

HEADQUARTERS  
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
FPO, San Francisco 96601

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3:KLL:hws  
5750  
2 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology; month of November 1965

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Chronology with Attachments

1. In accordance with reference (a), the command chronology for the month of November 1965 is submitted with attachments.

*C. H. Bodley*  
C. H. BODLEY

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

552-65 Copy # 148

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# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR 3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

## A. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation and location of reporting unit: 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF, CHU LAI, Republic of VIETNAM
2. Period covered: 1-30 November 1965
3. Commanding Officer: LtCol C. H. BODIEY  
 Executive Officer: Maj H. G. BALOGH  
 S-1 Adjutant: 2ndLt G. L. GILLESPIE  
 S-2 Officer: 1stLt A. J. FORLANO (1-28 Nov)  
 S-3 Officer: Capt W. M. CLAPP (28-30 Nov)  
 S-4 Officer: Capt R. H. SCHWARTZ (1-12 Nov)  
 Communication Officer: Capt W. M. CLAPP (12-28 Nov)  
 Supply Officer: Maj R. A. CLARK (28-30 Nov)  
 Motor Transport Officer: Capt H. E. F. VONCARP  
 En Surgeon: Capt E. T. FITZGERALD  
 Bn Chaplain: 1stLt F. J. LAMURA  
 1stLt D. J. MCKIBBAN  
 Lt (MC) L. J. SHIVERS  
 Lt (ChC) R. C. BETTERS (1-21 Nov)  
 Lt (ChC) E. W. EPTS (21-30 Nov)  
 H&S Company Commander: 1stLt G. M. SCHLITZ  
 "I" Company Commander: Capt J. E. CLEMENTS  
 "K" Company Commander: Capt D. E. THOMAS  
 "L" Company Commander: Maj R. A. CLARK (1-28 Nov)  
 "M" Company Commander: 1stLt D. M. MCEWEN (28-30 Nov)  
 Capt T. G. MCFARLAND
4. Average Strength USMC: 39 Officers 985 Enlisted  
 USN: 4 Officers 58 Enlisted

## B. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

- 1-30 Nov: Continued to occupy critical and key terrain features overlooking current TAOR and conducted aggressive patrols within the TAOR.
- 1 Nov: Ordered blackout conditions between hours of 2030H through 0600H.
- 2 Nov: Retracted patrols "Roadrunner" and "Wolf" from deep within the TAOR by AMTrac at 021130H. Company E, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines relieved Company M on the right flank of the FEBA.
- 3 Nov: Operation "BLACK FERRET" (Appendix (7))
- 4 Nov: Operation "BLACK FERRET" (Appendix (7))
- 5 Nov: Operation "BLACK FERRET" (Appendix (7))

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- 6 Nov: At 11600H, Company K, regimental reserve company, was alerted for movement to Chu Lai airfield. Company K displaced and was in position at the airfield at 1900H.
- 7 Nov: At 0230H 2nd Platoon, Company I reported seeing one individual at coordinates BT 546003. Man was carrying a rifle. One M26 hand grenade was thrown at the individual. Area was searched at first light. No body was found. Company M relieved Company K at Chu Lai airfield at 1700H.
- 8 Nov: Inserted Company I deep into the TAOR, patrol "Apollo" at 0800H (Appendix (5)).
- 9 Nov: Battalion civil affairs team commenced training for selected young men and women as hamlet corpsmen and nurses.
- 10 Nov: Conducted Marine Corps Birthday festivities.
- 11 Nov: Brigadier General PLATT visited this Command at 111045H. The general remained for dinner and departed at 111230H.
- 12 Nov: Civil affairs team administered medical aid to 32 villagers in TRI BINH (4) and 41 villagers in TRI BINH (1).
- 13 Nov: At 131230H Battalion Civil Affairs Officer returned from TRI BINH (1) with two guides from that area who were willing to lead Company I into position around TRI BINH (4) and point out VC in that village. Company I and guide departed at 131615H for movement to TRI BINH (4).
- 14 Nov: Commencing at 140645H Company I searched and cleared TRI BINH (4). Native guides, upon entering village, claimed all VC had left. Company I returned to patrol status at 141200H.
- 15 Nov: Companies K and L continued with aggressive patrolling out to 700 meters forward of the FEBA.
- 16 Nov: At 160900H Company K relieved Company M of the defensive positions at the Chu Lai airstrip. Company M assumed the duties of the patrolling company and established patrol bases "Majestic" and "Misty" at 161630H.
- 17 Nov: At 2300H the Battalion was notified by 7th Marines of the possibility of assuming a 16 hour alert status. Company M was called in from patrol status. Company H, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and the Regimental Provisional Company relieved Companies L and K of front line positions at 171200H. Major General WALT visited the Battalion CP. The alert was called off at 171630H. Companies L and K returned to the front lines and relieved Company H, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines and the Regimental Provisional Company at 171730H. Company M assumed deep patrol status. 12 UH-34's landed at LZ ROBIN (Execution of Wing Dispersal Plan) at 172000H and departed at 180700H.
- 18 Nov: Company M departed for TRI BINH (4) to conduct a search and clear operation at 1945H. Company K evacuated one man to "B" Med for snake bite. At 2007H Company M air evacuated one man to "B" Med for possible neck injury.

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- 19 Nov: At 0430H Company M was in ambush position around TRI BINH (4). At 0645H one platoon of Company K and one platoon of Company L joined Company M for search and clear of village. At 1100H 52 VCS were taken from TRI BINH (4) to Chu Lai POW Compound for interrogation. At 1320H civil affairs team conducted activities at TRI BINH (1). At 2210H the Battalion was put on a six hour alert.
- 20 Nov: At 1200H Company M relieved Company K of left flank of front line positions. At 1830H Company K departed the Battalion CP to assume patrols "Kangaroo" and "Koala".
- 21 Nov: Company K returned to Battalion CP at 0630H. At 1200H the Battalion Commander issued order to depart by helicopter at 1400H to relieve or reinforce elements of ARVN 2nd Infantry Division in HIEP DUC area, vicinity coordinates AT 9225. At 1300H Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and Company H, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines had relieved Companies M and L of front line positions. At 1415H Company L departed LZ ROBIN. At 1445H Company L returned to LZ ROBIN because of inclement weather. The operation was postponed (Appendix (5)).
- 22 Nov: At 1400H the Battalion was notified by 7th Marines that we were on a one-half hour alert to relieve or reinforce elements of 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN in the DUC PHUOC area, vicinity coordinates BS 757470. At 1610H Company L departed LZ ROBIN. By 1830H all of Company L, one-half of Company K and forward Command group had conducted an unopposed landing at vicinity coordinates BS 757470 (Appendix (8)).
- 23 Nov: Operation "Relief of TRACH TRU Village complex" (Appendix (8)).
- 24 Nov: Commenced retraction from Operation "Relief of TRACH TRA Village complex". Retraction was completed at 1530H. By 1800H Companies L and M had returned to front line positions. Company K departed CP area to continue with patrols "Kangaroo" and "Koala".
- 25 Nov: Company K continued to aggressively conduct activities from patrols "Kangaroo" and "Koala". Brigadier General PLATT arrived at 1445H. Civil affairs team conducted activities in TRI BINH (1).
- 26 Nov: Patrols "Kangaroo" and "Koala" continued to conduct activities forward of the FEBA.
- 27 Nov: Patrols "Kangaroo" and "Koala" returned to the Battalion CP at 0800H. Company K assumed positions of right flank company at 1200H and Company L assumed role of deep patrol company. Patrols "Lynx" and "Lion" departed at 1730H. Civil affairs was conducted in village of AN THIEN. Company L established an outpost ("Leopard") at vicinity coordinates BS 572965 at 1805H.
- 28 Nov: Received notice from 7th Marines that the 3000 meter patrol limit had been lifted. Patrols "Lion" and "Lynx" continued to operate. Patrol "Lynx" suffered one friendly WIA when pursuing a VC. The VC escaped. VC equipment captured included: Black powder, pack, hand grenades and other items of equipment.

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29 Nov: Patrols "Lion", "Lynx", and "Leopard" continued their patrolling activities forward of the FEBA.

30 Nov: Nothing significant occurred.

#### C. DOCUMENTS

1. Operation Order 10-65 (Appendix 1)
2. ✓ Operation Plan 4-65 (Appendix 2)  
✓ Operation Plan 6-65 (Appendix 3)  
✓ Operation Plan 7-65 (Appendix 4)
3. ✓ Frag Order 5-65 (Appendix 5)  
✓ Frag Order 6-65 (Appendix 6)
4. ✓ After Action Report "BLACK HERRET" (Appendix 7)  
✓ After Action Report Operation "Relief of TRACH TRU Village Complex" (Appendix 8)
5. ✓ Overlays of Battalion Position 1 (Appendix 9)  
✓ Overlays of Battalion Position 2 (Appendix 10)  
✓ Overlays of Battalion Position 3 (Appendix 11)  
✓ Overlays of Battalion Position 4 (Appendix 12)

ENCLOSURE (1)

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Div OperO 321A-65  
(b) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 9-65  
(c) MAPS: AMS Series L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6756 III, IV

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

3rd Bn, 7th Mar Log

023-65 Copy #21/50

Ser: 063-65

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).b. Friendly forces(1) Ground

(a) 7th Marines

(b) 4th Marines

(c) Co C, 1st Recon Bn

(2) Artillery. See Annex G (Artillery).(3) Air

(a) MAG-T2

(b) MAG-36

(4) ARVN Forces(a) CIDG Company, ARVN

1. Commencing at L hour + 90 minutes on D-day, land in LZ ROCHESTER, vicinity BS 445950. Secure LZ and extend over eastern end of zone of action. See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay).

2. Search and clear zone in northwesterly direction.

3. Effect juncture of forces with Company M at Linkup Point #1, vicinity BS 431955. See annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay).

4. Be prepared for further operations in target area on order.

5. Be prepared for retraction on order.

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(Appendix 1)

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2. MISSION. To search and clear the TINH TRUNG Valley and contiguous high ground of VC supplies, personnel, and installations.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. The mission will be accomplished through the employment of a hammer and anvil operation utilizing one rifle company and one company of ARVN infantry. Initially, the rifle company will land in a landing zone on the high ground in the northwest section of the target area. This company will establish a patrol base in the vicinity of the landing zone, fan patrol from this base as well as establish blocking positions at the head (northwestern end) of the TINH TRUNG Valley. Following this landing, the ARVN company will land in a zone in the eastern end of the valley and sweep west. A juncture of forces will be accomplished at the western end of the valley. Division Recon will establish an OP on Hill 294 from 17 through 20 November and one on the ridge to the north of the target area from 18 through 21 November. In the event that VC troop dispositions are discovered beyond the capability of available forces that an additional reinforced rifle company will be maintained in an alert status to be introduced into the area.

b. Company M (-)(Rein)

- (1) Commencing at L-hour on D-day, land in LZ ALBANY (BS 419966). Secure LZ and establish patrol base in that vicinity. Conduct fan patrolling to determine possible VC activity (See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay)).
- (2) Establish blocking positions southeast of the LZ to deny VC egress from the northwestern end of the TINH TRUNG Valley.
- (3) On order, search and clear zone in southeasterly direction.
- (4) Effect juncture of forces with ARVN force at Linkup Point #1 (BS 431955) (See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay)).
- (5) Be prepared for further operations in target area on order.
- (6) Be prepared for retraction on order.

c. 81mm Mort Plat (-)

- (1) Land in LZ ALBANY, vicinity BS 419966, with one section (rein). Establish firing positions at coordinates to be announced.
- (2) Displace on order to vicinity of Linkup Point #1.
- (3) Be prepared for further operations on order.
- (4) Be prepared for retraction on order.

d. 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

- (1) Attach one team to Company M to assist in mine clearance and demolitions.

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e. H&S Co (-) (Rain)

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- (1) Commencing at L hour + 45 minutes, land in LZ ALBANY (BS 427954).
- (2) Establish, coordinate, defend and supervise internal management of the Battalion CP.
- (3) CA/PsyWar Detachment
  - (a) Conduct civil affairs and psychological warfare activities.
  - (b) Conduct activities to influence and win the Vietnamese people to the cause of the legally constituted government of Vietnam

f. Coordinating instructions

- (1) D-day - TBA
  - (2) L-hour - TBA
  - (3) Unclassified code name of operation - "CHARLES ATLAS"
  - (4) Rules of engagement - See reference (b)
  - (5) Company M and ARVN juncture at Linkup Point #1 (BS 531955).
  - (6) Retraction - TBA
  - (7) Restricted targets
    - (a) There will be no indiscriminate firing into populated areas.
    - (b) There will be no firing into villages of populated areas without the express consent of the cognizant commander.
    - (c) The burning of buildings and huts will not be permitted without the express consent of the Battalion Commander.
  - (8) Reports. Immediate replies will be made on all requests of information from this Headquarters and timely reports will be made on the below indicated occasions.
    - (a) When initial helilift is completed and the reporting unit is prepared to move.
    - (b) Company location on request.
    - (c) All enemy sightings.
    - (d) All enemy contacts.
1. Use SALUTE format.

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(a) Cave discoveries.

1. Use CAVES format.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICSa. Supply(1) General

(a) Supply procedures - Routine.

(b) Prescribed loads

1. Class I - Three meals MCI per individual.

2. Class II - Combat essential, two days.

3. Class V - Basic allowance.

4. Water - local.

(2) Supplies and equipment available

(a) Prescribed loads.

(b) Battalion assets located at LZ ROBIN.

(3) Control and distribution

(a) Supplies will be requested via the Rapid Request format of the Battalion S-4 located within the CP group.

(b) Unit distribution.

(c) No stockage in field.

(4) Resupply. By helicopter upon request.(5) Salvage, captured, and excess material

(a) Evacuate via Battalion CP group.

(b) Transportation on request.

b. Evacuation and Hospitalization(1) Evacuation. Via helicopter upon request.

(a) Serious to "B" Med.

(b) Non-serious to Battalion CP (Rear)

(c) Wounded civilians to QUANG NGAI.

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- (a) Wounded VC to QUANG NGAI under guard.
- (2) Hospitalization. As directed by Commanding Officer of facility to which evacuated.
- c. Transportation. Limited helicopters available.
- d. Personnel. Routine
- e. Civil Affairs/PsyWarfare. Civil affairs and PsyWarfare teams will proceed on order to designated hamlets and conduct civil affairs/psy-warfare operations. Civil affairs/PsyWarfare will basically provide for civilian medical attention, collection on control of the local populace to preclude their obstruction of military operations and gathering of intelligence information concerning VC and booby traps in the area of operation, and to win the support of the local populace.
- f. Miscellaneous
  - (1) H&S Company will establish a liaison section at "B" Med.
  - (2) Excess personal property secured in Battalion CP (Rear)
  - (3) Uniform and equipment - Normal.
  - (4) Treat all local water prior to consumption.

## 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

### a. Radio

- (1) Primary means of communication will be radio.
- (2) Activate all standard Battalion nets together with the following at H-1:
  - (a) A station at the forward and rear Battalion CP's or the Regimental Command Net (2116 D-1).
  - (b) Battalion Admin Net (44.8 D-222).
- (3) TACF local will be on 44.4 D-219.
- (4) ARVN Company will activate a station on the Battalion Tactical Net (45.2 D-225).
- (5) Battalion CP (Fwd)-will suffix their call sign with the word "forward" on the Regimental Command Net.

### b. Wire

- (1) Limited wire will be installed within the Battalion CP (Fwd)
- (2) At night, if terrain and distance permit, Company M, 81mm Mortar Section and Battalion (-) CP will be tied in by wire.

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c. Message Center

- (1) Issue local shackle and authentication tables prior to the operation for the duration of the operation.
- (2) KAA-60 and KAC-138 will be used for communications exterior to the Battalion.

d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Bring three batteries per radio.
- (2) Limit repair facility available at Battalion CP (Fwd).
- (3) Batteries (BB-451) will be recharged at Battalion CP (Rear).
- (4) Visual signals will be in accordance with 3rd MarDiv msg 041304Z and locally produced SOP's and devices.
- (5) Battalion CP (Fwd) coordinates - TBA.

C. H. BODLEY

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
CommandingANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operation Overlay
- D - Fire Support Coordination
- E - Artillery
- F - Air Support
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution)

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

3rd Bn, 7th Marines

LtCol BODLEY

Co M (Rein)

Capt MACFARLAND

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Det Med Plat, H&S Co  
FAC Tm, H&S Co  
Interpreter, H&S Co  
Det CA/PsyWar Tm, H&S Co  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

Lt SCHLITZ

Interpreter, H&S Co  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
Det EOD

Btry M, 4th Bn, 12th Mar

Capt BLACK

81mm Mort Plat (-)

Lt HARPER

*C. H. Bodley*  
C. H. BODLEY

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 10-65

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A-1

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS Series L701 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 III and 6756 IV  
(b) DivC P3800.1E (Intelligence SOP)

Time Zone: H

# 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).
- b. See current ISUM's and intelligence briefs.

# 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Are the VC using the objective area as a part of an infiltration route? If so, what trails and roads do they use? Particular emphasis to the TINH TRUNG Valley area.
- b. Are the VC using the objective area as a logistical support area? If so, what type logistical support are they providing? What distribution and evacuation routes are used.
- c. What is the strength, location, and unit designation of VC units operating in the objective area? Are these forces Main Force or Local Force units?
- d. What supply caches, communication facilities, billeting facilities, and training facilities do the VC maintain in this area?
- e. What is the location and size of likely helicopter landing zones in the objective area? Particular emphasis to the TINH TRUNG Valley and surrounding mountains.
- f. Do the VC have an anti-aircraft defensive system in the objective area? If so, what weapons are used in this defense? How is this defense coordinated and controlled?

# 3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

## a. Orders to subordinate units

### (1) Rifle companies

- (a) Search out all supply caches, defensive positions, command and communications installations in assigned zone of responsibility reporting location, type and quantity of supplies, equipment and documents located therein to this Headquarters (S-2).
- (b) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and observation missions on order.

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(2) Detachment 3rd Platoon, Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion

- (a) Provide detailed technical information on all VC mines, booby traps, fortifications, caves and tunnels encountered.
- (b) Conduct engineering reconnaissance missions as directed.

(3) Detachment EOD Team

- (a) Be prepared to disarm and remove all VC explosive ordnance of intelligence interest.
- (b) Provide detailed technical analysis on the functioning and construction of all VC mines and booby traps encountered.

(4) All units, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rein)

- (a) Report to this Headquarters (S-2) attitudes and degree of any passive or overt hostility shown by the civil populace towards friendly forces.
- (b) Thoroughly search out assigned areas of responsibility for hidden food caches, arms, and other types of supply caches reporting location, type of cache, and quantity of supplies to this Headquarters (S-2).

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and supporting units(1) 7th Marines (Rein)

- (a) Provide current and predicted weather reports to this Headquarters daily during the period of operation.
- (b) Provide aerial photo coverage and IR's as requested.
- (c) Provide information on enemy units outside the objective area that are capable of reinforcing units in the objective area.

(2) Division A0 Section. Provide tactical aerial observation support over the objective area as requested.4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIALSa. Prisoners

- (1) Reference (b) applies.
- (2) Battalion S-2 personnel will screen all captives at the Battalion POW Compound. Coordinates of the compound will be announced.
- (3) Captives will be evacuated under guard to the Battalion POW Compound by the most expeditious transportation available. Under no circumstances will captives be brought into the Battalion CP.

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- (4) Prisoners will be bound at the wrists and blindfolded prior to evacuation to the Battalion POW Compound.
- (5) All prisoners will be tagged with a card showing capturing unit, location, time, and circumstances of capture.
- (6) Every effort will be made to induct captives to assist friendly forces in locating hidden supply caches, command installations, and arms factories.

b. Captured material

(1) Captured weapons

- (a) A spot report will be made to the S-2 immediately upon capture of any enemy weapons. This report will indicate the time, date, and location of capture, the capturing unit, and type, make, and quantity of weapons captured.
- (b) Each individual weapon captured will be tagged. This tag will show the date, time, and location of capture, the capturing unit, and name, rank, and serial number of the individual responsible for capture.
- (c) All captured weapons will be evacuated to the Battalion CP under guard. The guard will carry an inventory of the weapons he is escorting. Upon delivery of weapons the S-4 will provide the guard with a receipt for each weapon and be directed to return to his unit.

(2) Food stuffs

- (a) Capture of any food stuffs will be reported to this Headquarters. Reports will include the following information: Type and quantity of food captured, location and circumstances of capture.
- (b) Caches of food stuffs of sufficient quantity to justify evacuation, will be evacuated to the Battalion CP for redistribution by the civil affairs team or for evacuation to higher headquarters.

- (3) Other captured material. All other captured material will be evacuated to the Battalion CP by the most expeditious means available unless the size or quantity of the material prohibits evacuation. In this instance, samples of the material will be evacuated or sketches will be made of the material, and forwarded to the Battalion CP. All material sent to the Battalion CP will be tagged with a card showing time and location of capture, capturing unit, and circumstances of capture. Enemy radio equipment captured will be handled in the same manner as captured enemy weapons (Spot reports are required).

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5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHSa. Maps

- (1) Reference (a) is designated the standard tactical map for this operation.
- (2) Requests for additional maps will be made to this Headquarters (S-2).

b. Photographs

- (1) Photographs will be distributed as available.
- (2) Requests for aerial photographs will be made to this Headquarters (S-2).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. Reference (b) applies.
- b. Passwords and countersigns to be issued.

7. REPORTS DISTRIBUTION

- a. Spot reports will be submitted as soon after the occurrence of an event of intelligence interest as possible. Spot reports will be followed up with amplifying reports as additional information becomes available.
- b. Spot Report Format - See Div(Fwd)O 3100.1
  - (1) ALPHA - Unit reporting
  - (2) BRAVO - Local DTG
  - (3) CHARLIE - Location (Six digit coordinates)
  - (4) DELTA - Incident (Describe exactly what occurred)
  - (5) ECHO - Action taken as a result of DELTA
  - (6) GOXTROT - Friendly KIA
  - (7) GOLF - Friendly WIA
  - (8) HOTEL - Friendly MIA
  - (9) INDIA - VC KIA
  - (10) JULIETT - VC WIA
  - (11) KILO - VCC

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(12) LIMA - VCS

(13) MIKE - Weapons captured

(14) NOVEMBER - Equipment, documents, material captured

- c. A SALUTE report may be used for initial reporting, which will be followed by a completed Spot Report.

  
C. H. BODLEY

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

APPENDIX

1 - Intelligence Estimate

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 10-65

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation  
Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS Series L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 III and 6756 IV

Time Zone: H

1. MISSION. To conduct a search and clear operation in conjunction with  
CIDG Company, ARVN in the west central portion of the BINH SON District.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather

- (1) See weather forecasts as issued.
- (2) During the period of operations the weather is not expected to affect the enemy's capabilities. Prolonged heavy rains and low hanging clouds will effect helicopter resupply, observations, and communications.
- (3) Trafficability of trails for foot troops will not be affected by weather except during very heavy rains when trails can be expected to form a natural runoff for the excess water.
- (4) High humidities and/or high temperatures can be expected to slow down personnel particularly in close, densely vegetated, or steep terrain.
- (5) Precipitation in varying degrees can be expected and precautions to protect personnel and equipment must be taken.
- (6) Astronomical data - To be issued.

b. Terrain

- (1) Relief and vegetation. Relief in the area of operations consists of three basic types: flat paddy lands, brush covered rolling hills, and heavy jungle on steep mountain slopes.
  - (a) Paddy lands can normally be expected to be flooded at this season. This condition will limit movement through paddies, but not on paths along dikes or the edges of the paddies. The crops will be in varying conditions of growth from fresh plantings to mature fields.
  - (b) The brush covered hills are primarily on the eastern side of the area of operations. This brush consists of very thick bushes rising to a maximum height of about ten feet. Small paths intertwine throughout.

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- (c) The western sector of the objective area consists primarily of steep jungle covered mountains. Trails are usually bordered by extremely thick vegetation. The jungle canopy is dense and the high prevailing covered and concealed movement. Off trail movement will be extremely difficult.

(3) Critical terrain features

- (a) Village of TAY PHUOC (2) - Fortified village (BS 499948).  
 (b) Trail running east to west from BS 525957 to BS 423958  
 (c) Trail running south to northeast from BS 478918 to BS 482948  
 (d) Hill 261 (BS 455944)  
 (e) Hill 294 (BS 453956)  
 (f) Hill mass - BS 499965 to BS 425975

3. ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Composition. The VC forces in the area are probably elements of the 192nd (Main Force) Battalion, an unidentified Battalion (Main Force), and the T-19 Company (Local Force). There are also local guerrillas throughout the area.

(1) Strength

(a) 192nd Bn	Est 350
(b) U/I Bn	Est 350
(c) T-19 Co	Est 100
(d) Local guerrillas	Est 250
Total:	1050

(2) Combat Efficiency

- (a) 192nd Bn - Unknown  
 (b) U/I Bn - Unknown  
 (c) T-19 Co - Unknown

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- b. Disposition. See Tab A (Enemy Situation) for last reported location of VC units.

- c. Arms and Armament. Unknown.

- d. Recent and present activities. The enemy activity in the area of operations has been to collect rice tax and continue to control the population. In accomplishing this the VC have been operating in small, widely separated groups. These forces withdrew to the foothills in the THO AN Valley and the mountains to the west of the THO AN upon the approach of any sizable Marine force.

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- e. Time and space. The normal mobility of lightly equipped VC units would enable all VC forces in the objective area to withdraw from present locations to more defensive terrain immediately after receiving warning of U.S. operations. Distances of such terrain generally north and west of THO AN vary from one-half to five miles.
- f. Peculiarities and weaknesses. The reported units are largely main force and retain the advantage of support of the local population. They could blend with the civilians as a first step in withdrawal. They are susceptible to all forms of supporting fires unless they are in prepared defensive positions. Their only defense against air attack is small arms. Their weakness in combat power is directly proportional to our superiority in mobility and fire power. Surprise operations against them could create confusion because of inflexibility of their plans.

#### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

##### a. Enumeration

- (1) To withdraw present forces in the objective area fighting rear guard actions as necessary in withdrawing west or north at any time.
- (2) To defend in the objective area where located with all available forces.
- (3) To counterattack friendly forces in the area.

##### b. Analysis and discussion

- (1) Capability (1) - The enemy could choose to affect this capability at any time prior to the completed positioning of friendly forces. If he were to affect this capability it would only partly affect the accomplishment of our mission since we could not completely destroy his force.
- (2) Capability (2) - If he chooses to defend the objective area in his present positions, he will enhance our mission by allowing us to destroy his forces in place and concentrate our fire power on his strongest points of defense.
- (3) Capability (3) - The enemy does possess the capability to mass forces and to counter-attack our forces. However, in doing so, he will expose himself to our air power and may risk defeat without affecting the accomplishment of our mission.

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

- a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities. It is felt that the enemy will adopt capability (1). In effecting capability (1) it would allow him to escape from the objective area with his main strength intact. He also has indicated by past actions a reluctance to engage U.S. Forces in a direct confrontation.

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the commander's mission. In effecting capability (1) the VC would partially hinder the accomplishment of our mission.

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TAB

A - Enemy Situation Overlay

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


B-1-4

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

90  
44  
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Tab A (Enemy Situation) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to  
Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAP: VIETNAM, Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 III and 6756 IV

Time Zone: H



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
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 150800H Nov 1965

Annex 9 (Concept of Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAP: AMS Series 1701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6756 IXL, IV

Time Zone: H



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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAPS, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701, Sheets 6756 I, IV;  
6757 II, III  
(b) FMFM 7-1

Time Zone: H.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly forces. See Annex E (Artillery).

2. MISSION. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines FSCC will exercise overall responsibility for coordinating and planning conventional fires supporting the elements of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in this operation, thereby insuring maximum effective fire support and troop safety to all units operating in the zone of action.

3. EXECUTION. In accordance with reference (b).

4. TARGET INFORMATION

- a. Restricted targets. Villages and populated areas will not be fired upon except on order of the cognizant commander and only then when encountering organized resistance. Scattered sniper fire does not constitute organized resistance.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air sentries and lookouts

- (1) Air sentries will be positioned at artillery units and will check fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (2) Artillery forward observers will check fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery will endanger friendly aircraft.
- (3) Unless special coordination measures are prescribed, fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of insuring the safety of helicopters.

6. ILLUMINATION. The primary means of illumination will be by artillery and organic weapons on an "on call" basis.



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7. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

- a. A Fire Coordination Line has been established as shown in Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay). No fires will be placed across this line without the approval of this Headquarters. This approval must be voiced - silence does not mean consent.
- b. The nature of this operation is such that the following "No Fire Line" has been established: From BS 4098 to BS 5098 to BS 5088 to BS 4088 to BS 4098. No rounds will be fired outside of this area without approval from higher Headquarters.
- c. It is imperative that this Headquarters be kept informed of the front line positions of all units at all times. Front line position reports will be submitted by forward observers to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines FSCC as soon as practicable after each unit displacement.

8. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. Primary means of communication will be by radio.
  - (1) Primary conduct of fire frequency for artillery will be D-147. Alternate conduct of fire frequency will be D-163.
  - (2) 81mm mortar conduct of fire frequency will be D-333.
- b. Command posts. With Company M CP.



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 160800H Nov 1965

Annex E (Artillery) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6756 I, IV, 6757 II, III  
 (b) 3rd MarDiv OperO 321A-65  
 (c) FMFM 7-4  
 (d) 3rd Bn, 12 Mar ArtyGru OperO 321-65

Time Zone: H

### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex D (Intelligence) and ISUM's as issued.
- b. Friendly forces
  - (1) Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).
  - (2) Annex F (Air Support).
- c. Attachments and detachments. None.

2. MISSION. Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines on D-1 will displace two pieces to proceed from CHU LAI position to a firing position in vicinity BS 537023 and provide artillery support for 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines operations.

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of artillery employment
  - (1) Battery M will occupy a firing position to be designated in vicinity BS 537023 and provide direct artillery support of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines operations. Azimuth of fire will be 4150.
  - (2) Reinforcing fires will be available as required from medium and heavy caliber weapons of the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines Artillery Group.
- b. Coordinating instructions
  - (1) D-day - TBA
  - (2) Firing Chart - Grid Sheet 1:25,000
  - (3) Registration will be accomplished on D-1.
  - (4) Survey firing position will be surveyed in prior to occupation of position.
  - (5) Meteorological Data - To be furnished by 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines Artillery Group.

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- (6) Ammunition Restrictions - No more than 80 percent of available supply rate will be expended without approval of 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See paragraph 4 to Operation Order 10-65.
- b. Primary conduct of fire frequency will be D-147. Alternate conduct of fire frequency will be D-163.
- c. Command posts - Report location when established.

*CHB*

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Annex F (Air Support) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) MAP: AMS Series L701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 III, IV  
(b) FMFM-3 (Air Support)  
(c) FMFM 7-1 (Fire Support Coordination)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly forces
  - (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
  - (2) 1st MAW provides tactical air support, air assault and airborne command/control capability as required.

2. PROCEDURES

- a. Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines establishes bomblines, no fire lines, and fire coordination lines and publishes changes there-to as they occur (See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay)).
- b. Air-to-ground strikes within the objective area must be under positive control of TACP, TAC(A), or ASRT.
- c. Coordination of supporting fires in accordance with references (b) and (c). See Annex D (Fire Support Coordination).
- d. Mark friendly front lines with front line marking panels and/or colored smoke in accordance with paragraph 5 of Operation Order 10-65 prior to executing air-to-ground strikes.
- e. Every effort should be made to mark enemy air targets with red smoke or WP.
- f. Use target designator grid UTM contained in reference (a) for all air support missions.
- g. Preplanned requests for both fixed wing and helicopter in support of preplanned operations should be submitted to the Battalion ALO prior to 1700 each day.
- h. On-call requests for both fixed wing and helicopters will be relayed by the FAC to the Battalion ALO over the TACP net or any other alternate means available.

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## 1. Target area: Weather minimums:

	<u>Flts of 4 or more</u>	<u>Less</u>
Helicopter (Day)	1500'-5 Miles	500'-1 Mile
Helicopter (Night)	1500'-5 Miles	500'-2 Miles
Day Visual Close Air Support	3000'-5 Miles	
Visual Aerial Delivery	1000'-3 Miles	
Fixed Wing Observation	500'-2 Miles	
ASRT Missions	No Restrictions	

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. See paragraph 5 of Operation Order 10-65.
- b. FSOC will be in the vicinity of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP.

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APPENDIXES

- 1 - Conduct of Helicopter Operations
- 2 - Air Operations Overlay (To be issued)

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Appendix 1 (Concept of Helicopter Operations) to Annex F (Air Support) to  
Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar Communication-Electronics SOP

Time Zone: H

1. All landing sites will be marked as directed in reference (a). They will be at minimum, 60 paces on each side.
2. Mission priority for Med-Evacs will be as follows:
  - a. Emergency (Critical)
  - b. Priority (Serious)
  - c. Routine (Evac not required immediately)
3. FAC's will advise all Med-Evac flights of the best approach and retirement routes to and from the pick-up point to reduce the hazards of hostile ground fire. Every effort will be made to provide Med-Evac flights with friendly suppressive fires, ground or air, during the pick-up phase.
4. Units operation without FAC teams will forward Med-Evac requests to the Battalion ALO via the Battalion Tactical Net. Prior to the Battalion CP's establishment, Med-Evac requests may be relayed through a unit with a FAC team attached.



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CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
160800H Nov 1965

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF COPIES
CMC	2
MCLFDC	2
CG, FMF Pac	2
CG, III MAF	1
CG, FMAW	1
CG, 3rd MarDiv	5
ADC, 3rd MarDiv	1
CO, 7th Mar	3
CO, 4th Mar	1
CO, 3rd Bn, 7th Mar	24
CO, 1st Engr Bn	1
CO, 2nd Inf Div, ARVN	1
CO, Btry M, 4th Bn, 11th Mar	1
CIDG CO, ARVN	2
BINH SON LNO	2
FILE	1
TOTAL	50

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ERRATA: Add to paragraph 3.b.

- (4) Provide one platoon for a reserve element/CP security.
- (a) This platoon will screen an area from coordinates BS 575970 southwest on the road to THANH TRA (1) to coordinates BS 567963.
  - (b) Establish a perimeter defense in the vicinity of coordinates BS 567963.

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
011300H November 1965

*Operation PLAN 4-65*

Ref: (a) Div OperO 321A-65  
(b) 7th Mar Oplan 332-65  
(c) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 8-65  
(d) MAPS: AMS L701, VIETNAM Sheets 6756 I and 6756 II

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

*500-65* Copy # *12/65*

*Ln: 0053-65*

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

*RD 3120.1A*

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly forces.
  - (1) Ground. See reference (c).
  - (2) Air. Annex G (Air Support).
  - (3) Artillery. Annex F (Artillery) of reference (c).
  - (4) RVN Forces.
    - (a) Elements of 2nd Infantry Division ARVN, establish blocking positions along north and south bank of the SONG TRA BONG River and to the west of the objective area.
    - (b) PF and WF units in target area will withdraw to Route #1 at L-hour. On request both elements will be available to assist in search and clear operations.
    - (c) Attachments and detachments. Annex A to reference (c).
  - (5) Co C (-), 1st Recon Bn.
    - (a) H-hour on D-day will insert one platoon via helicopter in Landing Zone ALBATROSS to screen to the west of objective area.
    - (b) H-hour on D-day will insert one platoon via helicopter in Landing Zone CONDOR to screen to the north of the objective area.
  - (6) 1st Bn. 7th Mar. At H-hour on D-day 1st Battalion, 7th Marines will move to an assembly area on Route #1 and conduct a search and clear operation to the southwest in conjunction with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines.

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*(Appendix (2))*



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2. MISSION. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein), in conjunction with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) and forces of the 2nd Infantry Division, will conduct search and clear operation in the con-

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operation. Commencing H-hour on D-day the Battalion (-)(Rein) will be transported by AMTracs and 6X6 trucks to three assembly areas on Route #1, vicinity coordinates BS 583953, BS 585950, and BS588945. On order, the Battalion with three companies abreast and one in reserve will commence a search and clear operation to the southwest in the assigned zone of action (See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay)).
- b. Co I (-)(Rein).
- (1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day conduct a simultaneous and coordinated sweep of the Battalion zone of action. On order cross LOD and search and clear villages CHAU TU (3), PHUOC AN (2), PHUOC AN (1) and PHU LE (2). See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay).
  - (2) Provide right flank security for the Battalion until reaching Phase Line LEMON.
  - (3) Be prepared to revert to Battalion reserve upon reaching Phase Line LEMON.
- c. Co K (-)(Rein).
- (1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day conduct a simultaneous and coordinated sweep of the Battalion zone of action. On order cross the LOD and search and clear villages of CHAU TU (4), northern section of PHU LE (1). See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay).
  - (2) Assume right flank security upon crossing Phase Line LEMON.
- d. Co M (-)(Rein).
- (1) Commencing at H-hour on D-day conduct a simultaneous and coordinated sweep of the Battalion zone of action. On order cross the LOD and search and clear village of CHAU TU (6) and the southern portion of PHU LE (1). See Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay).
  - (2) Establish contact with the right flank company of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.
- e. Co L (-)(Rein). Regimental reserve. Reference (b) applies.
- f. 81mm Mort Plat.
- (1) Provide general support to the rifle companies.

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- (2) Establish initial firing positions vicinity coordinates to be announced.

g. 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn.

- (1) Attach one squad to each of the assault companies.  
 (2) Platoon headquarters remains in general support of the Battalion.

h. H&S Co (-)(Rein).

- (1) Establish, coordinate, defend and supervise internal management of the Battalion CP.  
 (2) Location of CP - TBA.  
 (3) Conduct CA and PsyWar activities.

i. Civil Affairs/PsyWar Detachment.

- (1) Conduct activities to influence and win the Vietnamese people to the cause of the legally constituted government of Vietnam.  
 (2) To assist military personnel in the accomplishment of their tactical goals.

j. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) D-day - TBA 3 Nov  
 (2) H-hour - TBA  
 (3) Cross LOD - 0900  
 (4) The unclassified code name for this operation is "BLACK FERRET".  
 (5) Rules of engagement - See reference (a).  
 (6) Contact will be from left to right.  
 (7) Sweep will commence on order.  
 (8) Restricted targets.  
 (a) There will be no indiscriminate firing into populated areas.  
 (b) There will be no firing into villages or populated areas without the express consent of the cognizant commander and only then when receiving fire from organized resistance in the village or area.

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(c) The burning of buildings and huts will not be conducted without the express consent of the Battalion Commander.

(9) Reports. Immediate replies will be made on all requests of information from this Headquarters and timely reports will be made on the below indicated occasions.

(a) When in position to cross Line Of Departure

(b) Arrival at each phase line.

(c) Company location on request.

(d) All sightings of enemy.

(e) All enemy contacts.

1. Use SALUTE format.

(f) Cave discoveries.

1. Use CAVES format.

(10) Coordination of units' movement will be effected by use of phase lines and objectives.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

##### a. Supply.

##### (1) General.

##### (a) Supply sources.

1. Prior to D-day - Normal.

2. In the objective area - LSA at coordinates BS 572965.

##### (b) Prescribed loads.

1. Class I. Three meals MCI with fuel per individual, two canteens of water.

2. Class II. Combat essential equipment as prescribed by commanders to include three days of halazone/iodine tablets and one days supply of dry cell batteries.

3. Class III and IV. None.

4. Class V. Basic allowance.

a. Engr Plat. One satchel explosive per MOS 1971.

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b. Medical supplies.

- 1' One Unit #1 per corpsman.
- 2' Three days supply of salt tablets.
- 3' Stretchers. As required by unit commanders.
- 4' BAS. Carry initial allowance plus three days supply of high usage items

(2) Supplies and equipment available.

- (a) Prescribed loads.
- (b) Logistics support area supplies. See Annex B to reference (b).
- (c) Resupply from Battalion (Rear). Organize stocks at Battalion CP (Rear), coordinates BS 538023.

(3) Control and distribution.

- (a) Units will requisition additional or resupply materials from the Battalion Supply Officer located within the Battalion CP group.
- (b) The Battalion Supply Officer will maintain a minimum of five day's resupply of Classes I and IV and two day's supply of dry cell batteries in the Battalion CP (Rear).
- (c) Unit distribution by helicopter will be utilized.

(4) Resupply.

- (a) The first resupply of Classes I, II, and IV materials will be furnished upon request on the evening of D-day.
- (b) Subsequent resupply will be upon request on a daily basis, emergency resupply anytime.
- (c) Requests for resupply should be submitted at least five hours prior to delivery and should include what, how much, when, and where the supplies are desired. Landing zone instructions and markings are required. If the requesting unit intends to return other materials on the delivering aircraft, this information should be included in the request.
- (d) Water cans must be returned to the Battalion Supply Officer as soon as practical after they are emptied.

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Evacuation and Hospitalization.(1) Evacuation.

- (a) Serious casualties and KIA's will be evacuated via helicopter to Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion. Requests will follow the "MEDEVAC" format.
- (b) Minor casualties will be evacuated to the BAS in the Battalion CP (Rear) via air. Request evacuation from the Battalion Command group (Fwd).
- (c) A BAS (Fwd) will be located with the Command group.
- (d) Seriously wounded Vietnamese may be evacuated to "B" Med.

(2) Hospitalization. Personnel requiring hospitalization will be evacuated to Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion.(3) Preventive medicine. Commanders will insure that all local water to be consumed is purified, that personnel take adequate salt tablets, and that personal hygiene is stressed throughout the operation. All trash will be buried.c. Transportation.

- (1) To objective area - Via 16 trucks (6X6) and 8 AMTracs.
- (2) The LSA (BS 575965) is accessible from the Battalion CP (Rear) via Route #1 (Vehicles) should the requirement arise.

d. Services.(1) Maintenance.

- (a) Second echelon communication-electronics maintenance will be available upon request to the Battalion Communications Officer.
- (b) Second and third echelon ordnance maintenance will be requested via the Battalion Supply Officer.

(2) Water points.

- (a) A water point is established in the Battalion CP (Rear).
- (b) A water point will be operated by Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion (-)(Rein) in the LSA (BS 575965).

(3) Salvage, excess, and captured material.

- (a) Salvage, excess, and captured material will be handled in accordance with Division Order 4000.16.

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- (b) Material should be safeguarded to prevent both unnecessary damage and its falling into enemy control.
- (c) All material of the above categories will be reported to the Battalion CP (Fwd) for information and assistance in evacuation.
- (4) Personnel. Annex D (Personnel) to reference (c).
- (5) Miscellaneous.
  - (a) Rear echelon.
    - 1. CP at coordinates BS 538023.
    - 2. Officer in charge. Lieutenant G. M. SCHLITZ (False 34).
  - (b) Excess equipment will be left in the Battalion CP (Rear) under guard.
  - (c) Commanders will exercise strict control over the use and conservation of water cans.
  - (d) Personal effects and government property will be handled in accordance with current regulations. The Battalion Supply Officer will make arrangements to recover and evacuate the above items with the casualty.
  - (e) Routine administration will be carried out by those members of the command not employed in this operation.
  - (f) Uniform and equipment. The uniform will be utilities, normal arms, marching pack, helmet (green side out), and body armor, upper torso.
- 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.
  - a. See Annex H to reference (c).
  - b. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP to be announced.

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Commanding

ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operation Overlay
- D - Personnel (See reference (c))

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- E - Base Support Coordination (See reference (c))
- F - Artillery (See reference (c))
- G - Air Support
- H - Communication-Electronics (See reference (c))
- X - Distribution

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
011300H November 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 4-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

3rd Bn, 7th Mar (-)(Rein)

LtCol BODLEY

Co I (-)(Rein)

Capt CLEMENTS

Arty FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
81mm FO Tm, H&S Co  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

Co K (-)(Rein)

Capt THOMAS

Arty FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
81mm FO Tm, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

Co M (-)(Rein)

Capt MCFARLAND

Arty FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
81mm FO Tm, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

Lt SANDERS

Det Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
CA Tm GVN  
PsyWar Tm GVN

81mm Mort Plat (-)

Lt HARPER

*C. H. Bodley*

C. H. BODLEY  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, SOUTH VIETNAM  
040800 November 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L701: Edition 2: Scale 1:50,000; sheets  
6756-I and IV, and 6757-II and III.  
(b) 3rd MarDivO P3800.1E

Time zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. See Appendix (1) (Enemy Situation Overlay) and Appendix (2) (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence)
- b. Current Intelligence reports and ISUMS as issued.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. What enemy units are located in the objective area? Particular attention to size, type, and unit identification.
- b. What are the locations of supply caches in the objective area? Particular attention to type supplies and quantity.
- c. What anti-air capability does the enemy possess? Particular attention to type weapons and locations.
- d. What enemy units are located immediately outside the objective area? Particular attention to area West of the SUOI SAU river.
- e. What is the attitude of the civil population in the objective area? If hostile, will this attitude be passive or active.
- f. Will the enemy attempt to defend in the objective area? If so, where and in what strength?
- g. Will the enemy counterattack our forces in the objective area? If so, where and in what strength?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

- a. Orders to subordinate units.

(1) RIFLE COMPANIES

- (a) Search out all supply caches, defensive positions, command and communications installations in assigned zone of responsibility reporting location, type and quantity of supplies, equipment and documents located therein to this headquarters (attn: 3-2)

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- (b) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and observation missions on order.

(2) 3RD PLATOON, "C" COMPANY, 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION

- (a) Provide detailed technical information on all VC mines, booby traps, fortifications, caves, and tunnels encountered.
- (b) Conduct engineer reconnaissance as directed.

(3) ALL UNITS 3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES (REIN)

- (a) Report to this headquarters (attn: S-2) attitudes and degree of any passive hostility shown towards friendly forces.
- (b) Thoroughly search out assigned areas of responsibility for hidden food, arms, and other types of supply caches reporting the location, type of cache, and quantity of supplies to this headquarters (attn: S-2)

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and supporting units

(1) 7th MARINES (-) (REIN)

- (a) Provide current and predicted weather reports to this headquarters daily during the period of operation.
- (b) Provide aerial photo coverage and IRs as requested.
- (c) Provide information on enemy units outside the objective area that are capable of reinforcing units in the area of operation.
- (d) Provide search results of all supply caches and command and communications installations located in ARVN area of operations.

c. Coordinating Instructions. See Appendix 3 (Coordinating Instructions) to this Annex.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIALS.

a. Prisoners.

- (1) Reference (b) applies.
- (2) Battalion S-2 personnel will screen all captives at the Battalion POW compound. Coordinates will be announced upon establishment of the compound.

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- (3) Captives will be evacuated under guard from the place of capture to the Battalion POW compound by the most expeditious transportation available. Under no circumstances will POWs be brought into the Battalion C.P.
- (4) Specific command attention will be exercised to insure compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of POWs.
- (5) POWs will be bound at the wrists and blindfolded prior to evacuation to the Battalion POW compound.
- (6) All prisoners will be tagged with a card showing the capturing unit, location, time, and circumstances of capture.
- (7) Every effort will be made to induce captives to assist friendly units in locating hidden supply caches, command installations, and arms factories.

b. Captured documents

(1) Captured Weapons

- (a) A spot report will be made to the S-2 immediately upon capture of any enemy weapons. This report will indicate the time, date, time, and location of capture, the capturing unit, and ~~and~~ type, make, and quantity of weapons captured.
- (b) Each individual weapon captured will be tagged. This tag will show the date, time, and location of capture, the capturing unit, and name, rank, and serial number of the individual responsible for capture.
- (c) All captured weapons will be evacuated to the Battalion C.P. under guard. The guard will carry an inventory of the weapons he is escorting. Upon delivery of weapons the S-2 will provide the guard with a receipt for each weapon and be directed to return to his unit.

(2) Food Stuffs

- (a) Capture of any food stuffs will be reported to this headquarters. Reports will include the following information: Type and quantity of food captured, location and circumstances of capture.

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(b) Caches of food stuffs of sufficient quantity to justify evacuation will be evacuated to the Battalion C.P. for redistribution by the Civil Affairs Team or for evacuation to higher headquarters.

(3) Other captured material All other captured material will be evacuated to the Battalion C.P. by the most expeditious means available unless the size or quantity of the material prohibits evacuation. In this instance samples of the material will be evacuated or sketches will be made of the material, and forwarded to the Battalion C.P. All material sent to the Battalion C.P. will be tagged with a card showing time and location of capture, capturing unit, and circumstances of capture. Enemy radio equipment captured will be handled in the same manner as captured enemy weapons (Spot reports are required).

#### 5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

##### a. Maps

- (1) Reference (a) is designated the standard tactical map for this operation.
- (2) Requests for additional maps will be made to this headquarters (attn: S-2)

##### b. Photographs


- (1) Photographs will be distributed as available.
- (2) Requests for aerial photographs will be made to this headquarters.

#### 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. Reference (b) applies.
- b. Passwords and Countersigns. To be issued.

#### 7. REPORTS DISTRIBUTION

- a. Spot reports will be submitted as soon after the occurrence of an event of intelligence interest as possible. Spot reports will be followed up with amplifying reports as additional information becomes available.
- b. See Annex 3 (Coordinating Instructions) to this Annex.


  
 C. H. BODLEY  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

#### APPENDICES

1. Enemy Situation Overlay
2. Intelligence Estimate
3. Coordinating Instructions
4. Passwords and Countersigns (To be issued).

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X (Distribution) to Operation Order 10-65.

Appendix 1 (Enemy Situation Overlay) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 10-65



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Headquarters, 3rd Bn 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, SOUTH VIETNAM  
010800 November 1965

Appendix 2 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) Maps MS L701; scale 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 II, III and 6756 I,  
IV.

Time zone: H

# 1. MISSION

- a. Basic Mission. To conduct a search and clear operation in assigned zone in the central portion of BINH SON district, southwesterly.
- b. Previous Decisions. To execute an overland assault from the vicinity of Route 1 Southwest.

## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

### a. Weather

- (1) See weather forecasts as issued.
- (2) During the period of operations the weather is not expected to affect the enemy's capabilities. Prolonged heavy rains in the objective area would limit use of helicopters and close air support and would seriously affect the trafficability of terrain for tracked and wheeled vehicles.
- (3) Astronomical Data for Period of Operations To be issued.

### b. Terrain.

- (1) Relief. Relief of the area is predominately characterized by flat rice paddy/dry crops type of terrain interdicted by numerous brushwood covered knolls, the latter of which are the primary location for the small but scattered built up areas (hamlets).
- (2) Drainage Drainage of the area is accomplished by the SONG TRA BONG which drains in a northerly direction and several small streams draining into the SONG TRA BONG (See reference

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- (3) Vegetation Vegetation throughout the area is dry crop vegetation and brushwood (approximately 25 per cent) the latter of which is found on the dispersed knolls and hills of the area. Rain forest type vegetation is lacking. Recent rainfalls have increased the growth and vegetation throughout the area.
- (4) Surface Materials The objective area contains three basic types of surface materials; some sand along the banks of the SONG TRA BONG; marshy area of alluvial soil throughout the objective area, and loose soil over laterite constituting the remainder of the area.
- (5) Critical Terrain Features
- (a) PHUOC AN (1) and (2) BS570944 and 573946
  - (b) PHU LE (2) centered at BS565938
  - (c) Hill 57 BS532924
- (6) Observation and Fields of Fire Long range observation and fields of fire for small arms should be good, being restricted only by possible paddy dikes and localized trees and brush in built-up areas. Short range observation is considered to be excellent throughout the objective area. Hill 57 and the hill mass running southwest to northeast affords excellent observation and fields of fire over the southwestern portion of the objective area.
- (7) Obstacles
- (a) The SONG TRA BONG is an obstacle to north-south movement.
  - (b) The hill mass running southwest-northeast (BS5392) to (BS5796) is an obstacle to north-south movement, especially vehicular.
  - (c) The wet rice paddies are obstacles to tracked and wheeled vehicles.
- (8) Avenues of Approach See reference (a).
- (9) Routes of Communication See reference (a).

c. Politics/Sociology All indications support the conclusion that the objective area is under VC control. The civil population in the area will be of no immediate assistance to a friendly force and will probably give the VC active support.

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3. ENEMY SITUATION

- a. Composition. The Viet Cong forces in the area of operations probably are the 192 (Main Force) battalion, the T-19 company (Local Force), and another unidentified Main Force company plus local guerrillas.

(1) Strength and Combat Efficiency

(a) 192 Bn	Est 350
(b) U/I Co	Est 100
(c) T-19	Est 100
(d) Guerrillas	<u>Est 200</u>

Total	750
-------	-----

(2) Combat Efficiency

(a) 192	Unknown
(b) U/I Co	Unknown
(c) T-19 Co (LF)	Unknown

- b. Disposition See Appendix 1 (Enemy Situation Overlay) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operations Order 10-65.

- c. Arms and armament Unknown

d. Recent and Present Activities

- (1) The enemy activity in the objective area has been to harass USMC and ARVN positions, to collect rice tax and continue to control the population. They also may have a mission to insure safe travel for a suspected supply route through the area under their control in BINH SON District.

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e. Time and Space The normal mobility of lightly equipped VC units would enable all forces to move from present locations to more defensive terrain within two hours after receiving warning of U.S. Operations. Distances to such terrain generally north and west vary from one half to five miles from reported unit locations.

f. PECULARITIES AND WEAKNESSES. The reported units are largely main force and retain the advantage of support of the local population. They could blend with the civilians as a first step in withdrawal. They are susceptible to all forms of supporting fires unless they are in prepared defensive positions. Their only defense against air attack is small arms except for a suspected AA position south of the objective area in vicinity of B-5588. Their weakness in combat power is directly proportional to our superiority in mobility and fire power. Surprise operations against them could create confusion because of inflexibility in their plans.

#### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

##### a. Enumeration

- (1) To withdraw present forces in the objective area fighting rear guard actions as necessary in withdrawing west, or south at any time.
- (2) To defend in the objective area where located with one local force company, one main force company and two main force battalions supported by local guerrillas.
- (3) To counterattack friendly forces in the objective area.

##### b. Analysis and Discussion

- (1) Capability (1). The enemy could choose to affect this capability at any time prior to the completed positioning of friendly forces. If he were to affect this capability it would only partly affect the accomplishment of our mission since we could not completely destroy his force.
- (2) Capability (2). If he chooses to defend the objective area in his present positions, he will enhance our mission by allowing us to destroy his forces in place and concentrate our firepower on his strongest points of defense.
- (3) Capability (3). The enemy does possess the capability to counter-attack our forces, however in doing so, he will expose himself to our air power and may risk defeat without affecting the accomplishment of our mission.

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5. CONCLUSIONS

- a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities. It is felt that the enemy will adopt capability (1). In effecting capability (1) it would allow him to escape from the objective area with his main strength intact. He also has indicated by past actions a reluctance to engage U.S. Forces in a direct confrontation.
- b. Effect of enemy capabilities on the Commander's Mission. In effecting capability (1) the VC would partially hinder the accomplishment of our mission.



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Headquarters, 3rd Bn 7th Marines  
 CHU LAI, SOUTH VIETNAM  
 010300 November 1965

Appendix 3 (Coordinating Instructions) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
 Operation Order 10-65

Ref: (a) 7th Marines Operation Order 332-65

(b) Div(Fwd)O 3100.1 of 22 May 1965 w/Change 1

Time Zone: H

1. Reports.

a. ISUMS

- (1) Format for ISUMS is contained in 3d MarDivO P3800.1E. Reporting of enemy KIA's, estimated KIA's and WIA's actual and estimated WIA's, VCS, VCC, captured weapons and equipment and weapons will be in this manner:

Total this period\_\_\_\_\_.

Cumulative total to date\_\_\_\_\_.

b. SPOT REPORTS

- (1) See reference (b).  
 (2) Spot reports will answer as completely as possible the following questions.

WHO

WHAT

WHERE

WHEN

WHAT ACTION WAS OR IS BEING TAKEN.

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Amplifying reports will be submitted detailing information on spot reports when required.

- (3) Spot reports shall also be used to report the following:

(a) Captured Personnel

(b) Captured Weapons and Communication Equipment

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- (d) Captured Materials
  - (e) Reporting of supply caches, installations and caves.
  - (f) Viet Cong killed or wounded
- c. ITT AND CI REPORTS. ITT and CI personnel shall submit to this headquarters and the capturing unit a copy of all interrogations as soon as possible after each interrogation.
2. CAPTURED VCS AND VCC's
- a. All VCS and VCC's captured during this operation will be sent to the Battalion collection point, (location to be announced) after, repeat: after, first being screened by the capturing unit.
  - b. ITT personnel will rescreen all prisoners at the Regimental collection point in the LSA prior to being evacuated to the CHU LAI compound at BT 547053.
  - c. No, repeat: No, VCS or VCC will be sent to any other place other than specified herein.
  - d. Wounded VCS or VCC will be evacuated through medical channels with a report to this headquarters on location of capture, time and date captured, circumstances of capture and place of evacuation.
  - e. Helicopter unit commanders supporting this operation shall insure that all flight crew personnel are thoroughly briefed on the procedure contained herein and on the location of the CHU LAI POW COMPOUND.
3. AERIAL OBSERVATION REQUESTS
- a. Aerial observation will be available upon request
  - b. All requests for aerial observation missions or photographs will be made to this headquarters. Upon approval of request the requesting unit will be notified.
4. PERTINENT INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL UNITS
- a. All captured VCS and VCC's shall be tagged, showing the location date and time of capture, circumstances of capture and capturing unit.

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- b. All captured documents taken from a prisoner shall be tagged and identified with and evacuated with the prisoner.
- c. All other captured documents shall be tagged showing the location, time and date of capture, circumstances of capture and capturing unit or individual.
- d. All captured weapons, and other transportable material shall be tagged showing location of capture, time and date of capture circumstances of capture, capturing unit or individual.
- e. No captured VCS, VCC, weapon or material shall be evacuated to the Battalion collection point without being tagged as described in paragraph 4.a. through 4.d.



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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
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
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3rd MAW  
 8th MAW  
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Annex C (Concept of Operation Overlay) to Operation Plan A-65

Ref: (a) MAP: AMS 1701, VIETNAM Sheets 6734 I, II

Time Zone: H



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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
011300H November 1965

Annex G (Air Support) to Operation Plan 4-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS L701, VIETNAM 1:50,000, Sheets 6756 I, IV; 6757 II, III  
(b) FMFM 7-3  
(c) FMFM 7-1  
(d) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 8-65

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Oplan 4-65.
- b. Friendly forces.
  - (1) See Annex A (Task Organization) to Oplan 4-65.
  - (2) 1st MAF provides tactical air support to include offensive air support and air assault as required.

2. PROCEDURES.

- a. Commanding Officer, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) establishes bomblines and/or no fire lines and publishes changes thereto as they occur.
- b. Air-to-ground strikes within the objective area must be under positive control of TACP, TAC(A), or ASRT.
- c. Coordination of supporting fires in accordance with references (b) and (c). See Annex E (Supporting Arms) of reference (d).
- d. Mark friendly front lines with front line marking panels and/or colored smoke prior to executing air-to-ground strikes.
- e. Use target designator grid (UTM) contained in reference (a) for all air support missions.
- f. Mission request procedures.
  - (1) Pre-planned missions should be submitted to the Battalion Air Officer by 1600 each day. In the event additional pre-planned missions are required, they should be submitted to the ALO prior to five hours before the mission is desired. All other missions will be considered "on call".

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- (a) Fixed wing. Requests for fixed wing air support will be submitted to the ALO to be forwarded to the DASC (Fwd). The tactical air request form will be used.
- (b) Helicopters. Requests for on-call helicopter support will be submitted to the ALO to be forwarded to the DASC (Fwd). The Helicopter Request Form will be used. Line

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8.g of the Helicopter Request Form will designate the most secure approach route and if landing zone is secure. If the request is for a medical evacuation, the helicopter MEDEVAC Request Form will be utilized.

- (c) Aerial Reconnaissance (Visual/Photo). Request for on-call visual and photo reconnaissance missions will be submitted to Division G-2 AO (Representative located in the 3th Marines (-)(Rein) Headquarters) via the most direct means.

(3) <u>Target area weather minimums</u>	<u>Flights of 4 or More Less</u>	
Helicopter (Day)	1500' - 5 miles	500' - 1 mile
Helicopter (Night)	1500' - 5 miles	500' - 2 miles
Day Visual Close Air Support	3000' - 5 miles	
Visual Aerial Delivery	1000' - 3 miles	
Fixed Wing Observation	500' - 2 miles	
ASRT Missions	No Restrictions	

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS. See Annex H (Communication-Electronics) to reference (c). FSCC and DASC (Fwd) will be in the vicinity of 7th Marines (-)(Rein) Headquarters during the offensive phase.



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Commanding

#### APPENDICES

- 1 - Conduct of Helicopter Operations (See Appendix 3 to Annex G to reference (d)).

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
011300H November 1965

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Ref: None

Time Zone: H


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CMC	1
MCLFDC	1
CG, FMFPac	1
CG, FMAW	2
CG, 3rdMarDiv	2
ADC, 3rdMarDiv	2
CO, 7th Mar	3
CO, 4th Mar	1
CO, 2nd Bn, 4th Mar	1
CO, 1st Bn, 4th Mar	1
CO, 3rd Bn, 7th Mar	28 30
CO, 3rd Bn, 10th Mar	2
FLSU #1	1
BINH SON LNO	1
<u>FILES</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>52</u>



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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
030800H November 1965

# Operation Plan 6-65

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000 L701, Sheets 6757 I, II, III, IV  
(b) 7th Mar Oplan 328-65  
(c) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 5-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 5-65

## 1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUM's.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Artillery. 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines.

(2) Infantry units.

(a) 4th Marines.

(b) 7th Marines.

(3) Direct support units.

(a) 3rd Plat, Co B, 1st Tk Bn.

(b) 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st AT Bn.

(c) 3rd Plat, Co A, 3rd AMTrac Bn.

(4) Air.

(a) MAG-36 (Helicopter support).

(b) MAG-12 (Close air support).

2. MISSION. To provide one reinforced rifle company to carry out missions as Regimental/Battalion reserve.

## 3. EXECUTION.

a. Each company that is designated the Regimental/Battalion reserve will be on a stand-by alert status and prepared to accomplish the following requirements on order:

(1) Have one reinforced platoon with an FO capability on a 20 minute alert to act as a heliborne strike force. This unit is primarily designed to come to the assistance of or reinforce elements of the Division Reconnaissance Battalion but may be used, in addition, to strike at targets of opportunity within the Regimental TAOR or RAOR.

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(Appendix 3)

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- (2) Have one platoon on a 20 minute alert to act as an overland strike force. This unit will also be prepared to support the requirements of paragraph 3.a.(1).
- (3) Have one reinforced heliborne squad on a 15 minute alert to provide security for downed helicopters. A second squad will assume a stand-by posture upon deployment of the first squad. The Platoon Commander will accompany the first squad to determine the requirements for additional security.
- (4) Have one platoon prepared to act as a reaction force in the event the Battalion CP should be attacked. Upon call, this unit will assemble in its own quartering area and be deployed by the H&S Commandant through the Unit Commander.
- (5) One platoon will assist in the night perimeter security of the Battalion CP when not otherwise committed.

b. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Companies conduct route reconnaissance and necessary rehearsals to insure readiness for rapid deployment by helicopter or overland transportation.
- (2) When designated as reserve company, be prepared to assemble in designated assembly area and organize for immediate employment upon notification from this Headquarters (S-3).
- (3) When designated as reserve company, be prepared to receive one section of tanks, one section of Ontos, and one platoon of LVT's upon notification from this Headquarters (S-3).
- (4) The designated assembly area for the reserve company and attached units, when alerted, is Helicopter Landing Zone ROBIN, BS 538023.
- (5) The reserve company will be committed only on order of the Battalion Commander/Regimental Commander.
- (6) Rounds will not be chambered while in the CP area or while aboard helicopters.
- (7) On arrival in target area communicate immediately via Battalion Tactical Net for current enemy disposition and orientation.
- (8) Company Commander will deploy with his second platoon. Guidance as to operational control in each case will be promulgated by this Headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Prescribed load.

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- (1) Class I - Three MIO's per individual.
- (2) Class II - T/E combat essential.
- (3) Classes III and IV - N/A.
- (4) Class V - Basic allowance plus:
  - (a) Four aircraft flares.
  - (b) Eight illumination flares.
  - (c) Twelve red, yellow, and green smoke grenades.
- (5) Water - Two full canteens, three days supply of halazone tablets.

b. Resupply. Unit distribution.

- (1) Request helicopter resupply four hours in advance.
- (2) Use Company HST personnel for landing zone control.

c. Evacuation. Request helicopter evacuation of serious casualties only when the evacuation will not prevent accomplishment of the mission.

d. Personnel.

- (1) Sufficient personnel will remain in the CP (Rear) to operate a company administrative rear.
- (2) S-1 and S-3 will be kept advised of the number of personnel committed in the execution of each mission.

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- (3) Helicopter manifest cards will be prepared in advance. In the event of helicopter deployment, cards will be turned in to landing zone control personnel prior to embarkation.

e. Miscellaneous.

- (1) Uniform. Utilities, boots, helmet (camouflage cover - green side out).
- (2) Equipment. Light marching pack with entrenching tool, poncho, cartridge belt, two canteens, jungle kits, bayonet, and body armor, upper torso.
  - (a) Hand grenades will be issued immediately prior to deployment.
  - (b) One strobe light, two flashlights with red filters, and four VS-6 air panels will be carried by the deployed unit in order to mark helicopter landing zones by day or night.

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

- a. AN/PRC-10's will be used by all deployed units for communications with Battalion rear. Battalion Tactical Net will be used. The first unit to deploy will carry an RC-292.
- b. Erect RC-292 if unable to communicate with Battalion CP.
- c. Be prepared to switch to alternate frequency if receiving interference.
- d. Each separate unit deployed must be contactable on the Battalion Tactical Net.
- e. Shackle sheets will be drawn immediately after being alerted for deployment.



C. H. BODLEY  
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Commanding

ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex B (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-65

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
030800H November 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 6-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective on order)

3rd Bn, 7th Mar

LtCol BODLEY

Co

Det Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Arty FO Tm

Det H&S Co

Sect, 81mm Mort Plat

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat

Det Med Plat

FAC Tm

Det Co B, 1st Tk Bn

Plat, Co A, 3rd AMTrac Bn

Det Co C, 1st AT Bn

Sect, Plat

*C. H. Bodley*

C. H. BODLEY

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
 CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
 030800H November 1965

Annex B (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

ORGANIZATION

NUMBER OF COPIES

CMC  
 MCLFDC  
 CG, III MAF  
 CG, 3rdMarDiv  
 ADC, 3rdMarDiv  
 CO, 7th Mar  
 CO, 4th Mar  
 CO, 1st Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 3rd Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 CO, Co B, 1st Tk Bn  
 CO, Co C, 1st AT Bn  
 CO, Co A, 3rd AMTrac Bn  
 CO, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

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FILES  
 TOTAL

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
170800H Nov 1965

S-1

## Operation Plan 7-65

- Ref: (a) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 5-65  
(b) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 3-65  
(c) 7th Mar OperO 327-65  
(d) 7th Mar OperO 308-65  
(e) 7th Mar OperO 329-65

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

526-65 Copy #22955

Ser: 066-65

## Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy forces. To be announced.b. Friendly forces

(1) CTC 76/78 conducts amphibious raids along the coast of RVN.

(2) U.S. field forces, Vietnam conduct tactical operations in II and III Corps Tactical Zone (ITZ).

(3) ARVN continues operations against the VC in areas of responsibility.

(4) FMAW will be prepared to provide necessary airlift and aerial resupply for assigned forces.

(5) 7th Marines will provide necessary strike forces to:

(a) Conduct offensive operations and/or relieve or reinforce committed units.

(b) 4th Marines (-)(Rein) will continue to occupy assigned TAOR and FEBA.

c. Attachments and detachments

(1) See Annex A (Task Organization).

(2) Effective on order.

d. Assumption. That there is a requirement for one infantry battalion (-)(rein) to relieve or reinforce units to be designated.

2. MISSION. This Battalion will be prepared to relieve or reinforce units to be designated, via the most expeditious means. On order, be prepared to execute this plan within a 16 hour period.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operation. In accordance with reference (e) this Battalion will be prepared to relieve or reinforce units to be designated via the most expeditious means to include transportation to the objective area by fixed wing aircraft, helicopter, or overland transportation.



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b. Right Flank Company. On execution of this plan, be prepared to be relieved on line by elements of the Regimental Provisional Battalion.

c. Left Flank Company

(1) On execution of this plan, be prepared to be relieved on line by elements of the Regimental Provisional Battalion.

(2) Continue to occupy Perch #1.

d. Airfield Defense Company. On execution of this plan, continue to occupy positions in defense of the CHU LAI airstrip.

e. Patrol Company. On execution of this plan, return to this CP by the most expeditious means available and prepare for embarkation.

f. Headquarters and Service Company (-). Upon execution of this plan, be prepared to provide the necessary personnel to support this plan.

g. Howtar Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines. Upon execution of this plan:

(1) Be prepared to deploy by the most expeditious means to an embarkation point to be designated.

(2) Be prepared to provide direct support of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines for future operations to be designated.

h. 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

(1) Upon execution of this plan, be prepared to move to point of embarkation as designated.

(2) Be prepared to provide surveillance and intelligence activities as required.

i. Det HST, 1st SP Bn. Upon execution of this plan, be prepared to assist in emplaning and deplaning operations at landing zones and air terminals to be announced.

j. Det Co C, 1st Engr Bn. Upon execution of this plan, be prepared to provide general or direct support in the destruction and clearing of booby traps, mine fields, and VC emplacements.

k. Coordinating instructions

(1) Regimental Provisional Battalion will relieve two front line companies and the Battalion staff.

(2) L-hour - TBA

(3) D-day - TBA

(4) Assembly area - LZ ROBIN (BS 537027)

(5) Upon execution, submit status reports every two hours (See RegtO 3120.1).

(6) This plan effective for planning on receipt and for execution on order.

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4. ADMINISTRATIVE LOGISTICS. See Administrative Plan 7-65,
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS. See Annex B (Communication-Electronics).

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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
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ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Communication-Electronics
- Z - Distribution

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
170800H Nov 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 7-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective on order)

3rd Bn, 7th Marines

LtCol BODLEY

H&S Co (-)(Rein)

Lt SCHLITZ

Det Comm Co, Hq Bn  
Arty Ln, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Shore Fire Control Party, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Co I (Rein)

Capt CLEMENTS

Co I  
FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det HST, 1st SP Bn  
Det Engr, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

Co K (Rein)

Capt THOMAS

Co K  
FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det HST, 1st SP Bn  
Det Engr, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

Co L (Rein)

Capt \_\_\_\_\_

Co L  
FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det HST, 1st SP Bn  
Det Engr, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

Co M (Rein)

Capt MCFARLAND

Co M  
FO Tm, Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det HST, 1st SP Bn  
Det Engr, Co C, 1st Engr Bn

81mm Mort Plat (-), 3

Lt HARPER

Howtar Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt ROBERTS

3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Recon Bn

Lt NASH

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3rd Bn [REDACTED] 7th Marines  
 CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
 170800H Nov 1965

Annex B (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 7-65

Ref: (a) Annex G (Communication-Electronics) to 3rd MarDiv OperO 321A-65  
 (b) 3rd MarDiv Communication SOP

Time Zone: H

# 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy forces. See current ISUM's.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) See Annex A (Task Organization).

(2) Command Posts: - TBA

2. MISSION. To install, operate, and maintain communications in support of the Battalion 16 hour mount-out from the CHU LAI area and in the objective area.

# 3. EXECUTION

a. Radio section

(1) Activate all internal Battalion circuits in accordance with reference (b) upon arrival in objective area.

(2) Activate necessary circuits to control embarkation/enplaning and movement to beach or airfield.

(3) Frequencies and call signs in accordance with reference (a).

(4) Be prepared to mount-out certain radio vehicles provided the necessary aircraft are available.

(5) In the event radio vehicles are brought into the objective area, be prepared to enter the FMF mobile command net.

b. Wire section

(1) Be prepared to install and operate a limited wire system within the Battalion CP to include teletype.

(2) Be prepared to lay wire to Company CP's if time and the tactical situation permits.

Message center section

(1) Be prepared to issue current editions of KAC-138 and KAA-60.

(2) Be prepared to activate KW-7 teletype circuit provided aircraft availability allows radio vehicles to be brought into the objective area.

B-1

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- d. Radio relay. Be prepared to activate radio relay circuit to either adjacent Marine or Army units as directed.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Administrative Plan 7-65.
- b. Bring three batteries per radio.
- c. Limited second echelon repair with the Battalion CP.
- d. BB-451 batteries will be recharged with the Battalion CP if aircraft can lift the necessary power source.



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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
 CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
 170800H Nov 1965

Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 7-65

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

ORGANIZATION

NUMBER OF COPIES

CMC (AO3H)  
 MCLFDC  
 CG, FMFPac  
 CG, III MAF  
 CG, FMAW  
 CG, 3rd MarDiv  
 CO, 4th Marines  
 CO, 7th Marines  
 CO, 1st Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 2nd Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 2nd Bn, 4th Mar  
 CO, 3rd Bn, 7th Mar  
 CO, 1st Recon Bn  
 CO, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 CO, 2nd Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn  
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C. H. BODLEY  
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CO  
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
052200H November 1965

Frag Order 5-65 (Company I Combat Patrol)

Ref: (a) MAP L701, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Sheet 6756 IV  
(b) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar FragO 4-65  
(c) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 5-65

Time Zone: H

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

50665 Copy # 1424

Su: 054-65

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISUM's.
- b. Friendly forces. See reference (b).
- c. Attachments. See reference (b).

2. MISSION. To conduct aggressive patrolling activities in an assigned zone of action to include sweeps, search and clear, ambushes, outpost, listening post, reconnaissance patrols and civil affairs in the central section of the BINH SON district. See: Annex A (Operation Overlay).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of operations. At L-hour on D-day land in Landing Zone FINCH and conduct search and clear activities and movements in accordance with Annex A (Operation Overlay). Be prepared to retract on D+6 from Landing Zone FINCH.
- b. Coordinating instructions.
  - (1) L-hour - 0800
  - (2) D-day - 3 November 1965
  - (3) Rules of engagement in accordance with reference (c).
  - (4) Landing Zone FINCH - BS 532952
  - (5) Code name for this patrol will be "APOLLO"
  - (6) Resupply will be at 0900H daily
  - (7) Reports required.
    - (a) SPOTREP - Upon contact
    - (b) SALUTERE - As required
    - (d) CAVEREP - As required
    - (d) POSREP - Every four hours and upon request

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See reference (b).
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS. See Communication SOP.



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Commanding

ANNEX

A - Operation Overlay

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SUTEX A (Operation Overlay) to FragO 5-65


Ref: (a) MAPS: AMS L761 Vietnam Sheets  
6756 IV

Time Zone: H

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines

Chu Lai RVN

052200H November 1965



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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
121200H November 1965

Frag Order 6-65

Ref: (a) 3rd Bn, 7th Mar OperO 8-65  
(b) MAP: AMS 1701, VIETNAM, Sheet 6757 II

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

81mm Mort FO Tm  
Arty FO Tm  
CA Tm

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

519-65 Copy # 116/22

Sn: 061-65

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. See current ISUM's.
- b. Friendly forces. No change.

2. MISSION. To search and clear TRI BINH (4), coordinates BS 559975, for five VC reported living in that village.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Move two platoons overland to positions (See Operation Overlay) by 130300H. At 130615H one reinforced platoon will depart by vehicle down Route #1 to assembly area at coordinates BS 568980 (See Operation Overlay). At 130645H one reinforced platoon will conduct search and clear operation of TRI BINH (4).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Supply - Normal.
- b. Transportation - Three 6X6 trucks to transport troops.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

- a. See 3rd Bn, 7th Mar Communication SOP for communications.
- b. One AN/PRC-10 per platoon.

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Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

ANNEX

A - Operation Overlay

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10



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2.1 Distributions, etc.  
 0.1 LAL, IMPROVING OF  
 121.200H November 1975

Annex A (Operation Overlay) to Frag Order 6-65

Ref: MAP: AM 1701, VIETNAM Sheet 6757 II

Time Zone: II



*C. H. Boddy*  
 C. H. BODDY  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

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## HEADQUARTERS

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, Marine #15  
 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 FPO, San Francisco 96601

3:KLL:hws  
 3000  
 12 Nov 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: J321),  
 APO, U.S. Forces 96243  
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 7th Marines  
 (2) Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific  
 Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

1. Operation "BLACK FERRET".
2. 030800H to 051600H November 1965.
3. Central sector, BINH SON District, QUANG NGAI Province Maps AMS Series L701, 1:50,000 Sheets 6756 I, IV; 6757 II and III.
4. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF.
5. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. BODLEY.
6. Task Organization  
 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein)  
 Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Det ARVN CA Tm/Interpreters
7. Supporting Forces

a. Air (Chronological utilization)

- 031150 - Company K requested routine "medevac" for VC.
- 031220 - Company K "medevac" picked up.
- 031305 - Company K requested armed HUE. Aircraft not available.
- 031405 - Company L requested two newsmen be picked up at BS 573946 to be taken to LZ FALCON.
- 031422 - Company L newsmen picked up.
- 031450 - UH34 took Skeptic 6 and Skeptic 3 to Company L's position, BS 573946. UH34 received fire and took off leaving Skeptic 6 and 3 with Company L.
- 031517 - UH34 to Company L picked up Skeptic 6 and 3 and brought them to Skeptic CP.

*Appx/dif (7)*

031630 - Starboard 6 arrived at Skeptic CP.  
 031635 - Starboard 6 UH34 took communications man and radio to LZ ROBIN and returned with basket of 81mm mortar ammo.  
 031645 - Starboard 6 departed CP. Reporter departed with Skeptic 6 to LZ FALCON.  
 031805 - Request helicopters pick up 12 Marines and six VCS from Company K. Helicopters not available.  
 031825 - Helicopters located Marines and VCS proceeding to CP. Helicopters picked them up and brought them to CP.  
 032000 - Smoky Gold arrived on station. 3/7 requested no flare drops.  
 040815 - Two Company M routine "med-evacs" and man on emergency leave picked up and taken to LZ ROBIN.  
 040820 - Two communications men and batteries from CP taken to LZ FALCON.  
 040910 - Men and recharged batteries return from LZ FALCON.  
 041015 - Requested aircraft for resupply informed by Landshark "B" that all logistics handled by LSA. LSA had their own aircraft.  
 041050 - Requested aircraft to take ten men in advance CP group to new CP position.  
 041205 - Two H34 arrived for advance CP group. Late arrival of aircraft held up movement of CP.  
 041220 - Requested aircraft to move CP to coordinates BS 537924.  
 041245 - Four H34's moved 140 troops to new CP. Two aircraft loads dropped at Company M CP by mistake. This happened because Company M saw aircraft circling and set off smoke thinking aircraft were looking for them.  
 041430 - Movement of CP completed.  
 041530 - Starboard 6 brought to CP.  
 041540 - Two H34 to Company M picked up VCS and brought them back to CP.  
 041600 - Starboard 6 aircraft was used to put 12 man reaction force out.  
 041615 - Starboard 6 departed. Wingman picked up Company K routine "med-evac".  
 041655 - Requested air for retraction of reaction force.  
 041750 - Two H34's bring in reaction force. Aircraft also brought excess supplies which were dropped at Company K's CP. Aircraft took three VCS and communication man with batteries to LZ FALCON.  
 050630 - Requested to have four VCS picked up at CP and taken to LZ FALCON.  
 050800 - Starboard 6 arrives at CP.  
 050805 - H34 picks up VCS.  
 050900 - Communication man with batteries returns from LZ FALCON.  
 050900 - Request H34's to lift advance CP group, 96 troops to LZ ROBIN ASAP. Also requested remainder of CP and 44 troops be lifted to LZ ROBIN at 1330.  
 051010 - Commenced lift of advance CP group to LZ ROBIN with four H34's.  
 051110 - Lift of advance CP group complete. Request four H34's be used to lift Company M to LZ ROBIN. Aircraft unavailable at that time.  
 051215 - Approximately 12 H34's commenced lift of Company M to LZ ROBIN.  
 051345 - Company M's lift complete. Some aircraft started lift of remainder of CP group to LZ ROBIN. Requested aircraft lift Company K to LZ ROBIN.  
 051400 - Lift of remaining CP group completed.

051430 - Starboard informed Skeptic 14 to cancel request for helicopters to lift Company K. Skeptic 14 complied.

b. Artillery

(1) Participating Units

- (a) 107mm Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
- (b) Battery I, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
- (c) 155mm Self-propelled Howitzers, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

(2) Events

(a) No fire missions were fired on enemy targets on D-day. Air observer registered 107mm Mortar Battery.

(b) At 1113H on D+1 155mm self-propelled howitzers (M-4-11) fired five rounds of HE and three rounds of WP on a suspected VC assembly area located at coordinates BS 51909335. Excellent effect on target. At 1125H on D+1, four rounds of HE and three rounds of WP 155mm were fired at another suspected assembly area and emplacement area in the vicinity of the first target. Excellent effect on target. At 1715H on D+1 16 rounds of 105mm were fired at sniper at coordinates BS 511910. The sniper was immediately silenced.

(c) At 0615H on D+2 22 rounds of 155mm were fired at suspected VC assembly area on Hill 109 at coordinates BS 496927. Air observer could not give accurate surveillance, because of heavy foliage in the area. At 1000H on D+2 six rounds of HE and three rounds of WP 155mm were fired at two VC snipers and emplacements, in vicinity of coordinates BS 51909335. Emplacements were destroyed and one sniper was killed. At 1023H on D+2 four rounds of HE and three rounds of WP 155mm were fired at VC assembly area in vicinity of coordinates BS 516942. Good effect on target.

(d) No further artillery missions were fired during this operation. Night defensive fires were planned for all defensive positions but none were required to be fired.

8. Intelligence

a. Prior to D-day the following VC units were believed to be in the objective area at the locations indicated: 192nd VC Bn (BS 5489), T-19 LF Co (BS 5392), U/I VC Co (BS 5591). The total strength of these units was estimated at 750. This figure includes an estimated 200 guerrillas believed to be operating in and around the objective area. Combat efficiency of these units was unknown.

b. Enemy capabilities in order of probability of adoption were estimated to be:

- (1) To withdraw present forces in the objective area to the south and west fighting rear guard actions as necessary.

(2) To defend in the objective area with all available forces from prepared positions.

(3) To counterattack friendly forces in the objective area. From an analysis of actual enemy activity encountered it appears that the estimate of relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities was correct.

c. Throughout the operation the only resistance encountered by the Battalion was sporadic sniper fire usually delivered from several directions simultaneously. From interrogations of VCC it was determined that this fire is delivered by local guerrillas and is designed to harass and delay USMC units rather than engage them in ambush. This tactic was used in order to stall possible pursuit of a MF VC Company that had withdrawn from the area probably on D-day.

d. As a result of this operation the 3rd Battalion accounted for two VC KIA, the capture of four VCC and two Massant Nagant bolt action carbines, and 14 VCS. In addition, two documents and individual equipment were taken from the VC KIA. Four booby traps and several bamboo stick type grenades were also destroyed.

e. Detailed interrogation of VCC revealed that a MF VC company was operating in the objective area, but withdrew to the foothills above DUC AN (2) in the vicinity of Hill 109. This unit conducted propaganda lectures in several of the hamlets from Route #1 east to MY LOC hamlet between 30 October and 3 November. The nature of this propaganda was anti-American and pro-NFLSVN. In these lectures the VC also stated that they would be returning shortly to collect rice and money taxes.

f. The list of names of VC operating in the district that was provided by 7th Marines S-2 was instrumental in the capture of one VCC, PHAN LIEN. This guerrilla had been sniping at Company L throughout the second day of the operation. He was finally apprehended in BINH YEN hamlet as he was seen exiting a spider hole. At the time of capture he had a farmer's hoe and a valid identification card. Had his name not been on the VC list he would have been released after his identification card had been checked. It is highly recommended that an up-to-date list such as this be published and distributed on a regular basis.

g. Civil Affairs/PsyWar

(1) At 031025H Company M's CA team entered CHAN TU (1), coordinates BS 588945. Medical aid was given to 15 civilians. PsyWar pamphlets were distributed to the villagers. CA team entered PHU LE (1), coordinates BS 577938, and treated 17 civilians at 1230H. The villagers were uncooperative. The people stated that at night they sleep at home and do not see any VC. The villagers complained of maltreatment by popular forces, who beat their men and stole from them. The CA team instructed the people not to run from Marines and that the Marines were here at the request of the Vietnamese government, also the villagers were instructed that Marines would not harm or steal from them but were here just to aid the Vietnamese government to rid the area of VC. At coordinates BS 573937 near PHU LE (1) an elderly man reported seven VC with carbines in the hamlet on the evening of 2 November. Medical aid was then given to ten villagers. Villagers then stated that on the evening of 1 November the VC came into PHU LE (1), with a loudspeaker and promised a richer and fuller life.

The VC requested of the villagers that they build a trench around the hamlet. Villagers stated that the VC came into the hamlet every third night in two or three man groups. Anti-American expressions (in English) were freshly painted on many of the buildings. Villagers stated that the VC came in one week ago and painted them on the buildings. Some of the expressions were: "America to the Americans, South Vietnam to the Vietnamese", and "Do not spread hatred by burning and killing women and children". The villagers were then instructed not to build the trench.

(2) At 031230H Company L's CA team entered PHUOC AN (2), coordinates BS 573947, and administered medical aid, and distributed vitamins. The villagers were instructed to bathe and wash daily. Soap was then distributed to 12 families. PsyWar pamphlets were distributed. At 031420H Company L's CA team entered PHUOC AN (1), BS 568943, and administered medical aid to four villagers. Soap was distributed to ten families. Villagers appeared to be in good health. At 040830H the CA team entered THANH TRA (2), BS 535947, and gave medical treatment to three children. The CA team also entered THANH TRA (1), BS 525936; BEN YEN (2), BS 522927; and DUC AN (3), BS 512911. People were very scarce in these hamlets. A total of eight villagers were treated in these hamlets.

(3) At 031100H Company K's CA team entered PHU LE (1), coordinates BS 580942. A Vietnamese male, NGUYEN COC, was evacuated for medical treatment of severe burns. Company K's CA team also entered PHU LE, coordinates BS 566937; TAN PHUOC, BS 537897 where medical aid was given to four villagers. Four pounds of extra rations were distributed to the villagers. These hamlets were sparsely populated.

9. Mission. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein), in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) and elements of the 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN, will conduct a search and clear operation in the central portion of the BINH SON District.

10. Concept of Operations. Commencing at H-hour on D-day the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines will be transported by AMTrac and 6X6 trucks to three assembly areas on Route #1, vicinity coordinates BS 583953, BS 585950, and BS 588945. On order, the Battalion with three companies abreast and one in reserve will commence a search and clear operation to the southwest in the assigned zone of action (See enclosure (1)).

11. Execution (See enclosures (1) through (3)(Operation Overlays))

a. D-day, 3 November 1965. At 030835H Companies K, L, and M plus the Battalion CP group departed the Battalion area via motorized column. All companies were at jump off positions at 030930H. Companies crossed the Line of Departure at 030948H.



(1) Company L reached Phase Line PEAR at 031015H, with no resistance encountered.

(2) Company M reported control extremely difficult while passing through cane field due to lack of visibility.

(3) At 031030H Company K discovered two booby traps at coordinates BS 577945. Booby traps consisted of three M-79 rounds, with nails for firing device and one 60mm mortar round with an unknown firing device. All booby traps were destroyed in place.

(4) The lead elements of Company L reached PHUOC AN (2) and conducted search and clear operations of village at 031100 coordinates BS 574948, one VCS was apprehended. Civil affairs team followed in trace of Company L and conducted sick call for villagers.

(5) 2nd Platoon of Company M reached Phase Line PEAR while the 3rd Platoon was moving on Objective "B". All Company M units arrived at Phase Line PEAR by 031120.

(6) While enroute to Phase Line PEAR Company K apprehended two VCS, one was badly burned. One was at 031115H, coordinates BS 578946, evacuated to QUANG NGAI and the other VCS, believed to be a medic, was escorted under guard to POW Compound. Company K crossed Phase Line PEAR enroute to Phase Line LEMON at 031300H.

(7) At the same time Company L departed PHUOC AN (2) and commenced search and clear of PHUOC AN (1) and encountered sniper fire. Company L returned the fire, no bodies were found. Three VCS were captured during the sweep of PHUOC AN (1).

(8) Simultaneously with Company L's operations, Company K conducted sweep of open terrain to Phase Line LEMON.

(9) In the meantime, Company M was continuing its mission and maintaining contact with Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on their left flank.

(10) Company L commenced sweep of PHU LE (2) and captured two VCS. Civil affairs team, still following in trace of Company L, conducted sick call for villagers.

(11) At 031915H Companies L and K had arrived at Phase Line LEMON. Company K set up night defensive positions at Phase Line LEMON.

(12) Company M established night defensive positions ranging from 100 to 400 meters northeast of Phase Line LEMON.

(13) Prior to the companies crossing the Line of Departure, the Battalion CP was established at coordinates BS 557955.

(14) At 031715H Company L moved out of the Regimental objective area to a harboring site at coordinates BS 543945. Company L reached harboring site at 032050H. No contacts or VC sightings were made.

(15) No contacts were made throughout the night.

b. D+1, 4 November 1965

(1) Company L commenced movement to THANH TRA (2) at 040615H and commenced sweep of THANH TRA (2) at 040700H. No VC were encountered.

(2) At 040700H Companies M and K were on line at Phase Line LEMON. Company M sustained three non-battle casualties, all three casualties were evacuated. Company L commenced sweep of THANH TRA (2), no VC encountered or sighted.

(3) At 040830H Company L commenced sweep of THANH TRA (1). The village appeared deserted with houses in a state of disrepair and trash littered throughout the area. While Company L was conducting its sweep, Company K crossed Phase Line LEMON and conducted sweep of open area to Phase Line CHERRY.

(4) At 040905H Company M reported apprehending two VC, one of whom was on the known VC list.

(5) Company L received sniper fire from hill at coordinates BS 519934 from an estimated two or three VC with automatic weapons. Company L returned the fire and assaulted the hill. The VC broke contact and withdrew. Enemy defensive position on hill was found in good state of repair. No friendly or enemy casualties reported. Positions were destroyed by artillery fire.

(6) At 041000H Company L continued on its mission to BINH YEN (2). Company L reported receiving small arms fire from six or eight VC located at coordinates BS 518925. 1st and 2nd Platoons assaulted the position, one VC KIA and one weapon captured. 1st Platoon advanced down the ridge line from coordinates BS 515925 to coordinates BS 511917, one friendly casualty was sustained by hand grenade. Casualty was light and not evacuated.

(7) Company M reached Phase Line CHERRY at 041100H.

(8) At 041230H Company K arrived at Phase Line CHERRY.

(9) Company L reported finding many trench lines and an abnormally large amount of individual shelters. One box of assorted cartridge casings was discovered and confiscated. Three VCS were also captured.

(10) At 041300H Company K dispatched one platoon new CP site, coordinates BS 532923, to secure area and establish and mark landing zone.

(11) At 041320H CP group commenced displacement to new location at BS 532923.

(12) At 041505 Company changed direction of movement from 234° mag to 352° mag in order to maintain contact with Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Company M arrived at Phase Line APPLE at 041600H.

(13) At 041630H Company L commenced movement from BINH YEN (1) to Hill 57 vicinity coordinates BS 532923. Company received sniper fire from coordinates BS 519910 and returned the fire. Company called artillery fire mission on snipers. After the mission was fired, the area was checked and no VC casualties were found. Company continued on its mission and received sniper fire from coordinates BS 51791. Company returned fire and backtracked. One VC ran into his house and was captured along with his weapon and three rounds of ammunition. Two other VCS entered the same house and were also captured.

(14) Company K reached Phase Line APPLE at 041700H.

(15) Company K established night defensive positions at 041800H on Phase Line APPLE.

(16) Company M established night defensive positions at Phase Line APPLE. They received one round of sniper fire at BS 534915. A search of the area produced no VC.

(17) At 041920H Company L reached Hill 57 and established night defensive positions.

(18) No activities were reported throughout the night.

c. D+2, 5 November 1965

(1) Company M moved out on assigned mission at 050530H.

(2) At 050700H Company M found a mine at coordinates BS 534904. The mine was retrieved by engineers. Company M tied in with Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

(3) At 050715H all Company M units were in position.

(4) At 050707H 2nd Platoon, Company K received fire from one VC sniper. Company returned fire, VC escaped. A VC ID card was found, believed to have belonged to a VC Platoon Leader.

(5) At 050820H Company L began retraction from Hill 57 via BINH YEN (2), THANH TRA (1), THANH TRA (2) and TRI BINH (5).

(6) At 050850H a VC administrative chief was apprehended at coordinates BS 521926.

(7) At 050950 Company K received sniper fire from coordinates BS 523942. An artillery fire mission was called on the position. Due to the time factor Company K could not investigate area fired on by artillery.

(8) Company K conducted search and clear of TAN PHUOC (1) area, no VC encountered.

(9) At 051130H Company K reached the "No Fire Line".

c. D+2, 5 November 1965

(10) Company M received orders for retraction by helicopter. 1st Platoon found mine at BS 535905. The mine was destroyed in place at 051200H. At the same time, Company L reached Route #1.

(11) At 051230H Company M commenced retraction by helicopter at 051230H. The mine was retrieved by engineers. Company M tied in with Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

(12) At 051300H Company L reached Regimental CP and commenced retraction by truck.

(13) Company K commenced foot movement to Route #1 at 051300H. No enemy contact. A VC ID card was found, believed to have belonged to a VC Platoon Leader.

(14) At 051315H the Battalion CP was retracted.

(15) At 051320H Company L began retraction from Hill 57 via BINH YEN (2), THANH TRA (1), THANH TRA (2) and TRI BINH (5).

(15) Company K arrived at pick up point, coordinates BS 593936, at 051520H.

(16) Company K arrived at Battalion area at 051600H.

(17) All units returned to CHU LAI enclave at 051600H.

d. Chronology of Events

(1) 1st Day, 3 November 1965

030802 - Departed the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP (Rear).  
 030837 - Reached debarkation point, unloaded off the trucks and departed for the CP (Fwd).  
 030940 - Arrived at the temporary CP location.  
 030945 - Moved out to the permanent CP location for the first day.  
 030956 - Set up the first day's CP site.  
 031040 - Company moved out at an azimuth of 225°.  
 031053 - Company L located on Phase Line PEAR on an azimuth of 225° to adjust lines. Will hold until directed to move.  
 031055 - Company K located 250 meters northeast of the railroad tracks.  
 031100 - Company L requested to move out and circle right flank.  
 031109 - CP coordinates were BS 558957.  
 031118 - Company L crossed Phase Line PEAR.  
 031130 - Company M's positions M-2 at Phase Line PEAR. M-1 located 300 meters east of Phase Line PEAR. Requested all units hold up in order to keep contact with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.  
 031145 - All Company M units at Phase Line PEAR except 3rd Platoon. 3rd Platoon was located at Objective "B".  
 031155 - Company K detonated booby traps.  
 031155 - Elements of Company L 400 to 500 meters past Phase Line PEAR and holding.  
 031240 - Company M was right of original position and adjusted.  
 031323 - CA team treated 15 people, gave out propaganda leaflets and soap to villagers at PHUOC AN (1).  
 031327 - All Company K units presently at Phase Line PEAR.  
 031330 - Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Companies M and K adjusted positions and occupied assigned zones. 3rd Platoon of Company B moved out. 3rd Platoon, Company K conducted search and clear of Objective "D" in zone of action.  
 031338 - Company L continued to search the village of PHUOC AN (1). Search for rice indicated about 1200 pounds. About 900 pounds was located in one house. 20 to 25 houses were searched with CA team employed. Company L desired to move.  
 031355 - Company L ordered to move out and search and clear Objective "F". Ordered to report when search and clear of Objective "E" was completed.

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031410 - Company M ordered to complete operation in Objective "D".  
Informed to coordinate with Company K on preparations for movement to Phase Line LEMON.

031447 - Companies M and K moved out.

031515 - Helicopters which picked up Skeptic 3 and 6 received sniper fire from PHU LE (2).

031527 - Company M 500 meters southwest of Phase Line FEAR (BS 572934 to BS 575929).

031528 - Company K at BS 571938 to BS 572934.

031529 - Company L at BS 565944 to BS 571938.

031550 - Company K Position Report - Left limit 300 meters from Phase Line LEMON. Right flank 200 meters from Phase Line LEMON. 1st Platoon on the forward edge of the FLU.

131615 - Company M leaving the village at BS 538930.

031630 - Elements of Company L on Phase Line LEMON.

031632 - Company K informed to hold at Phase Line LEMON.

031708 - Company's present position 100 meters north of Reference Point 4. Left flank 400 meters behind Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Right flank in contact with end of Company K.

031740 - Company L captured six VCS and holding at Phase Line LEMON.

031742 - Company L's CA team passed out pamphlets and administered medical aid.

031816 - Company K captured two VCS. One was evacuated to QUANG NGAI. The other was sent to the POW Compound.

031818 - Company L ordered to move up to THANH TRA (1).

031816 - Company M ordered to spend the night on Phase Line LEMON.

031950 - Company M established night defensive positions ranging from 100 to 400 meters northeast of Phase Line LEMON.

(2) 2nd Day, 4 November 1965

040650 - Company L began search and clear of first village complex.

040725 - Company L moved to the next village complex.

040741 - Companies K and M crossed Phase Line LEMON at 0700 and were continuing search and clear operations in their zone of action. CA team treated 25 civilians and passed out soap and propaganda leaflets.

040830 - Company L reports THANH TRA (2) had no activity except old people and very young children. THANH TRA (1) was deserted and ravished rice had been harvested. Company L cannot locate any rice in the village. No VC were sighted.

040900 - Company K position was 1000 meters southeast of Phase Line CHERRY.

040955 - Company M passed Check Point #5.

040959 - S-3 asked Company K the approximate time they will reach Phase Line CHERRY and have a landing zone secured.

040952 - 2nd Platoon, Company L received automatic fire from two VC at BT 519933. The platoon returned fire and the VC fled. No casualties were reported on either side.

041048 - Company K was 400 meters northeast of Phase Line CHERRY.

041007 - Company K's position was BS 560930 as of 0955. Company M's position was BS 563924 as of 0955. Company L proceeding to BINH YEN (2). Battalion CP position remains the same.

041024 - Company K located a possible landing zone and CP.

041019 - Company L located at BS 522930.

041034 - Company K was at Phase Line CHERRY.

041045 - Company K recommended Battalion CP and landing zone be located at BS 530923.

041115 - Company M attempted to link up with Company B at BS 561921. Company M captured one VCS at BT 562927 and will evacuate same with resupply helicopter.

041131 - Battalion Executive Officer warned Company K of possible VC main force units in their area.

041145 - Company M encountered two VCS in vicinity of BS 562927. VCS were ordered to halt but continued to run. Company M fired upon VCS but was unable to find a body.

041020 - Company L was taken under fire by two VC. Company L returned fire and killed one VC and wounded one VC. There were no friendly casualties.

041144 - Company K's position was at BS 554925 and were continuing search and clear operation in zone of action. Company M's position was at BS 560924 and continued search and clear operations in zone of action. Company L continued search and clear operations in THANH TRA Valley.

041221 - Company M reported helicopter will not evacuate VCS because of time schedule. Company M requested other means of evacuating VCS.

041230 - Company K located at Phase Line CHERRY.

041243 - Battalion CP moved to BS 532923.

041145 - Elements of Company L were taken under heavy sniper fire from BS 509911. There were approximately eight VC. Company L returned the fire. Results were one VC KIA and four VC WIA with several VC carbines, packs and frag grenades captured. One Marine was wounded slightly in the arm but returned to duty.

041310 - Companies M and K were at Phase Line CHERRY.

041407 - Company M located 100 meters southwest of Phase Line CHERRY.

041455 - Air had been requested to evacuate VCS from Company M position.

041525 - Companies M and K were on Phase Line CHERRY and continued their mission.

041621 - Companies M and K reached Phase Line APPLE. Company L's position ~~coordinates~~ BS 515915.

041638 - Company K was directed to continue to the "No Fire Line", then hold up.

041621 - Recon unit reported five VC in yellow uniforms at BS 543930.

041722 - Received word from Regimental S-3 to execute plan X-RAY.

041710 - Company L reported sniper fire from BS 511910. Company L returned fire with negative results.

041830 - Company M received sniper fire from two positions: BS 541909, BS 535907. Company M returned fire with negative results.

041912 - Company M continued search and clear of hamlet in vicinity of BS 514909 and found several tunnels near the west side of the hamlet.

041935 - Recon unit reported a flashing light in vicinity BS 535946.

041945 - Company K has established night defensive positions in vicinity BS 534915. Company M established night defensive positions in vicinity BS 540911. Company L established defensive positions around Battalion CP. One platoon from Company L remains in Regimental reserve at the Regimental CP.

042025 - Regimental 14 wanted to know if we desired continuous illumination.

042055 - Company L (-) arrived at Battalion to assume defensive positions. All other companies remain the same.

(3) 3rd Day, 5 November 1965

050242 - Company L and Battalion CP were on the high ground overlooking the "No Fire Line". Company K was located in the vicinity of the "No Fire Line". Company M was on Phase Line APPLE.

050500 - Company M moved out.

050700 - Company K reached the river but has no contact with 1/7 units at this time.

050759 - All 3/7 units notified of location and occupation of Landing Zone ALBATROSS.

050830 - Company K linked up with 1/7 and commenced sweep and clear operation.

051005 - Confirmed artillery report on one VC KIA and destruction of one VC emplacement.

051029 - Company L moved to THANH TRA (2). Company K moved with 1/7. First elements of Battalion CP were displaced.

051100 - Elements of 1/7 were moved into an assembly area. Company K moved on to the "No Fire Line".

051130 - Company L called in two fire missions. Company L was unable to find out assessments due to time element.

051140 - All units of Company L reached the transportation site.

051155 - Company K requested evacuation for one sick Vietnamese woman.

051227 - Company M was in landing zone and ready to be heli-lifted.

051300 - Company K departed from last position.

051352 - Company M had been retracted.

051404 - The last elements of Battalion CP were retracted.

12. Resultsa. Friendly

- (1) KIA: None
- (2) WIA: One (Non-evac)
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) KBA: None
- (5) Equipment and Material Losses: None

b. Enemy

- (1) KIA: Two
- (2) WIA: Five
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) KBA: None
- (5) Captured VCC: Five
- (6) Captured VCS: 14
- (7) Equipment Lost: Two 7.62mm Russian model carbines (Chinese manufactured) and assorted equipment i.e. pack, pistol belt, canteen, canteen cover, etc, one home-made gasmask and a VC ID card believed to belong to a VC Platoon Leader.

13. Administrative Matters

a. Resupply. Resupply during this operation was less than satisfactory. The system utilized of having the Companies request supplies from the Battalion and then the Battalion passing this request on to LSA representatives located within the Battalion CP, who in turn radioed the request back to the LSA which in turn filled the request and made delivery to the company proved too cumbersome and, in fact, didn't work. The long delay between the original request and delivery made it almost impossible to determine a point of delivery for the fast moving infantry company. The lack of centralized control cognizant of the various steps of delivery and accomplishment caused many problems and in turn unnecessary hardship upon all troops in the field. It is therefor recommended that any future operations conducted within the RAOR be resupplied on an individual basis by the participating Battalions. Each Battalion should be given the use of two helicopters for a specific period of about two hours each day for this function and that they utilize their own supply dumps vice a hastily established LSA. The periods of helicopter usage could either be predetermined or set up daily on a request basis. This system as described would allow for resupply and associated movements of the Battalion Staff as it is normally practiced on a day to day basis. It has been found that a normal one resupply per company per day for rations, dry cell batteries, and ammunition is required. Local water sources are utilized exclusively.



b. Medical. Medical evacuation by helicopter was utilized successfully.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. No special equipment and/or techniques were used during the operation. This Command did receive authority to utilize riot control agents when applicable. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were prepared to carry out this directive but the opportunity did not make itself available.

15. Commander's Analysis. The successful execution of operations against an enemy who is either unable or unwilling to resist in strength should include the following ingredients:

a. Encirclement - To cut off escape routes with friendly forces and natural obstacles.

b. Flushing Force - To influence the direction of exfiltration.

c. Observation Posts - To provide timely information concerning enemy sightings.

d. Reaction Force - To quickly exploit the sightings of enemy (Ground troops, artillery, and armed UH1E's).

e. Reaction Means - To place friendly forces in a position to destroy or capture small groups of enemy, preferably helicopters.

f. Flexibility in Plan - To rapidly adopt and exploit opportunities presented regardless of size of force.

#### 16. Recommendations

a. That greater emphasis be placed on procurement/issue of water purification tablets to infantry units.

(1) An ample water supply exist in the present area of operations, therefore water purification tablets would help do away with some of the present complex resupply problems.

b. That 60mm mortars be issued to each rifle company.

(1) Companies could move faster and further with 60mm vice 81mm mortars. Also accurate fire could be brought to bear on snipers and other VC concentrations in a more expeditious manner.

c. That body armor, upper torso be utilized during combat operations.

(1) It has been proven by the Battalion that rifle companies can move over large areas, wearing body armor, upper torso, without ill effect. The only exception to the use of said body armor is on extremely hot and humid days.

d. That Government purchasing agents or other government officials accompany Regimental or larger operations.

(1) When and where possible particularly during the harvest season government officials could purchase excess rice from the population.

HEADQUARTERS  
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
 FPO, San Francisco 96601

3:KLL:hws  
 3000  
 3 Dec 1965

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: J321),  
 APO U.S. Forces 96243  
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, 7th Marines  
 (2) Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
 (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report

Ref: (a) MAP Series L701, 1:50,000, Sheet 6755 1

1. Relief Operation of TRACH TRU Village Complex
2. 221610H through 241520H November 1965
3. BINH SON District, QUANG NGAI Province
4. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF
5. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. BODLEY
6. Task Organization  
     3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein)  
     Company K  
     Company L  
     Company M  
     H&S Company  
     Det 3rd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
     Det Co C, 1st SP Bn  
     Det Btry I, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

7. Supporting Forces

a. Air (Chronological utilization)

221610 - 30 UH-34's commenced lift of Companies K, L, and the CP group to vicinity BS 757469.

221830 - Lift stopped due to darkness with approximately one platoon of Company K not being lifted.

230430 - Informed that Company M would be lifted into vicinity BS 731468. Air had been requested by Regiment.

230925 - Fixed wing aircraft commenced preparation of landing zone at BS 731468 and surrounding high ground.

230943 - H-34's landed at BS 731468 with first elements of Company M.

231105 - Remaining elements of Company K landed at vicinity BS

757469. Two aircraft loads landed at BS 731468 by mistake. Elements of 81mm Mortar Platoon landed at BS 757467 instead of BS 731468.

(Appendix 8)

231130 - Four H34's arrived with resupply. Requested that these aircraft move 81mm elements and Company K elements to correct positions. Aircraft were unable to provide service due to insufficient fuel.

231155 - Request relayed through Starboard 55 and Landshark (X) for the four resupply helicopters to report to Skeptic to move 81mm and Company K elements.

231400 - UH1E in area to lift two WIA and one KIA friendlies out.

221600 - Informed by Landshark (X) that aircraft were on the way. Informed Landshark (X) that aircraft would be used to move remainder of CP to vicinity BS 734470. Landshark (X) said aircraft not available for troop lift. Finchhitter 6 Actual, who was at our position stated that he desired to have troop lift conducted.

231630 - Started lifting troops and supplies with Shove 6 Actual's UH1E.

231645 - Three H-34's arrived and assisted in lift.

231710 - Lift complete. H-34 lifted out seven VCS to Chu Lai Compound.

231740 - Relayed through Starboard 55 request for aircraft to lift out 11 more VCS. Request turned down. Aircraft will arrive first thing in the morning.

242025 - Received report that 24 H-34's would be available for retraction at 240900H.

240850 - 16 H-34's arrived to commence retraction. UH1E and VA aircraft on station.

241540 - Lift completed. Had UH1E and VA on station throughout lift. Lift went exceptionally smooth.

#### b. Artillery

1) No organic artillery was moved into the objective area. Two platoons of ARVN 105mm artillery were made available to this Command to provide direct support of operations. Although no targets of opportunity were undertaken by fire, ten rounds of 105mm were fired as harassing and interdiction and numerous concentrations were planned to support helicopter operations and defensive positions.

2) During the short span of this operation, this Command was favorably impressed with the speed and accuracy of ARVN artillery. A "well done" is extended to all concerned.

#### c. Naval Gunfire

1) At 221630H NGF SFCP departed Landing Zone ROBIN and landed at coordinates BS 759474. The spot team was attached to Company L and the liaison team set up in the 3/7 CP area. No NGF frequencies were initially available. Communication with Anglica (Airborne) spotter who was initially on station was established with this ship and a message was relayed to USS O'BRIEN (DD-725) to activate NGF Spot Net #1 (4301 KC) A.M. Communications was established with this ship at 221930H. Night defensive fire plan was sent to ship at 222000H, and H&I fires commenced on concentration # A, B, C, M, N, O, S, T, and U. The ship had been stationed at coordinates BS 815525. At 230100H all NGF A.M. gear shorted out due to extreme weather conditions. Communications with O'BRIEN (DD-725) was established with AN/PRC-10 F.M. Net (430). All fires for RVN units in area were observed and adjusted by 3/7 NGF SFCP.

2) At 230300H USS FLETCHER (DDE-445) reported on station and ready for call fires. Target #4006, coordinates BS 769467 received good effect on target. At 230530H target #307 coordinates BS 731457 VC hit burned area, with good effect on target. At 230545H USS O'BRIEN fired on target #308 coordinates BS 720454 VC confirmed. Effect not observed.

3) USS FLETCHER (DDE-445) was on station and ready for call fires throughout the daylight hours of 23 November, at coordinates BS 810540. 37th RVN Ranger Battalion called a total of four missions. Missions were monitored by 3/7 SFCP.

4) At 240030H USS ORLECK (DD-886) reported on station and ready for call fires. H&I fires on concentration #313 through 316 commenced at 240100H through 240600H, five rounds per hour, HE, fuze Q on target. Concentration #A through K were fired for 37th Ranger Battalion with six rounds VT per target. Illumination was fired on concentrations #L and M. Rounds were adjusted on target by 3/7 spot team. It was noted that all concentrations fired on were cratered with good effect on target.

5) 3/7 SFCP checked out of net at 241330H to return to 3/7 CP area. The ORLECK remained on station in support of RVN. It should be noted that the majority of the communications with ships was conducted with AN/PRC-10. Three U.S. advisors with RVN units in area relayed with PRC-25 when ships were beyond range of AN/PRC-10. It is estimated a total of 700 to 800 rounds were expended by O'BRIEN, FLETCHER, and ORLECK in support of this operation. Accurate individual ship and total ammunition expenditures reported are not available to this Command at this time. USS JOHN S. MCCAIN (DL-3) was also available for firing but the situation did not demand same.

6) It is felt that since NGF support was available continuously throughout the operation that NGF played a most significant supporting arms role.

## 8. Intelligence

a. When the Battalion first went on alert it was in response to intelligence derived from a VC operation order captured by ARVN. This operation involved an attack on a Popular Force outpost in the vicinity of BS 710420. This attack was to be conducted in order to entice ARVN to make an attempt to reinforce the outpost. The main VC force was to be in positions to ambush ARVN relief columns that attempted to enter the battle area by either of the two possible surface avenues of approach to the outpost or by helicopter. Enemy forces participating in this operation included three main force battalions and two heavy weapons companies commanded by a Regimental Headquarters unit. It was estimated that this force was the 1st VC Regiment.

b. After this first alert the Battalion was also alerted to the possibility of being deployed in the vicinity of the HIEP DUC Special Forces outpost located at AT 9325. VC forces at HIEP DUC included an estimated two to three battalions and an unknown number of heavy weapons elements. These forces were deployed and operating in a manner very similar to the scheme of maneuver described in the captured VC operation order.

c. The Battalion was finally committed on 22 November in response to an ARVN request for units to reinforce the 37th Ranger Battalion position on Hill 74 located at BS 756470. Initial interrogation of Ranger Battalion personnel

indicated that a large VC force had been preparing for an attack. It was estimated that a VC Battalion had attacked Hill 74 from all sides. The main thrust coming from the northeast along the long axis of the hill. Several VC had penetrated the four rows of barbed wire entanglements encircling the hill and were killed as close as three meters from friendly positions. These VC were armed with baskets of grenades and were apparently employed as suicide assault forces. All VC dead wore khaki or grayish uniforms of military cut. Weapons collected from VC dead around the hill included Chinese copies of Russian AK-56 assault rifles and Russian type SKS carbine rifles. The weapons, equipment, uniforms, and general appearance of VC dead indicated that the attack was conducted by hard core main force VC units.

d. In conjunction with the VC attack on Hill 74 on the night of 21-22 November a simultaneous attack was conducted on the Special Forces outpost in the vicinity of BS 764467. From the number of VC dead located around this outpost, it appeared that the attacking force was at least battalion size. The attack on this outpost was probably the main effort of the VC operation. The mission of the units involved was probably to kill or capture ARVN personnel, weapons, and equipment, in particular the one 105mm howitzer manned by ARVN at this outpost.

e. On the morning of 23 November the Battalion began a sweep of the area west of Hill 74 to Hill 61 located at BS 734471. In the course of this sweep the Battalion accounted for two VC KIA and the capture of two VCC, 16 VCS, one RPD Degatarev light machinegun, two AK-56 assault rifles, five SKS carbines, one 75mm recoilless rifle round, and a large quantity of individual equipment including several grenades.

f. The two VC KIA were first encountered hiding in a cave. Upon the approach of USMC personnel they threw several grenades from the cave and tried to flee taking advantage of the confusion created by their brief grenade attack. One Marine was KIA as a result of this encounter.

g. Interrogation of one of the captured VCC revealed that the man was North Vietnamese and an aidman in the 7th Company of the 512th Battalion, a regular North Vietnamese unit. This unit infiltrated South Vietnam some three months ago by foot.

h. Interrogation of the other captured VCC revealed that the man was a private in the 405th North Vietnamese Regiment which had come to South Vietnam just a few months before his capture.

i. In and around Hill 61 four large caves were located and destroyed. Three of these caves appeared to be bomb shelters. One, located at BS 735469, was about 300 feet long and had several side tunnels leading off the main passage. From the size of these structures it is estimated that between 500 and 1000 personnel could be housed in these caves in the event of an air attack or if an effort were being made to conceal personnel during daylight hours. Interrogation of both VCC captured revealed that three platoons and some wounded VC had occupied the caves on Hill 61 on the night of 22-23 November and had withdrawn at first light on the 23rd.

#### j. Items of Intelligence Interest

1) Analysis of the VC scheme of maneuver described in the captured VC operation order and analysis of VC movements in the battle of Hiep Duc reveals certain similarities. In both areas attacks were to be initiated.

on small outposts located near the river. These outposts were located in close proximity to high mountain ranges and were surrounded by dense jungle vegetation. In both cases there were limited surface routes of access into the immediate area of the outposts. These routes could be controlled by a force occupying key terrain astride or adjacent to these routes. These key terrain features also offered excellent ambush sites. Both areas had few likely landing zones for helicopters.

2) The intent of conducting this type operation is to draw ARVN relief/reinforcing units into prepared ambush sites either on surface avenues of approach or in likely landing zones. The attack on the outposts is actually a secondary attack designed to get ARVN forces to react in the desired way.

3) Mission. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) will conduct a movement by the most expeditious means to relieve or reinforce elements of the 2nd ARVN Division located in the central section of the TRACH TRU Village Complex.

10. Concept of Operation. At L-hour on D-day 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) will accomplish the mission by conducting a three company heliborne operation into landing zones vicinity of coordinates BS 757463, and will be prepared to relieve or reinforce elements of the 2nd Infantry Division ARVN as the situation dictates. Company L (Rein) will be helilifted into a landing zone at vicinity coordinates BS 757469, establish a landing zone security, and be prepared to deploy on order. Company K (Rein) will be helilifted into the same landing zone and move to an assembly area vicinity coordinates BS 757471. Be prepared to deploy on order. H&S Company will be helilifted into the same landing zone and move to an assembly area vicinity coordinates BS 757471. Company M will be helilifted into Landing Zone CROW vicinity BS 731468, secure the high ground in that vicinity and be prepared to deploy on order.

# 11. Execution (Enclosures (1) through (4))

a. At 192150H 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) was put on a standby six hour alert. At 192210H the Battalion was put on a six hour alert. At 211240H Company H, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines relieved Company L on the right flank front line position. At 211300H Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines relieved Company M on the left flank front line position. At 211330H False 6 returned from a reconnaissance and notified the Battalion to be prepared to be helilifted to the HEIP DUC area vicinity coordinates AT 9325 to relieve or reinforce elements of the 2nd Infantry Division ARVN. At 211445H Company L (Rein) returned to Landing Zone ROBIN because of inclement weather. The operation was temporarily postponed. At 221400 7th Marines put 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines on a 30 minute alert for TRACH TRU area vicinity coordinates BT 757471.

b. D-day, 22 November 1965. At L-hour 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)(Rein) commenced a helilift into a landing zone at coordinates BT 757469 in the following sequence: Company L, Company K, H&S Company, and Company M. The unopposed lift ceased on 221830H because of inclement weather and darkness with Company L and one-half of Company K into the landing zone. After linking up with elements of the Ranger Company, ARVN, night defensive positions were established at coordinates BT 757471.

1) Company L conducted an unopposed landing at BS 757470 at 221630H and moved to ARVN Ranger OP at BS 755470. At 221630H Company L captured seven VCS and one VCO (WIA) at coordinates BS 756468. At 221700H Company L arrived at ARVN Ranger OP and began establishing night defensive positions. At 221745H Company L's night defensive positions were established.

2) Company K. The 1st and 2nd Platoons of Company K plus the Battalion CP Group conducted an unopposed landing at BS 759470 at 221800H, moved to coordinates BS 755470, linked up with elements of Ranger Company, ARVN, and established night defensive positions.

3) Company M. At 221900H was in a standby alert status and was notified that their helilift would be delayed until the morning of 23 November 1965.

4) H&S Company. Elements of H&S Company which were composed of the Forward CP Group landed at coordinates BS 759470 at 221800H and proceeded to the ARVN Ranger OP, coordinates BS 757471 arriving at 221830H. Liaison was established with the ARVN Ranger Company and a CP was established for the night.

c. D+1, 23 November 1965

1) From 230910H until 230940H fixed wing aircraft prepared the landing zone at coordinates BS 735469.

2) At 230945H Company M commenced a helilift into a landing zone at coordinates BS 735469.

3) At 231000H Company L commenced a sweep to the hill at coordinates BS 733470. At 231115H the remaining elements of Company K and H&S Company landed at coordinates BS 759469 and moved to the ARVN Ranger OP to link up with the remainder of the Battalion.

4) At 231515H Company K and elements of H&S Company moved overland to high ground, coordinates BS 733470. At 231515H a helilift moved the remainder of the Command Group and 81mm Mortar Platoon to Hill 61, coordinates BS 734471.

5) Company K. The remaining elements of Company K landed in the vicinity of coordinates BS 759470 at 231130H and proceeded to the ARVN Ranger OP at BS 757471. Company K (-)(Rein) commenced a sweep at 231400H to Hill 61 in vicinity coordinates BS 734471. No contact was made. Company K discovered a cave at coordinates BS 735468 at 231445H. At 231530H Company K established defensive positions on the western side of Hill 60, vicinity coordinates BS 734471. The engineer team attached to Company K destroyed the cave located at coordinates BS 735468 at 231600H.

6) At 231000H Company K commenced a sweep to the west to Hill 61 vicinity coordinates BS 733470. At 231030H the 1st Platoon captured 11 VCS at coordinates BS 756474 to BS 750474. The 3rd Platoon captured three VCS at coordinates BS 757480. At 231245H 1st Platoon captured one North Vietnamese regular carrying a pack and a 75mm recoilless rifle round at coordinates BS 734473. One cartridge belt containing cleaning gear and 7.62 ChiCom rounds were also found at the same coordinates. At 231300H 1st Platoon found one broken section of a bangalore torpedo at BS 739474. At 231300H Company L

located one fresh grave, uncovered it and found a VC of North Vietnamese origin at BS 734473. At 231315H Company L and elements of Company M were taken under fire by two VC at coordinates BS 735474 resulting in one friendly KIA and one friendly WIA. The two VC were destroyed by friendly fire. Enemy equipment found consisted of one assault carbine and one rifle, both of ChiCom origin, one entrenching tool, ammunition, cartridge belt and pack. At 231415H friendly casualties were evacuated and defensive positions were established on high ground vicinity coordinates BS 733470. No further activities encountered that day.

7) Company M commenced land at coordinates BT 735468 at 230945H. During movement to objective (BS 733470) one 47 year old man with an ID card and one 14 year old boy without an ID card were captured. At 231000H Company M reached objective coordinates BS 733470. At 231215 one VCC was captured at coordinates BT 733472. At 231230H Company M and elements of Company L had two VC snipers at coordinates BS 733472 cornered. One friendly WIA was reported. The VC were destroyed by Company L. At 231235H the VC that was captured at 231100H disclosed information that a cave at BS 730472 contained five VC rifles and 782 gear. The cave was destroyed by the team of engineers attached to Company M. At 231730H Company M discovered a cave at coordinates BS 738472. The cave was inspected and blown. At 231800H Company M established defensive positions on the northern slope of hill 61, coordinates BS 734472. No further activity was encountered that day.

8) H&S Company. At 231026H forward Command group accompanies Company L on the sweep to BS 534471. At 231100H Command Group "B" arrived by helicopter. At 231400H the "B" Command Group of H&S Company joined Company K for movement to Hill 61, coordinates BS 734470. At 231530H the "A" Command Group and remaining elements of H&S were helilifted to hill 61. A CP site was established at coordinates BS 732469. No contact was made during the day or night.

d. D#2, 24 November 1965. The Battalion commenced a retraction to Landing Zone ROBIN beginning at 240857H. Sequence of retraction was Company L; Company M; "B" Command Group, H&S Company; "A" Command Group, H&S Company; Forward Command Group, H&S Company; and Company K. The lift was completed at 241530H.

#### e. Chronology of Events

221610 - Company L lifted from LZ ROBIN.

221640 - Company L landed in vicinity BS 757469. Company M will land in vicinity BS 731469 at 230900H.

221830 - Companies K and L occupied defensive positions in vicinity BS 756470 in conjunction with Vietnamese Ranger unit.

222114 - Company K was in this position with two-thirds strength.

222144 - S-3 requested to know location of remaining elements of Company K and Whiskey. Requested that Regiment arrange to deliver them at first light.

222154 - Forward Command Group requested resupply for 250 men. Landing zone was marked with red panels.

222308 - Regimental S-3 informed Battalion S-3 to keep them informed of all weapons and equipment picked up and captured, also enemy contact. The Regimental Commander departed for our area.

222300 - Regimental Commander and Battalion Executive Officer conducted planning conference with ADC, MAG-36, and MAG-16 personnel for helicopter landing on morning of 23 November.



230900 - Brigadier General PLATT, Regimental Commander, and Battalion Executive Officer arrived at this CP.

230925 - UH1E's and VA aircraft commenced preparation of landing zone at BS 731468.

230955 - Three elements of Company M linked up and are moving to secure high ground. No enemy contact.

231026 - Company L moved out to sweep area from BS 756470 to BS 524472.

231050 - Company M secured the high ground in vicinity BS 733470.

231055 - Company M captured a 46 year old Vietnamese male and a 14 year old boy. They stated that 30 VC were located 200 meters south of landing zone on night of 22-23 November.

231055 - Notified by 7th Marines that the Battalion was under operational control of Regiment.

231127 - Leatherneck 3 ordered to sweep south to vicinity BS 745503, then southwest to BS 733482, then southwest.

231129 - Company L at Phase Line #1 of sweep. Ordered to continue when finished with search and clear of village complex.

231230 - Requested Leatherneck 3 inform this unit when they moved out.

231235 - Company L captured 14 VCS at BS 750474.

231304 - Division Commander on the way to this CP.

231023 - 107mm Howtar Battery ordered not be brought in until they are called for.

231328 - Leatherneck 3 position was in vicinity BS 536522.

231400 - Company L tied in with Company M. Results of sweep: Two dead VC in khaki uniforms, grenades and automatic weapons recovered. Interrogation of VCC indicates North Vietnamese unit had been in this area for approximately five months.

231515 - Company K, 1st section of mortars and Forward CP group departed enroute to Company M position.

231650 - Word sent to Howtar Battery that it was anticipated that they would not be used until 24 November.

231713 - All units of Battalion CP displaced to vicinity BS 733467. Companies K, L, and M were setting in on high ground vicinity BS 734470.

231800 - ARVN artillery to fire H and I fires at the following coordinates BS 725395, BS 725510, BS 705405, BS 670427.

240025 - Regiment reported only 24 UH-34's available to start retraction at 240900H.

240204 - ARVN positions are at BS 756469 and BS 768467. There were patrols north and south of these positions between railroad and Highway #1.

240735 - Received word that retraction will commence at 240900H in the following sequence: L - M - H&S - K. Small staff groups will return with first helicopters to relieve Provisional Battalion staff. Desire 1/7 Executive Officer to remain in CP until Major BALOGH arrives.

240900 - Company L and advanced elements of CP group commenced retraction.

240953 - All 1/7 and 2/4 units were held on line until 241600H.

241000 - Company K reported someone observing their movement from vicinity BS 696475.

241015 - Battalion Commander passed to Company L "Do not relieve Company H as yet. Clean up gear and prepare for operations similar to ones discussed this A.M."

241020 - Requested close air support until completion of lift.

241107 - Company M commenced retraction.

241127 - 107 Battery released from Battalion control.

241206 - All elements of Company M were retracted.

241247 - All units of 1/7 and 2/4 will be relieved at 241600H.

241252 - First elements of Company B, 3rd Medical Battalion and "B" Command Group were retracted.  
 241520 - All Skeptic units returned to CP.

## 12. Results

### a. Friendly

- 1) KIA: One
- 2) WIA: Two
- 3) MIA: None
- 4) KBA: None
- 5) Equipment and Material Losses: None

### b. Enemy

- 1) KIA: Two
- 2) WIA: Unknown
- 3) MIA: Unknown
- 4) KBA: Unknown
- 5) Captured VCC: Three
- 6) Captured VCS: Twenty-two
- 7) Equipment Lost: One RPD Degatarev LMG  
 Two AK-56 assault rifles  
 Five SKS carbines  
 One 75mm recoilless rifle round  
 Several grenades

13. Administrative Matters. From the standpoint of logistics, this relief operation could be considered routine. The heliborne deployment was in accordance with established contingency plans. The unit deployed with normal arms and equipment, a basic allowance of ammunition, a two-day supply of dry cell batteries, and three days of high usage medical items and three meals per individual. Because of the necessity to redistribute some supplies to the ARVN unit relieved, a resupply by helicopter was required on the morning of 25 November. This one resupply was sufficient for the remainder of the operation. Resupply was accomplished from Battalion assets located at the CP (Rear). Medical support consisted of unit corpsmen, a BAS (Fwd) headed by one doctor, and a casualty reporting/property control section located at Company E, 3rd Medical Battalion. Casualties were evacuated to "B" Med via helicopter. Retraction was accomplished via helicopter.

14. Special Equipment/Techniques. A technique that is certainly not new but that has been put to use again with good results was the employment of the flamethrower. Two VC snipers were located in dense undergrowth and could neither be spotted nor flushed. The intense heat of the flamethrower caused the VC to flee their concealed positions thus being spotted and then destroyed.

15. Commander's Analysis. A combination of several factors greatly affected what this Battalion was able to accomplish the first day. First of all, the weather was poor. There was considerable rain and fog which limited helicopter employment and observation. In addition, the decision to employ the Battalion in a relief role was received relatively late in the day (221400H). Fortunately, the Battalion was already in an alert status and thus was fully capable of moving out on 15 minutes notice. The short period of daylight remaining for the helicopter lift was a definite limiting factor. However, another factor to be considered was the extended distance of the area of operation from Chu Lai which resulted in a one and one-half hour turnaround time. The number of aircraft available to accomplish the move was limited to 24. Quick planning considering all of the factors mentioned resulted in insertion of two companies (minus one platoon), an 81mm mortar section, an effective Command group with the capabilities to call and coordinate NGF and artillery, to control close air support, and to communicate with adjacent units and with Battalion (Rear). The "B" Command Group with the Executive Officer in charge remained in the rear area to assist in planning and coordinating the helicopter landing of the 3rd company on D+1. Considering the short period of time that was available for preparing for the operation and the lack of prior intelligence, the overall results of the operation were considered to be most satisfactory.

#### 16. Recommendations


- a. That provisions be made to provide the Alert Battalion with enemy intelligence on a timely basis so that adequate tactical plans can be developed as the situation develops.
- b. That the Alert Battalion be provided with a map package in sufficient time to accomplish planning and that a contingency map package be available at this enclave for issue (Estimated needs are 120 sheets).
- c. That the Alert Battalion be freed of all static defense responsibilities when called upon so that its total effort and assets may be pointed toward reaction and exploitation.
- d. That the Alert Battalion consist of a minimum of three rifle companies and elements of H&S Company.
- e. That AN/PRC-25 radios be made available for use by the Alert Battalion to insure positive communications with minimum battery resupply.
- f. That a pre-determined agreement be concluded whereby captured VC and VCS be released to ARVN/U.S. Army units in the immediate area when the distance is so great that it is impractical to shuttle them to USMC installations. Reports of all information obtained from captured personnel should be forwarded to USMC intelligence sources.

C. H. BODLEY

3rd Bat. 7th Marine  
CHV I. M.

Map of the 1st Marine Division, Sheets 6756 I, II

Map Name: X




95  
+  
60

D-Day+2 November 1965

52  
+88

ENCLOSURE (3)

Time Zone: M



Day 4 November 1965

954  
60

52  
+ 88


ENCLOSURE (2)

(7)

2nd Edition, 700 Minutes  
CH 11, 100

Ref: (a) MAP: ACS 1701, VIETNAM Sheet: 6756 II

Time Zone: E



95  
+  
60

85  
+  
52

R-hour B-day November 1963

ENCLOSURE (1)

(7)

This would make additional rice available to government controlled hamlets. This would also deny the VC the opportunity of confiscating rice from the farmer.


f. That deserted villages be destroyed.

(1) Deserted villages offer harboring sites and cover from the elements to VC and VCS. Therefore, it is recommended that these uninhabited and deserted villages be destroyed.

*C. H. Bodley*  
C. H. BODLEY

78

49



74


74

- 1 - ARVN Ranger Company position on D-day
- 2 - ARVN Ranger Company position on D-day
- 3 - ARVN Ranger Company position on D-day
- 4 - One platoon of Company L and advanced GP group landed D-day.
- 5 - 2nd and 3rd Platoon of Company L landed D-day.

ENCLOSURE (1)

(8)








- 1 - Company L and ARVN Ranger night defensive positions D-day
- 2 - Company M landing zone D+3
- 3 - Company M objective D+1

ENCLOSURE (2)

181




- 1 - Battalion defensive position D+1
- 2 - Battalion retracted from LZ on D+2

ENCLOSURE (3)

57

OVERLAYS OF BATTALION POSITION 1 (060800H to 180800H November 65)




UNCLASSIFIED

9/7, 10/65  
APPENDIX (9) to  
ENCLOSURE (1)

OVERLAYS OF BATTALION POSITION 2 (130800H to 200800H November 1965)

UNCLASSIFIED

57  
+ 05




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3/7, Nov 65  
APPENDIX (10) to  
ENCLOSURE (1)


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OVERLAYS OF BATTALION POSITION 3 (200800H to 270800H Nov 1965)



OVERLAYS OF BATTALION POSITION 4 (270300H to 302400H November 1965)

UNCLASSIFIED



3/7, Nov 65  
APPENDIX (12) to  
ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY FOR  
3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

## A. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA:

1. Designation and location of reporting unit: 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein) FMF, CHU LAI, Republic of VIETNAM
2. Period covered: 1-31 December 1965
3. Commanding Officer LtCol C. H. BODLEY  
 Executive Officer Maj H. G. BALOGH  
 S-1 Adjutant 1stLt J. L. GILLESPIE  
 S-2 Officer Capt W. M. CLAPP  
 S-3 Officer Maj R. A. CLARK  
 S-4 Officer Capt H. E. F. VONCARP  
 Communications Officer Capt E. T. FITZGERALD  
 Supply Officer 1stLt F. J. LAMURA  
 Motor Transport Officer 1stLt D. J. MCKIBBAN  
 Bn Surgeon Lt(MC) L. J. SHIVERS  
 Bn Chaplain Lt(ChC) E. W. EPPS  
 H&S Company Commander 1stLt G. M. SCHLITZ  
 "I" Company Commander Capt J. E. CLEMENTS  
 "K" Company Commander Capt D. E. THOMAS  
 "L" Company Commander 1stLt D. M. MCEWEN (1-4 Dec)  
 "M" Company Commander Capt J. E. SEEBURGER, Jr. (4-31 Dec)  
 Capt T. G. MCFARLAND
4. Average Strength USMC: 37 Officers 969 Enlisted  
 USN: 3 Officers 58 Enlisted

B. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF  
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

- 1 Dec: Lieutenant Colonel C. H. BODLEY, Second Lieutenant M. E. NENEZES, Sergeant D. L. TEEGARDIN, Sergeant C. C. PEARCE, and Corporal H. M. DUNKLE were decorated with the Vietnamese Gallantry Award at QUANG NGAI by Major General LAM, ARVN, Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division.
- 3 Dec: 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines exchanged one T/O rifle company and one T/O section of 81mm Mortar Platoon with 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines in accordance with DivBul 1300 dated 12 November 1965.
- 6 Dec: A Seismic Intrusion Device School was conducted at this Command.
- 9 Dec: This Command conducted instructions for squad leaders on forward observer's procedures and practical application for adjustment of artillery fire.
- 11 Dec: An art contest was held for the school children of the local village of TRI BINH (1). Prizes were awarded to the winners of the contest.

ENCLOSURE (1)  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12 Dec: Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were invited to attend the celebration of the anniversary of the death of NGUYEN VAN MINH in the local village of TRI BINH (1). After the religious ceremony the Marines participated at the banquet feast with the Hamlet Chief and elders.

13 Dec: Companies I and K conducted a joint search and clear operation of the village complex of LONG PHU (1) vicinity coordinates BT 512029 (Appendix (2)).

A flag raising ceremony was conducted in the local village of TRI BINH (1). The Hamlet Chief invited Captain LONG, the District Chief and representatives from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. The civil affairs team provided marching music for the occasion and a rifle squad to act as an honor guard for the flag raising.

HO VAN NHUT, a Vietnamese boy, was admitted to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines BAS. HO is ten years of age and lives in the local village of AN THIEN. On 10 December 1965, HO VAN NHUT was lighting a kerosene lamp when it exploded. At this time HO received 2nd and 3rd degree burns on his left shoulder and upper arm. Since HO's uncle did not evacuate him to QUANG NGAI Hospital as requested, HO was then admitted to 3/7 Battalion Aid Station by the Battalion Surgeon for immediate treatment and constant surveillance. HO no longer has a fever and the infection has diminished considerably. He is generally in good spirits and smiles quite frequently now since he has found new friends in the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines.

15 Dec: One squad size patrol was taken under fire by an unknown number of VC. Squad returned fire and assaulted. Results encountered: Two female VC KIA, approximately 17-20 years of age. One U.S. carbine captured.

20 Dec: Approximately six VC walked into a night fireteam ambush site. A daylight examination of the killing zone revealed large pools of blood and flesh particles. No bodies were found.

21 Dec: A platoon size patrol was taken under fire by small arms and hand grenades by approximately six VC. Platoon returned fire and pursued killing two VC.

22 Dec: Patrol located and destroyed two booby traps. One was constructed from an 81mm mortar round and the other from a 3.5" rocket round. VC had used eight large rocks to signify the location of the mine.

23 Dec: Estimated six VC threw grenades at a fireteam size outpost. Outpost returned fire and called in illumination. VC withdrew. Marines pursued but lost contact.

24 Dec: 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines civil affairs teams conducted a Christmas party in the local villages of TRI BINH (1) and AN THIEN. Santa Claus arrived with candy, clothes, dolls, fried rice and cake for the occasion.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

25 Dec: The cease fire truce that was put into effect over Christmas Day was broken when a VC element of unknown size opened fire on a two platoon size reconnaissance patrol resulting in one friendly KIA and eight friendly WIA.

The Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines invited the children of the local villages of AN THIEN and TRI BINH (1) to attend the Christmas celebration at the Battalion CP. Two hundred and forty-three children attended. The 3rd Marine Division Band provided the entertainment.

27 Dec: Operation "HUM BUG" (Appendix (1)).

29 Dec: A two platoon size patrol received five rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The patrol called an artillery mission on suspected mortar position. The incident resulted in one VC KIA and one VCS captured. The patrol sustained six WIA's from the mortar fire.

Air observer sighted six VC armed with heavy weapons (type unknown) in trench, AO called artillery mission. When AO attempted to evaluate results, he received .50 caliber machinegun fire from unknown position. Fixed wing airstrike was called. The following day a captured VCS reported ten VC had been killed by the airstrike.

31 Dec: The Hamlet Chief of TRI BINH (1) was shot and killed by an unknown assassin.

In the month of December over 2200 Vietnamese civilians were treated by the civil affairs medical teams. English classes and sports programs are being received with enthusiasm. Villagers are becoming more friendly and are starting to volunteer intelligence information.

#### C. DOCUMENTS:

1. Operation Order 11-65 (Appendix (1))
2. Frag Order 7-65 (Appendix (2))
3. After Action Report "HUM BUG" (Appendix (3))
4. Overlay of Battalion Position 1 (Appendix (4))  
 Overlay of Battalion Position 2 (Appendix (5))  
 Overlay of Battalion Position 3 (Appendix (6))  
 Overlay of Battalion Position 4 (Appendix (7))

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