

ORIGINAL

HELDQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF PPO San Francisco, California 96602

> 5750 5 April 1967

Pront Commanding Officer

To: Commending General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) MMF

Vide Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Sub j: Command Chronology for period 1 March 1967 to 31 harch 1967

Ref:

(a) MOO 5750,2

(b) FMF PAGO 5750.8

(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encla (1) 2nd Bn, 7th Mar Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c), Enclosure (1) is submitted.


W. P. KITTERMAN

L Bn. 7 th Marines

Copy No. __/_ of _/O Ser. No. 016-67

Downgraded at 3 year intervals DECLASSIFIED FIFR 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

> 7thMar S&C Log Nr. 0259-67 Copy# Lab 10



DECTAGGIELED

HEADQUARTERS

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 - starch 1967 to 31 Marsah 1967

INDEX

PART I Organizational Data PART II Negrative Summary

PART III Sequential Listing of Significant Events

PART IV Supporting Documents





PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

DESIGNATION

COMMUNDER

2nd Battalion, 7th Marines

Lt Col KITTERMAN

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters and Serive Company

Company E

Company F

Company G

Company H

2nd Lt PETRONZIO

Capt POOL

Capt WHIPPLE

Capt WILSON

Capt FLEMING (1-16 Mar 67)

Capt SZALANKEWICZ (17-31 Mar 67)

ATPACHED UNITS

3rd Platoon, Co C, 1st aT Bn (1-31 Mar 67) 1st Lt REED

2. LOCATION

1-31 March 1967: CHU LAI, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

S-1

8-2

S-3

8-4

S-5

Major KAUFFMAN (1-9 Mar 67)

Major PREBLE (10-31 Mar 67)

Capt SZulmNKEWICZ

(1-16 Mar 67)

Major WARHOLAK

2nd Lt LLV MEZ

2nd Lt MENTZER

2nd Lt HENRY (17-31 Mar 67)

2nd Lt BaCH

AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC

USN

MERRYSOULIED



PART II

KARATIVE SUMMARY

- 1. The amount of enemy contact within the TaOk continued to increase steadily during the first three weeks of March, as it has since the first of the year. Because the large majority of these contacts occurred in the Southern portion of the TaOk, Operation PERRY was initiated on 25 March 1967 to evacuate Vietnamese civilians from the VC-infiltrated TaN PHUOC area, to render the area ineffective as a VC harboring site, to relocate the refugees to secure areas under GVN control as requested and coordinated with the BINH SON District Chief. The severe drop in enemy contacts/sightings in the area since the conclusion of Operation PERRY is an indication of its success.
- 2. Saturation patrolling throughout the TaOR continued during the reporting period despite the fact that two organic rifle companies remained detached to other commands. Particular emphasis was placed on increased security and surveillance measures in the area referred to as the Missile Belt in order to prevent enemy rocket attacks on the vital areas of the CHU LaI TAOR. Augmentation of both patrol coverage and the placing of HAI fires into likely rocket launching areas was effected. In addition, greater effort was devoted to interdiction of waterways located within the TaOR.
- 3. Continued revision and updating of contingency plans was pursued through liaison visits to BINh SON District Hq, and the CIDG camps at TRA BONG, Ha Think and GLa VUC.



PART III

SECUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

1. Topics


a. Personnel and Administration

- (1) During the month of March, this battalion joined 1 officer and 119 enlisted personnel. One officer and 43 enlisted were processed for rotation.
- (2) Promoted by rank were 9 Sgt's, 5 Cpl's, 12 LCpl's, and 6 PFC's.
- (3) Recommendations were made for the following awards; 4 Bronze Stars, and 1 Navy Commendation medal. One Silver Star was presented.
 - (4) 113 Marines were processed for R&R.
 - (5) Casualties Sustained
- (a) There were 167 casualties sustained during the reporting period of which 21 were KIA and 145 were WIA.
- (b) Of the figures above, 16 of the KIA's and 107 of the WIA's were sustained by the company OPCON to 3/7 on Operation DESOTO.
 - (c) There was 1 non-battle injurys.

b. Enemy, Weather and Terrain

- (1) Contacts with the enemy increased by 230% over the previous month. In painticular, two areas were affected. The first, BS 5095, showed a marked increase in sniping incidents. The second, BS 5389 & BS 5489, showed a 70% increase incontacts, with our units engaging up to squad sized enemy units.
- (2) The amount of mining and booby trap incidents also showed a marked increase. Anti tank mines were found on combat base access roads, while booby traps were found along trails and hedgerows. Several M-79 rounds were found deployed along the edges of sugar canefields.
- (3) Operation PERRY was conducted on 25 March 1967 and concluded on 27 March 1967. The After Action Report is appended as Tab B.





VC KIA Confirmed	21
VC KIA Probable	~ ģ
VC WIA Confirmed	 14
VC WLA Probable	9
VCS	46
VCC	.0
Ralliers	1

(5) Weather had no adverse effect on operations during the month of March.

c. Organization and Operations

(1) Command Relations

- (a) 031100H, 3rd platoon "C" 1/7 detached to 1/7.
- (b) 070800H, "D" Co 1/26 attached to 2/7.
- (c) 080800H, "D" Co 1/26 detached to 1/7.
- (d) 111000H, 1st platoon "E" Co 2/7 detached from CLDC.
- (e) 230800H, "F" Co 2/7 detached from 3/7 to CLDO.
- (f) 230800H, 263rd plts "E" Co 2/7 detached from CLDC.
- (g) 230850H, "G" Co 2/7 detached to OPCON 3/7.
- (h) 241630H, 4 plts 1/7 attached to 2/7.
- (i) 250700H, attached mine clearance plt 3rd wmtrac Bn (LVIE-1)
- (j) 250700H, attached one plt, "B" Co 3rd antrac Bn (LVTP-5)
- (k) 271430H, 4 platoons 1/7. detached to 1/7.
- (1) 271500H, LVTP-5 and LVTE-1 detached to 3rd Amtrao Bn.
- (m) 310915H, attached 1 section, B Co, 3md amtrac Bn (LVTP-5).





(2) Fire Support

- (a) During the reporting period, 42 observed fire missions were fired with a total of 4 smoke, 203 HE, 40 WP, and 19 illumination rounds expended.
- (b) During the same period, 517 H&I missions were fired with a total of 2842 rounds expended.

(3) air Support

- (a) This battalion submitted a total of 32 helicopter requests during the month of March, with 26 of these run. 19 of these requests were Med Evacs.
- (b) Two fixed wing air strikes were conducted by TAC (A) within the TAOR. They were credited with 2 KBA and 7 structures destroyed.
- (4) Significant Operations Conducted. Operation PERRY was conducted on 25-27 March 1967, and the after action Report is appended as Tab B.
- d. Flans. The 2nd Bn, 7th Marines occupies and defends positions within the assigned TAGR so as to contribute to the defense of the base area, airfield and ancillary facilities at CHU iml. conducts aggressive day and night patrolling and offensive operations within the TAGR. Is prepared, on order, to deploy on 12 hour notice as a reserve/reaction force. Provides assistance to CLDC as directed. Assists in training of, and provides support to, Regional and Popular Forces. Coordinates local security of all organizations and units in battalion sector as assigned. Conducts pacification and civic action programs as directed. Is prepared to deploy as division reserve as directed.

e. Training

(1) The following list indicates personnel school trained during the month of March.

(a)	hand Mine Warfare	80
(b)	Nand Mine Warfars NCO Leadership	4
(o)	Vietnamese Language	10
(d)	Embarkation	1
(a)	Field radio. operators	. 3
(\mathfrak{x})	Basic ammo technician	5



DECLASSIFIED

(g)	Field Wire	1 1
(h)	Basic Infantry Weapons Repair	1 -
(i.)	Registered Publications	₫.
(t).	Communications Center	1.
(x)	_NTPS/21	40
(1)	Metal detector	9

- (2) 840 men fired the AM16H rifle-for familiarization and/or battle sights.
 - (3) 159 men are currently enrolled in MCI courses.
- (4) Battalion scouts underwent one week OJT with 9th ITT developing interrogation techniques.
 - (5) For weekly training information, see Tab C.
- f. Combined Action Company Program. The 2nd Bn, 7th Marines has formally requested authorization to form 3 combined action plts within the TACE, located in the hamlets of ChAU TU (2) & PHU LE's (1) & (3) Liaison and the construction of the CAP compound has been initiated.
- M-16 rifle on 30 March 1967. Issue of these M-16's and retrograde. of the M-14 began on 31 March 1967, without the benefit of prior planning or coordination. However, no major problems have arisen and this issue and retrograde is progressing well. 448 weapons were exchanged as well as a basic allowance of 5.56 ammo for each weapon. The isue on the 31st was made to H&S, Hotel and Echo Companies. F Company, presently located at CIDC, and G Company, OPCON to 3/7, will be issued these weapons on 1 April. It is anticipated that the M-16 will be in the hands of all troops rating them by TE by April 1st. In addition to a BA of ammunition, each command was issued 3 DOA on 31 March 1967.

h. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

- (1) During the month of March, approximately 6420 Vietnamese civilians were treated at Med Caps.
- (2) The following items were furnished to the citizens of the Republic of Vietnam for civic action projects:
 - (a) 70 sheets of tin
 - (h) 58 bags of cement



DECLASSIFIED

- (c) 27 gallons of paint
- (d) 100 school kits
- (e) 80 assorted pieces of lumber & timbers
- (f) 4500 pounds of rice
- (g) 400 bars of scap
- (h) 100 pounds of wheat
- (i) 100 pounds of salt
- (3) The following projects are in progress.
 - (a) Construction of the NUOC MON Village Office.
 - (b) Alterations in the dispensary of MUOC MUN.
 - (d) Construction of a school and dispensary in PHU LE (1).
- (4) Six English classes were held in the NUUC MON school house.

i. Psychological Operations

(1) The following leaflets were dropped during the month of March.

Leaflet No	Quantity	Drop Coordinates
41-67	25,000	BS 5197
SP-893	10,000	BS 5172
SF-1755	28,000	BS 5490
131-66	25,000	BS 5490

- (2) An aerial broadcast was held on 26 March 1967 over coord BS 5490 in connection with Operation PERRY explaining that we were moving the civilians to a refugee eamp.
- (i) Portable loud speaker broadcasts were held at BS 573923 on the 25th through the 27th explaining the reasons for the operation, and that the people would be well treated in the refugee center.


j. Communications


(1) A communications center bunker has recently been constructed to provide the message center, crypto center, and switchboard with adequate protection in case of attack.

DEPLY SHIED,

DEGLASSIFIED

- (2) Three AN/GRC-125's have been installed in the communications bunker to provide an alternate site of communicationa in case of attack.
- (3) A radio operator with an AN/PRC 25 has been attached to the 3rd Battalion, 2nd ROK MC Brigade for the purpose of providing a direct communication capability for command liaison matters.
- 2. Entries. See Tab & (Extracts from 5-3 Staff Journal) and Tab B (Combat Operations of ter action Report, Operation PERRY).





PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB as Extracts from 8-3 Staff Journal.

TAB B: Combat Operations after action Report, Operation PERRY.

W/ FRAG ORDER 2-67 24 MAR 67

TAB C: Weekly Training Schedule (5-12 MAR 67)

(12-18 MAR 67)

(14-19-67)



UEUT VOOTETEL

xtracts from 3-3 Journel

01104Œ

7H22 (Sqd 66D) vic BS 510915. Patrol observed 1 VCS zunning across rice paddy, VCS was wearing black PJ's. Patrol challenged at approx 100 meters in Vietnamese. VCS continued to run-Patrol fired 2 warning shots. VCS continued to run, patrol fired 4 rds 7.62 at approx 200 meters. 1 VC KLA, approx 27 years old with no ID card. Patrol, while searching body, received sniper fire.

031550H

7H18 (Sqd+ S&D) vid BS 533896. Patrol was taken under fire by estimated reinforced squad of VC. VC had automatic and semiautomatic weapons employed along a sixty meter front. Range to enemy approximately 300 meters. Enemy broke contect, 1 USN KIA. Patrol deployed and returned fire, Patrol called 3 artillery missions, received 33 rds HE and requested air support. Routine med-evac requested for KIA. Platoon searched area in vicinity of contact and found trench line approximately 300 meters long and 4 feet deep. 3 spider holes and blood in trench line along with blood stained Spider holes and trench line appeared, to be freehly clothing. dug. Platoon observed 2 VC with weapons, fired, killing 1 VC. The other VC escaped along with KIA's weapon. Detained 2 VN in vicinity of contact. 40 reported at 1630, that there were 2 KBA probable. VC were wearing black PJ's.

041915H · 7H4 (FT Ambush) vic BS 523944. 1 VC with weapon jumped out of brush and started running East. VC was dressed in black PJ's. Patrol fired 15 rds 7.62 and 1 M-26 grenade, 1 VC KLA confirmed, age approximately 17 years old. Darkness prevented finding weapon. Searched area at 050625 and found 1 carbine magazine and 1 U. S. carbine.

050730H -

7H25 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 542895. Patrol received 1 round carbine fire from approximately 75-100 meters. Patrol deployed and returned 30 rds M-14. 1 VC KIA. While sweeping area, patrol received | incoming grenade, resulting in | wla. Med evac requested and completed at 0820.

052150H

888 Co, vio BS 570961. Bunker seatry sisted 4 VC approximately 150 meters from his position, 3 with weapons, type unknown. VC were dressed in black PJ's. Sentry took VC under fire and observed 1 VC fall. Remaining VC ran to the Mortheast, sentry. pursued by fire. Search team of 6 men moved out to conduct search for VC who was hit. Searched area for 25 minutes under 81mm illumination with negative results.



TAB-(A)



061530H

7H27 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 523903. Patrol observed 15 VC with weapons wading across river at BS 533889. Called for and received artillery mission, patrol observed 1 VC fall. Fatrol, while moving to search area of artillery mission received automatic rifle fire resulting in 2 WIA. Moved WIA's to side of trail and returned fire. Unit moving to BS 523925 to link up with Golf Company patrol. After exchange of WIA's, 7H25 will resume mission of establishing embush.

061735H

7H25 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 523902. Patrol observed 20 VC crossing river, called artillery mission with 30 rds, good coverage.

061845H

7H25 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 523902, observed 7 VC crossing river with possible 60mm mortar. Called artillery mission and received 18 rds with good coverage, unable to search for casualties.

062300H

2/7 combat base, vic BS 545957. Perimeter position received 4-5 rounds sniper fire from vic BS 564949. Observed muzzle flash, fired 5 rounds 81mm WP and observed one secondary explosion. Searched area at 1st light with negative results.

070830H

Hotel Combat Base, vic BS 588935. Convoy moving to Hotel Company detonated 2 mines at BS 588935, resulting in 2 WIn (minor) and rear wheel blown off wrecker. Engrs completed road sweep by 0730. Preliminary report, 1 pressure type, other electrically detonated. Established security and main body continued by foot to combat base. Road being reswept by Engr and Shore Party. No evidence of shrapnel, suspect G-4 enclosed in poncho or plastic.

071015H

H Company S&D, vic BS 551897, received approximately 30 rounds of 30 cal machine gun fire from estimated 7 VC, 1 USMC KLL. Returned 100 rounds M-14, 4 rounds M-79 and requested med evac. Dispatched unit in pursuit and to search area. At 071110H cearch unit observed 7 VC with weapons in green uniforms fleeing Northeast. Unit in pursuit.

080945H

7H11 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 573947. While searching hamlet, heard 2 or 3 shots being fired. Observed Vietnamese male running West. Challenged in VN from 75 meters. VN continued to run, patrol fired warning shot. VC continued to run and patrol fired 70 rds M-16 as man entered canefield. Sparched area and found 1 VN male WIA, approx 60 meters in canefield. Preliminary reports indicate he is guerrilla squad leader. Captured 2 carbine magazines, 1 M-26 grenade, large case with documents and personnel effects, cartridge belt and camouflage soft hat.

Deci Vecilied

DIEWISHON ILED

081230H

7H11 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 573948. Patrol, conducting search of came field sighted 1 VC. Patrol challenged in VN but VC began to run. Patrol fired 15 rds M-14, 1 VC KL, dressed in black PJ's, with camouflage shirt underneath. VC had cartridge belt with 2 hand grenades. Captured 2 carbine magazines, 1 M-26 and 1 ChiCom grenade, cartridge belt, VC poneho and 1 wallet.

091145H

7H23 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 563925. Patrol in ambush, observed 5 VC with weapons approximately 175 meters Southeast. 3 were wearing grey uniforms, 1 was wearing khaki uniform and 1 black PJ's. Ambush opened firs with 100 rds 7.62 and observed 2 VC fall, patrol received 40-50 rds s/a fire from estimated 5 more VC. Patrol continued to fire, with approximately 100 mounds M-14. Ontos were sent into area and fired 30-40 rds 30 cal machine gun and 1 106mm. 1 small pool of blood, 2 large pools of blood were found during search. 3 VC WIA confired. Also found 1 darbine, Russian, model 1944, 7.62mm.

112130H

7H1 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 514958. Patrol departed at 1010 to search area of SPARROWALWK. Searched area vicinity BS 522 989 with negative results.

121630H

7H9 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 516903, patrol observed 1 VN male wearing black PJ's moving East on trail approximately 50 meters distance. Called to VN to halt, VN ran into bushes sont fireteam to pursue. VC started to run, fireteam fired 2 warning shots, VN continued to run. Fired 2 rd 7.62, 1 VC KIA approximately 30 years old with no ID card. Searched body and found 10 rds 30 cal ammo.

131245班

7H6 (Sqd Occupy) vic BS 578929, RD patrol in hamlet of Phu Le 1. while checking area for snipers was approached by a local VN who thought they were VC. RD personnel told VN that they were VC. RD were taken to a house where 2 VC were harboring. RD apprehended 3 VCC. RD will turn VC to Birth Son District Headquarters. No meapons were captured. 1 VC is over six (6) feet in height.

14 10 10H

7H15A (Sqd S&D) vio BS 550910. Patrol received 30 rds carbine fire from approximately 3 VC. Set up base of fire and deployed 2 fireteams to engage VC. Fired 75 rds N-14, 1 VC KLA approximately 30 years old, dressed in black PJ'S no weapon. Other snipers broke contact.



DEAL DOOR HED

14 1500E

7H15 (Plt S&D) vic BS 527896. Point observed 2 VC dressed in black PJ's and white hats with weapons and cartridge belts. VC observed patrol and threw 1 frag grenade and ran East. Point fired 3 rds M-14 at 40 meters killing 1 VC 20 years old. Captured 1 Russian carbine, Model 1944 (Ser No D2178, Marking 1960), ammo, gas mask, bandage, canteen with cover, plastic rifle cover and 1 hammock.

150830H

7H15 (Plt S&D) vic BS 552905. Point egressed from cane field and observed 1 VN male approximately 25 years old, wearing black PJ's, ran West. Point called to VN to halt and gave physical pursuit. VN continued to run, point then fired 2 warming shots. As man ran into cane field, patrol fired 10 rds M-14 at 50 meters. Searched cane field and found fresh blood, indicating 1 WL.

150945H

7G2 (Squb S&D) vic BS 477914. Patrol was moving thru open area when point observed 1 VC attempting to fire at patrol from 50 meters. VC was wearing black PJ's. Foint immediately fired 20 rds M-14 killing 1 VC, approximately 30 years old. VC had no ID card. Patrol captured 1 U. S. carbine serial number 3841450, homemade pack, extra change of black PJ's, 60 rds carbine ammo and leather cartridge belt.

150930H

7815 (Plt S&D) vic BS 548902. Squad searching assimged area, observed 5 VC with camouflage green uniforms, helmets, packs and weapons. Enemy took patrol under fire and expended approx 100 rds s/a fire and also fired across river at ROK unit. Enemy were in trench line which gave good cover from both North and South. Patrol initially returned fire with 25 rounds but ceased fire because of position of ROK. Patrol called artillery mission and fired 1 Law at enemy position which hit 1 VC as he started to run.

151030H

7H15 (Plt S&D) vic BS 548897. Patrol searching area of arty mission and prior contact, observed 2 VC dressed in black PJ's, without weapons, running in trench line trying to evade patrol. Patrol challenged VC, he attempted to escape, fired 20 rds at 35 meters, killing both. Ages approximately 18 and 20 years of age, neither had ID cards.

151410H

7G2 (Sqd+ S&D) vic BS 493892. Fatrol spotted 12 VC wearing black FJ's and camouflaged utilities, carrying carbines and moving East at approximately 1000 meters. Sniper team fired 5 rds, hitting 3 VC, remaining VC carrying bodies and weapons to river. Did not pursue due to distance. 1 KIm probable, 2 WIA probable.

UEULMOSIFIED

DEEL VEGIELED

170700H 7HAS5 (FT road sweep) vic BS 551956. Road sweep discovered ChiCom anti-tank mine M1A1. Engineers removed mine and will forward to 1st Engineer Battalion.

7860 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 524906. Patrol observed 5 VC with packs and weapons crossing river in a Southwesterly direction. VC wore white shorts but appeared to be carrying clothing. Range approximately 1200 meters.

180745H [360 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 540922. Marine sniper saw 1 VCS 50 meters away, no weapon sighted. Marine fired 1 warning shot and apprehended 1 VN. VN attacked sniper, but was unable to get away. VC forwarded to S-2 for interrogation.

7H14 (Scd S&D) vie BS 554908. Reaction to information from VCS (spot report 180745), moved into Tan Phoue 4 (BS 554908) and apprehended 1 VCS male 52 years old, dressed in black PJ's who attempted to mun from patrol. Elderly woman, probably his mother, started crying, bowing and begging Marines not to take her son. Because of loud noise, VCS who acted as guide was told to find his family, instead of looking for 2 more VCS. Could not locate his family. Patrol came back to CP, enroute Engrs blew gate which was probably booby trapped. Interrogation indicates he is Ngyen Ho, farmers assocation leader since June 1965. Will forward for further interrogation.

1808308 78.00 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 552906. Patrol engaged by approximately 7 VC with automatic carbines and M-1 rifles from cane field, vicinity BS 555903. 2 USMC WIA. VC were not observed and broke contact. Deployed and began to envelop VC from left flank. Patrol assaulted suspected sniper position with negative results.

190800H 7M&S2 (FT Security) vic BS 574970. Mr's in Nuoc Mon reported 1 VN male was beaten and killed by 7 VC at BS 579970 at approximately 190500H. VN reported to be VC plateon leader who defected to GVN and was a spy. VC fled to the West. Interpreters sent to hamlet.

191215H JH20 (FT Security) vic BS 542908. 7H20 received 30 carbine rounds. Observed 4 VC in black PJ's and all wore cartridge belts and had weapons. Hange 400-500 meters. Patrol fired approximately 100 rounds M-14 at VC knocking 1 down. 1 WIA probable.

PERENTAGE STATE

Deer registed

19145QH

TH20 (Sqd Security) moving through cane field at 20 foot interval, lead Marines stepped on trip wire of M-26 booby trap. 2 WIA. Second man only slightly wounded with 1 piece of shrapnel in leg. Requested med evao, and was completed at 1530.

200700H

7H&S5 (FT Road Sweep) vic BS 556969. Engineers sweeping road located a ChiCom anti-tank M1.1 mine, emplaced in left wheel tracks of road traveling East to West. Mine was rigged with pressure type detonator. Engrs deactivated mine and forwarded to 1st Engineer Bn.

211555H

7H21 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 562916. Patrol was moving through brush at 10 meter interval when point man stepped on M-79 booby trap. Round was emplaced in the ground with nail through a small piece of board beneath it to act as trigger. Patrol brought 2 men back to combat base and will continue original mission, WIA's non evac.

230845H

7H21 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 537899. Patrol observed Vietnamese male mum out of came field 100 meters from them. VN was wearing black PJ's. When patrol challenged, they received 8-10 rounds carbine fire. Patrol returned 50 rounds M-14, searched area and found 1 VC KLA male, with no ID card.

231045H

7H21 (Sqd S&D) vie BS 543905. Patrol observed 2 VC running East 200 meters to the South. VC were dressed in black PJ's. Fired 2 warning shots, then patrol fired 15 rounds M-14 when VC refused to halt. Dispatched 2 fireteams to search area. Fireteams found 1 VC KLA male approximately 39 years old with no ID card but had 1 M-26 grenade.

231050H

Co G commenced heli lift to Duc Pho. Chopped to 3/7.

240455H

7H5 (Sqd+ Ambush) vio BS 587918. Interdicting Song Tra Bong, patrol observed boat approximately 200 meters South of their position moving in a Northeasterly direction. Patrol fired 200 rds M-14, 50 rds M-60 and 2 rds 3.5. 2 VC KIA and boat sunk. Searched area at 0630 but was unable to find weapons or contraband.

241350H

Echo Cembat Base, BS 538943. Village Chief of Than Tra (2), brought a Chieu Hoi to combat base. Chieu Hoi stated he would lead Marines to area where he was to meet 5 VC, if he did not meet them, they were to go North. Chieu Hoi stated VC are located around 3 mines vicinity BS 502947 with electric firing device. Chieu Hoi said he could take Marines to his weapon, a Mas #36 and 2 hendgrenades. Chieu Hoi is \$9, his name is Phan Van Pho.

van Pho. Diser 1001FIED

DEGI VGGIEIED

241700H

Follow-up to 241350H. No indication of 5 VC or 3 mines in the area searched. Squad did get Chieu Hoi's weapon, a Mas #36, Serial No. 290950, 1 cartridge belt, 1 M-26, 1 bayonet, 14 rounds ammunition, 1 raincoat, 2 battle dressings and 1 piece of cable, 1/8" by 18 inches long.

311050H

7H35 (Sqd S&D) vic BS 555913. Patrol observed 3 VC, 2 in black and white PJ's and 1 in black PJ's. 1 with weapon and 1 with what appeared to be a scatchel charge. VC were approximately 600 meters from patrol. Patrol moved, unobserved, to within 200 meters and then fired 200 rounds M-14. 2 VC KLA, 3rd VC fell out scramoled into heavy brush. Pursued but found no evidence of VC or satchel charge. Captured 1 carbine, Sexial Number #3587895, 1 cartridge belt, 3 carbine magazines and 35 rounds carbine ammunition.

Deu veerled

DECEMBORIED

HEADQUARTERS 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF FPU San Francisco, California 96602

086-67 Son. No 045-67 3: LAP: lap 3000 3 April 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

(2) Commanding General, Task Force XRay

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PERRY

Ref: (a) ist MarDivO 3480.1

(b) Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series 17014, Sheet 6739 IV-

Encl: (1) 2nd Bn, 7th Mar Frag 0 2-67

- 1. Code Name. Operation PERRY, a Battalion minus search and destroy operation conducted in conjunction with GVN and ROK forces.
- 2. Dates of Operation, 250900H to 271800H Murch 1967.
- 3. Location. QUING NGAL Province, QUAN BINH SON District, BINH TUY and BINH THANH Villages.
- 4. Command Haadquarters

CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines LtCol KITTEHMAN
CO, Co E (Rein), 2nd Bn, 7th Marines Capt POOL
CO, Co H (Rein), 2nd Bn, 7th Marines Capt SZALANKEWICZ

5. Task Organization. See Annex A to Enclosure (1).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS, DOD DIR 5200-10

TAB-(B)



6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery

- (1) General artillery support was provided by H Btry 3/11 reinforced by H Btry 4/11 and W Btry 3/11.
- (2) Due to the close contact and coordination required to accomplish the mission of OPERATION PERRY in a relatively small area, the number of actual missions fixed was limited to one on a suspected VC harboring site. The 8 inch Howitzer platoon was used to fire this mission. A total of eight rounds were fired with good effect on the target reported.
- (3) Hal fires were used extensively during the hours of darkness. A total of 27 Hal missions were fired over the two day period. The weapons employed included 107mm Howtars, 81mm mortars, and 105 Howitzers. A total of 345 rounds were expended in Hal capacity.
- (4) Upon completion of the primary mission and departure of friendly forces from the area, coordination with the ROKMC was effected in order to fire four missions with ROKMC artillery. 105mm and 155mm Howitzers were employed with the purpose of destroying prospective VC harboring sites. Approximately 48 rounds were fired with excellent effect on targets reported.
 - (5) Total number of rounds expended:
 - (a) USMC 353 rounds
 - (b) ROKMC 48 rounds

b. Air

- (1) Close Air Support was utilized the morning after the operation's conclusion. Some difficulty was encountered getting a TACA, but after one was obtained, the area was bombed and napalmed by 4 sections of aircraft with effective coverage. A total of 24 D1A's, 8D-9's, and 8 D%'s were used, and 7 prospective VC harboring sites were destroyed.
- (2) <u>Halo Resupply</u> was used only once during the operation, and arrived late because of over commitment of the helo's. This posed no problem, however, as the unit resupplied was stationary.
- (3) <u>Med Evac</u>. Two separate med evac's were performed both quickly and efficiently.



Degi vogieled

(4) <u>Airborne-Observers</u>. Four requests for AO's were submitted, but USMC nO's arrived only once. Additional AO coverage was obtained on one occasion through the Senior U. S. Army advisor to BINH SON District Headquarters who accompanied the Battalion Alfa Command Group.

o. Amor

(1) Amtraca

- (a) The Mine Clearance Platoon (6-LVTE1's) and a platoon from Company B (10-LVTP5's), 3rd Amtrac Bn were in direct support of the 2nd Bn, 7th Marines during Operation PERRY.
- (b) Amtracs were invaluable in a variety of roles performed throughout the operation. They proved that the operational area was trafficable by tracked vehicles with few exceptions.
- (c) The LVTP-5's were utilized primarily in a combat support role for deep patrolling and for reconnaissance. They were employed once to resupply Co H and attachments, and were effectivily used to evacuate the bulk of the 1168 refugees from the objective area to the refugee screening center.
- (d) The LVTE-1's were employed to clear fields of fire and booby trapped areas, and to destroy known and suspected VC harboning sites. Nine line charges were expended with excellent destructive effects.

(2) Ontos

- (a) A neavy section of Ontos from the 3rd Platoon, Co C, 1st AT Bn were in direct support of the battalion during Operation PERRY.
- (b) Employment of the Ontos for deep reconnaissance and patrolling while acting as a flank screening force in conjunction with small infantry units proved most effective. The Ontos were utilized as a blocking force and in a direct fire support role at night.

7. Intelligence

- a. Estimate of Enemy Strength, Location and Disposition in the Objective area
 - (1) Force Anticipated in Immediate Objective area
 - (a) Unit Location Strength Tactical Disposition

 Confirmed



DECLACORED

Village

Guerrilla

BS 5389-5489

25

Semi-automatic, Automatic small arms

Probable

P-31 Co

Unknown

60 Unknown

- (2) Intelligence information leading to Operation PERRY was compiled by this unit.
- b. Enemy Strength and Situation Actually Found as Operation was Conducted. No solid contact was established throughout the conduct of the operation. Light sniper contact was made by the western blocking forces at BS 501889 and BS 517897.
 - c. Framy Units Identified. None.
 - d. Significant Intelligence Gained.
- (1) In view of light contact, it appears the enemy reacted as expected by withdrawing from the objective area and conducting harrassing activities with mines, booby traps and sniping.
- (2) Rice caches discovered were insignificant indicating that it had already been transported from the objective area. A total of 1,500 pounds of rice was captured.
- (3) Prior information from CIT and ITT reports regarding observation points, trenchworks and emplacement of booby traps was confirmed.
- (4) Three shotguns, one belt of 7.62 ammunition and an M-14 magazine were captured. The serviceability of these items indicate their having been hidden quite some time previously and never recovered.
- of refugees after they had been screened. The availability of LVT's permitted refugees to bring an abundance of material to the refugee screening center and consequently put a strain on the transportation previously planned for. The evacuation of extra personal belongings negated the planned movement by foot for the majority of refugees to the refugee center. Additional transportation was requested for D+1 and D+2 and no further problems were encountered. 1,160 refugees were processed and transported to the refugee center. Eight were classified civil defendants and sent to BINH SON District Headquarters.

MEGLV&& MEUEU

DEGI VOGIBIEL

6. Terrain


- (1) <u>Key Terrain</u>. Few critical terrain features existed in the operation area. Those noteworthy were occupied by friendly blocking forces. See Annex C to Enclosure (1).
- (2) Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation and fields of fire were extremely poor in the objective area because of hedgerows, sugar care fields and built-up areas. The higher ground features occupied by friendly blocking forces afforded good observation of areas surrounding the three objectives.


(3) Cover and Concealment

- (a) <u>Cover</u>. Cover was limited to paddy dikes and village trenches and holes.
- (b) Concealment. Concealment was good to excellent in all areas except rice paddies. Sugar cane fields, hedgerows and heavy scrub brush throughout the area of operation comprise the types of concealment.
- (4) Obstacles. The TRA BONG River bordering the Southern edge of the operation area was fordable during the operation and presented little difficulty. The TRA BONG River is considered the enemy's route of egress from the objective area.

f. Psychological Warfare and Civic Action

- (1) Area of Operation. See Annex C to Enclosure (1).
- (2) Target Audience. Local populace.
- (3) Themes Used.
 - (a) Necessity for local populace to clear area.
 - (b) Rewards for mines and booby traps.
 - (c) Chieu Hoi.
- (4) Dissemination Media
 - (a) Aerial broadcast
 - (b) Leaflet drop
 - (c) Portable loudspeaker
 - (d) Person to person





- (5) Approximate number of persons contacted. 1,200
- (6) Total Rice Distributed. 5,000 pounds
- (7) Number of people receiving medical attention. 85
- (c) Total broadcast hours. Four hours and thirty minutes.
- (9) Narrative Conduct of Operations
- (a) 25 March 1967. Established joint psychological warfare and Civic Action unit at refugee screening center. These units met each LVT bringing refugees to the center, assisted in unloading of vehicles, re-explained the reason for the operation, dispensed medical aid, rice and water. Shelters were constructed in order to get the refugees out of the sun. Upon completion of the screening process, refugees were assisted in loading their belongings into trucks and were transported to the refugee camp. A squad of Popular Forces from BINH SON District Headquarters assisted in all phases. At 2000, the BINH TUY Village Cuief and a National Policemen conducted one and one-half hours of broadcasts reassuring the refugees remaining in the objective area that they would be well treated, the necessity for their moving, and the Chieu Hoi Program.
- (b) 26 March 1967. Shortly after first light, an aerial broadcast and leaflet drop was conducted over the objective area, again emphasizing the purpose for the operation. The leaflets dropped concerned the Rewards Fund Program, Chieu Hoi Program, and Don't Run From Marines. The procedures described in paragraph (9) (a) were continued. At 2000, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines Kit Carson Scout and BINH TUY Village Chief conducted two hours of broadcasts emphasizing the previously described themes.
- (c) 27 March 1967. Continued procedures outlined in paragraph (9) (a). Kit Carson Scout accompanied road block established to prevent refugees returning from BINH SON refugee comp to the objective area. Kit Carson conducted 45 minute broadcast explaining to refugees the reason they could not return.
- 8. <u>Mission</u>. To conduct coordinated search and destroy operations with GVN and MOK forces in the Southern portion of the assigned Battalion TAOR, BINH SON District, GUANG NGAI Province, RVN for a period of 3-4 days. To evacuate Vietnamese civilians from the VC-infiltrated objective area, to render the area ineffective as a VC harboring site, and to relocate the villagers to secure areas under GVN control as requested and coordinated with the District Chief, BINH SON District.



Dear dearened

9. Concept of Operations. See Enclosure (1) and Annex C thereto.

10. Execution

a. Manning

- 17Mar67 Initial planning commenced at direction of CO, 2nd Rn, 7th Marines.
- 19Mar67 Helicopter recon of objective area by battalion, company and supporting arms representatives.
- 21Mar67 Initial liaison made with GVN officials at BINH SON District Hq.
- (AM) 22Max67 Concept of operations submitted to CO, 7th Marines.
- (PM) 22Mar67 Information received from Hq 7th Marines that operation could not be conducted prior to 1 April.
- (AM) 23Mar67 Continued liaison for future planning conducted with 2nd ROK MC Bde and District Chief, BINH SON.
- (PM) 23Mar67 Information promulgated from HQ 7th Marines that operation must be either completed by 28 March or postponed indefinitely. Immediately initiated plans to commence operation on 25 March.
- (AM) 24Mar67 Briefing conducted for Company Commanders and Battalion Staff. Supporting unit representatives were individually briefed as they arrived.
- (PM) 24Mar67 Frag Order 2-67 published and promulgated. Four platoons from 1st Bn, 7th Marines arrived, were briefed, and were dispatched to four separate locations in the TAOR for combat base security.

 Co E commenced night overland movement to blocking positions SHERMAN and SHERIDAN and OP GRANT.

 One squad from H&S Co reinforced with 106RR and 50 cal MG moved overland to CP LINCOIN.

b. <u>D-Day</u>, 25Mar67

- 250215H OP GRANT occupied by elements of Co E.
- 250430H OP LINCOLN occupied by elements of H&S Co with 106's and 50 cal MG's.
- 250510H Blocking position SHERMAN occupied by elements of Colle.

 DECLARRIED

7



250535H Blooking position SHEHIDAN occupied by Company Command Group and elements of Co E.

250800H Bn Command Group Alfa displaced by vehicle to BS 574923. Amtracs in position at same position.

250820H ROK forces occupying blocking positions at BS 553 893, BS 560900 and BS 530901. Commenced patrolling between established blocking positions.

250850H Refugee screening center at BS 573919 established for interrogation and segregation of returning civilians. GVN officials, psywarfare and civic action personnel and equipment in place.

250900H Ontos elements commenced patrolling and screening to the North and West from BS 574923. Co H commenced search and destroy operations along axis of advance to the South/Southwest.

251015H Bn Command Group Alfa and Amtracs commenced overland movement in trace of Co H.

251100H Co H detonated 2 booby trapped M-26 grenades at BS 555 913 three minutes apart, resulting in 3 USMC WIA. Medevac requested and completed by helicopters.

251120H Co H entered Eastern portion of objective ATLANTA and, with assistance of National Police, PF's and interpreters, commenced indoctrination of refugees and their evacuation to collection point at BS 561911.

251135H Bn Command Group Alfa displaced to BS 559910.

251145H Amtracs commenced shuttling refugees with their personal belongings to screening center. Villagers with livestock moved overland in a column protected by elements of Co H.

25:500H Amtrac struck command detonated booby-trapped 155mm round at BS 568918 while proceeding Southwest from refugee screening center, resulting in 5 USMC WIA. Med evac requested and completed by combination of Amtrac and helo. Squad displaced from refugee screening center to search area, with inconclusive results.

251530H Bn Command Group alfa found 1000 lbs of rice in abandoned houses in objective allayla. Forwarded by Amtrac to refugee screening center for their use.

251550H Objective ATLANTA secured. Refugee evacuation continued.

DEVENOUNTED

DEGI VEGIEIEL

251700H Elements of Co E in blocking position SHERIDAN challenged 3 VCS at BS 546915. VCS ran, patrol fired 2 rounds 7.62, but 1 VCS escaped into underbrush. 2 detained without ID cards. Subsequent interrogation revealed information on names and positions of seven VC in objective area. Intelligence passed to refugee screening center, where VCS will be sent on 26 March.

251720H Elements of Co E on OP GRANT received 5 rounds carbine fire from 2 VC at BS 501894. Returned 30 rounds 7.62mm, enemy broke contact. Search of area produced inconclusive results.

25:745H Bn Command Group Alfa uncovered additional 500 lbs of rice in abandoned homes which will be forwarded to refugee screening center on 26 March.

251810H Co H spotted 3 VCS hiding in brush at BS 550910.

Detained VCS and forwarded to refugee screening center.

251830H Night positions established. Bn Command Group Alfa and Amtracs - Eastern portion of objective ATLANTA.

Co H, PF's and Ontos - Western portion of objective ATLANTA. Co E - blocking positions SHERMAN, SHERIDAN and OF GRANT. Squad, H&S Co with 106 and 50 call MG OF LINCOIN. ROK - blocking positions at BS 553893, BS 560900 and BS 530891. Local night ambushes established from all positions. Total refugees evacuated: 504, including 5 classified as civil defendants. Total rice captured: 1500 lbs.

252100H Co H ambush fired 2 rds 7.62 at movement in brush at BS 551909. † VCS escaped, 1 apprehended and will be sent to refugee screening center on 26 March.

252120H Elements of Co E on OP GRANT spotted lights or torches in cane field at BS 506889. Fired 4 rounds 60mm, 4 rounds 3.5, 100 rounds 7.62. Lights went out. Search of area produced inconclusive results.

c. D+1 26 March 1967

260730H Leaflet drop and aerial broadcast conducted in vicinity of objective area. Refugees collected and protected during night plus 500 lbs of rice and 1 VCS captured 25 March evacuated by amtrac to refugee screening center. Ontos commenced patrolling and screening of Northern flenk.





- 260830H Co H and PF's began sweep toward objective DECATUR.
 One plt Co H effected link-up with Co E elements at blocking position SHERIDAN, sealing VC egress route to the North.
- 260940H ROK blocking positions reported approximately 100 refugees crossing SONG TRA BONG to the South. ROK forces will gather refugees and evacuate by vehicle to BINH SON District headquarters.
- 261030H Objective DECATUR secured. Ch H established refugee collection point at BS 548897 and commenced evacuation from that point
- 261045H Patrol from Co E at blocking position SHERMAN found VC hiding in house. Detained VC for forwarding to refugee screening center.
- 261100H Bn Command Group Alfa and Amtracs displaced to BS 548897 and commenced evacuation of refugees with personal belongings from objective DECATUR.
- 26114CH Resupply completed for Co H and En Command Group Alfa plus attachments by Amtrac.
- 261235H Co H and PF's commenced sweep toward objective SAVANNAH. Amtracs continued evacuation of refugees from present positions.
- 261450H Resupply completed for Co E by helo. Resupply helos brought 3 VCS captured 25 and 26 March to refugee screening center from Co E position.
- 261500H Objective Savannah secured. Refugee evacuation continued.
- 261615H Co H patrol found house at BS 551896 reported in previously received intelligence report as VC observation post. Forwarded documents found in house to refugee screening center.
- Night positions. Bn Command Group and Amtraosobjective DECATUR. Co H and PF's-objective Savannah.

 Co E blocking positions SHERMAN, SHERDAN & OP GRANT.
 Sqd, H&S Co with 106 and 50 cal MG OP LINCOLN. ROK
 blocking positions at BS 553893, BS 560900, and BS
 530891. Untos returned to TIEN DAC combat base at
 BS 574923. Local night ambushes established from
 all positions. Total refugees evacuated: 1168, including 8 classified as civil defendants.

DEWERSON (ED

DEGINGGIEIED

262210H Co H ambush spotted 1 VCS running West at BS 536 892. Fired 1 round M-79, 20 rounds 7.62. Search of area produced inconclusive results.

d. D+2 27 March 1967

270715H Co H commenced re-sweep of all objectives from West to East, bringing with them refugee stragglers found in the area.

270810H Co H completed re-sweep of objective SAVANNAH.

270820H Co E patrol moving across rice paddies redeived 50 rds s/a fire from approximately 4 VC at BS 517 897, resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Returned 200 rds 7.62, VC broke contact and fled into brush. Search of area produced inconclusive results. Medevac recuested and completed by helo.

271000H Co E commenced overland movement from blocking position to combat base.

271010H Bn Command Group Alfa displaced to BS 574923.

271130H ROK blocking positions displaced to permanent combat base.

271145H Co H with PF's and Amtracs completed re-sweep of objective DECATUR.

271210H E&S squad with 106's and 50 cal MG's commenced overland movement from OP LINCOLN to combat base.

271310H Co H and Amtracs completed re-sweep of objective ATLANTA.

271415H Bn Command Group Alfa returned to Bn C.P.

271430H Co E, on return route to combat base, was led by Chieu Hoi to 3 shotguns, 1 M-14 magazine and 200 rds linked 7.62 ammunition at BS 478938. Captured weapons and equipment returned with patrol to combat base.

2718OCH All units returned to combat bases and all refugees in newly established refugee center. Operation PERRY secured with the following results not indicated in para 11 below: 1168 refugees (including 8 civil defendents) with personal belongings, countless pigs, cattle, chickens and ducks were evacuated and the villagers screened and relocated to a secure area under GVN control, 1500 lbs of rice were captured and evacuated.



11. Results

a. Friendly Losses

(1) Personnel USMC WIA EVAC

10

(2) Equipment

None

b. Fremy Losses

(1) Personnel

VCS

7

(2) Equipment

Pice

1500 lbs

Shotguns

3

M-14 Magazines

1

7. 52 linked ammunition


200 rds

Assorted documents

- c. No air strikes were conducted during Operation PERRY.
- 12 Administrative Matters

a. Supply

- (i) No problems concerning resupply were encountered during the operation. Only one resupply was required and this involved rations only, as water was readily available in the operation area. Co E was resupplied by thelicopter and the Command Group and Co H by attached LV12*5's.
- (2) Approximately 1500 pounds of rice and 1168 refugees were evacuated by a combination of LVTP-5's, foot march and trucks from the TAN PHUOC's to the Refugee Camp in BINH SON District.
 - (3) Support by the intrace was considered outstanding.




DECI ASSIBILE

- b. Maintenance. None.
- c. Casualties. Normal evacuation by med-evac helicopters.
- d. Transportation. Transportation was considered good, especially in view of the fact that prior arrangements which had been made for the final leg in the evacuation of refugees proved inadequate. It was planned to evacuate the refugees from the screening center by foot march, but the amount of gear carried, the very old and very young refugees necessitated the use of vehicles.
- e. Communications. Communications were adequate to support the tactical scheme of maneuver. Radio, utilizing AN/PRC-25's, linked all tactical elements including a Liaison Officer with the ROK forces and the Bn S-2 at the refugee screening center. There were no equipment failures.
- f. Medical Evacuation. No significant problems were encountered in the handling of casualties or in the availability of medical supplies. Two corpsmen remained at the refugee screening center to assist in medical care of the incoming Vietnamese civilians.

13. Commender's Analysis

- a. The success of Operation PERRY cannot be measured by the usual standards of casualties inflicted and/or sustained, weapons and equipment captured, etc. Instead, the following accomplishments indicate the value of the operation for the reasons cited:
- (1) Tri-national cooperation and coordination between U.S. Marines, ROE Marines and GVN Officials and forces efficiently implemented the evacuation of 1168 Yietnamese villagers from the objective area to a refugee screening center, where they were indoctrinated, interrogated, segregated, medically treated (as required), and relocated to a newly established refugee camp. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that not one of the evacuees suffered any injury or harm from any source during the operation.
- (2) The relocation of the refugees combined with the capture of 1500 lbs of rice and the destruction of known and suspected VC harboring sites is considered agiant stride in rendering the TAN PHUOC area ineffective for future enemy operations. The lack of habitation and the consequent denial of food, livestock and houses to the VC is expected to discourage enemy infiltration into the area because of increased logistical problems, and to decrease the recently rising sniper incidents therein.



DEGLASSIFIED

- officials, with continued USMC assistance, to exercise governmental control and protection of a segment of their population hitherto inaccessible. Effective indoctrination of these refugees should create a strong pro-government nucleus which will make its influence felt when eventual resettlement in the TaN PHUCC area is implemented.
- b. Continuous liaison with the BINH SOW District Chief and the U.S. Army Sector Advisor before, during and after Operation PERRY resulted in a coordinated, harmonious effort. Augmentation of food and shelter for the refugees has already been provided, and civic action type projects are currently being initiated to further GVN objectives. Total count of civilians now in the refugee camp is 2435, which includes those evacuated by ROK forces and those who straggled individually from outlying areas without processing through the refugee screening center. That these people relocated voluntarily is indicative of the prependerant desire to leave the TAN PHUCC area expressed by the majority of the refugees.
- c. Patrols operating in the objective area subsequent to Operation PERRY have reported little sign of enemy activity, a sharp contrast to the almost dealy sighting and/or contact experienced before the operation. This is considered a significant indication of the successful accomplishment of the mission of Operation PERRY.

15. Recommendations

- a. That future operations involving evacuation and relocation of large numbers of Vietnamese civilians rely, as Operation PERRY did, on:
- (1) Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops throughout the objective area to explain the purpose of the operation.
- (2) Heavy participation by GVN officials with the maneuver elements in the objective areas, at the refugee screening center, and in the refugee camp. Constant explanation and indoctrination, preferably with ground loudspeakers is necessary to ensure that the refugees are constantly aware of the reasons for the relocation and the sequence of events to be followed.
- (3) Availability of sufficient transportation to adequately handle the refugees and their personal belongings from the objective area to the refugee screening center and thence to the refugee camp.



Degi vegieled

b. That secut dogs not be employed in future operations of this type. The sheer numbers of refugees and the inherent confusion of the mass execus seems only to excite the dogs, negate their effective ness, and unessarily frighten the villagers.

W. P. KITTERMAN

COMPIDENTIAL

2nd Bu, 7th Mar 360 No. 079-67 Copy Bin 20 of 11000, 100 Ser. No. 014-67 2nd Bn, (-) (Bein) 7th Far CHU LAI, VIETNAM 241600H Mar 1957

FRAG ORDER 2-67 (OPERATION PERRY)

Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6739 IV

(b) 1st Mar Div OperO 301-66

(a) 7th Mer OperO 301-67 (d) 2nd Bn, 7th Mer OperO 301-66

a) 2nd Bn, 7th Mar Admin Plan 301-66 (f) let Mar Div Order PO2000, 20 (CEOI)

TIME ZONE: H

TASK ORGANIZATION, Ammer A (Tesk Organization).

4. SITUATION.

Maro

- Annex B (Intelligence). RHOMY FORGER
- Friendly Ferres
 - (1) 7th Mar continues defense of TAOR.
 - (2) Artillery
 - (a) 3rd Bn(-) (Rein), 1s; FAG, 11th Mar direct support 7th
- (b) 4th Bn(-), tet FAG, 11th Mar reinforcing 3rd Bn(-), tet PAG, 11th Mar.
- (3) Air let MAN provides helicopter and fixed wing support as requiredo
 - (4) Det, Go B, 3rd Ambrae Ba, direct support 2nd Bn, 7th Mase
- (5) Mine Clearance Flat, 3rd Antree Bn, direct support 2nd Bn, 7 th Maro

DOWNGPADED AT 3 DEAR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200, 10

CONFIDENTIAL

HE-D-Wartids
2nd Battalion, 7th harines
1st Harine Division (Hein) For
FPO San Francisco, California 90602

3: haft lop 1500 23 narch 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Company Commanders

Subja Training Schedule for 26 March - 1 April 1967

Maf: (a) Bn0 1500.3

Encls (1) Training Requirements

- 1. Companies will return Enclosure (1) by 1600 on 2 april 1967, listing on the right hand margin the number of persons actually participating in instruction.
- 2. Additional Graff subjects listed in reference (a) and covered during this training period will be included in the report of training accomplished.

Line A PREBus By direction

C/s

\vdash
闰
Н
Щ
Н
Ω
Ø
⋖
Н
O
ū
A

Subject		lirs deg	Hro Act	demarks
Map Reading Thrust Points & Terrain Application	To inorease proficiency		:	E Go &r F Go
Ambushes (site location and satting up)		1		H Co & F Co
Radio Procedure FO Procedure		1 S		M Co & F Co
Slaymore Mine UCMJ & mules of ingagement	To teach tactical employment To keep troops well informed on the UCral & dules of ingagement			H Co & F Co
Live Firing of 60mm Mortars M-60 M-14 (M-16)	To increase proficiency	2		H Co & F Co
Spot Reports	To improve reporting procedures	1		h Co & F Co
POW Handling	To insure proper handling of FOW's			h Co & F Co
	To increase proficiency and improve reporting	7		ц Co
Field Fortifications	To improve positions	20		All Coºs
50 cal Machine Gun Field Firing Safety Precontions Immediate Action	To introduce personnel to the 50 cal mi	4		HII Co.s
CW Practice RATT Operation Circuit logs & Files		2		madio Section

3: miletap 500 22 Ner 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1)

W

		T. Byp	1961
		क्षा ३ क्षां ३ ह	1500 22 Iur
1			
- 1	5		

DECLASSIFIED

Subject		geo	nrs not	kemarka	_
Field Wire Const Switchboard Operations Circuits & Reports Trouble Shooting		4		wire section	olosuro (1)
Publications (COMTAC) RATI Operations Generator Operations Internal Distribution	·	1 1 1 1		Message Center	oute
Preventative Laintainenance Comm Security (Transmission)		1		Comm Platoon	
Claymore Mine K-141 K18A1 Field Firing	To introduce personnel to the claymore mine	1 3		All Co's S-lected Pers	
Man Pack Detector (Chemical)	To produce proficient operators on company level	2		All Co's Selected Pers	

DECLASSIFIED

Subject	Training Objective	neo exi	eth Joh	. Memarks	_
	To increase proficiency	. 40		Supply Section	xe (1)
Advice Codes Routing Taentifier Code		2			inclosure
General Maintainance of 81's Gun Drill (Dey) Improve Positions	Proper maintainance Increase proficiency Maintainance of positions Increase night displacement ability	7 14 21		8: Morter Plt	- Ta
Gun Drill (Night) Care & Cleaning of 106mmdR Gun Drill Markmanship Taining 50 cal Bore Sighting of 106mmd & 50 cal	To insure proper maintainance To increase proficiency	582		106madd 5ect	
Care & Cleaning of RPT Compressor maintainance Safety Precautions	To insure proper maintainance To preclude accidents	3 2 1		Flame section	•
Driver & Rechanic CJT Rifle & Personnel Insp. Water Proofing & Fording Procedures	To increase proficiency To ensure equipment is in serviceable con- dition To review proper procedures for water proofing and fording	46		ide Te	•
Sparrowhawk & Convoy ascort Map & Compass Heading Intelligence Gathering Fire Team & Squad Tactics Search, Clear & Destroy Operations Small Arms Fire Control, Fire Discipline & Tech of	To familiarize all personnel with duties To increase proficiency To increase reporting capabilities To increase proficiency To improve eperations To increase proficiency	other with the property of the state of the		ಭ Co	•

3s mars dap 1500 25 star 1967