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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/RJM/dab
5750
1 January 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology for period 010001H to 312400H Dec 1967.

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMF PacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: ✓(1) Command Chronology Report
✓(2) Operation Summary for Operation 33-67

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c) the Command Chronology for the month of December 1967 is hereby submitted.

R. C. Wise
R. C. WISE
By direction

3/5 S+C
004-68

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5TH MAR S&C FILES

0011-68
COPY NO. 1 OF 6

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3rd BN/5TH MAR

CMO CHRON

DEC 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
010001H to 312400H Dec 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATADESIGNATIONCOMMANDERPERIOD COVERED

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol W. K. ROCKEY

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Co

Capt R. J. MARNELL

Co I

Capt H. KOLAKOWSKI Jr

Co K

Capt L. W. FARMER

Co L

Capt J. D. NIOTIS

Co M

Capt J. E. MITCHELL

STAFF OFFICERS

XO

Maj R. C. WISE

S-1

1stLt J. W. HORTON
WO J. S. BISESI

1-12 Dec 1967

13 Dec 1967

S-2

1stLt D. R. DUNAGAN
WO J. W. BEVIER

1-21 Dec 1967

22 Dec 1967

S-3

Maj P. E. SHAW
Capt G. W. BOWERS

1-22 Dec 1967

23 Dec 1967

S-4

1stLt F. W. SMITH

S-5

1stLt G. E. OWSLEY
Capt J. A. FERNANDEZ

1-7 Dec 1967

8 Dec 1967

AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC

OFF

37

ENL

1111

USN

OFF

2

ENL

49

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PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Battalion infantry officer strength received its largest input of the year with the joining of 10, 03 Officers during December. Personnel turnover in key billets was at its worst with S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-5 billets changing hands.

Battalion Intelligence prepared information on enemy activity in the form of intelligence estimates for battalion and Company size operations.

The enemy continued to work in cells of three to seven and their activity included sniping, 36 mining incidents, and demolition of a bridge and culverts along highway #1.

The Battalion completed three search and clear operations, one cordon and search operation, and one Company size river search operation. Intensive patrolling of the Rocket Belt has continued. The Battalion is at present conducting Operation AUBURN. See Enclosure (2).

A shortage of AN/PRC 25 antennas reduces communication capabilities. Antennas are in a NORS status.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. Topics(a) Personnel and Administration

(1) The Battalion began the month of December with an on board strength of 32 Marine Officers, 1118 Marine Enlisted, 2 Navy Officers, and 45 Navy Enlisted. The current on board strength is 40 Marine Officers, 1217 Marine Enlisted, 2 Navy Officers, and 52 Navy Enlisted.

(2) Two Marine Officers are TAD (in excess of 30 days). The current effective strength of the Battalion is 35 Marine Officers and 1092 Marine Enlisted.

(3) Seventy-six Marine Enlisted are scheduled for rotation during January 1968 as shown below:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
0141	5
03	57
0369	2
2511	2
2531	3
2533	1
2542	1
2591	1
3051	1
3371	3

(4) Critical MOS Shortages are shown below:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>ML</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>
0302	34	31	1 Maj, 3 Lt
0402	1	0	1 Captain
2815	1	0	1 Corporal
2867	1	0	1 S/Sgt
0369	30	19	1 M/Sgt, 4 GySgt, 6 SSgt

CASUALTIES

KIA
WIA
WIANE
NON-HOSTILE
DAI

14✓
44✓
8✓
32✓
3✓

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Intelligence

(1) Personnel

(a) Organic. During the month of December the Battalion Intelligence/Scout Section lost one scout, Cpl 0311 and one Intelligence Assistant, Sgt 0311, to normal rotation and joined 3 scout trainees, two PFC's 0311 and one Cpl 0311, replacement.

(b) Attachments. During the previous month two dog teams were attached, one being withdrawn due to wounds received in the field. The IT personnel were withdrawn in mid-December and returned to Regiment. The remaining attachments include two MP's, an ITT team and four scout/sniper teams.

(2) Information Collection. The main information collection/target acquisition efforts during the month of December were directed toward the analysis of activities and the continuation of the terrain studies of operational areas.

(3) Intelligence Reporting. During December, the S-2 Section has prepared information on enemy activity in the form of intelligence estimates for battalion and company size operations. The Battalion S-2 conducted not less than one battalion command and staff intelligence briefing, and small unit briefings each day.

(4) Enemy Activity.

(a) Disposed in the TAOR, the local, semifixed Viet Cong have 250 to 300 men and women under arms. These local guerrillas have been found to be organized into cells of from 3 to 7 members for the conducting of most activities.

(b) The local Viet Cong have continued their activity in sniping, 36 mining incidents, and demolition of bridge and culverts along highway #1.

(c) The only known permanently located enemy force in the TAOR is the Dien Ban local force Company which is also known as Q.82 Company and the Q.15 Company.

(d) The local force and guerrillas that operate in the TAOR generally remain in cell size groups to avoid suspicion but they are capable of combining to form reinforced squads.

(5) ARVN Attachments. The Battalion S-2 Section joined one ARVN interpreter in mid-December. Presently three interpreters are employed in support of Combat operations and one is utilized in the S-5 program.

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(6) Kit Carsons. The Battalion presently has five Kit Carson Scouts and one Kit Carson Trainee. During December the Kit Carsons have proven themselves on operations with this Battalion. On the last operation two Kit Carson's were wounded in the field and med-evaced; they are expected to return to duty within one to two weeks.

(7) Enemy Losses. The enemy suffered the following casualties as a result of action this month:

KIA (C)	3	
KIA (P)	13	(Shown only for December;
WIA (C)	4	omitted thereafter)
DETAINÉES	45	

(8) Weather.

- (a) Rain total as of 27th was 8.33 in.
- (b) Temp; average high 70; Average low 61.
- (c) Light; average sunrise 1654; average sunset 0529
- (d) Winds; the wind range from 5 to 10 knots.

(9) Terrain. See Command Chronology for period 010001H Oct 67.

(10) Account of Enemy Equipment Captured or Destroyed. The largest find was the location of a mine factory and rice thrashing site located in the AT 9861 grid area. Found were engine parts and an engine, vats of 50 gallons capacity, 500 pounds of charcoal, car batteries, tubing, pipes, and other gear which was destroyed.

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c. Training

(1) Training included lectures, demonstrations, and/or application in the following subjects:

- (a) Starlight Scope
- (b) Weapons Safety
- (c) Space Heater
- (d) Radio procedures
- (e) Spot reports
- (f) Lighting procedures for the monsoon season
- (g) FO & FAC procedure
- (h) Care and cleaning of M-16
- (i) Med Evac procedures
- (j) FAM firing of individual and crew served weapons

(2) Additional classes for officers and staff NCOs were held on Weapons Safety.


(3) The organization conducted six indoctrination schools. Classes on FO/FAC procedures, and on the care, cleaning, maintenance, and safety of the M-16A1 Rifle are included in the school syllabus.

(4) All units Fam fired their individual weapons at least twice this month. All crew served weapons have been fired.

(5) Personnel attended the following schools:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| (a) CAG School | 11 |
| (b) Embarkation School | 2 |
| (c) NCO Leadership School | 7 |
| (d) Ammo Tech School | 1 |
| (e) Infantry Weapons Repair Course | 2 |
| (f) Vietnamese Language School | 3 |

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


(g) Operators and Maintenance School Radar 5

(h) Civic Action Indoctrination Course 1

d. Operations

- (1) At 011015H assumed OPCON Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.
- (2) At 011330H Company L departed Operation No Name 97.
- (3) At 020845H Company M departed Operation No Name 97.
- (4) At 020945H Alpha Command Group, Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines departed on Operation No Name 97.
- (5) At 021100H commenced Operation No Name 97.
- (6) At 061150H Chopped Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines to parent unit.
- (7) At 061205H the Alpha Command Group, Companies L & M returned Combat Base terminating Operation No Name 97.
- (8) At 071000H 1st plt Co I OPCON 5th Marine Regiment security.
- (9) At 081400H 2nd plt Co L OPCON 1st Marine Division.
- (10) At 091046H 81 mortar platoon while registering defensive fires on Ha Dong Bridge had (1) one short round of WP. Results (1) one WIA medevac.
- (11) At 100900H Company K departed to conduct river search operation.
- (12) At 110930H 2nd plt Company L returned from Rough Riders.
- (13) At 120930H Company K returned from river search.
- (14) At 140715H the Alpha Command Group, Companies K & L departed on Operation JUNCTION.
- (15) At 141400H Company K returned from Operation JUNCTION.
- (16) At 141510H the Alpha Command Group returned from Operation JUNCTION.
- (17) At 162205H 81 mortar plt firing a mission had one 81mm HE round short. Results were 3 KIAs, 35 WIAs.
- (18) At 180630H Alpha Command Group, Companies K & M departed on cordon and search operation.



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- (19) At 180840H Company F, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines OPCON 3/5.
- (20) At 181000H Company H, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines OPCON 3/5.
- (21) At 181050H Companies F & H, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines chopped to parent unit.
- (22) At 181655H Operation cordon & search terminated.
- (23) At 201355H 1st plt Company I returned from Regimental security.
- (24) At 211200H 2nd plt Company K chopped to 3/5 from III MAF.
- (25) At 230530H Company E & G, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines OPCON 3/5.
- (26) At 231130H Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines OPCON 3/5.
- (27) At 231210H Alpha Command Group, Company K departed on operation.
- (28) At 241700H Chopped Companies E & G, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines to parent unit.
- (29) At 241700H Chopped Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines to parent unit.
- (30) At 241700H Alpha Command Group and Company K returned from operation.
- (31) At 271500H Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines OPCON 3/5.
- (32) At 280835H Alpha Command Group, Company I and Company E 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines departed Operation AUBURN.
- (33) Operation AUBURN in progress from 280835H and continuing. See After Action Report to be submitted upon termination of operation.

e. Artillery Support

- (1) Battery F, 2/11 was in direct support of this Battalion during December.
- (2) Battery W, 3/11 supported this Battalion during the time Battery was displacing on 31 December 1967.
- (3) Battery F supported combined operations during 1-6, 14 and 18 December 1967 from previous positions and is supporting Operation AUBURN from Dien Ban and Hill 55.

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(4) There are four Artillery Officers assigned to this Battalion. Company I has an enlisted Forward Observer.

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(1) Fixed Wing Support. During December, 57 air strikes were conducted in support of tactical operations of which 50 were in support of Operation AUBURN.

(2) Helicopter Support

(a) 57 Medevacs, including 11 emergency medevacs.

(b) One assault landing with helicopter gun support.

(c) 14 visual reconnaissance flights.

(3) Fixed Wing Observation Supports. 14 missions (observation and artillery/air by AO's). On Operation AUBURN each day was considered as one mission due to almost constant presence of AO on station.

(4) Personnel. There were two ALO/FAC Officers assigned to the Battalion. Sufficient trained personnel were available to provide radio teams at company and battalion level.

g. Communications

(1) Means

(a) Primary means of communications within the Battalion were AN/PRC 25 radios. Approximately 10 to 15 percent were not available due to required repair work. Available assets have been completely committed and all requirements for AN/PRC-25s met.

(b) Teletype communications to senior units has been both by radio relay and landline. Landline has become primary with radio relay as backup. Total down time, based on 24 hours usage daily, was approximately 19 hours.

(c) All communications equipment has been inspected and action taken to correct any operational discrepancies.

(d) A complete administrative inspection has been completed and corrective action is taking place in the areas of communications supply and required records for the maintenance of equipment.

(2) Problem Areas. The effectiveness of the AN/PRC 25 radio is becoming seriously impaired by the lack of proper antennas. PRC-6 antennas have been modified to fit, but on frequencies below 47 mcs power output is

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reduced to a high degree. Current requisitions for these systems are in a NORS status.

h. Logistics

(1) General. The overall logistical status of the Battalion is satisfactory: accounts are in the process of being reconciled and shortages of equipment are being requisitioned.

(2) Supply

(a) Battalion Supply initiated a program for the reconciliation of M16A1 Rifles and also for the inspection of M60 Machineguns, both of which are accomplished weekly. In addition, all Table of Equipment (T/E) deficiencies have been placed on requisition.

(b) A Battalion Supply SOP was drafted and distributed. Disposition is being made on excess and any unserviceable gear. Allowance lists and component parts lists were prepared and distributed to each responsible account.

(c) The Battalion received one Refrigerating Mechanism, Household from the redistribution of assets of the 1st Antitank Battalion.

(3) Motor Transport. On 8 December Gunnery Sergeant R. C. SIMPSON reported aboard as the new Motor Transport Chief. On 16 and 17 December a school was held on 422A1 Mighty Mites and M274 Mules. Twenty-four licenses were issued at the completion of the training period. Every vehicle that needed paint has been taken to 1st FSR and repainted. Motor Transport received two additional M101 trailers on special allowance by the redistribution of assets of the 1st Antitank Battalion.

(4) Construction. Engineers continue to improve internal road network and road drainage. They are also continuing in alleviating the problems of standing water by using fill. In addition, they are near the completion of reinforcing the observation tower to prevent sinking and leaning.

i. Civic Action

(1) MedCaps. A total of 1,059 Vietnamese were treated at the Battalion MedCap station. Two mobile MedCaps were held, one in Thang Quit, where 150 Vietnamese were treated, and one in Bo Mung, where 228 were treated.

(2) Psyops. A total of 22,400 Psyops leaflets were hand distributed by Marines of this Battalion. Extensive use of Armed Propaganda Teams and Loudspeaker teams resulted in 25½ hours of Psyops broadcast time. The themes of the leaflets and broadcasts were, Chieu Hoi, rewards, health and sanitation. Also a new leaflet was introduced explaining why Americans are in Vietnam.

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(3) Village Officials. A meeting of the GVN Officials of Dien Ban District and the Battalion S-5 Officer was held on 17 December 1967, at the Battalion CP. As a result of this meeting the Village Chief of Ky Minh gave the Battalion a list of all VC organizations and names of VC in his village. Another meeting is planned for 7 January 1968.

(4) Serious Incidents. One Serious Incident was investigated by the Battalion S-5 Officer. The incident involved a Vietnamese girl who was wounded during a fire fight in which Marines were involved.

(5) Civil Affairs Assistance. During December S-5 distributed a total of 500 lbs of rice and 50 lbs of soap to needy Vietnamese. A total of 550 Christmas bags were given out to Vietnamese children throughout the TAOR.

(6) Incidents of Special Interest. On 12 December 1967 a small Vietnamese girl was brought to 3/5's CP with wounds in both hands. It was determined that she had fallen on an enemy booby trap. Her father made a taped statement denouncing the VC, which was used to make aerial broadcasts in the girl's home village. The girl was medevaced to Danang.

(7) Projects. Two self-help projects are in the planning stages. They are: a school building in the village of Vinh Kuong and a market place in the village of Thanh Troung. Material for a way station has been given to the 51st ARVN Regiment but no construction has been started. A second way station is in the planning as soon as the first is completed.

2. Chronology of Events

- 2-6 December - Conducted search and destroy operation.
- 10-12 December - Capt J. A. FERNANDEZ assigned duties as S-5.
- 13 December - WO J. S. BISESI assigned to duty as S-1.
- 14 December - Conducted search and destroy operation.
- 18 December - Conducted cordon and search operation.
- 22 December - WO J. W. BEVIER assigned to duty as S-2.
- 23 December - Capt G. W. BOWERS assigned to duty as S-3.
- 23-24 December - Conducted search and destroy operation. (See Encl 2)
- 28-31 December - Conducting Operation AUBURN

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3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/GWB/plb
1300
27 December 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Operations Summary

Encl: (1) Operations Overlay

001-68

1. Code Name. 33-67
2. Date of Operation. 23-24 December 1967
3. Location of Operation. Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam, extreme southwest portion of the 3/5 TAOR.
4. Command Headquarters. See Task Organization
5. Task Organization

3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (-)(Rein) LtCol ROCKEY

H&S Co (-) Capt MARNELL

Det Med Section, H&S Co
Arty In Tm, "F" Battery 2/11
Air In Tm, 1st MAW

Co K (Rein)

Capt FARMER

Co K
FAC Tm, H&S Co 3/5
81mm Mortar FO Tm, H&S Co, 3/5
Arty FO Tm, "F" Battery 2/11
Det H&S Co, 3/5 (S-2 Scout/interpreter Tm)
Det Co B, 1st Engineer Bn

Co E (Rein) 2/3

Capt CAHILL

Co E 23-24 December 1967

FAC Tm, H&S Co, 2/3
81mm Mortar FO Tm, H&S Co, 2/3
Arty FO Tm

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Det H&S Co 2/3 (S-2 Scout/interpreter)
 Det (Sniper Tm)
 Det Engineers

2nd Platoon, Company ILt ~~CHAM~~Task Force Dyer

Major DYER

Co F (Rein) 2/5

Capt McKEE

Co E
 FAC Tm H&S Co 2/5
 81mm mortar FO Tm, H&S Co 2/5
 Arty FO Tm "E" Battery 2/11
 Det H&S Co 2/5 (S-2 Scout/interpreter Tm)

Co G (Rein) 2/5

Capt MEADOWS

Co G
 FAC Tm H&S Co 2/5
 81mm mortar FO Tm, H&S Co 2/5
 Arty FO Tm "E" Battery 2/11
 Det H&S Co, 2/5 (S-2 Scout/interpreter Tm)

6. Supporting Forcesa. Artillery

(1) From the commencement of the operations on 231210H until termination 241700H, the Battalion had direct artillery support from "F" Battery of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.

(2) The Battalion used artillery frequently in night defensive fires. There were 6 H&I/diversionary fire missions for a total of 50 rounds in support of the operation. There were 10 observed missions during which a total of 200 rounds were expended.

b. ~~1st~~

(1) On D-1 an aerial observer was effectively utilized for reconnaissance.

(2) One Medevac for 5 Marines and one troop lift (three companies) were flown in support of the Battalion.

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Co E
 FAC Tm H&S Co 2/5
 81mm mortar FO Tm, H&S Co 2/5
 Arty FO Tm "E" Battery 2/11
 Det H&S Co, 2/5 (S-2 Scout/interpreter Tm)

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7. Intelligence

a. The enemy forces anticipated in the area of operation were not expected to exceed one VC Battalion and hamlet cells of less than 10 VC. This intelligence was passed to the Battalion Commander, Staff and Unit Commanders in estimate, briefing and overlay form.

b. In addition to the foregoing estimate, the following enemy units were identified as being in the general area of the operation or near enough to possibly influence the action:

- (1) 41st Drafted Bn
- (2) C-15 Company
- (3) R-20th Bn

c. Enemy forces encountered by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines consisted of a small VC force, platoon or smaller. No enemy unit identifications were developed through field interrogations.

d. Intelligence Collection and Dissemination

(1) Point where railroad bed and Highway #4 meets, AT 995607 was boobytrapped prior to our arrival there. Traps consisted of 7 punji traps with steel spikes, 1 boobytrapped M79 round (pressure detonating), and 1 trip stick with explosive device. These devices were destroyed in position.

(2) VC Propaganda leaflets were found in the area of Ha Nong Trung, BT 005568. There were four different types, and copies of each were sent to Regimental S-2.

(3) Three boats were found and destroyed.

8. Mission

The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the mission to capture or destroy enemy forces and equipment in the AO.

9. Concept of Operations

On D-1 two companies pre-positioned at Hill 55 and two companies, one rifle platoon and the Battalion Command Group pre-positioned in the 0056 grid square. At first light, movement commenced to establish blocking positions by H-hour. Two companies moved on order to the LOD and commenced search and destroy operations within their ZOA. All units returned to their parent unit by helicopter or motor march by 1750 on D-day. (See Enclosure 1)

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10. Execution

a. At 231210H the Command Group, Company K and 2nd platoon India Company commenced motor movement to junction of Highway #1 and Highway #4, and rendezvoused with Company E 2/3.

b. At 231340H the Command Group, Company K, 2nd platoon Company I and Company E, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines commenced foot march from junction of Highway #1 and Highway #4 to assembly area (grid 0056).

c. At 231450H Company E 2/3 at BT 014571 received one sniper round from treeline approximately 300 meters left flank at BT 014568. Dispatched first team to search area, with negative results.

d. At 231510H Command Group at BT 015571 received one sniper round from treeline on left flank at BT 014568. India platoon searched area with negative results.

e. At 231510H Kilo Company at BT 004567 spotted 6 VC moving south at 001567. Fired at VC with approximately 60 rounds 5.56. Search of area revealed one blood trail. (1 VC WIA)(p).

f. At 231755H Company E 2/3 at 008567 received 4 rounds sniper fire from BT 009569. Searched area with negative results.

g. At 231850H Company K 3/5 ambush patrol at BT 002563 received approximately 10 rounds small arms from BT 001562, which were inaccurate. Enemy fire received was apparently reciprocated by fire. Kilo unit did not return fire, and continued on activity.

h. At 232040H 2nd platoon India Company ambush at BT 011567 received one incoming grenade. Returned 50 M60 rounds, 40 rounds M16. Results 2 USMC WIA. Searched area with negative results.

i. At 240030H Company E 2/3 detached movement outside perimeter. One M79 round was fired toward suspected movement. Heard cries, "Don't fire anymore", and "someone has been wounded". Searched area at first light with negative results.

j. At 240110H Company K (ambush) received 1 incoming grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Returned 5 M79 rounds and 40 M16 rounds. Searched area at first light with negative results.

k. At 240815H Company G 2/5 at AT 976566 observed 2 VC swimming across river from east to west. Fired 3 LAWS, 100 7.62 rounds and as VC reached west side of river they entered treeline. No apparent results.

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27 December 1967

l. At 240850H at AT 993562 leading elements of Company E 2/3 tripped a booby trap (home made C-ration type). One Marine was knocked down by blast but not injured.

m. At 240855H at AT 984783, Company E found 4 boats, fishing type, hidden in brush along river. Destroyed boats.

n. At 240855 Company E 2/5 at AT 985561 saw 3 VC in high grass coming toward friendly positions. Fired 6 rounds 5.56, enemy broke contact and fled to Southwest. Searched area and found blood stains in grass along a trail. (1 VC KIA)

o. At 241030H Company K at AT 980563 (leading element of sweep team) received 10 rounds S/A weapons fire and 20 rounds automatic weapons fire from approximately 3 VC in dense grass at AT 979564. Returned 50 S/A M-16 rounds, 200 rounds M-60 MG and 5 M-79 rounds. Search of area revealed one distinct blood trail. (1 VC KIA)

p. At 241010H the Command Group discovered 7 punji pits at AT 993577. Punji pits were destroyed in place.

q. At 241050H coordinates 978570 Company K found one booby trap 60mm mortar with 15" trip wire. Trip wire was across a trail. Flew in place.

r. At 241200H at AT 9986584 E Company 2/5 discovered three friendly 2.75" rockets and cylindrical carrying pod believed to have accidentally become detached from aircraft. Engineers destroyed in place.

s. At 241700H Company E 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines chopped to parent unit.

t. At 241700H Company E and Company G 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines chopped to parent unit.

u. At 241700H Command Group and 2nd Platoon India Company displaced to Combat Base.

v. At 241750H Company K returned to Combat Base.

11. Results

a. Enemy

(1) Total confirmed enemy casualties were 3 KIA.

(2) The compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed is included in paragraph 7d.

b. Friendly- 3 KIA

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1300

27 December 1967

12. Administration. There were no significant administrative problems or occurrences on the operation.

13. Commander's Analysis

a. The motor march from the Battalion Patrol Defense Base to the junction of National Routes One and Four took one hour and 24 minutes. This inordinate amount of time was primarily due to an unusually high traffic density on Route One.

b. Security consciousness among small unit leaders lapsed on certain occasions during the operation.

c. Few enemy were encountered in the area of operations. This was probably due to extensive H&I fires in the area.

14. Recommendations

a. That liaison be effected with the Division Motor Transport Officer to determine if and when convoys are scheduled along the motor march route. Unit motor marches could then be planned for periods of minimum traffic.

b. Unit leaders at all echelons must stress and enforce all possible security measures.

c. Extensive H&I fires and frequent company size operations are an effective means of denying the area of operations to the enemy and should be continued.

15. Administrative

16. Recommendations

R. C. WISE

By direction

a. The motor march from the Battalion Patrol Defense Base to the junction of National Routes One and Four took one hour and 24 minutes. This inordinate amount of time was primarily due to an unusually high traffic density on Route One.

b. Security consciousness among small unit leaders lapsed on certain occasions during the operation.

c. Few enemy were encountered in the area of operations. This was probably due to extensive H&I fires in the area.

17. Recommendations

a. That liaison be effected with the Division Motor Transport Officer to determine if and when convoys are scheduled along the motor march route. Unit motor marches could then be planned for periods of minimum traffic.

b. Unit leaders at all echelons must stress and enforce all possible security measures.

c. Extensive H&I fires and frequent company size operations are an effective means of denying the area of operations to the enemy and should be continued.

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b. Item - Selection of Target Area

(1) Discussion - The target area selected included a water barrier which divided the ZOA between the Ranger TF and Marine units. The river also served as a FCL/NEL which in this particular operation proved to be very essential. However, when ARVN Rangers retired from the AO at 271630H, the river provided the VC with excellent sniper positions and limited considerably the maneuverability of the Marine unit.

(2) Recommendations. That the target area be small enough so that the forces available can effectively cordon it off and should include any barriers which bound it. One Company can effectively cordon and search an area approximately 500 meters square and two companies 800 meters square.

c. Item - Establishing the Cordon.

(1) Discussion. To achieve maximum effectiveness from the cordon, it must completely surround the target area and it should be accomplished swiftly and with complete surprise to gain maximum effect. Once again, the target must be selected so as to lend itself for the cordon. The cordon does not have to be immediately around the target but can be positioned so as to cover the target area by fire and observation.

(2) Recommendation. Use helicopters whenever available to position cordon swiftly and completely. If foot movement is required to position cordon, move into position prior to first light. Establish a complete encirclement and position forces so as to cover target area completely by fire and observation. Reposition cordon after initial sweep to completely consolidate position and provide maximum security for search elements.

d. Item - Search Techniques.

(1) Discussion. The search was conducted in three steps. First, the search force aggressively moved through the objective to kill, capture or drive the enemy forces into the cordon. Secondly, the sweep was reversed and conducted more slowly and in detail to uncover enemy forces which may have gone underground and/or booby traps. Thirdly, the "Hole Hunting" was conducted. Hindsight indicates that step two is unnecessary and is time consuming with little or no significant benefit. The detailed search must be thoroughly organized, coordinated and supervised to insure complete detailed coverage of the area. False walls and floors were

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located, some booby-traps were uncovered as well as holes, caves, tunnels and punji pits. The search must be painstakingly slow and thorough with alertness constantly emphasized. Scout dogs were employed and can be of great assistance in the "Hole Hunting".

(2) Recommendations. That ARVN Commandos be employed with search elements when available and integrated throughout Marine units to gain maximum effectiveness. (See Enclosure (2)) That the area be searched twice vice three times with the initial sweep being characterized by aggressiveness to route out the enemy forces and the second step the detailed "Hole Hunting". That the objective be organized to effect an orderly and comprehensive search with no repetitious movements. (See Enclosure (3)) The need for attention to detail cannot be over-emphasized.

e. Item - Length of Operation.

(1) Discussion. The operation lasted 3 days and 3 nights. The initial force to cordon and search area was accomplished on the 1st day with ARVN Forces retiring from AO by late afternoon on the 1st day. C Company, 1/5 chopped back to parent organization early morning of the 2nd day leaving L Company to conduct remainder of search. The maximum effectiveness of the search was gained in the first two days with diminishing enthusiasm and effectiveness noted as the search extended into the 3rd day.

(2) Recommendation. That the target area be selected so that an intensive search can be completed within two days.

f. Item - Civil Affairs/Personal Response in conjunction with cordon and search operations.

(1) Discussion. Commencing the afternoon of D-1, a MEDCAP/DENTCAP and a major Psy Ops effort was conducted in the vicinity of CAP 1. On D-day after the initial sweep of the area was completed, a complete MED/DENT CAP team proceeded with the Command Group to the objective area. The response was excellent and it was apparent that such a program in the future operations is desirable. During the MEDCAP is an excellent opportunity to personally hand deliver : Psy Ops leaflets advertizing rewards for booby traps etc.

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(2) Recommendation. That an extensive Psy Ops/ Personal Response/MED CAP effort be intergrated and coordinated with the operation. That maximum attention be devoted to this aspect because the people are more receptive to the presence of Marines and will inevitably lead to volunteering of information. This includes bringing the MED CAP to hamlets and villages not readily accessible by use of mules, helicopters or others if necessary.

g. Item - National Field Police, GVN Officials and Census Grievance Teams.

(1) Discussion. See paragraph 4d above. The serious breach of basic dignity shown to the people in the objective area required immediate corrective action and was detrimental to the overall effort.

(2) Recommendation. That these assets, if used, be thoroughly briefed prior to the operation stressing the conduct expected through-out the search. That Marines be assigned to assist, maintain surveillance of and provide security for these officials.

h. Item - VC Tactics.

(1) Discussion. After operating in the same general area on two occasions, a pattern has developed that indicates sniper action increases sharply commencing about 30 minutes before last light until darkness prevents further accurate shooting. This sniper fire is normally accurate, well controlled fire from 150 to 300 meters. Positions are so located that a barrier, such as a river is generally between friendly and enemy forces.

(2) Recommendation. That Marines be made aware of this trend and that "Stand to" be carried out during the appropriate period of time.

8. Commander's Analysis. The operation was successful in equipment and documents found but even more valuable in experiences gained. The planning must be extremely detailed and coordination meticulous to effect the cordon and contain the enemy. ARVN Commandos are valuable in many ways, not the least of which is training Marines in search techniques by example. The value gained from cooperation with other ARVN Forces due to command control for this type operation is questionable. Scout Dogs can be of assistance in hole hunting.

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also. Government Officials must be absolutely controlled or the MED CAP/Psy Ops effort will be defeated before it even gets started.

W. K. Rocky
W. K. ROCKEY

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
ANNEX C (OPERATIONS OVERLAY)

REF: (A) MAP: VIETNAM 1:50,000

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OPERATIONS OVERLAY
 ISSUED WITH 3RD BATTALION,
 5TH MARINES FRAG ORDER 23-67

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

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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ENCLOSURE (2)

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1. Weapons: Ph [redacted] Used As: Outside Security

2. Squad Areas Of Responsibility

Searches were conducted from outboard to inboard & then inboard to outboard




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ENCLOSURE 63

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