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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/CBW/plb
3121
9 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1
(b) 5th Marines Frp Order 45-67

Encl: Operations Description

1. Code Name. Operation CALHOUN
2. Date of Operation. 250600H June 1967 to 011200H July 1967
3. Location. Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization
5. Task Organization

3rd Bn (-) (rein), 5th Marines

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
Det, 1st Eng Bn
Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co I (rein)

Capt E. M. BURKE

Co I
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plt
Det, 81mm Mort Plt (FO Tm)
Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)
Det, Int Sect (Scouts and Chieu Hoi)
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (FO Tm)
Det, 1st Eng Bn
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

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Enclosure (1)

25 Jun - 1 July 67

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Co L (rein)

Capt. H. D. PETTENGILL

Co L

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plat

Det, 81mm Mort Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Comm Plat (FAC Tm)

Det, Int Sect (Scouts, Interpreter and Chieu Hoi)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, 1st Eng Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

3rd Plat, Co B, 1st Eng Bn

2ndLt J. B. MILLS

2nd Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn

2ndLt R. G. WILLIAMS

1stLt R. W. BAXTER

Battalion Reserve

Co K (-) (rein)

2ndLt J. C. GRACIDA

Capt W. R. TENNEY

Co K (-)

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plat

Det, 81mm Mort Plat (FO Tm)

Det, Comm Plat (FAC Tm)

Det, Int Sect (Scouts and Kit Carson Scout)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, 1st Eng Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Det, Hq Co, 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery

(1) During the course of Operation CALHOUN, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received artillery support from one battery. Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support throughout the Operation. At no time during the course of the Operation was the Battalion without artillery support.

(2) Artillery was used to prepare Battalion and Company Objectives and routes of advance. Preparation fires were effective and timely.

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b. Air

(1) Operation CALHOUN took place inclusively from 25 June 1967 to 1 July 1967. There were no periods during the Operation where weather was a deterrent to utilization of close air support.

(2) Fixed wing support was used very little during the Operation due to the lack of contact. One fixed wing air strike was run in support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on 26 June 1967.

(3) Airborne observers were utilized effectively during the Operation for visual reconnaissance of the operation area.

(4) The AN/PRC-25 was used exclusively for communications and proved to be a very reliable unit.

7. Intelligence

a. The enemy forces anticipated on Operation CALHOUN were primarily local force units with some possibility of finding elements of 2nd NVA Division ~~Eng~~ in the mountain area vicinity of BT 0143. No other specific enemy units were identified as operating in the area though increasing activity had been noticed during the last 30 day period.

b. A small contact on the first day of the Operation resulted in the finding of numerous documents. One military document mentioned the GK 32nd unit which is a recoilless rifle battalion and another named the 620th unit, part of the 2nd NVA Division, which was working in the area. Later on that same day an underground hospital was found at BT 024403. It consisted of one main room (4' X 5' X 50') and three others measuring 5' X 5' X 15'. There were twenty (20) beds found in the cave plus numerous medical supplies. On 26 June 1967 a large cave was found at BT 015404 measuring 4' X 15' X 30'. Ten (10) uniforms were found inside and hidden near the mouth of the cave were 18-82mm mortar rounds and 20-75mm recoilless rifle rounds. Another cave was found on 27 June at BT 032378. It measured 5' X 10' X 80' and contained twenty (20) beds. The villagers in the area said the VC travelling through the area would often stop and use it for a resting place. Hidden rice in large quantities was found in numerous hiding places as were items of enemy uniforms and equipment. During the Operation occasional sniper fire and some small scale probing were encountered.

c. The objective area for the Operation was Base area 116; the 3/5 sector, moving NW out of Qua Son (BT 0334), was the valley and hill area at BT 985355, then turning NE, the mountain area in the vicinity of BT 0241. In this area an arc light strike zone was examined and the area was heavily searched and patrolled. The latter part of the Operation was spent

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reversing direction and sweeping the same valley back into dense shrubs and 20 foot canopy spread over the area. Many well used trails covered the area, however very few civilians were encountered in the operational area.

d. The few Vietnamese civilians that were seen and questioned freely volunteered information concerning VC movements in the area. Because of the lack of people in the area civic action efforts were at a minimum. Some psychological warfare was employed through the Battalion's Kit Carson Scout and Chieu Hois who spoke to the civilians and explained the merits of the GVN program.

8. Mission

During the conduct of Operation CALHOUN, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission of thoroughly and methodically searching the assigned objective area to locate enemy personnel, installations, and supply and equipment caches.

9. Concept of Operations

At 242300H June 1967, three Companies I, K (-) and L, and the Alpha Command Group left the 1/5 Combat Base (BT 024346) and moved on foot along the LOD (main trail running from AT 988360 to BT 026397) crossing it at 250600H June 1967. Patrol bases were subsequently established in assigned zone to facilitate accomplishment of the assigned mission.

10. Execution

a. 24 June 1967

(1) At 241700H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the 5th Marine's Operation Order for Operation CALHOUN.

(2) At 242300H all units left the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base (BT 024346) and moved into position to cross the LOD at H-hour (250600H).

b. 25 June 1967

(1) At 250155H Company I's point encountered one VC on the trail at BT 003374 wearing a pack. The Marines fired at and killed the VC. While searching the area noises were heard in the bushes. Marines fired into the bushes and threw 4 grenades. A search of the area revealed two more VC bodies, two Chicom grenades, three packs, two cartridge belts, two carbine magazines and documents. Documents taken from one of the enemy dead mentioned the GK 32 and the 620th unit. The GK 32 was later found to be a weapons sub-unit of the RQ 22nd Battalion which is reported to have twelve 75mm recoilless rifles as part of its armament.

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- (2) At 250500H the lead elements arrived at the LOD (BT 022333).
- (3) At 250600H lead elements crossed the LOD.
- (4) At 250930H all units arrived at the following patrol base positions and commenced patrolling their assigned areas:

- (a) Command Group and Company K - BT 026408
- (b) Company I - BT 017404
- (c) Company L - BT 025410

(5) At 251130H Company I found 1000 pounds of rice in large containers at BT 023395. Rice was burned.

(6) At 251330H Company I found an underground hospital cave network at BT 014403. The main cave measured 4' X 5' X 50' and three side rooms measured 5' X 5' X 15'. The hospital contained 20 beds and the following items: 8-8oz powder bottles, 21 one quart urns of powder, 7 empty penecilin bottles, 5 gauze rolls, 5 medicine packets, 3 tubes of medicine and 1 small powder can. The medicine was manufactured by Vietnamese and French firms. The following items were also found in the cave complex: 250 pounds of rice, 10 pairs of black PJs, one blue uniform, one gun case for a caliber .50 machinegun and 7 rounds of Chicom 7.62mm ammunition. A sample of each medicine was forwarded to the S-2, 5th Marines and all other items were destroyed. The cave complex was blown by the engineers the next day.

(7) At 251400H Company K found one hut (BT 030410) with no people living in it. The hut contained six bushels of rice, four bushels of mushrooms, 15 pounds of salt, one half bushel of dried fruit, one half bushel of tobacco, one quart of kerosene and one quart of oil. The contents were destroyed in the hut.

(8) At 251830H a message was received from a recon insert stating that they had spotted numerous people vicinity BT 0339 moving west. No action taken because of inability to positively identify as VC.

(9) At 251840H a message was received from a recon insert stating that they had spotted VC at BT 043394 moving northeast and carrying something that looked like a mortar. 81mm mortar mission fired. Search of area revealed negative results.

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(10) At nightfall all units were located at their combat bases as described earlier. The limit of search for 25 June was as follows:

(a) Company I to BT 013409

(b) Company L to Bt 019415

(11) At 25235H Company I (BT 017404) spotted six to eight VC approximately 50 meters in front of their perimeter. Marines opened fire with approximately 150 rounds SA and 2 grenades. VC returned approximately 50 rounds automatic fire. The Marines heard moans from the automatic weapons positions after the firing had ceased. The area was searched at first light and two heavy blood trails were found. Results were 2 VC KIA (probable).

c. 26 June 1967

(1) At first light all units initiated patrols in assigned areas.

(2) At 260620H Company I (BT 018402) found a VCS male hiding between some rocks in the vicinity of the previous night's probe. Found with him were 8 pounds of rice, three sets of Vietnamese clothing made of parachute material, a cigarette lighter with a 403 insignia on the side, a plastic tube of powder and some dried fruit. The VCS was forwarded to the 5th Marines.

(3) At 260730H Company I found a 64 year old man hiding in a cave at BT 014404. With him were found 4 sets of black PJs, three bags of rice and one bottle of liquid aspirin. The VCS was forwarded to the 5th Marines.

(4) Between 261000H and 261800H Company L patrols located the following:

(a) 200 pounds of rice at BT 021408.

(b) VC rest area at BT 020414 which contained old camouflage and the remains of old cooking fires. Rest area had not been used for sometime.

(c) Camp site at BT 023405 with hot food still on a small fire.

(5) At 261130H Company I (BT 034413) spotted 6 VC running down a trail (BT 038412) 500 meters away. One VC was carrying a BAR, another

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was carrying a carbine. Company I opened fire with 100 rounds of SA, two M-79 rounds and called in an artillery mission and an air strike. Conducted a search of the area finding 500 pounds of rice, 4 bushels of potatoes, an NVA sweatshirt, assorted documents, clothing, and medical supplies.

(6) At 261345H Company I's Chieu Hoi found a large camouflaged basket containing 600 pounds of rice at BT 017404.

(7) At 261700H Company I found a cave at BT 015404. Cave was 4' X 15' X 30' with five bamboo beds, six sets of black PJs, and four khaki uniforms in it. Outside the cave Company I found 18 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, (3 Chicom make, the rest Russian), 20 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition with K3 markings on the projectile nose, one very rusty pump shotgun, one pack, one gas mask, and assorted papers. Four of the mortar rounds, one recoilless rifle round and all intelligence items were forwarded to the 5th Marines. The rest were destroyed.

(8) The limits of the day's search were as follows:

(a) Company I - BT 006403

(b) Company K - BT 044413

(c) Company L - BT 014421

d. 27 June 1967

(1) At first light all units initiated patrols to continue search of assigned areas.

(2) At 270630H Company I moved it's patrol base from BT 017404 of assigned areas.

(3) At 270925H Company L found a small cave at BT 023408. It contained 75 dishes, a few cooking pots, carpenter tools, many chop sticks clothing and some papers. Samples of all items were forwarded to 5th Marines; the rest were destroyed.

(4) At 271000H Company K found a tunnel entrance 15' underground. The entrance was 4' X 5' X 50' and lead into a main room which measured 5' X 10' X 80'. Inside were 20 beds. Company K's Kit Carson Scout questioned the villagers learning that 30 VC had stayed in the cave the previous night and had headed south at 270600H. VC were armed with rifles, carbines and Thompson SMGs. 2000 pounds of rice were found just outside the cave. The cave and rice were destroyed.

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(5) At 271105H Company L reached the limit of search on its route of reconnaissance (route WINTER at BT 017430) with negative results.

(6) At 271115H Company K (BT 032398) spotted six VC wearing black and white PJs (BT 027397) running into a dirt cave or bunker. An artillery mission was called on the enemy position. A search of the area was conducted with negative results.

(7) At 271500H Company K (BT 038404) found two HLZs, each measuring 40 meters by 40 meters covered with 6' tall helicopter punji sticks. No booby traps were found. All punji sticks were taken down and burned.

(8) At 271845H Company K (BT 026408) spotted a column of 12 VC moving west into a treeline (BT 050395) where they were joining 7 more VC. At least one VC had a weapon. Three artillery missions were called in. A company K OP saw 6 VC being dragged away. Another VC crawled out of the bushes and collapsed. The artillery caused one large secondary explosion. Results were 7 VC KIA (probable).

(9) At nightfall all units were located as previously reported.

(10) At 272300H Company I (BT 015408) spotted 1 VC in black PJs moving in the stream bed at BT 014407. Company I fired 20 rounds of SA and two M-79 rounds. The area was searched with negative results.

c. 28 June 1967

(1) At first light all units initiated patrols to continue search of their assigned areas.

(2) At 281025H Company L (BT 034420) received approximately 50 rounds of automatic weapons fire from an estimated 2 VC (BT 031422) wearing black PJs. Company L's Scout-Sniper returned one round and 1 VC fell. Called in an artillery mission with excellent coverage of target. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed).

(3) At 281400H Company L searched three villages at the following coordinates: Bt 046419, BT 044413, and BT 042413. In each, approximately 20 women and children and no men were found. The women stated that the men had left three days ago. Found ten VC gas masks, 1000 pounds of rice and some VC papers. The huts in which the above were found were burned and four secondary explosions occurred. Papers and gas masks were forwarded to the 5th Marines.

(4) At nightfall all unit CPs were located as previously reported. The limits of search for 28 June were as follows:

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- (a) Company I - BT 002418
- (b) Company K - BT 022396
- (c) Company L - BT 049416

This completed the search mission of routes of reconnaissance FALL and WINTER plus thorough coverage of the area to the east.

f. 29 June 1967

(1) At 290730H all units departed their patrol bases to conduct S&D operations enroute to the consolidation point at BT 022395.

(2) At 201100H all units arrived at the consolidation point.

(3) At 291330H all units moved out from the consolidation point to conduct S&D operations enroute to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' Combat Base.

(4) At 291700H all units arrived at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' Combat Base, and established the following positions:

- (a) Command Group - BT 023346
- (b) Company I - BT 021345
- (c) Company K - BT 023345
- (d) Company L - BT 024347
- (e) Company M - BT 025345

g. 30 June 1967

(1) All units conducted limited patrolling to secure the local area.

(2) At nightfall all units were located as previously reported.

h. 1 July 1967

(1) All units conducted limited patrolling to maintain security of the local area.

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(2) At 010730H Company M heli-lifted to Thang Binh (BT 165413) to provide security for Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. 5th Marines assumed OPCON of Company M.

(3) At 010830H Company K was heli-lifted to Hill #29 (BT 226320) to provide security for the 5th Marines CP and a detachment of the 9th Engineer Battalion repairing Highway #1. 5th Marines assumed OPCON of Company K.

(4) At 011200H Operation CALHOUN WAS secured.

11. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted:

- (a) VC KIA (confirmed) - 4
- (b) VC KIA (probable) - 10
- (c) VCS - 3

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed:

- (a) Shotgun (captured) - 1
- (b) 75mm RR rounds - 20
- (c) 82mm mortar rounds - 18
- (d) Rounds of small arms ammunition - 75
- (e) Medical supplies - 27 lbs
- (f) Documents - 4 lbs
- (g) Rice - 4,452 lbs

b. Friendly

No combat casualties were sustained throughout the Operation.

12. Administration

a. Resupply

(1) Resupply was accomplished from the Logistical Support Area at Tam Ky.

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(2) Normal resupply was accomplished every other day. Emergency resupply was accomplished when requested.

(3) The HST net was used as a logistical, administrative and helicopter control net.

(4) Availability of helicopters was a controlling factor but overall support was excellent.

b. Maintenance. Maintenance of equipment was accomplished in the field where possible. Replacement of defective equipment was accomplished through the LSA.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization

(1) Evacuation of personnel was accomplished smoothly and usually in a minimum of time. Again, availability of helicopters was a determining factor.

(2) Evacuees were removed expediently from the field and excellent care was received throughout the evacuation chain.

d. Transportation. No problems were encountered with transportation. Replacement and special supplies were transported by truck to the LSA. All resupplies and replacements were delivered to the field by helicopter from the LSA.

e. Communications

(1) The AN/PRC-25 is outstanding FM radio equipment. Except for the AN/PRC-41 used by the ALO and FAC teams, battalion communications were accomplished with the AN/PRC-25.

(2) The RC-292, less AB-125, was used in poor terrain to extend the range and power of the AN/PRC-25. It proved to be quite adequate.

f. Medical Evacuation

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|
| (1) Total number of medical evacuees | - 7 |
| (2) Killed in Action | - 0 |
| (3) Wounded in Action | - 0 |
| (4) Wounded in Action non-evac | - 0 |
| (5) Non-Combat deaths | - 0 |

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(6) Non-Combat injuries - 7

13. Special Equipment and Techniques

a. Scout sniper teams again proved to be a valuable asset when used to engage the enemy at long ranges.

b. The Kit Carson Scouts was most effective in finding hidden VC ammunition, rice, and equipment during this Operation. Their knowledge of VC methods and cache marking were invaluable in uncovering concealed positions.

c. The shaped charge is not as effective in blowing cave complexes as is the cratering charge; both were used during the Operation.

14. Commander's Analysis. Operation CALHOUN was relatively successful in finding a variety of small hidden Viet Cong havens and caches. Enough time was given to accomplish a detailed search and destroy mission and the results evidenced this time allowance. All of the searching was tedious and executed under very hot climatic conditions and in rugged terrain. Base area 116 (3/5 sector) did not produce any large enemy findings and an obvious lack of enemy troop activity was evident throughout this Operation which may have been the result of a previous week's Operation through the same vicinity. Most of the findings were at the lower mountain levels, predominantly in ravines and gulleys. Rice growing in the area was located at high elevations, terraced and well cultivated indicating probable cultivation by local VC. The mission given was accomplished and effective denial of harboring sites in the area of operations was accomplished as well as destruction of moderate quantities of enemy ammunition, food, and equipment.

15. Recommendations. That this type operation be instituted following a fast pursuit or sweep type operation through areas where large enemy emplacements and caches are known to exist and where deliberate searches have hitherto been unfeasible.


C. B. WEBSTER

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9 July 1967Operation Description for Operation CALHOUN

1. The concept of Operation CALHOUN was for the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines to establish a series of company patrol bases and then thoroughly search out two routes of reconnaissance named FALL and WINTER. FALL extended from BT 023410 up the draw to the North and then along the trail to BT 005426. Winter extended from BT 005426 SE to BT 021403.

2. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was operating to the Southwest of a line extending from BT 014398 to AT 987418. The 1st AVN Rangers were operating in the valley in the vicinity of AT 910380. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was operating to the Northwest over the mountain range. Elements of the 1st and 7th Marines were operating to the North across the mountains. The SLF (2nd Bn, 3rd Marines) was operating to the Northeast.

3. The mission for WINTER was accomplished a day early. Permission was requested and granted to conduct S&D operations to the east of WINTER to and including the valley in the vicinity of BT 048415.

4. While FALL and WINTER were being thoroughly searched, a company (-) was dispatched each day to conduct S&D operations between the 410 E-W grid line and the 395 E-W grid line and between the 020 and 050 N-S grid lines.

5. Operation CALHOUN was designed to reconnoiter and uncover Viet Cong arms and supply caches in the area known as Base area 116. In this respect, operations of this Command within assigned zone were successful.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
San Francisco, California 96602

3/ESP/dab
3121
31 July

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines (Attn: S-3)
Subj: Operational Summary (Period 25-26 July 1967)
Ref: (a) 5th Marines Frag Order 14-67

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay

1. Background. This Battalion received reference (a) on 24 July 1967 assigning it the mission of conducting a joint USMC/VN Regional Force cordon and sweep, limited objective operation on the Phuoc An/Tra Dea Hamlet/market complex (grid squares BT 2143, 2144, 2243, 2244); time frame was approximately 48 hours.

2. Sequence of Events

a. 242400H - Companies I and L, a platoon of tanks, and the Battalion CP Group departed Hill 63 Combat Base and moved to LOD on Highway 1. No enemy contact was made enroute.

b. 250200H - Company L arrived at jump-off point on LOD and held position. (BT 166433)

c. 250300H - Company I, CP and tanks arrived at Thang Binh jump-off point (BT 176419). Regional Force troops were met and joined. Regional Forces and 1 platoon of Company I moved south to their jump-off point on LOD (BT 190399).

d. 250500H - (H-Hour) All units crossed LOD attacking generally east toward objective area.

e. 250630H - Company C - 1/5 was heli-lifted into objective area (BT 2344) to begin its sweep.

f. 250700H - Company I (-) and the Alpha Command Group reached their position at BT 204434. One platoon of Company I was working jointly with 2 platoons of RF's, assumed blocking position at BT 208430 northeast to BT 212435. Company L moved east across the high dike and heavy hedgerow area (BT 1844 and 1944).

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g. 250800H - Company L at BT 18644 picked up a VN male with an ID card. The detainee informed Company L he saw two VC squads pass through the area at daybreak. They were moving east.

h. 250820H - Company L made contact with an estimated 50 to 100 man VC unit just east of their last position. The Company maneuvered well until engaged by heavy automatic weapon fire. An AO was on station and assisted by calling in air strikes continuously for thirty (30) minutes. The VC broke contact and fled in an easterly direction. Observation by an AO indicated they were carrying and dragging bodies. No assessment of damage or casualties were made at that time. A limited search of the area was conducted by Company L and heavy blood trails and one wounded VC, who later was medevac'd, was found in the area. The remainder of the day Companies L and C continued to search hamlets in their assigned areas. The results follow in the intelligence summary.

i. 251900H - Company I was joined by their third platoon and the RF's in setting up a night perimeter defense for the CP and tanks at BT 206432. Company L set in their night position at BT 203438 and Company CI/5 set in at BT 209441. All units conducted local security patrols during the night. Enemy contact was negligible except for occasional sniper rounds.

j. 260630H - Companies L and C jumped off on a search and destroy mission northeast to BT 205455 then turned and swept west to gate L. An AO on station in the area, called in an air strike on a position at 203454. Company C swept the area and found one VC body, many pieces blood-soaked clothing and blood trails leading from the area. Also captured at this time was one (1) M-60 machine-gun with 400 rounds of linked 7.62 ammunition, one (1) M-16 rifle with two magazines of 20 rounds each of 5.56 ammunition, and a damaged first-aid stretcher.

k. 260830H - Company C encountered two VC filling canteens at a water hole, when they challenged two more run across a rice-paddy dike, they challenged then opened fire killing one (1) VC confirmed and three (3) probable. They captured two CS grenades. Details to follow on intelligence summary.

l. 260830H - The CP, Company I, tanks and the RF's after waiting for Companies L and C to make their turn toward Highway 1 moved west from their position down the main access road to Thang Binh. After releasing the RF's the column continued into the combat base on Hill 63.

m. 261500H - Company C was heli-lifted to Que Son and LPCON returned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

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3. SUMMARY

Operation "No Name I" resulted in 11 VC KIA (confirmed), 29 VC KIA (probable), 11 detainees and 2 weapons captured, one a M-60 LMG and one (1) M-16 rifle, both were in operable condition.

By the tactics employed against us, that of, hit and run by small units, sniper fire, and the small unit sightings, it is quite evident that the units engaged were Main and local Force VC as opposed to regular NVA units.

The area covered revealed the people to be very hostile to Marine units. There was no cooperation, and a general harboring of all information concerning VC activities.

Aerial observation, rotary and fixed wing support for the operation were excellent. All air strikes were controlled by a tactical air controller (airborne). Fixed wing support commenced at 250615H with a bombing prep of the area adjacent to the LZ prior to the heli-borne operation at BT 232438.

Close air and direct air support missions were flown in support of the operation on both 25 and 26 July. AO support was outstanding in aerial observation and air strike control.

Forstrot Battery (2/11) was in direct support of the operation and fired both observed and unobserved fires. An artillery prep was fired in support of the heli-borne landing on the morning of 25 July. There was excellent target coverage.

The primary means of communication was the AN/PRC-25 and once again it proved to be highly effective and praiseworthy. The AN/PRC/41 was of very little use due to faulty batteries, this coupled with the heavy FM traffic resulted in an inability to obtain proper bomb damage assessment.

4. ANALYSIS. While no real VC traffic was uncovered in the objective area, the operation did provide an excellent area reconnaissance for the Battalion. It accomplished some destruction of local enemies, and gave new unit leaders experience in unit maneuvers and tank-infantry coordination. The night movement went smoothly and the objective area was well covered by sweep forces.

E. S. PIPER Jr.
By direction

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3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES 231800H
ANNEX A TO MEG ORDER 14-67 (OPERATIONS OVERLAY)



HEADQUARTERS
 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/PES/tfs
 3121
 31 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines (Attn: S-3)
 Subj: Operational Summary (Period 29-30 July 1967)
 Ref: (a) 5th Marines Frag Order 54-67

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay

1. Background. Reference (a) was received on 28 July 1967 assigning a Battalion (-) combat patrol/escort mission to deliver 2 self propelled 155 guns and one bulldozer at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines combat base at Que Son; time frame was approximately 36 hours.

2. Sequence of Events

a. 290400 - Companies I and L, a security platoon from K, and the Battalion CP group with 2 SP 155 guns and bulldozer from 2/11 departed Hill 63 combat base and moved by road to the LOD. No enemy contact was made enroute.

b. 290600 - Lead elements crossed LOD.

c. 290645 - Company I observed a force of 50 VC with weapons and packs moving in column in grid square 0942 towards the NW. Artillery mission was called in by AO on station. Company I secured objective 1A.

d. 290730 - Company L secured objective 1A. No enemy contact encountered.

e. 290800 - CP crossed checkpoint 1.

f. 290830 - CP crossed checkpoint 2.

g. 290930 - Company L secured objective 1C. CP crossed checkpoint 4.

h. 291105 - CP reached checkpoint 5. Company L secured objective 1D. Company I secured objective 1C.

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- i. 291200H - Company I secured objective ID. CP crossed checkpoint 6.
- j. 291215H - Engineers blew a 105 dud at BT 082390.
- k. 291400H - CP crossed checkpoint 7. Column stopped in hamlet at BT 064366 to care for 3 minor heat cases. A small MED-CAP program of treating minor injuries and sores was held.
- l. 291410H - Company L received 20 rounds sniper fire from VC w/grey uniform and carbine. Returned 60 rounds S/A and M-60 rounds.
- m. 291700H - CP and Companies I and L set up a night patrol base camp at BT 047338. Local ambush and security patrols were conducted in coordination with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
- n. 300600H - Commenced heli-lift to Hill #63. Heli-lift completed at 301145H.

3. SUMMARY

3/5 (-) (Rein) left Hill 63 and crossed the LOD at 290600H to escort two 155SP Howitzers to Que Son also one bulldozer. Enemy contact was limited to one sighting of 50 VC. AO called an artillery mission. Company I searched the area and found 5 VC KIA (confirmed) and 5 VC KIA (probable) based upon the blood trails and drag marks leading from the area.

The remainder of the contact was sniper fire. Company L had two VC confirmed KIA who sniped at the company. They were killed by 3.5 rocket fire. They were dressed in black PJ's and also found near the bodies were two M-26 grenades and the empty cartridge cases from 5 caliber .30 rounds.

At 291700H after delivering the SP's and dozer to Que Son, the 3/5 CP, Company I and L plus attachments set up a patrol base camp at BT 047338.

The 3/5 (-) (Rein) heli-lifted from Que Son to Hill 63 commencing 301030H, the last chopper set down at 301130H.

It is of interest that moving down the main access road between Hill 63 and Que Son, the column encountered twenty sets of vehicle traps. Most consisted of 8 railroad ties buried perpendicular in the road bed about six feet deep; there were ditches intersecting the road approximately six feet deep and six to eight feet wide. These traps created no particular problem since they were easy to bypass or bulldoze for easy passage. It will be considerably more difficult to traverse this same road in the monsoon season.

Total enemy casualties - 7 VC KIA (confirmed), 5 VC KIA (probable). Engineers blew a 500lb bomb and a 105 Howitzer round, both duds were very close to the road but neither was booby trapped.

4. ANALYSIS. Mission Accomplished.


E. S. PIPER, Jr.
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280900H



OPERATIONS OVERLAY
OPERATION NO-NAME II

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