

HEADQUARTERS 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

O San Francisco, California 96602

3/PES/dab 5750 1 Nov 1967

From:

Commanding Officer

To:

Commanding General, 1st Marine Div (Rein)

Via:

Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj:

Command Chronology for period 010001H Oct 67 to 312400H

Oct 67.

Ref:

(a)

MCO 5750.2A FMF Pac0 5750.8 (b)

(c) Div0 5750.2B

Encl: **V**(1) Command Chronology Report


1). In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), the Command Chronology for the month of Odtober with enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

K. ROCKEY

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HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 010001H Oct 67 to 312400H Oct 67

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Events






PART I ATA DAGITAZINADAO

		•
DESIGNATION	COMMANDER	PERIOD COVERED
3rd Battalion, 5th	Marines LtCol W.K. ROCKEY	7 Sept 67
	SUBORDINATE UNITS	:
H&S Company	Capt R.J. MARNELL Capt L.W. FARMER	30Sept-160ct67 Since 170ct67
Company I	Capt J.A. SPEICHER	30Sept67
Company K	Capt J.R. TENNEY	25May67
Company L	lstLt R.E. MULLER = Capt J.D. NICTIS	5Sept67-50ct67 Since 6 Oct67
Company M	Capt J.D. MURRAY	LAug67
	STAFF OFFICERS	
Executive Officer	Maj B.R. CUMMINS Maj R.C. WISE	22Apr-110ct67 Since 120ct67
S-1 Adjutant	1stLt J.W. HORTON	8Aug67
S-2	latLt D.R. DUNAGAN	2Ju167
S-3	Maj P.E. SHAW	5Aug67
S- 4	1stLt W.W. KING	19May67
S-5	lstLt G.E. CWSLEY	8Aug67
<u>A</u>	VERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH	. '.
USMC		USN
OFF ENL	OF	F ENL
38 1007	3	55







PART. II NARRATIVE SUMMARY

There currently exists in the Command the need for a Captain, 0402. At present the billet is being filled by a Lieutenant, 0302. First Sorgeants are currently assigned to each Company.


At present, all Companies in the Battalion are commanded by Captains. Officer strength and enlisted strength is at a minimum for operational commitments.

The Battalion Intelligence collection and processing activities during October included the development and distribution of five intelligence estimates and summaries, four terrain and communication trafficability studies and ning other information publications for operating companies. Intelligence reporting embraced the foregoing and at least two Battalion/Company Staff briefings per day.

Enemy activities were confined to two platoon demonstration/probing assaults in the southern quadrant of the TAOR, local sniping and scattered wire laying.

The Battalion has completed Operation BAXTER, 19 Oct67 to 21 Oct67 and a multi-Company Operation in cooperation with ARVN forces, 27 Oct67 to 30 Oct67. There has been intensive patrolling within the Rocket Belt.

At the present time there are no major communications problems.





PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Topics


(a) Porsonnel and Administration

- (1) The Battalion began the month of October with an on rolls strength of 38 Marine Officers, 1104 Marine Enlisted, 3 Navy Officers and 56 Navy Enlisted. Our current on roll strength is 38 Marine Officers, 1007 Marine Enlisted, 3 Navy Officers and 55 Navy Enlisted.
- (2) Four Marine Officers are TAD leaving an effective strength of 38 Marine Officers. There are also 28 Marine Enlisted not chargeable and 93 Marine Enlisted non-officetive. The current effective strength of the Battalian is 34 Marine Officers and 886 Marine Enlisted.
- (3) Three Marine Officers and 95 Marine Enlisted are scheduled for rotation during November 1967 as shown below.

MOS	RANK	NUMBER
0302 7552 03 01 25 2111 2031 3042 3371 3531 4131 7051	Captain Captain	21 69 7 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1

(4) Critical MOS Shortages are shown below

MOS	ML	OH	SHORTAGE
0130	2	1	1 WC





MOS	ML	OH	SHORTAGE .
0402	1	. 0	1 Captain
2311	1	0	1 Corporal
281 1	1	. 0	1 Corporal
2815	2	1	1 Corporal
2867	1	0	1 Staff Sergeant

b. Intelligance

- (1) Personnel. During the month of October the Battalion Intelligence/Scout Section lost a Cpl 03ll, Chief Scout, on normal rotation and a Sgt 03ll, Intelligence Assistant, for CAP Training and subsequent duty therewith.
- (a) S-2 attachments, including MP's IT Team, ITT Team, Scout Dog Teams, Scout Sniper Teams, total 1 officer, 16 Enlisted and 2 dogs.
- (2) <u>Intelligence Collection</u>. The displacement from Hill 63 to the present Combat Base dring the first week of October required a maximum information collection effort to develop terrain, enemy activities, 005 and trafficabiltly within the new TASR.
- (a) Three days following this displacement, the S-2 Section published an initial intelligence study on the TAOR. Within three weeks, sufficient information has been collected to publish the following:

Three seperate Intelligence Estimates for Battalion size Operations.

Two separate Intelligence Studies for Company size Operations.

Two terrain studies w/water and trafficability overlays.


One Bridge and Road Etudy with Overlay.

Six training/guidance memorandums to Companies on collecting/processing information.

Four detailed Blacklists, by Operational area.

One White List of all known US and allied Officers/officials having direct responsibilities on activities within the Battalion TAOR.





(3) Intelligence Reporting

- (a) (See also para l.b. (2) above)
- (b) Submitted three intelligence reports of interviews/interrogations conducted in the field. Reports include recent enemy activities, location of positions and names of infrastructure personnel.
- (c) Battalion S-2 Officer and Chief conducted not less than one Battalion Commander and Staff intelligence briefing, one individual Company and two special briefings each day.

(4) Enemy Activity

(a) Synopsis

Disposed in the TAOR, the local, semifixed Viet Comg have 150 to 180 men and women under arms. These local guerrillas have been found to be organized into cells of from 3-7 members for the conduct of most activities.

During the month of October, the local Viet Cong have confined themselves to sniping and scattered mining. There is some evidence that groups of 15 to 20 Viet Cong have engaged TIGER One (formerly Tiger Seven) and TIGER TWO (formerly Tiger Six).

Viet Cong Main Force (VCMF) and Company sized or smaller elements of NVA formations are known to have tactically moved in the Southern quadrant of our TADR, in East-West movements.


Some evidence that, a team of NVA snipers are working in this TACR, was manifest in several examples of enemy, long range, single shot targeting of Marines and allied troops.

The local Viet Cong in this TAOR, while trying to maintain representation in the majority of the hamlets, tend to favor those locations reasonably near a surface/water communication route.

The risk of having an active guerrilla in this TAOR, with the possible exception of the Southern quandrant, has increased in the past two years. As a result, the Combat effectiveness and determination of the remaining Viet Cong guerrillas experienced during October is responsibly rated as good to excellent.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

ENCLOSURE (1)



The local Viet Cong engaged by 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines has been effectively without coherent reinforcement ability. He has not engaged friendly forces on a scale larger than squad size.

- (5) Vietnamese Attachments. The Battalion has two excellent Vietnamese SSgt interpreters who are continually employed in support of Combat Operations. One interpreter charged to the roles of the S-2 Section, is activly engaged with S-5 and MEDCAP programs.
- (6) <u>Kit Carsons</u>. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines has five excellent, combat proven K_it Carsons who have been with this organization since they organization Chieu Hoi'ed. It is noted that these Kit Carsons are the product of twenty-two Chieu Hoi trainees screened in the past six months.
- (7) Enemy Losses. The enemy suffered the following casualties as a result of the 3rd Battalion actions this month.

KIA (c) 3 KIA (p) 2 WIA (c) 2 WIA (p) 1

DETAINEES 21 (only 3 classified as civil defendants. All others were interviewed for information and released as innocent civilians)

(8) Weather

- (a) Rain. During the month of October, approximately 10.5 inches of rain fell in the TAUR, and this almost exclusively during the 4 to 10 October interrupted storm. This short-term concentration caused flooding of rice paddies to a frequent height of 5 to 52 feet. The surface communications on National Highway One, between Song Cau Lau, in the South, and the South Danang bridges were impassible in six known locations.
 - (b) Temperature. Average High: 88 degrees Average Low: 69 degrees
 - (c) <u>Light.</u> Average Sunrise: 0637 Average Sunsot: 1820
 - (d) <u>Winds</u>. Exclusive of the winds generated by a storm on 8 October (6-9 Oct.), the winds average 7 knots.






It was noted that when the rice paddies were flooded the unit leader of night activities reported that the noise of the wind across the flooded paddies was so loud and of varying audio frequencies that it was extremely hard for one Marine to hear another not more distant than five meters.

- (9) Torrain. The TAOR is flat and without a single contour line. Consisting largely of rice paddies, the only ground features of military consequences are the hamlets and sub-hamlets, each with very thick bamboo treelines and the principal rivers. (See AMS Series L7014, sheet 6640 I)
- (a) This Battalion has commenced several special purpose terrain/trafficability studies of the whole TAOR. Major sections of these studies are complete and should prove to be of value during all seasons.
- (10) Itemized Account of Emeny Equipment Costured or Destroyed

Rifles/Carbines: Two (hidden seperately in false walls) Hand Grenades: U.S. Type: Four Handmado: 32 (seven inert) Bayonet, M-16 1 Blasting Caps: 78 (Type used for home made grenades and many boobytraps) M-79 round: 1 e30 Cal rounds, loose: 92 .30 Cal rounds, linked: 24 .50 Cal rounds, linked: 96 C-3 type explosive powder: 10 pounds (plus) in opened end can 5.56 rounds, loose: 15 81 mm mortar round; dud: 1 Radio receiver, tubed, civilian sales Vanguard (made in Japan without power supply: Documents; local Viet Cong military and personal communications: 35 Uniforms, enemy type, mixed: 5

c. Training

(1) The time spent in formal class instruction this month has increased. The emphasis was placed on subject areas which are of vital importance to the individual Marine and to the small unit in combat operations.





These classes included minos and boobytraps, marksmanship, fire control, patrolling, ambushes and proper search technique.

- (2) The S=3 has conducted two indoctrination Schools. Classes on FO and FAC procedure, and care, cleaning, maintenance and safety of the M-16Al Rifle are included in the school syllabus.
- (3) All units Fam Fired their individual weapons at least twice this month. All crow served weapons have been fired, with the exception of 106mm Recoiless Rifles.
 - (4) Personnel attended the following schools
 - (a) Okinawa

Vietnamese Language School	7
Armo Tech School	4
Military Justice School	1
Embarkation	2

(b) Da Nang

Cap School	. 3
Land Mine Warfare	22
Embarkation School	6
Personal Response	. 2
Psy-Warfare	1

(c) Japan

Registered Pubs School


Operations


- (1) From 010730H Company I, Company L and the Alpha Command Group participated in a multi-Company Operation in the Que Son Valley. At 011820H Company I and the Alpha Command Group returned to Hill 63.
- (2) At 021600H Companey I, and the Alpha Command Group displaced from Hill 63 enroute to 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Combat Base.
- (3) At 031615H Company I displaced from Hill 63 to 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines Combat Base.
- (4) At 041310H Company K chopped to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (5) At 051200H 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines assumed operation control of present TAOR.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10







- 3rd Bn, 5th Marines. At 181000H Co. D. 1st Bn. 5th Marines chopped to
- (7) At 190335H Alpha Command Group, Co I and Co D departed Combat Base for Operation BAXTER.
 - At 210912H Company D chopped to parent Battalion.
- (9) At 211530H Company I and the Alpha Command Group displaced to Compat Base.
- (10) At 260935H Company C. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines chopped to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.
- (11) From 270600H to 300700H Co C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Co L and the Alpha Command Group participated in multi-Company S&D Operation in cooperation with ARVN Forces. At 280915H Company C was chopped to parent battalion. At 281230H Co L displaced to the Combat Base. At 301335H Co I chopped to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

e. Artillory Support

During the month of October, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines was in support of the 5th Marines with "F" Battery in direct support of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinos.

again Due to the change in TAOR and the pacified nature of the new TAOR, employment of artillery has taken a different posture. Antillery missions are fired, only when absolutoly necessary and only with the approval of the Battalion Commandor.

From 19 to 21 October, during Operation BAXTER, one artillery mission was fired. utilizing HC smoke to register a night defensive fire.

Considerable time and effort has been spont coordinating the on call night defensive fires for the CAP units and other allied units within our TAOR. the area of the second of the second of the second

of far Air Support aller, the constant

- (1) During October this Battalion did not receive (1) fixed wing air support in conjunction with tactical operations.
- (2) Holicopter support included ModEvac and normal observation missions. Holicopter support was timely and offective.
- (3) Prosontly there are three aviator ALO/FAC Officers assigned to the Battalion. There are sufficiently trained enlisted personnel to provide all companies with either enlisted or officer FAC Teams.

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ENCLOSURE



Communications

- (1) The AN/PRC-25 continued to perform more than adequately this past menth. Care and ingenuity must be utilized in wet weather to keep all components of the radio and its handset dry. This Command utilized ponchos, battery bags, fighting hole covers, and a various assortment of materials when operating in the field.
- (2) The tape antenna used with the AN/PRC-25 should be used as much as possible vice the long whip antenna. When operating in donse brush the whip antonna is capable of setting off booby traps rigged with elevated trip wires.
- (3) Communications Security has improved immensely through continuous indoctrination and training. However, problems were encountered when tactical call signs were changed through inadvertent reference to old call sign.
- (4) Lectures, demonstrations, and training continued to consume the majority of the time in order to bring the section up to the high standards necessary.
- (5) Radio shots were set up utilizing gear that has not been tactically employed for many menths to ensure all T/E Communications equipment is operable and functioning efficiently.

h. Logistics

- (1) General. The overall logistical status of the battalion is satisfactory. Accounts are in the process of being reconciled and shortages of equipment are being requisitioned.
- (2) Supply. Battalion Supply started its move from Hill 63 early in October, but due to the lack of transportation the complete move of all equipment was not accomplished until 28 October 1967. Class I, II, IV, and V requisitions are submitted on a daily basis to FLC, with daily runs being made to pick up necessary items. The newly established SERV-MART at NSA has been in operation for a short time. It stocks many office supplies and consumable supplies that had been difficult to receive at Hill 63.
- (3) Motor Transport. Twice during the month of October the Motor Transport Officer requested from Division Motor Transport that contact teams be sont to our area. On both occasions the battalien benefitted tremendously from the helpful tips and constructive criticism concerning Motor Transport Maintenance and Operations.
- (4) Construction. Perimeter bunkers are being constructed by the attached 1st Engineers.

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To date, three (3) bunkers have been erected. Requests have gone to Division for the below listed projects:

- (1) Install grease traps in Mess Hall
- (2) Repair drainage system in Mess Hall
- (3) Ropair Battalion road system
- (4) Survey water drainage in Battalion Area

The attached 1st Engineers constructed a tin roof building for the POW Compound and completed another for the Battalian Police Sergoant.

i. Civic Action

- (1) MEDCAPS. 1408 Viotnamese from the local area were treated at the Battalion MEDCAP Station. In addition to those Viotnamese treated at the Battalion MEDCAP Station, 425 were treated at "Mobile MEDCAP" in the village of Hoa Chau, Thang Troung and Thanh Quit 1. 4,800 sanitation and health leaflets were hand delivered to the MEDCAP patients.
- (2) Problems. Lack of MEDCAP supplies has prevented a more extensive MEDCAP program. Another problem encountered was the absence of an area folder pertaining to the local government officials.
- (3) PsyOps. Psy/War teams accompanied all "Mobilo MEDCAP" units. 1500 "Thei Su" newspapers, 6000 Psy/War leaflets and 2000 health and sanitation leaflets distributed at two PsyOps programs held in the villages of Thang Tround and Hoa Phuoc. During these two programs a JEEPSTER AUDIO VISUAL UNIT from the 244th PsyOps Co showed a total of 120 minutes of cartoons and movies. The total attendance was 3500 adults and 2000 children.
- (4) Workers. S-5 is in the process of hiring 9 Viet-
- (5) Classes. All new members joining this Command during October were given an indoctrination class on Civil Affairs. Also, on 14 October a Personal Response Contact Team hold lectures for all members of this Command.

ENCLOSURE (1)







(6) Contacts with Local Officials. The Civil Affairs Officer and the Civil Affairs Chief met and discussed problems with the District and Province Officials.


(2) Chronology of Events


- 2 October- Displacement from Hill #63 to 2nd Battalion lst Marines TAOR commenced.
- 6 October- Capt J.D. NIOTIS assigned to Company L as Commanding Officer.
- 12 October- Joined Major R.C. WISE for duty as Battalion Executive Officer.
- 17 October- Capt L.W. FARMER assigned to H&S Company for duty as Commanding Officer.
- 18 October- Operation BAXTER commenced.
- 21 October- Operation BAXTER Terminated.
- 27 October- Multi-Company Quaration commenced.
- 30 October- Multi-Company Operation terminated.


ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco, California \$96602

67 4452

3/PES/plb 3121 1 November 1967

From: Commanding Officer

major A BOIRIE

To: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Operational Summary of Cordon and Search Operation conducted 27 through 30 October 1967

conducted 2/ through 30 october 190/

Ref: (a) Verbal Instructions received by my S-3 on 30 Oct 1967

(b) 5th Marines OP Plan 1-67

(c) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines Frag Order 23-67 dtd 25 October 1967

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay

(2) Intergration of Commando Platoon in Search

(3) Organization of Objective for Conduct of Search

- 1. Date of Operation = 270530H October 1967 to 300815H October 1967.
- 2. Task Organization. See Annex A to Reference (c).
- 3. Supporting Forces
- a. Artillery Artillery was not employed during the operation for numerous reasons. Prep fires delivered prior to the attack would tend to alert the area and the element of surprise lost. Artillery and mortar fires should be used with descretion in this area due to the large number of noncombatants. Targets encountered do not normally warrant the expenditure of artillery. Unexploded ordnance (duds) frequently turns up in VC Booby Traps.
- b. Air Air was used very effectively in the form of aerial observation and med-evac missions. Aerial observers should not arrive on station until the Cordon Force is established and the search begun. Early arrival indicates to enemy forces that an operation may be forthcoming. Med Evacs were efficient and timely. Fixed wing will seldom if ever be employed in these operations due to lack of suitable targets and density of population.

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Francis Learnes Or

~ 30 Oct 1967





3121 1 November 1967

Intelligence - (See Annex B to reference (C)

Summary of Significant Intelligence Activities and Collection

- (1) In consort with the tactical mission in the objective areas, the first and most extensive combat intelligence effort during the 27-28 October phase of the operation was a search for and identification of all things enemy.
- (2) Incidental to the intelligence collection, over 20 individual interviews of villagers in the objective area produced additional enemy and terrain information, much of which has proven to be responsible. The most significant information was separately reported to the S-2 Officer, 5th Marines on 29 October 1967.
- (3) The local Viet Cong enemy, known (in most cases, identified by name) to operate in the objective area plus. 2,000 meters, continued his operational technique of mid-tolong range sniping and light, short term squad size engagements. Additionally, following this Battalion's tactical entry into the same objective area 12 days prior to this action, the enemy increased his deployment of booby traps, all of which were wire triggered hand grenades.
- (4) The volume of enemy weapons and supporting equipment found hidden in this rather small, 900 by 300 meters Hamlet, demonstrated the degree of activity, occupancy and apparent safety the local Viot Cong enjoyed in that area.

b. Captured, Hidden Enemy Equipment and Material

Rifles/Carbines: Two (hidden separately in false wells) Handmade: 32 (seven inert) was

second Bayonet M-16: Tellonone of all things oncay.


Blasting Caps: 78

(Type used formal to the intelligence collection, ever 20 indichicom grenades of villagore in the objective inca production and many booky and termin information, much of voice hitraps) on be be responsible. The most significant inform M-79 round: and taly One parted to the S-2 Officer, jth

.30 Cal rounds, loose: 92 .30 Cal rounds, linked: 21,

.50 Calarounds, linkeding 96 cmy, known (in most cases, identific-3 Type explosive poweder: 10 pounds (+) in opened

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; end can DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. SOUTH TO SOUTH what. Find DOD DIR. 5200.10 allowing this develies or only into the state objective area 12 days pai






1 November 1967


5.56 rounds, loose: 15
8lmm Mortar round; dud: One
Radio receiver, tubed, civilian sales type Vanguard
 (made in Japan), without power supply: One
Typewriter, Vietnamese type face characters with large,
 amount of propaganda documents: One
Documents; local Viet Cong military and personal
 communications: 35
Uniforms, enemy type, mixed: 5

- c. Additional information developed by interviews/interrogations, conducted in the field, concerning captured aquipment.
- (1) The reported radio, documents and typewriter were found in a single story brick and mason, three room, house which was not occupied at the time of the search or at any time during the period 27-28 October.
- (2) In a house approximately sixty meters distant from the search house, Ba (Mrs) TRAN THI HUAN, age 58, who claimed to live alone was interviewed in detail and stated in substance: that the subject house was the real property of one BA DAN who source seldom saw. That BA DAN returned to the house four to five times a month for one or two days each period only. She returned unaccompanied and was not known to visit her neighbors.
- (3) Source claims that BA DAN stated that she frequently visited her son, who is/was employed in Danang as a stone mason.
- (4) The search house did not appear to have been occupied within the past five to ten days.
- (5) Source's house was also the subject of a detailed search conducted under my direct supervision, with negative results.
- (6) The false compartment was of excellent, professional mason design. A part of an exterior wall that also was connected to the family bomb shelter, the false compartment had a single overhead enterance, so well concealed that it was not discovered until entry into the compartment had been obtained by sound-tapping and forceable entry through the wall.

While there was some recent mud on the items found, it should be noted that no dust or other traces of long period stowage were noticed on either item. (S-2 comment: Recently placed/replaced in compartment)







- (7) The reported weapons, single hand grenade, camera, and additional documents were found in a false compartment inside a well built brick and mason family bomb shelter which was, in turn, interior to one of the three rooms in the house.
- (8) This house showed some minor evidence of recent occupancy or possibly children playing. It was not occupied at the time of the search nor at any time during the period 27-28 October 1967 with the following exception:

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An additional house, of better construction quality stands on the same ground, and the large kitchen was frequently used by some of the neighbors.


(9) Interviews with several neighbors indicated the following:


The house is owned by Ong (Mr) NGUYEN HUU-QUANG who lives in Danang with one of two sons. One son, name NGUYEN-HUU-DAI, attends high school (unk) in Danang. The clder son, name NGUYEN-HUU-MINH, lives in Hoi An and is studying to be a hairdresser.

- (10) Cng QUANG is reported to return to the house about twice a month. Some local sources believe Ong QUANG works for the U.S. Government in Danang in a stone cutting or gravel hauling job.
- (11) The interviews and interrogations, from which this information developed, were conducted by U.S. Marines, and regularly assigned ARVN Staff Sergeant interpreters only.

d. Additional Victnmese Attachments

- expected company size search and destroy operations in the AO, the special purpose Victnamese Teams and organizations available from the District Headquarters, Quan Dien Ban, were discussed by 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and the advisors at Dien Ban and Hoi An.
- (2) Following some excellent assistance and timely cooperation by the advisor personnel, five Vietnamese officials were assigned to assist this Command in the physical ground search and villager screening phase.
- (3) Ong Phem Huu De, Village Chief, Ong Nguyen NGL; VIllage Chief, Ong Phun TON, policeman, Ong Le Ngoc PHUNG, Village Chief, and Ong Ho Viet KY, Assistant Village Chief, reported







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to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines on the afternoon of 26 October.

(4) These gentlemen were attached as guest officers and given a detailed briefing of both the operational and intelligence plans for the operation, including our intended MEDCAP and hopeful friendly relations building designs for Thanh Quit 1.


Deployed in the field on the morning of 27 Oct, these officials were clearly advised that it was our desire to support them in their screening and search actions. This was manifest by the battalion assignment of a rifle squad, scout team and two Vietnamese language uniformed interpreters to the officials for security and assistance.

- (5) The total group was divided into two teams. During the examination of the first few houses, these officials addressed themselves to inspecting the artifacts and obvious personal valuables. They almost casually destroyed/broke the drawers, cabinet doors and fragiles for no possible cause.
- (6) The Battalion Intelligence Officer directly interceded and following a reinstruction on the desired character of the search, the understanding of which was clearly acknowledged by the officials, the two search teams continued their screening. Thereafter, each 20 to 30 minutes one of the security squad members reported to the S-2 Officer a seperate action of villager maltreatment and appropriation of personal property, not subject to martial confiscation. The S-2 Officer and his assistants moved from one group to another, correcting these problems, until the effort became unreasonable and the search actions by the officials was terminated for the day.
- (7) It is noted that during this time, the two six man security teams, in the course of excerting the officials, independent of any assistance from the officials, found two very professionally constructed hidden compartments, yielding weapons, a radio, a Vietnamese language typewriter, a camera and a number of VC documents and other lesser items.

On the second day of the search and screen action, the maltreatment, while reduced in frequency, continued to occur.

Those officials, on the other hand, conducted themselves exceptionally well with the Marines with whom they worked except for their conduct toward other Vietnamese which the Marines could neither understand nor approve.







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The character of this Orgaization's mission in this TAOR, and the clear and present need to develop honest rapport with the people of this area, makes future employment of such personnel questionable.

- 5. Mission To establish cordon of objective area and conduct a thorough, deliberate and detailed search to kill, capture and destroy enemy forces and equipment and conduct an extensive "Hole Hunting" Operation to uncover enemy cache sites, tunnels and logistical installations.
- 6. Concept of Operations. (See enclosure (1) Operations Overlay)
- a. At 270600H, Companies C and L(-) moved overland and established a cordon west and north of the objective area to be in position by 270730H. One Battalion of the ARVN Ranger TF moved overland from Dien Ban and established cordon in southern portion of objective area to be in position by 270730H with the other battalion moving directly to the LOD. One platoon of Company L with the Command Group in trace departed 270615H and moved overland, linked up with ARVN Commando Platoon at 032642 and proceeded to LOD. At 270735H, the ARVN Ranger Battalion commenced the attack in the southern ZOA and one platoon of Company L and the 1st Commando Platoon commenced the attack in the Northern ZOA.

7. Lessons Learned

- a. Item Coordination with ARVN Forces.
- (1) Discussion The coordination must be detailed, complete and exactly understood if any effective tactical coordination in the cordon and search operation is to be achieved. The arrangement of neither the Marine Commander nor the ARVN Commander having operational control results in extremly difficult fire coordination, makes positioning of forces and rapid reaction cumbersome and is generally ineffective. However the ARVN Commando Platoon worked extremely well with the Marine units conducting the search and were found to be very adopt in searching professional in their attitude and very cooperative.
- (2) Recommendations. That Marine forces be employed exclusively as the cordon force to make possible positive control and coordination essential for this type operation. It is also recommended that the ARVN Commandos be employed when possible to assist in the search. Marines can learn a great deal about search technique by working closely with this unit.

