese Troops. The site included a hut and seven large bunkers. Two sacks of propaganda material were found at the site including posters. pamphlets, leaflets, paper North Vietnamese Flags and receipt books that appeared to be used for recording membership in party organizations. Found also were three large banners which said (translated liberally): "Welcome to the liberation of South Vietnam. National Liberation Front", "Help defeat the American Imperialists and their Lackies", and "Save the people from Ky and his government of thieves". The site had recently been occupied: the diggings were fresh; food including fresh bread and fruit was found.











## DECLASSIFIED

- (3) 201610H Company K discovered at YD 014598 a battalion or possibly regimental sized Command Post and a bivouaghlocation. The area included over three hundred packs, over five hundred sixty uniforms, three hundred twenty-three blue sweat shirts, four hundred thirty-five shelter halves, two hundred ninety-seven pair of Ho Chi Minh sandals, two hundred sixty-eight Machettes, and numerous magazines and rounds (mostly 12.7mm). There was a great deal of expended 12.7mm brass about the area and about seventy pounds of documents including letters, diaries, and instruction books on mortars and heavy weapons. The area included tables, benches, class room type areas, two large huts and over four hundred bunkers and shelter holes. All gear was new or almost new and in excellent condition.
- (4) 210920H Company M found at MD 024618 an area believed to be a battalion sized bivouac area. The area contained over two hundred recently used bunkers and shelter holes. Captured at the site were six thousand rounds of 12.7mm ammunition, seventy-seven pounds of TNT block, thirty pounds of TNT flake, eleven Anti-tank mines, claymore mines, forty-five nonelectric blasting caps, eighty-eight pressure pull type fuses, one mine sweeper, five hundred feet time fuse, two crimpers, one splicer, four reels of communications wire, four weapons, forty pounds of documents including engineer training manuals, diaries and letters, and various items of 782 type gear. The bivouac site obviously supported an engineer battalion which vacated in a great hurry less than 24 hours in advance of Company M's arrival.
- (5) 231000H Company M discovered at YD 033627 an area which contained four large huts and twenty to thirty large bunkers. The complex was protected by both entrances by a system of fortified positions. Two NVA were sighted in this complex and were killed.
- (6) 220930H Company M investigated an NVA captives report of a regimental size Command Post located in the vicinity of Hill 314 in grid square 0262. Company M found on the northeast side of Hill 314 over two hundred freshly prepared bunkers reinforced with logs and covered by fresh foliage. The area had been vacated less than 24 hours prior but no equipment or documents were found.
- (7) 231555H Company I at YD 017607 discovered a battalion size bivouac site and a large supply of enemy equipment. In the area of the cache was an NVA soldier who had deserted and surrendered. The following items were captured in the cache: two Chinese submachine guns; one AN/PRC-10 radio; forty-eight wooden handle grenades; one hundred eight rounds .30 caliber ammunition; seven hundred thirty-eight 7.62mm rounds, two large canvas bags probably covers for heavy mortars, 62mm mortar cleaning gear; one flag; thirty-two pair sneakers; twelve full rucksacks; twenty-five kahki uniforms; numerous items of 782 gear and medical supplies; and numerous diaries, letters and assorted documents. All items of equipment were new or in excellent condition. About eighty to one hundred bunkers (two or four man) were found in the area.











(8) 241155H - An H&S Company patrol located an enemy bivouac site at YD 083614 - again for a battalion sized unit. The area included four huts and about one hundred forty reinforced bunkers. A limited amount of gear and documents was found.

Although Battalion Landing Team 3/5 made contact with only one identified unit (The 6th Battalion, 812th Regiment) and, as stated before, met most of its resistance in the form of small delaying groups it is estimated that at least one NVA Regiment and an Engineer Battalion occupied the zone of action prior to Battalion Landing Team 3/5's arrival. It is possible that the headquarters of the 324B Division may also have been located in the area. The facilities were there but the interpetation of the captured documents, letters and diaries will have the verify this conjecture.

- 3. <u>Mission</u>. As directed by Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 was to aggressively conduct search and destroy operations in assigned areas of responsibility. (see Tab A)
- 4. Concept of Operation. Battalion Landing Team conducts search and destroy operations within assigned TAOR with four rifle companies executing search and destroy operations from east to west within assigned zones of action.

### 5. Execution

### a. D+2 - 18 July 1966


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- (1) Battery F was lifted by helicopter commencing at 0830H to assigned firing positions south of Cam Lo; the battery was in position ready to fire by 1620H. At 1215H Companies M and L were lifted by helicopter to Landing Zone CROW. The Landing Zone received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire and Company M met enemy resistance as it secured the Landing Zone. By 1330H solid contact with the enemy was established. Air strikes were called, and Company M overran the enemy positions located at YD 043623. Of an approximate forty khakiclad enemy, Company M counted twenty-one KIA, two WIA, and eighteen WIA (Possible). Captured were one .30 cal machine gun; one .50 cal machine gun; five 7.62 automatic rifles; six 7.62 semi-automatic rifles; ten wooden hand grenades, two AT mines; one AT rocket launcher; and 1000 rounds of small arms ammo.
- (2) Company L found ten rounds small arms ammunition after landing in Landing Zone CRCW but had no enemy contact until 1810H when an unknown number of NVA were encoutered at YD 060610. This action resulted in one NVA KIA.









- (4) At 1730H Company L received machine gun and automatic rifle fire from an estimated twenty NVA at YD 060612. Company L returned the fire, resulting in two NVA KIA (Body Count) and five KIA (Probable). One sub-machine gun was captured and one .30 caliber machine gun was destroyed.
- (5) At dusk on D+2, Battalion Landing Team 3/5 units were in positions as follows:
  - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
  - (b) Company I YD 076605.
  - (c) Company K YD 065607.
  - (d) Company L YD 049619.
  - (e) Company M YD 049622.
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.
  - (g) Division Reconnaissance (1) YD 080597.
  - (h) Division Reconnaissance (2) YD 066605.
  - (i) Force Reconnaissance YD 092619.

#### b. D+3 - 19 July 1966


- (1) There was little contact during the morning of D+3. At 0650H Company L received three 60mm mortar rounds at YD 049619. Company M at YD 043623 found two additional bodies from the action of D+2. At 0845H Company I found a seven round clip of ammunition on a trail at YD 071597.
- (2) During the afternoon of D+3 contact was made by Company L at YD 045625 with a NVA Platoon armed with automatic weapons. Company L returned fire and killed four NVA (Body Count) with two WIA (Confirmed). They captured two automatic weapons and one rifle. At 1408H, Company K brought fire to bear on three NVA's at YD 058608, resulting in one WIA (Confirmed) and three captured hand grenades. At 1815H Company K at YD 049605 found one dead NVA believed to have been wounded in an











earlier action. The soldier was armed with a new semi-automatic rifle in excellent condition. Also in the area was a large cache of packs; equipment, supplies, rice, ammo and uniforms - all new: At dusk on D+3; Battalion Landing Team units were in positions as follows:

- (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604:
- (b) Company I YD 070596:
- (c) Company K YD 051605:
- (d) Company L YD 039617:
- (e) Company M YD 039617:
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.
  - (g) Division Reconnaissance (1) YD 080597:
  - (h) Division Reconnaissance (2) YD 066605:
  - (i) Force Reconnaissance YD 092619:
- (b) During the night of D+3, there was no enemy contact by any units of the Battalion Landing Team.

### c: D+4-= 20 July 1966.

- (1) At first light on D+4 all Battalion Landing Team Companies resumed search and destroy operations west in their assigned TOAR's: Reconnaissance elements of Battalion Landing Team 3/5 came under the operational control of Reconnaissance Group Bravo at 0700H to perform missions as directed in support of Task Force Delta operations:
- (2) At 0645H a Company L Observation Post at YD 038622 fired on four NVA but reported no results. At 0915H Company L completed destinction of the NVA Headquarters located at YD 040620: At 0945H Company M at YD 028616 brought three NVA under fire, killing one: The others fled to the northwest:
- (3) At 1130H Company M fired on five NVA's at YD 022610; killing three; capturing two, and wounding one. This area appeared to be the site of a Regimental Command Post. Captured were two Chinese 7.62 semi-automatic rifles, one light machine gun, one M-14 rifle (serial number 520895), thirty hand grenades, fifteen boxes of ammunition; over two hundred packs, and forty to fifty lbs of documents. At 1215H Company L killed one NVA at YD 030614. At 1300H an H&S Company batrol discovered a bivouac site at YD 098619 containing propaganda materials: The area







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appeared to be a reception center for incoming NVA troops. At 1610H Company K discovered a second bivouac area containing over three hundred packs, a large quantity of equipment and mortar instruction manuals. At 1815H Company L fired on and killed two NVA (Body Count) at YD 025610, capturing two others; all were armed with hand grenades. At 0100H a patrol from Company K ambushed an estimated ten to fifteen NVA at YD 041596. A daylight search of the area revealed no confirmed KIA.

- (5) By dusk on D+4, Battalion Landing Team units were in positions as follows:
  - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
  - (b) Company I YD 062589.
  - (c) Company K YD 039594.
  - (d) Company L YD 023608.
  - (e) Company M YD 025612.
  - (f) Battery F YD. 117579.
- (6) During the night of D+4, Company L at 2105H, ambushed an NVA squad at YD 019609 resulting in three NVA KIA (Body Count), four NVA KIA (Probable), and the capture of one .50 caliber machine gun, one automatic rifle, and one anti-tank weapon.

### d. D+5 - 21 July 1966

- (1) All Battalion Landing Team companies continued their search and destroy operations west through the assigned Battalion Landing Team TAOR.
- (2) Company M at 0920H located prepared positions at YD 024618 and found TNT, C-4, blasting caps and other equipment. The areas contained two hundred or more bunkers and shelter holes, as well as a hospital and a mess hall. At 1520H, a Company K natrol at YD 038592 made contact with one NVA who withdrew under fire. At 1700H Company M discovered a Chinese Communist mine detector at YD 028618. Also at 1700H two NVA bodies and twelve graves were found in the same location. The casualties were apparently caused by artillery fire, or an earlier contact with Company L or Company M.









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- (3) By dusk on D+5, Battalion Landing Team units were in position as follows:
  - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
  - (b) Company I YD 043588.
  - (c) Company K YD 038595.
  - (d) Company L YD 010607.
  - (e) Company M YD 023612.
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.

### e. <u>D+6 - 22 July 1966</u>

- (1) Continuing search and destroy operations to the west, company M reached Hill 314 (grid square YD 0262), which intelligence sources indicated was the site of a regimental Command Post. Search revealed numerous fighting holes but no abandoned equipment. At 1300H one NVA soldier was fired on and killed at YD 024625; one 7.62mm semi-automatic rifle was recovered.
- (2) At 1545 Company M received heavy automatic weapons fire and a grenade bombardment from an estimated thrity to forty NVA in the vicinity of YD 034625. Some of the NVA were wounded, although an ARVN interpreter repeatedly demanded their surrender, resistance continued and Company M overran the position. The action resulted in twenty NVA KIA (Body Count) and one .30 caliber machine gun captured.
- (3) While evacuating wounded from this action, Company M was taken under fire from YD 034623. Returning fire, the enemy position was overrun and two NVA were killed (Body Count) and two automatic rifles captured.
- (4) At 1700H an ambush patrol of Company L fired on four NVA in the vicinity of YD 025610. Shortly thereafter a squad from Company L reinforced the patrol and continued the action. This encounter resulted in four NVA KIA (Body Count); one NVA KIA (Probable); and one 7.62mm semi-automatic rifle captured.
- (5) At 1845H near YD 026608 Company I encountered twelve to fifteen NVA with automatic weapons. Fire was returned and the enemy withdrew.

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
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- (6) Night positions on D+6 were as follows:
  - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
  - (b) Company I YD 019607.
  - (c) Company K YD 028612.
  - (d) Company L YD 005600.
  - (e) Company M YD 034623.
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.
- (7) In defensive positions at YD 005600, Company L at 2045H received ten rounds of incoming mortar fire. The firing ceased, then resumed at 2210H. At this time, Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines sighted muzzle flashes, reporting their position to Battalion Landing Team 3/5. Artillery fire directed on this target resulted in secondary explosions and cessation of the firing. Company H reported definite destruction of the mortar and three NVA KIA (Probable).

### : f. D+7 - 23 July 1966


- (1) Early on D+7 at 0040H Company M was again taken under fire from YD 034625. Fire was returned resulting in two NVA KIA (Body Count); two NVA KIA (Probable); four WIA (Confirmed); and one captured semiautomatic rifle.
- (2) At 0815H Company L fired on and killed one NVA at YD 010605; one Mauser rifle was captured.
- (3) At 1000H Company M sighted three NVA in a clearing in the vicinity of YD 033627. Friendly fire resulted in two NVA KIA (Body Count), one NVA WIA (Confirmed), and the capture of one Chinese submachine gun. At the same time Company K discovered one dead NVA at YD 025611, who apparently had died as a result of artillery or air strikes.
- (4) Company I at 1105H sighted two NVA near YD 018602. Fire was delivered, resulting in the capture of one 57mm recoilless rifle with two rounds, one NVA KIA (Body Count), one NVA WIA (Confirmed) and one NVA captive.
- (5) At 1530H Company K found one dead NVA in a stream bed, coordinates YD 029613. The soldier had died of bullet wounds and carried no weapon.











- (6) At 1555H Company I discovered a large equipment cache at YD 017607. In the immediate vicinity was one NVA soldier who surrendered when sighted. The cache contained two Chinese submachine guns; one AN/PRC-10 radio: forty-eight hand grenades; fourteen plastic gas masks; and a large store of ammunition and equipment.
- 4 (7) At 1830H an outpost from the 107mm Mortar Battery reported three to five NVA in the vicinity of YD 052624. Artillery fire scored direct hits on the NVA position, resulting in an estimated five NVA KIA (Probable).
  - (8) Night positions on D+7 were as follows:
- (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 803604. 我想,我都就没有"更多"的"那么"的"多"的"我们"的"我们"的"不是这样的"。
  - (b) Company I YD 016609.
    - (c) Company K YD 028612.

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- 2005 (d) Company Lit YD 005600.
- (e) Company M YD 034623.
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.
- ga gerên ha innata la nove i i kak (9) At 2230H Company L received sniper fire from YD 005605. Fire was returned, resulting in one NVA KIA (Body Count) and the capture of one Chinese Communist semi-automatic rifle.

### e karangan kalangan karangan kalangan pelangan kalangan karangan kalangan karangan karangan karangan karangan g. D+8 - 24 July 1966

- (1) At 0700H on D+8 Company L was approached at YD 005605 by two NVA soldiers wearing camouflaged utilities and U.S. helmets. Because of the possibility they might be Marines, the soldiers were allowed to continue their approach. The NVA opened fire and fled. One was killed, but the other was able to make good an escape.
- (2) At 1115H Company I discovered twenty-one NVA bodies near YD 016617. The bodies were 3 to 4 days old and had been found in the area of Company L's 202105H ambush.
- (3) At 1115H a patrol from the 107mm Mortar Battery encountered four NVA near an enemy bivouac site at YD 083614. They were brought under fire, but no casualties were reported. The NVA soldiers were armed with one Browning Automatic Rifle, two .30 caliber carbines, and one 9mm French submachine gun. ા મહિનાની ફાઇને એક્ટર, પ્રાપ્તિ કે તે કે કારણા દેવા, કોઇલ્ડ કાંગુ તે જો પ્રોથમ કોઇલ્ડ મોં કે કે કે કે કે કે કો ઉત્તર જોડાઈક જોના મહિના કે કે કે કે કે કે કોઇલ્ડ કોઇલ્ડ ફાઇલ્ડ કે કે કે માં કોઇલ્ડ કે કે કરે કોઇલ્ડ કોઇલ્ડ કે

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
- (4) At 1200H Company I made contact with three NVA near YD 011616 on a well used trail running north and south through the area. One NVA was killed and two were captured, along with two rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. Later, at 1215H, Company I was brought under fire in the vicinity of YD 013616. Small arms fire was received from both sides in addition to incoming mortar rounds. Preliminary interrogation of captives indicated a force of one hundred NVA positioned near Hill 314 (YD 022622); that another ninety-five were moving north 500 meters from the action; and that mortar emplacements were located near YD 015629. Company I returned fire but an accurate damage assessment was made impossible by the thick vegetation.
- (5) At 1425H Company I received mortar and automatic weapons fire while moving up a small draw at the base of Hill 362 (YD 011616). The enemy advanced as close as thirty yards, but were repulsed by intense fire from Company I.
- (6) Two hours later, air strikes were directed by Company I at YD 018623. At this time, all incoming mortar fire ceased. At 1640H Company I attempted a medical evacuation of casualties, but heavy fire forced the helicopter out of the area.
- (7) At 1705H Company I again received mortar fire and moved to positions higher on Hill 362 (YD 011617).
- (8) Moving to the assistance of Company I, Company K at 1735H made contact with thirty to forty NVA near YD 018614. Assaulting elements of Company K killed six NVA (Body Count) and three NVA (Probable).
  - (9) Night positions on D+8 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
    - (b) Company I YD 011616.
  - (c) Company K YD 018616.
    - (d) Company L YD 005600.
  - (e) Company M YD 025636.
    - (f) Battery F = YD 117579.
- (10) At 2010H artillery fire was directed at suspected mortar positions near YD 021628. Two secondary explosions were observed and incoming mortar fire eeased in Company I's positions. It is estimated that two mortars of unknown caliber were destroyed.

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- (11) At 2130H a 107mm Mortar Battery Observation Post took an estimated NVA squad under fire at YD 055606. It is estimated that three NVA were killed (Probable).
- (12) At 2335H Company M was probed at YD 025636 by five NVA. Fire was returned, resulting in an estimated two NVA KIA (Probable).

### h. D+9 -- 25 July 1966

- (1) During the early morning of D+9, Company I was continually probed by forces of an estimated two NVA reinforced companies. These probes continued until 0430H when the enemy broke contact. At 0015H, one NVA walked into the lines of Company L at coordinates YD 005605; when challenged, he ran and was killed by small arms fire. Six hand grenades were recovered, but the NVA carried no weapon.
- (2) At 0950H an air observer reported the sighting of two NVA bodies, one damaged mortar, and one rifle at YD 014627. This damage was evidently the result of artillery fire directed into this area the hight of 24 July.
- (3) At 1000H Company L encountered one NVA YD 016607. The soldier was killed and his semi-automatic rifle captured. At 4500H a patrol from Company L sighted seven NVA (YD 011612) and opened fire, killing one who was armed with three hand grenades. Later at 4630H Company L was attacked by approximately twenty NVA at YD 011616. Returning fire, Company L killed four (Body Count) with ten KIA (Probable).
- (4) At 1645H Company L received three incoming grandes of an unknown tear gas agent. The attack, which took place at YD 011617, caused only minor eye irritation which was not long lasting. Although the grande canisters were never found, it was reported that the agent was neither CS nor CN.
- (5) Company K at 1700H conducted a search of YD 018617, an area which was occupied by NVA troops the afternoon and evening of 24 July. Six bodies were discovered along with numerous blood and drag trails, indicating an additional thirty NVA KIA (Probable). A large store of equipment was captured including machine guns, submachine guns, one M-14 rifle, hand grenades, demolitions, and uniforms.
- (6) By 1715H Company I had completed a patrol search of the area around TD 011617. Fourteen NVA bodies were found, along with blood and drag trails indicating thrity-six NVA KIA (Probable).
  - (7) Night positions on D+9 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.

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- (b) Company I YD 011616.
- (c) Company K YD 011616.
  - (d) Company L YD 011616.
  - (e) Company M YD 020635.
  - (f) Battery F YD 117579.

### i. D+10 - 26 July 1966

- (1) The 11th day of the operation was relatively quiet, with contact consisting chiefly of small probes. Company M joined Companies I, K, and L in preparation for the foot novement to a newly assigned TAOR (see Tab b).
  - (2) Night positions on D+10 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post YD 083604.
    - (b) Company I YD 011616.
    - (c) Company K YD 011616.
    - (d) Company L YD 011616.
    - (e) Company M YD 011616.
    - (f) Battery F YD 117579.

### j. D+11 - 27 July 1966

- (1) Continuing to probe company positions atop Hill 362, five to six NVA attacked Company L at 0015H. The hand grenade and small arms attack was repulsed with unknown results.
- (2) After conducting intensive air strikes and artillery preparation, Companies I, K, L, and M moved by foot westward to designated positions in the new TAOR. The Battalion Landing Team Command Post displaced by helicopter.
- (3) At 0815H on the 27th Company L received sniper fire from two NVA at YD 011617. Fire was returned, resulting in one NVA KIA (Body Count) and one NVA captive. Also captured were two Chinese submachine guns.

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- (4) At 1100H Company M was approached at YD 014617 by a Montanard farmer who had been forced to work for the NVA and now wanted to surrender. He was accordingly taken prisoner and returned to higher headquarters for interrogation.
- (5) No other contact was reported during the march; night positions on D+11 were as follows:
  - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post XD 979585.
    - (b) Company I XD 989596.
  - (c) Company K XD 997595.

    (d) Company L XD 988593.
  - (e) Company M XD 995597.
- (f) Battery F XD 117579.
  - (6) At 2030H a Command Post Forward Observer reported the sighting of three small lights blinking on and off near YD 985606. As it was suspected that these lights were aiming devices for mortars, artillery was fired at the target. Two secondary explosions resulted and it is est-imated at least three NVA were killed.

### k. D+12 - 28 July 1966

- (1) The following companies conducted search and destroy operations against NVA Forces in the grid squares indicated:
  - (a) Company K XD 9760.
  - (b) Company L XD 966C.
  - (c) Company M XC 9860, XD 9960, and XD 0060.
- (2) At 1215H Company M found a cache at XD 999593 of enemy equipment as follows: one machine gun barrel case, one bayonet scabbard, one map case, four blankets, six ponchos, forty-one sweat shirts, twelve sets of khaki uniforms, six undershirts, twelve drawers, four pairs of socks, five rice bags, five hammocks, two pairs of sneakers, one canteen, one ammo magazine with one hundred fifty 7.62 rounds, forty feet detonating cord, and two hundred pounds of TNT. The area had four defensive holes but was unoccupied.





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- (3) At 1315H Company M found another cache at XD 999593 which included fourteen sweat shirts, eighty-four trousers, eighty-one khaki shirts, nine hand grenades, thrity hammocks, five bags medical supplies and forty drawers. The area had been used for one or two days before discovery.
- (4) At 1400H Company K received ten to twenty rounds of sniper fire in the vicinity of XD 987592 from three or four NVA. Company K returned the fire with unknown results; enemy fire ceased.
- (5) At 1605H Company L made contact with four or five NVA snipers at XD 965603. Artillery was directed against this location. A search of the area revealed no trace of the enemy.
- (6) At 1815H Company I moved into the Battalion Command Post area to provide Command Post security and assume the mission of Battalion Reserve.
  - (7) Night positions on D+12 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post XD 979505.
    - (b) Company I XD 979585.
      - (c) Company K XD 987592.
      - (d) Company L XD 985594.
      - (e) Company M XD 994598.
      - (f) Battery F YD 117579.

### 1. D+13 - 29 July 1966


- (1) At 0915H Company K (the lead element) commenced movement toward Landing Zone BLUEJAY (vicinity XD 983563) for subsequent helilift to USS PRINCETON. Other units following in trace were elements of H&S Company, and the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Motor Transport Battalion. Company I provided rear security on the march. The helilift was completed by 1610H.
- (2) Battery F commenced helift from vicinity YD 117579 at 0900H to USS PRINCETON and were transported by boat from PRINCETON to USS ALAMO.
- (3) During the afternoon the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, and Companies I and K were transported by boat from the USS PRINCETON to assigned shipping.

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(4) At 1227H a patrol from Company M sighted twenty-five to thirty NVA at XD 989613 digging a mortar position and a 50 caliber machine gun position. An artillery mission was conducted followed by an air strike; four direct napalm and six 500 pound bomb hits were delivered. Estimate, fifteen NVA KIA (Probable), one 82mm mortar destroyed and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed (Probable).

- (5) During a search conducted by Company M a trail eight to tenfect wide was discovered in the general area of grid squares XD 0161 to 9661; it was noted that tall trees were culled and lashed together to complete the jungle canopy over the trail. The trail showed signs of frequent use. The trail extended the length of the ridge line and had communications were installed throughout its length:
  - (6) Night positions on D+13 were as follows:
    - (a) Battalion Landing Team Command Post XD 979585.
    - (b) Company L XD 985594.
    - (c) Company M XD 987591.

### m. <u>D+14 - 30 July 1966</u>

- (1) At 0830H on D+14, Companies L and M and the remainder of H&S Company commenced movement toward Landing Zone BLUEJAY (XD 985562): Helicopters lifted the first elements of Company M at 1305H; and by 1530H all units of Battalion Landing Team 3/5 were aboard assigned shipping.
- (2) The Special Landing Force reverted to the operational control of Commander Task Group 76.5 at 1515H.

### 6. Results

### a. Enemy

- (1) The following is an assessment of NVA personnel casualties inflicted by Battalion Landing Team 3/5:
  - (a) NVA KIA (Body Count) 155.
  - (b) NVA KTA (Probable) = 167.
  - (c) NVA WIA (Confirmed) 12.
  - (d) NVA WIA (Possible) 45.









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- (e) NVA CAPTIVE 7. (2 died of wounds after interrogation)
- (2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured and/or destroyed by Battalion Landing Team 3/5:
  - (a) 47 Soviet 7.62 Assault Rifle AK-47.
  - (b) 7 Mauser Chinat 7.62.
  - (c) 2 Soviet RP6 Gernade Launchers.
  - (d)  $2 US_{M-14}$  Rifles.
  - (e) 3 .30 caliber Machine Guns.
  - (f) 2 .50 caliber Machine Guns.
  - (g) 2 Soviet Carbine, M1944.
  - (h) 22 Soviet 7.62 Carbine SKS.
  - (i) 3 Soviet RPD 7.62 light Machine Guns.
  - (j) 2 57mm Recoiless Rifles.
  - (k) 2 US M-3 .45 caliber Submachine Guns.
  - (1) 1 Mine Detector, VIM203.
  - (m) 3 82mm Mortars.
  - (n) 1 12.7mm Heavy Machine Guns.
  - (o) 28,553 Rounds, small arms ammunition.
  - (p) 9,700 Rounds, 12.7mm ammunition.
  - (q) 369 Hand gernades.
  - (r) 6 spare .30 caliber Machine Gun barrels.
  - (s) 75 Entrenching tools.
  - (t) 1,020 Electric blasting caps.
  - (u) 132 Pounds TNT.







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- (v) 1 AN/PRC-10 Radio
- (w) 1 Field Phone
- (x) 21 82mm Mortar Rounds
- (y) 17 60mm Mortar Rounds
- (z) 22 LAWS
- (aa) 1 Claymore mine
- (bb) 5 -Anti Tank Rockets
- (cc) 235 Yards Comm wire
- (dd) 898 Khaki uniform shirts
- (ee) 853 Khaki uniform trousers
- (ff) 810 Packs with equipment
- (gg) 443 Shelter halfs
- (hh) 297 Pair "Ho Chi Minh " sandals
- (ii) 41 Pair Sneakers
- (jj) 269 Machete Knives
- (kk) 10 Map cases
- (11) 114 Mosquito nets
- (mm) 88 Pressure-pull type fuses.
- (nn) 223 Ponchos.
- (oo) 55 Pounds medical supplies.
- (pp) 76 Canteens.
- (qq) 33 Crenade pouches.
- (rr) 32 Cooking pots.
- (ss) 11 57mm Recoilless Rifle rounds.





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- (tt) 28 Gas masks.
- (uu) 7 Canvas weapon bags (82mm mortar).
- (vv) 3 Helmets.
- (ww) 173 Hammocks
- (xx) 1 Splicer.
- (yy) 1 Crimper.
- (zz) 1 Hand drill.
- (aaa) 15 Antitank mines.
- (bbb) 450 pounds documents, diaries, and letters.

### b. Friendly

- (1) Casualties sustained by Battalion Landing Team 3/5 are summarized below:
  - (a) Killed in Action 48.
    - Gunshot 42.
    - 2 Shrapnel 6.
  - (b) Died of Wounds 3.
    - 1 Gunshot 2.
    - 2 Shrapnel 1.
  - (c) Wounded in Action 162.
    - 1 Gunshot 25.
    - 2 Shrapnel 137.
  - (d) Deaths, Non-Battle 2.
    - 1 Shrapnel 1.
    - 2 Malaria 1.
  - (e) Non-Battle Casualties 98.
    - <u>l</u> Heat 20.
    - 2 Injuries and Miscellaneous 78.

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