


~~SECRET~~

3d MAR DIV (FWD)  
S+C # 1819-65

UNCLASSIFIED



**7TH  
MARINES**  
 COMMAND DIARY  
 1-31 AUGUST 1965

7thMar S&C Log Nr.  
 00539-65 Copy # 1 of 5

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, RLT-7  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
 3480  
 14 Sept 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd), FMP

Subj: Command Diary for 1-31 August 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 3480.1 W/Ch #1  
 (b) 3rd MarDivO 3480.1 W/Ch #1 & Ch #2

Encl: ✓ (1) Command Diary for Headquarters, 7th Marines and Supporting Documents.  
 ✓ (2) Command Diary for 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and Supporting Documents.

1. In accordance with instructions set forth in references (a) and (b), enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted as the Command Diary for the 7th Marines (-) (Rein). The diary covers the period for 1-31 August 1965.

*O. F. Peatross*  
 O. F. PEATROSS

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS RLIT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND DIARY

- Part I Organization Data Sheet
- Part II Narrative Summary
- Part III Supporting Documents

- 1. Daily Situation Reports #6-24
- 2. Weekly Operations Summaries 14 AUG-27 AUG 65
- 3. S-1 Journal 11-17 AUG, 21, 22 AUG, 25-31 AUG NIF
- 4. S-2 Journal
- 5. S-3 Journal
- 6. Regimental Frag Order 1-65
- 7. Regimental Operations Order 323-65; Comb O 323-65
- 8. Operation "STARLITE" After Action Report (2 rpts)

ENCLOSURE  
UNCLASSIFIED

## Part I

1. Reporting Unit: RLT-7
2. Period Covered: 1-31 August 1965
3. Date of Submission: 8 September 1965
4. Commanding Officer: Colonel O. F. PEATROSS
5. Command Post: Initially aboard the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33). The Command moved ashore at 141300H at Chu Lai, Vietnam in the vicinity of coordinates (BT 560048). The Command Post for the end of the reporting period is at coordinates (BT 560048).

UNCLASSIFIED

## Part II

1. Mission Assigned. Prior to the reporting period RLT-7 was deployed on Okinawa with RLT-7 Headquarters located at Camp Schwab. Pursuant to instructions set forth in Operation Plan 122-65, RLT-7 deployed to the Republic of Vietnam to execute a landing for purposes of guarding key installations, assisting ARVN forces, occupying a TAOR in an area to be assigned and to be prepared to assume opcon and adcon of two or more BLT's. RLT-7, composed of RLT Headquarters and BLT 1/7, was ordered to commence a covered landing at Chu Lai, Vietnam and on arrival to occupy positions in the southeastern portion of the enclave as promulgated by oral instructions ADC, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd), FMF. See RLT-7 Frag Order 1-65.
2. Operations. Intelligence indicated that a large Viet Cong force in the Van Tuong Hamlet complex was preparing to attack the Chu Lai enclave. From prior intelligence, this force was believed to include the 1st VC Regiment and a company from the 52nd Battalion. The 40th and 45th Battalions were also believed to be in the area, as well as an unidentified heavy weapons company. The capabilities of this force, particularly when augmented by the heavy weapons company, was such a great and impending threat to the Chu Lai enclave that the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), directed that a combined amphibious and helicopterborne attack be executed immediately in the Van Tuong Hamlet complex to conduct a search and destroy operation against the Viet Cong. RLT-7, consisting of BLT's 3/3, 2/4, 3/7 and RLT-7 Headquarters, was activated and assigned the mission. BLT 3/7, afloat as the Special Landing Force (SLF), was directed to rendezvous in the AOA and assume the mission as RLT-7 Reserve. Operation "STARLITE", as the operation was named, commenced on D-1, the 17th of August, three days after RLT-7 landed in Vietnam, and ran until the 24th of August. During the operation, on the 20th of August, BLT 1/7 relieved BLT 3/3 and both BLT 3/3 and BLT 2/4 returned to their defensive positions in the Chu Lai enclave. BLT's 1/7 and 3/7 continued the operation until its completion on the 24th of August. See RLT-7 Operation Order 323-65 and RLT-7 After Action Report 1-65.
3. Results Accomplished. The Viet Cong force, located in the Van Tuong Hamlet complex, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, was eliminated as a threat to the Chu Lai enclave. Part of the force was destroyed and the remainder forced to flee the area.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

4. Weather and Terrain.

- a. Weather. Clear with low cloud cover below 1000 feet, 5.5 hours per day. Visibility was restricted to 3 miles for 52 minutes per day.

Temperatures	High	Mean	Low
	93.5	84.7	76
Humidity	Precipitation		
89%	5.63"		

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Terrain.

- (1) Relief. Relief of the area is predominantly characterized by flat rice paddy and dry crop type terrain interdicted by numerous brush wood covered knolls, the latter of which are the primary locations for the small but scattered build up areas (villages).
- (2) Drainage. Drainage of the area is accomplished by two primary river systems; the Song Tra Bong (mouth located at BT 615020), which drains in a northerly direction; and the Riviere De Sa Ky which drains in an easterly direction. Both systems possess extensive tributaries which interlace the entire area of interest and which feed the rice paddy cultivated terrain.
- (3) Vegetation. Vegetation throughout the area is predominantly dry crop vegetation and brush wood (approximately 13 per cent), the latter of which is found on the numerous and dispersed knolls and hills of the area. Rain forest type vegetation, however, appears to be lacking.
- (4) Surface Materials. The area of interest contains three basic types of surface materials deep sand along the coastal areas extending from 50 to 300 meters inland; two soils coincide geographically with the paddy and dry crop and brushwood and knoll areas respectively.
- (5) Cover and Concealment. Cover from direct fire weapons is considered poor throughout most of the area, alleviated only by drainage ditches, paddy dikes, built up roads and trails, and the brush wood covered knolls. Cover from indirect fire weapons is considered poor throughout, the primary protection being bridge and culverts. The sandy and loose soil, however, is conducive for the digging of foxholes and bunkers. Concealment for foot troops is considered to be poor to fair throughout the majority of the area, (the paddy and dry crop portion) and fair to excellent along the treelined beaches and the brush wood covered knolls respectively. Concealment is also fair in the brush lined portions of the built-up areas. Concealment is also fair in the brush lined portions of the built-up areas. Concealment for vehicles is poor throughout most of the area.
- (6) Critical Terrain Features.
  - (a) Hill 74 at BT 702895
  - (b) Hill 23 at BT 675920

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- (c) Hill 70 at BT 653936
- (d) Hill 45 at BT 721938
- (e) Hill 50 at BT 686937
- (f) Hamlet AN CUONG (1) BT 717922
- (g) Hamlet LAC SON (1) BT 683915
- (h) Hamlet NAM YEN (3) BT 686922
- (i) Hamlet VAN TUONG (1) BT 699955
- (j) Hamlet VAN TUONG (2) BT 697944
- (k) Hamlet VAN TUONG (3) BT 708954
- (l) Hamlet VAN TUONG (4) BT 722951
- (m) Hamlet VAN TUONG (5) BT 722951
- (n) Hamlet NAM YEN (4) BT 692928

UNCLASSIFIED

- (7) Observation and Fields of Fire. Shore range observation is generally good, being restricted only by the scattered and localized tree and brush areas, and possibly by paddy dikes and built-up roads. Long range observation is generally poor with the exception of the following points which will command observation throughout the entire area of interest: NUI PHOUNG (BS 688873) and NUI TRAM (BS 631877). Fields of fire for indirect fire weapons are excellent throughout. Direct fire weapons have fair and good fields of fire throughout most of the area, with poor to fair fields of fire being located through the relatively narrow coastal treeline, and on many of the scattered knolls.
- (8) Obstacles. Obstacles to cross country movement consist of two types: natural and man made. Natural obstacles to movement consist primarily of the "wet" paddy areas and the brushwood covered knolls, which are poor to unsuitable for vehicular movement. The central portion of the area, however (inland from NIS Beach 11 at BS 713963), is a dry crop area where movement is fairly unrestricted (except for the knolls). Vehicular movement south of the area is restricted by a tributary of the SONG TRA BONG (BS 637967 to BS 630967).
- (9) Avenues of Approach. Numerous trails and secondary roads exist throughout the area running generally in an east-west direction.
- (10) Routes of Communication. Primary lines of communication consist of Route 1 and recently U.S. constructed roads in the beach and dunes area where U.S. forces are located. A secondary line of communications is the un-numbered local route from BS 479875 to Route 1 at BS 602918. Railroad is not useable.
- (11) Movements Made. RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 1/7 embarked aboard assigned shipping on the 8th of August and sailed for Chu Lai, Vietnam where they anchored in the stream on the 14th of August. On the 17th of August RLT-7 Command Post displaced by assigned shipping to the vicinity of the Van Tuong Hamlet Complex vicinity of (BS 706926), to conduct Operation "STARLITE".
- (12) Training Conducted. Due to the mission assigned and the problems of setting up a base of operations, training was limited and oriented towards preventive instructions. These instructions dealt with the safe handling of fire arms, rules of engagement, and the proper use of the challenge and password. A great deal of "on the job" training was accomplished.

(13) Morale and Discipline.

- a. Morale. The morale of RLT-7 is considered excellent. Postal and PX services have been established. The men have received a small quantity of beer and soft drink. Steps are being taken to establish clubs and movies which will aid in maintaining high morale. The Regiment is making plans at present for initiating "Rest and Relaxation" flights to Hong Kong and Bangkok. A chapel has been set up and regular worship services established. Permanent messing facilities have been established and they are a contributing factor to the high state of morale.
- b. Discipline. There have been no reported major offenses during the reporting period. Discipline remains good.

(14) Civil Affairs. On Operation "STARLITE", the Regimental Civil Affairs Officer coordinated through province officials to provide food and care for the refugees. Injured civilians were evacuated to medical dispensaries. After Operation "STARLITE" was completed, arrangements were made for Army Civil Affairs teams to move into the area of operations. Recently the Civil Affairs officer attended a 3 day briefing in DaNang. Two sergeants, from Headquarters Company, RLT-7, trained in the Vietnamese language, are conducting English classes in the village of An Tan vicinity of (BT 500066).

(15) Summary of Events.

1-7 August- RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 1/7 conducted training at Camp Schwab and the Northern Training Area, Okinawa.

8-13 August- RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 1/7 were embarked aboard assigned shipping for movement to Chu Lai, Vietnam where they arrived on the 14th of August.

14 August- RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 1/7 arrived at Chu Lai on assigned shipping. At 141300H the first elements of BLT 1/7 began moving into an assembly area in vicinity of coordinates (BT 574036). Construction of the Regimental Command Post site was begun at coordinates (BT 560048).

15 August- RLT-7 continued general unloading and preparations for a permanent Regimental Command Post were made.

16 August- RLT-7 continued to unload and prepare a permanent Command Post. Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines sighted 7 VCS in the vicinity of (BT 545029). They were challenged and fled south across Highway 1. Elements of 1/7 went on patrols with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines in order to familiarize themselves with the area.

17 August- 1/7 began to move into the 3/3 positions. RLT-7 Headquarters is completing preparations for a combined amphibious and helicopterborne attack with BLT 3/3, BLT 2/4, BLT 3/7 and 3rd Battalion (-)(Rein), 12th Marines participating.

18-24 August- See After Action Report for Operation "STARLITE".

Enclosure (8)

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 11

25 August- RLT-7 completed Operation "STARLITE" and returned to the Chu Lai TAOR to improve its base camp facilities. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will assume positions as directed by Division Operation Order 327-65 in the Chu Lai TAOR. 1/7 is also providing 2 rifle platoons to K Battery (SP) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines which is supporting ARVN operations to the south of the Chu Lai TAOR.

26 August- 1/7 has one rifle platoon from each of three rifle companies A, B and D Company, under the operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines employed in their positions on the MLR. This is in preparation for 1/7 moving to occupy 3/3 positions on the MLR.

27 August- 1/7 relieved 3/3 on the MLR. The Commanding Officer and the Executive Staff of RLT-7 were briefed at the 3rd Marine Division Command Post on the forthcoming operation.

28 August- RLT-7 Headquarters continues to improve its base camp facilities in the Chu Lai TAOR and plan for the forthcoming operation.

29 August- 1/7 conducted active day and night patrolling within the TAOR without any contacts made.

30 August- 1/7 continued its active day and night patrolling with negative results. Plans are underway to establish the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines within the Chu Lai TAOR.

31 August- BLT 3/7 started off-loading from the Special Landing Force at first light and should complete off-loading by the morning of the 1st of September. 3/7 has been assigned the mission as Regimental Reserve. 1/7 continued its active day and night patrolling with negative results. PFC Robert C. METOR 1980168 H&S Company, 81MM Platoon, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines had his left leg run over by an LVT just above the knee at 31100H resulting in the amputation of the leg.

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, RLT-7  
 Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 U/S, San Francisco, California

3/ENS/djs  
 3100  
 14 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3rd MarDiv (Fwd), FMF  
 Subj: Sitrep No #6  
 Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1A

1. This sitrep for period 141030H to 141700H Aug 1965.
2. The first embarkation unit of five ships with RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 1/7 at Chu Lai at 1030. Unloading commenced as soon as vessels were anchored in the stream. At 1300 troops of BLT 1/7 and selected elements of RLT Headquarters began arriving at the beach.
3. BLT 1/7: Commenced unloading with the first elements arriving at the Chu Lai beach at 1300. The BLT, consisting of ~~1500~~<sup>1500</sup> officers and men immediately began moving into an assembly area vic coord (BT 574036) to (BT 557023). It is estimated that all personnel, less ships platoons, will be ashore by 141800H. General unloading of all classes of supplies will commence at 1730 and continue until secured by darkness.
4. a. RLT-7 CP presently satilleted on 4th Marines (Rein) CP. Construction will commence on CP site at coord (BT 561047).
  - b. BLT 1/7 CP located at coord (BT 566041).
  - c. Company CP's will be reported when established.
  - d. For the next 48 hours, RLT Headquarters and BLT 1/7 will continue occupation of assembly areas, construction of CP's and unloading of shipping.
5. Major General WALT and BGen KARCH met the RLT Commander Col O. F. PEATROSS on arrival at the beach.

E. N. SNYDER  
 By direction

~~ENCLOSURE (1)~~

HEADQUARTERS, 7TH MARINES  
 RLT-7  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/TGM/jjs  
 3120  
 15 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report No 7.

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3100.1

1. RLT-7
2. 150001H to 1516000H
3. RLT-7 continues general unloading. No operations planned.
4. N/A
5.
 

1stBn (BT 563032)	Co B, 1st Tank Bn (BT 560048)
H&S Co (BT 563032)	Co A, 3d AmTracBn (-do-)
Co A (BT 571038)	Co C, 1st ReconBn (-do-)
Co B (BT 562025)	Co C, 1st EngrBn (-do-)
Co C (BT 558050)	Co C, 1st AT Bn (-do-)
Co D (BT 553025)	3dBn (-)(Rein), 11th Marines (-d6-)
6. N/A
7. None
8. None
9. N/A

E. W. SNYDER  
 By direction

~~ENCLOSURE (1)~~

HEADQUARTERS, RIF-7  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California


3/TGM/jja  
 3120  
 16 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division(Fwd)

Subj: RIF-7 Situation Report Number 8.

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RIF-7
2. 160001H to 162400H
3. RIF-7 continues to unload and prepare CP site.
4. At 152130H Co D sighted 7 VCS at the right flank of Co D position vicinity BT 545029. The VCS were challenged, then fled south across Highway 1. Five rounds of illumination and three rounds of small arms were fired without effect, the last at 152231H.
5. N/A
6. N/A
7. Fifteen troops from Co A and 8 personnel from Co<sup>B</sup>, on patrol with Co<sup>M</sup>, 3/3 and Co L, 3/3, respectively. The purpose is to familiarize 1/7 personnel with the area.
8. N/A
9. At 151800, Co G 1st MF Bn CHOPS to FLSU #1.

  
 E. N. SNYDER  
 By Direction

~~NCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS, RLT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
3120  
17 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number 9

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7
2. 170001H to 172400H
3. RLT-7 continues to prepare CP site. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines has begun to move into 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines positions. RLT-7 Headquarters is completing preparations for a combined amphibious and helicopterborne attack with BLT 3/3, BLT 2/4, BLT 3/7 and 3rdBn(-)(Rein), 12 Marines participating.
4. At 162155H a sentry from Company D challenged two VCs at the right flank of Company D position vicinity BT545028 three times. The VCs turned and fled and two rounds of small arms were fired at the two VCs without effect. Six rounds of illumination were fired without effect, the last at 162205H. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines has assumed the defensive positions of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines.
5. New changes in location for 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. A Company CP now located vicinity BT572029, B Company CP vicinity BT568020, C Company CP located at BT 562037, D Company CP at BT550016.
6. N/A
7. N/A
8. RLT-7 has completed plans for operation "Starlite" and is prepared to execute. See my Operation Order 323-65 which will be included in the "Starlite" post operation report.
9. N/A

E. N. SNYDER  
By direction

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
 3120  
 18 Aug 65

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division(Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number 10

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 180001H to 182400H
3. RLT-7(Fwd) is committed to Operation "Starlight". In support of DET K BTRY (SP) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines which is in support of Operation "Statlight", RLT-7 Headquarters(Rear) has one platoon from C Company 1st Reconnaissance Battalion providing security for K BTRY's position.
4. Headquarters Company RLT-7 has established a static defense for RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear) and the Class 5 Dump for Chu Lai TAOR.
5. N/A
6. One platoon from C Company 1st Reconnaissance Battalion located (GS) BT600.
7. N/A
8. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear) plans to reinforce the platoon from C Company 1st Reconnaissance Battalion with a composite platoon from Headquarters Company RLT-7 (Rear).
9. RLT-7 (Rear) held briefings today for the ADC G-3 of the Chu Lai TAOR and the Commanding Officer of HMM 161 and the Commanding Officer of BLT 3/7.

L. M. EATON  
 By direction

HEADQUARTERS, RLT-7 (REAR)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
3120  
19 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division(Fwd)  
Subj: RLT-7 Headquarters(Rear) Situation Report Number 11  
Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 190001H to 192400H

3. RLT-7 (Fwd) is conducting Operation "Starlight" in the Van Tuong Village Complex. 2nd Battalion, Fourth Marines, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines have almost completed their sweep to the sea. Resistance encountered very heavy all day yesterday. Today resistance has been light to moderate, RLT-7 Headquarters(Rear) has one platoon from C Company 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and one composite platoon from Headquarters Company RLT-7(Rear) providing security for one platoon of K Battery (SP) 4th Battalion, 12th Marines which is in support of Operation "Starlight."

4. RLT-7 consisting of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion 7th Marines began Operation "Starlight" on the 18th of August 1965 at 0630 local time and which <sup>will</sup> continue in all probability to late in the afternoon of the 20th of August 1965.

The operation began with the amphibious landing of 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines at H-Hour (180630H) and the helicopterborne landing of 2nd Battalion 4th Marines at L-Hour (180645H). At night on the 18th of August 1965 2 companies from 3rd Battalion 7th Marines, Companies I and L respectively were helilifted into RLT-7 (Fwd) CP. at grfd coordinates BS702918 for further deployment. At first light on the 19th of August 1965 M Company 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines landed on Green Beach in LVT.

This operation was centered in the Van Tuong Village Complex and consisted of a search and destroy sweep from the Southwestern portion of the zone of action to the Northeastern portion all the way to the sea.

Information concerning the enemy in the area is very scarce at all levels of intelligence sources. Certain sources report that T121 a Heavy Weapons Company was operating in the area with four 57mm recoilless rifles and two 75mm recoilless rifles. It is believed that elements of the 45th Battalion are operating in the zone of action. A VC prisoner reported at 191342H that 2 VC Battalions were or had been operating in the zone of action. Two companies of Hard Core VC were reported at grid coordinates BS688719. The night of the 18th of August, in the village of Van Tung 5, at grid coordinates BS721944, two VC platoons were reported seen with no crew served weapons in support.

ENCLOSURE (1)

2nd Battalion, Fourth Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in support have swept through their respective zones of action to phase line "Cherry." Enemy attempted to defend major installations and offered heavy resistance on the 18th of August 1965. On the 19th of August 1965, the enemy offered light to moderate resistance.

In support of the operation see my operation order 323-65 also the CLG USS Galveston is providing direct support to 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines.

As of 191100H there were 27 Marines KIA and 154 Marines WIA. 40 enemy captured and 550 estimated enemy KIA.

Operation "Starlight" should end on the 20th of August 1965 with a sweep by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines through the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines zone of action.

5. New location of companies and battalions. M Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines BS698977, G Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines BS707968, E Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines BS706973, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines BS707968, L Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, K Companies, 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines all located vicinity BS716945.

6. N/A

7. N/A

8. Plans for 20 August 1965 involve a sweeping search and destroy mission by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in the 3rd Marines zone of action. Efforts will be made to drive the enemy out of their caves and underground holes. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines will be helilifted out of the operation prior to this sweep.

9. N/A

LEONARD M. EATON  
By Direction

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS RLIT-7 (REAR)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o PPO, San Francisco, California

5/LME/jjs  
3120  
20 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division(Fwd)  
Subj: RLIT-7 Headquarters(Rear) Situation Report Number 12  
Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLIT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 200001H to 202400H (Rear)
3. RLIT-7 (Fwd) continues to conduct Operation "Starlight." At the present time 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is being helilifted into the zone of action to replace 2nd Battalion, Fourth Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will be helilifted into the present 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines C.P.
4. 2nd Battalion, Fourth Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines completed their respective sweeps through their respective zones of action with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in direct support. The Battalions pulled back into defensive positions the morning of the 20th of August with certain companies still occupied with mopping up operations. Enemy resistance for the last 24 hour period has been light to moderate.
5. Positions of Companies and Battalion CPs as of 2011/00H. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines C.P. BS711972, G Company, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines BS714975. RLIT-7 CP, H Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, and I Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines all at BS706925. 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines C.P, K Company 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, L Company 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and L Company 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines all at 716945. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP, I Company, 3rd Battalion, Seventh Marines and M Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines are all at BS701931. E Company 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines BS713977.
6. N/A
7. N/A
8. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines having deployed on order to the zone of operations will conduct with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines a search and destroy operation in the Van Tuong Village Complex. The purpose of this mission is to destroy remaining enemy forces and fortifications and seek items of intelligence value.
9. N/A

~~ENCLOSURE~~  
LEONARD M. EATON  
By Direction

HEADQUARTERS, RLT-7 (REAR)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/djs  
3120  
21 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear) Situation Report No #13  
Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 21001H-210005H
3. RLT-7 consisting of 1st Bn, 7th Marines and 3rd Bn, 7th Marines is conducting Operation "STARLITE" in the Van Tuong Village complex. Both battalions are maintaining night defensive position. NGF Support and artillery are providing illumination, H&I and on-call fire. The helicopter lift of 1st Bn, 7th Marines into the Zone of Action ceased 202100H and will continue at first light on 21 August 1965.
4. The helilift of 1st Bn, 7th Marines into the former battalion CP of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines began at 201515H with the helilift of the 1st Bn, 7th Marine Command Group into 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines CP. Companies A, B and D and the Battalion Aid Station were then helilifted into this Battalion CP. 1st platoon, Company C, 1st Recon Bn was helilifted into 7th Marines Regimental CP (Fwd) as part of this lift. Company C, 1st Bn, 7th Marines was supposed to be lifted into the 7th Marines Regimental CP (Fwd). Due to a mix-up in the helilift into 7th Marines Regimental CP (Fwd) only 50% of Co C, 1st Bn, 7th Marines was helilifted. The other 50% of Co C, 1st Bn, 7th Marines was helilifted into 1st Bn, 7th Mar (Fwd) CP. At first light on 21 August, the remainder of the company will be helilifted into the 7th Marines Regimental CP (Fwd).

LST-1162 docked at the Causeway at Chu Lai at 201915H and began to offload 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines. At 2200H vehicles of 1st Bn, 7th Marines began loading aboard this LST. They included 6 mules, 4 mites with trailers. The 106mm RR Platoon, one platoon from Company C, 1st AF Battalion and 1,000 cases of MIC's, 25 boxes of batteries, one hundred of 55 gallon drums of gasoline, and certain ammunition for 81mm mortars. LST-1162 will offload at Green Beach at first light on 21 August.

~~ENCLOSURE~~

At 202355H a wild NMF round from DD-886 USS ORLECK injured 3 men, one fatally at Company D, 1st Bn, 7th Marines position. Evacuation of the three men was completed at 210018H. NMF has ceased in order to be investigated.

With regard to supporting arms, the following vehicles were reported in support of RIF-7 at the beginning of the operation. 9 M-48 tanks, 1 M-67 Flame Tank, 15 LVT's and Command LVT and 8 Ontos.

The latest U.S. Marine casualties as of 210345H were 45 U.S. Marines KIA and 209 U.S. Marines WIA.

5. Changes in location of battalions and company CP's as of 210440H, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP, I-3/7, L-3/7 and M-3/7 are all located vicinity of BS 703934. K-3/7 remains aboard ship.

1st Battalion, 7th Marines CP, A-1/7, B-1/7, D-1/7 and 50% of C-1/7 located at BS 718942. 50% of C-1/7 is located at the 7th Marines Regimental CP at BS 702914.

6. N/A.

7. N/A.

8. 1st Bn, 7th Marines and 3rd Bn, 7th Marines will conduct on 21 August a search and destroy operation in the Van Tuong Village complex. The purpose of this mission will be to destroy remaining enemy forces, their fortifications and seek items of intelligence value.

9. N/A.

LEONARD M. RATON  
By direction

~~ENCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7 (REAR)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
o/e PPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
3120  
21 August 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear) Situation Report Number 14  
Ref: (a) Div (Fwd) O 3120.1

1. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 210005H to 212400H (Rear)

3. RLT-7 (Fwd) consisting of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines is conducting company size search, clear and destroy operations. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines is conducting its operations in the hamlet complex of An Thoi (1) and Nam Yen (3). 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is conducting its operations in the hamlet complex of Van Tuong concentrating its efforts on Van Tuong 5, Van Tuong 2 and Van Tuong 3. All companies plan to return to their respective Battalion CP's.

4. Operations: I Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines departed the Battalion CP at 210230H on a search and clear mission. M Company departed the CP at 210430H with a similar mission and L Company departed the CP at 210545 but was held up because of the nonavailability of close air support. M and I Company moved out on foot and L Company went by helicopter. As of 211130H I and L Company had no VC contact and M Company received sporadic small arms fire. However there was no organized resistance. M, I and L Company plan to return to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine C.P. by 211700H. The operations conducted by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began when D Company departed the battalion defensive perimeter at 210700H with the mission to search, clear and destroy caves, and holes at Van Tuong (5). They had no contact with the enemy and by 210735 they had destroyed 2 enemy caves. At 210815H A Company departed its defensive positions with the mission to search and clear Van Tuong 2. B Company remained at the Battalion CP to occupy the defensive perimeter. At 210800H D Company encountered sniper fire in the vicinity BS715942. There were no casualties. At 211015H A Company was at BS703937 moving west to its objective. D Company is in Van Tuong 5 as of 211015.

At 210917H ARVN forces consisting of 3rd Battalion, Marines, 47th Reconnaissance Company, 3rd Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 51st Regiment began a sweep in their zone of action to the Southwest of where Operation Starlight is being conducted. At 210900H they were expected to be somewhere in the vicinity of BS652937.

~~ENCLOSURE~~

[REDACTED]

5. Regimental 7th Marines CP still located at BS717926. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines CP located at BS718942, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP located at BS7C1932.

6. N/A

7. N/A

8. The 7th Marines plan to continue their company size search and clear operations with added emphasis on destroying caves and tunnels. Tomorrow certain forces will be concentrated on search and clear missions on the beach.

9. At 211200H 7th Marines(Rear) Major H. HOMBERG from COMUSMACV J-3 was briefed.

LEONARD M. EATON  
By Direction

[REDACTED]

~~ENCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS RLIF-7 (Rear)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LMB/dja  
3120  
22 Aug 1965

From: RLIF-7 Headquarters (Rear)  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RLIF-7 Headquarters (Rear) Situation Report Number #15  
Ref: (a) Div (Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLIF-7 Headquarters (Rear).
2. 220001H to 222400H (Rear).

3. RLIF-7 (Fwd) consisting of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines continue its operations in the Van Tuong Village complex. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines is engaged in a special mission to seek out and destroy any VC that are harboring in a line of hills running from grid coordinates BS 690905 to BS 690870. Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was landed from the SLF at 220630 and the three companies, India, Lima and Kilo will reconnoiter in force toward Hill 128 coordinates BS 688872. AMHE elements, consisting of the 3rd Battalion-Marines, 4th Recon Company, 3rd Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 51st Regiment, are continuing their sweep west of the No-Fire grid line which remains North-South grid line 68.

4. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in continuing their operations in the Van Tuong Village complex are sending out company size search and clear missions. Company C secured an objective running from grid coordinates BS 700953 to BS 705955 at 220715H. At 220900H Company C was proceeding to an objective at BS 695954 and encountered light sniper fire. At 220720H Company B called for interdiction fire at coordinates BS 690968 to BS 710968 near the village of Van Tuong (1). Company B and the O.P. group departed the Battalion C.P. at 220740H. Company B will search and seize Village Van Tuong (1) at 220800H. Company C secured objective B at BS 695954. Company Bravo's forward elements reached the position of Company C at 220815H. Company B stopped interdiction fires at 220825H. Company B reported no VC seen in village Van Tuong (1). 1st Platoon of C Company, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion has been sent to establish surveillance over a village in the vicinity of BS 722955.

At 221235 A Company engaged in a fire fight in a village at BS 698945. At 221300H B Company spotted 3 VC at coordinates BS 705937. They fired on the VC and one VC suspect was wounded and evacuated to "C" Med at 221315H.

D Company received sniper fire at BS 708954. They returned the fire at 221426H. A Company reported that they had killed a VC at coordinates BS 703937. The body was searched but nothing of intelligence value was found. At 221330H B Company received sniper fire at BS 705944. At 220720H an AO observed 15 VC armed moving east along a trail in the vicinity of BS 705959. At 221123H B Company conducted a search and clear of Van Tuong Village (3) at coordinates BS 709952. Friendly civilians informed B Company that there were no VC in the area. Ammo was found in tunnels under the houses. A Vietnamese male was shot by sniper fire at 221540 in the vicinity BS 708951. He was evacuated to the 7th Marines C.P. A map and book was found at BS 701924. A booby trapped shot gun shell was found in the vicinity of BS 701924. A paper of the National Liberation Front was found in a house at Van Tuong Village (3). At 221325H D Company departed on a search and clear mission of a village at BS 722956. 1st Platoon of C Company, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was attached to D Company for this operation.

Third Battalion, Seventh Marines (-) consisting of India, Kilo and Lima companies cleared the Battalion C.P. by 220900H. The companies moved out in feet in an approach march to BS 693907 which they designated an assembly area. I Company was in the right, L Company was on the left and K Company was in reserve to follow in trace.

The three companies of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines <sup>PARTICIPATING</sup> ~~participating~~ in this mission will move from this assembly area to BS 690870 where they will dig in for the night. The plan for 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines calls for them to search and clear the line of hills extending from coordinates BS 690905 to BS 690870 where it is believed that the VC have gone into a harbor site after fleeing the Van Tuong Village complex.

The ARVN elements are continuing their sweep now moving westward. An air strike was called on a suspected VC concentration in the vicinity of BS 667877 and 97 VC were reported killed.

5. All changes reported in paragraph 4.

6. N/A.

7. N/A.

8. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will continue its search and clear operations on the 23rd of August in the Van Tuong Village complex. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines will continue the search for the VC in the line of hills centered around Hill 128 at coordinates BS 688672.

9. N/A.

LEONARD M. EATON  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7 (Rear)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
o/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/djs  
3120  
23 Aug 1965

From: RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear) Situation Report Number #15<sup>16</sup>  
Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 230001H to 232400H (Rear)

3. RLT-7 (Fwd) continues operation "Starlite" in the Trung Phan Peninsula, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines finished its search and clear operations in the Van Tuong Village Complex by 231200H and began to move its wheeled and tracked vehicles to the beach. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines sent I, K and L Companies to the vicinity of BS 690870 to dig in for the night, last night. Today I, K and L Company will sweep to Hill 128 at BS 678859 then reveal their direction of movement and sweep back through the line of hills in their Zone of Action. From here the three companies will move to Green Beach by an axis of advance to BS 715890 then in a northward direction to Green Beach to be there by the end of daylight on the 23rd of August 1965.

The ARVN Regiment under the command of General LAMM continues its sweeps to the south of operation "Starlite".

4. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in continuing their mission this morning sent B Company out at 230840H on a sweep and A Company assumed the perimeter defense. C Company entered Van Tuong Village #1 and learned that 14 VC left the village and headed south toward the peninsula. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines reported that Van Tuong Village #4 was totally destroyed by fire and that there was no enemy contact in the area. In the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Zone of Action a large number of civilians were reported requiring medical aid. B Company made contact with an unknown number of V.C. in caves vicinity of coordinates BS 698955.

Upon discovery of large caves a complex attempt was made to search and destroy caves after penetrating them. Charges were set approximately 100 feet inside the tunnel. The tunnel collapsed at the detonation point but the entrance could not be sealed because of the 25 foot vertical shaft at the entrance. Twenty four civilian males were picked up in the vicinity BS 722955. VC suspects were captured at different locations in the Van Tuong Village (1) BS 698955.

ENCLOSURE

At 231200H 1st Battalion, 7th Marines ceased its search and clear operations and began to move its heavy gear to Green Beach where it will prepare for the new mission.

Third Battalion, 7th Marines, having completed its sweep of the area around Hill 128 with negative results has moved out on its Axis of Advance to arrive there by the end of daylight today.

5. New CP locations as follows: 1st Battalion, 7th Marines vicinity of BS 718928; 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines vicinity of BS 718928; 7th Marines Regimental CP at BS 718928. A perimeter defense will be established and 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will run from BS 702926 to BS 703930 to BS 720930 to BS 718924. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines will be from BS 718924 to BS 721916 to BS 718928 to BS 705921 to BS 702926.

6. N/A.

7. N/A

8. For the 24th of August 1965, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines will complete its backloading and re-embarkation aboard the USS Iwo Jima finishing its move not later than the end of daylight hours.

At first light on the 24th of August, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will return overland to its positions at Chu Lai to the rear of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. Enroute it will complete a sweep of the Trung Phas Peninsula. It is anticipated that the following plan will be adhered to for crossing the Song Tra Bong River. LVT's from Company A, 3rd Amphibious will pick up the troops at BT 610020 where they will drop off the troops to continue the sweep. RIF-7 Command Group will embark aboard the USS Bayfield (APA-53) and control the sweep of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines through the Trung Phan Peninsula from this ship. LSD-16 will embark vehicles and serve as a helicopter supply point. The two HCP support ships, one LCU with tanks embarked and the LST-1161 will be released after backloading is completed.

9. N/A.

LEONARD M. EATON  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS RIF-7 (Rear)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LMB/ajs  
3120  
24 August 1965

From: RIF-7 Headquarters (Rear)  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RIF-7 Headquarters (Rear) Situation Report Number #17  
Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RIF-7 Headquarters (Rear)
2. 240001H-2/2400H (Rear).
3. RIF-7 (Fwd) is bringing to completion Operation "Starlite". The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is making a final sweep of the Trung Phan Peninsula and returning to the Chu Lai TAON to a reserve area behind the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines continued to search and clear last night's positions and established a perimeter defense on Green Beach in preparation for the de-barking and backloading of personnel and equipment on assigned shipping.
4. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began its sweep of the Trung Phan Peninsula having moved out at first light on the 24th of August. By the end of daylight on the 24th of August the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is expected to be in its former reserve area behind the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP. In order to maintain control and keep us informed of their progress, the First Battalion, 7th Marines has established a series of check points. At 241130H they were resupplied with water at coord 667991.

To cross the Song Tra Bong River it was decided to employ the LVT's from Company A, 3rd Antras Company. All the troops will be picked up at BT 630021 and dropped off by the LVT's at coordinates BT 610020. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will terminate their operations and be in a reserve area by dark tonight, 24 August 1965. The LVT's plan to pick up the battalion and commence crossing the Song Tra Bong River at its mouth between 241600H and 241700H. As of 241545 there had been no enemy contact by either the battalion or reconnaissance elements out front.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines has established a perimeter defense on Green Beach and commenced backloading of personnel and equipment aboard assigned shipping. Certain companies have been searching the vicinity of last night's positions and at 241400H they completed this mission and proceeded to Green Beach to complete backloading prior to dark on the 24th of August.

5. N/A.
6. N/A.

~~ENCLOSURE (1)~~

[REDACTED]

7. N/A.

8. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will return to their former position within the Chu Lai TAOR.

9. N/A.

LEONARD M. EATON  
By direction

~~ENCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/IME/djs  
3120  
25 Aug 1965

From: RLT-7 Headquarters (Rear)  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number #18

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7
2. 250001H to 252400H
3. RLT-7 has completed Operation "Starlite" and has returned to the Chu Lai TAOR to improve its base camp facilities. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will assume positions as directed by Division Operation 327-65 in the Chu Lai TAOR.
4. At 241945H BLT 3/7 completed backloading of personnel and equipment aboard amphibious shipping of the Special Landing Force.

1st Battalion, 7th Marines is preparing to assume, on order, the positions in the defense of the Chu Lai TAOR now presently occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is also providing two rifle platoons to K Battery (SP), 4th Battalion, 12th Marines which is supporting ARVN operations to the south of the Chu Lai TAOR.

5. The entire RLT-7 Headquarters is now located at grid coordinates BT 560048. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is presently located at grid coordinates BT 565043.

6. N/A

7. N/A

8. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will assume new defensive positions as directed.

9. N/A

E. N. SNYDER  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS RLIT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/dje  
3120  
26 Aug 1965

From: RLIT-7 Headquarters  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLIT-7 Situation Report Number #19

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLIT-7
2. 260001H-262400H
3. RLIT-7 continues to improve its base camp facilities in the Chu Lai TAOR. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is prepared to assume positions as directed by Division Operation Order 327-65 in the Chu Lai TAOR.
4. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines has one rifle platoon from each of three rifle companies, A, B, and D Companies, under the operational control of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and serving in their front line positions. The purpose of this is to familiarize the men with the terrain and the job to be done.  
  
1st Battalion, 7th Marines also <sup>HQS</sup> two platoons from C Company providing direct support to K Battery (SP), 4th Battalion, 12th Marines which is supporting ARVN operations to the south of the Chu Lai TAOR.
5. No change.
6. N/A.
7. N/A.
8. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will assume new defensive positions as directed.
9. It should be noted in the Task Organization that three platoons of Popular Forces served with the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines during Operation "Starlite".

E. M. SNYDER  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS RIF-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/TGM/ajs  
3120  
27 Aug 1965

From: RIF-7 Headquarters  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RIF-7 Situation Report Number #20

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RIF-7.
2. 270001H to 272400H
3. RIF-7 continues to improve its base camp facilities in the Chu Lai TAOR. 1st Battalion relieved 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines in the Chu Lai TAOR.
4. At 0800, the 1st Battalion commenced relieving the 3d Battalion, 3rd Marines on the MLR. Relief was temporarily suspended at 1000 when both battalions were alerted to the forthcoming operation. However, it was decided that the relief should continue, which it did at 1300. The relief was completed at 1530. ~~At 1530~~. At 1530, Company D sent out small patrols to eject civilians in the 1st Battalion area east of Highway 1 and behind the 1st Battalion MLR. At 1600, the 1st Battalion assumed the security of both battalion CP's and simultaneously commenced registering artillery and 81mm mortars.
5. Hq 1/7 BT 565044  
Co A BT 572029  
Co B BT 566020  
Co C BT 563034  
Co D BT 553018
6. N/A.
7. N/A.
8. Plans. The Commanding Officer and Executive Staff of the 7th Marines are presently at the 3rd Marine Division CP being briefed for the forthcoming operation. Planning will continue throughout the night and commanders and their staffs, plus supporting arms commanders, will meet at the 7th Marines CP at 280900H to receive the commanders planning guidance.

~~ENCLOSURE (1)~~

T. G. MC FARLAND  
By direction

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/TGM/jjs  
3120  
28 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number 21

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7
2. 280001H to 282400H
3. RLT-7 continues to improve its base camp facilities in the Chu Lai TAOR.
4. N/A
5. N/A
6. N/A
7. N/A
8. (a) RLT-7 continues to plan for Operation Piranka. At 280900 the commander issued his concept of operations and initial planning guidance to subordinate commanders and supporting arms representatives.  
  
(b) See attached overlays.
9. N/A


E. N. SNYDER  
By Direction

~~ENCLOSURE~~

Borney Hill - 3

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CHULAI  
17

03 56  
+



60  
+ 99

UNIT	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	POD	POR	AMBUSH SITE?
Co A	A-1	Sqd (Rmr)	292100H	300100H	578033	572023	
Co B	B-1	PLT (Asmf)	290530H	291200	608019	608019	
	B-2	Sqd	292400H	300800	565018	566028	LAYOUT 614065

~~ENCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS, RIF-7  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FVF  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LNE/djs  
 3120  
 29 Aug 1965

From: RIF-7 Headquarters  
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RIF-7 Situation Report Number #22

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RIF-7.

2. 290001H to 291600H.

3. RIF-7 continues to improve its base camp facilities in the Oka Lai TAOR. Planning for the forthcoming operation continues as the Commanding Officer and his Executive Staff brief their staffs and supporting arms commanders. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines continues to man its defensive positions in the MLR. The battalion continues its active day and night patrolling within the TAOR.

4. Activity Summary.

a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

(1) Company A conducted local security patrols to the immediate front of the MLR with negative contact.

(2) Company B conducted two fire team size patrols, one security and one layout; with negative contact; one platoon (Rein) with negative results.

(3) Company C remains as the Battalion reserve and occupies the assigned assembly area. Today the company conducted a motorized daylight patrol behind the MLR to apprehend any civilians. This patrol met with negative results.

(4) Company D manned one OP Number #1 and a roadblock. It conducted a platoon (-) combat patrol and one squad (-) ambush both with negative results.

5. N/A.

6. N/A.

7. N/A.

8. Patrols for 31 August 1965:

a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PATROL</u>	<u>SIZE</u>	<u>TOD</u>	<u>TOB</u>	<u>POB</u>	<u>EOB</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
Co A	A-11	Sqd	302300H	310600H	(BT576035)	(BT 576033)	Layout (BT 593022)
	A-12	Pit	300830H	311200H	(BT573029)	(BT 577030)	Combat (
	A-13	Sqd	312400H	010700H	(BT569025)	(BT 570026)	Layout (BT 582014)
Co B	B-1	Pit(-)	310630H	311130H	(BT566017)	(BT 567018)	Combat
	B-2	Sqd	311900H	010100H	(BT569022)	(BT 568022)	Ambush (BT 569013)
	B-3	Pt	010200H	010630H	(BT565016)	(BT 567018)	Layout (BT 572018)
	B-4	Pt	311930H	010600H	(BT563015)	(BT 565017)	Layout (BT 566022)
Co D	D-1	Sqd(-)	010100H	Day Brk	(BT549012)	(BT 550012)	Ambush (BT 549003)
	D-2	Pit(-)	310630H	311200H	(BT552012)	(BT 556012)	Combat

9. In the Van Tuong Village Complex 887 civilians were processed. To these civilians 450 pounds of rice were distributed.

E. H. SNYDER  
By direction

~~ENCLOSURE~~ (✓)

HEADQUARTERS RLT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/EJV/4Jm  
3120  
31 Aug 1965

From: RLT-7 Headquarters  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number #28

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7

2. 300001H - 301600H

3. RLT-7 continues to plan for the forthcoming operation. BLF 3/7 started off-loading from the SLF at first light. This morning and should complete off-loading by early tomorrow. The mission of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines has been assigned as Regimental Reserve. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines continued to man its MLR positions and conduct active patrolling in its assigned TAOR. The battalion continued to improve its defensive posture by utilizing a bulldozer to improve fields of fire and observation.

4. Activity Summary.

a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

- (1) Company A conducted one squad ambush and one platoon combat patrol both with negative contact.
- (2) Company B conducted one squad ambush and one platoon combat patrol both with negative contact.
- (3) Company C continued as the Battalion Reserve, remained in the assigned assembly area and conducted daylight motorized patrols behind the MLR to apprehend any unauthorized persons.
- (4) Company D conducted one platoon (-) combat patrol and one squad (-) ambush both with negative results.

b. 3rd Battalion 11th Marines fired 6 H&I missions expending 96 rounds HE by 105 Howitzers.

5. N/A.

6. No change.

~~INCL 511~~

7. Company C, 1st AntiTank Battalion conducted a class on weapons and safety and tactical employment of the Ontos.

8. Patrols for 1 September 1965:

a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Co A	A-15	Sqd	020200H	020730H	(BT 576035)	(BT 575031)	Ambush	(BT 600017)
	A-1	Plt(+)	020830H	021730H	(BT 610020)	(BT 603021)	Combat	
	A-14	Sqd	022200H	030700H	(BT 574031)	(BT 572031)	Layout	(BT 600008)
Co B	B-1	Plt(-)	020600H	021230H	(BT 560008)	(BT 570021)	Combat	
	B-2	FT	021930H	022330H	(BT 566019)	(BT 565018)	Layout	(BT 572010)
	B-4	FT	021930H	030630H	(BT 562017)	(BT 568022)	Layout	(BT 566022)
	B-3	FT	030200H	030630H	(BT 565017)	(BT 563016)	Layout	(BT 568009)
Co D	D-1	Sqd(-)	020001H	Daybrk	(BT 562012)	(BT 562012)	Ambush	(BT 550000)
	D-2	Plt(-)	020700H	021300H	(BT 548011)	(BT 552012)	Combat	
	D-3	FT	022030H	022200H	(BT 557012)	(BT 557012)	Recon	

9. Miscellaneous.


a. At 311015H, PFC Robert C. MELTON, 1980168 U.MC of the 81mm mortar platoon suffered a traumatic amputation of the left leg above the knee joint. The injury was caused by an LVT. At 311028 the man was evacuated by helicopter to the LPH-2 IWO JIMA. The incident is currently under investigation.

b. No Civil Affairs action accomplished. The Regimental Civil Affairs Officer is currently at the 3rd MarDiv (Fwd) CP for conference.


c. A planning staff from RMC-7 is scheduled to arrive at the Div CP at 010800 in connection with Operation "PIRANHA".

E. N. SNYDER  
By direction

60  
1ST BN 7TH MAR  
CTRL OVERLAY FOR  
2 SEPT 65  
VIETNAM 1:50000  
SHEETS 6757 IV III



55  
97 +



HEADQUARTERS RLT-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/EJV/djs  
3120  
31 Aug 1965

From: RLT-7 Headquarters  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)

Subj: RLT-7 Situation Report Number #24

Ref: (a) Div(Fwd)O 3120.1

1. RLT-7
2. 300001H - 301600H
3. RLT-7 continues to plan for the forthcoming operation. BMT 3/7 started off-loading from the SLP at first light. This morning and should complete off-loading by early tomorrow. The mission of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines has been assigned as Regimental Reserve. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines continued to man its MLR positions and conduct active patrolling in its assigned TAOR. The battalion continued to improve its defensive posture by utilizing a bulldozer to improve fields of fire and observation.
4. Activity Summary.
  - a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines
    - (1) Company A conducted one squad ambush and one platoon combat patrol both with negative contact.
    - (2) Company B conducted one squad ambush and one platoon combat patrol both with negative contact.
    - (3) Company C continued as the Battalion Reserve, remained in the assigned assembly area and conducted daylight motorized patrols behind the MLR to apprehend any unauthorized persons.
    - (4) Company D conducted one platoon (-) combat patrol and one squad (-) ambush both with negative results.
  - b. 3rd Battalion 11th Marines fired 6 H&I missions expending 96 rounds HE by 105 Howitzers.
5. N/A.
6. No change.

~~ENCLOSURE (7)~~

7. Company C, 1st AntiTank Battalion conducted a class on weapons and safety and tactical employment of the Ontos.

8. Patrols for 1 September 1965:

a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Co A	A-15	Sqd	020200H	020730H	(BT 576035)	(BT 575031)	Ambush (BT 600017)
	A-1	Plt(+)	020830H	021730H	(BT 610020)	(BT 603021)	Combat
	A-14	Sqd	022200H	030700H	(BT 574031)	(BT 572031)	Layout (BT 600008)
Co B	B-1	Plt(-)	020600H	021230H	(BT 560008)	(BT 570021)	Combat
	B-2	FT	021930H	022330H	(BT 566019)	(BT 565016)	Layout (BT 572010)
	B-4	FT	021930H	030630H	(BT 562017)	(BT 568022)	Layout (BT 566022)
	B-5	FT	030200H	030630H	(BT 565017)	(BT 563016)	Layout (BT 568009)
Co D	D-1	Sqd(-)	020001H	Daybrk	(BT 562012)	(BT 562012)	Ambush (BT 550000)
	D-2	Plt(-)	020700H	021300H	(BT 548011)	(BT 552012)	Combat
	D-3	FT	022030H	022200H	(BT 557012)	(BT 557012)	Recon

9. Miscellaneous.

a. At 311015H, PFC Robert C. MELTON, 1980168 USMC of the 81mm mortar platoon suffered a traumatic amputation of the left leg above the knee joint. The injury was caused by an LVT. At 311028 the man was evacuated by helicopter to the LPH-2 IWO JIMA. The incident is currently under investigation.


b. No Civil Affairs action accomplished. The Regimental Civil Affairs Officer is currently at the 3rd MarDiv (Fwd) CP for conference.

c. A planning staff from RHT-7 is scheduled to arrive at the Div CP at 010800 in connection with Operation "PIRANHA".

E. S. SNYDER  
By direction

~~ENCLOSURE~~

60  
+04 1ST BN 7TH MAR  
PATROL OVERLAY FOR  
2 SEPT 65  
VIETNAM 1:50,000  
SHEETS 6757 07 III



55  
97+

~~ENCLOSURE~~

HEADQUARTERS RLIT-7 (REAR)  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LME/jjs  
3120  
21 Aug 1965

From: RLIT-7 Headquarters (Rear)  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: Weekly Operations Summary for period covering 141600 August to  
201600 August  
Ref: (a) DivO (Fwd) 3100.1

1. OPERATIONS

a. RLIT-7 landed 14 August 1965 with troops and some gear going over the beach and more equipment coming off ships onto the causeway at Chu Lai, Viet Nam. RLIT-7 Headquarters moved to a temporary location on the beach located at BT560048. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved to position to the rear of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines in an assembly area vicinity coordinates BT574056 to BT557023. Off loading continued for the next three days. At 1600 on 16 August RLIT-7 received warning order for Operation Starlight. On 17 August 1965 completed preparations for Operation Starlight with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and 3rd Battalion (-)(Rein), 12th Marines participating. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines assumed defensive positions vacated by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. On 18 August RLIT-7 (Fwd) was committed to Operation Starlight with H-Hour at 180630H August and L-Hour at 180645H August. Operation Starlight continued through 211600H August with 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines being withdrawn from the operation on 20 August. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was committed to Operation Starlight on 20 August 1965 via <sup>Div</sup> Frag Order 3-65.

b. (1) RLIT-7 Headquarters disembarked on 14 August 1965 to occupy a temporary CP and assembly area coordinates BT560048. For the next 48 hours RLIT-7 Headquarters continued to occupy assembly areas, off load and construct the C.P. At 161600H August, RLIT-7 Headquarters received a verbal warning order from Brigadier General KARCH for Operation Starlight. Preparation began for this operation. Operation Order 323-65 was issued at 170700H August 1965 outlining this operation. H-Hour was set for 180630H August. Headquarters Company (Rear) established a static defense for RLIT-7 Headquarters Company (Rear) and Class 5 Dump for Chu Lai TAOR. Operation Starlight is centered in the Van Tuong Village Complex. Resistance was heavy on 18 August 1965 and light to moderate on 19 August 1965. On 20 August 1965 Operation Starlight was ordered to continue for an additional 48 to 72 hours.

~~ENCLOSURE~~ (2)

(2) On 141300H August 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commenced unloading on Chu Lai beach. They moved to the assembly area vicinity coordinates BT574036 to BT557923. Off loading continued for the next 48 hours at 152130H. Company D sighted 7 VC suspects. Five rounds of illumination and three rounds of small arms were fired without effect. On 17 August 1965 1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved into positions previously occupied by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was placed under the operational control of the 4th Marines while 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines are participating in Operation Starlight.

(3) 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines was attached to RLF-7 for Operation Starlight. An amphibious landing was conducted by 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines at 180630H August 1965. Resistance was heavy the 1st day and moderate to light on 17 and 20 August. On 20 August 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines was returned to their original defensive positions in the Chu Lai Complex.

(4) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was attached to RLF-7 for Operation Starlight. A helicopterborne landing by 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was conducted at 180645 August. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines swept their zone with heavy enemy resistance the first day. On 19 August they continued their operation with lighter resistance. On 20 August 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines returned to their defensive positions in the Chu Lai Complex.

(5) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was placed under RLF-7 operational control for Operation Starlight. On the night of 18 August 1965 Companies I and L respectively were helilifted to RLF-7(Fwd) CP for further deployment. At 1st on 19 August M Company landed on the beach to join the operation. On 20 August these companies began a search and destroy operation to drive the enemy out of their caves and underground holes. LIGHT

#### STATISTICS

##### (1) Operation Starlight

(a) Major Units Participating. Listed in order as they entered operation.

- |                                |                             |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. RLF-7 Headquarters          | 9. 1st AmFracBn Co A        |
| 2. 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines  | 10. 3rd AmFracBn Co A       |
| 3. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines  | 11. 1st Tank Bn Co B        |
| 4. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  | 12. 3rd Tank Bn Co C        |
| 5. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines  | 13. 3rd AT Bn Co B          |
| 6. 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines | 14. 1st AT Bn Co C          |
| 7. 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines | 15. 1st Recon Bn Co C       |
| 8. 4th Battalion, 12th Marines | 16. 1st Force Recon Co, FMF |
|                                | 17. 1st EngBn Co C          |

(b) Units that have retracted from operation

1. 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines
2. 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines

[REDACTED]

(2) On 16 August 1965 15 men from Company A and 8 personnel from Company B went on a patrol with Company M 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Company L 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines respectively.

(3) Friendly as of 210600H August

USMC 44 KIA Confirmed  
USMC 205 WIA Unconfirmed

Enemy--- VC 451 KIA Estimated  
250 WIA Unconfirmed

(4) 50 weapons captured estimated

(5) N/A

(6) N/A

2. TRAINING

(a) Training accomplished was on the job training by participating in Operation "Starlight."

(b) None

LEONARD M. EATON  
By Direction

HEADQUARTERS, BIF-7  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMP  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/20M/4js  
3120  
28 Aug 1965

From: BIF-7 Headquarters  
To: Commanding General, Third Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: Weekly Operations Summary for period covering 201610H August to  
271600H August 1965  
Encl: (1) Patrol Overlay

1. OPERATIONS.

a. Operation "Starlite" continues.

(1) On 20 August, BIF 1/7 relieved BIF 3/3, which was retracted by surface craft from Green Beach and that BIF remained disposed around the BIF CP area. BIF 2/4 was helilifted to Chu Lai. TAORs were assigned and both BIFs conducted search and destroy operations with the mission of obtaining a body count of dead VC, collecting any material of intelligence value and eliminating any resistance that might remain in the area. At 201515H the helilift of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commenced into 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines CP (BS 718947). Companies A, B, D, the Battalion Command Group and 50% of Company C were helilifted into the area. The remainder of Company C was helilifted into the Regimental CP for security. The balance of Company C moved overland to close on the Regimental CP at 202100H. Helilift of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was completed at 202100H. Both battalions maintained night defensive positions.

(2) On 21 August, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 7th Marines conducted company size search, clear and destroy operations. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines conducted its operation in the hamlet complex of An Thoi (1) (BS 703937) and Nam Yen (3) (BS 688923). 1st Battalion, 7th Marines concentrated their efforts in the hamlet complex of Van Tuong mainly on Van Tuong (2) (BS 697944), (3) (BS 705952) and (5) (BS 710945). The companies moved out on foot except for Company L which was helilifted. I and L Companies had no VC contact. M Company received sporadic small arms fire. Companies A and D moved out by foot. Company A to search and clear Van Tuong (2) and Company B to search and clear Van Tuong (5). None of the companies encountered any organized resistance. At 211800H, M Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines relieved Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines as Regimental CP security and beach security.

(3) On 22 August the 3rd Battalion received a special mission to seek out and destroy any VC harbored in a line of hills running from grid coordinates (BS 909050) to (BS 690870). Company K was landed from the BIF at 220630H. Companies I, K and L reconnoitered in force toward Hill 128 (BS 688972). All companies moved out on foot in an approach march: I Company on the right; L Company on the left with K Company in reserve following in trace to an assembly area at (BS 690820) where they dug in for the night.

~~ENCLOSURE~~ (2)

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines continued their operation in the Van Tuong Complex. All companies reported receiving sniper fire. Company B fired on 3 VC at (BS 705937) one VC was wounded and evacuated to C Med. Company A reported that they had killed a VCC at (BS 705937). During Company B's search and clear of Van Tuong (5) ammunition was found in tunnels under the houses.

(4) On 23 August, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines completed its search, clear and destroy operations at 231200H and started to move all tracked and wheeled vehicles to Green Beach. In continuing their search and clear operations 1st Battalion, 7th Marines reported that Van Tuong (4) was totally destroyed by fire. Company B made contact with an unknown number of VC in caves vicinity of (BS 690955). Three VCS were captured in Van Tuong (1) (BS 690955). At 231200H, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines secured their search and clear operations and commenced movement of all other heavy gear to Green Beach and prepared for a new mission. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines commenced movement from their assembly area at (BS 690870) to sweep the line of hills to Hill 128 at (BS 678859), reverse direction and sweep back through the lowlands to the east of the hill mass in their Zone of Action.

(5) At approximately 241700H, RLT-7 displaced OP from (BS 702914) to the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33). On 24 August, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began over-land movement through the Trung Phan Peninsula at 0640H on 24 August with the mission to destroy any enemy encountered. The movement across the Peninsula was uneventful and no contact of any type was made. At 241700H the 1st Battalion reached their pick up point (BT 630021), embarked aboard LVT's and returned to a reserve area at Chu Lai, where they awaited orders to assume 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines positions in the TACH. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were ordered to cease operations and commence back-loading in SLP shipping and reassume duties as SLP. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines completed its sweep back to Green Beach without contact and commenced backloading at 241945H. RLT-7 OP displaced from the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) and returned to their base camp at Chu Lai with displacement completed and all units returned approximately 242000H.

b. See paragraph 1.a.

c. Weapons captured - 109  
 Weapons lost - 1 LVTP-5; 1 Flame Tank; 2,446 rounds  
 Artillery missions fired - 182 missions

d. For detailed account of Operation "Starlite", see 7th Marines After-Action Report 1-65.

2. N/A.

E. N. SNYDER  
 By direction

~~ENCLOSURE (2)~~

Hq, 7thMar, 3dMarDiv(Rein) (Fwd)

Chu Lai South Vietnam

150001/Aug65 152400/Aug65

1515 1 141124Z told CG MSC BARTOW to Transmit references S-4

Summary: No significant incidents during this  
24 hour period

S-1 Journal

*Endrom* (3)

## DECLASSIFIED

Hq, 7thMar, 3dMarDiv (Fwd)

Chu Lai WetNam

001 18Aug65 2400 18Aug65

0913	180913H	SD E 500 Meters So8th of Phase line Cherry	S-3
0938	180938H	SDE 600 Meters Beyond Phase line Banana	S-3
0943	180943H	S-6 Assumes control ashore 180930H	F
0950	180950H	Burn no buildings unless absolutely necessary	F
1000	181000H	Change to landing plan of sudden death	S-3
1040	181040H	Have physical contact with sudden death	S-3
1050	181050H	Juncture of BLF's effected at 1040H	F
1105	181105H	Pass to afterglow 3 alert force recon	F
1135	181135H	Request position report	F
1140	181140H	Total WIA (QO) KIA (EB)	S-3
1145	181145H	Request position of disabled tank	F
1150	181150H	Position report	S-3
1208	181208H	Request to know amount of damage to tks	F
1230	181230H	Force recon located with sudden death	F
1301	181301H	Were being pinned down 155 Recoiless rifel	S-2 3
1450	181450H	Request recon Co attached to thickskinned	F
1450	181450H	Warehouse need Amtrac	F
1510	181510H	Need 2 boxes hand illumination grenades	F
1515	181515H	Warehouse india position at (IROHX)	S-3
1530	181530H	Coded	S-3
1530	181530H	Sudden death and warehouse ordered to hold	F
1545	181545H	Request that remaining two companies of SLF	F
1540	181540H	Warehouse in tight position	F
1545	181545H	BT ready to land	F S-3
1602	181602H	Warehouse India has reached 10 men	S-3
1610	181610H	Chopper on way to you poss	F
1613	181613H	WIA report	F
1632	181632H	MGF preparing to fire mission	F
1705	181705H	Your req for coastal Blockade	S-3
1745	181745H	Est two additional skeptic units aboard	S-3
1910	181910H	Skeptic L taking casulties	S-3
1940	181940H	WH6 recommends moving WHK and WHL from poss	S-3
2020	182020H	CO SLF recommends transfer of kilo Co	F
2045	182045H	Sudden death requires to stop illumination	S-3
2050	182050H	Req H hour for landing	F
2115	182115H	Skeptic L remains in tight perimeter	S-3
2133	182133H	Urge max use avail suppot arms throu night	F
2143	182143H	Continus atk to final obj, reqall availFire	F
2153	182153H	Req time for reserve comp to land	F, S-6
2201	182201H	2 fir e missions sched, need consent to fire	S-3
2215	182215H	Req position report rifle co's & Bn CP	F
2230	182230H	Monroe will give assist, 26 reporters to arrive	F
2233	182233H	Reserve co's ready to land, req time to land	F
2245	182245H	Req resupply dawn also close air support	S-3
2246	182246H	Req land reserve co immed, assume greenB def	F
2250	182250H	Pass toSkeptic lima, squad return STBD CP	F

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Hq 7thMar, 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai Vietnam

0001 18Aug 65

2400 18Aug65

2253	182253H	Req casual rpt on skeptic	S-3
2336	182336H	Req status of landing skeptic mike	F
2340	182340H	26 Rpters arrive STBD CP, Req rep to STBD ASAP	F

## DECLASSIFIED

Hq 7thMar, 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai, Vietnam

0001 18Aug65 2400 18Aug65

0415	1	180415H	Fr: PROMINENCE-3 SITREP	F
0610	2	180610H	Fr: PROMINENCE-3 Negative contact for Warehouse Mike all quiet	F
0645	3	180645H	Fr: SEABROOK-1st Plt in position. Has completed sweep from grid coordinates 614017 to 605017 Team sent to meet convoy	F
0800	4	180800H	Fr: SUDDEN DEATH- 4th wave will be delayed approx 30 minutes for refueling	F
0830	5	180830M	Fr STARBOARD - Mine found at coord 609018 & is under observation. Voices heard in village at coord 608017	F
0915	6	180915	Fr: STA BOARD CP at coord BC(AUN VSC) at 180800H	F
0207	7	180632	Fr: CG 3dMarDiv Turn in all F FLSG gas masks S-4	
0955	8	180955Z	To: 1/7 Req for trucks received Cannot be filled	F
1105	9	181105Z	To: Starboard Sudden Death has had two tanks knocked out by 57mm Recoiless. Req 1Sic ASAP	F
1001	10	181001Z	To: Monreq S'bd CP at Coord BC (HUNVSC) at 180820H 71 7923	F
1005	11	181005Z	To: Monroe STBD Bravo 0845 Charlie BC (NAXRICV) BC (H4NVNP) Delta sudden Death CP group in LZ Warehouse at BS (HUNVNP) and moving out Echo Mike None	F
1020	12	181020Z	To: Monroe Spt rpt a sudden death HotelB 180900H C VIC LZ D received 8 rounds motar fire and sporadic small arms fire E/S unsuspected pos no res yet.	F
1021	13	181021Z	To: CATG I am assuming command at shore at 0930 BT	F
1027	14	181027Z	To: STBD Product Can you give time you will come ashore	F
1030	15	181030Z	To: STBD 4 Tac log running smoothly 10% classes 1&5 warehouse 4 aboard. I can come ashore in 30 min warehouse TAC log will run all during problem	F
1036	17	181036Z	To: STBD Prod Req you come ashore ASAP bring 4 green smoke grenades w/you	F
1120	18	181120Z	To: Monroe Spt rpt Alpha warehouse, Bravo 180815H Charlie BS (716925) village of Anchong Delta search and clear opns of anchon Echo warehouse intended to move out to link cut w/sudden death	F
1135	19	181135Z	To: Seabrook Affirmative. EOD left this area approx 1000 H	F
			DELETE ENTRY 19 ABOVE AS ERRONEOUS	
1150	19	181610H	To: Seabrook Affirmative EOD left this area approx 1000H	F
1315	20	181315H	To: S'bd 2 Request more info concern two tks knocked out by 57mm recoilless include: time of incident, location, No ms fired, No RR guns employed Tks were with Sudden Death. Need more specific info on w VC KIA and letters found in village coord 718922 57mm RR incident in same vicinity	F

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## DECLASSIFIED

Hq 7thMar, 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai Vietnam

0001 18Aug65

2400 18Aug65

1345	21	181345H	Casualty Rpt: WIA PFC R.D. MYERS	S-1
1629	22	181629H	Casualty Rpt: WIA PFC R.T. ESCOBDO	S-1
1630	23	181610H	Casualty Rpt: WIA PVT R.D. CRAWFORD	S-1
1700	24	180950H	Rpt Total Cas (WIA&KIA) (evac to B Med)	S-1
1830	25	181130H	Casualty Rpt: 25 WIA - 4 KIA	S-1
1830	26	181314H	CODED	S-3
1830	27	181640H	Mark Helo site near STBD Rear CP	S-4
1830	28	181632H	Airplane Availability	S-3
1830	29	181155H	Position Rpt	S-2,3
1200	30	181200H	FRecon location	S-3 F
1205	31	181205H	To: Monroe 2 VC KIA & Situation Rpt From Starboard (FWD)	F
1340	32	181340H	Grid coordinates	<del>S-3</del> // F
1830	33	181314H	Coded	S-6
1830	34	181314H	Coded	S-6
1830	35	181314H	Coded	S-6
1830	36	181413H	Coord of Companies	S-3
1411	37	181411H	WIA's & KIA's reported	S-3
1830	38	181314H	Coded	S-6
1455	39	181455aH	Evacuate casualties	S-3
1830	40	181118H	request verification of smoke grenades	S-3
1830	41	181010H	alert recon	S-3
1147	42	181147H	notify BLT's	S-3
1830	43	181145H	Request available BB 451	S-3
1830	44	181135H	FAD disarm mine	S-3
1306	45	181306H	No Helo's available	S-3
1830	46	181145H	Request 2 Helo's	S-3
1830	47	181300H	EOD team reported mine	S-3
1830	48	181145H	Chopper down	S-3 3
1933	49	181933H	Casualty report	S-1
1830	50	181850H	Helicopter pickup	S-3
1830	51		aircraft on station	S-3
1830	52	181913H	casualties taken	S-3
1830	53	181851H	Helicopter pickup	S-3
1830	54	181555H	No drummed gas	S-3
1830	55	181850H	Helicopter Pickup	S-3
1759	56	181759H	VC coord	S-2
1804	57	181804H	delivered POW's	S-2
1948	58	181948H	Opinions concerning VC intentions	S-2
2220	59	181108Z	CTF76 & CTF concur your 180928Z	S-3
1820	60	182015H	Tr KCo f r APA028 to LPH 2	S-3

DECLASSIFIED

Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai, Vietnam

18001/Aug65 182400/Aug65

2100	61	182035H	VC intend to defend seilected instilations	S-3
2110	62	182050H	WH6 is at skeptical positi n to recover WIA	S-3
2123	63	182100H	Skeptical remains in tight perimerter	S-3
2140	64	182115H	Request instructions for tomorrows operation	S-3
2230	65	182225H	Monroe 6 give latitude in use of troops	S-3
1025	66	181025H	Warehouse 4 req 6 Mogas & all Avil water cans F	
2315	67	182315H	To: Warehouse 4 Affr ans to your msg 182215H S	

Hq 7thMarine (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

190001/Aug65 192400/Aug65

x	45		Rpt casualties to CTF	F	
1000	46	191000H	Eng on way No ord expert avail	F	
1156	47	191156H	Warehouse 107 Howitzer to yr site	F	
1200	48	191203H	Req helo pickup PCW	S-3	
1200	49	191113H	NavGuns cease fire so we may sweep	S-3	
1109	50	191109H	No ARVN available	F	
1200	51	191058H	Village Van Thong rec ARVAN units sweep ASAP	S-3	
<del>1000</del>	52	191050H	Monroe 6 no longer this positin	F	
1200	53	191142H	Warehouse Limacasualty rpt	S-1	
1200	54	191025H	Situation Rpt Approx 1 plat VC in contact	S-3	
1030	55	191030H	2 armed HUEYs on the way	F	
1200	56	191100H	Request for supplies	S-4	
1200	57	191136H	Req condition of LVT	S-4	
1200	58	191145H	VC inland fr our position req 2 more aircraft	S-3	
1200	59	191610Z	Death and injury of Philippine Nationals	S-1	
1200	60	182200H	Missing Government property =	S-4	
1200	61	110159Z	Retention of shipboard records	S-1	
1200	62	111207Z	Use of privately owned auto on perm duty trav	S-1	
1200	63	110516Z	Unauth explosives aboard operational aircraft	S-4	
1200	64	170416Z	Gas cylinders	S-4	
1200	65	151546Z	3dMarDiv FY66 allowance class V train ammo	S-4	
1200	66	180718Z	Contaminated rations	S-4	
1200	67	132233Z	Separation policy for reg MC personnel	S-1	
1314	68	191314H	Tank retriever being employed at beach	F	
1300	69	191300H	mission NR 10 is completed	F	
1300	70	191213H	Advise if we remain at present position	S-3	
1600	71	191600H	Hamlet Van-Thong believed be VC Command Cnt	S-2	
1600	72	191225H	Want Helo's for retraction How many avail	S-1	
1600	73	191230H	Req SitRep	F	
1600	74	191232H	Ret to your msg permission is granted	F	
1600	75	191240H	Reference to your 191155H stay present pos.	F	
1600	76	191246H	Presently Ready lines to RLN be 717957	S-1	
1600	77	191300H	Send Tank retriever to beach load LVT abd LCH	S-1	
1600	78	191305H	STBD6 on way to SudDea6 CP in YP 15	F	
1600	79	191255H	Ref to msg time stbd6 coming to local at time	F	
1600	80	190750Z	Logistic Water Rations 2 Helo's required	S-4	
<del>X600</del>	1600	81	191222H	Msg Change to 1 flame tank out of action	F
1600	82	191310H	Consider possible backup of Helo requiremtns	S-4	
1600	83	191315H	Routine POW pickup	S-3	
1600	84	191330H	Suspect VC withdrawal contact Air Ovservatn	S-3	
1600	85	191335H	Resquest to know if trolling personnel needed	F	
1600	86	191342H	Interrogation of POW indicated 2 VC Bn in Area	S-3	
1600	87	191344H	Helo pick up	S-3	
1600	88	191345H	Neg result so far req instruction	S-3	
1600	89	191350H	Req arrival time of Helo's	S-4	
<del>X600</del>	<del>1600</del>	<del>191350H</del>			
1600	90	191408H	Helo request	S-4	

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Hq 7th Mar (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

190001/aug65 .192400/Aug65

1600	91	191415H	Ref to your msg personnel in trolling6	S-1
1600	92	191416H	Will send KIAs at 1500 unable prior to 1500	S-3
1600	93	191422H	Req emerg helo evacuation for 2 heat casualties	S-4
1600	94	191500H	Continue oper through remainder of starbd opr	S-3
1600	95	191450H	Advise to the ETA of helo for pickup	F
1600	96	191505H	Water & food staged at Bell fish 2 area	S-3
1600	97	191518H	Send helo's to STBD (Rear)	F
1600	98	191525H	Helo request	S-4
1600	99	191525H	Req 100 rounds Hand E 80 rounds Illuh	S-4
1600	100	191547H	Helo request	S-4
1600	101	191559H	Sitrep Co E finished sweep No contact	S-3
1600	102	191600H	Sending LVT with corpsman to K position	S-3
1600	103	191614H	Send Engr personnel to lay mines	S-3
1600	104	191622H	Helo request	S-4
1600	105	191630H	Resupply has just left payable CP	S-3
1600	106	191800H	Troop pickup	S-3
1600	107	191800H	Troop pickup	S-3
1600	108	191800H	Troops in area are skeptical	S-3
1800	109	191715H	Casualties evacuated KIA(VA) 15 WIA (AX) 55	S-3
1800	110	160016Z	Found Property	F
1800	111	161300Z	Rpt of Death	S-1
1800	112		Logistics Rpt	S-4
1800	113		Helo Reprt	S-3
1800	114	181700H	Supply request fr Skeptic FWD	F
1800	115	181204Z	Congrint Case	F
1800	116	181901Z	Rpt of Death Battle	S-1
1800	117	181902Z	Rpt of Death battle	S-1
1800	118	191442H	Req all Commands submit Logistic supply	S-4
1800	119	191605H	Liaison Officer send Sitrep via radio	S-3
1800	120	191620H	Relay for Monroe 5	S-3
1800	121	191700H	Helo request	S-3
1800	122	191715H	Req for personnel to lay AP mines	S-3
1800	123	191715H	Casualties report	S-1
1800	124	191715H	Casualties evacuated to Iwo Jima	S-1
1800	125	191720H	Movement of Warehouse Mike	S-3
1800	126	191720H	Movement of Warehouse Mike	S-3
1800	127	191736H	VC reported seen by helo	S-3
1800	128	191755H	Requests for LVT an LCU	S-3
1800	129	191823H	Supply req	S-4
1800	130	191813H	Commence writing after action report	S-3
1800	131	191810H	Enemy in caves	S-3
1800	132	191835H	Locations of Sudden death & warehouse etc.	S-3
1800	133		Rpt on Naval Gunfire	S-3
1800	134		Rpts No. 7,9,12	S-3
1800	135		Rpts No. 11,12	S-3
1800	136		Rpts on missions	S-3

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KZ Hq 7th Mar (FWD)

Chu Lai, Vietnam

191800/Aug65 192400/Aug65

1800	137	191840H	Rpts No. 12, 13	S-3, F	
1800	138	191900H	Helo request	S-3, F	
	1800	139	191435H	Have PFC Ronan fr Skeptic return to unit	S-1
	1800	140	191908H	Liaison Officer departed this position	F
	1800	141		Retraction of Skeptic	S-3
1800	142	191919H	Cron ressim and enemy flash USMC	F	
1800	143	191920H	Units lagging because of heat casualties	S-3	
	1800	144	191921H	Skeptices position	S-3
1800	145	191950H	Fr Monroe No LCU's available Chu Lai enclave	S-3	
1800	146	192005H	Fr Ware house situation when landed	S-3	
1800	147	192000H	Fr Warehouse 5 Req personel rpt	S-1	
1800	148	192023H	Fr Warehouse 4 Msg to Hq Cmdt Warehouse Rear	F	
1800	149	192050H	Fr Warehouse night defensive positions	S-3	
1800	150	192040H	Fr Thicksk in 4 Flare plane standing by	S-3	
<del>XXXX</del>	1800	151	192058H	Monroe desires trolling overlay	S-3
	1800	152	192045H	Lift for helo	S-3
2315	153		Parable W report	F	
2315	154	192045H	Sitrep all Op Locations	S-3	
	2315	155	192115H	For Slave Born ALFA 24 KIA and 11 WIA	S-1
2315	156	192125H	Pick up and drop coord and number of troops	S-3	
2315	157	192130H	Req rpt on rounds fired since 191600H	S-3	
	2315	158	192130H	Req to know if you want NGE illum resumed	S-3
2315	159	192145H	Skeptic ha ret to this CP, is set for nite	F	
	2315	160	192150H	Location of flare plane	S-3
2315	161	192155H	Req for 27 lifts by Warehouse Mike	S-3	
2315	162	192210H	Illusion delighted to accept for lunch	F	
	2315	163	192222H	Req confirmation of 2 MIA's	S-1
2345	164	191900H	Log rpt fr sudden death	S-4	
2345	165	192250H	Fire report fr Payable whiskey	S-3	
2345	166	192300H	Report air strike	S-3	
2345	167	192305H	Illumination delighted to accept for lunch	F	
2345	168	192325H	Report on air strike	F S-3	

Hq 7thMar, 3rdMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

0001 19Aug65 2400 19Aug65

0005	190005H	Skeptic Mike landing Green Beach	190025H	S-3
0012	190012H	Do you desire remain co's decrease react time		S-3
0113	190113H	Monroe 6 leave CP 0530 go STBD Fwd CP		F
0210	190210H	Monroe 6 arrive yr posit this am time unk		S-3
0638	190638H	Req 2nd plat Co H helo lift to Co CP		S-3
0650	190650H	Req ETA helo pickup Off to brief rpters		S-3
0707	190707H	Burning def position, moving to attack		S-3
0711	190711H	Gas resupply on way Imperit you move immed		F
0718	190718H	Co G moved present position (coded)		S-3
0747	190747H	Rpt total no casual evac to crosswalk		F

Hq 7thMar (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

200001/Aug65

202400/Aug65

0600	169 200014	Booby trap will not be employed	F
0600	170 200200	Fr Monroe: Warning Order	S-3
0600	171 200540	Thickskin req STBD (rear) to send courier	F
0600	172 192330	Require accurate VC casualties count	S-1

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Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

0000 20Aug65 2400 20Aug65

0736	1	200736H	Fr: Stbd 1 Req total no casualties vac	S-1
	0215	2	200215H To: Warehouse, Sudden death, Skeptic ALG ord of retraction cancelled	F
0409	3	200409H	Payable whiskey fire report	F
0527	4	200527H	Payable whiskey fire report	F
0523	5	200523H	Payable whiskey fire Rpt	F
0521	6	200521H	Payable whiskey fire rpt	F
0519	7	200519H	Payable whiskey fire rpt	F
0615	8	200605H	Fr: Stbd(Fwd) Affirmative on 200515 Standing by for instructions	F
0615	9	200615H	Stbd Warehouse rpt all quiet Negative contact	F
	0642	10	200642H To Stbd Fwd Req info concerning pickup of LVT F	F
0643	11	200643H	Playboy 1-2 rpt roadblock 658960	F
0725	12	200725H	Stbd Fwd rpt no word on LVT retriever	S-4
0730	13	200730H	Skeptic's Helo lift	S-3
0733	14	200733H	Skeptic 4 req 200 cases mics & water	S-4
	0100	15	190100H Sit Rpt fr Stbd	F
0735	16	2000735H	Stbd 1 req no casualties evac to crosswalk	S-1
0736	17	200736H	Stbd 1 req total no casualties to B Med	S-1
	1622	18	191622H Stbd 14 req Helo lift fr Thickskin 14	S-3
0741	19	200741H	Stbd 1 unable to account for PFC SANFORD, VR	S-1
0830	20	190039Z	Fr: CTG 76.5 Helo req being received incomplete	S-3
0830	21	181916Z	BLT 3/7 rpt of death PFC Robert O LONG 2041768/0311	S-1
0830	22	181904Z	BLT 3/7 rpt of death 2dLt DK SHAMBAUGH 090397/0302	S-1
0815	23	200815	Sudden death helo req	S-3
1715	24	191715H	Stbd 1 rpt <del>the</del> total casualties evac to IWO JIMA	S-1
0821	25	200821	Sudden death rpts children wounded air strike	S-2
0800	26	200800	Stbd 1 req for resupply	S-4
0745	27	200745	Skeptic Lima rpt change casualty report	S-1
0730	28	200730	Skeptic Helo request	S-3
	0753	29	200753H Stbd Rear req coord of Skeptic Lima	F
0805	30	200805	Stbd Fwd rpt coord 716945	S-3
	0812	31	200744H To Sudden Death	F
0821	32	200821	Fr SD to Stbd 2 will keep advised	S-2
	0830	33	200830 Req pick up Skeptic men by helo	S-3
	0835	34	200835 Helo logistics pickup	F
0840	35	200826H	Warehouse 3 rpt patrol operating 500 mtrs per	S-3
	0845	36	200845 To thickskin 14 Logistics helo	F
	0845	37	200845 To Monroe 6 ADC aboard Stbd CP	F
	0845	38	200845 Req Thickskin 14 pick rations	F
	0855	39	200855 Req thickskin helo pickup	F
	0900	40	200900 To Imbed arrangements for LWTR Retriever	F
0940	41	200940	Skeptic's 1 PDS	S-1
	0908	42	200908 To Monroe 6 ADC aboard Stbd CP	F
0825	43	200800H	Skeptic Rear rpt 8 KIA & 70 WIA	S-1
1000	44	181901Z	Rpt of death LCpl T E FIRTH 2029469/0311	L-3-7

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Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv (FWD)

Chu Lai, VietNam

0001 20Aug65 2400 20Aug65

	0908	45	200908	To Warehouse FragOrder 265	F
0948		46	200948H	Skeptic rpts have three for charge	F
	0926	47	200912H	To WH 4 Req send 2 Amtracs to Stbd CP	F
1002		48	201002H	Fr IMBED to Thickskin Req advise status 200900H F	
	1015	49	201015H	To Sudden Death Helo on way commence retraction F	
	0938	50	2009938	Advised Stbd Fwd will have to use own LCU	F
	1055	51	101055	To Thickskin FragO 3-65 agreed	F
0814		52	200814	Fr Skeptic Rear Rpt casualties evac to Crosswalk S-1	
1130		53	201130	Thickskin rpt 2 LCUs 2 mboats in area	F
1130		54	201130	WH 2 rpts Intel report to Stbd 2	S-2
1145		55	201145	Sudden death req more aircraft w/escorts	S-3
1140		56	201130H	STBD 4 req taperrecorders camera films	SpeServ
	1148	57	201148	Req info on Task Org	F
	1155	58	201155	Thickskin desires warehouse ret ASAP occupy position vacated by Prominence	F
1140		59	201120H	Req interpreters for 1/7 & 3/7 Urgent	S-2
	1157	60	201155H	Req Stbd take control all helo operations	F
	1213	61	201200H	Pinchitter concurs w/Stbd all helo opns	F
	1214	62	201210	To IMBED will pick up prisoner by helo	F
	1205	63	201200H	Advised Stbd Fwd Prominence CommGrup ETD this area 201200H or soon thereafter	F
	1215	64	201215H	Req 1 TACP w/ALO & 1 off asst FSCC ASAP fr Monroe F	F
1130		65	200022H	Classified Message	(S&C) F
	1325	66	201320H	Intel Rpt	F
1330		67	201322H	Stbd 1 rpt unable to account PFC Edward SANTON II 2122331 I Co Warehouse Check B Med	S-1
1225		68	201225	Thickskin rpt troop movement 400 VC	S-2, F
<del>XXXX</del> 1220		69	201228H	Req to StbdProduct to pick up supplies immed	F
1235		70	201205H	Sudden death retracting to rear CP	F
1255		71	201235H	Will send interpreters upon arrival	F
	1310	72	201305H	Movement of LCU to pick up LVT retriever	F
1314		73	201314H	Warehouse request to know Skeptic CP	S-3
1320		74	No DTG	Opcon for lift revert to Regt on arrival	F
1325		75	No DTG	TS-4 to TS6 says Stbd 4 no major sup problems	F
1335		76	No DTG	Armed VC reported at 717926	F
	1340	77	201335H	To Stbd Fwd re supporting arms for Prominence	F
1345		78	201215H	Req 1 TACP w/ALO & 1 OffAsst FSCC ASAP	F
1345		79	201325H	Supply requirements	S-4
1412		80	201412H	21 civilians to be evac to POW stockade ASAP	S-1
1610		81	201350H	VLT retriever will be loaded send work party	S-4
1610		82	201311H	Comm supply requirements	Comm
1610		83	201354H	Water and chow requirements	F
	1352	84	201352H	Req one TACP w/ALO & 1 A <sup>s</sup> st O FSCC	F
1610		85	201439H	Req disposition VC prisoners	S-3
	1435	86	201400H	Prominence Co to 706925 for security	F
	1415	87	201400H	Official VC KIA	F

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Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv(RWD)

Chu Lai, Vietnam

0001 20Aug65 2400 20Aug65

1515	88	201515H	Warehouse replaced by Prominence	S-3	
1500	89	201436H	NGF support group to sail giant Killer&glory	S-3	
1412	90	201412H	21 civilians to POW stockade	F	
<del>1400</del> 1400	91	201351H	Captured VC to SD position to furnish info	F	
1507	92	201457H	Prominence assumes position		
1541	93	201540H	Fr Stbd Fwd Desires 2 DD's remain on station	F	
	1538	94	201538H	Req LVT-5 be auth accompany LVT RI in recovery	F
	1414	95	201414H	Req info re what supplies placed on LCU	F
1517	96	201455H	Repl of force have not reported for opcon	S-3	
1417	97	No DTG	Inof concerning LCU to pick retriever	F	
1610	98	No DTG	SD does not desire VC prisoner in ther position		
			Have blown cave tunnel & serched thoroughly	F	
0948	<del>90</del>	200935H	Pinchitter actual will not be SD location	F	
1513	101	2015	Stuck LVT rescued	F	
1835	102	201829H	Corrected Casualty Rpt as of 1800 KIA 44		
			WIA 207 MIA 1	S-1	
1632	103	201632H	Prominence Charlie waiting for helos	F	
1638	104	201436H	Urgently need interpreter for booth	S-2	
	1638	105	No DTG	Regt a TACP party being flown from Peepsight	F
1644	106	No DTG	Line Rpt	F	
1650	107	No DTG	All Warehouse pers embarked	F	
1654	108	No DTG	Payable Whiskey 6 gave word to move out	F	
1700	109	No DTG	ETA LST 1161 1900H	F	
1710	110	No DTG	Movement of 3/3 to follow immediately	F	
1710	111	No DTG	Casualty rpt	S-1	
1715	112	No DTG	Conductor 2 has located 2 large warehouses	F	
		113	201710H	Stbd Fwd acknowledge receipt Frag0 3-65	F
1717	114	201708H	Skeptic 1 Casualty Rpt	S-1	
1755	115	No DTG	Prominence C rel to Stbd 14	F	
	1800	116	201755H	Presidential interest to casualties	S-1
1700	117	No DTG	Warehouse 14 Rear Ammo Request	F	
	1825	118	201820H	Req for helo this C <sup>r</sup> for pickup of AN/URC 83	F
	1800	119	201802H	Req for helos disapproved by Monroe No #SCU	F
1805	120	No DTG	Hot line between Fwd & Rear Stbd off	F	
	1805	121	201809H	C Co released by thickskin to Stbd	F
1809	122	No DTG	Providence 4 reqall water cans filled	F	
1810	123	No DTG	Prominence 4 req 8 axes	F	
1811	124	No DTG	Prominence 4 req 400 MIC's	F	
	1816	125	201810H	Scout dogs available at Da Nang	F
1541	126	No DTG	Payable Fwd req Sudden Death to contact him	F	
1835	127	201841H	1 ALO 1 FAC enroute ChuLai Monroe sends	F	
1930	128	No DTG	Plumtree req all LVT's be ret to his CP	F	
1940	129	201835H	Stbd Fwd req Scout dogs	F	
1	1945	130	201925H	4 scout dogs to be Stbd Rear CP 210630H	F
	1955	131	201945H	Scout dogs will leave DaNang ASAP	F

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Hq 7th Mar 50 Mar Div (Rein) (Fwd)  
Chu Lai Vietnam

0001 Aug65 2400 20Aug65

2010		132	No DTG	No transportation available for water	F
	2023	133	202020H	Req immed reply to my 201755H Monroe requires immed	F
2030		134	202025H	Imbed req Stbd to stop firing star shells	S-3
	2043	135	202037H	Smokey Purple on Station Button Red	F
2035		136	201802H	Cannot understand disapproval for helos	F
1215		137	200330Z	Casualty Rpt	F
1230		138	201810H	Req for 8 Axes	F
	1230	139	202205H	Information on interpers	S-2 S-3
1230		140	202008H	Information on interpers	S-2 S-3
1230		141	202308H	Casualties fr Skeptic	S-1
1230		142	202006H	Info on Monroe comments	F
	1230	143	202120H	Gear still remaining to be transported	S-3
	1230	144	202050H	Req for AO support	S-3
	0130	145	202340H	Rpt on number of WIA KIA	F
0130		146	No DTG	Rpt on VA and their mortar fire	F

Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv(Rein) (Fwd)

Chu Lai Vietnam

0001 23Aug65

2400 23Aug65

	0108	230108H	Request all elements of fleet present in area	F
	0110	230110H	Request permission from 76.5 to evacuate woman	F
0142		230142H	Request pick-up point for injured woman	S-3
0151		230151H	Desire circuit and station to contact	S-3
	0205	230205H	Permission granted for pick-up of woman	F
0236		230236H	will evac woman at first light	S-3
	0400	230400H	In regards to picking up injured woman	E
1628		231628H	Req your NGF requirements for tonight	S-3
	0835	230825H	Please extend to CG 2ndDiv my sincere regrets	F
	0842	230842H	Mark LZ with smoke for Helo with visitors	F
1410		231410H	Info CG 3MAF thickskinned	S-3
	1406	231406H	Special Intel report	F
2217		232217H	2nd Div advisory team senior advisor req	S-3
	2223	232223H	Information prominence	F
2242		232242H	Aircraft are 30 m n STNDBY	S-3
	2225	232225H	Hut sent afire by VC prior to landing 1stWave	F
2250		232250H	Coded concerning helo's on station	S-3
	2311	232311H	Ref 232240H Hut in quest is in VC BS	F
2322		232322H	Coded	E-3
	2336	232336H	Ref yr 232200H, no change in orders	F
2340		232340H	Regards yr 232220H From 4 located	S-3

Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv(Rein) (Fwd)

Chu Lai Viet Nam

0001 24Aug65 2400 24Aug65

0905	240905H	in reg to your 240901H	S-3
0920	240920H	Skep I receiving arty fire	S-3
0926	240926H	Cease firing grid square 6987	F
0048	240048H	Your 240006	F
0810	240810H	Insure accurate count Class1 & 5 on bckld	S-3
0831	240831H	Request Mark position	S-3
0835	240835H	Request dispatch this station	F
0912	240912H	Chop to CTG 76.5 & revert to SLF	F
0847	240847H	Req confirmation on Msg 240830H	S-3
0849	240849H	Req to present position	F
0900	240900H	Are you at 695985	S-3
0925	240925H	Req arrangements made ASAP	F
0925	240925H	Mark with smoke for Helo visitors	F
0937	240937H	Req location check point K	F
0941	240941H	Req search for amtrac spiral notebook	F
0825	240825H	Concr rations for Skep	S-3
1154	241154H	Req requirements fm 241111H to 241811H	S-3
1010	241010H	Req 2 Helo resupply of water coord 667 991	S-3
1010	241010H	Location check point one	F
1030	241030H	Req Psns report	F
1040	241040H	Prepair Helo loads coord 667 991	F
1137	241137H	Percentage complete	F
1113	241113H	Pass to STB 6A Ref 231411H	F
1115	241115H	Request number of weapons & how returned	F
1119	241119H	Helo coming back prepair 100 cans	F
1130	241130H	Country store in crosswalk respons forSkept	F
	241200H	Will proceed to beach No en contact	
1205	241205H	Request position report	F
1157	241157H	Direct liason Para 3 Pass Pinchhitten STBD	F
1250	241250H	Your 231410H authorized repeat chop	S-3
1223	241223H	Send all captured weapons to rear by helo	F
1342	241342H	Please notify US immediately w en prominence	F
1228	241228H	Req know action taken	F
1235	241235H	Twelve weapons will be delivered to STBD	F
1255	241255H	Your 232245H & 232305H not req	S-3
1550	241550H	Prominence when blowing cave	F
1545	241545H	Ref your msg regarding tactical optertions	S-3
1500	241500H	reports	F
1644	241644H	Companies in process of conductings action	F
1600	241600H	continued attack as described in para 8	S-3
1730	241730H	For period 240600 to 241200H	F
1720	241720H	Pass to monroe 3	F
1738	241738H	No information available this Hq	F
1545	241545H	Ref your msg regarding tactical operations	S-3
1540	241540H	Cannot give an ETA as yet	F

Hq 7thMar 3dMarDiv(Rein) (FWD)

Chu Lai, Viet Nam

0001 24Aug65 2400 24Aug65

1315	241315H	On D-Day hut on right flank set afire VC	F
1500	241500H	Prom will be at check pt 4 (HJMOV)	F

JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-66)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>Headquarters, RLT-7</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>1630 14Aug65</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>1200 16Aug65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1630		J-1	141630Aug65	Journal Opened		
1630		J-2	None	Disposition of captives. (CG3dMarDiv Conf)	S-F	
1631		J-3	None	CG, 3dMarDiv. New Lists of Hamlets, Quang Ngai	S-F	
1632		J-4	None	3d MAF Civil Affairs Rpt. (5800/31Jul)	S-F	
1633		J-5	030030Z.	III MAF Challenge and Passwords	S-F-T-M	
1634		J-6	None	4th Mar Sample Ident cards for Civ Per of Lyon Associates Inc.	S-F	
1520		J-7	5 August 65	Astronomical and Tidal Data	S-F	
1520		J-8	15 August 65	QUANG TIN Overlay	M-S-F	
1520		J-9	15 August 65	Enemy Sit Overlay	M-S-F	
2255	1745	J-10		3rd MarDiv INTSUM No 1	S-F	
00		J-11	152237H	Prominence VC spotted D Co area.	S-F-M	
		J-12		1/7 Rpt sighting of 7 VC	S-F-D	

*Embl... (u)*

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

- i. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-63 (REV. 8-56)  
 USES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>Headquarters, RLT-7</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>161200Aug65</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>171200Aug65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN		
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops	S-Staff
1300		J-1	<u>III MAF</u> INTELLSUM			S-F-M	
1300		J-2	151050H <u>III MAF</u> INTELLSUM			S-F-M	
1300		J-3	152255H <u>4th Mar</u> ISUM NO. 98			S-F-M	
1300		J-4	132330Z <u>III MAF</u> INTELLSUM			S-F-M	
1300		J-5	<u>RLT-7</u> INTELLSUM			S-F-M	
1940		J-6	161940H <u>2nd Inf Div</u> ISUM NO. 218			S-F-M	
2300		J-7	162243H <u>1/7 Spot</u> rept 2 suspected VC Probed lines			S-F	
0930		J-8	160326Z <u>III MAF</u> Special Security Precautions			S-F	

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#### b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

#### c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

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### 2. Body:

#### a. Time In:

(1) **Unit Journal.** Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal.** Enter time information is received within section.

#### b. Time Out:

(1) **Unit Journal.** Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal.** Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

c. **Serial No.:** Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.

d. **DTG:** Enter date/time group of radio message.

#### e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:

(1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

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### 3. Ending:

a. **Summary:** A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

b. **Closing:** Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

### 4. Journal File:

Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.

## JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 5-63)  
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-2 RLT-7

PLACE

VAN TUONG, RVN

FROM (Date and hour)

180800H Aug 1965

TO (Date and hour)

191200H AUG 1965

(Classification)

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
181200		J-1	181200H	Journal Opened		
181345	out	J-2	181345H	SUDDEN DEATH Req position of 57mm RR		S-F
181455		J-3	181455H	Warehouse VC Co on ridge coor 701959		S-F-M-T
181515	out	J-4	181515H	Division VC on ridge coor 701959		S-F
	181310	J-5	181310H	Behdix 2 Recap en sit your area.		S-F
181720		J-6	181720H	2/4 VC Co on ridge at 701959		S-F-M-T
181810		J-7	181810H	2/4 VC Co 81 mortar, 57mmRR, 12 KIA, 12VCS		S-F-T
181856		J-8	181856H	3/3 3/3 under heavy fire, s/a 702530		S-F-M-T
	181930	J-9	181930H	RLT-7 ISUM		S-F-T
182010		J-10	182010H	RLT-7 rear Monroe 2 desires opinions con cerning incidents, intentsm unit identsmetc		S-F-T
	182030	J-11	182030H	Division Present indic and en activity		S-F
182057		J-12	182057H	<del>3/3</del> 3/3 Small groups of VC scattered on knoll		S-F-M
	190735	J-13	190735H	Division Rpt en units in contact, kia wia		S-F-M
190730	out	J-14	190730H	3/3 Rpt en unit in contact, kia, wia		S-F-M
190858		J-15	190858H	2/4 Cache of grenades found and blown		S-F-M
190859		J-16	190859H	3/3 VC in front of "K" at 707964, NGF call		S-F-M
190800		J-17	190800H	2/4 Co G new coor, no en contact		S-F-M
190810		J-18	190810H	2/4 Shove 6 reports sev hundred VC kia		S-F
190930		J-19	190930H	2/4 Capt 3 VCs, KIA, 2 grenades, radio equip		S-F-M
190921		J-20	190921H	RLT-7 rear SpeIntell Rpt req by Sec of Def		S-F
190948		J-21	190948H	3/3 w/in 500 meters of beach, 5 POW		S-F-M
190953		J-22	190837H	RLT-7 rear Info on AQ on station		S-F-T
	190755	J-23	190755H	RLT-7 to Div We are in urgent need of AQ		S-F
	190950	J-24	190950H	2/3, 3/3 Rpt VC in contact, kia, wia, wpns		S-F
	191000	J-25	191000H	3/7 Rpt VC in contact, kia wia wpns, pow		S-F
191035		J-26	191035H	2/4 1 ply VC in contact, scattered gps in 24 area, VC cas, strength not known		S-F
191055		J-27	191055H	2/4 Vill VAN TUONG is combat vill, req sweep		S-F
191055		J-28	191055H	To 2/4 ARVN not available, yours for act		S-F
	191120	J-29	191120H	AllUnits All en wpns, matter, doc to RLT-7		S-F
191200		J-30	191200H	Journal Closed		

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

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## JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)  
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2 Rlt-7	
PLACE	
VAN TUONG, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
191200H Aug 1965	201200H Aug 1965

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
191200H		J-1	191200H	Journal Opened		
191205H		J-2	191205H	Pop Forces Mortar fires on 685916 produced trem secondary explosions		M-S-F
191330H		J-3	191330H	3/3 Re Helo for POW pickup		S-F-ALO
191326H		J-4	191326H	3/3 6 sus VC Launching sampan at 697977		S-F-M
191352H		J-5	191352H	3/3 1 VC bn in area, another in vill 680960		S-F-M-T
191340H		J-6	191340H	RLT-7 rear Trolling 6 wants to know if need		S-F
191348H		J-7	191348H	RLT-7 rear III MAF states 2/4 is keeping capt material for transfer to RLT-4		S-F
191558H		J-8	191558H	2/4 Sit Rep Co E, Co G, carrying out miss		S-F-M
191558H		J-9	191350H	RLT-4 May use arm bands to disband (VC)		S-F-T
191600H		J-10	180835Z	RLT-4 ISUM nr 101		S-F-T
191721H		J-11	191721H	2/4 31 VCS and documents have been pick up		S-F
191809H		J-12	191819H	RLT-7- To all units OP STRRLITE. My 191300H		S-F
191835H		J-13	191835H	2/4 Wpns and Doc sent to RLT-7? Bury dead?		S-F
191930H	191835	J-14	191930H	2/4 Affirm on your 1835		S-F
192003H		J-15	192003H	3/3 Rpt of events since landing on beach		S-F-M-T
192007H		J-16	191530H	3/7 Cas Rpt vill 722950 heavily tunneled		S-F-M
192036H		J-17	192036H	3/7 Pilot observes AW fire 191815H		S-F-M
192122H		J-18	192122H	3/7 Have one POW will hold toniht		S-F-M
192250H		J-19	192250H	2/4 2/4 requests air strike ceasefire		S-F-M-22
192249H		J-20	192249H	RLT-4 Flare plane rec fire 20mm MG		S-F-M
225519H		J-21	192255H	RLT-7 to AirO, cease air strike		S-F-M
200205H		J-22	200205H	Div Accurate body count, crew served wpns		S-F-M
200250H	out	J-23	200250H	2/4 3/7 3/3 Acc count of bodies, wpns etc		S-F
200340H	out	J-24	200340H	RLT-7 rear RPTS EVIDENCE OF CP		S-F
200423H		J-25	200423H	3/3 Rpts evidence crew serv wpns		S-F
200715H		J-26	200815H	AO Tenches surround vill of Phuoc-Thuan		S-F-M-T
200830H		J-27	200830H	3/7 Have not fired HE arty wpns destroyed		S-F
200750H		J-28	200750H	RLT-7 to 2/4 Do not hold 192045H		S-F
200745H		J-29	200745H	2/4 Rpts PF wounded by booby trap		S-F
200825H		J-30	200825H	3/7 mortar rds fd Vic An Cuong (2)		S-F-M
192045H		J-31	192045H	2/4 rpts tot VC kia, caves destroyed, sitrep		S-F
200909H	out	J-32	200909H	3/3, 2/4, 3/7 rpt white arms bands worn by VC		S-F
201000H		J-33	201000H	3/7 Found 2 comm sets, 81,60mm rds; EOD?		S-F-M
201000H		J-34	201000H	2/4 Interrogation of VCS wounded, at B Med		S-F
201026H	201026H	J-35		RLT-7 Expect evac of VC material, neg EOD		S-F
201030H	out	J-36	201030H	2/4, 3/3, 3/7 Req ISUM to incl VC Kia att units		S-F
201030H		J-37	201030H	3/7 1 KIA 6 Viet to be evac		S-F
201150H		J-38	201150H	3/7 2 VCS wounded came into CP		S-F
201125H		J-39	201125H	3/3 VC material found, 5 VC killed		S-F
	201133	J-40	201133H	RLT-7 Req 5 more interpreters (RLT-7 rear)		S-F
201140H	out	J-41	201140H	3/7 Don't send civ to RLT-7, evac to compd		S-F
201200H		J-50	201200H	journal closed		

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)  
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION S-2 RLT-7	
PLACE VAN TUONG, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour) 201200H Aug 1965	TO (Date and hour) 211200H Aug 1965

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
201200H		J-1	201200H	Journal Opened		
201300H		J-2	201300H	AO 8 fishing boats moving, having people	S-F-M-T	
201226H		J-3	201226H	RLT-4 400 VC rot mov west, req perm attack	S-F-M-T	
201200H		J-4	201200H	TacLog Co 15th junk flt capt pris	S-F	
201211H		J-5	201211H	TacLog Will have POW at Helo deck at 1230	S-F-ALO	
201205H		J-6	201205H	3/7 Req additional interpreters	S-F	
	201235H	J-7	201235H	3/7 Add interpreters requested	S-F	
201250H		J-8	201250H	<del>3/3</del> 3/7 old man rpts An Cuong (2) full of VC	S-F-M-T	
201333H		J-9	201333H	2/4 Found new caves, blew tunnel	S-F	
201400		none	none	Conductor 5 men in black running in vill	S-F-M-T	
	201320	J-10	201320H	Division Intell rpt	S-F	
201530		J-11	201530H	<del>3/3</del> 3/7 Sending wpns, equip, pows to evac	S-F-ALO	
201630H		J-12	201530H	RLT-7- ITT rpt'd at BS 703974 tunnel/cache.	S-F	
201625H		J-13	201625H	1/7- Interrogator for 1/7	S-F	
201630H		J-14	201630H	1/7- Have interpret r need 1 more	S-F	
201730H		J-15	201730H	RLT-7 POW's, wpns & documts to compound	S-F	
201705H		J-16	201705H	3/7 Sign & cntr-sign for tonight	S-F-T	
201800H		J-17	201800H	Cndctr 2 warehouses vic 686917 w/1/2 roof off	S-F	
201825H		J-18	201825H	3/7 Patr'l AN TOI(1) w/tunnels&trenches	S-F	
202153H		J-19	202153H	RLT-7 4 interpr'trs to stbd	S-F	
202020H		J-20	202020H	RLT-7 3/7&Prom not to send POW's	S-F	
<del>202050H</del>		J-21	202050H	RLT-7 MONROE furnish TAO	S-F	
202052H		J-22	202052H	RLT-7 PHONG LOC TU POW reveals names VC	S-F	
202100H		J-23	202100H	3/7 Recon debrief NAM YEN(3) 105mm casings	S-F	
202240H		J-24	202240H	RLT-7 HUONG NGOC HOUNG POW friendly USMC	S-F	
202245H		J-25	202245H	RLT-7 3/7 VC turncoat to assist 3/7 opera.	S-F	
210030H		J-26	210030H	3/7 Message on K-9 attachment	S-F	
210150H		J-27	210150H	RLT-7 Message to 3/7 answering	S-F	
210330H		J-28	210030H	RLT-7 Msg frm III MAF-2 HOT LINE	S-F	
210323H		"-29	210323H	RLT-7 " to " " " " "	S-F	
210730H		J-30	210730H	RLT-7 War Dog arrive PM	S-F	
210750H		J-31	210750H	B'hitter Needs rpt on VC dead, wpns	S-F	
210834H		J-32	210834H	RLT-7 Rpt on VC dead, wpns sent	S-F	
210827H		J-33	210827H	3/7 Evac 1 VC WIA to compound	S-F	
210930H		J-34	210930H	1/7 "C" rpt 2 VC BRAD count @ 703926	S-F	
210840H		J-35	210840H	RLT-7 For 3/7 3 interpreters for pickup	S-F	
211015H		J-36	211015H	PROM A KIA 1 VC armed w/grenade	S-F	
210945H		J-37	210945H	RLT-7 Need EOD man	S-F	
211000H		J-38	211000H	RLT-7 Req 211200 ISUM INCLUDE VC KIA	S-F	
211047H		J-39	211047H	3/7 Civ NAM YEN(3) fled; req relocation	S-F	
211115H		J-40	211115H	Prom "D" Co locate drugs, PRC-10 in cave	S-F	
211143H		J-41	211140H	RLT-7 3/7 not to evac civ	S-F	
211200H		J-42	211200H	PROM Interpreter deserted	S-F	
211206H		J-43	211206H	PROM Capt gear and 1 civ KIA	S-F	
211220H		J-44	211220H	RLT-7 Rec'd challenge, passw'rds Aug22-26	S-F	
211220H		J-45	211220H	RLT-7 Req 3/7 verify rpt 1000 VC NAM YEN	S-F	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

### 1. Heading:

#### a. Unit or Section:

- (1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or smaller unit.
- (2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.

#### b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

#### c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

#### d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

### 2. Body:

#### a. Time In:

(1) **Unit Journal:** Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal:** Enter time information is received within section.

#### b. Time Out:

(1) **Unit Journal.** Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal.** Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

c. **Serial No.:** Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.

d. **DTG:** Enter date/time group of radio message.

#### e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:

(1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

(2) Although brief, entries must include all vital elements of information, such as what, where, when, how, and who.

(3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.

(4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.

(5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.

f. **Action Taken:** This column is used to indicate administrative action taken, such as, routing to cognizant unit staff officer(s), dissemination of pertinent information and/or filing of message. Some of the more common symbols used to indicate action taken are: "M", posted on situation map; "S", circulated to unit staff; "T", information disseminated to troops or subordinate units; "F", filed in journal file.

### 3. Ending:

a. **Summary:** A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

b. **Closing:** Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

### 4. Journal File:

Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.

## JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)  
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION S-2 RLT-7	
PLACE VAN TUONG, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour) 211200H AUG 1965	TO (Date and hour) 221200H AUG 1965

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
211200				JOURNAL OPENER		
1230		J-1		3/7 ANSWERED NO VC IN AREA NAM YEM (3)	S,F	
1243		J-2		3/7 RPTS AO SPOTTED 5 VC IN FOXHOLES 682916	S,M,F	
1204		J-3		3/7 INTSUM 201200H TO 211200H	S,F	
1305		J-4		1/7 RPTS CO B SPOTTED 3 VC 705937, 1 WIA	S,M,F	
1200		J-5		3/7 L&M CO REMOVED 17 VCS FR NAM YEM (3)	S,F	
1331		J-6		RLT-7 REQ YOUR INTSUM	S,F	
1300		J-7		3/7 CAPTURED WEAPONS	S,F	
1230		J-8		RLT-4 POSSIBLE VC 625955	S,M,F	
1343		J-9		3/7 RPTS EXTENSIVE TUNNELS	S,M,F	
1400		J-10	20AUG65	RPT OF VCS WIA	S,F	
1445		J-11		1/7 INTSUM	S,F	
1403		J-12		3/7 VC WITHDREW TO HIGH GROUND	S,M,F	
1325		J-13		RLT-7(R) ITT SPOT RPT	S,M,F	
1655		J-14	211612H	1/7 A CO RPT 1 VC KIA	S,M,F	
1645		J-15		HMR-163 RPTS 1 SMG, 1 CARBINE	S,F	
	1705	J-16	211630H	RLT-7 DOG TEAMS INFO	S,F	
	1725	J-17	211720H	RLT-7 5 VCS & 1 VC TO POW COMPOUND	S,F	
1815		J-18		3/7(R) RPTS NO WPN ABOARD	S,F	
	1734	J-19	211725H	RLT-7 FORWARD INTEL ITEMS	S,F	
1843		J-20	211745H	1/7 NOTHING FOUND	S,F	
1845		J-21		ADC RPT THE FOLLOWING	S,F	
1935		J-22		3/7 WPN RPT	S,F	
	1940	J-23		RLT-7 YOUR 211845H	S,F	
	2030	J-24		RLT-7 YOUR 211845H	S,F	
2245		J-25	212030H	1/7 2 VC KIA SHOT IN TREE	S,F	
	2115	J-26	212121H	RLT-7 WPN RPT	S,F	
220030		J-27	220043H	RLT-7(R) OVERLAY SK OPER	S,F	
	0001	J-28	212356H	RLT-7 REF YOUR ORDER ON CONTROL	S,F	
	0152	J-29	220450H	RLT-7 RPT OF EN POW AND MATERIAL	S,F	
0755	out	J-30	220355H	Division Rpt of en captives and materials	S,F	
0550	out	J-31	220550H	Division Rpt on en captives and material	S,F	
	2200	J-32	222200H	RLT-7 Rpt on captives and materials	S,F	
0200		J-33	220200H	ADC Interog number of crew wpns capt	S,F	
	0715	J-34	220715H	ADC Body count, crew wpns, rpt of	S,F	
0815		J-35	220725H	1/7 Numerous individ unknown uniform	S,F,M	
0808		J-36	220808H	Monroe Intel rpt, current	S,F,M,T	
0809		J-37	220809H	3/7 POW (turncoat) never arrvd our psn	S,F	
	0843	J-38	220843H	Division Rpt of en captives and material	S,F	
0735		J-39	220735H	<del>1/7</del> 1/7 Req pasword for 22Aug	S,F,T	
	0915	J-40	220915H	1/7 password for 22Aug	S,F	
0930		J-41	220930H	RLT-7 rear Div req count of crew wpns	S,F	
0955		J-42	220955H	Arty Lg tunnels and bunkers in LE THUY	S,F	
0955		J-43	220955H	1/7 Sit rpt	S,F	
1010		J-44	221010H	RLT-7 rear Send 2B.	S,F	
1135		J-45	221135H	3/7 AO rpts 30 villagers moving out of vil	S,F,M,T	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

Page 1 of 2

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

### 1. Heading:

#### a. Unit or Section:

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#### b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

#### c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

#### d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

### 2. Body:

#### a. Time In:

(1) **Unit Journal.** Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal.** Enter time information is received within section.

#### b. Time Out:

(1) **Unit Journal.** Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

(2) **Section Journal.** Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

#### c. Serial No.: Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.

#### d. DTG: Enter date/time group of radio message.

#### e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:

(1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

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(3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.

(4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.

(5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.

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### 3. Ending:

a. **Summary:** A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

b. **Closing:** Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

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Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.



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## DECLASSIFIED

## JOURNAL

NAYMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)  
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION S-2 RLT-7	
PLACE VAN TUONG, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour) 221200H Aug 1965	TO (Date and hour) 231200H Aug 1965

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1203	out	J-1		Journal opened		
<del>1203</del>	1203	J-2	221203H	RLT-7 rear Neg crew served wpns	S,F	
	1200	J-3	221200H	Div Rpt of en captives and material	S,F	
1205		J-4	221152H	3/7 Rpt panji stakes in vill	S,F	
1210		J-5	221210H	3/7 Rpt large roadblock at 705896	S,F,T,M	
1200		J-6	221200H	3/7 INTSUM	S,F	
1200	out	J-7	221200H	1/7, 3/7 Bns keep lists of captured wpns	S,F	
1215	out	J-8	221215H	Division Rpt of en captives and wpns	S,F	
	1250	J-9	221257H	ADC Same as above	S,F	
1343		J-10	221343H	1/7 INTSUM	S,F	
1035	out	J-11	221035H	RLT-7 to Div corrected count of wpns	S,F	
	1340	J-12	221340H	1/7, 3/7 Send wpns to RLT-7 for accounting	S,F	
	1410	J-13	221410H	Div Rpt of en capt and material	S,F	
1421		J-14	221421H	3/7 yellow smoke sighted	S,F	
1435		J-15	221435H	3/7 POW had no documents	S,F	
1443		J-16	221443H	3/7 Found about 500-600 pds of rice	S,F	
	1553	J-17	221553H	Monroe SpecIntelRpt	S,F	
	1700	J-18	221700H	3/7 Permission granted rice to civilians	S,F	
1647		J-19	221647H	Air Air strike results	S,F	
1730		J-20	221730H	3/7 sending 5 POWs	S,F	
1704		J-21	221704H	Air Lg no. VC coord 685876	S,F	
	1740	J-22	221740H	1/7, 3/7 Two plts of VC moved to PHU NHIEU	S,F,M,T	
	1859	J-23	221859H	Div Rpt of en capt and materials	S,F	
	1825	J-24	221825H	Div Rpt of en capt and materials	S,F	
	1840	J-25	221840H	RLT-7raer 7 POW just sent by helo	S,F	
	1840	J-26	221840H	1/7, 3/7 Tag all POWs, you sent 3 recently?	S,F	
1815		J-27	221815H	RLT-7 rear Secure 2 hour rpt	S,F	
1910	out	J-28	221910H	ADC INTSUM	S,F	
2124		J-29	222124H	PROM DID NOT SENT 3 VCX TO STBD; DOES HOLD 3 VCS		
	2400	J-30	222400H	STBD VCS REPORTED LATE TODAY ARRIVE TOMORROW	S,F	
	0605	J-31	230605H	STBD A. THRU F. NO CHANGE	S,F	
0815		J-32	230815H	STBD R. THICKSKINNER AO SPOTTED MENNEAR	S,F	
				HUE-1 BS 713950		
	0816	J-33	230816H	STBD REQ RROM AND SK SEND SPECINTEL REP	S,F	
0933		J-34	230933H	EMBED 3 VC SIGHTED ON BEACH BS 730948	S,F	
1033		J-35	231033H	SK-2 INFO REGARDING 14 KIA AND WPNS	S,F	
0930		J-36	230930H	PROM-2 SPEC INTEL RPT	S,F	
1200		J-37	231200H	SK-2 SPEC INTEL RPT	S,F	

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(1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or similar unit.  
(2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.

b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

**2. Body:**

a. Time In:

(1) Unit Journal. Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

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(1) Unit Journal. Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1963 OF-690571

DECLASSIFIED



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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 USES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>Headquarters, RLT-7 (REAR)</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>171200Aug65</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>181200Aug65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN		
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops	
1400	1200	J-1	151310Z	RLT-7 INTELLSUM III MAP INTSUM NO. 97 JFA. RPTS MOVEMENT OF VCS		S-F	
2105		J-2					S-F
		J-3					S-F-M
0745		J-4		2-4 REC'D SPORADIC S/A FIRE FR LZ BLUE VIC BT 925690		S-F-M	
0855		J-5		RLT-4 INTELLSUM		S-F	
0845		J-6		1stPLT G-RECON FOUND 1 MINE AT BT609018			
0930	XXXX	J-7		1/7 INTELLSUM NO.1		S-F	
1101		J-8		RLT-7 SPOT RPT		S-F	
10		J-9		RLT-7 SPOT RPT		S-F	

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.



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  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>Headquarters, RLT-7 Rear</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>191200H AUG65</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>201200H AUG65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1525		J-1		RLT-7 SPOT RPT		S-F
1222		J-2		2/4 SPEC INTEL RPT ON VAN-THONG		S-F
1622		J-3		RLT-7 HELO REQ FOR 2 VC POW		S-F
1700		J-4		RLT-7 HELO REQ FOR 2 VC POW		S-F
1730		J-5		RLT-4 RPTS 2-3 VC ALONG RICE PADDY		S-F
1810		J-6		RLT-7 INTSUM NO.5		S-F
1820		J-7	191810H	RLT-7 EN IN CAVE COORD BT710977		S-F
2120		J-8	192045H	2/4 SIT REPORT		S-F
2005		J-9		3/3 SPEC INTEL RPT		S-F
2325		J-10		2/4 RPT ON AIR STRIKE STRIKE		S-F
0643		J-11		AO RPTS <del>REBELS</del> ROADBLOCK BT658960		S-F
0645		J-12	191344Z	IIIMAF INTSUM NO.101		S-F
0835		J-13	131330Z	IIIMAF INTSUM UNK		S-F
0840		J-14		RLT-7 HELO REQ		S-F
0951		J-15		3/3 RPT ON AIR STRICK		S-F
1130		J-16	200830	2/4 2 POSSIBLE VCS		S-F
1134		J-17		3/3 SPEC INTEL RPT		S-F
114		J-18		1/7 INTELSUM NO. 3		S-F
*2330		J-19	201120	RLT-7 REQ FOR INTERRERITORS		S-F
		J-20		3dMarDiv REQ EVIDENCE		S-F

\*\*\*\* LATE ENTRY\*\*\*\*

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-68 (REV. 8-56)  
 USES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>Headquarters, RLT-7 Rear</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>201200H AUG65</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>211200H AUG65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1225		J-1		RLT-4 400 VC RPT MOVING WEST VIC BS595815 AT 200630H	S-F	
1335		J-2		RLT-7 CONDUCTOR 1 RPTS ARMED VC AT VIC 717976	S-F	
1325		J-3	201320H	RLT-7 INTEL RPT	S-F	
1558		J-4	201535H	RLT-7 ITT RPT	S-F	
1638		J-5		RLT-7 INTERPETER NEEDED	S-F	
1740		J-6	201732H	RLT-7 POW COMPOUND	S-F	
1715		J-7		3/12 CONDUCTOR 2 LOCATED 2 LARGE WAREHOUSE COORD 683918	S-F	
<del>1815</del>	1816	J-8	201810H	RLT-7 SCOUT DOG	S-F	
<del>1900</del>		J-9		RLT-7 SCOUT DOG	S-F	
1945		J-10		RLT-7 SCOUT DOG	S-F	
1955		J-11		RLT-7 SCOUT DOG	S-F	
2007		J-12		RLT-7 INTERPRETERS ENROUTE	S-F	
2135		J-13	202104H	RLT-7 SET RPT	S-F	
<del>2145</del>	2305	J-14	210033H	RLT-7 INFO REQ	S-F	
0958		J-15	210955H	RLT-7 SCOUT DOG	S-F	
<del>2100</del>						
0845		J-16	210840H	RLT-7 INTERPETER	S-F	
0950		J-17	210935H	RLT-7 MY 210323H	S-F	
0955		J-18	210940H	RLT-7 EOD	S-F	
*****	0608	J-19	210323H	RLT-7 INTEL RPT	S-F	
0810		J-20	210803H	RLT-7 BODY COUNT	S-F	

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>RLT-7 S-2 SECTION</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>RLT-7</b> <i>Rene</i>	
OPENED (Dfg, Month, year) <b>211200AHg65</b>	CLOSED (Dfg, Month, year) <b>221200Aug65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
11		1	211800H	RLT-7 Special Intelligence Report	S	F
		2	212121H	RLT-7 Weapons Count	S	F
		3	211746H	RLT-7 Special Intelligence Report	S	F
		4	221549H	RLT-7 Special Intelligence Report	S	F
		5	221549H	AVRN Results fo air strike	S	F
		6	212245H	2/4 District Chief Req. to enter Villeges after U.S.M.C. is out of area.	S	F
		7	211940H	RLT-7 VC RIA Report	S	F
		8	221935H	RLT-7 Special Intelligence Report	S	F
		9	221400H	AVRN VC Movement	S	F
		10	221200H	RLT-7 Intsum	S	F

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 REDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
RLT-7 S-2 SECTION	
ORGANIZATION	
RLT-7 HEADQUARTERS <del>REAR</del> REAR	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
22 Aug 65	22 Aug 65

(Classification)

TIME	SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
0845	J-1		JOURNAL OPENED		NONE
	J-2	211243H	STBD. AO REPORT Prepared Trenches	S,F	
	J-3	221805H	STBD(rear) SHOVE-2 says secure 2 hour reports	S,F	
	J-4	221840H	STBD EIGHT VC DELIVERED TO POW COMPOUND	S,F	
	J-5	221553H	STBD SPECIAL INTELL REPORT	S,F	
	J-6	221910H	STBD INTELL REPORT	S,F	
	J-7	221945H	PROM INFO on 3 VC held by PROM	S,F	
	J-8	221740H	STBD INTERROGATION OF VC	S,F	
	J-9	221659H	STBD RPT of enemy captives and material	S,F	
	J10	230816H	STBD(rear) ASM RPT sighted large group men	S,F	
	J11	230815H	STBD(rear) AO RPT sighted large group men	S,F	
	J12	21 Aug 65	SMAIN 2 EQUIP, WEAPONS, POW, CAPTURED	S,F	
	J13	280838z	COMUSMACV_ COMMAND INFORMATION	S,F	

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
RLT-7 S-2 SECTION	
ORGANIZATION	
RLT-7	REAR
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
231200H Aug65	241200H Aug65

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1200	/	J-1		JOURNAL OPENED		
2000	/	J-2	231735H	STBD REAR. POSSIBLE VC PLAN TO ATTACK		S, F
	2000	J-3	221134Z	RLT-7 INTSUM		S, F
2355	/	J-4	232146H	STBD REAR. MONROE DESIRES EXAMINATION OF HUT OBSERVED BURNING ON D-DAY		S, F
2359	/	J-5	232305H	STBD HUT IN QUESTION VICINITY BS717927 or <del>718928</del> 718928		S, F
2359	/	J-6	232131H	PROM SEARCH OPERATION OF VAN TRONG BY "B" CO.		S, F
2400	/	J-7	231215H	STBD SPECIAL INTEL REPORT		S, F
2400	/	J-8	231420H	STBD SPECIAL INTEL REPORT		S, F
2400	/	J-9	232325H	STBD SKEPTIC AXIS OF ADVANCE		S, F
0745	/	J10	240630H	STBD SPECIAL INTELL REPORT		S, F
1130	/	J11	221200H	3D ITT INTERROGATION REPORT		S, F
1130	/	J12	221630H	3D ITT INTERROGATION REPORT		S, F
1130	/	J13	221430H	3D ITT INTERROGATION REPORT		S, F
1130	/	J14		3D ITT CAPTIVE DISPOSITION REPORT		S, F

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>RLT-7</b> <b>REAR</b>	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) <b>241200HAUG 1965</b>	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) <b>251200HAUG 1965</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1200H		1	241200H	RLT-7: OPEN		S.F.Div.
1700H		2	241600H	STED Special Intell Rpt		Div, F.
1705H		3	241200H	RLT-7 Intelsum		S.F. (classified)
1710H		4	221440Z	CG III MAF INTESUM 104		S.F.DIV.
1755H		5	241645H	STED INTELL RPT		S.F.DIV
1800H		6	241145H	STED 12 weapons to STED rear		S.F.
	1106H	7	241111H	STED REAR NUMBER WEAPONS		S, F
0950		8		AFTER GLOW SIGHTED VC BN.		S, F CONFIDENTIAL
0950		9	240601Z	THICK SKINDED ISUM NO. 107		S, F CONFIDENTIAL
0950		10	230700Z	THICK SKINDED ISUM NO. 106		F.
1200H		11	241200H	BOOTH INTELSUM RPT NEG		



JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 210-GS (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION <b>S-2</b>	
ORGANIZATION <b>RLT-7</b>	
OPENED (Org, Month, year) <b>251200H AUG 1965</b>	CLOSED (Org, Month, year) <b>261200H AUG 1965</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1200H		1	251200H	RLT-7 OPEN		
1210H		2	251005H	MONROE REQ VC REGT AND BNS IN CONTACT.		S.F.T.
1215H		3	251200H	RLT-7 INTSUM NO. 11		F.DIV.MAG-12
0910H		4	091526H	INSTRUCTIONS TO S-2 LIAISON to ADC		S, F
0920H		5	092026H	EOD Rpt on Ordnance Recovered 21August65		S, F
0925H		6	260925H	Captives rpt on disposition of 21Aug65 (Conf)		S, F
0925H		7	20Aug65	Interrogation Rpt on PHAM THU (Conf)		S, F
0925H		8	21Aug65	Interrogation Rpt on PHAM RUOU (Conf)		S, F
0925H		9	22Aug65	Interrogation Rpt on VO TRUONG (Conf)		S, F
0925H		10	171350Z	III MAF INTSUM NR 95 (Conf)		S, F
0930H		11	150750Z	III MAF Telephone Security (Conf)		S, F
0930H		12	210800Z	4th Marines Thick Skinned ISUM NR 104 (CONF)		S, F
0930H		13	221440Z	III MAF INTSUM NR 104 (Conf)		S, F
1000H		14	231546Z	III MAF INTSUM 105		S.F.
1100H		15		2/4 AFTER ACTION RPT.		F.
1150H		16		RLT-7 AFTER ACTION RPT		S.F.

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JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	S-2
ORGANIZATION	RLT-7
OPENED (DFG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DFG, Month, year)
261200H AUG 1965	271200H AUG 1965

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
1200H		1	261200H	<u>RLT-7</u> OPEN		
1215H		2	261200H	<u>RLT-7</u> INTSUM NUMBER 12		F. DIV.
2230H		3	262230H	MONROE 45 KT WINDS AND HVY RAINS TOMORROW		S, F, T
2335H		4	262335H	AFTERGLOW 15 ROUND INCOMING BENDIX AREA COMPLETE BLACK OUT		S. F. T.
2435H		5	272435H	S-1 PASS WORD CHANGED TO <del>XX</del> ALTERNET and COUNTER SIGN		S. F. T. S. F.
1800H		6	271800H	CG 3RD MARDIV- INTSUM NO. 13		S. F.
2040H		7	272040H	RADIANCE *- TRAP IN SHAPE OF FOXHOLE. FALSE BOTTOM 2FT BELOW GRNB LEVEL W/1 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 2FT PUNJI STAKES UNDER FALSE BOTTOM.		S. F. T.
1000		8	250715Z	<u>THICKSKINNED</u> INTSUM NO 108 (CONF)		S, F, M
001		9	261318Z	<u>III MAF</u> IMMEDIATE IMAGERY RPT (CONF)		S, F, M
1002		10	261316Z	<u>III MAF</u> IMMEDIATE IMAGERY RPT (CONF)		S, F, M
1000		11	260230Z	<u>III MAF</u> CHALLENGE AND PASSWORDS		S, F, M
1100		12	262357H	<u>RLT-7</u> OUTGOING, to 3rd MarDiv Msg on Operation Starlight		S, F, S, F, M
1101		13	260701Z	<u>4TH MAR</u> THINKSKINNED INTSUM NO. 109		S, F, M
1200				JOURNAL CLOSED		

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JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 5-63)  
 SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION <b>S-2 RLT-7</b>	
PLACE <b>CHU LAI, South Vietnam</b>	
FROM (Date and hour) <b>281200H Aug 65</b>	TO (Date and hour) <b>301200H Aug 65</b>

(Classification)

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP.	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
1200		J-1		Journal Opened.	
0230H		J-2		AFTER GLOW EN RPT COORD 599991	S.F.T.
0230H		J-3		STED EN RPT COORD 599991	BOOTH
0345H		J-4		BOOTH PATROL RPT NEG	S.F.DIV, AFTERGLOW
0850H		J-5	P 190715Z	THICK SKINNED INTSUM NO. 102	S-F
0850H		J-6	P 220618Z	THICK SKINNED INTSUM NO. 105	S-F
0850H		J-7	00 241254Z	III MAF INTSUM NR. 106	S-F
0850H		J-8	P 251102Z	IMAGERY RPT	S-F
0850H		J-9	0 251300Z	III MAF INTSUM NR. 107	S-F
0850H		J-10	P 251322Z	IMAGERY RPT	S-F
0850H		J-11	0 261508Z	III MAF INTSUM NR. 108	S-F
0850H		J-12	P 270700Z	THICK SKINNED INTSUM NR. 110	S-F
0850Z		J-13		BOOTH 2 ENEMY REPORT	S,F
1000H	1000H	J-14		BE INTSUM NR. 13	S-F
1000H		J-15	0 271456Z	III MAF INTSUM NR.108 PT 2	S-F
1025H		J-16		REQ FR BOOTH FOR INTERPRETERS FOR CIV WIA'S	S-F
1035H		J-17	P 271635Z	IMAGERY RPT	S-F
1035H		J-18	P 271638Z	IMAGERY RPT	S-F
1035H		J-19	P 271642Z	IMAGERY RPT	S-F
	1035H	J-20	280750Z	BE INTSUM NR. 14	F
1035H		J-21	P 280631Z	THICK SKINNED INTSUM NR. 111	S-F
1035H		J-22	0 281300Z	III MAF INTSUM NR. 109	S-F
	1035H	J-23	P 290600Z	BE INTSUM NR. 15	F

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

### 1. Heading:

#### a. Unit or Section:

- (1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or smaller unit.
- (2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.

#### b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

#### c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

#### d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

### 2. Body:

#### a. Time In:

(1) Unit Journal. Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

(2) Section Journal. Enter time information is received within section.

#### b. Time Out:

(1) Unit Journal. Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

(2) Section Journal. Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

c. Serial No.: Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.

d. DTG: Enter date/time group of radio message.

#### e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:

(1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

(2) Although brief, entries must include all vital elements of information, such as what, where, when, how, and who.

(3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.

(4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.

(5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.

f. Action Taken: This column is used to indicate administrative action taken, such as, routing to cognizant unit staff officer(s), dissemination of pertinent information and/or filing of message. Some of the more common symbols used to indicate action taken are: "M", posted on situation map; "S", circulated to unit staff; "T", information disseminated to troops or subordinate units; "F", filed in journal file.

### 3. Ending:

a. Summary: A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

b. Closing: Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

### 4. Journal File:

Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.

JOURNAL  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
S-2	
ORGANIZATION	
RLT-7	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
301200H Aug 65	311200H Aug 65

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps	T-Troops
301145H		J-1		Wounded Civillians and two personnel observed.		S-F
1156		J-2		Guerilla Activity		S-F
1330		J-3		Booth Intsum No. 13.		S-F
1330		J-4		Booth Special Order No. 1.		S-F-D
	1500	J-5		BH Intsum No. 16.		S-F-D
1530		J-6		Friendly Document		S-F
1530		J-7		VC Bunker		S-F
2240		J-8		District chief request on arty coord 570968, 571965, 579968, and 579971.		S-F
0725		J-9		LAUGH INTSUM		F

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
    - (2) Entries are recorded in order of occurrence.
    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items (messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 236 C



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### 4. Journal File:

Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.

RLT-7

OPERATIONS JOURNAL

CHU LAI, VIETNAM

AUGUST 1965

~~Embroid (3)~~

UNIT: RLIT-7 3-3  
 OPENED: 181300H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 161730H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SENO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1300		Verbal	141300H	RLIT-7 debarked from USS BAYFIELD (APA-33). Col PEATROUS met at causeway by MajGen WALT, BGen KARCH & Staff.	S-F
1430		Verbal	141430H	Continuing to offload from shipping.	S-F
	1445	1	141445H	TO 3dMarDiv: Status Report. Etab CP at Chu Lai beach- continuing to off-load from assigned shipping.	S-F
	0800	2	150800H	TO RLIT 1/7: Meeting of Task Org Commanders at 1400H this CP.	S-F
1515		3	151515H	FM: CoC, 1stLtBn & Det - Change to Task Org (FracO 2-55).	S-F
	1700	4	151700H	TO 3dMarDiv: SitRep #7	S-M-F
1715		5	151715H	FM 4thMar: Carrier flight wings this position.	S-M-F
1732		6	151732H	FM 4thMar: Req to know if RLIT-7 will have SitRep at 4thMar pos in time for flight to DaNang. (Affirm)	S-F
1915		7	151915H	FM 4thMar: Be advised you send Sit-Rep daily.	S-F
	2000	8	152000H	TO 3dMarDiv: Status Report	S-F
2237		9	152237H	FM 1/7: Have fired illum in front of D Co because of VC.	S-M-F
	2304	10	152304H	TO 1/7: Info required on 152237H is in SpotRep format.	S-F
	2318	11	152318H	TO 1/7: Illum firing by 1/7 is illuminating 3/3's positions.	S-F
2320		12	152320H	FM 1/7: Spot Report	S-F
0645		13	160645H	FM 1/7: More info on 152237H.	S-M-F
	1000	14	161000H	TO: 3dMarDiv - Status report.	S-M-F
	1215	15	161215H	TO 3dMarDiv - Status of unloading as of 161200H.	S-M-F
	1340	16	161340H	TO 4thMar: Req CO, 4thMar to stop by 7thMar CP at 1530H.	S-F
1350		17	161350H	FM 1/7: 15 pers from 1/7 on patrol w/ 3/3.	S-M-F
1353		18	161353H	FM 1/7: 8 pers from Co L, 3/3 on patrol for familiarization.	S-F
	1405	19	161405H	TO 1/7: Re your 161350H & 161353H- Req time of departure & arrival area.	S-F
1625		20	161625H	FM 1/7: Sit Rep #2	S-M-F
	1700	21	161700H	TO 3dMarDiv: Sit Rep #2	S-M-F
1730		Verbal	161730H	RLIT-7 planning & drafting of OpOrd 323-65 commenced for Operation STAR-LITE.	

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 161730H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED:

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
2243		22	162243H	FM 1/7: Spot Rep of suspected VC	S-M-F
	2245	23	162245H	FM RLT-7 to 3/7: Notify S-3 of of Task Organization and Troop List	S-F
1135		24	171135H	FM 3/7: Change positions of Co's.	S-M-F
1219	Verbal		171219H	RLT-7: OpOrd 323-65 (Operation STARLITE) distributed to Task Org.	S-F
1217		25	171217H	FM 1/7: Co D set in 3/3's positions near Co I.	S-M-F
1230		26	171230H	FM 1/7: Req PAC (3/3 can provide unless otherwise directed by Address	S-F
	1412	27	171412H	TO 1/7: 7thMar commencing to lay line to 1/7 GP area.	S-F
	1430	28	171430H	TO 1/7: Permission granted to attach PAC Tn to 5/3 TAGP.	S-F
	1458	29	171458H	TO 1/7: Submit location of Co pens and changes of Bn GP	S-F
	1700	Verbal	171700H	RLT-7 Task Org preparing to embark aboard assigned shipping for STARLITE	S-F
	1745	30	171745H	FM 2/4: Change to landing plan	S-F
	2130	31	172130H	FM 7thMar to 3rdMarDiv: Sikes #9	S-F
0415		32	180415H	FM 1/7: Spotted 8 to 12 VCs on way to ambush location.	S-M-F
0600	Verbal		180600H	RLT-7 Task Org commenced amphib landing IAW OpOrd 323-65.	S-M-F
0610		33	180610H	FM 1/7: Negative contact	S-F
0645		34	180645H	FM Recon Bn: 1st plnt in position.	S-M-F
0650		35	180650H	FM 3rdMarDiv: 1st wave touch down on beach.	S-M-F
0730		36	180730H	FM 3/3: Co M needs ammo	S-F
0745		37	180745H	FM 2/4: 3d wave landed in zone BLUK & received small arms fire.	S-M-F
0755		38	180755H	FM 2/4: 4th wave delayed 30 min.	S-F
0800		39	180800H	Elms of RLT-7 Hqts landed via LVT at (BS 717923).	S-M-F
0815	Verbal		180815H	FM 2/4: 2 wIA & 1 VC w/wpn Vio 716925 at An Cuong (1). Result of H-hour search & clear operation.	S-M-F
0840	Verbal		180840H	FM 3/3: At coord 717924 & moving out.	S-M-F
0845		40	180845H	FM 2/4: 2 tanks knocked out by 57mm Recoilless. Req one SEC ASAP.	S-M-F
	0900	Verbal	180900H	Air strike commenced.	S-F
	0910	Verbal	180910H	RLT-7 CO assumes control ashore	S-F
0944	Verbal		180944H	CG 3rdMarDiv: Burn no buildings or villages indiscriminately. (To all units)	S-F
0950	Verbal		180950H	FM CO 3/3: Have contact with 2/4. They are in 3/3 ZOA coordinating move.	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7 3-3  
 OPENED: 181899Z Aug 1965  
 CLOSED

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1010		Verbal	191010H	FM RLT-7 Rear: Pass to 4th Mar- Alert Force Recon for immediate lift to LZ WHITE.	S-M-F
1015		Verbal	181015H	FM 2/4- Change to Landing Plan: LZ RED at L-hour; 2d wave at WHITE L+25; 3d wave at BLUE (L+50); 4th at WHITE (L+60)	S-M-F
	1100	40	181100H	FM 7thMar CommO: Req all avail EB-451 from 7thMar Rear.	S-F
1135		41	181145H	FM Recon: Has EOD Tn been released to disarm mine at 609018.	S-M-F
	1130	42	181130H	TO 3dMarDiv: Junction of BLT's affected at 1040H.	S-M-F
1139		Verbal	181139H	FM 3/3: Situated just forward of Phase Line APPLE.	S-M-F
	1140	Verbal	181140H	TO 7thMar Rear: Location of Recon	S-M-F
1150		43	181150H	FM Rlt S-2: Affirm on your req for EOD team.	S-M-F
1155		44	181155H	FM B Med: Casualty Report- 25 WIA; 4 KIA	S-M-F
1200		45	181200H	FM 1/7: Casualty report	S-F
1300		46	181300H	FM Recon: EOD determined that mine location at 609018 is not a mine.	S-F
1306		47	181306H	FM 7thMar Rear: No holes avail but will notify when avail.	S-F
1310		48	181310H	FM 2/4: Position report	S-M-F
	1354	49	181354H	FM 7thMar ALO: Req 2 helos to pan coord 700952 marked w/yellow panels	S-M-F
	1355	50	181355H	TO RLT-7 Units: Req casualty report	S-F
	1411	51	181411H	TO RLT-7 Rear: Casualty report: 60 WIA; 16 KIA.	S-F
1403		52	181403H	FM 3/3: Co L receiving heavy mortar fire at 703977.	S-F
1425		53	181425H	FM 3/3: Company positions	S-M-F
	1430	54	181430H	TO 4thMar ADC: Req Recon Co attached to 4thMar be helilifted to 2/4. Notify 7th Mar prior to lift.	S-F
1455		55	181455H	FM 3/3: VC on ridge at 701959.	S-F
1500		56	181500H	RLT-7 now at coord 701923.	S-M-F
	1510	57	181510H	FM 7thMar to 3/7: Req that remaining 2 companies of JLF on board AFA be made avail for employment on order. ETA 181900H.	S-F
	1512	58	181512H	TO 3dMarDiv: 2/4 and 3/3 have been ordered to hold defensive pans on best existing terrain until arrival of JLF.	S-F
1515		59	181515H	FM 3/3: I Co reached 10 men who were with downed HUEY. Most of the 10 men are casualties.	S-F

UNIT: RL7-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 181530H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 182215H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1935		60	181535H	FM 3/3: In tight position at PL BENAMA; L Co at 715940; K Co at 712902; I Co (w/heavy casualties) at 703928.	S-M-F
	1600	61	181600H	TO: 3/3- Halo on way to pick up CO 3/3 and CO 2/4. Mark lines with smoke.	S-M-F
1610		62	181610H	FM CTO 76.2: Your req for coastal blockade approved. Destroyer <u>WARLOCK</u> <u>ORLECK</u> taking station now.	S-F
1910		63	181910H	FM 3/3: Co L taking casualties but have situation under control.	S-F
1940		64	181940H	FM 3/3: CO, 3/3 recommends moving Co K and L from pres positions at BS 1401 to his pen at (BS 7562)	S-M-F
1950		65	181955H	FM 3/3: CO, 3/3 under heavy small arms fire at 702530.	S-F
	2000	66	182000H	TO CG 3rdMarDiv: Present indication is that the VC plan to defend selected pens or installations while trying to avoid concentrating his forces in strength. Possibly the estimated Bn in immediate area is the 40th Bn. Bn forces thus far have been aggressive in their action.	S-F
	2045	67	182045H	FM 2/4: Stop illum over GP ASAP.	S-F
2050		68	182050H	FM 7th Mar TAG LOG: Req H-hour for landing Reserve Company. Need guide from 7th Mar on beach.	S-M-F
2100		69	182100H	FM CO 3/3: L Co remains in tight perimeter. One plat searching area vic of burning LVT for wounded men from tank platoon.	S-M-F
2115		70	182115H	FM 2/4: Req to know instructions 2/ tomorrow's ops. 2/4 GP & Co E located at 692940.	S-M-F
	2130	71	182130H	TO 2/4: Continue attack to final obj 190700H. Prep fires 190500H to 190700H. Req all avail fires.	S-F
	2130	72	182130H	TO 2/4: Urge max use of avail supt arms throughout the night.	S-F
	2150	73	182150H	TO 3/3: Req pen rpt of rifle co's and Bn GP.	S-F
2200		74	182200H	FM 3/3: Have 2 fire missions sched at 700925 & 713954. Need consent to fire. (Affirm)	S-M-F
2215		75	182215H	FM 2/4: Req resupply first light tomorrow. Also req close air support.	S-F

UNIT: RL7-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 182245H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 190812H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
	2245	76	182245H	TO 3/7: Req you land Reserve Co immediately to assume GREEN Beach defenses.	S-M-F
	2315	77	182315H	TO 2/4: Concerning resupply. What classes do you desire.	S-F
2330		78	182330H	FM 3dMarDiv: 26 reporters to arrive your CP tomorrow.	S-F
	2335	79	182335H	TO CTO 76.2: Req status of landing M Co 3/7.	S-F
2555		80	182355H	FM CTO 76.2: M Co landing at Green Beach 190025H.	S-M-F
0012		81	190012H	FM CTO 76.2: Do you desire remaining company transferred from APA to LPH to decrease reaction time.	S-F
0026		82	190026H	FM CTO 76.2: Landing forces the beach	S-F
0123		83	190123H	FM CG 3dMarDiv: I have just received a UP release. Your press reports very favorable. (Censor)	S-F
0140		84	190140H	FM 3/7: Helo pilot spotted 3 VC entering area via T04917.	S-M-F
0318		85	190318H	FM 3/7: We will be in 7thMar CP area in 15 minutes. Need billeting & supplies for 150 men.	S-F
	0425	86	190425H	TO 2/4: Will commence resupply at first light.	S-F
0457		87	190457H	FM 3/7: Co H commenced movement. Anticipate completion by first light	S-M-F
	0500	88	190500	FM 3dMarDiv: Req pres strength of rifle companies, Tank, Ontos and LVT losses.	S-F
0638		89	190638H	FM 2/4: Req 2dPlat, Co H be helilifted to Co H. CP at LZ BLUE. Before Co H can move they must have 150 gal of gas for Tanks and Ontos.	S-F
	0710	90	190710H	TO 2/4: Gas resupply en way.	S-F
0717		91	190717H	FM 1/7: Burning defensive pens. Moving to attack.	S-F
0745		92	190745H	FM 1/7: I Co moving through An Cuong village.	S-M-F
0800		93	190800H	FM CG 2/4: Req helo at (BS 603956). Co G at (BS 603955) cannot move until chopper arrives on scene.	S-F
0810		94	190810H	FM 2/4: G Co has no immed contact. VC KIA 11. Sighted 12 VC WIA. Informed by villagers. Possibly 40th Pa	S-F
0812		95	190812H	FM 3/3: Req helo lift Co H to Mike pens upon reaching final obj.	S-F

UNIT: RLT-7 3-3  
 OPENED: 190815H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED:

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
0815		96	190815H	FM 3rdMarDiv: 10 reporters due your pan. Have rep avail.	S-F
0835		97	190835H	FM 2/4: Co H cannot move without gas and ammo.	S-F
	0843	98	190843H	FM 2/4: 3/7 will be operating east of H Co. 2/4 commencing 0900H.	S-F
0852		99	190852H	FM 2/4: E Co has reached Phase Line BANABA and still moving.	S-F
0905		100	190905H	FM 2/4: Co K has VC in front of them at BS 707964. Calling NGF and Air. Co L has 2 POWs - no wons but equip	S-F
0913		101	190913H	FM 2/4: Co E 500 meters of PL CHERRY.	S-M-F
0938		102	190938H	FM 3/12: Hit by small arms fire at 619011.	S-M-F
0948		103	190948H	FM 3/3: Co H within 500 meters of beach. 3 companies abreast have 5 VC POW's.	S-F
	1000	104	191000H	TO 2/4: Troops observed at beach BS 699976. Intend to fire NGF predicated on your approval.	S-M-F
1015		105	191015H	FM 2/4: Req 2 armed HUEY's- have 25 VC spotted. Have HUEY's come up on Bn TAG NET 44.2 or 49.4.	S-F
1020		106	191020H	FM 3/3: Co G receiving heavy small arms fire at 715975. Calling Supt arms.	S-M-F
1025		107	191025H	FM 3/3: Be advised that Co G is on beach. Receiving small arms fire.	S-M-F
1100		108	191100H	FM 2/4: Co E is 400 meters North of PL CHERRY.	S-M-F
1110		109	191110H	FM 2/4: Req you have Naval Guns cease fire on Hill 32 so that we may sweep.	S-M-F
1115		110	191110H	FM 2/4: We will have a flashing mirror to identify friendly troops.	S-M-F
1120		111	191120H	FM 2/4: Co E is about to sweep at GS 7197.	S-M-F
1130		112	191130H	FM 3/3: Now on final objective. Rec sporadic fire from rear.	S-M-F
1146		113	191146H	FM 3/3: VC inland our pan. Req A/G immediately (2 more).	S-M-F
1147		114	191147H	FM 3/7: Truck located at 706933 is loaded w/ammo. Should be blown. Req you send expert to inspect it.	S-M-F
1200		115	191200H	FM 2d Army Advisory Team: 2 gun trucks out of action. 1 gun tank is badly damaged; 1 flame tank has shot his load.	S-M-F

UNIT: BLT-7  
 OPENED: 191215H 30p 1965  
 CLOSED 191558H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
	1215	116	191215H	TO 3/3: Will lift Co M to your pos with first avail helos. Remain on obj and commence search & clear of caves and coastline.	S-M-F
	1217	117	191217H	TO 2/4: Req Sit Rep.	S-F
1225		118	191225H	TO 7th Mar FM 3/3: Req to run air strike on village at 719942. Are any friendly in that area.	S-F
1230		119	191230H	FM 3/3: Req you advise if we stay at pres pos or return to orig landing beach. Have reached final obj. All Co's tied in. Am protecting rear w/ supporting arms.	S-M-F
	1234	120	191234H	TO 3/3: Stay at present pos.	S-F
1236		121	191236H	FM 3/3: Presently readjusting lines to run BS 717957 to BS 729950. Do not have contact with BLT 2/4.	S-M-F
1240		122	191240	FM 2/4: Want helos approx 1500H for retraction. Req to know how many helos available.	S-F
	1243	123	191243H	TO 2/4: CO, 7th Mar coming to your position. Will answer at that time.	S-M-F
	1257	124	191257H	TO 2/4: Mark your GP w/ smoke.	S-F
	1315	125	191315H	TO 2/4: Have your troops in helo size teams.	S-F
1318		126	191318H	FM 2/4: Co G ready for helo lift. Have 200 troops in 8 man Helo size teams. LZ marked w/ smoke at 698973. Req arrival time of helos & escort.	S-M-F
1336		129	191336H	FM CG 76.2: Leaving station for 2 hours.	S-F
1342		130	191342H	FM 3/3: Interrogation of POW indicates 2 VC Bn's in area and probably still remain.	S-M-F
1352		131	191352H	FM 3/3: 1 VC Bn in our area. Another battalion in village from 680960 to 700960.	S-M-F
1355		132	191355H	FM 4th Mar: One tank out of action.	S-F
1508		133	191508	FM 3/7: Req MTA of BOD. Bring spec BOD equip. Confirm authorization to remove mine by BOD pers.	S-F
1523		134	191525H	FM 7th Mar Rear: Send helos to this pos to pick up 44 engr pers ADAP. Helos to make 2nd lift of mines and done as required.	S-F
1558		135	191558H	FM 2/4: Sit Rep. 2/4 units digging in and carrying out assigned missions	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 19 1730H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 200810H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
	1730	136	191730H	TO 3/3: Will chop to 3/3 on your arrival at Beach. Submit After Action report within 48 hrs after return to your Base Camp. Co H be prepared to retreat by helo at first light 20Aug.	S-M-F
1740		137	191740H	TO 2/4: Be prepared to retreat by helo during AM of 20Aug. Upon of 2/4. Submit After Action report 48 hrs after return to B.Camp.	S-M-F
1810		138	191810H	FM 2/4: Req NavGunfire illum at 705965 & 702973. Req at least 2 rds on ea target every hr.	S-M-F
1858		139	191858H	FM USS CABILDO: Fishing boats going to sea. 6 men in each boat w/no nets any boat. Leaving coast as quickly as possible.	S-M-F
1905		140	191905H	FM 2/4: Highly recommend all junks leaving Peninsula be intercepted.	S-M-F
1955		141	191955	FM USS ORLECK: Have fired on 3 junks w/.50 cal MG. Junk in sinking condition. We can finish w/main btry if necessary.	S-M-F
2036		142	192036H	FM 3/7: Helo pilot observed auto. wpns fire at 191915H fm vic where helo was flying.	S-M-F
2110		142		FM 2/4: Cease fire all NGF in our area. Repeat - Cease fire!	S-M-F
	2115	144	192115H	FM RLT-7: Cease fire for all NGF passed to all units. NGF will however, fire illum in area on request.	S-M-F
2252		145	192252H	FM AOC, 3rdMarDiv: Do not booby trap your area. Will explain in morning. (Passed to TaskOrg RLT-7).	S-M-F
2300		146	192300H	FM 3/3: Sit Rep	S-M-F
2310		147	192310H	FM 2/4: Sit Rep	S-M-F
	0100	148	200100H	TO G-3, 3rdMarDiv: Sitrep #1	S-M-F
0115		149	200115H	FM G-3, 3rdMarDiv: 4thMar cancelled retraction plan for 201505.	S-F
	0120	150	200120H	TO 2/3, 3/3, 3/7: Cancelled orders for retraction.	S-F
0600		151	200600H	FM 3/7: Sending out 2 patrols at first light.	S-M-F
0807		152	200807H	FM 3/3: Casualty totals	S-M-F
	0810	153	200810H	TO 3/3: Req to know vicinity of ptrls operating for info to sup arm.	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 200925H AAGS 1985  
 CLOSED: 201134H AAGS 1985

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
0825		154	200825H	FM 3rdMarDiv- No LCU's available- LVT retriever will not be sent	S-M-F
0826		155	200826H	FM 3-3,3/3: Control oper within 500 meters of perimeter. Also calling arty and/or MCF on area.	S-M-F
	0853	156	200853H	FM 7th Mar to 3/3,2/4,3/7: Frag Order 2-65	S-M-F
	0855	157	200855H	TO 3/3,2/4,3/7: Do not execute Frag Order 2-65 until directed	S-F
0857		158	200857H	FM 2/4: WUS with white bands means withdraw.	S-F
	0912	159	200912H	FM 7th Mar to 3/3: Send 2 airtacs to 7thMar CP. GO,3/3 rpt to 7th Mar ASAP.	S-M-F
	0915	160	200915H	TO 2/4,3/3. Evacuate all BB-451's to rear CP's for charging ASAP. All rear assets exhausted.	S-F
0920		161	200920H	FM 3/3: 3/3 prepared to execute FragO 2-65 when directed.	S-F
0922		162	200922H	FM 3/7: Patrol to arrive your loc approx 45 min to accompany Gen LAM and staff to our CP.	S-F
0925		163	200925H	FM CG, 3rdMarDiv: If LVTB is need- ed 7th Mar will have to use one or own LCU-LVTB Chn lci.	S-F
0930		164	200930H	FM ADG,3rdMarDiv: Will not be at your location at 0945H.	S-F
0932		165	200932H	FM 2/4: Evacuated 2 wounded child- ren and 2 wounded possible WBS & 1 woman as a result of last night's air strikes.	S-F
0936		166	200936H	FM 3/7: 2 damaged radio sets or SWBD's via 702927 also found 81 & 60mm mortar rds same location.	S-M-F
	1010	167	201010H	TO 2/4: Helos on way. Commence retraction.	S-F
1015		168	201015H	FM CG,3rdMarDiv: Execute my FragO 3-65 asap. Acknowledge receipt.	S-F
	1017	169	201017H	TO CG, 3rd MarDiv: Ack receipt your FragO3-65.	S-F
1100		170	201100H	FM 3/3: XO,3/3 now approaching your CP w/Co I.	S-M-F
1130		171	201130H	FM 2/4: Presently retracting to rear CP.	
1154		172	201154H	FM 2/4: Co B lift completed. Commencing B&Co lift	S-F

UNIT: ELT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 201200H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED:

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1200		173	201200H	FM CG, 3rdMarDiv: Am w/ CG, 15th ARVN Junk Div at POW compound. VC POW states VC plot in caves at BS 711967. They have 8mmMort, 5 BARs and many small weapons. Will deliver prisoner if you desire.	S-M-F
1210		174	201210H	FM 7thMar: Will pick up prisoner. Where is he now located.	S-F
1212		178	201212H	TO 7thMar: Have prisoner aboard USS CABILDO at present. Will be on helo pad.	S-F
1234		179	201234H	FM 3rdMarDiv: USS GERNON CNTY will embark at ChuLai after debarkation and bring to this area.	S-F
1300H		180	201300H	FM 2/4: 8 fishing boats moving North at BT 6805. Each boat has at least 6 people. Some have 10.	S-M-F
1305		181	201305H	FM 2/4: One company moving toward cave infested with VC.	
1333		182	201333H	FM 2/4: Company found caves. Blew one tunnel.	S-F
201603		183	201603H	FM 7thMarRear: Req LVTP-5 be authorized to accompany LVTR-1 in recovery opn	S-F
1649		184	201649H	FM 7thMarRear: One regt TACP party is being flown from beach site in DaNang.	
1652		185	201652H	FM 5/3: All of 3/3 is embarked aboard LVT's.	S-F
1720		186	201720H	FM 1/7: Detach Co L and have them move by foot to 1/7 CP ASAP.	S-F
1755		187	201755H	FM 7thMarRear: Presidential interest msg received. must know: How many men were killed, wounded in armored column. What was the total number of men involved. Was any man WIA and not found until the next day in a rice paddy. Need answers ASAP.	S-F
1802		188	201802H	FM 7thMarRear. Req of helos was disapproved by G-3. Reason: lack of P-CC located at 7thMar(Fwd).	S-F
	1830	189	201830H	FM 7thMar to Rear: Cannot understand disapproval. We possess full HHC capabilities here.	S-F
1855		190	201855H	FM 7thMarRear: Pass to C, 1/7. Co J has been released from 4thMar but will go to 7thMar direct from here. Do you want any other attachments-if so we can put on LST tonight. Everything going well.	S-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 201840H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1840		191	201840H	FM 3rdMarDiv: Scout dogs avail at Da-Nang. Howmany do you want. Provide other info. Passed from 7thMarRear	S-F
	1900	192	201900H	TO 7thMarRear: Req 4 scout dogs w/ Vietnamese handlers.	S-F
1915		193	201915H	FM 3/3: Am disembarking from beach. Will assume pens on MLH at 2015H	S-M-F
1920		194	201920H	FM 3rdMarDiv: Have 2 ARVN Navy Boats avail for Shore Line Patrol.	S-F
1923		195	201923H	FM 3rdMarDiv: One ALO, one FAC and FAC Tm w/ FRC-41 in route ChuLai. ETA 1925	S-F
	2000	196	202000H	TO 1/7: Req to know if any Co C component are in your area. If so, how many?	S-F
2005		197	202005H	FM 1/7: Co C has left our area and should arrive your CP shortly.	S-F
	2020	198	202020H	TO 3/7: Req list of 3/7supt arms that landed on beach. Info for IIMAF.	S-F
2034		199	202034H	FM 1/7: CP loc BS 717941. Co M in 200 meter perimeter around CP.	S-F
	2110	200	202110H	TO G-3, 3rdMarDiv: Sit Rep #12.	S-F
2200		201	202200H	FM 7thMarRear: More info on scout dogs.	S-F
2252		202	202252H	FM CG, IIMAF to COMUSMACV info 7thMar: In process of putting 1/7 into obj area & retracting 2/4 and 3/3. CG, 2dDiv I Corps has offered 2 Bns to assist current search and destroy effort. Anticipate 3d ARVN Bn and 3dBn, 51st Regt will be introduced into Obj Area 21 Aug f/ period of about 2 days. Also anticipate sibs of BLT 3/7 can be reembarked 22Aug.	S-M-F
2255		203	202255H	FM 7thMarRear: 3 men injured, one fatally by wild Naval GunFire round at 2255H on Co D, 1/7 pen. Evac of 3 men completed at 210018H. Dead is Cpl R. P. PETRICK. HQF has ceased and is being looked into.	S-M-F
0425		203	210425H	FM 7thMarRear: Req loc of all 3/7 Co's	S-M-F
0501		204	210501H	FM 3rdMarDiv: This morn MACV is sending H.H. HOLMBERG to ChuLai f/STARLITE info for mil rep to JCS. He will bring 2 ARVN officers. Will depart Saigon 0800.	S-M-F
0655		205	210655H	FM 3/7: 3/7 received sniper fire in CP approx 10 rds. M Co is moving and receiving sporadic sn arm fire. I Co ready to jump off-awaiting orders.	S-M-F
0735		206	210730H	FM 7thMarRear: Scout dogs will arr this afternoon w/ Army advisors & handlers. 7thMar must provide interpreters to aid handlers. Dogs eat C-rats.	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7 3-3  
 OPENED: 210750H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 220630H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
0730		207	210750H	FM 1/7: Co D departed perimeter at 0700H. Obj Van Tuong (5). No contact as of 0735H.	S-M-F
	0800	208	210800H	TO 3/7: Req Sit Rep	S-M-F
0815		209	210815H	FM 1/7: Co A departed pres pens at 0815. Obj Van Tuong (2). Co B occupying perimeter. Co D encountered sniper fire.	S-M-F
0830		210	210830H	FM 1/7 NOFO: Has 4th Mar been informed of incident last night? (Negative)	S-M-F
	0909	211	210909H	TO 7thMarRear: ARVN Forces have commenced operation in adjacent zone of Action	S-M-F
1440		212	211440H	FM Army ARVN Advcory Group: ARVN req clearance for arty & air strike.	S-M-F
1445		213	211445H	FM 1/7: Friendly position report.	S-M-F
1450		214	211450H	FM 3rdMarDiv: Req you send list of units participating in Operation STARLITE.	S-M-F
	1500	215	211500H	TO 1/7, 3/7: Req you send captured weapons by type.	S-M-F
	1745	216	211745H	TO CTO 76.2: Exchange of forces. Req you provide landing craft to transport H Co 3/7 to APA-208 and K Co 3/7 to Green beach at 0630.	S-M-F
1830		217	211830H	FM 3/7: 3/7 displaced at 1630H. Advance elements reached new location at 1745H.	S-M-F
	1905	218	211905H	TO 1/7: All of C Co has been relieved to regimental security assignment.	S-M-F
	2024	219	212024H	TO 3rdMarDiv: List of units participating in Operation STARLITE.	S-M-F
	2221	220	212221H	TO 1/7: FragO 4-65. Conduct search & clear operations.	S-M-F
	2230	221	212230H	TO 1/7: Req to know if flare plane is required on station all night?	S-M-F
2350		222	212350H	FM 7thMarRear: Info on 1/7's continuation of mopping up via Van Tuong	S-M-F
0018		223	220018H	FM 7thMarRear: STARLITE opens 22Aug. Continued operations ashore w/Recon. Enemy forced toward Hill 128 and mop up of Van Tuong Village. Concept of Operations contained in 7thMarRear msg 212325H. CG, 3rdMarDiv sends.	S-M-F
0911		224	220011H	FM 3rdMarDiv AirinO: questions before providing air support. Time of pick-up, LZ.	S-F
	0155	225	220155H	TO 3rdMarDiv: 7thMarSitRep #14.	S-F
0630		226	220630H	FM 7thMarRear: District chief requests to reoccupy Binh Lanh and Binh-Ky villages today after USMC is out.	S-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 220700H 1965  
 CLOSED: 220700H 1965

IN	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
0700 220700H		<p>FM: President of the United States - "I extend my heartfelt thanks and congratulations and those of the American people to the military units under your command which have achieved clearcut victory against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment at Chulai. This nation is deeply proud of its fearless fighting men. They will have the continued, united and determined support of their people at home. Our hearts go out to the families and comrades of those who have given their lives. I know that the men who have won this victory will show the traditional generosity of the American Armed Forces to those whom they have defeated. We must prove all our actions that the path to peace for these adversaries is through return and reconciliation, and not through continued aggression. The courage and skill of our men in battle will be matched by their magnanimity when the battle ends and all American military action in Vietnam will stop as soon as aggression by others is stopped."</p>	
		Signed: LYNDON B. JOHNSON-President of the United States.	All Hands
0700 220700H		<p>FM COMSEVENTHFLT: "Once again the Seventh Fleet Amphibious forces and seventh fleet marines have combined to add a glorious new chapter to the annals of amphibious warfare. The masterful planning and execution of Operation STARLITE have received accolades from all echelons of command including the Commander-in-Chief President Johnson. Please extend to all the officers and men in your command my admiration and pride in their outstanding performance in this extra ordinary combat operation. You have stunned and demoralized the enemy in Vietnam and made a significant step toward achieving the peace and freedom for the people of South Vietnam which is the goal of your government and the people of the United States. Congratulations and well done." Signed: VADM Paul P. Blackburn Jr.</p>	
			All Hands
0700 220700H		<p>FM CG III MAF: "Two days ago a VC Regiment was decimated at Van Tuong by a surprise amphibious/helicopter assault. This significant defeat of a tough-well armed, and fanatical enemy is a tribute to the professional skill, consummate courage and teamwork of all who participated and is a bright new chapter in the annals of our country's hard won battles against the enemies of freedom. ----- The preservation of freedom in this world--there is no better cause. Well done to all Marines, the U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers, sailors and airmen who participated."</p>	
		Signed: MajGen L. W. Walt-USMC	All Hands

UNIT: RL5-7 3-3  
 OPENED: 220800H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 221730H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
0800		230	220800H	FM Army/ARVN Advisory Group: Req to know if today's OpPlan requires your moving south and still using Grid Line 68 as old fire line. Reply ASAP.	S-M-F
	0815	231	220815H	TO Army/ARVN Advisory Group: Grid Line 68 is still NFL.	S-M-F
0830		232	220830H	FM 1/7: Co C secured Obj BS 700953 to BS 705955 at 0710H. Proceeding to Obj BS 695954. Co C encountered light sniper fire entering Obj 2 at 0720H. Commenced interdiction fires.	S-M-F
0915		233	220915H	FM 1/7: Co B in Van Tuong (1). No VC activity-no VC encountered. Natives very docile and are offering themselves the company. Proceeding to collection point. Interpreters say VC left Van Tuong (1) 10 days ago. There are many caves and huts containint equip and ammo.	S-M-F
1000		234	221000H	FM ADC, 3rdMarDiv: Execute planned ops unless local reasons override. If this is the case notify me ASAP.	S-F
1015		235	221015H	FM 3/7: Situation Report	S-M-F
1115		236	221115H	FM CTG 76.2: Have been notified that you require 3LF LVT's, at Green Beach. Have taken action to do this but req you confirm requirement immediately	S-F
	1117	237	221117H	TO CTG 76.2: Confirmation of requirement to land LVT's from 3LF.	S-F
1200		238	221200H	FM 3/7: Co's I and L have reached the Assembly Area at BS 693907.	S-M-F
1220		239	221220H	FM ADC, 3rdMarDiv: MajGen FIELDS to visit CP 230800H.	S-F
1400		240	221400H	FM Army/ARVN Advisory Group: Approx 80 VC coord 667877 moving SEast. ARVN pursuing with armor & arty. Have req A/S. Will cross BT 68. Req to know southern friendly position.	S-M-F
	1410	241	221410H	TO Army/ARVN Adv Group: Friendly pan located 694888.	S-M-F
1435		242	221435H	FM 1/7: At 1325H Co D departed on a search and clear mission in village BS 722956.	S-M-F
	1515	243	221515H	TO 3/7: Req position report	S-F
1530		244	221530H	FM 3/7: Locations of Co's I, L & K	S-M-F
1550		245	221550H	FM 3/7: 3/7 to move Co K to vic 695843 ASAP to estab blocking position.	S-M-F
1730		246	221730H	FM Army/ARVN Adv Group: ARVN ops terminating - returning to home CP. Closing down net.	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 221735H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 231010H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERBO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1735		247	221735H	FM 1/7: Co C and OP Group has returned to Bn perimeter.	S-M-F
1801		248	221801H	FM 3/7: Co K blocking pens changed to 695885.	S-M-F
	1940	249	221940H	TO 1/7 & 3/7: Submit report of caves and positions destroyed. Include location and description.	S-F
2000		250	222000H	FM 1/7: Advise this Hq as to coord of Flanks of Green Beach.	S-F
2045		251	222045H	FM 1/7: Co D will remain at BS 732954 overnight and continue search & clear mission in Van Tuong (4) tomorrow. Many persons injured by air strike on 18 Aug.	S-M-F
	2110	252	222110H	TO 1/7: Req account of incident - fight w/VC in cave at Van Tuong (1). Any USMC casualties?	S-F
2120		253	222120H	FM 7thMarBarr: There are several PP TRPs west of North-South NFL.	S-M-F
	22005	254	222205H	TO 1/7: CG, 3rdMarDiv will visit your CP from 230930 to 230950H.	S-F
	2206	255	222206H	TO 3/7: CG, 3rdMarDiv will visit your CP from 230910H to 230925H.	S-F
	2210	256	222210H	TO 1/7: FragO 5-65. Complete search & destroy of Van Tuong (1).	S-M-F
	2220	257	222220H	TO 3/7: Upon completion of ops assigned by CG, RLT-7, occupy defensive perimeter from BS 713920 to BS 722914). Submit overlay of defensive pens by 1900H. 7thMar CP will displace to Green Beach late afternoon.	S-M-F
2247		258	222247H	FM 3/7: CP location no change. Co K at 695885; Co I at 696090; Co L 695887.	S-M-F
	2250	259	222250H	TO 7thMarBarr: 7thMar Sit Rep #15.	S-M-F
2310		260	222310H	TO 1/7: MGF will be firing in GS 7188	S-M-F
	0849	261	230849H	TO 7thMarBarr: Cas report	S-F
0855		263	230855H	FM 4th Mar: AO spotted large gathering of men BS 613950 near HUA.	S-M-F
0900		264	230900H	FM 4thMar: AO again spotted large groups of men gathering in vic BS 653977. women also leaving the area carrying items.	S-F
0905		265	230905H	FM 7thMarBarr: Req to know if you desire UDF personnel aboard this ship (CABILDO)	S-F
	0910	266	230910H	FM 7thMar to 7thMarBarr: Casualty report as of 0800H.	S-F
1010		267	231010H	FM 1/7: Concerning distribution of rice. CP is in process of displacing and will have neither time nor manpower to distribute rice.	S-F

UNIT: RLT-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 231610H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED:

IN	OUT	SRNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1610	268	231610H		FM 3rdMarDiv: I Corps indicates possible VC plan to attack Binh Son.	S-M-F
	1615	269	231615H	TO 3/7: Cease target operation-return to Green Beach.	S-F
1620	270	231620H		FM 1/7: Co B conducted search operation of Van Tuong.	S-M-F
	1746	271	231746H	TO 3rdMarDiv: Spec Intel report	S-F
	1755	262	231755H	TO ADC3rdMarDiv: Captives and wms report	S-F
1800	273	231800H		FM 7thMarRear: Hut on right flank observed burning. 3rdMarDiv wants site examined f/ intel info.	S-F
	1910	274	231910H	TO CTG 76.2: S-4, 1/7 has req 2 additional LVT's for backload. None avail here. Yours for action.	S-F
2245	275	232245H		FM 1/7: Situation Report	S-F
0640	276	240640H		FM 1/7: Moving out	S-F
0755	277	240755H		FM 1/7: First Co from 1/7 arr Check Point L	S-F
0830	278	240830H		FM 3/7: Req 1/7 mark position by smoke to enable Helo with visiting ply to land.	S-F
	0840	279	240840H	TO 3/7: Upon completion of backload and clearance of Green Beach, chop to CTG 76.5 and revert to SLP Status.	S-F
0845	280	240845H		FM 3/7: Report of incoming rounds falling at 695875. Are there friendly fires. Req confirmation.	S-F
0850	281	240850H		FM 3/7: Co I rec arty fire B3 6987. Req you check and secure firing this area.	S-F
0910	282	240910H		FM 3/7: Req arrangements be made ASAP f/ meeting of 1/7, RLT-7 & CTG 76.5 concerning retraction.	S-F
1020	283	241020H		FM 1/7: Pass CkPt #2 on way to CkPt#3	S-M-F
1025	284	241025H		FM 4thMar: Req to know MCFBS requirements from 241000H to 241800H. Will you need all three ships.	S-F
1050	285	241050H		FM 1/7: Co A supporting advance to #3. Hold on #3 while calling fires to #4.	S-M-F
1103	286	241103H		FM 7thMarRear: Pass to CO, RLT-7. Open 1/6 return to 7thMar upon passage of FEBA 4thMar. XO, 7thMar sends.	S-M-F
1200	287	241200H		FM 3/7: CP no change. Co I 697889; Co k 718882 and moving forward Phase Line 2. Co I from coord 715897 to 729900 BT:	S-M-F
1410	288	241410H		FM CO3rdMarDiv: Commence backloading of heavy equipment and supplies on 27 Aug. Auth chop and opoon sweep bn to 4thMar on entry Truoc Phad Peninsula passage return to parent control on FEBA. Direct liaison auth.	S-M-F

UNIT: RLT-7

OPENED: 241445H Aug 1965

CLOSED: 272300H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	NUMBER	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
1445		289	241445	FM 3/7: 3/7 progress slow. Rec sweeping operations be terminated. Your intent relative howtar Bn and your halo requirements???	S-F
	1500	290	241500H	FM 3/7: 3/7 ceased tactical operations at 1500H.	S-F
1600		291	241600H	FM 3/7: Est time of LVT pickup up CkPt #5 is 1700. 1/7 leading elements at Ck Pt #4 as of 1545. Recon plat elm is at CkPt 5 w/negative enemy contact.	S-F
1645		292	241645H	FM 7thMarRear: ADC req all info avail on ARVN ops to the SW of 7thMar organizations.	S-F
1730		293	241730H	FM 1/7: Leading elms at CkPt #5. From CP 500 yds from beach.	S-F
1740		294	241740H	FM 1/7: CO has arrived at CkPt#5 at 634024.	S-F
	1820	295	241820H	TO 3rdMarDiv: 7thMar departed USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) for home CP.	S-F
1820		296	241850H	FM 3rdMarDiv: Secure Operation "STARLITE"	S-F
1945		297	241945H	FM 3/7: Have commenced backloading of personnel and equipment aboard amphib shipping of the SLF.	S-F
2000		298	242000H	TO 3rdMarDiv: RLT-7 debarking from BAYFIELD. Will be located at coords BT 560048. 1/7 at BT 565043.	S-F
0700		299	250700H	FM 1/7: Ready to assume pans as directed by DivOpOrd 327-65 in Chu Lai TAOR.	S-F
1545		300	241545H	FM 1/7: Have 2 platoons from Co C providing direct support to K Btry (SP), 4/12 which is supporting ARVN ops in southern portion of ChuLai TAOR.	S-F
2250		301	241545H	FM 1/7: Have one plat from each of A, B, and D under opcon 3/3. To familiarize them with terrain and job to be done.	S-F
0950		302	260950H	FM 3/7: Have completed backloading.	S-F
1245		303	271245H	FM 1/7: Have relieved 3/3 in Chu Lai TAOR.	S-F
1400		304	271400H	FM 3rdMarDiv: Prepare planning guidance for forthcoming Operation PIRANHA.	S-F
1500		305	271500H	FM 1/7: Relief of 3/3 completed.	S-F
1600		306	271600H	FM 1/7: Have assumed security of both Bn CP's. Have commenced registering arty and 81mm mortars.	S-F
2300		307	272300H	FM 1/7: Present locations: CP at 565044, Co A at 572029, Co B at 572029, Co B at 566020, Co C at 563034, Co D at 553018.	S-F

UNIT: RL7-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 280900H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 301645H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
	0900	302	280900H	TO Task Org RL7-7: OpPlan 323065 Operation PIRANHA.	S-M-F
1330		303	281330H	FM 1/7: Patrol A-1 left area at 1330 for BT 577029.	S-M-F
1930		304	281930H	FM 1/7: Patrol A-1 returned -neg contact	S-M-F
2100		305	282300H	FM 1/7: Patrol B-1 left area at 2300 for area at BT 565017. Squad size.	S-M-F
2300		306	282300H	FM 1/7: Patrol B-2 left area at 2300 for area at BT 566019. Squad size ambush patrol.	S-M-F
0500		307	290300H	FM 1/7: Patrol B-1 returned -neg contact	S-M-F
0430		308	290430H	FM 1/7: Patrol B-2 returned -neg contact	S-M-F
0745		309	290745H	FM 1/7: Co C to conduct motorized patrol behind MLR to apprehend any civilians.	S-M-F
1150		310	291150H	FM 1/7: Co D to man OP No 1 and a roadblock.	S-M-F
1300		311	291300H	FM 1/7: Motorized patrol met no contact	S-F
1630		312	291630H	RL7-7: Briefing on Operation PIRANHA for all unit commanders by RL7-7 CO	S-F
1830		313	291830H	FM 1/7: Co A Patrol A-2 left for patrol to BT 576033.	S-F
2045		314	292045H	FM 1/7: Co B Patrol B-1 Plt(-) left to BT 567018.	S-F
2250		315	292250H	FM 1/7: In Van Tuong Complex 687 civilians processed. 450 pounds of rice distributed	S-F
2315		316	292315H	FM 1/7: Co B Patrol B-2 (Sqd) left for a layout patrol at 572018.	S-M-F
2330		317	292330H	FM 1/7: Co D Sqd (-) combat patrol left for 556012.	S-M-F
0200		318	300200H	FM 1/7: A-2 returned neg contact	S-F
0345		319	300345H	FM 1/7: B-1 patrol returned -neg contact	S-F
0605		320	300605H	FM 1/7: B-2 patrol returned -sporadic sniper fire encountered. Will send out another Sqd (rein) patrol ASAP.	S-F
0815		321	300815H	FM 1/7: D-1 patrol returned -no contact	S-F
1000		322	301000H	FM 1/7: All company conducted patrols have reported back with only one patrol reporting sniper fire.	S-F
1500		323	301500H	FM 1/7: Have established OP at: OP#1 (BT 559996); OP#2 (BT 543013); OP#3 (BT 583027).	S-F
1645		324	301645H	FM 1/7: 1/7 BAS treated four wounded indigenous personnel, three from Tan Hy Hamlet, Binh Giang Village BT 620010, and one from Hai Minh Hamlet, Binh Ja Village. Injured persons evacuated to Quang Ngai and one to DaNang.	S-F

UNIT: RL7-7 S-3  
 OPENED: 302300H Aug 1965  
 CLOSED: 302400H Aug 1965

IN	OUT	SERNO	DTG	MESSAGE	ACTION
2300	325	302300H		FM 1/7: Co A (Sqd) patrol A-11 to 576033.	S-M-F
2315	326	302315H		FM 1/7: Co A (Plt) patrol A-12 to 577050.	S-M-F
2330	327	302330H		FM 1/7: Co A (Sqd) patrol A-13 to 570026 for layout patrol.	S-M-F
2345	328	302345H		FM 1/7: Co B Plt (-) patrol on combat patrol at 567018. Patrol B-1	S-M-F
2400	329	302400H		FM 1/7: Co B Sqd patrol B-2 on layout patrol at 572018.	S-M-F
0030	330	300030H		FM 1/7: Co B Plt patrol B-3 on layout patrol at 566022.	S-M-F
0100	331	300100H		FM 1/7: Co B Plt patrol B-4 on ambush patrol at 549003.	S-M-F
0645	332	300645H		FM 1/7: A-11 returned - no contact.	S-M-F
0730	333	300730H		FM 1/7: A-12 and A-13 returned neg contact	S-M-F
0845	334	300845H		FM 1/7: B-1 returned - neg contact.	S-F
0900	335	300900H		FM 1/7: Patrols B-2,3,4 returned - no contact.	S-F
1530	336	301530H		RL7-7: Briefing for Regimental Staff on Operation PIRANHA.	S-F
1845	337	301845H		FM 1/7: Co A patrol A-15 to 576035.	S-F
1930	338	301930H		FM 1/7: Co B Plt patrol B-1 to 560021.	S-F
2200	339	302200H		FM 1/7: Co B Sqd (-) patrol B-2 to 564018	S-F
2230	340	302230H		FM 1/7: Co B Plt (rein) patrol B-3 to 570013)	S-F
2300	341	302300H		FM 1/7: Co D Sqd (-) patrol D-1 to 555015 on ambush patrol.	S-M-F
2315	342	302315H		FM 1/7: Co D Plt (rein) patrol D-2 to 559015.	S-M-F
2400	343	312400H		FM 1/7: Co D Sqd patrol D-3 to 564020.	S-M-F

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 RLT-7  
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM  
 140800H Aug 1965

FRAG ORDER 1-65

Ref: (a) RLT-7 OpPlan 122-65  
 (b) Oral instructions ADC, 3rd MarDiv (Fwd), FME  
 (c) 3rd MarDiv OpOrder 321A-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Same as per reference (a) except following deletions:

- (1) 3d Bn, 9th Marines
- (2) Btry F, 2d Bn, 12th Mar
- (3) 2nd Plt, Co B, 1st Tank Bn
- (4) 2nd Plt, Co C, 1st AT Bn

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy forces. No change from ref (a).b. Friendly forces. No change from ref (a).c. Attachments and detachments.

- (1) BLT 3/9 is deactivated effective 140800H. Those units from BLT 3/9 not listed as deleted in above task organization will revert to RLT Headquarters.
- (2) BLT 1/7 is deactivated on arrival at the assigned staging area. All attached units less those in (3) below will revert to RLT Headquarters, but will remain in direct support of and under opcon CO, 1st Bn, 7th Marines.
- (3) The following units will chop to FLSU #1 on landing:
  - Co C (-)(Rein), 1st SP Bn
  - Co C (-)(Rein), 1st Med Bn
  - Co A (-)(Rein), 7th MT Bn

2. MISSION. RLT-7, composed of RLT Headquarters and BLT 1/7 will commence a covered landing at Chu Lai, South Vietnam on arrival to occupy positions in the southeastern portion of the enclave as per Annex 2 (Operation Overlay).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operations. RLT-7, supported by elements of FLSU #1 will effect a covered landing on the central portion of the beach and over an installed causeway at Chu Lai for the purpose of occupying a TAOR in the southeastern portion of the Chu Lai enclave.
- b. BLT 1/7. Execute covered landing and move to an assembly area vic coord BT 570033. Be prepared to assist in a general unloading of the RLT and on order, occupy positions now held by 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines (Rein).

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Guides will be furnished to assembly area by 3rd Bn, 3rd Marines (Rein).

- c. 3d Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Mar. Execute a covered landing over beaches as designated by elements of FLSU #1 and move to an area designated by the 3rd Bn, 11th Marines advance party representative.
- d. Co B (-) (Rein), 1st Tank Bn. Effect a covered landing over designated beaches and close on the RLT-7 CP.
- e. LSG, RLT-7. Execute a covered landing over designated beaches and chop to FLSU #1 on landing.
- f. Coordinating instructions.
  - (1) Landing beaches will be designated by Shore Party elements of FLSU #1.
  - (2) Rules of engagement.
    - (a) Rounds will not be inserted in the chambers of individual weapons unless an encounter with the enemy is obvious, and in the judgement of the senior Marine present, this measure must be taken to preserve the lives of USMC personnel.
    - (b) During the hours of darkness, the sequence of engagement will be:
      1. Challenge.
      2. If there is no response to the challenge or the response is incorrect the area will be illuminated.
      3. If the person challenged makes an overt attempt to avoid apprehension, opens fire, or commits any other hostile act, and thereby endangers the life of the challenger, a challenger may load and fire.
    - (c) Magazines will not be inserted in weapons in a camp area during daylight hours unless under attack.
  - (3) No supporting arms will be fired into any populated area except when the infantry commander on the ground personally determines that such action is necessary to save Marine lives, and that there is no alternative such a course of action.
  - (4) Every effort will be made to preserve intact religious, cultural, medical and public installations from damage and destruction by any weapon or supporting arms.
  - (5) Instructions for liaison officers and personnel both Marine and ARVN will be issued as available.
  - (6) Reports as per reference (a).

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- (7) Supporting arms information other than artillery, will be promulgated as it becomes available.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

##### a. Supply.

- (1) Supplies and equipment to be retained by units.

- (a) Class I - 3 days MCI w/fuel.  
- 3 days "B".

Class II - All embarked including batteries.

Class III - 30 days special oils and lubes.  
- 2 days MOGAS drummed.  
- 4 days diesel drummed.

Class IV - All on hand.

Class V - B/A.  
- 4 days 3.5's.  
- 4 days 81mm.  
- 4 days 106mm.  
- 10 days 105mm illuminating.  
- 4 days 155mm.

- (b) All supply stocks in excess of above will be turned in to FLSU #1.

- (c) All supplies and equipment embarked with the Logistics Support Group will be retained by that unit with the exception of E/G items belonging to RL7-7 units.

- (d) All units, including attachments, will provide representatives on the beach to identify and segregate supplies as they land.

- (e) Resupply - Source of all resupply for RL7-7 is the Force Logistics Support Group.

##### b. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- (1) Evacuation will be to Company "B" 3rd Medical Battalion located at Force Logistics Support Unit #1.

- (2) No further change.

c. TRANSPORTATION - No change.

d. SERVICE - No change.

e. PERSONNEL - No change.

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## f. MISCELLANEOUS

- (1) An information booth will be manned by Shore Party at the foot of the causeway on the beach.
- (2) Staging areas will be assigned each unit and attachment. Location of each staging area may be obtained at the information booth.
- (3) All supplies and equipment will be staged in assigned staging areas prior to the movement of these supplies to dumps or command post locations.
- (4) Units will provide security in their own staging area. Guides must also be provided for movement of supplies and equipment to command post or dump locations.
- (5) All dunnage will be removed from ships and staged in Company "C", 1st Engineer Battalion staging area.
- (6) First Battalion, Seventh Marines will make 200 men and 4 officers available on call for beach working parties.
- (7) Instruct all vehicle drivers to deflate tires in accordance with nomenclature plate prior to reaching the beach.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS

- a. (1) See reference (a).
- (2) Radio and switch board call signs have been furnished to advance party representatives.
- (3) Frequency assignments will be issued by the RLT-7 Communications Officer.
- b. Command Posts.
  - (1) RLT-7 coord BT 561048.
  - (2) BLT 1/7 and 3rd Bn (-)(Rein), 11th Marines report positions as soon as established.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL PEATROSS



NEIL M. HANSEN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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 Chu Lai, Vietnam  
 170700H Aug 1965  
 0043-65

Operation Order 323-65

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701 Sheets 6757 I & III  
 (b) 3dMarDiv Operational Order 321A-65  
 (c) 3dMarDiv Operational Order 327-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces: See Annex B (Intelligence)  
 b. Friendly Forces:

(1.) Air

- (a) MAG-12 supports RLT-7 with preparatory strikes prior to L-Hour and close air support and interdiction missions on call.  
 (b) MAG-16 provides helicopters for the helilift assault, retraction, emergency reaction and evacuation.

(2.) Artillery

- (a) Det (3 guns) Btry K (SP), 4thBn, 12th Marines provides general support fires to RLT-7.  
 (b) Det (3 guns) 1st 155 Gun Btry (SP) FMF provides general support fires to RLT-7.  
 (c) 107mm Howtar Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Marines provides support as follows: 1st Plt, 107 Howtar Btry, direct support of BLT 2/4; 2nd Plt, 107 Howtar Btry, direct support of BLT 3/3

- (3.) Naval Gunfire. DD-886 USS ORLECK provides direct support fires to BLT 3/3.

2. MISSION. RLT-7 executes a combined amphibious and helicopterborne attack in the Vau Tuong Village Complex area vicinity (BS7095) to conduct a search and destroy operation against the Viet Cong.

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3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of execution.

At H-Hour on D-Day RLT-7 executes a search and clear operation in the Van Tuong Village Complex area. One company of BLT 3/3 moves overland and occupies blocking position vicinity (BS 682970) at H-30. BLT 3/3 (-) lands at Green Beach at H-Hour and BLT 2/4, supported by air, lands by helicopter in landing zones Red, White, and Blue commencing at L-Hour. (See Annex C, Concept of Operations). After effecting a juncture, the RLT then sweeps to the northeast, supported by artillery, air and naval gunfire. Upon reaching the coast, the entire RLT moves into a defensive perimeter until daylight of D+1, when elements of supporting artillery, the blocking company of BLT 3/3, and BLT 2/4 (-) are retracted by helicopter. BLT 3/3 (-) and tracked vehicles of BLT 2/4 return by the same route to Green Beach and back loads aboard assigned shipping. BLT 3/7 arrives on station at 181300H to constitute a RLT reserve and execute reaction operations if necessary.

b. BLT 3/3

- (1) Place one company in a blocking position vicinity (BS 682970) by H-30.
- (2) Execute an amphibious landing over Green Beach at H-Hour on D-Day and effect a juncture with BLT 2/4 at BLT boundary. After effecting the juncture, execute a search and destroy mission to the northeast in the assigned zone of action. (See Annex C, Operation Overlay).
- (3) Upon reaching the coast, be prepared to move into an RLT defensive perimeter until D+1.
- (4) On D+1 be prepared to return minus one company by the same general route with BLT 2/4 tracked vehicles attached to Green Beach and backload onto assigned shipping.

c. BLT 2/4

- (1) Execute a helicopterborne landing on landing zones Blue and White at L-Hour and at L+25 in landing zone Red on D-Day. After BLT 3/3 has effected a juncture, on order conduct a search and destroy mission to the northeast in the assigned zone of action (See Annex C, Operations Overlan).

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- (2) Upon reaching the coast, be prepared to move into an RLT defensive perimeter until D+1.
- (3) At daylight on D+1, be prepared to execute a helicopter retraction after the 107mm Howtar Btry, 3dBn, 12thMar and one company of BLT 3/3 have been retracted.

d. 3dBn(-) (Rein), 12th Marines

- (1) Execute a helicopter lift of the 107mm Howtar Btry, 3dBn, 12th Marines into LZ Yellow at L+50 on D-Day. (See Annex C, Operations Overlay)
- (2) Provide on call general support fires to RLT-7 in the zone of action throughout the operation.

e. RLT Reserve

(1) BLT 3/7

- (a) On arrival on station, BLT 3/7 is designated RLT Reserve.
- (b) Prepare plans to execute reaction force operations in support of this order.

f. Coordinating instructions

- (1) D-Day 18 August 1965
- (2) H-Hour 0630
- (3) L-Hour 0645
- (4) Junction force commander: CO, BLT 2/4.
- (5) FSCC procedures as per ref (a) and Annex A (Fire Support Coordinating instructions).
- (6) Restricted targets Annex A (Fire Support Coordinating Instructions).
- (7) Artillery - Annex E (Artillery)
- (8) Naval Gunfire - Annex F (Naval Gunfire).
- (9) Air support and preparatory missions - Annex G (Air Support).

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- (10) Reports - see reference (b)
- (11) Distribution - see Annex Z (Distribution)
- (12) This order is effective immediately.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. See Admin Plan 323-65

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. Communications - Electronics. See Annex H (Communications - Electronics)
- b. Command Posts
  - (1) Afloat - LSD 16
  - (2) Ashore - to be announced.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

*O. F. Peatross*

O. F. PEATROSS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organizations
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operations Overlay
- D - FSC
- E - Artillery
- F - Naval Gunfire
- G - Air
- H - Communications - Electronics
- I-Y Not used
- Z - Distribution

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 170700H Aug 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 323-65

Time Zone: H

RLT-7

Col PEATROSS

Det, Hq Co, 7th Marines  
 Co B (-) (Rein), 1st Tank Bn  
 Det, 3d Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Marines  
 Det, Co A, 3d Amtrac Bn

BLT 2/4

Lt Col FISHER

2d Bn, 4th Marines  
 2d Plt, Co C, 3d Tank Bn  
 2d Plt, Co B, 3d Engr Bn  
 Det, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

BLT 3/3

Lt Col MUIR

3d Bn, 3d Marines  
 3d Plat, Co A, 3d Tank Bn  
 3d Plat, Co B, 3d AT Bn  
 3d Plat (Rein), Co A, 1st Amtrac Bn  
 3d Plat, Co B, 3d Engr Bn  
 Det, 3d Bn, 12th Marines  
 Det, 1st Bn, 12th Marines  
 Det, ITT

BLT 3/7

Lt Col BODLEY

3d Bn, 7th Marines  
 Btry I, 3d Bn, 11th Marines  
 107mm Mort Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Marines  
 3d Plat, Co C, 1st AT Bn  
 3d Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 2d Plat, Co A, 7th MT Bn  
 3d Plat, Co C, 1st Recon Bn  
 3d Plat, Co B, 1st Tank Bn  
 3d Plat, Co A, 3d Amtrac Bn  
 Det, Hq Co, 7th Marines  
 Det, 3d Dental Co, FMF  
 Det, 1st FSR  
 Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 Det, BMU 1  
 Det, Coll Plat, Co C, 1st Med Bn  
 Det, 1st Force Recon Co, FMF

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BY COMMAND OF COLONEL PEATROSS

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Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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E. N. SNYDER  
Major, U. S. Marine Corps  
S-3

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 HEADQUARTERS, RL7-7  
 CHU LAI, South Vietnam  
 0800 17 August 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 323-65

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701; scale 1:50,000; sheets 6757 II and III, 6756 I  
 (b) 3d MarDiv O P3800-1E

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Appendix 1 (Enemy Overlay)
- b. Current intelligence reports and ISUMS.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Will the enemy defend the helicopter landing zones? If so, in what strength and from what position?
- b. Will the enemy defend the landing beaches? If so, in what strength? What type weapons and from what positions?
- c. Will the enemy attack friendly forces while landing in the helicopter landing zones and over the beach? If so, in what strength and at what time during the landing?
- d. Will the entire population in the areas of operation be hostile to our forces? If so, in what manner will this hostility manifest itself?
- e. Will the enemy attempt to reinforce their units in the area? If so, in what strength and from where?
- f. Will the enemy attempt to counterattack our forces while we are withdrawing from the area? If so, in what strength and when?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. Orders to subordinate units.

- (1) Signal Corps. Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and observation missions on order.
- (2) Artillery. Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and observation missions on order.
- (3) Tactical Air Observers.
  - (a) Conduct aerial observation as directed.

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(b) Be prepared to observe area outside of immediate area of operations to observe movements of possible reinforcements.

(4) All Units.

- (a) Observe and report acts of a suspicious nature not of overt hostility.
- (b) Thoroughly search out assigned areas of responsibility for hidden supply and arms caches.

b. Request to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

- (1) 3d Marine Division furnish current and predicted weather for period of operations.
- (2) 3d Marine Division provide aerial photo coverage of area of operations as requested.
- (3) 3d Marine Division provide Tactical Aerial Observers as requested.
- (4) 3d Marine Division provide current information on current location of possible enemy reinforcements and movement into the area of operations once the operation has commenced.

c. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Only those persons showing open and active hostility to our forces will be apprehended and evacuated.
- (2) Requests for AO support will be to this headquarters.
- (3) Count of enemy dead will be verified by physically sighting the dead body.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIALS.

a. Prisoners.

- (1) Reference (b) applies.
- (2) MFL personnel with each battalion will initially screen all captives at battalion level.
- (3) Captives will be evacuated from battalion collection points via helicopter direct to the regimental collection point at coordinates BT 581046.
- (4) All captives will be tagged showing the date, place, time and circumstances of capture prior to evacuation to the regimental collection point.

b. Captured documents.

- (1) Documents found on prisoners will be tagged, identified with and evacuated with the prisoners.
- (2) Other documents will be tagged showing time, date, place and circumstances of capture, and evacuated to the regimental POW collection point.
- c. Captured material. Small arms, machine guns, and other weapons and material that can be transported via helicopter will be evacuated to the regimental POW collection point. Other weapons and material too heavy for helicopter evacuation will be evacuated via ship upon withdrawing from the area of operations.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

a. Maps.

- (1) Reference (a) applies.
- (2) Battalions will utilize their own maps in-so-far as possible. Requests for additional map support will be made to this headquarters as required.

b. Photographs. Photographs will be distributed as available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Reference (b) applies.

b. Password and countersign.

(1) Primary

<u>Date</u>	<u>Password</u>	<u>Countersign</u>
18	SET	PAPER
19	SCOTT	GENDER

(2) Alternate

<u>Date</u>	<u>Password</u>	<u>Countersign</u>
18	MORE	WINTER
19	TAIL	LITTLE

c. Counterintelligence personnel will operate from the regimental POW collection point.

7. REPORTS AND DOCUMENTATION.

a. Units will continue to submit ISUMs in accordance with existing instructions and practice with copy to this headquarters.

b. Spot intelligence reports will be followed up with an amplifying report.

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G. T. PRATHERS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

APPENDIXES.

- 1 - Enemy situation overlay.
- 2 - Intelligence Estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 323-65

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*G. H. Gentry Jr.*  
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From: Commanding General  
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam, ATTN: J321,  
APO, U. S. Forces 96243  
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report.  
Ref: (a) MACV Directive No. 335-8 dtd 1Jul65  
Encl: ✓(1) After Action Report, Operation Starlite  
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

D. W. SHERMAN  
Chief of Staff

RTR  
After Op. Starlite

Declassified by the Director of Marine Corps  
History and Museums in accordance with the  
provisions of DMO Itr Op-249D323 Joy. Ser:  
10770 2042 of 12 October 1971.

R. B. Coffey 5/13/76  
Signature/Date

OCT 14 1965

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Encl (8-#2)

17-240  
10/15/65

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UNCLASSIFIED RLT-7 AFTER ACTION REPORT (OPERATION STARLITE)

- Encl: ✓(1) Concept of Operation Overlay  
 ✓(2) D-Day Operations Ashore Overlay  
 ✓(3) D+1 Operations Ashore Overlay  
 ✓(4) D+2 Disposition of Units Overlay  
 ✓(5) D+3 Disposition of Units Overlay  
 ✓(6) D+4 Disposition of Units Overlay  
 ✓(7) D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay  
 ✓(8) Route of March 1st Bn, 7th Marines Overlay

1. Name of Operation. Operation Starlite. A search and clear operation in the VAN TUONG Village Complex.

2. Date of Operation. 171000H to 242100H August 1965.

3. Location. VAN TUONG Village Complex; BINH SON District; QUANG NGAI Province South of the CHU LAI Enclave in the vicinity of North of E-W Grid Line (BS 92), East of the N-S Grid Line (BS 67) and South of E-W Grid Line (BS 98).

4. Command Headquarters. Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

5. Reporting Officer. Colonel O. F. PEATROSS, Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

6. Task Organization.

a. Marine Corps Ground Units.

(1) RLT-7 consisting of:

HqCo, 7th Marines

Det, Co B (Rein), 1st Tank Bn

Det, 3d Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Marines

Det, Co A, 3d AT Bn

107mm Mortar Btry, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

Det, Hq Bn, 3d Marine Division

Det, Co A, 3d Amphrac Bn

(2) BLT 2/4

H&S Co, 2d Bn, 4th Marines

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Co's E, G, H

2d Plt, Co C, 3d Tank Bn

2d Plt, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

Plt MP Co, 3d Marine Division

## (3) BLT 3/3

H&amp;S Co, 3d Bn, 3d Marines

Co's I, K, L, M

3d Plt, Co A, 3d Tank Bn

Plt, Co B, 3d AT Bn

3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Amphtrac Bn

3d Plt, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

Det, 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Det, III, 4th Marines

## (4) BLT 3/7

H&amp;S Co, 3d Bn, 7th Marines

Co's L, M, I

Btry I, 3d Bn, 11th Marines

107mm Mortar Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Marines

3d Plt, Co Co, 1st AT Bn

3d Plt, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

2d Plt, Co A, 7th MT Bn

3d Plt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

3d Plt, Co B, 1st Tank Bn

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UNCLASSIFIED 3d Plt, Co A, 3d AmTrac Bn

Det, 1st FSR

Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Det, BMU-1

Det, Co C, 1st Med Bn

Det, 1st Force Recon Co

7. Supporting Forces.

a. Following Units supported assault.

(1) Marine Air

MAG-11

VMFA-513

VMFA-542

MAG-12

VMFA-311

VMA-225

VMA-214

MAG-16

HMM-361

HMM-261

VMO-2

HMM-161

SLF

HMM-163

VMCJ-1

(2) Marine Ground Units supporting the operation from within the  
CHU LAI Enclave.

3d 155 Gun Btry (SP), FMF

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Plt Btry K, 155 How (SP) Btry, 4th Bn, 12th Marines

FLSU #1

## (3) Army Aviation Units.

7th Airlift Plt, I Corps Avn Co (Prov) with UH1B

220th Aviation Co with OLF

## (4) Naval Gunfire.

USS GALVESTON CLG 3

USS ORLECK DD 886

USS PRITCHETT DD 561

## (5) Air Force Units.

311 Air Commando Squad (Flaership)

## (6) ARVN.

I Corps Interrogation Teams

b. Following units joined during mop-up operations beginning 200800H.

## (1) Marine Corps.

Co K, 3d Bn, 7th Marines

BLT 1/7

H&amp;S Co, 1st Bn, 7th Marines

Co's A, B, C, D

Det, Hq Bn, 3d Marine Division

Co C (-) (Rein), 1st Engr Bn

## (2) ARVN Units.

3d VN Marine Bn

2d Bn, 51st Regt

Det, 3d Arm Pers Carrier Troop

Co, 3d Bn, 5th Regt, 2d Division

1st Infantry Scout Dog Plt, I Corps

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21st Arty Bn, 2d Division

c. Additional Marine units engaged in support of both assault and mop-up.

MACS-9

VMGR-152

Det, VMGR-352

ASRT (System-11)

HDC/DASC from MASS-2

d. U. S. Navy Amphibious Group, Initial Assault

USS BAYFIELD APA 33

USS CABILDO LSD 16

USS VERNON COUNTY LST 1161

LCU 1482

LCU 1493

e. U. S. Navy in SLF.

USS IWO JIMA LPH-2

USS POINT DEFIANCE LSD 31

USS TALLADEGA APA 208

f. ARVN units blocking West of Highway One during operation.

PF units of BINH SON District, 698th RF Co

g. Task Forces.

TF 76

TF 78

TG 78.5

TG 76.0

TU 75.0.1

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TG 76.2

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TG 76.5

## h. Employment of Supporting Arms.

(1) Artillery.

(a) Artillery consisted of the 107mm Mortar Battery, 3d Bn, 12th Marines, helilifted into a position vic (BS 682973) and Battery K (SP), 4th Bn, 12th Marines, located in an advanced position vic (BT 605018). Additional batteries providing fire from their firing positions within the CHU LAI enclave included Battery C, 1st Bn, 12th Marines, Battery M, 4th Bn, 11th Marines, the 3d 155 Gun Battery (SP), FMF, and the 1st platoon, 3d 8" Howitzer Battery (SP), FMF. The 3d Bn, 12th Marines controlled all artillery fires through an advanced FDC located in the vicinity of Battery K. The 107mm Mortar Battery made one displacement on 20 August 1965 to a firing position within the RLT-7 CP perimeter, vicinity (BS 705928). This displacement was necessary to support continued operations to the south and provide cover for the eventual retraction of units over the beach. Artillery was available throughout the operation.

## (b) Artillery fired 192 missions as follows:

<u>1.</u> <u>Adjusted missions.</u>	58
<u>a.</u> Troops entrenched	8
<u>b.</u> Troops in open	10
<u>c.</u> Built up areas	7
<u>d.</u> Fortification	5
<u>e.</u> Weapons and Equipment	8
<u>f.</u> Suspected VC	20
<u>2.</u> Preparations	14
<u>3.</u> Harrassing and Interdiction	84
<u>4.</u> Marking concentrations	36

(c) Total number of rounds fired were 3,040, broken down by Battery as follows:

<u>1.</u> 107mm Mortar Battery, 3/12	757
<u>2.</u> Battery C, 3/12	176
<u>3.</u> Battery K, 4/12	1,719

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- |                         |     |
|-------------------------|-----|
| 4. Battery M, 4/11      | 190 |
| 5. 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP) | 179 |
| 6. Plt, 1st 8" How Btry | 19  |

(d) A summary of observed enemy casualties is as follows:

- |           |     |
|-----------|-----|
| 1. VC KIA | 116 |
| 2. VC WIA | 15  |

(2) Air.

(a) Air support for STARLITE began with landing zone preparation by A4-C's and E's, and F4B aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing from 0615 to 0730. Sixteen sorties delivered 13.5 tons of bombs, four tons of napalm and 1,600 rounds of 20mm in the vicinity of the landing zones prior to L-hour. Fixed wing support was provided throughout the day with seventy-eight sorties, and upon occasion strikes were called within fifty yards of friendly positions. Three Army UH1B armored helicopters also provided additional air cover on D-day. More than 500 helicopter sorties were flown in D-day support as 800 passengers and twenty tons of cargo were landed.

(b) Fixed wing cover was continuous throughout the operation from 17 August to 241200 August when the operation secured. Day and night F4B or A4 aircraft were on a constant airborne alert status, with fifteen and thirty minute strip alerts provided as a backup.

(c) On 20 August, Army AO-01F Mohawks began to provide infra-red coverage of the operation area during the hours of darkness, thus augmenting the VMO reconnaissance capability and providing twenty-four hour battlefield surveillance.

(3) Naval Gunfire.

(a) Naval gunfire support for Operation STARLITE was provided by one light cruiser (CLG) and two destroyers (DD). All ships remained on station throughout the operation. Two shore fire control parties were employed during the operation. The USS GALVESTON (CLG-3) was initially assigned in direct support of BLT 3/7 and the USS ORLECK (DD-886) provided support for BLT 3/3 and 1/7 after the former's relief. The USS PRICHETT (DD-561) was also available for direct support of either battalion. Ship assignments for units were changed daily to equalize ammunition consumption and to destroy or neutralize targets requiring the USS GALVESTON's 6"/47 battery.

(b) Fire support ship stations were also changed continuously throughout the operation to meet a variety of situations in relation to troop movements, target locations, and terrain features. Providing optimum gun target lines and occasional relief for re-arming and refueling were primary considerations and both were accomplished with minimum difficulty. At first

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light on the 19th, the USS GALVESTON and the USS ORLECK had expended nearly their entire allowances of illumination projectiles. This resulted from the necessity of providing continuous illumination in the area of the disabled LVT's. The USS ORLECK also discouraged VC attempts to escape by sea, by reporting the action of five sampans and damaging two. All fires were delivered in an accurate, timely and effective manner for both close and deep support missions. Total naval gunfire ammunition expended on this operation is as follows:

1. 6"/47 High Capacity	563
2. 5"/38 AAC	446
3. Illumination	471
4. WP	82
Total rounds	1,562

8. Intelligence. Intelligence preceding Operation STARLITE indicated that a large Viet Cong force in the VAN TUONG Village complex was preparing to attack the CHU LAI enclave. From prior intelligence, this force was believed to include the First VC Regiment (Main Force) and a company from the 52d Battalion (local force). The 1st VC Regiment is composed of the 60th, 80th and 90th Battalions, however the 80th Battalion had not been confirmed as being in the area. The 40th and 45th Battalions were also believed to be in the area, as well as an unidentified heavy weapons company. The capabilities of this force, particularly when augmented by the heavy weapons company, were such a great and impending threat to the CHU LAI enclave that the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), directed that a combined amphibious and helicopter-borne attack be executed immediately in the VAN TUONG Village Complex to conduct a search and destroy operation against the Viet Cong.

9. Mission. To destroy Viet Cong Forces in the VAN TUONG Village Complex.

10. Concept of Operation.

a. To land by helicopter and/or amphibious means to block, fix and destroy Viet Cong forces in the area. Upon completion of this mission, re-tract by helicopter and/or amphibious means. Minimum prep fires will be conducted to protect the element of surprise. Operations will be conducted in three phases: (See enclosure (1) Concept of Operation Overlay to Operation STARLITE.)

- (1) Phase I - Initial Assaults.
- (2) Phase II - Operations Ashore.
- (3) Phase III - Retraction.

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11. Execution.

a. RLT-7, consisting of BLT's 3/3, 2/4, with 3/7 available as a reserve afloat, and RLT-7 Headquarters, was activated and assigned the mission. On the evening of 16 August 1965 the participating units were alerted to Operation STARLITE. BLT 3/7, afloat as the Special Landing Force (SLF), was alerted by message to rendezvous in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and assume the mission as RLT Reserve. Since RLT-7 Headquarters had landed administratively in Viet Nam only two days before, the facilities of the 4th Marines Headquarters were utilized for planning. The battalion and regimental staffs assembled with supporting arms representatives and on the morning of the 17th, the operation, administrative and embarkation orders were completed and distributed.

b. The operation commenced on D-1 at 171000H when M/3/3 departed the CHU LAI area by LVT for subsequent overland foot march to occupy a blocking position in the northern sector of the Amphibious Objective Area prior to H-hour and D-day at (BS 683971). At 171400H, RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 3/3 commenced embarking aboard the following ships:

- (1) USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) - RLT-7 Headquarters
- (2) USS CABILDO (LSD-16) - BLT 3/3
- (3) USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1169) - BLT 3/3

c. At 180600H, HMM-261, 361 and BLT 2/4, less Company F, which remained in position on the CHU LAI perimeter, were staged at the CHU LAI Airstrip. Prior to H-hour, two of the following fire support ships (FSS) arrived in the AOA and took station.

- (1) USS GALVESTON (CLG-6)
- (2) USS ORLECK (DD-886)
- (3) The USS PRICHARD (DD-531) arrived on D+1.

d. On the morning of D-day, at H-hour (190630), attack aircraft from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (FMAW) commenced preparation of landing zones RED, WHITE and BLUE while Companies I and K of BLT 3/3 landed abreast at GREEN Beach. (See enclosure (1) for the Concept of Operations Overlay.)

e. BLT 2/4 commenced landing as follows:

- |               |                          |
|---------------|--------------------------|
| (1) 1st Wave: | LZ BLUE at L-hour (H+15) |
| (2) 2d Wave:  | LZ WHITE at L+25         |
| (3) 3d Wave:  | LZ RED at L+50           |
| (4) 4th Wave: | LZ WHITE at L+60         |

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f. The original plan was to land as follows:

- (1) Company E in LZ WHITE at L-hour.
- (2) Company H in LZ BLUE at L-hour.
- (3) Company G in LZ RED at L+25.

g. The original plan was based on a helicopter availability of 40 UH-34's but alterations as shown above were necessary due to only 26 helicopters being available.

h. The command and control elements of the RLT-7 Headquarters landed at GREEN Beach at 180730H. By 1200 the CP was established at (BS 706925), and before the end of the day, housed not only the command post but the logistic support and resupply complex for the operation. (See enclosure (2), D-day Operations Ashore Overlay.) Additionally I/3/3 (in the adjacent Zone of Action on the right) encountered heavy fire from AN CUONG (2) and requested and received permission to cross over into the BLT 2/4 Zone of Action to secure the village. In the trace of these two incidents involving heavy casualties, five LVT's carrying supplies from the RLT-7 CP complex to BLT 3/3 were ambushed at 181255H in the vicinity of (BS 698932).

i. The five LVT's were accompanied by two flame tanks requested by the CO of BLT 3/3 for use by I/3/3. One of the flame tanks returned to the Regimental CP complex which was only a few hundred meters away, and reported the ambush.

j. A relief force, consisting of elements of BLT 3/3 rear CP, five LVT's, five Ontos and one gun tank set out to relieve the halted column, but encountered heavy fire prior to reaching their objective. One LVT was disabled and the gun tank did not fire because of friendly troops in the target area. This relief force, under the Executive Officer of BLT 3/3, was located in the RLT-7 CP complex. The XO of BLT 3/3 was directed to take I/3/3 to relieve the LVT column. This new relief force started at 181305, but became engaged in a heavy fire fight at (BS 703927) at 181400. The enemy's heavy weapons (3.5" RL, 57mm RR, and 81mm Mortars) firing across the open ground prevented I/3/3 from locating the relieving column, but it did locate the 3d Platoon of H/2/4 nearby.

k. These attacks resulted in the RLT Commander temporarily halting the attack and requesting the landing of BLT 3/7.

l. At 181600H, L/3/7 landed at (BS 708927) and was assigned the operational control of BLT 3/3. Reinforced with two tanks, L/3/7 was assigned the mission to juncture with I/3/3 at (BS 700930). Before effecting juncture with I/3/3, L/3/7 became engaged in a heavy fire fight at 181845H (BS 702926) in an attempt to cross the open ground. This situation prevented L/3/7 from reaching I/3/3. In this action L/3/7 received 4 KIA and 14 WIA. Although

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junction was not effected with I/3/3, L/3/7 located the LVT's and flame tank but could not advance to them. However, L/3/7 relieved sufficient pressure from I/3/3 to enable it to break contact. Since it was well after dark, L/3/7 was directed to move to the 3/3 CP and arrived at 190130H. I/3/3, and the 2d Platoon of H/2/4 returned to the RLT-7 CP complex, arriving at 190500H, and were assigned the mission to provide security for the Regimental CP complex and GREEN Beach respectively. I/3/7, which had been heli-lifted to the RLT-7 CP complex at dusk on the 18th to provide security was relieved of the security mission. At 190025H, M/3/7 landed at GREEN Beach.

m. On the morning of 19 August, BLT 3/3 resumed the attack to the northeast at 0700, and BLT 2/4, less H/2/4, attacked at 0800. At 0900, BLT 3/7 (-) composed of Companies I and M, attacked to the northwest near the center of RLT-7's Zone of Action and secured the area of the LVT/flame tank column. All personnel present were brought out and plans were executed to evacuate the LVT's and tanks. During the afternoon both BLT's 2/4 and 3/3 reached the coast. During this time escape by the VC to seaward had been blocked by the fire support ships. (See enclosure (3), D+1 Operations Ashore Overlay.)

n. On 20 August, BLT 2/4 was heli-lifted back into its normal position in the CHU LAI Enclave. The return trip of the helicopters from the CHU LAI Enclave was utilized to lift BLT 1/7 into the BLT 3/3 area at (BS 717942). BLT 1/7 relieved BLT 3/3, and BLT 3/3 was retracted by surface craft from GREEN Beach. (Upon retraction of BLT 3/3, L/3/7 was returned to BLT 3/7 control.) Companies A, B, D, the Battalion Command Group and 50% of Company C were heli-lifted into the area vic (BS 717942). The remainder of Company C was heli-lifted to the Regimental CP complex. The balance of the company moved over land close to the CP at 202100H. C/1/7 was to provide security not only for the logistics installations, helicopter landing zone and command post contained in the RLT-7 complex, but also security for GREEN Beach. Prior to completion of the heli-lifts, TAORs were assigned and both BLT 1/7 and 3/7 were assigned the mission to conduct search and clear operations within their TAORs to confirm the VC KIA count, collect any material of intelligence value and to eliminate VC resistance that might remain in the area. (See enclosure (4), D+2 Disposition of Units.)

o. On 21 August (D+3), BLT's 1/7 and 3/7, in execution of their missions, conducted battalion size search and clear missions. During the course of these operations, engineers were employed to destroy many of the caves, tunnels and fighting positions in the area. BLT 3/7 conducted its operations in the hamlet complex of AN THOI (1) and NAM YEN (3). Companies moved out on foot except for L/3/7 which was heli-lifted. M/3/7 received sporadic small arms fire, which was BLT 3/7's only contact with the VC. BLT 1/7 concentrated their efforts in the hamlet complex of VAN TUONG. A/3/7 moved out on foot to search and clear VAN TUONG (2), and D/1/7 to search and clear VAN TUONG (5). On the way to its objective, D/1/7 encountered sniper fire from vic (BS 715912) but received no casualties. None of the companies encountered organized resistance.

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p. At 211800H, M/3/7 relieved C/1/7 as security for the RLT-7 CP complex and GREEN Beach. (See enclosure (5) for the D+3 Disposition of Units Overlay)

q. On 22 August, BLT 3/7 received a new mission to conduct a reconnaissance in force to determine the presence of organized VC and to destroy any VC encountered in line of hills from (BS 690905) to (BS 690870). To further support this mission K/3/7, the last unit of the landing force to come ashore, was landed from the SLF at 220630H. All companies moved out on foot in an approach march, I/3/7 on the right, L/3/7 on the left, with K/3/7 in reserve following in trace to (BS 690870), where BLT 3/7 established defensive positions for the night.

r. BLT 1/7 continued its operation in the VAN TUONG complex. All companies reported receiving sniper fire. B/1/7 fired on 3 VC at (BS 707937). One VC was wounded and evacuated to Company B, 3d Medical Bn. A/1/7 killed a VC at (BS 703937) while conducting its search and clear operation of VAN TUONG (3). (See enclosure (6) for the D+4 Disposition of Units Overlay.)

s. On D+5, 23 August, BLT 1/7 was alerted to conduct, on the 24th of August a reconnaissance in force across the TRUNG PHAN Peninsula. At 231200H, BLT 1/7 commenced moving all equipment that was not desired for the overland movement to GREEN Beach for subsequent embarkation and movement by ship. In continuing its search and clear operations, BLT 1/7 reported the search of VAN TUONG (4) had been completed. B/1/7 made contact with an unknown number of VC in caves (BS 698955) and three VCS were captured. At 231600H, BLT 1/7 secured their search and clear operations, commenced movement of all other remaining equipment to GREEN Beach and prepared for its new mission.

t. By 231800H RLT-7 Headquarters displaced from (BS 725928) to GREEN Beach and subsequently to the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) by LVT's. Supporting arms representatives and the Regimental Communications Officer, in conjunction with the section of Amphibious Squadron 7 activated the Supporting Arms Control Center (SACC). (See enclosure (7) for the D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay.)

u. On 23, and the morning of 24 August, BLT 3/7 conducted search and clear operations in the previously mentioned line of hills. This operation was conducted by a series of ground sweeps supported by blocking companies which were heli-lifted into position 500 to 1,500 meters in advance of the sweeping companies. During the course of the sweep of this hill mass, over 80 VC were captured and 13 VC were killed in action. Numerous fortifications and training sites were destroyed, as well as VC equipment. At 241400H, BLT 3/7 was directed to cease search and clear operations and to return to GREEN Beach to reembark prior to dark. The last elements of BLT 3/7 were embarked by 241900H and the BLT resumed its mission as SLF.

v. On the morning of 24 August, BLT 1/7 began the overland march through the TRUNG PHAN Peninsula to destroy any enemy encountered. (See enclosure (8), Route of March of BLT 1/7.) During the march, the fire support ships

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maintained station advancing at sea parallel to the advancing column to support the BLT with Naval Gun fire if necessary. Maintaining progress with the BLT ashore were two LCU's preloaded with tanks, to be landed if heavy enemy resistance was encountered. The USS BAYFIELD, with its SACC in full operation also sailed parallel to the advance of BLT 1/7. While on the march, BLT 1/7 was supported by helicopters that delivered water and rations, as well as evacuating heat casualties. At 241700H, BLT 1/7 reached its pickup point (BT 630021) near the mouth of the SONG TRA BONG and embarked aboard LVT's. Movement of the LVT's from CHU LAI was coordinated so as to arrive at the beach near the SONG TRA BONG with the arrival of the BLT. Upon return to its area in the CHU LAI Enclave, BLT 1/7 assumed the positions of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in the TAOR.

w. Operation STARLITE was completed when the last elements of RLT-7 Headquarters landed at CHU LAI at 241100H.

## 12. Results.

a. <u>LOSSES.</u>	<u>USMC/USN</u>	<u>VC</u>
	KIA - 45	KIA - 688
	DOW - 6	WIA - 263 (Estimated)
	WIA - 204	VCC - 9
		VCS - 25
		WEAPONS - 109

## 13. Administrative Matters.

### a. Supply.

(1) Comment. Supplies and equipment were ordered, issued and stock-piled for a planned operation of 24-48 hours. A safety factor of two days extra supplies were loaded as Landing Force Supplies. Additional supplies and equipment were ordered from the Force Logistics Support Unit (FLSU) at CHU LAI on a daily basis for the detailed search of the area.

### (a) Methods of Supply.

1. Resupply of BLT 3/3, the surface lifted BLT, was from the primary control ship (PCS) by means of helicopters and amphibian tractors. The heli-lifted battalion, BLT 2/4, was resupplied by helicopters from the battalion rear at CHU LAI. Supply from the PCS, wherein the TAC-LOG was embarked, worked smoothly and efficiently.

2. When the operation was extended, the PCS than became the primary source of supply for both ELTs. Helicopters would have been a feasible method of supply had the operation lasted the planned 24-48 hours. The extension of the operation and the associated shortage of helicopters necessitated the establishment of an RLT supply dump in the RLT-7 CP complex for all units. This dump maintained a two day supply of MCI rations, Class V and as

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much water as could be stored. The BLTs were supplied rapidly from this dump by helicopters and LVTs.

(b) Operation of the TAC-LOG. The USS CABILDO (LSD-16) (PCS) was the source of resupply where helicopters could land on the superdeck and LVTs could swim aboard for supplies. This method of resupply proved to be extremely efficient, and less time was lost than when landing supplies by small boat, despite the slower speed of the LVTs. The LVTs were moved inland to the RLT supply dump and frequently directly to the user.

(2) Recommendation.

(a) That if the situation permits, embark landing force supplies on the PCS.

(b) That the PCS be assigned as LVT haven.

(c) That an LSD with a superdeck be utilized as PCS, and that its helo platform not be used for landing force supplies and equipment.

(3) Comment. The resupply of water proved to be the largest logistics problem encountered. Units normally hold enough water cans to carry two gallons of water per man per day. This is inadequate in this climate on fast moving operations. Some water was resupplied by helicopter, but the bulk of it was resupplied by LVT.

(4) Recommendation. That the various methods of transporting water (i.e. M-107 Trailer in LVT; inflatable water container in LVT; organic transportation; etc.) be explored in the planning phase and that several alternatives be available in the final plan draft.

b. Maintenance.

(1) Problem. Due to the planned short duration of the operation, no maintenance services were provided for, and all material casualties had to be evacuated to the PCS.

(2) Recommendation. Planning phase should include the various methods of providing repairs/replacements of major items of equipment (maintenance floats; repair teams; what level; location; etc.).

c. Medical Evacuation.

(1) Comment. Plans were made to evacuate all minor casualties to the battalion aid station (BAS) and all major casualties to Company B, 3d Medical Battalion, which has a complete surgical team. When the LPH arrived on station off the landing beach, serious casualties were to be evacuated to the LPH. When the action was at its greatest, there was a casualty overload at Company B because casualties were occurring rapidly.

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(2) Recommendation. All personnel (including helicopter crew chief, small boat coxwains, corpsmen, small unit leaders, etc.) should be briefed on the procedures and methods of medical evacuation. WIA's must be moved to relatively secure areas for heli-evacuation. Plans should include alternate medical facilities, if available, to process the overload of casualties.

d. Transportation.

(1) Problem. Initially no organic transportation was taken on the operation. Reliance was placed on LVTs and helicopters. When the last BLT entered the operation, wheeled vehicles were brought in. They were of negative value because of poor trafficability.

e. Communications.

(1) Comment. The basic reference (Div Op Order 321A-65) was not distributed to all participating ships, aircraft and ground units. Communications personnel were obliged to improvise after execution commenced.

(2) Recommendation. All Naval, Air Force and Army units hold JANAP 119 and 195. These publications should be the guide for unit call signs and frequencies/designators.

(3) Comment. The LVTP-5 command tractor does not have the capability to net with single side band equipment.


(4) Recommendation. Install a single side band radio capable of netting with the AN/PRC-47.

14. None.

15. None.

16. None.

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


Maps: AMD L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Enclosure (1) Concept of Operation Overlay to RLif-7 After Action Report L-65.  
(Operation STARLITE)

Time Zone: Hotel

ENCLOSURE (1)



Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: Hotel


Enclosure (2) D-Day Operation Ashore Overlay to  
RLT-7 After action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (2)

~~W/2/4~~ retracted by 201230

~~Cnd Grp/2/4~~ retracted by 201530

~~/2/4~~ retracted by 201700




Maps: A MS 1701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757, III, II

Title Zone : Hotel

Enclosure(5) D-1 Operations Ashore Overlay to  
MIA-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (3)




Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: H

Enclosure (7) D-2 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RLT-7 After Action Report 1-65 to (Operation STANLITE)

ENCLOSURE (4)






67

Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

TimeZone: Hotel

Enclosure (9) D-3 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RIT-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (5)




Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756, I 6757, II, III

Title Zone: Hot 22

Enclosure (10) D-4, Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RLT-7 After Action Report L-65 (Operation STAPLITE)


ENCLOSURE (6)



Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets: 6756 I, 6757 II, III  
 Time Zone: H

Enclosure (11) D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
 RL7-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (7)



Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757II, III

Time Zone: Hotel

Enclosure (12) Route of March of BLT 1/7 Overlay to  
BLT-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (8)

7th S&C Log Nr.  
0474-68 Copy#

File

HEADQUARTERS  
Regimental Landing Team-7  
c/o 3d Marine Division, California

3/TCM/djs  
3000  
31 Aug 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Fwd)  
Subj: RLT-7 After-Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)  
Ref: (a) 3dMarDiv OpOrd 321A-65

- Encl: (1) Concept of Operations Overlay
- (2) D-day Operations Ashore Overlay
- (3) 2d Bn, 4th Marines After Action Report 2-65
- (4) 3d Bn, 3rd Marines After Action Report #33
- (5) D+1 Operations Ashore Overlay
- (6) BLT 3/7 After Action Report (Operation "STARLITE")
- (7) D+2 Disposition of Units Overlay
- (8) 1st Bn, 7th Marines After Action Report #1, Operation "STARLITE"
- (9) D+3 Disposition of Units Overlay
- (10) D+4 Disposition of Units Overlay
- (11) D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay
- (12) Route of March of BLT 1/7 Overlay
- (13) Problems, Comments and Recommendations

NIF-52 3/7, 65

RLT-7  
a/a rpt 1-65 (Opn STARLITE)

1. In accordance with reference (a), this report is submitted.

Unit: RLT-7

Strength: 4513

Time: 171000H - 242100H August 1965

Place: Van Tuong Village Complex; Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province south of the Chu Lai enclave.

Casualties: Friendly: KIA-46 WIA-204 DOW-5  
Enemy: KIA-688 WIA-263 (est)  
(includes 115 est)

2. As the enclave defense forces at Chu Lai had not been of adequate strength to consider attacking a Viet Cong (VC) regimental sized unit outside but near-by the enclave, this was made possible upon the arrival of RLT-7, consisting of Headquarters, BLT 1/7 and with BLT 3/7 afloat nearby as the SLF.

3. Intelligence preceding Operation "STARLITE" indicated that a large Viet Cong force in the Van Tuong Village complex was preparing to attack the Chu Lai enclave. From prior intelligence, this force was believed to include the 1st VC Regiment (main force) and a company from the 52d Battalion (local force). The 1st VC Regiment is composed of the 60th, 80th and 90th Battalions, however the 80th Battalion had not been confirmed as being in the area. The 40th and 45th Battalions were also believed to be in the area, as well as an unidentified heavy weapons company.

17-24 Aug 65  
(31 Aug 65)

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The capabilities of this force, particularly when augmented by the heavy weapons company, were such a great and impending threat to the Chu Lai enclave that the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), directed that a combined amphibious and helicopterborne attack be executed immediately in the Van Tuong Village complex to conduct a search and destroy operation against the Viet Cong. RLT-7, consisting of BLT's 3/3, 2/4, with 3/7 available as a reserve afloat, and RLT-7 Headquarters, was activated and assigned the mission. On the evening of 16 August 1965 the participating units were alerted to Operation "STARLITE". BLT 3/7, afloat as the Special Landing Force (SLF), was alerted by message to rendezvous in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and assume the mission as RLT Reserve. Since RLT-7 Headquarters had landed administratively in Viet only two days before, the facilities of the 4th Marines Headquarters were utilized for planning. The battalion and regimental staffs assembled with supporting arms representatives and on the morning of the 17th, the operation, administrative and embarkation orders were completed and distributed.

The operation commenced on D-1 at 171000H when M/3/3 departed the Chu Lai area by LVT for subsequent overland foot march to occupy a blocking position in the northern sector of the Amphibious Objective Area prior to H-hour and D-day at (BS 663971). At 171400H, RLT-7 Headquarters and BLT 3/3 commenced embarking aboard the following ships:

USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) - RLT-7 Headquarters  
 USS CABILDO (LSD-16) - BLT 3/3  
 USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1169) - BLT 3/3

At 180600H, HMM-261, 361 and BLT 2/4, less Company F, which remained in position on the Chu Lai perimeter, were staged at the Chu Lai Airstrip. Prior to H-hour, two of the following fire support ships (FSS) arrived in the AOA and took station.

USS GALVESTON (CLG-6)  
 USS ORLECK (DD-886)  
 The USS PRICHARD (DD-531) arrived on the 19th of August, on D+1.

On the morning of D-day, at H-hour (180630H), attack aircraft from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (FMAW) commenced preparation of landing zones RED, WHITE and BLUE while Companies I and K of BLT 3/3 landed abreast at GREEN Beach. See enclosure (1) for the Concept of Operations Overlay.

BLT 2/4 commenced landing as follows:

1st Wave: LZ BLUE at L-hour (H+15)  
 2nd Wave: LZ WHITE at L+25  
 3rd Wave: LZ RED at L+50  
 4th Wave: LZ WHITE at L+60

The original plan was to land as follows:

Company E in LZ WHITE at L-hour  
 Company H in LZ BLUE at L-hour  
 Company G in LZ RED at L+25

The original plan was based on a helicopter availability of 40 UH-34's but alterations as shown above were necessary due to only 26 helicopters being available.

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The command and control elements of the RLT-7 Headquarters landed at GREEN Beach at 160730H. By 1200 the CP was established at (BS 706925), and before the end of the day, housed not only the command post but the logistic support and re-supply complex for the operation. See enclosure (2), D-day Operations Ashore Overlay and enclosure (3), 2d Battalion, 4th Marines After-Action Report 2-65. Additionally I/3/3 (in the adjacent Zone of Action on the right) encountered heavy fire from An Cuong (2) and requested and received permission to cross over into the BLT 2/4 Zone of Action to secure the village. (See 3d Battalion, 3rd Marines After Action Report #33). In the trace of these two incidents involving heavy casualties, five LVT's carrying supplies from the RLT-7 CP complex to BLT 3/3 were ambushed at 181255H in the vicinity of (BS 698932).

The five LVT's were accompanied by two flame tanks requested by the CO of BLT 3/3 for use by I/3/3. One of the flame tanks returned to the Regimental CP complex which was only a few hundred meters away, and reported the ambush.

A relief force, consisting of elements of BLT 3/3 rear CP, five LVT's, five motos and one gun tank set out to relieve the halted column but encountered heavy fire prior to attaining their objective. One LVT was disabled and the gun tank did not fire because of friendly troops in the target area. This relief force, under the Executive Officer of BLT 3/3, was located in the RLT-7 CP complex. The XO of BLT 3/3 was directed to take I/3/3 to relieve the LVT column. This new relief force started at 181305, but became engaged in a heavy fire fight at (BS 703927) at 181400. The enemy heavy weapons (3.5, 57mmRR, and 81mm Mortars) firing across the open ground prevented I/3/3 from locating the relieving the column, but it did locate the 2d Platoon of H/2/4 nearby.

These attacks resulted in the RLT Commander temporarily halting the attack and requesting the landing of BLT 3/7.

At 181600H, L/3/7 landed at (BS 708927) and was assigned to the operational control of BLT 3/3. Reinforced with two gun tanks, L/3/7 was assigned the mission to juncture with I/3/3 at (BS 700930). Before effecting juncture with I/3/3, L/3/7 became engaged in a heavy fire fight at 181845H in an attempt to cross the open ground. This situation prevented L/3/7 from reaching I/3/3. In this action L/3/7 received 4 KIA and 14 WIA. Although juncture was not effected with I/3/3, L/3/7 located the LVT's and flame tank but could not advance to them. However, L/3/7 relieved sufficient pressure from I/3/3 to enable it to break contact. Since it was well after dark, L/3/7 was directed to move to the 3/3 CP and arrived at 190130H. I/3/3, and the 2d Platoon of H/2/4 returned to the RLT-7 CP complex, arriving at 190500H, and after resting were assigned the mission to provide security for the Regimental CP complex and GREEN Beach, respectively. I/3/7, which had been helilifted to the RLT-7 CP complex at dusk on the 18th to provide security was thus relieved of their security mission. At 190025H, M/3/7 landed at GREEN Beach.

On the morning of 19 August, BLT 3/3 resumed the attack to the northeast at 0700, and BLT 2/4, less H/2/4, attacked at 0800. At 0900, BLT 3/7 (-) composed of Companies I and M, attacked to the northeast near the center of RLT-7 Zone of Action and uncovered and secured the area of the LVT/flame tank column. All personnel present were brought out and previously made plans were executed to evacuate the LVT's and tanks. During the afternoon both BLT's 2/4 and 3/3 reached the coast. During this time escape by the VC to seaward had been blocked by the fire support ships. See enclosure (5), D+1 Operations Ashore Overlay and enclosure (6), BLT 3/7 After Action Report (Operation "STARLITE").

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On 20 August, BLT 2/4 was helilifted out of the operation and back into its normal operation in the Chu Lai enclave. The return trip of the helicopters from the Chu Lai enclave was utilized to lift BLT 1/7 into the BLT 3/3 area at (BS 717942). BLT 1/7 relieved BLT 3/3, and BLT 3/3 was retracted by surface craft from GREEN Beach. (Upon retraction of BLT 3/3, L/3/7 was returned to BLT 3/7 control). Companies A,B,D, the Battalion Command Group and 50% of Company C were helilifted into the area at (BS 717942). The remainder of Company C was helilifted to the Regimental CP complex. The balance of the company moved overland to close onto the CP at 202100H. C/1/7 was to provide security not only for the logistics installations, helicopter landing zone and command post contained in the RLT-7 complex, but also security for GREEN Beach. Prior to completion of the helilifts, TAORs were assigned and both BLT 1/7 and 3/7 were assigned the mission to conduct search and clear operations within their TAORs to confirm the VC KIA count, collect any material of intelligence value and to eliminate VC resistance that might remain in the area. See enclosure (7), D+2 Disposition of Units and enclosure (8), 1st Bn, 7th Mar After Action Rpt #1, Operation STARLITE.

On 21 August (D+3), BLT's 1/7 and 3/7, in execution of their mission, conducted battalion size search and clear missions. During the course of these operations, engineers were employed to destroy many of the caves, tunnels and fighting positions in the area. BLT 3/7 conducted its operations in the hamlet complex of An Thoi (1) and Nam Yen (3). Companies moved out on foot except for L/3/7 which was helilifted. M/3/7 received sporadic small arms fire, which at the moment, was BLT 3/7's only contact with the VC. BLT 1/7 concentrated their efforts in the hamlet complex of Van Tuong. A/3/7 moved out on foot to search and clear Van Tuong (2), and D/1/7 to search and clear Van Tuong (5). On the way to its objective, D/1/7 encountered sniper fire from the vicinity of (BS 715942) but received no casualties. None of the companies encountered organized resistance.

At 211800H, M/3/7 relieved C/1/7 as security for the RLT-7 CP complex and GREEN Beach. See enclosure (9) for the D+3 Disposition of Units Overlay.

On 22 August, BLT 3/7 received a new mission to conduct a reconnaissance in force to determine the presence of organized VC and to destroy any VC encountered in line of hills from (BS 690905) to (BS 690870). To further support this mission K/3/7, the unit of the landing force to come ashore, was landed from the SLF at 220630H. All companies moved out on foot in an approach march, I/3/7 on the right, L/3/7 on the left, with K/3/7 in reserve following in trace to (BS 690870), where BLT 3/7 established defensive positions for the night.

BLT 1/7 continued its operation in the Van Tuong complex. All companies reported receiving sniper fire. B/1/7 fired on 3 VC at (BS 707937). One VC was wounded and evacuated to Co B, 3d Medical Battalion. A/1/7 killed a VC at (BS 703937) while conducting its search and clear operation of Van Tuong (3). See enclosure (10) for the D+4 Disposition of Units Overlay.

On D+5, 23 August, BLT 1/7 was alerted to conduct, on the 24th of August, a reconnaissance in force across the Trung Phan Peninsula. At 231200H, BLT 1/7 commenced moving all equipment that was not desired for the overland movement such as wheel and tracked vehicles to GREEN Beach for subsequent embarkation and movement by ship. In continuing its search and clear operations, BLT 1/7 reported that search of Van Tuong (4) had been completed. B/1/7 made contact with an unknown number of VC in caves (BS 698955) and here three VCS were captured. At 231600H, BLT 1/7 secured their search and clear operations, commenced movement of all other remaining equipment to GREEN Beach and prepared for its new mission.

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By 231800H RLT-7 Headquarters displaced from (BS 725928) to GREEN Beach and subsequently to the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) by LVT's. Supporting arms representatives and the Regimental Communications Officer, in conjunction with the staff of Amphibious Squadron 7 activated the Supporting Arms Control Center (SACC). See enclosure (11) for the D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay.

On 23 and the morning of 24 August. BLT 3/7 conducted search and clear operations in the previously mentioned line of hills. This operation was conducted by a series of ground sweeps supported by blocking companies which were helilifted into position 500 to 1500 meters in advance of the sweeping company. During the course of the sweep of this hill mass, over 80 Viet Cong were captured and 13 VC were killed in action. Numerous fortifications and training sites were destroyed, as well as VC equipment. At 241400H, BLT 3/7 was directed to cease search and clear operations and to return to GREEN Beach to reembark prior to dark. The last elements of BLT 3/7 were embarked by 241900H and BLT 3/7 resumed its mission as SLF.

On the morning of 24 August, BLT 1/7 began overland march through the Trung Phan Peninsula to destroy any enemy encountered. See enclosure (12), Route of March of BLT 1/7. During the march, the fire support ships maintained station advancing at sea parallel to the advancing column to support the BLT with Naval Gunfire if necessary. Maintaining progress with the BLT ashore were two LCU's preloaded with tanks, to be landed if heavy enemy resistance was encountered. The USS BAYFIELD, with its SACC in full operation also sailed parallel to the advance of BLT 1/7. While on the march, BLT 1/7 was supported by helicopters that delivered water and rations, as well as evacuating heat casualties. At 241700H, BLT 1/7 reached its pickup point (BT 630021) near the mouth of the Song Tra Bong and embarked aboard LVT's. Movement of the LVT's from Chu Lai was coordinated so as to arrive at beach near the Song Tra Bong with the arrival of the BLT. Upon return to its area in the Chu Lai enclave, BLT 1/7 assumed the positions of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines in the TAOR.

Operation STARLITE was completed when the last elements of RLT-7 Headquarters landed at Chu Lai at 242100H.

In retrospect, the RLT, on a very short notice, embarked prepared to conduct an operation of duration up to 36 hours. Many of the challenges encountered listed in enclosure (13) were a result of the protraction of Operation STARLITE. Many conditions satisfactory for a short duration operation, as planned, resulted in some make shift arrangements on a day-to-day basis as the operation was extended. However, inasmuch as a hard-core VC regiment had been destroyed, it was obviously in the best interest of the operation to extend it so the entire area could be systematically searched and to assure that no organized resistance was in the area.

It is believed (based on ITT interrogation of POWs) that the VC encountered in the AOA were the remnants of the 45th Battalion and possibly the 40th Battalion (unconfirmed). Reports received through interrogation of not only VC POWs, but also civilians, indicated that the Staff of the 1st VC Regiment located in Van Tuong (1), split and fled upon the landing of RLT-7. Undoubtedly a considerable number of the staff was killed or wounded during the initial battle while trying to escape.

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Positive identity of enemy units remains pending results of III MAF ITT interrogation of POWs. However, III MAF ITT has stated that BLP 2/4 landed in the middle of the 60th VC Battalion and that both the 60th VC Battalion and the T-121 Heavy Weapons Company were almost completely destroyed. The 80<sup>th</sup> VC has been confirmed by III MAF ITT to be two-thirds destroyed.

Operation STARLITE undoubtedly accomplished its mission, for the enemy in the Van Tuong Village complex that once posed so great a threat to the Chu Lai enclave no longer exists as an effective fighting force.

In Operation STARLITE, NGF played its greatest amphibious support role since the Korean War. The need for further Naval Gunfire Support was apparent throughout the operation the fire response of the fire support ships was rapid and reliable, though not without problems. During the ship-to-shore movement Naval Gunfire was available prior to the landing of artillery. In further operations where air support radar teams are not available, Naval Gunfire will play an even greater role in providing fire support during the period of low visibility.

In line with fire support, the 60mm Mortar would have proved a valuable asset by being immediately available to the company commander during periods where communications/coordination problems in priority of fires slowed the response of the larger caliber supporting arms. Although 81mm Mortar fire is generally available to the company commander, the time required to bring a target under fire is considerably longer than that of the 60mm Mortar.

There is a definite requirement among our several supporting arms for a light automatic weapon. Amtracs, Tanks, Ontos and Engineers often find themselves in a position where a heavy volume of small arms fire is needed to overcome enemy attack during the period when the above supporting arms are vulnerable, such as at halts, bivouacs, etc. The M-14 is too bulky to handle in the interior/confines of the combat support vehicles. Firing from a hatch/aperture or moving vehicle demands a light, small automatic type weapon such as the AR-15 or M3A1 submachinegun.

*O. F. Peatross*  
O. F. PEATROSS

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TU 76.0.1	1
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
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CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	1
CO, USS TALLADEGA (APA-208)	1
CO, USS PT DEFIANCE (LSD-31)	1
CO, USS CABILLO (LSD-16)	1
CO, USS VERNON CNTY (LST-1161)	1
CO, BLP 3/3	1
CO, BLP 2/4	1
CO, BLP 1/7	1
CO, BLP 5/11	1
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CO, VMCU-1	1
CO, VMAR-152	1
CO, Co B, 1st Hk Bn	1
CO, Co A, 3d Antarac Bn	1
CO, Co C, 1st AF Bn	1
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CO, Co C, 1st Engr Bn	1
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


Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Enclosure (1) Concept of Operation Overlay to RLT-7 After Action Report 1-65,  
(Operation STARLITE)

Time Zone: Hotel

ENCLOSURE (1)



Maps: AMS L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: H

Enclosure (2) D-day Operations Ashore Overlay to  
RLT-7 after Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

2d Battalion, 4th Marines (Rein)  
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM  
 25 Aug 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (Rein)  
 Subj: 2d Battalion, 4th Marines After Action Report 2-65  
 Ref: (a) Div Op Order 321-65  
 (b) RLT-7 Op Plan 323-65  
 Encl: ✓(1) Summary Overlay of Operation  
 ✓(2) Break Down by Units of VC Killed, Wounded and Captured  
 ✓(3) Company H After Action Report

1. Statistical Data

a. Units Involved

(1) Companies E, G, H and H&S	(519 personnel)
(2) 3 Platoons PFI's	(54 personnel)
(3) 2d Platoon, Co B, 3d Engineer Bn	(28 personnel)
(4) Platoon MP's 7th Marines	(28 personnel)
(5) Det, Force Recon	(21 personnel)
(6) Lt Section, 1st Plat, Co C, 3d Tk Bn	(8 personnel)
(7) Heavy Section, 2d Plat, Co B, 3d AT Bn	(12 personnel)

b. Strengths

c. Time. The operation was conducted between 180615H to 202100H.

d. Place. The operation took place in the QUANG-NGAI Province, BINH SON District.

e. Casulties

(1) Friendly

USMC KIA	18
USMC WIA	95 (including WIA's not evacuated)
USMC MIA	None
USMC Heat Casualties	9

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ENCLOSURE (3)

PF's KIA	6
PF's WIA	6
Inter. Officers WIA	1
Civilian Photographer WIA	1
(2) <u>Enemy</u>	
VC Killed	342
VC Wounded	2
VC Captured	2
VCS	33

## 2. Narative Account of Operation

- a. 2d Battalion (-)(Rein) consisting of Companies E, G, H, H&S (-) and 3 Platoons of PF's departed their position vicinity (BT 527035) at 180645H to conduct a 3 day search and destroy operation 13 miles southeast of CHU LAI.
- b. At 180645H Co G landed west of LZ Red at (BS 666955). The landing was unopposed. At 180730H Co E landed in LZ White (BS 675933) under small arms fire from ridge line (BS 674946 to 680933). The landing zone was secured from close in fires while an air strike was taking place by attack aircraft and UH1E Helicopter on the ridge line mentioned above. Sporadic small arms was received from the ridge line while in the Landing Zone. No casualties were sustained. At 180745H Co H landed in LZ Blue (BS 692921) and moved into the attack toward NAM YEN (3) (BS 692922). At 180815H the Command Group landed at LZ White (BS 675933) under sporadic small arms fire from the ridge line (BS 674946). At 180830H Companies E and G moved into the attack in a north westerly direction. In the the attack Co E and the Command Group came under 60mm, 81mm, machine gun and small arms fire from an estimated 50-60 VC occupying the north portion of the ridge line. One platoon moved into the attack to seize the hill ground at (BS 680933). In the attack the platoon received incoming 81mm, 60mm, machine gun and small arms fire from an estimated 50-60 VC occupying the hill. The platoon sustained 2 KIA and 3 WIA while registering a direct hit with a 3.5 rocket on 3 VC killing all three fleeing some 400 meters to the southeast. When the platoon reached the top of the hill they received 6 rounds of 60mm incoming fire with negative results. Co G moved one platoon into blocking positions (BS 673960) over looking PHU LONG (1) and (2) and the remainder moved out with the PF's to search PHU LONG (1) and (2). The village contained many tunnels, trenches and fox holes most of which were located in hedge rows and were difficult to locate. Eight VCS were picked up in and around the village.

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At 180830H Company H moved toward NAM YEN (3) (BS 692922). One platoon moved into positions at (BS 689918) and took some VC under fire on Hill 43 (BS 685916). The remainder of the Company maneuvered toward NAM YEN (3) with no contact. As one platoon closed on the village they came under heavy small arms fire. After moving 25 meters in the village they were pulled back to (BS 690922) in order to utilize air on the objective. During the air strike 11 WIA's and 1 KIA was evacuated.

- c. At 180900H Company E maneuvered the remaining platoons to seize the ridge line from (BS 687942 to 683937). During the attack Company E (-) and Command Group received 81mm, 60 mm and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 60 VC. While in the assault one section of 81mm provided fire on the objective area, and to the rear. The hill was secured at 181000H and enemy casualties are unknown. Company E reorganized and attempted to evacuate their 2 KIA's and 15 WIA's. At this time several requests were sent in for evacuation and it took approx 50 minutes for the helos to arrive. The 81mm section displaced forward and continued to fire at probable VC withdrawal routes. At 181000H Company H was joined by 3 tanks and 3 Ontos bearing casualties, captured VC weapons were evacuated. At 181030H 1 platoon from Company H continued to sweep Hill 43 up to the topographical crest, at that time the VC broke contact. At 181100H Company E and Command Group moved out in a north easterly direction to continue the sweep in assigned sector. At 181200H while moving into the hamlet at (BS 687944) Company E and Command Group began receiving 81mm, 60mm, 57mmRR, machine gun and small arms incoming fire from (BS 688945, 688948, 691945) from an estimated 50 VC. Fire was returned by all organic weapons including 1 .50 cal machine gun that was attached to Company E. The hamlet was secured at approx 181300H which action resulted in 8 friendly WIA's. One VC FO was shot from a tree and carried away with other casualties. During this period the Command Group received 81mm, 60mm, 57mmRR and small arms fire which resulted in 2 WIA's. At 1230H Company H departed from the vicinity (BS 688919) to resume the attack. Company H by-passed NAM YEN (3) as Company I 3/3 had swept through and reportedly cleared the village. The company moved in a northeasterly direction with no contact. At 181300H the company received small arms from the rear, simultaneously tanks and Ontos began to have increased difficulty in movement due to the rice paddies. Company H held up at (BS 688925) in order to give armor a chance to maneuver. At this time the company began taking heavy small arms, 81mm, 60mm, 3.5" rocket and 57mmRR fire from the vicinity of Hill 30 (BS 698390) and NAM YEN (3). During this time the company was still receiving heavy automatic weapons, 80mm, 60mm and 57mmRR fire from all directions. This fire was returned at maximum rate possible utilizing the tanks and Ontos weapons. The fire fight continued and the armor was unable to move forward, and was continuing to receive intense incoming fire. All personnel and equipment were evacuated from the area while still under intense fire. At this time one platoon of Company H lost contact with the company and came upon Bravo

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enclosure (3)

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Command of 7th Marines under Major COLEMAN, vicinity (BS 702928). The Major ordered the platoon to secure the hill and wait for him to return with F and L and downed Amtracs. The platoon waited until 190430H when they returned and then moved out to the Regimental CP. At 181630H the remainder of the company moved to (BS 695923) under sporadic small arms, coming from NAM YEN (3) and made contact with Company I. The company was unable to effect liaison with Company I and therefore preped Hill 43 (BS 685916) to prepare it as a night defensive position.

- d. At 181330H Company G vicinity PHU LONG (1) (BS 668959) received the order to move to blocking positions vicinity (BS 683972). The company arrived there at 181500H with no contact and coordinated with M. 3/3. Company G moved to the hill complex vicinity (BS 678968) and established defensive positions.
- e. At 181400H Company E finished evacuating casualties and continued to sweep in assigned sector to (BS 693948). Along the route numerous spider holes and camouflaged punji traps were uncovered; also, empty 60mm and 81mm mortar casings were scattered throughout the area. At 181400H the company began digging in for night defensive positions (BS 693948). At 181515H approx 100 VC armed with 81mm, 57mmRR and small arms were observed by the Command Group moving south vicinity (BS 696946). A flash message was sent requesting arty immediately. A lapse of 12 minutes between the time the message was sent to when the first round landed. Howtars fired 20 rounds with devastating effect on the VC. It was later reported by the Battalion Commander that he had observed approximately 90 VC bodies while flying in a UH1E in the vicinity (BS 696946). At 182100H Company E's ambush party was proceeding along the trail at (BS 692947) when they killed 1 VC armed with only 2 grenades. It is probable that this VC was an FO for mortars because later on during the night 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fell wide of Company E and the Command Group. There was no other contact during the night due to the fact aerial illumination constantly kept the area illuminated along with constant H&I fires.
- f. At 181730H Company H requested fuel for the Ontos. At that time they only had 1/8 tank of gas were unable to travel any distance. At 181800H a section of 81mm Mortars arrived at Company H's position along with resupply of food water and ammunition. Company H was still unable to effect liaison with Company I. No reinforcements could be expected and no fuel arrived for the Ontos therefore, the company established a tight defensive perimeter in the vicinity (BS 693921). The perimeter consisted of 3 Ontos, 3 tanks, 1 section 81mm Mortars and 24 infantry men. The company remained there during the night with no contact with the enemy.
- g. At 182300H Company G vicinity (BS 678968) observed approx 1 khaki clad VC moving from east to west at (BS 678962). The VC got out of sight before fire could be ordered on them. Artillery was called for on the draw where they were last seen. It took approx 15 minutes to receive the first arty round (due to no fault of the FO) and by the

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time fire for effect arrived it's to be assumed the VC had cleared the area. No further contact was made during the night. At 190700H Company G was ordered to continue assigned mission and drive to the coast. It's to be noted that although it had been sent by helicopter Company G did not get a resupply the night before and therefore was out of food and water. The company moved out and at 190800H they received heavy small arms fire from the vicinity (BS 685965) and (BS 699973). Fire was returned but very few VC were observed as the majority of the fire came from behind hedgerows. Arrival of personnel at the hedge yielded negative results. At 190830H Company G arrived on the ridge line at (BS 692968) and received heavy small arms fire from vicinity (BS 693970 to 698965). Several VC were observed in hedge rows both to the front and right flank. The Company Commander felt there were possible many VC across the draw to his front and were waiting for the company to cross the ravine. The locations of adjacent units were requested and this indicated no friendly units in the immediate area. An air strike was requested on the VC positions at 190845H. As the first bomb hit the target, the VC in the hedge rows erupted with heavy small arms fire from approximately 40 to 50 VC. After the second bomb dropped the Company Commander received a message from CO M 3/3 that the air was hitting friendly troops. The air strike ceased and it was found that Company M was at (BS 690973) instead of their reported position. Company G assaulted the position killing 4 VC and finding 2 VCS hiding in the hedge rows. No weapons were found. The hill mass was secured at 190930H with no friendly casualties.

- h. At 190800H Company E continues to attack in their zone of action. Prior to the attack the Battalion Commander utilized all available supporting arms on possible VC locations in each direction. At 190900H Company E swept thru the village of VAN TUONG (1) (BS 6995) and collected various documents, VC packs, small arms ammunition, grenades and VC communication wire. The ammunition was blown in place and documents turned over to the Bn S-2. The VC communications wire was laid from north to south and from east to west. Which led to the high ground where they had OP's. Company E moved through the village with no contact. The village was exceptionally large for one rifle company to search thoroughly. The Battalion Commander immediately recommended to CO, 7th Marines that an ARVN Bn be sent to the village to search after Company E had left. At 191000H Company E received intense small arms fire from approximately 20 VC who were located vicinity (BS 705964) Company E assaulted the VC position and when they got to the top of the hill the VC fled in a northerly direction. No friendly casualties were sustained. At 191030H contact was made with K 3/3 in the right flank. At this time the Command Group received 2 incoming rounds of 81mm Mortar fire sustaining no casualties. At 191100H Company E reached the high ground vicinity (BS 707960) at which time it received the order to sweep to (BS 705974) turn northeast and sweep the peninsula to include the village of PH UOC THUAN (1) (BS 7197). At 191200H Company E moved out on

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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the sweep as ordered and received small arms fire from the left rear (BS 701973). The area was marked with 3.5 rocket WP as a mortar target and Company E continued on its assigned mission. The 8mm section with the Command Group fired 8 rounds of HE on the target area and the VC firing ceased. Co E continued to sweep thru the assigned sector capturing 1 VCS. The company moved to the top of Hill 32 vicinity (BS 712978), prepared night defensive positions and sent out 2 seven man patrols to scout to the east, to the northeast and the southwest.

- h. At 190800H Company H received a resupply of fuel and received word to move to Green Beach (BS 7192). At 191130H the company arrived at Green Beach and was joined by the platoon that was detached from them on the previous day. Co H then was assigned the mission of Regimental Reserve and CP security. At 201200H the company was retracted by surface craft and arrived CHU LAI at 202100H.
- i. At 191300H Co G received word to move overland to the vicinity (BS 706967) for a new mission. During this movement Co G sustained 8 heat casualties which was due to not receiving a resupply of food and water. Co G's new mission was CP security for the Command Group.
- j. At 191500H Co, 7th Marines arrived and assigned 2d Bn (-)(Rein) the mission of mining and booby trapping the area in which we held. Co E booby trapped Hill 32 (BS 712978) and all avenues of approach. 1 squad of B Engineers and Det, Force Recon booby trapped trails and avenues of approach vicinity (BS 7096). Approximately 125 MK, 26 fragmentation grenades was used to accomplish this mission.
- k. At 191100H an AO reported sighting 3 VC in the coast line (BS 710978). A patrol from Co E was sent to scout the area and encountered 3 VC. This patrol killed 1 VC and captured 2. Four enemy grenades were blown in place. At 191800H the company sighted movement on the high ground vicinity (BS 716978). Artillery was called on the target with unknown results. By 191830H Co E night defensive positions were completed and the company prepared for the night.
- l. Between the periods 192100H Co G and Command Group received 5 rounds of Naval Gun Fire all of which were fire directed at Co G and the Command Group. The rounds landed behind these units with no damage inflicted. Several flash messages were sent requesting to cease the firing of Naval Guns. The danger was that we were not directing their fire, also the rounds were being fired directly over head and could have hit the high trees, causing an air burst. At 192300H an air strike (not requested or controlled by this unit) was conducted vicinity (BS 714974). The rockets and bombs used fell within 200 meters of Co E position on Hill 32 vicinity (BS 712978). A flash message was sent requesting cease fire on the air strike. During the

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hours of darkness there was no enemy contact due to the fact that aerial flares constantly illuminated the area.

1. At 200600H a Popular Forces soldier attached to Co G was wounded by our own booby traps (BS 719968) when he tried to retrieve an aerial flare dropped the night before. The PF's had been instructed several times not to move around until they were told to. A team from B Engineers and Det Force Recon was despatched and recovered the wounded PF and he was evacuated by helo. Between 200745H and 201000H 5 villagers came to Co G position; (BS 718968) 2 children, 2 adult males and 1 adult female all of whom were wounded. The 2 children and the adult female were wounded by the air strike conducted at 192300H the night before. All 5 were helo evacuated to B Med immediately. At 201030H Co E commenced retraction from their positions (BS 712978) utilizing 4 helos and no close air support. Co E arrived back at CHU LAI on 201230H.

n. At 201315H CO, 7th Marines reported that 1 VC platoon was hiding in a cave vicinity (BS 704970). Co G was assigned the mission to search the area and blow all caves and tunnels. Co G swept thru the objective area with no contact. Several large tunnels and caves were blown by B Engineers. Co G returned to their position by 201500H and prepared to retract by helo. The Command Group was retracted by 201530H and Co G was retracted by 201700H without incident.

### 3. Problems encountered

- a. The FLT-7 TAC Net was continuously clogged with messages that were up graded to a degree that a normal routine or priority message could not be transmitted; for instance, this Hq received a priority message concerning 26 reporters who were to be at FLT-7 Hq. Frag Orders were sent with a Precedence of Routine, a Flash message was sent concerning CO, 7th Marines coming to our CP.
- b. This Hq was not informed on air strikes and Naval Gunfire being used within our area of operations resulting in 5 rounds of Naval Gunfire being fired into our position and 2 air strikes, 1 of whose rockets landed 200 meters in front of Co E.
- c. In several instances it took as long as 50 minutes for helos to arrive for evacuation of wounded.
- d. During the retraction of Co E there was no air escort for the helos.
- e. A helicopter must be readily available for use as a air relay/ command helicopter for the Battalion Commander.
- f. Artillery was awfully too long in arriving on target after fire mission was called.

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
ENCLOSURE (3)

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- g. The PF's would not cooperate. They wanted to go to the villages to cook and get water. They were instructed several times to remain with the company as they might get shot or hurt. They demanded twice the amount of food and water as we normally get.
- h. Logistic support was inadequate by the 7th Marines. Co G did not receive any food or water for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  days. Co E and Command Group\* received no food and only 30 gallons of water for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  days.
- i. Having CAS a/c on station is the only proper way to provide the type of support operations like this will require.
- j. We need to have an airborne DASC to operate in the capacity of overall air coordinator to handle both air strikes and helo missions.
- k. Primary HD, UHF can not be the same frequency as primary TAD, UHF.
- l. Additional TD, and HD, UHF frequency must be assigned and utilized.
- m. Administrative traffic can not be tolerated on tactical nets.
- n. Bb-45 battery resupply is critical and sufficient reserves of charged batteries must be maintained at all times during an operation of this size.
- o. We need napalm and zuni rockets to enable FAC's to work the air strikes closer than 150-200 meters from the friendly troops. Working 500 pounders at this range is extremely hazardous but can be done if required. The ACro 7D pod is not well suited to close support due to the wide dispersion pattern.
- p. We need more helicopters, both for resupply and tactical mission.
- q. We need VT fuzes for 250 and 500 lb bombs.

*J. R. Fisher*  
J. R. FISHER

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STARLITE

2/4  
 CHU LAI  
 17 Aug 1965  
 OPERATION OVERLAY  
 Map: 1:50,000  
 AMS L701  
 Sheet 6757I, II  
 Prepared By  
 S-3 2/4

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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BREAKDOWN BY UNITS OF VC KILLED, WOUNDED AND CAPTURED

UNIT	KILLED	WOUNDED	CAPTURED	VCS CAPTURED	WEAPONS CAPTURED AND DESTROYED
Co E	31			12	100 Grenades blown in place
Co G	4			11	10 Grenades blown in place
Co H	156				58 assorted small arms 1 Chi Con 3.5 rocket launch including 1 81mm mortar 1 57mm RB 1 .50 cal MG destroyed.
Command Group	1	2	2	10	
Air	60				
Artillery	90				
Total	342	2	2	33	

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COMPANY H AFTER ACTION REPORT

Company H (Rein) landed in LZ Blue (BS 69242) at 180745H and set up in a 360° perimeter. The UH1E Helicopters who were flying security for our landing immediately took the VC to our southwest under fire with their machine gun and rocket strikes. Also we were taken under fire by small arms from our southwest (BS 697920). We gained fire superiority immediately with M-14's and M-79 fire. Three VC KIA's were counted at this position before we moved out in the attack in a north westerly direction. The 2d and 3d Platoons were in the attack with the 1st Platoon as rear security. The 2d Platoon was on the left flank and was engaged in a heavy fire fight with VC on Hill 43 (BS 689918). The 1st Platoon was ordered to attack the village with the 3d Platoon located in vicinity of NAM YEN (3) (BS 690924) providing a base of fire. At this time there had been no fire from NAM YEN (3). At 180840H the 1st Platoon moved into the village and came under intensive small arms fire. After moving past the first row of houses in the village the 1st Platoon was pulled back out of the village for an air strike. We were still receiving small arms fire from the village even as the air strike continued. Immediately after the air strike Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines swept the village of NAM YEN (3). Two M-48 tanks arrived at our position at 180945H. The 1st Platoon and the two tanks made a tank-infantry coordinated attack to relieve pressure on the 2d Platoon who were at this time pinned down by automatic small arms fire, 81mm and 60mm Mortar fire. The tank-infantry attack caused the VC to break contact and fall back to the west. An air strike was called to the west also to hit the fleeing enemy. During this attack one VC .50 cal MG and one .30 cal MG was knocked out but due to heavy small arms fire and heavy mortar fire the weapons were not recovered. Automatic fire was coming from a house at (BS 684919) and one tank moved over to get a shot at the house when the tank was hit by some type of recoilless weapon. The second tank moved over also to get a shot at the house and was also hit but the house was destroyed and no more small arms fire was received from that area. The tanks were not damaged severely and were back in action in approx 5 minutes. We then began receiving heavy small arms fire from a hedgrow at (BS 687919). Also at this time a flame tank arrived at our position and he was moved to within range of the hedgrow and burned it out. For approx 30 minutes after this we received no incoming fire from any direction. By 181000H a total of 5 tanks and 3 Ontos had joined me at my position. All friendly casualties were evacuated at this time and approx 50 VC weapons and one VC POW was sent out by helicopter also. The 1st Platoon while giving us security to the southwest inspected numerous VC fighting positions and found as many as 6 VC KIA in the previous .50 cal MG hole and numerous VC KIA in other small fighting holes. All fighting holes were observed in the hedgrows and were well camouflaged. At 181100H we moved out again in the attack with the 2d Platoon on the right and 3d on the left with the 1st Platoon as rear guard. We moved out in a north easterly direction, bypassing the village of NAM YEN (3) believing it was cleared by Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. As the 2d and 3d Platoons moved out, the tanks were immediately behind the assault line with the Ontos to the rear and on the flanks in general support. As the assault line reached the stream and rice paddies to the east of NAM YEN (3) the rear guard (1st Platoon) began to receive heavy automatic fire from NAM YEN (3) and

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from their east flank also. Shortly thereafter the 2d and 3d Platoons began receiving heavy small arms fire and heavy 81mm and 60mm Mortar fire. The 2d and 3d Platoons moved across the rice paddy and set up a defense to protect the tanks and Ontos as they looked for a place to cross the rice paddy. The paddy was searched in both directions with no crossing located. The Ontos tried to cross the paddy at the same place the troops crossed. The first Ontos made it across with the second getting stuck in the mud. Under heavy automatic and mortar fire the second Ontos was pulled from the mud and both Ontos recrossed the paddy to join up with the tanks. The first Platoon had moved one squad around to the northwest on NAM YEN (3) and had killed 9 VC who were operating an 81mm Mortar. The small arms fire then became so intense that the squad had to pull back in closer to the tanks and they were unable to recover the 81mm Mortar. Friendly WIA and KIA's were also being evacuated by helo under this intense fire. All that were not evacuated by helo were loaded on tanks and began to pull back toward LZ Blue to try and flank the rice paddy in order to cross it with the armor. While evacuating the wounded NAM YEN (3) was hit by artillery and the high ground at (BS 698929) was hit by an air strike. At 181400H the Company with all attachments started moving back to LZ Blue with the 1st Platoon as the point and the 2d and 3d Platoons in the rear fighting a delaying action. As the 1st Platoon moved out they were pinned down behind a dike by small arms fire from NAM YEN (3) and were receiving some small arms fire from (BS 698926). At this time the 1st Platoon had cut across the rice paddy toward (BS 698930). Numerous helicopters were landing in this area so they moved out toward that high ground. After arriving on the high ground they met the Bravo Command group from Regt under Major COLEMAN. The Major ordered the 1st Platoon to secure the hill and wait for him to return with Companies I and L of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The 1st platoon waited until 190430H when the Major returned and then moved out to the Regt CP where they joined us the following day. At 181630H the remainder of Company H had moved back to LZ Blue and had received instructions from the Battalion Commander to coordinate with Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and set in a defensive position. Contact was made with one Platoon Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines but the remainder of the Company could not be located. At 181715H that platoon pulled out to the Regt CP. Further instructions were received from the Battalion Operations to set in a defense at LZ Blue for the night. Prior to this instruction another air strike was made on Hill 43 to insure that no VC dug in positions were still there and also to prepare it for our night defensive position. At that time it was unknown that a large ditch was between LZ Blue and Hill 43 which prevented the armor from getting to this hill. We were still getting sporadic small arms fire from the village of NAM YEN (3). At this time the Ontos and tanks proceeded to level all houses which remained standing and doing so all small arms fire ceased. At 181800H we were resupplied with food, water and ammunition. Also we received a section of 81mm Mortars. Still unable to effect liaison with Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines we set in a defense at (BS 698921) with 24 infantrymen 1 section of 81's, 3 Ontos and 3 tanks. The other 2 tanks had gone back to the Regimental CP with the platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. We had

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
constant illumination throughout the night with no enemy probes or enemy action of any kind. At 190800H we received more supplies and orders to move to Green Beach. Our movement to Green Beach was uneventful. Upon arriving at Green Beach we received further orders to report to the Regimental Command Post. Upon arriving at the Regimental Command Post we set in a defense around the Regimental Command Post for the night. That afternoon at 201400H we moved back to the beach and loaded aboard ship to return to our positions at CHU LAI.

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E/2/4 retracted by 201230

Cmd Grp 2/4 retracted by 201530

/2/4 retracted by 201700





Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: Hotel

Enclosure (5) D-1 Operations Ashore Overlay to RL7-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation ST-RL7E)

ENCLOSURE (5)



Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: Hotal

Enclosure (7) D+2 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RLT-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)

ENCLOSURE (7)

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Headquarters, I MAF  
 CHU LAI, South Vietnam  
 170700 August 1965

Appendix 2 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 323-65

Ref: (a) Maps. LMS L701; scale 1:50,000 sheets 6756 I, 6757 II and III  
 (b) Joint Intelligence Center, Headquarters IX Corps DLR 106-64

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION.

a. Basic mission. To destroy Viet Cong Forces in the VAN TUONG Village complex area, vicinity (BS 7095).

b. Previous Decisions.

- (1) To employ an RLT consisting of two BLT's and an RLT Headquarters. The RLT Headquarters will come from the 7th Marines.
- (2) To land at least one of the two BLT's via helicopter from the (CHU LAI TAOR).
- (3) To withdraw the RLT from the objective area upon completion of the search and destroy operation.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather.

- (1) See current predicted weather report for period of operations. During the period of operations the weather is not expected to affect the enemy's capabilities. Prolonged heavy rains would limit our use of helicopter and close air support and would affect the trafficability of tracked and wheeled vehicles.
- (2) Astronomical Data for period of operations.

DATE	SUNRISE/SET	MOON RISE/SET	MOON PHASE
18 Aug	0632/1916	2320/1111	3/4
19 Aug	0632/1909	2250/1202	1/2

b. Terrain.

- (1) Relief. Relief of the area is predominantly characterized by flat rice paddy/dry crop type terrain interdicted by numerous brushwood covered knolls; the latter of which are the primary locations for the small but scattered built-up areas (villages).
- (2) Drainage. Drainage of the area is accomplished by two primary river systems; the SONG TRA BONG (mouth located at BT 615020), which drains in a northerly direction; and the RIVIERE DE SA KY

B-2-1

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which drains in an easterly direction. Both systems possess extensive tributaries which interlace the entire area of interest and which feed the rice paddy cultivated terrain.

- (3) Vegetation. Vegetation throughout the area is predominantly dry crop vegetation and brushwood (approximately 13 per cent), the latter of which is found on the numerous and dispersed knolls and hills of the area. Rainforest type vegetation, however, appears to be lacking.
- (4) Surface Materials. The area of interest contains three basic types of surface materials; deep sand along the coastal areas extending from 50 to 300 meters inland; marshy area of alluvial soil throughout the majority of the inland area; and loose soil over laterite constituting the remainder of the area. The latter two soils coincide geographically with the paddy/dry crop and brushwood/knoll areas respectively.
- (5) Cover and Concealment. Cover from direct fire weapons is considered poor throughout most of the area, alleviated only by drainage ditches, paddy dikes, built-up roads and trails, and the brushwood covered knolls. Cover from indirect fire weapons is considered poor throughout, the primary protection being bridge and culverts. The sandy and loose soil, however, is conducive for the digging of foxholes and bunkers. Concealment for foot-troops is considered to be poor to fair throughout the majority of the area (the paddy/dry crop portion) and fair to excellent along the tree-lined beaches and the brushwood covered knolls respectively. Concealment should also be fair in the brush-lined portions of the built-up areas. Concealment for vehicles will be poor throughout most of the area.
- (6) Critical Terrain Features.
  - (a) Hill 74 at BT 702895
  - (b) Hill 23 at BT 675920
  - (c) Hill 70 at BT 653936
  - (d) Hill 45 at BT 721938
  - (e) Hill 50 at BT 686937
  - (f) Hamlet AN CUONG (1) BT 717922
  - (g) Hamlet LAC SON (1) BT 683915
  - (h) Hamlet NAM YEN (3) BT 686922
  - (i) Hamlet NAM YEN (4) BT 692928
  - (j) Hamlet VAN TUONG (1) BT 699955
  - (k) Hamlet VAN TUONG (2) BT 697944
  - (l) Hamlet VAN TUONG (3) BT 708954
  - (m) Hamlet VAN TUONG (4) BT 722951
  - (n) Hamlet VAN TUONG (5) BT 710945
- (7) Observation and Fields of Fire. Short range observation is generally good, being restricted only by the scattered and localized tree and brush areas, and possibly by paddy dikes and built

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up roads. Long range observation will be generally poor with the exception of the fine following point which will command observation throughout the entire area of interest; NUI PHUONG (BS 688873) and NUI TRAM (BS 631877). Fields of fire for indirect fire weapons is excellent throughout. Direct fire weapons will have fair and good fields of fire throughout most of the area, with poor to fair fields of fire being located through the relatively narrow coastal treeline, and on many of the scattered knolls.

- (8) Obstacles. Obstacles to cross country movement will consist of two types; natural, and man made. Natural obstacles to movement will consist primarily of the "wet" paddy areas and the brushwood covered knolls, which will be poor to unsuitable for vehicular movement. The central portion of the area, however (inland from NIS Beach 11 at BS 713963), appears to be a dry crop area where movement should be fairly unrestricted (except for the knolls). Vehicular movement south of this area will be restricted by paddies (provided they are flooded). Vehicular movement south of this area will be restricted by a tributary of the SONG TRA BONG (BS 673967 to BS 630967);
- (9) Avenues of approach. Numerous trails and secondary roads exist throughout the area running generally in an east-west direction. Primary cross-country avenues of approach are not apparent, because of the relief and drainage aspects of the terrain.
- (10) Routes of communication. Primary lines of communication consist entirely of Route 1 and Railroad 1. A secondary line of communication is the un-numbered local route from BS 470875 to Route 1 at BS 602918.

c. Hydrography.

- (1) NIS 12. Centered 4-1/2 miles NW of CAP BATANGAN.
- (a) Length. 5-1/2 miles; slightly concave beach, terminated by reef-fringed headlands; parts of shore in NW part of reef fringed and unusable; interrupted in NW part by stream mouth 4-3/4 miles unusable.
- (b) Width. 50-160 yards at LW; 40-80 yards at HW
- (c) Gradient. 1 on 5 to 1 on 55, LW to HW; 1 on 5 to 1 on 10, HW zone.
- (d) Approach. Nearshore bottom slopes gentle to flat shoreward of 6 feet depth contour 150-500 yards off HW line of SE half of beach and gentle to mild shoreward of 18 feet depth contour 750-1300 yards off HW line; offshore approach partly obstructed by reef-fringed islands 16 km NE of beach; nearshore partly obstructed by reefs fringing unusable parts of beach; bottom sand; anchorage bottom unknown.

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- (e) Surf and Tidal Data. Surf 4 feet or greater 4%; tidal range 4-1/2 feet, tropic.
- (f) Material. Sand; firm in wetted areas, soft where dry.
- (g) Terrain Immediately behind Beach. Beach packed by partly tree-covered dunes extending 100-1000 yards inland; dunes backed by extensive lowland and traversed by numerous streets bordered by marsh; lowland flanked to SE by river bordered by saltpans; lagoons immediately back dunes behind central part of beach; isolated wooded hills on lowland; wooded mountains about 18 miles inland from the beach; villages at NW end of beach and on lowland.
- (h) Exits. Exit across country or by trails and unsurfaced roads leading inland from villages to surfaced coastal road 6-1/2 to 11 miles inland; surfaced road 4-1/2 to 6-1/2 miles behind NW part of beach connects with surfaced coastal road.

(2) Tidal data for period of operations.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>HIGH TIDE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOW TIDE</u>
18 Aug	0245	3.5	0712	2.9
	1417	3.8	2004	2.7
19 Aug	0311	3.7	0838	2.9
	1513	3.5	2007	2.9

- d. Politics/Sociology. Chances are that the civil population in the objective will be of no immediate assistance to a friendly force and will possibly give the VC active support. At best, the language and racial differences between the Vietnamese and Americans tend to favor the VC.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Composition. Viet Cong forces in the area of operations are believed to include the 1st VC Regiment (main force) and a company from the 52nd battalion (local force). The 1st is composed of the 60th Battalion, the 80th battalion, and the 90th battalion. The 80th Battalion has not at this time been confirmed as being in the area of operation. Also believed to be in the area is the 45th battalion, the 40th battalion and an unidentified heavy weapons company.

b. Strength and Combat Efficiency.(1) Strength

(a)	1st VC Regiment	1207*
(b)	45th Bn	500
(c)	40th Bn	est 450
(d)	Company of the 52d (LF)	est 100
(e)	Unidentified Wpns Co	est 60
		<u>2,317</u>

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\* Excludes the 80th Bn and 400th Wpns Bn believed to be organic to the 1st VC Regiment. Also it must be assumed that Main Force and Local Force units operating in the area will have the support of an undetermined number of guerrillas.

(2) Combat efficiency.

- (a) 1st VC Regiment. Excellent. Has proven ability to control multi-battalion operations.
- (b) 60th Battalion. Unknown.
- (c) 90th Battalion. Excellent. Most highly decorated unit of the regiment.
- (d) 45th Battalion. Unknown.
- (e) 40th Battalion. Unknown.
- (f) Unidentified Weapons Company. Unknown.
- (g) 52d Battalion Company. Unknown.

c. Dispositions. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Situation Overlay) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 323-65.

d. Arms and armament.

(1) 1st VC Regiment.

Anti-aircraft Company - 4/12.7 mgs  
5 mg's and rifles

60th Battalion

2/81mm Mortar  
3/60mm mortar  
2/57mm RR's  
5/30 cal Mg's  
26 AR's  
Rifles

90th Battalion

2/81mm mortar  
3/60mm mortar  
2/57mm RR's  
4/30 cal Mg's  
23 AR's  
65 SMG's

40th and 45th Battalions Unknown.

52d (LF) Battalion Company Unknown.

Unidentified Weapons Company Unknown.

Note: The 1st VC Regiment is the unit which captured the two 105mm Howitzers at BA GIA

e. Recent and Present Activities.

- (1) 1st VC Regiment. Attacked BA GIA on 29 May to 1 June and on 5 July. Since that time, the 1st has been continually reported in the mountainous area immediately northwest of BA GIA. It was last reported in this area on 6 August vicinity BS 4681. On 14 and 15 August, independent sources placed the 1st VC Regiment in the objective area.

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- (2) 60th Battalion. Believed to have participated in both BA GIA actions. Since 6 July, the 60th has been continuously reported in the mountainous area immediately north and northwest of BA GIA, as well as the lowlands area immediately northeast of BA GIA.
  - (3) 90th Battalion. Believed to have participated in both BA GIA actions. The 90th has not been involved in any known operations since 5 August. On 22 July, an unconfirmed report placed the battalion at BS 6981. The last confirmed location was at 3891 (BS) on 27 July. On the same date an agent reported it at BT 4101, and it was again reported at BS 5352 and BT 3701 on 6 and 7 August respectively.
  - (4) 52nd Battalion. Suspected to be a local Force battalion, the 52nd has operated in the general area south of CHU LAI and north of QUANG NHA I since mid-May. It is believed this unit detaches its companies to operate with local guerrillas which would account for the great number of reports of this and other battalion size units being seen in the area.

f. Time and Space. The relative foot mobility of the lightly equipped VC units and the wide travelability of the area would enable all forces to move from present locations to more defensive terrain within three hours warning of U. S. Operations. Distances to such terrain generally to the south vary from four to five miles from reported unit locations.

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g. Reinforcements. Unknown, insufficient information.

(2) 60th Battalion. Believed to have participated in both BA GIA actions.

h. Peculiarities and weaknesses. While the reported units are largely main force units, they retain the advantage of support of the local populations and can blend with civilians as the first step in exfiltration. They are susceptible to all forms of supporting fires unless dug in in combat villages or prepared defensive positions. Except for reported AA Guns probably used for defense of the regimental command post, they have no defense against air attacks. Their weakness in combat power is directly proportioned to our superiority in mobility and fire power. Sudden surprise operation against them could create confusion because of inflexibility in plans imposed in part by their weakness in communications.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Suspected to be a local Force battalion, the 52nd has operated in the general area south of CHU LAI and north of

a. Enumeration. Since mid-May. It is believed this unit detaches its companies to operate with local guerrillas which would account

(1) To exfiltrate present forces in objective area at fighting rear site guard actions as necessary from combat hamlets in withdrawing to the south or west at any time.

f. Time and Space. The relative foot mobility of the lightly equipped

(2) To defend from combat villages in the objective area where located with one Local Force Company and four main force battalions in supported by local guerrillas. Distances generally to the south vary from four to five miles from reported unit locations.

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g. Reinforcements. Unknown, insufficient information.

(2) 60th Battalion. Believed to have participated in both BA GIA

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- (3) To counterattack friendly forces in the landing zone and on the beach with available forces.

b. Analysis and discussion.

- (1) Capability (1). The enemy could choose to affect this capability at any time prior to the completed landing of friendly forces, however, after friendly blocking forces have landed and are in position he would be unable to successfully accomplish this capability. If he were to affect this capability it would only partly affect the accomplishment of our mission in the sense that we could not completely destroy his forces.
- (2) Capability (2). If he chooses to defend from combat villages and present positions where located he will enhance our mission by allowing us to destroy his forces in place and concentrate our firepower on his strongest points of defense.
- (3) Capability (3). If the enemy does possess the capability to counter-attack our forces while landing, however, in doing so, he will expose himself to our air power and risk defeat without affecting the accomplishment of our mission.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

- (1) It is felt that the enemy will adopt capabilities (1) and (2) in that order and adopt capability (3) only as a desperate attempt to seriously slow down the accomplishment of our mission and utilize the results for propaganda purposes to embarrass the U. S. In affecting capability (1) it would allow him to escape from the objective area with his main strength intact. In affecting capability (2) he could melt into the local populace thus allowing the bulk of his main forces to remain in their local areas and achieving relatively light casualties among his own troops.

- b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the Commanders mission. In affecting the capabilities as discussed only capability (3) would seriously hinder the accomplishment of our mission.

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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Official:

*[Signature]*  
G. H. GENTRY JR  
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ANNEX C  
RLT-7, Op Order 323-65  
17 Aug 1965

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*From RLT-7, C/Chon, Aug 65*

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 321-65.


Ref: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS L701, Sheets 6757II, 6757III and 6756I.

Time Zone : H

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- (2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will check fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.
- (3) Unless special coordination measures are prescribed, fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of helicopters using the route.
- (4) Information on all artillery and naval gunfire missions will be posted to all helicopters and fixed wing control agencies. For this purpose, a SAVA PLANE report will be used. This report will include the coordinates of the firing unit, the target coordinates, the time period involved, the maximum ordinate of the projectiles.  
Example: SAVA PLANE X A-5404 X B-4-897 X C-0900 X D-1100 X E-5000 Ft.  
Individual Bn FSCC's will be responsible for passing the SAVA PLANE reports to the RLT FSCC's. The 4th Marines will disseminate the reports to the air control agencies.

- b. Flak Suppression Fires. When required and when time permits, flak suppression fire will be planned in detail to most effectively protect support aircraft from enemy ground fire and to provide a reasonable degree of safety from the suppressing fire.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES. No fires will be placed across Bn boundaries without the approval of RLT-7 FSCC. This approval must be voiced - silence does not mean consent. The final phase line between the sweeping units and the blocking force is a Fire Coordination Line. No fires will be placed across the line without the approval of the RLT-7 FSCC: The nature of this operation is such that extreme care must be taken to avoid the accidental attack of friendly forces.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. Annex H (Communications - Electronics).
- b. Command Posts. As published.

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Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Ops Order 323-65

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701 Sheets 6757 I & III  
 (b) 3dMarDiv Op Order 327-65  
 (c) 3dMarDiv Order 321A-65  
 (d) FMFM 7-1

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence) and intelligence summaries as issued.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex E (Artillery)  
 (2) Annex F (NGF)  
 (3) Annex G (Air Support)

2. MISSION. RLT-7 FSCC will exercise responsibility for planning and coordinating conventional fires supporting the elements of RLT-7 in this operation. The Chu Lai TAOR FSCC (4th Marines) will exercise overall responsibility for conventional fires throughout the TAOR thereby ensuring maximum effective fire support and troop safety to all units operating within the TAOR and zone of action.

3. EXECUTION. Fire Support coordination will be in accordance with references (b), (c), and (d).

4. TARGET INFORMATION

- a. Restricted Targets. See reference (a)

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air Sentries and lookouts

- (1) Air Sentries will be positioned at artillery units and naval gunfire support ships, and will check fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.

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1-7  
 Chu Lai Vietnam  
 170700H Aug 1965  
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Annex E (Artillery) to Operation Order 323-65

- Ref: (a) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Shots 6757 I and II  
 (b) 3d Mar Div Order 321A-65  
 (c) 3d Mar Div Order 327-65  
 (d) 3d Bn, 12th Marines Order 3000.3A (SOP for Operations)

Time Zone: H

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence)  
 b. Friendly Forces.  
 (1) Annex D (Fire Support Coordination)  
 (2) Annex F (Naval Gunfire Support)  
 (3) Annex G (Air Support)  
 c. Attachments and detachments. None

2. Mission. Third Bn. (-) (Rein), Twelfth Marines supports RLT-7 operations from present positions, alternate positions and in landing zones.

3. Execution.

- a. Concept of artillery employment.  
 (1) One Plt (3 How) Btry K, (SP) 4th Bn, 12th Mar will occupy firing positions prior to H hour on D-Day and provide general support to RLT-7  
 (2) One Plt (3 guns) 3d 155 mm Gun Btry (SP), FMF will provide general support to RLT-7 from present positions.  
 (3) 107 mm Mortar Btry (Towed), 3/12 will be heli-lifted from a designated position into HLZ YELLOW at L+50. One Plt will be in D/S of BLT 2/4 and the second Plt will be in D/S of BLT 3/3. On order the battery will be heli-lifted to another designated HLZ inside a defensive perimeter for night occupation. Upon completion of the operation the battery will be heli-lifted back to within MLR.  
 b. Coordinating Instructions.  
 (1) D-Day - 18 Aug 1965  
 (2) H Hour - 0630  
 (3) L Hour - 0645  
 (4) Position Areas and Fire Capabilities.  
 (a) Plt, Btry K located in 6001 grid square, AZ of fire to be announced.  
 (b) Plt, 3d 155 mm Gun Btry coordinates 539052, AZ of fire to be announced.  
 (c) 107 mm Mortar Btry (Towed) coordinates 682970, AZ of fire each Plt to be announced.  
 (5) Firing Chart - Reference (a)  
 (6) Registration - None, Met plus VE GFT  
 (7) Survey. Firing positions, excepting that of 107 mm Mortar Btry, will be surveyed in prior to D-Day.  
 (8) Ammunition Restrictions. Batteries will not expend more than 80 percent of on hand ammunition without approval of 3/12.

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- (9) Air Observation. 3/12 will require two O1-B aircraft for the dual purpose of artillery adjustments and airborne radio relay during daylight hours. 3/12 will provide the two air observers required.
- (10) No fire lines. No artillery and mortar missions will be fired across the boundaries of individual battalion's zones of action without the express approval of RLT-7 F3CC.

4. Administration and Logistics.

- a. RLT-7 admin order 323-65
- b. Plt, Btry K, 4/12 will carry 300 rounds mobile loaded for this operation.
- c. 107 mm Mortar Btry will carry 540 rounds to be heli-lifted with the Btry for this operation.

5. Command and Communication - Electronics.

- a. Annex H (Communication - Electronics)
- b. Reference (d)
- c. Air observer communications, to include airborne radio relay, for the artillery conduct of fire nets will be accomplished using AN/PRC-9 radios.
- d. Command Posts. Report CP locations when established.

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ANNEX F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 323-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: Viet Nam 1:50,000 AMS Series L 701 Series Sheets  
 6757 I and III  
 (b) 3rd MARDIV OpOrder 327-65  
 (c) 3rd MARDIV OpOrder 321A-65  
 (d) EMTM 7-2 Naval Gunfire Support

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS.
- b. Friendly Forces. See Operation Order 323-65

2. MISSION. Beginning at H-hour on D-day, DD-1 and other fire support ships if assigned, support the landing and operations of RLT-7.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. DD-1 : Direct Support of BLT 3/3.
- b. (to be assigned) : Direct Support BLT 2/4 (with Air Spotter only)
- c. No scheduled fires are planned or will be executed. All NGF support will be for call missions only.
- d. No unobserved missions will be fired.
- e. Fire support stations to be used will be assigned via Support/Control Net. Initial Fire Support Station for DD-1 is vicinity of grid square BS 7592.
- f. Restrictions: see Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) and ref. (c).
- g. Standard Salvos: 5" 8rds; 2 guns, 4 salvos  
 6" 9rds; 3 guns, 3 salvos

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See RLT-7 Administrative Plan

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION \*ELECTRONICS.

- A. See Annex H

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Annex G (Air Support) to Operations Order 323-65

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-3

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See current INTSUMS.
- b. Friendly forces. See Annex A (Task Organizations)

2. PROCEDURES

- a. Air strikes within the area of Operations will be under positive control of TACP.
- b. Coordination of supporting fires. See Annex D.
- c. Display red (orange) pannels and mark with yellow smoke closest friendly unit prior to executing air strikes.
- d. The Universal transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid Reference system will be used for target location.
- e. Mission Request Procedures. Standard procedures will be used.
- f. Alert Status of Aircraft
  - (1) Condition 1 - 2 minutes, reconstituted
  - (2) Condition 4 - 30 minutes, reconstituted
- g. Aircraft Armament. Armament available as follows:
  - (1) Bombs - MK 81 (250 GP), MK 82 (500 GP), and Napalm.
  - (2) Other - 20mm cannon, and smoke
- h. Helo Escort. Helo escort will be utilized during landing of troops within HLZ Red, White, Blue, and Yellow and during all evacuation and logistics flights.
- i. Retraction. Helo escort will be utilized during retraction from area of operations.

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- j. HLZ Preparation. Prior to L-Hour HLZ White and Blue will be prepared with air. HLZ Red will be prepared by air at L+10.
- k. Suppressive Fires. Suppressive fires will be conducted by escort air craft simultaneously, with the first wave landing into HLZ's Blue and White. See Annex C (Concept of Operations) for Air target #1.
- l. Quick Reaction. At completion of Helilift of 2dBn, 4th Marines and artillery elements into HLZ's Red, White, Blue and Yellow Helo's will be available for lift of reaction forces into designated HLZ.
- m. Airborne Observers. Request for Airborne Observers will be submitted to 4th Marines FSCC.
- n. Helicopter Landing Zones.
  - (1) Red BS 672952
  - (2) White BS 675931
  - (3) Blue BS 695921
  - (4) Yellow BS 680975
- o. Air target.
  - (1) BS 654935
- p. Emergency Evacuation. Request for emergency Helo evacuation will be submitted to 4th Marines FSCC by the most expeditious means available and will include the following information.
  - (1) Number of personnel to be evacuated.
  - (2) Nature of injury.
  - (3) Pick up coordinates and how marked.
  - (4) HLZ secured or not secured.

### 3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. See Annex H (Communications - Electronics)
- b. Location of Control Agencies.
  - (1) Afloat - LSD 16
  - (2) Ashore - to be announced

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ANNEX H (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 323-65

Ref: (a) Third Marine Division Operation Order 321A-65  
 (b) Third Marine Division Operation Order 327-65

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence), current INTSUMS and reference (a).
- b. Friendly Forces. See Operation Order 323-65.

2. MISSION. RTL-7 communications-electronics elements provide communications support for subordinate and attached units in accordance with reference (a).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Communications Platoon, Headquarters Company, RTL-7.
  - (1) Land on order; install, operate and maintain communication for RTL-7 Headquarters.
  - (2) Provide communications guard for all units of RTL-7 in the area of operations.
- b. BLT 3/3. Install, operate and maintain communications to support assigned mission; be prepared to activate link-up communications on circuit D-187.
- c. BLT 2/4. Install, operate and maintain communications to support assigned mission; be prepared to coordinate link-up communications on circuit D-187.
- d. BLT 3/7. Install, operate and maintain communications to support assigned mission.
- e. Fire Support Coordination Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) and Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).
- f. Artillery Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) and Annex E (Artillery Support)

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g. Naval Gunfire Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) and Annex F (Naval Gunfire Support).

h. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) and Annex G (Air Support).

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) During the movement to the objective, assigned shipping will provide communications services for embarked units of the waterborne components.

(2) All units activate radio circuits in accordance with Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).

(3) Code word for this operation is Operation ~~STARLite~~ <sup>STARLite</sup>.

(4) All communications will be in conformance with reference (a), NWIP 16-1 and appropriate JANAPs and ACPs.

(5) No cryptographic devices or publications will be utilized, by subordinate elements of RLT-7, in the objective area except the brevity numerical cipher and authentication codes distributed by RLT-7 Headquarters for this operation.

(6) GMT (Zulu) time on all messages external to RLT-7. Hotel time for all internal messages.

(7) Radio.

(a) Call signs in accordance with Appendix 2 (Call Signs)

(b) Frequency assignments in accordance with Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) and reference (a).

(8) Warning, Visual, Sound and Pyrotechnics. See Appendix 6 to Annex G to reference (a).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Administrative Plan to Operations Order 323-65.

b. BLT's carry one spare dry battery for each radio set and provide for resupply of dry batteries for subordinate and attached units. All wet cell batteries will be fully charged prior to embarkation or emplaning. BLT's provide for resupply of spare wet cell batteries for subordinate and attached units as required.

c. A limited re-charging capability will be maintained at the RLT-7 Headquarters CP for emergency replacement of wet cell batteries.

d. Units making the waterborne landing will perform necessary water-proofing of communications equipment prior to embarkation.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL PRATROSS

Neil M. HANSEN -  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

- 1 Radio Plan
- 2 Call Signs

DISRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 323-65

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 Chu Lai, VietNam  
 170700H Aug 1965  
 0043-65

Appendix I (Radio Plan) to Annex H (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 323-65

Time Zone: H

Unit	Circuit					LEGEND
	3/12	TAOR F30C	Chu Lai	BLT 3/7	BLT 3/4	C - Net Cont X - Guard O - As Required Y - Copy L - Listen
					RLT-7 Hq	
					BLT 3/3	
					BLT 3/4	
					BLT 3/7	
					Chu Lai	
					TAOR F30C	
					3/12	
				X	Div Tac #1 P9254/3A3J/200	
		X			NGF Control/CS SFC Spot P3224/3A3J/100	
					SFC Spot #2 8230/3A3J/100	
					SFC Spot #3 8630/3A3J/100	
					NGF AirSpot #2 3186/6A3/10	
		X			TAR #1 S2196/3A3J/500	
					TAD #2 (Green) S325.0/6A3/25	
					TAD #3 (Purple) P285.8/6A3/25	
					LZ Control 48.3/36F3/1	
					HD #1 (Maroon) S273.8/6A3/25	
					HD#3 P45.1/36F3/16	
					RLT-7 Cmd P2116, S8720/3A3J/200	
					RLT-7 TAC P38.3, S41.6/36F3/16	
					BLT 2/4 Tac #2 (Link-Up) 41.1/36F3/16	
		X			3/12 Cmd Net P7775/3A3J, 0,1A1/200 S27.8/36F3/16	

H-1-1

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Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex H (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 323-65)

Time Zone: H

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Voice Radio Call Sign</u>
CG, 3d MarDiv	Monroe
RLT-7	Starboard
BLT 3/3	Warehouse
BLT 2/4	Sudden Death
BLT 3/7	Skeptic
3/12 (-) (Relief)	Payable
Co B, 3d Engr Bn	Today Bravo
Co B, 1st Tr Bn	Plattsburg
Co B, 3d AT Bn	Morbid
Co A, 1st AmTracBn	Salveborn

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CHU LAI VIETNAM  
170700H Aug 1965

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 323-65

Time Zone: H

CMC (AO3H)	1
FILE	1
CG, FMFPAC	1
CG, III MAF	1
CG, FMAW	1
CG, 3dMarDiv(Fwd)	1
CO, 4th Marines	1
COMPHIBRON 7	3
CO, 3dBn, 3d Marines (for BLT 3/3)	5
CO, 2dBn, 4th Marines (for BLT 2/4)	5
CO, 1stBn, 7th Marines	5
CO, BLT 3/7	5
CO, MAG-12	2
CO, MAG-16	2
CO, MAG-11	2
CO, 3dBn, 11th Marines	5
CO, 3dBn, 12th Marines	5
FILE	20

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see with Redman  
Nator's limp  
found of  
evidence  
officer #119

CMP

Copy \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies  
 RLIT-7  
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM  
 170500H

Embarkation Order 323-65 to Accompany Operation Order 323-65

- Ref: (a) 3rd Mar Div Op Order  
 (b) RLIT-7 Administrative Order 323-65  
 (c) FMFM 4-2  
 (d) FMFPacO P4600.1F (SOP for Embarkation)  
 (e) DivO P4600.1F (SOP for Embarkation)

Time Zone: Hotel

7th Mar S&C Log Nr.

0412-65 Copy #26 of 70

1. Organization for Embarkation

a. General.

- (1) RLIT-7 will commence embarkation of troops, supplies, and equipment on 17 August 65. LSD-16 USS Cabildo is anchored off Red Beach and the LST 1161 USS Vernon Cty or the LST 1157 Terrel Cty will be anchored at Red Beach causeway.
- (2) RLIT-7 will be organized for embarkation into two embarkation units, formed around the major troop organizations.

Embarkation Unit

Unit

1-1

RLIT Hq and 3d Bn 3d Marines

1-2 (Helilift unit)

2d Bn, 4th Marines

b. Assignment to Shipping.

Organization

Ship

(1) RLIT Hqs

LSD-16 USS Cabildo

(2) 3d Bn 3d Marines

LSD-16 USS Cabildo

LST 1157 Terrel Cty

or

LST 1161 Vernon Cty

2. Material to be Embarked.

a. Organic Equipment. See reference (b).

b. Types and Amounts of Supplies. For prescribed load see reference (b).

c. Preparation.

- (1) All vehicles will be mobile loaded to capacity.
- (2) All unit supplies will be palletized to the maximum extent possible.

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(1) Both ships will commence loading on Red Beach at 171400H.

6. Miscellaneous.

a. Loading Reports.

(1) Team embarkation officers will submit loading status reports upon commencement of loading and at 1800, 0800 and 1200 until the completion of loading.

(2) Below listed is the format:

Name and hull number

Alpha (Commenced loading)  
 Papa (% personnel embarked)  
 Charlie (% cargo by class)  
 Victor (% vehicles embarked)  
 Foxtrot (% completion of loading)  
 DTG

(3) Sierra reports will be submitted in accordance with reference (d).

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 CHU LAI, VIETNAM  
 170500H

RLT-7 Administrative Order 323-65 to accompany Operation Order 323-65

Ref: (a) Maps: L701: 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III, 6756 I

Time Zone: Hotel

7th Mar S&C Log Nr.

0413-65 Copy # 32 of 57

1. SUPPLY

a. Sources of Supply.

- (1) Prior to Embarkation - Parent organization for all classes of supply.
- (2) In the Objective Area.
  - (a) Helicopter lifted BLT resupply will be by helicopter controlled by the BLTs.
  - (b) Surface lifted BLT resupply by helicopter and LVT from the LSD-16. BLT 3/3 will furnish resupply support to the RLT Headquarters.
- (3) Any supplies & equipment not available from BLT assets maybe requested from RLT-7.

b. Prescribed loads.

- Class I - ~~One MGI with fuel per man.~~ *AS DIRECTED BY BLT COMMANDER*
- Class II - Combat essential as required by BLT commander.
- Class III - Vehicle tank full, 5 gal cans full.
- Class IV - None.
- Class V - ~~Basic Allowance.~~ *AS DIRECTED BY BLT COMMANDER.*
- Water - Two canteens per man, all water cans full.

c. Supplies and Equipment to be Embarked.

- (1) Prescribed loads.
- (2) Surface lifted BLT will embark one M-54 truck mobile loaded with drummed MOGAS.

d. Supplies and Equipment Available.

- (1) Helicopter lifted BLT will maintain a three day operating level of all classes of supply in their battalion area prepared for Helicopter lift.

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(2) Surface lifted BLT maintain 3 days supplies aboard LSD-16.

e. Plan for landing Supplies.

(1) Supplies and equipment will be mobile loaded to the maximum extent, and landed upon order of the BLTs.

(2) Resupply will be by airlift for the helo lifted BLT and by air or IVT for the surface BLT.

f. Control.

(1) Surface lifted BLT will maintain a TAC-LOG as required aboard the LSD-16.

(2) Helo-lifted BLT resupply will be controlled as required by the BLT.

(3) Floating dumps containing classes I, III, & V will be maintained in IVTs by the surface lifted BLT.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Serious casualties will be evacuated by helicopter directly to Co "B" 3d Medical Battalion *OR USS IWO JIMA.*

b. Minor casualties to BAS by helicopter.

c. BLT 3/3 assume medical responsibilities for the RLT Hq.

d. RLT-7 Hq will furnish <sup>MEDICAL OFFICERS</sup> two ~~doctors~~ to BLT 3/3 BAS.

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. BLT 3/3.

(1) By sea to landing site.

(2) AmTracs and tanks in the objective area.

b. BLT 2/4. By helicopter to objective area.

4. SERVICES - None required.

5. PERSONNEL

a. Strengths - All units will embark at current strengths.

b. Replacements - No replacements.

c. Discipline law and order in accordance with Div Order 5800.9.

d. Prisoners of War.

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- (1) Prisoners of war will be evacuated.
- (2) All captured Vietnamese will be considered prisoners of war until interrogated by the S-2 section.

e. Graves Registration.

- (1) No deceased personnel will be buried in the zone of operation.
- (2) All deceased personnel will be processed in accordance with DivO (Forward) 3040.2.

f. Morale and Personal Services.

- (1) Decorations, Medals & Awards processed in accordance with DivO (Forward) 1650.1 upon conclusion of the operation.
- (2) Informational services. Each BMT will take informational services personnel with their Headquarters to gather information for future releases.

g. Personnel Procedures.

- (1) All personnel will wear dog tags (including blood type) and geneva convention cards.

h. Miscellaneous.

- (1) Combat Casualty Reporting will be in accordance with DivO (Forward) 3040.2 through the parent battalion.
- (2) Uniform as prescribed by BMT commanders.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. This order is effective upon receipt and execute upon order.
- b. All personnel will carry a minimum of three days supply of salt and halizone tablets.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL PEATROSS

*Neil M. Hansen*

NEIL M. HANSEN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

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HEADQUARTERS  
 1st Battalion, 7th Marines  
 Marine #13  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF (FWD)  
 P.O. San Francisco, California  
 96604

1ST BN, 7TH MARINES

0221-65

3: RDK:cp  
 3000  
 27 Aug 1965

Copy#	File#
4 of 35	BN Plans

7th Mar SMC Log Nr.
0429-65 Copy# 3 of 5

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: After Action Report # 1, Operation STARLIGHT

1. General

a. Identification of Units involved:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF.	ENL.	OFF.	ENL.
1st Bn (Rein) 7th Mar	51	1130	3	42
1st Bn, 7th Mar	43	989	2	42
3d Plt, Co B, 3d AT Bn	1	15	0	0
1st Plt, Co C, 1st AT Bn	1	12	0	0
Det, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st AmtracBn	0	4	0	0
Det, Btry G, 3d Bn, 11th Mar	4	18	0	0
SEEP, HqBtry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar	0	2	1	0
1st Plt, Co C, 1st Engr Bn	1	21	0	0
Det, 3d IIT	0	2*	0	0
Det, ARVN (Interpreters)	0	2*	0	0
Dog Teams	0	3*	0	0
1st Plt, Co C, 1st Recon Bn	1	22	0	0

b. Dates of Action: 201315H Aug 65 to 242015H Aug 65.

c. Place of Action: Van Tuong Village Complex, South Vietnam (Quang Ngai Province), and Van Tuong Peninsula.

d. Casualties

- (1) Friendly: 2 DOW, 3 WIA.
- (2) Enemy: 4 KIA, 3 WIA.

e. Nature of Action

- (1) Search and clear. (20-23 Aug)
- (2) Reconnaissance in force. (24 Aug).

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\* includes ARVN pers (1 IIT, 2 interps, 2 dog tms)

ENCLOSURE (9)

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 2. Narrative account of Action

a. At 200900H Aug 65, 1st Bn, 7th Mar received a warning order from Hq, 7th Mar to be prepared to move that day by LVT, landing craft, or helicopter and join 7th Mar for Operation SPARLIGHT. Preparations were initiated.

b. The move commenced at 200315H Aug 65 with a small command group. 1st Bn, 7th Mar joined 3rd Bn, 3rd Mar Headquarters at coordinates BS 70594. After the command group, rifle companies landed in the order of Co A, Co B, and Co D. Co C was to have been diverted to the 7th Marines CP for CP security at coordinates BS 705926; however, by mistake Co C was landed with the rest of 1st Bn, 7th Mar and later marched on foot after dark to the 7th Marines CP.

c. At 201802H, the Bn CO issued his operation order for the following day. Co A was ordered to search and clear Van Tuong 2. Co D was ordered to search and clear Van Tuong 3. Co B was to be prepared on order to search and clear Van Tuong 1.

d. The first night of operations was quiet except for one incident of sniper fire in the Co A sector of defense at 202300H. Co A defended the western half of the Bn perimeter, Co D defended the eastern half of the perimeter. The sniper fire was returned without casualties on either side.

e. At 202355H Aug 65, a 5" shell from U. S. Naval Gunfire landed on the eastern edge of the Bn perimeter, resulting in 2 friendly DOW in Co D and 1 friendly WIA in Co B. The cause of the accident is as of this date unknown.

f. On the second day of operations, Co D departed the Bn perimeter at 210700H to search and clear Van Tuong 3. Throughout the day Co D encountered moderate to heavy sniper fire in the village, resulting in two VC KIA in the village and one Marine WIA (non-critical abdominal wound). The village contained about 200 civilians, mostly old men, women, and children. The villagers were terrified and reluctant in response to the search and clear activities. Entrenchments were found on the rim of the village. Inside the village there were numerous individual shelter caves and dugouts. Only about 3 large caves were found. All caves that would lend themselves to concealed storage were destroyed by demolitions. The villagers were found to be very poor; so poor in fact that they reported that the VC did not tax them. Villagers reported that the VC would not permit anyone to possess more than 30 pounds of rice at any one time. All adults were interviewed through the interpreter and ITT. Villagers reported that the VC village cadre had departed the village the night before, headed in the direction of Binh Son, and taking along with them the Village Chief, an old man who was described as a VC puppet.

g. Co A departed the Bn perimeter at 210835H to search and clear Van Tuong 2. While enroute to the village the company encountered and killed one VC sniper at coordinates BS703937. Upon arrival at the scene, the company found that the sniper's weapon had been taken away.

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Co D searched and cleared Van Tuong 2 throughout the day, receiving light to moderate sniper fire resulting in one VC KIA in Van Tuong 2. Co D returned to the perimeter just after dark.

h. On the afternoon of 21 Aug, Co B wounded a VCS who ran out of the bushes in front of the perimeter. He was unarmed. The wounded VCS was evacuated for medical treatment.

i. At 211730H, the Bn CO issued the operation order for the following day, calling for search and clear operations in Van Tuong 1 and 4. At 212235H, 7th Marines Frag Order 4-65 was received by message confirming the next day's mission.

j. At 220630H, Co C departed the Bn perimeter to seize and occupy the high ground south of Van Tuong 1. Objective C (coords BS 698955 to BS 704955) was secured by 220925H. Objective B (coords BS 694954) was secured by 220940H. Co C reported wounding two VC snipers while seizing these objectives (unconfirmed). As Co C was seizing Objective B, Co B advanced from the Bn perimeter to conduct the search and clear operation. Meanwhile, from 220630H through 220830H, Air strikes, artillery, and Naval Gunfire interdicted the high ground to the north, east, and west of Van Tuong 1 in order to block the escape of any VC in the village. Co B began search and clear of the village at 220955H.

k. Van Tuong 1 (centered at coords BS 698955) was found to be heavily fortified. The village was encircled with a trench line and double apron fence. The village streets had panji traps for personnel and vehicles, as well as spider traps. There were numerous hand-painted wooden Anti-American signs. There were very numerous caves throughout the village, most of which were destroyed by demolitions. Some 5 tons of rice, corn, potatoes, barley and other foodstuffs were found in large storage jars, obviously not personal stores. These were destroyed. Most of these supplies were found in the vicinity of coordinates BS 698957. Other items found in village caves included an AR-RNC 10 Radio with associated equipment, together with numerous VC documents, munitions, manuals, letters, and propaganda materials. Some 578 civilians were processed and interviewed. These people were generally terrified and reluctant at first, but settled down after it became apparent that the Marines would not harm them. Villagers reported that uniformed VC, part of a training company, and armed with carbines had billeted in the village and departed 10 days previously. A team of war dogs were used during the village search and succeeded in locating a VC den in a cave. The Sergeant in charge of the dog team stated he had not seen such extensive fortifications and tunnels anywhere in Vietnam (14 months in country) except in Zone D. The only incident of enemy fire in the village occurred in a cave where VCS fired at Marines in a cave. These VCS were never found. Co B did, however, capture 3 VCS during the day in caves. One of these later turned out to be a VC hard core leader, another turned out to be a resident cadre guerrilla. Co B returned to the Battalion perimeter just after dark without completing the search and clear operation in Van Tuong 1.

l. At 220930H, the Battalion CO ordered 1st Platoon, Co C, 1st Recon Bn to establish surveillance over Van Tuong 4 (coordinates BS 722953). Subsequently, Co D departed the Bn perimeter at 221235H to

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conduct search and clear operations in Van Tuong 4. A vehicle breakdown caused a delay in Co D's progress, requiring that Co D establish a perimeter defense at coordinates BS 731954 for the night and continue search and clear operations the following day with the Recon Platoon attached.

m. On the night of 22 August at about 2200H, small arms fire was received and returned on the Bn perimeter. No casualties on either side.

n. At 222200H, 7th Mar Frag Order 5-65 was received directing 1stBn to continue search and clear operations in Van Tuong 1 and Van Tuong 4 the next day, and also to conduct a two-company search and clear operation southward parallel to the coastline from Van Tuong 4 to Green Beach (coordinates BS 718923). This order also directed that all wheeled and tracked vehicles be delivered to Green Beach by 231200H. The Bn CO issued his operation order for the following day.

o. At 230920H, Co C and a small command group from Bn Hq arrived at Van Tuong 4 to join forces with Co D for the coastal search and clear operation. Co D was still searching and clearing Van Tuong 4. It was found that most of the village had been burned out by alleged napalm air strikes on 18 August, and that there were several civilian casualties in the village. Two of these casualties were evacuated by helicopter for medical treatment. Villagers were terrified at first but calmed down after seeing that the Marines meant no harm to them. Villagers also reported that the VC always arrived in the village at night and departed early in the mornings. No fortifications were found, only small family shelters. Villagers reported that the village was VC controlled and that the Village Chief was a VC (not present). Some 35 young males were singled out in the village and closely interviewed. None were VC. Company corpsmen set up a treatment station at the village well and treated numerous civilians, most of whom had skin diseases.

p. At 230920H, a message was received from 7th Marines Hq to cancel the coastal search and clear mission towards Green Beach as prescribed in 7th Marines Frag Order 5-65. Consequently, upon completion of the search and clear mission in Van Tuong 4, Co D and Co C returned to the Bn perimeter at 231410H.

q. The orders for the following day were received from Hq, 7thMar on the evening of 23 August. The Bn CO issued his operation order the same evening.

r. 1stBn, 7thMar commenced a reconnaissance in force from the Bn perimeter at coordinates BS 705945 to a beach pickup point at coordinates BT 635024 at 240640H. Co A initially led the Bn tactical column, occupied Check Point 2 (coordinates BS 675986) to support by fire the advance of Co C to Check Point 3 (coordinates BS 668992). At Check Point 3 the Bn was resupplied with water by helicopter. After water resupply, Co C supported by fire the advance of Co B to Check Point 4 (coordinates BT 650005). Check Point 4 was subjected to an airstrike, using 500-lb bombs and strafing, prior to Co B moving out. After seizure of Check Point 4, Co B led the Battalion to the beach, where 23 LVT's were waiting to transport the troops to the Chu Lai Enclave. The last elements of the

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Bn boarded LVT's at 241910H, and arrived at Chu Lai (coordinates BT 565044) at 242015H. The Battalion established an assembly area on the beach for the night.

s. Throughout the reconnaissance in force mission, there were no encounters with VC or VCS. An aerial observer was on station at all times throughout the march. 1st Platoon, Co C, 1st Recon Bn was deployed by hoptr in advance of the Bn tactical column at Check Points 2, 3, and at the beach.

### 3. Commentary

a. War dogs can be very useful in locating personnel hiding in caves. Although 1st Bn, 7th Mar was able to use War Dogs on only one brief occasion, the potential for their successful employment in counterguerrilla operations was manifestly apparent..

b. When moving through guerrilla country, an aerial observer is invaluable, especially in preventing a surprise attack or in locating targets.


c. There is a need for higher levels of command to issue orders on a more timely basis than was experienced in Operations Starlight. Orders were issued late in the evening, making it difficult to issue orders and carry out troop leading steps at the small unit level. Similarly, plans were changed on 24 August after forces were already deployed and committed to the original plan. This change in plan was apparently not caused by enemy action.

d. More concern must be given to the safety of villages. Instances were noted where villages were severely damaged or destroyed by napalm or naval gunfire, wherein the military necessity of doing so was dubious.

*James P. Kelly*  
JAMES P. KELLY

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*Enclosure (8)*







Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: Hotel

Enclosure (9) D-3 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RLT-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STABLET)

ENCLOSURE (9)




Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 sheets 6736 I, 6737 II, III

Time Zone: Hotel

Enclosure (10) D+4 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
RLM-7 After action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLITE)


ENCLOSURE (10)



Maps: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, 6757 II, III

Time Zone: H

Enclosure (11) D+5 Disposition of Units Overlay to  
HLR-7 After Action Report 1-65 (Operation STARLINE)



Map 1-5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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Enclosure (12) Route of March of BIL 1/7 Overlay to  
BIL-7 After Action Report 1-65. (Operation 1-65)

ENCLOSURE (12)

[REDACTED] Problems, Comments and Recommendations [REDACTED]

1. S-1

a. Prisoners Of War

(1) Based on the planned short duration of the problem, previous experience, and helicopter availability, prisoners were to be evacuated direct from the battalions to the POW Stockade at Chu Lai. There was no plan to have a central stockade within the landing force objective area. As planned, this system worked satisfactorily for the first two days. However, in that operation STARLITE had been so successful during the first two day in destroying the Viet Cong's main force 1st Regiment, the decision was made to extend the operation and to conduct a thorough search of the area in order to locate enemy weapons, stores, and items of intelligence value. When the operation was extended each day the number of prisoners increased beyond that which had been predicted. As the availability of helicopters was reduced, the POWs increased, and as the duration of the problem was further extended, battalions were no longer furnished adequate numbers of helicopters to handle their POWs. The POWs were then sent to the RLT CP. Although the RLT Headquarters satisfactorily handled the POW situation, it nevertheless strained the already overtaxed small tactical headquarters, as the POWs could not be evacuated immediately, and as most POWs had to be retained overnight. Based on the aforementioned method evacuating prisoners into Chu Lai, the MP Platoon organic to RLT-7 Headquarters, was assigned to the understrength BLT 2/4 as there was no planned use for their services in the RLT-7 CP complex. Further, these MPs were retracted with BLT 2/4 on D+2.

(2) Recommendation. That in an extended operation that provisions be made by regimental or higher level for collecting, safeguarding, and evacuation of POWs by means in addition to helicopters. This is necessary as there may be times that helicopters cannot fly and times when other priorities preclude evacuation of POWs by helicopters. Also, due to frequent movement of battalion command posts, the battalion headquarters should seldom be anymore than a way-station;

b. Civial Affairs.

(1) Comment. Due to the expected short duration of the operation, no provisions were made in the planning phase for prolonged control, safeguarding, and welfare of the refugees. It was expected that civilians encountered would be screened for arms, etc., by the searching and clearing unit, and then held in a temporary local collecting point. Initially, refugees were controlled and provided with water by BLT Headquarters. Later, however, this was accomplished for some units by the RLT Headquarters. Moreover, this situation was complicated by the fact the first attempts to evacuate civilians from danger areas was difficult as they were frightened and initially distrustful of Marines.

(2) Recommendation. Since it is reasonable to expect that civilians will always be present on the Vietnamese battlefield, our policy of humane treatment of the civilian victims of war dictates that we be prepared to feed and provide medical treatment. To facilitate this, it is recommended that civil affairs with an English speaking Vietnamese civil official accompany the senior headquarters on independent operations such as Operation "STARLITE". These teams should be trained and equipped to provide food and medical treatment to civilians, so as to not drain the military resources that are designed to support the operational forces.

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Enclosure (13)

c. Control of Civilian News Media.

(1) Comment. The planned duration of Operation "STARLITE" was so short that had it ended as planned, undoubtedly no correspondents/photographers would have been present during the operation. For this reason, no provisions were made to control or brief them. However, due to the noteworthy success of the operation and its extended duration, on D+2 newsmen began to arrive in the RLT-7 CP complex in large groups. Although notice was given of their coming, there was no PIO or any one person available solely for them. Therefore, the CO, S-3, S-2, S-1, briefed small groups when their time permitted and others wandered through the CP taking photos and gathering their opinions from many persons with whom they talked.

(2) Recommendation. That arrangements be made for a liaison officer from higher headquarters to accompany the operating unit. It is recommended that this officer be aware of the Marine Corps policy in dealing with the press. He could further advise the subordinate units via the S-1 on the arrival of the newsmen in their area and what information they are authorized to receive.

2. S-2a. Prisoner Collection Activity and ITT Operations.

(1) Comment. Arrangements were made to use the 4th Marines stockade at Chu Lai, as RLT-7 landed two days before the operation and had no stockade of its own. As the operation was extended so was the magnitude of the prisoner handling. In the absence of a central collecting point, control of prisoner collecting broke-down.

(2) Recommendation. That there must be established in the AOA a prisoner collecting point to which all prisoners must be sent without exception for initial interrogation by ITT. ITT results are then immediately available to local commanders.

b. Effective Utilization of Division Reconnaissance.

(1) Comment. The concept of Operation "STARLITE" precluded employing division reconnaissance in their doctrinate role.

(2) Recommendation. In rapid situations such as this, it is necessary to employ more unconventional concepts. Reconnaissance personnel's special skills can be more fully utilized by employing them in the search aspects of operations as often the infantry elements move through a hamlet under conditions which do not permit a complete search or neutralization of the area. Under these conditions reconnaissance teams can follow in trace and prevent enemy sniping from the rear and accomplish more thorough search and destroy missions. Reconnaissance units also have a demolition capability which can amplify the search and destroy capability of the infantry. Additionally, reconnaissance teams can be inserted into areas of likely enemy escape. With close coordination with the FSCC, fire power can be brought to bear on specific targets as the enemy attempts to escape.

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3. S-3a. Direct Air Support Center.

(1) Comment. Since the RLT-7 Headquarters landed in Viet Nam only two days prior to commencement of planning and was not established ashore, the division DASC had to be satellited on the 4th Marines FSCC, hence DASC was not in the AOA or under the operational control of the Landing Force Commander (LFC). However, the USS BAYFIELD (APA-53), which might have housed the DASC, was not assigned as flagship until late D-1. Since the DASC was established and the operation was to secure in two days, it was felt that a late shift would be inadvisable. While this was sufficient for the planned short term operation, it became unwieldy as Operation "STARLITE" was extended up to seven days.

(2) Recommendation. That the established doctrine of establishing DASC in the AOA under the LFC not be modified except in emergencies. In such cases, it may be advisable to make the AOA a restricted air space, and place aircraft in the air under control of the Landing Force Air Officer.

b. Tactical Situation.

(1) Comment. Due to the necessity of speed of execution for Operation "STARLITE," only local forces were available to be employed. The initial reserve, the SLF composed of BLT 3/7, could not arrive in the AOA until the afternoon of D-Day. As the enemy was trapped and forced to stand and fight on D-Day, all Marine units became quickly engaged. As a result, there were insufficient troops available to cover the RLT-7 zone of action to prevent all the enemy from escaping from the encirclement on the night of D-Day.

(2) Recommendation. Insert reconnaissance teams into areas of likely enemy escape. With close coordination with the FSCC, fire power can be brought to bear on the enemy as he attempts to escape from the battle area.

c. Destroy Operations.

(1) Comment. Although it was anticipated that there would be a requirement for demolitions in this search and destroy operation of the planned duration, the fortifications exceeded all expectations and emergency orders went back to Chu Lai for additional demolitions, and the remainder of the engineer company. As the problem was extended, even more fortifications were discovered, and due to time and personnel available, not all fortifications could be destroyed.

(2) Recommendation. That a destruction list be established much the same as a priority of targets list.

(3) Problem. Due to its high detonating velocity, TNT was only marginally satisfactory for destroying underground structures.

(4) Recommendation. That the more suitable cratering charges, shape charges and bangalore torpedoes be used to destroy underground structures.

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Enclosure (13)

Tank and LVT Employment

(1) Problem. The necessity of having elements of two different tank battalions resulted in the loss of the advantages of training together and working together. This was not unacceptable in planning, because the different tank elements were supporting a different battalions. However, when these two different tank elements were brought together under hostile fire, immediate coordination did not exist.

(2) Recommendation. That when it becomes necessary to employ combat support elements from different parent organizations, regardless of initial employment, that provisions be made for central control.

(3) Problem. In warfare such as this, where there are no front lines and no safe rear areas, encounter with the enemy must be expected at any time and any place.

(4) Recommendation. That units requesting non-air transportable support from the "rear" such as tracked and wheeled vehicles, provide the necessary guides and security for their movement to the requesting unit.

S-4.

a. Supply

(1) Comment. When orders were received for this operation, it was as has been mentioned previously, planned that it would last 24-48 hours. Supplies and equipment were ordered, issued and stockpiled on that basis, utilizing a safety factor of two days' extra supplies. As the original operation was so successful, it was decided to extend it for the purpose of making a detailed search of the area. Additional supplies and equipment were ordered from the Force Logistics Support Unit (FLSU) at Chu Lai on a daily basis.

(a) Methods of Supply.

1 Originally, plans were made to supply BLT 3/3, the surface lifted BLT, from the primary control ship (PCS) by means of helicopters and amphibian tractors. The helilifted battalion, BLT 2/4, was to be supplied entirely by helicopters from the battalion rear at Chu Lai. Supply from the PCS, wherein the TAC-LOG was embarked, worked smoothly and efficiently.

2 When the operation was extended, there was soon a shortage of helicopters as they had been only scheduled for the original short period. Consequently, BLT 2/4 could not be supported entirely by helicopters. The PCS then became the primary source of supply for both BLTs. Had the operation lasted as planned, helicopters would have been a feasible method of supply. Resulting from the extension of the operation and associated shortage of helicopters it became necessary to establish an RLT supply dump in the RLT-7 CP complex for all units. This dump then maintained a two day supply of MIC rations, Class V and as much water as could be stored. The BLTs were supplied from this dump by helicopters and LVT's. This establishment and use of this dump saved much time and effort since helicopters and tractors could be loaded faster from this dump than they could from the PCS.

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ENCLOSURE (13)

## b. Operation of the TAC-LOG.

Landing force supplies were located on the same ship as the TAC-LOG. The PCS, the USS Cabildo (LSD-16), was utilized so that helicopters could land on the superdeck and LVTs could swim aboard for supplies. This method of resupply proved to be extremely efficient. With supplies embarked on the LSD, less time was lost as in the usual method of landing supplies by small boat, despite the slower speed of the LVTs as the LVTs were moved inland to the RLT supply dump and frequently directly to the user.

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2) Recommendation.

(a) That if the situation permits, embark landing force supplies on the PCS.

(b) That the PCS be assigned as LVT haven.

(c) That an LSD with a superdeck be utilized as PCS, and that its helo platform not be used for landing force supplies and equipment.

(3) Comment. The supply of water proved to be the largest logistics problem encountered. As there were not enough helicopters available to accomplish the supply missions, although there were more water cans than authorized by TE, there was still a shortage of water cans and this further complicated the problem. Units normally hold enough water cans to carry two gallons of water per man day. This is inadequate in this climate at this date on fast moving operations where trailers cannot be deployed. Another problem associated with water supply was collecting empty cans from the using units. Over 1500 gallons of water per day were supplied to units of the RLT. The PCS was used as the water point. For a considerable period of time during the seven days of the operation, the ship was forced to go on water hours because of the amount of water being furnished the RLT. Some water was resupplied by helicopter, but the bulk of it was resupplied by LVT. A very efficient method of water resupply was developed. The LVTs were floated into the well deck with empty cans loaded and open. A two-inch water hose was lowered into the tractor and the cans were filled in place without having to manhandle them, thus saving precious time and manpower.

(4) Recommendation.

(a) That any unit coming into Viet Nam and particularly in operations outside an enclave, bring enough water cans to provide four gallons per man per day. This will allow the RLT dumps to stockpile water and cut down on shortages and avoid frantic resupply runs to water points.

(b) That front line commanders be impressed with the fact that if empty cans are not collected and returned, that their units cannot be resupplied with water. Along this line, lister bags can be employed where the situation permits. The water cans can be emptied into the lister bags and returned in the same transportation that brought them.

b. Battery Charger for BB-451 Battery.

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(5) Comment. Since the operation was expected to be of short duration, the battery charger for the BB-451 was not taken. As Operation "STARLITE" was extended communications suffered for lack of charged batteries.

(1) Recommendation.

(a) That a battery charger for the BB-451 be taken on an operation regardless of its anticipated duration.

(b) That a pool of approximately 20-30 BB-451's be set up in the Chu Lai enclave. Under normal circumstances, the T/E allowance is adequate but when a heavy demand for information is placed on a unit conducting combat operations and the available helicopters are already overburdened with casualty evacuations and other priority missions, the normal supply of batteries becomes totally inadequate. Since it is not envisioned that continual operation would exist in the majority of operations conducted it is not considered to be economical to solve the problem by increasing the units' allowance of BB-451's.

c. PIQ5 Portable Public Address System.

(1) Comment. Each battalion rates two PIQ5 Portable Public Address Systems. It was found that this number is insufficient and there should be enough PIQ5's available for platoon search and clear operations. This will enable the searching units of platoon size to inform civilians of their intention to search houses and caves and further enable the platoon to advise the civilians of action to take. Moreover this unit has multiple usage and can be used in training, riot control, and in similar usages.

(2) Recommendation.

(a) To increase the infantry battalion allowance of PIQ5's to 12 or one per platoon.

(b) Recognizing that the availability of interpreters may not be that of the increased allowance, it is further recommended that prepared tapes be recorded to be used with the PIQ5 so that interpreters will not be required for each address system and thus enable the platoon to tell civilians that they will not be harmed, they will be fed, etc.

d. Smoke Grenades.

(1) Comment. Before the operation began the Force Logistic Support Unit (FLSU) at Chu Lai exhausted its supply of green and yellow smoke grenades, which are essential items in the employment of helicopters. By the end of the first day the supply was exhausted. A request to Logistic Support Group (LSG) brought sufficient supplies by the end of the second day.

(2) Recommendation. That larger stocks of these items be maintained at the FLSU in Chu Lai not only for operations such as Operation "STARLITE" but also for the use in defense of the enclave.

e. Flashlights.

(1) Comment. It was learned on Operation "STARLITE" that there were not nearly enough flashlights available in RLT allowance for searching caves and tunnels.

(2) Recommendation. That at least one flashlight per squad be made available for this purpose.

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f. Medical Evacuation.

(1) Comment. Plans were to evacuate all minor casualties to the battalion aid station (BAS) and all major casualties to Company B, 3d Medical Battalion, since it had a complete surgical team. When the LPS arrived on station off the landing beach, serious casualties were to be evacuated to the LPH. Nevertheless, at one point when action was at its greatest there was a casualty overload at Company B because casualties were occurring so fast that all wounded, whether slight or serious, were taken to Company D. For a short period after this, all cases, both serious and slight, were sent to the BAS.

(2) Recommendation. That helicopter crew chiefs and all medical personnel be briefed on evacuation plans prior to the operation rather than rely completely on corpsmen and small unit leaders who may not be readily available to provide guidance at the time of the medical evacuation.

g. Transportation.

(1) Problem. Initially no organic transportation was taken on the operation. Reliance was placed on LVTs and helicopters. When the last ELT entered the operation, wheeled vehicles were brought in. Because of poor trafficability they were of negative value in that they presented a problem of having to be secured as well as prolonging embarkation.

(2) Recommendation. That a minimum of M-274 (mules) be taken for water resupply of companies and that a M-274 be used by the RLT supply camp for the staging of supplies in the helicopter landing zone.

h. Maintenance.

(1) Problem. Due to the planned short duration of the operation, no maintenance services were provided for, and all material casualties had to be evacuated to the PCS.

(2) Recommendation. That on prolonged and large size operations, contact repair teams in all commodity fields should be stationed aboard the PCS. For operations of short duration that a maintenance float be utilized.

5. Communications.a. Division Communication SOP.

(1) Comment. The limited time available for planning resulted in a requirement for a great amount of improvising.

(2) Recommendation. That improvising could be facilitated in the future by the following change to the present 3d Marine Division communications operating procedures.

(a) Assign unit radio call signs in accordance with JANAP 119. Not all Naval units are in possession of the Comm-Elec Annex to Generation Order 321A-65, but they are in possession of JANAP's and ACPs.

(b) Use JANAP-195 circuit designators for assigned frequencies. The above comment applies to frequencies also.

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b. LVTP-5 Command Tractor.

(1) Comment. The LVTP-5 Command tractor provides an excellent operating facility for operations of short duration where the terrain restricts the use of wheeled vehicles. However, it lacks the single side band capability.

(2) Recommendation. Install a SSB radio in the LVTP-5 command tractor to net with the AN/RRC-47 and AN/7RC-75.

6. Artillery.a. Organization.

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(1) Problem. Initially a certain amount of confusion and uncertainty in communications on the part of battalion liaison officers (LNO) and forward observers (FO) existed as a result of the changing battalions and having new LNOs and FOs from another artillery organization when the initial BLTs were relieved. Their normally assigned frequencies had to be changed in some cases at the last minute and there was timelost in promulgating this information to all the FOs. The fire support coordination center (FSCC) did it's best to rectify this situation when relief of BLTs passed through RLT Headquarters.

(2) Recommendation. That the frequency assignments of the 7th Marines and 4th Marines be studied for possible reassignment or reconciliation.

b. Damage Assessment.

(1) Comment. Difficulty was experienced in receiving damage assessment reports after each fire mission. There seemed to be reluctance on the part of the battalion LNOs and/or FOs to estimate casualties. They often reported the target "well-covered" but would not state that casualties resulted because they could not see any.

(2) Recommendation. That instruction be given to LNOs and FOs on how to estimate casualties in damage assessment reports.

c. FSCC Operating Spaces

(1) Comment. On fast moving, short duration problems, a LVTP-5 command tractor is well suited for FSCC operations, especially due to the lack of time required to displace and its ability to function on the move, both on land and in the water.

(2) Recommendation. That on operation such as this, a LVTP-5 command tractor be made available for the FSCC.

d. Shackle Codes.

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(1) Comment. RLT-7 originated shackle codes for subordinate field units on Operation "STARLITE" out of necessity. It was necessary since PacFlt KAC-138 series were apparently not available for issue to RLT-7. While this arrangement sufficed for field units, no provisions existed for communications between naval gunfire support ships until about D+4 (days), when the ships were issued our codes. As a result, many items of information had to be transmitted in the clear despite the security risks.

(2) Recommendation. That should a similar situation exist in future operation not utilizing joint service shackle sheets, provisions be made for ensuring that NGF support ships that are assigned on short notice are provided same.

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