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HEADQUARTERS

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3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/PES/plb
5750
5 Oct 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology for period 01000H Sep67 to 302400H Sep67

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMF PacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) Command Chronology Report
(2) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Combat After Action Report Operation SWIFT
(3) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Combat After Action Summary Operation SHELBYVILLE

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), the Command Chronology for the month of September with enclosures (1), (2) and (3) is hereby submitted.

W. K. ROCKEY
W. K. ROCKEY

5TH MAR S&C FILES

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
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
HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
010001H Sept 67 to 302400H Sep 67

INDEX

PART I - Organizational Data
PART II - Narrative Data
PART III - Sequential Listings of Significant Events

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1

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

<u>1. Designation</u>	<u>Commandor</u>	<u>Period Covered</u>
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines	LtCol C.B. WEBSTER LtCol W.K. ROCKEY	27May67-6Sep67 Since 7Sep67

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company	Capt J.A. SPEICHER 1stLt R.J. MARNELL	4July67-29Sep67 Since 30Sep67
Company I	Capt F.M. PURKE Capt J.A. SPEICHER	18June67-29Sep67 Since 30Sep67
Company K	Capt J.R. TENNEY	25May67
Company L	Capt H.J. KOLAKOWSKI 1stLt R.E. MUELLER	4July67-4Sep67 Since 5Sep67
Company M	1stLt J.D. MURRAY	1Aug67

STAFF OFFICERS

Exec0	Maj B.R. CUMMINS	22Apr67
S-1/Adjutant	2ndLt J.W. HORTON	8Aug67
S-2	1stLt D.R. DUNAGAN	2July67
S-3	Maj P.E. SHAW	5Aug67
S-4	1stLt W.W. KING	19May67
S-5	1stLt G.E. OWSLEY	8Aug67

AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
35	1020

<u>USN</u>	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
3	56

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

There currently exists in the command the need for a Captain, 0402. At present the billet is being filled by a Lieutenant, 0302. The Battalion currently has on board a Sergeant Major. First Sergeants are currently assigned to each company.

During the past month the Battalion experienced an effective loss of 7 officers to a combination of reasons, WILs, Non-Battle Casualty, and TAD. At present 3 companies in the Battalion are commanded by First Lieutenants.

The intelligence collection and dissemination effort during this period was dedicated specifically to (1) the areas of combat operations and (2) the terrain, civilian populace, and enemy activities within the adjacent land areas surrounding the Combat Base Camp at Hill 63. This latter area was given extensive attention to gathering trail overlays, population density surveys and water table charts for the approaching monsoon seasons.

The Battalion has completed Operation SWIFT (4 Sept67 to 15 Sept67) and Operation SHELBYVILLE (22 Sept67 to 28 Sept67).

At the present time there are no major communication problems.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Topicsa. Personnel and Administration

(1) The Battalion began the month of September with an on-roll strength of 40 Marine Officers, 1120 Marine Enlisted, 3 Navy Officers and 56 Navy Enlisted. Our current on-roll strength is 36 Marine Officers, 1122 Marine Enlisted, 3 Navy Officers and 56 Navy Enlisted.

(2) Two Marine Officers are TAD to CAG and III MAF. One Marine Officer is TAD to Okinawa leaving an effective strength of 32 Marine Officers. There are also 3 Marine Enlisted non-effective. The current effective strength of the Battalion is 30 Marine Officers and 860 Marine Enlisted.

(3) There are 2 Marine Officers and 72 Marine Enlisted scheduled for rotation during the month of October.

b. Intelligence

(1) Personnel. During the month of September the Battalion Intelligence Section joined a Staff Sergeant 0369/0231 for duty as the Intelligence Chief. Loss of personnel included a Master Sergeant 0239, two Lance Corporal Scouts, one on normal rotation the other a thrice wounded.

(2) Intelligence Collection. During Operations SWIFT and SHELBYVILLE and local company operations, the Companies developed and processed to Battalion 79 separate combat intelligence reports.

(3) Intelligence Reporting

(a) Eight intelligence estimates and summaries with supporting OOBs and overlays were developed and presented to the subordinate units during the reporting period.

(b) Eleven additional terrain and enemy activities overlays, for planning and study were developed and made available to staff officers and company commanders.

(c) Battalion S-2 personnel conducted daily detailed patrol briefings and debriefings.

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(4) Enemy Activity

(a) Hill 63 Combat Base. Enemy activity around the Combat Base has increased extensively during the month of September. During the period 23-29 September, the counter-mortar/OP reported 61 individual sightings of armed and uniformed enemy personnel. Over 15 of these sightings resulted in arty/81mm mortar fire missions.

(5) Vietnamese Attachments. There are three excellent interpreters, all of whom are actively employed in support of combat operations.

(6) Kit Carsons and Chieu Hoi's. This Battalion has four Kit Carsons and four Chieu Hoi's providing excellent support.

(7) Enemy Losses. The enemy suffered the following casualties as a result of the 3rd Battalion actions this month:

KIA (c) - 371
 KIA (p) - 327
 KBA (c) - 58
 KBA (p) - 157
 PW's 7
 Detainees- 61

c. Training

(1) Few days were available to the Battalion for formal training due to the operational commitments.

(2) Between operations, training was continuous by all companies. The Battalion conducted two formal Indoctrination Schools for newly joined Marines. Classes on artillery/mortar observed fire procedure, forward air control procedures, care, cleaning, maintenance and safety of the M-16A1 rifle, and utilization of the Starlight Scope were presented.

(3) The following formal schools were attended by personnel from the Battalion.

(a) Okinawa


1 Vietnamese Language School -1

2 Embarkation School -1

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3 NCO School -5

(b) DaNang

- 1 Vehicle Waterproofing School -1
- 2 Psychological Operations School -1
- 3 OAG School -1
- 4 Embarkation School -2
- 5 FAC/ALO School -2
- 6 Vietnamese Language School -2

d. Operations

(1) From 040500H to 151600H September 1967 the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines participated in Operation SWIFT.

(2) At 041150H Companies K and M chopped to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines for Operation SWIFT.

(3) At 041545H Company I chopped to the 5th Marines.

(4) At 041605H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines assumed OPCON of Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

(5) At 042130H the Alpha Command Group with Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines helilifted to Que Son to commence Operation SWIFT. See Enclosure (2).

(6) At 071400H LtCol W.K. ROCKEY assumed command from LtCol C.B. WEBSTER.


(7) At 151600H September Operation SWIFT terminated.

(8) At 211600H September the Alpha Command Group, Companies I, K, and L departed Hill 63 for Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(9) At 220730H September 1967 Operation SHELBYVILLE commenced.


(10) At 280800H September 1967 Operation SHELBYVILLE terminated.

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(11) At 301225H Company K chopped to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

(12) During September the Battalion provided security daily for the engineer road sweep from Hill 63 to the intersection of the Song Ba Ren and National Highway 1, and security for engineer road repair efforts in the AO.

e. Artillery Support. See Enclosure (2)

f. Air Support

(1) During September this Battalion did not request helicopter support for internal tactical operations. Helicopter support requirements during operations were handled by attached Helicopter Support Teams. Helicopter support was timely and effective.

(2) See Enclosure (2) for air operations of Operation SWIFT.

(3) The Battalion has two aviator ALO/FAC. There are sufficiently trained enlisted personnel to provide all companies with either enlisted or officer FAC team(s).

g. Communications

(1) The AN/PRC-25 radio performed more than adequate during the past month. The AN/PRC-47 was also utilized to a small degree as a back-up net and on one operation as an admin net. It provided good communications, but its weight makes it extremely difficult to carry any great distance.

(2) The following problems were encountered this past month:

(a) Preventive maintenance of radio gear in the companies.


(b) Communications security.

(c) Keeping radio gear dry.

(3) Classes are being given to Battalion Communication personnel, so all staff sections and companies to remedy these problems, with the biggest emphasis on methods of water-proofing radio gear. Communications security has improved through continual training and supervision.

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(4) The inexperienced radio operators continue to gain valuable experience by operating nets in support of the unit's activities. Presently all Battalion Communication personnel, with the exception of three to four people, can be depended on for accurate and efficient work.

(5) No major problems were encountered this month. One AN/PRC-47 is missing from an earlier operation and appropriate tracer action has been taken.

h. Logistics

(1) General. At present the overall logistics status of the Battalion is satisfactory.

(2) Supply. During the month of September, Battalion Supply continued to prepare for the monsoon season. The requisitions for the required monsoon equipment have been submitted.

(a) On 15 September there was a change in supply chiefs. SSgt MARTINEZ reported to 3/5, with GySgt ZEBIGANT transferred to 1/5.

(b) On 23 September an assistance team from Division (G-4) arrived to assist the Battalion in reconciling the formal and informal accounts.

(c) Inventory control data was established for expendable items and non-expendable items. Priority 02 requisitions were made on items of supply that required an immediate need and items that have fallen below the requisition objective. Backorder and obligation cards were initiated for NAVMC 708 cards. An inventory of individual equipment was taken and reconciled with the locator cards. Requisitions held by Comm and Motor Transport were reconciled and follow-ups submitted on overdue status cards. Follow-ups were also submitted on requisitions for which current status was not held.

(3) Motor Transport. On 26 September a team from Division (G-4) Motor Transport section visited the Battalion. A period of informal instruction was conducted by the team covering 1st echelon maintenance.

(4) Construction. Due to lack of engineer support, construction in the Base Camp has been minimal. Some bunker material has been received. Future plans include construction of a 500 man mess hall, and wooden structures for the staff sections.

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i. Civic Action

(1) MedCap. 531 Vietnamese from the villages of Phu-Huong and Phu-Hiep were treated during MedCaps. MedCaps are conducted in the respective Village Administrative Offices.

(2) Training. Due to operational commitments during September 1967 and shortages of corpsman, training of Vietnamese medical and health personnel was not conducted.

(3) Waste Food. Wastefood is being delivered daily to Phu-Huong and Phu-Hiep Villages.

(4) Graves. Removal of all graves within the Combat Base which the Vietnamese desired removed, has been completed.

(5) Problems. Lack of available engineer support and equipment has precluded commencement of Civic Action Projects.

(6) Serious Incidents. On 12 September 1967, a Marine assaulted a 71 year old male Vietnamese. A Serious Incident Report was submitted. An investigation was conducted and case has been referred to trial by Court-Martial.

(7) Psyops. An extensive program of hand delivery of leaflets was conducted by all units during the month of September. A ground Psyops broadcast team was employed during Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(8) Projects. Presently the S-5 is coordinating and assisting the villagers in harvesting the rice crop within the protective wire at Hill 63. Numerous self-help projects are in the planning stage contingent upon availability of support and supplies.

2. Chronology of Events

- 4 September - Operation SWIFT commenced.
Lt V.R. CAPODANNO, USNR KIA.
- 5 September - Capt H.J. KOLAKOWSKI was transferred to USNH Guam while hospitalized.
- 7 September - LtCol C.B. WEBSTER was reassigned to Hdqts. 3rd. 1st MarDiv for duty.
- 8 September - Joined LtCol W.K. ROCKEY for duty as CO.

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15 September

- Joined Lt C.T. KELLY ChC, USNR for duty as Battalion Chaplin.

Operation SWIFT terminated.

22 September - Operation SHELBYVILLE commenced.

28 September - Operation SHELBYVILLE terminated.

29 September - Capt J.A. SPEICHER reassigned to Company I for duty as Commanding Officer.

30 September - Capt F.M. BURKE was transferred to Hdqts Bn, 1st MarDiv for duty w/CAP.
1st Lt R.J. MARNELL assumed duties as CO of H&S Co.

Joined Lt J.J. LEPORE, ChC, USNR for duty as Chaplin.

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HEADQUARTERS
 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
 PFO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/BRC/plb
 3121
 22 September 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division O. 3480.1
 (b) 5th Marines Frag Order

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

3/5 S+C
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1. Code Name. Operation SWIFT.
2. Date of Operation. 040500H September 1967 to 151600H September 1967.
3. Location of Operation. Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization.
5. Task Organization

3rd Bn. (-)(Rein), 5th Marines LtCol C. B. WEBSTER
 (Since 7 Sept 67) LtCol W. K. ROCKEY

H&S Co (-) Capt J. A. SPEICHER
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines
 Det, 1st SP. Bn (HST)
 Det, 1st Eng Bn

Co K Capt J. R. TENNEY
 Co K (Rein)
 Det, H&S Co
 Det, Med Plt
 Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)
 Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)
 Det, Int Sec (Scout)
 Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines
 Det, 1st Engineer Battalion
 Det, 1st SP Battalion (HST)
 Det, Hdq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

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UNCLASSIFIED

3121
22 September 1967

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Co M

1/Lt J.D. MURRAY

Co M (Rein)

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plt

Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)

Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)

Det, Int Sec (Scout)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)

Det, 1st Engineer Battalion

Det, 1st SP Battalion (HST)

Det, F&G Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

Battalion Reserve

Co I

Capt F. M. BURKE

Co I (Rein)

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plt

Det, 81mm Plt (FO Tm)

Det, Comm Plt (FAC Tm)

Det, Int Sec (Scout)

Det, Btry F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)

Det, 1st Engineer Battalion

Det, 1st SP Battalion (HST)

Det, Hdq Co, 5th Marines (Scout-Sniper Tm)

6. Supporting Forcesa. Artillery

(1) From the commencement of Operation SJIFT at 050400H September until termination at 151600H September, the Battalion had direct artillery support from Batteries D and W of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. Artillery support was continuous even though on occasion priority of fire was given to another unit.

(2) The Battalion used artillery and mortars extensively in preparation fires and blocking fires. Due to the nature of the close in fighting experienced on this Operation, adjusted fire missions were occasionally hard to use in support of the action. However, the FO's were able to use the artillery and mortars to block routes of withdrawal and pursue by fire when the enemy broke contact.

(3) There were major problems encountered with artillery support which will be discussed in paragraph 13b.

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3121
22 Sept 1967

b. Air

(1) During Operation SWIFT a total of 41 fixed wing and 20 UH-1E attack missions were flown in support of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(2) Flare ships were utilized in support of the defensive position on five occasions. In addition, the "Spooky" gunship was employed on three occasions. On all occasions these supporting weapons proved to extremely effective and a positive assistance during engagements.

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3121

22 September 1967

(3) This Battalion used for the first time on three different occasions CS (riot control agent) gas. The deliveries were made by both fixed wing (A-4) and rotary wing (UH-1E). The delivery made by the UH-1E appeared to be the more effective means of dispensing this type of munitions. The employment of the gas through aircraft delivery proved to be of unquestionable value in disorganizing and disrupting the deployed enemy forces.

(4) The Battalion utilized as available to the maximum extent the air observer, both fixed wing and rotary wing, in support of all ground movements. In this respect the utilization of the AO in the UH-1E supplies the ground commander with "on station" air support. The UH-1E has the capability of immediate and effective suppressive fire and at the same time can request fixed wing missions utilizing the larger types of ordnance.

(5) All close air support missions were controlled by the TAC (A) and monitored by the unit forward air controller with the exceptions of the flare and "Spooky" gunships who were exclusively controlled by the unit forward air controller.

(6) The AN/PRC-25 radio was used exclusively for communications with the TAC (A). The period of time when there was established a separate TAC net for each battalion proved to be highly satisfactory in controlling aircraft in support of the Battalion's operation.

(7) At no time was weather a deterrent to air support.

7. Intelligence

a. The specific identification of enemy forces anticipated on Operation SWIFT was not known at the time of the reaction deployment of the 3rd Battalion CP group and one company on the night of 4 September 1967. This deployment in support of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines elements, then operating in the vicinity of BT 076333, did expect some degree of contact with elements of the 2nd NVA Division (1st or 3rd Battalions) or possibly the 70th Battalion.

b. In addition to the probable enemy formations then engaged with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines units, the Commanding Officer and staff of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were advised that the following additional enemy units were suspected of being recently active in the West, North-West quadrant of Quan Thang Binh:

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3121
22 September 1967

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40th Battalion, then suspected of being co-disposed with the 2nd Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment located to the east.

c. A post operation intelligence estimate of enemy forces encountered by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during Operation SWIFT, must be cited in phases, as set forth below.

(1) This enemy order-of-battle analysis was made as a result of an on-the-ground, individual debriefing, and analysis of enemy dispositions during contact. Additionally, the degree in which the enemy was or was not able to police the battlefield of his personnel/equipment losses, prior to retirement was a substantial indicator of his total available strength in each contact.

(2) A detailed intelligence oriented ~~account~~ and OOB analysis is reported for each separate action during the operation:

(a) Action and Location: 4 September 1967, Company M, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (OpCon to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines), BT 095336, Sheet 6640 II, Series L7014.

Estimated Enemy Strength/OOB: One Battalion, Infantry, NVA.

Supporting Facts/Analysis: Enemy units, disposed in platoon size formations were deployed in a 360° circle about Mike Company's position. The enemy had the strength and covering fire support to approach and temporarily enter the friendly positions. On disengagement, initiated by the enemy in phases in the early morning of 5 September 1967. The enemy had sufficient personnel to remove enemy dead and wounded from the battlefield. This included all his KIA (C) except those bodies found in or near the final friendly positions at first light. It should be noted that those enemy confirmed KIA's were the result of an inspection of only the first 100 meters in radius of the position. Operational requirements on 5 September disallowed a more complete ground sweep of the area. In view of the contacts by Company M and Companies B and D of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in the same area, it is believed the enemy force encountered was not less than two NVA Battalions with heavy reinforcements.

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3121

22 September 1967

(b) Action and Reaction: Companies I and K contact of 6-7 September 1967 on Hill 43, vicinity BT 123323, Sheet 6640 II AMS Series L7014.

Estimated Enemy Strength/OOB: two Battalions,
Infantry, NVA.


Supporting Facts/Analysis: Initial enemy contact by Companies I and K, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines appeared to be multi-squad in strength on Hill 43. Within thirty minutes of first contact, the enemy small arms fire, by volume and distribution, continued to increase. This contact continued to enlarge and by 1910 hours, the demonstrated enemy strength was clearly that of not less than one NVA Battalion. The enemy's dispositions, employment of at least nine crew-served class machine guns in an action zone of less than 400 meters indicated the strong possibility that the enemy had elements, if not the whole of a second infantry battalion supporting the one engaged. Following the commitment of Company M at 2000H 6 September and the aerial employment of CS gas, the enemy reduced the degree of contact and exercising a retirement screen of increased crew-served weapons fire, retired his main infantry forces from the battlefield. Of special significance of this enemy contact, are the following facts and observations:

1. The enemy's section of the battlefield was policed in extreme detail prior to his total extraction from the contact. This included the removal of many enemy dead, wounded and their weapons/equipment from the field.

2. The enemy, in many cases declined the recovery of M-16 rifles and other equipment available to them from the forward Marine casualties and elected to recover personal items from packs and dead Marines. This was witnessed by several wounded Marines who were themselves subject to search of their persons and packs.

3. While both Marine companies were in maximum engagement, just prior to last light, 6 September, a supporting aerial gun-ship commander reported killing over 23 NVA moving from another nearby hill mass, immediately south of Hill 43, and reported the enemy was "swarming all over the top of the hill" (Hill 43). The gun-ship fired continuing passes for over 30 minutes on the enemy forces. It is noted that the enemy troops identified by the pilot was exclusive of those enemy forces then heavily engaged with Companies I and K.

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3121

22 September 1967

4. On the 7th of September, local farmers in the area of Hill 43 were "telling stories" of the NVA "suffering 300 lost men on the hill", and carried "so many away".

5. Analysis:

a. That the NVA, prior to initial contact with Companies I and K on the Western slopes of Hill 43, had one battalion disposed in an "L" or "U" shaped position. Well concealed in fighting holes and heavily camouflaged trenchlines on the hill. The enemy was deployed expecting our movement into the position. The approach and initial assault on this enemy position was against his left flank (element) and denied him his numerical advantage. The two company consolidated position allowed the Marine companies to inflict what responsible post action debriefing indicates to be 161 witnessed enemy "nock-down, stay-down" KIA's. This figure is exclusive of any enemy kills by air.


b. That the enemy had a second infantry battalion disposed on the heavy foliated hill mass at BT 124313. This unit provided a degree of direct ground support during the initial enemy contact and was largely responsible for the detailed police and removal of the enemy dead and wounded from the area.

(c) Action and Location: Company H, contact 10 September 1967, on Hill 43 (BT 124313).

Estimated Strength/OOB: One Company, Infantry, NVA with an unknown attached weapons section.

Supporting Facts/Analysis: Following the 3rd Battalion's continued attack to the south, south-east on 9 September, a platoon combat patrol was searching the area of the 6th of September action. The patrol made contact with a force of initially unknown size, armed with mixed small arms and automatic weapons. Subsequent disclosure of enemy dispositions and fire power would lend to an analysis that this force was not less than a company in strength deployed in caves and other covered fighting positions. The deployment of friendly units and supporting fires suppressed and dispersed the enemy force.

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3121

22 September 1967

Analysis: This enemy company or company (-) force had returned to the area of the heavy 6 September contact to conduct tactical surveillance of friendly forces.

(d) Action and Locations: 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, contact of 12 September 1967, at the Battalion Patrol Base, vicinity BT 133114, Sheet 6640 II, AMS Series I70114.

Enemy Strength/OOB: One Company, Infantry (+) NVA.

Supporting Facts/Analysis: About 0330 hours, an enemy NVA company, moving to assault what the enemy must have believed to be the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Command Post, with no more than a company security force, was pressed to commit his forces prematurely by the action of the Battalion's Combat Outposts and suffered 35 "foot-on-the-body" KIA's and not less than 18 witnessed WIA's. From two wounded NVA PW's taken in this action, it was learned that the enemy force was a company, possibly two with the specific mission of assaulting our position.

d. No subsequent enemy contact developed during the final few days of the operation.

e. Intelligence collection and dissemination during all engagements in all the areas of Operation SWIFT included the following:

Field screening of captured PW: 5


Field screening of detainees: 11; 7 of which were processed to Regiment S-2.

Captured VC Civil Function Documents: 31; 9 of which were processed to Regiment S-2.

Captured VC Military Documents: 6; 6 of which were processed to Regiment S-2.

(1) Deployed companies radioed 11 separate intelligence spot reports to Battalion S-2. Five of these reports contained sufficient information to warrant retransmission to Regiment.

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22 September 1967

(2) Captured Weapons and Equipment:

Rifles - 23
 M-79 - 2
 M-79 rounds - 16
 B-40 Rocket Launcher - 1
 B-40 Rocket rounds - 3
 Ammo, misc, - 3000 (plus
 "782" gear; NVA and ChiCom - 30 items (plus)

(3) Captured rice: 2,000 pounds

f. Enemy English Language Skills

(1) During the action of 6-7 September, when the distance between Companies I, K, and M and the NVA units was frequently 20 meters or less, the enemy demonstrated that he had personnel who could speak some English phrases without any noticeable accent.

g. Enemy Troop Losses:

KIA (C)	315
KIA (P)	307
KBA (C)	53
KBA (P)	140


8. Mission


During the execution of Operation SWIFT, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission of deliberate search and destroy the enemy forces, and to conduct detail sweeps within the zone of action to disrupt and destroy enemy lines of communication, supply and administrative bases.

9. Concept of Operation

At 042130H the Alfa Command Group and Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines commenced a helilift from Hill 63 to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base at Que Son. The helilift was completed at 042230H. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(rein) departed the Que Son patrol base at 042335H to assist Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines who were under attack at the time. (See Enclosure (1))

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
3121
22 Sept 196710. Execution

a. 4 September 1967

- (1) At 1110H Company K was chopped to 1st Bn, 5th Marines.
- (2) At 1150H Company M was chopped to 1st Bn, 5th Marines.
- (3) At 1545H Company I was chopped to the 5th Marines.
- (4) At 1605H assumed OPCON of Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.
- (5) At 1900H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the 5th Marines Frag Order for operation SWIFT.
- (6) At 2130H the Alfa Command Group with Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines commenced a hoilift to Quo Son. The lift was completed at 2230H.
- (7) At 2335H the unit departed Quo Son by foot march to attack the onomy force and relieve the pressure of the assault on Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

b. 5 September 1967

- (1) At 0420H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines assumed operational control of Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (2) At 0720H the Alfa Command Group with Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines arrived at the patrol base (BT 076333) of Companies B and D. The position was immediately consolidated and police of the battl-field conducted. During the remainder of the day the evacuation of casualties and equipment was conducted. Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was assigned the mission to conduct definite search and destroy operations in the area adjacent to the patrol base.
- (3) At 0850H Company B captured a Vietnamese National male dressed in a grey uniform with an M-79 grenade launcher and 15 rounds of M-79 ammunition, four magazines for an AK-47 and various items of 782 gear associated with

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
3121
22 Sept 1967

the North Vietnamese Army units. The prisoner was hiding in a cave which contained a body dressed in the same uniform as the prisoner.

(4) At 1130H Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at coordinates BT 07733 discovered three freshly dug graves. Uncovering the graves the Marines found in each a dead NVA and items of 782 gear. The graves were recovered. The equipment was evacuated to the 5th Marines S-2.

(5) At 1210H Marines from Company D discovered fourteen freshly dug graves at BT 075325. Each grave contained the body of a dead NVA soldier. The graves were recovered.

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3121
22 September 1967

(6) The Battalion remained in the patrol base the remainder of the night and conducted alert, aggressive night patrols and ambushes.

c. 6 September 1967

(1) At 0600H the Battalion commenced the attack to the south-east. (See Enclosure (1))

(2) At 0820H operational control of Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was passed to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Operational control of Companies I, K, and M, was assumed by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(3) At 0830H operational control of a heavy section of tanks from Company A, 1st Tank Battalion was passed to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines from the 5th Marines.

(4) At 1110H the second tank in column detonated a mine of unknown type at BT 105343. The right tread and the center road wheels of the tank were damaged.

(5) At 1130H Company K at BT 100320 while moving in the attack discovered three freshly covered graves. The graves each contained a body of a dead NVA soldier.

(6) At 1410H the operational control of the heavy section of tanks from A Company was returned to the 5th Marines due to the extensive delay anticipated in repairing the damaged tank.

(7) At 1530H Company I in the attack at BT 121323, made a heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force. The initial contact was light but as the Marines advanced further into the objective the volume of enemy fire quickly increased. By the volume of fire and the automatic weapons present the enemy forces were estimated at least a battalion reinforced and possibly two battalions in strength.

(8) At 1620H Company K was diverted from the mission of consolidating a battalion objective at BT 122312, and assigned the mission of assisting Company I which was heavily engaged with the enemy forces.

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UNCLASSIFIED

2121
22 September 1967

(9) At 1910H Company K fought into the position, linked up with Company I and established a two company perimeter defense at BT 123322. Both companies were heavily engaged. The enemy force assaulted the perimeter on three occasions, each occasion the attack was repulsed with heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy. During this period the companies were continually consolidating the position and attempting to recover the casualties who were scattered throughout the battlefield.

(10) At 2000H the battalion's reserve company, Company M, was committed to reinforce Companies I and K who were still heavily engaged and the Alfa Command Group established a defensive perimeter at BT 113321.

(11) At 2210H Company M reached Company I and K's positions and began consolidating. It was at this time the enemy contact began to decrease. However throughout the night there was sporadic automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire as the enemy covered their withdrawal. During this contact riot control gas was employed by a UH-1E gunship and evaluated to very effective in disrupting the enemy's attack.

(12) At 2400H Companies, I, K and M consolidated the defensive position. They began to extract the casualties and administer first-aid. During this contact Marine casualties were 34 KIA, 88 WIA (medovac) and 21 WIANE. Conservative enemy casualties were 83 confirmed KIA 105 probable. During the contact the infantry units were supported extensively by UH-1E gunships and the "spooky" gunship with both illumination and fire support. There was no assessment of KIAs. However, on two selected occasions the following was reported.

(a) The UH-1E gunship reported to have over 100 NVA in the open and began firing on them.

(b) The "spooky" gunship spotted a position with four 50 cal machine guns. Intensive fire was delivered on the position and the firing ceased.

d. 7 September 1967

(1) At 0900H a Company M combat patrol searching the area around BT 128323 discovered four graves. Each grave contained the body of a dead NVA soldier.

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3121

22 September 1967

(2) The remainder of the day the Battalion consolidated a position at BT 119322, evacuated the casualties and equipment from the battlefield and conducted aggressive search and destroy operations in the immediate vicinity.

(3) At 1400H LtCol W. K. ROCKEY assumed command of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(4) At 1800H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines assumed operational control of Company H, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and Company L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines from the 5th Marines.

c. 8 September 1967


(1) At 0915H Company M in movement to a new patrol base observed 8 to 10 VC with weapons hiding in a treeline at coordinates 130326. One VC was shot by a scout-sniper and was observed being dragged away by the other VC in the treeline. An airstrike controlled by Klondike was run on the area. The AO reported approximately 30 VC/NVA in the treeline and assessed 10 KBA.

(2) At 1045H Company H received 10 rounds sniper fire from unknown number of enemy at BT 137332. Returning fire they swept the area and found in a foxhole one ChiCom 7.62 carbine and 4 rounds 7.62 ammo. There was no evidence of enemy casualties.

(3) At 1245H a Klondike spotted a NVA with grey uniform in a rice paddy. Klondike contacted Company M. A Company M squad challenged the NVA who ran from area. The squad challenged again and when the NVA continued to run he was shot and killed. The dead man was dressed in a NVA uniform.

(4) At 1715H a Marine from Company L detonated an unknown type mine at BT 126315 resulting in one Marine WIA medevac.

(5) At 1800H a Marine from Company M detonated a mine at coordinates BT 123321 resulting in two Marine WIA medevacs. Search of the area discovered two M-83 mines that were destroyed in place.



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3121

22 September 1967

(6) The remainder of the night the Battalion conducted aggressive combat security/ambush patrols.

f. 9 September 1967

(1) At first light, the Battalion commenced detailed search and destroy operations to secure patrol bases as follows:

(a) Command Post, Company I, Company K and Company L were located at BT 133314.

(b) Company H and Company M were located at BT 136321.

(2) At 1230H Company M found at BT 137320 one land mine with markings U.S. Bomb Frag BLU-3/8 Lot LOP 2-19, 5-66; one 60mm mortar round with pressure type fuse and one M-16 magazine with 20 rounds in a small cave. Engineers destroyed all equipment except the M-16 magazine and ammunition.

(3) At 1235H a Company H platoon received small arms fire from estimated 10 VC/NVA in a hamlet. The platoon returned fire and called a 60mm mortar mission on the objective. The platoon assaulted the position and searched the hamlet. They found in a cave one dead VC in black pajamas with cartridge belt and a M-26 grenade. Further search revealed a dead VN boy about 12 years old. Interrogation of villagers indicated the boy was not from the village and was believed to be traveling with the VC band that had fired on approaching Marines. No solatium payment was made.

(4) At 1335H a Marine from Company M detonated an unknown type booby-trap resulting in one WIA medevac.

g. 10 September 1967

(1) At 0630H a combat patrol from Company M observed approximately 8 NVA in grey uniforms with weapons at BT 135325. The platoon commenced firing on the enemy and observed three enemy fall. The other NVA were seen dragging their three fallen comrades into the heavy underbrush. Searching the area the platoon found heavy blood trails leading into the brush but lost the trail about 15 meters into the heavy undergrowth.

(2) At 0800H a platoon patrol from Company H at BT 133325 on a search and destroy operation found a complete 60mm mortar unit, a U.S. helmet, two NVA uniform shirts, an AK-47 magazine, and 5 male VN hiding in a cave. The 5 males had marks on their shoulders of carrying a pack and recent

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3121
22 September 1967

vaccination scars on their arms. The detainees and captured equipment was forwarded to the 5th Marines S-2.

(3) At 1150H a combat patrol from Company M received six to eight rounds sniper fire as they approached a hamlet at BT 149322. Returning fire on the enemy they flushed out between 25 and 30 who withdrew quickly to the northeast. An AO called a 81mm mortar mission on the fleeing enemy and assessed 10 KIA probable.

(4) At 1520H a platoon of Company H made contact with an estimated enemy company in trenches at BT 128326. In the initial contact the Marine platoon was pinned down by heavy enemy automatic weapons fire. The Company Commander maneuvered another platoon to assist the engaged platoon. The maneuvering platoon immediately encountered stiff enemy resistance. At 1630H the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines committed Company M to support and assist Company H. Company M became engaged at BT 127327 as the Company Commander attempted to roll the flank of the enemy. The maneuver by Company M caused the enemy to reposition his forces to counter the attack by Company M. When the enemy repositioned it allowed Company H to maneuver and start to withdraw the casualties. A fixed wing strike was called by Company M on the entrenched enemy. The aircraft delivered napalm, 500 lb bombs and strafing runs. There was 100% target coverage.


(5) At approximately 1830H the Commanding Officer employed Company I and a small command group to move to a vantage point at BT 125317 to support the evacuation of the casualties and provide a secure landing zone.

(6) The enemy broke contact and began to withdraw from the position at about 2330H. The Battalion fired in excess of 120 rounds of 81mm mortars in support of Companies H and M in the attack and on the routes of enemy withdrawal. Casualties to friendly units were 9 KIA; 20 WIA and 3 WIA. Enemy casualties were 40 KIA confirmed; 17 KIA probable. There was no assessment given on the 81mm mortar mission on the enemy routes of withdrawal.

h. 11 September 1967

(1) At first light the position held by Companies M and H was consolidated and the evacuation of casualties and equipment began.

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2121

22 September 1967

(2) At 1030H a combat patrol from Company M searching the Battlefield at BT 127327 found a 60mm mortar sight and case. The serial number on the sight was 6529390 and the serial number on the case was 7692951.

(3) The remainder of the day the Battalion conducted deliberate search and destroy operations in the zone of action. At 1700H the companies were located at the following patrol bases.

(a) Command Post, Companies I, K, and L - BT 133314.

(b) Companies H and M - BT 138311.

The units established night activities at the following locations which are very revelent to the following action report.

(c) Company I - reinforced squad combat outpost BT 133312.


(d) Company K - reinforced plt combat outpost BT 128312.

(e) Company K - squad combat outpost BT 130312.

i. 12 September 1967

(1) At 0330H the squad combat outpost of Company I observed movement of a large enemy force moving west to east. Immediately the COP opened fire and began to take fire on their position. Approximately 10 minutes later the entire patrol base perimeter on the southern side began to receive fire from the enemy force estimated a NVA company and possibly two. The enemy force was equipped with automatic weapons and assault machine guns. The "spooky" gunship was utilized in illumination and fire support. At about 0530H the enemy force began to break contact and in an attempt to flee west were engaged by the Company K combat outpost. The enemy did not attempt to fight this force only suppress by fire. The combat outpost upon post action interview, estimated the enemy force to be two company in size. Casualties to the friendly units was 4 KIA; 1 DOW; 20 WIA; and 2 WIANE. The enemy suffered the following casualties; 35 KIA confirmed; 20 KIA probable and 4 PWs of which 3 died of wounds before they could be evacuated. The assessed probable casualty figure does not include an assessment of KBA.

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3121
22 September 1967

(2) The remainder of the day the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations and evacuated the casualties and equipment policed from the scene of battle.

(3) At 1700 the Battalion with Companies H and M loading the attack secured Task Force X-ray Objective 1 at BT 1530 with no enemy contact.

(4) The Battalion consolidated the position and during the remainder of the night conducted night security/ambush patrols from the patrol base.

j. 13 September 1967

(1) At 0800H Companies L and H commenced the attack on Regimental Objective A, at BT 1731. The objective was seized and secured at 1030H unopposed.

(2) At 1030H Companies K and M crossed the line of departure to attack, seize and secure Task Force Objective 2, located at BT 1830 and BT 1831. The objective was secured unopposed at 1430H. The Battalion immediately commenced to consolidate the position, establish a patrol base and conduct deliberate search and destroy operations in the objective area.

(3) At 1700H the Battalion was tasked the mission to conduct a helilift from the present position to a secure LZ at BT 1639 and attack south to support the 1st RVN Ranger Task Group units at BT 1635.

(4) At 2000H the leading elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines commenced the helilift from LZ at BT 158388.

(5) At 2100H after Company I and a platoon from Company H had been lifted out, the landing zone came under attack by snipers with automatic weapons. Two Marines were wounded requiring medevac. The remainder of the helilift was cancelled.

(6) At 2130H Company I and the platoon from Company H was chopped to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(7) At 2330H the 3rd Battalion (-)(rein) commenced a foot march from BT 158388 to Hill 35 at BT 2231.

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3121
22 September 1967

k. 14 September 1967

(1) At 0630H the leading elements reached the objective area at Hill 35.

(2) At 0800H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines commenced a helilift from Hill 35 (Hill 29) to a landing zone at BT 136367 to attack, seize and secure the Hill 53 complex at BT 129369 and prepare to continue the attack to the west.

(3) At 0840H the leading elements of the Battalion set down in the landing zone unopposed and commenced the attack on Hill 53.

(4) At 0910H the last elements of the Battalion landed in the LZ.

(5) At 0930H Company L secured Hill 53 unopposed. The Battalion commenced consolidation of the objective and landing zone areas and began preparations to continue the attack.

(6) At 1630H the Battalion was relieved of the security of Hill 53 by the 1st ARVN Ranger Task Group.

(7) At 1630H the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines with Companies K and H in the lead commenced the attack to the Regimental Objective D at BT 1137.

(8) At 1830H Companies H and K secured Objective D. Companies L, M and the Command Post followed in trace and began consolidation of the Objective area.


(9) Throughout the remainder of the night the Battalion consolidated the position and conducted aggressive night security/ambush patrols.

1. 15 September 1967

(1) At 0800H Company H commenced the move from Objective D to a LZ at BT 156387 followed in trace by Company L, the Command Post, Companies M and K.

(2) At 0930H Company H, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was chopped to 5th Marines for helilift to 2/5 area.

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3121

22 September 1967

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(3) At 1030H operational control of Company I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was returned to parent organization from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

(4) At 1200H all units of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines were in the assembly area for truck movement to Hill 63 combat base.

(5) At 1600H all units of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines had returned to Hill 63 Combat base and Operation SWIFT was terminated.

11. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC/NVA personnel casualties inflicted based upon post operation debriefing.

(a) NVA KIA (confirmed) - 313 (includes 53 confirmed KBA)

(b) NVA KIA (probable) - 307 (includes 140 probable KBA)

(c) VC KIA (confirmed) - 2

(d) Detainees - 11 (7 processed to 7th ITT)

(e) PWs: (NVA) - 5

(2) The compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed is included in paragraph 7 (Intelligence portion).

(3) The following is a compilation of equipment and material loss or captured from the Marines units.

(a) One AN/PRC 25 Serial No 3323

(b) Two 7.62 Machine Guns, M-60 Serial No 48639 & 20510.

(c) Four M-16 Serial Nos unknown at present

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3121

22 September 1967

b. Friendly

- (1) KIA - 48 + (1 DOW)
- (2) WIA - 130 + (26 WIANE)

12. Administration

a. Resupply

(1) Resupply of all classes of materials was accomplished from the logistical support area at Hill 63.

(2) The HST net was used as a logistical and helicopter control net.

(3) Difficulty was encountered with resupply in two areas.

(a) The resupply orders were never fully completed.

(b) Clothing resupply was barely adequate at best.

b. Maintenance

(1) Normal maintenance was accomplished in the field.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization


(1) There was at times a problem in the evacuation of casualties. This was the first time during the summer campaign that this Command has experienced difficulty in evacuating casualties from the field. At times it took 48 hours to get KIA's from the battlefield, 24 to 30 hours to evacuate routine and priority WIAs. It is understandable that the mass casualties created a problem normally not experienced but there was a definite lack of helicopter availability to support an operation of this size.


(2) The emergency medevac helicopters as usual were outstanding in terms of timeliness and aggressiveness in evacuation of seriously wounded Marines.

d. Transportation

(1) No problems were encountered with transportation.

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3121

22 September 1967

(2) A particular note should be made of the heli-lift of this Battalion on the morning of 14 September. It took only 30 minutes to helilift this Battalion from the time the first Marine set foot in the tactical LZ until the final load disembarked from the helicopters. This quick build up of forces enables the Battalion Commander to gain rapid control of the landing zone and still have sufficient forces to continue the attack if necessary. This lift was a classic example of the Marine Corps doctrine of vertical envelopment. The utilization of the CH 53 helicopter was the single contributing factor to the rapid troop build up. The value of this aircraft is unquestionable from a ground commander's view point.

e. Communications

(1) Operational Communications were maintained throughout Operation SWIFT by utilizing the AN/PRC-25. This radio, again, proved to be highly reliable in voice communication.

(2) This Battalion experienced some communications difficulty with the enemy electronic interference of the nets. However, quick and positive action was taken to switch to alternate frequencies to eliminate the problems when the jamming occurred on the Battalion frequency.


(3) Considerable difficulty was encountered with the life span of the BA 386. The life of the battery was about half of past experience. Investigation revealed that batteries (BA 386) received in resupply were ones on which shelf life terminal dates had expired.

f. Medical Evacuation

(1) Total number of medical evacuations	- 226
(2) Killed in Action	- 48
(3) Wounded in Action	- 131
(4) Wounded in Action Non Evac	- 26
(5) Non Combat Deaths	- 0
(6) Non Combat Injuries	- 27

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20



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Sept 1967

13. Commander's Analysis

a. Following large engagements during Operation SWIFT, this Battalion was allowed sufficient time to conduct search and destroy operations in the immediate area. However, when operating in well known and/or suspected enemy logistical support areas the Battalion did not have time to adequately search for the supply caches. On at least three instances it would have been advantageous to establish a battalion patrol base and conduct detail search and destroy operations.

b. During Operation SWIFT friendly artillery impacted in the positions of the Battalion on three occasions, inflicting a total of four Marines wounded in action. The causes appeared to be:

(1) The position of the friendly unit was on the gun-target line; and,

(2) On two occasions the battery was firing at maximum range with the friendly units on the gun-target line. Recognizing this danger efforts should be initiated to assign the mission to a battery that will have friendly units free of the gun-target line.

c. Problems encountered with medical evacuation and resupply are worthy of further discussion. The prime problem was simply lack of available helicopters to support the logistical load. The Battalion experienced at one time a 30 hour delay in evacuating wounded Marines. Even though the evacuees were not in an emergency status it is felt this time period was excessive. There was also a delay of 48 hours in evacuating the remains of deceased Marines. The availability of the helicopters also caused a delay in resupply. These areas create a problem to the ground commander in that exploitation of this initial success and continuation of the attack is slowed until the logistical requirements are accomplished.

d. Operation SWIFT is considered successful in terms of experience gained, disorganization of the established North Vietnamese Army units, the temporary disruption of his supply routes and inflicting losses on his personnel.

14. Recommendations:

(1) That on future operations consideration be given to obtain helicopter support from any available source.

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3121

22 September 1967

(2) That in future helilifts consideration be given to include CS gas in preparing LZ's just prior to the first wave landing.

(3) That consideration be given to allow units more time to conduct detailed search and destroy operations, particularly in well known and suspected enemy logistic support areas.

B. R. Cummins
B. R. CUMMINS
By direction

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AFTER ACTION SUMMARY OPERATION SHELBYVILLE1. Intelligence

a. During the planning for Operation SHELBYVILLE the enemy was known or suspected to have the following forces disposed in the area of operation:

Q-13 Company Reported at BT 0251 in late August; suspected of early September displacement to BT 1052.

Q-15 Company With suspected disposition at BT 0360.

R-20 Battalion Reported at AT 8852 in mid-August; suspected of early September displacement to AT 9952.

V-25 Battalion Reported at BT 0654 and BT 1952 in mid-September.

b. This whole area, including the Island, is a movement route from the Western side of the "Rocket Belt" to the suspected VC supply center at Cho Ba Market area, BT 2044. Accordingly, many pre-operation intelligence reports were available indicating as many as five enemy Battalions. Third Battalion, Fifth Marines' pre-operation estimate reported one VC Battalion (Main Force) harboring on the Island; Q-13 Company and unknown elements of the V-25 Battalion, possibly a recon element with missions in the AO.

c. During the conduct of the operation, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines is believed to have had contact with one VCMF company on the night of 23 September 1967 at BT 027528. A second major contact was had on 25 September 1967 with one VCMF or NVA company at BT 004528. During this contact, the enemy established a "U" shaped ambush and engaged Lima Company after India Company had previously moved through the same general area.

d. No major (Platoon or Company) contact developed during the operation.

e. Several snipers, individuals, and three man teams continued to attempt the delay of the Battalion's advance.

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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f. Terrain

(1) The whole area of operation was characterized by flat terrain flanked by two generally East-West rivers about four to five feet in depth in the South to over twelve feet in the North branch of Song Ky Lam.

(2) The vegetation takes many forms, ranging from very thick bamboo treelines to high, thick grass and vines. This vegetation is so thick and frequent that fields of fire were never greater than 200 meters and, most often, less than 100. The single uniform exception to this were the few rice paddies formed in the central "Island" area only.

g. Population

(1) Detailed and/or brief screening interviews were conducted of the Vietnamese farm families by the Battalion Intelligence personnel. From these 26 interviews the following facts or Vietnamese opinions developed.

(a) Of the people who lived on the "Island" 12 to 16 months ago, only one for every four now remain in the area.

(b) Only six non-hostile Vietnamese males were observed out of some 140+ people seen from the center of the Island to the Western river shores. Of these, all were over 50 years of age. All the families claimed that the younger, heads of the house, were in Da Nang working.

(c) The families and the living quarters were observed to be poorer than normally found in Que Son and Thang Binh Provinces.

h. Rice Harvest

(1) The few Dien Ban rice fields in the area of operation, according to 16 Vietnamese sources, are expected to yield not more than 1200 Tons of rice, starting on 1 October 1967. -

(a) It was difficult for the Vietnamese to explain who was going to harvest the rice with all the men "working in Da Nang" and, based on previous answers to screening questions, not expected to return for "several months." One single source, a 74 year old man, personally interviewed by

DECLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE (3)
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the Battalion Intelligence Officer, admitted that squads of VC from the South and North of the Island would come to help with the harvest. In some cases, the VC individually or in small groups own the fields.

i. Structure and Ground Damage

(1) The area covered by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines evidenced extensive damage to homes, out-buildings and fields as a result of aerial and artillery bombardment. Those few people remaining on the Island, who were strongly suspected of being VC families, were indifferent to the bombardment.

(a) The man-made cover against artillery and medium ordnance, were found to be professional and extensive. Deep communication trenches and extra reinforced bunkers were far too numerous to plot on a map.

j. Enemy Rocket Information

(1) None of the Vietnamese Nationals interviewed claimed to have any knowledge of enemy rockets. Additionally, most of them knew of the 100,000 piasters reward for rocket information but none believed the Government would let them keep the money.

k. Enemy Losses

KIA (C) - 30
KIA (P) - 34
WIA (C) - 3
WIA (P) - 9

l. Enemy Equipment Captured

1 M-60 Machinegun
6 Mixed auto and semi-auto rifles
21 Chi Com Grenades (All destroyed in place)
18 Items of serviceable "782" gear, VC and NVA
900 lbs (Approx) of hidden polished rice (given to local villagers in equal shares)
20 lbs of NVA class medical service gear (destroyed in place)

2. Mission

To establish blocking positions by H-hour on D-day along the south bank of the Song Chiem Son River in the assigned AO

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to prevent enemy withdrawal or exfiltration to the south. To conduct deliberate and thorough search and destroy operations to kill, capture, and destroy enemy forces and equipment.

3. Concept of Operation

At 211600H Company I departed the Hill 63 Combat Base and moved North along Route #1 to the intersection of Highway #537 (BT 095528) then West to the blocking position at BT 015518. At 211800H Companies K and L and the Alpha Command Group followed in trace of Company I blocking positions at BT 048528 for Company K and BT 031529 for Company L and the Alpha Command Group.

4. Execution. See Operations Overlay.

a. 21 September 1967

(1) At 1130H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received the First Marines Operation Order for Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(2) At 1600H Company I departed Hill #63 as the advance guard for the Battalion (-), to move to the attack position at BT 015516.

(3) At 1800H Companies K, L and the Alpha Command Group departed Hill #63 for attack positions east of Company I. Company L with the Alpha Command Group at BT 032513 and Company K at BT 049512.

(4) At 2100H Company L received fire from an ARVN compound at BT 127480 wounding one Marine. Order was restored, coordination again made and the march continued at 2230H.

b. 22 September 1967

(1) At 0230H 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines chopped to 1st Marines for Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(2) At 0700H all companies commenced the attack into their respective blocking positions. Company I received approximately 20 sniper rounds from an estimated 3 VC from the vicinity of BT 023515. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative results. One Marine WIA.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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(3) At 0830H Company L while conducting a search and destroy patrol saw 5 VC with weapons fleeing across a river at BT 031525. A search of the area revealed 5 VC KIA confirmed with one weapon captured along with various 782 gear.

(4) At 1115H Company I spotted two VC across the river at BT 008524. Both were carrying weapons and taken under fire. Results were one VC KIA confirmed through field glasses and one VC KIA probable seen to fall and drag himself into the brush. The area wasn't searched because of boundary and barrier restriction.

(5) All companies organized patrol bases in their objective areas and conducted local night activities.

c. 23 September 1967

(1) At 1000H the scout-sniper team with Company K spotted 4 VC wearing black and carrying weapons across the river moving into the treeline. The sniper fired 4 rounds and saw 3 VC fall and lay still. The fourth made it into the treeline.

(2) At 1200H Companies I and L along with the Alpha Command Group repositioned their blocking positions. Company I moved to BT 036523 and Company L with the GP moved to BT 030524. All units continued to conduct aggressive search and destroy patrolling of our AO.

(3) At 1425H the leading elements of Company I tripped what was believed to be a M-26 frag grenade booby-trap with a vine trip wire across the trail at BT 027523. Three (3) WIA Medevac.

(4) At 1526H the Alpha Command Group found approximately 200 lbs of rice and 200 lbs of salt at BT 035522. Kit Carson Scouts divided the rice and salt up in equal shares and handed it out to the families in the immediate area.

(5) At 1600H a Marine from Company L tripped a M-26 frag grenade booby-trap while moving through a hedgerow. One WIA Medevac.

(6) At 1730H Company K spotted 6 VN males and 3 VN females running from a patrol at BT 040522. Two of the males were carrying weapons and fired 2 rounds S/A fire at the patrol. The patrol returned fire. Search of the area revealed 2 VC KIA confirmed, one captured US carbine along with two blood trails leading from area indicating (2) VC KIA probable.

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(7) At 2030H a Company L, LP at BT 028529 sighted through a Starlight Scope 20 camouflaged VC. The LP took the enemy under fire and was withdrawn to the main COP.

(8) At 2115H a Company L platoon size Combat outpost at BT 027528 was taken under sniper fire and occasional incoming grenades. Enemy fire was received from all sides throughout the night until 240330H. During the night both flare-ships and fire-flies were employed with excellent results. No friendly casualties were received with one NVA KIA confirmed and 20 KIA probables estimated from extensive blood trails and drag marks.

d. 24 September 1967

(1) At 0730H all units began moving to a river fording site at BT 012521.

(2) At 0900H Company I received approximately 10 rounds incoming sniper fire from BT 013513. Blackcoat adjusted an 81mm mortar mission and a platoon swept through the area observing 3 VC in green uniforms with weapons moving into the brush. The platoon took them under fire and saw 2 VC fall. Results of search located 2 distinct blood trails but no VC bodies. No friendly casualties and 2 VC KIA probables.

(3) At 1100H Dreamhour 3-4 spotted 20-30 VC in the open at BT 007518 to AT 990516. Dreamhour controlled two flights of fixed wing with the following results: 6 VC EDA confirmed, 5 VC EDA probable, and 5 fighting holes destroyed.

(4) At 1730H the leading elements of Company I were taken under heavy auto and semi-automatic S/A fire at BT 010525. Company I returned fire immediately but the enemy broke contact and moved NW. Five (5) friendly WIA's Modevac.

(5) At 1830H all units had consolidated at BT 010524 and conducted local night activities.

e. 25 September 1967

(1) At 1130H Company L received heavy semi automatic, automatic S/A fire and M-79 fire from an estimated 20-25 VC dug in the vicinity of BT 005527. Artillery was requested but was ineffective due to numerous check fires because of helicopters in area. Fixed wing was requested with negative results. Aircraft were launched but were diverted for a higher priority elsewhere. 81mm mortars were effectively employed. Results: 5 WIA Modevac, friendly.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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(2) At 1330H Company L detected 3 M16A1 Bouncing Betty mines at BT 003526. All were blown in place.

(3) At 1550H the scout sniper team attached to Company K spotted 2 VC with weapons at BT 015520. The sniper fired 2 rounds and saw one VC fall and remain in position. The second fled into the tall grass. Area was not searched because of boundary and barrier but was kept under surveillance until dark with negative results. One VC KIA confirmed.

(4) At 1600H one erratic 81mm mortar round fell short at BT 010524 killing two Marines and wounding five others. All were evacuated immediately and no other ammunition from that particular lot was fired. Investigation has been conducted. Results: faulty ammunition-Required reports submitted.

(5) At 1710H the Alpha Command Group received a heavy volume of S/A fire and M-79 rounds from BT 010519 to BT 014520 from an estimated 15(+) VC. An airstrike was run and the enemy immediately broke contact and fled south. Results: one VC KIA confirmed and one VC KIA probable. One Marine KIA and one Marine WIA Medevac.

(6) At 1900H all units consolidated at BT 006528 and conducted local night activities.

f. 26 September 1967

(1) At 0700H Company L continued the attack to secure Objective #1 at AT 999528 with Companies K, I and GP in trace. After securing Objective #1 Company K passed through Company L and continued the attack to Objective #2 at AT 986528.


(2) At 1635H Company K, while conducting thorough search and destroy in the vicinity of AT 981529, found one NVA KIA in a trench line. Enemy had black trousers and a green jacket on but had no weapon. 1 VC KIA confirmed.

(3) At 1805H all units consolidated in the vicinity of AT 985528 and conducted local night activities.

(4) At 2135H a Company L squad size combat outpost spotted 3 VC with heavy camouflage moving in a westerly direction at AT 988530. Outpost took them under fire and heard one VC yell loudly. Search of area at first light revealed one heavy drag mark - one VC KIA probable.

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g. 27 September 1967

(1) At 0730H the attack was continued with Companies K and L abreast with Company I and the CP moving in trace, to the vicinity of AT051438 and then to the vicinity of AT 969553.

(2) At 1100H Company L found 2 NVA KIA confirmed at AT 976528. Both appeared to have been hit with 81mm mortars. Both had NVA uniforms, packs, cartridge belts and weapons. One K-44 and one M-60 machine gun.

(3) At 1610H Company I while sweeping through their ZOA found 2 VC hiding along the river bank at AT 970554. Both were taken under fire before they could throw a grenade and were killed. The search of the area revealed 6 ChiCom grenades, 2 packs and 3 cartridge belts along with one US 30 Cal Carbine, one MAS 36 rifle and one SKS rifle.


h. 28 September 1967

(1) At 0700H Operation SHELBYVILLE terminated.

(2) At 0935H all units moved to the vicinity of AT 928528 for helilift to Hill #63.

(3) At 1300H the first units began lifting back to Hill #63.

(4) At 1620H the last unit arrived at Hill 63.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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