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HEADQUARTERS
7th Marines

1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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9 October 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 September 1967 to 30 September 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 7570.2
(b) FMF PacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) 7th Marines Command Chronology
(2) 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Command Chronology
(3) 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Chronology
(4) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Chronology

Filed Sep

7th Marines

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosures (1) through (4) are submitted.

T J Bohannon
T. J. BOHANNON
BY DIRECTION

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California, 96602

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 September 1967 to 30 September 1967

INDEX

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- PART II Narrative Summary
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Enclosure (1)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

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7th Marines, 1st Marine Division
(Rein), FMF

COMMANDER

Col R. R. MINER
035874 USMC
(1-30 Sep67)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company, 7th Marines

Capt G. A. SHAVER
082539 USMGR
(1-30 Sep67)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

LtCol J. D. ROWLEY
053367 USMC
(1-14 Sep67)

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines

LtCol W. J. DAVIS
049480 USMC
(14-30 Sep67)

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines

LtCol J. R. LOVE
051951 USMC
(1-30 Sep67)

2. Location. 1-30 September 1967 DA NANG.

3. Staff Officers - Headquarters, 7th Marines.

ExecO	LtCol R. E. JOHNSON 045285 USMC	1-2 Sep 67
	LtCol T. J. BOHANNON 021354 USMC	3-30 Sep 67
S-1	Capt D. R. MUNCIE 085517 USMC	1-30 Sep 67
S-2	Maj T. C. HOUSTON 070875 USMC	1-30 Sep 67
S-3	Maj L. A. PREBLE 070447 USMC	1-21 Sep 67
	Maj J. L. BIEGLER 066172 USMC	22-30 Sep 67
S-4	Maj J. L. BIEGLER 066172 USMC	1-7 Sep 67
	Maj M. A. SWEITZER JR. 074708 USMC	8-30 Sep 67
S-5	Capt R. T. JOHNSON JR. 073652 USMC	1-30 Sep 67

4. Average Monthly Strength.

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>USN</u>
135		3482	9	

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ENL
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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. Narrative summaries by each battalion are contained in their chronologies.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. TOPICS.a. Personnel and Administration.

(1) Administration. No significant changes.

(2) Personnel. During this reporting period operations consisted of processing assignments of 293 replacements, 430 Rest and Recuperation quotas being allocated and filled, administration of 254 rotatees, processing of 19 recommendations for personal awards, processing of 7 meritorious combat promotions requests and 4 requests for Hardship Discharge.

(3) Casualties Sustained.

(a) There were 144 combat casualties during the month of which 10 were KIA's and 134 were WIA's.

(b) There were 4 non-battle casualties.

b. Enemy, Weather and Terrain.

(1) Significant Reports.

(a) During the month of September a large number of low level agent reports were received indicating the continued presence of VC Battalion and company size units in the ARIZONA area. These reports were substantiated by numerous sightings of small enemy units by Recon and contacts by our organic units.

(b) Numerous reports were received of VC units with rockets planning to attack the DA NANG Airbase.

(c) The interrogation of NGUYEN VAN LONG, wounded and captured by "M" Battery 4/11 in the attack on the M-4-11 position on the morning of 2 September revealed that LONG was a member of the R-21 Company of the R-20 Battalion. LONG enlisted in the NVA in North Vietnam in April 1966 and arrived in DAI LOC District QUANG NAM Province on 28 September 1966 as a replacement in the R-20. The R-20 is reportedly located in the Operation ARIZONA area. During the last part of August, LONG stated that the R-21 Company swam the SONG VU GIA River at HA NHA vic AT 806544 and moved along the edge of the mountains to the area of AT 8780. Their mission was to destroy all American outposts, positions, and CP's along the northwestern

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edge of the 1st Division TAOR. The attack on M-4-11 is the only action attributable to the R-21 during September.

(d) The interrogation of NGUYEN VAN XUAN, captured by F-2-7 on the night of 20 September revealed that XUAN was a member of the 3rd Platoon, 70th Company of the 1002 Battalion. The 1002 Battalion consists of the 167th, 168th, 68th and 70th infantry companies and the 69th artillery company. XUAN stated that the 1002 Battalion arrived at TRO NIEU Mountains in HOA VANG District on or about 25 July 1965. XUAN and a detail of 4 had come from the mountains vicinity AT 823888 to get supplies at the village of THUY TU and was returning when captured. XUAN joined the VC in October 1965 in DAI LOC District with the 1002 Battalion. XUAN states that the 1002 is at full strength with good supplies and good morale.

(e) New units reported to be operating within the TAOR are the 1002 Battalion in HOA VANG District and an unidentified Battalion in Operation ARIZONA area.

(2) Operations. One major operation was conducted during the month of September. Operation YAZOO was conducted by the 1st Bn, 7th Marines during the period 26 August to 5 September with light enemy contact. Operation YAZOO resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and one individual weapon captured. The major accomplishment of Operation YAZOO was the discovery and search of the East-West trail network utilized by the VC from Happy Valley into the vital area of the DA NANG Airbase complex.

(3) VC Activity.

(a) VC activity within the TAOR was moderate with a total of 181 Marine and VC initiated incidents and 74 mine and booby trap incidents.

(b) There were two rocket attacks during September. On 2 September, a coordinated attack was launched against the FLC compound at Red Beach and the DA NANG Airbase. Twenty 122mm rockets impacted at the FLC compound from firing positions at AT 854851 and AT 852780. Simultaneously, 9 140mm rockets impacted along the southeastern edge of the DA NANG Airbase from a firing position at AT 964674. On 9 September an abortive attack was launched against the DA NANG Airbase. Three 140mm rockets impacted in the eastern-central portion of the airbase from a firing position at AT 963687. The reaction force that searched the launch area found 8 unfired rockets and 11 launchers. The "Fire Arrow" alert has been in effect throughout the month of September and continues at this time.

(c) There were three acts of terrorism reported during September. On September 3 the village of GO DAU AT 927837 was burned and 1 Vietnamese woman was killed by 32 VC armed with K-44 rifles and M-79's. On 10

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September a Vietnamese woman was killed by 1 VC with an AK-47 for giving Popular Force troops information concerning VC activities. On 26 September the village chief of HOA VINH AT 988773 was assassinated in a well coordinated attack by an estimated 10-12 VC.

(d) At 060200H, a 30 meter section of Liberty Bridge AT 927533 was destroyed by an unknown type explosive device. The explosion appeared to have occurred either at water level or below. No enemy fire or movement was observed and indications are that the VC employed divers to plant the device.

(e) At 140310H, a force of 30-40 VC unsuccessfully attacked the Popular Force defending the bridge at AT 926867. The position received 20 82mm mortar rounds and A/W fire resulting in 2 Popular Forces soldiers killed and 1 wounded. E/2/7 sent a reaction force and mortar and artillery fire was directed onto likely withdrawal routes.

(f) AT 181835H, the E/2/7 platoon position providing security for the MCB rock crusher at AT 887955 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from AT 883943. Six Marines and 1 Sea-Bee were wounded but did not require evacuation.

(4) Regimental Intelligence Section Activities.

(a) Normal administrative and Combat Intelligence functions were carried out during the month. On 25 September the assistant S-2 and the intelligence chief attended a meeting in HOI AN which discussed Infrastructure Coordination Evaluation Exploitation (ICEX). This program is a concerted effort against VC infrastructure by the National Police Agency, QUANG DA Military Special Sector, the Census Grievance agency and the local DOICC's. This information and administrative matters were discussed at a meeting called by the Regimental S-2 with the Battalion S-2's on 30 September.

(b) A Regimental detainee collection point has been constructed at Hill 55. Eight military policemen have been attached to Hq Co, 7th Marines for the operation and security of the collection point.

(c) The 9th Interrogation Translation Team has completed construction of facilities at Hill 55 and continues to provide Interrogation-Translation support to the 7th Marines.

(5) Weather. Ground operations were not seriously affected by the weather conditions. The number of days with measurable precipitation was 18 with a trace of precipitation on 3 days of the month. Precipitation amounted to 14.74 inches. Maximum, minimum and mean temperatures were 94, 73 and 83.5 degrees respectively. The average relative humidity was 78.

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percent during the month of September.

(6) VC Statistics. Activities in the TAOR resulted in detention of 70 Vietnamese of whom 5 were sent to the III MAF compound as POW. One was sent to the Provincial Interrogation Center at HOI AN and two were evacuated to Medical facilities. The total enemy casualties was 36 KIA confirmed and 99 KIA probable. Weapons captured are as follows:

- (a) 1 M-16
- (b) 1 SMG
- (c) 1 AK-47
- (d) 1 M-14

(7) Terrain. Enclosures (2) through (4) (Battalion Command Chronologies).

c. Organization and Operations.

(1) During this reporting period, the 7th Marines was under the operational control of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

(2) Fire Support.

(a) Artillery. Artillery support during September was normal, except as indicated below:

(1) A provisional composite battery consisting of 2 LVTB-6, 2 155 How, 1 8" How and 1 155 Gun was formed and became OPCON 3rd Bn, 11th Marines on 28 August to provide additional artillery support for ground forces on Operation YAZOO.

(b) Air Support.

Total Requests	307
Total Completed	240
Total Troop Lifts	12
Total Logistic Lifts	45
Prisoners Carried	1
Escorts for Prisoners	1
Liaison Missions	

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Recon Missions	10
Unit Cmdr Missions	9
Staff Missions	18
Tactical Air Requests/Received	34/37
Total Med Evac's Requests	142
Total Med Evac's Completed	135
Total Med Evac Personnel	261
Total Log	140,000 lbs
Total Troops Lifted	721
Cancelled Due to Weather	22
Cancelled Due to Unavailability of A/C	37

(c) Naval Gunfire. During September there was no naval gunfire available.

(3) Significant Operations Conducted.

(a) Operation YAZOO, a search and destroy operation west of the Rocket Belt in the Happy Valley area was conducted from 27 August to 5 September 1967 under the control of the CO, 7th Marines. Additional information is contained in the 1st Bn, 7th Marines Command Chronology.

d. Plans.

(1) Combat Missions Assigned.

(a) 7th Marines has established and maintains a recon screen throughout assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR; conducts unilateral offensive operations within assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR; conducts coordinated, unilateral and combined offensive operations in Division Area of Responsibility and I CTZ as directed; and maintains control of assigned sector of DA NANG TAOR.

(b) When directed, on twelve hour notice, 7th Marines provides one Battalion (rein) for employment anywhere in RVN; with an additional 12 hour notice, provides a regimental headquarters and one or two battalions for employment anywhere in RVN upon commitment of initial battalion.

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(c) 7th Marines is prepared to provide one battalion as division reserve when directed and one company (rein) to Airbase Defense Battalion for defense of DA NANG Airbase and DA NANG East when directed.

(d) 7th Marines ensures coordinated, planned surveillance and interdiction of possible enemy mortar and rocket firing sites within its assigned area and similarly conducts aggressive patrol activities and employs all available assets to interdict and deny use of waterways to the enemy.

(e) 7th Marines provides forces to reinforce threatened Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps, to re-establish such camps in enemy territory if destroyed, and to pursue enemy forces involved in attacks on such camps as necessary.

(f) 7th Marines provides forces to reinforce threatened District Capital and Revolutionary Development cadre, to re-establish such positions in enemy hands and pursue forces involved in attacks on such positions.

(g) 7th Marines is prepared to commit rapidly by helicopters such reinforced units of squad, platoon or company size as appropriate to reinforce friendly units, to protect downed aircraft or drones, and to exploit supporting arms employment.

e. Training.

(1) During September eight men attended Vietnamese language school on OKINAWA and three attended school in DA NANG.

(2) Six men received instruction in Basic Infantry Weapons.

(3) One officer and one enlisted attended Embarkation School on OKINAWA.

(4) Five men attended Basic Ammo Tech school

(5) Fourteen men attended NCO school on OKINAWA.

(6) The Regimental NCO School was temporarily halted during September. It will resume in November.

(7) The 7th Marines had no quotas for Land Mine Warfare School during September.

f. Combined Action Company Program.

(1) The 7th Marines has 12 Combined Action Platoons in its DA NANG TAOR.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~g. Logistics.

(1) Operation YAZOO was terminated on 5 September. The only significant problem was a lack of helicopters which resulted in sporadic re-supply. The ISA was disbanded and all remaining supplies returned to FLC by 7 September.

(2) The Regimental Supply Officer and Motor Transport Officer made Staff Visits to each of the battalions in accordance with the following schedules:

1st Battalion, 7th Marines	5 September
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines	6 September
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines	7 September

The purpose of the visit was to see what action had been taken to correct the discrepancies noted in the Division Supply and Material Readiness Management Team Inspections conducted during August.

(3) On 6 September a list of the key bridges and major equipment required for their defense was submitted to Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

(4) The shortage of sandbags and dogtags which was previously reported as critical was alleviated.

(5) Special allowance requests were submitted for nine (9) additional 81mm mortars for the Regiment.

(6) Over 12,000 lbs of food unfit for human consumption has been delivered to the 3 refugee camps in the eastern portion of the 2/7 TAOR to be used as pig food. The food is delivered on a weekly basis.

(7) One building has been completed at the Orphanage of QUANG LAM. Work continues on other improvements to the orphanage.

i. Communications.

(1) During the period covered by this report, the Communication Platoon conducted no new operations. This unit conducted normal training and communication system improvement.

j. Medical.

(1) A total of 317 Marines were seen at the Regimental Aid Station during the month of September, an increase of 81 from August. There were 6

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cases of Venereal disease reported to Hq Co. No cases of Malaria or FUO were found in Hq personnel.

(2) The Division Surgeon's inspection of the Regimental Aid Station was satisfactory with major discrepancies that was largely related to their request for a new supply and inventory system. Their request has been complied with and the Regimental Aid Station will shortly be ready for reinspection.

(3) During September 112 Vietnamese civilians were brought to the Regimental Aid Station for treatment of severe illness or injury. This MED CAP responsibility is not confined to any specific hours, but rather is available 24 hours a day. The large majority of civilians have either shrapnel or small arms injury.

(4) The health of the Command is excellent.

k. New Techniques Employed. Enclosures (2) through (4), Battalion Command Chronologies.

2. ENTRIES. Tab A (7th Marines Unit Journal for September).

TAB B A/RPT opd PECOS

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20 September 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Subj: Combat After Action Report; Operation PECOS

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1A
(b) Maps: Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6540I, 6541 II
(c) 7th Marines OperO 6-67

Encl: J(1) After Action Report, 1st Bn, 7th Mar
(2) After Action Report, 3rd Bn, 4th Mar
(3) After Action Report, 1st Shore Party Bn
(4) After Action Report, 1st Engr Bn

1. CODE NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION. Operation PECOS, a 7th Marines (-)
(Rein) search and destroy operation.

2. DATES OF OPERATION. 200700H to 270700H July 67.

3. LOCATION. THUONG DUC (Happy Valley).

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. CO, 7th Marines.

5. TASK ORGANIZATION.

7th Mar (-) (Rein)
Hq Co (-) 7th Mar
Det, 7th Comm Bn
Det, Comm Co, Hq Bn
Det Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div
Det, IPT
Det, CIT
Det, MP's
Co H (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 7th Mar

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ENCLOSURE(56)

TAB-B

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LtCol ROWLEY

1st Bn (-) 7th Mar
 FO Tms, Btry G, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar
 Plt, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, EOD
 Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div
 Det, ITT
 Det, CIT
 Det, ISO
 Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar (Scout-Snipers)
 Det, ARVN Intell

3rd Bn (-) (Rein), 11th Mar

LtCol BALZER

Det, Hq Btry
 Btry G
 Btry K (-) (Rein), 4th Bn, 11th Mar
 Plat, 3rd 8" How Btry (SP), 11th Mar
 Plat, 3rd 155 Gun Btry, 11th Mar

Co (Rein), 1st Recon Bn

Capt GARRITY

Logistics Support Unit

Capt LUKER

Det, 1st FSR
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Regimental Reserve

Capt

Co , 2nd Bn, 7th Mar

6. SUPPORTING FORCES.a. Air.(1) Helicopter Support.

(a) Operation PECOS was planned and executed as a completely helicopter supported operation. The assault troops were prepositioned at AN HOA on D-1 to facilitate helicopter refueling and effect a rapid build up of troops in LZ VULTURE. The lift consisted of 570 troops and was completed in 2½ hours utilizing CH-46 aircraft. Only token sniper fire was received by one CH-46, and this was quickly suppressed by HUIE gunships.

(b) Upon securing the LZ, CH-53 aircraft were utilized to heli-lift six 105 Howitzers of "G" Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar into LZ VULTURE. A rapid buildup of artillery ammunition was effected on D-Day and resupply was conducted each day thereafter.

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ing, conducted the LZ prep and provided armed support throughout D-Day in the operation area. One aircraft was assigned as command and control and proved invaluable in affording an opportunity for the Battalion and Company Commanders to conduct aerial reconnaissance.

(2) Fixed Wing Support.

(a) Fixed wing aircraft were used for all LZ preps and effectively neutralized enemy activity in the immediate vicinity of the LZ.

(b) Air strikes were used with success in the destruction of enemy way stations, supply areas and bunkers, which were in defilade from artillery.

(3) Aerial Observation Coverage.

(a) O1 aircraft were used extensively to assist the maneuver elements navigate when the dense jungle canopy limited visibility. Division AC's were used without exception for this type navigation and for general observation in the operation area.

(4) Forward Air Control Team.

(a) An Air Officer or enlisted FAC teams were present with the maneuver element at all times; however, a TAC(A) was necessary for each fixed wing strike because of the reduced visibility in the dense jungle canopy.

(5) Landing Zones.

(a) Landing zone VULTURE initially accommodated 2 CH-46's and during the course of the operation was improved and enlarged to accommodate 8 CH-46's.

(6) General.

(a) The air support furnished by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was timely, accurate, effective, and professional throughout.

b. Artillery. See Enclosure (2).

c. Fire Support Coordination (PECOS).

(1) No significant problems were encountered in fire support coordination.

(2) Liaison representatives from reconnaissance units were located in Infantry Regimental and Battalion Fire Support Coordination centers, which facilitated the coordination between the infantry and reconnaissance elements.

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a. During the two month period prior to operation PECOS, elements of 1st Recon Bn sighted numerous small units of 2-10 VC in the operational area. These units were believed to be infiltration groups or patrols from larger units in the area. Special agent reports tended to indicate a possible logistic and personnel staging area in the western end of the operational area. In addition, a Special Forces Task Force made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA company at ZC 065691 on 19 April and a 5-hour fire fight ensued. The Special Forces unit reported 28 VC KIA (C) and 35 VC KIA (P). Reinforcements within 12 to 24 hour period consisted of the Q-14th Company Local Force and the 402nd Sapper Battalion.

b. The intelligence information upon which operation PECOS was planned was provided by 1st Marine Division, G-2, which, through analysis of patrol reports, low level agent reports, and other reliable intelligence sources concluded that there were no confirmed enemy units operating in the operational area, but that there were inevitably guerilla forces located therein, and probably elements of the 402nd Sapper Battalion and the Q-14th Local Force Company.

c. VC strength and situation actually found during the conduct of the operations:

(a) 190815H (D-1) Recon patrol CLASSMATE attempted a helicopter insertion and received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from bunkers at ZC 188648, ZC 193646 and ZC 199646. The insertion was cancelled and an air strike was called. The supporting aircraft received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from ZC 196643. The bomb damage assessment for the strike was 10-13 VC KBA and two bunkers destroyed.

(b) 191810H-191930H (D-1) Recon patrol CLASSMATE reported hearing 15-20 VC converging on their position from north, south, and west. The patrol used CS to break contact. HUIE gunships fired suppressive fires around the patrol's position receiving fire themselves.

(c) 220915H (D+2) Recon patrol KILLER KANE ZC 073677, engaged approximately 40 VC in a harbor site with small arms fire and 1 SPONER ~~SMG~~. The patrol confirmed 2 VC KIA and estimated 3 VC KIA (Prob); captured equipment included: 2 7.62mm Chicom type 56, B-40 Rocket launchers w/3 rockets, 1 7.62mm Chicom AK-47 assault rifle w/5 mag, a large assortment of ammunition, grenades, 20 lbs TNT, 12 firing devices, 25 ft time fuse, 550 lbs of rice, 10 lbs of medical supplies, 2 sony transistor radios, 8 knives, 13 tools, wrist compass, 10 flashlights, 3 flags, large assortment of cooking gear.

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(d) Recon sightings of small groups of VC were as follows.

191400H - 6 VC w/packs and wpns ZC 134667

191335H - 3 VC moving east ZC 136668

201205H - 7 VC moving north w/packs and wpns ZC 132668

201800H - 4 VC Plt engaged at 20 meters ZC 184654

210945H - KILLER KANE OP obs VC firing AW's at helos from ZC 060672 and 0867.

221900H - Unk number of VC ZC 073673.

231515H - 10 VC at ZC 128654

d. The VC successfully eluded infantry units under the heavy canopy but many indications of their presence were found. Harboring sites and 1 obviously VC controlled village was found. These are listed as follows:

(1) ZC 156670, 8 huts with underground caves, captured 1 Z10, 6 rds 7.62, 2 pair boots, 3 sets utilities, 1 canteen, 1 MAS-36, and spare parts for wpns.

(2) ZC 132672, 3 huts, area cultivated; equipment captured included 1 beret, 1 USMC tropical shirt, 1 First aid kit, 1 cartridge belt, VC mess kit, 6 sets black PJ's, 100 lbs salt, 1 VC letter.

(3) ZC 098669, 3 bunkers, large enough for 4-6 persons, site commanded portion of valley floor.

(4) ZC 099659, "R&R" center, 25 structures for 20-30 persons each, mess hall, and swimming hole, captured assorted clothing, papers, 1 K-44 bayonet, 2 lighted cigarettes, expended 57mm RR rds, 2 pairs boots and jungle utilities.

(5) ZC 123670, Rest area, can accomodate 10-15 persons, scraps of food found in area indicating recent occupation.

(6) ZC 157654, 40 ft tower with sleeping quarters 50 meters away that could accomodate 3-4 persons.

(7) ZC 123660, 4 thatched huts and corn field.

(8) ZC 155679, 23 bamboo shelters, 4x5x7, 8 fighting holes, 6x8x10, 5 punji pits 3x3x4.

(9) ZC 143657, Village with 15-20 structures. Found VC bulletin boards with various propaganda items. Captured 2 old military rifles, French 8mm M-1916, and numerous 60mm mortar cannisters.

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CONFIDENTIALe. Additional Intelligence Gained.

(1) From documents and personal correspondence captured at ZC 070677, 22 July by a unit of 1st Recon Bn in a brief engagement with approx 40 VC. It was determined that the VC unit engaged was the 402nd Sapper Bn.

(2) The numerous harbor sites found in the area and the sightings by Recon units indicate that deeper penetration into the valley will result in additional and possibly more extensive discoveries.

f. Enemy Units Identified.

(1) There were no units positively identified as a result of this operation with the exception of the 402nd Sapper Bn.

g. Terrain.(1) Critical Terrain.

(a) The area of operation was a large valley (Happy Valley). Critical terrain was the natural and man-made openings in the canopy on the sides of the mountains overlooking the valley.

(2) Cover on the valley floor was poor, while on the heavily vegetated sides of the valley, fallen trees provided fair cover.

(3) Concealment in the jungle was excellent due to the trees, bamboo and brush. On the valley floor, elephant grass, 12-15 ft high and bamboo patches, 15 ft high, afforded excellent concealment.

h. Observation and fields of fire.

(1) Observation was poor except for cleared areas on the sides of the mountains looking down into the valley. Otherwise the thick vegetation limited observation to 5-10 meters.

(2) Fields of fire for direct fire weapons was good on the valley floor from prepared positions. Mountain sides provided poor fields of fire due to the irregular terrain and the heavy growth.

j. Obstacles.

(1) Throughout the operation, the irregular terrain and heavy underbrush in the mountains hampered troop movement. On the valley floor, the tall elephant grass also impeded maneuver elements.

k. Weather.

(1) The weather had an adverse effect on the operation in that extra precautions to preclude heat exhaustion slowed troop movements. Precipitation had negligible effect on the operation.

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8. MISSION. 7th Mar (-) (Rein) attacks, seizes and establishes forward combat base in Happy Valley area, QUAN HIEU DUC and QUAN THUONG DUC Districts, QUANG NAM Province, RVN, carries out search and destroy operations and conducts reconnaissance in force westward for a period of 5-7 days within support limits of forward base to determine nature and extent of enemy activity in operational area.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. See reference (c).

10. EXECUTION. The 7th Marines promulgated Operation Order 6-67 for Operation PECOS at a conference held at the 7th Marines CP on 17 July 1967. Enclosures (1), (2) and (3) contain a daily narrative of the sequence of events.

11. RESULTS.

a. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel: KIA (Conf) - 4
KIA (Prob) - 9
VCS (CAPT) - 0
Weapons - 5

b. Friendly losses:

(1) Personnel: KIA - 0
POW - 0
WIA - 0
WIA (NE) - 1
NBC - 2

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. General.

(1) Pre-planning for Operation "PEGOS" logistical support included liaison visits to, 1st Marine Division G-4, Engineers, Division Surgeon; the Operations Officer of Supply Battalion of Force Logistics Command; the Commanding Officer of 1st Shore Party Battalion; and the S-4 of MAG-36. Additionally the S-4 officer participated in all pre-operational briefings.

(2) Logistic Support of Artillery Units: Although not attached to 7th Marines, Golf Battery, 11th Marines was supported by the LSA. This resulted due to the Batterys' location in the operational area which necessitated close coordination and control over aircraft movement.

(3) Force Logistic Command Support. Support provided by Supply Battalion of the Force Logistic Command was outstanding in all respects.

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b. Supply/Resupply.

(1) The Logistic Support Area (LSA) was established at Hill 55 and opened at 0700H on D-Day. Pre-staging of supplies and equipment commenced on 16 July. The Class V buildup was greater than normal due to the requirement to be prepared to provide either 105mm or 107mm ammunition. Initial dump levels of artillery ammunition were limited to the basic allowance plus 3 DOA. On D+4 the dump level of 105mm increased to 5 DOA and the 107mm was removed from the LSA. All LSA operations were smooth and efficient.

(2) Resupply to units was accomplished entirely by helicopter. Support provided by the CH-53 Squadron was outstanding.

(3) Resupply was delivered by external lift utilizing wire nets, baskets, nylon slings and nylon nets. This method of delivery is much superior to internal lift and materially increases helicopter utilization. The principal difficulties encountered in the external lift were a shortage of long reach pendants and wire nets. It is recommended that these items be added to the Table of Equipment of the Shore Party Battalion.

c. Casualty Evacuation. All medical evacuation was accomplished by helicopter. No special problems were encountered. Because of the nature of the terrain night med-evac was virtually impossible. To provide a treatment capability a Battalion Aid Station was located in the operational area. There were very few casualties and this arrangement proved satisfactory.

d. Services. Equipment requiring repair was forwarded to the LSA. It was then delivered to the First Battalion (Rear) also located at Hill 55. When required repairs were beyond the capability of the Battalion the item was evacuated to FSR. In all cases the repaired equipment or a replacement item was returned to the using unit within 12 hours.

13. COMMUNICATIONS.

a. During Operation PEGOS, a radio relay station was established on top of BA NA, Hill 1467, to facilitate radio transmission into the valley. Six nets were established: the regimental tactical, regimental command, TACP local, artillery battalion fire direction, close support artillery battery GOF and the regimental HST net. The original frequencies assigned were:

	<u>PRIMARY FREQ</u>	<u>TRIGGER FREQ</u>
REGT TAC	66.0	36.9
REGT CMD	43.6	32.5
TACP	46.9	63.6
ART BN FD	42.9	45.5

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ART COF	40.1	68.1
REGT HST	56.0	43.4

b. Throughout the six day problem three of these nets maintained automatic retransmission. These were regimental tactical, TAGP, artillery battalion fire direction. Partial reasons for the failure to maintain automatic retransmission were, improper sighting of equipment, failure to use high gain antennas, and faulty equipment. Seven of 12 retransmission cables did not work through the first day. Upon examination it was found that wires were improperly soldered, seizing wire was used in the cables, circuit boards were warped from overheating with a soldering iron, and components were missing.

c. High gain antennas were used at the regimental CP and at the relay site. In every instance where a high gain antenna was used in the valley and equipment was properly sighted, sustained automatic retransmission was possible. One frequency proved unacceptable for retransmission and that was 66.0. When this frequency was changed to 67.7 on the third day of the operation, communications cleared up considerably. The D/S battery COF net of the attached artillery battalion was able to monitor fire missions directly from Happy Valley on 40.1. The battery was located in the center of the valley and on the far eastern end. However, to talk on this net the artillery battalion headquarters had to use the relay site and talk over 68.1. Regiment tried to contact other units in the valley on the primary frequencies, but was unsuccessful. Radio retransmission became very poor during periods of high condensation in the valley and on the mountain. This was usually in the morning and evening.

d. Lessons were learned in the employment of the retransmission gear. During CP displacement adequate communication equipment and personnel must be in the first wave to establish a tactical and artillery net. This equipment must include RC-292 antennas or field expedient high gain antennas. All retransmission equipment must be in excellent condition. Radio operators must be schooled in retransmission and have some practical training as a team.

e. It is recommended that if multichannel radio retransmission is necessary from Happy Valley in the future that retransmission be attempted through AN/TRC-27B radio relay equipment. This would omit half the radios required, the use of retransmission cables, loss of signal in retransmission and most important eliminate half the frequencies used together with the problem of finding non-interfering frequencies. An AN/TRC-27B shot and one for each radio net used is all that is required. The radio signal would come from Happy Valley from a radio to an AN/PRC-25 radio on top of Hill 1467. The signal would then be remoted into the radio control set C-2329/GRA-39, and sent over wire to one of the eight AN/TRC-27B channels. At the regimental CP the signal would come in over a channel in the AN/TRC-27B and go over the wire to be guarded on a radio control set C-2328/GRA-39.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~14. COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE ENCLOSURES.

a. The enclosed after action reports have been reviewed. The recommendations concerning continued operations in the Happy Valley area are considered valid and have been implemented, Operation YAZOO having been conducted in the same area late in August 1967. Although contact was minimal during Operation PECOS, the operation is considered important for its significant intelligence findings.

T J Bohannon

T. J. BOHANNON

By direction

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