

TAB-J

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

7th Mar S&C Log Nr.
00298-69 Copy # 16 of 24

OKLAHOMA HILLS



AFTER ACTION REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
PFO San Francisco, California 96602

3/AMK/rba
3480

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
Subj: Combat After Action Report
Ref: (a) DivO 3480, 1B
(b) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6541 I,
6541 II, 6640 IV, 6641 IV
Encl: (1) List of Enclosures

1. Name and Type of Operation. Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was a 7th Marine (Rein) search and destroy operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 302000H Mar 69 to 291800H May 69
3. Location. DAI LOC, THUONG DUC, HIEU DUC District, QUANG NAM Province (CHARLIE RIDGE-WORTH RIDGE-HAPPY VALLEY).
4. Command Headquarters. 7th Marines.
5. Reporting Officer. Colonel R. L. NICHOLS, Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment.
6. Task Organization
 - a. 302000H March 69 - 211200H April 69

7th Marines (Rein)

Col NICHOLS

Hq Co (-)

1st Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol DOWD

H&S Co (-)
Co A 7th Mar
Co B 7th Mar
Co C 7th Mar
Co D 7th Mar
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
Det, Co C 1st Engr Bn
FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

UNCLASSIFIED

2nd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol NELSON

Co E 7th Mar
 Co F 7th Mar
 Co G 7th Mar
 Co H 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol ALLISON

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 7th Mar
 Co K 7th Mar
 Co L 7th Mar
 Co M 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 26th Mar (-) (Rein)

LtCol SNELLING

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 26th Mar
 Co K 26th Mar
 Co L 26th Mar
 Co M 26th Mar
 Det, 5th SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co A 5th Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

b. 211201 April 69 - 261200 April 69

7th Mar (-) (Rein)

Col NICHOLS

Hq Co (-)1st Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol DOWD

Co A 7th Mar
 Co B 7th Mar
 Co C 7th Mar
 Co D 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol ALAYSON

Co I 7th Mar
 Co K 7th Mar
 Co L 7th Mar
 Co M 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 26th Mar (-) (Rein)

LtCol SWELLING

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 26th Mar
 Co K 26th Mar
 Co L 26th Mar
 Co M 26th Mar
 Det, 5th SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co A, 5th Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

c. 261201H April 69 - 031800H May 69

7th Mar (-)(Rein)

Col NICHOLS

Hq Co (-)1st Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol DOWD

H&S Co (-)
 Co A 7th Mar
 Co B 7th Mar
 Co C 7th Mar
 Co D 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol ALLISON

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 7th Mar
 Co K 7th Mar
 Co L 7th Mar
 Co M 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd Bn, 26th Mar (-) (Rein)

LtCol SNELLING

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 26th Mar
 Co K 26th Mar
 Co M 26th Mar
 Co L 26th Mar
 Det, 5th SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co A, 5th Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

3rd Bn, 1st Mar

LtCol BULGER

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 1st Mar
 Co K 1st Mar
 Co L 1st Mar
 Co M 1st Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 1st Bn, 11th Mar

d. 031801H May 69 - 101200H May 69

7th Mar (-) Rein)

Col NICHOLS

Hq Co (-)1st Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol DOWD

H&S Co (-)
 Co A 7th Mar
 Co B 7th Mar
 Co C 7th Mar
 Co D 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol ALMISON

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 7th Mar
 Co K 7th Mar
 Co L 7th Mar
 Co M 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

UNCLASSIFIED

3rd Bn, 1st Mar

LtCol BULGER

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 1st Mar
 Co K 1st Mar
 Co L 1st Mar
 Co M 1st Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 1st Bn, 11th Mar

e. 101201H May 69 - 291800H May 69

7th Mar (-) (Rein)

Col NICHOLS

Hq Co (-)1st Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol DOWD

Co A 7th Mar
 Co B 7th Mar
 Co C 7th Mar
 Co D 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol ALLISON

H&S Co (-)
 Co I 7th Mar
 Co K 7th Mar
 Co L 7th Mar
 Co M 7th Mar
 Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)
 Det, Hq Co 7th Mar (Scout Snipers)
 Det, Co G, 1st Engr Bn
 FO Teams, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

f. ARVN Participation

(1) 310600H March 69 - 141200H April 69

2nd Bn, 52nd ARVN Regt
 3rd Bn, 52nd ARVN Regt

(2) 141801H April 69 - 171200H April 69

3rd Bn, 52nd ARVN Regt
 4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) 171201H April 69 - 011800H May 69

1st Bn, 51st ARVN Regt
4th Bn, 51st ARVN Regt

(4) 011801H May 69 - 091200H May 69

1st Bn, 51st ARVN Regt

(5) 091201H May 69 - 261800H May 69

2nd Bn, 51st ARVN Regt

7. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery/FSCC

(1) Artillery support for the forces committed to Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was provided by the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines and general support/reinforcing Batteries from the 11th Marines.

(2) The artillery organization for combat was essentially as follows:

3rd Battalion (-) (Rein), 11th Marines direct support, 7th Marines
Det A, 1st 175 Gun Battery (SP)
Plt A, 1st Armored Amphib Co (SP)
Plt B, 3rd 8 Inch How Battery (SP)
K Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines (SP)

(3) The artillery task organization for support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was as follows:

3rd Battalion (-) (Rein), 11th Marines	
G Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines	6 105 How (31Mar-29May)
H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines	6 105 How (31Mar-5Apr)
I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines	6 105 How (31Mar-29May)
W Battery (-), 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines	3 107mm Howt (31Mar-29May)
B Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines	6 105 How (26Apr-9May)
C Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines	6 105 How (21Mar-3May)
W Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines	6 4.2 Mort (31Mar-3May)
K Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines	6 155 How (SP) (31Mar-29May)
B Platoon, 3rd 8" Battery	2 8" How (31Mar-29May)
Det A, 1st 175 Gun Battery	3 175mm Gun (SP) (21Mar-29May)
A Platoon, 1st Armored Amphib Company	4 LVTH-6 (105 How-SP) (31Mar-29Apr)

(4) The maximum number of artillery tubes by caliber supporting Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
4.2 Mortars	6
107mm Howitzer	3
105mm Howitzer (TD)	30
105mm Howitzer (SP)	4
155mm Howitzer (SP)	6
8" Howitzer (SP)	2
175mm Gun (SP)	3
TOTAL:	54

(5) Disposition of artillery in the operation area of OKLAHOMA HILLS followed the tactical situation and development of Fire Support Bases (FSB's). The FSB's were selected and developed in such a manner that they were mutually supporting and gave a high degree of depth in supporting the ground gaining units and reconnaissance teams operating in the AO. All FSB's were pre-selected and developed prior to being occupied. Mini-dozers developed sufficient gun pits for protection from enemy fire. Ammunition storage berms were erected for the protection of munitions, personnel and equipment. The FSB's were cleared of large trees and surrounding trees were thinned to provide mask clearance/fields of fire for both indirect and direct fire missions.

(6) The following chronological data traces the development of FSB's in support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. In each case the batteries that were positioned for direct support plus the location of and tube density at the FSB is listed.

29 March 1969

Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB RAWHIDE (AT 883584) with priority of fires to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

Battery H, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB STALLION (HILL 10) (AT 923619) with priority of fires to 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB MUSTANG (HILL 52) (AT 787551) in general support/reinforcing 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. 6 155mm Howitzers (SP).

B Platoon, 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery (SP) displaced to FSB MUSTANG (HILL 52) (AT 788552) in general support/reinforcing 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. 2 8" Howitzers (SP).

A Platoon, 1st Armored Amphib Co displaced to FSB MUSTANG (HILL 52) (AT 788550) in general support/reinforcing 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. 4 LVTH-6 (SP).

UNCLASSIFIED

31 March 1969

Battery I, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines commenced supporting the operation from FSB RAWHIDE (AT 883579) with priority of fires to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

Battery W (-), 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines commenced supporting the operation from FSB MUIR (HILL 55) (AT 963609) providing reinforcing fires as directed. 3 107mm Howitzers.

Det A, 1st 175 Gun Battery (SP) commenced supporting the operation from position at AN HOA (AT 877475) providing general support/reinforcing 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. 3 175mm Guns (SP)

6 April 1969

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines displaced to FSB RATTLESNAKE (HILL 749) (ZC 124650) with priority of fire to 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

Battery W, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines displaced to FSB RATTLESNAKE (HILL 749) (ZC 124650) with priority of fire to 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines. 6 4.2 Mortars.

7 April 1969

Battery H, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB BUCKSKIN (HILL 502) (AT 823659) with priority fires to 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

20 April 1969

A Platoon, 1st Armored Amphib Company terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB MUSTANG (HILL 52) (AT 787551). 6 105mm Howitzers.

21 April 1969

Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB STALLION (HILL 10) (AT 923691) and terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

UNCLASSIFIED

26 April 1969

Battery D, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB MUIR (Hill 55) (AT 962612) with priority of fires to 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. 6 105mm Howitzers.

2 May 1969

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines displaced from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

3 May 1969

Battery W, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines displaced from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Battery G (-) 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) (ZC 124650) with priority of fires to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. 4 105mm Howitzers.

Battery I, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced two 105mm Howitzers to FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) where a 4 tube provisional battery was formed (Golf Xray) with the remaining two 105mm Howitzers of Battery G. 4 105mm Howitzers.

5 May 1969

B Platoon, 3rd 8" Howitzer Battery displaced from FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) and terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

9 May 1969

Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines displaced from FSB MUIR (Hill 55) and terminated its support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB RAWHIDE (AT 883579). 6 105mm Howitzers (SP).

The provisional Battery (Golf Xray) deactivated and the two Howitzers each from Battery G and Battery I joined their parent units.

UNCLASSIFIED

20 May 1969

Battery G and I displaced two 105mm Howitzers each to FSB BULLWHIP (ZC 055664) and formed a provisional Battery (Golf Xray).

25 May 1969

The provisional Battery displaced from FSB BULLWHIP to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and FSB RAWHIDE (Hill 65).

Battery G, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines displaced to FSB STALLION (Hill 10). 6 105mm Howitzers.

(7) Fire support coordination was established and maintained at the 7th Marine FSCC. The function of the FSCC was to coordinate all supporting arms within the area of operation, ensuring maximum effectiveness and economy of all arms, and maximum safety for friendly troops. Fire Support Coordination procedures were in accordance with 1st MarDiv O P03300.1 (SOP for FSCC).

(8) The 7th Marines FSCC processed all sav-a-planes through the normal Division FSCC channels. No unusual situations were encountered which hampered or restricted the effective coordination of supporting arms during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

(9) All artillery batteries, direct support and general support reinforcing responded to a total of 1783 observed fire missions, 732 unobserved fire missions, and 3292 harassing and interdiction fire missions. The 5807 missions fired accounted for a total of 49,899 rounds of all calibers and types. The following is a breakdown of artillery ammunition expended by type and caliber from 302000H March 1969 through 291800H May 1969 in support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>105 HOW</u>	<u>CALIBER 155 HOW</u>	<u>175 GUN</u>	<u>8" HOW</u>
HE	3291	37,564	5,281	118	449
WP	129	1,607	119	1	0
ILL	52	1,024	167	0	0
C.S.	0	1	0	0	0
F.C.	0	1	90	0	0
TOTAL	3472	40,197	5,663	118	449

OVERALL TOTAL: 49,899

UNCLASSIFIED

(10) Within the western OKLAHOMA HILLS AO surveillance information from FO's, AO's and reconnaissance teams was greatly reduced by the heavy double and triple canopy trees.

(11) Naval gunfire supported Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS during the early phase of the operation, 30 March 1969 to 2 April 1969. Naval gunfire was mainly directed at enemy fortifications while preparation fires were delivered principally on the eastern CHARLIE RIDGE, WORTH RIDGE area. The following ships were on station to support Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS on the dates indicated.

U.S.S. MULINEX

30 March 1969

ARMBENT
5"/54

U.S.S. NEWPORT NEWS

31 March - 2 April 1969

8"/55

The following is the amount of ammunition fired by caliber:

5"/54

253 Rounds

8"/55

497 Rounds

Total Rounds: 750

Ground observers provided the following surveillances and GDA statistics resulting from the employment of naval gunfire.

KIA'S

2

Secondary Explosions

3

Structures Destroyed

5

Bunkers Destroyed

10

Caves Destroyed

4

Tunnels Destroyed

1

100 Meters of Trenchline Destroyed

b. Air

(1) General. On 31 March 1969 the air operations in direct support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS commenced. Prior to D-Day, certain preliminary air support operations occurred which were to provide indirect support to the operation. The nature of the terrain which consisted primarily of mountainous, thickly canopied jungle, devoid of normal land lines of communications required the utilization of helicopters as the only means of logistic resupply, medical evacuation of wounded and ill personnel, personnel and courier transportation, and command and control flights and observation. The total air support for US forces came from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing with the exception of the flare ships and the AC-47 (Spooky)

UNCLASSIFIED

which were provided by Air Force units. Marine Aircraft Group 16 provided the majority of the helicopter support with the remainder being supplied by Marine Aircraft Group 36. The ARVN portion of the operation used U.S. Army and VNAF helicopters generally to effect resupply, troop lift, med-evacs, and command and control. On a number of occasions U.S. Marine helicopters provided direct support to the ARVN units for the same roles listed above.

(2) Air Support

(a) Preliminary planning for the operation established the need for specific air support in various categories. These included the following pre-D-Day helicopter and fixed wing support requirements: (1) aerial photography of objective area, (2) visual reconnaissance of areas of operations and landing zone sites, (3) the emplacement of communications facilities on the top of RC BANA Mountain, (4) visual reconnaissance of proposed sites for the use of the Commando Vault landing zone clearance weapon, and (5) radar beacon controlled delivery of fixed wing ordnance on selected targets.

(b) D-Day requirements established the need for fixed wing and helicopter support to effect the heliborne landings of two battalions through the use of fixed wing landing zone preparation and close air support (CAS) subsequent to the landings; the use of helicopters as troop transports, wave escorts, and helicopter coordinator airborne (HC(A)); and the use of OV-10 aircraft as TAC(A)/AO throughout the landings. Additionally, D-Day saw the requirement for a medical evacuation package on stand-by at FSB MUIR (Hill 55), a command and control package for the use of the regimental commander, and a logistic resupply package to support those ground units which walked into the operating area on D-1.

(c) Post D-Day air support requirements again fulfilled the missions of medical evacuation of personnel, logistical resupply, troop movement within the operating areas, fixed wing support and TAC(A)/AO missions, as well as the command and control package.

(d) Special air support requirements included the following categories: (1) Air Force C-130 aircraft for delivery of the Commando Vault landing zone clearance weapon, (2) reconnaissance team insert and extract packages which were administered by the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and which utilized their package throughout the operation, and (3) the Air Force and Army loudspeaker and leaflet dropping aircraft which were utilized in the psychological operations effort.

(3) Air Liaison Functions

(a) In view of the fact that Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was a regimental size operation, the air section was not expanded beyond that which is normally available to the 7th Marine Regiment. The original analysis of the operation developed no requirement for a DASC or ASRT to be located at FSB MUIR (Hill 55) for the direct support of the operation. These functions were handled quite adequately by those facilities located at DANANG. Standing Operating Procedures remained in effect for the handling of all air requests with the exception of helicopter resupply.

UNCLASSIFIED

Specifically, requests by separate battalion FAC's for med-evac helicopters, AO's fixed wing support or command and control helicopters were requested through TACP channels to the regimental air section, combined there, and forwarded to the 1st Marine Division air section or DANANG DASC as appropriate. A standard mission was established for the logistical resupply package and was made available each day. This package was tailored as required to meet specific requirements for resupply and troop movements. Since the normal logistic request did not usually develop until late in the evening preceding the day of the requirement for resupply, close liaison between the regimental air officer and the regimental S-4 provided sufficiently accurate estimation of aircraft requirements so that helicopter requests could be submitted in accordance with 1st Marine Division SOP's on the subject. Close monitoring of aircraft assets actually on hand, as compared to those assets which were requested, enabled the air section to maintain adequate aircraft support and on those few days when aircraft availability was not sufficient to meet the regimental needs, liaison with the LSA to effect the most critical resupply ahead of routine was accomplished. Another function of the air section was to maintain "Sav-A-Plane" information as established by the 7th Marines FSCC. This information was passed on to aircraft working in the operating area on the TACP radio net.

(b) Communications was one area in which the air section had to maintain constant attention. FM frequencies for use by aircraft are of course always in short supply but at times there is a requirement when working with large numbers of aircraft in many diverse areas to have discrete frequencies for specific use. Several of the techniques used to effect this were: (1) LSA common was used only by the LSA and the most distant units in the western extremities of the operating area, (2) a second LZ common frequency was established for units in the eastern portion of the operating area, (3) local frequencies were used by the battalions working in the southern area, (4) the Army Advisor frequency was used when supporting the ARVN battalions, (5) med-evac common was used exclusively for TACP administrative traffic, air control, and Sav-A-Plane information. Four problem areas which developed in the communications field were: (1) getting the med-evac requestor and the med-evac helicopters on the same frequency at the same time; (2) frequency interference with the LSA and the western unit (Units on the ground did not have any problems in this regard but the airborne aircraft had a much greater transmission range for receiving and transmitting and noted that the traffic being passed by the LSA to aircraft was interfering with transmissions passed between aircraft and ground units in the western area); (3) inadequate radio alert watch on the part of HST and TACP personnel in the field (here there was a tendency for several things to occur: company commanders would use the HST or TACP radios for tactical or administrative traffic which took the radio off frequency or else tied up the frequency and prevented its proper use, on one occasion med-evac common was used for administrative traffic, HST personnel were not alerted that there was air traffic inbound and therefore did not monitor the net, HST and TACP personnel would check off the net without alerting higher headquarters and without leaving a guarded frequency on which they could be reached, and HST and TACP personnel were frequently not fully briefed by the battalions or companies as to the

EFFECTING MED-EVACS, AND (6)
TACP LOCAL WAS USED FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

nature of operations which they were to control and which caused, on several occasions, aircraft to be diverted to other missions because the intended users were not prepared to handle them); and (4) during the operation there were several frequency and call sign changes which created confusion because: Units were not familiar with changes and frequently did not get the word on new frequencies, somehow frequency and call sign changes did not get filtered down to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units, it takes several weeks to work out interference problems with units in other areas such as 3rd Marine Division, XXIV Corps, and Americal units. The helicopter "dream sheet" which is becoming a standard item in LSA/LOG operations is the only answer to passing frequencies, call signs, and coordinates in a fast and secure manner. In addition, the FSB MUR (Hill 55) "dream sheet" had a shackle code printed on it so that frequency and location changes could be passed in a secure manner without a time-consuming verbal brief to the aircraft. The "dream sheet" also had the beneficial effect of making the working helicopters aware of frequency and call sign changes which occurred as mentioned above. Unfortunately this "dream sheet" could not be passed to fixed wing aircraft nor on some occasions could it be passed to some of the UHLE gunships because weight and temperatures prevented their being able to land on the LSA. The SEA TAC MISSION CODE was instituted towards the latter weeks of the operation with excellent results. Some of its disadvantages are that it is difficult for the advanced units to maintain where they could keep the one package shackle sheet quite easily. Since security for most information passed in this type of operation is not usually valid for more than about six hours, the shackle system appears to be the more satisfactory method of passing numeric information.

(c) Record keeping For the operation amounted to the maintenance of specific performance data. Initially, data was kept to develop trends relating to helicopter support and aircraft availability but since those assets which were required and requested were usually available, support trends were not maintained. As a general rule, the aircraft assets were programmed to provide six hours of flight time for each working aircraft. When aircraft developed maintenance problems, it was normally possible to reconstitute the working aircraft in sufficient time to maintain the normal resupply. On those occasions when weather or aircraft availability did not permit the programmed resupply effort to be effected, additional aircraft were programmed for the following day. Since units in the field normally maintained at least two days of supply on hand with the fire support bases maintaining five days of ammunition, there were very few resupply problems caused by lack of aircraft. The following chart is a summary of the aircraft support received during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION SUMMARY

CAS MISSIONS SCHEDULED	198
CAS MISSIONS COMPLETED	198
HELICOPTER MISSIONS SCHEDULED	260
HELICOPTER MISSIONS COMPLETED	253
HELICOPTER MISSIONS CANCELLED	9
FOR AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY	6
FOR WEATHER	1
BY USER	2

UNCLASSIFIED

CARGO TRANSPORTED	3,019 Tons
PASSENGERS CARRIED	19,209
MED-EVACS CARRIED	1,036
AVERAGE EMERGENCY MED-EVAC TIME	42 Minutes
COMMAND AND CONTROL MISSIONS	61
LOGISTIC MISSIONS	92
PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION MISSIONS	19
MED-EVAC MISSIONS	353
OBSERVATION (AO) MISSIONS	347
FLARESHIP MISSIONS	20

c. Tank Support. Company B (-), 1st Tank Battalion with two gun platoons and one flame tank section provided tank support throughout the operation. On the eve of the operation, 30 March 1969, a flame section escorted by a section of gun tanks deployed to FSB RAWHIDE (Hill 65) and burned the areas in and around the tactical wire. This proved highly profitable as several mines and booby traps were ignited resulting in their destruction and no friendly casualties. Tank employment during operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was generally restricted to the low ground in the south and southwest portion of the area of operation. The first platoon, Company B, operated in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, while the headquarters platoon operated in direct support of the regiment. Tanks in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines provided convoy escort, security, and reaction from both FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) and FSB RAWHIDE (Hill 65). Tanks escorted a total of 18 convoys during the operation. The majority of these convoys contained either self-propelled guns or important items of resupply. During the hours of darkness tanks assumed defensive positions at the FSB's and provided direct fire support. On numerous occasions the tanks accompanied the daily road sweep and provided both direct fire support and security to the sweep teams. During this period tanks from FSB MUIR (Hill 55) also escorted daily convoys and road sweeps from Hill 55 to Hill 37. On one occasion the road sweep team was pinned down by enemy sniper fire and the supporting tanks effectively neutralized the fire by means of their inherent firepower resulting in no friendly casualties and enemy losses unknown. Additionally, terrain along the axis of the SONG VU GIA River is well suited for employing tanks in a direct fire role from either FSB RAWHIDE (Hill 65) or FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) south into the river or the ARIZONA area. On four separate occasions tanks engaged the enemy in their boats or on land with 90mm cannon fire resulting in 14 VC/NVA KIA. On 22 April 1969 tanks provided direct fire support with their main guns along with artillery and air when B/1/7 crossed the SONG VU GIA and assaulted the opposite shore. Again on 1 May 1969, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines crossed the river and tanks provided excellent overhead direct fire support. Tanks also accompanied infantry elements upon the opening of the road to THUONG DUC. Of particular interest was the fact that no anti-tank weapons, RPG's or RE, were encountered during the operation, however, on 3 May 1969 between FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) and RAWHIDE (Hill 65) a tank detonated an estimated 40lb box-type mine resulting in a combat loss to the tank and one Marine wounded (non-evacuated). Throughout the operation excellent tank support was afforded the infantry with no significant problems encountered by either the tanks or infantry being supported.

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Engineer Support

(1) Concept of Employment. Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion operated in direct support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. During pre D-Day operations elements in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines provided combat engineer support to improve Route 4 west of Hill 65 to Hill 52 and to construct FSB MUSTANG at Hill 52. During the conduct of the operation Company C maintained personnel and equipment at Hill 55 which were organized and task assigned to construct individual fire support bases as required. Additionally, Company C provided normal close combat engineer support to maneuver elements throughout the operation. Finally, Company C was charged with upgrading the road from FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) west to THUONG DUC along the Route 4 road bed.

(2) Execution (See Enclosure (28)).

8. Intelligence

a. Enemy Forces in the TAOR. Prior to FVMAF being deployed during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, the following enemy units were considered to be present in the AO. Enclosure (2) depicts the probable disposition of these forces as of 30 March 1969.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>
FE, HQ Front 4 (Central Wing)	100
31st NVA Regt HQ (Includes Supt Cos)	470
102nd Bn, 31st NVA Regt	370
103rd Bn, 31st NVA Regt	375
141st NVA Regt HQ (Includes Supt Cos)	370
1st Bn, 141st NVA Regt	230
2nd Bn, 141st NVA Regt	235
3rd Bn, 141st NVA Regt	240
368B Arty Regt HQ	200
1st Bn, 368B Arty Regt	340
2nd Bn, 368B Arty Regt	340
Q83 Local Force Co	120
H3 Local Force Co	UNK
TOTAL:	3,390

b. Enemy Forces Reinforcement. Enemy units capable of reinforcing forces within the AO primarily consisted of major elements of the 2nd NVA Division. Enclosure (2) depicts probable locations of these units as of 30 March 1969.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>
1st VC Regt, 2nd NVA Division	920
21st VC Regt, 2nd NVA Division	690
TOTAL:	1,610

c. Enemy Courses of Action

(1) Attack. The enemy possessed the capability to attack with units as large as a regiment. In theory, the enemy held the high ground and had the option of being able to attack down hill. Additionally, he possessed the capability to direct mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket fire against FVMAF fire support bases, helicopter LZ's and troops. As set forth in 7th Marines Operation Order 1-69 (Intelligence Estimate), it was not held likely that the enemy would try to attack due to the number of casualties incurred during the period 22-23 February 1969.

(2) Defend. The enemy was known to possess extensive fortifications within the area of operation. During past operations, (Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON) for example, the enemy had chosen to briefly defend such terrain features as Hills 502 (AT 832660) and 1025 (AT 807627). It was generally held that the enemy's fortifications were primarily oriented to defend against attack from the east. Possession of the high ground overlooking proposed LZ's, provided the enemy the ability to briefly defend against helicopterborne assaults.

(3) Reinforce. Within the area of operation there was an identified enemy force estimated to be between 2,700 and 3,200 men, not including rear service support units and local VC forces. The enemy's thorough knowledge of the terrain and trail networks in the area theoretically provided him the capability to internally reinforce any units at any time. The most probable units capable of reinforcing from outside the operation area were elements of the 1st and 21st Regiments of the 2nd NVA Division considered to be located in the ARIZONA/ONG THU Slope area. But internal or external reinforcement presumably would occur if the enemy estimated that a favorably decisive conclusion might result.

(4) Withdrawal. In light of the 7th Marines assigned mission and scheme of maneuver, the enemy's capability to execute a partial or total withdrawal was considered the most probable course of action. Again, the enemy's thorough knowledge of the area would enable him to move rapidly towards egress points from the AO. Once the enemy had determined: (a) the general concept of the operation, (b) the deployment of our forces and (c), our inability to seal all exits simultaneously, he would likely endeavor to avoid contact and commence a partial withdrawal from the immediate area of operations. Upon departure of our forces, he in all probability would attempt to reoccupy and reestablish his bases in the area.

d. Collection Agencies. The below listed intelligence collection agencies were employed by, or supported, Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. The type support provided is indicated.

(1) First Marine Division G-2. Provided intelligence from all sources, as well as invaluable background data and administrative assistance.

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. Direction for initial team employment was in accordance with TABS (A) and (B), to Appendix (2) 7th Marines Operation Order 1-69. Subsequent activity was dictated by operational requirements. Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was placed in direct support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS on 30 March 1969. The company conducted a total of 28 patrols in support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. Initially, the teams were employed on a mission orientated basis; i.e., to conduct observation/surveillance patrols both forward of friendly forces moving through the operational area and on the periphery of the AO. Subsequently, the teams were employed in the rear of friendly forces to provide a screen against possible withdrawal or reinforcement of enemy units within the AO, as well as to execute special missions. Overlays of patrol routes are contained in Enclosure (3).

(3) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Rein). The Battalion operated in general support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS conducting a total of 40 patrols. These patrols augmented the direct support efforts of Company A. The Battalion was most receptive to requests for employment of teams to the west, northwest and north along the periphery of the operational area. Company A was passed from a direct support role on 29 April 1969 and the Battalion continuously provided support both in and adjacent to the AO. The permanent OP on Hill 200 (AT 795527) provided excellent surveillance of the SONG VU GIA and the adjacent ARIZONA area.

(4) 9th ITT. The 9th ITT provided interrogation/classification support of detainees and submission of attendant reports; supervision of detainee evacuation; screening of captured documents; and maintained sub teams at Battalion level to provide rapid, on the spot interrogation of detainees and captured documents for quick exploitation in the field. Results of ITT are contained in Enclosure (4).

(5) VMOJ. Provided aerial photography and IR on intermittent basis.

(6) VMO-2. Provided AO aircraft; conducted APD missions and provided VR aircraft.

(7) District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) HIEU DUC (D) and DAI LOC (D). Provided agent reports and information from refugees.

(8) 245th SAC (USA). Provided photography, Infra Red (IR) and SLAR support on an intermittent basis.

(9) Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Recon Section) (MIBARS) (USA). Provided photography on an intermitted basis.

(10) 6th Platoon, 1st Radio Battalion (-) FMF. The platoon provided direct support units for employment in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. "Hot Line" communications between the 7th Marine S-2 and the Platoon Command Post provided timely, reliable information.

UNCLASSIFIED

(11) Air Observers. 1st Marine Division provided the AO assists during the operation. Over 347 AO missions were fraged, each mission averaging 2.3 hours duration. Eleven hand-held photo missions were run in support of the operational forces. Briefings/debriefings were conducted by Division G-2 personnel.

(12) Sub Team 3rd CIT. Normal CI support.

(13) Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG THUONG DUC). Provided local agent reports.

e. Situation Encountered. The impact of weather and the enemy situation encountered is discussed below.

(1) Weather. One of the key planning considerations for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was the anticipated weather conditions, particularly cloud ceilings and fog in the AO during the period 31 March through June. Based upon weather data compiled by 1st Marine Division G-2 (Special Study: NUI MANG-NUI DA NA-CHARLIE RIDGE, Period: 1 January to 5 March 69 inclusive, March 69), it was anticipated that air operations (helo-troop movements, tactical air support and heliborne resupply) would be restricted by frequent periods of low ceilings, reduced visibility and rain. It was further anticipated that late March-mid April period would be the most crucial in that air operations might be limited for periods of several days by low ceilings and restricted visibility. In actuality, no days of air operations (helo resupply or troop lift) were lost during the operation due to weather and only one night tactical air support mission was precluded by heavy ground fog. During April, early morning fog and low ceilings were prevalent, however air operations were able to commence generally after 1000H. Thunder and rain showers were prevalent in the AO in the late afternoon hours during the month of May.

(2) Enemy Situation.

(a) Base Camp Penetration

At 1100H, 1 April 69, Hoi Chanh BUI VAN TRI, MSgt, 8th Company, 2nd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment was detained by reconnaissance team "REPORT CARD" on the southeast slopes of CHARLIE RIDGE. At about the same time, PW NGUYEN VAN CO, WO, 18th Company, 31st NVA Regiment was captured (WIA) by elements of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines vicinity (AT 906637).

Subsequently, on 3 April, Hoi Chanh TRI was taken on a visual reconnaissance by helicopter and pointed out terrain he identified as the base camp area of the 2nd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment vicinity (ZC 1760). He later drew a detailed map of the base camp depicting the location of the subordinate companies of the 2nd Battalion as well as the enemy's bunker defense system. PW CO volunteered to provide a maptrack of the location of the 18th Company, 31st NVA Regiment vicinity (AT 823629). A PW borrowed

UNCLASSIFIED

from the 1st Marine Regiment (Sgt HANH, Hq, 31st NVA Regiment) also provided a maptrack of the relative locations of Hq's and Bn's of the 31st NVA Regiment.

Based on this information, the decision was made to move units rapidly towards these locations in an attempt to fix enemy units in the camps before they had time to withdraw.

On 8 April 1969, Company L, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines uncovered the first enemy base camp vicinity (ZC 148616). As the company advanced into the camp area they observed approximately 20 NVA attempting to flee to the southeast. The enemy was taken under fire and the company entered the base camp proper. (This camp was subsequently identified as the Q-79 Dispensary). Thus the penetration of enemy base camps and facilities began. During the remainder of April 1969, 24 enemy camps and facilities were uncovered, 14 additional camps and facilities were uncovered during May 1969. Enclosure (5) depicts the locations of these facilities. Enclosure (6) is an example of a typical base camp (Q-79 Dispensary). Enclosure (7) provided sketches of typical structures encountered. Enclosure (8) provides a listing of the materials captured in part from these camps.

(b) North ARIZONA Area Incursion

Based on an increasing intelligence picture which had been accumulating since mid-April, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines conducted a brief but violent incursion against enemy units located just south of the SONG VU GIA. The intelligence picture consisted primarily of a number of low level agent reports from DAI LOC District Headquarters coupled with 14 sightings (2 major sightings by reconnaissance teams and 12 by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines' units) indicated an enemy buildup in the area bounded by grid line (AT 81) on the west, (AT 89) on the east and the 53 grid line on the south. The enemy units identified in the agent reports ranged from elements of the 21st NVA Regiment, elements of the 1st VC Regiment, the 141st NVA Regiment to elements of the at that time unconfirmed, 90th NVA Regiment of the 324th Division.

In the early morning hours of 29 April under cover of darkness, Companies B and D crossed south across the SONG VU GIA vicinity (AT 8555) and commenced reconnaissance in force operations in the North ARIZONA Area. Contact with an estimated two NVA Companies occurred at 291055H April and continued sporadically until 2 May. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines was inserted by amtrac into the same area on 011845H May in an attempt to exploit the contact.

On 3 May, elements of both 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines commenced a sweep east along the south bank of the SONG VU GIA which concluded uneventfully and found both units returning to the north side of the river by 021500H May.

UNCLASSIFIED

During this engagement the enemy exhibited excellent camouflage and fire discipline as well as control. The enemy troops were well equipped with new weapons (AK-47, B-40, 60 and 80mm mortars). They were tall, muscular, well fed, well groomed and wore new uniforms. (An enemy barber shop was found vicinity (AT 845547)).

(c) KEN

As early as January 1969, PW's reported that a major NVA ordnance storage area was located to the west of the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO. The name of the area was KEN. A maptrack indicated a settlement named KEN was located in the vicinity of (YC 9863), approximately 4 kilometers south of route 614 (previously confirmed as an NVA logistical and infiltration route). Subsequent PW/Hoi Chanh interrogation reports made a vague reference to ammunition caches in the vicinity of KEN. Among the documents found in the base camp of the Headquarters, 141st NVA Regiment by Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines on 22 April was a note concerning enemy supply operation to the KEN storage area. The note, dated 6 February 1969 to an unspecified cadre, revealed that D-14, Security Guard Section, units C-17, C-21, C-18, C-3, C-5 and K-1 were issued the following ammunition from the KEN ammunition depot during the period November 68 to February 1969: 518 81mm rounds, 189 82mm rounds, 812 60mm rounds, 856 assorted B-40 and B-41 rounds, 74 assorted recoilless rifle rounds, 2,266 grenades and 38,420 assorted ammunition rounds. Also included among these same documents was a rough, undated sketch (not to scale) noting directions from the DOC MAY Slope area to KEN.

On the basis of the PW interrogation reports and the captured documents, it was decided to extend the existing reconnaissance screen even further west in an attempt to validate the existing information on KEN. During the period 1-14 May, intensive reconnaissance activity was conducted in and around KEN. On 14 May, Recon Team "COSSACK" was forced to execute an emergency helo extraction after a running contact with an estimated 30 NVA/VC. On the 13th of May, this same team had reported sighting an underground tunnel complex in the vicinity of (YC 994637). While enroute to their extract LZ, the team reported observing camouflaged caves in the vicinity of (YC 992638) as well as fighting holes throughout the area. Previous recon teams had reported enemy activity in the same general area.

There existed no single piece of intelligence or sightings by recon teams to substantially validate the existence of a large ammunition cache in the KEN area. None of the PW's or Hoi Chanh's had ever said he had been there. However, the cumulative intelligence picture certainly suggested the presence of enemy facilities and possible caches in the area.

On 21 May 1969, Companies L and M, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and the Reconnaissance Company of the 51st ARVN Regiment conducted heliborne landings in the KEN area to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area. Their specific mission was to conduct a detailed search of the area in an attempt to locate the purported ammunition cache.

UNCLASSIFIED

The initial river crossing by Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines apparently caught the enemy by surprise. These units did not establish contact until almost 1100H on the 29th of April. Enemy units withheld fire until lead elements approached a treeline vicinity (AT 849549). Contact continued to develop throughout the day until it was determined that friendly units were engaged with an enemy force estimated to be two NVA Companies. By nightfall, over 60 NVA bodies had been counted.

The bodies of the NVA KIA were searched but no documents or laundry markings were found. The two NVA Companies were generally located vicinity (AT 863556) and (AT 858555) respectively. A bunker complex located vicinity (AT 863556) gave every indication of being a Battalion CP.

Later in the operation, freshly cooked buffalo meat was found in cooking pots nearby supporting observation that the enemy has been caught by surprise. The complex consisted of two log bunkers, each having three rooms. The interior of the rooms was lined with polished bamboo. The overhead of the bunkers was 12 feet thick and consisted of dirt and logs.

By night fall on the 29th, Companies B and D had established a half-moon shaped perimeter anchored on the bank of the SONG WU GIA and extending a maximum of 300 meters south of the river bank. During the night, the enemy was able to dig a trench within 20 meters of the perimeter and on the morning of the 30th when medevac helo's attempted to land, intense small arms fire was received from this trench just outside the perimeter.

Although not a new technique, the enemy was able to place mortar fire accurately on friendly targets by adjusting to points marked by small arms tracer fire. The next night (012130H May), at least 16 NVA were observed by elements of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines through starlight scopes moving towards the perimeter. Immediately, 6 NVA were taken under fire resulting in 4 NVA KIA. One of the KIA's was described as being 6 feet tall and carrying a backpack radio. The remaining enemy dispersed. But shortly afterwards, 3 NVA were again observed attempting to recover the radio and taken under fire and dispelled. Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines recovered the radio, a Chicom Model 71-B1 (1967), at first light 2 May. It was held that the small enemy force involved in the 012130H May contact were involved in a recon mission. Based on past knowledge of enemy recon efforts being led by the commanding officer or executive officer of the unit (and the type of radio captured) it was further held that 1 of the enemy KIA was probably a ranking officer of the unit. A search of bodies the next morning failed to confirm this conclusion.

Enemy trenchlines were located in treelines. Those observed were approximately 3 feet wide and 3 feet deep. Every 7 or 8 feet, holes had been dug back into the side of the trench and downwards approximately 5 feet, thereby providing the enemy protection from shrapnel.

UNCLASSIFIED

By 25 May, no significant caches had been uncovered. However, the following items were found: 1 SKS rifle, 1 308 bolt action rifle, 1 French sniper rifle, 1 RPG cannister, 6 82mm mortar rounds, 18 huts, cooking gear, farming tools, rice, watermelons, peanuts and corn.

(d) Lob Bomb.

During the period 25 April to 27 May, there were four reported incidents of the enemy employing five "Lob Bombs" against positions on Hill 55 (there were two other reported incidents occurring outside the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO during the same period).

The first "Lob Bomb" was directed at the rear billeting area temporarily occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines on finger 3, Hill 55 (AT 973614) 252300H April 1969. The bomb consisted of a dud 250 lb low drag bomb which had been refused utilizing a NVA #8 fuse (NFI) and propelled a distance of 600 meters from a launch site located SE of the impact area. On this occasion a low air burst occurred resulting in maximum fragmentation dispersion. The second bomb was directed at the 4.2" mortar battery position on Hill 55 (AT 966621), again involving a 250 lb bomb on 122000H May 1969. The third incident occurred on 200135H May 1969 but the bomb appeared to be either undershot or overshot in that it missed both troop concentrations or artillery positions and impacted behind the Hill 55 Chapel. The fourth and last incident during the period occurred on 272300H May 1969 when two 105mm round Lob Bombs were launched and directed at artillery gun positions located on finger 3, Hill 55 (AT 972615). Casualties from these four launches were 4 KIA and 28 WIA.

Analysis of launch and impact craters were conducted, ~~but it~~ was not until 14 May when a Hoi Chanh from the Q-83 District local force battalion indicated he had knowledge of the launch technique that information as to the weapons characteristics and employment was forthcoming. The Hoi Chanh demonstrated the lob bomb technique showing how the propelling charge (a quart sized or number 10 can packed with explosives) was placed under the center of gravity of the projectile and detonated.

Subsequent field testing by personnel from the Division G-2 section resulted in more definitive performance parameters. The range which dud ordnance can be propelled may exceed 1000 meters and there appears to be no practical size limitation to the ordnance being propelled (a 750 lb bomb was reported being "lobbed" at an ARVN Ranger position) although the most commonly projected ordnance have been 105mm artillery duds and 250 lb low drag bombs. (A more detailed report on the construction and employment of the "lob bomb" is contained in 1st MarDiv Special Intelligence Bulletin dated 26 May 1969 (NOTAL)).

(e) In summary, the enemy response to OKLAHOMA HILLS was essentially as estimated prior to the commencement of the Operation. The enemy chose to withdraw from the immediate area, some enemy forces moving to the south, others to the north. In some cases, the enemy apparently chose to avoid contact only to circle around the operational forces and return to their base areas when friendly forces had withdrawn from the area. Enclosure (9) depicts suspected enemy movement during the period 31 March to 29 May 1969.

UNCLASSIFIED

f. Enemy Units Identified

(1) Enemy units currently held in Free World Military Forces Order of Battle:

- (a) Rear Services, Front 4
- (b) 141st NVA Regiment
- (c) 31st NVA Regiment
- (d) 1st Bn, 368B NVA Artillery Regiment
- (e) 2nd Bn, 368B NVA Artillery Regiment
- (f) H-16 Local Force Company

(2) Units reported having no previous record in First Marine Division Order of Battle:

- (a) Q-79 Dispensary, Front 4
- (b) Q-80 Dispensary, Front 4

(3) Units cited in paragraph 8.g (1) above are identified by PW's/ documents (Enclosure (4)). Units listed in paragraph 8.f.(2) are identified solely by documents.

(4) Enclosure (4) also cites captured documents identifying the presence of units and subordinate elements thereof, which operated in the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO. These documents have been recorded by 9th ITT and the 1st Marine Division Document Translation Center (DTC) for future use.

g. Significant Intelligence

(1) Infiltration and Routes of Supply

Considerable information on infiltration/supply routes in the area of operation was available prior to the commencement of OKLAHOMA HILLS. Subsequent PW/Hoi Chanh interrogations and reconnaissance sightings during the operation added to the available information. PW Sr Captain LONG (captured 25 February 69 by I/3/7) provided information on the major supply/infiltration routes. He related that the major supply routes for the 141st NVA Regiment (and in all probability for the 31st and 368B Regiments) originated to the far west in the AI YIN area (YC 7861) and could be traced east along route 614. At the point where the route divided, one route continued east along route 614 into HAPPY VALLEY, the other commenced at the intersection of the SONG CON and route 614 (vicinity (ZC 0166)) and followed the SONG CON south to its intersection with the SONG YANG at AN DIEN and

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Enemy AA fire incidents. Enclosure (11).
2. Helicopter LZ's utilized during the operation. Enclosure (12).
3. Trail network in AO. Enclosure (13).
4. Mine and surprise firing device incidents. Enclosure (14).

h. Targeting

(1) Targeting was accomplished by the S-2 in conjunction with the FSCC through employment of the various collection agencies, to support the friendly scheme of maneuver and harass/interdict enemy lines of communications and assembly areas. During the operation, targets were acquired for employment of the following supporting arms:

- (a) Artillery
- (b) TPQ-10
- (c) CAS/TAS
- (d) Beacon controlled air strikes
- (e) Post operation arflight strikes.

(2) A total of 120 TPQ-10 strikes, an undetermined number of artillery and naval gunfire missions were targeted against intelligence developed targets.

i. Cover and Concealment

(1) Mountainous Areas. This terrain complex is covered by dense vegetation thicket, undergrowth and jungle canopy afforded maximum concealment for both friendly and enemy forces. Cover from small arms and flat trajectory weapons is provided by large trees and boulders.

(2) River Valleys. Natural concealment is generally poor in the rice field areas, improving somewhat near the hamlet, adjacent hedgerows and treelines. Natural cover from flat trajectory weapons, provided by rice paddy dikes, is considered fair. Man-made spider holes, tombs, fortified bunkers and well camouflaged fighting holes provide the enemy with excellent cover and concealment.

(3) HAPPY VALLEY. This valley is covered by dense brush and elephant grass 7 to 10 feet high which affords maximum concealment for both friendly and enemy forces. Cover from small arms and flat trajectory weapons is afforded by brush, scattered trees and stream escarpments.

UNCLASSIFIED

then east to the SONG VU GIA where supplies and men could easily be diverted to the ONG THU Slope area thence to the northern ARIZONA Area or north into the DOC MAY Slope/CHARLIE RIDGE areas.

From the route 614 terminus in the HAPPY VALLEY, supplies arriving from the west are easily transported to units astride or adjacent to the SONG TUY LOAN and to the units located in NE CHARLIE RIDGE-SHERWOOD FOREST-WORTH RIDGE area.

PW/Hoi Chanh interrogations revealed that all enemy units had established rice resupply as a priority mission during the period 31 March to 29 May. The majority of the prisoners and Hoi Chanh's were on rice gathering missions when captured or rallying. Among the material captured by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines from NVA/VC bodies found in the area located between the SONG VU GIA and south CHARLIE RIDGE were numerous packs filled with rice and supplies. Documents captured as well as PW/Hoi Chanh reports established the HA NHA/BA TAN area vicinity (AT 8055, 8155) as well as the MINH TAN area on the south bank of the SONG VU GIA vicinity (AT 8254, 8354) as major NVA/VC market places. Other rice gathering areas mentioned frequently in documents and PW/Hoi Chanh interrogation reports as rice gathering areas were HOA PHU vicinity (AT 9272), HOA LOC vicinity (AT 9074) and HOA BINH vicinity (AT 8966) villages.

Infiltration routes described by PW's/Hoi Chanh were of a general nature. The one common point mentioned was the ONG THU Slope area (ZC 1750 center of mass) from which replacement drafts were taken to their respective new units by "cafres". Enclosure (10) depicts known or suspected infiltration and supply routes.

(2) Location of Captured/Destroyed Enemy Equipment

(a) Enclosure (8) lists the total material captured or destroyed.

(b) Enclosure (5) depicts the location of significant base area and bunker complexes.

(3) Identification of Ordnance

(a) During the operation, Hills 37 and 55 were subjected to intermittent attacks by fire. Employing crater and fragmentation analysis, it was determined that the 250 lb launch bomb was used for the first time against Hill 55.

(b) Both 75mm recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars were employed in the attacks on Hill 37 and Hill 55.

(c) Significant ordnance included 1 75mm howitzer round (Japanese make) uncovered by K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 166605) on 22 April 1969.

(4) Other Significant Information Recorded

(a) The following information was recorded for future use:

UNCLASSIFIED

j. Obstacles

(1) CHARLIE RIDGE. Numerous densely vegetated, narrow, steep sided valleys, ravines and gorges compartment the area. The steep mountains slopes restricted and canalized movement.

(2) River Valleys. The inundated rice paddy dike area and numerous streams and rivers provide the only significant obstacle to both enemy and friendly movement.

(3) HAPPY VALLEY. The numerous streams and dense brush throughout the area together with the thick elephant grass make movement of friendly or enemy troops difficult.

9. Mission. Commencing H-hour on D-day the 7th Marine Regiment (-) (Rein) in coordination with the 51st ARVN Regiment (-) conducts a multibattalion operation in the WORTH RIDGE-CHARLIE RIDGE-HAPPY VALLEY area to destroy enemy forces, caches, installations and fortifications.

10. Concept

a. The 7th Marines (-) (Rein) with 5 Marine battalions conducts a phased movement into the AO; establishes fire support bases (FSB's) and landing zones (LZ's) as required to facilitate operations and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in the WORTH RIDGE-CHARLIE RIDGE- HAPPY VALLEY area. Reconnaissance elements conduct screening operations in the northern and western portions of the AO and within the maneuver area to find enemy forces. Additionally, one Marine battalion conducts screening operations south of CHARLIE RIDGE to prevent enemy north-south movement. A fifth Marine battalion is available on two hours notice as a reaction/exploitation force.

b. Prior to or on D-Day FSB's are prepared and/or occupied on Hill 52 (AT 788552) western HAPPY VALLEY vicinity (ZC 1066), Hill 10 (AT 922691) and Hill 65 (AT 878577). Additional FSB's are established on WORTH-CHARLIE RIDGE as necessary.

c. During the hours of darkness on D-1 two Marine battalions commence a coordinated sweep to the west along the axis of WORTH-CHARLIE RIDGE. On D-Day at L-Hour one Marine battalion lands by helicopter in western HAPPY VALLEY vicinity (ZC 132655), establishes FSB BRONCO (later renamed FSB RATTLESNAKE) (Hill 749) at (ZC 123650) and conducts reconnaissance in force operations in the western portions of the HAPPY VALLEY-CHARLIE RIDGE area to interdict enemy infiltration/exfiltration.

d. On D-Day in cooperation and coordination with Marine forces 2 ARVN battalions land by helicopter, one battalion in the vicinity (ZC 1256) and one battalion in the vicinity of (ZC 1855). These battalions conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the southwestern portion of the CHARLIE RIDGE area to destroy enemy forces, caches and installations.

UNCLASSIFIED

11. Execution

a. Pre D-Day Operations

(1) Operations directly in support of OKLAHOMA HILLS commenced on 21 March with elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines moving west from Hill 65. I/7 had been assigned the mission of securing route 4 between Hill 65 and Hill 52 (AT 788552) preliminary to the establishment of a major fire support base, FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52), at the latter location. At 0600 on 24 March Company C/1/7 seized Hill 52 and began conducting security patrols off of the hill. On 25 March, a platoon from B/1/7 and a platoon of engineers left Hill 65 and began the initial sweep west of Route 4. In addition to sweeping for mines this force also began to repair and grade the road. By noon on 26 March Hill 52 was secured and the road west from Hill 65 was cleared and ready to support the heavy logistic traffic necessary to sustain FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52). The first convoys moved from Hill 65 to Hill 52 on 27 March. Engineer work on Hill 52 gun positions commenced on 28 March and by 30 March FSB MUSTANG was ready to receive artillery units.

Meanwhile, it was necessary to relieve the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 7th Marines from their normal TACR responsibilities to enable them to participate freely in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. The 26th Marines assumed responsibility for the area normally controlled by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 7th Marines, exclusive of the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO. By 1800 on 29 March this relief was completed and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 7th Marines made final preparations to commence the operation. On 25 March an automatic retransmission station was established on RC BA NA (ZC 205704) to provide for adequate communication throughout the AO. A security element was provided this relay from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines initially. As the operation progressed, and various battalions were phased out, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines followed by the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines provided this security.

At 2015 on 30 March the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines departed Hill 10 (AT 925691) and commenced a covered movement on foot into the area of operations. Concurrently, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines commenced a similar move to the west from Hill 41 (AT 934664) into the AO.

b. Operational Phases. Although there was originally no intention of separating Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS into distinct phases there were several occasions during the conduct of the operation when circumstances dictated a shift in tactics and emphasis. As a result the 60 days of operations developed into three distinct phases. During the first phase all units initially involved in the operation entered the AO and commenced a coordinated sweep towards the dominant highground in the center of CHARLIE RIDGE with the objective of finding, fixing and destroying the enemy.

During the second phase, all units commenced a systematic search of streambeds and draws and other likely areas for enemy base camp facilities.

UNCLASSIFIED

The third phase was occasioned by a reduction of participating forces and was characterized by widely dispersed units operating throughout the area in an effort to reestablish contact with elements of the enemy which had reentered the AO, as well as searching for and destroying the enemy's base camps.

(1) Phase I 31 March - 21 April 1969 (See Enclosure (17))

Events moved smoothly on the morning of D-Day with all pre H-Hour LZ preparation being completed on schedule. The lift of the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment into LZ HAWK (ZC 175553) and the 3rd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment into LZ EAGLE (ZC 128564) commenced at 1107 and was completed without incident by 1216. The lift of 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines commenced at 1125 and by 1500 on the 31st of March the battalion and the 4.2" mortar battery of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines were into LZ ROBIN (ZC 132655) without incident. These landings coupled with the overland move on the night of 30 March completed the introduction of all major units into the AO.

The tactical maneuver of all units during Phase I was in accordance with the originally stated concept. That is, the 2nd and 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines attacked to the west along the axis of WORTH RIDGE and CHARLIE RIDGE respectively while the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines and 51st ARVN Regiment (-) attacked to the southeast and northeast into the highground. Several different factors affected the maneuver of units during this period. On 1 April a Hoi Chanh and a PW were detained in widely separated engagements. Reconnaissance insert "REPORT CARD" detained a MSgt from the 8th Company, 2nd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment at (AT 836635) and K/3/7 captured a Warrant Officer from the 18th Company of the 31st NVA Regiment. Both of these enemy soldiers identified specific locations within the AO where their regimental base camps were located. The MSgt from the 141st Regiment was most definite in locating his home base during an aerial reconnaissance. As a result of this information the movement of the attacking battalions, which in concept, was to be a slow and methodical sweep towards the highground, was modified and the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines were directed to close as fast as possible on the area believed to be the base camp of the 141st NVA Regiment.

Consequently, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines moved rapidly to complete FSB RATTLESNAKE on Hill 749 (ZC 123650) from where they could support their move to the southeast into the target area. Upon landing on D-Day M/3/26 moved overland from LZ ROBIN to Hill 749 and commenced construction of FSB RATTLESNAKE. The fire support base was completed and ready to receive artillery on 6 April and by 1600 both C/1/13 and W/1/13 were established on RATTLESNAKE and ready to support the maneuver of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines. Thus the first of five FSB's in the AO was completed and direct support artillery fire was extended to cover the area suspected to be the base camp of the 141st NVA Regiment.

UNCLASSIFIED

Both the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines moved as directed, to close as rapidly as possible to the vicinity of the 141st NVA Regiment base camps. As a result, their movement was along a restricted axis due to the terrain and vegetation as opposed to a wide searching front. It was hoped that rapid movement would succeed in closing with the enemy in his base camps or at least prevent him from properly evacuating his material from his rear areas.

The 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines pushed southeast up the long ridgeline from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) with Companies I and L towards Hill 1166 (ZC 142623). During this period contact with the enemy was made repeatedly as small groups of enemy were continually encountered along the trail networks.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines accelerated their movement to the west along CHARLIE RIDGE in an effort to reach the camp of the 141st while it was still occupied. At the same time the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines reached the western extent of 105mm howitzer coverage from Hill 10 (At 923690) FSB STALLION and on 5 May work commenced on the construction of FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) (AT 831659). As a result the advance of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was slowed as the battalions awaited the construction of an artillery platform to support their further movement west.

By 1800 on 7 April K/3/7 had reached Objective H (ZC 200604) with L/3/7 in trace at (ZC 790596). Simultaneously I/3/26 had reached Objective L (ZC 157620) with L/3/26 in trace at (ZC 153618). On April 8 these forwarded elements continued to close on the deep ravine area believed to contain the base camp of the Headquarters, 141st NVA Regiment. At first light on the 8th it appeared that the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines was in the best position to rapidly close on the objective; consequently 7th Marine FragO 34-69, transmitted that evening, directed that this battalion assume operational control of K/3/7 (the closest 3/7 company) and conduct a coordinated attack to seize Objective M. Objective M was designated as an area as follows: Upper Left (ZC 170620); Lower Right (ZC 182604).

8 April was a noteworthy day for L/3/26. As the company pressed to close on Objective M the lead element came upon an enemy base camp/field dispensary installation at (ZC 148616). Company L engaged approximately 20 enemy soldiers in the camp and had to fight their way into the installation. A total of 35 enemy bodies were found in the camp most in graves recently killed by supporting arms.

On the 9th of April, I and L companies 3/26 continued to close on Objective M from the north and west while K/3/7 remained on Hill 943 (ZC 181604) prepared to block the objective area on the south. Company K discovered an enemy camp containing approximately 27 huts while they prepared to move into their blocking position. Contact continued to be sporadic throughout the day. Movement into Objective M during the next several days was exceedingly slow due to continuous contact with the enemy, the rugged terrain, and the many enemy camps uncovered.

UNCLASSIFIED

While the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines were closing on Objective M the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines left elements of F/2/7 on FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) (Objective D, vicinity (AT 831659)) to provide security for the construction of the fire base. Meanwhile H/2/7 searched the valley floor north of WORTH RIDGE while Companies E and G moved up the ridge towards Hill 785 (AT 807650) and the area suspected to be the base camp of the 31st NVA Regiment as revealed in the interrogation to the Warrant Officer captured on 1 April. On 8 April FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) was completed and occupied by H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines.

On 11 April at 1450 E/2/7 discovered an extremely large base camp area at (AT 813637). The lead platoon received heavy machinegun fire from the camp as they entered the periphery. Initial reports indicated this camp to be the largest yet discovered and estimated it to contain in excess of 200 structures.

The 10 days, 11-21 April, represented a period of relative stability in the maneuver of all major units. Disposition of battalion command posts found the CP of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines on Hill 785 (AT 807650) while Companies E, F (-) and G continued to search the extensive base camp at (AT 7963, 8063 and 8163). The CP of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was located on Hill 1235 (Objective G, (ZC 200620)) which was secured by M/3/7 on 9 April at 1710. Patrols from Companies I and M searched the area around Objective G, while L/3/7 continued to patrol off of Objective H (Hill 1062, (ZC 200604)). Sporadic contact was made with small groups of enemy on the move throughout the 3/7 AO.

The 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines CP which had displaced on 6 April to Hill 1066 (ZC 142623) remained at that location collocated with K/3/26 patrolling that area. M/3/26 remained at FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749), provided security for that installation, and patrolled that area. I/3/26, L/3/26 and K/3/7 continued to move closer to Objective M.

At this point the major units essentially had reached their final objectives. 2/7 was searching the 31st NVA base camp and continuing to engage small pockets of tenacious defenders. 3/7 (-) had reached Objectives H and G and local patrolling was producing no significant results. 3/26 (Rein) had closed on Objective M and discovered a massive network of enemy camp facilities. After 15 April contact in the 3/7 and 3/26 areas nearly evaporated while 2/7 continued to find the enemy contesting his base camps.

By 15 April 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines had closed on Objective M with I/3/26, L/3/26 and K/3/7. These units were engaged during the next several days with conducting a thorough search and destruction of the base camps uncovered.

On 19 April 7th Marines FragO 38-69 directed 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines to withdraw to Hill 785 and FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) in preparation for a helilift out of the area of operations on 21st. This move

UNCLASSIFIED

was necessary because the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was scheduled to go afloat and a battalion was needed to cover that portion of the DANANG TAOR which would be vacated. Concurrent with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines' withdrawal from the operation, coordination was made with the 51st ARVN Regiment in order that a relief in place might be conducted between the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and a battalion from the 51st ARVN Regiment.

On 21 April, in a coordinated effort involving Marine and VNAF helicopters, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and H Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines were withdrawn and replaced by the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment and an ARVN 105mm howitzer battery. The ARVN battalion's dispositions remained similar to those of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines with a company protecting the battery on FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) and the majority of the battalion operating from Hill 785. This evolution terminated the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines participation in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Throughout Phase I the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines executed the missions assigned in 7th Marines Operation Order 1-69 along the axis of the SONG VU GIA River. This battalion, provided security for the major fire support base MUSTANG (Hill 52) (AT 798552), conducted security patrols and outposted Route 4 to insure its viability as an MSR. Emphasis was placed on interdicting the enemy's movement north and south between CHARLIE RIDGE and the northern ARIZONA area. One of the assigned tasks was the daily setting of ambushes at known river crossing sites along the SONG VU GIA. This tactic produced excellent results on the night of 13 April when a platoon from B/1/7 in position along the north bank of the river, observed 30 NVA soldiers entering the water to cross from the south bank. The platoon withheld its fire until the enemy had almost reached the north bank before a heavy volume of fire was directed into the enemy in the water. This action accounted for 14 NVA soldiers killed. The 1st Battalion's operation seriously impeded the facility with which VC/NVA units could aggress from CHARLIE RIDGE to the south and manifestly denied the enemy the capability to reinforce from the ARIZONA area.

(2) Phase II 21 April - 3 May 1969 (See Enclosure (18)).

7th Marines FragO 37-69 dated 15 April which had to be issued prior to 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines withdrawal, modified by FragO 41-69, provided the concept for the execution of Phase II. Subsequent to this order the 7th Marines were directed to withdraw the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines from the operation and as a result a revised overlay and different boundaries were promulgated to accompany the revised order. The execution of Phase II was delayed until the relief of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines by 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN was completed on 21 April. The stated concept called for dividing the area of operation into zones and conducting a coordinated and systematic search in successive zones to destroy enemy forces, uncover enemy caches and installations and concurrently construct helicopter landing zones and a series of mutually supporting fire support bases.

UNCLASSIFIED

The second development was the inevitable loss of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines from the operation.

In anticipation of these developments the latter part of Phase II saw considerable troop movement and realignment. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, in a standby reserve status since D-Day, was finally called on to participate in this phase of the operation. 7th Marines FragO 39-69 dated 20 April outlined the need for friendly presence south of Hill 55 (AT 9661) in an area which had been devoid of friendly forces since D-Day and directed the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines to conduct search and clear operations in that area. This activity commenced on 26 April and was a preliminary to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines relieving the eastern portion of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines area to enable that battalion to move west to commence further work on Route 4.

A second troop movement resulting from the Phase III concept was the rotation of companies from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines out of the area of operations back to Hill 10 for a 48 hour rehabilitation period. This sequential move commenced on 29 April with Companies K and M/3/7 returning to Hill 10 via LVTP's from the eastern tip of CHARLIE RIDGE. On the 2nd and 3rd of May 1/3/7 and I/3/7 respectively followed M and K back to Hill 10 for a rehabilitation period.

Meanwhile in a continuing effort to establish a system of mutually supporting FSB's throughout the area of operations, a company from the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment was helilifted to Hill 462 (ZC 189648) on 28 April to provide security for and assist the Marine engineers in the construction of FSB STAGECOACH (Hill 462) completed on 4 May, the fourth base completed, but like FSB LONGHORN (Hill 886), FSB STAGECOACH (Hill 462) was not occupied with artillery during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

During Phase II while the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines began to make preparations for withdrawal, sporadic enemy contact within the area of the 141st Regimental complex indicated that the enemy was still in small separate groups in that area.

On 1 May the 4th Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment was withdrawn from Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS leaving the southwest portion of the AO above THUONG DUC void of friendly forces. This move left one ARVN Battalion in the AO.

On 2 May the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines began to withdraw from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS with K/3/26, L/3/26 and C/1/13 being lifted from the AO. At 0800 on 3 May, a day completely void of enemy contact, a platoon from K/3/7 was lifted into FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and commenced a move to the southwest towards Hill 1166 (ZC 142623) to secure the LZ at that location for the remainder of the Company. Battery G (-) 4 tubes, was lifted from FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to provide 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines direct support artillery. By noon the remaining elements of 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines had been lifted from FSB RATTLESNAKE.

UNCLASSIFIED

In anticipation of commencing Phase II L/3/7 was directed to move overland from Objective H (ZC 200604) to Hill 886 (AT 823605) to commence construction of FSB LONGHORN. Company L arrived on Hill 886 at 1130 on 20 April and clearing operations began.

During Phase II the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines conducted a detailed and methodical search of their AO from west to east retracing their original move along CHARLIE RIDGE. L/3/7 searched the draws and ravines in the vicinity of FSB LONGHORN and at the same time provided security for and assisted the engineer personnel during the construction of the base. Companies I and M and the CP moved to the south from Objective G (ZC 200620) to the vicinity of (AT 7959) searching ravines during the move. On 24 April I/3/7 was lifted from (AT 792592) to Hill 722 (AT 840613) and M/3/7 and the battalion CP were lifted to (AT 837636). Both units commenced thorough searches in those areas. On the 25th of April K/3/7 was chopped from 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines back to their parent battalion as operations in the vicinity of Objective M were completed.

K/3/7 was chopped and helilifted from Objective M to (AT 837637) on the eastern slopes of CHARLIE RIDGE. On 25 April FSB LONGHORN was completed and L/3/7 joined the general sweep to the east by 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. FSB LONGHORN was the third FSB constructed in the AO. It was the first one not immediately occupied but rather left for use during subsequent operations. During this period 3/7's contact with the enemy was almost nonexistent.

The 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines continued operations similar to Phase I during Phase II although the battalion's AO was divided into areas for detailed search by FragO 41-69. It was still necessary for the battalion to insure that all base camps in the vicinity of Objective M were discovered, searched and destroyed. As stated earlier, K/3/7 was released to its parent battalion on 25 April. Meanwhile K/3/26 conducted extensive patrolling, and search activities from Hill 1066 (ZC 143623) and M/3/26 continued to conduct combat patrols in the draws and ravines in the vicinity of FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749). Contact with the enemy was rare and consisted of harrassing sniper fire and mortar fire in the area of the base camp complex.

Operations in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines area during Phase II continued as during Phase I. There were two incidents worthy of note: a very successful ambush conducted along the SONG VU GHA on the night of 21-22 April and a two battalion subsidiary operation conducted in the Northern ARIZONA area between 29 April and 2 May. Both of these activities will be addressed seperately in paragraphs c(1) and (2) below. Additionally the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines coordinated with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and conducted ambushes in the low ground at the base of CHARLIE RIDGE as the 3rd Battalion conducted sweeps downhill through the main draws of the ridge.

Two developments dictated the change of tactics which warranted a shift into Phase III of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. The first development was long anticipated and that was the mission assigned the 7th Marines to repair the bridge at THUONG DUC (ZC 149538) and repair and upgrade Route 4 from Hill 52 to that point.

UNCLASSIFIED

high ground east of Hill 1166. Company M continued to provide security for and patrol from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749).

In late April and early May the reconnaissance screen along the western and northwestern periphery of the AO reported an increase in enemy activity and there were several instances of recon teams making contact with the enemy. This increase in activity provided the catalyst for landing I/3/7 to the west of HAPPY VALLEY on 6 May. Company I was directed to land in LZ DRY GULCH (ZC 047674), conduct a reconnaissance in force for enemy in the area and finally move to (ZC 055664) to provide security for the construction of FSB BULLWHIP. FSB BULLWHIP would enable the 7th Marines to project Marine presence further to the west.

On 9 May I/3/7 was helilifted from Hill 1166 to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to relieve M/3/7 of the responsibility for securing FSB RATTLESNAKE. This lift was completed by 1030 and M/3/7 conducted a helicopterborne assault into the northern position of the AO at (ZC 135736). This move, like I/3/7's lift was in response to recent enemy activity reported by reconnaissance teams in the northwestern AO. Company M was directed to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the north of HAPPY VALLEY.

On 9 May FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) was evacuated and the general support artillery formerly located there was redistributed and positioned on Hill 65 (AT 881579) and Hill 55 (AT 965617).

Events to the east in the DANANG YAOR again dictated the loss of a unit from the operation due to the security requirements in the area then patrolled by the 26th Marines. On the morning of 12 May I/3/7 was helilifted from FSB BULLWHIP, where they had operated since 6 May, to Hill 10. Upon arrival at 1200 Company I was chopped to the 26th Marines. A platoon from Company L was lifted from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to FSB BULLWHIP in anticipation of Company I's departure.

The period between 12 and 20 May was one of relative stability with Company M continuing to conduct reconnaissance in force operations to the north of HAPPY VALLEY and Companies K and L searching the area in the vicinity of Objective M and the area to the north of Objective M.

On 20 May the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines shifted forces to the west; occupied FSB BULLWHIP with a battery (-), 4 tubes; and on the morning of 21 May conducted a helicopterborne assault into the KEN Valley, (YC 9863), with Companies L, M and the Reconnaissance Company of the 51st ARVN Regiment. This move was conceived of as a raid to search for and destroy/capture suspected enemy arms in the target area and is covered in detail in paragraph c.(3) below.

On 25 May 3rd Battalion (-), 7th Marines completed the KEN Operation with the battalion CP and Companies K and L being lifted directly to Hill 785 in order to assist the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment in the final destruction of the 31st NVA Regimental base camp earlier discovered by E/2/7 during Phase I. M/3/7 was lifted back to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to commence the disestablishment of that installation. On the 26th of May the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment commenced to with-

UNCLASSIFIED

Thus ended Phase II of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS with the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment and 3rd Battalion (-), 7th Marines the only units remaining in the WORTH RIDGE-CHARLIE RIDGE area.

(3) Phase III 3 May - 29 May 1969 (See Enclosure (19)).

On 3 May, as elements of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were relieving elements of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines on FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commenced operations along Route 4 to the west of Hill 52. The 7th Marines Frag 0 41-69 dated 29 April directed the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines to assume responsibility for the eastern portion of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines TAOR to enable that battalion to shift its attention west towards THUONG DUC. 1st Engineer Battalion was tasked with improving Route 4 from Hill 52 to THUONG DUC while the 7th Engineer Battalion was directed to improve the bridge at the CIDG Camp. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was responsible for the security of both of these engineer efforts and C/1/7 provided security by occupying the high ground north of Route 4 and THUONG DUC, while A/1/7 deployed along Route 4 to provide physical close-in security. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines shifted its CP to Hill 52 and continued to provide security for FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52) and Route 4 beyond Hill 65. The battalion maintained these same general dispositions until 9 May at which time both Route 4 and the THUONG DUC bridge had been improved and were back in use by the local Vietnamese civilians. On 9 May the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines shifted companies back to the east to relieve companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. At 1200 on 10 May 3/1 was chopped to the 1st Marine Regiment and this concluded that battalions participation in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines continued its original mission of providing screening and blocking forces along the SONG VU GIA and security for FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52). Meanwhile, Phase III found one ARVN battalion, 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, and elements of one Marine battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines the only units remaining in the CHARLIE RIDGE-WORTH RIDGE area. By sunset on 3 May Companies K and M plus G Battery (-) were back in the AO after the infantry units had conducted rehabilitation on Hill 10. The 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment continued to conduct patrolling operations from Hill 785 and FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502). On 26 April the Reconnaissance Company from the 51st ARVN Regiment was lifted to Hill 462 (ZC 189649) where they provided security for the construction of FSB STAGECOACH.

While the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment was conducting operations in the northeast portion of the AO the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were given the remainder of the high ground in the AO. The concept for operations during this period was for the 3rd Battalion to conduct wide-spread operations throughout the AO in order to establish contact with the enemy who was believed to have reentered the area of operations. Consequently when K/3/7 returned to the AO the company was lifted into Hill 1166 in order to be close to the base camp complex at Objective M. The 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines had continued to engage the enemy in this area until they were withdrawn from the AO and indications were that the enemy was back in the area. On 4 May L/3/7 was lifted into Hill 1166 and K/3/7 moved southeast into Objective M while Company L conducted patrols in the

UNCLASSIFIED

draw from the AO with the majority of the battalion lifting out of Hill 785 in VNAF helicopters with Marine CH53's retrograding the artillery battery from FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502).

Companies K and L continued a concerted effort to destroy the large camp facilities in the vicinity of (AT 7963 & 8063) until they were lifted from Hill 785 to Hill 10 on the afternoon of 28 May.

On 28 May G/3/11 was lifted from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to Hill 10 and after completely destroying and burning all bunkers on FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) M/3/7 was helilifted from the AO arriving on Hill 10 at 1345 on the 29th. This move completed the withdrawal of all units from the HAPPY VALLEY, WORTH-RIDGE-CHARLIE RIDGE portion of the AO and Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was officially terminated at 1800 29 May 1969.

c. Related Operations. During the course of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS there were three operations which took place along the periphery of the original AO and which were related to the larger operational picture. In each case the boundary of the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO was temporarily modified to include the area in which the action occurred. These actions were not included in the proceeding chronological narrative of the operation in order not to complicate or confuse that account.

(1) The SONG VU GIA Ambush 21-22 April 1969. Throughout Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines were tasked with a screening mission along the SONG VU GIA to prevent enemy north-south movement. On the night of 21 April, Company B was in ambush positions along the north bank of the river in consonance with the Battalion's assigned mission. At 1945 the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon, Company B observed seven NVA soldiers on a sandbar directly opposite their ambush site at (AT 823552). This squad was directed to withhold fire on the small group of enemy soldiers because low level intelligence received earlier that day had indicated the possibility of a large enemy movement north from the ARIZONA area. Company B prepared to interdict the southern river bank with organic and supporting arms. A second squad located in the immediate area closed on the already positioned ambush and the 3rd Platoon, Company B, located approximately 600 meters west, positioned a 106mm recoilless rifle and a Cal .30 machine gun to fire on the southern bank. Artillery and mortar fire was plotted on the target area.

At 2100, the Marines on the north bank observed a large enemy force emerge from the bush onto the sandbar in groups of 40 or more dragging boats. The enemy moved to the river's edge and commenced a river crossing. The two squads continued to observe while the enemy placed 17 boats in the water; each containing 3-5 enemy and guided by 2-3 soldiers wading in the river. An additional force of approximately 25 began wading behind the boats.

As the enemy reached the middle of the river Company B called for illumination and initiated contact with all available organic and supporting arms available.

UNCLASSIFIED

Caught completely unaware by the planned fires, the enemy became confused and uncoordinated. A group of approximately 25 continued to attempt the crossing while those on the south bank attempted to withdraw to the south. The enemy in the river was subjected to small arms fire and 81mm mortar fire while those on the south bank were caught in the pre-planned artillery. At the height of the action, small unit leaders observed 150-200 enemy attempting to cross. Through starlight scopes, 57 enemy bodies were observed in the water and strewn along the sandbar.

Unfortunately illumination was not continuous throughout the remainder of the night and the enemy was successful in removing the majority of his dead and wounded from the south bank.

At 0730 on the 22nd Company B embarked in LVT's and, under cover of supporting arms fire, conducted a river crossing in order to sweep the south shore of the river at the crossing site. During this subsequent operation Company B uncovered 14 NVA bodies in new uniforms with new equipment. The sandbar itself was covered with bloodtrails, uniforms and parts of bodies which had been overlooked in the mass removal.

RESULTS: Enemy Losses: 71 NVA KIA

Friendly Losses: 2 USMC WIA

(2) The Northern ARIZONA Operation 29 April - 2 May 1969. During the period 15-29 April low level intelligence indicated the presence of enemy forces to the south of the SONG VU GIA in the northern ARIZONA area. During this time 14 separate enemy sightings were made south of the river by reconnaissance teams and units from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines patrolling the north bank and on Hill 65. In order to react to this threat against FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52), Hill 65, and Route 4 the 1st Battalion planned a quick thrust south of the river into the northern ARIZONA to find and destroy enemy forces located immediately to the south of the SONG VU GIA. On the 29th the 5th Marines granted the 7th Marines an AO extension into the northern ARIZONA between the NS grid lines AT82 and 89, north of EW grid line 53 and south of the SONG VU GIA.

During the night of 29-30 April the 1st Battalion (-), with Companies B and D plus the battalion command group crossed the river at (AT 858569) and, at first light commenced to attack to the ESE when Company B on the right flank was heavily engaged from their right rear. The battalion wheeled to NW and attacked back into an estimated two NVA companies. Contact was fierce as the enemy directed heavy small arms and mortar fire against the battalion (-). After again reaching the river the battalion turned to the left and attacked to the SW along the axis of the river. Meanwhile Company A deployed along the north bank as a blocking/reserve force in the vicinity (AT 834550). Both Companies B and D continued to attack under heavy fire through a series of hedgerows and treelines supported by artillery, air and CS gas. Contact throughout the afternoon was sporadic but heavy and on the evening of the 30th Companies B, D and the command group established defensive positions at (AT 845545).

UNCLASSIFIED

On the morning of 1 May resupply helicopters attempting to land at 1/7's positions were driven off by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire and Company A on the north bank was called on to resupply the force on the south bank by LVT. At approximately 0830 Company B received 60mm mortar fire. By this time the GO 7th Marines had established an OP on Hill 65 and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, then operating to the NE of LIBERTY Bridge in the vicinity of (AT 9355), was directed to move overland by truck and Amtrac to (AT 823551), make a river crossing, and establish blocking positions to the west of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in the vicinity of (AT 8354).

During the morning and early afternoon, while the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines were moving to effect the river crossing, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines resumed the attack to the west but continued to meet heavy resistance from each treeline, and succeeded in covering only 200 meters. By 1700 the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, with Companies I, K and L had reached the south bank of the SONG VU GIA and commenced to wheel to the east to attack towards 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Darkness on the 1st found 3/1 (-) in defensive positions at (AT 830546) and 1/7 (-) located at (AT 843547).

During the night the order was issued to the two battalions for the attack on 2 May. The plan called for 1/7 to hold their positions while 3/1 attacked to the east towards the eastern battalion. Once 3/1 closed on 1/7 that battalion was to turn about and both battalions were to attack to the ENE to destroy the enemy force which was now suspected to be mainly to the east of 1/7.

At 0600 on 2 May the 3rd Battalion (-), 1st Marines commenced their attack to the east towards the 1st Battalion (-), 7th Marines. The attack proceeded as planned without contact. 3/1 closed on 1/7 about 1100 and both battalions began a methodical attack to the ENE prepping each successive treeline with artillery as they moved. By late afternoon both battalions had reached the south bank of the SONG VU GIA; 1/7 at (AT 863564) and 3/1 at (AT 869570). At that point 3/1 began receiving sporadic 60mm mortar fire from the south which was effectively silenced by accurate countermortar fire with artillery. By 1900 both battalions were back on the north bank of the SONG VU GIA and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines moved into position to relieve 1st Battalion, 7th Marines to allow them to shift west to commence work on Route 4 west of Hill 52.

RESULTS

NVA KIA:	60	USMC KIA:	9
CSWC:	3	USMC WIA(E):	60
IWC:	13		

(3) The KEN Valley Operation 21-25 May 1969. The operation against KEN at (YC 9863) was conducted to a large extent because Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS had provided the opportunity to support such an action. KEN had long been mentioned in PW interrogations as a main arms and ammunition storage facility. Time and again prisoner reports told of making a trip to KEN to pick up 140 and 122mm rockets.

In anticipation of such an operation and in consonance with the mission assigned the 7th Marines of establishing a widespread system of fire support bases, Company I, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was landed in LZ DRYGULCH on 6 May and moved overland to (ZC 056664) to provide security for the construction of FSB BULLWHIP at the location. FSB BULLWHIP was completed on 12 May. This FSB, within 105mm Howitzers range of KEN, set the stage for the operation against KEN.

Between 18 and 20 May planning proceeded for the operation; contact was made with the 51st ARVN Regiment and arrangements made for the Reconnaissance Company of the 51st to participate in the operation. On the 20th the CO of the ARVN Recon Company was lifted to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) to effect final coordination with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines for the operation. 3/7 provided a Vietnamese speaking Marine officer as liaison officer and an artillery FO team and Helicopter Support Team was attached to the company. Companies L and M plus the battalion command group were scheduled to make the assault into KEN. On 20 May K/3/7 assumed responsibility for security of both FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and BULLWHIP and a provisional battery of 4 105mm Howitzers was positioned on the westernmost FSB in the AO.

At 0600 on 21 May an AO extension to the west including KEN became effective and at 0930 L/3/7 commenced a helicopterborne assault from FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749) and from the 51st Regimental CP (BT 023657) in CH53's. Company L was followed into the objective area by the 51st Recon Company which landed at (YC 963632) at 1045 behind L/3/7. From the assault landing zone Company L commenced reconnaissance in force operations to the NE through Objective A while the ARVN Reconnaissance Company commenced operations to the SE through Objective C. By 1300 M/3/7 had landed at (ZC 001641) and commenced reconnaissance in force operations to the SW through Objective B. Thus the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines had succeeded in projecting the western most presence of the operation into the KEN Valley.

3/7 (-) (Rein) conducted a thorough search of the area around KEN over a 5 day period with contact being almost nonexistent. Evidence of enemy presence in the area was scarce and physical contact with the enemy was made on only two occasions with minor results. No supply facilities or caches were discovered.

On the 25th of May all units were withdrawn from the KEN Valley by helicopter without incident.

RESULTS

NVA KIA:	1	USMC KIA:	1
IWC:	2		

UNCLASSIFIED

d. **ARVN Participation.** The original concept for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS called for 7th Marines conducting the operation in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces. CG, ICTZ made forces from the 51st ARVN Regiment available for participation and combined planning commenced early in March 1969 with the CO 51st Regiment and his staff.

The basic concept called for 2 ARVN and 5 Marine battalions executing the operations. The southwest portion of the AO during Phase I was agreed upon as the responsibility of the two ARVN battalions. This arrangement was made in order that the 105mm battery at THUONG DUC CIDG Camp (ZC 143531) could support the ARVN battalion from that location. Initial direct support artillery for the ARVN battalions was provided by an ARVN 105 battery at THUONG DUC and one Marine 105 battery at FSB MUSTANG (Hill 52). Close liaison with the 51st ARVN Regiment was established from the outset with the CO 51st ARVN Regiment colocating his command post on FSB MUIR (Hill 55).

The mission assigned the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 51st ARVN Regiment was to land in the southwest corner of the AO to the north and northeast of THUONG DUC and conduct reconnaissance in force operations to the north and northeast to destroy the enemy and uncover his caches. The CO 51st ARVN Regiment made plans to rotate the battalions participating in the operation.

At 1107 on the 31st of March the 2nd Battalion commenced landing in LZ HAWK (ZC 175561) from VNAF helicopters while the 3rd Battalion was landing in LZ EAGLE (ZC 122578) from Marine helicopters. Both landings were unopposed and the battalions moved into the foothills north of the respective landing zones.

During Phase I the 2nd and 3rd Battalions conducted extensive patrolling operations in the southwest portion of the AO with very little contact being made with the enemy. Evidence of enemy presence in this portion of the area of operations was scarce. On 13 April the 2nd Battalion withdrew from the high ground to LZ HAWK and on the 14th the 4th Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion and assumed the latter's mission. On 17 May the 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion in a similar move. Action continued throughout the remainder of Phase I without noteworthy incidents.

As outlined earlier, Phase II commenced for the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment on 21 April with a helilift into the northeast section of the AO where the battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines on Hill 785. CH53's lifted the ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery into FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) that same day.

During Phase II, between 21 April and 1 May the 51st ARVN Regiment maintained two battalions in the AO: the 1st Battalion in the northeast and the 4th Battalion in the southwest. The 4th Battalion maintained relatively static positions in the low hills north of THUONG DUC while the

UNCLASSIFIED

1st Battalion conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations to the west of Hill 785. On the 28th of April, the Recon Company of the 51st ARVN Regiment was helilifted from Hill 449 (ZC 202652) to Hill 462 (ZC 189649) to provide security for Marine engineers during the construction of FSB STAGECOACH.

On the 1st of May the 4th Battalion was lifted from the airfield at THUONG DUC and withdrawn from the operation leaving one ARVN battalion, the 1st Battalion, operating in the northeast.

On 9 May the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502), Hill 785 and Hill 462.

The 2nd Battalion remained in the operation area patrolling from Hill 785 and Hill 462 for the remainder of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. The battalion had no contact with the enemy until on 20 May a company pushed further south from Hill 785 towards the area known to be the 31st NVA Regimental base camp and made contact with a small enemy force killing 3 NVA soldiers. On the 23rd of May the 2nd Battalion was on the periphery of the extensive base camp complex E/2/7 but was forced to leave when withdrawn from the operation on 21 April. The battalion commenced destruction of the bunkers and huts in the camp but were hampered by lack of heavy demolitions. On 25 May the 3rd Battalion (-), 7th Marines landed on Hill 785 to assist the 2nd Battalion with the destruction of the base camp in the vicinity of (AT 7963 & 8063). The two battalions worked together to finish the destruction of over 100 bunkers and huts.

On the 26th of May the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment was lifted by VNAF and Marine helicopters from Hill 785 and FSB BUCKSKIN (Hill 502) and were withdrawn from the AO terminating the participation of the 51st ARVN Regiment in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

12. Results

a. Table of Losses

(1) Friendly Casualties:

<u>USMC</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
53 KIA	5 KIA
350 WIA(E)	7 WIA(E)
133 WIANE	5 WIANE
11 KNBC	4 KNBC
260 NBC(E)	13 NBC(E)

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Enemy Personnel Losses:USMC

494 NVA KIA

102 VC KIA

8 NVA PW

1 VC PW

2 RTNEE/NVA

1 RTNEE/VC

10 CIVDEF

ARVN

16 NVA KIA

(3) Enemy Equipment Losses: (See Enclosure (8)).13. Administrative Mattersa. Logistics

(1) Logistics operations for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS were established and promulgated by the 7th Marine Regiment Administrative Order 1-69. This order contained all information required to adequately inform the individual battalions of all supply and service support available during the operation. In addition to the standard information concerning prescribed loads, medical evacuation, supply services, transportation and personnel matters several annexes were included in the Admin Order which dealt with the operation and functioning of the Logistic Support Area (LSA) and the Logistic Operations Center (LOC). Included as appendices to these annexes were samples of all forms which were used during the operation. The following paragraphs will describe in detail the operation and functioning of the LSA and the LOC located at Camp MUIR (Hill 55).

(2) The Logistics Support Area

(a) The LSA was constructed by the 1st Shore Party Battalion and was completed as it presently exists on 25 March 1969. It consists of a four plane refueling pad constructed of pierced steel planking (PSP) matting and a 9 lane 2 section landing and loading zone also constructed of PSP. It should be noted that a passenger pad was not built because the existing LZ 490, located on the western portion of Hill 55 was considered adequate in size and location to meet passenger traffic needs.

(b) Additional space was allocated around the LSA in order to facilitate the placing of each battalion's Class II and Class IV organic supplies. These supplies were moved from each battalion's organic supply warehouse direct to the LSA. As requisitions for Class II and Class IV items were received from the field they were filled from the organic supplies staged in each unit's own area around the LSA. Also located around the LSA were the Class I, III and V dumps maintained by the LSU from FLC (see Enclosure (33)). These stocks were maintained at an automatic 5 day level

UNCLASSIFIED

and replenished as required by LSU personnel. These supplies were trucked direct to the Camp MUIR (HILL 55) LSA from FLC.

(c) During the construction phase of both the LSA and the LOC, several trips were made to the LSA complex at AN HOA. The purpose of these visits was to observe operations and discuss problem areas with LSA personnel at AN HOA. Two visits were made during the conduct of Operation TAYLOR COMMON and actual, tactical support operations were observed. Since resupply functions during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS were to be primarily by helicopter, the Regimental S-4 and the Regimental Air Officer determined early in the planning phases that the resupply effort must be a joint effort between them. This relationship was established early during the planning phases and proved invaluable during the entire operation.

(3) The Logistics Operations Center.

(a) The LOC was constructed in accordance with the existing Division SOP for the operation on an LSA. The LOC bunker was centered on the edge of the LSA Landing and Loading Zone and contained sufficient space for all personnel required for functioning of an LSA. There was an office for the LSA coordinator and a front desk for the LSA switchboard and the Shore Party representatives. These personnel maintained the dump level status boards, monitored all admin radio traffic, coordinated resupply requests and directed the speedy transmission of resupply requests to unit representatives. They also informed radio operators when loads for their units were airborne and on the way.

(b) After visits to the AN HOA LSA it was determined that the control tower should be centered on the LOC bunker. The placement of the tower directly above the bunker enabled the tower operator to observe the entire LSA complex and control all air traffic from a central location. All refueling, resupply and administrative air movements were observable from the tower at all times. Additionally, the LSA coordinator was able to observe all aspects of the LSA operations from the tower including the loading and stocking of all supply dumps located around the LSA.

Through the use of remote radio connections established in the tower, it was also possible to monitor all air to ground communications and thus insure that the individual Helicopter Support Teams assigned to the Battalions were monitoring their nets and ready to give proper zone briefs to pilots once the helicopters were over their respective positions.

(c) Passenger traffic was also handled from the LSA tower. Although the passengers were physically located at LZ 490, 1000 meters to the north, a radio at LZ 490 kept the LSA tower informed of passenger status so that the tower operator could divert helicopters to LZ 490 for passenger pick up prior to hooking up loads on the LSA destined for the same location.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) Supply/Resupply

(a) The LSA at Camp MUIR was primary source of all supplies and all service support. No alternate LSA was established because of the proximity of Camp MUIR to APS 1 prior to the disastrous fire, ASP 2 and the FLC dumps located at Camp BOOKS.

(b) The LSU located at Camp MUIR was tasked with maintaining a five day level of supplies at the Camp MUIR LSA. This five day level was for Class I, III and V only with organic battalions furnishing their own Class II and IV supplies pre-positioned on or around the LSA.

(c) The LSU was in direct communications with FLC. As supplies were issued to the using units, the LSU requisitioned resupply from FLC in order to maintain the established five day levels.

(d) As mentioned previously, Class II and IV was obtained from the organic accounts of the units participating in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. As additional supplies were required, unit supply officer requisitioned directly from FLC at DANANG and transported their own Class II and IV supplies to their locations around the LSA.

(e) The LSU was resupplied on a daily basis. This resupply was accomplished by surface convoys direct from FLC. Material handling equipment located at the LSA unloaded the trucks and placed the supplies in their respective dumps. One innovation used during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS in the area of Class I resupply was the force feeding of ration supplements consisted of such items as ice cream in dixie cups (packed in styrofoam bomb containers for insulation) fresh onions, hot sauce, fruit juices, fruit cocktail, chocolate milk, bread, donuts, ice, soft drinks and beer. The ration supplements were delivered to the LSA by the Division Food Services Officer in conjunction with the FLC. A daily status of ration supplements was called in to Division Food Services every morning and the ration supplements were also maintained on a five day level. No problems were encountered with this technique and it is highly recommended for future operations.

(f) The concept of operations called for most units to be operating out of Fire Support Bases or Combat Operating Bases and during the entire operation a two day level of supplies was maintained at these forward operating bases. This was done in order to minimize the effect of inclement flying weather on the resupply operations. The success of this concept is evidenced by the fact that during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS only one emergency resupply was necessary even though weather conditions were below minimums on several occasions.

(g) Statistics reflecting all classes of resupply delivered to units participating in the operation can be seen on Inclosure (29). As a general summary the following information is submitted.

UNCLASSIFIED

and these were all due to sling failure. The three loads dropped were two water trailers (destroyed beyond repair) and one load of 105 HE ammunition. The 105 He ammunition was located by reconnaissance personnel and destroyed in place.

(6) Procedures Followed for Dropped Cargo. Although there were only three loads dropped during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, specific instructions were contained in the pilots daily dream sheet concerning dropped loads, these were:

(a) Upon dropping load, contact LSA immediately via LZ COMMON and report loss.

(b) Circle area where load was dropped and give coordinates of location.

(c) Make evaluation of status of dropped cargo where possible.

(d) Remain in area until recovery team arrives at the scene or other instructions are passed from the LSA.

It should be noted that in case of the three loads only one required recovery action.

b. Strength, Casualties/Hospitalization and Graves Registration

(1) Strengths

(a) Initial strengths of rifle companies were substantially at that number authorized in the TO. Though many casualties (456 NBC, 44 KIA, 218 WIA(E) and 121 WIANE) occurred, replacements were provided which allowed rifle company strengths to remain substantially the same throughout the period of the operation. Average rifle company strengths during the operation are as indicated: On rolls: 6 officers and 195 enlisted, "Foxhole": 5-140. Variances were experienced due to R&R, special leave, annual leave, those nonchargeable and those required for administrative/security functions in each battalion's rear component. No critical personnel problems were encountered during the period of the operation. Input of replacements and personnel returned to duty offset the loss of those evacuated.

(2) Casualties and Hospitalization

(a) Concept. Due to the mountainous jungle terrain with double and at times triple canopy in which the operation would be conducted and the communications difficulties normally encountered in such terrain, it was originally planned to have one casualty reporting clerk from each participating element at the Logistics Operation Center (LOC). From this location on Hill 55, continuous communications was expected due to its central location in relation to the AO. It was planned that all casualty

UNCLASSIFIED

reports would be passed from the AO to the organization's casualty reporter in the LOC via the administrative/logistic radio net for further transmission via radio or land line to the Battalion's administrative rear.

(b) Execution. As the operation progressed this system proved unnecessary since most elements were able to maintain continuous radio communications with their administrative rears. In those few isolated cases where radio communication with the battalion rear was not possible, casualty reports were received at the LOC and passed to the battalion rear. No unusual problems were encountered in casualty reporting.

(3) Evacuation. Evacuation of casualties was directly from the AO to the NSA hospital and 1st Medical Battalion via helicopter. Immediate evacuation of casualties was difficult and for short periods of time impossible due to low cloud cover obscuring the LZ and during those times when the casualties were under the jungle canopy. When casualties were incurred in the thick canopy where LZ's were not available, Marines were moved by litter to the closest LZ or extracted by use of the jungle penetrator and "Neil Robertson Litter".

(4) Non-Battle Casualties. A total of 456 non-battle casualties occurred during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. This total exceeds the number of those wounded in action (439). This large number of nonbattle casualties is attributed to the rugged, frequently slippery terrain and thick jungle vegetation. Most casualties were broken bones and sprains received from falling when climbing or traveling across the rough rocky terrain. Approximately 93% of the non-battle casualties returned to duty within 6 weeks.

(5) Morale. Problems with morale were not a significant factor during the operation even though rifle companies operated continuously in the field for as long as 45 days. Maximum effort was exerted in ensuring that mail was delivered daily or at least four times weekly. A significant factor contributing to the high level of morale sustained is the factor that generally, at least twice per week hot meals, cold drinks and ice cream was provided. Delivery was made very difficult due to all resupply being accomplished by helicopter. Land transportation was not possible.

c. Communications

(1) General

(a) Communications support for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was provided by Communication Platoon, 7th Marine Regiment supplemented by detachments from 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division Communication Company and the 7th Communications Battalion.

(b) The overall concept for the employment of communications was to maintain continuous radio communications throughout the OKLAHOMA HILLS AO. In order to maintain radio communications with those infantry and

UNCLASSIFIED

artillery units deployed west of Hill 55 in mountainous terrain, it was necessary to plan for and establish an automatic radio retransmission site on RC BA NA. Units operating within the range of organic radio equipment and not masked by terrain features communicated directly to Hill 55 without retransmission through RC BA NA.

(2) Operation

(a) 7th Marine Headquarters

1. Communication with higher commands.

a. The primary means of communication with Division Headquarters were telephone and teletype via the radio set AN/TRC-97.

b. During the planning stage it was anticipated that one 60 word per minute circuit would not be sufficient to carry the traffic. To provide for the additional load a Bravo circuit was established as a simplex receive only circuit. Additionally, a half duplex circuit was established between the 7th Marine COC and 1st Marine Division COC. As was expected, the following figures show that teletype traffic doubled during the conduct of the operations.

<u>CKT</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>ARP</u>	<u>MAY</u>
Alpha	2082	1874	2194	3090	2002
Bravo				383	438
COC				<u>430</u>	<u>412</u>
TOTALS:	2082	1874	2194	3903	2852

2. Communications with subordinate and supporting units.

a. Radio was the primary means of communication to battalions in the field. The scheme of maneuver called for battalions operating on both sides of CHARLIE RIDGE and in western HAPPY VALLEY, and this meant that the battalions operating north of CHARLIE RIDGE in HAPPY VALLEY would be masked from the 7th Marine CP located on Hill 55. This scheme dictated the establishment of a radio relay retransmission site, and R. C. BA NA was selected because of its elevation and location which permitted line of sight communications to units north of CHARLIE RIDGE and to Hill 55. Initially, eight radio nets were activated in the automatic retransmission mode or as extended remotes from R.C. BA NA. However the masking of radio signals by CHARLIE RIDGE proved to be less of an obstruction than originally supposed. Due to directional antenna, it was found that for short periods of time most frequencies being employed could be used on a direct shot to FSB RATTLESNAKE (Hill 749), FSB BULLWHIP (Hill 65), and Hill 1166 (ZC 143624). This ability to work direct over CHARLIE

UNCLASSIFIED

RIDGE, plus the fact that the battalion CP's carried RC-292 antennae made communications extremely reliable.

c. Due to the large volume of traffic air nets and frequencies had to be expanded. Besides the TACP Local, a second LZ frequency was designated in addition to the Division LZ Command for use in every other LZ. The net established was the Air Traffic Control Net (FM). In addition to the ATC net, a separate Med Evac frequency for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was also initiated; however, it was discontinued when the on-station MedEvac package was discontinued due to the low volume of casualties.

d. The Logistics Operations Center operated with liaison teams from each battalion and established a Battalion Logistics Team with their parent units. These nets were dedicated to supply requests and greatly facilitated logistical traffic.

3. R.C. BA NA

a. The initial plan was to retransmit on eight radio nets from the retransmission site. These nets included:

Regimental Tactical Net

Regimental Command Net

Regimental Logistics Net

TACP

Fire Direction #1

Fire Direction #2

Golf Battery Conduct of Fire

Hotel Battery Conduct of Fire

b. Communications equipment included 1 AN/TRC-27 radio relay unit, 7 AN/MRC-110 jeeps, 12 AN/PRC-77's, and 5 AN/PRC-25's. The large amount of equipment was the primary reason for the success of the retransmission site, since technical trouble with the TRC-27 and MRC-110's necessitated backup gear in the form of PRC-77's utilizing a MK-465 retransmission cable for automatic retransmission.

c. The communication insert and security personnel constructed 9 security bunkers, laid 3 sleeves of concertina, emplaced 6,300 sandbags, cleaned off rubble adjacent to standing structure, and initiated rat preventive measures.

UNCLASSIFIED

d. PsyOp Activities

(1) General. The Psychological Operations support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS consisted of daily leaflet drops and aerial and ground loudspeakers broadcasts. These were planned on current intelligence information available, as well as on enemy contacts and the demand of the tactical situation.

(a) Aerial Leaflets and Loudspeaker Broadcasts

1. Leaflet and aerial broadcasts were used daily throughout the operation. They were used in areas of enemy contact, as well as on enemy base camp areas and along known routes of enemy infiltration.

2. Special leaflets and aerial broadcast tapes were used to support the tactical situation as it developed, as well as the Chieu Hoi Program.

(b) Ground Loudspeaker Teams and Hand Distribution Leaflets

1. The HB (Loudspeaker) Team was used in a mobile concept, as a reaction team to exploit enemy contacts, intelligence information, or Hoi Chanh. Due to the weight of the equipment involved and the rugged terrain, movement of this equipment was limited to helicopter transportation or short movements overland. The following specific operations were successful:

a. On 17 April the PsyOps team was helilifted to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines CP. From there overland movement was accomplished to (AT 8261), the location of E/2/7. A briefing by the company commander indicated the unit was under constant sniper fire and the PsyOps activities that night were directed at snipers operating in the area. Incorporated into the broadcast was a message from a Hoi Chanh who rallied on 5 March to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. That night there was no immediate response to the broadcast, but the following morning an NVA soldier rallied to a patrol operating from Hill 502 (AT 8366) at 1030. The Hoi Chanh indicated that the broadcast he had heard the night before convinced him to surrender. The HB Team was then airlifted to Hill 502 and operated in this area for three days without further results.

b. On 23 April the HB Team was lifted to FSB RATTLE-SNAKE (Hill 749) which was manned by M/3/26. A Chieu Hoi message was broadcast on the night of the 23rd. Three unarmed men approached the southern perimeter on the afternoon of the 24th. They were followed at a 5-10 minute interval by two armed men. Both groups of men were dressed in green uniforms. It is felt that the five soldiers were attempting to surrender, but that small arms fire from a platoon manning a near by OP frightened them away. This view is supported in the light of events of the next day. Chieu Hoi messages emphasizing the fact the Marines had been told to allow passage to any unarmed persons shouting "Chieu Hoi" approaching the lines were broadcast during the night of the 24th of April. Voices were heard early on the morning of the 25th in the same area in which the men were seen the previous day. Shortly after this five men were spotted,

UNCLASSIFIED

sitting in a group talking. Only moments after the broadcast started trying to talk them in, there was an accidental discharge on an M-16 in the immediate area. The men scattered and were not seen again. The PsyOps team stayed in the area two more days without results.

2. Hand leaflets were disseminated along enemy trail networks, and large posters covered in plastic were also placed along trails and known infiltration routes and base camps.

(2) PsyOp Assets

(a) PsyOp assets available to Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS included one HB team, used as a mobile team, and assigned to Headquarters, 7th Marine Regiment. Another HB team was on a standby basis with the reaction battalion. The 1st Marine Division provided leaflets for hand distribution as well as coordination with the 7th PsyOp Battalion which printed and developed all leaflets and aerial tapes, and was the source for the creation of all special leaflets and tapes prepared for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. Flight A, 9th Special Operations Squadron flew all aerial leaflets and loudspeaker missions.

(b) During Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS a total of 11,505,000 leaflets were dropped, and 13:00 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were flown. The HB team broadcast a total of 57:00 hours. There were 54,000 leaflets and posters hand distributed.

e. Medical. Medical support for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was conducted using normal procedures and standard techniques. Particular consideration was given during planning to the problems posed by heavy vegetation and inclement weather, as effecting medical evacuation. Fortunately there was only one instance of inclement weather causing delay in evacuation and most serious casualties were taken directly to the hospitals in DANANG. A limited number of routine medevacs were brought to Camp MUIR (Hill 55) by supply helicopters for treatment, sorting and later evacuation either to DANANG or to the battalion aid stations. All medical resupply to the battalions was staged and coordinated by the 7th Marine Regiment Aid Station. Some 32 newly improvised unit one kits prepared by 1st Medical Battalion were delivered to the corpsmen in the field. In general these unit one kits were enthusiastically received.

(1) Malaria. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines sustained only two cases of malaria during the 1st month of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS while operating on the eastern slopes of CHARLIE RIDGE. This rate increased to 26 cases during the month of May as the battalion operated in western HAPPY VALLEY. As of 14 June, 16 days after the termination of the operation, the battalion had recorded 90 additional cases.

The incidence of malaria during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS and the immediate post-operational period was as follows:

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>
April 1-15	22
April 15-30	9
May	36
June 1-14 (post-operation)	95

There were 13 cases of Malaria reported during the first two weeks of the operation which in light of the incubation period are not attributable to Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Again, as during Operation TAYLOR COMMON, certain areas inhabited by the enemy or used by him as hospital areas appear to be particularly infested with the carrier mosquito. For example, KEN Valley appears hyperendemic in view of the high incidence of malaria in Companies L and M/3/7, the two companies which operated in that area during the period 21-25 May when compared with the record of the other companies of that battalion. Interestingly, only 1 FVO was medevaced as a NBC from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines during the last 2 weeks of the operation. From June 6, 15 days after entering KEN Valley, to June 11, 86 patients from L and M/3/7 were diagnosed malaria.

Results of interview with these patients revealed that 30 admitted not using repellent "regularly". It is to be emphasized that the best protection against malaria is frequent use of repellent and proper wearing of clothing. No drug available today can ward off the parasitemia of multiple mosquito bites. While 13 of these Marines admitted failure to take the C-P tablet for the 4 weeks prior to hospitalization, only 21 had measurable chloroquine in their urine on admission.

Of 164 personnel admitted to 1st Medical Battalion and 1st Hospital Company during the period 3 May to 3 June, only 45% had urine samples positive for chloroquine. Random urinary chloroquine tests collected by each battalion on a weekly basis have been more encouraging.

(2) Non-Battle Casualties (NBC)

Statistics were maintained on 363 non-battle casualties. It is noted that almost 60% of all NBC were sustained during the first two weeks of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS while all units were maneuvering and fire support bases were being built. The much lower number of NBC's in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines is attributable to the fact that the battalion was operating in the low ground to the south of CHARLIE RIDGE in relatively open terrain.

During the first two weeks of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines sustained as many sprains, fractures, and lacerations

UNCLASSIFIED

As 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines combined. At the same time the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines had more than twice as many cases with fever medevaced as the three other battalions combined. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines also sustained 13 of 18 reported heat casualties during the first 5 days of the operation. 11 of these 18 heat casualties occurred on April 2. Only 14 more heat casualties are recorded for the remainder of the operation.

56% of lacerations and skin infections occurred during the first two weeks of the operation at which time approximately 900 jungle gloves were distributed to the field which certainly may account for much of the subsequent decline.

In the chart below NBC's are grouped by cause and the operational period divided into quarters for clearer analysis.

	<u>1/7</u>	<u>2/7</u>	<u>3/7</u>	<u>3/26</u>	<u>3/1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% of TOTAL NBC's</u>
Sprains- Fractures	2	24	8	19			
	0	7	9	8	0		
	2	0	9	0	1		
	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	4	30	28	27	1	90	25%
Laceration	1	12	6	3			
	0	2	6	2	2		
	1		2	0	0		
	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	2	14	15	5	2	38	10.5%
Heat Casualties	0	13	5	0			
	1	3	4	0	0		
	0		4	0	0		
	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	2	16	14	0	0	32	9%

UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>1/7</u>	<u>2/7</u>	<u>3/7</u>	<u>3/26</u>	<u>3/1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% of TOTAL NBC's</u>
Skin Infection	1	15	11	8			
	1	7	4	7	0		
	0		4	1	0		
	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	3	22	23	16	0	64	17.5%
Fever	3	22	3	5			
	4	9	4	4	0		
	2		7	0	0		
	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	9	31	15	9	0	64	17.5%
Abdominal Pain & Diarrhea	1	7	2	12			
	0	0	3	0	0		
	1		2	0	0		
	<u>3</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	5	7	10	12	0	34	9.5%

In about equal numbers psychiatric disorders, contact dermatitis, insect bites, VD, upper respiratory infections, hemorrhoids, and abscessed teeth accounted for some 41 more NBC or 11% of the total 363 NBC's reported.

Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS accounted for 53 KIA's and 11 KNBC's. The body distribution of major cause of death was as follows:

Head	25	41%
Neck	5	8%
Thorax	22	34%
Abdomen	5	8%
Upper ext	1	1.5%
Lower ext	4	6%
Burns	1	1.5%

UNCLASSIFIED

An estimated 15-20% of all casualties were evacuated through the heavy jungle canopy utilizing the jungle penetrator or the NEIL-ROBERTSON litter. These evacuation techniques must be considered standard practice while operating in terrain such as encountered in the Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS AO.

11. Commanders Analysis

a. The initial concept as outlined in CG 1st Marine Division message 110538Z March 1969 called for two battalions to be helilifted into the southwestern and northwestern portions of the AO; one battalion to attack northwest from Hill 52; one battalion to attack south from R.C. BANA; and one battalion to attack west along the axis of WORTH RIDGE and CHARLIE RIDGE placing pressure on the enemy in the AO from all directions. As the 7th Marines commenced planning for the operation the following facts became apparant. A landing on R.C. BANA followed by a sweep south from the ridge and onto CHARLIE RIDGE would be very difficult, hazardous and time consuming because of the extremely rough terrain to be traveled in this crosscompartment maneuver. Additionally, one battalion would have difficulty in effectively conducting search and destroy operations over the broad expanse of terrain formed by CHARLIE RIDGE and WORTH RIDGE. In light of this evaluation, the concept of operations as formally presented to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division on 27 March 1969 called for two battalions attacking west along the axis of WORTH/CHARLIE RIDGE in lieu of the landing of a battalion on R.C. BANA. This concept was predicated on the fact that R.C. BANA was an effective obstacle to enemy north-south movement and that at least two battalions would be necessary to insure adequate coverage of the WORTH/CHARLIE RIDGE area. This modification to the original concept was approved by the Division Commander and planning proceeded to develop the detailed scheme of maneuver and fire support plan to support it.

From the very outset it was perceived that the enemy would enjoy a definate advantage in the area of ground mobility and that the option to stay and fight or withdraw would be his. As events developed it became obvious that the enemy had chosen to avoid contact, to delay our advance into his base areas by use of harassing tactics and to withdraw from his base camps with as much of his material as could be evacuated. The information on base camp areas provided by the PW's taken on 1 April posed two alternatives:

(1) The attacking units could continue their movement towards the central high ground in the vicinity of Hill 1235 conducting a thorough search of draws and ravines during this movement, or

(2) The maneuvering battalions could move rapidly to the vicinity of the suspected base camps, possibly bypassing other camps or caches, in order to quickly close on the more specific intelligence target to trap the enemy in the camp or, at least, prevent him from evacuating his material. The decision was made to pursue the latter course in an attempt to react to the only firm intelligence known at that time. Concurrently with this decision, plans were made to conduct a second phase of the operation in order that all units might reverse their direction of movement and search in detail the areas bypassed.

UNCLASSIFIED

Throughout the operation the enemy was successful in avoiding major contact with our units in the heavy vegetation. Contacts were generally of two types; either meeting engagements with enemy soldiers in small groups who were unaware of our presence in the AO, or sniping/harassing activity by well concealed enemy soldiers aimed at slowing our advance. The one exception to this pattern was the enemy's tenacious defense of the 31st NVA Regimental base camp area in the vicinity of (AT 8063) as E/2/7 initially entered this area.

As a result of these contacts it is considered that extended cross country movement in terrain such as encountered within the area of operations will not produce remunerative results. Cross country movement is slow and debilitating and the enemy has shown that he does not move directly cross country. By using the trails the enemy was able to move quickly, flank our units and avoid contact. The enemy's camp facilities are also situated on the trail network and friendly units must follow the trails in order to effectively uncover these installations.

Company and platoon commanders found operating in the rough terrain and heavy vegetation difficult; land navigation was a continual problem and once contact was made with the enemy unit commanders found it nearly impossible to bring their superior combat power to bear effectively. It was determined that the best results under such circumstances can be obtained by individual platoons operating within range of mutual support but from widespread company combat bases. Company combat bases must not remain static but rather should make full use of helicopter assets to keep units on the move.

Helicopter support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was generally excellent. Unfortunately operations in rough, heavily vegetated terrain at the elevations encountered is completely dependent on the weather. Although intelligence estimates on the AO indicated that bad weather could be expected during April and May, weather was generally good and there were only isolated periods of low visibility. Nevertheless, the periods of inclement weather did raise the spectre of units heavily engaged and completely isolated.

Although the units in the high ground under the jungle canopy had trouble making contact with large groups of enemy forces, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, operating south of CHARLIE RIDGE along the axis of the SONG VU GIA were successful at interdicting relatively large enemy forces moving north and south between CHARLIE RIDGE and the ARIZONA area. This battalion's success suggests strongly the value of similar interdicting missions during incursions into those enemy strongholds which will result in displacing him from his established base camps.

The operation conducted in the KEN Valley, vicinity (YC 9863) was targeted against a suspected major munitions supply facility which had been mentioned in several PW interrogations. Although the precise location of the supply installation was not determined, the operation was planned and executed based on the fact that Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS had provided the opportunity to conduct such a strike and that opportunity might not again be available.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

In summation it is considered that Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was a success. Although the enemy avoided a major confrontation, he was driven from his base camps in the CHARLIE RIDGE area and deterred from rapid reoccupation of this area. The sanctity of CHARLIE RIDGE was also destroyed as maneuver elements operated at will throughout the area of operation. The concept for developing mutually supporting FSB's and a series of landing zones was validated and a valuable complex of such facilities was established to support any future projection of combat power into the CHARLIE RIDGE/HAPPY VALLEY area. The casualties inflicted on the enemy by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines attest to the fact that the enemy was uprooted and forced to move against his will. The relatively low level of enemy initiated attacks from the southwest against the DANANG vital area must in part be attributed to the disruptive effect of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS and suggests that similar operations be conducted into this area periodically in the future.

A significant feature of the operation was the system of logistic support to maneuver companies deployed over vast distances in the deep jungle canopy. Rifle companies were able to operate for extended periods of time remote from LZ's and FSB's because of the unique capability to effect resupply and evacuation by helicopter through the canopy. This was accomplished primarily through the refined organizational structures of the HST's of Shore Party Battalion and the development of equipment and techniques such as the jungle penetrator and NEIL-ROBERTSON litter. Foremost among the refined techniques is the Logistic Support Area/Logistic Operations Center SOP. This SOP discussed in para 13.a. of this report needs only to be reflected in Marine Corps doctrinal publications to become an accepted Marine Corps air ground team tactic. It opens the way to new application of Marine Corps amphibious assault or ground combat by permitting the establishment of combat/fire support bases and accompanying ground maneuvers in heretofore inaccessible terrain.

R. L. Nichols
R. L. NICHOLS

UNCLASSIFIED

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

- ✓1. List of enclosures
- ✓2. Enemy order of battle as of 30 March 1969
- ✓3. Reconnaissance patrols during March, April and May 1969
- ✓4. Prisoners of War, Hoi Chanh, Civil Defendants and captured documents
- ✓5. Enemy facilities and base camps uncovered 31 March-29 May 1969
- ✓6. Q-79 dispensary (Front 4) 8 April 1969
- ✓7. Sketches of typical enemy facilities uncovered
- ✓8. Enemy facilities, equipment and material captured/destroyed
- ✓9. Enemy movement 31 March-29 May 1969
- ✓10. Infiltration and supply routes
- ✓11. Anti-aircraft incidents 31 March-29 May 1969
- ✓12. HLZ's utilized 31 March-29 May 1969
- ✓13. Trail networks as of 29 May 1969
- ✓14. Surprise firing devices and mining incidents 31 March-29 May 1969
- ✓15. Bay by day narrative
- ✓16. Key terrain
- ✓17. Phase I overlay
- ✓18. Phase II overlay
- ✓19. Phase III overlay
- ✓20. Phase I schematic
- ✓21. Phase II schematic
- ✓22. Phase III schematic
- ✓23. Related operations
- ✓24. SONG VU GIA Ambush
- ✓25. North ARIZONA Operation
- ✓26. KEN Valley Operation
- ✓27. Artillery fire cap
- ✓28. Engineer support
- ✓29. Recapitulation of supplies issued
- ✓30. Daily helicopter activity
- ✓31. Sample pilots daily sheet
- ✓32. Logistics flow
- ✓33. LSA layout
- ✓34. LOC bunker layout
- ✓35. PsyOps chronology
- ✓36. PsyOps themes used
- ✓37. List of medical supplies issued
- ✓38. Recommendations

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1)

CONFIDENTIALPRISONERS OF WAR, HOI CHANH, CIVIL DEFENDANTS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

1. During Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, 31 March 1969 through 29 May 1969, 9th ITT provided direct support to the 7th Marine Regiment. A sub-team from 9th ITT was attached to each battalion in order to provide immediate spot interrogation, classification of detainees, effect rapid scanning and interpretation of captured documents, supervise the evacuation of detainees, and the submission of attendant reports. 9th ITT headquarters, located at Camp Muir, controlled the Regimental Interrogation Center and supervised operation of the Regimental Collection Point. At the Regimental Interrogation Center, detainees were further interrogated for supplementary information, captured documents were separated into identifying batches, screened and forwarded to DTC for a more comprehensive read-out. The results of the 9th ITT operation during the period of 31 March through 29 May are contained in TABs A through C.
2. ITT/IT Coordinator 1st Marine Division provided additional support to Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS, insuring that the supplementary interrogation reports on 7th Marines PW's completed by DIC and/or NSA interrogators, and the DTC comprehensive readout of captured documents were passed back to the 7th Marines as expeditiously as possible.
3. Prior coordination with ARVN officials made possible the joint interrogation of US and ARVN PW's and the mutual exchange of intelligence gained through these interrogations.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (4)

CONFIDENTIALINTERROGATION-TRANSLATION RESULTS

(Period 31 March 1969-29 May 1969)

<u>Interrogations</u>	<u>US</u>	
NVA/PW	8 *	
VC/PW	1	
NVA/Returnee	2	
VC/Returnee	1 **	
Civil Defendent	10 ***	
Innocent Civilian	333	
<u>Reports Submitted</u>	12	
Spot Interrogation Report	12	
Initial Interrogation Report	9	
Very Important Source Report	2	
Supplementary Report	7	
2nd Supplementary Report	3	
Civil Defendent Report	9	
Documents Scanned	55 Batches	Approx 200lbs

* Includes NVA/PW captured by 1st Recon Battalion USMC in general Support capacity on 041000H May 69 (vic ZC 163762)

** ARVN Spec Forces Soldier who escaped from VC slave group 201600H May 69 (vic AT 977621)

*** Spot Interrogation Report not required-released to custody of District authority after approval of 1st Marine Division Staff Legal.

CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A to
Enclosure (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

PRISONERS OF WAR/HOI CHANH/CIVIL DEFENDENTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF CAPTURE</u>	<u>9TH ITT REPORT NO</u>
Nguyen Van Co	NVA	WO	18th, 31st Regt	011100H Apr 69	01-04-69, 06-04-69
Le Van Dan	NVA	Cpl	C-19 Plt, 31st Regt	191500H Apr 69	07-04-69
Nguyen Van Thoai	NVA	Cpl	K-9 Co, D-3 Bn, 31st Regt	241300H Apr 69	08-04-69
Nguyen Van Ky	NVA	Sgt	6th Co, 31st Bn, 31st Regt	082230H Apr 69	Spot Only
Vu Duy Vinh	NVA	PFC	C-4 Co, 141st Regt	270100H Apr 69	15-05-69, 14-05-69
Nguyen Anh Van	NVA	Pvt	402 Bn, Unk Regt	191500H Apr 69	None
Le Van Tam	NVA	Pvt	2nd Co, 1st Bn, Unk Regt	211230H Apr 69	07-05-69, 09-05-69
Nguyen Van Thao	NVA	Sgt	7th Co, 3rd Bn, 575 Arty Regt	091000H Apr 69	02-05-69, 03-05-69
Nguyen Loan	VC	Guerrilla	HaNha(H), Dai Loc(D) VC	261055H Apr 69	13-05-69, 16-05-69

RETURNEE

<u>NAME</u>	<u>NVA/VC</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE OF RALLY</u>	<u>9TH ITT REPORT NO</u>
Bui Van Tri	NVA	MSgt	8th Co, 2nd Bn, 141st Regt	011100H Apr 69	02-04-69, 03-04-69 10-04-69
Vu Dinh Dien	NVA	PFC	11th Co, 2nd Bn, 31st Regt	181115H Apr 69	05-04-69
Nguyen Duc Nhi	SVN	Slave Labor	MF Co, 3rd Bn, 36th Regt (NVA)	201600H Apr 69	12-05-69, 13-05-69

CONFIDENTIAL
TAB B to
Enclosure (4)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CIVIL DEFENDANTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>JOB W/VC</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
Le Huong	36	Mbr Farmers Assoc	050700HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 080930HApr69
Nguyen Tinh	59	Coolie Laborer	061530HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 111230HApr69
Doan Thi Sao	37	Mbr Mother/Sister Assoc	081045HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 111130HApr69
Nguyen Van Phuong	46	Coolie Laborer	081200HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 121200HApr69
Le Thi Sanh	56	Mbr Mother/Sister Assoc	081200HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 121200HApr69
Le Huong	25	Mbr Farmers Assoc	191000HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 221530HApr69
Nguyen Thi Tam	20	Ldr Youth Assoc	221200HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 291530HApr69
Nguyen Thi Tam	15	Mbr Youth Assoc	221200HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 291530HApr69
Le Thi Hai	25	Mbr Mother/Sister Assoc	221200HApr69	Rel to Dai Loc (D) Hq, 291530HApr69
Unk Vn Female		Classified CD by NSA Interrogator 130600HApr69		MedEvac to NSA Hospital

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
TAB B to
Enclosure (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CDEC NO</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>DOC</u>
<u>31st NVA Regiment</u>			
Personnel, Weapons and Activities 22nd CO, 31st NVA Regt	05-1503-69	AT840560	08May69
Combat order from 31st NVA Regt	04-1927-69	ZC171605	15Apr69
Personalities, 31st NVA Regt	04-1924-69	AT795635	20Apr69
Sapper Tactics adapter by 31st NVA Regt	04-1925-69	AT795635	18Apr69
Ken Ammo Depot and Attack plans of 31st NVA Regt	04-1663-69	AT808636	14Apr69
Preparations for offensive, 31st NVA Regt	04-1655-69	AT808636	14Apr69
Infiltration Grp 1055, 8th Bn, 50th NVA Regt reassigned to 31st NVA Regt	04-1606-69	AT811639	12Apr69
<u>368B Arty Regt</u>			
Movement of rockets from Ken Depot by 1st Bn, 368B NVA Regt	05-1651-69	ZC185617	18May69
Deactivation of C10, 2nd Bn, 368B Arty Regt	05-1147-69	ZC197642	16Apr69
140mm Rocket Trng Lessons	05-5011-69	ZC166613	10Apr69
Weapons Status, 2nd Bn, 368B Arty Regt	04-1743-69	ZC178609	12Apr69
Personnel, Weapons Status, 571st Bn, 368B Regt	04-1671-69	ZC178609	11Apr69
120 rockets transported from Ken to Meo Station	04-1730-69	ZC178609	12Apr69
<u>Others</u>			
After Action Report, 2nd NVA Div	05-5632-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Rice Shortage, Units in Quang Da Special Zone	004-1903-69	ZC171605	15Apr69
Cover Disignators	05-5371-69	AT795635	20Apr69
Sketches of Locations, Quang Da Special Zone	05-5393-69	AT795635	20Apr69
Infiltration passes, Grp 1071 8th Bn, Grp 60	05-1377-69	AT853565	10May69
3rd Regt AKA Grp 60	05-1378-69	AT854539	09May69
Infiltration of large unit, Mar 69	05-1379-69	AT853565	10May69
Status of wounded and sick, Quang Da Special Zone	04-1761-69	AT805637	16Apr69
Status of wounded and sick, Quang Da Special Zone	04-1544-69	ZC149617	11Apr69
Sketches of Various types of grenades mines and explosive charges with instruction concerning manufacture.	UNK	AT794635	12Apr69

CONFIDENTIAL
TAB C to
Enclosure (4)

CONFIDENTIALSIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS CAPTURED PERTAINING TO ENEMY UNITS NATIVE TO
OKLAHOMA HILLS AO

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CDEC NO</u>	<u>POG</u>	<u>DOC</u>
<u>Elements of GP-44</u>			
Personalities of Surgical Unit 2	05-5209-69	AT745635	20Apr69
Personalities and Identification of Q79 Dispensary	04-1611-69	ZC149617	11Apr69
Q79 Dispensary and Group 60	04-1550-69	ZC149617	11Apr69
Dispensaries Q79, 20, D91 and Dispensary DOAN 44	04-1556-69	ZC149617	11Apr69
Medical Section Front 4	04-1545-69	ZC149617	11Apr69
Q80 Dispensary	05-5094-69	ZC144605	08Apr69
Surgical Unit 2	05-5168-69	AT793635	18Apr69
Personnel Strength of Antial Area, Quang Da Special Zone	04-1905-69	AT795635	18Apr69
<u>141st NVA Regiment</u>			
Rice, weapons and ammo issued to 141st NVA Regt	05-5615-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
141st NVA Regt Personnel sent to Ken for ammo	05-5628-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Personnel Strengths and Weapons status 141st Regt	05-5631-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Ammunitions received by 141st Regt	05-5596-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Requirement from Ken Ammunition Depot, Weapons and Ammo status 141st NVA Regt	05-1084-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Personnel Strength, 141st NVA Regt as of Aug 68	05-1085-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Personnel Strength and Casualties 3rd Bn, 141st NVA Regt	05-1086-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Weapons, 141st NVA Regt	05-1089-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Composition, strength and Casualties of 141st NVA Regt From B-52 strikes	05-1101-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Weapons Status 141st NVA Regt	05-1103-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
Personnel, Weapons, 141st NVA Regt	05-1058-69	ZC1660	22Apr69
521st Bn, 42nd Regt, 350 NVA Div, reassigned 141st NVA Regt	01-1457-69	ZC163597	12May 69
<u>Local Force</u>			
Personnel Strength, H16 Co, Hoa Vang District	04-1926-69	AT805637	16Apr69
Personnel Strength, H16 Co, Hoa Vang District	05-5303-69	AT745635	20Apr69

CONFIDENTIAL
 TAB C to
 Enclosure (4)

CONFIDENTIALENEMY FACILITIES UNCOVERED

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE FACILITY</u>
08 Apr	ZC148616	L/3/26	Base Camp, Q-79, 1 Dispensary and 24 Huts
09 Apr	ZC161617	L/3/26	Base Camp, 7 Huts, C-17/141st
09 Apr	ZC178604	K/3/7	Base Camp, 27 Huts, C-20 (Regt Dispensary 141st)
10 Apr	ZC172603	K/3/7	Base Camp, 15 Huts, Prob C-21
11 Apr	ZC167618	L/3/26	Base Camp, 141st, Poss Bn or 368B
11 Apr	AT813637	E/2/7	Base Camp, Hq 31st Regt and poss 3rd Bn 31st Regt 200 Bunkers/Huts
14 Apr	ZC176610 -174610	L/3/26	Base Camp, 89 Huts
14 Apr	AT793637	G/2/7	Harbor Site, 7 Huts
16 Apr	ZC197641	M/3/7	Harbor Site, 9 Huts, 12 Tunnels
16 Apr	ZC135615	K/3/26	Base Camp, 15 Huts w/Bunkers
17 Apr	ZC133615	K/3/26	Harbor Site
17 Apr	ZC205641	M/3/7	Harbor Site, Plt size w/3 Bunkers
17 Apr	AT795635	G/2/7	Base Camp, Caves, Prob Regt Aid Sub Station 31st Regt
19 Apr	ZC195635	L/3/26	Base Camp, Messhall and 4 Huts
19 Apr	ZC171600	K/3/26	Base Camp, 10 Huts Poss Aid Station 141st Regt
19 Apr	ZC201622	M/3/7	Fortified Position, 5 Bunkers, 1 Hut, 1 Tunnel
20 Apr	ZC167615	L/3/26	Base Camp, 34 Huts
22 Apr	ZC166605	K/3/7	Base Camp, 141st Regt Hq and C-19 Engr Camp
23 Apr	ZC157625	L/3/26	Base Camp, Hut Complex
23 Apr	ZC162602 -164603	K/3/26	Base Camp, 15 Huts and Bunkers
24 Apr	ZC136617	K/3/26	Harbor Site, 4 Huts and Caves
24 Apr	ZC157625	L/3/26	Base Camp, NVA Camp under Construction
26 Apr	ZC140620	K/3/26	Harbor Site, 2 Huts and 7 Bunkers
26 Apr	ZC165333	L/3/26	Base Camp, 24 Huts and Bunkers
04 May	ZC148619	K/3/7	Harbor Site, 9 Huts and 4 Bunkers
04 May	ZC157625	L/3/7	Fortified Position, 30 Bunkers
04 May	ZC152622	L/3/7	Base Camp, 20 Huts and Bunkers, Messhall, Class- room
05 May	ZC153671	L/3/7	Harbor Site, 10 Huts and Bunkers
05 May	ZC120654	I/3/7	Harbor Site, 10 Huts and Bunkers
06 May	ZC154623	L/3/7	Harbor Site, 3 Huts and 9 Bunkers
06 May	ZC157631	L/3/7	Base Camp, 25 Huts and Messhall, Field Hospital, Tunnel Complex
06 May	ZC157611	K/3/7	14 Hut Transient Camp
07 May	ZC155606	K/3/7	Base Camp, 19 Bunkers
09 May	ZC044668	I/3/7	Cornfields, 7 Huts, 3rd Mar Div Sweatshirts, and Stationary
09 May	ZC055662	I/3/7	Bunkers/Fighting Holes
10 May	ZC136745 -138745	M/3/7	14 Huts, Tunnels (368B)
11 May	ZC141751	M/3/7	7 Huts, 4 Bunkers, 2 OP's 368B Arty Regt
12 May	ZC162597	K/3/7	2 Huts, Bunkers, Caves

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (5)

CONFIDENTIAL


SKETCHES OF TYPICAL FACILITIES UNCOVERED

- ✓ TAB (A) Natural Cave Bunker
- ✓ TAB (B) Typical Enemy Messhall
- ✓ TAB (C) Typical Enemy Bunker
- ✓ TAB (D) Typical 2-3 Man Hut

1. The tabs to this enclosure contain sketches of unusual or representative types of dwellings, structures or facilities uncovered during the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (7)

**NATURAL CAVE BUNKER CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING 4-5 MEN
(L-3-7, VIC ZC 153623)**



DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

TAB A TO ENCLOSURE (7) OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS AFTER ACTION REPORT



TYPICAL ENEMY MESSHALL
(L-3-7, VIC ZC 154623, 6 MAY 69)
TAB B TO ENCLOSURE (7)
OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS AFTER ACTION REPORT

TYPICAL ENEMY BUNKER (CUT AWAY VIEW)
(L-3-7, VIC ZIC 154623, 6 MAY 69)



TAB C TO ENCLOSURE (7) OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS AFTER ACTION REPORT

DECLASSIFIED



**TYPICAL 2-3 MAN HUT FOUND IN BASE CAMP
VIC ZC 1660
APPROX 4'X7'**

DECLASSIFIED

TAB 9 TO ENCLOSURE (7) OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS AFTER ACTION REPORT

CONFIDENTIALFACILITIES-EQUIPMENT-MATERIAL CAPTURED/DESTROYED

1. <u>Facilities:</u>		7. <u>Communications Equipment:</u>	
Complexes	36	Radios (ChiCom type K-63)	3
Hootches	672	Radio (ChiCom Type K-71)	1
Bunkers	656	Radio (PRC-10)	1
Tunnels	49	Radio (PRC-25)	1
		Field phone	9
		Switchboard Handset	2
2. <u>Ammunition:</u>		8. <u>Medical:</u>	
Small Arms	10,088 rds	Drugs (assorted)	20 lbs
60mm mortar	206 rds	Surgical instrument 2x5 gal can	
81mm mortar	42 rds		
82mm mortar	382 rds		
57mm recoilless	15 rds		
75mm recoilless	14 rds		
106mm recoilless	1 rd		
RPG	144 rds	9. <u>Miscellaneous Equipments:</u>	
140mm rockets	6 rds	Rocket sights:	16
122mm rockets	9 rds	Aiming circles	4
105mm Howitzer	21 rds	Plotting board	1
Mines	27	Binoculars	2 pair
M-79	51 rds	ChiCom compass	4
M-26 grenades	68	New Uniforms	52
ChiCom grenades	549	Periscopes w/tripods	12
Pistol flares	30 rds		
3. <u>Weapons:</u>			
IWC	180		
CSWC	27		
75mm recoilless	1		
12.7 Machine gun	3		
60mm mortar	2		
82mm mortar	3		
122mm rocket launcher	8		
140mm rocket launcher	2		
Flamethrower (Soviet Hvy	2		
flamethrower Model TPO-50M)			
4. <u>Explosives:</u>			
C-3	500 lbs		
Bangalore Torpedo	10		
5. <u>Document Batches:</u>			
	55		
6. <u>Foodstuffs:</u>			
Rice	8,228 lbs		
Corn	1,145 lbs		

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (8)

DAY BY DAY NARRATIVE30 March 1969

At 302015H 3/7 passed between Hill 41 and M/3/7 Tower vicinity (AT 921675) and commenced a covered movement into the AO.

At 302040H 2/7 departed Hill 10 vicinity (AT 923690) and commenced a covered movement into the AO.

31 March 1969

At 310515H A/1/7 Squad Combat patrol vicinity (AT 968602) received SA fire from 2-3 enemy. SA fire returned, area swept. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 311035H artillery preparation fires commenced on all LZ's.

At 311101H 2/51 commenced lift into LZ HAWK vicinity (ZC 175561); 3/51 commenced lift into LZ EAGLE vicinity (ZC 122578).

At 310800H K/3/7 vicinity (AT 912643) observed 50 enemy vicinity (AT 905636) moving SW wearing green uniforms and carrying packs. Snipers engaged with SA. Called fire mission 105mm. Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 311125H 3/26 commenced landing in LZ ROBIN vicinity (ZC 135658).

At 311140H K/3/7 vicinity (AT 911644) observed 1 enemy soldier vicinity (AT 905637) moving west wearing green uniform. Snipers engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 311900H K/3/7 vicinity (AT 911643) observed 2 enemy moving SW vicinity (AT 906637). Snipers engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 312130H C/1/7 vicinity (AT 788552) received approximately 30 mortar rounds and observed 5 enemy moving NE vicinity (ZC 208566). Called fire mission. Res: 3 USMC WIA, 1 USMC WIA(E)

1 April 1969

At 010820H Recon insert REPORT CARD vicinity (AT 839635) point Marine engaged 5-10 enemy with SA moving S across trail. Enemy returned fire. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 2 IWC

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (15)

SECRET

At 010945H Commando Vault weapon system delivered on 2 targets (two drops on each target) vicinity (ZC 155604 and 165613).

At 011030H 3/7 Command Post vicinity (ZC 906637) captured 1 NVA PW.
WIA. Res: 1 NVA PW

At 011045H M/3/26 vicinity (ZC 123650) commenced construction on FSB RATTLESNAKE.

At 011100H C/1/7 vicinity (ZC 211551) bulldozer detonated 1 40lb box mine. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 2 USMC WIANE

At 011215H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 952583) reported a truck moving W to E along Route 4 encountered 1 command detonated box mine.
Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 011330H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 877576) sniper observed 4 enemy in rice paddy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 011400H F/2/7 reached and secured Objective A vicinity (AT 863665).

At 011410H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 961604) detonated 1 pressure type AP device. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE

At 011420H C/1/7 vicinity (AT 788552) detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 011440H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 820552) detonated 2 mines along Route 4. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 13 USMC WIA(E), 1 truck destroyed

At 011445H B/1/7 Scout Snipers vicinity (AT 849557) observed 4 enemy moving SW vicinity (AT 849551) in green utilities and carrying packs. Snipers engaged with SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA

At 011735H 2/51 secured Battalion Objective vicinity (ZC 176574).

At 011755H 3/51 secured Battalion Objective vicinity (ZC 128593).

SECRET

Enclosure (15)

2 April 1969

At 020155H B/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 821551) heard 5-10 persons holding meeting, engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 021000H K/3/7 reached and secured Objective B vicinity (AT 878625).

At 021130H G/2/7 reached and secured Objective D vicinity (AT 831659).

At 022153H 3/51 vicinity (ZC 127597) engaged unknown size enemy force at close range. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

3 April 1969

At 030930H K/3/26 vicinity (ZC 125645) found 1 NVA KIA in grave. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 030950H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 828552) observed 1 enemy soldier on south side of river. Engaged with AW. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 031015H M/3/7 reached and secured Objective C vicinity (AT 858641).

At 031015H 3/51 vicinity (ZC 127597) engaged 2 enemy soldiers with SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 2 IWC

At 031200H 2/7 Command Post lifted from Hill 301 vicinity (AT 863665) to Hill 502 vicinity (AT 831659).

At 031630H B/1/7 Scout Sniper vicinity (AT 846556) observed 1 enemy with cartridge belt. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 031855H 3/51 vicinity (ZC 117597) observed 4 enemy soldiers, engaged with SA. Res: 4 NVA KIA

4 April 1969

At 040650H M/3/26 vicinity (ZC 133653) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 4 USMC WIANE

At 040855H C/1/7 vicinity (AT 793548) patrol received chicom grenade. Res: 3 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

SECRET

At 041300H completed lift of I and L/3/26 from vicinity (ZC 132655) to FSB RATTLESNAKE vicinity (ZC 123650).

At 041400H G/1/7 vicinity (AT 820553) Marine on Road Sweep detonated 1 AP device. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 041510H D/1/7 Convoy vicinity (AT 820554) Vietnamese truck detonated 1 40lb box mine. Res: 2 ARVN WIA(E), 3 USMC WIA(E)

At 041715H M/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 848638) found 1 grave with 1 NVA KIA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

5 April 1969

At 050930H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 854560) observed 2 enemy wearing black pajamas moving E at vicinity (AT 856556). Engaged with SA. Res: 2 VC KIA

At 051000H commenced clearing operations on FSB BUCKSKIN.

At 051131H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 814550) patrol engaged well entrenched enemy force vicinity (AT 814554) with CS and SA. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA(E), 5 NVA KIA, 4 IWC

At 051340H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 155628) patrol received SA and AW fire from unknown size enemy force. Returned fire, called fire mission with negative results. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 051400H BLT 3/26 displaced and helilifted to FSB RATTLESNAKE vicinity (ZC 123650) from vicinity (ZC 133655).

6 April 1969

At 060825H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 829658) while burning trash 4 140mm rockets exploded. Res: 5 USMC WIA(E)

At 061115H Recon Insert LAUNDRY MAN vicinity (ZC 200603) received SA from approximately 15 enemy. Returned SA fire. Res: 4 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 061200H completed lift of C/1/13 into FSB RATTLESNAKE.

SECRET
Enclosure (15)

At 061700H completed lift of W/1/13 into FSB RATTLESNAKE.

At 061900H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 150621) received SA from approximately 30 enemy. Enveloped position and engaged with SA fire. Res: 4 NVA KIA, 1 IWC, 1 USMC WIA

7 April 1969

At 070515H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 856660) received SA and B40 rockets from approximately 15 enemy vicinity (AT 852660). Returned fire with SA, 60mm, 81mm and artillery. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA(E)

At 071400H K/3/7 reached and secured Objective H vicinity (ZC 200604).

At 071650H FSB RATTLESNAKE fired first rounds in support of 3/26.

At 071740H I/3/26 reached and secured Objective L vicinity (ZC 157620).

8 April 1969

At 081300H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 148616) found enemy base camp and hospital, estimated to be of battalion size, with numerous bunkers and huts. Approximately 20 enemy were in the camp and they were engaged with SA, enemy fled SE. Swept area. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 36 NVA KIA, 3 IWC

At 081800H 26th Marines assumed Opcon of K/3/7.

9 April 1969

At 091010H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 839552) observed 3 enemy with weapons S of river vicinity (AT 832518). Engaged with SA. Res: 3 VC KIA

At 091400H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 161617) observed 1 enemy on trail. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 091437H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 808565) observed 5 enemy moving S. Engaged with SA. Res: 2 VC KIA, 1 IWC

Enclosure (15)

SECRET

At 091520H Company B Tanks vicinity (AT 956583) vehicle detonated box mine vicinity (AT 954588) with negative casualties. Observed 3 enemy. Engaged with 90mm. Res: 2 VC KIA

At 091555H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 176624) patrol received AW fire. Returned SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 091630H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 166618) patrol received SA. Returned fire. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 091710H M/3/7 reached and secured Regimental Objective G (ZC 200620).

At 091800H M/3/7 vicinity (ZC 199620) patrol engaged unknown size enemy force. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 091915H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 872553) observed 2 enemy. Called fire mission. Res: 2 VC KIA

10 April 1969

At 100530H L/3/7 perimeter watch. Marine shot in leg by sniper. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 100810H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 185620) point man shot by sniper. Res: 1 USMC KIA

At 100925H Recon Insert PARK AVENUE vicinity (AT 837621) observed 4 enemy moving E on trail. Enemy observed patrol. Patrol received SA, returned SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 101035H H/2/7 reached and secured Objective F vicinity (ZC 209660).

At 101110H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 193587) found 4 graves containing 4 bodies. Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 101227H 2/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 803650) helicopter received SA. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 101300H I/3/7 reached and secured Objective G vicinity (ZC 200620).

SECRET
Enclosure (15)

At 101329H 3/7 Command Post vicinity (ZC 195620) as helicopter landed in LZ received 2 60mm rounds from vicinity (ZC 208628). Called fire mission on suspected mortar position. Res: 1 USMC WIA

At 101400H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 169617) received SA from fortified bunkers, holes, and trees. Returned fire and swept area. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 15 USMC WIA(E), 10 VC KIA

At 101500H 2/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 820643) received SA fire from estimated enemy platoon. Called fire mission 81mm and artillery. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E)

11 April 1969

At 111030H K/3/26 vicinity (ZC 148614) found 1 PPK 50 pistol, documents, 1 chicom grenade, 2 empty cans of plasma, 84 AK47 rounds, and empty pencillin bottles. Res: 1 IWC

At 111301H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 802551) 1 CH46 helicopter broke into several sections in mid-air, crashed and burned at vicinity (AT 813555). Tail section crashed vicinity (AT 802551) resulting in 4 USMC KIA (Crew), 5 Civilian WIA(E). Security elements from Company B and C/1/7 dispatched. Also detained one civilian in area. Res: 4 USMC KIA, 5 CIV WIA(E), 1 DET

At 111405H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 179613) observed 8 enemy moving N vicinity (ZC 179616). Called fire mission artillery. Res: 3 NVA KIA

At 111450H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 813637) found large enemy base camp approximately 300 meters by 300 meters. Lead platoon received MG fire from camp. Company maneuvered to MG position and returned 81mm mortars, SA and AW fire. Res: 5 USMC WIA(E), 1 NVA KIA, 1 CSWC

At 111601H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 167623) found 1 NVA KIA in bunker with 1 AK47, 1 SKS, documents and clothing. Also found base camp with underground dwellings. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 2 IWC

At 112030H L/3/26 Squad Ambush vicinity (ZC 167620) received SA. Returned SA. Res: 1 USMC KIA

Enclosure (15)

SECRET12 April 1969

At 120740H Recon Insert PAGE AVENUE vicinity (AT 823629) observed 1 enemy moving on trail. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 120750H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 846554) observed 1 enemy with weapon vicinity (AT 845548). Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 120840H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 817639) received SA from estimated 5-7 enemy. Returned SA and swept area. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 121029H K/3/26 vicinity (ZC 149620) observed 5 enemy on trail. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 121130H K/3/26 vicinity (ZC 151613) observed 3 enemy with weapons. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 121230H I/3/7 vicinity (ZC 203623) received SA and chicom grenades. Returned SA, AW and called fire mission. Swept area found numerous blood trails. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 121315H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 810631) received SA from 2 enemy. Returned SA and swept area. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 NVA KIA, 1 IWC, 1 CSWC.

At 121532H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 810637) received SA from two directions. Returned SA, called fire mission 81mm mortar. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 121430H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 811630) found 3 Russian 7.62 MG, 32 82mm mortar rounds, 71 60mm mortar rounds, 7 BLU rockets, 3000 AK47 rounds and approximately 200 wooden grenades. Res: 3 CSWC

At 121600H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 812639) platoon searching enemy base camp was engaged by 1 enemy. Continued assault through position and was engaged by SA from both flanks. Patrol was unable to maneuver due to terrain and fog. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA(E), 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 121700H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 895596) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

SECRET

Enclosure (15)

At 121900H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 178609) discovered bunkers and hut complex. Found 1 chicom compass, 17 7.62 model 1944 carbines, 1 7.62 sub MG, 10 springfield rifles, 5 French 36 rifles, 1 BAR, 2 U.S. field phones, 2 base sockets for 60mm mortar, 52 new uniforms, 11 maps, and 20 graves containing 20 bodies. Res: 20 NVA KIA, 33 IWC, 1 GSWC

13 April 1969

At 130940H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 178609) found 1 82mm mortar round, 27 chicom grenades, 1 galvanometer, 2 barrel wrenches for artillery piece, 4 122mm rockets, 1 radio hand set with spare parts, 2 AK47 magazines, 1 SKS, documents, 500 AK47 rounds, 1 110mm rocket, 10 periscopes with tripods, 2 switch board hand sets and 100 meters of wire. Res: 1 IWC

At 131000H K/3/26 vicinity (AT 790598) observed 1 enemy with weapon. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 131015H C/1/7 vicinity (AT 790573) ARVN detonated AP device. Res: 2 ARVN WIA(E).

At 131400H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 809636) received SA from approximately 2 enemy. Returned SA and assaulted enemy position. Found 26 chicom grenades, 4 NVA packs, 2 helmets, 2 NVA cartridge belts, 4 pair utilities, and 2 AK47 magazines. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE, 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 131600H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 855560) observed 1 enemy with weapon S of river at vicinity(AT 860559). Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 131700H 3/51 vicinity (ZC 152576) received SA and AW fire. Returned SA fire and swept area. Res: 2 ARVN KIA, 5 ARVN WIA(E)

At 131905H C/1/7 Scout Snipers vicinity (ZC 207565) observed 3 enemy in front of a cave at vicinity (ZC 218575). Engaged with SA. Res: 3 VC KIA

At 132000H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 840550) observed 30 enemy across river moving S to N vicinity (AT 854555) wearing black pajamas. Engaged with SA and called fire mission 81mm mortars. Res: 14 NVA KIA

Enclosure (15)

SECRET14 April 1969

At 140200H C/1/7 vicinity (AT 798546) received 1 grenade. Searched area with negative results. Res: 2 USMC WIA/NE

At 141030H H/2/7 completed helilift from Objective H vicinity (ZC 209661) to Hill 785 vicinity (AT 803650) to rejoin remainder of the battalion in operations to the north of Hill 785.

At 141033H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 192592) platoon from Objective H observed 6 enemy moving among rocks. Engaged with SA and swept area found 3 NVA packs, 1 bunker, 6 fighting holes and assorted documents. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 141200H I/3/7 vicinity (ZC 204627) received SA from 5-8 enemy. Returned SA, called fire mission 81mm mortars, swept area. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 141205H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 819553) Vietnamese ox cart detonated 1 80lb box mine. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIA/NE

At 141215H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 812638) found 1 57mm recoilless rifle with tripod and sight, 3 57mm rounds, 57 AK47 rounds. Res: 1 CSWC

At 141300H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 174610) found NVA base camp with approximately 30 huts, documents and 24 graves. Res: 24 NVA KIA

At 141420H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 812638) found 1 compass, 200 AK47 rounds, 20 82mm mortar rounds, 152 82mm mortar fuses, medical supplies, 3 maps. Also found 8 graves. Res: 8 NVA KIA

At 141530H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 807620) platoon engaged estimate squad of enemy in bunkers. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 141645H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 794638) engaged 3 enemy in bunker. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 141715H 2/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 812637) found 1 NVA KIA with 1 pack with assorted personal gear. Res: 1 NVA KIA

SECRET
Enclosure (15)

At 141930H 3/51 ARVN vicinity (ZC 153577) received sniper fire from vicinity (ZC 153577). Res: 1 ARVN KIA

At 141935H 4/51 completed relief of 2/51 ARVN.

At 142000H 3/51 vicinity (ZC 153577) received sniper fire. Res: 1 ARVN WIANE

At 142300H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 878576) received 7 mortar rounds, SA, AW and 2 B40 rockets from approximately 1 enemy platoon. Called fire mission artillery, 81mm mortars and tanks. Res: 1 USMC WIANE, 1 USN WIANE, 9 Vietnamese Killed, 5 VC KIA

At 142305H D/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 878568) observed 5 enemy moving N. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 1 USMC WIANE

15 April 1969

At 150850H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 817654) found 1 NVA KIA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 150900H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 894639) found 5 NVA graves containing 5 NVA bodies. Res: 5 NVA KIA

At 150932H A/1/7 Road Sweep vicinity (ZC 192594) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

At 151030H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 192594) encountered 4 enemy and engaged with SA. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 151240H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 794638) engaged estimate 6-7 enemy vicinity (AT 794639). Found 200lbs rice. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 6 USMC WIANE, 1 NVA PW, 2 IWC

At 151300H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 172602) found 2 12.7 MG with 2 spare barrels and tripod. Res: 2 CSWC

At 151300H 2/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 799629) helicopter attempted to land and received SA fire, returned SA with negative results. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

SECRET

At 151304H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 131610) received SA. Returned SA.
Res: 2 NVA KIA, 5 USMC WIANE

At 151310H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 805625) engaged by 4 enemy. Res: 3
USMC WIA(E)

At 151330H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 192612) found 22 graves containing
22 NVA KIA. Res: 22 NVA KIA

At 151830H A/1/7 vicinity (AT 953583) observed 1 enemy on road
vicinity (AT 955579). Engaged with SA. Swept area found 1 female
KIA with clothing, documents and bandages. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 152215H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 794629) moved to LZ for emergency
med-evac. LZ received 7 chicom grenades. Res: 1 USMC KIA., 9 USMC WIA(E)

At 152300H B/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 824556) engaged enemy.
Enemy returned SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 2 USMC WIANE

16 April 1969

At 160710H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 810637) found 4 graves with 4 NVA KIA.
Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 160810H C/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 968590) Marine detonated
1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 160830H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 811639) found 1 grave with 1 NVA KIA.
Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 160900H L/3/7 vicinity (ZC 201620) found 1 grave with 1 NVA KIA.
Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 160920H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 809636) found 2 graves with 2 NVA KIA.
Res: 2 NVA KIA

At 161000H M/3/7 vicinity (ZC 197641) found base camp containing
9 huts and 12 tunnels, also numerous trails. Engaged 1 enemy with SA,
swept area found numerous documents and 1 pack. Res: 1 NVA KIA

SECRET
Enclosure (15)

At 161000Z H/3/26 vicinity (ZC 167615) received sniper fire from village. Returned SA and swept area. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E), 8 NVA KIA

At 161002H M/3/7 vicinity (ZC 193631) found base camp consisting of 15 huts and bunkers.

At 161130H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 175596) engaged 3 enemy with SA. Found 2 canteens, 2 ammunition belts, 2 knives and 3 chicom grenades. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 IWC

At 162155H A/1/7 vicinity (AT 967596) Marine detonated pressure type AP device. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E).

17 April 1969

At 171020H C/1/7 (ZC 200571) found 1 VC killed by artillery. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 171120H H/2/7 vicinity (AT 816646) found 3 graves with 3 NVA KIA. Res: 3 NVA KIA

At 171130H M/3/7 vicinity (ZC 202642) received SA from unknown size enemy force. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC KIA

At 171345H K/3/26 vicinity (ZC 133615) found NVA base camp consisting of huts and bunkers. Received SA and chicom grenades. Returned SA and AW fire, swept area found 12 AK47 magazines, 1400 rounds, 1 NVA radio, 782 gear and clothing. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 5 NVA KIA, 4 IWC, 1 NVA radio

At 171510H F/2/7 vicinity (AT 810648) found 1 NVA KIA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 IWC

At 171515H 1/51 completed relief of 3/51. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

18 April 1969

At 180005H H/2/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (AT 819636) found 1 NVA KIA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 181145H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 795636) found 1 grave with 1 NVA KIA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

SECRET
Enclosure (15)

SECRET

At 181223H H/2/7 vicinity (AT 838657) 1 NVA Chieu Hoi'd. Chieu Hoi turned in 1 AK47 and documents. Res: 1 DET, 1 IWC

At 181350H G/2/7 vicinity (AT 793635) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC NBC(E)

At 181700H L/3/26 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 173618) found documents indicating names of wounded, treatment, date of admission and discharge of 11 enemy. Resupply request forms. Believed to be of Regimental size.

At 181730H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 808636) found 11 SKS, 1 M14, 2 Russian carbines, 1 Russian rifle, 1 RPG launcher, 1 30 cal with tripod, 1 Soviet MG, 15 60mm mortar rounds, 6 anti-tank grenades, 31 chicom grenades, 1 61mm mortar tripod. Res: 15 IWC, 2 CSWC

19 April 1969

At 191155H E/2/7 vicinity (AT 811630) observed 4 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 191230H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 171600) found 1 82mm mortar tube with tripod and base plate, 11 boxes of 7.62 ammunition, 4 RPG rounds, 5 75mm warheads, 52 82mm rounds, 5 complete uniforms, 10 documents, huts, and aid station. Res: 1 CSWC

At 191501H G/2/7 Squad Recon vicinity (AT 795635) found 2 NVA in separate caves. When challenged Chieu Hoi'd. Res: 2 DET

At 191750H 2/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 801641) found 4 graves, 4 RPG rounds, 6 61mm mortar rounds, 3 anti-tank rifle grenades, Res: 4 NVA KIA

20 April 1969

At 200800H 2/7 commenced withdrawal from enemy base camp areas in the vicinity of (AT 7963, 8063, 8163) with Companies E, F, and G returning to Hill 785 and Company H to FSB BUCKSHIN for helicopter withdrawal from AO on 21 April.

At 200845H E/2/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 808635) found 1 82mm mortar tube with tripod and base plate, 1 chicom grenade, 10 82mm mortar rounds, 1 map. Res: 1 CSWC

SECRET

Enclosure (15)

At 200915H L/3/7 reached Hill 886 vicinity (AT 822605) and commenced clearing operations preliminary to construction work at that location for FSB LONGHORN.

At 201330H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 831559) tank detonated 40-60lb box mine. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

At 201630H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 168602) while moving to high ground above suspected enemy base camp received AW fire from 10-12 enemy. Returned fire enemy fled. Hill secured. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 201845H D/1/7 Observation Post vicinity (AT 878578) observed 10 enemy vicinity (AT 866562) with packs, digging in sand. Called fire mission artillery. Res: 1 VC KIA

21 April 1969

At 211105H 3/7 Command Post vicinity (ZC 208585) found 3 bodies approximately 3 weeks old. Res: 3 NVA KIA

At 211110H B/1/7 Squad Recon vicinity (AT 802550) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

At 211130H 2/7 completed helicopter withdrawal from AO terminating participation in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS

At 211430H K/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 168605) observed 6 enemy with utilities and weapons. Engaged with SA swept area found 1 body, 1 ammunition belt, 2 chicom grenades, 1 AK47 magazine. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 211630H 1/51 completed helilift from the vicinity of THUONG DUC to Hill 785 and FSB BUCKSKIN to relieve 2/7.

At 211630H K/3/7 vicinity (ZC 166606) while moving to high ground engaged 6 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 3 USMC WIA(E), 1 USN WIANE, 1 NVA KIA

At 211940H B/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 823552) observed 150 enemy attempting to cross SONG VU GIA. Engaged with SA, called fire mission 81mm, 106mm and artillery. Spooky on station. Res: 71 NVA KIA, 1 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

22 April 1969

At 221145H K/3/26 Platoon Recon vicinity (ZC 143615) observed 1 enemy. Engaged with SA, swept area found 1 NVA KIA, 1 AK47, 3 AK47 magazines, 3 chicom grenades, 1 NVA cartridge belt. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

23 April 1969

At 231145H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 944613) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 231345H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 938608) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 231615H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 947600) received AW fire from approximately 1 enemy at 20 meters. Returned SA fire with negative results. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

24 April 1969

At 241420H M/3/7 and battalion Command Post completed lift from Objective H vicinity (ZC 200604) to vicinity (AT 832635) and commenced reconnaissance in force operations in that area.

At 241502H L/3/26 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 162626) observed 1 enemy with weapon. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

25 April 1969

At 250650H M/3/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 828634) found 1 NVA body. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 250900H K/3/7 chopped from 3/26 to 3/7 and commenced helilift from LZ in the vicinity of Objective M (ZC 176610) to LZ in the vicinity of (AT 842638).

At 250930H M/3/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 833632) Marine detonated 1 daisy chain AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 2300H 7th Marine Command Post vicinity (AT 975615) received 1 large explosion. Res: 12 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

26 April 1969

At 260720H B/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 831551) observed 3 enemy on S side of SONG VU GIA wearing black uniform moving S vicinity (AT 831547). Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 261030H 3/1 (-) commenced move by truck to south from Hill 55 into assigned AO in the vicinity of (AT 9657) and began extensive patrolling south of Route 4.

At 261345H I/3/26 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 163600) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIA(E)

At 261615H C/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 795547) Vietnamese child secured weapon from sentry and shot Marine. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 DET

At 261845H C/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 794555) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 DET WIA(E)

At 262100H I/3/26 vicinity (ZC 163603) defense position received AW and chicom grenades. Returned SA and M26 grenades. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

27 April 1969

At 272040H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 981623) observed movement through starlight scope. Engaged with SA. Swept area. Res: 1 VC KIA

28 April 1969

At 280930H K/3/26 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 152607) found 1 grave. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 280945H completed helilift of 51st ARVN Regiment Reconnaissance Company into Hill 462 vicinity (ZC 189649) in preparation for construction of FSB STAGECOACH in that location.

At 281000H BLT 3/26 Command Post displaced to FSB RATTLESNAKE from Hill 1166.

At 281030H K/3/1 Platoon Sweep vicinity (AT 947564) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 3 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

At 281100H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 826552) observed 7 enemy with packs and cartridge belts moving S. Sniper engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 281330H L/3/26 vicinity (ZC 163603) observed 4 enemy. Engaged with SA, swept area found 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK47, 3 AK47 magazines, 2 chicom grenades, and documents. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 281645H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 948560) Marine tripped AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE

At 281715H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 982624) received SA and AW fire from approximately 10 enemy vicinity (AT 983623). Returned SA and 90mm, swept area. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

At 282000H G/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 797547) received 1 chicom grenade. Res: 3 USMC WIANE

29 April 1969

At 291045H I/3/26 completed helilift from LZ vicinity (ZC 163603) to FSB RATTLESNAKE to relieve M/3/26 of responsibility for security of that position. M/3/26 commenced reconnaissance in force operations to the SE and SW of FSB RATTLESNAKE.

At 291700H M/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 896697) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 291800H L/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 948558) Marine fell into punji pit. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

30 April 1969

At 300430H Companies B and D/1/7 conducted river crossing at vicinity (AT 858560) into N ARIZONA.

At 300800H K/3/1 Platoon Patrol vicinity (AT 937575) Marine detonated AP device with trip wire. Res: 3 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

At 301055H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 861545) encountered approximately 2 enemy companies vicinity (AT 860543). Engaged with SA and mortars. Enemy returned fire. Company A sent to react for Companies D and B/1/7. Res: 9 USMC KIA, 60 USMC WIA(E), 60 NVA KIA, 3 CSWC, 13 IWC

At 301155H I/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 935556) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 301215H L/3/1 Company Sweep vicinity (AT 954553) found 1 grave. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 301580H Companies K and M/3/7 arrived at Hill 10 and commenced rehabilitation.

1 May 1969

At 010830H 1/7 Forward (AT 839547) Resupply helicopter received mortars, SA, AW fire. Returned SA, called fire mission resulting in 1 secondary explosion and 200 meters of trenchline destroyed. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 4 NVA KIA.

At 011015H 3/1 (-) commenced withdrawal from AO E of Route 540 and S of Route 4 and began move overland to vicinity (AT 823551) to conduct river crossing and establish blocking positions vicinity (AT 831547).

At 011730H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 844544) received SA from unknown size enemy force. Returned SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA.

At 011800H 3/1 (-) in blocking positions vicinity (AT 831547).

At 012130H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 8455) observed 16 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 012300H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 8454) received 15 rounds 82mm mortar fire from vicinity (AT 855546). Called fire mission with unknown results. Res: 2 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

2 May 1969

At 021150H Companies K and L/3/26 completed helilift from Hill 1166 vicinity (ZC 142623) out of AO. K/3/7 completed lift into FSB RATTLESNAKE and C/1/13 completed lift from FSB RATTLESNAKE out of AO to Hill 55.

At 021300H I/3/1 Company Sweep vicinity (AT 858548) found 1 body dressed in green utilities. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 021430H L/3/26 Command Post vicinity (ZC 146622) helicopter hit tree stump and rolled down hill. Res: 2 USMC KNBC, 5 USMC NBC(E)

At 021630H L/3/7 completed overland move from E CHARLIE RIDGE to Hill 10 for rehabilitation.

At 021835H 1/7 (-) and 3/1 (-) completed operations S of the SONG VU GIA and conducted river crossing to the N.

At 022120H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 981624) observed several enemy with starlight scope vicinity (AT 982623). Engaged with SA and AW and received AW fire. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

3 May 1969

At 030730H 3/7 squad relieved 3/26 squad as security for RC BANA radio retransmission station.

At 031030H W/1/13 completed lift from FSB RATTLESNAKE out of AO. K/3/7 completed lift into Hill 1166 from Hill 10.

At 031145H I/3/7 completed overland move from E CHARLIE RIDGE to Hill 10 for rehabilitation.

At 031800H 3/26 chopped to 1st Marine Division.

4 May 1969

At 040200H C/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 203567) Marine detanated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 040900H L/3/7 completed lift into Hill 1166 from Hill 10.

Enclosure (15)

At 041000H L/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 145624) found 2 NVA bodies in green utilities. Res: 2 NVA KIA

At 041300H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 208554) found 1 VC in grave. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 041515H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 836561) AmTrac moving E detonated 1 30-40lb box mine. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

At 041647H 7th Marine Command Post vicinity (AT 953628) observed 1 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 041815H L/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 961584) while checking disabled vehicle found 1 VC body in hole. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 042330H D/1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 826557) observed 15 enemy vicinity (AT 826558) moving N of Command Post. Engaged with organic weapons, called fire mission artillery. Swept area found 6 packs, helmets, cartridge belts with chicom grenades. Res: 2 USMC WIANE, 2 VC KIA

5 MAY 1969

At 051200H M/3/7 Sweep vicinity (ZC 120654) found base camp with fighting holes, cooking gear and 3 NVA KIA. Also 1 case AK47 rounds. Res: 3 NVA KIA

At 051400H K/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 836580). Detained 3 Vietnamese males and 1 Vietnamese female. Res: 4 DET

At 051445H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 836580) received SA from E. Engaged 2 enemy with SA. Swept area detained 6 Vietnamese females. Res: 6 DET

At 051500H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 957590) detained 3 Vietnamese males and 8 females. Res: 11 DET

6 May 1969

At 060445H E/3/7 Squad Combat vicinity (ZC 157626) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

At 060700H I/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 917586) detained 3 females with bags of medical equipment. Classified as VC by ITT. Res: 3 DET

At 061000H L/3/7 Sweep vicinity (ZC 154623) found enemy basecamp with 19 bunkers, 3 cooking huts, 1 well, rifle racks, and numerous trails in area.

At 061030H I/3/7 completed lift into LZ DRYGULCH vicinity (ZC 047674) and commenced reconnaissance in force operations towards proposed site of FSB BULLWHIP.

At 061040H L/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 946557) Marine detonated 1 daisy chain AP device. Res: 6 USMC WIA(E)

At 061100 L/3/7 Company Sweep vicinity (ZC 157631) found enemy base camp with 25 huts, 1 messhall, 1 field hospital, medical gear and documents. Also found tunnel complex under huts.

At 061255H L/3/1 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 977596) received AW fire from estimated 3 enemy vicinity (AT 979596). Engaged with M79 and SA. Called fire mission, swept area. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE

At 061825H I/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 055666) Marine stepped on punji stick. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 0620005H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (ZC 173547) Marine tripped AP device. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

7 May 1969

At 071035H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 943590) detained 1 Vietnamese male with no identification card. Res: 1 DET

At 071100H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 944593) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 071115H L/3/7 Sweep vicinity (ZC 046647) observed 3 NVA. Snipers engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

Enclosure (15)

At 071130H K/3/7 Sweep vicinity (ZC 155606) found 19 bunkers, 1 grave, 5 RPG boosters, 2 chicom grenades, and assorted clothing. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 071610H B/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 801545) detained 1 Vietnamese female with suspicious identification. Res: 1 DET

At 071650H D/1/7 Scout Snipers vicinity (AT 825552) observed 3 enemy with packs vicinity (AT 830547). Snipers engaged with SA. Res: 2 VC KIA

8 May 1969

At 080115H D/1/7 Platoon Command Post vicinity (AT 833599) observed 1 enemy. Engaged with SA. Enemy returned SA and 1 chicom grenade. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 080830H K/3/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (ZC 160598) received SA from unknown size enemy force at 50 meters. Returned SA, called fire mission artillery. Called air strike, 1 500lb bomb detonated above K/3/7. Res: 1 USMC KNBC, 1 USMC KIA, 24 USMC NBC(E), 6 USMC WIA(E)

At 081100H L/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 948617) received 1 RPG round and AW fire. Returned SA, swept area. Res: 5 USMC WIA(E)

At 081500H 2/51 relieved 1/51 in place and continued missions assigned in AO.

At 082230H D/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 840560) engaged 20-25 enemy moving N. Called fire mission artillery blocking fires. Swept area found blood trails, 1 pack containing 60 lbs rice. Res: 1 NVA KIA

9 May 1969

At 090640H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 946585) observed 1 enemy vicinity (AT 946584). Engaged with SA, swept area found 3 maps, 1 chicom grenade. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 091000H L/3/7 completed lift from Hill 1166 to FSB RATTLESNAKE and relieved M/3/7 of responsibility for security of that position. M/3/7 conducted lift from FSB RATTLESNAKE to vicinity (ZC 1374) and commenced reconnaissance in force operations.

Enclosure (15)

At 091200H I/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 946568) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 091330H B/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 803560) detained 1 13 year old boy. Res: 1 DET

At 091540H D/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 862562) received SA from approximately 13 enemy vicinity (AT AT 862560). Returned SA. Res: 2 VC KIA

At 091850H L/3/1 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 906549) observed 1 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 092000H I/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 907554) observed 40 - 50 enemy on S side of SONG VU GIA. Called fire mission artillery with negative results.

At 092002H L/3/1 vicinity (AT 901546) observed 1 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 092100H L/3/1 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 901546) observed 5 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 2 VC KIA

At 092210H C/1/7 Platoon perimeter (AT 820550) observed 3 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 092234H A/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 820550) observed 3 enemy. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

10 May 1969

At 100550H L/3/1 Platoon Ambush vicinity (AT 901546) observed 4 NVA attempting to cross SONG VU GIA. Engaged with SA. Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 101115H K/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 160598) received SA from approximately 7 enemy in bunker. Returned SA, called fire mission. Res: 2 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA(E)

At 101200H 3/1 chopped from 7th Marines to 1st Marines.

Enclosure (15)

At 101330H 3rd AmTracs/7th Marines vicinity (AT 968596). 2 LVT's were returning to Hill 55 when one LVT hit command detonated 105mm round. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 1 LVT destroyed

At 101730H M/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 136745) found small base camp with approximately 10 huts, 2 tunnels, 6 graves, numerous fighting holes. Res: 6 NVA KIA

At 102355H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 837561) Marine detonated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 3 USMC WIANE

11 May 1969

At 110945H A/1/7 Company Command Post vicinity (AT 813546) observed 30-35 enemy across river moving W vicinity (AT 810541) wearing brown uniforms and black pajamas. Called fire mission artillery, called air strikes with good coverage.

At 111315H one platoon L/3/7 lifted from FSB RATTLESNAKE to FSB BULLWHIP in preparation for I/3/7 withdrawn from operation.

At 112245H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 833562) received SA and grenades from approximately 3-4 enemy. Returned SA, swept area with negative results. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

12 May 1969

At 120145H 7th Marines Command Post vicinity (AT 967616) received 6 82mm mortar rounds from (AT 963621). Res: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 121200H I/3/7 lifted from FSB BULLWHIP to Hill 10 and chopped to 26th Marines for further chop to 2/7.

At 121710H K/3/7 Company Sweep vicinity (ZC 162596) observed 1 enemy moving along trail. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

13 May 1969

At 131000H platoon L/3/7 lifted from FSB BULLWHIP upon completion of its construction to FSB RATTLESNAKE.

Enclosure (15)

At 131130H K/3/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (ZC 161596) found small base camp consisting of 24 huts with bunkers, 2 cooking huts, 10 spider holes, 7 RPG rounds, and 15 AK47 rounds.

At 131815H K/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 164603) received sniper fire from approximately 3-5 enemy in spider holes. Returned fire, enemy broke contact. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA(E)

14 May 1969

At 140800H Company K and L/3/7 conducted relief in place. K/3/7 will now assumed responsibility for security of FSB RATTLESNAKE and L/3/7 commenced recon in force E to search out suspected enemy forces in vicinity (ZC 1760).

At 140830H K/3/7 Squad Combat vicinity (ZC 164602) observed 3 NVA moving E. Engaged with SA. Res: 2 NVA KIA

At 1420005H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 895581) received 1 M79 round from vicinity (AT 898584). Returned SA, swept area. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 142035H C/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 961624) heard explosion. Detained 2 Vietnamese as VC suspects. Res: 2 DET

15 May 1969

At 150700H D/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 943578) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Evac helicopter received M79 rounds from vicinity (AT 948574). Called fire mission 81mm mortars. Swept area. Res: 4 USMC WIA(E), 1 USN WIA(E), 2 USMC WIA(E)

16 May 1969

At 160930H K/3/7 lifted from FSB RATTLESNAKE to FSB STAGECOACH and commenced reconnaissance in force operations to the W and SW to Objective K vicinity (ZC 178637).

17 May 1969

At 170900H A/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 955628) found 1 NVA body dressed in khakies. Res: 1 NVA KIA

Enclosure (15)

At 171110H K/3/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (ZC 176633) observed 1 NVA moving W. Engaged with SA, swept area found 1 chicom grenade, 1 pack with assorted clothing. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 171815H D/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 938576) received 6 M79 rounds and AW from vicinity (AT 940577). Returned fire swept area. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E), 6 USMC WIANE

At 171950H C/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 940613) received 1 grenade. Res: 1 USMC WIANE

18 May 1969

At 181400H L/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (ZC 185617) engaged 5-8 enemy with SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 2 IWC

At 181700H Platoon K/3/7 completed reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of (ZC 1764) and lifted from vicinity (ZC 165655) back to FSB RATTLESNAKE.

19 May 1969

At 191500H 2/51 commenced move to FSB BUCKSKIN.

At 191555H Company 1/7 on river recon observed 2 enemy across river vicinity (AT 940594). Engaged with SA. Received SA from approximately 7 VC and returned SA sweep area results 2 VC KIA, 1 M-16, 2 NVA flags, 1 banner, 1 cartridge belt, 2 NVA uniforms, 1 pair black pajamas and documents. Res: 2 VC KIA, 1 IWC

At 192105H L/3/7 Command Post vicinity (ZC 177609) received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Called fire mission. Res: 4 USMC WIANE

20 May 1969

At 200135H 7th Marine Command Post vicinity (AT 968618) received 1 250lb bomb from vicinity (AT 976615) causing damage to switchboard wire center.

At 200230H 7th Marine Command Post vicinity (AT 968618) received 10 - 15 rounds 82mm mortar fire from (AT 976614). Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

At 201100H 2/51 vicinity (AT 807641) observed 3 enemy. Engaged with SA. Swept area found 400lbs rice. Res: 3 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 201200H D/1/7 continued sweep to NE from LIBERTY Bridge. C/1/7 provided blocking force vicinity (AT 9557).

At 201230H 1/7 (-) conducts search and destroy operation in NW portion of DODGE CITY with Companies A, C, D and Command Post to destroy enemy personal.

At 201300H K/3/7 moved from FSB RATTLESNAKE to FSB BULLWHIP. L/3/7 moved to FSB RATTLESNAKE from Hill 1366. Provisional battery, 4 tubes, established on FSB BULLWHIP. All moves made in preparation for impending operation in KEN VALLEY vicinity (YC 9863).

21 May 1969

At 210830H A/1/7 Squad Sweep vicinity (AT 985607) destroyed claymore AP device. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 210855H A/1/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (AT 984607) Marine detonated 1 AP device. Res: 2 USMC WIA(E)

At 211120H A/1/7 Platoon Sweep vicinity (AT 988600) Marine detonated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 211145H completed lift of L/3/7 from FSB RATTLESNAKE to vicinity (YC 963632); lift of the Reconnaissance Company, 51st ARVN Regiment from Regimental Command Post vicinity (BT 023657) to FSB RATTLESNAKE, vicinity (YC 963632) and M/3/7 from vicinity (ZC 108705) to (ZC 001641).

At 211145H B/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 888558) observed 30 NVA crossing SONG VU GIA S to N vicinity (AT 885555). Engaged with SA, called fire mission. Swept area found numerous blood trails leading to river.

22 May 1969

At 221000H 1/7 redistributed companies and resumed regular patrolling in assigned AO.

At 221105H D/1/7 vicinity (AT 956584) road sweep returning to Hill 55 on 6x6 vehicle, hit command detonated 35lb box mine. Res: 3 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

23 May 1969

At 230645H L/3/7 vicinity (YC 981638) patrol point man received SA. Returned SA, enemy fled SW. Res: 1 USMC KIA

At 230945H B/1/7 vicinity (AT 846558) observed 1 enemy with weapon and pack vicinity (AT 848548) on S side of river. Sniper engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 231015H B/1/7 Command Post Tower vicinity (AT 915582) observed 3 enemy crossing road with packs and weapons moving N to S. Called fire mission 81mm mortars. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 231045H B/1/7 Command Post Tower vicinity (AT 878576) observed 3 enemy on S side of river moving E vicinity (AT 872553) with weapons and wearing black pajamas. Called fire mission. Res: 3 VC KIA

At 231600H 81mm Mortar 1/7 vicinity (AT 878576) spotted 6 enemy with packs and weapons vicinity (AT 872551). Called fire mission 81mm. Res: 3 NVA KIA

24 May 1969

At 241330H L/3/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 006656) observed 4 enemy with weapons. Engaged with SA. Swept area found bolt action rifle and assorted documents. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC

At 241340H A/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 928597). Marine detonated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

25 May 1969

At 251200H completed move of 51st ARVN Reconnaissance Company from vicinity (YC 972623) to 51st Regimental Command Post; L/3/7 from vicinity (ZC 004642) to Hill 785; M/3/7 from vicinity (ZC 004642) to FSB RATTLESNAKE; and K/3/7 from FSB BULLWHIP and FSB RATTLESNAKE to Hill 785. Provisional battery at FSB BULLWHIP disbanded and moved to Hill 65 and Hill 10.

At 251200H C/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 813585) observed 1 suspected enemy wearing brown uniform moving S. Engaged with SA. Received AW fire, returned fire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

At 251245H C/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 823552) observed 6 enemy crossing river S to N. Engaged with SA and AW fire. Called fire mission. Res: 4 NVA KIA

At 252020H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 828554) Marine detonated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 1 USMC WIAE

26 May 1969

At 260850H A/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 803550) Marine detonated AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 261100H B/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 854569) observed 1 enemy running from patrol. Scout Sniper engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 261530H K/3/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 797634) observed 4 enemy. Engaged with SA and AW. Enemy returned SA. Found 7 NVA packs with medical gear and supplies, 6 chicom grenades, 240lbs corn, documents, assorted 782 gear and 2 chicom field phones. Res: 2 NVA KIA, 2 USMC WIAE, 2 IWC

At 261545H 2/51 completed withdrawal from Hill 785 and FSB BUGSKNIN terminating ARVN participation in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

At 261835H D/1/7 Squad Combat vicinity (AT 955605) received SA from unknown size enemy force vicinity (AT 955606). Returned SA and LAAW's and swept area. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 262100H K/3/7 Listening Post vicinity (AT 794634) was probed by 8-10 enemy. Engaged with SA and grenades. Enemy returned SA and chicom grenades. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 262205H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 807551) observed 2 enemy in boat circling lake. Engaged with SA. Swept area found 80lbs rice. Res: 2 VC KIA

27 May 1969

At 270055H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 798552) observed 30 enemy moving N to S. Enemy observed patrol and threw chicom grenades and fired AW and RPG's. Returned fire with SA and AW fire. Res: 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIA(E)

Enclosure (15)

At 270800H L/3/7 Platoon Patrol vicinity (AT 809635) observed 3 enemy moving S wearing uniforms. Engaged with SA. Swept area. Res: 2 NVA KIA

At 271130H 3/7 commenced move of elements of H&S Company from FSB RATTLESNAKE to Hill 10.

At 271650H B/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 889559) observed 2 enemy S of river with weapons. Engaged with SA. Res: 2 VC KIA

At 271730H B/1/7 Squad Patrol vicinity (AT 893560) observed 1 enemy in river vicinity (AT 894559). Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 271915H B/1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 878576) observed 1 enemy moving W at 75 meters. Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 272040H 1/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 916582) received 12 82mm mortar rounds. Called fire mission on previous sites. Observed 1 secondary explosion (AT 900584). Res: 1 USN WIA(E)

28 May 1969

At 280100H A/1/7 Platoon Ambush vicinity (AT 802550) observed 3 enemy moving NW at 10 meters. Engaged with SA, enemy returned fire with negative results.

At 280815H B/1/7 Scout Snipers vicinity (AT 877565) observed 1 enemy S of river vicinity (AT 878559). Engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 281015H completed move of G/3/11 from FSB RATTLESNAKE to Hill 10.

At 281015H completed move of K and L/3/7 and battalion Command Post from Hill 785 to Hill 10.

At 281930H D/1/7 Platoon Combat vicinity (AT 970621) observed 6-10 enemy with weapons and packs moving N vicinity (AT 975604). Scout Sniper engaged with SA. Res: 1 VC KIA

At 282230H H&S Company 3/7 Command Post vicinity (AT 923690) had 1 explosion. Under investigation. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E), 2 USMC WIANE

Enclosure (15)

At 282305H A/1/7 Squad Ambush vicinity (AT 803553) observed unknown size enemy force with SA, AW and M79. Enemy returned fire. Reaction force sent, enemy broke contact. Called fire mission. Res: 4 USMC KIA, 21 USMC WIA(E), 20 NVA KIA

29 May 1969

At 290030H B/1/7 Platoon Patrol vicinity (AT 824556) while moving to react to A/1/7, received AW fire. Returned fire. Res: 1 NVA KIA

At 290200H B/1/7 Platoon Patrol vicinity (AT 824556) observed 3-4 enemy. Engaged with SA, RPG and chicom grenades. Returned SA. Res: 1 NVA KIA, 1 USMC WIANE, 1 IWC.




At 290815H A/1/7 Company Sweep vicinity (AT 812551) Marine detonated 1 AP device with trip wire. Res: 1 USMC WIA(E)

At 291330H M/3/7 completed deconstruction of FSB RATTLESNAKE and conducted helilift to Hill 10 as last unit to withdraw from CHARLIE RIDGE.


At 291800H Terminated Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

Enclosure (15)

KEY TERRAIN




PHASE I
30 MAR - 21 APR



ENCLOSURE (20)

PHASE II
21 APR - 3 MAY




79

ENCLOSURE (21)

PHASE III
3 MAY - 29 MAY

04
79




51
91

ENCLOSURE (22)


RELATED OPERATIONS

04
79

KEN VALLEY OPERATION 21-25 MAY



NORTHERN ARIZONA OPERATION
29 APR - 2 MAY




SONG VU GIA AMBUSH
21-22 APR




51
91

SONG VU GIA AMBUSH
21-22 APR



ENCLOSURE (24)

DECLASSIFIED




KEN VALLY OPERATION
21-25 MAY

DECLASSIFIED

ARTILLERY FIRE CAP

79 — 14



10

15 — 51

ENCLOSURE (27)

ENGINEER SUPPORT-EXECUTION

1. Construction of FSB MUSTANG located at Hill 52 (AT 788552) at 260700H March 1969 on Hill 52 a squad of Combat Engineers with heavy equipment operators, and equipment 1 TD-18, 1 TD-15 with straight blade, and 1 TD-15 with loader, were staged to begin construction of FSB MUSTANG. The artillery commander and the engineer officer made a reconnaissance of the hill and planned the location for gun emplacements, ammunition storage area, bunker position and roads. At 260900H construction commenced. For the ARVN 105 Howitzers, five emplacements were constructed thirty feet in diameter with three feet berm walls, and constructed one 8"x12" bunker for use as a FDC. For LVTH-6's six emplacements were constructed. These were 30'x20' with five feet berm walls, and with three ammunition revetments. For the 8" Howitzers, two gun emplacements 30'x20', three ammunition revetments 20'x25' and one 8"x12' FDC bunkers were constructed. For the 155 Howitzer battery, six emplacements 25'x15', three revetments 40'x20' for ammunition storage, one 8"x12' FDC bunker and one 8"x12' COC bunker were prepared. In addition to the areas constructed for artillery positions the following work was accomplished: One 8"x12' COC bunker for the infantry commander was built, one 12'x10' garbage pit was dug, 400 meters of road completed, 150 meters of berm perimeter wall erected, 3,000 square meters of underbrush cleared with heavy equipment, and 1,000 square meters of underbrush cleared with 1,225 lbs of bangalore torpedos.

2. Construction of FSB HUCKSKIN

a. 041200H April 1969, Hill 502 (AT 832659) was secured by the infantry (2nd Battalion, 7th Marines) and the engineer officer with a squad of combat engineers, tools, and explosives were helilifted to Hill 502. The lift was completed without difficulty and the engineers commenced work at 041500H. It was determined that using a mixture of 40 lb shape charges and 40 lb cratering charges (see Tab B), would both enlarge the top surface of the hill and soften the earth to make the work for the "Mini Dozer" (Case 450) easier. Engineers with an artillery working party, began by digging holes approximately 12 feet deep in a checkerboard pattern about 8 feet apart for 40 lb shape charges. (Later it was decided unnecessary to dig holes beneath the shape charges). While the holes were being dug, another team began laying the 40 lb shape charges and rigging primers. It is noted that working the two teams simultaneously sped up the operation considerably. Once all the holes were dug, the shape charges were double primed into trunk line for simultaneously detonation. All personnel except the engineer officer and the demolition team leader were moved to a safe distance. At this time the 3 minute fuses were lit and "fire in the hole" was sounded to insure that all personnel took safe positions. Detonation of the shape charges resulted in 32 holes averaging 7 feet deep and 12 inches in diameter. Although some of the holes caved in and had to be cleaned out by hand, over all results were satisfactory. After the area had been checked for missfires by the engineer officer and demolition team leader, the artillery working party began placing the 40 lb cratering charges and the engineer demolition team began double priming the charges and placing them in the holes drilled by the 40 lb shape

Enclosure (28)

chargers. After placing the 40 lb cratering charges and tamping them they were double primed into trunk line and detonated simultaneously, using the same safety precautions as were used with the shape charges. Detonation of the cratering charges resulted in well-cratered and softened earth which greatly reduced the amount of work required by the "Mini Dozer". After requesting that the "Mini Dozer" be helilifted to the area of construction the following morning, the engineers and working party set into defensive positions at 041900H April 1969.

b. At 050730H April 1969 while waiting for the "Mini Dozer", the engineers began clearing the passenger LZ and staging area. Trees were felled by using external charges of Composition 4 (C-4) primed into a trunk line to fall an average of 15 trees at a time. After felling the trees, chain saws were used to cut the trees into sections small enough to be moved by the working party and "Mini Dozer". In clearing the LZ area, care was taken to begin the clearing process on the outboard edges of the area to be cleared and working towards the center. This allowed easy removal of the trees. Due to delay in helicopters the "Mini Dozer" did not arrive until 051700H at which time leveling of the FSB commenced along with construction of gun positions. By 051900H one and one-half gun positions were completed and the team secured for the night. It is noted that delay in arrival of the "Mini Dozer" delayed completion of the FSB by almost one day.

c. At 060700H, the "Mini Dozer" leveled an area for the FDC bunker so the engineers and working party could construct a 8'x12'x8' FDC bunker concurrent with the dozer work and emplacement development. By 061500H six gun positions 20 feet in diameter with 3 feet berm walls, the FDC bunker, the external lift drop zone, and passenger LZ were completed and the engineers with their equipment were helilifted to Hill 55 to await further orders.

d. At 071600H it was decided to enlarge the LZ and cover it with M8A1 steel runway matting. The engineers and "Mini Dozer" were helilifted back to FSB BUCKSKIN and began leveling and enlarging the LZ area. At 080800H the M8A1 matting was helilifted into the LZ staging area and the engineers with working party began laying the 48'x48' LZ. Laying of the LZ was interrupted several times by helicopter landing on the LZ site, however work was completed by 081500H, and the engineer team with equipment was helilifted back to Hill 55.

3. Construction of FSB LONGHORN (AT 824666)

a. On 211400H April 1969, the proposed area having been secured by the infantry (3rd Battalion, 7th Marines), the engineer officer and one squad of combat engineers, with tools and demolition were helilifted into the planned area for FSB LONGHORN, construction began immediately. Although the hill top was relatively clear of trees, there were several large granite boulders that required moving. Through test shots, it was learned that 40 lb shape charges (without normal standoff) propped around the boulders did the most effective job of breaking them up.

Enclosure (28)

While one demolition team with an infantry working party was setting up 40 lb shape charges around the boulders, an additional demolition team of engineers with working party was preparing charges to fell trees on the North side of the FSB that would block the approach/take off zone of helicopters and mask the artillery when firing low angle fire in a northerly direction. The charges on the boulders and trees were set at the same time in order to reduce the number of times demolitions would have to be detonated. It is further noted that the trees in this area that required felling did not require removal from the area.

b. After breaking up the boulders on the proposed site for the gun positions the "Mini Dozer" was helilifted into the site designated for the LZ. Since the LZ was a safe distance from the FSB and required very little leveling it was decided to level the LZ while the demolition team were cratering and softening the earth on the FSB. By 221330H, the LZ had been leveled and the FSB had been suitably softened for the "Mini Dozer" to begin construction of the gun positions. One large boulder was uncovered and broken up with 40 lb shape charges. All gun positions were completed by 231800H. On 240730H the engineers were helilifted to Hill 55. Final results on FSB LONGHORN were as follows: six gun emplacements 25 feet in diameter with 3 feet berm walls, two ammunition revetments, one FDC bunker emplacement, one LZ for external helilift between the gun emplacements, and one passenger LZ.

4. Construction of FSB STAGECOACH (ZC 189648)

a. Prior to beginning construction of FSB STAGECOACH a visual reconnaissance of the proposed area at (ZC 203655) was made. Heavy ground cover of the specific spot necessitated a ground reconnaissance. When the proposed area was secured the engineer officer and the artillery officer were helilifted into the area and it was found unsuitable for a FSB. The final area decided on for FSB STAGECOACH was at (ZC 189648).

b. By 290830H April 1969, the proposed location had been secured by one company of the 51st ARVN Regiment. The engineer officer and one squad of combat engineers with tools and demolition were helilifted to the area. Upon arrival they cleared an LZ so that a CH-53 could lift in the "Mini Dozer". For this task, C-4 primed by trunk lines was used exclusively. The LZ and good approach lanes were quickly cleared. Afterwards the engineer team began clearing the larger trees from the proposed gun emplacements using C-4 primed by trunk lines. It was requested that the "Mini Dozer" be helilifted into the LZ to level it while the engineers were completing demolition work on the gun emplacement area. After clearing the gun emplacements of trees larger than 3" in diameter, the engineers began placing 40 lb shape charges in a checkerboard pattern as shown in Tab B. The 40 lb shape charges were double-primed with trunk lines and after all personnel were moved to a safe area the engineer officer and the demolition team leader detonated the charges simultaneously. Note that the side blast from the shape charges cleared most all the small underbrush from the immediate area. After the engineer officer and demolition

Enclosure (28)

team leader checked for miss fires the engineers began priming and placing 40 lb cratering charges into the holes prepared by the shape charges and tamping them. Having double primed the cratering charges into trunk lines and moving all personnel to a safe area, the engineer officer and demolition team leader detonated the charges simultaneously. The heaving effect of the 40 lb cratering charges not only cratered and softened the earth, it also blew small trees (3" or less) and stumps from the ground making them easily removed with the "Mini Dozer" and pioneer tools. Even though the "Mini Dozer" had arrived several hours late, the passenger LZ was already complete. Afterwards the dozer began leveling the gun emplacement area and constructing ammunition revetments. While the "Mini Dozer" was working on the gun emplacement area the demolition team leader began felling trees above the FSB that could mask artillery fire. At 021600H May 1969, FSB STAGECOACH was completed and engineers and equipment were extracted.

c. Final results on FSB STAGECOACH are as follows: one passenger LZ with staging area, one external load drop zone (located near the gun emplacements), three ammunition storage revetments 8'x20'x4', six gun emplacements 20 feet in diameter with 3 feet high berm walls and one area leveled for a 8'x12' FDC bunker.

5. Construction of FSB BULLWHIP (ZC 056664)

a. During the V.R. a suitable area for FSB BULLWHIP was located at (ZC 056664). However, a suitable LZ was not available at that location. It was decided to attach a demolition team to the infantry unit (I/3/7) and let them walk in to clear a temporary LZ. On 061100H May 1969 the infantry unit had secured the proposed area and the engineer demolition team had cleared a temporary LZ. The engineer officer and one squad of combat engineers with equipment and demolition were helilifted to the area. The engineers with an infantry working party, began enlarging the LZ. In clearing the LZ, engineers used C-4 primed by trunk lines to fell and cut trees for easy removal. On 071100H the "Mini Dozer" was lifted to the job site and commenced leveling the area and pushing trees over the sides of the hill. Concurrent with dozer operations, engineers and working party fell trees that would mask artillery fire and also cleared a passenger LZ and staging area. Due to the density of the trees and the close proximity of the "Mini Dozer", the dozer work, for safety purposes, had to be interrupted several times. On 120900H the FSB area was completed and the "Mini Dozer" began pushing felled trees and underbrush from the passenger LZ. In addition while leveling the FSB area, several granite boulders were uncovered and broken up using 40 lb shape charges without standoff. On 121600H FSB BULLWHIP was completed.

b. Final results of FSB BULLWHIP were: six ammunition revetments 6'x10', an external load drop zone near the gun positions and ammunition revetments, and one passenger LZ and staging area capable of handling two CH-46's.

Enclosure (28)

6. Road Construction Hill 65 (AT 866574) to Hill 52 (AT 788552)

a. On 250630H March 1969, a squad of engineers with heavy equipment operators and heavy equipment consisting of, two TD-18's, one TD-15, one Adams-550 grader, two M-51 dump trucks, and one TD-15 with loader, began constructing a pioneer road along Route 4 from (AT 866574) to (AT 788552), a distance of approximately 8,500 meters. Security elements were posted to front, rear, and on both flanks by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Road construction began by having a mine sweep team advance in front of the construction team to clear the intended path of the road bed. Past records show that Route 4 throughout the area had been heavily mined when previously used. Visual reconnaissance from the air showed that there were several shell craters in the road that would require filling. Plans were made to haul fill from Hill 65 located at (AT 878577) and to use fill from sources close to the area needing fill when possible. Construction proceeded at a rapid pace, according to plan, until 251210H the lead tractor, a TD-18, detonated an estimated 80 lb box mine, resulting in major damage to the tractor and sheeps foot rollers, and also minor wounds to the operator. As soon as the damaged equipment could be cleared the construction team continued. Construction of the basic pioneer road was completed and passable on 251900H. The team spent the next three days improving and oiling the road without further incidents. On 281800H the pioneer road was opened for tactical traffic.

b. Resulting from the operation was a pioneer road capable of one way traffic over a distance of 8,500 meters.

c. During this phase of construction one TD-18 was destroyed, one sheeps foot roller was heavily damaged, and one USMC Engineer Equipment Operator received minor wounds.

7. Pioneer Road Construction Hill 52 (AT 788552) to THUONG DUC (ZC145532)

a. Prior to commencing construction on the pioneer road from Hill 52 (AT 788552) to THUONG DUC (AC 145532), extensive visual reconnaissance flights were made over the intended path of the road to determine; possible fill sites, bridges to be repaired or by-passed, estimates of the work required and possible ambush sites. The required heavy equipment and materials for the task were staged on Hill 52 prior to commencing construction of the road.

b. At 040900H May 1969 beginning at Hill 52 (AT 788552), construction of the pioneer road to THUONG DUC commenced using one squad of engineers, heavy equipment operators, and engineer equipment consisting of; one EIMCO tractor with romo plow attachment, one TD-15 with dozer blade, one TD-15 with loader, one Adams-550 grader, one M-60 crane, and two M51 dump trucks. Security elements were posted to the front, rear, on both flanks, and were also manning the high ground along Route 4 overlooking possible ambush sites. An engineer mine sweep advanced ahead of the equipment to clear the intended route of possible mines. At 041030H located at (ZC 208554), the construction team came upon a destroyed bridge. The engineers constructed a by-pass using one 54 inch culvert 30 feet in length. After constructing

Enclosure (28)

a by-pass around the bridge the construction team continued west along Route 4 making repairs. At 041600H, located at (ZC 192558), the construction team came upon a second destroyed bridge. A by-pass was also constructed around this bridge using one 54 inch culvert and three 36 inch culverts, all 30 feet in length. The by-pass was completed at 041800H and the engineers and security set up defensive positions for the night. At 050600H engineers again commenced making repairs along Route 4, in a westerly direction. At 050630H the construction team came upon a third destroyed bridge located at (ZC 184556). A by-pass was constructed around this bridge using four 36 inch culverts 30 feet in length. At 050930H the by-pass was completed on the construction team continued west to THUONG DUC where at 051200H the pioneer road was completed and the eastern approach to the bridge repaired.

c. End results of this phase of the operation was a pioneer road capable of one way traffic, 6,000 meters in length.

d. One USMC Engineer non-battle casualty was sustained during this phase of the operation.

8. Road Sweep Operations

a. Road sweep teams in support of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS were located at Hill 10, Hill 55, Hill 37, Hill 65, Hill 52. The Hill 10 sweep team cleared the road from Hill 10 to (AT 952689). The Hill 55 sweep team cleared Route 1D North from Hill 55 to (AT 985630) and Route 1D and Route 4 south from Hill 55 to Hill 37. The Hill 37 sweep team cleared Route 4 from Hill 37 to Hill 65. The Hill 65 sweep team cleared Route 4 from Hill 65 west to (AT 835560). The Hill 52 sweep team cleared Route 4 from Hill 52 east to (AT 835560). In addition one other team on Hill 52 cleared Route 4 from Hill 52 to THUONG DUC while a pioneer road was being built along Route 4 to THUONG DUC.


Enclosure (28)

FIRE SUPPORT BASE DEMOLITION USAGE CHART

	40 lb shape charges	40 lb cratering charges	Bangalore Torpedos	Detona- tion Cord	Non- electric Blasting Caps	Time Fuse (ft)	C-4
MUSTANG	0	0	7 cases	0	50 each	50	400lbs
BUCKSKIN	32 each	32 each	0	8 cans	175 each	100	400lbs
LONGHORN	65 each	45 each	0	12 cans	620 each	200	1,080lbs
STAGECOACH	60 each	42 each	0	17 cans	700 each	350	3,360lbs
BULLWHIP	48 each	40 each	0	25 cans	600 each	500	6,700lbs

TAB A to
Enclosure (28)

SHAPE CHARGE/CRATERING CHARGE SCHEMATIC



TAB B to
Enclosure (28)

RECAPITULATION OF SUPPLIES ISSUED 26 Mar-23 May 69CLASS I

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
MCI (cs)	13,530
Trioxane Tablets (cs)	98
Water (gal)	60,832
Sundry Packs (ea)	303
Long Range Patrol Rations (cs)	628
Fruit Juice (cs)	886
Fresh Fruit (cs)	137
Fruit Cocktail (cs)	103
Milk, Chocolate (cs)	162
Ice Cream (cs)	75
Bread (cs)	13
Catsup (cs)	14
Hot Sauce (cs)	16
Onions (cs)	12
Meat Sauce (cs)	1

CLASS II

Utility Jackets (sml)	141
Utility Jackets (med)	525
Utility Trousers (sml)	1,439
Utility Trousers (med)	862
Boots, (all sizes) (pr)	271
Socks, Woll (all sizes) (pr)	1,061
Undershirt (ea)	986
Drawers (ea)	62
Shirt, Wool (ea)	803
Jacket, Field (ea)	16
Gloves, Hand, Tropical (pr)	405
Rainsuit (ea)	38
Towels (ea)	506
Body Armor, Upper Torso (ea)	116
Helmets, Complete (ea)	20
Liner, Helmet (ea)	18
Cover, Camouflage, Helmet (ea)	5
Sweat Band f/Helmet (ea)	23
Poncho (ea)	299
Liner, Poncho (ea)	123
Mattress, Pneumatic (ea)	175
Mosquito Net (ea)	20
Shelter Half (ea)	10
Gas Mask (med) (ea)	70
Filters, Gas Mask (set)	101
Lense, Gas Mask (pr)	12
Haversack (ea)	43

Enclosure (29)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Knapsack (ea)	1
WP Bag (ea)	2
Packboard (ea)	44
Canteens (ea)	221
Cover, Canteen (ea)	141
Belt, Cartridge (ea)	15
Pouch, Grenade (ea)	84
Pouch, First Aid (ea)	14
Bag, Lister (ea)	2
Bag, Water, Plastic 2½ gal (ea)	15
Bayonet w/scabard (ea)	25
K-bar w/scabard (ea)	12
Machete (ea)	17
Axe (ea)	21
Entrenching Tool w/carrier (ea)	58
Battery, BA-30 (bxs)	122
Battery, BA-200 (ea)	10
Battery, BA-386 (bxs)	153
Battery, BA-399 (ea)	921
Battery, BA-505 (ea)	1,501
Battery, BA-1100 (ea)	88
Antenna Base (ea)	20
Whip Antenna w/base (ea)	17
Tape Antenna w/base (ea)	18
Handset H-189 (ea)	59
Flashlight (ea)	111
Signal, Light Marker Distress (ea)	11
Compass (ea)	29
Note Pads (ea)	314
Pens (bxs)	4
Grease Pencil (bxs)	2
Watch, Wrist (ea)	8
Repellant, Insect (btl)	2,599
Foot Powder (cans)	633
Salt Tablets (bxs)	55
Hydrogen Peroxide (btl)	5
Halizone Tablet (btl)	656
Morphine Syringes (ea)	8
Malaria Tablets (btl)	7
Battle Dressing (sm) (bx)	28
Battle Dressing (lrg) (bx)	10
M-16 Magazines (ea)	53
M-16 Cleaning Rods (ea)	196
M-16 Bore Brushes (ea)	510
M-16 Cleaning Patches (bxs)	46
M-14 Rifle Stock (ea)	3
M-14 Combination Tool (ea)	1
M-14 Cleaning Rods (ea)	32
M-14 Bore Brushes (ea)	22
M-14 Chamber Brushes (ea)	6
M-14 Cleaning Patches (bxs)	2
M-60 Gun Wrench	17

Enclosure (29)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
M-60 Chamber Brushes (ea)	9
Cal .45 Holster (ea)	20
Cal .45 Ammo Pouch (ea)	14
Cal .45 Bore Brushes (ea)	8
M-79 Stock (ea)	3
M-79 Bore Brushes (ea)	97
M-79 Firing Pin (ea)	1
60mm Firing Pin w/Spring (ea)	3
60mm Cleaning Rods (ea)	3
60mm Cleaning Brushes (ea)	3
Cleaning Solvent (cans)	787
L.S.A. (btl)	422

CLASS III

Mogas (gal)	3,365
Diesel (gal)	2,305
O.E. 30wt (gal)	184

CLASS IV

Sand Bags (ea)	35,500
Engineer Stakes (all Sizes) (ea)	1,388
Concertina (sleeves)	7
Barb Wire (rolls)	10
LZ Matting (section)	90

CLASS V

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
A011	Ctg 00 Buckshot (rds)	20
A071	Ctg 5.56mm Ball (rds)	110,860
A072	Ctg 5.56mm Tracer (rds)	27,920
A127	Ctg 7.62mm Linked (rds)	45,800
A130	Ctg 7.62mm Ball (rds)	4,200
A136	Ctg 7.62mm Match (rds)	1,400
A140	Ctg 7.62mm Tracer (rds)	960
A218	Ctg Cal .30 Linked (rds)	2,000
A475	Ctg Cal .45 Ball (rds)	3,850
A520	Ctg Cal .50 Linked (rds)	7,700
A574	Ctg Cal .50 Spotter (rds)	416
B535	Ctg 40mm WSP (rds)	362
B536	Ctg 40mm WSC (rds)	288
B534	Ctg 40mm HE-MP (rds)	115
B543	Ctg 40mm HE (rds)	3,732
UNK	Ctg 40mm CS (rds)	272
B610	Launcher Chemical Agent CS (ea)	10
B626	Ctg 60mm HE (rds)	4,946
B627	Ctg 60mm WP (rds)	287

Enclosure (29)

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
B530	Ctg 60mm Illum (rds)	1,200
G226	Ctg 81mm Illum (rds)	1,076
G256	Ctg 81mm HE (rds)	6,843
G276	Ctg 81mm WP (rds)	674
G650	Ctg 106mm HE (rds)	36
G651	Ctg 106mm HEP-T (rds)	116
G660	Ctg 106mm Beehive (rds)	74
G890	Gren Hd Frag M26 (ea)	2,899
G895	Gren Hd Illum (ea)	496
G900	Gren Hd Incendary (ea)	89
G935	Gren Hd Smk WP (ea)	22
G940	Gren Hd Smk Green (ea)	272
G945	Gren Hd Smk Yellow (ea)	1,590
G950	Gren Hd Smk Red	208
G963	Gren Hd CS (ea)	262
H555	Rocket 66mm LAAW (rds)	181
H600	Rocket 3.5 inch HE (rds)	33
K143	Mine AP M18A1 (ea)	370
K763	Chemical Agent Crystal CS (lbs)	153
L307	Sig Grnd Illum RSC (ea)	36
L311	Sig Grnd Illum RSP (ea)	165
L312	Sig Grnd Illum WSP (ea)	944
L314	Sig Grnd Illum GSC (ea)	201
L316	Sig Grnd Illum WSC (ea)	460
L324	Sig Grnd Illum GSP (ea)	93
L493	Sig Grnd Illum Trip Flare (ea)	1,810
M023	Demo Expl C-4 (lbs)	3,922
M026	Bangalore Torpedo (ea)	2,960
M039	Charge Cratering 40lb (ea)	68
M130	Cap Blasting Electric (ea)	156
M131	Cap Blasting Non-elec (ea)	3,765
M420	Charge Shaped 151b (ea)	60
M421	Charge Shaped 401b (ea)	18
M456	Detonating Cord (ft)	7,100
M670	Time Fuze (ft)	9,650
M766	Igniter Fuze M60 (ea)	1,218
UNK	Aircraft Flare (ea)	10

Enclosure (29)

DAILY HELICOPTER ACTIVITY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>POUNDS LIFTED</u>	<u>NO OF LIFTS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>POUNDS REMAINING</u>	<u>LIFTS REMAINING</u>
26Mar69	45,243	24	28	0	0
27Mar69	7,639	5	1	0	0
28Mar69	19,216	10	13	0	0
29Mar69	15,372	8	9	0	0
30Mar69	16,247	9	3	0	0
31Mar69	126,972	33	1,400	0	0
1Apr69	75,332	28	28	39,744	23
2Apr69	99,751	43	49	0	0
3Apr69	93,725	39	179	0	0
4Apr69	64,995	37	49	0	0
5Apr69	132,619	49	30	0	0
6Apr69	200,605	54	59	0	0
7Apr69	192,666	68	172	0	0
8Apr69	157,222	44	37	0	0
9Apr69	149,138	42	66	0	0
10Apr69	123,217	44	88	0	0
11Apr69	168,646	36	35	0	0
12Apr69	70,383	40	89	152,000	44
13Apr69	104,562	42	94	34,650	13
14Apr69	101,773	39	1180	0	0
15Apr69	63,595	31	77	42,000	23
16Apr69	8,935	6	0	133,622	45
17Apr69	160,714	62	103	0	0
18Apr69	102,150	51	34	32,000	7
19Apr69	39,117	23	37	162,481	45
20Apr69	167,701	53	137	30,000	22
21Apr69	25,638	11	171	67,000	33
22Apr69	239,222	93	150	23,000	10
23Apr69	144,360	52	58	0	0
24Apr69	60,980	31	41	0	0
25Apr69	94,506	31	30	24,000	10
26Apr69	52,008	28	104	0	0
27Apr69	104,696	38	36	0	0
28Apr69	74,640	25	60	0	0
29Apr69	81,675	37	8	8,400	6
30Apr69	60,095	26	31	42,000	15
1May69	62,765	27	38	0	0
2May69	86,577	22	30	28,000	4
3May69	46,200	10	44	0	0
4May69	79,848	30	15	0	0
5May69	142,511	46	29	0	0
6May69	63,601	20	17	0	0
7May69	104,680	39	29	3,600	2
8May69	81,000	22	15	0	0
9May69	16,700	7	10	72,600	19
10May69	107,200	32	26	5,500	1

Enclosure (30)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>POUNDS LIFTED</u>	<u>NO OF LIFTS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>POUNDS REMAINING</u>	<u>IN TS REMAINING</u>
11May69	57,100	21	20	41,000	6
12May69	75,200	24	32	0	0
13May69	59,500	21	23	0	0
14May69	82,700	21	14	0	0
15May69	53,000	14	24	0	0
16May69	59,700	24	30	0	0
17May69	42,100	18	16	0	0
18May69	48,610	22	10	0	0
19May69	60,000	18	42	0	0
20May69	159,600	54	47	0	0
21May69	51,500	14	19	0	0
22May69	34,700	16	8	0	0
23May69	11,850	13	17	0	0
24May69	36,600	17	21	0	0
25May69	39,000	18	28	0	0
26May69	16,400	6	23	0	0
27May69	5,900	2	0	0	0
28May69	2,300	2	0	0	0
29May69	17,480	6	14	0	0
30May69	9,250	6	12	0	0
31May69	13,600	13	70	0	0
<u>TOTALS:</u>	<u>5,219,027</u>	<u>1,895</u>	<u>5,409</u>		

Enclosure (30)

OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS
DREAM SHEET


LINE#	UNIT	UNIT CALL SIGN	FREQ	COORD	POSITION	ELEV
1	K/3/7	RIO GRANDE KILO	43.20			
2	I/3/26	GREY REBEL INDIA	49.80			
3	K/3/26	GREY REBEL KILO	49.80			
4	L/3/26	GREY REBEL LIMA	49.80			
5	M/3/26	GREY REBEL MIKE	49.80	125650	RATTLESNAKE	785
	CP/3/26	GREY REBEL CP	49.80			
	C/1/13					
	W/1/13					
6	COMM	BEECHNUT RELAY	49.80	205704	BA NA	1167
7	B/1/7	QUIZ MASTER BRAVO	49.80	811547		
8	C/1/7	QUIZ MASTER CHARLIE	49.80	787553	HILL 52	52
9	D/1/7	QUIZ MASTER DELTA	49.80	808565		
10	E/2/7	CROCHET ECHO	43.20	833658		
11	F/2/7	CROCHET FOX	43.20	833658	BUCKSKIN	502
12	H/3/13	NIGHT COVER TEAM	43.20	795653	BUCKSKIN	502
13	G/2/7	CROCKET GOLF	43.20			
14	H/2/7	CROCKET HOTEL	43.20			
15	CP/2/7	CROCKET CP	43.20	795653		
16	I/3/7	RIO GRANDE INDIA	43.20			
17	M/3/7	RIO GRANDE MIKE	43.20			
18	L/3/7	RIO GRANDE LIMA	43.20			
19	CP/3/7	RIO GRANDE CP	43.20			
20						
21						

- NOTE: (1) Any question contact BEECHNUT 14 Frequency 43.00
 (2) If external load is dropped take following actions:
 (a) Contact CHARLIE PROVIDE (LZ COMMON) or BEECHNUT 14 (43.00)
 (b) Give coordinates of dropped load
 (c) Circle load or have escort circle load until recovery team arrives on scene
 (3) Air shackle code for OKLAHOMA HILLS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
I	B	A	D	W	H	I	S	K	E	Y
II	T	I	M	B	E	R	W	O	L	F
III	N	A	V	Y	P	I	L	O	T	S
IV	B	L	A	C	K	S	H	I	R	T
V	L	A	D	Y	F	I	N	G	E	R
VI	R	O	U	N	D	T	A	B	L	E
VII	N	V	A	R	O	C	K	E	T	S
VIII	F	R	E	N	C	H	L	A	D	Y


ENCLOSURE (31)

LOGISTIC FLOW OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS




ENCLOSURE (32)

LSA LAYOUT FOR OPERATION OKLAHOMA HILLS



ENCLOSURE (33)

INTERIOR SET UP - LOC BUNKER LSA
FSB MUIR



ENCLOSURE (34)

PSYOP CHRONOLOGY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LEAFLET AIR DROP</u>	<u>LEAFLET HAND DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>HOURS OF AERIAL BROADCASTING</u>	<u>HOURS OF GROUND BROADCASTING</u>
29Mar69	112,000	0	:20	2:00
30Mar69	102,000	0	0	0
1Apr69	805,000	200	0	0
2Apr69	0	250	0	2:00
3Apr69	448,000	200	0	0
4Apr69	562,000	300	0	2:00
5Apr69	0	250	0	2:30
6Apr69	173,000	0	0	2:30
7Apr69	316,000	300	:35	0
8Apr69	20,000	0	0	0
9Apr69	0	200	0	0
10Apr69	336,000	250	:10	3:00
11Apr69	160,000	400	:30	3:00
12Apr69	120,000	200	:15	0
13Apr69	0	200	0	0
14Apr69	233,000	200	:45	0
15Apr69	60,000	0	:45	0
16Apr69	0	0	0	0
17Apr69	68,000	200	:20	2:00
18Apr69	0	0	0	1:30
19Apr69	135,000	300	0	2:00
20Apr69	205,000	400	:30	1:30
21Apr69	54,000	200	0	1:00
22Apr69	60,000	0	0	0
23Apr69	113,000	0	:30	2:30
24Apr69	42,000	300	:40	2:00
25Apr69	0	250	:30	2:00
26Apr69	126,000	0	0	2:00
27Apr69	283,000	200	:20	0
28Apr69	426,000	300	0	1:30
29Apr69	268,000	0	:30	0
30Apr69	0	0	:25	0
1May69	218,000	1,200	1:20	0
2May69	234,000	900	:25	0
3May69	220,000	1,400	:15	2:00
4May69	0	600	0	1:00
5May69	318,000	0	0	0
6May69	108,000	1,000	:10	1:00
7May69	150,000	800	:25	0
8May69	366,000	1,100	:10	0
9May69	590,000	1,600	:30	0
10May69	270,000	1,700	0	1:00
11May69	94,000	1,200	0	4:00
12May69	124,000	2,200	:10	1:30

Enclosure (35)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LEAFLET AIR DROP</u>	<u>LEAFLET HAND DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>HOURS OF AERIAL BROADCASTING</u>	<u>HOURS OF GROUND BROADCASTING</u>
13May69	342,000	2,700	1:05	2:30
14May69	412,000	1,400	0	0
15May69	120,000	1,600	:10	0
16May69	116,000	2,400	0	1:30
17May69	106,000	1,200	:30	2:30
18May69	164,000	3,100	:10	0
19May69	0	1,400	0	0
20May69	160,000	1,700	0	0
21May69	148,000	900	0	0
22May69	60,000	1,200	0	0
23May69	231,000	600	0	0
24May69	177,000	1,700	0	0
25May69	54,000	2,700	:50	0
26May69	0	1,400	0	2:30
27May69	150,000	2,800	0	2:30
28May69	312,000	1,800	:10	0
29May69	0	2,100	0	0
30May69	108,000	2,600	:10	0
31May69	178,000	2,900	0	0
TOTAL:	11,505,000	54,000	13:00	57:00

Enclosure (35)

PSYOP THEMES USEDLEAFLET THEME

SVN Rewards

Affection Has No Frontier

Rally to the Just Cause

Cooperation of Civilian Helped

Rewards Checklist

Rally to the Just Cause

Chieu Hoi Surrender

Rally or Surrender and Live to See
Your Family

Attention Citizens of Cua Valley

Health and Sanitation

VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians

Don't be Deceived by Your Leaders

Good Solution

Death or Prosperity with the GVN

Report VC Activities

Why Die of Malaria

Support the "Tim Sung Gier"

Rally or Surrender and Live to See
your FamilyThe GVN Welcomes Returnees from Your
Ranks

Don't Die Needlessly

Safe Conduct Pass

Doctor and Medicine Shortage

Rally to the GVN

Don't Handle Ordnance

LEAFLET THEME

Allied Jets Bring Death

VC Defeat is Certain

Report VC Activities

Many Nations Help the RVN

Death Awaits You

Report VC Activities

VC Mines Kill and Mutilate Civilians

Democracy Has Come

Denounce VCI

Rally to the GVN

Safe Conduct Pass

What Will be Your Fate if Wounded
in Battle

Rally Instructions

Your Leaders Lied

Choose Life or Death

You May never Get Home

Safe Conduct Pass

Rally to End Hardships

You May Never Get Home

The GVN Will Always Let You Rally

The People Don't Want Liberation

Your Leaders Lied

Protect What is Yours

Rocket Rewards

Enclosure (36)

LEAFLET THEME

Do You Know the Truth

Report VC/NVA Activities

Communist Shelling

The People Condemn The Communist

Your Existence is Denied

If You Continue to Fight You Will Certainly Die

Do You Want to be Buried in a Unmarked Grave

NVA Chieu Hoi

The Communist Split

Allied Jets Bring Death

The People Condemn the Communist

Enclosure (36)

MEDICAL SUPPLIES USED

<u>STOCK #</u>	<u>DISCRIPTION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>U/I</u>
6505-			
059-9017	Librium	1	BT
074-4704	Lomotil	222	BT
237-4868	Desenax Sol	12	BT
299-8183	Benzakonium Chloride 2cc	792	BT
890-1657	Kaopectate, Dehydrated	22	BT
926-9033	Dapsone Tabs.	13	BT
890-1764	Plasma	74	PG
116-1890	Dextan Inj.	12	PG
543-4048	Water for Injection 25's	38	EX
160-7110	Procaine Penicillin	403	BT
515-1584	Foot Powder	1042	CN
656-1612	Potassium Penicillin V K	83	BT
890-1420	Ornade	14	BT
660-1601	Robaxin Tabs.	9	BT
129-5518	Morphine 5's	38	PG
598-6116	Lidocaine 1%	8	BT
558-1289	Gelusil Tabs.	21	EX
153-8480	Hydrogen Peroxide	104	BT
150-1990	Zinc Oxide Oint	12	TU
100-9985	Asprin 100's	61	BT
153-8750	Asprin 1000's	4	BT
725-6992	Darvon 500's	6	BT
660-1720	Darvon 100's	23	BT
753-5043	Malaria Tabs 500's	44	BT
153-8818	Tetracaine Oint.	185	TU
689-5528	Hydrocotisone Cream	180	TU
656-1466	Calamine Lotion	112	BT
286-7302	Tetracycline Tabs.	77	BT
261-7257	Bensoin Tint.	8	CN
159-6625	Bacitracin Oint 12's	36	EX
106-0875	Ammonia Inhalant 10's	4	PG
114-9885	Codeine 32mg 100's	1.22	BT
116-1740	Phisohex Soap 5oz	15	BT
116-1750	Phisohex Soap Gal	6	BT
116-8350	Benadryl 250's	18	BT
128-5705	Thimersol Tinc	13	BT
130-1960	Furacin Oint	2	JR
141-1900	Surgical Soap	48	CK
146-4425	Gantrisin Tabs.	1	BT
147-1720	Tetracaine Opth Oint 12's	4	PG
149-8705	Benzakolium CL Sol	6	BT
153-8379	Eugenol	2	BT
153-8651	Sodium Chloride Inj 6's	6	EX
299-8095	Alcohol 5gal	1 1/5	CN
299-8276	Oxytetracycline Tabs.	14	BT
299-8279	Gamma Benzene Cream	47	TU
299-8615	Ringers Lactate Inj 6's	8	EX
299-8740	Bacitracin-Neomycin Oint.	33	TU

Continued (37)

STOCK #	DISCRIPTION	QUANTITY	U/I
399-9678	Kaopectate Cal	1 1/2	BT
550-8464	Meproamate 500's	1	BT
597-5843	Thorazine Inj 6's	4	EX
598-8561	Piperazine Citrate	9	BT
656-1347	Compazine Caps 15mg	7	BT
656-1610	Compazine Inj 6's	6	EX
662-9790	Erythromycin Tabs.	19	BT
664-4814	Desenex Oint	85	TU
664-7116	Pen G Inj	16	BT
687-4482	E.T.H.	37	BT
687-7901	Zactirin Tabs.	3 1/2	BT
687-8205	Cepacol Loz	8	EX
721-9121	Donnatol Tabs	3	BT
721-9383	Vitamins	30	BT
753-9615	Actified Tabs	6	BT
754-2436	Cortisporin Ear Drops	17	PG
754-2828	Salt Tabs	98	BT
770-8343	Ampicillin Caps	1	BT
782-6510	Griseofulvin Tabs	3	BT
784-4976	Darvon CPD Caps 32mg	13	BT
817-0360	Timeral	1	BT
890-1208	Combid Spansules	1	BT
890-1658	Tetralac	2	BT
890-1913	Polymagna Tabs	2	BT
890-2012	Novahistine	1	BT
912-2404	Lincocin	2	BT
926-2095	Hydrocortisone Oint	168	TU
926-2241	Tinactin Sol	65	BT
961-5504	Mycolog Cream	36	TU
967-8735	Darvon CPD 65mg	15	BT
985-7110	Synalor Cream	36	TU
6510			
597-7468	Bandaid 18's	36	EX
597-7469	Bandaid 100's	68	EX
201-1755	Triangular Bandage	152	EX
203-8448	4x4 Gauze	55	PG
203-5000	Tape 3"	119	EX
203-5500	Tape 12" assorted	18	EX
201-7435	Battle Dressing Sm	1039	EX
201-7430	Battle Dressing Med	161	EX
201-7425	Battle Dressing Lg	6	EX
200-2200	Ace Bandage 3" 12's	59 1/2	PG
200-2185	Ace Bandage 2" 12's	10	PG
200-2400	Ace Bandage 4" 12's	24	PG
202-0800	Vaseline Gauze	3	EX
559-3221	2x2 Gauze	31	EX
200-7015	Tubular Gauze	1	EX
200-6206	Roller Gauze 3"	1	EX
200-6204	Roller Gauze 2"	6	EX
200-5000	Roller Gauze 3"	5	EX
200-4000	Roller Gauze 2"	10	EX

Enclosure (57)

DECLASSIFIED

<u>STOCK #</u>	<u>DISCRIPT</u>	<u>QUANT</u>	<u>U/I</u>
200-3185	Bandage Gauze 3"	115	EA
203-6010	Moleskin	5	RL
553-0050	Iodoform Gauze	5	BT
582-7992	Kerlex	24	BX
781-9850	Furacin Gauze	8	JR
913-5874	Steri-Strips	1	BX
6515-			
889-7448	Cutter IV Sets	91	SE
203-8250	Cotton Tip Applicators	77	PG
383-0565	Tourniquet	14	EA
660-0011	Blade Surgical #10 6's	4	PG
660-0010	Blade Surgical #11 6's	23	PG
300-2910	Airway	5	EA
324-5500	Tongue Depressors	2	BX
374-2220	Stethoscope	2	EA
550-7199	Otoscope	2	SE
754-0406	5cc Syringes 100's	8	BX
890-1540	2cc Syringes 100's	8	BX
754-2835	Needles #22	2	BX
754-2836	Needles #20	1	BX
754-2838	Needles #21	6	BX
763-9526	Angiocath 50's	1	BX
793-2000	Thermometer	68	EA
6530-			
406-0150	Bottle Screwcap 2oz	1	BX
406-0180	Bottle Screwcap 4oz	1 1/2	BX
889-9028	Bottle Plastic 72's	5	PG
783-7510	Litter Nylon Poleless	44	EA
6545-			
927-4960	Unit One Complete	13	EA

Enclosure (37)

DECLASSIFIED

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. INTELLIGENCE

a. ITEM: Decentralization of ITT effort by placing one sub-team with each battalion command group.

DISCUSSION: The wide area deployment of the rifle companies during the operation precluded effective support by ITT sub-teams due to transportation requirements. As an alternative solution, a battalion's sub-team was placed with the rifle company determined most likely to need ITT support. The detainees captured by the unsupported rifle companies then had to be forwarded to the Regimental Collection Point for interrogation thus creating a bottleneck to enable tactical exploitation.

RECOMMENDATION: The problem can be alleviated by placing the sub-team commander with the battalion command group as ITT liaison. The sub-team commander is then readily available to advise the supported battalion commander on ITT procedures as well as liaison with the ITT commander located at Regimental Collection Point. The remaining personnel of the sub-team remain at the Regimental Collection Point both to assist in the detailed interrogations and to be formed into task organized "Go Teams" capable of being rapidly helilifted to the rifle companies on an as needed basis from the Regimental CP.

b. ITEM: Proper search techniques.

DISCUSSION: During the early phases of the operation, it became apparent that rifle company personnel, particularly those people in the junior enlisted ranks, lacked a basic understanding of classical enemy caching techniques. Such techniques as false walls, ceilings, and floors in bunkers, as well as concealed entrances to caves were repeatedly employed by the enemy and unfortunately, many went undetected. Many of the items of intelligence value such as documents, rank insignia, etc. were inadvertently retained by the troops as souvenirs.

RECOMMENDATION: That Battalion S-2 sections conduct classes on enemy cache techniques and search procedures prior to deployment of forces. Additionally, the intelligence sections should conduct repeated instruction in the importance of reporting each item uncovered when searching enemy camps and caches, no matter how innocuous. This instruction must commence during the 5-day indoctrination period held by each battalion for newly arrived personnel and continue periodically thereafter.

2. OPERATIONS

a. ITEM: Utilization of trail networks.

DISCUSSION: Early in the operation there was some reluctance on the part of unit commanders to take advantage of the trail network which criss-crossed the jungle terrain. There is inherent danger in moving along unfamiliar trails, particularly if observation is limited and the admonitions

Enclosure (38)

against such movement are understandable. However, experience on Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS indicated that cross country movement was almost impossible and tactically ineffective. The extremely rough terrain, innumerable deep ravines and heavy vegetation make cross country movement slow and debilitating. At the same time the enemy used the trail network exclusively and was able to move quickly and with little effort. Almost all contact with the enemy occurred along the trail network and all base camp facilities were discovered adjacent to existing trails.

RECOMMENDATION: In future operations conducted in heavy jungle terrain maximum effort should be made to seek out the existing trail network and exploit them in order to increase the possibility of finding the enemy and/or his base camp facilities.

b. ITEM: Time Space Factors in Jungle Canopy

DISCUSSION: Experience on Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS validated the fact that movement in the terrain such as encountered in the AO is painfully slow. It was not unusual for units on the move to cover less than 500 meters during a daylight move.

RECOMMENDATION: Commanders and staff officers must be made aware of the effect heavy jungle terrain has on space time factors and this fact must be taken into consideration during the planning of tactical evolutions.

c. ITEM: Land Navigation in Mountainous Terrain.

DISCUSSION: Experience gained during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS indicated that unit commanders found it difficult to remain oriented while operating for extended periods in the dense jungle highlands. The terrain in western CHARLIE RIDGE is extremely rugged and there are countless fingers and ravines which are not depicted on the maps of the area. Unit leaders had a tendency to mistake every prominent ravine for one depicted on the map and consequently there were incidents when platoons and companies were disoriented. This situation poses serious problems when use is made of supporting arms. Control of airstrikes from the ground was virtually impossible. On occasion ground commanders were able to mark their position with smoke and receive an accurate position fix from aerial observers overhead. Calling for artillery illumination over a known point was another method used with success to check units locations.

RECOMMENDATION: That prior to operations in mountainous terrain such as encountered on Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS that unit commanders be advised of land navigation difficulties in the jungle and methods of fixing location be disseminated for information.

3. AIR

a. ITEM: Fire Support Base LZ's

DISCUSSION: In working with the fire support base concept, it is necessary to provide for the increased resupply requirements which must be planned for well in advance of construction operations. Experience has shown

Enclosure (38)

that, where possible, there should be two landing zones, one for external cargo handling and one for internal cargo and passenger operations so that external cargo will not obstruct the zone to landing aircraft. On one occasion a CH53 had to shutdown for mechanical difficulties in the landing zone at a fire support base which caused all helicopter support operations at that position to be cancelled for twenty-four hours.

RECOMMENDATION: That if space permits, provide two landing zones where aircraft can set down when constructing the fire support base.

b. ITEM: Danger of debris to helicopters

DISCUSSION: As in other operations, the state of police at the fire support base needed constant attention. FSB commanders must consider that resupply helicopters generate hurricane force winds and in order to prevent aircraft damage and/or personnel injury, debris must be disposed of properly and promptly.

RECOMMENDATION: It is not satisfactory to have merely a trash pit. Trash must be burned or buried to prevent flying missile danger.

c. ITEM: Air/logistic liaison in combined USMC/ARVN operations

DISCUSSION: Because Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS was a combined effort with ARVN participation, a number of considerations had to be accounted for to effect a smooth effort. Liaison was the first and foremost item which had to be considered. With the air effort this liaison was effected through three channels; FSCC liaison, the logistic liaison, and the US Army advisors. Since there was no one person who was responsible for this task, there were some problem areas. It was found that the best means of effectively providing the air support necessary was to keep in personal contact with the US Army advisors and the ARVN S-3. This was especially true for troop lifts and medevacs. Normal ARVN resupply was handled adequately through the LOC utilizing the ARVN communication net and HST communications net. Because of the more than adequate handling capability at the LSA it developed that all ARVN resupply could be handled from the LSA rather than from their rear areas. In order to prevent undue loss of staged cargo and also to insure that cargo weights were accurately recorded, it was necessary to have Marine HST personnel supervise cargo staging. When it was necessary to move cargo from the ARVN rear area or to move their artillery, Marine HST personnel were transported to those locations to supervise operations. Throughout the operation, Marine HST personnel were attached to the ARVN in the field units so that adequate air to ground communications could be set up and maintained. This permitted the LSA to notify the unit on inbound loads.

RECOMMENDATION: That on future combined operations, specific air liaison personnel be assigned to help coordinate air support. Further that all ARVN logistic support be conducted from a Marine LSA where possible and that Marine HST personnel be programmed to support ARVN operations on the same basis as their support of Marine units.

Enclosure (38)

d. ITEM: Handling retrograde material.

DISCUSSION: One area of helicopter supported operations which has not received sufficient attention is the problem of retrograding cargo nets, cables, slings, and items such as water cans. When operating from a fixed combat base there is no particular problem because the daily resupply can pick up the previous day equipment. However, when companies are on the move and especially in the canopy, a very definite problem exists. It is not considered a practical solution to destroy cargo nets as a matter of course due to the expense and limited supply. The wire cables which are used to effect resupply in the canopy are costly in that they are locally manufactured and therefore in limited supply. The weight and bulk of the nets preclude the maneuvering companies from transporting them by man pack during tactical operations. If retrograde is to be effected the day following resupply, the company is detained in its position until a helicopter can effect the retrograde.

RECOMMENDATION: An immediate retrograde of the nets and slings can be effected if the company receiving the resupply is standing by to immediately empty the nets and in the case of extremely long pendants one side of the net be unhooked and the resupply spilled out as the helicopter lifts out of the zone. To effect this technique, it is necessary to thoroughly indoctrinate ground and wing personnel as to the merits of immediate retrograde and the savings in terms of dollars and unit flexibility.

e. ITEM: Programmed use of aircraft

DISCUSSION: On a number of occasions during the operation, a unit which was receiving resupply by helicopter would attempt to divert the aircraft to another task such as the transporting of passengers to areas other than the LSA. This problem was prevalent in outlying areas where helicopters are less frequently available for a smaller unit employment. However, when helicopters which are tasked with the resupply mission are diverted to other tasks by the units in the field without prior knowledge of the LSA, crew time is used up and programmed aircraft utilization is inefficient. This could result in some units not being resupplied without aircraft assets being redistributed which in turn may jeopardize the accomplishment of the scheduled resupply/troop movement for the day. Additionally, there were occasions when the medevac package was requested to perform other than its assigned mission such as retrograding personal gear or extraction of personnel for administrative reasons. Lives are at stake, fast efficient handling of medevac helicopters without hinderance of diversion interfering with the accomplishment of this mission is a necessity.

RECOMMENDATION: Air requirements must be submitted daily through air and S-4 channels to insure that all requirements can be programmed to satisfy the using unit.

f. ITEM: Use of aerial observers to control close air support.

DISCUSSION: It was found that the extensive canopy and mountainous terrain in Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS frequently made it impossible for

Enclosure (38)

forward air controllers to adequately control air strikes.

RECOMMENDATION: Increased emphases be placed on the use of aerial observers to control close air support as well as artillery, and NGF. Additionally the AO's are the best source to provide ground units with detailed information in respect to their areas of operation.

g. **ITEM:** Helicopter Support Operations.

DISCUSSION: During Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS both platoons and companies operated for extended periods separated from their parent organizations. Under these conditions helicopter support planning was conducted concurrently at several echelons. Quite often the subordinate detached unit was unable for tactical reasons to respond to operations planned by higher echelon while higher echelon was unable to respond to requests from subordinate units. This situation was particularly manifest in helicopter resupply operations and quite often a company or platoon was unable or unprepared to receive resupply at the time and place requested by higher echelon. Conversely on occasion the subordinate unit was thwarted by higher echelon's inability to arrange for resupply at the time and place desired by the subordinate unit. The problem was one of coordination and communications. All echelons must insure that both senior and subordinate units are aware of helicopter support planning. This principle must be carried out down to the lowest echelon, ie, the Helicopter Support Team, as the most carefully planned evolution may go awry when the helicopters arrive over the operating area and are unable to communicate with the ground unit.

RECOMMENDATION: That close continual coordination be conducted at all levels of command down to and including the HST to insure widest dissemination of helicopter support plans.

h. **ITEM:** Pilots' Daily Sheet (Dream Sheet)

DISCUSSION: 1st Marine Division Order P4000.17A (SOP for LSA's) contains the format for the pilots' "Dream Sheet" as an enclosure. The "Dream Sheet" is prepared daily by the LSA and is used as a guide for pilots conducting operations within the area of operations. Information such as unit call signs, radio frequencies grid location and designation of each unit requiring resupply is readily available in tabular form for the pilot. One shortcoming on the "Dream Sheet" is the absence of elevation at each unit location. Without this information the pilot is forced to consult his map to determine the elevation of the units in the field. During the conduct of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS the form for the "Dream Sheet" was revised to include an additional column containing elevation at each unit location. (See enclosure (31)).

RECOMMENDATION: That Division Order P4000.17A be revised to include the elevation information on the standard pilots' "Dream Sheet".

i. **ITEM:** The Commando Vault Weapons System.

Enclosure (38)

DISCUSSION: Based on the initial scheme of maneuver for Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS and the requirements for a series of LZ's throughout the AO to facilitate operations, plans were made to utilize the Commando Vault Weapons System to clear zones in the canopy. A detailed reconnaissance, both map and visual, was conducted to select appropriate targets. Based on Operation TAYLOR COMMON experience which indicated a rather large CEP an effort was made to select target areas on gently rounded hill tops in order to insure a useful LZ once cleared. Six targets were selected and two weapons were dropped on each target. The results were disappointing. Although map and visual reconnaissance indicated the targets to be relatively flat such was not the case and once the canopy was blown away the terrain was revealed as extremely rough and unsatisfactory. As a result none of the areas cleared by the weapon were used in the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Commando Vault Weapons System not be employed in mountainous jungle terrain unless a prior ground reconnaissance is conducted to identify suitable target sites.

4. ARTILLERY

a. ITEM: Mutual Support of Fire Support Bases.

DISCUSSION: When conducting operations throughout a large AO in mountainous terrain, consideration must be given to constructing a system of mutually supporting fire support bases. As a general rule FSB locations selected on Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS were positioned so that each base could provide close defensive fires for at least one adjacent base. In mountainous terrain covered with high canopy FSB's should be positioned within 70% maximum range of the 105mm Howitzers of adjacent bases.

RECOMMENDATION: That FSB's be positioned so that each base can provide close fire support for at least one adjacent FSB.

b. ITEM: Selection of FSB's in Mountainous Terrain.

DISCUSSION: When selecting a fire support base in mountainous terrain altitude of the position is of utmost importance. To provide for maximum range from the artillery weapons the position must be at an altitude high enough to prevent masking by adjacent mountains. At the same time helicopter capability and cloud cover must be taken into consideration. As artillery weapons and the large amount of ammunition they require are very heavy loads for the helicopters, the altitude of the fire support base must be low enough to enable the aircraft to operate effectively. Also, during a great deal of the time, the cloud cover in the mountains is such that the higher elevations are in the clouds and resupply is impossible.

RECOMMENDATION: Consideration must be given to FSB altitude to insure that the weapons will not be masked and that normal cloud cover will not prevent resupply of the proposed base.

c. ITEM: Effective use of Supporting Arms in Heavy Canopy.

DISCUSSION: When providing fire support to infantry units operating

Enclosure (38)

in areas with double triple canopy, light artillery weapons do not deliver optimum effectiveness with the normal fuze quick. To penetrate the heavy canopy, fuze delay, followed by fuze quick should be employed. In addition, for more effective penetration of heavy canopy, high angle fire should be utilized where possible with the above fuze action. High angle fire permits the projectile to pass through the canopy further before detonating, thus giving more effective height of burst.

RECOMMENDATION: The Fire Direction Officer determining the method of attack must evaluate the terrain and vegetation and attack the target utilizing high angle fire where possible with fuze delay followed by fuze quick.

5. LOGISTICS

a. ITEM: Use of 175mm Shell Casing as Water Container.

DISCUSSION: During Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS a tremendous amount of water was required by the individual Marine in the field. This occasioned a shortage of water containers and also made the retrograde of these water containers an added burden to the units in the field.

RECOMMENDATION: Empty 175mm shell casings make excellent water containers. They will hold 17 gallons of water, have a double locking rubber gasket top and can be dropped from the heights of 100 feet without bursting. Additionally, they do not require evacuation.

b. ITEM: Control of 782 Gear

DISCUSSION: The control of 782 gear becomes a problem in large multi-battalion operations. Due to the continuation of administrative procedures during combat operations personnel are rotated from the field for R&R, routine med-evacs and the standard combat med-evacs. In all these cases 782 gear may be left at the combat operating base, aboard the helicopter or deposited at 1st Medical Battalion or NSA Hospital in the case of bonafide emergency medevacs. In many cases the individual becomes separated from his gear through no fault of his own.

RECOMMENDATION: All units participating in an operation should assign one man to 1st Medical Battalion, one man to the NSA Hospital and assign one man at the LSA to monitor incoming flights. All loose 782 gear should be collected and stored in the units' supply point until the items are reclaimed or reissued. Additionally, when individuals are medevaced from the field every effort should be made to tag loose gear with the units designators.

c. ITEM: Orientation of Unit Representatives concerning LOC Operations.

DISCUSSION: Prior to the commencement of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS the Regimental S-4 conducted classes for all Battalion S-4 and Supply Officers concerning all phases of the LOC/LSA operations. These classes included instructions on staging diagrams, positioning of cargo, hook up

Enclosure (36)

RECOMMENDATION: That the present T/O for a Show Party Company (T/O M-1863) be scrutinized and reviewed with an eye to possibly changing the present T/O to better support helicopter operations in Vietnam.

6. COMMUNICATIONS

a. ITEM: Performance of the AN/PRC-25 Radio.

DISCUSSION: The AN/PRC-25 has been found to be a very dependable piece of communication equipment. It is extremely durable, which makes it much more reliable in field situations than other VHF radios. In addition to the PRC-25 constituting the backbone of our field communications, a small number of modified PRC-25's were used for automatic radio retransmission when trouble developed with the AN/MRC-110 radio jeep. This was done by means of the MK-456 retransmission cable and two PRC-25's, and could not have been accomplished with unmodified PRC-25's.

RECOMMENDATION: Since the PRC-25 is the most reliable of our radios, it is suggested that provisions be made for modification of a selective number to enable them to be used in automatic radio retransmission. This would greatly add to the flexibility of our present communications system when it is in the field.

b. ITEM: Helilift AN/MRC-110.

DISCUSSION: External sling lifts of the AN/MRC-110 jeep tend to damage antennae and radio mounts. Also, external lift requires stripping of the vehicle top and lowering the windshield. Every windshield was either broken or cracked when externally lifted.

RECOMMENDATION: When helicopter lift of an AN/MRC-110 is required, the vehicle should be loaded internally if at all possible. If externally loaded the windshield should be removed or boxed and special effort be made to protect delicate communication equipment.

c. ITEM: Overheating, RT-524 Transceiver.

DISCUSSION: When using the RT-524, difficulties were encountered in use of the retransmission mode. The operators and staff officers tend to keep the set keyed for long periods of time. The normal duty cycle (transmit time, as compared to receive time) is one minute transmit to nine minutes receive; i.e. a 1:9 ratio. Extensive transmission and busy net operation resulted in components growing excessively hot. And results in the loss of this means of communication.

RECOMMENDATION: As the RT-524 is prone to overheat, all steps possible should be taken to keep it cool and shaded, especially during hot periods.

d. ITEM: Retransmission Cable, MK-465.

DISCUSSION: The retransmission cable, MK-465, proved the most unvulnerable segment of the automatic retransmission equipment. The cables

Enclosure (38)

frequently overheated and had to be switched off the net to allow cooling. Also, they were quite fragile and had a propensity for developing short circuits.

RECOMMENDATION: The cable should be set in shade or kept covered. When it is necessary wet burlap may also be used to aid in cooling the cables.

e. ITEM: RC-292 Antenna.

DISCUSSION: The RC-292 was found to be the best means of communicating through the canopy. The RC-292 is also the most durable antenna and well resists high velocity winds. During one rain squall, 5 of 8 AS-2236 Log-Periodic antennas were blown over and damaged. Whereas all 8 of the RC-292's were undamaged.

RECOMMENDATION: For ground stations, all maneuvering units should carry an RC-292 for each net they are required to monitor.

f. ITEM: Utilization of HST Frequencies.

DISCUSSION: Experience gained during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS indicates that while the supporting aircraft have sufficient UHF frequency capability to operate during major operations this is not the case with ground units. The FM nets used by the ground units (HST's) to communicate with the aircraft (resupply helicopters) are restricted in number and during Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS became very congested. See paragraph 7.b. to the basic After Action Report for further discussion.

RECOMMENDATION: That during large multibattalion operations consideration be given to providing additional FM (VHF) frequencies to alleviate congestion problems on HST nets.

7. PSYOPS

a. ITEM: Use of aerial tape broadcast.

DISCUSSION: Due to altitude of the aircraft, the aerial tape broadcasts were virtually undistinguishable on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: That if a ground unit is operating in an area of proposed aerial broadcasts; then the broadcast aircraft should establish communication with the air-ground controllers. By this means the broadcast aircraft can determine the danger of receiving enemy fire, and the altitude of flight to maximize the broadcast effectiveness.

b. ITEM: Use of Leaflets in Dense Vegetation.

DISCUSSION: Triple canopied jungle presents a difficult obstacle to effective distribution of air delivered leaflets. The great majority of the leaflets never penetrate to the ground. However, since most enemy troops move along trail networks and the many open areas of the river and

Enclosure (38)

techniques, use and control of HST personnel and the physical layout of the LSA as well as an orientation tour of all supply dumps and proposed battalion supply areas. Additionally possible problem areas were discussed and requirements for working parties were allocated. This orientation prior to the actual operation assured an efficient and well coordinated resupply activity.

RECOMMENDATION: That prior to any operation employing an LSA, all unit S-4 and Supply Officers be thoroughly briefed on all aspects of LOC/LSA operations as outlined in DivO P4000.17A.

d. ITEM: Use of Separate Passenger Pad.

DISCUSSION: During Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS a separate passenger pad was employed for the movement of troops in and out of the field. By keeping passenger traffic away from resupply activities, confusion and congestion was kept to a minimum air traffic was also reduced in the immediate area of the LSA. By requiring aircraft to load passengers at LZ 490 (approximately 800 meters away from the LSA) the aircraft were then free to hook up loads at the LSA with a minimum amount of time spent at the LSA.

RECOMMENDATION: That future LSA operations make provisions for the use of a separate passenger pad located away from the LSA.

e. ITEM. The Helicopter Support Team in Vietnam.

DISCUSSION: By assigned mission, the Shore Party Company is required to provide a nucleus of command and control personnel required for the support of an RLT in landings over the beach or in helicopter landing zones in the amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore. Primarily oriented along engineer lines, the T/O of the average Shore Party Company calls for 51 enlisted in MOS 1381 and 8 enlisted in MOS 1371. The Company Commander and the Company Executive Officer are both required to be 1302 (Engineer Officer). This T/O was developed primarily to support beach operations with the helicopter mission assigned as a supplementary function. During operations in Vietnam, an average Shore Party Company has been fragmented down into as many as 20 separate Helicopter Support Teams to act as controllers in 20 LZ's all of which are in use at the same time. The Concept of Organization as stated in T/O number M-1863 requires the Shore Party Company to only maintain a capability to split into and form two helicopter support teams. Due to the nature of operations in Vietnam and specifically in operations such as OKLAHOMA HILLS it is considered that the existing Shore Party Company T/O needs revising with an eye towards modifying the present T/O to facilitate the forming of more HS Teams. Additionally, it is considered that a Marine aviator (helicopter pilot) would make an excellent Shore Party Company Commander when a company is used in support of helicopter operations. This would place in position of command a Marine Officer thoroughly familiar with helo operations and capabilities. The requirement of staffing Shore Party Companies with primarily engineer personnel should also receive close scrutiny as some personnel in OF 03 would prove most useful in the formation of small, mobile HS Teams attached to rifle companies or battalions.

Enclosure (38)

stream lines it is more efficient to drop the leaflets at these locations.

RECOMMENDATION: That the problem of distributing leaflets can be minimized by selecting river and stream valleys and major avenues of movement.

Enclosure (38)