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HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

2nd Bn. 7th Marines  
Log No. **0083-66**

Copy No. 1 of 4  
SER No 0015-66

3/AJD/WWV  
3000  
7 April 66

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology Report

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv Order 5750.2  
(b) RegtO 3120.1A

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. As directed by references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

*Leon N. Utter*  
LEON N. UTTER

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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11 APR 1966

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~~SECRET~~1. Organization Data Sheet.

- a. Location. 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein) CP located in Chu Lai (BT 504036).
- b. Period covered. 1 - 31 March 1966.
- c. Commanding Officer and Staff.
  - (1) Lieutenant Colonel LEON N. UTTER Commanding Officer
  - (2) Major G.H. GENTRY Jr. Executive Officer
  - (3) 1st LT R.W. HALL S-1
  - (4) 1st LT G.V. HARTMAN S-2
  - (5) Major A.J. DOUBLET S-3
  - (6) Capt M.E. O'CONNER S-4 - 1-22 Mar 66

2. Detailed Description of Significant Events.a. Personnel

- (1) One Marine officer KIA, 39 Marine enlisted KIA, 3 U.S. Navy enlisted KIA, one Marine enlisted DOW. One hundred and twelve Marine officer and enlisted were WIA and five Navy enlisted WIA. In addition four non-battle casualties were evacuated during the month of March.
- (2) One captain promoted to major, one 1st Lt promoted to captain, 2 staff sgt's promoted to gysgt's, 2 sgt's promoted to staff sgt. There were no promotions effected in the grade of sgt. and below.
- (3) One hundred and ninety-seven personnel were joined during March and 156 personnel were transferred due to normal rotation during the same period.
- (4) Four Silver Star Medals, five Bronze Star Medals, five Navy Commendation Medals, 46 Purple Heart Medals and ten Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Medals were awarded during the month.
- (5) Average monthly strength during period was 30 Marine officers, 900 Marine enlisted and 3 Navy officers, 47 Navy enlisted.

- b. Intelligence. During the month of March 1966 significant intelligence

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was gained which indicated an extensive buildup of enemy forces in northern Quang Ngai Province. Information which predicated "Operation Utah" on 4 March 1966 was initially obtained by the ARVN 2nd Division Forces based at Quang Ngai City, and was furnished to this unit on the night of 3 March 1966 at which time it was considered reliable and valid. The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy elements of the 36th Regt, 308th Division of the North Vietnamese Army believed to be newly arrived in Quang Ngai Province. It was initially anticipated that the enemy might possess an anti-aircraft capability, and that he had been concentrating his efforts on constructing field fortifications. Significant intelligence gained by 2/7 on 4 March was that the enemy units encountered were well equipped with automatic weapons in both the light and heavy machine-gun category, including three of four weapons of .50 caliber. The vast majority of weapons captured were automatic or semi-automatic of Chi Com manufacture. In addition, the VC supply of ordnance and ammunition was noticeably complete. It is significant to point out that much of the expended VC cartridge casings were observed to be of brand-new and untarnished brass, indicating that they had probably been transported into the area in quantity and in the original containers. It was apparent that the area the enemy chose to defend had been well stockpiled in advance with ammunition supplies. Throughout the operation the VC made maximum use of natural camouflage materials, both on their person and entrenchments. The difficulty that Marines continue to encounter in commencement of fire, is an extraordinary handicap. All entrenchments appeared to have been no more than two or three weeks old. Although night air strikes and artillery fires were conducted continuously on the evening of 4 March, the VC were able to remove a considerable number of their dead and weapons from the battle field.

- c. Training. To provide for continuity in company training programs while maintaining semi-static positions, patrol activity was assigned to two companies on a weekly basis while leaving the other companies free to train. A heavy increase of replacement personnel placed increased emphasis on subject matter contained in "Lessons Learned and Training Tips" publications. A battalion directive was promulgated to provide guide lines. (Appendix B). Coordination with U.S. Advisory personnel in Ly Tin (BT 495069) established a limited training program for Ly Tin PF units. This program is presently hampered by the distance that PF units must travel from their homes, and their reluctance to remain in our area of responsibility for more than two days at a time. Liaison continues to develop a workable solution.

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d. Special Operations

- (1) During the period 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein) participated in "Operation Utah" 4-7 Mar 66, and "Operation Indiana" 29-30 Mar 1966. (Appendix A After Action Reports).
- (2) A four day company size search and destroy operation was planned but had to be cancelled due to "Operation Indiana".

e. Command and Control.

- (1) During "Operation Utah", 4-7 March 1966 the battalion operated under control of Task Force Delta.
- (2) On 3 March 1966 Task Force Smith responsible for the Chu Lai Airfield Defense under CO, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines was dissolved when 3rd Battalion 1st Marines assumed airfield defense responsibility.
- (3) On 31 March 66 companies "E" and "F" accompanied by a Command Group went under OPCON of the Chu Lai Airfield Defense Commander for airfield, RMK contractor area and class V dump security.

f. Close Combat. Close combat during the period consisted of the battalions participation in "Operation Utah" and "Operation Indiana". (Appendix A- After Action Reports).g. Logistics.

- (1) During the reporting period, the Battalion Command Bunker was completed and put into operation. The battalion continued to improve its defensive fortifications along the MLR.
- (2) The battalion received sixteen replacement Mites M422A1 during the month. However there continues to be a severe shortage of spare parts for the Mule M274.
- (3) Lack of antennas for the radio set PRC-6's and PRC-10's continues to be a problem. There are ten PRC-6's and eight PRC-10's presently deadlined for lack of antennas.
- (4) Three 3.5 Rocket Launchers were received but six M60 Machine Guns and three M79 Grenade Launchers remain on priority O2 requisition.

Enclosure (1)

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- (5) The battalion remains without an E/G refrigeration unit. After nine months in-country this battalion has been unable to obtain any type of refrigeration units through normal supply channels.
- (6) One radio set AN/MRC-38 and twelve AN/PRC-10's were received under the R&E program. In addition, one telegraph typewriter was received.

h. Combat Air Support.

g. Civil Affairs.

- (1) FLSG-B has taken over Civil Affairs responsibility for Chu Lai New Life Hamlet (BT 500060) thus enabling this battalion to concentrate its activities on the hamlets of Long Phu 1 (BT 508042), Long Phu 2 (BT 510030) and Tich Tay (BT 495039).
- (2) Early in the month a large quantity of food, clothing and tools were distributed to the needy villagers of Long Phu (1) and (2). The bulk of the commodities were received by the Chaplain from the people of San Diego. Included in the gifts to Long Phu (1) was a hand crank water pump to be used near the dispensary in connection with Med Cap activities. Before installing the pump the CA team suggested to Mr So the Hamlet Chief, that a new and better well be dug to house the pump. He agreed and suggested that a shower also be built. The CA team provided the cement and a well and shower unit is presently being built with completion scheduled in about one week. Once the well project was under way in Long Phu (1) a similar project was suggested for Long Phu (2). Cement was provided and now construction of a well is also in progress in Long Phu (2).
- (3) Language classes continue daily in Long Phu (2) under the guidance of the Company "G" Commander, Captain SEYMOUR.
- (4) Liaison has been made with the Civil Affairs Officers of new Marine units moving into our area of responsibility. An expanded civil affairs program is in the planning.
- (5) Med Cap services treated a total of 1192 civilians during March.

Appendices:

A - Reference Material

B - Documents

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2ND Bn. 7th Marines

Co. No. **49-66**

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Copy No. 3 of 41  
SER. NO. 0010-66

3/AJD/der  
3000  
12 March 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta  
Subj: After Action Report; "Operation Utah"  
Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay for D-day  
(2) 2/7 Adjusted Scheme of Maneuver D-day  
(3) 2/7 Dispositions after solid contact made D-day  
(4) Operation Overlay for D+1  
(5) Operation Overlay for D+2  
(6) Operation Overlay for D+3

1. Code Name. "Operation Utah".
2. Dates of Operation. 4-7 March 1966
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam; AMS Map Series L701, 1:50,000  
Sheets 6756 I and IV.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines - 4 March 1966, CG, Task Force  
Delta 4-7 March 1966.
5. Task Organization.

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein)

LtCol UTTER

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

1stLt CROSZ

Company E (Rein)

Capt THEER

Artillery FO Team  
81mm Mortar Team

Company F (Rein)

Capt LINDAUER 4Mar66

Capt LEE 4-7Mar66

Team, Engineer Plat  
Artillery FO Team  
81mm Mortar Team  
FAC Team

Company G (Rein)

Capt SEYMOUR

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Appendix A-1

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Team, Engineer Plat  
81mm Mortar Team  
FAC Team

Company H (Rein)

1stLt LAU

Team, Engineer Plat  
Artillery, FO Team  
81mm Mortar Team

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. "M" Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines was positioned at Binh Son BS 600923 on 040830H to support the operation. As the scope of the operation expanded "Kilo" and "Lima" Batteries, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines and one 105mm Battery were emplaced at Binh Son to provide additional fire support during "Operation Utah". "M" Battery fired the preponderance of supporting fires for this battalion. On D-day three extensive fire missions were called and fired against enemy forces in the open and on suspected enemy mortar positions. In all cases the observed effect on targets was excellent. H and I fires were requested and fired during the nights of D-day, D+1 and D+2. There was considerable difficulty on D+1 in submitting a request for nightly H and I fires due primarily to the impracticability of transmitting the request on what was an exceedingly overcrowded conduct of fire net. As more units were phased into the operation there was no corresponding increase of radio nets to compensate for artillery fire requests. Thus it soon became apparent that priority of fire missions determined who controlled the net. Early on D+2 this dilemma was resolved with the activation of two additional conduct of fire nets.

b. Air.

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. The battalion only had one troop lift which occurred on D-day. Approximately 20 MAG-36 helicopters lifted the battalion from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to LZ Alfa (BS 545830) in the objective area. The initial lift was by eight H-34 helicopters. There followed an approximate forty-five minute delay before the remainder of the battalion was lifted. Although the pickup zone was marked with yellow panels and a controller was present at each point, there was some confusion on the part of helicopter pilots as to where loading sights were located in the pickup zone. Once oriented, and with the arrival of the remainder of the helicopters, the lift progressed gradually but with considerable shifting and reorganizing of heliteams. From start to finish the lift took three hours.

(2) Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopters were not in direct support of the battalion on D-day as had been requested. It was later determined that heavy AA fire in the LZ disabled four thus precluding the direct support role. Their presence would have been invaluable on D-day. On D+3 armed helicopters were on station and used to good effect as the battalion conducted an eight thousand meter long search and destroy operation from BS 566817 to the RJ at BS 635802.

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(3) Helicopter Med-Evac. Reaction time for Med-Evac Helicopters was slow on D-day for two reasons. First, at the time when their need was vital they were obviously over-committed, and secondly once on station it was not possible to bring them in because of an extremely "hot" LZ. The professional skill and determination displayed by helicopter pilots to Med-Evac our WIA's and bring in resupplies the night of D-day, cannot be over-praised. Flying without lights, in a pickup zone that was periodically crisscrossed with enemy fire, they evacuated 60-70 WIA's and resupplied the battalion with vitally needed class V supplies.

(4) CAS. Close Air Support was requested and used by this battalion on D-day only. Air strikes in our zone were controlled by TAC(A) and only briefly by one FAC. The TAC (A) was required because one complete FAC team was lost to enemy fire and the remaining FAC team later suffered communications problems or was not in position to observe and control air where it was most needed. In all cases reaction time and target coverage was very good. However, when it was later possible to enter the target area, it was determined that a heavier ordnance with delayed fuzes would have been more effective.

## 7. Intelligence.

### a. Estimate of VC strength, location, and disposition in the Objective Area.

#### (1) Forces anticipated in immediate objective area.

(a) <u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Tactical Disposition</u>
36th Regt	BS 5481	Unknown	Unknown
	5482		
	5483		
	5581		
	5582		
	5583		
52nd Bn	BS 6782	300	Unknown
	6781		
T-19 Co	BS 5392	100	Unknown
T-18 Co	BS 6887	50	Unknown
210th Doc Log Co	BS 5684	100	Unknown

(2) The intelligence information which predicated "Operation Utah" was initially obtained by the ARVN 2nd Division Forces based at Quang Ngai City, and was furnished to this unit on the night of 3 March 1966 at which time it was considered reliable and valid.

(3) The objective of the operation was to fix and destroy elements of the 36th Regt, 308th Division of the North Vietnamese Army believed to be newly arrived in Quang Ngai Province. It was initially anticipated that the enemy might possess an anti-aircraft capability, and that he had been concentrating his efforts on constructing field fortifications.

### b. VC strength and situation actually found as operation was conducted.

(1) Although LZ Alfa, coordinates BS 545830, had initially been secured by ARVN units, Companies "F" and "G" established scattered contact with VC remaining in the landing zone at the outset of the operation on 4 March 1966.

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(2) In the early afternoon of 4 March, Companies "F" and "G" established firm contact with what was later evaluated to be two well entrenched VC Battalions deployed from BS 556834 to BS 556828. Company "H" was committed at this time. A stiff fire-fight ensued which lasted until 1900 hours of the same day, whereupon the three rifle companies were extracted a distance of 250 meters in order to employ supporting arms, resupply with class V, and establish a perimeter night defense. The enemy defenders were confident of their position and did not withdraw until sometime after dark of the same day. Last contact of note was at 042145H.

(3) From 5 to 7 March 1966 contact with the VC was limited to the sightings of scattered evading VC, and sporadic contact with snipers.

c. VC Units Identified.

(1) On 5 March 1966, a VC rallied to Company "G" at BS 554830. He was dressed in khaki uniform and equipped with cartridge belt and several concussion type grenades. During interrogation he stated that his billet was a cook, and that he was a member of the 7th Company of the 2nd Battalion. He was unable to identify the regimental unit to which his battalion belonged. He further stated that his company was composed of 78 men.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) The enemy units encountered on 4 March by 2/7 were extremely well equipped with automatic weapons in both the light and heavy machine-gun category, including three or four weapons of .50 caliber. The vast majority of weapons captured were automatic or semi-automatic of ChiCom manufacture. In addition, the VC supply of ordnance and ammunition was noticeably complete. It is significant to point out that much of the expended VC cartridge casings were observed to be of brand-new and untarnished brass, indicating that they had probably been transported into the area in quantity and in the original containers. It was apparent that the area he chose to defend had been well stockpiled in advance with ammunition supplies.


(2) The VC made maximum use of natural camouflage materials, both on their person and their entrenchments. The difficulty that Marines continue to encounter in locating VC positions by virtue of extensive camouflage prior to the commencement of fire, is an extraordinary handicap. All entrenchments appeared to have been no more than two or three weeks old.

(3) Although night air strikes and artillery fires were conducted continuously on the evening of 4 March, the VC were able to remove a considerable number of their dead and weapons from the battlefield.

e. Terrain.

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

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Hill 97	(BS 539826)
Hill 85	(BS 541817)
Hill	(BS 553837)
Hill	(BS 557825)

(2) Observation and fields of fire. The terrain traversed during the course of the operation was comparatively flat and unobstructed by obstacles or heavy foliage. It was, however, laced and crisscrossed with hedgerows. The VC were able to take maximum advantage of these features for killing zone fires.

(3) Cover and Concealment. The essential natural materials universally used by combat troops for concealment were in sparse supply in the objective area. However, the VC demonstrated their usual remarkable ability to conceal themselves even in relatively open terrain.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered during the course of the operation.

8. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) in conjunction with elements of the 2nd ARVN Division conducts search and destroy operations in designated zone on 4 March 1966 and provides convoy security as required.


9. Concept of operation.

a. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) was to follow elements of the 2nd ARVN Division into LZ alfa (BS 545830) at approximately L+1 hour. Company "F", as the leading element of 2/7, was to relieve 2nd ARVN Division units for the security of the LZ upon landing. Company "G", upon consolidating in the LZ, was to move South by 300 meters and on order secure Hill 85 (BS 541817). Company "H", upon consolidation in the LZ, was to move Southwest by 300 meters and on order secure hill 97 (BS 539826). H&S Company was to follow the Command Group, which was to move behind Companies "G" and "H" when ordered to move out, and Company "F" would bring up the rear and act as battalion reserve. After securing hills 85 (BS 541817) and 97 (BS 539826) 2/7 would commence search and destroy operations to the Southeast, remaining South of the road, and tying in with ARVN forces who were to move North of the road. "M" Battery 4/11 would provide artillery fire support from Binh Son (BS 600923) and air was to be on station.

b. At 040730H Company "E" (-), 2/7 joined "H" Battery 4/11 at check point number one (BT 522045) to escort the latter unit to its designated firing positions in Binh Son. The remaining platoon of Company "E" was to remain in the Battalion CP till noon, prepared to escort a truck convoy, which was to bring 2/7 units back to Chu Lai should the target area be void of VC forces. (Enclosure (1)).

10. Execution.

a. Planning. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was alerted at 031720H to be prepared to depart for Quang Ngai early on 4 March 1966 to conduct a coordinated operation with the 2nd ARVN Division in Quang Ngai Province. At 032115H the Commanding Officer and his Executive Staff were directed to report to the CP of the Commanding Officer of the 7th Marine Regiment for a



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briefing on operations to be conducted on 4 March 1966. The briefing was conducted by the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines and his staff at the 7th Marines CP about 032200H. Combat and combat service support unit commanders were present. All orders and instructions were verbal, and based on orders and instructions received and liaison conducted, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) Frag Order No 2-66 was published at 040200H.

b. D-day, 4 March 1966. At 040700H Company "E" (-)(Rein) departed by motor convoy from the CP to join "M" Battery, 4/11 on highway one and provide security for the latter's move to Binh Son (BS 600923). Company "E" had no further contact with 2/7 during "Operation Utah", having later been placed under operational control of Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The rifle platoon of Company "E" that remained in the CP was committed to convoy escort to Binh Son at 050300H and there rejoined its parent organization. The remainder of the battalion moved from the CP (BT 504036) to LZ Carp (BT 509052) at 040815H in preparation for an approximate 040930 helo lift. The leading elements of Company "F" departed the pickup LZ at 041040H arriving in LZ Alfa (BS 545830) at 041100H. No further helicopters were available until 041104, and from that point remained constant till the conclusion of the entire lift. Starboard 3 reported at 041055H that AA fire had been heavy in LZ Alfa initially, and four helicopters had been hit with one going down at BS 536817. Sporadic sniper fire greeted Company "F" in LZ Alfa although it had been relatively secured by the ARVN Airborne Battalion earlier. Company "F" took one WIA which was promptly evacuated by helicopter. Company "G" last elements arrived in LZ Alfa at 041210H and after reorganizing moved South as directed. The Battalion Command Group arrived with the last elements of Company "G". The ARVN Airborne Battalion was oriented to the Northeast at this time and from initial sounds and sightings appeared to be engaged with the enemy at BS 550835. The Commanding Officer of 2/7 moved to coordinate with the Senior Adviser of the ARVN unit and after ascertaining his situation proceeded to prepare for the further execution of his own mission. An H-34 that was down in LZ Alfa was reported to Starboard 3. In moving South from LZ Alfa at 041230H Company "G" killed four VC and captured some 30 packs and 100 rounds of .50 caliber machine-gun ammunition. Observation of hills 97 (BS 539826) and 85 (BS 541817) indicated no enemy movement. The Senior ARVN Adviser requested assistance by radio at 041330H as his counterparts unit was heavily engaged at BS 550835. The Commanding Officer of 2/7 reported to Starboard 3 on the lack of enemy activity in the direction the battalion had been ordered to conduct operations, and also that the ARVN forces were meeting stiff resistance. Starboard 3 directed 2/7 to coordinate with the Senior Adviser of the ARVN Airborne force to render assistance as required to the East. Also, to provide security for the two downed helicopters at BS 545830 and BS 536817. Company "G" reported killing four more VC at BS 546829 and Company "F" killed two at BS 548829 at 041300H. Company "G" was directed to send a platoon to secure the downed helicopter at BS 536817, and Company "H" ordered to provide the same type of security for the downed helicopter in LZ Alfa. Orders were then issued at 041342H for Companies "F" and "G" to move to the East with Company "F" tying in with the ARVN right flank. Company "H" would bring up the rear with H&S Company elements following in trace of the lead companies. The last of Company "E" units arrived in LZ Alfa at 041340H (Enclosure (2)). Sporadic long range sniper fire and occasional automatic weapons fire met the leading elements of Company "F" as they crossed open rice paddies at BS 553833. The ARVN forces now on the Southern slopes of the hill at BS 553837 were still firmly engaged, but not quite as heavy as initially. The ARVN Senior Adviser reported by radio that they were going to work completely around the hill they were presently on (BS 553837).

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as it contained caves and tunnels that had to be cleaned out. Company "F" in turn was directed to continue to move on the ARVN right flank until oriented to the North and then hold their line at this point until Company "G" moved abreast. Reports from the ARVN advisor indicated the VC had withdrawn to the Northeast. At approximately 041450H heavy small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire commenced on the left flank of Company "F". The company at this time was oriented toward the Northeast. Heavy fire commenced in the Company "G" area almost simultaneously. Company "G", who was minus its one platoon for helicopter security, soon reported that the VC were moving to their right in an attempt to hit their exposed flank. Company "H", minus its one platoon for helicopter security, was immediately ordered forward to protect the battalion's right flank. Moving in rapid fashion Company "H" was soon tied in on the right of Company "G", occupying a dominating hill at BS 557825 facing to the East and South. (Enclosure 3). Supporting arms in the form of both air and artillery were utilized to the East but the close in fighting remained fierce. Companies "F" and "G" reported engaging the enemy at ranges of 50 meters and less. A flame-thrower squad with Company "G" successfully assaulted two well entrenched automatic weapons. Company "F" was by far the most heavily engaged, and its company commander reported no radio contact with his left and right flank platoons. Shortly thereafter the Company "F" commander was wounded. He was replaced by the assistant Battalion S-3 who had to move through devastating fire to find the Company "F" Command Group and replace the wounded commander. Company "H" reported receiving increasingly heavy sniper and automatic weapons fire from the Southeast and began taking casualties. They modified their positions somewhat to better protect the battalion's right flank from envelopment by the enemy and seek additional cover. Solid contact had been going on for an hour and one half. At this time the battalion had suffered approximately 14 KIA's and 35 WIA's. Initial estimates from engaged units indicated an approximate 100 VC KIA and 50-75 WIA. The new Company "F" commander reported that elements of his left flank platoon were cut off and could not extract due to heavy enemy fire pinning them down. The Senior Advisor with the ARVN Airborne unit was requested to have his counterpart move forces to regain contact with the left flank of 2/7. He reported that his counterpart refused to do so. The helicopter security platoon that was employed at BS 536817 was able to return at about this time, the downed helo having been repaired and flown out, and this platoon was now directed to report to Company "F" to assist in the extraction of the left flank platoon. Both the center and right flank platoons of Company "F" were still closely engaged, as was Company "G". All during this time attempts were being made to move wounded personnel far enough back to be flown out by helicopter. Because of intense enemy fire only three helicopters had been able to recover any wounded and both of these had received very heavy fire. Both air and artillery supporting arms had been brought in as close as possible but the enemy fought on tenaciously from what gradually became revealed as well concealed and dug in positions. Company "F" was making some headway in getting its left flank platoon extracted with the assistance of the platoon from Company "H", and better control and coordination of its other two platoons was now possible. The engagement had now been going on some three and one half hours. To better exploit supporting arms, to resupply ammunition, and to recover a considerable number of wounded, orders were issued to withdraw and form a perimeter at BS 553829. As Company "H" broke contact they were hit from behind by 60mm mortar fire and a large force of VC came over the hill they had occupied from the East. Mortar fire was immediately called on the hill and

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the enemy immediately withdrew with heavy losses. The last of Company "F" arrived in the perimeter to take up their positions at 041930H. The reinforced platoon of Company "G", previously guarding the downed helicopter at BS 536817, returned at 042015H. The helicopter had been recovered two hours earlier. They had encountered only sniper fire while on their mission. Air was now called in to strafe and bomb what had previously been the line of battle - followed by artillery. All wounded had been recovered but many of the dead had to be left. When a helicopter landed in the CP perimeter to extract some wounded he was bracketed by 81mm mortar rounds and lashed with .50 caliber machine-gun fire. He miraculously flew out of the zone but three of the wounded awaiting evacuation were killed. No further med-evacs were possible at that time. Approximately 042130H six helicopters returned and came in under blackout conditions to commence evacuation of the wounded. Under the handicap of darkness, plus sporadic enemy fire, they worked for the next seven hours evacuating some 70 wounded Marines and resupplying the battalion at the same time. It was estimated that the apposing enemy force consisted of two main force battalions. The variety of weapons at his disposal - 81mm and 60mm mortars, 57 recoilless rifles, .50 caliber machine-guns and automatic weapons confirmed this estimate. His supply of ammunition was more than adequate as he engaged our forces for a total of five hours plus and launched an attack against the ARVN some eight hours later. From this engagement we counted 94 dead and estimated 63 wounded. The next day caves were found with an additional 46 bodies inside. Our losses were 43 KIA and 84 WIA. An additional 20 odd personnel received minor wounds but were not evacuated. Close air support missions were flown under flares during the night as well as the firing of artillery H and I fires. A flare ship was on station throughout the night. Only sporadic small arms fire was received during the night and most of that was directed at helicopters.

c. D+1 5 March 1966. The battalion was assigned the mission of a blocking force from its position at BS 552829, to maintain pressure to the East, and to act as Task Force Reserve. During the day all companies conducted individual attacks out to 1000 meters of the perimeter to keep pressure on any enemy forces and to recover dead while the other companies were prepared to provide covering fire. Company "F" killed two more VC and found a cave with 46 dead VC at BS 559835. Company "H" found another VC KIA with a weapon. All companies recovered the remaining U.S. KIA's. No major contact was made by any company. At 051625H Company "H" had a platoon outpost on the small hill at BS 557825 until dark. No enemy contact was made. The ARVN airborne moved East off the hill at BS 552836. A platoon from Company "G" occupied the hill for the night at 051830H. Artillery and 81mm mortar H and I fires were fired throughout the night. No significant enemy contact was made during the night. (Enclosure 4).

d. D+2 6 March 1966. A platoon from Company "H" was again sent to outpost the hill at BS 557825. Patrols were planned but cancelled when the battalion was ordered to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in their blocking position at BS 570815. A tactical column was quickly formed with Company "H" as the advance guard followed by Company "G" with the Battalion Command Group. H&S Company, and Company "F" would bring up the rear. The move was accomplished without difficulty and only one sniper round received without any friendly casualties. Company "H" commenced the relief of 2/4 at 061030H with the last of 2/7 closing on the new position at 061215H. The mission here was to

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block to the north for the action of both ARVN forces and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. A defensive perimeter was established and patrols sent out during the day without contact. At 062145H two VCS ran when challenged by elements of Company "H". One was KIA the other captured. At 062200H another VCS was challenged by Company "H" and was WIA. He later died of wounds. Two ambushes were placed out during the night at BS 563817 and BS 572818. The one at BS 572818 had contact and delivered a heavy volume of fire and threw grenades. After it revealed its location it withdrew to friendly lines. An investigation of the ambush site at first light was negative. No other contacts were made during the night (Enclosure (5)).

e. D+3 7 March 1966. The battalion was ordered to conduct search and destroy operations in all directions outside the vicinity of its perimeter to the limits of the FCL during the AM of 7 March 1966. At 071200H it was to conduct a search and destroy operation to the East astride the road. This latter operation would be in conjunction with ARVN forces moving in the same direction on the battalion's North. A frag order was issued to implement these instructions, each of the three rifle companies being assigned a sector of responsibility within a 1000 meter radius of the CP. The early operations uncovered 12 VCS, various types of VC clothing and equipment including grenades, medical supplies and one land mine. Four caves were destroyed, but there was no enemy contact. At 071200H leading elements of the battalion crossed the IP at BS 573817 after a fifteen minute 81mm mortar preparation on the hill at BS 576814. Company "F" moved 500 meters North of the road and Company "G" moved 500 meters South of the road. Company "F" was responsible for the road and was the base unit. H&S Company followed in trace of the front line companies with Company "H" bringing up the rear. There was no enemy contact during this search and destroy by 2/7. The battalion closed on the RJ at BS 630804 at 071550H. A truck convoy was formed for the return trip to Chu Lai and departed at 071710H arriving at the 2/7 CP at 071810H. The convoy trip back was extremely hampered by a lack of trucks, and had enemy contact been encountered personnel would have been at a decided disadvantage due to overcrowded conditions (Enclosure (6)).

# 11. Results.

## a. Friendly Casualties      KIA      DOW      WIA (Evac)      WIA Back to duty

(1) 2/7	43	1	76	39
(2) Attachments	1		3	2

## b. Enemy Casualties and Captives.

### (1) Personnel      Total

VC KIA (body count)	146
VC KIA (estimate)	50-75
VC WIA (estimate)	75-100
VCC	2
VC Ralliers	1
VCS	18

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<u>c. Captured Equipment.</u>	<u>Totals</u>
DPW - IMG	3
AK - Sub MG	5
SKS - Carbine	6
ChiCom 7.62 Carbine	1
RPG - rocket launcher	1
	<u>16</u>

d. All areas where air strikes and artillery fire missions were called were not searched by this battalion. However, ARVN units and elements of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines conducted search and destroy operations in most of these impact areas.

e. All equipment salvaged from the battlefield has not yet been returned to this organization and an accurate determination of losses cannot be made at this time.

## 12. Administrative Matters.

a. Resupply of the Battalion was achieved totally by helicopters and was excellent. The intensity of initial contact with the enemy required immediate resupply of ammunition. Initially this resupply was delivered promptly and under enemy fire. A subsequent emergency request for ammunition and medical supplies was initiated and delivered, but with a seven hour delay. During the remainder of the operation, resupply was prompt and complete.

b. The initial combat load was adequate; however, the intensity of the battle caused a rapid expenditure of the basic allowance of ammunition. In the case of crew served weapons i.e., (60mm Mortar, M-60 machine gun, and 3.5 RR), ammunition far in excess of the basic allowance was carried by all rifle companies.

c. The initial concept of the operation did not provide for HST support. Therefore it was necessary to use the Battalion TAC Party local net as landing zone control. This method proved successful but is not recommended as this additional requirement detracts from the primary mission of Battalion Tactical Air Control Party.

d. Transportation of the Battalion from the area of operations to the Chu Lai Enclave was by motor transport. Due to the amount of trucks provided it was necessary to load 30 Marines in each M-36, and 20-25 Marines in each M-35.

e. This battalion, fortunately, did not have to request a resupply of water at any time. Maximum use was made of local well-water treated with halazone tablets. It will not always be possible to depend on such a source of supply and procedures should be initiated now for the extended use of the plastic water can or better yet the procurement of a disposable water carton as was suggested at the post operation critique.

f. The availability of adequate PRC 25 radio's on the infantry battalion net needs to be followed by allocation of the required amounts for artillery battalions. Fast moving targets require positive and timely communications.

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13. Special Equipment and Techniques. The use of the thrust line point for transmitting map location should become standard practice. It facilitates the transmission of a shackled location without the necessity of referring to another form or directive.

14. Commanders Analysis.

a. After the original direction of attack for the battalion was changed and we went to the aid of the ARVN, and in the direction of the largest VC force, a common field commander should have been designated. As it was, our initial move took enemy pressure off of the ARVN right flank and resulted in our own left flank becoming thoroughly engaged. There was no corresponding response from the ARVN on our request similar to our action when we had moved to assist them. Had ARVN forces merely regained contact with our left flank once we became heavily engaged it would have put the VC at a decided disadvantage and might possibly have presented the ARVN with an opportunity to deliver a telling blow to the enemies right flank. The ability of the ARVN commander to respond to this request is not known. The answer could have been a single commander on the spot to coordinate and direct both forces, based on the engagement of each.

b. Although the enemy had exceptionally well concealed and strong defensive positions he was not reluctant to maneuver from them to keep the contact close. As a result of his close contact tactics the enemy denied us the full use of a portion of our supporting arms because of his close proximity to our friendly units. To counter this enemy tactic, units in contact, must be prepared to rapidly disengage with enemy forces for a short period of time in order to better employ supporting arms.

c. The enemy forces engaged by the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines on 4 March 1966 were a well disciplined and well equipped fighting organization. Their discipline was evidenced by the tenacious manner in which they fought, and weapons and ammunition captured indicated a brand of fighting equipment not previously encountered by this battalion. Contact with such a determined enemy following on the heels of an operation (Double Eagle Phase II), where the enemy remained constantly elusive; and whose primary offensive tactic was long range sniper fire, requires our forces to be constantly alert and ready to deal with either variety. Adequate preparation of suspicious areas where the enemy could be entrenched should become standard technique and these areas should be well worked over by all supporting arms.

15. Recommendations.

a. Plans need to be developed immediately to assure an automatic expansion of artillery conduct of fire nets simultaneously with the commitment of additional infantry units of company or larger size. Ideally, each battalion should be allotted a separate conduct of fire net.

b. Liaison with the 2nd ARVN Division must be made to determine what is necessary to improve the present battlefield command structure in US/ARVN coordinated operations. If our American advisors are to fulfill their mission of adequately preparing the Vietnamese military in the art of war, so that one

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day they may stand alone, why then do we fail to emphasize now one of cardinal principles of war - unity of command? How can the Vietnamese commander learn this principle if we don't show him what it will do for him? What assurance is there that when he works along side other ARVN units, under whose operational control he may not be, that he will understand his responsibility to quickly respond to requests from a fellow commander that would exploit a tactical advantage? The importance of his understanding now may well be the difference between victory or defeat. The lack of cooperation or response from a friendly adjacent unit to regain contact with this battalion's left flank, resulted in a decided advantage for the enemy. All the above is stated with full knowledge of our present "guest" status in RVN - but with an eye to the future when operations will expand.

e. Every effort should be exerted to improve the recovery time for downed helicopters or else free assault units from having to deplete their forces to guard them. Twenty-five percent of the riflemen of this battalion were involved in security for downed helicopters at the height of our engagement with the VC. Additionally, excessive delay in recovery permits the VC to gather superior forces with which to attack the helicopter security force.

d. Established doctrine sets forth the procedures to follow in organizing and executing a tactical motor-march in areas where ambushes are a threat. One of these principles is the danger of over-loading vehicles. Adequate vehicles must be made available in conducting tactical motor-marches to assure the timely and successful execution of counter-ambush techniques.

*Leon N. Utter*  
LEON N. UTTER

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CO MAC-12	2
CO 11th Marines	2
CO 1/7	1
CO 3/7	1
CO FISU #1	1
CO 4/11	1
Files	5
Total	<u>41</u>

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2/7th Marines, March 1966

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Appendix A

- A-1. After Action Report; "Operation Utah"
- A-2. After Action Report; "Operation INDIANA"
- A-3. S-2 Journal
- A-4. S-3 Journal

Appendix B

- B-1. Frag Order No. 2-66
- B-2. Bn Bulletin 1500, "Company Training Programs, 22 March 1966"

added 8 Jun 66/dr

OPERATION OVERLAY FOR D-DAY 4 MAR 1966

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Rein)  
Operation Utah


Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 IV, 6757 I.

CONVOY SECURITY

E  7(-)


○ BINH SON

FROM LZ CARP  
BT 508055  
L + 1 HOUR

89  62

D-DAY  
AM


53  
 84



2/7 ADJUSTED SCHEME OF MANEUVER D-DAY 4 MAR 1966

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Belin)  
Operation Utah

Map: AMS Series L701, Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 IV, 6757 I.




52  
+80

62  
+87

Enc. (2)

Map: AMS Series 1701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757 IV, 6757 I.

789




25

75-10

OPERATION OVERLAY FOR D + 1 5 MAR 1968

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (rein)  
Operation Uiah

Map: AMS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 IV, 6757 I.




52  
+  
80

61  
+  
87

OPERATION OVERLAY FOR D+2 6 MAR 1966

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Rein)  
Operation Ural

Map: AMS Series 1701, Vietnam 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 IV, 6757 I.



87 + 61


ENCL (5)

OPERATION OVERLAY FOR D + 3 7 MAR 1966

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Retn.)  
Operation Utah

Map: AMS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 IV, 6757 I.

COMPANY SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR SEARCH & DESTROY OPERATIONS  
D+3 AM



D + 3 PM

2/7 CLOSED 071655H

MOTORIZED CONVOY  
TO CHU LAI  
071700H TO 071800H

65  
+  
85

ENCL (6)



2nd Bn. 7th Marines

Log No.

0079566

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## HEADQUARTERS

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2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/AJD/www

3000

3 April 1966

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: After Action Report; "Operation INDIANA"

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B

- Encl: (1) Operation Overlay for D+1  
(2) Tactical Dispositions AM of D+1  
(3) Tactical Dispositions PM of D+1

1. Code Name. "Operation INDIANA"2. Dates of Operation. 28-30 March 19663. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam; AMS Map Series L701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I and IV.4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines5. Task Organization.2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein).

LtCol UTTER

H&S Co (-) (Rein).

Capt GROSZ

Hq. Eng Plat

HST

Company E (Rein).

Capt GATCHEL

Arty FO Tn

Sect, 81mm Mortar Plat

Tn, Engr Plat

Sqd, Flame Sect.

Company F (Rein).

Capt LEE

Arty FO Tn

FAC Tn

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DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

APPENDIX A - 2

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Company G (Rein).

Capt SEYMOUR

Arty FO Tn  
Sect, 81mm Mortar Plat  
Tn, Engr Plat  
Sqd, Flame Sect  
FAC Tn

Company H (Rein).

1stLt LAU

Arty FO Tn  
Tn, Engr Plat  
Sqd, Flame Sect  
81mm Mortar FO Tn

6. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery. Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines were prepositioned at the Quang Ngai Airfield on both D-day and D+1. They provided H&I fires in support of the battalion on the night of D-1. It is believed that the adjustment and addition of these H&I fires during the night of D+1 helped to suppress enemy mortar fire received in the 2/7 CP.

b. Air

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. The battalion had two troop lifts which occurred on D+1 and D+2. Approximately 30 MAG-36 helicopters lifted the battalion from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to the objective area LZ (BS 545810) on D+1. Twenty-four helicopters extracted the battalion from an LZ at BS 548798 and took them to the CP at LZ Goose (BT 504035) the morning of D+2. Both lifts were completed most expeditiously and without incident.

(2) Armed Helicopters. Armed helicopter support was provided for the helicopter lift on D+1, in support of the battalion advance on D+1 and they also furnished security and observation in extraction from the LZ on D+2. Close supporting fires were delivered on a VC trench line by armed helicopters with good results on D+1, as the battalion moved South from the objective LZ.

(3) Helicopter Med-Evac. During this operation med-evacs were required for only heat casualty cases. Response to requests were timely and handled without incident.

(4) CAS. Fixed wing aircraft provided LZ prep on D+1. No other support was required.

7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location, and Disposition in the Objective Area.

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(1) Forces anticipated in the objective area.

(a) Main Force	Location	Strength	Tactical Disposition
1st VC Regt Hq	BS 605800	350	Unknown
60th Bn	BS 506796	300	"
90th Bn	BS 505700	400	"
52nd Bn	BS 605805	300	"
103rd Bn	BS 567894	Unk	"
110th Bn	BS 713847	Unk	"
408th Bn	BS 405702	Unk	"
195th AA Bn	BS 405800	300	"

(b) The source of intelligence was considered valid as of 18 March 1966. This information was obtained from the ARVN Advisor Staff of the 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai.

(c) It was anticipated that the VC units in the objective area were concentrating on regrouping their forces in preparation to leave the objective area after Operation's "UTAH" and "TEXAS".

b. VC strength and situation actually found as operation was conducted.

Throughout the conduct of the operation, no actual organized resistance was encountered. However, if the stories of 2 VCC and 3 VCS can be believed several Viet Cong units were observed by the VCC and VCS on 28 March, and again on the morning of 29 March prior to the landing of this battalion at helicopter landing zone centered at coordinates BS 545810. The VC observed were moving north on the road located at BS 544816. The first group on 28 March were reported as 40 VC helping 90 VC WIA's, and the second was reported in the same area on 29 March as 100 strong.

c. VC Units Identified. No Viet Cong units were identified through documents or captured VCC or VCS.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained. During the conduct of the operation significant information was obtained as mentioned in paragraph d. on the movement of two large groups of Viet Cong on 28 and 29 March.

e. Terrain.

(1) Critical Terrain Features.

Hill 97	BS 538826
Hill 85	BS 541816
Hill	BS 547812
Hamlet Chau Nhui (1)	BS 546820
Hamlet Vinh Loc (4)	BS 543814
Hamlet Vinh Loc (5)	BS 541808

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The relatively flat

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rice paddies joined with low rolling hills which were covered with dense vegetation afforded excellent observation and fields of fire to the enemy in and around the HLZ. However, due to the action directly south of the HLZ on 28 and 29 March and adequate LZ prep by CAS, no resistance was met.

(3) Cover and Concealment. As in the past, as soon as the remaining VC in the area of the helo landing zone discovered the presence of Marines they hid in caves which were only found by a thorough search.

(4) Obstacles. No major obstacles were encountered during the operation.

8. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein), in conjunction with the 1st Battalion 7th Marines, conducts a helicopter-borne assault into objective area on D+1; thereafter conducts search and destroy operations and provides convoy security as directed.

9. Concept of operation.

a. On D-day Company "F" provided convoy escort for two increments of 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines artillery from the Chu Lai enclave to Quang Ngai Airfield. They then provided security for the artillery and 7th Marines CP at this location. On the morning of D+1 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducted a helicopter-borne assault into the objective LZ (BS 546810) from where it was to conduct a search and destroy operation to the South and link up with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Company "G" was to secure the LZ, and after the arrival of Company "E", take up positions to secure the high ground to the East of the LZ. Company "E" in turn was to secure the high ground to the West. Company "H" was to land and consolidate to the North of the zone. H&S elements and the Battalion Command Group followed Company "E" into the LZ. Once the LZ was secured Companies "E" and "G" were to commence search and destroy action to the South astride the road between Vinh Loc (4) (BS 546814) and Vinh Loc (5) (BS 541809); followed by the Command Group, H&S and Company "H" to bring up the rear. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines were to provide artillery fire support from the Quang Ngai Airfield, and armed helicopters on station and CAS on strip alert were also available. A platoon reinforced from Company "H" early on D+1 provided convoy escort for additional artillery elements from Chu Lai to Binh Son. (They returned in sufficient time to lift out with their parent unit.)

10. Execution.

a. Planning. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was alerted for "Operation INDIANA" at 281245H when a briefing was held by the CO, 7th Marines and staff. Initial 2/7 participation required only escort units for two artillery convoys from Chu Lai to Quang Ngai. At 290015H the Commanding Officer was alerted to attend another briefing at Quang Ngai 290630H involving commitment of 2/7. At 290620H the Battalion CO and

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S-3 in company with the CO, MAG 36 flew by helicopter to Quang Ngai and were briefed on D+1 planned operations by the CO, 7th Marines and Staff. All orders and instructions were verbal, and based on orders and instructions received, a verbal frag order was issued to the staff and company commanders of 2/7 assembled in LZ Carp at 290845H. Attached engineers and ESB personnel joined the battalion in LZ Carp. (Enclosure (1)).

b. D-day, 28 March 1966. At 281300H a platoon reinforced from Company "F" escorted elements of 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines from the Chu Lai enclave to Quang Ngai Airfield. At 281500H Company "F" (-) (Rein) escorted additional 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine element to Quang Ngai Airfield. Both convoys were completed without incident. Company "F" remained under OPCON CO, 7th Marines for remainder of operation providing security for artillery units and the 7th Marines CP at the Quang Ngai Airfield.

c. D+1 29 March 1966. At 290530H a reinforced platoon from Company "E" departed the CP to provide convoy escort for elements of the artillery battalion from Chu Lai to Binh Son. The convoy moved without incident and the platoon returned to Chu Lai at 290900H in sufficient time to be helo lifted with remainder of Company "E". At 290913H leading elements of Company "G" were lifted by 20 MAG-36 helicopters from LZ Carp (BT 509052) to the objective LZ (BS 545810). Company "G" secured the LZ without contact. Company "E" landed and consolidated in the objective LZ at 291030H and assumed responsibility for the West half of the LZ. The last elements of the battalion landed and consolidated in the LZ at 291050H. At 291120H Companies "E" and "G" moving abreast, Company "E" on the right, commenced search and destroy operations to the South. (Encl (2)). Armed helicopters on station reported movement in a trench line at BS 545798 and took the target under fire with rockets. Company "E" took a group of five VCS fleeing to the Southwest under fire at BS 534609 with negative results. At 291205H Company "E" found and destroyed a network of caves and tunnels at BS 546006. During this time they apprehended two VCS. At 291220H 2/7 was directed to assume blocking positions along grid line 40 (PL Green) by Starboard 3, while 1/7 seized high ground at BS 554796. While holding blocking position Company "E" apprehended two VCS, one with a weapon, at BS 545813. At 291550H 2/7 continued to move South to consolidate positions for the night at Vinh Loc (6) (BS 545797). At 291615H Starboard 6 arrived by helicopter to discuss the enemy situation with CO 2/7. In view of insufficient enemy contact 2/7 was directed to prepare for helicopter extraction on 300830H. At 291710H Company "E" discovered a network of caves and tunnels at BS 542798 in which a 60mm mortar base plate, a mortar site and mortar and small arms ammunition were found. Two VCS were also apprehended. These caves and tunnels were to be searched further on 30 March 66 prior to destruction. At 291745H 2/7 had established a night-time perimeter at BS 545797. (Encl (3)). Liaison was made by radio to coordinate position.

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locations and activities. Artillery and mortar H&I fires were requested and approved. Ambush activity was scheduled at BS 538800, BS 545805 and BS 547797. At 292010H and again at 292033H one round of suspected 81mm Mortar landed within the CP perimeter. No casualties were sustained. Additional H&I fires were requested and others shifted to cover possible VC mortar positions within range of the CP. A flare ship was also on station throughout the night. No further enemy incoming was received, nor was there any enemy contact throughout the night.

d. D+2 30 March 1966. At 300700H caves and tunnels at BS 542798 were re-searched and destroyed by Company "E". Loading elements of 2/7 were extracted by helo from an LZ at BS 548798 to LZ Goose (BT 504035). The entire lift was completed without incident at 301040H. One company remained on rapid reaction force standby to reinforce Company "F" on convoy escort from Quang Nai Airfield if required. Company "F" closed on 2/7 CP at 301500H.

#### 11. Results

a. Friendly Casualties. None

b. Enemy Casualties and Captives.

(1) <u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
VCC	2
VCS	5

c. Captured Equipment.

AK 44 Chi Com SMG - 1  
 US 60mm mortar base plate - 1  
 Chi Com Mortar sight - 1

d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None

#### 12. Administrative Matters.

a. The attached HST facilitated the preparation and operation of HLZ's for both helicopter troop lifts and resupply missions. They once again proved their value to an infantry battalion in predominantly helicopter-borne operations.

b. Range of Communications equipment overextended. The initial distance from the objective LZ (BS 545810) to the net control stations on the Quang Ngai Airfield was seven miles. This exceeded the rated capability of the AN/PRC-9, 10 and 25 with whip antenna. In actuality, the range was too great for the AN/PRC-9 and 10, and barely satisfactory communications existed using the AN/PRC-25. There were no relay facilities provided as such, and the use of

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other than whip antennas was precluded by a moving situation. Consequently, communications on the Regimental Tactical net (AN/PRC-25) was poor and the artillery conduct of fire net functioned only by relaying information through the 1/7 conduct of fire net. This is not satisfactory from previous experience where both units become engaged and are simultaneously requesting artillery support. Present limited resources available to the infantry battalion does not make it possible to provide AN/PRC-25 radio's for all stations on all nets.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.

14. Commanders analysis.

a. Where U.S. forces are concerned, consideration should be given to delegating authority to adjacent ground commanders to adjust the Fire Control Line (FCL) to fit the immediate enemy situation, when necessary. In "Operation INDIANA" a key terrain feature for the scheme of maneuver of 1/7 was beyond its FCL boundary. Timely liaison by radio between the 1/7 and 2/7 ground commanders enabled 1/7 to direct artillery preparation fires upon and seize an objective on the 2/7 side of the FCL. On the spot coordination precluded the delay of going back through the chain of command to first adjust the FCL in order to obtain a tactical advantage.

b. Once again this battalion found it profitable to establish a night time perimeter around a local village within its area of operation. While some hold the opinion villages are normally VC registration points this is not the experience of 2/7. On the contrary, local guerrilla forces are reluctant to bombard villages in which they have left behind families and personal belongings. Additionally, these villages furnish ample water supplies from numerous wells that need have the water treated only with halazone. This avoids a staggering logistic requirement for receiving and staging water cans. The majority of the villages have trench-lines already prepared, thus obviating the requirement of extensive and time consuming digging once the perimeter is established. Since the majority of villages are on elevated land surrounded by rice paddies, fields of fire and observation are available. Huts within the villages provide covered CP's and FSCG's where lights can be used while maintaining blackout conditions. Finally, contact is made with the local population where limited food (excess C-rations opened and distributed) and medical treatment can be provided, and usually a certain amount of information about the enemy obtained.

15. Recommendations.

a. With the advent of the dry season in the Chu Lai, Quang Ngai and Tam Ky areas the possibility of employing tracked vehicles

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more extensively than in previous operations deserves consideration. Helicopters are now available in country with the capability of lifting the ONCOS, and stream beds are sufficiently low enough to construct by-passes for tank traffic. Response of track vehicles employment need not be geared toward D-day but D+1 and subsequent as the spearhead of a blocking force or a fast moving strike force.

b. Operations should be planned within the known capabilities of communications equipment or adequate radio relay facilities should be provided.

*Leon N. Utter*  
LEON N. UTTER

Distribution:

CC. 7th Marines  
Files

45  
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30

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
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Time Zone: H


From LZ Camp  
BT 509052

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Rein)  
Operation Indiana



D + 1  
291130E

CONCEPT OF OPERATION




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2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Rein)  
Operation Indiana

Time Zone: H

59  
84



TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS D + 1

51  
76


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Maps: AMS Series L701 Vietnam 1:50,000  
Sheets 6756 I& IV

2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-) (Rein)  
Operation Indiana

Time Zone: H

59  
84



TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS D + 1

51  
76

Encl (3)

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UNIT OR SECTION
S-2 Second Battalion Seventh Marines
PLACE
Chu Lai S. Vietnam
DATE:
FROM: 040800H TO: 051615H March 66

TIME		J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
IN	OUT			
			040800H	Operation UTAH Commenced
			041355H	G Co killed 4 VC in khaki uniforms at BS 546829. 20 VC packs and 100 rds 50 caliber ammo destroyed.
			041030H	7th Marines S-2 rptd two 20mm AA MG's captured which had previously been rptd as 50 caliber. Estimated VC Bn N&S of landing zone. Boundary road believed mined as well as hill 85 and 97.
			041410H	G Co killed 4 more VC at BS 546829. F Co rptd 2 VC KIA in LZ "Alpha" BS 548829.
			042230H	Isun #1 from 041100H to 041900H: (1) 2/7 units killed 12 VC vic LZ Alpha BS 547929 at approx 041200H. (2) At approx 041500H 2/7 engaged an estimated 2 Main Force Bn's. VC well armed with many AW's including 50 cal MG and 81mm and 60mm Mortars. VC extremely well supported with ammo. Location of contact BS 557835. (4) 100 VC KIA: estimated 100-150 more KIA: 13 VCS: Approx 25 wpns of various types..
			051200H	Wpns evacuated 5 MG's, ChiComm: 4 ChiComm SKS assault rifles (folding bayonets).
			051530H	E Co found 42 VC KIA At BS 557835 in tunnel. also killed 2 VC at scene: Total: 44 VC KIA.
			051615H	At 051530H one VC surrendered to G Co at BS 556832. VC identified his unit as the 7th Co of the 3rd Bn. States he was a cook and buried 3 VC companies on the afternoon of 4 March. Stated his unit had began infiltrating S. Vietnam in Aug 1965, arrived in November and occupied this province for 1 month. VC evacuated as Choi Hei with Subscriber 6.

## Appendix A - w

## UNIT OR SECTION

S-2 Second Battalion Seventh Marines

## PLACE

Chu Lai S. Vietnam

## DATE:

FROM: 051755H

TO: 062130H March 66

TIME		J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
IN	OUT			
			051755H	<p>Isum #2: (3) (a) All units recd sporadic sniper fire while conducting sweep in areas assaulted 4 March. (b) At approx 050800H F company killed one VC at BS 559834. (c) At approx 051230H H company spotted 20 VC at BS 575825. At 051230H G Co recd 2 incoming 60mm mortars vic BS 553830. (d) At 051545H F Co killed 2 VC at BS 557835. (e) At 051530 E Co found tunnels with 42 bodies in it. BS 557835. (4) 49 VC KIA (b) 1 VC Choi Hoi: (c) 1 ChiComm assault rifle 1 SKS carbine. One 7.62 ChiComm carbine. (d) Totals: 143 VC KIA, 13 wpns. (7) (A) Choi Hoi captive stated he belonged to 7th Co 2nd Bn. (b) Stated his Company commander name was Ve Thai Ninh. (8) Choi Hoi stated his unit had been in this province approx 1 month. (11) S-2 observation of 4 March: VC well armed with M-79 grenade launchers.</p>
			062000H	<p>Isum #3: (3) (a) No significant enemy contact this period. At approx 061030H H Co apprehended 2 VCS hiding in cave BS 560823. At 061500H H Co patrol found and destroyed 30 VC packs and small amount miscellaneous ammo in trench line from BS 570820 to 570822. 1 VCS apprehended in same area, believed to be a VC cadre tax collector. Diary with 1 page script and unidentifiable hand-drawn map found same location. Diary evacuated with VCS at 061800H. (4) 2 red and white metal aiming stakes retained at this position were found at BS 571821. Stakes given to Bn mortar section. (5) 1 VC KIA body found by H company at 060730H at BS 557823. 1 VC body found. 3 VCS apprehended. 30 VC packs and ammo destroyed. 2 Aiming stakes retained this position. Short diary and map evacuated. Totals as of this period: 144 VC KIA 9 VCS 1 Choi Hoi. 14 wpns all evacuated. (11) S-2 estimate of present enemy situation: VC units have split into small groups and are making every effort to exfiltrate battle area.</p>

## UNIT OR SECTION

S-2 2nd Battalion Seventh Marines

## PLACE

Chu Lai S. Vietnam

## DATE:

FROM: 062130H TO: 071800H March

TIME	IN	OUT	J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
				062130H	Subscriber rptd that interrogation by ITT of VCS captured by H Co at BS 573825 along with 30 packs and equipment at Dai My Hamlet, Son Kim Village provided the following information: Captive stated he saw 100 MF VC hiding in Dai My Bac sub-hamlet about 1-2 March. Captive r recently saw his son who is a hamlet guerrilla. His son said he believes the 100 VC to be a unit of the 58th Regt. Equipment rptd to be 2 BAR's per plt. Some AA wps, rifles AW's and grenades. Captive was very cooperative.
				062050H	2 Vietnamese males ran into H Company lines at BS 568817. 1 KIA and 1 apprehended. Identification and documents 1 man was VC cadre tax collector. Will forward VCS to Subscriber CP on 7 March AM. Interrogation of captive this position has been negative.
				062200H	1 Vietnamese male tried to pass through F company lines moving east at BS 570819. Subject was shot. When questioned claimed to be age 25. Name: Dang, member of 8th Co 52nd ARVN Spl Force Bn. Cnd by Capt Bao. Subject DOW.
				071000H	H Co apprehended 2 VC Vic of BS 569819. Subject admitted to being VC and having wps. Are unwilling to give location of wps or identify unit they belong to. Both evacuated to Subscriber CP at 070930H.
				07100H	G Co apprehended 8 VCS inside temple beating on bell at BS 557813. Suspects claim to be monks but appearance and interrogation does not support claim. 1 VC pack with grenades picked up in same area. Aroma of Decaying flesh same vicinity.
				071800H	Isun #4 (3) (a) H Co killed 1 VC and apprehended 1 VCS who attempted to run through their lines BS 569819. (b) At 062200H F Co killed one Vietnamese who attempted to run threw their lines.

## UNIT OR SECTION

S-2 Second Battalion Seventh Marines

## PLACE

Chu Lai S. Vietnam

## DATE:

FROM: 201720H TO: 291220H

TIME	IN	OUT	J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
					man stated he was from the 8th Co 5 <sup>th</sup> ARVN Spl Force Bn before he DOW. (3) At 07000H H Co apprehended 2 VC who admitted they were VC and hid there wons. VC apprehended at BS 571818.
					(4) G Co patrol apprehended 8 VCS inside temple dressed as monks at BS 551813. S-2 believes suspects are imposters. (4a) 2 VC KIA: (b) 2 VC captured: 8 VCS (c) 1 chinese rocket launcher
					Totals: 164 KIA 2 VCC 18 VCS 1 Choi Hoi rallier 15 Wons.
					Operation UTAH ended.
				201720H	Provisional company from E and H&S manning OP# 39 coord BS 573965 rptd they recd 3 rds sniper fire from unk coord.
				222240H	H Co BT 519001 recd one incoming grenade resulting in one Marine WIA. Marine fired in direction of incoming grenade with negative results.
				240240H	H Co ambush BS 519995 rptd 3-4 VC came into ambush zone. H Co opened fire resulting in 3 (poss) VC KIA. A search at first light revealed negative finding.
				241105H	G Co rptd receiving 4 rds sniper fire from BT 516012. Fire returned with negative results. Marines had 1 WIA evacuated to BAS.
					Operation INDIANA Commenced.
				291200H	E Co apprehended 2 VCS. One at BS 539808 suspect stated on 28 March 66 he saw 40 VC helping 90 VC WIA moving on main road BS 545808 heading N.W. 2nd prisoner apprehended on road BS 545807. Suspect was WIA at capture.
				291220H	E Co apprehended one VCS at BS 538807. Suspect hiding in house.

## UNIT OR SECTION

S-2. 2nd Battalion Seventh Marines

## PLACE

Chu Lai S., Vietnam

DATE:

FROM: 291250H TO: 300700H March 66

TIME		J #	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC.
IN	OUT			
			291250H	H Co apprehended one male Vietnamese age 15 hiding in cave BS 845813. Suspect stated he saw 400 VC in area on the night of 28 March 66 and at 1800 that night they split into two groups of approx 200 each. The first group headed N.W. that night, the remaining 200 left at approx 0600 29 March. Suspect lied and changed stories a number of times. Suspect said the VC were from the 21st Regt. An ARVN agent claims he is a VC.
			291530H	H Co apprehended one VC with AK ChiComm Sub-machine gun at BS 545816. VC was just walking along road. VC and Wpn evacuated approx 1600H.
			291730H	E Co found 2 caves with the following types mortar ammunition; 1x82 ChiComm. 5US 60mm, 2xChiComm 60 mm Mortars. Also they found 2 LAW's and 1000 8mm Lebelles rds, 1x60mm Mortar base plate and 1 ChiComm Mortar site, destroyed by Engr.
			291950H	H&S Co apprehended 2 VCS hiding in a cave at BS 545769. During interrogation suspects stated they built houses for VC.
			292010H	Bn CP recd 1 rd incoming 81mm Mortar at BS 545 769. 292023H: Bn CP recd another round suspected 81mm Mortar.
			300700H	Helo evacuated 2 VCS to Quang Nghai.



**JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY**  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-58)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

1-3  
 UNIT OR STAFF SECTION

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

ORGANIZATION

Chu Lai, Vietnam

OPENED (DTG, Month, year)

010745H Mar 66

CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

041310H Mar 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			010745H	DD6 ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR BN TAOIR FROM BENDIX 6. DD COMPANIES CURRENTLY EFFECTING RELIEF OF LINES. DDF CONTINUES OPCON TFD. TWO PLATOONS LOCATED AT TAM KY. ONE PLAT ENROUTE TO TAM KY AS CONVOY ESCORT.	
			022145H	LAUGH FDC GAVE A REPORT AS A WEAPON BEING FIRED AT BT 498053, CALLED ALL ADJACENT UNITS, NO REPORTS OF INCOMING ROUNDS.	
			031200H	DDF RELIEVED BY 3/1 OF RESPONSIBILITY OF AIR FIELD	
			031720H	BONNIE HERO ORDERED DIXIE DINNER TO BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON 4 MARCH AT FIRST LIGHT TO QUANG NGAI.	
			040700H	DDE MINUS ONE REIN PLAT DEPARTED BY MOTOR CONVOY TO REDESVOUZ WITH "M" BATTERY ON HWY #1. TO PROVIDE <del>ESCORT</del> ESCORT FOR "M" BATTERY TO BINH SON (BS 600923).	
			040815H	2/7 (-)(REIN) MOVED TO LZ CARP (BT 509052) FOR 0930H HELO LIFT TO LZ ALFA (BS 545830) AS PER 2/7 FRAG ORDER 2-66.	
			041040H	DDF DEPARTED LZ CARP FOR LZ ALFA. HEAD ELEMENTS ARRIVED IN LZ AT 041100H.	
			041055H	STB 3 REPORTS AA IN LZ ALFA HAVE HIT FOUR HELO'S. ONE HELO DOWN AT BS 563817.	
			041145H	HELO LIFT STILL IN PROGRESS. DDF COMPLETE. DDG IN PROGRESS. DDF TOOK ONE WIA IN LZ IMMEDIATELY EVACUATED BY HELO.	
			041210H	DD6 AND CMD GRP LAND IN LZ ALFA.	
			041245H	DD6 MAKES LIAISON WITH ARVN ADVISOR ON ENEMY ACTION IN HIS SECTOR.	
			041310H	PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR 2/7 TO EXECUTE SEARCH AND DESTROY TO THE SE. DDG HAD 4 VC KIA'S SOUTH OF LZ, FOUND 30 PACKS AND 100 ROUNDS OF .50 CAL AMMO.	

PAGE NO:

(Classification)

APPENDIX A-4

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. To make entries:
  - a. Headings:
    - (1) Enter the unit or staff section designation.
    - (2) Enter official designation of the organization.
    - (3) Enter the DTG that journal is opened.
    - (4) Enter the DTG that journal is closed.
  - b. Time in: Enter the time information was received within your unit, or the time an event took place within your unit.
  - c. Time out: Enter the time outgoing information was delivered.
  - d. Serial number: Number each item consecutively.
  - e. Date-Time Group: Enter if available, if not, enter time signed.
  - f. Incidents, messages, orders, etc:
    - (1) First line, enter the addressee if outgoing and the originator if incoming.
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    - (3) For written messages or orders, write a brief synopsis which will indicate the substance of the message or order.
    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

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**NAVY COMMAND DIARY**  
 NAVMC 219-63 (REV. 6-58)  
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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
ORGANIZATION	
Operation Utah	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
041300H Mar 66	041930H Mar 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			041300H	DDG AND DDF REPORT TOTAL OF 6 VC KIA'S AT BS 546829 AND BS 548829.	
			041330H	DD6 REPORTS TO STB 3 NO ACTIVITY ON HILLS 85 AND 97. ENEMY ACTION IS TO E. 2/7 DIRECTED TO COORDINATE WITH ARVN ON THEIR CONTACT. ONE H-34 HELO DOWN IN LZ.	
			041342H	ORDERS ISSUED TO DDF AND G TO MOVE E. DDF TO <del>BE</del> IN WITH ARVN RIGHT FLANK, H&S TO FOLLOW IN TRACE. DDH BRINGS UP REAR. ALL OF DDH ARRIVED IN LZ AT 041340H.	
			041400H	SPORADIC LONG RANGE SNIPER FIRE RECEIVED BY DDF AS IT MOVED ACROSS OPEN RICE PADDY AT 553833. ARVN NOW TO SWEEP AROUND HILL AT BS 553837. DDF TO CONTINUE TO MOVE TO RIGHT OF ARVN UNTIL ORIENTED TO N.	
			041450H	DDF HEAVILY ENGAGED ON LEFT FLANK. DDG THE SAME MINUTES LATER.	
			041515H	DDG REPORTS ENEMY MOVING TO THEIR RIGHT. MAY HIT THEIR EXPOSED FLANK. DDH ORDER FORWARD TO PROTECT DD RIGHT FLANK.	
			041620H	DD UNITS REPORT APPROXIMATELY 100 VC KIA AND 50-75 WIA. DD LOSSES ESTIMATED 14 KIA'S AND 35 WIA'S. ARVN ADVISOR ASKED TO HAVE COUNTERPART REGAIN CONTACT WITH DDF LEFT FLANK. COUNTERPART OF AMERICAN ADVISOR SAYS NO. DDF CO REPLACED, WIA.	
			041635H	DDH1 GOES TO ASSIST DDF EXTRACT F1 FROM PINNED DOWNED POSITION.	
			041720H	EMERGENCY RESUPPLY OF AMMO TAKEN TO DDF BY CARRYING PARTY. AMMO SUPPLY ALMOST EXHAUSTED.	
			041845H	DD6 ORDERS ALL UNITS TO BREAK CONTACT AND FALL BACK TO PERIMETER AT BS 553829 IN ORDER TO MAKE FURTHER USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS.	
			041930H	ALL DD UNITS IN CP PERIMETER AT BS 553829.	

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2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
ORGANIZATION	
Operation Utah	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
042015H Mar 66	051820H Mar 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			042015H	DDG3 RETURNED FROM GUARDING DOWNED HELO.	
			042100H	SITREP #2 SUBMITTED.	
			042115H	STILL UNABLE TO GET WIA'S OUT DUE TO HOT LZ.	
			042130H	H&I AND CAS UNDER FLARES HITTING VC POSITIONS E OF 2/7 CP.	
			042200H	FLARE SHIP ON STATION FOR NIGHT.	
			042230H	HELO'S COMMENCE NIGHT MED-EVAC'S AND RESUPPLY WORK TILL 0530H. TAKE 70 ODD WIA'S OUT OF ZONE.	
			050100H	DD TO REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITION ON 5 MAR TO BLACK FOR 3/1 COMING S AND 2/4 COMING N. DESIGNATED TF RESERVE.	
			050500H	SPORADIC SNIPER FIRE THROUGHOUT NIGHT. SITREP #3 SUBMITTED.	
			050915H	UNCLASS CODE NAME FOR THIS OPERATION IS UTAH.	
			050955H	CG TF DELTA VISITED CP.	
			051015H	DDG CONDUCTS SWEEP TO E TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE AND RECOVER US KIA'S.	
			051030H	SITREP #5 SUBMITTED.	
			051100H	DDH CONDUCTS SWEEP TO S TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE AND RECOVER US KIA'S. OUTPOST HILL AT BS 557825 UNTIL DARK. RETURNED 051900H NO CONTACT. FOUND ONE VC KIA WITH WEAPON.	
			051400H	DDF CONDUCTS SWEEP TO NE TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE AND RECOVER US KIA'S. FOUND 46 VC KIA'S IN CAVE. 2 VC KIA'S ON SWEEP.	
			051700H	SITREP #6 SUBMITTED.	
			051820H	DDG3 OCCUPIES HILL AT BS 552836 FOR NIGHT AFTER ARVN AIRBORNE MOVE E. NO CONTACT DURING NIGHT.	

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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION 2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
ORGANIZATION Operation Utah	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year) 052100H Mar 66	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year) 071030H Mar 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			052100H	DIFFICULTY IN REQUESTING NIGHT H&I'S DUE TO CROWDED CONDUCT OF FIRE NET.	
			060500H	SITREP #7 SUBMITTED. NO CONTACT THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. ARTY AND MORTARS FIRED H&I'S DURING NIGHT.	
			060800H	DD ORDERED TO RELIEVE 2/4 IN POSITION AT BS 570815. FRAG ORDER #1 ISSUED.	
			061030H	LEADING ELEMENTS DDH RELIEVE 2/4 SITREP #8 SUBMITTED.	
			061215H	DD CLOSES ON NEW POSITIONS AT BS 570815. ONE SNIPER ROUND TAKEN IN MOVE. NO CASUALTIES. DD BLOCKS TO NORTH FOR ARVN AND 3/1.	
			061330H	ALL DD UNITS CONDUCT PATROL ACTIVITY FROM ESTABLISHED PERIMETER.	
			061630H	SITREP #9 SUBMITTED.	
			062145H	TWO VCS RAN WHEN CHALLENGED NEAR DDH POSITION. ONE KIA AND ONE CAPTURED.	
			062200H	ONE VCS SHOT WHEN HE RAN NEAR DDH POSITION DOW.	
			062215H	TWO AMBUSHES OUT AT BS 572818 AND BS 563817. AMBUSH AT BS 572818 FIRED AT 3-5 SUSPECTED ENEMY. SECURED TO FRIENDLY LINES. AM CHECK REVEALED NEGATIVE RESULTS.	
			062230H	SITREP #10 SUBMITTED.	
			062250H	FRAG ORDER #2 ISSUED FOR 7 MAR ACTIVITY. ALL DD UNITS CONDUCT S&D 1000 METERS FROM CP. 071200H DD CONDUCTS S&D E TO RJ.	
			070830H	SITREP #11 SUBMITTED. NO OTHER ENEMY CONTACT THROUGHOUT NIGHT.	
			071030H	SITREP #12 SUBMITTED. DD UNITS S&D'S HAVE NETTED 12 VCS, VC EQUIPMENT - PACKS GRENADES ONE MINE, MEDICAL SUPPLIES. FOUR CAVES BLOWN.	

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(Classification)

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JOURNAL COMMAND DIARY  
 NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 8-56)  
 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
 WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
ORGANIZATION	
Operation Utah	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
071200H Mar 66	162215H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			071200H DD	LEAD ELEMENTS CROSS IP AT BS 573817 TO CONDUCT S&D TO E. ARVN UNITS TO NORTH. ARMED HELO'S ON STATION.	
			071555H	LAST OF DD UNITS CLOSED ON RJ AT BS 630804. NO CONTACT ON SWEEP.	
			071710H	DD DEPARTS RJ FOR CHU LAI IN MORTAR CONVOY. TRUCKS EXCESSIVELY OVERLOADED DUE TO SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. NEGATIVE CONTACT.	
			071910H	ALL DD UNITS RETURNED FROM OPERATION UTAH.	
			080100 H	3/12 REPORTS 3 MEN MOVING NE CARRING WHAT LOOKED LIKE A MORTAR WITH ROUNDS APPROX BT 518055 BONNIE HERO ALSO NOTIFIED.	
			080805H 081600H	2/7 RELIEVED 3/7 ELEMENTS OF 2/7 MLR. DD NEW REAR BOUNDARY IS HWY #1 INCLUSIVE.	
			081620H	BGEN ENGLISH CG 3D MARDIV ACTING VISITED THE CP TO CONGRATULATE THE CO AND BATTALION FOR ITS PERFORMANCE IN OPERATION UTAH.	
			132150H	DDF 6 CALLED ABOUT SEEING TRACERS AND HEARD SHOOTING IN THE VIC OF THE RMK COMPOUND AREA.	
			141000H 150930H	VISIT BY MAJGEN TILLSON FROM J-3 MACV BGEN J. PLATT VISITED DD CP.	
			152305H	DDF PATROL #36 TIME 152200H AT BE 478032 AMBUSHED. PATROL RETURNED FIRE. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES 1, KIA, 1 WIA, PATROL RETURNING TO CP. CAS EVAC BY HELO. INVESTIGATION REVEALS PATROL FIRED ON THEIR OWN UNIT.	
			162055H	CO G REPORTED SMALL ARMS FIRE PASSING THROUGH THE COMPANY CP AREA. (INVESTIGATION REVEALS IN-COMING FROM CO H AMBUSH #40)	
			162215H	CO H #40 AMBUSH HEARD 2 PEOPLE MOVING IN A NE DIRECTION ALONG TRAIL AT BT 516032. 1MAN, 1 WOMAN, THE AMBUSH FIRED WHEN PEOPLE WERE 20' FROM THEM. FT LEADER INVESTIGATED. ONE VCS WIA.	

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## MARINE COMMAND DIARY

NAVJG 219-85 (REV. 8-56)  
SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITION  
WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION

S-3

ORGANIZATION

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

OPENED (DTG, Month, year)

180945H MAR 66

CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

212400H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			180945H	CG FMF PAC VISITED DD POSITION'S LTGEN KRULAK	
			181825H	BH GAVE DD REQUIREMENT FOR ONE T/O SQD, INTERPRETOR, RADIO OPERATOR WITH PRQ10 FOR 20 DAY MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY FOR HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY TEAM ABOARD AGS-16. TO BE PICKED UP IN LZ GOOSE AT 190730H. CO H PROVIDES SQD.	
			182300H	REPORT FROM HQ BATTARY 11th MAR. REPORTED, (1) INCOMING GRENADE, AT BT 520040. RETURNED FIRE, NEGATIVE RESULTS.	
			190800H	DDH. SQUAD DEPARTED FOR DUTY AS SECURITY FOR HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY TEAM.	
			191600H	DD ALERTED TO PROVIDE TWO GO'S TO ASSUME 3/7 POSITIONS SOMETIME ON 20 MAR 66.	
			192145H	H&S SECURITY ELEMENTS THREW ONE GRENADE AND FIRED 7 ROUNDS AFTER SEEING WHAT APPEARED TO BE MOVEMENT. NEGATIVE RESULTS	
			200045H	BE NOTIFIED DD THAT DD WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FALSE TAOR AS OF 200800H	
			200835H	DDE IS IN POSITION ON LEFT FLANK OF 3/7 MLR	
			201020H	DDH IS IN POSITION ON RIGHT FLANK OF 3/7 MLR.	
			201720H	DDY FURNISHED (1) SQUAD TO MAN OP 39 IN FALSE'S TAOR.	
			201720H	FALSE-3 SUBMITTED SPOT REPORT TO DD-3 & BONNIE HERO, FALSE OP #39 RECEIVED 3RDS. S/A FIRE.	
			201840H	DDY SQUAD IS IN POSITION ON OP 39.	
			212035H	DDE REQUESTED ILLUM AT BS 537981 SUSPECTED CIVILIANS IN FRONT OF LINES. NEGATIVE RESULTS.	
			212400H	DDH REPORTED THAT AT 2300 OP #11 RECEIVED 5 TO 6 SMALL ARMS ROUNDS FROM BS-529992	

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WHICH MAY BE USED

UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
S-3	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
221100H MAR 66	242100H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			221100H	ONE SQUAD PF ARRIVED FROM LY TIN DISTRICT TO TRAIN AND WORK WITH 2/7 FOR PERIOD OF ONE WEEK.	
			222115H	AT OP 39-BS 573963 DD YANKEE UNIT REC'D 3RDS SNIPER FIRE. SA FIRE RETURNED, TANK LIGHT USED NEGATIVE RESULTS.	
			222100H	AT OP 39 BS 573963 DD YANKEE HEARD VOICES IN FRONT OF THEIR POSIT. TANKS ILLUMINATED. (2) FIGURES SEEN RUNNING. SMALL ARMS FIRED. NEG. RESULTS. SPOT REP SUBMITTED BY FALSE.	
			222240H	H6 REPORTS (1) FRIENDLY WIA-MORE INFO TO FOLLOW GOLF ALERTED THAT MED EVAC VEHICLE MAY USE ROAD THROW THEIR POSITIONS.	
			222240H	AT BT 519001 "HOTEL" HAD (1) WIA FROM GRENADE FRAGMENTS. MAN CLAIMS HE REC'D (1) INCOMING GRENADE HE RETURNED SMALL ARMS, COULD NOT SEE ANYONE.	
			231800H	PF SQD THAT ARRIVED FOR TRAINING TWO DAYS AGO WAS RETURNED TO LY TIN DISTRICT BY REQUEST ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE WITH SECTOR ADVISOR TO HAVE THEM RETURN.	
			232355H	DDE LP 10 REPORTED TWO MEN ON LEFT FLANK AT 01558993 OP WITHDREW TO DASE OF HILL AND THREW A GRENADE, AFTER THEIR ILL FAILED GO OFF. SEARCH RESULTS NEGATIVE.	
			240240H	SUBMITTED SPOT REPORT ON DD-H #3 AMBUSH AT BS 519995. 3 VC KIA POSSIBLE.	
			241105H	DDG-6 REPORTED RECEIVED A VOLUME OF SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM BT 518012 (1) WIA. REPORTED FURTHER INFORMATION TO FOLLOW. ALL MLR CC'S ALERTED.	
			241630H	DDG WIA DETERMINED TO BE RESULT OF SNIPER ACTION. 5RDS SA RETURNED. NEGATIVE RESULTS.	
			"242100H	"E" REPORTED ONE MAN SIGHTED AT BS 544994 RAN WHEN CHALLENGED BY ONTOS. ONTOS FIRED 30 CAL. AND THREW ONE GREN. RESULTS UNKNW.	

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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
S-3	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
250030H MAR 66	282345H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			250030H	F REPORTED POSSIBLE MOVEMENT IN FRONT OF THIRD PLT POSITION, REPORT TWO GRENADES THROWN.	
			250100H	"E" REPORTED POSSIBLE ENEMY MOVEMENT IN FRONT OF THERE POSITON, FIVE ROUNDS OF 155 ILLUMINATION WERE FIRED NEG. RESULTS WERE REPORTED.	
			260940H	DDH & DDE COMMENCED MOVING BACK TO 2/7 TAOR	
			261245H	DDG RETURNED TO THERE PLACE IN BN DEFENSIVE POSITION.	
			261315H	DDE RETURNED TO TAOR, LESS YANKEE UNITS	
			261400H	YANKEE RETURNED TO TAOR	
			261430H	CO "H" SQUAD THAT WAS PROVIDING SECURITY FOR HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY TM RETURNED LESS 5 MEN. FIVE INDIVIDUALS REMAINING STILL ABOARD ANOTHER SHIP PROVIDING SECURITY. LATTER'S RETURN PENDING.	
			271000H	PF ELEMENTS ESTABLISH ROAD BLOCK NEAR DD G POSITION TO SUPERVISE LOCAL CIVILLIANS DURING RICE HARVEST.	
			280700H	RECON TEAM INSERTED INTO LZ CANARY. COMMENCE CO F S&D OPN.	
			281200H	DDF OPERATION SECURED.	
			281240H	BB6 ATTENDED BRIEF BY STARBOARD 6 ON OPER-INDIANA. 1/7 COMMITTED NOW WITH DDF FURNISHING TWO MOTOR CONVOY'S. ONE PLAT (REIN) AND ONE CO (-). CONVOY DESTINATION IS QUANG NAI AIRFIELD.	
			261600H	DDF (-) COMMENCED CONVOY ESCORT OF 3/11 TO QUANG NGAI AIRFIELD.	
			282345H	NOTIFIED OF REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE CONVOY ESCORT 290530 MARCH. CO H PROVIDE PLAT.	

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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION	
S-3	
ORGANIZATION	
2nd Bn, 7th Marines	
OPENED (DTG, Month, year)	CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)
290015H Mar66	291230H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			290015H	DD6 IS TO GO TO QUANG NAHI WITH NF6 290615 DD ALERTED TO PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION INDIANA ON 29 MAR 66.	
			290445H	BH CALLED AND SAID BRIDGE AT BS 578964 HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY SQUAD OF VC WITH AUTO WEAPONS. FRIENDLY UNITS DEFENDED WITH 81mm MORTAR SUPPORT. INFO TO DDH FOR CONVOY ES- CORT. FURTHER INFO TO COME <del>TRIP BY</del> AS AVAILA ABLE.	
			290545H	BH 3 ASSIST (JNJ) CALLED FROM QUANG NGAI SAID CO COULD PICK UP FAC AND FO TEAM WHILE ON RECON AT THAT POSITION.	
			290630H	CO AND S-3 TO QUANG NGAI FOR BRIEF OF 2/7 COMMITMENT OPERATION "INDIANA".	
			290700H	CO MADE RECON OF "INDIANA" LZ.	
			290845H	FRAG ORDER NO 1 ISSUED FOR OPERATION "INDIANA" AT LZ CAMP.	
			290913H	1ST LIFT OF 30 MAG-36 HELO'S DEPARTED FOR OBJECTIVE LZ AT BS 545810 WITH CO "G".	
			291040H	CO "G" SECURED LZ. NO CONTACT.	
			291050H	HELO LIFT COMPLETED.	
			291120H	CO'S "E" AND "F" MOVED ABREAST TO THE S IN SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION.	
			291205H	CO "E" UNCOVERED AND DESTROYED NETWORK OF CAVES AND TUNNELS AT BS 540808. APPREHENDED 2 VCS.	
			291220H	2/7 DIRECTED TO ASSUME BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG GRID LINE 80 FOR 1/7 ATTACK TO N.	
			291230H	CO H APPREHENDED 2 VCC. ONE WITH WEAPON AT BS 545813.	

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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION

S-3

ORGANIZATION

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

OPENED (DTG, Month, year)

291615H MAR 66

CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

301515H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			291615H	STARBOARD 6 VISITED CO TO TALK ABOUT ENEMY SITUATION. <del>SINCE LITTLE ENEMY CONTACT 2/7</del> <del>EXTRACT ON 30 MAR.</del>	
			291710H	CO E UNCOVERED NETWORK OF CAVES AND TUNNELS AT BS 542798 CONTAINING 60mm MORTAR BASE PLATE, MORTAR SIGHT, 2 THOMPSON SMG, MORTAR AND SA AMMO.	
			291745H	2/7 PERIMETER ESTABLISHED FOR THE NIGHT AT BS545797. AMBUSHES SCHEDULED AT BS 538800, BS 545805 AND BS 547797. H&I PLANNED AND REQUESTED.	
			292010H	ONE ROUND SUSPECTED ENEMY 81mm MORTAR IN-COMING. NO CASUALTIES.	
			292033H	SECOND ROUND OF SUSPECTED ENEMY 81mm MORTAR IN-COMING. NO CASUALTIES. H&I FIRES INCREASED AND SHIFTED TO POSSIBLE VC MORTAR POSITIONS BASED ON MAP RECON. NO FURTHER MORTAR IN-COMING. FLARE SHIP ON STATION.	
			292400 H	NO ENEMY CONTACT.	
			300700H	CO E RE-SEARCHED CAVES AND TUNNELS AT BS 542798. DESTROYED SAME.	
			300829H	H&S CO COMMENCED HELO LIFT TO CP AT LZ GOOSE (BT 504035).	
			301040H	HELO LIFT COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CO E DESIGNATED RAPID REACTION FORCE STANDBY TO SUPPORT CO F CONVOY ESCORT DUTY FROM QUANG NGAI.	
			301200H	2/7 RELIEVED COMPOSITE UNIT ON MLR.	
			301500H	CO F <del>CLOSED</del> ON BN CP.	
			301500H	BN RADIO CALL SIGN CHANGED TO CHATSWORTH.	
			301515H	CO E REQUESTED LP #1 AND #2 BE DILITED. APPROVED.	

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 NAVMC 210-65 (REV. 8-66)  
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UNIT OR STAFF SECTION

S-3

ORGANIZATION

2nd Bn, 8th Marines

OPENED (DTG, Month, year)

301915H MAR 66

CLOSED (DTG, Month, year)

311545H MAR 66

(Classification)

TIME		SER. NO.	DTG	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN M-Maps T-Troops S-Staff F-File
IN	OUT				
			301915H	BH 3 REQUESTED CONVOY ESCORT FOR FUEL TANKERS TO MOVE TO QUANG NAI ON 31 MAR 66. DDE ASSIGNED COMMITMENT FOR ONE PLAT (REIN).	
			311130H	MAJGEN FIELDS VISITED DBCP.	
			311200H	CW TO PROVIDE 2 CO'S AND A CMD GROUP FOR AIRFIELD DEFENSE FOR A PERIOD OF 2-3 WEEKS.	
			311545H	CW "E" & "F" HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRFIELD AND RMK/AMMO DUMP. UNDER OPCOM 1ST MARINES.	

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    - (4) Oral messages should be recorded in detail or reduced to writing and handled like written messages.
    - (5) Incorrect entries should not be altered but marked "VOID" and corrected with a new entry.
  - g. Action taken: Enter a brief description of the action taken on each message, incident or order received. In the case of outgoing messages, indicate information addressees.
2. Keep a journal file: number all items(messages, transcriptions, etc) consecutively; enter them in the journal; and then file them in numerical order.

A 23608

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
3rd Marine Division (Rein), MAF  
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

BnBul 1500  
3/AJD/den  
22 March 1966

BATTALION BULLETIN 1500

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Company Training Programs

Ref: (a) BnBul 1500 of 27Nov65  
(b) Force/Naval Component Command Bul 1710 of 15Mar66

Area: (1) Training Tips to be utilized as background information for  
Company Training Programs

1. Purpose. To furnish guidelines for company training programs and provide information on recent combat experiences of this and other battalions for inclusion in subject training.

2. Information. The present policy of having only two companies conduct patrol and ambush activity within the TAOR at any one time has as its objective the following:

a. The establishment of a routine daily training programs uninterrupted by other active commitments.

b. Continued improvement of static defensive positions and living areas.

c. Administrative functions as directed by company commanders, i.e. care, cleaning and replacement of equipment, recreation, etc. The same routine is applicable to H&S Company. It should be understood that operational commitments or support requirements levied by higher headquarters will necessitate frequent alterations to these desired objectives.

3. Action

a. Company commanders will establish a daily training program during those periods when not involved in active operations. Four hours of training is considered to be a minimum for each day.

b. Company commanders and section heads will continue to emphasize to replacement personnel the special indoctrination and training outlined in references (a) and (b).


c. Training will include, but is not limited to, the material contained in enclosure (1).

Appendix B-2

d. Completed training will be included on the daily situation report submitted to the S-3.

e. The Battalion S-3 will provide current training references as requested, and in addition ensure distribution of published lessons learned, commanders analysis, etc., provided by higher headquarters.

4. Self-cancellation. 30 Sept 1966.

  
LEON N. UTTER

DISTRIBUTION: "C"



TRAINING TIPS TO BE UTILIZED AS BACKGROUND FOR  
COMPANY TRAINING PROGRAMS

1. General. Training tips listed below are the results of combat experiences of this battalion and other commands of the 3rd Marine Division (Rein). Many of them are applicable each day we operate in Vietnam while others apply less frequently. Many of them are the results of successful engagements with enemy forces while others are areas where weaknesses have been displayed. Our experienced application of many of these tactics and techniques has been good but can be improved. Future operational proficiency will be proportionate to the degree of emphasis placed on these experience factors during scheduled training:

a. Aggressive action and varied techniques against snipers. Timely use of organic indirect fire weapons against suspected sniper positions.

b. Helicopter Landing Zones - On entry rapidly disperse to outer limits of the zone to guarantee security of zone from enemy small arms fire. On leaving the zone establish prior coordination with supporting air to provide close supporting fires during extraction of last elements.

c. Field expedients in marking helicopter LZ's. A mirror during day; three wads of burning paper at night.

d. In the attack - timely determination of the extent of enemy field fortifications so as to take advantage of the most devastating type of ordnance available in our air and artillery arsenals, i.e. 500-1000 lbs bombs with delayed fuzes against bunkers and tunnel complexes.

e. Adequate supporting arms preparation of suspicious areas that dominate routes of march or exposed terrain features that must be traversed.

f. Instruction on utilization of the Mity Mite Portable Blower on tunnels and caves. Also the destruction of tunnel and cave complexes. (See Lessons Learned and Training Tips Folder).

g. Indoctrination on mines and booby traps employed by the VC. (See Lessons Learned and Training Tips Folder).

h. Common tactics and techniques employed by VC forces. (See Lessons Learned and Training Tips Folder).

i. Map orientation with emphasis on a timely determination of map location to ground location.

j. Develop unit leaders proficiency to call and direct the fire of all supporting arms.

k. Accurate, complete and timely reporting on enemy observation and contacts to include as a bare minimum the who, what, when, where and how.

l. The importance of secure radio and wire messages, particularly as they pertain to friendly plans, dispositions and locations of units not engaged with enemy forces.

m. Vietnamese language training with emphasis on the use of the "Pointee Talker" booklet published by the S-2.

n. Indoctrination on the employment of psychological warfare measures. (See Lessons Learned and Training Tips Folder).

o. Responsibility and deployment of tactical elements within a tactical march column. Deploying from a tactical column.

p. Rapid deployment from the approach march phase into the attack.

q. Basic fundamentals of first aid on the battle field. Buddy and self aid.

r. Care and cleaning of equipment. Particularly under adverse weather conditions.

s. Utilization and employment of the Seismic Intrusion Detector (SID-150).

t. Specialized training common to the individual occupational specialty.

u. Care of the foot.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies  
 2nd Bn, 7th Mar (-)(Rein)  
 Chu Lai, Vietnam  
 040200H Mar 1966

Frag Order No. 2-66

Ref: (a) Map Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheet 6756I & IV  
 (b) 2nd Bn 7th Mar OpOrder 206-65

Time Zone: H

# 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. Current ISUM's.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) MAG-36 Helo support.

(2) MAG-12 CAS.

(3) Army FAC (A).

(4) "M" Btry 4/11 DS.

(5) 37 Ranger Bn ARVN.

# 2. MISSION

2nd Bn, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) in conjunction with elements 2nd ARVN Div conducts search and destroy operations in designated zone on 4 Mar 1966 and provides convoy security as required.

# 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. 37 Ranger Bn lands at L-Hr in LZ ALFA, secures LZ and then conducts search and destroy operations to the SE on North side of road. 2/7 lands in LZ ALFA, relieves ARVN of security of LZ then conducts search and destroy operations to the SE on South side of road.

b. Co F (Rein).

Attached: 1 Sqd Flames

1 Eng Tm

1 FAC Tm

(1) Land in LZ ALFA and relieve ARVN forces of security for LZ.

(2) On order conduct search and destroy operations to the SE, South of road. Guide on the road.

c. Co G (Rein).

Attached: 1 Sqd Flames

1 Eng Tm

1 FAC Tm

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 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

Appendix B-1

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- (1) Land in LZ ALFA and move South of road 300 meters to assembly area.
- (2) On order conduct search and destroy operations to the SE, South of the road. Guide on Co "F".

d. Co H (Rein).

Attached: 1 Sqd Flames  
1 Eng Tm

- (1) Land in LZ ALFA and move South of road to assembly area to the West of Co "G".
- (2) On order follow in trace of H&S elements by 200 meters.
- (3) Be prepared to assume mission of either Co's "F" or "G".

e. 81mm Mortar Plat.

- (1) Land in LZ ALFA and move to assembly area vicinity of Co "H".
- (2) Be prepared to provide supporting fires as directed.

f. H&S Co (-). Land in LZ ALFA and move to assembly area vicinity of Co's "F" and "G".g. RESERVE COMPANY + ENG Tm

- (1) At 040700 provide Co (-) as convoy security for artillery battery from RJ MSR and Hwy #1 to Bin Son (BS 599923). Provide security for artillery battery in Bin Son area.
- (2) At 041230H provide Plat (Rein) as convoy security for truck convoy from MSR and Hwy #1 to Bin Son. Continue convoy security for extraction of 2/7 (-) and return to Chu Lai Enclave.

h. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-Day 4 Mar 66.
- (2) L-Hour 040900H.
- (3) Air panels will be used to mark front lines when CAS is called for.
- (4) LZ's for helo evac or resupply must be secure from enemy SA fire.
- (5) Position reports will be by thrust line as follows:
  - (a) Point #1 BS 550850 - designated by name of any car.
  - (b) Point #2 BS 600790 - designated name of any country.
- (6) Rules of engagement contained in reference (a).
- (7) Use extreme caution for mines and booby traps.

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(8) Use of CN/CS authorized.

4. LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY

Admin Order 203-65

5. COMM-ELEC

a. Annex F to OpOrder 206-65

b. Report CP's when established

c. Cmdr Group moves behind center of Co's "F" and "G"

d. Task Force ALFA OP BS 6475.

e. Comm frequencies as directed.

f. Reports.

(1) Position reports every six hours commencing 1100H.

(2) Spot reports as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL UTTER

G. H. GENTRY Jr  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
Executive Officer

ANNEX:

A - OP Overlay

OFFICIAL:

*A. J. Doublet*  
A. J. DOUBLET  
Capt USMCR  
S-3

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