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HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

FP0 San Francisco, California 96602

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3/PES/plb

5750

00314-67

10 September 1967

Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)  
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines (Rein)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 010001H Aug67 to 312400H Aug67

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A  
(b) FMF PacO 5750.8  
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology Report  
✓(2) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Combat After Action Report, Operation PIKE  
✓(3) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Combat After Action Report, Operation COCHISE

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), the Command Chronology for the month of August with enclosures (1), (2) and (3) is hereby submitted.

*B. R. Cummins*  
B. R. CUMMINS  
By direction

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1st Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

010000H Aug67 to 312400H Aug67

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PART I


## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>1. DESIGNATION</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>PERIOD OCCUPIED</u>
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol C. B. WEBSTER	27May67
SUBORDINATE UNITS		
H&S Company	Capt J. A. SPEICHER	4July67
Company "I"	Capt F. M. BURKE	18June67
Company "K"	Capt J. R. TENNEY	25May67
Company "L"	Capt H. J. KOLAWOWSKI	4July67
Company "M"	1stLt J. D. MURRAY	1July67
STAFF OFFICERS		
Exec 0	Maj B. R. CUMMINS	22Apr67
S-1/Adjutant	2ndLt G. E. OWSLEY 2ndLt J. W. HORTON	4July67-7Aug67 since 8Aug67
S-2	1stLt D. R. DUNAGAN	2July67
S-3	Maj E. S. PIPER, Jr Maj P. E. SHAW	16Nov66-4Aug67 since 5Aug67
S-4	1stLt W. W. KING	19May67
S-5	1stLt G. E. OWSLEY	8Aug67

## AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u> 41	<u>ENL</u> 1081	<u>OFF</u> 3	<u>ENL</u> 56

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## PART II

## NARRATIVE SUMMARY

There currently exists in the command the need for a Captain 0402. At present the billet is being filled by a Lt 0302. First Sergeants are assigned in all companies and a First Sergeant is currently the Battalion Sergeant Major. A serious shortage exists in the staff sergeant rank, however, in most cases they are adequately filled by Sergeants.

During the period October through December this Battalion will experience the loss of 9 officers. The Battalion Executive Officer in October, two Company Commanders, an S-3 Liason Officer, and the Air Liason Officer in November; the S-4 Officer, the Adjutant, the Assistant Adjutant, and a Company Executive Officer in December.

The intelligence collection and dissemination effort in the AO has developed well beyond initial expectations. Aggressive information is being accomplished by small unit patrols. Debriefing of the patrols by intelligence section and dissemination of the evaluated and processed information to subsequent patrols and units has led to excellent ground coverage and denial of an advantage to the enemy.

The Battalion has completed Operation PIKE (1Aug-3 Aug67) and Operation COCHISE (11Aug-28Aug67). (Enclosures (2) and (3)).

Bunker materials and lensatic compasses are critically short. The Battalions portion of Hill 63 is prepared to receive prefabricated bunkers for defensive positions. An area has been reserved for future construction of a Combat Operation Center bunker.

The Battalion is operating with approximately 25% of required compasses. All formal and informal attempts to alleviate the shortage have failed.

At the present time there are no major communication problems.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Topicsa. Personnel and Administration

(1) The Battalion began the month of August with an on-roll strength of 46 Marine Officers, 1065 Marine Enlisted, 4 Navy Officers and 54 Navy Enlisted. Our current on-roll strength is 40 Marine Officers, 1125 Marine Enlisted, 3 Navy Officers and 56 Navy Enlisted.

(2) Two Marine Officers are TAD to CAG, III MAF, leaving an effective strength of 38 Marine Officers. There are also 34 Marine Enlisted not chargeable and 142 Marine Enlisted non-effective. The current effective strength of the Battalion is 34 Marine Officers and 948 Marine Enlisted.

(3) Forty-two Marine Enlisted are scheduled for rotation during the month of September. No officers are scheduled for rotation during September.

b. Intelligence

(1) Personnel. During August, the Battalion Intelligence Section joined two Marines: one Sergeant 0311, as Intelligence Assistant and one LCpl, 1441, employed in drafting, terrain, defensive and post-patrol intelligence overlays. There was no intelligence personnel loss.

(2) Intelligence Collection

(a) During the two operations, (PIKE and COCHISE) the companies generated and transmitted 37 combat intelligence reports. These reports ranged from detailed enemy defense information to specific enemy movements and intentions. This high level was a direct result of the interest in intelligence collection and reporting by units and by individual efforts with special assistance given by the attached scouts.

(b) During Operation PIKE, 21 individual enemy trench and reinforced fighting positions were uncovered, recorded and reported. A field interrogation of a drunken male detainee resulted in identifying a VC ambush site to be employed against the battalion four hours later. Fore

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knowledge and counter maneuver was alerted the ambush and no casualties were sustained by friendly forces.

(c) On Operation COCHISE, reporting continued to provide timely responsible information. In two companies scouts processed all information, under the cognizance of the Company Commander, and prepared all intelligence spot reports.

(3) Intelligence Reporting

(a) Eleven Intelligence Reports/Special Enemy Activity Summaries were developed and disseminated to Company Commanders and patrol leaders.

(b) Seventeen overlays (1:50,000 and 1:25,000) outlining enemy activities and ground defenses were developed and passed to Company Commanders to support pre-planned platoon/squad activities.

(c) When co-located with the Alpha CP Group, Battalion S-2 assistants and scouts provided detailed briefings and debriefings of each patrol and ambush activity.

(4) Enemy Activity

a. In the Hill 63 Combat Base area, enemy activity has ranged from light sniper fire to enemy reconnaissance activity and probing our night dispositions. It is believed enemy activity has been a failure due to both the aggressive day and night patrolling activities which have deterred successful enemy day and night reconnaissance.

(b) The enemy has been very successful in delaying withdrawal and retirement tactics, choosing to hide and evade our patrols and movement. However, through skillful use of terrain and wide deployment of patrol activities on 17 August 1967 on Operation COCHISE, a company of VCMF was maneuvered into the open and practically destroyed in detail. (see enclosure (3))

(5) Vietnamese Attachments

(a) Interpreters. The Battalion has three interpreters, one of whom is considered outstanding. One is unacceptable to all Company Commanders and to the Intelligence Officer. This interpreter is temporarily employed

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with the S-5. The third interpreter avoids field work and has been UA since 18 July 1967. Essentially the Battalion has one, effective responsible Vietnamese interpreter.

(b) Kit Carsons. Four Kit Carsons are available, three of whom are recent appointees. They are providing excellent combat service. The three recent Kit Carsons were Chieu Hoi's early in August 1967. Of the four Chieu Hoi's one has excelled in combat, two are being returned to the Chieu Hoi center as unsatisfactory and the fourth will continue to be trained and observed for at least one more month.

(c) The enemy suffered the following casualties as a result of 3rd Battalion actions this month:

VC KIA (conf)	: 84
VC KIA (prob)	: 152
PW (WIA)	: 7
Detainees	: 34

c. Training

(1) Few days were available to the Battalion due to operational commitments. During operational breaks the S-2 conducted Indoctrination Schools for the new men. S-2 Scouts were instructed in forward observer and forward air controller procedures, classes in the care, cleaning, maintenance, and safety of the M16A1 rifle and battalion weapons. The S-3 has held two classes on the employment and care of the "Starlight Scope", training 25 men.

(2) All units have held extensive classes on small unit patrolling, tactics, use of supporting arms, fire discipline and the "Rules of Engagement".

(3) All units FAM fired their individual and crew-served weapons at least once during the month.

(4) Personnel attended the following formal schools.

(a) Okinawa

1	Vietnamese Language School	- 3
2	NCO School	- 6
3	Armo Technication School	- 1

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(b) DaNang

1	Embarkation School	-2
2	Starlight Scope	-2
3	FAC/AIO	-2
4	Ammunition Technicians	-1

d. Operations

(1) From 010530H to 031200H August 1967 Company I, Company L, and Company C, 1st Bn, 5th Marines (OPCON to 3rd Bn) and the Alpha Command group participated in Operation COCHISE under Operational Control of the 1st Marine Regiment. See After Action Report (Enclosure (2))

(2) During August the Battalion has provided a reinforced squad daily for security of the 1st Engineer Battalion road sweep from Hill 63 to the intersection of Song Cau Lau River and National Highway #1.

(3) During August the Battalion provided M Company as bridge and road security north for the area Tam Ky to Hill 63. The Battalion has also provided security for daily engineer activities in the vicinity of Hill 63.

(4) At 092400H Company I, Company K, Alpha Command Group and Company L, 3rd Bn, 1st Mar (OPCON to 3rd Bn) moved from Hill 63 south to the Que Son area to establish a patrol base as advance preparation for Operation COCHISE. (See Enclosure (3))

(5) At 180745H Companies I and K were chopped OPCON to 1st Bn, 5th Mar for phase II of Operation COCHISE.

(6) At 260847H Company K chopped OPCON from 1st Bn to parent battalion.

(7) At 261310H Company L was chopped OPCON to 1st Bn, 7th Mar.

(8) At 261715H Company I was chopped OPCON from 1st Bn to parent battalion.

(9) At 281245H Company K was chopped OPCON to the 7th Marines.

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(10) At 291000H Company T of 1st OPGON to the 5th Mar and was used jointly with 6/1/5 to conduct a search and destroy mission in pursuit of the enemy force that attacked Thang Bien the previous night.

e. Artillery Support. See the Combat After Action Reports for Operations PIKE and COCHISE. See enclosures (2) and (3).

f. Air Support

(1) During August this Battalion did not request helicopter support for internal tactical operations. Helicopter support requirements during operations were handled by attached Helicopter Support Teams attached. Helicopter support was timely and effective.

(2) Air operations included fixed wing, rotary wing fire suppressive support and visual reconnaissance conducted by AO's in support of Operations PIKE and COCHISE and for combat patrols. See After Action Reports (Enclosures (2) and (3))

(3) The Battalion has two aviator ALO/FAC's. There are sufficient trained enlisted personnel to provide all companies with either enlisted or officer FAC team(s).

g. Communications

(1) The primary means of communications is the highly reliable and effective AN/PRC-25. On Hill 63 during operations, the RC-292 was utilized extensively to increase the range and effectiveness of communications.

(2) During Operation COCHISE the AN/PRC-47 was effectively used to establish communication with the rear echelon. The impressive results far outweigh any logistic disadvantages. The radio was a highly effective link for the Battalion Commander. (See After Action Report enclosure (2))

(3) The Battalion Communication Section has established a preventive maintenance pool and maintenance float, which facilitates providing fresh radios on a rotating basis to the units. This program is proving to be highly successfully in maintaining the radios at maximum reliability and availability.

h. Logistics

(1) General. The overall logistic status of the

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Battalion is satisfactory. Two problem areas are (a) lack of bunkers (prefabricated) and (b) logistical shortages of compasses, lensatic. Minor problems are being concurrently reduced by active reviews of priorities and daily on-the-spot liaison by logistics and supply personnel with their supporting counterparts in higher echelons.

## (2) Supply

(a) During August, Battalion Supply moved to Hill 63. Operating stocks, Armory and Office tents were erected and arranged to facilitate supply activity. A West-Pac supply inspection was held August 5th and a Division inspection was held on 26 August. The results were satisfactory with minor discrepancies.

(b) Protection and preservation of supplies has received priority considerations to prepare the Battalion for anticipated early monsoon conditions.

(c) The LSA at Hill 63 has supplied all Class I, III, IV and V. Class II requirements are processed by FLC, Danang, marked for this Battalion (by RUC number) and, depending on size and weight, shipped to the Hill 63 LSA by road convoy or helicopter.

(d) One battalion supply man remains in DaNang with remaining bulk gear in a warehouse shared with 1/5.

(e) Priority of supply effort is devoted to maintaining combat essential items and procuring items required for the monsoon season.

## (3) Motor Transport

(a) On 17 August the Battalion received thirty (30) replacement M274A2's (trucks). A Division MT inspection was held on 26 August. Results were satisfactory with minor discrepancies.

(4) Construction. Due to lack of engineer equipment and materials availability, construction in the base camp has been minimal. Bunker material is on order. Approved plans include construction of a 500 man mess hall, a battalion shower, and wooden structures for the staff section offices.

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1. Civic Action

(1) MEDCAP: In the villages of Phu-Huong and Phu-Hiep (BT 14457), 559 Vietnamese have been treated by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines medical personnel. MEDCAP activities were slightly curtailed during the last week of August due to the Village Chief's fear of VC terrorist activity.

(2) Training. Upon completion of the Vietnamese National Elections, a training program will be instituted involving all village medical personnel i.e., corpsmen, practical nurses, mid-wives, and sanitation personnel. The long range goal of the training program is to increase sanitation standards and technical proficiency of the Vietnamese health personnel and enable them to conduct and manage to the greatest extent possible, their own local health facilities.

(3) Waste Food. Waste food for pigs is being delivered daily to Phu-Hiep Village (BT 142452)

(4) Graves. A number of Vietnamese graves are located within the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines area. An initial deadline of 29 August 1967 for removal was established. After the 3 September elections an attempt will be made to have all the graves removed. Graves of national importance have been marked, encircled with wire and will not require removal at this time.

(5) Problems. Lack of available engineer support and supplies has precluded digging wells in the two refugee camps located in the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Civil Affairs area of responsibility. Plans have been coordinated for early completion of this vital health prevention project as the refugees are forced to drink untreated river water.

(6) Serious Incidents. On 29 August 1967 one faulty 81mm mortar round fell in the village of Phu-Huong (BT 144457) seriously wounding two Vietnamese Nationals. On 29 August 1967 a 24 round artillery mission was requested by the local ARVN Commander and fired by "F" Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. The mission landed where called (BT 148466) but killed nine civilians, eight of which were children, and wounded five, one seriously.

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(7) Psy Ops. Leaflets are being delivered or attached to buildings and trees along trails by all patrols and units. A Psy Ops Audio Team has been programmed for early September to support all platoon sized or larger operations. Health and sanitation films have been requested for showing in conjunction with MEDCAP activities. A VC mine killed one Vietnamese and seriously wounded another on 25 August 1967. A request for leaflets was submitted to the 1st Division and photographs of the incident were provided.

(8) Projects. The following self-help projects are in various stages of planning and execution contingent upon availability of support and supplies. They are:

- a. Wells for the refugee camps.
- b. Dental MEDCAP for school children.
- c. Building of a high school.
- d. Construction of a permanent cement block dispensary.
- e. Distribution of soap.
- f. Distribution of captured rice.

## 2. Chronology of Events


- 1 August - Operation PIKE commenced at 010600H.  
Captain D. L. DOTNEN reassigned to 1st MAW.  
Lt J. E. LEWIS (MC) USN to CONUS.
- 2 August - Capt E. A. VERDEVELD, Jr reassigned to 1st AT Bn.
- 3 August - Operation PIKE terminated at 031200H.  
LCDR E. TAKESTAN (CHC) USN reassigned to Hqs, 5th Marines.
- 4 August - Maj E. S. PIPER, Jr reassigned to Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div (G-2).
- 5 August - Capt S. C. THOMPSON, Jr reassigned to Hq, 5th Marines (Supply).
- 7 August - Joined Lt V. R. CAPODANNO, CHC USN for duty as Chaplain.

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- 8 August - Joined 2nd Lt. J. W. WILSON for duty as S-1/Adj.
- 9 August - The Battalion (-) (Main) departed Hill 63 at 092400H to set up a patrol base in Que Son, as advance preparations for Operation COCHISE.
- 11 August - The Battalion (-) (Main) commenced the attack at 110900H on Operation COCHISE (See Enclosure (3)).
- 18 August - Company L security patrol on Highway 1 road sweep discovered 21 rounds of 76mm anti-tank ammunition at 17 22509. The rounds were still in their casings. The Engineers destroyed them in place. The Alpha Command Group returned to Hill 63 from Operation COCHISE. Companies I and K were chopped OPCON to 1st Bn, 5th Marines for the duration of Operation COCHISE.
- 25 August - Company K returned to 3/5.
- 26 August - Company I chopped OPCON to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Company I chopped OPCON from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to 3/5.
- 28 August - Company K chopped OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.
- 29 August - Company I OPCON to 5th Marines for one day.

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HEADQUARTERS  
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
PO Box 30 San Francisco, California 96602

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3121  
7 August 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines  
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division  
Via: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1  
(b) 1st Marines Frag Order 126-67

00277-37

Encl: (1) Operations Description  
(2) Operations Overlay

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1. Code Name. Operation PIKE.
2. Date of Operation. 010600H August to 031200H August 1967.
3. Location. Thang Binh Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization
5. Task Organization.

3rd Battalion (-) (Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

H&S Co (-)  
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (Ln Tm)  
Det, 1st SP Bn, (HST)  
Det, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co I (Rein)

Capt F. M. BURKE

Co I  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plt  
Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
Det, Int Sec (Scouts, Interpreters and Chieu Hai)  
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
Det, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

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Co L (Rein)

Capt H. J. KOKALOWSKI Jr.

Co L  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plt  
Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
Det, Int Sec (Scout and Chieu Hoi)  
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
Det, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co C 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Attached)

Capt H. C. JOHNSON Jr.

Co C (Rein)  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plt  
Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
Det, Int Sec (Scouts and Chieu Hoi)  
Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
Det, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

3rd Plt, Co B, 1st Eng Bn

2nd Lt J. B. MILLS

2nd Plt Co B, 1st SP Bn

1st Lt R. W. BAXTER

Battalion ReserveCo K (-) (Rein)

Capt J.R. TEENEY

Co K (Rein)  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plt  
Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
Det, Int Sec (Scouts)  
Det, Btry F 2nd Bn 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
Det, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

6. Supporting Forcesa. Artillery

(1) From commencement of Operation PIKE at 312000H July 1967

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until completion at 031200H August, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received direct artillery support from Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. At no time during the operation was the Battalion without artillery support. Battery F 2/11 fired a total of 1544 rounds in support of the operation either in observed fire missions by the forward observer and aerial observer or harrassing and interdiction fires.

(2) On D-day at approximately 0930H, a coordination problem occurred which resulted in an elapse of about an hour in getting supporting arms on target. The problem occurred in getting clearance to fire. The mission was cleared by the FSCC's at the 1st Bn 1st Marines and the 1st Marine Regiment but denied by Division FSCC. After a second attempt, clearance was still denied by Division FSCC, but was finally cleared after repeated attempts.

(3) There occurred on D+1 an unfortunate event, Company I on objective D received one WP 105mm long round which was fired in registering night defensive fires. There were three minor casualties and immediate remedial action was taken by Battery F 2/11.

#### b. Air

(1) During Operation PIKE there were no periods where weather was a deterrent to the utilization of close air support.

(2) Fixed wing support was used extensively during the period D-day and D+1 on a multitude of targets. A total of ten fixed wing missions were run in support of elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on these two days.

(3) All missions were observed by aerial observers and monitored by the forward air controller. Target coverage was excellent.

(4) The AN/PRC-25 was used exclusively for communications with the aerial observer and the AN/PRC-41 was used for monitoring the fixed wing net by the FAC. Both proved to be highly reliable.

#### 7. Intelligence

a. During the planning phase of Operation PIKE, the Battalion Intelligence Summary listed the following enemy units within the 1st Marines area of operation:

V.25 Bn w/strength of 300(+)  
 105 Bn (elements of) w/strength of 250(+)  
 2nd Bn, 3rd NVA Regt (unknown elements and strength)  
 78th Co (possible 1st VC Regt) w/strength of 200(-)  
 Q.12 Co w/strength of 100(-)  
 Local Guerrillas w/strength from 150 to 350

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7 August 1967

b. Within 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, objective areas ALFA through DELTA, elements of two local guerilla companies and approximately 50 NVA/VC troops were encountered. There were mixed reports on D-1 and D-2 of enemy troops in a wide variety of uniforms, none of which provided sufficient information to develop unit ID/COB.

c. The first major encounter of the operation was with five VC snipers, armed with at least one BAR, one M-1 rifle and three other unknown bolt action rifles. This VC force fired from well concealed positions, 200 to 250 meters east of the Battalion CP. This sniper group fired approximately 40 rounds of SA-8 at a group of six Battalion CP personnel searching a section of Hien Hu-ong village. CP personnel returned 30 rounds SA-8 at the sniper positions and the enemy withdrew to a range of 450 meters. This distance was closed by the CP personnel to about 300 meters and an additional 15 rounds of SA-8 was exchanged. The snipers withdrew completely from SA range when a 3.5 rocket team fired three rounds at the sniper's last known position. An air strike followed with excellent target coverage and the enemy broke contact.

d. Detainees. The Battalion processed the following PW's and detainees:

PW's: Seven

Innocent Civilians: Three (all released following processing)

(1) Included in the PW's processing was the wounded paymaster of 2nd Company, 40th Battalion, 1st VC Regt. Identified by questioning and documents as NGUYEN-VAN-SA, this PW stated that while his Battalion and Regiment remained in south-west Hiep Duc, he was recently posted to temporary duty in the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines objective area with two missions: 1) observe and train in counter-U.S. Marine Corps operations and; 2) to serve as paymaster of the two local guerilla companies operating in that area.

(a) NGUYEN claimed to be transferring from his paymaster field to the status of "fighter". He stated that other "technicians" in the 1st VC Regiment were also being retained in combat leadership fields. According to NGUYEN, moral in the 1st VC Regiment was poor.

(b) This PW was captured during a Company I contact with 15 VC at 1030H, 3 August 1967. Fleeing VC tried to extract him from the target area, but facing the Marines sweeping the area, they took NGUYEN's rifle and ran.

(c) NGUYEN was captured with 14,440 GVN, one Chi-Comm grenade, and cartridge belt. He stated he entered the area with 50,000 GVN. The grenade was destroyed in the field. The 14,440 GVN were turned over to the S-2 of the 5th Marines.

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(2) PW indicated a desire to "Chieu Hoi" for Marines and was tired of the VC. Several attempts were made to extract the wounded PW, including request for Emergency MEDEVAC (EME). The Battalion was advised by HST echelons that no Vietnamese can be given EME. At 1300, 3 August, Company I executed a tactical movement in which NGUYEN could not be carried. He was left with water, minor medical supplies, rations, and a nearby Vietnamese woman was informed of his position.

f. The Battalion captured and processed over 52 documents of some intelligence which were passed to both the 1st Marines during the operation and the 5th Marines on 4 August. In addition to the uniforms, medical supplies, and a booby-trap command-device that were forwarded to 1st Marines, four uniform articles, military blankets, and foreign "782" gear had to be burned in the field due to the lack of helicopter availability.

g. Battalion intelligence personnel interviewed-interrogated 16 local villagers during 1-3 August, and much of this information proved to be of tactical value, i.e., on the evening of 1 August, a drunk 50 year old Vietnamese stumbled into the Battalion area. Upon questioning the following morning, this source revealed the location of a trench net and an ambush site just below Company C's objective area. Receiving this information, Company C conducted a ground reconnaissance and observed uniformed VC in the area described. The resulting ground and air reconnaissance of this suspected area (BT 1969) resulted in one arty and two air strikes on enemy in the area.

h. Several local source references were made to the Cho Da market area, BT 2047, as the logistic center of local VC units; the fishing hamlets, running intrace from BT 177507 in a southeast trace to BT 221459; Dong Lam village at BT 144485, and Fishing Weirs at BT 215442.

i. Terrain. The terrain from Highway #1 in the vicinity of BT 1445 to objective A (BT1650), B (BT 1649), C (BT1847), and D (BT 2145), inclusive of the objective areas, was correctly diagrammed on the AIT map sheets, series BT 66401 with the following exceptions; a stream bed was found with shallow running water in specific trace of the irregular path now shown from BT 185467, south to BT 186460.

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#### 8. Mission

During the conduct of Operation PIKE, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission of providing blocking forces for the attacking elements of the 1st Marine Regiment and to conduct thorough, methodical and aggressive patrolling in the immediate area of the blocking positions.

#### 9. Concept of the Operation

At 312000 July, three Companies I, L and C left Hill 63 (BT 133454) on foot and moved generally north east after crossing the bridge on highway 1 at BT 145456 to take up company blocking positions on Objectives A, B and C respectively. All three positions were occupied by H-1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> hours on D-day.

#### 10. Execution

##### a. 29 July 1967

(1) At 291500H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the First Marines Operation Order for Operation PIKE.

##### b. 31 July 1967

(1) 311300H - Company C 1st Bn, 5th Marines was assigned operational control to 3rd Bn, 5th Marines for Operation PIKE.

(2) 312000H - All units left the 5th Marines Combat Base at Hill 63 and moved across Song Lyly River on Highway 1 BT 1546, 1547, 1548, and 1649 to a company release point, at which time Company I moved independently to occupy Objective A (see operation overlay); Company L and the CP moved into Objective B (see operation overlay).

##### c. 1 August 1967

(1) At 010500H Company C received sniper fire while moving onto Objective C. Returning fire they observed two VN males run from the area where the sniper firing was initially received. Upon failing to halt when challenged in Vietnamese they were fired on. One was killed and the other captured and forwarded to the Battalion S-2.

(2) At 010530H, Company L received sniper fire from the hamlet on Objective B. They returned fire and upon searching the area they found a blood trail leading to the river. Interrogation of villagers indicated about 30 VC had been in the hamlet and fled by boat across the river as Company L entered the hamlet.

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(3) At 010930, a five man VC unit opened fire on a six man Marine unit on a hamlet search killing two Marines. When fire was returned the VC unit broke contact and was taken under fire by small arms and a 3.5 rocket at coordinates BT 174484 and BT 176485. The aerial observer called an artillery mission and air strike by fixed wing aircraft, with excellent target coverage. Search of the area by ground units revealed seven structures destroyed, 10 structures damaged and 50 meters of trench line destroyed.

(4) At 011100H Company C received 50 rounds of automatic weapons fire on their position from two VC in green uniforms at coordinates BT 192474. Company C returned fire and killed one of the VC approximately 24 years of age, and capture a map and other documents which were forwarded to the Battalion S-2. No weapon was found.

(5) At 011204H the aerial observer called a fixed wing mission on 30 to 40 VC at BT 201455 with excellent target coverage. The aerial observer assessed 9 confirmed KBA which he could observe, and 11 KBA probable. There were no ground units available to search the area.

(6) At 011450H Company C received one WIA from sniper. When the MEDEVAC came into the LZ it began to receive fire from a light machine gun at coordinates BT 192469. A 36 round artillery mission was fired and an area search by a combat patrol revealed three large blood trails and drag marks in the area.


(7) At 011710H Company L perimeter observed a junk approximately 20' long by 8' wide moving south on the river with six or eight VC who fired into the Company L perimeter. A 3.5 rocket team sunk the junk about 600 meters south of Objective B with one WP and one HE 3.5 round. The six men began swimming to shore, two were killed in the water and the other four were shot and fell on the shoreline and could be observed at sunset that evening.

(8) At 011830H Company I received small arms fire from four VC on the east bank of the river across from Objective A. Returning small arms and automatic weapons fire, the four VC were killed and observed to be in the same position an hour later.

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(9) Units remained in place throughout the night and conducted local combat and security patrols in the vicinity of their positions as previously stated.

d. 2 August 1967

(1) At first light all units began conducting local combat and security patrols.

(2) At 020830H a combat patrol apprehended one VN male in green shirt and short pants, approximate age 29 years old who had no ID card. He attempted to run from the patrol as it approached BT 020945. Detainee forwarded to Regimental S-2.

(3) At 020930H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the order to occupy Objective D. Company I commenced to occupy Objective D.

(4) At 021215H, Company I while moving received sniper fire from BT 168480. Returning small arms fire and searching the area they found one VC WIA, who shortly thereafter died of wounds, one U.S. Caliber 30 M-1, serial No. 14746634, 26 rounds of U.S. Cal. 30 ammunition, photographs of uniformed troops and various other documents.


(5) At 021315H, a Company C squad combat patrol observed 15 VC in black PJ's and with weapons in a small tree line. An artillery mission was fired with excellent coverage. Sweep of the area revealed bloody clothes, drag marks, and blood trails (nine VC probable).

(6) At 021540H a platoon combat patrol from Company I engaged five VC in black PJ's with weapons. The patrol caught the VC by surprise and fired fifty rounds of machine gun fire. Two VC fell and were observed being carried off by the other three.

(7) At 021700H a squad patrol from Company C a 15 man VC unit with weapons. The squad contacted the aerial observer and pointed out the target. The aerial observer called fixed wing missions by Oxwood, Swiss, and Miss Moffett. There was 100% coverage. Ground units swept the area and observed 6 VC KBA confirmed and 5 VC KBA probable. No weapons or equipment was found.

(8) At 021820H Company I while moving to Objective D received fire from BT 204462 by two VC dressed in black PJ's. Returning fire they killed one VC confirmed and observed the other run off with both weapons.

(9) At 021830H the resupply helicopter for Company C received sniper fire at the LZ on Objective C from BT 199477. The scout sniper returned fire and killed one VC, the other ran into the tree line.



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He returned to the body of the fallen VC about 5 minutes later and picked up the weapon. Before squad could get to the area the wounded VC was observed to limp off into the tree line with both weapons. The searching squad found one dead VC and a blood trail that disappeared into the tree line.

(10) At 021830H Company I occupied Objective D.

(11) At 021920H Company I received one 105mm WP round on their position while registering night defensive fires. They sustained three minor casualties. The long round is considered to be caused by faulty ammunition, not human error.

(12) The remainder of the night Company L and the CP on Objective B, Company C on Objective C and Company I on Objective D continued local combat and security patrolling.

e. 3 August 1967

(1) At first light all units commenced aggressive small unit combat patrolling and maintaining blocking positions in support of the maneuvering units of Operation PIKE.

(2) At 030946H a squad combat patrol, from Company C challenged two VN males at coordinates BT 185478. Both men ran, one was shot and the other ran into a hut. The squad searched the hut and captured the other man. Both men dressed in black pajamas, the dead VC had an old green utility jacket in his shirt, the captured VC was found with a new khaki uniform. The clothing and prisoner were forwarded to 1st Marines S-2.

(3) At 031030H a Company I squad combat patrol received 30 automatic weapons rounds from approximately 12 VC in a tree line at BT 207457. They returned fire and called an artillery mission with excellent target coverage. Searching the area they found many blood trails and captured one VC with cartridge belt, one ChiCom grenade, 14,440 piasters and assorted papers (See paragraph 7 Intelligence.)

(4) At 031030H Company I's scout sniper fired at 7 VC in a tree line at BT 219458, he saw two VC fall. An artillery mission was called with excellent target coverage. Search of the area revealed bloody clothing, drag marks and the two VC killed by the scout sniper.

(5) At 031200H operational control of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was returned to the 5th Marine Regiment for return to the Combat Base Camp on Hill #63

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## 11. Results

### a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assesment of VC personnel casualties inflicted.

- (a) VC KIA (confirmed) - 26
- (b) VC KIA (probable) - 62
- (c) Detainees - 6

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed:

- (a) US Cal 30 M-1 - 1
- (b) ChiCom grenades - 2
- (c) Rounds of small arms - 55
- (d) Uniforms - 6 sets
- (e) Misc clothing and materials - 5 lbs
- (f) Documents - 3 lbs

### b. Friendly

- (1) KIA - 3 ( one DOW)
- (2) WIA - 7

## 12. Administration

### a. Resupply :

(1) Resupply of ammunition for Company C was accomplished from the logistic support area at Hill #63

(2) The HST net was used as a logistical and helicopter control net.

(3) Nonavailability of helicopters, which necessitated leaving a valuable prisoner, was also a controlling factor in overall support.

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b. Maintenance. Normal maintenance was accomplished in the field.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization:

(1) Evacuation of personnel was accomplished smoothly and usually with a minimum of time. Again, availability of helicopters was a determining factor.

d. Transportation. There were no problems encountered with transportation.

e. Communications

(1) The AN/PRC-25 was the principle means of communications and as usual provided highly reliable in voice communications. No problems were encountered by the Battalion switching to the 1st Marine Regiment's tactical net.

(2) The RC-292 less the AB-125 was used to extend the range and power of the AN/PRC-25. It proved adequate.

f. Medical Evacuation

(1) Total number of medical evacuees - 12

(2) Killed in Action - 3

(3) Wounded in Action - 7

(4) Wounded in Action NonEvac - 4

(5) Non Combat Deaths - 0

### 13. Commander's Analysis

This Battalion on Operation PIKE provided blocking forces for the attacking elements of the 1st Marine Regiment and conducted patrolling in the area of the blocking positions.

The initial night movement enabled the Battalion to close on the blocking positions with minimal enemy dection. In the usual case the warning gongs and drums were sounded as the column entered the hamlets and villages.

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One coordination problem occurred on D-day which resulted in a one hour delay in clearing an artillery mission. The mission was cleared by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and 1st Marine Regiment FSCC's on the ground but was not cleared by the 1st Marine Division FSCC until the third time the request was made. This resulted in the target being able to move out of the area of observation. (See para 6a)

A conflict developed also between the III MAF SOP for Combat and Air Operations and the Division SOP for Intelligence on the evacuation of Vietnamese from the field. The Combat and Air Operations SOP states that Vietnamese will be evacuated on a routine basis only. The Intelligence SOP, Sec 8 para 3b, states that if a PW is an extremely important one, he can be evacuated on a priority or emergency status depending on the situation. The Battalion was forced to treat and abandon a wounded, confirmed VC. (See para 7d)

Operation PIKE was considered successful both in experience gained and in disorganizing the local Viet Cong.

*B. R. Cummins*  
B. R. CUMMINS  
by direction

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7 August 1967Operational Description for Operation PIKE

1. The concept of Operation PIKE was for the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines to establish a series of blocking positions west of the Troung Giang River in grids BT 1551, 1649, 1847. These positions were to be occupied by H -1½ Hours on D-day, in order to block and delay the enemy forces from withdrawing while the attacking forces of the First Marines made their sweep. In addition, the Battalion upon order, would occupy a blocking position in grid BT 2145 to prevent enemy exfiltration.
2. The First Marines were to attack on D-day, on a line from BT 1845 to BT 2156 and to conduct search and destroy operations on their drive south across phase lines Blue and Green.
3. Operation PIKE was designed primarily to conduct search and clear operations to destroy enemy operational bases, disrupt enemy lines of communications, and deny the enemy access to the supply caches in the area.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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3rd Battalion, 5th Marines  
1st Marine Division, 1st MAF  
FPO San Francisco, California 96302

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1 September 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1  
(b) 5th Marines Frag Order 2-67

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

1. Code Name - Operation COCHISE.
2. Date of Operation. 110500H August 1967 to 181700H August 1967.
3. Location of Operation. Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization
5. Task Organization

3rd Battalion (-)(Rein) 5th Marines LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

H&S CO (-)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn 11th Marines (LnTm)

Det, 1st S.P. Bn (HST)

Det, 1st Eng Bn

Det, Hq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co I (Rein)

Capt F. M. BURKE

Co I

Det H&S Co

Det, Med Plt

Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)

Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)

Det, Int Sec (Scouts, Interpreters and Chieu Hoi)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn 11th Mar (FO Tm)

Det, 1st Eng Bn

Det, Hq Co 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co K (Rein)

Capt J. R. TENNEY

Co K

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Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
 Det, Int Sec (Scout, Interpreters and Chieu Hoi)  
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn 11th Mar (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, Hq Co 5th Mar (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Co L (Rein) 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines Capt J. W. GIBBS III  
 (attached)

Co L  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, 81mm Plt (FO)  
 Det, Comm Plt (FAC)  
 Det, Int Sec (Scout, Interpreter and Chieu-Hoi)  
 Det, Btry C, 1st Bn 11th Mar (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

3rd Plt, Co B, 1st Eng Bn

2ndLt J. B. MILLS

2nd Plt, Co B, 1st S.P. Bn

1stLt R. W. BAXTER

#### Battalion Reserve

Co L(Rein)

Capt H. KOLAKOWSKY, Jr.

Co L  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)  
 Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)  
 Det, Int Sec (Scout, Interpreter and Chieu-Hoi)  
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)  
 Det, 1st Eng Bn  
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)  
 Det, Hq Co 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

#### 6. Supporting Forces

##### a. Artillery

(1) From the commencement of Operation COCHISE at, 110900H August 1967 until the termination of Phase I at, 180930H August 1967 the Battalion received direct artillery support from Delta, Foxtrot, Foxtrot X-ray, and Whisky

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Batteries of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines and 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Artillery support was continuous, even though on occasion the Battalion did not have a priority of mission, this did not cause any significant problems.

(2) On several occasions communications and communications discipline between the battery, the FO, and the FSCC caused considerable concern. In some instances fire missions were cancelled because of communication difficulties that resulted in an unacceptable delay in obtaining clearance.

(3) Artillery and mortars were used extensively by the Battalion and subordinate units during the operation.

b. Air

(1) During Phase I of Operation COCHISE a total of 19 fixed wing and 8 UH-1E missions were flown in support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(2) All missions were controlled by a tactical Air Controller (Airborne) and monitored by organic Forward Air Controllers. Air support was rapid and tactical target coverage was excellent.

(3) This Battalion utilized as available the air observer, both fixed wing and helicopter, in support of all movements for immediate, flank and deep area coverage. Their observation capability proved invaluable.

(4) On 16 August, a vivid example occurred which serves to reveal how devastating the air/ground team can be. An AO spotted the enemy and called a fixed wing mission on the target which fixed the enemy and enabled the infantry to move quickly to attack and blocking positions under cover of the air strikes. The ground assault netted 40 enemy killed, 14 weapons captured and numerous other supplies.

(5) At no time was weather a deterrent to air support.

(6) The AN/PRC-25 radio was used extensively and exclusively for communications with the TAG(A). The AN/PRC-41 was marginal in the field because of the difficulty in keeping it operational. Difficulty was encountered frequently in communicating with other aircraft, primarily because these aircraft were not prepared to come up on the TACP frequency.

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## 7. Intelligence

a. The enemy forces anticipated in Operation COCHISE, Phase I, were not expected to exceed one VCMF Battalion or elements thereof, four widely disposed local force guerrilla companies and selected hamlet/village defense squads. This intelligence was passed to the Battalion Commander, Staff and Unit Commanders in estimate, briefing and overlay form.

b. In addition to the foregoing estimate the following enemy units were identified as being disposed in the general area of the Phase I zone of action or within distance to possibly influence the action:

70th Bn, 1st VC Regt  
409th Bn, Sapper  
72nd Bn (LF)  
1st Bn, 3rd Regt, 2nd NVA Div (NVA)  
71st Tan Lap Co  
U/I Bn, 21st Regt  
K/42nd Arty Co  
F/105 U/I Unit  
V/16 Company

Est Six other U/I Units of unknown size not greater than company strength.

c. A post operation Intelligence estimate of enemy forces encountered by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during Phase I includes:

Two VCMF Companies, operating independently and without reinforcement capabilities.

Three VCMF Platoons (or elements thereof) operating independently and without reinforcing capabilities.

Local guerrillas: Total of 50 to 60 operating in groups of 3 to 20; armed and unarmed.

While local villagers, Civil Defendant Detainees and PW's provided a substantial amount of timely and tactically usable terrain and enemy information/intelligence, no enemy unit identifications were developed from detainees during Phase I.

## d. Intelligence Collection and Dissemination

(1) During Phase I, battalion intelligence personnel

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screened by interview/interrogation, the following numbers of VN Nationals:

FW's - 3  
Detainees, Civil Defendants - 12

(2) Interviews and interrogations of above mentioned nationals produced 21 separate reports of enemy location, disposition, storage sites; and, most important during Phase I, recent movements of individuals and units.

(3) Three separate VN nationals (2 detainees and one innocent civilian) provided names and location of local guerrillas.

(4) Deployed companies radioed 14 separate intelligence spot reports to battalion S-2, during Phase I. This was a new high for company intelligence, collection and reporting on a single operation.

(5) Captured documents ranged from main force squad leader's notebook, unit equipment lists, a defense overlay for a sub-hamlet, VC Tax Stamps and recent tax collection records, to inventories of personnel property and live stock sold by VC.

(6) Captured rice totaled 6500 pounds which was destroyed in place because of the inability to transport it from the storage sites.


c. Communications Intelligence

(1) On 15 August, while moving east in the attack in BT 052300, the battalion tactical net radio operator noticed some Vietnamese language on 42.5 Megacycles. A Chieu-Hoi and a U.S. Marine interpreter copied and translated the transmission. Lasting approximately 23 minutes, this transmission was identified as enemy (possibly NVA but on subsequent analysis, more probably VC/MF). The transmission consisted largely of a tactical request to store weapons and change a route of enemy movement to avoid U.S. Aircraft. Several locations and events were mentioned also. Within two hours of this intercept, the 5th Marines Command Post dispatched an aircraft pick-up of the Vietnamese and English copies of this transmission.

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(2) On 16 August, while moving in vicinity of BT 137228, the Alpha Command group experienced a 100% "blackout" of all tactical communications. All considerations indicate that this area is a "dead space" for high frequency RF transmissions.

### 8. Mission

During the conduct of Operation COCHISE, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission of searching for and destroying enemy forces, supplies and equipment in assigned zone, and to conduct thorough, methodical and aggressive sweeps to kill or drive the enemy into the blocking positions established by other friendly units.

### 9. Concept of Operation

At 092400H August 1967, the Alpha Command Group and companies I, K, and L, 3rd Bn, 1st Marines (attached) departed the Combat Base at Hill #63 and moved generally southwest along Highway 535 to an area south of Que Son (BT 0433 and 0432) and thence to the attack positions east of Nui Lac Son. (See Enclosure (1)).

### 10. Execution

#### a. 8 August 1967

(1) At 1400H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the Fifth Marines orders for Operation COCHISE.

(2) At 2400H the Alpha Command Group with companies I, K and L departed Hill #63 to establish a patrol base at BT 0432.


#### c. 10 August 1967

(1) At 0930H the Alpha Command Group and Company L established a Patrol Base at BT 045328, Company K at BT 043323 and Company I at BT 038325. All units conducted patrolling in their assigned areas throughout the remainder of the day.


(2) At 1825H a 12 year old VN boy showed Co K the location (BT 045323) of a 60mm mortar round rigged as a booby trap in place. The VN boy was rewarded with 100 piastres from rewards fund.

(3) At 2300H Co I departed their patrol base and began movement to the attack position. (See Enclosure (1))

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(4) At 2400H Co K departed their patrol base and began movement to the attack position. (see Enclosure (1))

d. 11 August 1967

(1) At 0100H the Alpha Command Group and Co L departed their patrol base and began movement to the attack position. (see Enclosure (1))

(2) At 0500H all units were in position.

(3) At 0851H the order was received to commence the attack at 0900H.

(4) At 0900H all units crossed the line of departure and commenced attacking in their assigned zones.

(5) At 1030H Co I while in the attack received approximately 60 rounds S/A fire and 50 rounds of A/W fire from 8 VC at coordinates BT 0532. Co I returned small arms fire, called an artillery mission and the AO controlled an air-strike by UH-1E gunships. A sweep of the area revealed a set of very bloody clothes indicating one VC KIA (probable). Friendly units sustained two WIA's.

(6) At 1045H Co K discovered a series of cave type fighting holes 6' wide x 8' long and 4' high with a living area 4'x6'x4' adjacent to the cave. Search of the area revealed a cache of more than 1000 lbs of rice. Permission was granted to destroy the rice and cave complex.


(7) At 1600H Co I found one VN male at BT 060292 who had been bandaged professionally. The VN male claimed to have been wounded by artillery that morning, denied any knowledge of the VC in the area and would not tell where he had received his medical care. Male VN was detained and forwarded to the Regimental S-2.

(8) At 1700H Co L and the Alpha Command Group established a patrol base at BT 055293; Co I at BT 059298; Co K at BT 064298. All units conducted local combat and security patrols throughout the night.

e. 12 August 1967

(1) At 0315H Co L and the Alpha Command Group received approximately 10 rounds of incoming mortar fire in and near the patrol base. No damage or injuries were sustained. At

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first light three craters in the patrol base and the tail fins of three M-79 rounds with the markings M-34-1953 Lot MA 2-238 were recovered.

(2) At 0900H Co K found a tunnel 5' high and 3' wide and 300 meters long with several living compartments off the main tunnel. There were empty C-rations cans inside. Indications were that the tunnel had not been recently used. Engineers destroyed the tunnel complex with 40 cratering charges.

(3) At 0930H Co I found two (2) tomato can mines and one (1) 250 lb dud bomb. All were destroyed in place.

(4) At 1700H the Alpha Command and Company L established a patrol base at 073308; Co I at 095295; Co K at 088305. All units conducted aggressive combat and security patrols throughout the night.

(5) At 2115H Co K received 5 M-79 rounds and 40 rounds small arms fire from the northwest. Co K fired a 10 round 60mm mortar mission on the area. A squad searched the area with negative results. There were no friendly casualties.

(6) At 2200H a Co L squad ambush at BT 075301 observed movement in the killing zone. They fired 25 rounds of small arms, searched the area and found one dead VC woman in black pajamas with an M-26 grenade, a large blood trail and drag marks leading to the tree line. The squad searched the tree line but lost the trail and returned to an alternate ambush site.

f. 13 August 1967.

(1) At 0005H Co I received 3 rounds M-79 and 4 hand grenades in their patrol base from an unknown position. Three Marines were wounded and med-evaced at first light.

(2) At 0300H an order was received from CO, 5th Marines to conduct a helilift from the Company K patrol base (BT 088305) into LZ VULTURE (BT 0224).


(3) At 0500H the order was transmitted to I, K and L Companies.

(4) At 0530H Company I, Company L and the ALPHA Command Group commenced movement to the Company K patrol base.

(5) At 0800H the helilift commenced. The landing was essentially unopposed and was completed at 1020H.

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(6) At 0945H Co X, while providing security for the units being helilifted received automatic weapon fire from BT 084312. The FAC controlled an air strike by UH-1E gunships. There was 100% target coverage and the gunship reported seeing two VC lying near a tree line. Time limitation did not permit search of the area.

(7) At 1030H, upon completion of the helilift, Companies I and L attacked to establish blocking positions at BT 038239 and BT 034229.

(8) At 1315H Co I received fire at BT 038245 from BT 039241. Enemy was estimated to be an NVA Platoon, dressed in khaki uniforms, helmets, camouflage and were carrying bandoleers of ammo draped around their body. Enemy unit opened fire with an estimated 15 automatic weapons and 15 small arm weapons on the Company lead element from about 50 meters away. Because of the heavy vegetation which greatly impaired movement, Co I withdrew about 250 meters, returning small arms and M-79 rounds as they withdrew and called a 50 round 105mm artillery mission. Co I swept the area following the artillery mission and the enemy broke contact. The search revealed 4 large blood trails and areas in the jungle growth with blood covering the vegetation. There was an estimated 4 enemy KIA (probable).

(9) At 1630H the resupply helicopters for Co L received sniper fire from two VC snipers in a tree line. The Company fired 15 rounds of 60mm and a 24 round 105 artillery mission. One VC in black pajamas with pack was carried from the area by two other VC in black pajamas with three weapons. One VC KIA (probable).

(10) At 1710H Co I while moving to their assigned objective received automatic and small arms fire, believed to be the same unit encountered at 1315H, at BT 037238. Co I returned small arms, automatic weapons fire and 4 rounds 60mm mortar. The VC observed the deploying unit, broke contact and withdrew to the southeast. The FAC called an air strike with UH-1E gunships that pursued by fire until contact was lost. In sweeping the area, Co I personnel found many blood trails and evidence of enemy injuries, one (1) pair of binoculars, two magazines for an AK 47 and one cartridge belt. Marine casualties were one KIA and five WIA, all med-evacs. Enemy casualties were two VC KIA (probable). It should be noted that the following day an AO discovered what he considered to be eight fresh graves.

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Ground units attempted to search the area but because of the assigned mission did not have the necessary time to conduct a detailed and thorough search.

(11) At 1740H Co L while on the move received approximately 200-250 rounds of semi automatic and automatic weapons fire from 12 VC in positions at BT 039231 and BT 036228. Co L returned semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire. An artillery mission and an Air Strike were called by an AO with excellent target coverage. Searching units found blood trails, bloody bandages and other signs of enemy casualties. Co L assessed five VC KIA (probable). Friendly casualties were one KIA and three WIA, all medevaced.

(12) At 1930H a two man LP at Co K patrol Base (BT 024247) observed six enemy in green uniforms, helmets and weapons walking on a trail leading into the patrol base. They opened fire with M-16 rifles killing the first two VC. The remaining VC returned fire at the LP which prevented recovery of the weapons. A search of the area later found two VC KIA in green uniforms but no weapons or equipment.

(13) Co K and the Alpha Command Group set up night patrol base at BT 025245, Co I at BT 038237 and Co L at BT 043225. All units conducted aggressive security and combat patrols throughout the night.

g. 14 August 1967

(1) At 0700H the leading elements of the Battalion commenced an attack along an axis from BT 040243 to BT 052241 to BT 060240 to BT 071240 to BT 094235.

(2) At 1145H Co L apprehended one VN male w/o identification card, age 25, hiding in a cave. The male VN had a healing scar on his right leg apparently from a gunshot wound. When questioned he stated he was a VC sniper and had been wounded about two weeks earlier. He would not disclose the location of his weapon.

(3) At 1430H Co I sighted 15 enemy at BT 075243 wearing green uniforms, some with helmets and some with heavy camouflage. When the VC sighted the Marines they quickly gathered a dozen or so women and children from a hamlet and fled into the treeline. The Marines maneuvered to cut off the fleeing enemy. After determining that the women and children were no longer with the enemy they engaged the VC with small arms, 8 rounds of 60mm mortar and an artillery mission. A search of the area produced negative results.

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(4) At 1930H all units were established at a night patrol base vicinity BT 096228.

(5) All units conducted aggressive security and combat patrols during the night.

h. 15 August 1967

(1) At 0040H a squad from Company L returning to the patrol base challenged three VN's approaching them at BT 099231. The VN's ran and the patrol fired killing one VC in a green uniform and hitting another. Search of the area revealed a small box that contained a poncho and a hammock.

(2) At 1200H a large brush fire started in the patrol base from unknown causes. Six Marines were wounded by shrapnel from exploding duds. Twenty Marines suffered from smoke inhalation and heat exhaustion. All were med-evaced.

(3) At 1830H Company L moved to a patrol base at BT 110239. The Alpha Command Group with Companies I and K established a patrol base at BT 105228. All units conducted local security and combat patrols.

i. 16 August 1967

(1) At 0600H all units resumed the attack to the east in assigned zone.

(2) At 0830H Company L received 60 rounds of sniper fire from approximately 10 VC in black pajamas at coordinates BT 130230 and BT 135235. Company L returned fire and called an artillery mission and a fixed wing strike which was controlled by an AO. The area was not searched due to time limitations, restricted terrain and the assigned mission.

(3) At 1030H the Alpha Command Group received approximately 100 rounds of sniper fire from an estimated 20 VC in a tree line at coordinates BT 134233. The Alpha Command Group returned small arms suppressing fire and the AO fired rockets in strafing runs. Two Marines were wounded and required med-evac from the area. During the med evac an AN/PRC 41, which was being carried by one of the med evacs, was inadvertently left and captured by the VC. A squad (rein) was immediately dispatched to search the area and on entering the hamlet, received small arms sniper fire. The squad returned fire killing one VC in a rice paddy and capturing three VC hiding in a hut with the radio. As the squad moved from the hamlet they encountered 4 more VC in a rice paddy killing three. The radio was recovered.

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(4) At 1730H [redacted] was established for all units at 185249. [redacted] aggressive security and combat patrols.

j. 17 August 1967

(1) The Battalion remained in the patrol base for re-supply and conducted platoon size combat patrols in the vicinity.

(2) At 1110H a UH-1E gunship supporting the resupply helicopters observed 50 to 60 VC in the open at coordinates BT 199247. They were dressed in green uniforms and armed with a variety of weapons. The UH-1E expended his ordnance and called a fixed wing strike on the enemy. A reinforced platoon patrol in the area was maneuvered to establish a blocking position on the probable escape route to the south. Company L(-) was immediately deployed from the patrol base to join their reinforced platoon patrol north of the enemy position. Company L's assault and sweep of the area revealed 40 VC KIA (confirmed), 2 Browning Automatic Rifles, 5 US Cal 30 M-1's, 2 Chicom AK 42s, 2 Chicom AK-47s, 1 grease gun, 1 MAS 36, 1 Chicom Bolt Action Rifle, 12 Chicom grenades, 4 M-26 grenades, 21 BAR Magazines, 35 clips of Cal 30 ammo, 550 rounds assorted ammo, 16 cartridge belts, 5 packs, miscellaneous clothing, documents, rice and medical supplies. An offensive artillery mission was fired on the few enemy that were able to escape to the east, resulting in an additional 14 VC KIA (probable). Only three Marines were wounded, all of which were med evaced.

(3) The Battalion remained in the patrol base for the night and conducted local security and combat patrolling.

k. 18 August 1967

(1) At 0600H the Battalion commenced movement to Hill #29.

(2) At 0630H OPCON of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was passed to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines for movement to Hill #29.

(3) At 0715H OPCON of Companies I and K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, was passed to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines for phase II of Operation COCHISE.

(4) At 0930H the Alpha Command Group, Company L and Company G arrived at Hill #29.

(5) At 1510H OPCON of Company L was passed to the 5th Marines for helilift from Hill 29 to the 1st Marines area.

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(6) At 1530H the Alpha Command Group and Company G departed Hill 29 by truck convoy.

(7) At 1650H Operational Control of Company G was passed to 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, for movement by truck convoy to the 1st Marines area.

(8) At 1700H the Alpha Command Group arrived at Hill #63.

## 11. Results

### a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted.

(a)	VC KIA (confirmed)	= 48
(b)	VC KIA (probable)	= 48
(c)	Detainees	= 12
(d)	PW's	= 3

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed.

(a)	US. Cal. 30 BAR	= 2
(b)	US. Cal. 30 M-1	= 5
(c)	Chicom AK 42	= 2
(d)	Chicom AK 47	= 2
(e)	Grease Gun Cal. 45	= 1
(f)	Chicom Bolt Rifle	= 1
(g)	M-26 hand grenade	= 4
(h)	Chicom hand grenade	= 12
(i)	Cal. 30 ammunition	= 700 rds
(j)	Assorted ammunition	= 150 rds
(k)	Magazine, BAR	= 21
(l)	Magazines assorted	= 25
(m)	Cartridge bolt	= 16
(n)	Packs	= 5
(o)	Uniforms	= 30 sets
(p)	Misc. clothing and material	= 10 lbs
(q)	Medical Supplies	= 5 lbs
(r)	Documents	= 4 lbs

### b. Friendly

(1) KIA = 4 (One DOW)  
 (2) WIA = 35 (8 WIA NE)

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12. Administrationa. Resupply

(1) Resupply of all classes of materials was accomplished from the logistical support area at Hill #63.

(2) The HST net was used as a logistical and helicopter control net.

(3) Difficulty was encountered during resupply on two occasions when helicopters encountered sniper fire in the LZ and returned to the LSA to await an escort.

b. Maintenance. Normal maintenance was accomplished in the field.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) Evacuation of casualties was accomplished smoothly and as usual, rapidly.

(2) Medovac helicopters, as usual, were outstanding in terms of timeliness and aggressiveness in evacuating friendly casualties.

d. Transportation. No problems were encountered with transportation.

e. Communications

(1) Operational communications were maintained throughout Operation COCHISE by utilizing the AN/PRC-25. This radio proved to be highly reliable. ~~Supplies communication.~~ On only one occasion was communication lost between Battalion and Regiment. This was as a direct result of terrain mask.

(2) The NO 292 antenna was utilized when the Alpha Command Group established a patrol base. It effectively enhanced reception and transmission to operational range in all areas encountered on Operation COCHISE.

(3) The Battalion utilized the AN/PRC 47 at night to establish an administrative net to pass traffic to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines rear on Hill 63. This proved most effective.

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(c) The main difficulty encountered in communications occurred on a few occasions when aircraft would not or were unable to establish communications on the BASS (local) net. This created coordination problems which under other circumstances, could have become serious. All supporting aircraft, other than resupply and med-evac helicopters, must be briefed as to correct frequencies and directed to check in on the battalion BASS (local) net prior to undertaking any supporting action.

#### f. Medical Evacuation

(1)	Total number of medical evacuees	~ 80
(2)	Killed in Action	~ 1
(3)	Wounded in Action	~ 35
(4)	Wounded in Action Non Evac	~ 6
(5)	Non Combat Deaths	~ 0
(6)	Non Combat Injuries	~ 45

#### 13. Commander's Analysis

a. Night movements during Operation UGGLI, as in the past, have proven quite successful for this Organization. The movement the night of 9-10 Au was to the patrol base south of the Hon, and the subsequent night movement the following evening to initial attack positions, met with no opposition and appeared to be generally undetected by the enemy. Had he been aware of our intentions and/or movements it seems logical to assume that he would have taken advantage of at least one of several suitable areas to either ambush or delay our force.

b. A serious and potentially dangerous coordination problem arose on 10 Au. Resupply helicopters received sniper fire as they attempted to land in the designated LZ, and further resupply was halted until an escort could be obtained. Approximately twenty (20) minutes later a flight of four aircraft appeared and began to bomb and sweep the area to the south of the battalion's position, again without clearance. Upon investigation, it was discovered that they had been in contact with the attached 1st Officer on the 10 Au radio net and that he, because of gross incompetence, had cleared their flies. Error in this instance is two fold. First 1st Officer, or any other master any other 1st Officer attached to this Command, will never attempt to clear or direct a tactical air strike. The problem could have been further precluded had the flight leader checked in to the battalion's BASS (local) net prior to providing supporting fires, as is proper.

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c. On two occasions the assigned objective assigned was of such a distance so as to be almost impossible with the assigned mission of thorough search and destroy in the time frame allotted. This, combined with extremely difficult and restrictive terrain, though the assigned objectives were attained, resulted in quite superficial performance of search and destroy operations.

d. The most outstanding aspect of the entire operation occurred on D +6 and is an excellent example of the tremendously successful results that can be obtained through proper and professional air/ground coordination. The action is described in paragraph 10.j(2), and resulted in almost total annihilation of a sizeable enemy force.

e. Operation COCHISE (Phase I) is considered successful in terms of experience gained, disorganization of local VC forces and temporary disruption of his supply routes, and the inflictions of losses on his personnel, weapons and supply assets.




#### 14. Recommendations

a. That all aircraft dispatched in support of ground forces, with the exception of resupply and med-evac flights, be thoroughly briefed on and provided with the HAZOP (local) frequency of the supported unit. It is imperative that communications be established with the command elements of the supported unit in order to effectively control tactical operations.

*[Signature]*  
C. J. WILSON


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3RD BATTALION, 5TH MARINES  
OPERATIONS OVERLAY  
OPERATION PIKE  
(ISSUED W/VERBAL FRAG O)  
301100H JULY 1967

315 Command Chronology, Aug 67  
Enc 1(2) to Enc 2(2)



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