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HEADQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division, (Rein) FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3/RAS/1ef
1300
2 August 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: Commanding Officer
TO: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (Rein) FMF

Subj: Command Chronology Report

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2A

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. As directed by reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted.

John J. Roothoff
JOHN J. ROOTHOFF

2/7

Bn. th Marines
Log No. **0338-66**
Copy No. 1 of 8
SER. NO. 046-66



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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0338-66

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY1. Organization Data:a. Location. 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein) CP Location Chu Lai RVN BT-504036b. Period Covered. 1-31 July 66c. Commanding Officer and Staff

(1) Lieutenant Colonel JOHN J. ROTHOFF		Commanding Officer
(2) Major R.E. MOSS		Executive Officer
(3) 1stLt. E.L. BONHAM		S-1
(4) 2ndLt. R.L. LEROY	9-31 July	S-2
(5) Major R.A. STEPHENS		S-3
(6) 1stLt. S.B. CROWLEY	9-31 July	S-4

Enclosure (1)

2. Detailed Description of Significant Events

a. Personnel

(1) During the month of July this battalion joined 13 officers (2 Capts, 10 2ndLts, and 1 WO), 139 enlisted Marines and 5 enlisted Navy. 30 enlisted were transferred due to normal rotation.

(2) Casualties during the period were 3 enlisted KIA, 8 enlisted WIA, 6 nonbattle casualties and 29 heat exhaustion casualties.

(3) 2 GySgt's were promoted to 2ndLt, 84 LCpl's were promoted to Cpl, 132 Pfc's were promoted to LCpl, and 9 Pvt's were promoted to Pfc.

(4) 1 Silver Star, 1 star in lieu of a second Bronze Star, 1 Bronze Star, 1 Navy Commendation Medal, and 6 Purple Hearts were awarded during July.

(5) 54 personnel were processed on R&R during July.

(6) 8 office hours were conducted by the Battalion Commander.

b. Intelligence. Significant intelligence obtained and acted upon during the period resulted in operation "FRANKLIN I". Supporting information is contained in paragraph 7, of the Combat After Action Report attached as Appendix A.

c. Training. Extensive commitments to Airfield Defense, and two battalion sized operations, limited training during the period. One Marine went to Okinawa for familiarization training and firing of the M-16 rifle. One Marine is attending NCO Leadership school in Okinawa. The S-2 scouts received training in handling of POW's, documents, weapons, and map reading. Numerous classes in scouting and patrolling, map reading, booby traps and mines were conducted by the companies.

d. Special Operations

(1) There were two battalion sized operations during the period. The operations were commanded by the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines. Both operations are covered in detail in the attached Combat After Action Reports.

(2) During the month the following small unit activity was conducted within the battalion TAOR.

(a) One platoon search and destroy operation.

(b) Two squad reconnaissance patrols.

Enclosure (1)

- (c) Two fire team reconnaissance patrols.
- (d) 22 squad night ambushes.
- (e) 22 squad night security patrols.
- (f) 43 fire team night ambushes.
- (g) 43 fire team night security patrols.
- (h) 279 fire team night listening posts.

e. Command and Control. Battalion operations during July were under the command and control of the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

f. Close Combat

(1) Close Combat during battalion operations is described in the attached Combat After Action Reports.

(2) Close Combat within the TOAR was as follows:

(a) 082125H "E" Co received one incoming grenade, called for illumination at BT-515015, mission fired, searched area with negative results.

g. Fire Support

(1) A concise picture of fire support furnished for operations is contained in paragraph 6 of each of the attached Combat After Action Reports.

(2) Fire Support within the TOAR consisted of 116 H&I fire missions during the period.

h. Civil Affairs/Civil Action

(1) During the month of July the Civil Affairs team was able to organize and teach 20 Vietnamese boys (ages 9-14) the game of softball. On 17 July the Commanding General, 1st MAR DIV (Rein), FMF, General FIELDS, threw out the first ball for the opening game of the Vietnamese "Little League". Also present were General STILES, ADC, and many Vietnamese people, including the hamlet and village chiefs as well as over 200 Marines from this command. Each boy was furnished a complete uniform and many pictures were taken by the division photographers.

(2) The Civil Affairs Team was instrumental in raising enough money to pay the salary of the schoolmaster at Long Phu #1 for the coming school year. On July 22 the CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines presented these funds to the hamlet chief during a ceremony at the schoolhouse. The Executive Officer presented the schoolmaster with a 3' X 5' Vietnamese flag and a 22' flag pole. The Civil Affairs Team distributed 120 school kits (received from Care), 120 bars of soap, 120 tooth brushes, 120 tubes of toothpaste, and 400 lollipops.

(3) The Civil Affairs Team assisted the populace of Long Phu #1 and #2 by furnishing paint and cement for the repairs needed on the schoolhouses and dispensaries in the two hamlets.

(4) There were 266 persons treated at Med Cap this month.

APPENDICES:

A - List of References

B - Documents

APP. A^{#1} - A/A Rpt. Opn. OAKLAND

APP. A^{#2} - A/A Rpt. Opn. FRANKLIN I

APP. B - [See list at B]

Enclosure (1)

APPENDIX A to Enclosure (1) of Command Chronology.

List of References:

1. MAPS: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L-7014 Sheets 6739 I, II, IV, 6738 I, II, 6838 I.
2. After Action Reports- Operation "OAKLAND" and Operation "FRANKLIN I".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/REM/wll
 3000
 5 July 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Bn. 7th Marines

Subj: After Action Report; "Operation Oakland"

Log No. 0298-66

Ref: (a) DivO 3400.1
 Encl: (1) Operations D-Day
 (2) Operations D+1
 (3) Operations D+2

Copy No. 60 of 63
 Ser. NO. 042-66

1. Code Name. "Operation OAKLAND"
2. Dates of Operation. 29 June- 1 July 1966
3. Location. Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam; AMS Map Series L-701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6755 I and 6756 II.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines
5. Task Organization.

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol ROTHOFF

H&S Co. (Rein)

Lt JOHNSON

HST Tm

NGF Liaison Tm

Engr Tm

Scout/Interp Tm

Company "E" (Rein)

Capt SEAY

Arty FO Tm

81mm Mortar FO Tm

Engr Tm

Company "F" (Rein)

Lt CROWLEY

NGF Spot Tm

FAC Tm

Arty FO Tm

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 DOD DIR 5200.10

APP. A #1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81mm Mortar FO Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm
 Engr Tm
 Sgd Flames

Company "G" (Rein)

Capt. SHOFTAW

NGF Spot Tm
 FAC Tm
 Sect 81mm Mortars
 Arty FO Tm
 81mm Mortar FO Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm
 Engr Tm
 Sgd Flames

Company "H" (Rein)

Lt. PIATT

Arty FO Tm
 Engr Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery. "I" Battery, 3/11 and "E" Battery, 2/11 were positioned at BS-705603 in general support. Artillery was utilized throughout the operation with good coverage on all targets. Through the assistance of the 3/11 FDC, a system of preplanned concentrations was effected with 2/7 forward observers to more quickly assist the infantry companies. A list of two on-call missions at all times was found to be workable. Although plagued by an unusual number of dud, the use of shell smoke in adjustment of close support missions merits further testing in future operations. Communications throughout the operation were excellent.

b. Naval Gunfire. The Shore Fire Control Party provided two spot teams to the assault companies of this battalion. The rocket ship U.S.S. WHITE RIVER and the destroyer U.S.S. DAVIS fired a LZ prep, H&I's as well as two missions in direct support of 2/7 and one in response to a request from ARVN units. The naval guns were impressive and accurate in their coverage of targets.

c. Air

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. The battalion was lifted on D-Day from QUANG NGAI Airfield to LZ HAWK (BS-745604), in 30 UH-34's and 9 CH-46's. This lift proceeded smoothly despite hurried organization caused by the late departure of the motor convoy from CHU LAI. On D+2 the battalion (-) was extracted from LZ WREN (BS-778545) and returned to LZ GOOSE. This lift was accomplished by 12 UH-34's and 10 CH-46's. Initially, problems resulted in the extraction due to

the battalion advance being slowed by heavy underbrush and booby traps, plus the early arrival, by ten minutes, of the first flight of UH-34's. Some uncertainty on the part of the HST loaders, resulted in slow organization and direction in the loading of the helicopters. Also on D-2, Company "H", then under operational control of Commanding Officer, 7th Marines, was extracted from an LZ (BS-750593) to LZ GOOSE. This lift was commenced upon completion of the battalion(-) lift.

(2) Close Air Support. Close air support consisted of three separate strikes. The first was a half-hour preparation of LZ HAWK on D-Day. The second was a TAC(Δ) controlled napalm and strafing strike on a village adjacent (BS-740590) to LZ HAWK, conducted by two AD's of MCG-12. The TAC(Δ) reported 19 structures destroyed and four damaged. Napalm duds appeared to be excessive. Preplanned MCG-12 aircraft, on station, were not utilized due to lack of targets. The third fixed-wing strike was called and controlled by MCG-36 gunships on D+1 when company "H" was ambushed (BS-760575). Two F4 aircraft responded and provided excellent target coverage with napalm and bombs.

(3) Armed Helicopters. Gunships acted as TAC(Δ) on D-Day, performed reconnaissance over the battalion zone, and took 4 VC, in trenches, under fire, reporting one confirmed kill. On D+1, gunships responded within ten minutes to an emergency request to assist Company "H" during the ambush. On arrival, targets were so numerous, they called for fixed wing support. While awaiting the fixed wing aircraft, the gunships took several of the targets under fire, then controlled the F4 strikes. Upon departure of the two F4 aircraft, the four gunships continued to rocket and strafe the target area with excellent coverage. Darkness precluded damage assessment.

(4) Helicopter Medical Evacuation and Resupply.

a. Medical evacuation during operation OAKLAND was generally fair. Difficulties were encountered in the delay of helicopters being dispatched from the LSA. The average time for helicopter medical evacuation was approximately 35-40 minutes which is deemed to slow. It is felt that routine medical evacuation should take no longer than 20-25 minutes.

b. Resupply by helicopter was poor during operation OAKLAND. On the evening of D-Day, helicopter resupply was requested at approximately 1700. This late request was caused by contact with Viet Cong forces at approximately 1600 which necessitated water and ammunition resupply since resupply had not been planned for the afternoon of D-Day. The LSA notified this organization twice that the helicopters were "on the way". Unfortunately, one medical evacuee was held pending arrival of the resupply helicopters due initially at 1830. The helicopters didn't arrive until 2030 and the medical evacuee was in worse condition than if he had been evacuated earlier as had been planned. The resupply on the evening of D-Day included three times the amount of 60mm Mortar ammunition requested, one third the amount of 40mm ammunition requested,

and no clothing or BB-451 battery as requested. The shortages were not critical, however, the overages caused a delay in moving the Battalion on D+1 since they had to be evacuated prior to moving out. The helicopter resupply on D+1 was generally fair. 800 pounds of C-4 explosives were delivered when only 40 pounds was requested. The resupply on D+1 commenced at 1630 and was not completed until 1930. Helicopter crew members began throwing filled water cans from one aircraft approximately 5-6 feet in the air thereby spilling water and damaging some cans. HST support during medical evacuation and resupply was good.

7. Intelligence.

a. Estimate of VC strength, location, and disposition in the Objective Area.

(1) Forces Anticipated:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
38th VC Bn (Provincial) (-)	BS-6758	UNK
48th VC Bn (Provincial) (-)	BS-7653	UNK
2 Companies, 48th Bn	BS-6951	UNK
C-17 Co (Local Force)	BS-6957	UNK
C-19 Co (Local Force)	BS-7358	UNK

(2) The intelligence information which generated operation OAKLAND was initially acquired and processed by the 2nd ARVN Division. The intelligence was provided to this command on 27 June 1966, along with additional information from aerial sightings.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted. Contact throughout the battalion's zone consisted of sporadic sniper fire from small 2-4 man groups. On D+2, 2nd ARVN Division advisors reported approximately 100 VC moving back into the area previously swept on D-Day.

c. Significant Intelligence Gained. The intelligence estimate disseminated prior to the operation disclosed the objective area to be well populated and was suspected as being manned by a substantial VC force. In most cases, indications were that this was true. Fields were tilled and most buildings were well kept. Many women, children and old men were seen throughout the zone of operation.

d. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

Nui Van Bang Hill Mass	BS-7459, BS-7559
	BS-7460, BS-7560
Nui Ong Do	BS-7653
Nui Dao	BS-7753

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire

The terrain was relatively flat except for the Nui Van

Hill Mass. Ground observation and fields of fire are limited in most cases by hedgerows and thick undergrowth surrounding the hamlets. Observation and fields of fire definitely favor the defender.

(3) Cover and Concealment

No major obstacles were encountered during the course of the operation.

8. Mission. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) conducts operations in QUANG NGAI Province in conjunction with coordinated ARVN operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

9. Concept of Operations. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) moves by motor convoy to QUANG NGAI Airfield at L-3 on D-Day. At L-Hour lands in LZ HAWK (BS-749601), and conducts search and destroy operations in zone.

10. Execution

e. Planning. At 271500H June, Commanding Officer, 7th Marines and his staff, briefed the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines and his staff on the concept and conduct of Operation OAKLAND. Combat and Combat service support elements were present and liaison was effected. All orders and instructions were verbal and were followed by 7th Marine Frag-Order 16-66. At 271720H June, message from CO, 7th Marines was received delaying Operation OAKLAND 24 hours. CO, 2/7, issued verbal orders at 271900H. This was followed by Frag-Order 17-66 at 280900H.

b. D-Day 29 June 1966. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein), commenced motor march to QUANG NGAI Airfield at 0610H. Departure was delayed due to late arrival of trucks and subsequent search for motor transport officer, who later stopped convoy at the intersection of Highway #1 and Route 22-A to wait for the motor transport communications vehicle. Leading elements finally crossed the IP at 0627H. Arrived QUANG NGAI Airfield at 0835H. Assault elements of Companies "G" and "F" commenced lift to LZ HAWK (BS-749601) at 0847H. All units were in the LZ by 1045H. Upon consolidation, 2/7 commenced operations Westward in zone with Companies "F" and "G" abreast, Company "F" on the left. Companies "E" and "H" moved South and set up as covering force for Companies "F" and "G". At 1325H, Company "H" received light small arms fire in right rear flank from HOI AN (2). Fire returned by both Company "H" and Company "F" moving up behind Company "H". At 1440H, with Companies "E" and "F" abreast and Companies "G" and "H" in trace, continued the advance in zone. At 1715H, Company "E" (BS-751589), received heavy small arms fire from village at BS-753593, resulting in one USMC WLA. Assisted by naval gunfire and artillery, Company "E" forced the enemy to withdraw with three VC KIA (probable). The battalion set in a perimeter defense (BS-751592) for the night without further contact.

c. D+1 30 June 1966. At 0730H, the battalion continued the attack.

South, with Companies "E" and "F" leading, "G" and "H" in trace. As they advanced, leading elements received sporadic sniper fire. At 0900H, Company "E" received one USMC WIA (BS-752585). Fire returned resulting in three VC KIA and evidence of two VC KIA (probable) (BS-753584). In the vicinity of the same area, Company "E" closed seven small caves. About 1015H, Company "F" reported one VC KIA. Body was found in cave (BS-757579). Four VCS were taken during this period. Continued sweep South in zone. About 1550H, halted advance (BS-768555) to receive instructions from 7th Marines Executive Officer and S-3. At 1630H, Company "H", reinforced with FAC and NGF Spot Teams, was detached to retrace route of advance and establish position vicinity BS-750590. Battalion (-) set in perimeter for night (BS-768555). At 1655H, three rounds 60mm mortar landed in CP LZ. Fired from the South. ARVN units in the area were contacted and denied firing. One USMC WIA non-evac. No further incoming mortar fire was received. At 1715H, Company "H" received fire from four VC (BS-765558), returned fire, one VC KIA. One Marine dislocated left leg while maneuvering into firing position. At 1810H, Company "H" moving North, was ambushed with heavy small arms fire (BS-758576 and BS-760579). Fire was returned. VC broke contact, leaving one VC KIA. One USMC WIA minor. About 1840H, Company "H" received fire from estimated 3-5 VC at BS-762572. Fire and maneuver resulted in three VC KIA. At 2015H, Company "G" listening post (BS-775551) observed two VC crawling toward lines. Marines fired, one VC KIA, carrying two CHICOM and one MK-26 fragmentation grenades. Upon arrival at new position about 1920H, Company "H" chopped to CO, 7th Marines. Three 81mm mortar fire missions were fired in support of Company "H" during the night.

d. D+2 1 July 1966. At 0730H, with Companies "E" and "F" in the advance, Company "G" in trace, 2/7 continued the sweep South in zone to LZ WREN. At 0750H, Company "H" patrol found one body in a cave, (BS-755585) dead of gunshot wounds. A Vietnamese woman identified the body as a local VC. At 0800H, Company "H" observed a VC with weapon, running vicinity BS-759591, one VC KIA. A few minutes later, Company "H" apprehended two VCS (BS-745583). About 0805H, Company "F" encountered six fragmentation grenades and one 81mm mortar round booby traps. At 0845H, leading elements of Company "E" began sweep of LZ WREN. At 0850H, four UH-34's arrived in the LZ, as security of the LZ was not completed and initial lifts ready, the helos took off to orbit. The first flight of troops lifted off at 0905H. The battalion (-) was returned to LZ GOOSE in the TAOR by 1145H. The extraction of Company "H" followed and was completed by 1407H.

11. Resultsa. Friendly Casualties

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
KIA	0
WIA	8
WIA (non-evac)	2
Non-battle	8

b. Enemy Casualties and Captives

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC KIA	11
VC KIA (probable)	6
VCS	10

c. Captured Equipment and Supplies. None.d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None.12. Administrative Matters. None.13. Special Equipment and Techniques. None.14. Commander's Analysis.

a. The HST is a most important element in tactical troop lifts. Through their organization and operation of an LZ, the tactical integrity of assault units is maintained and the lift proceeds smoothly. However, such was not entirely the case with this battalion's two lifts. There appeared to be a certain amount of hesitancy by the HST. Loaders did not "take charge" and give positive direction to heliteams, thus, in some instances, tactical integrity of assault units was lost and a certain amount of confusion resulted.


b. When a motor march to QUANG NGAI Airfield is requested, it is imperative that the motor transport element arrive at the loading point on time with a designated person in charge. If the motor transport element waits until loading time to form their organization, valuable time is lost.

c. The major problem encountered during this operation was primarily of an internal nature. From 18 May until 27 June, the battalion was split, providing two companies and a command group to the defense of the Chu Lai Airfield. This left the two remaining companies to man a FEBA of over 4000 meters. During this period, rotation caused numerous personnel changes. Thus, the battalion went into Operation OAKLAND with three inexperienced company commanders and with one exception, all new company officers. There was no opportunity to train new personnel through platoon or company operations. If a battalion is to operate smoothly and efficiently under local combat conditions, it is imperative that it be welded into a cohesive team. This cohesion can only be attained by the battalion

being in a position to mount out numerous platoon and company operations, with a minimum of one battalion operation each month. To place an infantry battalion in a "guard duty" status for protracted periods, then commit it to combat without benefit of developing the "team spirit", through intensive training of new personnel, is not in the best interests of that battalion.




15. Recommendations

- a. That naval gunfire be utilized as much as possible.
- b. That the ISA be in a position to respond quickly and accurately to resupply and medical evacuation missions.
- c. That HST loaders "take charge" and give positive directions to heliteams.
- d. That ~~this battalion~~ be given the opportunity to conduct weekly, 2-3 day company operations and at least one 4-5 day battalion operation monthly. Squad and platoon tactics can be taught internally. This would necessitate some provisional augmentation on the FEBA for company operations and a complete take-over of 2/7's T&OR by another unit for battalion operations.


JOHN J. ROOTHOFF

DISTRIBUTION:	Regiment	50
	Files	<u>5</u>
	Total	55


2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Jun 1966



MAP: Quang Hien, Series L-701, Sheet 6755 I
Quang Ngai, Series L-701, Sheet 6756 II

Encls (1) D-Day Activities


2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Jul 66



MAP: Quang Hien, Series L-701, Sheet 6755 I
Quang Ngai, Series L-701, Sheet 6756 II

Encl: (2) D+1 Activities

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Jul 66



MAP: Quang Hien, Series L-701, Sheet 6755 I
Quang Ngai, Series L-701, Sheet 6756 II

Encl: (3) D+2 activities

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HEADQUARTERS
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMP
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/REM/lef
3000
3 August 1966

FROM: Commanding Officer
TO: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: After Action Report; "Operation Franklin I"

Ref: (a) DivO 3480.1
Encl: (1) Operations D-Day and D+1
(2) Operations D+2
(3) Operations D+3

Bn. th Marines

Log No. **0337-66**

Copy No. 62 of 63
Ser. No. 045-66

1. Code Name. "Operation Franklin I"
2. Dates of Operation. 26-29 July 66
3. Location. Binh Son district, Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam.
AMS MAP: Series L-7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6739 I and 6739 II.
4. Command Headquarters. CO, 7th Marines
5. Task Organization

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol ROOTHOFF

H&S Co (Rein)

Lt JOHNSON

HST
Hq. Engr Plt.

Company "E" (Rein)

Capt. SEAY

FAC Tm
NGF Spot Tm
Arty FO Tm
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Scout/Interp Tm

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App A #2

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Company "G" (Rein)

Capt. SHOPTAW

Arty FO Tm
 NCF Spot Tm
 Engr Tm
 Sqd Flames
 Scout/Interp Tm
 Hvy Sect Anti-Tank

Company "H" (Rein)

Lt. PIATT

Engr Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery. Due to the lack of targets artillery was not utilized except for H&I fire missions.

b. Air

(1) Helicopter Troop Lift. The only troop lift during the operation was executed on D+3, when the battalion was extracted from Cape Batangan (BS-775855) to the entrucking point (BS-703770). Initially, 8 H-34's from MAG-36 participated and were later joined by 4 additional H-34's. The entire lift took 3 hours and proceeded smoothly except when on two occasions sniper fire was directed at the helos from BS-766851.

(2) Close Air Support. One fixed-wing air strike was conducted on D-Day at BS-638896. This strike was called and controlled by the TAC (A) when he observed 8 VC in a trench line. Two A4E's from MAG-12 on station made rocket and strafing runs. Coverage was considered fair to good. After the A4E's expended their ordnance, two F-4 aircraft made rocket (5") runs. All runs were on target. Neither TAC (A) nor this Battalion could make a damage assessment. On D+3, 2 MAG-12 A4E aircraft made dummy runs on the sniper position from which the helos were receiving fire. When these fixed-wing aircraft departed, sniper fire again commenced.

(3) Armed Helicopters. Gunships acted as TAC (A) on D-Day and performed reconnaissance over a portion of the battalion zone until H+3. They controlled the aforementioned air strike and made several strafing runs on the target.

(4) Helicopter Med-Evac and Resupply

(a) Med-Evac. Helicopter medical evacuation during Operation FRANKLIN was fair. Casualty evacuation improved throughout the operation, however, it was marred by two instances where an inordinate amount of time was required to evacuate seriously wounded personnel. Representative medical evacuation times are shown below:

<u>MISSION#</u>	<u>TG MSG AT LSA</u>	<u>TOA A/C</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Y-1	260743H	260825H	2 Emergency MedEvacs
Y-2	261325H	261355H	1 Emergency MedEvac
Y-4	261450H	261525H	1 Emergency MedEvac
Y-6	261725H	261815H	2 Emergency MedEvacs
Y-8	262300H	262325H	1 Emergency MedEvac
Y-11	270953H	271010H	-do-

For medical evacuation, it is recommended two helicopters be assigned a battalion on a standby basis at the LSA in order to respond immediately. The elapsed time of 42 to 50 minutes respectively for missions Y-1 and Y-6 shown above is unacceptable in view of the fact that critically wounded men were involved. In the case of Y-6, a helicopter on another mission had to be diverted for pickup thus emphasizing the need for stand-by aircraft. Needless to say, long delays in helicopter medical evacuation can have an adverse affect on troop morale in the field and endanger the lives of seriously wounded men.

(b) Resupply. Helicopter resupply during Operation FRANKLIN was good. Noteworthy was the high and accurate fill rate of requested items. On D+1 (27 July), the battalion night defensive perimeter included only one marginally suitable landing zone. The battalion arrived in this position at approximately 1800 and immediately relayed the coordinates to the ISA for resupply which had been requested earlier. The response was good with the first aircraft arriving at approximately 1910. Due to poor configuration of the landing zone and the onset of darkness, only 25% of the resupply was delivered since the helicopter pilots felt the zone unsafe for night operations. This caused the majority of the battalion to go unfed the night of D+1. The balance of the D+1 resupply was requested at 0600 on D+2 (28 July) and arrived at 0630 delaying the battalion one half hour from its scheduled departure time. These events have reemphasized the need within the battalion to be established in night defensive positions early enough to permit resupply within daylight hours if at all possible. Helicopter resupply on D+2 was excellent.

7. Intelligence

a. Estimate of VC Strength, Location, and Disposition in the Objective Area.

(1) Force Anticipated in immediate objective area.

<u>(a) Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Tactical Disposition</u>
<u>Confirmed</u>			
T-18 Co.	Unknown	60	Unknown
<u>Probable</u>			
48th Bn.	Unknown	400	Unknown

(2) The intelligence information which led to "Operation FRANKLIN" was furnished to this unit on 25 July 1966 at which time it was considered reliable.

(3) The objective of the operation was to find and destroy any VC units in the area, to confiscate any caches of supplies or weapons, to destroy any cave complexes found in the area, and to gain more definite intelligence concerning VC activity in the area.

b. VC Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted.

(1) No solid enemy contact was established by 2/7 throughout the conduct of the operation. Light contact with small VC units was made in the villages of Tam Hoi (1) BS-676889, Tam Hoi (4) BS-681896, An Phuoc (2) BS-708908, and on the high ground in between. At 271115H, a squad from H&S Co. fired at two VC running across a rice paddy at BS-681904, wounding one; and at 271307H, at BS-696907, Co. "E" wounded and captured one VC sniper. At 271705H, two VC were killed and one injured when Co. "E" threw two CN grenades into the cave in which they were hiding at BS-703917. At 271830H, Co. "E" fired upon an eight-man unit at BS-714910, killing one.

c. VC Units Identified. None

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) It is apparent that there is Local Force and Guerilla activity in and around the high ground in GS BS-6889, BS-6890, and BS-6990. There was light contact and sightings of small VC units throughout the area, as well as some booby trapping. In response to interrogation, the villagers in Tam Hoi (1) BS-676889, and Tam Hoi (4) BS-681896, reported that small groups of VC came to the villages about once or twice a month from the east. These visits are apparently to train the people, to issue propaganda, and to pick up supplies. It was reported that they always return to the east. Significantly the villagers in An Phuoc (2), BS-708908, did not respond to interrogation. Documents found in the village, including a USMC ID card, and the incidences experienced by Co. "E" in the area, in conjunction with the information given by the villagers in Tam Hoi, give strong indication that An Phuoc (2) and probably other villages to the east of the high ground are harbouring VC. In addition, the rice paddies in and around Tam Hoi (1), Tam Hoi (4) and An Phuoc (2) were much more productive than those of other villages further west.

(2) It was clear that the Cape Batangan area is thoroughly controlled by the VC, although no reliable information could be obtained concerning the size or identification of any units. The people in the area reported they knew of our approach three days in advance. The night prior to our arrival (28 July), a group of VC forced the villagers of Chau Thuan (1), BS-783862, to remain

in their houses while they heavily booby trapped the northwestern approach into the Cape in GS BS-7785 and 7786. It does not seem likely that any large unit permanently inhabits the Cape itself since it is very sparsely cultivated and no food caches were found. However, it seems that groups of VC are frequently in the area and some reports indicate they may pick up weapons and supplies here.

(3) The villages of Tam Hoi (1), Tam Hoi (4) and An Phuoc (2) were moderately fortified with bamboo fences and trenchlines, with frequent punji pits.

(4) The Cape Batangan area is heavily fortified with trenches, fighting holes, and punji pits.

(5) Tunnels and Caves

(a) General. Very few caves or tunnels of note were found on Operation "FRANKLIN I". The usual family bomb shelters were found and were not destroyed. None of the caves and tunnels contained any weapons or supply caches.

(b) Number and Locations. Only four significant tunnels were found during the operation, and three of these were blown. Co. "E" found two tunnels in the vicinity of BS 682898. The tunnels had entrance shafts approximately 15 feet deep, and they were from 25 to 50 feet in length with several bends. There were no side rooms and they were empty. They were sealed off by approximately 10-15 pounds of demolitions. A third tunnel was found at BS-682898 with an entrance shaft 10 feet deep and a connecting tunnel approximately 25 feet long. This too, was sealed off by 10 pounds of demolitions. The fourth cave was found by Co. "E" at BS 781863. It had three entrances in the side of a hill. The main tunnel extended approximately 50 meters in an east-west direction with three branches approximately 10-20 meters long running off to the south. This cave was empty and was not blown due to lack of sufficient explosives and lack of time to order a resupply.

e. Terrain

(1) Critical Terrain Features

Hill at BS-638896
 Hill at BS-667896
 Hill mass covering GS BS-6889, BS-6890, BS-6989, and BS-6990
 Sand dune ridgeline extending SE from GS BS-7291 to GS BS-7685.
 High ground extending SW from GS BS-7885 to GS BS-7884.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire. The observation and fields of fire in the objective area range from poor in the densely vegetated northern Cape Batangan area to fair in the high ground which is more heavily vegetated than the map indicates. The only

good observation and fields of fire are across the rice paddies. These conditions apply to both defender and attacker.

(3) Cover and Concealment. Cover was excellent in the villages and fair to good in the high ground due to the irregular terrain. Concealment was good to excellent in the moderately vegetated Cape Batangan area. In all cases, these conditions favored the defender as routes into these areas were not well concealed.

(4) Obstacles. One road block was blown by Co. "E" at BS-632898. The high, thorny hedgerows in the northern Cape Batangan area are thick and numerous enough to constitute serious obstacles to foot and vehicle movement.

8. Mission

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducts operations in Binh Son district, Quang Ngai Province, in conjunction with coordinated ARVN operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

9. Execution

a. Planning. At 251300H July the Battalion Commander and his staff were briefed by the Commanding Officer, 7th Marines and his staff on the conduct of Operation "FRANKLIN I". Combat support and combat service support representatives were present. At the same time, 7th Marines Frag Order 17-66 was issued. Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines issued verbal orders for the execution of Operation "FRANKLIN I" at 251600H. This was followed by the issuance of Frag-Order 18-66 at 251930H.

b. D-Day 26 July 1966. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) commenced motor march to the line of departure at 0520H. At 0700H assault elements of Companies "E" and "G", "E" on the left, crossed the line of departure. The Command Group, H&S Co., and Company "H" followed in trace. About 0715H at BS-620882 an unidentified booby trap exploded resulting in two Company "G" Marines being WIA. The advance in zone continued with no contact. About 1713H, two corpsmen were wounded at BS-660891 when a Chicom fragmentation grenade booby trap was detonated. About 1800H, the Battalion set in a perimeter for the night in a hamlet west of Tam Hoi (1) BS-664668. One VCC with a VC trainees document was apprehended within the perimeter at 1900H. Three ambushes were set and the night passed without significant incident. One Marine was emergency Med-Evaced at 2325H after stepping on a barbed metal punji stake.

c. D+1 27 July 1966. At 0700H the advance eastward in zone was continued with Companies "E" and "G" leading, Company "H" in trace. Only light sniper fire was encountered in the advance. Soon after crossing the LD, one VCC was apprehended at BS-66388. At 0812H at BS-677895, Company "E" received 6-8 rounds small arms fire from an estimated one VC. Fire was returned with negative results. At 0942H at BS-674889, Company "H" received one round small arm fire,

resulting in one USMC KIA. The sound of this shot indicated it was definitely from a high-powered rifle, fired from 400-600 meters. The killing hit was made in the head. The advance continued through very heavy brush and hedgerows, forcing lead elements to cut their way through. About 1115H at BS-681904, H&S company fired on ZVC with weapons, resulting in one VC WIA. At 1307H Company "E" at BS-696907 received 6-10 rounds small arms fire; returned 35 rounds small arms and captured 1 VC. At 1655H at BS-710905, Company "E" captured 1 VCS who twice tried to evade being captured. At 1705H at BS-703917, Company "E" located three VC in a cave. Riot control agents were employed and the VC elected to remain. Two VC KIA were extracted from the cave and the third was in very bad condition. He later died of the over exposure to the riot control agent. The battalion established night positions at BS-708908 about 1750H. About 1830H Company "E" received 3 rounds small arms fire from BS-714910 and observed 8 men, four with weapons, 4 with packs and 1 dressed in a khaki uniform. Company "E" opened fire and pursued, resulting in one VC KIA. 75% of the evening resupply was aborted. AN/PRC-10 radio batteries that were received were unserviceable due to being completely wet. Plans were completed with First Battalion, 7th Marines to transfer the heavy section of Ontos at 0730H D+2. A quiet night was spent without incident.

d. D+2 28 July 1966. At 0643H Company "E" jumped off to escort the three Ontos to a 1/7 unit at BS-710919. At 0700H, Company "H" began a sweep southeast to the coast, to screen the Battalions right flank. Company "G", Command Group and H&S Company continued east in zone to the beach. About 0910H, with Companies "G" and "H" leading, "G" on the left, Company "E" in trace (after delivery of the Ontos to 1/7) the advance southeast along the beach continued without contact. Company "E" apprehended 1 VCS at BS-736885 about 1130H. No incidents other than med-evac of heat casualties. At 1545H, Company "H" lead elements detonated an unidentified booby trap vicinity BS-763868 resulting in three USMC WIA and two KIA. Movement was slowed by further booby traps and hedgerows that had to be cut through. Continued advance to Chau Thuan (1) and established night positions vicinity BS-783862. This hamlet had received approximately 12 rounds of naval gunfire during the afternoon. There were no contacts during the night.

e. D+3 29 July 1966. At 0700H, Company "H" commenced sweep south to vicinity of BS-783840, then northwest to BS-771845, then north to extraction LZ at BS-783855. At the same time, Company "G" began its sweep east and south to BS-792846, then northwest to extraction LZ. At 0900H, Company "E" with command group and H&S Company in trace began its sweep southwest to extraction LZ. Company "G" secured the LZ by 1105. All remaining units were in position in the vicinity of the LZ by 1145H. Extraction commenced at 1230H and was completed by 1529H. As the last elements of Company "G" were preparing to leave the LZ, 20-50 rounds small arms and two probable grenade explosions were received from BS-781856 by an undetermined number of VC. Remaining elements of Company "G" deployed and returned 75-100 rounds small arms with unknown results. The

VC immediately broke contact and the extraction was completed. All elements boarded trucks at BS-703770 and commenced motor march to TAOR positions at 1540H. Last elements closed TAOR position by 1845H without incident.

10. Results

a. Friendly casualties

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
KIA	3
WIA	8
NBI	39

b. Enemy casualties and Captives

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC KIA	3
WIA	3
VCC	3
VCS	4

c. Captured Equipment and Supplies

1- Chicom Grenade

d. Friendly Equipment Losses. None

11. Administrative Matters. None

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

13. Commanders Analysis

a. HST Support was outstanding throughout Operation FRANKLIN I. Responding to numerous crises, the attached HST performed admirably under very adverse conditions of weather and terrain. Adjusting to the tactical situation, the HST wisely split into two groups to more effectively control multiple landing zones when casualties occurred in two or more units simultaneously. A significant contribution to effective HST operations is the use of the AN/PRC-47 Radio for the Helicopter request net. When casualties occurred, it required approximately 10 minutes to set this radio in operation, thereby increasing the time required for medical evacuations.

b. The Ontos platoon commander and his three crews did an excellent job in moving their vehicles over very difficult terrain. Forward progress in most instances was limited to much lateral movement. It would have been difficult at best to quickly move these vehicles to forward firing positions. The terrain was difficult enough to cause all three vehicles to over heat on D+1, result-


ing in a 2 hour delay while water resupply was effected for them.

14. Recommendations

It is strongly recommended that HST personnel be equipped with AN/PRC-25 radios to either communicate directly with the LSA or through a relay station when the situation permits. The use of the PRC-25 radio coupled with standby helicopters, assigned exclusively for a battalion's use, would make medical evacuation and resupply much more effective.




JOHN J. ROOTHOFF



MAP: Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 I
 Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 II

Encl: (1) D-Day and Del Activities




2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Jul 66



MAP: Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 I
 Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 II


Encl: (2) D+2 Activities

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Jul 66



MAP: Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 I
 Tra Bong, Series L-7014, Sheet 6739 II

Encl: (3) D-3 Activities



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Copy No. _____ of _____ Copies
 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (Rein)
 Chu Lai, RVN
 251600H July 1966

FRAG ORDER 18-66

- Ref: (a) MAP, Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L-7014, Sheets 6739 I
 and 6739 II.
 (b) 7th Marines Frag Order 17-66
 (c) 2/7 OpOrder 206-65
 (d) DivO 2000.2B
 (e) CG 1st MarDiv msg 2212052
 (f) BnO 2000L.C

2nd Bn, 7th Marines
 Log No. 00327-66

Copy No. 5 of 32
 SER No 0064-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Current ISUMS.b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 1st MAW provides required air support
- (2) 3/11 direct support 7th Marines
- (3) NGF direct support 7th Marines
- (4) 1/7 conducts operations on our left
- (5) 2nd ARVN Div conducts coordinated operations on our right.

2. MISSION

2nd Bn, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conducts operations in BINH SON district, CHANG NGAI Province, in conjunction with coordinated ARVN operations to capture and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. 2nd Bn, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) moves by motor convoy at H-2 to the LOD. At H-Hour crosses LOD with two companies abreast, one in trace and conducts search and destroy operations eastward in zone.

b. Co. "E" (Rein).

Attached: FAC Tm
 NGF Spot Tm

UNCLASSIFIED 1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
 INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED
 AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

App. B #2

SECRET

Arty FO Tm
 S1 FO Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm
 Engr Tm
 Sqd Flames

- (1) At H-2 move by motor convoy to LOD.
- (2) At H-Hour cross LOD and conduct search and destroy operations eastward in left portion of zone.
- (3) Be prepared to assist adjacent USMC battalion on order.
- (4) Be prepared to execute helilift to operation area west of Highway #1.

c. Co. "G" (Rein).

Attached: Arty FO Tm
 NGF Spot Tm
 S1 FO Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm
 Engr Tm
 Sqd Flames

- (1) At H-2 move by motor convoy to LOD.
- (2) At H-Hour cross LOD and conduct search and destroy operations eastward in right portion of zone.
- (3) Be prepared to assist adjacent USMC battalion on order.
- (4) Be prepared to execute helilift to operation area west of Highway #1.

d. Co. "H" (Rein).

Attached: Arty FO Tm
 S1 FO Tm
 Engr Tm
 Scout/Interp Tm

- (1) At H-2 move by motor convoy to LOD.
- (2) Bn. reserve. On order, cross LOD in trace H&S Co.
- (3) Be prepared to assist adjacent USMC battalion.
- (4) Be prepared to execute helilift to operation area west of Highway #1.

SECRET

SECRETe. Co. "F"

(1) Continue defense of TAOR.

f. H&S Co. (-) (Rein).Attached: HST
ARVN Intell Tm
Engr Plt HqsScout/Interp Tm
NGF Ln Tm

- (1) At H-2 move by motor convoy to LOD.
- (2) On order cross LOD in trace of Cmd Grp.
- (3) Be prepared to support operations as required.
- (4) Provisional Rifle Plt. provide flank security for Cmd Grp.
- (5) Be prepared to execute helilift to operation area west of Highway #1.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day 26 July.
- (2) H-Hour 0700.
- (3) Sequence of Motor March: Co. "G", Cmd Grp, Co. "E", H&S, Co. "H".
- (4) Two sections 81mm Mortars G.S.
- (5) Sequence of movement: Co's "E" and "G", Cmd Grp, H&S, Co. "H", in trace.
- (6) Rules of engagement and handling of private property, reference (C).
- (7) Be alert for mines and booby traps.
- (8) Use of CS/CN authorized. Report use to Cmd Grp immediately.

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

- a. PDS and Treadwell Reports will be submitted daily at 0630H, covering the period 0600H to 0600H.

SECRET

SECRET

- b. Rations - 4 MIC per man
- c. Water - 2 canteens
- d. Ammo - BA to include CS/CN.
- e. Body armor- optional
- f. Resupply requests:
 - (1) Morning by 1800.
 - (2) Evening by 1400.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS

- a. Communication-Electronics. In accordance with references (d), (e), and (f).

(1) Frequency Assignment

<u>NET</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Freq. Desig.</u>
<u>7th Marines</u>		
Regimental Command #1	(P) 41.8	M-388
	(S) 43.5	M-405
Regimental Command #2	(P) 8720	M-184
	(S) 2116	M-8
Regimental Tact #1	(P) 38.4	M-355
	(S) 46.8	M-435
Regimental Tact #2	(P) 2536	M-29
	(S) 8126	M-172
<u>1st Bn. 7th Marines</u>		
Bn Tact #1	7465	M-159
Bn Tact #2	50.4	M-461
<u>2nd Bn. 7th Marines</u>		
Bn Tact #1	3217	M-2
Bn Tact #2	38.75	M-513
81mm Mortar COF	44.7	M-416
Co E Tact	53.6	M-488
Co G Tact	52.4	M-479
Co H Tact	50.2	M-460
Co Y Tact	43.5	M-405
TACP Local	44.9	M-418
<u>2nd ARVN Div</u>		
ARVN Lm Net	40.6	M-376

SECRET

SECRET(2) Call Signs

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Voice</u>
7th Marines/RLT-7	COMPUTATION
1st Bn, 7th Marines/ BLT-1/7	CONSTRUE
2nd Bn, 7th Marines/ BLT-2/7	COUTNY FAIR
3rd Bn, 11th Marines	CIRCUMVENT
Co C, 1st AT Bn	COWHIDE CHARLIE
Co B, 1st AT Bn	BENNINGTON BRAVO
Co B, 1st Recon Bn	CRANKCASE BRAVO
1st Bn, 4th Regt, ARVN	MICKEY REVIEW TWO
3rd Bn, 4th Regt, ARVN	MICKEY REVIEW FOUR
2nd Bn, 5th Regt, ARVN	LYRICAL THREE
37th Rgr Co, ARVN	BOOZE MIKE
RECON, 2nd ARVN Div	BOOZE TWO NINE

(3) Coordinating Instructions.

- (a) Radio. All tactical net stations report-in to the net control station at H-3. Inoperative radio equipment will be evacuated to Bravo Command Group.
- (b) Wire. Each company provide for its own internal wire requirements. In addition, provide one (1) telephone TA-1 in the field to connect onto the Battalion lines.
- (c) Cryptographic. Current effective editions of KAC-JJ (Auth. and Numerical), KAC-181, KAC-138, and KAA-60.

b. Command Posts.

- (1) Cmd Grp moves behind center of Co's "E" and "G".
- (2) Report CP locations when established.

c. Reports.

- (1) SPOT Reports as soon as possible after any contact or significant occurrence.
- (2) SITREPS at 1030H, 1630H, 2230H and 0430H.
- (3) Position Reports hourly.

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
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(4) Thrust Points:

6492-Any CAR
6993-Any CITY
7191-Any SPORT
6489-Any GIRL

6789-Any BOY
7388-Any BEER
6987-Any SOFT DRINK
6785-Any CIGARETTE
6486-Any STATE

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT



JOHN J. ROOTHOFF
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corp
Commanding

Annex:

A- Operation Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Special

SECRET

2/7th Marines, Jul 66

Annex: A to Frag Order 17-66


Ref: (b) MAP: Viet Nam,
1:50,000 Quang Ngai,
Series L-701,
Sheets 6755 I &
6756 II



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROTHOFF

OFFICIAL:


R.A. Stebens
 R. A. STEBENS
 Maj USMC
 S-3



"B" Co 1/7	CONSTRUE BRAVO
2nd Bn 7th Marines	GOOSEY FAIR
1st Recon Bn	CRANKCASE
2nd Plt "D" Co 1st Recon Bn	CASILLIAN
2nd Bn 4th Regt ARVN	RUNNER PEGGER BRAVO
2nd Bn 5th Regt ARVN	SNAKEY PLY OFF BRAVO
Ranger Co ARVN	ALLIGATOR MIKE

- b. Command Posts.
- (1) CPD GRP moves behind center of Co's "G" and "F".
 - (2) Report CP locations when established.
- c. Cryptographic. Effective editions of K&K-JJ, K&C-138, K&A-50.
- d. Reports.
- (1) Situation Reports upon landing and at 1030, 1630, 2230, and 0430.
 - (2) Spot reports as soon as possible.
 - (3) After Action Report within 48 hrs of return to T&OR.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT



John J. ROTHOFF
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEX: A - Operation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Special

- (5) 81mm Mortar sections, less FO's revert to general support on order.
- (6) Rules of engagement and handling of private property contained in reference (c).
- (7) Use of CS/CN authorized. Notify BnCO upon utilization.

4. ADMIN & LOGISTICS

- a. PDS and Treadwell Reports will be submitted daily at 0630H, covering the period 0600 to 0600.
- b. Rations - 4 MLC per man
- c. Water - 2 danteens
- d. Ammo - BA to include CS/CN
- e. Body Armor - optional
- f. Resupply requests:
- (1) morning - by 1900
 - (2) evening - by 1400

5. Command and Communication Electronics

- a. Communication Electronics. In accordance with reference (c), except as modified herein.

(1) Frequencies

<u>Net</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>Desig</u>
Regt Cmd #1	7th Marine Regt	(P)45.8		M-427
		(S)43.8		M-405
Regt Tact #1	7th Marine Regt	(P)38.4		M-355
		(S)46.8		M-435
Bn Tact #2	1st Bn 7th Mar	50.4		M-461
"E" Co Tact	1st Bn 7th Mar	55.0		M-497
Bn Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	41.7		M-363
TACP Local	2nd Bn 7th Mar	44.9		M-418
81mm Mortar (COF)	2nd Bn 7th Mar	44.7		M-416
"E" Co Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	53.6		M-488
"F" Co Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	52.4		M-479
"G" Co Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	51.8		M-474
"H" Co Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	50.2		M-460
TAB #2	Air Circuits	(P)4132		M-95
		(S)2812		M-44
H&S Co Tact	2nd Bn 7th Mar	40.1		M-371
Bn Cmd	1st Recon Bn	(P)2505		M-30
		(S)9448		M-189
Bn Tact	1st Recon Bn	(P)39.4		M-363
"D" Co Cmd #1	1st Recon Bn	(P)2697		M-34
"D" Co Cmd #2	1st Recon Bn	45.3		M-423
LZ Control	1st Shore Party Bn	49.8		M-457
Advisors Nets	ARVN	42.4		M-394

(2) Call Signs

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Voice Call</u>
CG 1st Marine Division	CORSAIR
Air Observers	BLACK COAT
7th Marines	COMPUTATION
1st Bn 7th Marines	CONSERVE

defense of North 180° of LZ.

(3) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations Westward initially, advancing in North half of battalion zone.

c. Co "F" (Rein).

Lt CROWLEY

Attached:

NGF Spot TM
Sect 81mm Mortars
FAC TM
Arty FO TM
Scout/Interp TM
Eng TM
Sqd Flames

(1) Land in LZ and upon coordinations with Co "G", assume responsibility for defense of the South 180° of LZ.

(2) Be prepared to conduct search and destroy operations Westward initially, advancing in South half of battalion zone.

d. Co "E" (Rein).

Capt SEAY

Attached:

Arty FO TM
Eng TM

(1) Land in LZ and move to assembly area in Eastern portion of LZ.

e. Co "H" (Rein)

Lt PIATT

Attached:

Arty FO TM
Eng TM
Scout/Interp TM

(1) Land in LZ and move to assembly area in Western portion of LZ.

(2) On order, follow in trace of Co "F".

f. H&S Co (-) (Rein).

Lt JOHNSON

Attached:

H&S TM
NGF Liaison TM
Engr TM
Scout/Interp TM

(1) Land in LZ, move to assembly area in Southeast portion of LZ.

(2) Be prepared to support operation as directed.

(3) Provisional Platoon provide flank security in movement South.

(4) Follow in trace of CP (Fwd).

g. Coordination Instructions.

(1) D-Day 29 June 1966

(2) L-Hour 0900H

(3) Position Reports will be by thrust points as follows:

BS-7660	CIGARETTE
BS-7353	BILL
BS-7657	TONY
BS-7555	WOODY
BS-7752	any CAR
BS-7950	any CIGARETTE
BS-7648*	any SLISE

(4) Sequence of landing will be:

Co "G", Co "F", CP (Fwd), Co "H", CP (Rear), H&S, Co "E".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2nd Bn, 7th Marines
 Chu Lai, RVN
 280900H June 1966

Frag Order 17-66

Ref: (a) 7th MarFrag Order 16-66
 (b) Map: Viet Nam 1:50,000, Series L-701, Sheets 6755 I,
 and 6756 II
 (c) 2/7 OpOrder 206-65

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy. Current INTSUMS
 b. Friendly Forces
- (1) MAG-36- helicopter support
 - (2) MAG-12- CAS
 - (3) 3/11(-)(Rein)-DS
 - (4) Naval Gunfire-as assigned
 - (5) 2nd ARVN Div conducts coordinated operations South of E-W grid line 54. S

2nd Bn. 7th Marines
 Log No. 0287-66

Copy No. 6 of 24
 SER No 039-66

2. MISSION

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) conducts operations in assigned zone in QUANG NGAI Province in conjunction with coordinated ARVN operations, to capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment located therein.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein) moves by motor convoy to QUANG NGAI airfield at L-3 on D-Day. at L-Hour executes helicopter-borne assault into LZ HAWK (BS-749601), then conducts search and destroy operations in zone.

b. Co "G" (Rein).

Attached: NCB Spot TM
 Sect 81mm Mortars
 FAC TM
 Arty FO TM
 Scout/Interp TM
 Eng TM
 Sqd Flames

- (1) Conduct helicopter-borne assault to seize and defend LZ HAWK. Ensure security of LZ out to effective small arms range.
- (2) On arrival Co "F" in LZ, assume responsibility for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Downgraded at three year intervals, Declassified after 12 years, DOD DIR 5200.10

APP B #1

APPENDIX B to Enclosure (1) of Command Chronology.

List of Documents

1. ✓ Battalion Frag Order No. 17-66
2. ✓ Battalion Frag Order No. 18-66
3. ✓ S-2 Command Journal for July 66.
4. ✓ S-3 Command Journal for July 66.
5. ✓ Battalion Newspapers. #14-16

B-1

JOURNAL

Unit or Staff Section: S-3

Organization:

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN

Opened
122005Closed
171630

Time	In	Out	Ser. No.	DTG	Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.	Action Taken
122045					SitRep F Company Suspected probe Hill #49 No Contact - 1 grenade (outgoing) 81 Illumination (5 rounds) coord. 487035.	
131005					General Stiles arrived in Bn. area to observe training (Fam fire & Arty. Firex).	
131135					General Stiles left area.	
150525					Reg't notified 2/7 to alert one company to support 3/7.	
150530						Co. "E" Alerted
150600					Convoy Cancelled.	
150605						Co. "E" Given go ahead.
150715					One platoon, Company. "F" takes over lines for Company "E".	
150720					Company "F" and "B" command group put on alert.	
151940					Company "F" reports one platoon manning lines for Co. "E" has returned.	
152015					E-13 cancelled by Fatstuff-5.	
160615					One platoon "F" Company Departs for convoy duty.	
171330					General Fields, CG 1st MARDIV FMF and General Stiles, Asst. Div. CMDR Arrived LZ Goose for Awards ceremony and tour of 2/7 area.	
171630					CG & ADC left 2/7 area by helicopter.	

JOURNAL

Unit or Staff Section: S-3

Organization:

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN

Opened
171630Closed
261050

Time In	Out	Seq. No.	DTG	Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.	Action Taken
180900				CF "Yankee" left on patrol, security and ambush.	
181630				CF "Yankee" returned from patrol.	
192115				"E" Company reported sighting small fires at BT-49600L. Bonnie Hero-3 notified.	
202055				"F" Company requested illumination to check possible probe at coord. 49550385	
220015				"E"-19 requested illumination. Fired negative results.	
231230				Two young Vietnamese children told members of "E" Company about two Frag grenades (US) and then showed them their location. The Frag grenades were wired as bobby traps, located at coord. 511025. They were dismantled.	
241430				G&H returned to OPCON of 2/7 from CLDC.	
251900				CF "F" now manning TOAR.	
260445H				Echo, Golf, Hotel, and H&S companys, Alpha and Bravo Command groups departed from CF area for Operation Franklin. Foxtrot Company remained in rear to man the lines.	
261050H				Several Vietnamese were being herded out of H 2/7's area at coord. 502059 by CF Foxtrot. One of the Vietnamese tried to hide and when questioned did not have proper ID card. He just had a piece of paper which he said was his ID card. Vietnamese was forwarded to IIT.	

JOURNAL

Unit or Staff Section: S-3

Organization:

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN

Opened

Closed

010001

122005

Time In	Out	Seq. No.	DTG	Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.	Action Taken
021545				Call from CF-6 to CF-3 prompted the following actions: There was a reported fire fight at the village of An Tan BS-499067. CF-3 alerted CF "E" to be prepared to move out in 15 minutes.	
021555				CF-3 left CF CP proceeding to An Tan arriving approximately 1603 investigated, found that a PF had ordered food in a restaurant in An Tan then did not have funds with which to pay for the food, whereupon the manager enlisted the aid of several ARVN troops in an attempt to force the PF to pay, a fire fight ensued. No casualties. After thorough investigation CF-3 returned to CF CP.	
042335				A 105 Illumination mission revealed 4 VC fleeing west from coord. BT-501024 one possible VC WIA. <i>Probable</i>	
052258				Grasshopper #3 (2/5) informed that they had a patrol in our TOAR through error ambush located at coord. 460019 contact made with one squad VC (9to10) cancelled H&I fire TH804 located at coord. 461019.	
082125				Spot Rep from "E" Company probable enemy 40-50 meters to front. Received incoming grenade. Require 81 Illumination at BT 515015	
120805				Convoy left IP.	
121445				Convoy returned.	
122005				"E" Company extended lines on left flank 120 meters within 30 meters of 3/7's position.	

APP B #4

JOURNAL

Unit or Staff Section: S-3

Organization:

2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN

Opened

261050

Closed

291745

Time	In	Out	Ser. No.	DTG	Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.	Action Taken
261100					A sign was found attached to a stick and pointing toward the positions at coord. 505023. The sign was in the shape of an arrowhead and had the word "KEM" & "3-M" on it. ITT was called to find out the meaning. No answer as yet.	
261245					A male Vietnamese was found wandering through the company positions at coord. 505023 when personnel from CF Foxtrot tried to question him, he tried to run and was apprehended. He did not have any ID card and was taken to ITT.	
270930					Two marines from CF Foxtrot were out in front of their positions removing stakes that had been placed there during the night. They noticed a Vietnamese male moving away from the area on trail. He was apprehended at coord. 500020. The VCS was questioned by S-2 scout, did not have any ID card. VCS was taken to ITT.	
270945					A squad of marines from CF Foxtrot checking the Vietnamese nationals in front of the lines for ID cards. Found one male Vietnamese without ID. VCS was questioned by S-2 scout and then sent to ITT.	
271335					Marines on hill #49 noticed two Vietnamese at the base of hill at coord. 486037. Marines were sent to check their ID cards, they didn't have any so were apprehended. Questioned by S-2 scout and taken to ITT.	
291635					First elements of 2/7 returned from operation "Franklin".	
291745					Final elements of 2/7 arrived at CP.	

-(CLASSIFICATION)-

STAFF JOURNAL

FROM:

PAGE _____ of _____ PAGES

S-2 Section

2nd Bn, 7th Marines

LOCATION:

JOURNAL

TIME		J#	DTG	INFORMATION	H, S, T, F
IN	OUT				
			192115H	CO. E, REPORTED SIGHTING SMALL FIRES AT BT 496001 NO ACTION TAKEN.	
			231230H	CO. E, REPORTED TWO YOUNG VIETNAMESE CHILDREN TOLD MEMBERS OF CO. E, ABOUT TWO FRAG GRENADES (U.S.) AND SHOWED THEM THEIR LOCATION. THE FRAG GRENADES WERE WIRED AS BOOBY TRAPS LOCATED AT BT 511025. THE FRAG GRENADES WERE DISMANTLED.	
			260720H	CO. G, FOUND ONE BOOBY TRAP GRENADE BS 620882 (2) USMC WIA MED. EVAC.	
			261030H	CO. E, OBSERVED THREE VC W/RIFLES AND CAMOUFLAGE UTILITIES MOVING FM BS 637904 TO VILLAGE AT BS 643904. no action taken due to distance.	
			261120H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS BS 637904, VCS QUESTIONED AND RELE ASED AT 261350H.	
			261610H	CO. E, REC. 5 RDS. S/A FIRE FM BS 659893. RET. 40 RDS. S/A FIRE. UNK RESULTS.	
			261713H	CO. H&S, RPT. ONE BOOBY TRAP BS 660891. (2) USN WIA MED. EVAC.	
			261900H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS W/DOCUMENT AT BS 665 889. FWD. TO IIT.	
			261930H	CO. E, REC. 3 RDS S/A FIRE FM BS 692891.	
			262143H	ONE USMC WIA FM PANJI TRAP. IN VILL. AT BS 665889.	
			262230H	CO. E, LOC. 2 TUNNELS AT BS 682898. TUNNELS SEARCHED FOLLOWING MORNING AND BLOWN BY ENGR.	
			270645H	CO. Y, FOUND DOCUMENTS IN HOUSE VIC. BS 663888. DOCUMENTS FWD TO IIT.	
			270655H	CO. Y, CAPTURED ONE VCC W/DOCUMENTS IN VILLAGE, BS 663888. VCC AND DOCUMENTS FWD TO IIT.	
			270810H	CO. E, FOUND ONE CHI-COM GRENADE BOOBY TRAP BS 67238942. GRENADE DISARMED.	

PAGE #1

-(CLASSIFICATION)- App. B #3

-(CLASSIFICATION)-

STAFF JOURNALFROM:
PAGE _____ of _____ PAGESS-2 Section
2nd Bn, 7th Marines
LOCATION:JOURNAL

TIME		J#	DTG	INFORMATION	H, S, T, F
IN	OUT				
			270812H	CO. E, REC. 608 rds S/A FIRE FM BS 677895. RET. 45 RDS SEMI-AUTO WITH UNK RESULTS.	
			270829H	CO. E, OBSERVED 5 MEN W/WPNS RUNNING VIC BS 679895. VC DISAPPEARED BEFORE ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.	
			270905H	LOCAL VIETNAMESE AIDED CO. Y IN LOCATING PANJI PITS VIC BS 682895.	
			270942H	CO. H, REC ONE RD S/A FIRE, ONE USMC KIA.	
			270945H	CO. Y, FOUND ONE TUNNEL VIC BS 682898. BLOWN BY ENGR.	
			271105H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS AT BS 686894. VCS RPT. 100 VC W/WPNS IN AREA FIVE DAYS AGO. VCS ESCAPED ENROUTE TO COMMAND "B".	
			271115H	CO. Y, OBSERVED 2 VC, ONE W/WEP, RUNNING ACROSS RICE PADDY BS 681904. FIRED 6-8 RDS, ONE VC WIA.	
			271307H	CO. E, REC APPROX. 10 RDS S/A FIRE FM BS 696907. RET. APPROX 35 RDS S/A FIRE, ONE VC WIA CAPTURED.	
			271655H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS VIC BS 710905.	
			271705H	CO. E, FOUND THREE VC IN CAVE BS 703917. TWO CN GRENADES USED, TWO VC KIA ONE VC WIA CAPTURED.	
			271710H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS BS 703915.	
			271830H	CO. E, REC, 3 RDS S/A FIRE FM BS 714910. RET. APPROX. 150 RDS S/A FIRE ONE VC KIA.	
			271900H	CO. Y, FOUND ONE WALLET INCLUDING VC ID CARD USMC ID CARD AND GEMVA CONVENTION CARD.	
			281130H	CO. E, APPREHENDED ONE VCS BS 736885.	
			281545H	CO. H, ENCOUNTERED ONE BOOBY TRAP, TWO USMC KIA THREE USMC WIA.	
			281555H	CO. G, LOCAL VILLAGERS RPT VC IN VILLAGE LAST NIGHT, VILLAGERS FORCED TO REMAIN IN HOMES. VILLAGE HEAVILY BOOBY TRAPED.	

PAGE #2

-(CLASSIFICATION)-

JOURNAL

Unit or Staff Section: S-3

Organization:


2nd Bn, 7th Marines, Chu Lai RVN

Opened

Closed

Time In	Out	Ser. No.	DTG	Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.	Action Taken
			290815H	BS 785862, LOCAL VIETNAMESE RPT. THEY KNEW THREE DAYS IN ADVANCE OF OUR PLANS TO ENTER CAPE BATAGAN AREA.	
			290905H	BS 781863, CO. E, LOC. LARGE CAVE COMPLEX W/3 ENTRANCES. TUNNEL EXTENDED 50 METERS E.W. ACROSS HILLS, THREE BRANCHES RAN S. 10-20 METERS IN LENGTH, CAVE EMPTY.	
			290915H	BS 781861, CO. E, LOC TWO M-26 GRENADE WHICH THEY BLEW IN PLACE.	BOOBY TRAPS
			290945H	BS 780860 CO. E, FOUND ONE BOOBY TRAP M-26 GRENADE. BLOWN IN PLACE.	
			291010H	CO. E, FOUND ONE 155 RD BS 776857, BLOWN IN PLACE.	
			291025H	CO. E, FOUND ONE BOOBY TRAP, M-26 GRENADE, AT BS 781860. BLOWN IN PLACE.	
			291100H	CO. E, FOUND ONE CHI-COM GRENADE BOOBY TRAP. BS 781858. BLOWN IN PLACE.	
			291120H	CO. E, BS 777855, FOUND ONE 4.5" ROCKET BLOWN IN PLACE.	BOOBY TRAP.
			291130H	CO. E, FOUND ONE 4.5" RD DUD. BLOWN IN PLACE.	
			291255H	CHOPPERS REC. LIGHT S/A FIRE FM BS 764851, ARTY. MISSION PREPARED.	
			291510H	CO. G, REC, 20-50 RDS S/A FIRE AND 2 POSS GRENADE EXPLOSIONS FM UNK NR. VC AT BS 781856. RDS S/A FIRE, VC BROKE CONTACT.	RET. 75-100

PAGE #3



BATS BASES & KIDS

Flatbush and sandlot are combining strength at the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines as the first Vietnamese Little League softball team is being trained here for an opening game scheduled July 17 at the battalion area.

Convention will be the keynote for the Vietnamese little leaguers.

Honest-to-goodness baseball gloves and bats will be used. For the kids of another vintage, but just like kids anywhere, there is a heck of a lot of enthusiasm and fun for all expected.

Credit for the idea of the team goes to Hospital Corpsman First Class Thomas Hughey, civil affairs NCO.

The idea is fun for the kids but also to draw the people of this embattled land closer to the Marines who are fighting a war here.

Currently members from BAS, the S-2 section, communications and other sections from the battalion have offered coaches to teach the village children how to play the best loved American game.

"We don't expect them to be professionals when they get out there the first time. In fact, we'll have Marines in there helping them get started, but they'll catch on soon enough," said Corpsman Hughey about the scheduled first game.

** *****

Fizzled Out

A Chi-Com pineapple grenade has a funny popping fizzle type fuze.

When it sputters next to a Marine it strikes a note of fear.

Marines in the command post unit of Golf Company during Operation Oakland felt that instantaneous fear.

They were walking when they heard the infamous fizzling and crackling of what sounded exactly like a Chi-Com grenade.

Everyone froze.

Eyes searched rapidly for the place where the sound was coming.

In those seconds, stomachs turned jumped and returned to normal.

For the fizzling grenade turned out to be the static on a radio operator's "squak box."

And according to one of the men who was fooled by the static, "it was a mighty big relief to find out the joke was on us. * *****

App B #5

THE NEW MAN

The sea is the sight of a million ancient and modern mysteries.

On July 6 it became the scene of one of Man's most precious gifts.

The gift of Baptism.

On that day Pfc. David S. Boundy Jr, from Golf Company was immersed in the salty water of the South China Sea. When he came up from the water he had finished the last religious step in becoming a Baptist.

Chaplain Paul Pearson, 2/7's chaplain performed the baptism ceremony.

Members of Golf Company on airfield defense were gathered to congratulate the 18-year-old Buffalo N.Y. Marine.

After the ceremonies were over Boundy said, "I feel like a new man.

And by the laws which govern the purifying of the soul, that is exactly what the sea and chaplain had done for him.

** *****

LETTER REGS

The battalion postal clerk reminds Marines of 2/7 about postal regulations. All letter mail may be sent free to the U.S. if properly addressed. The mailers return address must be written in the upper left corner of the envelope in full. The word, "FREE" must be handwritten in the upper right hand corner. Also, only letters are allowed free delivery.

Photographic film to be developed, cannot be mailed free by placing it in an envelope and sending it as if it were letter mail.

A reminder is also made to use the Zip Code System at all times.

** *****

R. P. 11

SHORT STOPS

World heavyweight champion Cassius Clay will defend his crown against Brian London of Britain at the Earls Court indoor arena on Aug. 6, promoter Jack Solomons said July 1.

Cl

Clay is to receive a guarantee of \$250,000 plus expenses and ancillary rights from the live (Early Bird) satellite television relay back to the United States.

London is on a percentage basis of everything that's left but Solomons added he will get not less than Henry Cooper received for his fight against Clay.

Cooper netted between \$120,000 and \$140,000 when Clay stopped him in six rounds at the Arsenal outdoor arena in London last May 21.

London, 32, former British and Empire champion from Blackpool, will be making his second attempt to win the world title. In May, 1959, he was knocked out in 11 rounds by Floyd Patterson in Indianapolis. He has won 35 of 48 fights. For Clay, it will be his third title defense this year. The undefeated champion has 23 consecutive victories to his credit.

** *****

League Ratings

The top league standings of July 2 were: for the American, Baltimore on top followed by Detroit, Cleveland and then California.

In the National limelight was San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and Philadelphia.

Celler teams for the American league was Boston and for the National, Chicago.

** *****

Conservative Effect



SERGEANT TRAINS C.O.

"You better square away Marine."

"When you speak to me, you will say sir."

"Get that chest out and that stomach in. You look like a pregnant billy goat. How can you command men if you aren't the best example?"

That's the way for an NCO to talk to his commanding officer?

Well, for Staff Sergeant Bobby L. Mullins, a forward artillery observer with "F" Company, 2/7 that's about the gist of his speech to his company commander 1st Lieutenant Stephen B. Crowley.

But that was back in September 1964 when Sgt. Mullins was the lieutenant's primary instructor at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

Now the two Marines are matched up again in Vietnam. This time it is Mullins who is on the "sir" end of the line, and according to him, he's mighty proud of it.

Mullins instructed Lieutenant Crowley from September-December 1964 when the lieutenant was going through Officer Candidate Course. He taught courses such as drill, leadership, general military subjects and squad tactics.

"I always had a feeling someday, one of my C.O.'s would be an officer I put through school," Mullins said. "It makes you feel good to see your product at work, especially when he's doing a good job at it.

"Sometimes I hear him (Mullins) sitting over in his tent counting cadence for the troops," lieutenant Crowley said, "It sure brings back old memories."

"You don't hold any hard feelings for this guy who harassed you for four months. You respect him because he did everything for your benefit."

The two Marines came together here June 22 and worked against the enemy during operation Oakland.

** *****

COKES FOR KIDS

"STEP RIGHT UP. GET YOUR ICE COLD COKES. RIGHT HERE MARINES, AT THE BATTALION MOVIE, MONDAY, TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY NIGHTS. ICE COLD COKES TO HELP SEND THE CHILDREN OF LONG PHU #1 TO SCHOOL FOR A YEAR. ONLY TWENTY-FIVE CENTS APIECE. STEP RIGHT UP."

That's the barker's call starting Monday and running until Wednesday eve at the battalion movie as 2/7 civil affairs drives to collect enough money to pay for the education of more than 100 village children's education this coming year.

A total of \$300 dollars is needed to pay for the children's schooling.

So on those evenings, drink up for kid's sake.

** *****

MAD
WAR

Some people claim that Vietnam is a dirty little war. Well, I'd like to throw my five piasters into the hullabaloo and call it the big little mad war.

Now I don't mean a frothing at the mouth type of mad, or a bizarre beserk type of confusion.

I imply the simple, quiet kind of insaneness that we all notice.

But few mention.

Just the other day I noticed a Marine petting his thumbnail. Naturally I inquired as to what he was doing.

"Oh," he replied, "I've planted some petunia seeds under my nail and I'm patting down the soil now."

"Oh," I answered. "Do you think they will grow?"

"No," he answered patting the nail gingerly.

"Well why did you plant them?"

"I thought they were the other kind."

"What other kind?"

"Summer perennials."

"Well what kind are they?"

"Winter perennials." he said looking up sadly.

"Pray for snow," I said comforting and then continued about my business of checking on the snow shovel supply.

** *****

EDITORIAL


Approximately 7 months ago a 19-year-old American youth entered the service. To be more specific, the Marine Corps. He had plans of going in for two years (he expected these two years to be a bit trying, but nothing too difficult, after all, his recruiter had said, "There's very little chance that you'll end up in Vietnam") Now, just 7 months later, still a green boot to you old salts, he found himself to be in Vietnam, and cried out in amazement, "What am I doing here"!!

He also made another startling discovery. While in his ITR and BIT training, he encountered a number of individuals who had actually been to Vietnam. The trainees would stare in admiration and whisper to each other "Gee, that guys been to Vietnam, I'll bet he's tougher than nails". Upon arrival here, the young Marine couldn't understand this. These young men seemed just like the young friends he had left behind, carousing around at all hours of the night, and just generally having a good time. At least they thought it was a good time even if no one else did.

However, after a short time here, he discovered that these weren't just like the friends at home. In short time, he discovered that the likeness was only on the surface. He discovered that underneath that surface was the courage and mind of a man, doing a man's job. A very serious job at that, fighting a war for the prestige of their country and the sake of freedom of all men living in a free nation. This seems like a tremendous burden to put on a young man of 19 or 20 years of age, but just as they have done from the Revolutionary War through the Korean Conflict, the nation's youth have responded with vigor and courage and again have risen to the cause here in Vietnam.

And now an old salt after one whole month in Vietnam, this young Marine is finally beginning to understand why he is here, and he is proud to be a part of it.

PFC MOSIMAN



NLIMBAH 1 GAME T MROW

THE FIRST VIETNAMESE LITTLE LEAGUE SOFTBALL GAME, PROBABLY THE FIRST OF ITS KIND IN VIETNAM, IS GOING TO BE HELD AT THE BATTALION MOTOR TRANSPORT PARKING LOT, SUNDAY AT 4:00 p.m.

Cold sodas will be sold during the game, with profits going toward the local school fund and also to help pay for the little leaguer's uniforms.

Playing the game will be the best team in the 2/7 TAOR, the Long Phu Angels. The Vietnamese children will be garbed in baseball hats, shirts and short trousers.

Their ages range from 9-14.

All together, the team numbers 21 boys. Because of no formal competition, the team will be playing itself for a full five innings of softball.

Marine coaches will be on hand to help the children.

The team, which has practiced now for a full two weeks under the careful eye of Marines from the S-2, Communications, and BAS sections is ready to play, according to Doc Hughey who initiated the team under his civil affairs program.

SSgt. Robinson, an interested part of the team said, "they look just like the little leaguers in the States.

So come one, come all tomorrow and have an afternoon of fun.

And drink a coke too, for Kid's sake!

REENLISTMENT PROFITS

During the next few months the Marine Corps faces the possible loss of approximately 18,000 first enlistment Marines; most of whom are qualified for reenlistment.

To assist in the attempt to keep as many of these qualified Marines as possible, reenlistment incentives are afforded to those who will be discharged or released from active duty June 10-October 31.

The first incentive is that of promotion.

The first term reenlistee will rate promotion of one grade to LCpl. and Cpl.

These promotions will be effected at the next regular promotion period provided that the reenlistee is still considered eligible and qualified for promotion.

Promotions effected under this incentive program will be in addition to the regular promotion quota.

Retraining in another skill for which the individual Marine is qualified is highly encouraged.

(con't page 2, col 1)

(REENLISTMENT--can't)

Previous formal schooling will not automatically preclude retraining.

Area options for East Coast, West Coast, West PAC Ground Forces, West PAC Marine Air Forces, will also be available for first term reelistment of three or more years.

If during the first year of an option selection for duty area, an individual receives orders to overseas duty, the individual will be returned to his option area after the completion of his overseas duty.

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THE LIGHT IN YOUR LIFE

Ever try to read a book in the dark?

How about writing without lights, or the discomfort of using a flickering candle to do your nightly homework by, like cleaning your rifle, or finding an address book in the bottom of your dark, dark footlocker?

The 2/7 Power and Light Company doesn't want you to have these problems.

To avoid them, the chief executive of the 2/7 Power and Light Co., Corporal Bergh, requests that all hands conserve as much electricity as possible.

"Our generator is putting out its peak every night" the corporal said, "I wouldn't want to put any more stress on it. If everyone can turn off lights they're not using, and other electrical appliances, it would help out quite a bit."

Everyone in the battalion knows how troublesome it is when the generator coughs, sputters, chugs and then goes kapoosh.

To keep darkness out of your life CONSERVE ELECTRICITY. THE WATT YOU SAVE TODAY MAY BE THE ANSWER TO YOUR MOVIE OR READING LIGHT TOMORROW!!

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FREE FOR A FUNNY

How about a free case of cokes or beer?

Well, it's not really free. It requires a bit of work on your part. Being funny.

Everyone is funny, everyone knows a joke, everyone has had a humorous experience since he's been in Vietnam, and especially around the 2/7 area.

The Two Seven Tooter is looking for these "funnies" and will print the most humorous experience or tale of the week. Special Services has announced that it will give a prize one case of beer or coke, to the best "funny" of the week.

Length and wit are important.

Try to make your stories about a page long. If they are funny and short, no sweat.

The best will win regardless of size.


Submit your stories to S-1, Cpl. McKenzie.

Deadline for stories is Thursday of each week.

P.S. Don't worry about the truth. If you are a good fibber, fib, but fib humorously.

Thanks for your cooperation 1stLt. Funk, Special Services officer.

** *****



"So I said to myself, why not join the Corps, they 'Build Men'."

BE SECURITY WISE

MAD MAD WAR

I was out in the battlefield the other day. It was a quiet battlefield. Some battlefields are louder than others, the louder ones scare you more than the quiet ones.

This particular battlefield was a sniper battlefield.

Snipers are creepy little guys who slink around the bushes and fire at you from assorted emplacements, bushes, haystacks, little secret holes in the ground, trees, wells, rooftops, ditches.

Well these snipers were having a field day firing bullets. The bullets were coming from everywhere and nowhere. You just couldn't see the little devils anywhere. One minute the rounds came from there, another minute they'd be here, then there again.

We were broken into groups, maintaining a good degree of military control and discipline. Each little group of about 12 men were firing at targets where they figured Sleeky Sneaky Charlie was hiding

Except for one.

He was sitting cross-legged, head and helmet bent down, drawing what appeared to me as pictures in the sandy soil we were fighting in.

"Oh, O," I said to myself, "this guy's cracked. Better go see what's up."

After being splattered in the face with sand from a couple of close missiles, I made it to this unconcerned fellow.

"Don't you think you should get down, friend?" I asked as innocently as possible.

"Don't bother me," he answered.

I waited a couple of minutes. The firing was still hot and heavy. Another close one cracked overhead.

"Excuse me," I said looking up with a mouthfull of sand which I had just acquired, "but in my opinion you make a very good target sitting there."

"I'm busy, go away." He continued to etch things in the sand.

"Do you mind?" He said irritably

(mad, mad, war, con't)

looking down at me for the first time. I had just nudged him and asked him if he thought he was drawing the enemy's fire.

"I suppose I do," I answered honestly.

"Well, for your information I was quite good in high school trigometry. In fact, I was the top student in my class."

"Is that important now?" I pleaded.

"Yes, you see," and with this he scooted over next to me and began drawing again in the sand with the tip of his bayonet.

"Here is where we are. Now I've been calculating vectors from the sound and impact of the incoming rounds, locating the exact positions of the enemy snipers.

"There is a sniper here, another there and there." He drew the knife through the sand like a pencil on a clean piece of paper.

"By these figures, figuring the angle and cosine etcetera, three good rounds from the rocket launcher should clean them out."

"Are you sure," another bullet cracked overhead shattering what few nerves I had left, "that you haven't had too much sun, maybe a teensy bit too much?"

Ignoring me he stood and walked to the rocket launcher team.

"KARRROOOM, KARRROOOM, KARRROOOM," the rounds went whinging to their mark. Three enormous explosions shook the air. No more enemy rounds.

After a while I caught up with this amazing young fellow to offer my congratulations.

"Say that was an amazing piece of perception on your part. Can you do it all the time?"

"No, not all the time."

"Why not?" I asked a bit confused.

"Only when we're fighting in sand and I've got something soft to draw my pictures in," he said.

"Do you mind," he added slipping back into his platoon.

It's a mad, mad, war.

the end???

(editor's note: The following letter is dedicated to all those "short timers who wish to warn the USCC--United States Civilian Corps--of their expected arrival. Good luck in your adjustment!)

"ISSUED IN SOLEMN WARNING THIS _____ DAY OF _____ 1966AD."

To: The friends, neighbors and relations of _____.

1. Very soon the above Marine will once again be in your midst, de-Americanized, de-moralized and de-hydrated; ready for readjustment to humanity with freedom and justice for all, engaged in life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
2. In making your social preparations to welcome him back into respectable society, you must make allowances for the crude environment in which he has suffered for the past 13 months. In other words, he may be somewhat asiatic; suffering from advanced stages of Vietcongitis, Flakjacket slump and Gunny Growleria.
3. Therefore, show no alarm if he prefers to squat rather than sit on a chair, pads around the house in thongs and a towel, tries to sell smokes to the post-man (for a profit of course), shuns Coca Cola or tips the bottle up to see if the cap will burn off from acid, picks suspiciously at his food as if you were trying to poison him, insists on dipping his plate in boiling water before eating and gripes because the butter is hard instead of soft and runny from the heat. Don't be surprized if he refuses to answer questions about Vietnam and shakes his head saying, "Kong Biec, Kong Biec." Be tolerant with him when he tries to buy everything at half the asking price, accuses the grocer of being a thief and refuses to enter a strangers house without asking for a grenade and fire team to cover him. He may complain about sleeping alone on a soft mattress but if he does, throw a raincoat in the yard where the mosquitoes are the heaviest, add some recorded sounds of 105 mm howitzers blasting in the backround, and he'll be as happy as a bug in a rug.
4. Any of the following sights should be avoided since they can produce an advanced state of shock: people dancing, television (especially Batman noises and war movies), candy, real honest-to-goodness ice cubes floating in a glass and especially American women. In a short time his profanity will decrease enough to permit him to associate with mixed groups and soon he will be speaking English as well as ever.
5. For the first few months (until he is house broken), be extremely watchful when he is around beautiful women. His first reaction upon meeting an attractive girl my be to stare, scream, slobber or faint, depending on his capacity for shock. If you live in a topless bathing suit area, a steel leash is suggested for walking him.
6. Keep in mind that beneath his tanned, rugged exterior there beats a heart of gold. Treasure this for it is the only thing of value he has left. Treat him with kindness, tolerance and an occasional gallon of ice cream. When he's muttering to himself in the quiet of an American evening and you hear him say over and over, "Ready for Anything, Counting on Nothing," respect his solitude for he is repeating the creed of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines who he went through hell with and was proud of every minute.

UTAH DOUBLE EAGLE II		BLUE MARLIN NEVADA	STOMP
TWO SEVEN		MONTGOMERY HOT SPRINGS	OAKLAND TOOTER
INDIANA Vol. No 1, No. 16, July 23, '66	HARVEST MOON		

TALENT NEEDED: YOU!

HOW'S YOUR SOFT SHOE, YOUR SINGING, DANCING, JOKING OR JUST PLAIN OLD SHOWMANSHIP? WELL, IF YOU'RE NOT SHY AND CAN GET BEFORE AN AUDIENCE, THE 2/7 TALENT SHOW SLATED TO BEGIN AT 6:00 p.m. SUNDAY, JULY 31, IS THE PLACE TO BE.

And there are prizes too. As of this printing, the prizes have not been decided, but you are guaranteed something, pleasurable for your effort.

Personnel interested in participating are urged to contact 1stLt. Funk at the BOQ. All acts must be coordinated through him prior to the 29th of July.

A public address system and lighting will be provided at the movie area where the talent show will be held.

Acts will be limited to 12 minutes or two songs.

A panel of officers and enlisted Marines will judge the best act.

Refreshments will be served, cold too.

Only two Marines have come forward so far to be entered into the show. Give them some competition and get together a skit.

If you know a sea tale you've been dying to tell, this is your big chance. Come one, come all.

Also, special services will be hosting the Deacons, a rock and roll and rhythm and blues, band at the movie theater July 25th, Monday eve, at 7:00 p.m. for a two hour show.

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3.2 PERCENT PAY RAISE

President Johnson has signed the military pay raise bill effecting a 3.2 percent pay increase for all military personnel July 1.

E-1 through E-5 pay will be as follows under the pay scale:

Two years active duty or less,
96.90, 100.50, 121.80, 168.60, 200.40

Over two years will yeild, 129.00
141.00, 170.10, 211.50, 246.90.

Over three years figures stand at
129.00, 141.00, 182.00 222.90, and,
258.60.

These figures are based on E-1 to E-5 respectively.

For further information your company office should have a new pay scale posted soon.

By the way, an O-10 over 26 years gets \$2,000.60 a month. They threw the extra sixty cents in for cab fare every day to the dart board where personnel assignments are made.

Remember, add \$65.00 a month to your pay while in a combat zone.

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MEDALS FOR SEVEN 2/7 MARINES

Seven Marines from 2/7 were honored for their heroism and for wounds received during combat here last week.

Colonel John J. Roothoff, battalion commander, was on hand to assist Major General Lewis J. Fields, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, who presented the medals to the Marines.

Topping the award list was Staff Sergeant Howard W. Wenger who received the nation's third highest combat award for bravery, the Silver Star Medal.

He was awarded the medal for Operation Utah.

Second to receive an award was 1st Lieutenant John Cebrowski. He was presented the Bronze Star Medal for his heroic actions during Operation Utah also.

Staff Sergeant John McRee was given the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V" for his heroism during the operation Hot Springs.

Each of the awardees received in addition to the medal, a ribbon and lapel ribbon to be worn with civilian attire.

The next four awardees were presented the Purple Heart Medal for wounds incurred by enemy forces during combat.

The Purple Heart Medal winners were: Gunnery Sergeant James M. Martin, Corporal Guillermo Castro, Corporal Arthur J. Evaristo, and Private First Class Bobby Utterback.

Two Seven holds the title as the most decorated battalion in Vietnam. Since its arrival in this embattled country 143 personnel have been recommended for decorations for bravery in the face of enemy forces.

These medals range from the Congressional Medal of Honor to the Navy Commendation Medal.

This does not, however, include the Purple Heart Medal.

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(an optimist believes everything has a good, pleasant outcome.

a pessimist believes just the opposite, everything has a bad end.)

THE STORY OF THE OPTIMIST AND THE PESSIMIST

Donnie and Ronnie were young twins identical in every way but one.. their personalities. Donnie was a persistent pessimist, while Ronnie was an outstanding optimist. Their attitudes were revealed in everything they did and said.

Their parents tried to find some way to engender a little enthusiasm in the pessimist, to restrain or control the liveliness of the optimist, but it was to no avail.

When the twins were to have a birthday, the father hit on an idea. The perfect answer.

When the big day arrived, they led the little pessimist into one room and the little optimist into another. Donnie, the pessimist was presented with many gifts...all designed to intrigue and delight any boy of his age. As he opened his presents, one by one, he expressed nothing but concern: One would break too easily, another was not the right color, or wasn't as shiny as he liked...in short, nothing pleased him.

Trying to hide their disappointment at the pessimist's reaction, the mother and father proceeded to the living room where they had put the optimist's gift...a huge pile of manure. They peeked into the room to see him digging frantically in the pile and saying happily to himself, "I know there's a horse in here somewhere! I JUST KNOW THERE'S A HORSE IN HERE SOMEWHERE!"

(moral to the story: Always be, "READY FOR ANYTHING, COUNTING ON NOTHING," ...

BUY U.S. ~~SAVING~~
BONDS TODAY
FOR TOMORROW —

THE NEXT BARRIER?

by Rick Mosinan

Just twelve years ago, Roger Bannister did the "impossible". He ran a mile in less than 4 minutes.

Before this feat, the four minute mile had been declared impossible by athletes and scientists alike. Since he shattered the "impossible" barrier in London, England, 1954, Bannister has been joined by a number of "Under Four" companions.

Some of the more notable are milers Michele Jazy of France, Peter Snell of New Zealand and Dyrrol Burlinson and Jim Grelle of the United States. The latest arrival to this elite group is a young Kansas State freshman, Jim Ryan, who has become a very real threat to the 3:50 mile.

His short career has astounded the "experts". Since he first went under four minutes as an 18 year old High School senior, he has repeated the feat no less than 8 times.

A long distance runner is not expected to "peak" until he is between the ages of 25 and 30. And yet, the 19 year old Ryan, just 12 years after the first 4 minute mile was run, has gone under that mark by practically 9 full seconds. Running in a national meet last Monday night the college freshman galloped around the Edward's Stadium oval in a world record mile time of 3:51.3. What do the "experts" have to say now? There is not much they can say. No one can say what man's ultimate limit will be. Some are now talking of a 3:30 mile.

Of one thing they all seem to be in agreement, however. The name Jim Ryan will be heard in the sporting world for many years to come. He has truly earned his place among the immortal men of sports. And it is a pretty sure bet that Jim Ryan will be headed for new and even bigger "barriers" - -

BE SECURITY WISE

\$ FOR KIDS

Where there's kids in need, there are Marines indeed.

Coming to the aid of 120 Vietnamese children of Long Phu #1 Marines of 2/7 payed 25 cents a coke a couple of weeks ago.

The proceeds of this "Cokes For A Kid" drive have been turned over to the village chief of Long Phu #1 to pay for the children's education for one year.

Lieutenant Colonel John ROTHOFF, 2/7's battalion commander, turned the money over Friday to the village chief.

Corpsman Thomas HUCHEY, the civil affairs noncommissioned officer began the drive after learning that the children might not be able to get an education because of teacher costs.

With Marines pitching in their quarters and receiving ice cold cokes the drive was soon successful and now the children of Long Phu #1 will be read'n, rit'n and rithmetic'n.

A thanks is extended to all those who participated; you drank a coke for Kid's sake, and they are glad.

Thanks again.

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BATTLE REPRINT

ATTENTION ALL HARVEST MOON BATTLE VETERANS.

AVAILABLE AT THE S-1 OFFICE ARE REPRINTS OF COLONEL UTTER'S ARTICLE ON THAT DECEMBER BATTLE OF LAST YEAR ALL HANDS THAT PARTICIPATED ARE INVITED TO TAKE A COPY.

THE STORY RELATES THE ALMOST MINUTE BY MINUTE ENCOUNTER OF THE 2/7 MARINES WITH THE ENEMY AND HOW THEY PULLED THE NOOSE OVER THE V.C.'S NECK.

IF YOU WERE THERE, COME AND GET A COPY FOR YOUR WAR MEMENTOS.

IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO GET INTO THE BATTALION AREA, LET YOUR COMPANY 1ST SERGEANT KNOW AND HE CAN ORDER YOU ONE.

THERE'S NO COST. IT'S ALL FREE.

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(editor's note: The following news article was extracted from Time Magazine July 15, 1966 edition)

DOGS DEATH AND SMOKING

Medical researchers have tried for years to train laboratory animals to smoke. And as if in testament to the animals' innate wisdom, the training always failed. It did, that is, until Dr. Oscar Auerbach, a pathologist at the East Orange, N.J., Veterans Administration Hospital, finally found a way to force the habit. In relentless pursuit of a sure link between lung damage and smoking, Dr. Auerbach turned on man's best friend, specifically the trusting little beagle.

For his experiments, he told the AMA he opened the throats of nine males and one female with a tracheostomy. When they were accustomed to breathing through the permanent holes in their necks, the dogs were hooked up to a smoking machine every morning and afternoon. After a cigarette was lit, the dogs were permitted to inhale at will. After five straight puffs, they were given a few breaths of fresh air. They were broken in gently on just one filter-tip cigarette a day; after seven months they had worked up to as many as a dozen regular-length non-filters a day. Beagles were chosen because their lung structure resembles humans', and the twelve-cigarette daily dosage was considered equivalent of heavy smoking in man.

Like any small boy, the beagles reacted to the initial cigarettes with tears and redness of the eyes, coughing and sometimes, nausea. After a few weeks, many of them seemed to have developed a taste for tobacco. They wagged their tails and jumped willingly into the box where they were hooked up. Then, on the 24th day of the experiment, the first dog died. The second died 205 days later and three more died before the experiment was ended after 14 months. The remaining five were sacrificed for autopsies. Ten nonsmoking control dogs, two of them with tracheostomies, were also sacrificed.

Post-mortems revealed that the lungs of the nonsmokers were entirely healthy. Damage to the smokers' lungs was massive. The lung tissue of the last two to die spontaneously was so completely destroyed that doctors had difficulty evaluating what had happened. In the others, reported Dr. Auerbach, the changes in the lungs were remarkably similar to the effects of emphysema in man. The experiment had not continued long enough to see whether cancer would develop.

Critics, including the Tobacco Institute Inc., as well as many doctors, quickly pointed out that beagles are not humans, and more important, that humans smoke differently. They rarely inhale five times in a row, and they normally do not smoke butts down to less than a quarter of an inch, as the dogs did. Nonetheless, the dead beagles provided the first controlled experimental evidence of the relationship of cigarettes to lung damage.