TO WILLIAM



EMADQUARTERS

1st Batto Jaon, 7th Ma ins

nine # 13

1st Marine Mivision (Rein) INF
c/o FFO San Francisco, California
96602

5/SJI/sep 3000 6 April 1966

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology, March 1966

Encl: (1) Command Chronology, March 1966

Ref: (a) % MarDiv0 5750.1

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

Spir F. W. ST

1ST BN, 7TH MARINES

073-66

Copy# File#

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CONTIDENTIAL



PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

- Designation lst Battalion (Rein), 7th Marines
- Period Covered 010001H thru 312400H March 1966
- Commanding Officers, Executive and Special Staff Officers
 - 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

 - b. H&S Company
 - Сомра**пу** А
 - Company B
 - Company Colon
 - Company D
 - 8•
 - garat i babba
 - S-3

 - Communications Officer

- 1. Supply Officer
- Value (Kor Motor Transport Officer
- O. Medical Officer Capt C. R. BLEDSO

- Civil Affairs Officer
- Attachments
 - Det, Battery G, 3dBn, 11thMar

LtCol James P. KELLY

Capt G. A. BARTLETT (01 Mandisto 27 March) Capt N. F. MITCHELL (28 March to 31 March)

Cot G. MARINO

THE TOTAL PROPERTY OF THE PROP

lstle B. A. GOODWYN

Capt D. D. BROUKS

QWO P. F. COLEMAN .

GySgt J. McGOWAN · 1985年 - 1986年 - 1986年 - 1

Capt R. D. KING

Capt P. J. Failan

Capt N. F. hIICHELL

lstLt W. H. WHALEN.

1stLt R. M. ROBB

Lt D. H. TOWNES, USER

p. Chaplain USNR (Ol March to 08 March) Lt R. J. USACZA, USNR us is (09 arch to 31 March)



letLt R. D. FULCHER (Ol March to 03 March)

1 stlt R. J. MEYERS

(04 March to (31 March)

rnclosure (1)

CONFIDENCE ASS

- Det 1st Plt; Company C, 1st Engr Bn 1stLt E. M. Mc KERNAN
- Det, 1st Plt, Company B, Ist Tank Bn 1stLt C. D. LENON

a.		Y/C		
	OFF	<u>em</u>	OFF	ENL
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Supporting Documents

- Lab (1) Periodic Personnel Report 5-66
 - -b. Tab (2) Periodic Personnel Report 6-66
 - c. Tab (3) Weekly Position Overlay, 6 March 1966
 - d. Tab (4) Weekly Position Overlay, 13 March 1966
 - /e. Tab (5) Weekly Position Overlay, 20 March 1966
 - f. Tab (6) Weekly Position Overlay, 27 March 1966
- of. Tab (7) Daily Intelligence ISUMS with accompanying Patrol Reports and Patrol Overlays for the month of March 1966. #60-89.
 - h. Tab (8) Daily Situation Reports for the month of harch 1000 [Note: Tals constitute of forms" Open Summary". "Plans Summary" and related vi. Tab (9) After Action Report, Operation UTAH Centitled report

 - Tab (10) After Action Report, Operation Ind. Con duce)
 - /k. Tab (11) Special Report of Company B (21-25 March)

7. Maps Used

a. Viet Nam, 1:50,000, Series L701, Sheets 6756 I & IV, and 6757 II and III.

PARTIL: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH 1966

- 1. Parsonnel. There were no significant events during the month. Sec Tabs (1) and (2).
- 2. Administration. There were no significant events during the month. See Tabs (1) and (2).

a. Significant intelligence was obtained by the Battalion's patrols. See Tab (7) for the daily intelligence information tained and processed from the 372 patrols conducted by the Battalion.

Enclosure (1)



b. Weather for the Reporting Period

- (1) Maximum temperature: 93
 - (2) Minimum temperature: 71
 - (3) Mean temperature: 80
 - (4) Average humidity: 86%
 - (5) Total rainfall: 1.86"
 - (6) Total days of rainfall: 10
 - (7) Cloud cover: less than 20,000 ft. 41% of the month
 - (8) Surface wind
 - (a) Prevailing direction: SE
 - (b) Prevailing speed: 6-10 knots
 - (c) Mean speed: 8 knots
 - (d) Maximum speed: 15-20 knots

c. Terrain


- (1) Relief. Relief of the area is predominately characterized by flat/dry crop type of terrain interspersed with numerous brush wood covered knolls. The latter are the primary location for the small, scattered built-up areas.
- (2) Drainage. Drainage of the SONG TRA BONG River and its tributaries is in a northerly direction.
- (3) Vegetation. Vegetation throughout the area is dry orop agriculture, canefields, and rice paddies. Brushwood is found on dispersed knolls and hills. Rain forest type vegetation is lacking.
 - (4) Surface materials. The area contains three basic types of surface materials. Sand extends along the banks of the SONG TRA BONG River and beach area running in and from the SOUTH CHIMA SEA a distance of two to four miles. Marshy alluvial soil is found on the low ground throughout the area. Losse soil over laterite constitutes the comainder of the surface area.

4. Training

a. The Battalion did not conduct or publish a formal training schedulc. The Company Commanders betermine the type of training deemed necessary primarily through combat observations and critiques. The time available for training was limited by the aggressive patrolling and the operational commitments of the Battalion.

Enclosure (1)

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i	
(1)	Subjects Covered Man Hours
	Leadership 418
	Organized Athletics 738
	First Aid
	Field Sanitation and Hygiene 250
	History of Indo-China 90
	Communist Insurgency
	Viet Cong Tactics 20
	Cave and House Search Techniques
	Small Boats and River Crossing
2.	Booby Traps and Mines 2475 Francisco A. 1981 A. 1982 A
	Map and Compass 828
	M-10 and M-16 Plotting
	BC Scopensor and protein the Control of the Control of the Scopensor and protein the Control of the Scopensor and the Control of the Control of the Scopensor and the Control of the Contr
	->-
	3.5 Rocket Launcher 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
* .	M-72 LAW Hand and Rifle Grenades
	History and Regulations of 1st Bn, 7th Mar 15
	Scouting and Patrolling and Patrolli
· · · · · ·	FO Procedures
	Vietnamese Religious Instruction 70 70

- c. Each Company utilized firing ranges within their zones of action. Firing exercises were conducted with M-14, M-60, 3.5" RL, M-79, M-72, and .45 caliber pistol. Emphasis was placed on night firing of the individual weapons and stressed the importance of good marksmanship by the individual Marine.
- d. The 81mm Mortar Plateon conducted a total of 961 man-hours of gund drill, inspections and FO procedures.
- c. The 106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon conducted a total of 1640 manhours of gun drill, functioning, and fire suprost procedures. A total of 4200 man-hours were utilized for maintenance of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle, .50 caliber spotting rifles, and the M-274 (Mechanical Mule).

5. Special Operations

a. The Battalion conducted 372 patrols varying in size from first came to reinforced platoons. Ambush, security, search and destroy and civic action type patrols were conducted by the Battalion. The Battalion also maintained 620 Listening Posts tring March. See Tab. (7) for patrol routes and reports.



- (1) Operation TACITURN is a continuing company (rein) size operation on the NAM TRAM (TRUNG PHAN) Peninsula. The company occupies a combat base at BS 626992, and conducts patrolling from this base.
- (2) During the month VC activity decreased significantly. The company had 24 contacts with the VC. Four of these contacts were probes on the combat base. The remaining contacts resulted from aggressive patrol action by the company. As a result of these contacts six VC were killed, two VC were wounded, and five VC/VCS were paptured. Company D sustained only one WIA during the month on the Pauinsula.
- (3) The following is a chronological listing of the company s contacts with the VC which resulted in casualties or captives on either $\sigma oldsymbol{ ext{side}}_{oldsymbol{ ext{o}}} = \sigma oldsymbol{ ext{o}}_{oldsymbol{ ext{o}}} = \sigma oldsymbol{ ext{o}_{oldsymbol{ ext{o}}} = \sigma oldsymbol{ ext{o}_{$
 - (a) At 021100H Company D received 20 rounds of SA and two rounds of 60mm mortars from approximately 10 vc vic BS 635992. The Marines returned 650 rounds of SA, two rounds M-79, and five rounds of 90mm. The VC broke contact and withdrew. One Marine was wounded slightly by the 60mm mortars. Four VC were killed (confirmed) and three VCS were captured possessing VC propaganda.
 - (b) At 150900H, BS 659995, a UH-LE, in support of Company D, fired on six VC, one of which was armed. The UH-12 killed one VC who was dragged to cover by the surviving VC. There was no contact with the enemy by the patrol.
 - lit reolet Janobatti (c) At 160930H, BT 653003, Company D received approximately 150 rounds of SA fire from an estimated eight VC vic BT 654003. The Marines returned fire with 10 M-79 rounds and 500 SA rounds. The Marines observed one VC killed and two wounded. The bodies were dragged away as the VC broke contact and fled.
 - (d) At 211100H. BT 620010, Company D apprehended one VC.
 - identified by BINH SON Police Chief as an ARNN Desertor.

 (e) For additional information on Operation TACITURE;
 see Tab (8).
- c. Throughout the month there were 18 contacts with the VC made by the companies occupying the MLR. Nine of these contacts were probes along the MLR. The remaining contacts resulted from vigorous patrolling by the Battalion. The results of these contacts were one VC killed and one VC wounded. There were no Marine casualties during the month of the following is a chronological listing of the Battalion's contacts with the VC. which resulted in casualties or captives on either side on the MLP.
 - (1) At 181355H, a Company C patrol received fire from an estimated five VC with carbines from vic BS 614948. The Marines returned fire with 350 rounds of SA and five M-79 rounds. One VC dead was found during the search of the area.

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- (2) At 312200H, Company A observed four VC at BT 611016. A Patrol was despatched to investigate. The patrol observed one VC during their return at BT 610016. A Marine fired three rounds of SA and observed the VC fall. A search of the area revealed a blood trail and the Marines considered the VC wounded.
- (3) For additional information on contacts with the VC, see Tab (8).
- d. The Battalion CP defensive perimeter was probed eight times during the month. No confirmed casualties or captives on either side resulted in these probes.
- e. Company A conducted several patrols on the NAM TRAM (TRUNG PHAM)
 Peninsula during the month. The patrols had six contacts with the VC.
 The results of these contacts were 25 VC/VCS captured. The patrols sustained seven WIA's during the period. The following is a chronological listing of the patrols' contacts with the VC which resulted in casualties or captives on either side.
- (1) At 040030H, a platoon from Company A tripped two consecutive M-26 booby traps at BT 663033. Seven Marines were wounded as a result of the explosions.
- (2) At O81230H, Company A apprehended 25 VC/VCS who were delivered by the Junk Fleet. The Junk Fleet picked up the VC/VCS at BT 630050 in conjunction with Company A's patrol.
- (3). For additional information or contacts with the VC, see Tab

6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Special Warfare

- a. The Battalion has not used or encountered any nuclear or biologic l
- b. Chemical. This Battalion has made extensive use of colored smoke and white phosphorous grenades. They have been primarily used to mark helicopter landing sites. A secondary use has been to signal units for a particular type of action at the company level.
- 7. Command and Control. Command and Control was normal with no significant events occurring within the month.

8. Communications and Electronics

- a. No significant communications problems were experienced during the month.
- b. During tactical employment of fast reaction/exploitation type missions, the Battalion must be prepared to supply non-signic units with shackle, authentication and code word sheets to fast itate rapid integration of units.

Enclosure (1)





- c. Instruction was conducted for the Communications Platoen and Company radio personnel on preventive maintenance, authentication and CW training.
- 9. Close Combat. See Tab (8).

10. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination

- a. Battery G, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines remained in direct support of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The Battery provided on-call illumination and HE missions addition to H&I fires employed within the Battalion's TAOR.
- b. Continued progress was made in firing the Battalian's defensive concentrations.
- c. On 7 March, two 107mm Howters from Howter Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines were moved to the Company D Combat Base. Their mission is to reinforce Battery G and provide additional fire support on the Nam TRAM (TRUNG PHAN) Peninsula. The Fire Direction is decentralized so that Forward Observers need only get permission from the Battalion FSCC to fire missions.
- d. The 81mm Nortar Platoon had three sections attached to Companies B, C, and D respectively. The Platoon Headquerters and one section remained at the Battalion CP in general support. All sections continued providing on-call illumination and HE missions.

ll. Logistics


and the second

- a. The Battalion conducted normal logistical support to the companies and attachments.
- b. The nature of the terrain in the Battalion's area severely restrict the use of wheeled vehicles. Consequently, a large portion of the transportation support for the Battalion has come from Company A, 3d Amtrac Battalion. It has been requested that Engineers commence work on road surfacing to facilitate the use of wheeled vehicles.
- c. Support of routine activities, including the Company D Combat Base, remains normal. Class I support was normal with three hot meals furnished to companies each day, except during operations. Class II remained the same except for resupply of Motor Transport repair parts which continue to be a problem. A real deficiency exists in the M-274 (Mechanical Mule). The Battalion rates 30 M-274's, thirteen of which are currently on hand with only seven operational. This deficiency seriously limits the Battalion's flexibility in the field, particularily the amployment of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle. Class IV has continued to improve with the partial fulfillment of barbed wire, concerting and metal stake requirements. Class V support was adequate, except for non-availability of White Star Parachute signal flores. Five additional strongback kits were received for the construction of company galleys.

12. Air Defense

only. The sir defense measures within the Battalion are of a assive nature only. The sist of sandbagged fighting holes and bunsers both on the MLR and in the CP area.

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- p. The Battalion's air defense plan utilizes a lert plan and vehicle dispersion plan.

 c. The 2d LAAM Battalion provides retive air defense for the Bat-
- talion's TAOR

- a. 1st Buttalion, 7th Marines required five Med Evac hissions and four troop lift missions
- b. The Battalion continued to utilize AO's at every or ortunity especially on the NAM TRAM (TRUNG PHAN) Peninsula.
- c. Company B FAC controlled 21 CAS missions during Operation WIAH and Company C FAC controlled eight CAS missions during Operation INDIANA.
- d. Armed UH-1E helicopters during combat operations proved a valuable asset in providing suppressing fires for helicopters during resupply and Med Evac missions under intense anti-aircraft fire.

- a. General. The overall health of the Barbalion is excellent. There was a slight increase of short-term, self-limited gastrointestinal disorders; however, only a minor problem area exists. Varieu skin disorders, related to heat, excessive moisture, and unclean living conditions, continue to be the primary complaints during sick call.
 - b. Wacuation. Helicopter response for casualty evacuation was excellent.
- Problem Areas. The advent of extreme hot weather accentuates the danger of heat casualties. Unit Leaders and Corpsmen are required to insure the adequate intake of salt and some for all personnel.

 15. Chaplain

- a. Catholic and Protestant services were held in the Latt lion CP every Sunday. Services were also conducted at the Company Cats as frequently
- as possible.

 b. One residred dollars from the Chapel Fund was donated to the Catholic Refugeo Center & BINH SON.
 - c. Eight Red Cross cases were handled by the Chaplain during the month. The second of th

16. Civil Affairs

a. The civic action program has improved considerably. The Battalion Civil Affairs Team, assisted by the rifle companies, or rated in nine different hamlets with a total of 64 visits. Company A continued with its excollent program in HAI NINH and VINH AN. Company B is making progress in MY HUE (1), (2), and (3), and BINH YEN MOI (2). Company Cahad increased



t orbitte



activity in BINH YEN NOI (1), while Company D is making progress in the hostile hamlet of TAN HY. The combined efforts of all the teams provided treatment to 4,219 Vietnamese Mationals.

- b. Members of the Battalion continue to provide funds for the operation of three orphanage/refugee centers in BINH SON.
- C. A radio, provided by USOM, was donated to the Civic Center in HOA VAN (2) for the entertainment of the people.
- d. The Battalion continued to provide emergency treatment for civilians at the BAS and to insure hospitalization of serious cases. Several lieunamese have been referred to the USOM hospitals of QUANG NGAI, DA NANG, and SAIGON for major surgery.
- c. Food and clothing was provided for needy families within the Bat-talion TAOR.
- f. Eight Victnamese Health Workers continue to receive training by Battalion Hospital Corpsmen.

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Hq, AstEn, 7thMar
3rdMarDiv (Rein) FMF
160800 Mar 1966

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Periodic Personnel Report No 5-66

SET POSERIES IN HER HE Period Covered: 1Mar66 to 15Mar66

Hef: (a) 3rdMarDiv0 1080.3

Time Zone: H () ar.o. o.l) resemble simil objects the cast

1. Strongths.

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a. See my Personnel Daily Summary of this date.

b. Losses:	SMC	ÜSN.
Battle:	OFF ENL	OFF ENL O O
Administrative:	0 0 1 59	0 0
Replacements.		

2. Replacements.

a. Joined Fifty-five (55) USMC enlisted and one (1) USM officer; four USMC enlisted returned to duty.

3. Discipline, Law and Order. One violation of article 36, 91 and 123; two violations of article 121 and eight of article 113. Eight office hours, four Special Courts martial and two Summary Courts martials have been completed; two Summary and two Special Courts are pending.

4. Prisoners of War.

	VCC	, vcs
Captured:	6	31
Evacuated:	6	31
On Heng:	Ω	. To

5. Graves Registration. Five USMC enlisted KIA's evacuated to "B" Med.

6. Morale and Personnel Services.

LONG COLUMN COLU a. State of Morale. Good, a USO show was presented for the troops during the period. This organization has been without beverages for two reporting periods. Movies for the troops has not been consistent this past week. This command received and distributed Christmas packages from operation Christmas Star from Maryland. Mail received has not been as good as normal

b. Awards Made:

4 Vietnamese Medals

Fact OPX and Postal Synits have been sent to the Companies during this period.

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- Affairs. See my Civil Affairs SITREP.
- 3. Personnel Procedures. Missing records have been requisted from Sub Unit #3, no repl; has been received. Normal Design of Person Company waters I
- Interior Management.
- 10. Civilian Employees. None.
- 11. Miscellaneous. Unit Commanders (See Annex A). A CHARLE WILLIAM

. NAS A DES TO THE BY COMMAND OF LICOL JAMES P. KELLY

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Sec. 20202 Strain Co.

JAMES P. KELLY
Lieutenant Colonel, S. Larine Corps
Commandin

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P. F. COLEMAN COMPS TO SELECT THE COMPS OF THE COLEMAN CWO-2 U. S. Merine Corps

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Mg, 1stBn, 7thMar 3rcMarDiv (Rein) FMF 160800 Mar 1966

ANNEX A (Unit Commanders) to Periodic Personnel Report No 5-66

Ref: (a) 3rdMarDiv0 1080.3

Time Zone: H

1. Unit Commanders

1stBn.	7th	Marines	LtCo1	J.	P. KELLY
	H&S		lst Lt	G.	A. BARTLETT
	II A II	Co	Capt	G.	MARINO
	"B"	Co	Capt	R.	C. PREWITT
	ıı <u>C</u> ıı	Co	lstLt	В.	R. GOODWIN
	"D"	Co	Capt	. D.	D. BROOKS

BY COMMAND OF LTCOL JAMES P. KELLY

JAMES P. KELLY
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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P. F. COLEMAN CWO-2 U. S. Marine Corps S-1/Adjutant

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Hq, 1stBn, 7thMar 3rdMarDiv (Rein) FMF 010800 Apr 1966

ANNEX A (Unit Commanders) to Periodic Personnel Report No 6-66

Ref: (a) 3rdMarDiv0 1080.3

Time Zone: H

1. Unit Commanders.

1stBn, 7th Marines	${f LtCol}$	J. P. KELLY
H&S Co	Capt	G. A. BARTLETT
"A" Co	Capt	G. MÁRÍNO
иВи Со	Capt	R. C. PREWITT
nGn Co	lstLt	B. R. GOODWYN
uDu Co	Capt	D. D. BROOKS

BY COMMAND OF LTCOL JAMES F. AMELY

JAMES P. KELLY
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: S-1, 7thMar (1) F I L E (4)

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P. F. CCLEMAN
CWC-2 U. S. Marine Corps
S-1/Adjutant

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Hq, 1stBn, 7thMar
3rdMarDiv (Rein) FWF
010800 Apr 1966

Periodic Personnel Report No 6-66

Period Covered: 16Mar66 to 31Mar66

Ref: (a) 3rdMarDiv0 1080.3

Time Zone: H

1. Strengths.

(a) See my Personnel Daily Summary of this date.

(b)	Losses:	USM	IC		US	N
•		OFF	ENL		OFF	ENL
	Battle:	0	3 8	.,	Ò	5
	Non-Battle:	0	5		(,	C
	Administrative:	0	59		Ü	C

2. Replacements.

- a. Joined ten (10) USMC enlisted and one (1) USMC enlisted returned to duty.
- 3. Discipline Law and Order, One (1) violation of article 92. Two (2) Special Court-Martials completed and three (3) Summary Court-Martials completed, One (1) Summary Court-Martial pending.
- 4. Prisoners of War.

		VGC	VCS
Captured:	•	0	53
Evacuated:		0	53
On Hand:		•	Ō

- 5. Graves Registration. Ten (10) USMC enlisted KIA's evacuated to "B" Med.
- 6. Morale and Personnel Services.
 - a. State of Morale. Good. This organization has not been in receipt of beverages for 3/4 of this reporting period and none for the last two reporting periods. Movies for the troops have not been consistent this reporting period.
 - b. Awards Made:

1 Navy Commendation Medal

c. PX and Postal Units have been sent to the Companies during this reporting period.

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- 7. Civil Affairs. See my Civil Affairs SITREP.
- 8. Personnel Procedures. Normal.
- 9. Interior Management. Normal.
- 10. Civilian Employees. None.
- 11. Miscellaneous. Unit Commanders. (See Annex A).

BY COMMAND OF LTCOL JAMES P. KELLY


JAMES P. KELLY Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Commanding


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
P. F. COLEMAN CWO-2 U. S. Marine Corps S-1/Adjutant


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




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



RELEASED: J. MCGOWAN

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INF TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 60
- 2. 011/200H TO 021/200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 020810H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 012145H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 621991, OBSERVING A BOAT PROCEEDING ACROSS THE SONG TRA BONG RIVER FROM TAN HY VICINITY COORDINATES BS 624988. FIRED ILLUMINATION AND TWENTY ROUNDS OF 7.62 CAUSING THE BOAT TO RETURN TO TAN HY. RESULTS OF ACTION TAKEN UNKNOWN.
- (2) AT 020830H, "B" COMPANY CP REPORTED, AT 012200H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 605000, RECEIVING TWO ROUNDS OF CARBINE FIRE FROM CHE VC LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BT 604002. AFTER FIRING THE VC WAS CBSERVED RUNNING EAST, FIRED THIRTY EIGHT 7.62 ROUNDS AT THE VC WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. PATROL REPORT ATTACHED





1st Rn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
2 Feb 1966
010600H-021600H
Vielnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
PFC J. C. ARNSTRONG Communication
27 Feb 1966

LISTENING POSTS
Co A (6)575026,578023,614016
615016,611006,613009
Co B(15)609002,608001,605999
605993,603992,601991
599990,597990,594989
592989,590969,589989
585989,583969,580989
Co C (3)576989,572992,566998

UNIT	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Co A	CENTAUR-1	PLIT(+)	01 SSOOH	020130H	COMBAT
	CENTAUR-2	SQD()	010100H	01:0500H	SECURITY
Co B	SQUIRREI—1	3Q D(+)	011930H	020730H	AMBUSH
the second se	SQUIRREL_2	SQI(+)	011950H	020730H	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL-3	SQD	012030H	020700H	ambush
	FIELDMOUSE	SQTO	021000E	021430H	SECURITY/CA
Co C	SIDEWINDER	FT(+)	012200H	020200H	COMBAT
	HCFFF OAD	SQD (+)	0209COH	021300H	COMBAT/RECON
Co D	PLOCIHOUND-1	PLE(+)	021300H	021600H	GENERAL

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Sparrow Heark

MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 6757 II

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 18 Men
- 2. MISSION: To losate by observation, 20-30 men VC force, and to conduct search and destroy operations as directed.
- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 011030H March 1966
- 4. TIME OF RETURN: 011725H March 1966
- 5. ROUTE: Refer to overlay
- 6. OBSERVATIONS ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

TIME	COORDINATES	OBSERVATION
1145	BT 667034	Observed three smoke fires.
1425	BT 651017	56 large crocks of rice inside and
		outside of approximately 12 houses.
1535	BT 646025	Twenty large crocks of rice in ide.
-,-		and outside of approximately four hou-
		9es-

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: Hamlets of DONG LE (4) and TUYET DIEM (2) and (4) were very quiet with almost no activity. The only civilians observed were women and old men and children.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: N/A
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Good, with high moral.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: That a squad is too small to effectively conduct hamlet search missions - a platoon or larger unit is recommended.

/s/ FLOYD R. SCHULTZ

FLOYD R. SCHULTZ, SOT, B-1-7, USMO NAME, RAWK AND UNIT OF PATROL LEADER

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None

/s/ R. C. PREWITT

R. C. PREWITT, CAPT, B-1-7, USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF DEBRIEFER

RELEASED: J. McGOWAN

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES. TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81's, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3


- 1. ISUM # 61
- 2. 021200H TO 031200H MARCH 1966
- SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY GROUND
- (1) AT 021300H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 021140H VICINITY COORD-Inates BS 628993, approximately 150 vietnamese civilians (PLD Men, women AND CHILDREN) APPROACHED "D" COMPANY PRIMETER. CIVILIANS CLAIMED THEY were there to protest artillary damage to their homes and fivilds. As Mar-Ine security were screening the civilians they observed approximately 10 VC MOVING INTO POSITION VICINITY COORDINATES BS 635992. TWO MARINE SQUADS WERE IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED. THE VC UBON BEING OBSERVED OPENED FIRE WITH 20 ROUNDS OF AR AND 2 ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTARS. MARINES RETURNED 650x7.62, TWO M-79 AND FOUR 90MM. 90MM SCORED TWO DIRECT HITS ON VC POSITION KILLING A UNCONFIRMED FOUR VC. ONE MARINE AND TWO CIVILIANS WERE WOUNDED BY MORTAR FIRE. DUE TO THE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS IN THE AREA A SEARCH OF THE VC POSI-TION WAS NOT CONDUCTED TILL ABOUT 45 MIN. AFTER THE INCIDENT. SEARCH WAS NEGATIVE. 5-2 COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE VC RECRUITED THE CIVILIANS MOSTLY FROM BINH THONG VILLAGE, AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHERE TO GO AND WHAT TO SAY. WHEN THE CIVILIANS ARRIVED AT DELTAS POSITION THEY APPE-ARED TO BE CONFUSED, DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT TO SAY. AS SOON AS THE CIVILIANS HAD MORE OR LESS CATHERED INTO ONE GENERAL AREA THE VC MOVED INTO POSITION, AS SOON AS THE VC KNEW THAT THEY WERE OBSERVED THEY OPENED Fire hoping to put moh<u>ba</u>r rounds amongst the civilians thereby creating A INCIDENT WHICH COULD EAISLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MARINES.
- (2) AT 022100H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 022035H VICINITY COORD-INATES BS 625986, OBSERVING A CARROT LIGHT SOURCE. OBSERVED VC DUCK OUT OF SIGHT. NO FURTHER CONTACT.
- (3) AT 030700H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 022245H VICINITY COURD-INATES BS 625987, AGAIN OBSERVED A CARROT LIGHT VICINITY COORDINATES BS 625986. FIRED 20x50, 3xM-79 AND 115x7.62 ROUNDS AT THE SOURCE. RESULTS OF FIRE UNKNOWN.
- _ (4) AT 031115H, "A" COMPANY AMTRACKS REPORTED, AT 030905H-VICINETY COORDINATES BT 556018, ONE OF THEIR LVT'S RECEIVED FOUR ROUNDS OF SWALL ARMS FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BT 562012. DID NOT RETURN FIRE, COULD NOT OBSERVE THE VC.
- (5) AT 031155H, "A" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED, AT 031130H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 653038, OBSERVING TIREE VC RUNNING FROM THE HAMLET LOCATED vicinity coordinates by 662038. Civilians in the hamler stated they were VC. PATROL CURRENTLY SEARCHING THE AREA.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) FOUR VC KILLED (POSSIBLE) B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE 8. NOEN
- 11. NONE
- 12.
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:

LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THAT A VC REGIMENT IS LOCATED VICINITY OF BINH NAM VILLAGE COORDINATES BS 668845,688841,603855, AND 708845. REGIMENT REPORTEDLY CALLS ITSELF THE 6th REGT PART-OF THE 5th VC DIVISION AND IS COMMANDED BY LT. COL. HUGNH TAN TUY.

VC (PUSSIBLE REGIONAL FORCE GUERRILLAS) FORCES WHO WORK THE BINH SA THROUGH BINH KY VILLAGE AREAS HAVE A SUPPLY BASE IN BINH TUY VILLAGE AT COORDINATES BS 462902. AREA IS REPORTEDLY EXTREMELY THICKLY VEG-AT ED.

- 14. OF HER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ANTIACHED





CROCODILE SIDEWINDER

1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
3 March 1966
021600H-031600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
PFG J. G. ARMSTRONG (1997)
26 Feb 1945
LISTENING POSTS
Co A(6) 573026,578023,614016
615016,611006,613009
Go B(15)609002,608001,605999
605993,603992,601991
599990,597990,594989
592989,590989,589989
585989,583989,589989
Co C(3) 576989,572992,566998

UNIT	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TŒ	Tipe
Сод	CENTAUR-1	SQI(=)	022200H	E002220	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	SQD(-)	022100H	030100H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-3	SQD(-)	030230H	03033QH	SECURITY
Co B	SQUIREL-1	300(+)	021900H	0307COH	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL—2	SQD(+)	021930н	030700H	ambush
	SQUIREEL-3	SQD	022130H	030700H	ambush
erine de Promision de Salesta, el Sile d'Allen	PACKRAT	SQD	030930H	035430H	security/ca
Co C	CROCOUTLE	SQI(+)	022 0 00H	022400H	COMBAT/RECON
·	SIDEVINDER	SQD(+)	03090CH	031500Н	COMBAT/RECON (

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
TO: 7th MARINES

ENFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, HESCO, 81 'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 62
- 2. 031200H TO 041200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND

(1) AT 031400H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP TWO WES APPREHENDED, AT 021110H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 628993, AFTER DEMONSTRATION BY LOCAL CIVILIANS AS POSSIBLE VC PROVOCATORS. FORWARDED TO 1TT AT 031730H.

- (2) AT 031300H, "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS OF A NOTEBOOK FOUND IN A HOUSE, VICINITY COORDINA TES BY 624008. THE NOTEBOOK IS ALLEDGED TO HAVE WRITING ON CAMOUFLAGE, AMBUSHES, ETC. ALSO A ID CARD BELONGING TO PHAM THE KIEM WHICH WAS FOUND ON A TRAIL, VICINITY COORDINATES BS 628992, AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION OF 3 MARCH 1966.
- (3) AT 031900H, "G" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED, AT 031030H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 561014, RECEIVING EIGHT ROUNDS OF AUTOMATIC CARBINE FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCARED VICINITY COORDINATES BT 561017. RETURNED FORTY ROUNDS OF 7.62 AND SEARCHED THE AREA WITH NEGITIVE RESULTS.
- (4) AT 032130H, "B" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 032045H VICINITY COORD— INATES BS 607999, OBSERVING ONE VC MOVING TOWARD THE PROTECTIVE WIRE VIC-INITY COORDINATES BS 608999. THREW ONE HAND ILLUMINATION AND FIRED FOUR 7.62 ROUNDS AT THE VC WHO WITHDREW TO THE TREE LINE.
- (5) AT 040635H, HAS COMPANY GUARD REPORTED, AT 040055 VICINITY COORDINATES BT 586017, RECEIVING ONE ROUND OF CARBINE FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. GUARD FIRE ONE 7.62 ROUND AT SUSPECTED LOCATION WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (6) AT 040900H, "A" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED, AT 040830H VICINITY COORDINATES BY 663033, ACTIVATING A BOOBY TRAP CONSISTING OF TWO M-26 GREN-ADES. FIVE MARINES WERE WOUNDED AND EVACUATED TO "B" MED.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) TWO VES (APPREHENDED)
 - B. EQUIPMENT
 - (1) ONE VE NOTEBOOK
 - (2) ONE ID CARD.
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED
 - C. VC PROPAGANDA REPORT




1st Bn 7th Marines Patrol Overlay For 4 Feb 1966 031600H to 041600H Vietnam: 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III L/CPL M. E. WOOD 1 Feb 1966 m s. Wood

LISTENING POSTS

Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,

Co B(15)609002,608001,605999,605993,603992,601991,599990,597990,594989,592989,590989,589989,585989,585989,585989,585989,585989,572992,566998。



TIMITE	PATROL.	STZE	TOD.	TOR.	mvDi:
Co A	CENTAUR-1	SQD(-)	040300H	040500H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	SQD(-)	03 20 00 H	040100Н	SECURITY
Co B	SQUTRREL 1	SQD(+)	031930H	040700H	AMBUSH
	SQUTREEL-2	SQD(+)	031930H	040700H	AMBUSH
	SQUTREEL 3	SOD	031930н	040700H	AMBUSH
Co C	HOPINT CAD	SQD(+)	032000H	032400H	COMBAT
	CROCODILE	SUD(+)	040930H	041430H	COMBAT/RECOV
Go D	BLOODHOUND-1	PI/T(+)	040900H	041300H	GENERAL.

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Unicorn

MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheet 6757 II

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 32 Men
- 2. MISSION: Combat Patrol

G = _ #

- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 031100H Mearch 1966
- 4. TIME OF RETURN: 051100H March 1966
- 5. ROUTE: Refer to overlay

6.	OBSERVATIONS - ENEMY AND TERRAIN:							
	TIME 031100		ORDINATES	OBSERVATION				
	03/11/00	BT	653037	Observed several men running away				
				vicinity coordinates BT 662039. Pur-				
				sued physically and by fire unable to				
				apprehend.				
	031700	BT	646046	Apprehended a VC while sweeping the				
			•	area.				
	040800	ВT	663036	Apprehended one VCS running from hill				
				They were carring empty fish baskets				
				empty rice pots(20-25) and empty water				
				containers.				
	040815	200	.663027					
	040015	DI	663033	Hit two consective M-26 grenades.				
				Seven men were wounded and six evacuat				
	014000			ed.				
	041000	\mathbf{BT}	636023	Apprehended two known VC at this loc-				
				ation. Names were on list given by the				
				people of HAI NINH.				
	0509 30	BT	655046	Upon observing the patrol two fishing				
				boats which were coming into the mouth				
	•			of the river turned around and put out				
				to sea. Warning shots were fired and				
	-			when one failed to respond. it was taken				
				under fire. The boat was hit by small				
				arms fire and was later picked up by				
				a Vietnamese patrol boat. The suspect				
				one the first boat was released.				
				OUT OUT TITOU DOWN MAY INTORPE().				

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: Sweeps were conducted of Hamlets at BT 653040.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITHTHE ENEMY: The enemy was not engaged in a fire fight at any time.
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: Wounded had all been evacuated.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
 - a. Intelligence agents are a great help.
 - Sweeps should be conducted of all fishermen.
 - c. Patrol boats should check out all boats that refuse to come in. because of the patrol being in the area.

/s/ RONALD R. WELPOTT

RONALD-R. WELPCTT - 1-stLT - A-1-7. USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF PATROL LEADER

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: On 4 February 1966 deposed Village Chief BUA GIA and set fire to one VC house.

/s/ J. K. KANGAS

J. K. KANGAS, 1stlT, XO, A-1-7, USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF DEBRIEFER


RELEASER: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "T", The Sol, 2/7,3/7

- 2. 041200H TO 051200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
- A. GROUND
- (1) AT 041400H. "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREE INDED AT 031700H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 647046 FOR NOT HAVING AN ID CARD. FORWARDED TO III AI 041635H
 - (2) AT 041530H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED AT 041500H VICINITY COCRDINATES BS624991, RECEIVING TWO ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM VICINITY COORDINATES BS613985. DID NOT RETURN FIRE, COULD NOT OBSERVE THE VC.
- (3) AT 041750H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 040915H VICINITY COORDINATES BT625005. BECAUSE WHEN QUESTIONED HE LIED CONTINUOUSLY DURING QUESTIONING. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 041810H.
- (4) AT 041750H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPRENDED AT 040930H VICINITY COORDINATES BT622009, FOR BEING OF MILITARY MORE FORWARDED TO ITT M 041810H.
- (5) AT 050945H, "A" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED AT 040900H VICINITY COORDINATES BY 657045, OBSERVED TWO BOATS ENTERING THE MOUTH OF THE TITE VICINITY COORDINATES BT650041. UPON OBSERVING THE PATROL THEY TURN IN ARCUND AND HEADED TO SEA. THE PATROL FIRED ON THE BOATS, ONE TURNED AROUND, THE OTHER HEADED OUT TO SEA. A VIETNAMESE PATROL BOAT IS CURRENTLY CHECKING THE BOAT THAT HEADED TO SEA AND ALL OTHER BOATS.
 - 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL

 (1) FOUR VCS APPREHENDED
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
 - 5. NONE
 - 6. NONE
 - 7. NONE
 - 8. NONE
 - 11. NONE
 - 12. NONE
 - 13. NONE
 - 14. OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED




Patrol Overlay For 5 Mar 1966 041600H to 051600 Vietnam: 1: 50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III L/CPL M.E. WOOD 2 Mar 1966 m s. wood.

LISTENTING POSTS

Go A(6)573026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,

Go B(15)609002,608001,605999,605993,603992,601991,599990,597990,594989,592909,5969989,585989,585989,585989,585989,572992,566998.



UNIT	Patrol	SIZE	TOD	TOR-	TYPE
A	CENTAUR-1	SQD(-)	0500301	050330Н	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	sqD(-)	042230H	050200H	SECURITY
Co B	SQUIREEL-1 W/FF	SQD	041930Н	050700Н	AMBUSH
	squirrel-2a w/pf	SQD	04 1930H	050700Н	AMBUSH
	SQUIBREL-1B W/FF	SQD	041930н	050700Н	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL-2 W/PF	SQD	041930日	050700Н	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL-2A W/PF	SQD	04 1930Н	050700H	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL-3	SQD	04 1930H	050700Н	AMBUSH
Co C	HCRNT Q AD	SQD(+)	051000H	051400Н	COMBAT/RECON
	SIDEWINDER	F.T(+)	042100H	042400H	COMBAT
Co D	BLOODHOUND-1	PLT(+)	05063011	051100H	GENERAL

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7, 3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 64
- 2. 051200H TO 061200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND


(1) AT 060800H, AMTRACKS REPORTED, AT 052330H VICINITY COORDIN-ATES BT 555035, OBSERVING ONE PERSON. FIRED TWO ROUNDS OF 7.62 AND REC-EIVED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ROUNDS IN RETURN. AGAIN FIRED EIGHT ROUNDS OF 7.62 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.


- 4. NONE 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. CAPTURED PERSONNEL REPORT ATTACHED



HORNT OAD

1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay Fee
6 March 1966
051600M to 061600M
Vistnams 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/Cpl M.E. Wood
3 March 1966 ms wood





INIT	PATROL	SIZE	TCD	TOR	TYPE
Co A	DNICORN	PIE(+)	051600H	061600H	COMBAT
	CENTAUR-1	S((D(-)	05193CH	052330H	SECURITY
	GENTAUR-2	SUD(=)	052300H	060200H	SECURITY
lo A	SQUIRREL-1 W/PF	SOD	051930H	060700H	AMBUSH
	SOUTRREL-1A W/FF	son	051930H	O60700H	AMBUSH
To the skill of the same should be	SQUIRREL-1B W/PF	S⊌D	O51930H	O60700H	HEUGMA
-	SUITRHEL_2 W/PF	SOD(+)	05 1930H	060700H	HEUSMA
	SAUTRRUL-3	SUD	051930H	060700H	AMBUSH
<u> </u>	HORITOAD	SQD(+)	060900Н	061400H	COMBAT/RECON
	GROGODILE	S\(\mu\D(\psi\)	062000H	062400H	COMBAT
CoD	BLOODHOUND-1	PUT(+)	060630H	061100II	GENERAL

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, HASCO, 81 S,BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 65
- 2. 061200H TO 071200H MARCH 1966
- 3. NONE
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY


RELEASED: R. H. KUSTS

FROM 1st BETTALION, 7th MARINES 7th MARINGS

INTO: "Linco, 45 "CO, "C"CO, PL"CO, MASCO, Stis, BIMH SCH. 2/7,3/7

- to EXEMPT 65
- 2. 061200H TO 071200H MARCH 1966
- 3. HOME.
- 5. FC (3 7. TC (3

- S. NOIL
- 11. NORE
- -12. NONE to. Bons
 - ia orten
 - a, ROADBLOOK REPORT ASTACHED
 - b. MASTER PERAOL OVERLAY




Party &

1st Bn 7th Marines
Petrol Cverlay For
7 March 1966
061600H to 071600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
4 March 1966 m s. wood

LISTENING PCSTS

Co A(6)575026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590988,593985,599988,602990,603992,609002,608001,

605999, Co C(3)576989,572992,566998。



					
dnit	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYDE
Co A	CENTAUR—1	SQD(~)	062000Н	062400H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	SQD(=)	062400H	070300H	SECURITY
Co.B	PACKRATOS W/PF	SQD(-)_	061930H	070700Н	AMBUSH
	PACKRAT.AA W/PF	SQD(=)	061930H	070700H	AMBUSH
10.57	PACKRAT-2 W/PF	SQD(-)	061930H	070700H	AMBUSH
	PACHRAT-2A W/PF	SQD()	061930H	070700Н	AMBUSH
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	PAGERAT-3	SQD	062000H	070700H	AMBUSH
Co.C.	CROCODILE	SQD(+)	065000H	0624 00 H	COMBAT
. Co.D	BLOCOMOUND-1	PLT	070930出	071230H	COMBAT/RECON
		un Oles region			

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7.S-3 FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINES TO:

- 1. ISUM # 66 2. 071200H TO 081200H MARCH 1966
- 3. NONE
- 4. NONE
- NOME
- NONE
- NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED

PACKRAT-2A

PACKRAT-2A

PACKRAT-3

PACKRAT-3

PACKRAT-3

PACKRAT-3

PACKRAT-3

1 PACKRAT-1

SIZE

S.D(-)

SOD(-)

SQD(_)E/PF

SODY -)W/PF

SADE - W/PF

Sud(=)w/PF

SUD

PIM

 $F_{\bullet}T(+)$

Swil (+)

F.T

PATROL

CHATAUR-1

CENTAUR-2

CHNTAUR-3

PACKRAT-1

PACKHAT-1A

PACKRAT-2

PACKRAT-2A

PACKRAT.3

SIDENIE DER

CROCODILE

BI-OODHUGE D-1

Co A

Co B

(2:5 C.


Co.D.

1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
8 March 1966
071600H to 081600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/Crl H.E. WOOD
5 March 1966 M & Wood

LISTENIEG POSTS

Co A(6)573026,578023,694096,615016,611006,613009,615016,611006,613009,608001,603992,609002,608001,605999,

99



AMBUSH

AMBUSH

CUMBAT

COMBAY/RECON

COMBAT/RECOR

PACKRAT-1A

TOD

072100H

072000H

080200H

071930H

071930H

071930H

071930H

071930H

072100H

081300H

080630H

080700H

080700H

072400H

081600H

080900H


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES: TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H2S, 81s, S-1,S-3,BINH SCN, 2/7,3/7

1. ISUM # 67

2 3

- 2. 081200H TO 091200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 081230H "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP TWENTY TWO VCS.
 SUSPECTS APPREHENDED BY ARVN JUNK FLEET IN VICINITY GS6305, GC5506 AT 080900H.
 ARVN ADVISED SUSPECTS GO OUT TO SEA WHEN MARINES ARE IN THEIL TREA. TWO
 SUSPECTS ADMITTED TO BEING VC AND IMPLICATED THREE OTHERS DURING TACTICAL
 INTERROGATION. FIVE VC AND SEVENTEEN VCS FORWARDED TO ITT AT 081520H.
- (2) AT 081845H "D" COMPANY REPORTED AT 081300H A TANK ATTACHED TO THE COMPANY FIRED ONE ROUND 90MM HE FROM VICINITY BS641978 AT POSSIBLE AMBUSH SITE LOCATED VICINITY BS639964. ROUND CAUSED A SECONDARY EXPLOSION OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE TO THAT OF A 90MM ROUND DETONATION. BLACK SMOKE PRODUCED BY SECONDARY EXPLOSION WAS 80 METERS WIDE AND 50 METERS HIGH.
- (3) AT 090940H "D" COMPANY REPORTED AT 090915H PATROL LOCATED VICINITY BT648003 OBSERVED SIX VCS MOVING IN AN EASTERLY DIRECTION VICINITY OF BT650003. FIRED 30 ROUNDS M-60 AT VCS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- 4. FERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) SIX VC APPREHENDED
 - (2) EIGHTEEN VCS, APPREHENDED
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- (1) AT 081230H "A" COMPANY REPORTED AT 071600H TWO YOUNG VIETNAMESE APPROACHED A PATROL IN VICINITY OF BT620030 AND ADVISED THERE WERE TWO VC IN A BOAT OFF SHORE THAT FISHED BY DAY AND CARRIED GRENADES FOR THE VC AT NIGHT. AT 071620H PATROL APPREHENDED SUSPECTS. DURING TACTICAL INTERROGATION ONE SUSPECT ADMITTED TO SIGNALLING THE VC WHENEVER PATROLS TITLER HIS AREA. VC AND VCS FORWARDED TO ITT AT 081520H.
- (2) AT 082200H "A" COMPANY REPORTED AT 082030H A CIVILIAN SOURCE FROM VINH AN (2) VICINITY BT615016 REPORTED AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF VC OCCUPYING BINH THUA VICINITY COORDINATES BS601968 WILL MOVE TO CHUA TU CN 9 OR 10 MARCH POSSIBLY TO AMBUSH USMC PERSONNEL, AT COORDINATES BT587945, WHO ARE GOING TO AND FROM BINH SON BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900. THEIR MISSION IS ALSO TO CLOSE OFF NATIONAL ROUTE # 1. (S-2 EVAL: F-6)
- 14. OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED
 - C. TWO NATIONAL ID CARDS



9

3

2

58

tet Dn 7th Mexines
Patrol Overlay Fer
9 March 1966
081600H To 091600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/OPL M.E. WOOD
6 March 1966 M E Wood

LISTENING POSES

Oo A(6)573026;576027;6140%6;
615016;611006;613009;
Co B(10)576989;583991;5909:6;
593985;5999888602990;
603992;609002;60800%;
605999;
Co C(3)576989;572992;566998;

	NAME OF THE PARTY	Sim_	<u> </u>	TOR.	DV2E
Co_A	GRIFFATINOS	S00()	082100H	H002060	SEOTRETTY
	CENTRATIR-2	800(-)	0824001	090500H	SECURITY
Cog	CROCODILE	SQD(+)	082030H	090100H	COMBAT
	HORNTOAD	SCD(+)	091100Н	091500н	COMBAT/REGON
<u>Con</u>					

← CROCODILE

RELEASED: R. H. KUHIS


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, 'B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3

1. ISUM # 68

. فلاست.نگ

- 2. 091200H TO 101200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 091400H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP TWO LETTERS FOUND ON A TRAIL VICINITY COORDINATES BS 628992. ONE WAS WRITTEN BETWEEN A WOMAN AND HER BROTHER, THE OTHER TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED WOMAN FROM THE HEAD OF THE VC WOMAN'S ASSOCIATION.
- (2) AT 091700H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS, APPRE-HENDED AT 091615H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 616010, FOR NOT HAVING A ID CARD. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 091745H.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VCS (APPREHENDED)
 - B. EQUIPMENT
 - (1) TWO LETTERS
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 16. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- A. THE VILLAGERS OF VINH AN STATED THAT 100NVA TROOPS ARRIVED AT VICINITY COORDINATES BS 567918. AT LAST REPORT THEY WERE STILL IN THE AREA, ARMED WITH TWO 60MM MORTARS AND TWO MG'S. (EVAL: F-6)
- B. "A" COMPANY REPORTED THAT THE VILLAGERS OF VINH AN STATED THAT THE VC OF BINH SON DISTRICT ARE PAYING THE PEOPLE TO PLACE M-26 TYPE BOOBY TRAPS NEAR MARINE POSITIONS.
- C. "A" COMPANY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE VC NO LONGER USE SAMPANS OR BASKET BOATS TO CROSS THE RIVER, INSTEAD THEY HAVE CONSTRUCTED A BAMBOO TRIANGLE TO ACT AS WATER WINGS.
- 14. OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED




1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
10 March 1966
091600H to 101600H
Wietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M. E. WOOD
7 March 1966 me wood

LISTENING POSTS

Co A(6)573025,578023,614016,615016,614006,615009,615016,614006,615009,603999,583991,590989,602990,603992,609002,500000,605999,600000,576989,572992,566998

SIDE/INDER 98

FHORNTOAD



A T	PATROL	STZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Go A	CENTAUR-1	SQD()	100230Н	100500Н	SECURITY
·	CTANT ATTR-2	SOD(=)	992100Н	10020011	SECURITY
Co C	HORWPOAD	SOD(*)	FO1 300H	101600E	COMBAT/RECOR
	SIDEWONDER	F.F(+)	092400H	100300H	TA-60700
Go_D	BI COOD HOUNTD-4	PLC (69)	100600E	100900B	CONBAT/RECON

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81.18, BINH SON, 2/7, 3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 69
- 2. 101200H TO 111200H MARCH 1966
- 3. NONE
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NOME
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - 80. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED

CHAT AUR-3

CHAT A

CROCODILE

1st En 7th Marines
Patrol Overley For
11 Mar 1966
101600H to 111600H
Victnem: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
8 Mar 1966 M & Wood

LISTENING POSTS

Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590989,
593985,599988,602990,
603092,609002,608001,
605999,
Co C(3)576989,572992,566998。

4 De BLOODHOUND-i


Tem	200 DOL	STZE	TOD	TOR	WADE.
	CENTAITE :	<u> </u>	130300Н	110/30H	SECURITY
	CEWE AUR-2	5QD(-)	102100H	110200H	ALBUSH/SLOURING
	CEMPAUR-3	F.T	102030H	105500H	SECURITY
	THOCODILE TO THE	300(%)	102200FL	110300H	CONBAT!
	STORWINDER	F.T(s)	110830H	1331308	COLTBATE/RECON.
Co M	-STOODHOUND-3	FINE(+)	830600н	110900H	COMBAT/REGOR

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B
TO: 7th MARINES 81'S, BI

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, HASCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7,5-3

- 1. ISUM # 70
- 2. 111200H TO 121200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 112112H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 212020H VICINITY COURD-INAMES BS 628989, OBSERVING WHAT APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN A SIGNAL LIGHT VICINITY COORDINATES BS 624983. FIRED ONE 90MM ROUND AND USED THE ROSE OBSERVING THREE VCS. AGAIN FIRED THREE 90MM AND FIFTY .50 CAL ROUNDS AT THE SAME AREA. THE LIGHTS WENT OUT, NO FURTHER SIGHTINGS OF THE VCS.
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. MONE
- 8. MONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATIOJN GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- a. ON 10 MARCH 1966 A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THAT A COMPANY CONTAINER, TRAM, IS TRAINING SIXTY GUERRILLAS FROM TAN PHUOC HAMLET. THE GUERRILLAS ARE TRAINED AT TAN HUC HAMLET LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BS 529898 AND BT 526903. THIS AREA IS REPORTED TO BE HEAVILY FORFESTED. (EVAL F-6)
- b. ON 11 MARCH A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THAT THERE WERE MANY TRENCHES WITH PUNJI STAKES BEING BUILT VICINITY COORDINATES DS 519895, 507902 AND 510918. (EVAL: F-3)
- 14 OTHER
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED



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1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
12 March 1966
111600H to 121600H
Victnem: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
9 March 1966 M & Wood

LISTEMINE POSTS
Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590988,

co B(10)576989,583991,590988, 593985,599988,602990, 603992,609002,608001, 605999,

605999, co c(3)576989,572992,566998。

99

BLOODHOUND-1

5 0


		يرد در رفطند واستياره دو وين و مستود سبي وينب د	}		
TIK TO	PATROX.	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Co a	CENTAUR-1	son(-)_	112300H	120100H	SECURITY
	CHAT ATRAS	300(=)	120030H	120330H	SECURITY
Co R	PACKRAT-9 W/PF	Son(-)	111930H	120700H	AMBUSH
	DAGOVDANI-SA W/DIP	SQD(-)	111930Н	120700H	AMBUSH
	PACKRAT-2 W/PF	SQD(=)_	111930H	120700H	AMBUSH
	PACKRAD-2A W/PF	SQD(-)	111930H	\$20700H	AMBUSH
	PACKRAT-7	SQD	111930H	\$20700Н	AMBUSE
Co C	HOHNTOAD	SQD(4-)	112200H	120230H	COMBAT
	SIDEWIND FR	SOD(&)	\$20900H	921400H	COMBAT/RECOR
Co D	BLOODHOUND	PUF (+)	120600R	121700#	COMBAT/RECON

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 7th MARINES 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7,S-3


- 1. ISUM # 71
- 2. 121200H TO 131200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 130700H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 1.22210H VICINITY COOFD.


 INATES BS 628989, OBSERVING, WITH CARROT, ONE MAN BEHIND A BUSH VICINITY
 COORDINATES BS 625984. FIRED ONE 90MM ROUND AND CARROT SCANNED AREA.
 RESULTS OF ACTION TAKEN UNKNOWN.
- (2) AT 131038H, "A" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED DISCOVERING A CAVE 4x4x130 METERS VICINITY COORDINATES BT 647046. CAVE WAS CUT THROUGH ROCK AND HARD SAND AND HAS THREE EXITS. WILL DESTROY UPON COMPLETION OF SEARCH,
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8 NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14 OF HER
 - a. CAPTURED PERSONNEL REPORT ATTACHED



1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
13 March 1966
121600H to 131600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & ILI
L/CPL M.E. WCOD
10 March 1966 M & Wood

LISTENING PCSTS
Co A(5)573026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590988,602990,603092,609002,608001,605999,
Co C(3)576989,572992,566998.





401	The state of the s				TYPE
	HNTAURe 1	34I(-)	130100H	130330H	SECURITY
Language of the state of the st	MOTAUR-2	SQD(-)	122000H	122400H	AMBUSH/SECURITY
Go 3	Pagkran-1	SQD(-) W/PF	121900Н	130700H	AMBUSH
THE OWN NAMES APPEAR TO PERSONAL COMMONWEAR AND ADJUSTAGES AND	PACKRAT-1A	SOD(-) W/PF	121930H	130700H	AMBUSH
P. C.	PACKRAT-2	SQD(-) W/FF	121830H	130700Н	AMBUSH
The state of the s	PACKRAT-2A	SQD(-) W/PF	12153CH	130700H	AMBUSH
	Pagkra t-3	S(()(+)	121930H	130700H	AMBUSH
Go 3	JRCC ODILE	SQD(+)	121930H	122200H	COMPAT
1	STOMMINDER	SQD(+)	131000H	131400H	CCMBAT/RECON
G-1 N	BLOOMHOUND-1	PLT(+)	130700H	131100H	COMBAT/RECOM

PACKRAT-1A


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

1. ISUM # 72

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- 2. 131200H TO 141200H MARCH 1966 3. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 131300H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 121300H VICINITY COORDINATES BT624001, BECAUSE HIS ID CARD AND BIRTH CERTIFICATE DID NOT COINCIDE. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 131340H.
- (2) AT 131600H, "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 130930H VICINITY COORDINATES BT622021, BECAUSE HIS ID CARD HAD BEEN ALITERED. FORWARDED TO LTT AT 131627H.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) TWO VCS APPREHENDED
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE.
- 6. NONE
- 7. NOFE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14 OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED




CHOCO JILE

lst Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
14 March 1966
131:00H to 141600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CTL M.H. WOOD
11 March 1966 m & Wood

LISTENING_FOSTS

Co A(6)573026,573023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,5839980,573736,
593935,599983,6029900,
603992,609002,60300,
605999,
Co C(3)576939,572992,566993,



JALIT	PATROL	SIZE	cor	TOR	TYPE
Co A	CENTAUR-1	S _w D(-)	131930H	132230FL	SECURITY
	CENTALE 2	8 ^f D(-)	132300H	17r0530HT	SECLETTY
	CENTAUR-3	<u> </u>	140300H	1404306	SECURITY
Co B	FIELOWINGSELI	Sap(-)	131930H	140700H_	AMBLSR
	FIRITMONSE_1A	1 san(-)	131930н	110700H	AMBUSH
	FIREDMOUSE_2	Sup(-)	131830Н	1407GOH	AMBLSR
	FIELDMOUSE-2A	Suu(-)	131330H	140700H	AMBLSH
	FIELDMOUSE-3	Sup()	131030H	Troxcon	AMBLSH
Co_C	HORNTOAL	Sin(+)	132000H	1323308	CONBAT
	CEOCO DILE	some	17150 H	าไฮ 530ย	COMPATIANCIAL.
Co u	BLOODHOLN.)-1	FIT(+)	140600H	171000H	COMBAT/RECON


()/ "IELOMOUSE-1

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 73
- 2. 141200H TO 151200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 142130H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED AT 142100H VICINITY COORDINATES BS628989, OBSERVING A VC WITH A LIGHT ON THE RIDGELINE VICINITY COCRDINATES BS623984. FIRED FOUR ROUNDS OF 90MM HE. FIRST ROUND HIT THE VC THE CTHER THREE WERE IN THE GENERAL AREA.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VC KILLED
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
 - AT 141300H, A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

 - (1) 100 VC ARE IN BINH KY VILLAGE, KHUNG HO HAMLED
 (2) 100 VC ARE IN BINH THIEN VILLAGE, VAN TUONG HAMLED
 (3) 100 VC ARE IN BHINH THONG VILLAGE, AN LOC HAMLED. (EVAL F-3).
- 14 · OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED





FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S. 81s.5-1.5-3.BINH SON.2/7.3/7

- 1. ISUM # 74
- 2. 151200H TO 161200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 151600H "D" COMPANY HEPORTED AT 150900H AO OBSERVED SIX VC VICINITY BS659995. THREE DRESSED IN GREEN SHIRTS AND BLACK TROUSERS AND THREE WERE DRESSED COMPLETELY IN BLACK. AO FIRED ON VC POSSIBLY KILLING ONE.
- (2) AT 152120H "D" COMPANY LOCATED BS622992 OBSERVED TWO BOLTS. ONE AT BS623999 AND ONE AT BS618999. BOATS APPEARED TO BE SIGNALLING WITH FLASHING LIGHTS. FIRED ILLUMINATION AND 35xM-60, 20xM-14 ROUNDS. BOATS STOPPED FLASHING LIGHTS AND MOVED UP RIVER OUT OF RANGE OF ILLUMINATION.
- (3) AT 160730H "D" COMPANY LOCATED BT624009 OBSERVED SIX VCS DRESSED IN BLACK RUNNING VICINITY BT646007. VCS APPEARED TO CARRY WEAPONS. FIRED 3x81mm MORTAR AND 50x7.62 ROUNDS WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (4) AT 160930H "D" COMPANY LOCATED BT653003 RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 150 ROUNDS OF FIRE FROM ESTIMATED EIGHT VC ARMED WITH M-1 CARBINES AT VICINITY BT654003. RETURNED FIRE EXPENDING 10xM-79, 200xM-14 AND 300xM-60 ROUNDS. TWO VC WOUNDED BY REPURN FURE.
 - 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VC KIA (POSSIBLE)
 - (2) TWO VC WIA
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
 - 5. NONE
 - 6. NONE
 - 7. CNONE CONTRACTOR OF CONTRACTOR
 - 8 . NONES LOS OF MARKET SERVICE SERVICE
 - 14. NONE
 - 12. NONE
 - 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
 - 4. PEOPLE OF DONG BINH (1) REPORTED TO CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM THAT AT 151600H THEIR HAMLET OCHIEF HAD BEEN ARRESTED THE PREVIOUS WEEK BY THE DISTRICT CHIEF OF BINH SON. IN THE PLANE HAR HAR HAR HAR BOTH IN THE RESERVE OF T
 - B. A LOCAL SOURCE HAS STATED THE FOLLOWING:
 (1) VC SUPPORTERS IN BINH GIANG AND BINH SA VILLAGES ARE TELLING VC
 - THEY SHOULD ATTACK THESE TWO VILLAGES.


 (2) AT 142100H THIRTY VC ENTERED TAN HY HAMLET. SOURCE OBSERVED TWO M-1s. THREE CARBINES. ONE SUB-MACHINEGUN AND ONE RIFLE OF RUSSIAN OR CHICOM MANUFACTURE. OF THE THIRTY TWO WERE WOMEN NOT ARMED AND THREE OF THE MEN WERE NOT ARMED. (SH2 EVAL: F-6) CONTAINS DAMEST PROBACT OF THE TOTAL SERVICE STREET 14. OTHER TO SET VELLETET BURKELING - WAS LAST CLED LICELEGE. A LAST TO LEGE
 - ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED

And the state of the

B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED SECTION OF THE STATE OF

SER TO ATA GARBERAD


C. AT 151500H "B" COMPANY DELIVERED TO S-2 VARIOUS ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA FOUND AT 151100H VICINITY COORDINATES BT667012. ALSO A LETTER FROM A MOTHER TO HER SON IN THE TC. FOUND AT 141430H VICINITY COORDINATES BS607977. FORWARDED WITH THIS ISUM.



Fat Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
16 March 1966
151600H to 161600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/Cpl McHo WOOD
13 March 1966 M & Wood

LISTENING POSTS

Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,615016,611006,613009,593935,599988,602990,603992,609002,608001,605999,



PATROI.	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
CENTAUR-1	SOD(e)	152200H	960200H	AMBUSH VIC CP 3
CINTATIR-2	SOD(-)	152500H	160130H	SECURITY
Create attra-R	ም.ም	160230H	860450H	SECURITY
SIDEMINDER	P.T(+)	\$52100H	152400H	COMBAT
GROCODTT,R	SOD(+)	160930H	961300H	COMBAT/REXCON
RLOODHOUND-\$	PLE (+)	160700H	9/51100H	COMBAT/RECON
PTELIMONGE 4 WAPE	SQD(-)	151945H	160700H	AMBUSH
PTET MANIET-4A W/DF	SOD(=)	151045H	460700H	ANBUSH
FTER DANTIGE 9 W/DF	200(-)	\$51045H	260700H	AMBUSH
SPER PARATION OF HI / TABLE	cont_1	4E40AETI	\$60700H	AMRIIGH
PTM THANTOT X	SOD(=)	159945H	160700Н	AMBUSH
	CHAPT AHRES CHAPT	CHAPT AHRES SOD(=) CHAPT AHRES SOD(=) CHAPT AHRES SOD(=) CHAPT AHRES R.T STREATH DER P.T(+) CHOCODITLE SOD(+) RICODHOHND=\$ PIT(+) ETHIRMOUGH A W/PF SOD(=) FILE DMOHER A W/PF SOD(=) FILE DMOHER A W/PF SOD(=) FILE DMOHER A W/PF SOD(=)	CENTAIRS SOD(S) 152200H CENTAIRS SOD(S) 152300H CENTAIRS R.T 160230H STDEMINDER R.T(+) 152100H STDEMINDER SOD(S) 160930H RLOODHOHNDS PLT(S) 160700H BTELDMOUGH W/PF SOD(S) 151945H BTELDMOUGH W/PF SOD(S) 151945H	CENTAIRS SOD(S) 152200H 960200H CENTAIRS SOD(S) 152300H 160130H CENTAIRS R.T 160230H 360430H STDEMTN DER P.T(+) 152100H 152400H GROCODTLE SOD(S) 160930H 961300H BLOODHOUNDS PLT(S) 160700H 161100H PTELDMOUGES W/PF SOD(S) 151945H 160700H PTELDMOUGES 24 W/PF SOD(S) 151945H 160700H PTELDMOUGES 24 W/PF SOD(S) 151945H 160700H


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", HAS, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7, 3/7

- 1. ISUM # 75
- 2. 161200H TO 171200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 171045H "C" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VIETNAMESE FEMALE APPREHENDED AT 170830H VICINITY COORDINATES BS565997, FOR HAVING IN HER POSSESSION 11,000\$ PLASTERS, \$1.00 MPC, C-RATIONS AND NINE CARTONS AMERICAN BRAND CIGARENTES. FORWARDED TO LIT AT 171100H AS CI INTEREST.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VCS CI INTEREST
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- A. AT 162130H A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THERE ARE 300 VC AT BINH PHIEN VILLAGE BINH YEN HAMLET LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BS503969. SIXTY OF THE VC ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE. SOME OF THE VC ARE FROM BINH THONG, BINH THANH, BINH NGHIA AND BINH THUY VILLAGES. (EVAL: F-3)
- 14 OTHER

退世

- A. ROADBLOCK REPORT AFTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED




1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
17 March 1966
161600H to 171600H
Victnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.s. WOOD m & wood

LISTRATING POSTS

Co A(6)573026,578025,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590988,
593985,599988,602990,
603992,609002,608001,
605999,

Co C(3)576989,572992,566998.



unir	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Co A	Cant Aur-1	p.r	162030H	162200H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	SQD(-)	162000H	270030н	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-3	F.T	170300н	170430H	SECURITY
Co B	FIELDACUSE-1 W/PF	SQD(=)	161930н	370700Н	ambush
	FIELDMOUSE-4A W/PF	SQD(=)	161930н	170700н	Al-Bush
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	FIELDMOUSE=2 W/PF	SQD(-)	16193011	170700H	AMBUSH
	FIELD OUSE-2A W/PF	SQD(=)	161930H	370700 Н	AMBUSH
	Field Ouse-3	SQD(+)	161930H	170700H	AMBUSH
	BRAVO KRAY	SŲD(⇔)	160900H	161530H	CIVIL AFFAIRS
Co D	BLCODHOUND=1	PLT (+)	970900H	171400H	COMBAT (SEARCH & CLAM
Ca C	SIDSVINDER	F.T (+)	16210Œ	162400H	COMBAT
	HORNTOAD .	SQD(+)	17100CH	171430H	COMBAT/RECON

1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT


INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S, 81s,S-1,S-3,BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 76
- 2. 171200H TO 181200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENERGY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND

(1) AT 180630H, "D" COMPANY REPORTED AT 180300H VICINITY COORDINATES BS624992, OBSERVING FOUR BOATS WITH LIGHTS. FIRED FIFTEEN 7.62 AND EIGHT •50 CAL. ROUNDS AT THE BOATS. THE BOATS MOVED TO VICINITY COORDINATES BT619000 AND TURNED OFF THEIR LIGHTS. NO FURTHER OBSERVATION WAS MAKE.

- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

 - A. PERSONNEL: NONE B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OTHER
 - A. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED




Fielimouse-1 -> ①

1st on 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
18 March 1966
171600H to 181600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
15 March 1986 M E. Wood

LISTENING 10STS
Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,615016,611006,613009,60 B(10)576989,583991,590988,593985,59988,602990,603992,609002,608001,

605999, Co C (3)576989,572992,566998。



WUR.	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	ZANT
Co A	Centaur-1	SQD(-)	18020GH	180330H	SECURITY
	Centaur-2	80D(=)	172200M	ROOASTE	SECURITY
Co R	PTELDMOUSE W/PF	SOD(=)	474950H	180700H	REUGIA
	PIELIMOUSE-2A W/PF	SWD(=)	171930H	1807009	E-UBMA
S-19 de 11 - 1 - 1 - 1	FIELDOUSE-2 W/PF	SQD(=)	171930H	1807009	Al-IBUSH
	PIBLOMOUSE_2A W/PF	Sup(=)	171 950H	1807009	AMBUSH
	FIELDEDUSE-3	SUD(-)	171950H	1807001	AMBUSA
Co_C	SIDEWINDER	F.T(+)	172100H	172400H	COMBAT
	CHOCODILE	SQD(+)	1813001	781600H	COMBAT/RACON
Co D	BEOOMOUNTES	PIP (a)	1609004	181,2008	COMBAT/RECOU
			Trave Source		

DECLASSIFIED

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Bloodhound # 1

MAPS: Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757 II

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: Platoon (Rein): Plt, wons (MG&AT) sqd; artillery FO, S-2 Scout, 2 PFs, Engineer team
- 2. MISSION: Combat/Recon.
- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 160645H March 1966
- 4. TIME OF HUTURN: 161215H March 1966
- 5. ROUTES: See overlay filed with S-3
- 6. OBSERVATIONS ENEMY AND TERRAIN:
 - a. Terrain consisted of wide rice paddies throughout the entire atea.

ъ.	TIME	COORDINATES	OBSERVATION
	160730	BT646007	Observed six VCS running north, dressed in black, appeared to have weapons.
	160930	BT 654003	8 VC with 8 weapons consisting of carbines and M-1s fired 150 rds at patrol. Patrol returned fire.
	161015	BS661990	Destroyed 35 meter caves. They were old and unused.
	161100	BS656993	Discovered four new or re-dug fighting holes along the main trail.

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: Regarding second incident item 6b; the enemy were well hidden in tall grass. MG & Radiomen were taken under fire by the enemy who initiated the action.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: Regarding second incident item 6b; two VC were wounded by Marine return fire.
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: No casualties. Condition good.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
- a. Save-a-plane submitted to cover the entire time and area the patrol will be moving in. Will cut down reaction time of supporting arms.

/s/ DANIEL A. HITZELBERGER

DANIEL A. HITZELBERGER, 1st Lt. D-1-7-3 NAME, RANK & UNIT OF PATROL LEADER

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None

/s/ D. M. JORDAN

D. M. JORDAN, lstlt, D-1-7-3 USMC NIME, RANK & UNIT OF DEBRIEFER

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7, 3/7

- 1. ISUM # 77
- 2. 181200H TO 191200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - GROUND
- (1) AT 181400H "B" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS OF FOUR VCS APPREHENDED. AT 180900H VICINITY COORDINATES BS617997. THE VILLAGERS OF VINH AN (4) STATED THEY WERE VC SPIES.
- (2) AT 181425H "D" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED AT 181100H VICINITY COORDINATES BT623007, RECEIVING FIRE FROM ONE VC LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BT626006. THE VC WAS DRESSED IN BLACK PJB AND ARMED WITH A CARBINE. PATROL RETURNED FIRE AND SEARCHED THE AREA WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (3) AT 181425H "D" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED AT 181100H VICINITY COORDINATES BT629004 THE POINT OBSERVED A VC ARMED WITH A CARBINE ON THE TRAIL. IMMEDIATELY FIRED AT THE VC WHO DROPPED A BAG VC POSSIBLY WOUNDED +-
- (4) AT 181445H "C" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED AT 111355H VICINITY COORDINATES BS611949 RETEIVING FIRE FROM FIVE VC LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BT614948. THE VC WERE ARMED WITH CARBINES. PATROL RETURNED FIRE KILLING ONE VC. THE REMAINING VC BROKE CONTACT AND WITHDREW WITH THE BODY AND WEAPONS.
- (5) AT 181715H "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 181200H VICINITY COORDINATES BT626006. UPON OBSERVING THE PATROL THE VCS. RAN. WHEN APPRESENDED IT WAS FOUND HE HAD ANOTHER PERSONS ID CARD. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 181748H.
- (6) AT 190045H "A" COMPANY REPORTED AT 190045H VICINITY COORDINATES BT613011, RECEIVING ONE ROUND OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. FIRED ILLUMINATION, THIRTY FIVE ROUNDS OF 7.62 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (7) AT 190050H "B" COMPANY REPORTED AT VICINITY COORDINATES BS604995, RECEIVING THREE ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. FIRED ILLUMINATION WITH NEGATIVE OBSERVATION.
- (8) AT 190100H "A" COMPANY PATROL REPORTED AT 190015H VICINITY BT609003 OBSERVING TWO VC. FIRED ILLUMINATION, FIFTEEN ROUNDS OF 7.62 AND ONE M-79 ROUND AT THE VC WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (9) AT 190800H H&S COMPANY GUARD REPORTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0130H AND 0200H HEARING PERSONS AT THE PROTECTIVE WIRE VICINITY COORDINATES BT592014, 591012, 588012 AND BS585015. TEN ROUNDS OF 7.62 WERE WELLD AT THE PERSONS LOCATED AT THE ABOVE COORDINATES WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - ONE VC KILLED
 - ONE VC WOUNDED (POSSIBLE)
 - (2) (3) FIVE VCS APPREHENDED
 - EQUIPMENT В.
 - (1) DOCUMENTS:


VC RIEFFIELD POLICY.

THE RULES FOR LIBERATION FARMERS . THE REGULATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF VC WORKERS. A SIX MONTH VC WORK PLAN FOR 1966 OF THE DISTRICT PARTY. VC STUDY DOCUMENT FOR VC CADREMEN AND PARTY MEMBERS. (THE IMPORTANCE OF MASS EDUCATION). Individual fitness report on a vc written by himself to party CADRE AT BINH THONG VILLAGE . NOTEBOOK CONTAINING NAMES OF VC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THUONG HOA (H) TAN HY (H) AND SON TRA (H)

EQUIPMENT:

- (1) CLOTHING:
 - 2 Trousers one gray, one khakt
 - 3 SHIRTS ONE BLACK, ONE KHAKI, ONE BLUE
 - 1 T-SHIRT
 - 2 PONCHOS
 - 1 BAG BLUE
- 5. NONE

- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE . .
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- AS AT 181700H A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED 100 VC GUERRILLAS LOCATED THROUGHOUT TAN HY (H) AND SON TRA (H). EVAL: C-3.
- B. AT 181400H VC STOPPED BOATS AT BS615974 AND ACCORDING TO STURES CAPTURED A SAMPAN AND A VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN NAMED TRAN VAN TOAN. WE KURPORTEDLY MOVID TO BS620953 AT 181600H. VC ARE STATING THAT THEY WANT TO ATTACL THE HAMLET OF GIAO THUY (UNLOCATED). EVAL: F-6.
- C. LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THAT A MR TRINH WHO LEVES IN MY HUE (12) TUY (V) HAS A 15 YEAR OLD BROTHER WHO IS FOLLOWING THE VC. EVAL: F-6. 14. OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED
 - C. CAVE REPORT ATTACHED



unia	PAT ROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Go_	CENTAUR-1	SQD(~)	1820303	182200H	SECURITY
	GENTAUR-2	SQD(=)	18223CH	190200H	SECURITY/ALBUSE
Co_B	FIELDIOUSE W/PF	SQD(=)	1819308	190700H	ALBUSIA .
****	FIELDMOUSE-1A V/PF	SQD(=)	18193Œ	19070QH	AMBUSH
	FIELDADUSE-2 V/PF	SQD(=)	161930H	1804008	WARINER .
	FIELDADUSE-2A W/FF	SQD(=)	1819304	1907009	AMBUSH
	FIELDIOUSE-3	SQD(+)	1819308	1907009	AMBUSH
	BRATO XRAY	SQD(=)	180 900H	181530H	CIVIL AFFAIRS
Co C	HORMOAD	SOD(+)	182200E	1900308	COMBAT
	GROGODILE	SQD(+)	191200FI	192500H	COMBAT/REDON
Go D	BLOODHOUND=1	PIF (+)	1915458	191930B	COMBAT/RECON

RELEASED: J. McGOWAN


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 7th MARINES 81.S.BINH SON, 2/7,3/7,S-3:

- 1. ISUM # 78
 2. 191200H TO 201200H MARCH 1966
 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 A. GROUND
- (1) AT 191245H, "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THESOP 21 VCS APPREHENDED, AT 191000H VICINITY COORDINATES BY 615017, BY THE RVN JUNK FLEET. ALL ARE ALLEDGED TO BE VC SUPPLIERS. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 19 4 JOB:
- (2) AT 191405H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED, AT 190600H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 618985, AS A VC SUPPLY CADRON THE VCS WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF BINH NGHIA VILLAGE COMMITTEE. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 191430H.
- (3) AT 191405H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS OP ONE VOS APPREHENDED, AT 190730H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 621009, AS BEING A VC. THE VCS WAS IDENT-IFIED BY THE VILLAGE CHIEF OF BINH GIANG. FORWARDED TO ITT AM 191430H.
- (4) AT 191405H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS OP ONE VOS APPREHENDED, AT 190800H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 619011, AS A VC SUPPLY CADRE. THE VCS WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE BINH NGHIA VILLAGE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN. FORWARDED TO ITT ΔT 191430H•
- (5) AT 191405H, "D" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED, AT 190900H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 634004, BECAUSE HE DID NOT HAVE A ID CARL. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 191430H
- (6) AT 191630H, "A" COMPANY DELIVERED TO THIS CP CHE VCS APPREHENDED, AT 191530H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 556010, BECAUSE HE HAD TWO ID PAPERS AND NO ID CARD. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 191700H.
- (7) AT 192120H, "A" COMPANY REPORTED, AT 191955H VICINITY COORDINATES BT 615009, RECEIVING ONE INCOMING GRENADE AND OBSERVED TWO VC DRESSED IN BLACK
- PJ'S. THE VC TRIPPED A FLARE, THREW TWO GRENADES AND FIRED TWO 7.62 ROUNDS AT THE VC WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

 (8) AT 200955H, "C" COMPANY DELIVER D TO THIS OP SIX M1A2 ADAPTOR GRENADE PROJECTION DEVICES AND ONE VC PROPAGANDA SIGN. THE DEVICES AND SIGN WERE FOUND AT 191300H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 602954.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) 26 VCS (APPREHENDED)
 - B. EQUIPMENT
 - (1) FIVE GRENADE ADAPTORS
 - (2) ONE VC PROPAGANDA SIGN
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- A. AT 201030H, A VILLAGER OF BINH THONG STATED THERE IS A CAVE, 100 MET-ERS LONG IN THE HAMLET OF AN THANH. THE CAVE IS IN A HILL CALLED ONG THO LOCATED AT BS 690978. FURTHER STATED THE VC LIVE IN THE HAMLET OF AN THANH AND LE THUY, THERE ARE THREE VC TO A HOUSE. THE VC TRAVEL TO BINH GIANG VILLAGE ALONG A TRAIL CALLED COY QUIT WHICH LEADS TO SON TRA AND TAN HY HAML-ETS. THE VC PLACE SMALL TREES ALONG THE TRAIL TO PROVIDE CONCEALMENT FROM THE AIR.

- B. AT 201030H, A VILLAGER OF BINH THUY VILLAGE, DONG YEN HAMLET STATED A SAMPAN OWNED BY LE DIEN GOES TO BINH GIANG VILLAGE AND GIVES INFORMATION TO THE VC IN TAN HY.
- C. AT 191000H, A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THERE ARE 100VC OPERATING IN BINH LINH, BINH THONG AND BINH GIANG VILLAGES. THE VC ARE KNOWN TO BE ARMED WITH CRUSSBOWS WITH POISON ARROWS. FURTHER STATES THE VC ARE TRAINING THE CHILDREN TO MAKE BOOBY TRAPS.
- D. AT 190800H, A LOCAL SOURCE STATED THE VC CAME TO TAN HY AND SON TRA HAMLETS ON 18 MARCH. WHEN THE VC LEFT AT 190400H THEY LEFT 11 VC BENIND. BELIEVES THE VC WENT TO THUAN PHUOC AND DONG LE HAMLET.
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED


CAPTURED PERSONNEL REPORT ATTACHED.



1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay Fer
20 March 1966
191600H to 201600H
Vietnam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
17 March 1966 m e. wood

LISTENING POSES

Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590988,
593985,599988,602990,
603992,609002,608001,
605999,
Co C(3)576989,572992,566998.



1 2 BLOODHOUND-1

un cr	PATROI.	SIZE	aop	TOR_	TYPE
Co_	CHALVIB-\$	SQD()	192030H	1,92230H	SECURIFY
	CEMPATER_9	SOD(=)	105500H	100500H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-3	SQD(-)	200330Н	200530Н	SECURITY
lo B	FIELDMOUSE-1A W/PF	Ran(-)	191930H	200730Н	AMBUSH
	FTFLDMOUSE-1B W/PF	SOD(~)	191930H	200730H	AMBUSII
	FT ET.DMOHER-O W/PR	SOD(+)	191830H	200730H	AMBUSH
	FIELDMONSR-2A W/PF	SOD(~)	191830H	200730H	AMBUSH
	FTELDMOUSE-3	SQD()	191830H	200750H	AMBUSH
	FTWI.DMONGE_4	SQD	191600H	201600H	SECURITY
lo_C	SIDEVINDER	F.T (4)	192000H	192230Н	COMBAT
	HORNYPOAD	SOD(+)	201100H	201530H	COMBAT/RECON
in a	BLOODHOUND-3 3	MT (+)	S00@COM	204C00E	CIVIL AFFAIRS

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Sidewinder

MAPS: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Sheets 6756 I and IV, 6757 II and III

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: 14 Men
- 2. MISSION: Combat/Recon
- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 190900H March 1966
- 4. TIME OF RETURN: 191600H March 1966
- 5. OBSERVATIONS ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

TIME	COORDINATES	OBSERVATIONS
1120	BS 604954	Found one shell from a 155 dud.
		Informed S-4 to have EOD destroy.
1135	BS 604954	Observed many buildings these were
		burned and much of the surronding area
		was also burned.
1200	BS 602954	Observed that the village was almost
		completely vacent of residents.

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: At coordinates BS 602954 patrol members found VC propaganda sign and Six grenade adapters for use on R-1 rifles.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: N/A
- 9. CONDITION OF THE PATROL: Good
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommend that the dud be destroyed.

/s/ PETE PADILLA

PETE PADILLA, SGT, C-1-7, USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF PATROL LEAD R


11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: NONE

RELEASER: J.

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SCN, 2/7, 3/7

- 1. ISUM # 79
- 2. 201200H TO 211200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 201320H D CO OP REPORTED, AT 190600H VICINITY COCRDS BS618985, WHILE CHECKING BOATS, CONFISCATED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS; 9 RILOS OF TOBACÇO, 54 KILOS OF TEA, 20 KILOS OF SUGAR, 3 BARRELS OF WINE AND 10 LITRES OF GASOLINE. ALL ITEMS FORWARDED TO BINH SON.
- (2) AT 202150H C CO OP REPORTED AT COORDS BS578975 RECEIVING FIVE RDS OF CARBINE FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCATED VIC COORDS BS578968. FIRED ONE 306 AND 15x81MM MORTAR ILLUMINATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - 4. PERSONNEL: NONE
 - B. EQUIPMENT: See Par 3.A.(1).
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 1/ OF HER
 - A. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED
 - B. PATROL REPORTS ATTACHED




RELEASED: J. McGOWAN

Sanger Trivial Country of Land Control of Co

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
To: 7th MARINES


MFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7, 3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 80
- 2. 211200H TO 221200H MARCH 1966
- 3, SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 217600H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPROXIMATES BT 621005, FOR NOT HAVING A ID GARD. FORWARDED TO TIT AT 211620H.
- (2) AT 211600H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VC APPRIMENDED, AT 211110H VCINITY COORDINATES BT 620010, AS A ARVN DESERTER WHO STATED HE WAS FORCED BY THE VC TO JOIN THEM. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 211620.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VC CAPTURED
 - (2) ONE VCS APPREHENDED
- 5. NONE
- 6. NCNE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:
- A. LOCAL SOURCE REPORTS THAT THE VILLAGERS OF BINH HOANG, BINH NAM AND BINH AN HAVW HEARD FROM THE LOCAL VC IN THE AREA THAT TWO MAIN FORCE BATTALIONS, THE 42ND AND 111TH ARE BEING RECALLED TO NORTH VIETNAM. IT IS BELIEVED THE VC ARE PURPOSELY CIRCULATING THIS SUMOR. REASONS ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. (EVAL: F-6)
- B. INFORMATION GAINED FROM THRAE UNRELATED SOURCES STATES THE VC PLAN TO ATTACK BINH SON THE 22 AND 23 OF MARCH. 60 VC WERE SHEN AT BS615960, 60 AT BS640963 ON 21 MARCH 1966. (EVAL: F-3)
- C. A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED AT 201700H THIRTY VC WERE AT TUYET DIEM LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BT654035. THE VC CALL THEMSELVES THE LUC LUONG". ALSO THERE WERE 30 VC CALLED "DU KICH" AT TAN HY. THE VC CHIEF OF TUYET DIEM IS PHAM TUAN AND THE VC CHIEF OF TAN HY IS NGO LAI. FURTHER STATED THE VILLAGERS OF TAN HY ARE CONSTRUCTING FORTY BAMBOO TRIANGLES TO BE USED TO CROSS THE RIVER. THE VC HAVE STATED THEY INTENT TO ATTACK BINH SON VILLAGE (EVAL: F-6)
- 14. OTHER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAYS ATTACHED



ONE T	PAP ROL	SIZE	FOD	TOR	TABE
Co A	CHNTAUR-1	SQD(=)	2122001	220200H	SECURITY/AMBUSI
	CENTAUP=2	SQD(∞)·	212300H	220330H	SACURITY
	CENTAUR-3	FeT	220250E	220430H	SECURITY
Co B	SOUIRREJ-1	SOD	211600H	22160CH	SECURITY
	SQUIRREL-1A W/FF	SQD(-)	2119008	2207UOH	AIGRUSH
	SQUIRREL-1B W/PF	SQD(~)	211500H	220700H	AMBUSH
	SQUIRREL-2 W/FF	SQD(-)	2118303	220700H	AMBUSH
	SQUIREL-24 W/PF	SQD(~)	2118305	220700H	AMBUSH
	SOUTHREL-3 W/PF	SQD()	21195CH	2207008	AGBUSH
	BRAVO XRAY	SOD(=)	2309509	211530H	CIVIL AFFAIRS.
Go C	НОНИГОАВ	SUD(+)	2119308	212230H	COLBAT
	CROCO DILE	SQD(+)	550900A	221400H	COMBAT

1st on 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay for
Os D, 22 March 1966
211600H to 221600H
Vistan 150,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
March 19 1966




3.61	LOSTAC	8127	TOD	TOR	TYPE	
:a_D	BLOOTHOUND-2	PUP (+)	220630H	221200E	COMBAT	
- A PKS r	Air Support. W-34 (2 Mares) 2	Gunnipa V/	ю.		
	Bick un 40 troops et	LZ Leopard	2206306-			
	DEP AD troops at LZ	BS6G4985_	ASAP after	briofing/		
. * . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Comphine & AD remain	on station	till fuel	rang out.		
	No LZ prepa					

RELEASER: J. MCGOWAN


FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
To: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 81
- 2. 221200H TO 231200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 231700H D CO REPORTED AT 210600H VICINITY COORDS B5618985
 STOPPING A BOAT WITH 13 VCS AND SUPPLIES BELIEVED TO BE FOR THE VC. THE
 FOLLOWING ARTICLES WERE FOUND: 10 YARDS OF BLACK MATERIAL, 35 BAGS OF TEA,
 9 CASES OF MEDICINES, TWO GROSS OF MATCHES, 106 BARS OF VIETNAMESE TYPE SOAP,
 1 KILO OF SMALL CANDLES, 38 TUBES OF TOOTHPASTE AND 2 DOZ BOXES OF COUGH DROPS.
 THE VCS WERE FORWARDED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE TO BINH SON ON 21 MARCH. THE
 SUPPLIES WILL BE FORWARDED ON 23 MARCH.
- (2) AT 222050H C CO CONVOY SECURITY REPORTED AT 222035H VICINITY COORDS BS592910, ACTIVATING A LAND MINE. THERE WERE NO MARINES WOUNDED AND DAMAGE WAS SLIGHT. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY TYPE OF MINE. THE CRATER WAS 3-6 FT DEEP.
- (3) AT 222150H "A" CO REPORTED AT 222105H VICINITY COORDS BI613017, RECEIVING ONE INCOMING GRENADE. FIRED TEN RDS OF SA, THREW ONE GRENADE AND FIRED ONE M-79 RD AT SUSPECTED VC LOCATION. AREA ILLUMINATED WITH NEGATIVE OBSERVATION.
- (4) AT 222235H D CO REPORTED VICINITY COORDS BS626989 RECEIVING POSSIBLY ONE MORFAR ROUND. FIRED 15 RDS SA, 81MM MORF ILLUMINATION AND 60MM HE AT SUSPECTED AREA WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (5) AT 230400H H&S CO GUARD REPORTED AT 230345H VICINITY COORDS BT585017, RECEIVING ONE RD OF CARBINE FIRE. RETURNED ONE RD OF 7.62 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) 13 VCS (FORWARDED TO BINH SON)
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. NONE



1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
23 March 1966
221600H to 231600H
Vietama: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E.WOOD
20 March 1966 m e. wood
LISTENING 1955
Go A(6)573026,578023,614016,
615076,611006,613009.
Co C(3)576989,572992,566998.



HG RIVIOAD

LISTENING POSTS

Co B (10)576989,583991,590988,
593985,599988,602990,
603992,609002,608001.

BLOOMOUND -


ROTE: CPL NICOLERI MOTIFIED.

GO C: CROCODILE PATROL VILL

BE LEAVING THE BUTAOR:

RECT, NOTIFIED VIA VIRE
TIME. 2014008

IMIN	Patiol	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPH
Co A	Centaur-1	F.T	222300H	2303004	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	F.T	222200#	23010CH	SECURITY
Go B	SQUIRREL-1	SUD	223600H	23 1600H	SECURITY
	SOUTRELLA W/HF	SOD(=)	221900H	230730H	AMBUSE
	SOUTRIEL-1B W/PF	SQD(=)	221900H	230730H	ALTRUSH
	SOUTRERL-2 W/PF	Sob(=)	22183CH	2307001	AMBUSH
-	SQUIRREL-2A W/PF	SQD(=)	221830H	250700%	HEUSHA
<u>CoC</u>	SIDANINDER	<u> </u>	222100H	222330H	COMBAT
Projecting deligorable throughout the characters religing	HORMIOAD	SQD(+)	250900H	231600H	COMBAR
Ca_D	NICOPIOND-8	PIM (+3	2308 0 09	230,000H	CONTRACT



Go D 1-7
BLOOTHOUND-3
23 March 1966
221600H to 231600H
TOD: 230630H
TOR: 231100H
S/SOT A.S. D'ALTOO
19 March 1966
OREO Charles

Remarks

l. Air Support

- a. 2 Cumships for helo escort 0630-0830. At included. Remain on station until fuel is exhausted. Operate on frequency 47.8 (Co D).
- b. 8 H-34 for troop insertion. Report to Co D LZ at 0630. 4 H-34 to each LZ initially—thereafter, 6 return to LZ red to complete lift.

2. Other Support

- a. 5 LVT's provide river blocking force. Report to Co D Combat Base at 0700.
 Also provide return transportation for troops to Co D Combat Base.
- b. Artillery fires on call only.
- c. No LZ prep.
- 3. Task Organization of participating force includes:

One Fit (Rein), Co D
One Fit (-)(Rein), Co D
Sqd 60M1 Fitre
Arty FO Tm
81M1 Fort FO Tm
Co Hq
Interpreter(s)

(Total about 80 troops)

4. Use of CS agent in caves is anticipated.


RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES
TO: 7th MARINES

INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, HASCO, 81'S, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7,S-3

- 1. ISUM # 82
- 2. 231200H TO 241200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 232000H, "D" CO REPORTED, AT 231030H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 683986, OBSERVED A VCS RUMNING FROM THE PATROL. FIRED AT THE VCS WOU-NDING HIM. THE VCS WAS EVACUATED TO "B" MED AS A CIVILIAN BY MISTAKE.
- (2) AT 232000H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS OF ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 231030H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 699977, FOR NOT HAVING A ID CARD. FOR-WARDED TO ITT AT 232020H.
- (3) AT 232000H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS OF ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 231130H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 698978, FOR NOT HAVING A ID CARD. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 232020H.
- (4) AT 232000H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS CP TWO VCS APPREHENDED AT 231200H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 697975, FOR LYING TO THE PATROL AND NOT HAVING A ID CARD. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 232020H.
- (5) AT 232000H, "D" CO DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED AT 231515H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 696978, FOR RUNNING FROM THE PATROL. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 232020H.
- (6) AT 232045H, "D" CO REPORTED DISCOVERING A CAVE, VICINITY COO-RDINATES BS 697974, 110METERS x 6' x 5'. THE CAVE WAS CUT INTO CLAY, NO SHORING WAS USED IN THE CAVE AND THE ENTERANCES WERE NOT CAMOUFLAGED. THE MAIN TUNNEL HAD A SMALL TUNNEL LEADING OFF TO A EXIT. ENGINEERS PARTIALLY DESTROYED THE CAVE, WILL FINISH AT A LATER DATE.
- (7) AT 240630H, "D" CO REPORTED, AT 232310H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 620982, FIRING ON FISHING BOATS VICINITY COORDINATES BS 627990. ONE WAS MOVING UP THE RIVER AND FOUR WERE MOVING ACROSS THE RIVER. RESULTS OF FIRE UNKNOWN.
- (8) AT 240745H, "D" CO REPORTED, AT 231100H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 697977, RECEIVING ONE ROUND OF CARBINE FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCATED VICINITY COORDINATES BS 694974. RETURNED THIRTY FIVE ROUNDS OF 7.62 WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) SIX VCS APPREHENDED (ONE WOUND ID DELIVERED TO "B" NED)
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE 14. OTHER
 - A. MASTER PARROL DUSBLAY ANT LOSED

y 🔻 🚟 👺



	PATRO L	SIZE	COT	TOR	TYPE
(lo A	CENTAUR-1	P.Q	240:230H	240430H	SECURINY
and which we have a supplementary of the supplement of the supplem	CEMPAUR-2	P.T	23:950H	242400H	SECURETY
ويرسون واردود وينون وينوسودورون الالانات اللاندود الدائي	GENTAUR-3	F.T	23,2000H	2422008	SECURITY
(lo B	SUURREL-1	SQD	23 1600H	24 % 500H	SECURETY
makes the supply parties of makes, the season to the first of the supply	SQUIRREL-1A W/PF	SQD(=)	231900H	240700H	AMBUSH
* 1990)*** Print to Laboratorius * 10 Print propriete depretar part (Standarden)	SQUIRREL-1B W/PF	SOD(-)	25.1900H	240700H	AMBUSH
water the state of	SOUTRIEL-2 W/PF	SQD(=)	23 1830H	240700H	AMBUSH
was an own as worked a that playing angle by a specie	SOUTRREL-2A W/FF	sop(-)	23 1830H	2407COH	AMBUSI
Ch_Cl	GROCODILE	SQD(+)	254930H	232530H	COMBAT
ng or — then is, magnessed a residency beginning a back of the section of	HORMTOAD	SOD(+)	241000H	241430H	COMBAT
Go D	BIOODHOUND=1	PW (+)	2408309	241200H	COMBAT
Go B	BRAVO X RAY	SQD(-)	240900H	24153 0 H	CIVIL AFFAIRS

RELEASER: J. MCGOWAN

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "", "C", "D", H&S, 81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7


- 1. ISUM # 83
- 2. 241200H TO 251200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 241335H A CO REPORTED AT 241300H VICINITY COORDINATES BS605995, RECEIVING THREE ROUNDS OF SA FIRE FROM VIC COORDS BT603004. FIRE TEAM INVESTIGATED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (2) AT 241625H A CO REPORTED AT 241445 TO 241500H VIC COORDS BT608000 RECEIVING FIRE FROM TWO VC, ARMED WITH M-1s LOCATED VIC COORDS BT608004. A FIRE TEAM SEARCHED THE AREA FINDING SIX M-1 AND THREE EMPTY .50 CAL. CARTRIDGES. ALSO DISCOVERED THREE SPIDER HOLES DURING THE SMARCH. NO CONTACT WAS MADE.
- (3) AT 250130H H&S GUARD LOCATED VIC COORDS BT590015 RECEIVED FIVE RDS OF SA FIRE FROM VIC COORDS BT592017. FIRED TEN ILLUMINATION ROUNDS AND RETURNED TWENTY FIVE 7.62 RDS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (4) AT 250150H H&S GUARD LOCATED VIC COORDS BT590015 OBSERVED A BLINKING LIGHT VIC COORDS BT592017. FIRED A SEVEN RD BURST OF M-60 AT THE LIGHT WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (5) AT 250300H H&S GUARD LOCATED VIC COORDS BT590015 OBSERVED ONE VC ANTEMPTING TO PENETRATE THE PROTECTIVE WIRE VIC COORDS BT592017. THREW ONE GRENADE AND CALLED FOR ILLUMINATION. OBSERVED THE VC BEHAVING IN A FURTIVE MANNER. FIRED FIVE RDS OF 7.62 AT THE VC WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (6) AT 250400H H&S GUARD LOCATED VIC COORDS BT590015 OBSERVED A VC IN FRONT OF HIS POSITION VIC COORDS BT 592017. FIRED THREE 7.62 ROUNDS AT VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (7) AT 250430H HAS GUARD LOCATED VIC COORDS BT 590015 OBSERVED 3-5 WC APPROACHING THE PROTECTIVE WIRE VIC COORDS BI592017. FIRED LILUMINATION, 110 7.62 RDS AND THREW ONE GRENADE, WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
- PERSONNEL: NONE
- B. EQUIPMENT: NONE. ... 191 (198
- NONE A CHARLES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY
- MONE ROBALTO

 TO NONE:

 ONE TO SERVICE TO SERVICE SERV
- 11. NONE CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF THE LOCAL PROPERTY.
- 13. INFORMATION GAINED FROM VIETNAMESE NATIONALS:

In the course of the control of the

- A. AT 250800H, A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THAT ABOUT, 182400H VICINITY COORDS BI611009, MARINAS MADE CONTACT WITH FOUR VC (REFER TO ISUM # 77 PAR 3-6 OR 8 FOR POSSIBLE INCIDENT). SOURCE SPATED THE VC WAS HIT IN THE BACK WITH ONE ROUND IND IS DYING FROM THE WOUND. THE VC IS IN A HOUSE IN BINH GLANG (V). Source knows the location of the house. Further states the vo's name is DO PHU AND HE IS A QUINRILLA FROM BINH GLANG (V)
- B. IF 251000H A LOCAL SOURCE STATED THE VC AT BINH CTANG (V) ARE NOW CARRYING "FOUNTAIN PEN ASSASSINATION WEAPONS" (REFER TO CHIEN OU TAP IF PAGE 10). SOURCE STATES HE HAS OBSERVED TWO PENS AND THERE ARE THE PENS IN THE WILLAGE: THE THE ANY GRADING LINE AND LARGE TWO LINES VIN STORES OF THE ANY Grand Constant of the Service of the Constant of the Constant



1st Bn 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
25 March 1966
241600H to 251600H
Victuam: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
22 March 1966 74 E. Wood

LISTENING ROSTS

Co A (6) 573026,578023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B (10) 576989,583991,590988,
593985,599908,602990,
603992,609002,608001,
605999

RECT, NOTIFIED VIA VIRE.

TIMB: 221100H

ECO C (3) 576939,572992,566998.

BORNTOAD

TAOR

BLOO INCUMD-2

HOTE: GUNLY INCRESOLA HOTIFIED

CO C: HORNTOAD PATROL WILL


BE LEAVING HE TAOR:

IINTP PATROL TOD TYPE SIZE TOR P.T 244 93CH 24233CH SECURITY Co. A CENTAUR-1 F.T SMURITY/ALBUSH CENTAUR-2 242400H 250300E CENTAUR-3 F.T 250330H 250530H SECURITY P.T(+) COMBAT Co C SIDMINDER 942100H HOOMSAS SOD(+) 250900H 251600H COMBAR HORMOAD PLT(+) COLIBAT Co. D BLOODHOUND-2 250500H 25.1200H

RELEASED: R. H. KUHNS

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 7th MARINES 81'S, BINE SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 84
- 2. 251200H TO 261200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 251900H, "C" CO DELIVERED TO THIS CP ONE VCS APPREHENDED, AT 251225H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 571991, FOR RUNNING FROM THE PATROL. FORWARDED TO ITT AT 252010H.
- (2) AT 251935H, RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM BINH SON THAT A COOF VC WERE IN MY HUE (1). (EVAL: B-3)
- (3) AT 262200H, "D" CO REPORTED, AT 252200H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 624991, OBSERVING A BOAT MOVING SOUTH WITH RUNNING LIGHTS ON VICINITY COORDINATES BS 617982. FIRED FIFTEEN ROUNDS OF .50 CAL AT THE BOAT. THE RUNNING LIGHTS WERE TURNED OFF AND NO FURTHER OBSERVATION WAS MADE. RESULTS OF FIRE UNKNOWN.
- (4) AT 261055H, "D" CO REPORTED, AT 252330H VICINITY COORDINATES BS 988656, OBSERVING A LIGHT SOURCE THROUGH TANKS BINCOULARS VICINITY COORDINATES BS 984656. THE LIGHT WAS NOT VISIABLE TO THE NAKED EYE, HOWEVER WITH THE BINCOULARS A LIGHT SOURCE WAS DISTINGUISHABLE SCANNING NEW DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. LIGHT WAS OBSERVED FOR APPROXIMATELY 3-5 MIN.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VCS APPREHENDED
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- $5 \cdot NONE$
- 6.≠ NONE
- 7 NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OF Har
 - a. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED



DECLASSIFIED

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Bloodhound - 3

MAPS: Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757II

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: Platoon Reinforced
- 2. MISSION: Search and clear of THUONG HOA (3), (2).
- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 260530H March 1966
- 4. TIME OF RETURN: 260915H March 1966
- 5. ROUTES: See overlay filed with S-3
- 6. OBSERVATION ENEMY AND TERRAIN:

TIME	COORDINATES	OB SERVATION
0715	BS644979	No hamlet exists on finger
0730	BS643975	Found an abandoned cave, no signs of recent use, approximately 20 meters long.

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: None
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE TENEMY: None
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: No casualties, good morale.
- 10. DONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A squad (Rein) patrol with engineers will destroy cave in near future.

/s/ G. D. VOIGT

G. D. VOIGT, 1stLt, D-1-7-3 USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF PATROL LEADER


11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None

RELLASED: R. H. KUHNS

TROMO 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES INFO: "A"CO, "B"CO, "C"CO, "D"CO, H&SCO, 81'S, BINE SON, 2/7,3/7, S-3

- 1. ISUM # 85
- 2. 261 200 H TO 271 200 H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 262345H, H&S CO REPORTED, AT COORDINATES BT 586012, RECEIVING ONE ROUND OF SA FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. FIRED TWO 7.62 ROUNDS AND THREW ONE M-26 GRENADE AT SUSPECTED LOCATION WEEK UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OF HAR
 - a. CAPTURED PERSONNEL REPORT ATTACHED
 - b. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED

W -- 👺



97

fet Ba 7th Marines
Patrol Overley For
27 March 1966
261600H to 271600B
Vietnes: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/Cpl M.E. WOOD
24 March 1966 24 E. 4/000f

LISTENING ROSTS

Co A(6)573026,576023,614016,615016,611005,613009,615009,533991,590988,593985,599988,602990,603992,603002,606001,605999,60001,576989,572992,566998

THEFT	PATE FO.L	eize	TOD	TOR	TYPE	gillige lineare lineare commence () : 4 · · ·
Co A	CENTAUR-1	F. 2	261930H	25 213 OE	SECURITY	
	CERTAUR-2	SQD(=)	26 20 00H	270200H	SECURITY	
	CENTAUR-3	F.T	270503	2705309	SICURITY	
Go D	BLOOIHOUND-1	PIT (+)	2709003	271300H	COMBAT	

RELEASER: J. MCGOWAN

TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", B", "C", "D", H&S


81s,S-1,S-3,BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

1. ISUM # 86


271200H TO 281200H MARCH 1966

SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

- (1) AT 271450H D CO REPORTED AT 271130H THEIR PATROL LOCATED BT628006 OBSERVED A GROUP OF WOMEN. WOMEN RAN FROM MARINES AS THEY APPROACHED. PATROL PURSUED THE WOMEN AND RECEIVED 50 RDS M-1 & M-2 CARBINE FIRE FROM 5-6 VC LOCATED BT627008 PLUS TWO RDS OF FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCATED BT630008. PATROL RETURNED 75x7.62 and 4xM-79 WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (2) AT 272015H B CO PATROL LOCATED BS612982 SIGHTED THREE BOATS WITH 12-15 VC/VCS. PATROL CHALLENGED BOAT OCCUPANTS WHO ATTEMPTED TO FLEE AREA. PATROL FIRED 1200x7.62 AND 7xM-79 RDS AT FLEEING BOATS. BOAT OCCUPANTS RATURNED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF RDS SA FIRE AND MANEUVRED INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE RIVER WHERE THEY COULD NOT BE OBSERVED. RESULTS OF FRIENDLY FIRE UNKNOWN.
- (3) AT 272220H C CO LOCATED BS569997 RECEIVED TWO INCOMING GRENADES. FIRED 2xM-79, 20xM-14 AND TWO WP GRENADES AT SUSPECTED EN LOCATION WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.
- (4) AT 272250H A CO LOCATED BT614009 RECEIVED ONE INCOMING GRENADE. FIRED 1xM-14 RD AT SUSPECTED ENEMY LOCATION WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- (5) AT 281150H A CO REPORTED AT 281130H S-2 SCOUT LOCATED BT617017 RECEIVED 2 RDS CARBINE FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. NEGATIVE ACTION TAKEN BY S-2 SCOUT.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL: NONE
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OF HER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED



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


1st Ba 7th Marines
Patrol Overlay For
28 March 1966
271600H to 281600H
Vietnem: 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 II & III
L/CPL M.E. WOOD
25 March 1966 M E. Wood

LISTENTHO POSTS

Co A(6) 573026,578023,614016,
615016,611006,613009,
Co B(10) 576989,583991,590988,
593985,599988,602990,
603992,609002,608001,
605999,
Co C(3) 576989,572992,566998.

The m	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
	CENTAUR-1	san(=)	272030H	272230H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	SQD(⇒)	272300H	280330H	SECURITY
CO_D_	BLOODHOUND-2	PLT (+	270600日	250900H	COMBAT



(10 C = 160 Ba 1th Nations Batrol Overley For 23 March 1966 2716CCH 2816OCH Vietnam: 1501000 Sicota 6757 II & III b/12L N.E. 1000 25 March 1966 M E. Wool

THE THE MATER IN MATERIAL TO LITTER FOR CASE OF MET WITH MACHINERING STREET, AND RESIDENCE.	Operation and a supplication of the suppl	above mineral American American American	Constitution and the statement of the st	K KIMASSACANO TAMBINDAN ASP'ILANDIA A MININA A MANAGEMENTA A TAM	
AND LOS COMPANIES	SIZE	COL	<u> </u>	TTPG	
man a source of the second of		280.2001	281600H		
	and the second s	, and the second			

RW/Wh

1. Task Organizati a of unit

26 Plt (Ref.), Co C
2d Plt, C C
Det, ART (Interp)
Det, Mod. Elt, H& Co
FO Tm. I by G, 10th Mer.
MG Sqd. T C
60MM Mer. Sect, Co C

- 2. May 6 can mpi of south as far as and line Il
- 3. A radio relay thation will be established vic BS 606920 for the duration of the patrol.
- 4. Occadination with District. Chief is required. (Action He 7th Max).
- 5) Sed will provid 4 trucks on 28 Mar to pick up 60 troops at 0830 at BK 564557 set drop there a BS 606920 and BS 608906; subsequently, to pick up 60 troops at BS 606920 at BS 598925 at 1600 and drop them at BS 564997.

PATROL REPORT

DESIGNATION OF PATROL: Packrat - 1

MAPS: Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III

- 1. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: Squad Reinforced
- 2. MISSION: Ambush
- 3. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 271800H March 1966
- 4. TIME OF RETURN: 280700H March 1966
- 5. ROUTES: See overlay filed with S-3
- 6. Observations enemy and terrain:

TIME

COORDINATES

OBSERVATETOF

272015

BS613978

Observed 3-5 boats on beac with 12-15 men on shore moving north in a single column. Patrol fired illumination and the VCS hit the deck and as soon as the flare went out the group scattered. The patrol opened fire and attempted physical pursuit. Approximately 1200 7.62 and 7 M-79 rounds were fired at the fleeing VCS. Three boats succeeded in making the river where they too split up. No further contact made.

- 7. OTHER INFORMATION: Searched area of contact by light of illumination and found a pair of black PJ type trousers with a wallet and one sheet of paper in the wallet. Searched the area again at first light with negative results.
- 8. RESULTS OF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ENEMY: No friendly casualties. Enemy casualties unknown, several were heard moaning and screaming.
- 9. CONDITION OF PATROL: No casualties, good morale.
- 10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None

/s/ R. MANDO ...

R. MENDOZA, SCT, B-1-7-3 TEMO NAME, RANK & UNIT OF FIRALLEADER

11. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY DEBRIEFER: None

/s/ D.W. WILSON

D.W. WILSON, 1stSgt, B-1-7-3 USMC NAME, RANK & UNIT OF DEBRIEFER


RELEASER: J. MCGOWAN


FROM: laten, 7thMAR (REAR) TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", H&S,

81s, S-1, S-3, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 87 2. 281200H TO 291200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - 4. GROUND
 - (1) NEGATIVE THIS REPORTING PERIOD
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE 12. NONE
- 13. NONE 14. OTHER
 - A. PATROL REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED





Company No. 120. 281600K to 291600E BLOOIHOUED-3 29 March 1966 TOD:290630E TOR:291200E

REMARKS

- l. Air Support
 - Remain on station until fuel runs out. Operate on freq 4708 (Co/D).
 - b. 8 H-54 for troop landings. Report to Go D LZ at 0650. 4 H-54 to each LZ initially—thereafter, 4 H-54 to make 2nd troop lift to LZ BLUE. (Remaining H-54 can secure at this point).
- 2. Other Support
 - 2. 3 LVT's provide river blocking force. Report to Go D Combat Base at 0615. Also provide return transportation for troops to Go D Combat Base. Released about 1200.
 - bo Artillery fires on call only.
 - c. No LZ prep.

3. Task Organization

Co Hq

Dot, ARVN

Det, PF

Det, let Flt, Co C Engrs

Det, S-2 Sect

3d Plt (Rein)
3d Plt

Sod, ATA Scot, Co D

Blocking Force #1
Sqd, 2d Plt, Co D
Sect, 1st Plt, Co B Tks
Dat, 1st Plt, Co C Engra
FO Tm, 611M Mort Plt

Sign Force #2
Sign, 2d Pit, Co D
Sign, MG Sect, Co D
Tim, ATA Sign, ATA Sect
FO Tim, Btxy G
Sect, 60MM Mort, Co D

Blocking Force #5
FT: 2d Fit
Det: Co A: 3d Amtrass
Det: PF

4. Use of CS Agent im cares is anticipated. RIMDEZVOUS

10 Support

a. Artillary: Btry G direct support. HE & Illumination.

- b. Co D provide Rein Sqd blocking force vio BS614948, and two Sampan patrols in Song Tra Bong River covering from BS603940 to BS615966. All elements in place by 0800.
- 6. 4 Trucks pick up 45 troops from Co C at BS575972 at 0700 deliver them vis BS595955, then secure.

2. Task Organization

1st Flu (Rein). Co C
1st Pit, Co C
Det, AHYN (Interp)
FO In, Btry G
60M Sqd, Co C
M6 Sqd, Co C
Det, Med Pit, H&S Co
Det, S-2 Sect, H&S Co
Det, PAT
Hq, FAT Det
Pit, FAT

Prom Charáis-1 Date: 29 Karob 1966 Ted: 290700 March Ter: 021600 Aprál.

3. Ates

Operation in some on first doy, jet Plt (Rein) Go C (including 2 PM Plt) remains in the zone for 4 additional days (until 2 April). During this period, systematic daily search and clear patrols are conducted. After the 5 days, the 2 PAT Plts remain in zone, while 1st Plt; Go C withdraws to Co C Enclave TAOR. In this manner, WW control is restored to the area and maintained thereafter by PAT units.

- b. Co C Troops and PAT troops will rendezvous at BS593933 at 290730 H-Hg 0800 (LOD Hwy 1).
- o. PAT Plts are organized under a single PAT Hop PAT Hop in turn is subordinate to Plt Cmdr, ist Plt, Co C. PAT unit is under Opcon ist Plt, Co C.
- d. 1st Bn, 7th Mar Free Fire zone is in effect 290700 021600.

8

RELEASER: J. MCGOWAN


FROM: 1SIBN, 7THMAR (REAR)
TO: 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", 'B", "C", 'D", H&S, 81s,S-1,S-3,BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 88
- 2. 291200H TO 301200H MARCH 1966
- 3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY
 - A. GROUND
- (1) AT 291410H A CO BS626991 RECEIVED 15 RDS SA FIRE FROM AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VC LOCATED VICINITY BS628995. COMPANY COULD NOT DETERMINE EXACT ENEMY LOCATION AND DID NOT RETURN FIRE.
- (2) AT 291945H THREE VC ACTIVATED A TRIP FLARE AND THREW ONE M-26 GRENADE AT A CO POSITIONS LOCATED BT615010. MARINES RETURNED 7XM-26 GRENADES AND 20 RDS M-14 POSSIBLY KILLING ONE OF THE VC.
- (3) AT 292350 A VC ACTIVATED A TRIP FLARE AT A CO POSITIONS VICINITY.
 BT613013. MARINES FIRED 20 RDS 7.62 AT THE VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. A SEARCH
 OF THE AREA WAS CONDUCTED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- 4. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
 - A. PERSONNEL
 - (1) ONE VC KILLED (POSSIBLE)
 - B. EQUIPMENT: NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NONE
- 8. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. NEGATIVE





March.



1st Bn 7th Marinos Patrol Overlay Far 30 March 1966 29160CH to 30160CH Victuan: 9:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III L/CPL M.E. WOOD 27 March 1966 M. E. Wood

LISTEWING FOSTS
Co A(6)573026.578023.614016.
615016.611006.613009.
Co B(10)576989.583991.590988.
593985.599988.602990.
603992.609002.608001.
605999.
Co C(3)576989.572992.566998.






	PATRO L	SIZE	WD_	Tor	TYPE	
Со А	Centaur-1	JF.T	300500H	300500H	SECURITY	PECTEL RésideNicolar destachém Příc (Austrian), refer
THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND ADDR	CHISTATR	FoT	292130H	29240Œ	SICURITY	NATIONAL PROPERTY AND THE PROPERTY OF THE
Co B	PACKRATEI	SQD(+)	29200CH	300/700R	AMBUSH	دائر الكان والدوي الدران يستان والمراج وأوسا أوالمارية
how I make the advisoration representation Systematic Electron	PAGERAT-2	SQD(+)	291830H	<u> 300700H</u>	AMBUSH	
ženo a nalopoulous parakonous akalakas opisla	PACKRAT-3	sop(+)	29#950E	300700H	AMBUSH	
Q(L	30=2	SQD(+)	300900H	3014CCH	COMBAT	teritalisministration (es. 5 -
	MICOTHOUND-1	PIT (+)		<u>1301600H</u>	COMBAT	till timpengi kecapanga ya awa ne 34

RELEASER: MCGOWAN

FROM: 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES 7th MARINE REGIMENT

INFO: Cos "A", "B", "C", "D", EES, S-1, S-3, 81s, BINH SON, 2/7,3/7

- 1. ISUM # 89
- 2. 301200H TO 311200H MARCH 1966
- 3. NONE
- 4. NONE
- 5. NONE
- 6. NONE
- 7. NOME
- 8. NONE
- 9. NONE
- 10. NONE
- 11. NONE
- 12. NONE
- 13. NONE
- 14. OF HER
 - A. ROADBLOCK REPORT ATTACHED
 - B. MASTER PATROL OVERLAY ATTACHED
 - C. LATE REPORTS
- (1) ON 28 MARCH H&I WAS FIRED AT COORDINATES BS635009 BASED ON A LOCAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT. ONE CIVILIAN WAS WOUNDED, UPON QUESTIONING IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT TWO YO WERE KILLED AND THREE WERE WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF THIS
- (2) ON 29 MARCH, 300 VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS DEMONSTRATED PROPESTING H&I FIRES. THE CIVILIANS WERE DISBURSED BY MARINES AND REPUENED TO THATR HAMLETS AFTER APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES. NO INCIDENTS RESULTED.
- (3) ON 29 MARCH, A LOCAL SOURCE REPORTED THE VC WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK "A" COMPANY'S POSITION BECAUSE OF THE MARINES LEAVING THE APEA. SEVEN VC WERE IN POSITION AT BS620969 AT 291930H IN ORDER TO SCOUT THE LARA FOR THE CROSSING OF THE MAIN BODY OF VC (20-30) AND TO JOIN AN HOUR LATER AT BS650965. ON 30 MARCH A UNRELATED CONTACT IN HAMLET STATED THE VC HAD NOT GROSSED THE DUE TO THE HAI FIRE THAT HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC COORDINATES BS650965, 635969 AND 639970.



1st Rn 7th Herines Patrol Overlay For 31 March 1966 301600H to 311600H Victness 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III L/CPL H.E. WOOD 28 March 1966 79 8. Wood

I_ST_ENTING_HOSTS


Co A(6)573026,578023,614016,
615016,611086,613009,
Co B(10)576989,583991,590986,
593985,599988,602974,
603992,609002,608001,
605999,
Co C(3)576989,572992,566800.

.....

UNIT	PATROL	SIZE	TOD	TOR	TYPE
Co` A	CENTAUR-1	F.T	302300H	310500H	SECURITY
	CENTAUR-2	F.T	302200H	310100H	SECURITY
Co B	PACKRAT-1	SQD(+)	302030H	310700H	ALBUSH
	PACKRAT-2	SQD(+)	30183CH	31070Œ	AMBOSE
	PACKRAT-3	SQD	30200Œ	310700H	ALBUSH
	CO HIERw1	SQD	310930H	311430H	C.A.

FOR OTHER MER AMAY

Comparit of Operation Overlay let Mn (-) (Rein), ith Mar Operation Indiana 28 Mar 1986 Map: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Serice 1701, Sheets 6756 III & IV



Emclosure (2)


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Overlay of Action on 28 March Co C, 1st Bu, 7th Mar Operation Indiana


Mada VITEM 1:50,000 AMS Serice L701, Sheets 6756 IIJA IV

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100 6 7 1 1 10 2 Comp





Co Delta, ist In 7th lindage Patrol Overlay Fee 30160CH to 31160CH Victions 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II & III L/OFL N.B. WOOD 28 Nameh 1966 74 6, cooks

hard-real-						
TINU	PATROL	STAR	70D	TOR	TYPE	
Co D	BLOODEOUND=2	PIE (+)	310615E	311100E	GO34848	

REMARKS

- 1. Air Support
 - as 4 H=34 heles report to LZ Leopard (Co D) at 0615. Make two lifts to LZ at BS664986 (48 men W/eqpt).
 - b. 2 General ps W/AO report to LE Leopart (Go D) at 0615. Contact "BLOOMHOUND-2" on FM 47.8. Act as help except, remain as AO and blooking elements until fuel exhausted.
- 2. To LZ Prep.





let Battalion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

- L At 012145H Company D sighted a Fletnamose boat departing TAN HI apparently attempting to oxose the SCHC THA BONG River at BS 624968. Illumination was called for and 10-20 rounds of 7.62 were fired at the boat. The boat returned to TAN HY. There was no indication of any YC eastwaltiss.
- 2. At Olzholf Company B received two rounds carbine fire from vio ET 604002. One figure was observed running in an ensterly direction fallowing the firing. The Marines fixed 36 rounds 7.62 at the fleeing suspect. There was no indication that he was hit by the Marines.
- ocabat hase at BS 633985 requesting to work the fields around the combat base. The request was denied and the civilians were referred to BIME SCH Bistrict Bis. At this base the atvilians presented some pro-WG propagated to BIME SCH Bistrict Bis. At this may tured the atvilians presented some pro-WG propagated to Company D. The Marines quickly may tured the atvilians presented some pro-WG propagated to keep them was taking place form these were governing the divilians in an atvient to keep them wall clear at the combat base. At approximately 1100 there Marines received 30 rounds 84 and two rounds 650 rounds 7.62, two rounds M-79 and five rounds 90mm. The WG broke contact and with drew. The Marines sustained one WIA from the 60mm morters. Two civilians were also wounded by the marter fire. The WG surfaced four killed as a result of direct hits by 90mm rounds. These VG were emplayed by the Marines might the WG propagands they were passing eat. A search of the area by the Marines morealed no thing of empagands they

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

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PERIOD: _____ 10012 ____ TO ___ 1000 2 ____ 1000

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I Day / Night	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B			***************************************	
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	<u>;</u> ;		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	C R	S T	<u>u</u> _ <u>v</u> _		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		EE FE	GG HH	ll JJ	KK LL

REMARKS;



#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

ORGANIZATION: BN. PERIOD: 10012	• •			D/	TE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/ NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	1 J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	MN	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	S T	<u>U</u> <u>V</u>		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBAT	GG HH	[] t	KK LL
REMARKS:					Madulas Handlins o

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD

PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	L DATE 4 INIT BY	. MMA.T	ERIAL CA APONS CSW	PTURED OTHER
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+ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:

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Ist Battalion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

- 1. At 022035H Company D observed an infra-red light source at BS 625986. The area was illuminated by tank mounted search lights but nothing was observed.
- 2. At 0222458 Company D observed an infra-red light source at BS 625987. The Marines fired 20 rounds 50 caliber, three rounds K-79 and 115 rounds 7.62 at the light. The light disappeared and nothing further was observed.
- 3. At 0225598 BES Company observed one VC at BT 590016. The area was illuminated and two rounds 7.62 were fired. The VC apparently withdraw.
- 4. At 0309502 while returning from a run to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines OF an Amtreo from Company A, 3rd Amtrao Battalion received four rounds harassing fire from BT 562012. The YC were not observed so the amtrao did not stop or return the fire.
- 5. At O311 NOW a patrol from Company A observed three VC running from a hamlet at BT 662036 as the Harines approached. Civilians in the hamlet identified them as VC. The area is presently being searched by Marines.

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H. D. KING By direction

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PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION +	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	WEAPONS IW CS	
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USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:

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
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USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:



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1st Battelion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

- 1. At 282110H HAS Company observed two persons near the protective wire at RT 588011. Illumination was fired and 15-20 rounds 7.62m. There was no indication of VC casualties.
- 2. At 010750N a Company B patrol observed two VCS in a backet-boat moving toward the mouth of the SCHG TRA BONG River at BS 612998. The boat was taken under fire by the Narines and the two VCS jumped into the river and disappeared. The Marines fired 100 rounds 7.62mm and eight rounds 81mm Illumination.

MISCRILLANDOUS

- a. Int Battalion, 7th Marines has assumed the mission of Division General Reserve (12 hour slort).
- b. 1st Battalion. 7th Marines has assumed the mission of providing a "Sparrow Hark" reaction squad for the 7th Marines. Company E has been essigned this mission.

R. D. KING By direction

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	6 H	[] J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	<u> </u>	<u>u</u> <u>v</u>		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		EE_FE_	GG _HH	II JJ	KK LL
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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

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ORGANIZATION: 1st BN 7th REGT____TAOR

PERIOD: 1 10017 Mar TO 2 1000 7 Mar 1946

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY* DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	6 F	0 3 G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K F	0 0 M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 1 C R	1 1 S T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		1 1 0 X (COMBAT	T 1 1 PATROL)	AA BB	O O CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	6G HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS;



#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD


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⁺ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:

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lat ha, 7th Mar Actions With Contact

- 1. At03.70455 Company B received four rounds of earline fire at BS 608999. The Merines three one hand illumination grands and fired four rounds 7.62. The YO was observed running into a tree line.
- 2. At 0400551 SAS Company received one round of carbine fire at BE 586017. The Marines returned one round 7.62 at the suspected energy position.
- 5. At 040830 a platoon from Company A tripped two someoutive N-26 booby trape at DT 669053. Gaven Marines were wounds as a result of the explosion.

Mendlaneous

a. 1st Bettalion, 7th Parines assumes the mission of Division Ceneral Reserve

R. W. KDW By direction

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H			
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	QR	S_T_	<u>u v</u>		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FF.		11 11	KK LL

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FOR PERIOD	

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PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	MATERIAL CA WEAPONS IW CSW	OTHER
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⁺ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM. USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY REMARKS:







let lattelian, 7th Marines Malions 4th Control

2. It 050900H a plateon from Cospeny A at N7 657045 observed two fighting beats extering the SHAR HOL River at N7 650041. When the tests observed the Marines they attempted to escape to the HOLE CRIES Sex. The Maximum fixed at the bosts and one of the bosts belted. The other best continued to the mas. A Tistomers Sorannest Patrol Best spending in the ones cheshed out the bost beld up. We have me information on the results of their investigation.

March Laborate

a. At 0509250 Company 5 departed by holicopter to 2nd Batteline, 4th Sarinee surrently operating in \$100 500 Michigan.

• At Ohligh let Detroline, 7th Marines Alpha Command Group Asparted for Bill SCS

A. A. C. C. by direction



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PERIOD:10012	10 1000) 		3	
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	[] J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	C R	S T	<u> </u>		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	GG HH	II JJ	KK LL
REMARKS:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			

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	TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD Day/Night	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION DAY/NIGH	
	SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB					
	LISTENING POST (LP)	C D					
	AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	6 H	1 1			
	RECON PATROL (REC)	KL	MN	0 P			
	SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	S T	<u>u v</u>			
	SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD	
	CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	GG HU	11 11	KK LL	
	REMARKS:			<u> </u>			

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT


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	PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	WEAPONS JW CSW OTH	
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+ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:



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1st Battalian, 7th Marines Actions With Centact

1. At 052030H a patrol from Company A, 3d Amtrac Battalian mighted one TO gt
BT 555035. Two rounds 7.62 were fired at the VC who then fired one round at the
patrol. The patrol returned eight more rounds 7.62 and the VC disappeared into
the brush.

Missellaneane

a. Operation MAINE has been postponed indefinitely.

2. E. SETSER by direction

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OPERA	TIONS	SUMM	ARY

ORGANIZATION: / BN REGT AT TAOR

PERIOD: ____ 10012 ___ TO ___ TO ___ 10002 ___ ___

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*1 DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D			·	
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	6 H	[[[]] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [, ,	
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P	·	
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	C R	<u> </u>		•	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		EE FE	GG HH	11 JJ	KK LL

REMARKS;

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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PERIOD:10017	_ 101000	, 			
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY / NIGHT	BATTALIO DAY/NIGI
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
ISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	6 H			
RECON PATROL (REC)	KL	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	QR	3 1	<u>u</u> _ v _	- William Will	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z	AA BB	CC DI
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE		II JJ	KK LI
REMARKS:					

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R. E. SETSER By direction

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 15T BN 7TH REGT CHULAI TAOR

PERIOD: 07 10017 MAR TO 08 1000 7 MAR 1966

8 MARCH 1966 DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	O 9				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	Ø / G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O	0 0 0 P	• 	
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 2 c R	0 / S T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBAT	GG HH	0 0	KK LL

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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ORGANIZATION: JOHN THE REGT CHANGE TAOR
PERIOD: 10017 TO 11/2 10007 1/16

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	O 24 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	∅∅EF	G H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 Q R	0 2 s T		- L	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O	O O 0	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size perations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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let Bettalion, 7th Marines Astions With Centact

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as let Battalion, 7th Marines' Command Group meturned from Operation WPAH to the Ba OP at 071550H.

be Company B, let Battalion, 7th Maximos returned from Operation UTAH to the Ru TAOR at 071935H.

e. At OSIZOOH let Battalian, 7th Marines is relieved as DIVISION OSMERAL RESERVE (6 hour elect).

R. D. KING By direction

CONTINUIAL (Modified Handling Authorized)

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
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LISTENING POST (LP)	0 24 C D				
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RECON PATROL (REC)	<u>о</u> о к L	M N	0 0 0 P		
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SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)			10	00	6 6

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CLEARING (CLR)

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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ORGANIZATION: 157 BN 27H REGT CHU LAL TAOR

9 MARCH 1966 DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD Day/Night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				7.
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 24 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 0 6 H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 1. Q R	0 2 S T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
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REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size perations will be reported and All be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD

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FMFPAC REPRO 1506



⁺ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:

COMPINENTIAL (Modified Handling Authorised)

ist Battalion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

1. At 0909 15H a Company D patrol observed six VCS moving east at Bf 650003. The patrol fixed several bursts from their H-60 at the suspects. The fire fulled to stop the VCS and they escaped into the underbrush.

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a. Rome

R. S. KING By direction

COMPINATIAL (Medified Handling Authorised)

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

Modified Handling Authorised

ORGANIZATION: 157 BN 7TH REGT CHU LAI TAOR

PERIOD: 09 10017 MAR TO 10 1000 7 MAR 1966

10 MACH 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM Day/Night	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 24 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0	Ø O	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 / c R	0 2 s T	0 0 u v		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)	·	W X	/ O Y Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	PATROL) O O GG HLH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS;

CONFIL)ENTIAL
Modified Handling Authors and

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: ST BN 7TH REGT CHULAL TAOR

PERIOD: 10 11 1000 7 1966

10 MARCH 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD Day/Night	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 22 C D				•
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 5 6 H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	/ 2 Q R	0 0 S T	0 0 U V		# #
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		O / X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	GG HU	0 0 II JJ	KK LL

REMARKS:

CHARLEN HALL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

CONFIDENTIAL (Modified Handling Authorized)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

1. None

Miscellaneous

a. None

R. D. KING By direction

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: KT BN 77H REGTCHULAL TAOR

PERIOD: 10 11 1000 7 MAR 1944

11 MARCH 1965 DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 22 c D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 5 6 H	0 0		# .
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	/ 2 R	0 0 s T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	2 0 Y Z PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	O O GG HH	0 0	O O

REMARKS;

CONFIDENTIAL Modified Handling Authorities

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: AT BN 774 REGT CHILBE TAOR

PERIOD: _//_ 10017 MAR TO 12 10007 MAR 1946

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	O 22 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 5 G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 Q R	*/ 2 s T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	GG HH	0 0	KK LL

* INDICATES CIVIC ACTION PATROL



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let Buttalion, 7th Marines Actions with Contact

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ENTIAL STATION: 157 BN PERIOD: 10012	11h REGT 44		UMMARY		4 / /6 <u>/</u> ATE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY#! DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 () A B				S. •
LISTENING POST (LP)	c D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	G H	1 J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	6 0 c R	* /	0 .0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)		2 / W X	/ 0 Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(CÓMBAT	PATROL) GG HLH		KK LL
REMARKS: # 100.0000	9 (101m)	Contract Contract	ere de la companya de		CONFIDENTIAL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY / NIGHT	BATTALION* DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				Maria de la companya della companya
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	1 1		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	S T			
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE_FE		11 JJ	KK LL

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PROVINCE/ COORDINATE	S DATE/ S TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	MATER WEAP IW	ONS CSW	The second second
Qual 100	11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11	20 30 C	D- 1-7	AMERICAN.	MC (W.5)	4	10	1/2
								2
64.3 <u>54.</u>							\$ 7 m	

+ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY
REMARKS:

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Modified Handling Authorises

FMFPAC REPRO 1506

COMPIDENTIAL (Vodified Handling autorised)

1st Mattalion, 7th Marines actions with Contact

1. At 112020H Company B observed what appeared to be a signalling light at B0 624983. One round of 50% was fired at the light and the area was illustrated with the tank's searchlight. Three VC were observed in the immediate area. Nine additional rounds 50% and 50 rounds .50 callour were fired at the VC. Due to high volumeter fire placed on the target and the relatively short range the probability of VC killed or wounded is high though not confirmed by the sompany.

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A. A. KING

COMPLUMITIAL (Medified Handling Authorized)

CONFIDENTIAL *ORGANITATION:BN PERIOD:10012	1 REGT Chia	PERATIONS S TAOR 52	SUMMARY	/3/M/n.	///// ATE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	<u></u>	() (b) (G) H	00	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	G R	O O S T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		/ / / W X	/ O	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBAT	PATROL) GG HH	() () () () () () () () () () () () () (
REMARKS:					ONFIDENTIAL diffed Handling Authorates

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

FMFPAC REPRO 1508

PERIOD: 10012	<u> </u>			DATE		
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT	
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B					
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 /7 C D					
AMBUSH (AMB)	♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠<	(1 6 H	00			
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P			
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	S T	0 0 U V			
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		/ O X	/ / // Z	AA BB	CC DD	
CLEARING (CLR)		(CÓMBAT		11 33	KK LL	
REMARKS:				DOTT	MATAL Sent Total	

PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	TERIAL CAPTURED EAPONS CSW OTHE
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÷ USE TYPE ACTION USE REMARKS SEC				URED MATERIAL IF	NECESSARY	CONFIDENTIAL Montried Mandhing Anthon



let Battalien, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

1. At 130930E Company A apprehended one YCS at MY 622027 for having an altered ID card.

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a. Ist Mattalion, 7th Marines assumed the mission of DIVISION GENERAL RESERVE (six hour elect) at 151415H.

A. D. KING by direction

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: AND PERIOD: 10012 MAR TO 14 1000 2 MAR 1966



				76 W	
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O		· ·		
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	6 H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 2 c R	\$ T_	0 0 u v		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBAT	PATROL) OO GG HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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ORGANIZATION:BN PERIOD: 10012	I <u>/ ''</u> REGT		MMARY	<i>J4 /41.4</i> Di	ATE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	() // C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	() () () () () () () () () ()	G H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	O O	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SE.C)	7 3 Q R	/ / s T	0 0 U V		est of the second
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBAI C C C	GG HH		KK LL
REMARKS:					

#1 All Company and Battalion strongerations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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1st Battalion, 7th Marines Astions With Contact

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	O 19			1 1 1 1	
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 A 6 H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 D	0 0 M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	1 3 c R	1 1 s_T_	0 0 U V	1. ************************************	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		1 0 W X	1 0 Y Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	PATROL) O O GG HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS:

PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: __/51 BN __7-6 REGT CHU LA L TAOR
PERIOD: __/5 10017 MAR TO _/6 10007 MAR _ 1966

15 MAR 1966 DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	1 19 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	Ø \&7	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 3 Q R	*1 1 s_T_	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		J O X (COMBAT	1 0 Y Z PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)	m _k .	O O EE FE	0 0 66 HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS:

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+ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.		

1st Bett alien. 7th Marines Actions With Contact

1. At 150 900H, BS 65 9995, a Wi-1E in support of a Company D Search and Destroy mission fired on six VO, one of which was arranged. The Wi-1E killed one VO which was dragged to cover by the surviving VC. There was no contact with the enemy by the pastol.

MISCELLANEOUS

a. At 151030K, BS 524982, a Company D patrol discovered four wounded civilians. Three of the civilians were treated by the Corporan and the fourth was evacuated to BAS. Begsons for the wounds were undetermined.

b. GP and OP legations

(1)	Headquarters, 1st H	attalion, 7th	Marines	37 586017
(2)	Company A			38 606018
(3)	Company B			Bs 605994
(4)	Company C			BS 572992
(5)	Company D			BS 624991
(6)	81MM Flatoon (-)			胶 589014
(7)	Battery G, 3d Batte	ilion, 11th Ma	rines	班 589019


R. D. KING By direction

CONFIDENTIAL (Medified Handling Authorised)

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ORGANIZATION: IST BN 2TH REGT CHULAL TAOR
PERIOD: 15 10002 MAK TO 16 10002 MAK 1966



TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D		·		
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 7 6 H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 3 c R	*/ / / S T	0 0	1	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		/ O X	/ O Y Z	O O	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)	1	(CÓMBAT	PATROL) O O GG HLH	0 0	KK LL

* INCLUDES CIVIC ACTION PATROL REMARKS:

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PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: FT BN 774 REGTON TAOR
PERIOD: FOOTE SHE TO FT 1000 2 SHE 1964

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	G H	1 J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SE.C)	QR	S T	0 0 u v		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	O O Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBAI C C C	GG HH	0 0 11 JJ	KK LL

REMARKS:

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	PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INFT BY		APONS CSW	OTHER
	QUANTE MEAT	160730H 160930H	PAT S+D	0-1-7 None	UNKNOWN NONE	MARINES	9	0	0
	O. LANG NEAL	160930H	500 5+0	D-1-7 NONF	1) AK NOWN TUC. KILLD, 2 V		8	0	O
					WOUNDED				
	SE TYPE ACTION SE REMARKS SEC IARKS	ABREVIATIONS TION FOR ADD	SHOWN ON BO DESC	OX SCORE FORM. CRIPTION OF CAPT	FURED MATERIAL IF	NECESSÄF	₹ Y	CONFIDE Modified Hea	NTIAL adling Authors

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let Battalion, 7th Marines Actions with Contact

1. At 160750, ME 646007, a Company D patrol fixed upon 6 VC with weapons remning along a trail. The Marines fired three rounds of 61 ME and 50 SA rounds. A seasoft of the area by the patrol proved negative.

2. At 160990E, HT 653003, Company D received approximately 150 rounds of the first from an estimated eight VC armed with carbines from vie HT 654003. The Marines returned fire with 10 N-79 rounds and 500 SA rounds. The Marines observed one VC fillied and two wounded. The bedies were dragged away so the VC broke contact and fled.

Miscellaneous

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R. D. KING

COMPLEMENT (Vedified Bendling Authoritys)

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 157 BN ZIA REGT Chief La TAOR
PERIOD: 16:400 HOOLZ MAR TO 17.410.00 Z Mar 1966

SCOUT SNIPER (SS) LISTENING POST (LP)	0 0 A B / 19 C D			報酬 できない できない からない からない からない からない からない からない からない から	
LISTENING POST (LP)				CA .	
	0 0				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 b 6 H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 2 c R	0 2 s T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)		W X	O O Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBAT	PATROL) GG H.H	0 0	O O

REMARKS:

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PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 15t BN /th REGT Cha Lai TAOR
PERIOD: 17 10012 Mar TO 18 2 1000 2 Mar 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B			
LISTENING POST (LP)	7 19 C D			
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 5 6 H	00	
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 O	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P	
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 Q R	*1 2, s T	0 0 u v	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		O O EE FE	0 0 -GG _H.H _	0 0 KK LL

REMARKS: * wellete cave action partiel

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lat Battalion, 7th Parines Actions With Contuct

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Miscellanoons

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R. D. KING by direction

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ORGANIZATION: 15 BN 114 REGT 240 41 TAOR
PERIOD: 17 10012 114 TO 18 1000 2 114 1966

FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
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/ /9 C D				
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O O	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
0 0 c R	* 1 2 s T	0 0 u v		
	W X	2 0 Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
	EE FE	GG HH	0 0	KK LL
	DAY/NIGHT O O A B // /9 C D O O E F O O K L O O C R	DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT O O O A B / /9 C D O O S E F G H O O O M N K L M N * 1 2 S T O O O W (COMBAT)	DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT O O A B // /9 C D O O S O O O E F G H I J O O O O O O O K L N N O P O O O S T U V (COMBAT PATROL) O O O	DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT O O O A B // /9 C D O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

REMARKS: *

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ORGANIZATION:BN				Di	ATE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	l J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	S T	_ <u>u</u> _ <u>v</u> _		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)			GG H.H	II. JJ	KK LL

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ORGANIZNATION PROVINCE/			<u>/*_</u> 1 0002 _ frd unit/			MATER	RIAL CAF	TURED
COORDINATES	TIME	SIZE TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES		liw 🗀		OTHER
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and the sale of			10-1-1					
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			A SW SW	A. d. A. Martin	, V		<u> </u>	-5
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						<u> </u>		-
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+ USE TYPE ACTION A USE REMARKS SECT	BREVIATIONS	SHOWN ON BOX	SCORE FORM.	IDED MATERIAL I	E NECESSAD			
REMARKS SECT	ION FOR AUL	JITTUNAL DESCR	RIPTION OF CAPTO	JRED WATERIAL I	r Negessan			

COMPINENTIAL (Notified Handling Authorized)

1st Bestalies, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

- to At 18030CR, HT 619000, Company D OF chaptered four boats with lights flashing. Marines fixed 15 sounds of 3A to and eight sounds of .50 caliber to move the boats. The boats then moved to HT 619005 and mealed stationary at this point.
- 2. At 18110/H, a Company D patrol observed a VC with a carbine and dominante on a trail at Hr 629004. The Parines fixed at the VC as he flad. The VC dropped the documents which were secured by the Marines during their sales of the gross. One VCS was apprehended during the search.
- 3. At :61100E, a Company D patrol at SE 625007 was fired upon by one VU with a carbine, ST 626006. The VC fixed six mounds and fled. The Marines Setwand fire with 20 rounds SA fire and searched the grea with negative results.
- 4. At 1813551, a Company C patrol was first on by an estimated five V6 with carbines from 35 614946. 120 pounds of fire was most ved by the Marines and the Marines returned fire with 350 nounds 34 and five M-79 rounds. One V0 dead was found upon ascaulting and searching the area.

MISCRIMENT US

III III

a. At 181400E, a Company B patrol apprehended four VCS at BS 61537. She VCS were pointed out by the chief of Vish An (4) as being VC spice.

a. b. iING by direction

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ORGANIZATION: AT BN 77 REGT CHE LAL TAOR
PERIOD: LA 10012 MAR TO 19 1000 2 MAR 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B			Marie de la companya	
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ /9 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 // G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 c R	/ 2 s_T_	0 0 u v		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBAT O O LEE FE	PATROL) O O GG HIH	0 3	KK LL

REMARKS;

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PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 15T BN 7TH REGT CHULAI TAOR
PERIOD: 19 10017 MIL TO 20 1000 7 MAR 1964

19 MARCH 1916

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 6 6 H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 Q R		*/ O		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	O O	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBAT OOO	PATROL) O O GG H.H	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS: * CIVIC ACTION PATROL

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD

No.	IST BN. TIMAR	2400H N <u>/8</u> 1 001Z _	MAR TO	19 PERIOD	MAR 1966	DATE Z	(2) (2)		
	PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	MATER WEAP	RIAL CAP ONS CSW	TURED OTHER
<u> </u>	QUANG MGAI BT 613011	1900154	Sed SEC	A-1-7 NONE	UNKNOWN NONE	MARINES	a	0	0
Q _	QUANG NEWS	1900454	SOU SEC	A-1-7 NONE	<u>I) NKNOWN</u> NoNE	VC	0	0	0
3—	QUANG NOAL BS GOI 982	190050H	SQD SEC	B-1-7 NONE	UNKNOWA NONE	VC	O !	0_	0
4 _	QUANG NGAI	190130H 190200H	Co SEC	HIS-1-7 NONE	UNKNOWN	MARINES	Ø	0	0
5-	QUANG NGAI BT 625005	190530H	PLT S+D	D-1-7 NONE	UNKNOWN NONE	vc	đ	0	0
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8 –							A STATE OF THE STA	· .	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						· ————— /			·

⁺ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.

USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY

REMARKS:

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Madified Handling Inthonesia
FMFPAC REPRO 1508

DECLASSIFIED



let Bettalion, 7th Marines Astions With Centert

- L. At 1900158, I negative results. # 613011, to spanor and and one N-79 round at the YC as they flada Company A OP observed two TO moving along
- Line. RESIDENCE. ¥ 19045H, M 619011, a Company The Parises respon Was searched with コムマ ガ negative wesults. rounds A OP received one round of SA fire from a EL EL EL EL EL N-79 sounds under THE REAL

ar in a nort out

11 (5)11 1

- 2000 At 1900508, 38 604505, Company Į Marines fired one round of Class illumination with . rounds of haracaing fire TOPLICO I
- bing infiltration of the Command pentries fired 10 rounds SA each From 1921/10 to 1902001, E48 Company et the vc. 8 enotitions. of the area *Mas66 reported H TO H
- Y 5 1,505,500. M the area 625005, a Company D patrol reacted one incoming round of Comm 4 \$ 6 POTITION

Manual Language

- At 1906com, Committee # 616362° 9 a E D sppra YCS identified
- Of BIME At 190730H, Mr 621009, Company D apprehended one YUS pointed out by Filliage

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

- mi tite THOUSE BETTE Company D appro 705 identified by Tillage
- TO LONGON FOOKS H Company 1 4 5 T YOS who had no ID card.
- ve 13000m M 615017, Company > received 21 VCS delivered in The 8
- At 191530H, Mr 556010, Company one VCS who had two

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A direction

CONFIDERIAL (Modified Handling Authorised

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PERIOD: 19 10012 MAC TO 20 10002 MAC 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY#1 DAY / NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ /9 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 7 6 H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	O O		*/ O		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	O O Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		COMBA	PATROL) GG HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS: * TICLUDES CIVIC ACTION PATROL

CONFIDENTIAL Modified Handling Authorise

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PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: IT BN ITH REGTCHULAL TAOR
PERIOD: 20 10012 // TO 2/ 1000 2 // 1/4

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ /// C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	<i>f. f.</i> E F	6 H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	() () () K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R	*/ 3 S T	U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(SAD)			Y, Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBAT	PATROL) GG HH		KK LL

REMARKS: * INCLUENS CINIC ACTION PATROL

INFIDENTIAL patricipal Authorizant			ACTION REPO			
ORGANIZNATIO	DATE/	A) A TO 2 ACTION +	<u>Ø</u> 1000₹ _/// FRD_UNIT/	ENM UNIT/	INIT	IATERIAL CAPTURED NEAPONS
COORDINATES	TIME	SIZE TYPE	LOSSES	LOSSES	BY	W CSW OTHER
1.5 62.8482	20105CH	Sav SHO	D-1-7 NONE	WAKHOWN NONE	- VC	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
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USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM.
USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF MARKS:

CONFIDENTIAL Modified Handling Authorise

FMFPAC REPRO 1506

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let Battalien, 7th Marines Astions with Contact

l. At 201050H, BS 624982, a Company D patrol received five rounds of SA fire from one VC at BS 628982. The Marines fired 20 rounds of SA at the VC as he broke subtast and fled. A search of the area proved negative.

Masel langua


a. Mossa.

M. J. HOCHERAUER
By direction

COSPIDENTIAL (Modified Handling Authorised)

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				August

ORGANIZATION: 1 BN THE REGT Charles TAOR
PERIOD: 20 10012 Max TO 11 1000 2 Mar 1111



TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY / NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ 19/ C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	6 H	00	•	
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 P		4 1 1
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Ø / C R	w2 3 s T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)	N _i	W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)	*	EE FE	GG HH	II JJ	KK LL
REMARKS: * Medicida	civic och	ne fitted		CON! Modero	TOENTIAL HARDINA ANDRIGO

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PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: BN REGT TAOR
PERIOD: 10017 TO 20 10007

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 9 E F	G H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 4 Q R	<u>s</u> T			
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)	(現在) (大)	EE FE	GG HH	0 0	KK LL

REMARKS:

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Madilled Headling Asthonics



let Battalion, 7th Maximes Actions With Contact

In House,

Manal Langue

a. At \$13000H, Mr 621005, Company B apprehended one VCS who had no In carrie

b. At 211100H, Mr 620010, Company D apprehended one VC identified by Milk SCE Police Chief as an ARTH deserter.

the duration of Operation TEXAS. Company B departed their Mill positions at 2114908 to assume defensive positions at 1st Mattalian, 4th Marines.

de CF and OP Logations

(1)	Readquarters, let Battalion, 7th Marines	H 586017
(2)	Company A	IF 606017
(3)	Company B	Ni 605994
(a)	Company C	B6 57299?
(5)	Company D	I S 6249%.
(6)	Simm Martar Platoon (-)	M 569014
(7)	Bettery G, 3d Bettelion, 7th Harines	DF 589019

R. D. KING Dr direction

COMPIDESTIAL (Modified Handling Ashkomised)

安康 一 网络

ORGANIZATION: LET BN 7TH REGT MULAL TAOR
PERIOD: 21 10012 MAC TO 22 1000 Z MAC MAC

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	C(DA)	MPANY*I ∕NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B					
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ /9 C D				;	
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	G H	00		The second secon	distriction of the second seco
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	M N	0 D			
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 C R	9 T	<u>U</u> <u>V</u>			
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z PATROL)	O AA		CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		EE FE	GG HH	[Q II	13	KK LL

REMARKS:

PLANS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 457 BN 774 REGT (41) LAL TAOR
PERIOD: 22 10012 MAR TO 23 1000 2 MAR 1666

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	/ /9 c D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	0 0 M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 0 Q R	0 0 s T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	6G HH	00	KK LL

REMARKS:

CONTINUES (modified Handling Authorized)

let Mettalione 7th Marines Actions With Contest

1. Rone.

March Allege

m. At MCGCE, Company B apprehended 13 VCS on a boat, B: 618965, the had equipment and medical supplies alleged to be for the VC.

R. D. KING By direction

OCEFIBERIAL (Fodified Maneling Authorised)

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION DAY/NIGHT
COUT SNIPER (SS)					
ISTENING POST (LP)	7 19 C D				
MBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	00		
ECON PATROL (REC)	K L	() (). M N	○ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Agent Constitution of	
ECURITY PATROL(SEC)	ු ි c	() () () () () () () () () ()	28 O	Apple - Apple	
EARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		/ / / W (X)	/ O	AA BB	CC DD
LEARING (CLR)		(CÓMBAT		()	KK LL

FMFPAC REPRO 1508

DECLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATION: BN PERIOD: 10012			DATE		
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY / NIGHT	BATTALIC DAY/ NIG
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	AB				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	6 6 F	G H			
RECON PATROL (REC)	(3) (3)	M N	0 P	d g	
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 R	My / Z			

REMARKS

CLEARING (CLR)

SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)

#1 All Company and Battalion size exerations will be reported and well be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

X Y (COMBAT PATROL) DD

PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	IÑIT BY	WEA IW	PONS CSW	OTHER
QUANC NCAL BT 585017	<u> 230545H</u>	Security CP	HOS-1-7 NONC	Unk None	vc	0	0_	

COMPIDENTIAL (Modified Handson, Authorised)

let Battalion, 7th Mazines Actions With Contact

1. At 230345E, wie BT 5050M7, HAS Company OP security received one round of carbine fire from an unknown source. The sentry fired one round of SA with results unknown.

MISCELLANGOUS

- a. The Communications Platoon conducted one hour of training with the 45 Cal. Listruction included safety precautions and known-distance firing.
- b. The Battalion provided two platoons for security of Convoys traveling from the Enclave to Mish Son for Operation TEXAS.

R. D. KINO By direction

COMPIDENTIAL (Modified Handling indications)

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PERIOD: LOO12	TO 10CCT	an an analysis and a second		DALE	
TYPE ACTION	FIRETEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD Day/Night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	CD				
AMBUSH (AMB)	EF	G H	I J		
RECON PATROL (REC)	KL	MN	OP		•
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	QR		J v v		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		W X COMP	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FF	1	II JJ	KK LL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate with the classified as S/D or CLR as is mos

					5477411041
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION* DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	7 19 D	S.y.			
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	O O G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	6 0 K L	O O M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 /h	S T	<u> </u>		· .
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
	i	LUMBAL	111211421		

-	CONF	DEN	TIAL	•
	ATT + Bak			

CONTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD PROVINCE/ DATE/ **₹FRD UNIT/** ENM UNIT/ INIT WEAPONS ACTION + COORDINATES TIME SIZE TYPE LOSSES LOSSES IW CSW OTHER BY WHKMOWAI

USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM. USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF REMARKS:

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FMFPAC REPRO 1506

COMPICERIAL (Hedified Haldling Asthorized)



let Rektalions 7th Maximus settems With Contact

Le Ab 241,3896, Bo 605995, Company A received these sounds of SA fire from vis DF 605004. A fireteem was disputabled to supply the area with me content being made with the FC.

2. At 2614600, BS 605994, Company A received mix rounds of earthse fire from an unbrown number of TO vie M 609004. A sille squad manufact the area with negative secults.

MEGRILLIANES

- a. Company C provided a accurity plateon for convoys operating on Eighter I from Operation TEXAS to the Englare.
 - b. Company B continues under Operational Control of let Mattalian, 4th Mariness

R. D. KING By direction

COMPIDENTIAL (Modified Handling Amhorhood)

25 MAR 66 DATE

TYPE AUTION	FINETEAN DAY/RIGHT	SAUAD Day/night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	0 0 G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)	O O L	O O M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL (SEO)	0 2 Q R	S T	2 /		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		2 0 X X/COT	Y PATROL) Z	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		CCOMBI CCOMBI EE FF	O O HH	O O II JJ	O O

REMARKS:

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate.

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ORGANI COMO AST.	7 TH EST CHULDI TAOR	
1001 25 10017	MARIO 26 3800 MAR 15	166

25 MARCH, DATE

TYPE: ACTION	DIRETEAM DAT/NICKY	equad day/night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	I II G				
AMBUSH (AMB)	O O E F	G H	0 0		
RECON PATROL (REC)		OON	0 O		
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)			O O V		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		W X	T D MPC Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLE TRING (CLR)		COMBA	T PATROL) GC HH	O O	KK IT
REMARKS:	y ex man a special and a s				CONFRENTIA

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate...

- volesk stanting Apphonent		CONTACT .	action report					
\mathcal{F}		FOR	PERIOD					
1 BN 1 MK 24	3400H WAS TO	25 2400 H Mai	- 1966 DATE 2	5 Med, 66				
Province/	Date/	Action +	Frd Unit/	Enm Unit/	Init		riel Cept oons	ured
Coordinates	Time	Size Type	Losses	Losses	Ву	$\mathbf{I}V$	CSV	Other
					£			
· QUANC NIGAT		3.	4-5-1-7	UNK				
592-017	250130H	CP Security	MENC	NONE	UC	0	0	O
QUANC NIGAL			1425-1-7	UNK		:		
592017	4011036	CP Security	177 6716	NONE	USME	0	0	0
3 QUANT NGA			14.5-1-7	UNK		!		
592017	250300H	CP Security	mone	NONE	ELSME.		0	<u> </u>
1 QUANC NGA		1	1465-1-7	UNK		į		
592017	250400H	CP Security	mone	LONE	USME	6		9
- QUANC NGA			14d6-1-7	UNK				
592 017	250430 H	CP Suity	mone	None.	USINC	မ	0	Θ
L QUANC NGA		,	0-1-7	UNK:		1		
BT 66 0006	250850H	PU 5+D	MOne	NONE	VC.	<u>်</u>	<u>O</u>	<u> </u>
)			* .
& .	0							

⁺ USE TYPE ACTION PROVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOY SCORE FOW. USE RIMARKS SECTION FOR MULTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY. REMARKS:



CONTIDENTIAL (Modified Reguling Authorised)

lst Battalion, 7th Marines Actions With Contact

- 1. At 250130H, HT 590015, HAS Company security received five rounds of SA fire from unknown number of VC, vio HT 592017. The Marines fired 25 sounds of SA's while illuminating the area with 61mm Mortane. The results of the fire were unobserved.
- 2. At 250150H, HT 590015, HAS Company security observed a blinking light vio BP 590017. The Marines fired seven sounds from a M-60 Machine Com with unknown results.
- 3. At 250300H, HT 590015, HAS Company security observed one man near the protective wire vio HT 592017. The Marine three one hand grenade and fixed five rounds of SA as the VC withdrew from the wire and fled out of range.
- 4. At 250400H, BT 590015, H&S Company security observed one VC near the protective wire vio BE 592017. The Marine fixed three rounds of SA fire with unknown results.
- 5. At 250430H, BT 590015, HAS Company security observed three to five VC approaching the protective wire vio HT 592017. The Marine fixed 110 rounds of SA and three ene hand granade with results unobserved.
 - 6. At 250850H, a Company D petrol, MY 656000, received eight to ten munds of SA from two VC, vio HY 660006. The patrol returned fire with 45 rounds of SA and three H-79 rounds as the VC broke contact and fled.

MISCELLARIOUS

- a. At 251410H, Company B returned to their MLR positions and will assume the Company one hour elect status at 260630H.
- b. At RélD408, Company A destroyed a tunnel 110 meters long near TVIST DIES (1), ET 646048. A total of 350 lbs. of G-4 was used to destroy all of the tunnel secret a small portion under a house. A Vietnamese knapsack containing clothing and destroy ments were found in the tunnel during the initial search.

R. D. KING By direction

CONFIDENTIAL (Modified Handling Authorised)

OPERATIONS SUMMON BEGT Chubay

PER OD: 25 240011 Mac 26 24004 Mac 66

TABE - TION	firetoam 1760/night	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O				
LISTENING POST (LP)	[/ [9]				
ambush (amb)	O O E F	0 Z			
RECON PATROL (REC)	O O	O O M N			
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	0 2 Q R		O V		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		W X	T PATROL)	O O BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		I COMBI		II JJ	KK TĒ

REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR astis most appropriate...

Plans Summary 26Mar66

TYPE ACTION	FIRETRAM DAI AGHT	SQUAD . THOTW,YAD	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / RIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O				
LISTENING POST (LP)					
AMBUSH (AMB)		G H			
RECON PATROL (REC)	O O	O O	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	QR	0 2 s T	0 0 v		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		O O	$\begin{bmatrix} Z & I \\ Y & Z \end{bmatrix}$	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMBA	T PATROL) GG HH		KK LL

REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most

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1st Bestalion, 7th Marines Astions With Contact

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SQUAD FIRETEAM PLATOON COMPANY #1 TYPE ACTION DAY GRIGHT DAY NIGHT DAY / NIGHT DAY/NIGHT SCOUT SNIPER (SS) LISTENING POST (LP) AMBUSH (AMB) RECON PATROL (REC) SECURITY PATROL (SEC) SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D) BB ΛA . Z CC DD CLEARING (CLR) JJ II LLREMARKS: #1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is nost appropriate...

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DAY NIGHT

COMPANY #1

DAY/NIGHT

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DAY NIGHT

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REMARKS

CLEARING (CLR)

TYPE ACTION

SCOUT SNIPER (SS)

LISTENING POST (LP)

SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate...

X (COMBAT PATROL)

CONTACT ACTION REPORT

	ORGANIZNATION	26 1001Z	MACTO B	OR PERIODH 71 0002 _	Mar. 66	DATE 27	/////// MATERIAL	CAPTURED
a A	PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	WEAPONS IW CS	
	BS 624984	•	Lo Sec	0-1-7 None	UNIK	<u>UKN</u> VC	0	0 0
5	BTG27008	271/304	<u>p/T 5+D</u>	NONE	None	vc	<u></u>	0 0
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⁺ USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS SHOWN ON BOX SCORE FORM. USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY REMARKS:

CONTINUEDIAL (Baddfied Hearling Authorised)

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ORGANIZATION: 1307	TO 10007	And the second s		DATE	/ (
EMPN ANTION	FIRETOM DAY/RIGHT	SQUA D DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	CCMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)					
LISTENING POST (LP)	A B D				
AMBUSH (AMB)		G H			
RECON PATROL (REC)		N N	OP		
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)		S T		*	
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		V X	YZ	AA BB	lol a
CLEARING (CLR)		O SOME	AT PATROL) Z GG HH		KK LI

TYPE ACTION	FIRETEAM DAY/NICHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)		*			
LISTENING POST (LP)					
ambush (amb)		Q A	TQTQ1		
recon patrol (rec)	PP	To P			
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)					
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		X COMB	AT PATROL)	AP BB	CC DD
CLE RING (CLR)		EE FF	GG GH		

CONTAC	T AC	TION	REPORT
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9 . 8	ORGANIZNATION	1 26 1001Z	71A1 TO 2	OR PERIOD. 2 1000 Z	Mar. 66	DATE <u>27</u>	MAC 66 MATERIAL C	Υ ΔΡΤΗRFD
•	PROVINCE/ COORDINATES	DATE/ TIME	ACTION + SIZE TYPE	FRD UNIT/ LOSSES	ENM UNIT/ LOSSES	INIT BY	WEAPONS IW CSW	OTHER
1-	QUANS NGAI BS 624984	2104294	Co Sec	D-1-7 NONE	UNIK	UKMC	<u> </u>	0
9 -	BTG27008	271/30H	p/T S+D	NONG	None	UC_	0 0	
3	OF GOTON	27/30/	#4		JUNE TO WE	UCM.		<u>O</u>
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USE REMARKS SECTION FOR ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY
REMARKS:

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hat Bettellos, 7th Maxines Actions with Contest

At 2704294, BS 625980, Company D observed one VO at vio BS 624984.

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THE REST TO SELECT

At 252345H, Mr 506012, a CP security during assertant one notice of the filessuspected sites

At Fillion, M 627008, a Vistamers sivilian was oracuated by Company In ilian was wounded in the lag and it was unknown as to how the civilian was

M 607016, a Marine from Company D tripped a N-48 trip Chara

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TYPE ACTION	FIRTHEM D/A/MIGHT	SOJAD Day/night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY XIGH
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O				
listening post (lp)	7 19 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)		0 2 G H	0 0 I J		98
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	O O	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	Q R	S T	O O V	No.	
EARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		0 0	2 0	O O	O O DD
LEARING (CLR)		O O	AT PATROL) Z	00	00

#1 All Company and Bettalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLE as is most appropriate.

ORGANIZATION: 50 PERICD: 10012	10002	11. 11. F.	<i>*</i>	DATE	y
TYPN ACTION	FIRETEAM DAY/NIGHT	equad Day/night	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	DAY / NIGHT
scout eniper (ss)	PP				
LISTENING POST (LP)	19				
ambush (amb)		G A	I	2	
reçon patrol (rec)	K L	M	0 P		-
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	Q B		U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		W X	Y	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(COMB	AT PATROL)	II JJ	KK LL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate.

CONTAGT ACTION REPORT
FOR PERIOD

Province/ Coordinates	Date/ Time	Acti Size	lon + Type	Frd Unit/ Losses	Enm Unit/ Losses	Init By	West IW		Other
BT 617017	381130 14	FIRE TEAM	SEC	A-1-7 NONE	NONE	VC.	0	0	
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USE TYPE ACTION ABREVIATIONS, SHOWN ON BOY SCORE FORM.

USE RIVERS SECTION FOR ADMITIONAL DESCRIPTION OF COTURED MATERIAL IF NECESSARY.

RUMARKS:

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-Michigan reporting MY 617017; a Company A patrol received two rounds of A 70 from an unknown legation. indidents or encounters the petrol K

MICE STATE OF THE

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- lot Battalion, 7th Marines assumed the stanton of Myinten
- minately 2000000, let Battalion, 7th Marines was placed on & for Operation INDIANA. for Operation
- to belilisted from let Justalion, the bears of 261403H and 261605H the Let Battalion, 7th 1 7th Marines 2,02 to Operation INDIANA shiper
- Company M_{i}^{-}), 3rd Bestalion, 7th Marines is manning the MLR position r be let Battalion, 7th Marines for the detation of Operation INDIAN INDIAN.

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- Dodpany L. 5rd Battalion, 7th Maris Operation INDIANA
- (-) from Company A lat Pattelion, 7 Fightons (-) (Reds) and a few 7th Mariana

1 1 1

- The Company A positions will be attailed, 7th Marines sugmented by Plateon (-) from Company N., 356
- During the hours of darkness, MLR positions will be reinforced with 2 Mag of Outon and 1 Plateon of Tanks.
- 4. CP and OF Locations

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REMARKS

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLB as is most appropriate...

A place of the second Hanne condition according PLATOON COMPANY #1 TYPE ACTION DAY/RICHT DAY/MIGHT DAY / NIGHT DAY/NIGHT SCOUT SNIPER (SS) LISTENING POST (LP) AMBUSH (AMB) RECON PATROL (REC) SECURITY PATROL (SEC) SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D) (COMBAT PATROL) CLEARING (CLR) ΚK REMARKS: CONFIDENTIAL Maddled Residence Applicates

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate.

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COUTACT ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD

	Province/ Coordinates	Date/ Time	Action + Size Type	Frd Unit/ Losses	Enm Unit/ Losses	Init By	Material Con Verpons IV GSV	othe:
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REMARKS:

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let Battalion, 7th Marines Astions With Contact

le At 25k4kM, Company A (-), manning the Combat Meas during the absence of Company B, meteriod approximately 15 rounds SA fire from via of BS 62099%. Company A could not observe any enemy neversett and was not able to return the fire.

MISCHLIANDUS

- a. Company N (-), 3rd Battulion, 7th Marines continues to man the NLR posttion of Company B, let Battalion, 7th Marines.
- b. Company L, 3rd Jettalion, 7th Harines continues to man the Mil position of Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Harinese
- 6. Two platoons (-) and the Company Regignarters of Company As let Buttalions 7th Marines continue to man the Company D Garbet Base.
- d. The Company A position continues to be manued by one plateon (-) (main) from Company A, let Battalion, 7th Harines and a plateon (-) from Company H, 3rd Battalion, 7th Harines.
- e. During the hours of darkness, HLR positions continue to be reinferred by 2 light actions of Ontes and 1 plateen of Tanks.

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CONTINUEDIAL (Modified Handling Authorized)

ORGANIZATION:	TO 1000Z		•	30 MAR	(
TYPE ACTION	FIRETEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOCN DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION DAY NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	00			,	
LISTENING POST (LP)	Z P				
ambush (amb)	0 0 E F	G H	1 1		
RECON PATROL (REC)	O O	O O	0 0 0 P		*
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	O O R	S T	O O V		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		V X/COV	O O AT PATROL) Z	MA BB	O CC DD
CLE TRING (CLR)		O O		O O	00

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as S/D or CLR as is most appropriate as

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TYPE ACTION	FIRETEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY #1 DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION #1
scout sniper (ss)					
LISTENING POST (LP)	1/1/9				
ambush (amb)	PP	Q 3 G H			
recon patrol (rec)	لمِلمِ	O O N	O O P		
SECURITY PATROL (SEC)	02 R	*/ O	O O		
SEARCH & DESTROY (S&D)		V COMPA	T PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)			PATROLE		O O

REMARKS:

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CONTACT ACTION REPORT FOR PERIOD

Province/ Coordinates	Date/ Time	Action + Size Type	Frd Unit/ Lossos	Enm Unit/ Losses	Init By		erial Capt pons CSV	Other
QUANG NGAI BT613013	292350H	Co(-) SEC	A-1-7 NONE	UNKNOWN	ve	0	0	e
						1		<u> </u>
								-
	-	<u>.</u>					-	
			<u> </u>			!		
								-

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Lo 48 292550%; a trip flare was set off at constitutes M 613015 in the vicinity of Company & CP by a VC who was seen running nursh. Approximately 20 rounds of 7.62mm were first at the VC. A therough search of the area was conducted with magnetive results.

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1 10 mm

- a. At 302430K, Companies B, C and the let Plateon of Company A zeturned from Operation INDIANA and zeaseamed their portions of the let Battalion, 7th Maximus MLR.
- b. At 503530H, Company B returned from Operation INDIANA and rescoupled the Combat Base of ecordinates BS 624992.
- c. Companies N and L of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines have been relieved of positions on let Battalion, 7th Marines MLR and have neturned to their respective 3rd My Battalian positions.

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•		\cdot	110 0	V 171	

ORGANIZATION: 15 BN 7 REGT Chu LO TAOR
PERIOD: 30 7007 Mar TO 31 7000 Mar 1966

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*	BATTALION*1 DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	1 19 c b				
AMBUSH (AMB)	0 0 E F	O O H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	0 0 K L	M N	0 0 0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 2 c R	ST	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	O O PATROL)	O O AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	GG HH	0 0	KK LL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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ORGANIZATION: A BN 7 REGT Chu-hai TAOR
PERIOD: 31 10017 MAC TO OL 10007 April 66

DATE

			51 455 611	COMPANY	DATTALIONAL
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY / NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	O O A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	1 19 C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	O O F	0 3 6 H	00		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	0 0 M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	0 3 Q R	0 0 s T			
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE FE	0 0 66 HH	00	KK LL
REMARKS:					CONFIDENTIAL

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

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TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	1 1		
RECON PATROL (REC)	KL	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	Q R		U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		LEE_FE	GGH.B	[] JJ	KK LL

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World Handling Althoras	01	PERATIONS	SUMMARY	1	9,000
ORGANIZATION:BN. PERIOD:10017	*			D	ATE
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY ≠ NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY / NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	() X		•		
AMBUSH (AMB)	9 E F	G H			
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	c R	3 0 S T	0 C	·	
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	Y Z	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)	•	(CÓMBAT	GG HH	0 8	KK LL
REMARKS;		.	<u> </u>	(4	DAY OF NIA

#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate

	PERIOD: TO TO Z				
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	©OMPANY*I DAY / NIGHT	BATTALION*
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	6 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	7 5		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	M N	6 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	c R	S T			4 *
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X (COMBAT	Y Ž	A'A BB	CC DD
		EE FE	GG HH	11 JJ	KK LL
CLEARING (CLR)					

FMFPAC REPRO 1508

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ORGANIZATION: BN. PERIOD: 10012				DATE	
TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I	BATTALION* DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	C D				•
AMBUSH (AMB)	E F	G H	<u> </u>		
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	MN	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	QR	S T	<u>u</u> _ <u>v</u> _		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)		W X	YZ	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		(CÓMBAT	PATROL) GG HH	II JJ	KK LL
REMARKS:					CHEDENA,

FMFPAC REPRO 1508

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OPERATIONS SUMMARY

ORGANIZATION: 1st BN 7th REGT Che Led TAOR

DATE

TYPE ACTION	FIRE TEAM DAY/NIGHT	SQUAD DAY/NIGHT	PLATOON DAY/NIGHT	COMPANY*I DAY/NIGHT	BATTALION*I DAY/NIGHT
SCOUT SNIPER (SS)	0 0 A B				
LISTENING POST (LP)	0 24 C				
AMBUSH (AMB)	6 F	0 (G H	(1)	4	
RECON PATROL (REC)	K L	(. () N	0 P		
SECURITY PATROL(SEC)	C 1	9 7 T	0 0 U V		
SEARCH & DESTROY(S&D)	,	W X	Y Z PATROL)	AA BB	CC DD
CLEARING (CLR)		EE FE .	GG HH	4 O	KK LL

REMARKS:

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#1 All Company and Battalion size operations will be reported and will be classified as either S/D or CLR as is most appropriate





HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 7th Marines
Marine# 13
3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO San Francisco, California

3:RDK:cp 3000 15 Mer 1966

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, FMF

Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report.

Encl: (1) Special Combat Operations After-Action Report on Company B, 1stBn, 7thMar

- 1. Code Name and Type Operation. Operation UTAH, a fast-reaction search and destroy operation.
- 2. <u>Dates of Operation</u>. 050855H 071915H March 1966.
- 3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Binh Son District. Area of operations about 7000 meters in diameter, roughly centered on grid square BS 5684.

4. Command Headquarters

a. Battalion Commander, 1stBn, 7thMar:

LtCol James P. KELLY

b. Company Commander, Co K, 3dBn, 1stMar:

Capt L. H. GONZALES

c. Company Commander, Co E, 2dBn, 7thMar:

Capt R. E. THEER

d. Company Commander, Co L, 3dBn, 1stMar:

latht S.H. GRECORY

e. Company Commander, Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar:

Capt R. C. PRIMITT

5. Task Organization

1stBn(-)(Rein), 7thMar Det, H&SCo, 1stBn, 7thMar (Command Group) Arty Liaison Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar

Co K(Rein), 3dBn, 1stMar (051320-061030 Mar)
Co K
FO Tm, 81MM Mort-Rit, 3dBn, 1stMar
FO Tm, Btry. C, 1stBn, 11thMar
Det, Med Plt, 3dBn, 1stMar

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Co E(Rein), 3dBn, 7thMar Co E FO Tm, 81MM Mort Plt, 2dBn, 7thMar FO Tm, Btry H, 3dBn, 1thMar Det, Med Plt, 2dBn, 7thMar

Co L(Rein), 3dBn, 1stMar (070930-071530 Mar)
Co L
FO Tm, 81MM Mort Plt, 3dBn, 1stMar
FO Tm, Btry C, 1stBn, 11thMar
Det, Med Plt, 3dBn, 1stMar

Recon Co, 2d ARVN Div (061415-071430 Mar)

2d Sect, 81MM Mort Plt, 3dBn, 1stMar

Note: See enclosure (1) for Company B, 1 stBn, 7thMar Task Organization.

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines was employed on 5 March a during the tactical march into the objective area. Two concentrations were fired in at danger areas along the route of march as a part of the counterambush plan. An attempt was later made to fire in several concentrations in the valley located in grid squares BS 5885 and 5886, to be used in case of an enemy attempt to depart the objective area by that route; however, these missions were disapproved by the Task Force FSCC for reasons unspecified.

b. Helicopters were used for the delivery and retraction of supplies, and in two cases, for reconnaissance.

- c. Fixed wing CAS was available in abundance, but need for it did not arise.
- d. See enclosure (1) for separate report of supporting forces for Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

7. Intelligence

a. Enemy strength and situation

(1) The strength of enemy units operating throughout the battle area could not be determined by this Headquarters due to a lack of contact with the enemy. Company B while attached to the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines had contact with at least one enemy rifle company, with a heavy weapons element attached. Specifically, one VC unit was identified as the U-101 Company with the X-90 Heavy Weapons Attachment, having an estimated strength of 200 mem. Documents found on the bodies of the dead listed the company's battalion designation as the "Red River Battalion" consisting of the U-101, U-102, and U-103 Rifle Companies and the X-90 Heavy Weapons and Anti-Aircraft Company commanded by THU TRUONG NGUYEN HUYEN. In addition to the above an estimated 50 guerrillas joined the main force company in the attack on Company B's LZ position. 36 VC were killed (confirmed by body count) and an estimated 103 VC wounded or dead

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were carried off during the engagement by the VC. While under the command of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on 7 March 1966, Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines conducted a search and destroy operation along a 200 meter front, vicinity coordinates BS 553848, finding 20 VC packs (19 destroyed by burning, 1 turned into S-2 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines) and seven VC bodies all killed by fragmentation. Seven additional bodies were found in graves, three in one and four in another. Fifty fresh shallow graves were discovered throughout the area but due to time limitations the company could not exploit their search. It was felt by the company commander that many more bodies were in the general area and that the VC had apparently attempted to exfiltrate from CHAU MAI (3) and were caught in a heavy artillery barrage. All of the bodies that were found had strips of camouflaged parachute cloth, some long and some short, pinned to the upper sleeves. Bodies were all dressed in khaki uniforms. The packs each had three different types of clothing in them. One set of dark green (uniform), one set of light green (uniform) and one set of black "PJ's". In addition the packs contained two sets of underwear, some pure sugar, and rolled rice. All web gear except the canteens were American; the canteens were ChiCom plastic with a red star on the side. Numerous ChiCom grenades were laying throughout the area. Local civilians were observed burying seven women and children vicinity of BS 559841, all killed by artillery. Civilians would not touch the dead VC and had made no attempt to bury them. The high ground located at BS 553848 was heavily fortified with entrenchments and individual fighting holes. Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines while securing an objective on 7 March found seven dead VC with grenades at BS 557841. A further search of the objective area BS 543839 produced eight additional VC bodies.

- (2) On 7 March the S-2 personally counted 34 uniformed VC bodies located at coordinates BS 552837. Only 50 meters of this hill was searched due to time limitations. All the VC had been killed by small arms fire, mortar and M-79 fire. Numerous ChiCom grenades were laying around the area, various parts of ChiCom web gear and personal effects were found on the bodies. Fortifications had been hastily dug. Some of the VC had died while still digging. By the stench and the way the wind was blowing from the south, many more bodies were believed to be on the south side of the hill. Six shallow graves were bocated at coordinates BS 552838.
- b. Information gained from local civilians. Civilians reported to Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines that the VC came into the area four days prior to the operation and ordered all civilians to stay away from the hill located vicinity coordinates BS 556791 and not to use the trail from SON-CHAU village vicinity coordinates BS 556791 to the CHU DINH market place vicinity coordinates BS 585768.
- c. Terrain (KOCOA). Key terrain in the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines area was dominated by the hill mass located at BS 575860, affording excellent observation of the entire area of operations. Cover consisted of heavy woods, brush and bamboo growth. Excellent avenues of approach were evident from all directions. The terrain to the south consisted mainly of cultivated fields, rice paddies, bamboo growth, thick brush, and hedgerows throughout the built up areas. Numerous trails bisected the lowlands. Terrain in the Company B area consisted of rice paddy areas and cultivated fields with heavy bamboo growth in the built up areas and numerous hedgerows throughout the area. Observation from the LZ was limited to the ridgeline running from north to south on the west side of the LZ. Observation to the north and east was excellent due to



open terrain (rice paddies). Heavy vegetation on the south end of the LZ running from coordinates BS 560784 to coordinates BS 564786 provided good evenues of approach covering approximately 1800 radius of the LZ. The VC used this avenue extensively during the attack on Company B's perimeter.

- d. Attitude of the civilian population in the Company B area at first was withdrawn and scared; however, on secondary contact they seemed to be no longer scared and acted nonchalantly.
- c. Summary. The intelligence potential could have been greatly enhanced if time and particular attention could have been placed on areas that had been heavily saturated with air strikes, artillery concentrations and heavy engagements. Particular emphasis should have been given and time alloted to units in order to exploit tunnels, trenchlines, and enemy dead. The amount of live and dud ordnance (both VC and friendly munitions) that was left in the battle area is enough to supply the local guerrillas in BINH SON district with booby trap material for many months to come.
 - f. See enclosure (1) for additional information concerning Company B.

8. Mission

- a. On'5 and 6 March, the Battalion mission was to block enemy egress from the objective area via grid squares BS 5785 and 5885, and to serve as Task Force Reserve.
- b. On 7 March, the Battalion mission was to pass through elements of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and to conduct search and destroy operations in a west-southwesterly direction from vicinity BS 560844 to BS 543839.
- c. See enclosure (1) for mission of Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines while task organized with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

9. Concept of Operation

- a. On 5 March, the Battalion moved in tactical column from Einh Son to the assigned blocking position. One company was employed as advance guard, one as rear guard, both with flank security elements.
- b. On 6 March, the Battalion established OP's and blocking positions on the high ground dominating the Battalion Zone.
- c. On 7 March, the Battalion conducted a search and destroy operation with three companies abreast moving along the assigned axis of advance.
- d. See enclosure (1) for concept of operation for Company B, 1st Battalion 7th Marines while task organized with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.





10. Execution

- a. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was ordered to provide a Battalion Command Group to Task Force Delta at Q51030 Nameh 1966 for participation in Operation UTAH, and to proceed by motor vehicle to Binh Son.
- b. In the discussion that follows, all time zones are in Time Zone H. All grid coordinates are in 100,000 Meter UTM Grid designation BS.
- c. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Command Group moved out from its Enclave CP location at 051145, arriving at 11th Marines Artillery position, 598914, near Binh Son, at 1245.
- (1) Company K, 3rd Battalian, 1st Marines reported to the Command Group at 1320. The Company had one 81MM Mortar Section and an artillery FO team attached.
- (2) At 1325, Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines reported to the Command Group. The Company had one 60MM Mortar, an Artillery FO team, and an 81MM Mortar FO team.
- d. At 1405 the Commander, Task Force Delta, arrived by helicopter and issued a verbal operation order. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was assigned the mission of Task Force Reserve and was to proceed overland to blocking positions along grid line 86 approximately bounded by easting lines 57 and 59, and was to prevent VC exfiltration from the Task Force objective area in zone.
- (1) At 1410 the Battalion moved out in a westerly direction in the following order of march: Company E, Command Group, 81MM Mortar Section, and Company K.
- (2) At 1810, the Battalion Commander determined to move into a defensive perimeter on the hill located at 576862. Company K moved to the head of the column at 580866 and proceeded to climb toward 576861. Extreme difficulty was encountered while climbing the steep slopes of the hill toward the objective. Large boulders, bamboo sheets, brambles, and sharp grass hampered movement immensely. All units were in a 360 degree perimeter at 2235 with Company K occupying the western half, Company E the eastern half, and the CP and 81MM Mortar Section in the center. The Battalion had no contact throughout the night.
- e. On 6 March at 1030, Company K was detached and returned to its parent unit, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The Battalion was to eventually receive another company from 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines and also the Recon Company from 2d ARWN Division.
- f. At 1415, Recon Company, 2d ARVN Division, Quang Ngai, joined the Battalion and was assigned the mission of a reaction force.
- g. At 2140 the Battalion received orders to move out toward the trail junction located at 543839, and to search the adjacent area for enemy dead or survivors of the previous day's attack. Company L, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines was to join the Battalion the next morning. Arrangements were made to rendezvous with Company L at 569847. There was no contacts throughout the night.



- h. At 070825, the Battalion moved off the hill westerly towards the assigned objective area. Rendervous with Company I was made at 0930. The column was delayed on the trail for 45 minutes awaiting helicopters for evacuation of water cans and surplus ammunition and equipment. Plans were for Company I to seize objective at 553847 and 546844. Company E was to seize an objective at 543839. 2d ARVN Recon Company was to seize an objective at 553837. Grid Line 56 was designated as the IOD with the 81MM Mortar Section to set up at the IOD at 557844.
- i. Company E Activities on 7 March. At 1100, Company E found seven dead VC w/grenades at 557841. The Company secured the objective, 543839, at 1255. A search of the immediate area produced eight additional VC bodies. The Company was instructed to locate a helicopter LZ and secure it. At 1325 the Company had secured an LZ at 541839 and awaited the arrival of Company L and the Battelion Command Group. The Company commenced a helicopter lift to its Enclave CP and completed the lift by 1530.
- j. Company L Activities on 7 March. At 1150, the Company encountered several howitzer and mortar duds near the base of a hill near 553847. By 1200 the Company reached the objective and had completed a search by 1300. The Company found several howitzer and mortar duds in the objective area. At 1325 the Company was ordered to move to the vicinity of the LZ at 541839 and stand by to be lifted to its Enclave TAOR. The Company arrived at the LZ at 1350 without incident. The Company commenced its helicopter lift at 1530. The lift was completed at 1600. One heat casualty was turned over to Company M, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines at 1200 for evacuation to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines BAS.
- k. 2d ARVN Recon Company Activities on 7 March. During the movement towards the objective from the LOD, the ARVN Commander experienced difficulties in controlling his units. Control was restored prior to arrival on the objective at 553839. The Company arrived on its assigned objective at 1200. The U.S. Army Advisor informed the Battalion Commander that the ARVN would not search for bodies and that no search would be made of individual VC dead by the ARVN troops. The three man U.S. Advisor team conducted the search. Prior to the time the Battalion S-2 arrived on the scene, only 15 dead VC bodies were discovered. The S-2 and party discovered 34 VC bodies on a small portion of the ARVN objective but further search was denied because of orders to retract from the objective area. There were numerous ChiCom concussion grenzes, and indication of the presence of 82MM Mortar positions sometime earlier. At 1340 the company was ordered to remain in position and select a helicopter LZ for retraction from the battle area. The company secured an LZ at 548837 and was lifted to Queng Ngai at 1430.
- 1. Command Group Activities on 7 March. The Battalion Command Group with the 81MM Mortar Section arrived at 559844 at 1045. The group remained at this position until all unit objectives were secured. The Command Group departed the OP at 1410 and arrived at the LZ, 541839, at 1450. The 81MM Mortar Section was returned to Operational Control of Company L at this time. The Battalion Command Group departed the LZ at 1525 and all returned to the Enclave CP by 155
- m. See enclosure (1) for separate report on activities of Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines while task organized with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.



11. Results

- a. Enemy losses inflicted by lstBn(-)(Rein), 7thMar: none known.
- b. Enemy losses inflicted by Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar while task organized with 2dBn, 4thMar: See Eab (1) to enclosure (1).
 - c. Friendly losses sustained by lstBn(-)(Rein), 7thMar:

KIA - none

WIA - none of the transfer of the second of

Non-battle casualties - one (Co L, 3dBn, 1stMar)

d. Friendly losses sustained by Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar while task organized with 2dBn, 4thMar:

KIA - 5

WIA - 26

Non-battle casualties - none

12. Administrative Matters

- a. <u>Supply</u>. The Battalion experienced satisfactory support from Task Force Delta and ran into no serious problems. Resupply requests were fulfilled however, there was one instance when Company B--at the time attached to 2d Battalion, 4th Marines--requested supplies that were sent to the 1st Battalion LZ. This mistake stemmed from the use of the Battalion call sign, "Prominence" being used in connection with both Company B and this Battalion. Procedures as to channels of resupply, etc., were not clear; however, by using normal practices all requests were met. It is recommended that a Task Force Delta Administrative Plan be written and SOPs established so as to consolidate and clarify procedures.
 - b. Maintenance. There were no maintenance difficulties.

- c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation and Hospitalization. Due to the absence of casualties in the Battalion, no problems were encountered. However, while task organized with 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines sustained a number of casualties which unavoidably could not be rapidly evacuated due to heavy enemy fires in the LZ.
- d. Transportation. The Battalion was helilifted from the operational are and a MAG Loadmaster Team was provided to coordinate the lift. Some confusion as to sequence of units to be lifted was encountered between the Battalion and the Loadmaster Team members. It is recommended that more definite guidelines as to lift procedures be established and closer liaison between the MAG Loadmaster Teams and infantry units be initiated. Once in the air, individual helicopters were not clear as to their terminal destination, even when told the name of the Battalion helicopter landing site, and some confusion resulted. It is recommended that pilots have knowledge of the location of the terminal destination prior to pick-up.



e. Communications

- (1) Communications to higher headquarters was by means of two radio nets—a command net and a tactical net. Both utilized the PRC 10/25 series radios and no loss of communications was encountered at any time during the operation. The tactical net was used for lengthy Sit Reps, PDS Reports, etc., thereby keeping the tactical net free for urgent commander-to-commander traffic. It is recommended for future operations, unless great distance between Battalions is envisioned, that FM radio continues to be used as the primary means of communications to higher headquarters. In the past, the PRC-47 has been utilized for a command channel. Its weight and relatively short battery life, plus the fact it cannot be operated on the move make it unfeasible in a fast moving operation.
- (2) Although the sky was continually filled with OE and UH-IE type observation aircraft, communications with them on every conceivable frequency was virtually non-existent. It is recommended that in future operations AO aircraft monitor a common FM or UHF frequency and that this frequency be made available to all units.
- (3) Task Force Delta Headquarters used a frequency throughout the operation that has been assigned since September 1965 by Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division for use by this Battalion. It is recommended that closer frequency management, assignment, and supervision of use of frequencies be exercised at higher headquarters.
 - f. Medical Evaluation. None.
- 13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.
- 14. Commander's Analysis
- a. There is a need for a Task Force Delta Operation Order and Admin Order to cover all of the standard procedures appropriate to such a command.
- b. There is a need for a Task Force Delta SOI containing shackles and authentication tables. Such tables could be made up on the basis of D-Day, D+1, etc., instead of on a date basis. Use of international tables is not feasible due to the necessity to distribute these items down to a platoon or even lower level in some cases, and also due to the severe complications that arise when compromise occurs.
- o. Aerial photos are too scarce. Periodically updated serial photos of all probable objective areas should be made available in abundance to all Regiments for immediate issue and study upon alert. Aerial photos of the 1st Battalion's zone of action would have been extremely valuable in determining routes of advance, danger areas, avenues of approach, and objectives.
- d. Information on the activities and locations of friendly forces needs to be more widely and frequently disseminated. Very little such information was received by this Battalion during the operation.



15. Recommendations

- a. That Task Force Delta publish a general operation order and admin order that standardize procedures to be used on Task Force operations.
- b. That Task Force Delta issue an abundant supply of shackle and authentication sheets for use on Task Force operations.
- c. That greater efforts be made to prepare, update, reproduce, and disseminate serial photos of all likely Task Force objective areas. Also, that greater efforts be made to reduce aerial photo request response times.
- d. That all organizations be kept appraised by G-3 of friendly unit dispositions and general activities in the objective area.

JAMES P. KELLY

DECLESCIES.



SPECIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT ON Co B. Letten. 7thMar

1. Task Organization of Co B

Co B (Rein), 1stBn, 7thMar

Co B

Det, H&S Co

Det, Comm Plt

Det, S-2 Sect

FAC Party

Det, Med Plt

FO Tm, 81MM Mort Plt

Fo Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, IlthMar

Det, ARVN (Interpreter)

2. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery of 3dBn, 11thMar was available and wood extensively throughout the operation. In one instance artillery was adjusted to within 50 meters of friendly lines with excellent effect. A total of 457 counds were fired for

b. Fixed wing CAS was used extensively by Co B. 21 sections of strike aircraft were directed on targets around the perimeter by the attached FAC Party.

c. Helicopters were used for initial landings, resupply, and medical evacvation. Heavy ground fire, including 50 calibor, was experienced by helicopters witil the last two days of the operation. Co B protected a downed H-34 helicopter for two days. This helicopter was extracted by a Chinook helicopter on 6 March. In two instances, due to heavy ground fire, supplies were dropped out of helicopters into a drop zone rather than by landing.

a. On 5 March, the Company mission was to provide security for a downed H-34 helicopter at the 2dBn, 4thMar LZ. This was accomplished by establishing a perimeter with three platoons on line.

b. On the night of 6 March, the Company mission was that of Battalian Reserve for the 2dBn, 4thMer perimeter.

0. On 7 March, the Company mission was to provide a rear guard for the 2dBn, 4thMar tactical march to National Route 1.

4. Execution

a. 042100H. Received warning order to be prepared for helilift at 050700E to occupy and defend positions within the 2dBn, 4thMar Enclave TAOR.

b. 042230H. Received further instructions to be prepared for helilift into the operation area and upon arrival report to and carry out missions as assigned by 2dBn, 4thMar.

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- c. 050700H. Company prepared and standing by in Company LZ.
- d. 050855H. Lifted first element 2d Plt, Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar into 2dBn, 4thMar LZ at 559790 in six helicopters. As helicopters approached LZ, SA fire was received. Due to the intensity of the SA fire the helicopters landed at random to discharge troops. The platoon was split within the LZ by about 250 meters, with half the platoon on the west side at approximately 558788 and the other half on the east side at approximately 559790. That portion of the platoon on the west side moved in behind Co G, 2dBn, 4thMar which was receiving heavy sniper fire and was unable to advance. After deplaning, one of the helicopters was hit with several rounds of SA fire, disabling the aircraft from further flight. The platoon moved further west of the aircraft until held up by heavy sniper fire. Co G had already taken approximately 13 to 15 WIA and 3 to 4 KIA and the 2d Plt, Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar received 1 WIA.
- e. 050920H. The OP Group of the Company Command Group arrived at the LZ, again under heavy fire landing approximately 50 meters from the 2dBn, 4thMar command group. Upon debarking and establishing contact with the 2d Plt, CO Go B, 1stBn, 7thMar reported to the CO, 2dBn, 4thMar for instructions. The mission of providing security for the downed helicopter was assigned until such time as it was retrieved and/or repaired, and on order, to follow in trace of Co G and Co H to the east to approximately GL 57, turn north and follow up the Battalion rear, conducting search and destroy operation to the north
- f. 050945H. The first wave of the 1st Plt landed in LZ again under heavy SA fire, splitting the platoon while disembarking. Approximately 20 minutes Later, the platoon was intact and the Platoon moved into its sector along the north side of the LZ. At this time the lines were intermingled by elements of Co G, Co H and the 2d Plt of Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar. The 1st Plt was then ordere to move through and to the right of Co G to reestablish the LZ security on the northwest sector. Co G was pinned down by sniper fire in this sector, however under good protection of fire and maneuver, the 1st Sqd broke through the cane field and established the line. Initial contact occurred with the enemy at a range of 150 meters.
- g. <u>O51030H</u>. The 3d Plt and CP group landed under the same heavy sniper fire again splitting the units upon their landing. After reorganizing, the 3d Plt assumed defense of the LZ on the southern sector.
- h. <u>O51100H</u>. All elements of Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar in the LZ and perimeter defense were established. Co H pulled back into the perimeter followed by Co G. During the next hour and a half 2dBn, 4thMar was reorganizing and bringing in their wounded.
- i. <u>O51245H</u>. CO, Co B, lstBn, 7thMar received word from CO, 2dBn, 4thMar that the Battalion minus Co B was moving out and restated the original mission adding the requirement to evacuate the remaining dead and wounded. For the next two hours the Company continued to receive sniper fire. During this period, all elements of the perimeter were under heavy to moderate automatic fire.





cij.a: <u>05.1430H.a.</u>The 3d Pltawas of dered to attackathe southwestern is cotor? of the ridge vicinity 556788 from where a heavy two lune cofafire had crupted. After jumping off in the rattack, and moving approximately 200 moters other. Platoon was pinned down by heavy SA fire from the front and left flank Atroraft on station were called in and provided excellent coverage of the Platoon objective; however, movement was still held up due to an even greater volume of fire from the south and east at a range warying from 50 to a 400 meters Incoming enemy 60MM mortar shelling yas received on the Company position for the first time during this perticular fire fight which lasted an estimated 45 minutes. Artillery, 810 mortars rand two more air estrikes were called in support of the attack. During the attack, fine group of VC, approximately 30 to 40 was observed running southeast along the ridge line carrying quite heavy loads which appeared to be mortar amunition and equipment. During this same period the remainder of the Company was deceiving increased SA fire from all sides Nov under the increased activity, ampunition supply became low our normal request for logistical resugaly was submitted. Continuous air strikes, armed Mr. 118 strikes startillery and 81161 - in montary concentrations were fixed in a 3600 zone. During this time registration trations were plotted for might defense by 60MM mortars, 181M sourtains and as artillary in the event of having to defend that position at might supertone this point casualties were as follows: friendly KIR 4.2; MIA - The WC KIA estimated les 24 parte la pone ylancumbano besille y crox delands no filorocio

the islinggreen were nathingform. k. 051630H. Many VC were observed moving from the north along the ridge line south and then est and eventually completing the engineer of the company on the northeast sector. At one time an lestimated 100 MG re with excellent camouflage were observed moving a cross an open rice paddy SPPreximately, 400 meters to the feaster Shefire was immediately comployed with many VC observed falling and being carried off. Simultancously Can air strike was being run on the southwest sector. As the air strike ceased, artillery and 81M mortar fire was called in on the exposed energy. The effect on target was excellent, resulting in an estimated 25 VO AI.

ter callly followed by definite accepted the representation of the control of 1. C54700H. Requested emergency ammunition resummed weinforcements. By this time all N-79: 3.5 WP and 3.5" HE had been expended and machine gun and M-14 ammunition was setting very lower Redistribution was directed with-A.in the platoons. KA. Med Hyac was requested brown from the bed become and

he dear and adjusted or aways posterior within airding the activity of the franklig m. 051730H. Med Evac arrived and completed evacuation of casualties. During the Med Evac, all helicopters received moderate sniper fire but do evacuation was completed with no further casualties. During this period however, the remaining supply of amounition was greatly reduced in order to provide protective covering fire; or of to be madden sow attaches several Lukindaha (Kali Makabahahara) ang ada nari dibang ka rati afila da ka ka ka ka ka ka Karangan alawado

n. 051830H. CO, Co B, 1stBn; 7thMar again called for an emergency amunition resupply and reinforcements, this time getting a positive ensucr that amunition was on the way and that a platoon of reinforcements were preparing to depart for our position.

filte of home of the albem are offic notion yield beveret o. 052000H. Emergency amounition resupply carrived. Helicoptor attempted to set down but was immediately brought under a devastating volume of autonatic cross fire from 3600 to include, for the first time, two 50 caliber machine guns which covered the company position in crossfire. ang on the market of

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Enclosure (1) OFFICIETE UNIT ONLY

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(P) experients. Edital

The helicopter (call sign White Gold 2-35") received several hits on his first run, causing some contact damage to the aircraft. However, after a few minutes the pilot said he thought he was all right and asked if it was really necessary to have the amount tion tonight. When we told him we had expended almost all we had on his last run; he requested to coordinate for a drop. In close proximity to the DZ were 12 or 13 casualties awaiting medical evacuation which had to be moved prior to the resupply drop. Approximately 20 minutes elapsed in moving the wounded and preparing the drop zone. As the helo approached, again enemy fire from 360 epened up. The drop was executed perfectly, landing the supplies approximately 50-60 meters from the CP. (It was learned from the pilot after the operation that he had taken 17 hits, of which one was a 50 caliber round through the cockpit.) A heavy volume of fire continued across the entire perimeter following the drop. Approximately 10 minutes later another helicopter with another load of amounition said he was ready to make his run. again upon his run heavy fire from 3600 was received but the drop again was right on a target. (That helicopter received six hits with one .50 caliber hole). This drop was followed by another hovy volume of fire; this time with approxinately 10 rounds of 60MM and 81MM morter fire. By this time amminition was at a premium. The firs fight lested for approximately 15 minutes. Due to the heavy volume of fire the casualties could not be lifted out. Flare aircraft on station were utilized continuously and effectively following the helicopter drop until 060600H. to the good and the course of a most produced measured bed as in the course of the cou

- p. 05:2030H. Was notified that reinforcements were unable to be provided until morning.
- q. 052130H. Under heavy attack from all sides attack was launched under 60MM and 81MM mortar barrage. The later than the same attack was launched attack was launched attack was launched.
- r. 052300H. Under extremely heavy mortar attack. This mortar barrage consisted mainly of 81MM nortars and exceeded 100 rounds. The hortar shelling was swiftly followed by infantry assaults using hand grenades and other concussion type weapons, later determined to be M-79 grenades. The main assaults came from the north, west and southwest. This engagement continued until 060130H, at which time the VO abruptly broke all contact! During the above described engagement supporting artillery and mortar fires were brought to bear and adjusted on enemy positions within 50 meters of the friendly front lines. To avoid such close in protective fires the encay crept to within 10 to 30 meters of the Company perimeter by utilizing cover of interlocking rice paddy dikes. From the enemy volume of fire and magnitude of commands in Vietnamese language that were heard, the size of each of the three assaults was estimated at 50 to 100 VC by the friendly units most closely engaged. The enemy assault from the west was disrupted and repulsed at a range of approximately 50 meters by the effect of three consecutive 105MM battery fire-for-effect missions. This engagement resulted in an estimated VC KIA of 75 (conservative); Friendly KIA 3; Friendly WIA 10. विकासी है कि अले के के का मान
- s. 060500H. Received heavy mortar fire and moderate SA automatic fire for approximately 20 minutes. This time engagement was by fire only and gradually broke off. It is assumed the engagement was to provide covering fire for a withdrawal action. One friendly WIA: Estimated 12 VC KIA.





- t. 060645H. All three platoons were ordered to put out squad sized patrols to their immediate fronti to search the perimeter, to regain contact and bring in intelligence information. The 1st and 3rd rlatoons encountered only fleeing VC. The 1st Platoon discovered three newsmachine gun positions and eight new fighting holes that were dug during the night approximately 30 meters from the Platoon left flank. The 2nd Platoon ran into a few well dug in snipers on their patrol, receiving three will before the action was broken off after killing three snipers. The 3rd Platoon located a series of freshly dug trench lines at an average distance of 200 meters from the Company perimeter, approximately 20 feet in length and 3 feet in depth, one of which revealed the impression of a mortar base plate, type not identifiable.
- u. 060830H. Helicopter resupply of emmunition, chow and water arrived evacuating the wounded from the hight's and morning seation. No shiper fire was received at all with four different flights setting down.
- v. 060910H. Received instructions from Commanding Officer, 2ndDn, 4thMar that they were moving towards our position shortly and for Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar to move our people off the high ground and establish blocking positions in the vicinity of the downed helicopter.
- w. Octoon. Helicopter landed with aircreft mechanics and equipment to propare the downed helicopter for lift. No saiper First received again.
- x. 061045H. Chinook helicopter and Uniterescort arrived to lift out the downed helicopter. As the Chinook hovered to hook-up, sniper fire was received from the southwest. After being immediately engaged by fire, by the 2nd and 3rd Platoons, the sniper fire ceased. Approximately 15 minutes later the Chinook came in affected the hook-up and lifted the helicopter out.
- y. 061430H. Received approximately six to 10 rounds of artillery fire at coordinates 557792, throwing fragmentation across the entire landing zone. Fire had been called in by Co G, 2ndBn, 4thMax in preparation for its approach to high ground adjacent to landing zone. This action resulted in wounding one Marine.
- z. 061515H. 2ndBn, 4thMar arrived and Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar was ordered inside the perimeter of Co H and Co G for the night. Sporadic small arms and occasional 60MM mortar fire was received during the night with one friendly WIA.
- sa. 070800H. Received mission to provide rear guard security for Battalion search and destroy mission enroute to rendezvous point at Highway # 1, coordinates 638758.
- bb. <u>070830H</u>. Moved out on assigned mission, found four additional bodies and seven freshly dug shallow graves approximately 200 meters from previous position. Negative contact throughout search and destroy mission.
- cc. <u>07.1545H</u>. Arrived at assembly area, reorganized and returned to Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar area by motorized convoy.

The cape with

DICLASSING Enclosure (1) OF##GLASSISMONLY

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- kinda iliki kudina ka umtuk kuannehintaharritanya iliki kati emil juli kudinuma an-5. - Enemy Losses Inflicted by Co B. of Sce tab (1), And gradual when and factor
- 6. Significantive identification and the second second and the second se

Name: TRINH VINH PHUC

Age: 27-28

Rank: Lieutenant

Residence: Hung-Yen Province, NVN

Unit Unknown

b. VC Asst Platoen Compander (deceased)

Name : Unknown attack to a grant of the wife the me bardpoint of

Age: 24-25

Residence: Benefire Province, RVN

Unit at Unknown Serions days, but the Sixbor and serious of cases

Other Info: Note found on body asking finder to noticy his sister (Miss TRINH THI THU THUY of Ben Tre Province) of his death.

Biologic Committee and Committ of the VC bodies found by Co B had VC ID Cards (forwarded to S-2, 2dBn, 4thMar). These ID Cards indicated the VC came from two areas:

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7. Aunnels and Caves found in Co. B Area was a standard and a second a

a. Cave found at 070930h at BS 563788, height 6! x width 3 x length a 20 . Entrance covered by bamboo door. Dug into the earth.


Open Trench, found at 070,930H at BS 564788 to BS 5637877 Lopth 3 x width 12 x length 125 to 150 meters. Dug out of the earth? Contained 30. calibor and 7:62 calibor arrunition and two Chi Con grandes. Also contained signs of 20-30 dead or wounded VC. This tranch was destroyed.

name fleie structure archer ad the first that the injuries archive in the first of interest and differen rat detaille fill blitta company films mas nacei son dunag the eight fills make that

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was a series of the

ENEMY LOSSES INFLICTED BY CO B.

1. VO Casualtics and Prisoners

VC Killed 36 VC Wounded Estimated 103

VC Captured
1 (female nurse)
Sec ITT Report No.
83-3-CL of 6 Mar 66.

2. Captured Equipment and Material

a. Documents

Description Diaries VC ID Cards Nurses Training Henual

b. Weapons

Description Chi Con Submachine piscols Russian Simonov "SKS" 7.52 Semi-auto carbine U.S. Browning Automatic Rifles Russian "SUPAYAV" PPS 7.62 Submachine gun magazines U.S. Bar nagazines Chi Com Submachine pistol magazines Rockets: Russian Anti-Tank model RPG 2 Russian Offensive Hand Grenades Type RG-42 U.S. made Claymore mine Grenades (Potato Masher) M-26 U.S. Grenades (Duds) 40MM N-79 rounds (Destroyed) Small ammo box of 7.62 M-14 rounds Small ammo boxes of .30 cal. M-1 rounds (Destroyed) 60MM (U.S. MFB) Mortar round (Dud) Chi Com Anti-Tank grenades 🐬

c. Equipment

Description
Cartridge belt.
VC hammocks
U.S. ponchos
U.S. Army magazine pouches
Corpsmans bag (similar to U.S. Mfr)
Containing battle dressings and bandages
U.S. Canteens (metal) with covers
U.S. Canteen (plastic)



HEADQUARTERS

1st Battalion, 7th Marines Marine # 13 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF o/o FFO San Francisco, California 96602

Andrew Constant

3:RDK:sep **300**0 8 Apr 1966

From: Commanding Officer

Commanding General To:

Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After-Action Report

(1) Task Organization of 1stBn (-)(Rein), 7thMar

(2) Concept of Operation Overlay

Overlay of Action on 28 March

- 1. Code Name and Type of Operation. Operation INDIANA, a fast-reaction. search and destroy operation.
- Dates of Operation. 281400 March through 301415 March 1966.
- Location. Quang Ngai Province, Son Tinh District, RVN. Battle area approximately centered on grid square BS 5578.
- 4. Control or Command Headquarters

CO, lstBn, 7thMar LtCol James P. KELLY
CO, Co B, lstBn, 7thMar Capt R. C. PREWITT

CO, Co C, 1stBn, 7thMar
CO, Co D, 1stBn, 7thMar
Capt D. D. BROOKS

- 5. Task Organization. Enclosure (1).
- 6. Supporting Forces

a. Air Support

(1) A total of 12 close air support missions were run in support of 1stBn, 7thMar during the operation. They include two strikes by armed UH-1E's. 10 of them were against VC troops or positions and the other two were in preparation for a company search through a village. In addition 8 TPQ-10 missions were run the night of 28 March as interdiction on trails north of the area of engagement.

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- (2) Ordnance used during the secretarities included 260lb frag bombs, 250lb GP bombs, napalm, 2.75" aerial rockets, 20mm cannon and 7.62mm MG. The 260lb frag bombs were very effective against the enem proops in the open, but friendly troops had to pull back farther than 200 meters before allowing the mission.
- (3) The air strikes were controlled jointly by USAF FAC (Airborne) and our own USAF FAC with Co C. In addition, the USAF FAC (A) was most helpful in relaping information from the AlO to the DASC.
- (4) Excellent support was given by MAG-36 UH-34's in making medical evacuation of wounded and emergency ammunition resupply in the face of intense small arms and anti-aircraft MG fire.
- (5) The logistics system used was sound in concept and freed the TACP for control of tactical air. The logistics officer had his own direct support aircraft which were controlled from the LSA. Also the use of Shoro Party HST greatly aids the flow of logistics and again frees the TACP to work with offensive air exclusively.
- (6) The flare aircraft on station both nights all night were obtained only after great difficulty from the DASC, but once on station no problems resulted other than some minor communications difficulties.
- (7) It is noted that AO support is invaluable in controlling air strikes, spotting artillery missions, detecting enemy troop movements, and acting as a communications relay. In quick reaction movements such as Operation INDIAMA, a maximum effort should be made to obtain adequate AO support.

b. Arvillery

- (1) During Operation INDIANA artillery fired approximately 2000 rounds in support of 1stBn, 7thMar. The majority of the rounds were fired from early evening on 28 March until approximately 290200 March. There were six observed missions during this time upon an estimated two VC companies. There was no positive surveillance on the missions. If and I fires were fixed in the area surrounding Co C in an effort to prevent VC from withdrawing from the area or recovering their equipment and casualties.
- (2) During the late morning of 29 March, two preparations were fired on Co B's and Co C's objectives prior to search operations.
- (3) The artillery fire was accurate but speed was hampered by poor communications. Fire missions were received from the TC on one net and relayed by the Artillery Liaison Officer to the FDC on another. Considerable time was lost by this process.
- (4) Artillery could have been used to good advantage when Co C was engaged with heavy resistance. However, due to helicopter evacuations, artillery could not always be called in with complete freedom.



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- c. Information gained from local civilians. In the Vinh loc complex there were four women, one old man and approximately nine children. Throughinterrogation it was learned that the VC had entered the area three to four days prior to the operation. The VC had hastily prepared their positions. The majority of the VC spoke in the Northern Dialect.
- 8. <u>Mission</u>. To commence at 281400 March to lift by helicopter to an LZ vicinity BS 565774, and to establish blocking forces on the northern and western sides of Phuoc Loc (1) located in grid squares BS 5576 and 5676. If contact was established, ARVN forces would conduct search and destroy operations westward toward the blocking positions.
- 9. Concept of Operation. See enclosure (2). The Battalion was to land all companies at a single LZ. One company was assigned to secure the LZ, while two others were assigned separate blocking positions to the west of the LZ at objectives C and D, respectively. The fourth company was held as a reserve initially, with the intention of having it eventually relieve the company on Objective C so as to permit the latter to establish a blocking force further west at Objective E. Each company was to send out a patrol in its zone to determine the enemy situation. In this manner Phuoc Loc (1) was to be effectively surrounded on the northern and western sides preparatory to an ARNN search and destroy operation from the east.

10. Execution

- a. 1stBn, 7thMar received a warning order to execute the mission at 280945H March. Issuance of the complete Regimental Operation Order was effected during a coordination visit to 2d ARVN Division Headquarters at Quang Ngai and subsequently at ADC Command Group Headquarters at Chu Lai. The operation order, presented in verbal form, was issued in full by 281300H.
- b. In the discussion that follows, all times are for Time Zone H, and all grid coordinates are in 100,000 meter UTM Grid Square Designation BS unless specified otherwise.

c. Events on 28 March

(1) Initial landing

- (a) Elements of the Battalion were lifted from their respective Company LZ's commencing at 281400, in the order of Co B; Co C; lst Plt, Co Λ; Command Group; H&S Co Provisional Security Plt; and Co D. Λll elements were landed without resistance at 565774 by 281656, including the 2d ΛRVN Division Strike Company, which was lifted in to the LZ from Quang Ngai.
- (b) At 1515, Co C commenced movement to Objective C. At 1620, Co D commenced movement to Objective D. At 1620, the ARVN Strike Company commenced movement in trace of Co C, with the mission initially as Battalian Reserve, with a subsequent mission on order to relieve Co C on Objective C so that Co C could then further secure Objective E. By 1630 the Command Group, together with the 1st Plt, Co A, the H&S Co Provisional Security Plt, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon were fully established at 564773. At 1638, Co B commenced movement to Objective B, establishing itself there by 1745. All companies were to establish blocking positions and send out patrols upon arrival at their objectives.



(5) It is necessary that the artillery liaison officer be furnished a PRC-25 Radio in lieu of a PRC-9 for more reliable communications with the FO teams and FDC.

7. Intelligence

a. VC Strength and Situation

- (1) The strength of the VC in the 1stRn, 7thMar area of responsibility is estimated to have been in excess of two VC Companies with heavy weapons attached. One Company was identified as the J-17 Company. The Company consisted of the A-1, A-2 and A-3 platoons with a heavy weapons platoon attached. The enemy also had 60mm and 81mm morters attached, plus a .50 Cal MG and four 12.7 AA guns. Total strength of the enemy engaged is estimated at 300-450 men. During the action ten VJ snipers, tied in the trees, were shot and last seen hanging at their position. The snipers were armed with AR's and with granades which they had dropped on advancing troops. During the night the snipers' bodies were removed by the VC. A total of 63 VC (confirmed) were killed and an estimated 215 additional killed or wounded during the action.
- (2) On 29 March, Co B conducted a search of the Vinh Loc Hamlet Complex. 20 VC dead were found and the count of VC weapons captured was raised to 20, including two 12.7mm AA gans.
- (3) Indications were that the remaining VC force withdrew at 282000ff. Civilians reported that at 282200ff the VC returned to carry off their dead, then withdrew at 282400ff to the north. No further contact was made by 1stBn, 7thMar.
- (4) Throughout the firefight, air strikes and artillery were constantly called on the hamlet complex and on hill located BS 5567% killing an estimated 50 VC. During the search of this area conducted by Co B, a total of four positions were found for AA guns at BS 5577%. From the new brass in the general vicinity and the lack of drag marks from one gun position to another, it is believed that two of the four gams were removed as the VC withdrew from the area.
- b. Terrain (KOCOA). The principal terrain features consisted of a hill mass starting at the center of grid square BS 5578 north through grid square BS 5579, the hill mass to the west from grid square PS 5378 north through grid square 5379 and the hill mass north in grid square BS 5580, BS 5481 and BS 5581. The key terrain located at BS 556791 afforded excellent observation of the entire area of operation. The southern approaches consisted of heavy woods, and brush growth thinning out northward. Terrain to the east and west consisted mainly of cultivated fields, harvested rice paddies, canefields and hedgerows throughout the built up areas. Terrain to the north was dominated by the hill mass located at BS 553806. No tunnels or caves were found in the operating area. Defenses consisted of the lines, bunkers, individual shelters and spider traps.

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(2) Activities of Co B on 28 k rob

- (a) After establishment of perimeter blocking position at Objective B, the Company sent out a recon patrol into Phung Loc (1) to the south. The patrol ventured forth some 500 meters without contact. The village, largely destroyed in Operation TEXAS, appeared occupied only by elderly persons.
 - (b) The night of 28 March passed without convict.

(3) activities of Co C on 28 March

- (a) The Company departed the Battalion LZ at 1515, moved out toward Objective C in the order of 3d Plt, Command Group, FAC Party, Wons Plt, 1st Elt, and 2d Plt. In the complex, brush-covered terrain, the Company made a navigational error, moved well to the north of the assigned objective. At 1615, the point sighted VC outposts at 556786 and 556791. The 51 Plt was ordered to pursue. At 1630 the 3d Plt pasced over the high ground at 556791 and attacked to the edge of the village at 554794. Opposed by an estimated 2 VC Platoons with heavy weapons and would dug in, the 3d Plt at this point could no longer advance due to intensive enemy fire and heavy casualties. The Platoon was ordered to hold its position and provide a base of fire for the 1st Plt. The Co CP was established at 555791.
 - (b) At about 1645, the 1st Plt commenced an attack to envelop the right flank of the ridgeline and assault the hill at 5577%. The Platoon conducted an assault after artillery preparation, carrying the position by use of bayonets, grenades, and hand-to-hand combat. This attack was supported by Wpns Plt located at 555791 using machinegums, rockets, and 60mm mortage.
 - (c) At 1730 the 2d Plt, which had been in reserve, was committed to the attack. The Platoon moved around the left flank of the ridge to join the 3d Plt and assault through the village at 553785. As the Platoon advanced it encountered heavy automatic weapons fire from 554788. Due to the intensity of the fire and heavy casualties, the attack was stalled. At this same time, the Co CP came under heavy 81mm mortar fire. Heavy artillery fires and air strikes were placed continually on the hamlet area during this period.
 - (d) At about 1800, due to darkness falling, the 1st Plt was ordered to withdraw with casualties from its objective and assist in the withdrawal of the 3d Plt. Plans were made to position all elements into more tenable dispositions and to prepare for a counterattack.
 - (e) At about 1855 the ARVN Strike Company arrived and assisted the 2d Plt in withdrawing with its casualties to the Company perimeter. This was accomplished with the assistance of an airstrike on the hamlet complex.
 - (f) At about 1900 the 1st Plt regarded the 3d Plt and assisted in withdrawing them with casualties to the Company perimeter.



- (g) The withdrawal of casualties proved to be a most hazardous mission. Desparate attempts were repeatedly made to evacuate all WIA and KIA, resulting in numerous additional casualties. The VC made a concerted effort to cover casualties with intensive fire. In the end, all wounded were successfully evacuated, but seven KIA had to be left behind until daylight.
- (h) Med Evac helicopters were finally able to land at about 2000 as the enemy fires subsided. Evacuation of KIA and WIA continued until 2300.
- (i) Co Darrived at 2030, moved into the southern portion of the perimeter. ARVN Strike Company occupied the northwest portion of the perimeter. Co C occupied the northeast portion of the perimeter. The conter of the perimeter was located at 556790.
 - (j) Resupply of Co C was completed by 2400.
- (k) During the above action involving Co C, friendly forces sustained 11 KIA and 53 WIA. The VC suffered in excess of 150 killed (60 of which were verified by body count) and 100 wounded. The Marines captured 15 weapons, including a 12.7mm AA Gun during the action, leaving others to be discovered the next morning. In turn, the Marines sustained bullet damage to one 3.5 rocket launcher, lost no weapons.
 - (1) Throughout this furious engagement, communications between Co C and the Battalion CP were fully satisfactory.
 - (m) The VC broke contact with Co C and withdrew, apparently to the northwest, at about 2015. This withdrawal was not observed; however it was anticipated and was heavily interdicted by artillery and mortar fires on all routes of egress from the day's battle area.

(4) Activities of Co D on 28 March

- (a) By 1730, Co D was established on Objective D, and sent forth a patrol about 800 meters into Phuoc Loc (3) with negative contact. The patrol's observations were similar to the Co E patrol's observations.
- (b) At 1915, Co D commenced movement to join with Company C and the ARVN Strike Company. Some difficulty was encountered in that Co C was not where it was presumed or reported to be, due to a navigational error made by Co C. However, this difficulty was overcome by having 81mm mortars adjust illumination directly over Co C, acting as a marker on which Co D could guide during their night movement through the complex terrain. Co D linked up with Co C and the ARVN Strike Company at 2030. A three company perimeter was formed with a 200-300 meter radius, centered at 556790. Co D held the southern sector of the perimeter, had no contact during the night.





(5) Activities of ARVN Strike Company on 27 March

(a) After moving out to follow in trace of Go C, the Company experienced difficulty in locating Go C due to the aforementioned navigational error. This greatly delayed arrival of the Company at a position from which it could effectively assist Co C. This was accomplished, however, at 1855. The Company moved in on the south side of Co C, forming a two-company perimeter. Later, upon arrival of Co D, a three-company perimeter was formed, with the ARVN Strike Company on the northwest sector.

(b) The company had no contact throughout the night.

(6) Other Activities on 28 March

A CALL TO A SUBJECTION

(a) Systematic artillery and mortar destruction and interdiction missions were carried out all night throughout the battle area. Emphasis was placed on fires in the areas where Marine KIA were located and where VC dead were located. In addition all egresses from the area, particularly trails and passes through ridgelines to the north, east, and west, were thoroughly covered with fires.

d. Events on 29 March

(1) General. At 0800, Co B joined the Command OP Group at the Battalion CP, and these elements moved to the perimeter established at 556790. Co D was ordered to search the hamlet at 553788, especially to recover friendly KIA and to assess VC losses. Co B was ordered to an likewise in the hamlet centered at 553796. Co C was ordered to search the hamlet at 553791. Subsequently, Co D was ordered to search Vinh Loc (3) at 545788. Coordination was effected with 2dBn, 7thMar as to Co B's objective at 553796, as this objective was north of the assigned FCL.

(2) Activities of Co B on 29 March

(a) Upon arrival in the vicinity of the perimeter established by Co B, Co D, and the ARVN Strike Company at 556790. Co B established a perimeter centered at 557785 to await resupply and orders. Since no resupply was forthcoming, and since the Company was without water, a detail was sent into the village at 553788 to obtain well water. Thus delayed, the Company moved out at 1245 to search its objective, the village and hill mass central at 5547%. Artillery prep fires were used to precede entry into the districtive area. Two platoons were used to envelop the east flank if his objective. The objective was thoroughly searched without dentated producing three Co C KIA that could not be recovered the night before, and discovering 20 additional VC dead, two VC 12.7mm AA Cums, 14 boxes of 12.7 ammunition, and a quantity of VC individual equipment, all located in the vicinity of 557795. The mission was complete at 1510.

(b) At 1515, the Company moved back to assume the southern portion of the Battalion perimeter. The remainder of 29 March was without contact.

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(3) Activities of Co C on 29 March

- (a) At 0741, the Company sighted a group of seven armed VC moving across a field at 546780. An artillery trike was ordered with excellent effect. Three VC were observed killed by direct hits. The remainder were undoubtedly killed or wounded.
- (b) At 1237, the Company sent a plateen to search the hamlet located at 553792. The search was completed by 1345 with no significant find.
- (c) At 2200, the Company experienced five rounds of enemy 60 or 80mm Mortar rounds near the perimeter. The origin of the fire was indeterminable.

(4) Activities of Co D on 29 March

- (a) At 0800 the Company sent one platoon into the hamlet at 553788 to search for Marine KIA and evidence of VC losses. Four KIA from Co C were found. No VC bodies were found; they were obviously carried away during the night despite intensive H&I fires in the village and throughout the adjoining areas all night. Many trenches, fighting holes, and bunkers were found; all of them soaked thoroughly with blood. The mission was completed at 0930.
- (b) At 1100 the Company sent one platoon to search the hamlet at 545788 (Vinh Loc (3)). Artillery and mortar prop fires were used. Two lines of trenches with barbed wire were found on the perimeter of the village. Several large crocks of rice were found in the village but were left undestroyed because it was believed to be a reasonable amount for local villagers needs. Several fresh panji traps were observed. There was no apparent sign of VC casualties in the area. The mission was completed by 1415.
- (c) At 1146, the Company sighted 10 VC in a treeline at 546794. 81mm mortars were placed on the target with excellent effect, causing unknown casualties.
- (d) At 2205, the Company sighted two groups of five VC approaching their lines at 554788. The target was engaged with heavy small arms fire with unknown results.
- (e) At 2217, 3 rounds of enemy 60 or 81mm mortars were received near the perimeter at 555788. The origin could not be determined.

(5) Other activities on 29 March.

- (a) Heavy H&I fires were used throughout the hours of darkness.
- (b) Command Group Alpha, the H&S Co Security Platoon, and lst Plt, Co A moved from the original CP site at 564773 at 0935 and arrived at the Battalion perimeter at 1020.

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- (c) The 81mm Mortar Plt with ammunition was lifted by helicopter from the old CP site to the Battalion perimeter commencing at 0850. This move was completed by 0915. The guns were in action by 0930.
- (d) The ARVN Strike Company, the H&S Co Provisional Security Plt and 1st Plt, Co A remained in reserve in the perimeter throughout the day.

e. Events of 30 March

- (1) Commencing at 0650, the Battalion conducted a movement eastward to Highway 1 to rendezvous with a truck convoy at 637758 for transportation back to the Enclave. The route followed passed south of An Tuyet (1), 563787, joined the main trail at 575783, passed through Lam Loo (1), 585767, and along the main road to Highway 1. The order of march was Co B, Co D, Command OP Group, Mortar Plt, H&S Provisional Security Platoon, Command Group Alpha, ARVN Strike Company, Co C, and 1st Plt, Co A. There was no contact along the route. However, at 0805, one VC 81mm mortar round was received at the Battalion perimeter site where the tail of the column was waiting to move out.
- (2) The delayed arrival of helicopters, which were scheduled to arrive at 0700 to evacuate surplus supplies, but which did not arrive until over an hour later, caused some delay in the movement of the column.
- (3) All elements of the column were at the Highway 1 rendezvous point by 1115. The state of the s

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(4) The Battalion convoy moved out to Chu Lei at 1220. All elements were back in the Battalion Enclave TAOR by 1415.

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a. Enemy losses

63 VC dead (confirmed) 215 additional VC killed and wounded (estimated) (2) Weapons Captured

ll AK SMG Assault Rifles (7 destroyed by Co C) 4 Mossin Nagant Rifles (3 destroyed by Co C) 2 M-1 Garand Rifles (both destroyed by Co C) 2 12.7mm AA Guns (Chinese) 1 Pistol TOK REV-51 7.62mm (Chinese) 20 Total Captured/Destroyed

(3) Documents

7. VC ID Cards 1 VC performance report on Operation UTAH 4 applications to join the Communist Party 1 Platoon Leader's Diary and note book



Numerous items of VC individual equipment and uniforms (destroyed by burning)

(5) Food

4,000 lbs of rice (destroyed)

(6) Ammunition

12 cans of 12.7mm ammunition 2,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition (destroyed) 70 ChiCom grenades (destroyed) 15 M-26 grenades (destroyed)

b. Friendly losses

- (1) KIA 11
- (2) WIA 55
- (3) Non-Battle Casualties 1
- (4) Material losses: One 3.5" Rocket Launcher damaged by gunfire

12. Administrative Matters

a. Supply

- (1) Initially when Co C faced it's heavy enemy contact a need for ammunition resupply soon arose. It had become dark and the resupply chain to the LSA was not completely established. Therefore some confusion resulted among supporting and supported units. Meanwhile Co C continued to use up ammunition. Around midnight on 29 March personal delivery of ammunition was made by the Regimental S-4 via helicopter.
- (2) The next morning all efforts were made to establish definite resupply procedures. The four elements, Battalion, Regiment, Shore Farty, and the helicopters began working under a united system and consequently a good, continual flow of supplies came into Battalion and it's companies. However, towards the end of the day, the operation was ordered terminated by the next morning. Thereupon retraction of the large amount of supplies brought in during the day was undergone with fine coordination and success.
- (3) As night came, the helicopters, with only three loads remaining, withdrew for the night. It was arranged to have an early morning pickup at 030700 March, in order to lift out the remaining supplies before the Battalion's tactical departure from the area. As has happened in the past, the helicopters arrived late and it was not until 0820 that the last of the supplies was lifted away causing great inconvenience to the Battalion.



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(4) It was clear that the injection of two new elements to the system of supply, i.e., Shore Party's Helicopter Support Teams and the arrival of the regimental logistical element got confused with the systems of supply used on past operations such as UTAH where rifle units dealt with another source, Task Force Delta. Although we understood the mission of Shore Party, lack of direct contact and published policy (SOP) between all units concerned, caused confusion as to who did what. A definite SOP must be established and disseminated to the infantry battalions, regiments, Shore Party, and the MAG. In this way all units will be clear as to procedures and missions of the support units. On Operation INDIANA the system eventually was established thus:

Company requests to Battalion.

Battalion requests to Regiment and informs its HST of the request and the request number.

Regiment contacts Shore Party at the LSA as to the request.

Shore Party fills the order by number and loads an UH-34D.

Shore Party notifies Regiment request number "X" on the way.

UH-34D flies out.

Regiment informs Battalion.

Battalion informs company and the Battalion HST.

Company informs it's HST.

Battalion HST talks UH-34D into company area via FW radio.

- (5) It is clear that there is a "middle man" in the above system—Regiment. On the other hand, Regiment acted as an excellent coordinator and a familiar voice to express our troubles to. In any case, a definite and clear system must be initiated so that valuable bours will not be used in the field and under combat to establish a jury-rig affair.
 - (6) It has always been difficult to understand the restrictions that keep helicopters from getting an early morning start to meet dawn commitments. In this case on Operation INDIANA, the late hour agreed upon by the helicopter unit—-0700—— caused the Battalion to delay unfavorably its tactical departure. UH-34D's would not leave MAG-36 until 0630. From the Battalion point of view, it is not understandable why an earlier takeoff could not be effected to permit arrival at the Battalion's area at first light, thus allowing the tactical commander the earliest possible start for the day's action.



(3) All in all, each supporting unit performed in an increasingly professional manner. The helicopters especially rate the highest praise for their daring emergency flying under fire. With each operation it is evident that the logistical situation is becoming clearer and clearer. More understanding of each unit is mission and the establishment of a clear policy cannot be far from accomplishment, and when this happens, units will be able to operate with the most practical and economical logistical support for the troops.

b. Maintenance. Not applicable.

- c. Treatment of Casualties. Professional conduct of company corpsmen in the initial treatment of casualties was outstanding. In spite of the presence of devastating enemy fire and wounds sustained by themselves, the corpsmen continued to render care to other wounded personnel. Evacuation was delayed by the continued presence of enemy fire, making it impossible for evacuation helicopters to land immediately. The present evacuation and hospitalization chain is outstanding, utilizing Co D, lst Med Bn as the primary evacuation point for emergency treatment, sorting, and further evacuation to other treatment facilities.
- d. Transportation. At operation's end the Battalion was transported by convoy from Quang Ngai to Chu Lai and the various company areas by 1st Division motor transport units in outstanding fashion.

e. Communications

- (1) For the first six hours of the operation there was no contact with 7th Mar on either the Regimental Tac Net or the Logistics Net. Battalion Gommunicating elements tried antenna relocation without success. Finally, about 282100 March the Battalion made a weak but readable contact with Regiment utilizing a field expedient antenna. At about 1000 on the second day of the operation, Regiment came in loud and clear on both nets and no trouble was experienced thereafter.
- (2) The Shore Party HST was not adequately equipped with communication equipment and was unable to make contact with the LSA at Quang Ngai. Initial emergency ammunition requests were relayed to 7th Mar through the DASC at Chu Lai. 7th Mar S-4 soon assumed control of logistics matters from the HST elements who were then relegated to a landing zone control function.

f. Medical Evaluation

- (1) Under the circumstances, the handling of casualties on this operation must be considered excellent. In retrospect, however, and for future reference, the establishment of a battalion aid station detachment and landing zone in closer proximity to the actual company positions, to which casualties could be evacuated by litter and bearers, would permit slightly more sophisticated treatment of casualties in the event that helicopter evacuation is delayed.
- (2) The advent of continued extreme hot weather conditions and the incidence of cases of heat exhaustion during the ix mile Battalion march to the truck pickup point indicates that unit commanders and corpsmen must continually emphasize adequate intake of salt and water.



13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

14. Commander's Analysis

- a. As soon as it became apparent from patrolling that there were no VC in Fnuoc Loc (1) and at the same time contact was established almost 2000 meters north of the assigned objective area, the Battalion responded by immediately and unhesitatingly changing its mission to meet the circumstances. The concept of blocking forces around Phuoc Loc (1) was abandoned, and all forces of the Battalion were redirected to the point of contact to the north.
- b. The navigational error by Co C had both fortunate and unfortunate effects. If Co C had not gone too far to the north, it is probable that there would have been no contact with the VC during the operation. The VC most probably would have exfiltrated the area the first night. On the other hand, when reinforcements were sent to assist Co C, their arrival was significantly delayed by the fact that Co C was 1000 meters north of where it was believed to be. Since darkness was falling, time was of the essence. As it was, reinforcements did not arrive in time to effectively exploit Co C's immediate success.
- c. The determination and violence with which Co C attacked the VC force once it was located not only assured success, but also undoubtedly had the effect of reducing friendly casualties in the final analysis. An understrength Marine Company was pitted against a VC Battalion sized force in dug-in positions. If Co C's attack was less swift and violent, the VC would not have been surprised, and the VC would have undoubtedly counter-attacked in strength. As it was, the VC withdrew shortly after dark, made no effort to counter-attack, and left behind many dead and a significant number of weapons.
- d. The coordination of supporting fires with helicopter medical evacuations became a difficult problem. Fire superiority over the LZ could not be maintained without supporting arms, yet supporting arms could not be used while the helicopters were in the area. Under the circumstances, the best sort of fire support would be a form of CAS, which could, unlike artillery, be conducted concurrently with a medical evacuation. It is clear that without fire superiority over the LZ, casualties simply cannot be evacuated.

15. Recommendations

- a. That a greater effort be made by higher headquarters to establish a forward command post at the outset of such an operation as this, thus to assure from the beginning positive and trouble-free communications with the unit initially committed.
- b. That an SOP be published which sets forth a clear doctrine for helicopter resupply in contingency operations such as this. This document should be designed to unify and coordinate the activities and responsibilities of S-4's, helicopter units, HST attachments, and logistic Support Units.

c. That AN/PRC-25 radios be allocated for use by artillery FO's, artillery Liaison Officers, and HST Detachments in order to extend their operating ranges.

JAMES P. KELLY

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1stBn(-) (lein), 7thMar

Task Organization of 1stBn (-)(Rein), 7thMar

Det, H&S Co, (Command Group)
Det, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar (Arty LO)
Det, ARVN, (Interpreter, ARVN Liaison)
Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Co B (Rein)
Co B
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plt
Det, Comm Plt
Det, S-2 Sect
FO Tm, Mort Plt
FAC Party
FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar
Det, ARVN (Interpreter)

Co C (Rein)

Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plt
Det, Comm Plt
Det, S-2 Sect
FO Tm, Mort Plt
FAC Party
FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, llthNar
Det, ARVN (Interpreter)

Co D (Rein)

Co D

Det, H&S Co

Det, Med Plt

Det, Comm Plt

Det, S-2 Sect

FO Tm, Mort Plt

FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar

Det, ARVN (Interpreter)

Det, PF

Det, lst Plt, Co C, lst Engr Bn

Strike Co, 2d Inf Div, ARVN

lst Plt (Rein), Co A

Ist Plt, Go A

MG Sqd, Co A

ATA Sqd, Co A

Det, Med Plt, H&S Co
Det, Comm Plt, H&S Co

Provisional Security Plt, Edd Co


81MM More Plt (-)(Plt Hg & 2 Sects)



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Consops of Operation Overlay Let Bn (-) (Rein), 7th Mer Operation Indiana 28 Mar 1956 Map: TIETRAM 1:50,000, AMS Series 1701, Sheets 6756 III & IV



Prolosure (2)



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Summary of Company B Activities for Period 21-25 March 1966

- 1. A summary of this units' activities while under Operational Control of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during the period 211700H 271400H March is as follows:
- a. 211200H. Company received warning order to be prepared to relieve Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and occupy and defend its sector of responsibility on the north side of the airfield defense inner perimeter.
- b. 211600H. Departed Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines area or motorized convoy with 117 effective strength, including 81mm mortar and artillery FO teams.
- c. 211700H. Arrived at Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines' position and immediately effected relief of lines. The company's sector of responsibility extended from BS 531081 on the right flank to BS 540000 on the left flank. Company CP was established at BS 531076. This sector was defended by placing three rifle platoons with organic attachments on line, and setting in night ambushes forward of the line. A heavy section of 1.-48 tanks was in direct support; a section of 81mm mortars and a battery of 107mm Howtars were in general support.
- ambush sites with no significant incidents or activity occurring.
- e. 240230H. Approximately 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire were received in and to the rear of the company area concurrently with heavy small arms fire and anti-tank rifle grenades concentrated on the center squad of the 2d Platon at BS 529075. Approximately 100 7.62mm rounds of fire was returned on the VC at a range of approximately 30 meters during the 3-4 minute engagement. 81mm mortar illumination was requested, but not received until after contact had been lost. Casualties were: Marines KIA-1, KIA-0, and VC KIA probable-3.
- f. 240300H. A squad was ordered to sweep the area of contact and to remain at that location until day light to conduct a search.
- g. 24060CH. Two additional squads joined the above menticled squad and conducted an extensive search of the area. This resulted in finding three mortar firing positions and eighteen 60mm mortar rounds, three A-T rifle g. enades, two CHICOM hand grenades, three home-made TMT hand bombs, spent bress, two openings cut low to the ground in both the outer and inner rows of defensive concertina wire with seven freshly-dug firing positions next to the openings in both the outer and inner rows of concertina, and three blood trails.
- h. 241600H. An additional light section of M-48 Ontos were placed in direct support of the company.

PA3 (11)

CONSTITUTION

- i. 242145H. Patrol enroute to ambush site reported receiving one incoming hand grenade at approximately the same location as the previous nights contact. 81mm mortar illumination was provided and patrol swept area and reported 3-4 VC were observed at which they fired small arms and M-79 grenades with unknown results. There were no friendly casualties.
- j. 250600H! Platoon size search of the area had negative results and findings.
- k. 251000H. Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines relieved Company B in place.
- 1. 251300H. Commenced return movement to Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines area by motorized convoy.
- m. 251400H. Arrived at Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines HTP positions.

HEADQUARTERS lst Battalion, 7th Marines
Marine # 13 Marine # 13 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF o/o FRO San Francisco, California 96602

> 3:RDK:sep 3000 8 Apr 1966

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General

Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

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Encl: (1) Task Organization of 1stBn (-) (Rein), 7thMar

(2) Concept of Operation Overlay

- (3) Overlay of Action on 28 March
- 1. Code Name and Type of Operation. Operation INDIANA, a fast-reaction search and destroy operation.
- 2. Dates of Operation. 281400 March through 301415 March 1966.
- 3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Son Tinh District, RVN. Battle area approximately centered on grid square BS 5578.
- 4. Control or Command Headquarters

CO, 1stBn, 7thMar CO, Co B, 1stBn, 7thMar
Capt R. C. PREWITT
CO, Co C, 1stBn, 7thMar
Co, Co D, 1stBn, 7thMar
Capt D. D. BROOKS

LtCol James P. KELLY

5. Task Organization. Enclosure (1).

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Supporting Forces

a. Air Support

(1) A total of 12 close air support missions were run in support of 1stBn, 7thMar during the operation. They include two strikes by armed UH-1E's. 10 of them were against VC troops or positions and the other two were in preparation for a company search through a villege. In addition 8 TPQ-10 missions were run the night of 28 March as interciction on trails north of the area of engagement.

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- (2) Ordnance used during these rikes included 260lb frag bombs, 250lb GP bombs, napalm, 2.75" aerisl rockets, 20mm cannon and 7.62mm MG. The 260lb frag bombs were very effective against the energy troops in the open, but friendly troops had to pull back farther than 200 meters before allowing the mission.
- (3) The air strikes were controlled jointly by USAF FAC (Airborne) and our own TOMC FAC with Co C. In addition, the USAF FAC(A) was most helpful in relaying information from the ALO to the DASC.
- (4) Excellent support was given by MAG-36 UH-34's in making medical evacuation of wounded and emergency ammunition resupply in the face of intense small arms and anti-aircraft MG fire.
- (5) The logistics system used was sound in concept and freed the TACP for control of tactical air. The logistics officer had his own direct support aircraft which were controlled from the LSA. Also the use of Shore Party HST greatly aids the flow of logistics and again frees the TACP to work with offensive air exclusively.
- (6) The flare aircraft on station both nights all night were obtained only after great difficulty from the DASC, but once on station no problems resulted other than some minor communications difficulties.
- (7) It is noted that AO support is invaluable in controlling air strikes, spotting artillery missions, detecting enemy troop movements, and acting as a communications relay. In quick reaction movements such as Operation INDIANA, a maximum effort should be made to obtain adequate AO support.

b. Artillery

- (1) During Operation INDIANA artillery fired approximately 2000 rounds in support of 1stBn, 7thMar. The majority of the rounds were fired from early evening on 28 March until approximately 290200 March. There were six observed missions during this time upon an estimated two VC companies. There was no positive surveillance on the missions. H and I fires were fixed in the area surrounding Co C in an effort to prevent VC from withdrawing from the area or recovering their equipment and casualties.
- (2) During the late morning of 29 March, two preparations were fired on Co B's and Co C's objectives prior to search operations.
- (3) The artillery fire was accurate but speed was hampered by poor communications. Fire missions were received from the FO on one net and relayed by the Artillery Liaison Officer to the FDC on another. Considerable time was lost by this process.
- (4) Artillery could have been used to good advantage when Co C was engaged with heavy resistance. However, due to helicopter evacuations, artillery could not always be called in with complete freedom.

(5) It is necessary that the artillery liaison officer be furnished a PPC-25 Radio in lieu of a PRC-9 for more reliable communications with the FC teams and FDC.

7. Intelligence

a. VC Strength and Situation

- (1) The strength of the VC in the 1stBn, 7thMar area of responsibility is estimated to have been in excess of two VC Companies with heavy weapons attached. One Company was identified as the C-17 Company. The Company consisted of the A-1, A-2 and A-3 platoons with a heavy weapons platoon attached. The enemy also had 60mm and 81mm mortars attached, plus a .50 Cal MG and four 12.7 AA guns. Total strength of the enemy engaged is estimated at 300-450 men. During the action ten VC snipers, tied in the trees, were shot and last seen hanging at their position. The snipers were armed with AR's and with grenades which they had dropped on advancing troops. During the night the snipers' bodies were removed by the VC. A total of 63 VC (confirmed) were killed and an estimated 215 additional killed or wounded during the action.
- (2) On 29 March, Co B conducted a search of the Vinh Loc Hamlet Complex. 20 VC dead were found and the count of VC weapons captured was raised to 20, including two 12.7mm AA gans.
- (3) Indications were that the remaining VC force withdrew at 282000ff. Civilians reported that at 282200H the VC returned to carry off their dead, then withdrew at 282400H to the north. No further contact was made by 1stBn, 7thMar.
- (4) Throughout the firefight, air strikes and artillery were constantly called on the hamlet complex and on hill located BS 5567% killing an estimated 50 VC. During the search of this area conducted by Co B, a total of four positions were found for AA guns at BS 5577%. From the new brass in the general vicinity and the lack of drag marks from one gun position to another, it is believed that two of the four guns were removed as the VC withdrew from the area.
- b. Terrain (KOCOA). The principal terrain features consisted of a hill mass starting at the center of grid square BS 5578 north through grid square BS 5579, the hill mass to the west from grid square BS 5578 north through grid square 5379 and the hill mass north in grid square BS 5580, BS 5481 and BS 5581. The key terrain located at BS 556791 afforded excellent observation of the entire area of operation. The southern approaches consisted of heavy woods, and brush growth thinning out northward. Terrain to the east and west consisted mainly of cultivated fields, harvested rice paddies, canefields and hedgerows throughout the built up areas. Terrain to the north was dominated by the hill mass located at BS 553806. No tunnels or caves were found in the operating area. Defenses consisted of trench lines, bunkers, individual shelters and spider traps.

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- there were four women, one old man and approximately nine children. Through interrogation it was learned that the VC had encored the area three to four days prior to the operation. The VC had hastily propared their positions. The majority of the VC spoke in the Northern Dialect.
- 8. Mission. To commence at 281400 March to lift by helicopter to an LZ vicinity BS 565774, and to establish blocking forces on the northern and western sides of Phuoc Loc (1) located in grid squares BS 5576 and 5676. If contact was established, ARWN forces would conduct search and destroy operations westward toward the blocking positions.
- 9. Concept of Operation. See enclosure (2). The Battalian was to land all companies at a single LZ. One company was assigned to secure the LZ, while two others were assigned separate blocking positions to the west of the LZ at objectives C and D, respectively. The fourth company was held as a reserve initially, with the intention of having it eventually relieve the company on Objective C so as to permit the latter to establish a blocking force further west at Objective E. Each company was to send out a patrol in its zone to determine the enemy situation. In this manner Phuoc Loc (1) was to be effectively surrounded on the northern and western sides preparatory to an ARWN search and destroy operation from the east.

10. Execution

- a. 1stBn, 7thMar received a warning order to execute the mission at 280945H March. Issuance of the complete Regimental Operation Order was effected during a coordination visit to 2d ARVN Division Headquarters at Quang Ngai and subsequently at ADC Command Group Headquarters at Chu Lai. The operation order, presented in verbal form, was issued in full by 281300H.
- b. In the discussion that follows, all times are for Time Zone H, and all grid coordinates are in 100,000 meter UTM Grid Square Designation BS unless specified otherwise.

c. Events on 28 March

(1) Initial landing

- (a) Elements of the Battalien were lifted from their respective Company LZ's commencing at 281400, in the order of Co B; Co C; lst Plt, Co A; Command Group; H&S Co Provisional Security Plt; and Co D. All elements were landed without resistance at 565774 by 281656, including the 2d ARVN Division Strike Company, which was lifted in to the LZ from Quang Ngai.
- (b) At 1515, Co C commenced movement to Objective C. At 1620, Co D commenced movement to Objective D. At 1620, the ARVN Strike Company commenced movement in trace of Co C, with the mission initially as Battalian Reserve, with a subsequent mission on order to relieve Co C on Objective C so that Co C could then further secure Objective E. By 1630 the Command Group, together with the 1st Plt, Co A, the H&S Co Provisional Security Plt, and the Olmm Mortar Platoon were fully established at 564773. At 1638, Co B commenced movement to Objective B, establishing itself there by 1745. All companies were to establish blocking positions and send out patrols upon arrival at their objectives.

(2) Activities of Co B on 28 Marsh

- (a) After establishment of perimeter blocking position at Objective B, the Company sent out a recon patrol into Phuse Loc (1) to the south. The patrol ventured forth some 500 meters without contact. The village, largely destroyed in Operation TEXAS, appeared occupied only by elderly persons.
 - (b) The night of 28 March passed without contact.

(3) Activities of Co C on 28 March

- (a) The Company departed the Battalion LZ at 1515, moved out toward Cojective C in the order of 3d Plt, Command Group, FAC Party, Wpns Plt, 1st Plt, and 2d Plt. In the complex, brush-covered terrain, the Company made a navigational error, moved well to the north of the assigned objective. At 1615, the point sighted VC outposts at 556785 and 556791. The 3d Plt was ordered to pursue. At 1630 the 3d Plt washed over the high ground at 556791 and attacked to the edge of the village at 554794. Opposed by an estimated 2 VC Platoons with heavy weapons and well dug in, the 3d Plt at this point could no longer advance due to intuitive enemy fire and heavy casualties. The Platoon was ordered to hold its position and provide a base of fire for the 1st Plt. The Co CP was established at 555791.
- (b) At about 1645, the 1st Plt commenced an attack to envelop the right lank of the ridgeline and assault the hill at 5577%. The Platoon conducted an assault after artillery preparation, carrying the position by use of bayonets, grenades, and hand-to-hand combat. This attack was supported by Wpns Plt located at 555791 using machinegums, rockets, and 60mm mortars.
- (c) At 1730 the 2d Plt, which had been in reserve, was committed to the attack. The Platoon moved around the left flank of the ridge to join the 3d Plt and assault through the village at 553785. As the Platoon advanced it encountered heavy automatic weapons fire from 554788. Due to the intensity of the fire and heavy casualties, the attack was stalled. At this same time, the Co CP came under heavy 81mm mortar fire. Heavy artillery fires and air strikes were placed continually on the hamlet area during this period.
- (d) At about 1800, due to darkness falling, the 1st Plt was ordered to withdraw with casualties from its objective and assist in the withdrawal of the 3d Plt. Plans were made to position all elements into more tenable dispositions and to prepare for a counterattack.
- (e) At about 1855 the ARVN Strike Company parimeter. This was accomplished with the assistance of an airstrike on the hamlet complex.
- (f) At about 1900 the 1st Plt reached the 3d Plt and assisted in withdrawing them with casualties to the Company perimeter.

- (g) The withdrawal of casualties proved to be a most hazardous mission. Desparate attempts were repeatedly made to evacuate all WIA and KIA, resulting in numerous additional casualties. The VC made a concerted effort to cover casualties with intensive fire. In the end, all wounded were successfully evacuated, but seven KFA had to be left behind until daylight.
- (h) Med Evac helicopters were finally able to land at about 2000 as the enemy fires subsided. Evacuation of KIA and WIA continued until 2300.
- (i) Co Darrived at 2030, moved into the southern portion of the perimeter. ARVN Strike Company occupied the northwest portion of the perimeter. Co C occupied the northeast portion of the perimeter. The conter of the perimeter was located at 556790.
 - (j) Resupply of Co C was completed by 2400.
- (k) During the above action involving Co C, friendly forces sustained 11 KIA and 53 WIA. The VC suffered in excess of 150 killed (60 of which were verified by body count) and 100 wounded. The Marines captured 15 weapons, including a 12.7mm AA Gun during the action, leaving others to be discovered the next morning. In turn, the Marines sustained bullet damage to one 3.5 rocket launcher, lost no weapons.
- (1) Throughout this furious engagement, communications between Co C and the Battalion CP were fully satisfactory.
- (m) The VC broke contact with Co C and withdrew, apparently to the northwest, at about 2015. This withdrawal was not observed; however it was anticipated and was heavily interdicted by artillery and mortar fires on all routes of egress from the day's battle area.

(4) Activities of Co D on 28 March

- (a) By 1730, Co D was established on Objective D, and sent forth a patrol about 800 meters into Phuoc Loc (3) with negative contact. The patrol's observations were similar to the Co B patrol's observations.
- (b) At 1915, Co D commenced movement to join with Company C and the ARVN Strike Company. Some difficulty was encountered in that Co C was not where it was presumed or reported to be, due to a navigational error made by Co C. However, this difficulty was overcome by having 81mm mortars adjust illumination directly over Co C, acting as a marker on which Co D could guide during their night movement through the complex terrain. Co D linked up with Co C and the ARVN Strike Company at 2030. A three company perimeter was formed with a 200-300 meter radius, centered at 556790. Co D held the southern sector of the perimeter, had no contact during the night.

(5) Activities of ARVN Strike Company on 2 March

- (a) After moving out to follow in trace of Co C, the Company experienced difficulty in locating Co C and to the aforementioned navigational error. This greatly delived crival of the Company at a position from which it could effectively assist Co C. This was accomplished, however, at 1855. The Company moved in on the south side of Co C, forming a two-company perimeter. Later, upon arrival of Co D, a three-company perimeter was formed, with the ARVN Strike Company on the northwest sector.
 - (b) The company had no contact throughout the night.

(6) Other Activities on 28 March

(a) Systematic artillery and mortar destruction and interdiction missions were carried out all night throughout the battle area. Emphasis was placed on fires in the areas where Marine KIA were located and where VC dead were located. In addition all egresses from the area, particularly trails and passes through ridgelines to the north, east, and west, were thoroughly covered with fires.

d. Events on 29 March

(1) General. At 0800, Co B joined the Command OP Group at the Battalion CP, and these elements moved to the perimeter established at 556790. Co D was ordered to search the hamlet at 553788, especially to recover friendly KIA and to assess VC losses. Co B was ordered to do likewise in the hamlet centered at 553796. Co C was ordered to search the hamlet at 553791. Subsequently, Co D was ordered to search Vinh Loc (3) at 545788. Coordination was effected with 2dBn, 7thMar as to Co B's objective at 553796, as this objective was north of the assigned FCL.

(2) Activities of Co 3 on 29 March

- (a) Upon arrival in the vicinity of the perimeter established by Co B, Co D, and the ARVN Strike Company at 556790, Co B established a perimeter centered at 557785 to await resupply and orders. Since no resupply was forthcoming, and since the Company was without water, a detail was sent into the village at 553788 to obtain well water. Thus delayed, the Company moved out at 1245 to search its objective, the village and hill mass centered at 554796. Artillery prep fires were used to precede entry into the objective area. Two platoons were used to envelop the east flank of the objective. The objective was thoroughly searched without contact, producing three Co C KIA that could not be recovered the night before, and discovering 20 additional VC dead, two VC 12.7mm AA Guns, 14 boxes of 12.7 ammunition, and a quantity of VC individual equipment, all located in the vicinity of 557795. The mission was complete at 1510.
- (b) At 1515, the Company moved back to assume the southern portion of the Battalion perimeter. The remainder of 29 March was without contact.

(3) Activities of Co C on 29 March

- (a) At 0741, the Company sighted a group of seven armed VC moving across a field at 546780. An artillery trike was ordered with excellent effect. Three VC were observed killed by direct hits. The remainder were undoubtedly killed or wounded.
- (b) At 1237, the Company sent a platoch to search the hamlet located at 553792. The search was completed by 1345 with no significant find.
- (c) At 2200, the Company experienced five rounds of enemy 60 or 80mm Mortar rounds near the perimeter. The origin of the fire was indeterminable.

(4) Activities of Co D on 29 March

- (a) At 0800 the Company sent one platoon into the hamlet at 553788 to search for Marine KIA and evidence of VC losses. Four KIA from Co C were found. No VC bodies were found; they were obviously carried away during the night despite intensive H&I fires in the village and throughout the adjoining areas all night. Many trenches, fighting holes, and bunkers were found, all of them soaked thoroughly with blood. The mission was completed at 0930.
- (b) At 1100 the Company sent one platoon to search the hamlet at 545788 (Vinh Loc (3)). Artillery and mortar prep fires were used. Two lines of trenches with barbed wire were found on the perimeter of the village. Several large crocks of rice were found in the village but were left undestroyed because it was believed to be a reasonable amount for local villagers needs. Several fresh panji traps were observed. There was no apparent sign of VC casualties in the area. The mission was completed by 1415.
- (c) At 1146, the Company sighted 10 VC in a treeline at 546794. 81mm mortars were placed on the target with excellent effect, causing unknown casualties.
- (d) At 2205, the Company sighted two groups of five VC approaching their lines at 554788. The target was engaged with heavy small arms fire with unknown results.
- (e) At 2217, 3 rounds of enemy 60 or 81mm mortars were received near the perimeter at 555788. The origin could not be determined.

(5) Other activities on 29 March

- (a) Heavy H&I fires were used throughout the hours of darkness.
- (b) Command Group Alpha, the H&S Co Security Platoon, and lst Plt, Co A moved from the original CP site at 564773 at 0935 and arrived at the Battalion perimeter at 1020.

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- (c) The 81mm Mortar Plt with ammunition was lifted by helicopter from the old CP site to the Battalion perimeter commencing at 0850. This move was completed by 0915. The guns were in action by 0930.
- (d) The ARVN Strike Company, the H&S Co Provisional Security Plt and 1st Plt, Co A remained in reserve in the perimeter throughout the day.

e. Events of 30 March

- (1) Commencing at 0650, the Battalion conducted a movement eastward to Highway 1 to rendezvous with a truck convoy at 637758 for transportation back to the Enclave. The route followed passed south of An Tuyet (1), 563787, joined the main trail at 575783, passed through Iam Loo (1), 585767, and along the main road to Highway 1. The order of march was Co B, Co D, Command OP Group, Mortar Plt, H&S Provisional Security Platoon, Command Group Alpha, ARVN Strike Company, Co C, and 1st Plt, Co A. There was no contact along the route. However, at 0805, one VC 81mm mortar round was received at the Battalion perimeter site where the tail of the column was waiting to move out.
- (2) The delayed arrival of helicopters, which were scheduled to arrive at 0700 to evacuate surplus supplies, but which did not arrive until over an hour later, caused some delay in the movement of the column.
- (3) All elements of the column were at the Highway 1 rendezvous point by 1115.

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(4) The Battalion convoy moved out to Chu Iai at 1220. * All elements were back in the Battalion Enclave TAOR by 1415.

11. Results

a. <u>Enemy losses</u>

(1) VC Casualties

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63 VC dead (confirmed) 215 additional VC killed and wounded (estimated)

(2) Weapons Captured

11 AK SMC Assault Rifles (7 destroyed by Co C)
4 Mossin Nagant Rifles (3 destroyed by Co C)
2 M-1 Garand Rifles (both destroyed by Co C)
2 12.7mm A Guns (Chinese)
1 Pistol TOK REV-51 7.62mm (Chinese)
20 Total Captured/Destroyed

(3) Documents

7 VC ID Cards
1 VC performance report on Operation UTAH
4 applications to join the Communist Party
1 Platoon Leader's Diary and note book

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(4) Equipment

Numerous items of VC individual equipment and uniforms (destroyed by burning)

(5) Food

4,000 lbs of rice (destroyed)

(6) Ammunition

12 cans of 12.7mm ammunition 2,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition (destroyed) 70 ChiCom grenades (destroyed) 15 M-26 grenades (destroyed)

b. Friendly losses

- (1) KIA 11
- (2) WIA 55
- (3) Non-Battle Casualties 1
- (4) Material losses: One 3.5" Rocket Launcher damaged by gunfire

12. Administrative Matters

a. Supply

- (1) Initially when Co C faced it's heavy enemy contact a need for ammunition resupply soon arose. It had become dark and the resupply chain to the LSA was not completely established. Therefore some confusion resulted among supporting and supported units. Meanwhile Co C continued to use up ammunition. Around midnight on 29 March personal delivery of ammunition was made by the Regimental S-4 via helicopter.
- (2) The next morning all efforts were made to establish definite resupply procedures. The four elements, Battalion, Regiment, Shore Farty, and the helicopters began working under a united system and consequently a good, continual flow of supplies came into Battalion and it's companies. However, towards the end of the day, the operation was ordered terminated by the next morning. Thereupon retraction of the large amount of supplies brought in during the day was undergone with fine coordination and success.
- (3) As night came, the helicopters, with only three loads remaining, withdrew for the night. It was arranged to have an early morning pickup at 030700 March, in order to lift out the remaining supplies before the Battalian's tactical departure from the area. As has happened in the past, the helicopters arrived late and it was not until 0820 that the last of the supplies was lifted away causing great inconvenience to the Battalian.

(4) It was clear that the injection of two new elements to the system of supply, i.e., Shore Party's Helicopter Support Teams and the arrival of the regimental logistical element got confused with the systems of supply used on past operations such as UTAH where rifle units dealt with another source, Task Force Delta. Although we understood the mission of Shore Party, lack of direct contact and published policy (SOP) between all units concerned, caused confusion as to who did what. A definite SOP must be established and disseminated to the infantry battalions, regiments, Shore Party, and the MAG. In this way all units will be clear as to procedures and missions of the support units. On Operation INDIANA the system eventually was established thus:

Company requests to Battalion.

Battalion requests to Regiment and informs its HST of the request and the request number.

Regiment contacts Shore Party at the LSA as to the request. Shore Party fills the order by number and loads an UH-34D. Shore Party notifies Regiment request number "X" on the way. UH-34D flies out.

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Regiment informs Battalion.


Battalion informs company and the Battalion HST.

Company informs it's HST.

Battalion HST talks UH-34D into company area via FM radio.

- (5) It is clear that there is a "middle man" in the above system--Regiment. On the other hand, Regiment acted as an excellent coordinator and a familiar voice to express our troubles to. In any case, a definite and clear system must be initiated so that valuable hours will not be used in the field and under combat to establish a jury-rig affair.
- (6) It has always been difficult to understand the restrictions that keep helicopters from getting an early morning start to meet dawn commitments. In this case on Operation INDIANA, the late hour agreed upon by the helicopter unit---0700--- caused the Battalion to delay unfavorably its tactical departure. UH-34D's would not leave MAG-36 until 0630. From the Battalion point of view, it is not understandable when an earlier takeoff could not be effected to permit arrival at the Battalion's area at first light, thus allowing the tactical commander the earliest possible start for the day's action.

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b. Maintenance. Not applicable.

- c. Treatment of Casualties. Professional conduct of company corpsmen in the initial treatment of casualties was outstanding. In spite of the presence of devastating enemy fire and wounds sustained by themselves, the corpsmen continued to render care to other wounded personnel. Evacuation was delayed by the continued presence of enemy fire, making it impossible for evacuation helicopters to land immediately. The present evacuation and hospitalization chain is outstanding, utilizing Co D, lst Med Bn as the primary evacuation point for emergency treatment, sorting, and further evacuation to other treatment facilities.
- d. Transportation. At operation's end the Battalion was transported by convoy from Quang Ngai to Chu Lai and the various company areas by 1st Division motor transport units in outstanding fashion.

e. Communications

- (1) For the first six hours of the operation there was no contact with 7th Mar on either the Regimental Tac Net or the Logistics Net. Bat-talion Communicating elements tried antenna relocation without success. Finally, about 282100 March the Battalion made a weak but readable contact with Regiment utilizing a field expedient antenna. At about 1000 on the second day of the operation, Regiment came in loud and clear on both nets and no trouble was experienced thereafter.
- (2) The Shore Party HST was not adequately equipped with communication equipment and was unable to make contact with the LSA at Quang Ngai. Initial emergency ammunition requests were relayed to 7th Mar through the DASC at Chu Lai. 7th Mar S-4 soon assumed control of logistics matters from the HST elements who were then relegated to a landing zone control function.

f. Medical Evaluation

- (1) Under the circumstances, the handling of casualties on this operation must be considered excellent. In retrospect, however, and for future reference, the establishment of a battalion aid station detachment and landing zone in closer proximity to the actual company positions, to which casualties could be evacuated by litter and bearers, would permit slightly more sophisticated treatment of casualties in the event that helicopter evacuation is delayed.
- (2) The advent of continued extreme hot weather conditions and the incidence of cases of heat exhaustion during the six mile Battalion march to the truck pickup point indicates that unit commanders and corpsmen must continually emphasize adequate intake of salt and water.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

14. Commender's Analysis

- a. As soon as it became apparent from patcolling that there were no. VC in Phuce Loc (1) and at the same time contact was established almost 2000 meters north of the assigned objective area, the Battalion responded by immediately and unhesitatingly changing its mission to meet the circumstances. The concept of blocking forces around Phuce Loc (1) was abandoned, and all forces of the Battalion were redirected to the point of contact to the north.
- b. The navigational error by Co C had both fortunate and unfortunate effects. If Co C had not gone too far to the north, it is probable that there would have been no contact with the VC during the operation. The VC most probably would have exfiltrated the area the first night. On the other hand, when reinforcements were sent to assist Co C, their arrivals was significantly delayed by the fact that Co C was 1000 meters north of where it was believed to be. Since darkness was falling, time was of the essence. As it was, reinforcements did not arrive in time to effectively exploit Co C's immediate success.
- c. The determination and violence with which Co C attacked the VC force once it was located not only assured success, but also undoubtedly had the effect of reducing friendly casualties in the final analysis. An understrength Marine Company was pitted against a VC Battalion sized force in dug-in positions. If Co C's attack was less swift and violent, the VC would not have been surprised, and the VC would have undoubtedly counter-attacked in strength. As it was, the VC withdrew shortly after dark, made no effort to counter-attack, and left behind many dead and a significant number of weapons.
- d. The coordination of supporting fires with helicopter medical evacuations became a difficult problem. Fire superiority over the LZ could not be maintained without supporting arms, yet supporting arms could not be used while the helicopters were in the area. Under the circumstances, the best sort of fire support would be a form of CAS, which could, unlike artillery, be conducted concurrently with a medical evacuation. It is clear that without fire superiority over the LZ, casualties simply cannot be evacuated.

15. Recommendations

- a. That a greater effort be made by higher headquarters to establish a forward command post at the outset of such an operation as this, thus to assure from the beginning positive and trouble-free communications with the unit initially committed.
- b. That an SOP be published which sets forth a clear doctrine for helicopter resupply in contingency operations such as this. This document should be designed to unify and coordinate the activities and responsibilities of S-4's, helicopter units, HST attachments, and Logistic Support Units.

c. That AN/PRC-25 radios be allocated for use by artillery FO's, artillery Liaison Officers, and HST Detachments in order to extend their operating ranges.

JAMES P. KELLY

Task Organization of 1stBn (-)(Rein), 7thMar

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lstBn(-)(Rein), 7thMar
   Det, H&S Co, (Command Group)
Det, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar (Arty IO)
   Det, ARVN, (Interpreter, ARVN Liaison)
   Det : 1st SP Bn (HST)
   Co B (Rein)
      Co B
      Det, H&S Co
         Det, Med Plt
         Det, Comm Plt
         Det, S-2 Sect
         FO Tm, Mort Plt
         FAC Party
      FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar
      Det, ARVN (Interpreter)
   Co C (Rein)
      CoC
      Det, H&S Co
         Det, Med Plt
         Det, Comm Plt
         Det, S-2 Sect
         FO Tm, Mort Plt
         FAC Party
      FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar
      Det, ARVN (Interpreter)
   Co D (Rein)
      Co D
      Det, H&S Co
         Det, Med Plt
         Det, Comm Plt
         Det, S-2 Sect
         FO Tm, Mort Plt
      FO Tm, Btry G, 3dBn, 11thMar
      Det, ARVN (Interpreter)
      Det, PF
      Det, 1st Plt, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
   Strike Co, 2d Inf Div, AEVN
   1st Plt (Rein), Co A
      1st Plt, Co A
      MG Sqd, Co A
      ATA Sqd, Co A
      Det, Med Plt, H&S Co
      Det, Somm Plt, H&S Co
   Provisional Security Plt, H&S Co
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81MM Mcrt Plt (-)(Plt Hg & 2 Sects)

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Overlay of Action on 28 March Co C, 1st Bn, 7th Mar Operation Indiana

Maps VITEM 1:50,000 AMS Series 1701, Sheets 6756 III& W

