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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3:JEC:mde
5750
1 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
(Attn: Field Historian)
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology; month of May 1966

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2A

Encl: (1) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Chronology with Attachments

1. In accordance with reference (a), the command chronology for the month of May 1966 is submitted with attachments.

B. B. DEWITT
B. B. DEWITT

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

251-66 Copy # 1010

SER: 622-66

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3RD BATTALION, 7TH MARINES COMMAND CHRONOLOGY WITH ATTACHMENTS

A. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA:

1. Designation and location of reporting unit: 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF, Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam
2. Period covered: 1 May to 31 May 1966
3. Commanding Officer LtCol C. H. BODLEY 1-27
 Executive Officer LtCol B. B. DEWITT 28-31 May
 S-1 Adjutant Maj PALOUGH 1-4
 S-2 Officer Maj VORGANG 5-31 May
 S-3 Officer 1stLt J. J. COVERT
 S-4 Officer Capt W. M. CLAPP
 Communications Officer Maj R. A. CLARK
 Supply Officer Capt H. E. F. VONCARP
 Motor Transport Officer Capt E. T. FITZGERALD 1-24
 Bn Surgeon Capt H. C. SCHRODER 25-31 May
 Lt(Mc) L. J. SHIVERS 1-12
 Lt(Mc) M. G. ASHKAR 13-31 May
 Lt(Chc) E. W. EPPS
 Bn Chaplin Capt E. T. FITZGERALD
 H&S Company Commander Capt J. E. CLEMENTS 1-25
 "I" Company Commander Capt P. R. GOTTLIEB 26-31 May
 "K" Company Commander Lt W. M. LINGENFELTER 01-17
 Lt W. L. BYRD 18-31 May
 "M" Company Commander Capt T. V. DRAUDE
 "L" Company Commander Capt M. J. QUINN
4. Average Strength: USMC: 25 Officers USN: 3 Officers
 875 Enlisted 54 Enlisted

The total number of personnel on hand within 3/7 as of 31 May 1966 is 952.
 The total effective strength on 31 May 1966 is 903.

During the month of May 326 new personnel were joined to this unit, while 321 were dropped from the roles.

A total of 249 personnel have rotated, fifteen (15) personnel were W.I.A.

B. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

4 May Company K and the Bravo Command Group of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were relieved of the defense of the Chu Lai Air Field by Company K and Bravo Command Group of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.

At 1850H, Company M, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines reported that a truck driver informed the highway #1 roadblock, manned by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, coordinates BS564997, that his truck was fired on from the West of highway #1 between OF 39 (BS5796) and the roadblock. At approximately the same time, Company K observed 5-7 Vietnamese running from Highway #1 West toward the Tri Binh (1) Hamlet, Coordinates BS555987. As the Vietnamese were running, Company M observed 7 explosions. At 1910H, Company M dispatched a squad to Tri Binh (1). At 1920H two Vietnamese arrived at Company M's position on the M.R. and reported that many people had been injured in Tri Binh (1) as a result of incoming rounds.

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At 1905H, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines reported that they had fired 5 rounds of 106 MM HEAT and 4 rounds of 81MM HE Medium in support of vehicles that had been fired on by a 50 caliber Machine Gun from Coordinates BS559987. At 2025H, a Civil Affairs team with a doctor and security group from 3/7 were dispatched to Tri Binh (1). There were 4 Vietnamese treated for minor shrapnel wounds and it was verified that the villagers had taken two wounded females to Huoc Mon market which is located at Coordinates BS547970. A school house was destroyed and one house was damaged. The hamlet Chief and several other residents stated that the VC had not been in the area, however, they had heard firing from the vicinity of Tri Binh (4) Hamlet at Coordinates BS559979. Despite the casualties and property damage, the general attitude of the villagers continued to be friendly.

5 May At 2100H, the point man from a reinforced squad, Company K, enroute to an ambush site discovered a VC hiding behind a Dike at BS573942. When challenged, the VC fled. The point man caught the VC and killed him with a knife when he resisted. The Marine returned to his squad and reported the incident. When the squad reached the area where the incident occurred they were unable to find the body, however, a 45 year old villager in Phuoc An (1) related that the VC killed was a member of a three man security team guarding a trail into Phuoc An (1). The two remaining members of the VC team had carried off the body.

7 May Company K, Company L and a Command Group from 3/7 assumed the responsibility of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines MLR.

13 May A squad ambush from Company M. located at Coordinates BS581951 opened fire on two VC resulting in 1 VC K.I.A. and the capture of a French MAT 49 submachine gun with three magazines, 1 U.S. Pistol Belt, 1 U.S. wire cutters, 1 U.S. bayonet, and a billfold with assorted papers. The second VC escaped.

14 May Company K, Company L, and a Command Group from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines were relieved of the responsibility for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines MLR.

16-17 May Operation "TOMA" (160400H-171700H) combined two comparatively new tactical concepts i.e. a night helicopter landing and a "County Fair" operation. The tactical considerations were made in order to evaluate these concepts. The Hamlet Tan Phuoc (4) was selected as the target in order to exploit persisting intelligence reports which indicate that the VC have attempted to effect complete Military, economic and political control throughout this area. The concept of operation called for the introduction of Battalion pathfinder teams to mark the LZ with strobe and flash lights. The LZ's were strategically selected in order to effect a complete encirclement of the objective area with two rifle Companies and a Battalion Command group. Initial Contact with VC forces was made at approximately 160030H when the pathfinders assembled a hasty ambush which resulted in 6 VC K.I.A. and an estimated 8 VC W.I.A. There were no friendly casualties. At 160400H the heliborne landing commenced. The encirclement of the objective area was accomplished in a minimum amount of time. The landing went smoothly and was unopposed due to the shock and surprise effect of the unprecedented 1 hour. During the conduct of the operation only sporadic sniper fire was encountered resulting in one friendly non serious W.I.A.


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Companies I and M conducted a detailed search and clear and an intensive Psy Warfare program was initiated. In addition to the 6 VC K.I.A. and 8 VC W.I.A., the operation resulted in 7 VCC and 9 VCS, two French MAS-36 rifles, two M-1 Carbines, one bolt action Chi Com Carbine (K-44) and one M-26 grenade captured. Retraction commenced at 171600H with the initial wave encountering sniper fire resulting in one slightly wounded Marine. As the last wave retracted, the Marines encountered VC sniper and automatic weapons fire. HUELS conducted suppressing fires and A-4 aircraft conducted an air strike after the last helicopters cleared the area.

19 May Company K, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines was relieved by "B" Company 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on the right flank of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines MLR.

20-22 May Operation "MORGAN" was conducted in South Central Binh Son District, My Loc Hamlet Complex, located in grid squares 4989, 5089, 4988 and 5088. This operation was a combined effort of USMC and ARVN forces employing a joint Armored/Infantry thrust with heliborne landing of troops in the objective area in order to effect complete encirclement. The operation commenced on D-3 when Company L began its movement into the Tay Phuoc Hamlet complex via GS4894 in order to establish a blocking position in preparation for a Company size sweep from the East. On D-1 at 0015H, Company I moved from OP#39 via GS5796 and commenced a sweep of Thanh Tra (2) GS5394 at 0600H. At approximately 1600H on D-1, Companies I and L completed a perimeter in the Tay Phuoc Hamlet Complex and established their night defensive positions. On the night of D-1, one platoon from Company L moved overland in order to establish blocking positions to the West of the objective area via BS438889 and a USMC Reconnaissance platoon was inserted at vic BS530930 to establish OP positions. On D-day an armored/infantry thrust moved from Highway #1 via BS588944 in a SW direction toward the objective area. The column initially consisted of Tanks, Ontos, LVTs and an ARVN reconn Company however, the tanks and LVTs failed to negotiate the terrain West of GS5892 and returned to Highway #1. The Ontos and ARVN reconn Company continued its movement west toward the objective area. Sporadic sniper fire was encountered by the armored column, however, in all instances the VC were quick to break contact and there were no friendly casualties sustained. At 1015H on D-day Company L commenced a helo-lift from LZ Apple via BS507945 into LZ Peach via BS499896 followed by Company I into LZ Pear via BS500898. A simultaneous helo lift from LZ Robin brought Company K with one platoon from Company M into LZ Plum via BS513900 followed by the Battalion Command Group into LZ Pear. The 2nd Bn, 4th Reg't ARVN conducted a heliborne landing into LZ Pine BS493884 and a complete encirclement of the objective area was completed by 1200H. Company K initiated a search and destroy mission of the My Loc Hamlet Complex with no enemy contact. Intensive Psy warfare action was then initiated in conjunction with the "County Fair" concepts. During the course of the operation, 1 VC was KIA, 25 VCC and 2VCS were apprehended as well as 1 MAS 36 rifle, 9 Air to Ground Rockets, 8 105 MM rounds, 1 81 MM Mortar round, 2 cargo river boats and 10 lbs. of medical supplies confiscated. On D+2, 750 refugees with 250 cattle were evacuated by the Recon Company ARVN, the Ontos and a platoon from Company K, 3/7 to Binh Son district headquarters and encountered sporadic sniper fire on route. No casualties were sustained. On D+2 at 1500H, helicopter retraction of the Battalion Command Group, Companies I, K, and L commenced from LZ Pear to LZ Robin and was completed by 1615H.



During the course of this operation, a Command Group from the 1st Battalion 7th Marines assumed responsibility for the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines MLR and arrived at 3/7 CP at 200745H and were relieved at 221625H.

24 May Companies I and L 3/7 relieved Companies A and C respectively and were placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

26 May A Battalion command group and a platoon from Company M on a reconnaissance mission detonated a Chi Com Z-10 hand grenade via BS537947 resulting in two friendly W.I.A. (Bn Cadr + S-4 Officer). Numerous punji stakes and another booby trap Z-10 were discovered during a subsequent search of the area.

28 May Company L returned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines from operational control of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

29 May Company I returned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines from operational control of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

31 May The Psy War Drama Team from the 2nd Infantry Div. ARVN, Quang Ngai arrived by helicopter in the Hamlet of Tri Binh #1 BS555988 at 0900H and presented a 1 Hr. variety show in conjunction with the 3/7 CA/Psy war pacification program.


CIVIL AFFAIRS

During the month of May the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Civil Affairs Team treated 1712 Villagers. These villagers received 2689 treatments. Daily visits were made by the Civil Affairs Team to Tri Binh (1) BS559987, Tri Binh (4) BS556978 and Tri Binh (5) BS568971. During the month, emphasis was placed on medical aid, English Classes and "County Fair" type activities. An extensive Civil Affairs program was initiated in conjunction with operation "YUMA" and "MORGAN" details of which are included in the after action reports appended to this chronology.

B. B. DEWEET

✓ Appendix 1- After action report for Operation "YUMA" Concept of Operation and "Operation SANDHILL"

✓ Appendix 2- After Action report for Operation "MORGAN" 3d Bn, 7th Mar Frag C 7-66.



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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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28 May 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) Frag Order "SANDMAN" Redesignated "YUMA"
(b) MAP: TRA BONG 1:50,000 Sheet 6756 IV, L701

1. Operation "YUMA" Night Helicopter Assault/County Fair.
2. Dates of Operation. 151730H - 171600H May 1966
3. Location. QUANG NGAI Province, BINH SON District, TAN PHUOC (4) Hamlet.
4. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. BODLEY USMC.
5. Task Organization.
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)
Detachment - Company "C", 1st Engineer Battalion
Detachment - Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
Scout Dog Team, III MAF
Detachment - National Police, BINH SON District Headquarters
Psy Warfare Team, Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN, QUANG NGAI
6. Supporting Forces.
 - a. Air (Chronological Utilization)

On 16 May 1966 at 0345H, the helilift of the Battalion commenced from Landing Zone ROBIN. Twenty-six helicopters were utilized for the movement and the lift was completed at 0445H. Landing Zone ROBIN was divided into three loading zones, marked by different colored lights to denote the landing zone into which each wave of helicopters would land. When the first wave of helicopters landed in the prescribed landing zones in the objective area the Crew Chief from one of the helicopters marked the zone with the same colored light that was in the loading zone at Landing Zone ROBIN, enabling the helilift phase to proceed with minimum confusion. Flarepots were placed for each helicopter landing point and guides were provided for each heliteam. The loading phase was orderly and the loading time for the first twenty-six helicopters was only five minutes.

The three landing zones were illuminated from 160355H until dawn by Lamplighter Aircraft. One significant point of the helilift portion of the operation was the efficient manner in which the helicopter pilots performed. The twenty-six helicopters landed almost simultaneously into three landing zones enabling the Battalion to completely encircle the target area in less than thirty minutes.

The landing zones were marked by strobe lights put in place by pathfinder teams from Company "M" and Company "I". Even though they encountered

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many obstacles, the pathfinders were able to reach their respective landing zones and accomplish their mission. The success of the night landing was to a great extent due to the efforts of these Marines.

Two UH34s were standing by on condition 4 for resupply utilization throughout the operation. At 160830H the resupply aircraft delivered the Civil Affairs Team, two Scout Dog Teams, and cooking facilities to the Battalion Command Post (FWD). At 160930H Isherwood 5 arrived at the Battalion Command Post (Fwd). He departed by helicopter at 161045H. At 161030H an emergency med-evac request was submitted for one USMC WIA. The med-evac was completed at 161050H.

The resupply helicopters delivered two loud speakers and one case of smoke at 161100H. At 161600H ten VCS were evacuated to IPT. At 161630H a platoon of Company "K" was retracted from BS 559991 and returned to Landing Zone ROBIN. At 161700H a request was submitted to place Lamplighter aircraft on condition 4 for the duration of the night.

At 170630H a helicopter arrived to pick up Crepe Myrtle 6 to return to Landing Zone ROBIN.

Resupply helicopters were utilized throughout the remainder of the day to deliver MEIs and explosives. At 171130H an emergency med-evac request was submitted for two USMC with gas asphyxiation. The med-evac was completed at 171200H. At 171400H helicopters retracted Vietnamese Psy/Warfare personnel and one civilian med-evac to QUANG NGAI. At 171500H helicopters arrived to pick up GP tents, stoves and miscellaneous equipment to be delivered to Landing Zone ROBIN.

The retraction of the Battalion commenced from BS 55999 at 171600H. As the last wave of helicopters were approaching the retraction zone, the VC commenced firing with automatic weapons. The security elements returned fire and withdrew from the hamlet in order that the HUIEs could provide suppressing fire. The HUIEs fired rockets into the hamlet at BS 562915 and BS 563914 and enabled the troops to withdraw and board the helicopters. After the last wave had lifted A4Es were called in and commenced bombing and strafing attacks on the hostile hamlet. The retraction was completed in approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.

b. Fire Support.

(1) Fire Support for this operation was provided by Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines; Battery "M", 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, and one section of the 81mm mortar platoon, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines.

Nine H&I missions, one target of opportunity, one registration, and two illumination missions were fired during the conduct of the operation. Ammo expended included:

| | <u>HE</u> | <u>ILLUM</u> |
|-------|-----------|--------------|
| 81mm | 7 | 11 |
| 105mm | 135 | |
| 155mm | | 12 |
| Total | 142 | 23 |

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(2) Chronological Summary of Events.

(a) On 16 May 1966, the FSCC landed with the Battalion Command Post Group to commence operations in the objective area.

(b) During the daylight hours of 16 May 1966, one 81mm mortar registration was fired, and one 81mm mortar mission was fired at VC snipers at BS 563913. The mission was not completed as the snipers dispersed after the first round.

(c) During the night of 16 - 17 May, two illumination missions were fired for Companies "I" and "M". No sightings were made under the illumination. In addition, nine H&I missions were fired.

(d) No missions were fired during the daylight hours of 17 May. The FSCC was retracted at 171620H and returned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines.

(e) Comments and Recommendations.

1 It was decided to carry extra 81mm illumination rounds on this operation as the operational area was out of range of direct support illumination and experience had shown that delays often developed during the conduct of general support illumination missions. It was hoped that 81mm illumination could provide an effective bridge between the time illumination was called for and the time an artillery mission could be generated. The Battalion was still within HE range of the direct support battery, so it was determined that the number of 81mm HE rounds carried could be reduced. The concept worked well, and is recommended for like situations where the area of operations is at extreme ranges for direct support illumination.

2 In order to prevent or limit the 81mm mortar Platoon from making large initial deflection errors, it is recommended that azimuth indicators be constructed for each mortar and placed at 800 mil intervals around the tube. An azimuth could then be made an integral part of the fire command. The gunners would then have two positive references for direction. This technique has worked well for artillery and should prove equally effective for the mortars.

3 The AN/PRC-25 continues to provide reliable long-range communications. It is recommended that the number of these radios available be increased so that the artillery FO teams may also be equipped with them. The FSCC should continue to carry the antenna RC-292 because it serves to ensure positive communications between the FO and the artillery battery.

7. Intelligence.a. Anticipated Strength and Situation of Enemy.

(1) Operation "YUMA" was an operation conducted in exploitation of intelligence gathered from a variety of sources, as well as to evaluate the concept of the night heliborne encirclement of a given target area. For

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several months, prior to the operation, the indications were that an increasingly strong VC effort to effect complete military, economic and political control was being made throughout the area. It was anticipated prior to the entry of U.S. Forces into the objective area that elements of the T-19 Local Force Company plus hamlet and village guerrillas would be encountered.

(2) In view of the fact that this area had not been occupied by friendly forces in nearly a year, it was assumed that a typical VC political and economic apparatus would have been established to control the population.

(3) It was estimated that armed VC forces would attempt to exfiltrate the objective area, in both easterly and westerly directions when confronted with major friendly units. Presupposing a successful encirclement of the TAN PHUOC (4) objective area, it was felt that these enemy would be forced into hiding places in the immediate area.

b. Currency, Adequacy, and Sources of Intelligence.

(1) Intelligence on which this operation was based was quite current and the actual conduct of the operation proved it to be essentially correct. For some months prior to the operation, BINH SON District sources had been reporting increased Local Force Guerrilla type activity in the area. Further, the number of contacts involving increasingly bold and well armed guerrilla units had shown a gradual increase in the preceeding three to four months. It was apparent that VC forces were operating in this area in greater strength.

(2) The decision to designate the TAN PHUOC (4) area as the specific objective area for the operation was predicated in part on the results of recent Company patrol conducted in the area, as well as terrain configurations which would support the concept of landing at night in three adjacent zones. The Company patrol found, within the hamlet of TAN PHUOC (4), several large and freshly dug caves that were unusually deep (as much as 25 feet below surface level) and well constructed. Though no material was located in the caves at the time, it seemed unlikely that the VC would put forth such construction effort if they did not in fact plan to use the caves for some significant purpose.

c. VC Strength and Situation Actually Encountered.

(1) The only major contact encountered during the operation occurred several hours prior to the landing. At about 0150H a fifteen man pathfinder team, moving into the area from across the TRA BONG River with the mission of marking the three HLZs with strobe lights, made contact with and ambushed 10 - 15 VC. This clandestine patrol was forced to trigger their hastily established ambush when the VC force, apparently unaware of their presence, nearly walked over them. The concentrated fire of 15 weapons fired at close range produced a devastating effect on the VC, killing six and wounding eight others. Debriefing of the patrol indicated that there may very well have been other casualties, as many screams and moans were heard from distant points in the killing area. The patrol left the area rapidly to continue their mission, and only had time to pick up two MAS-36 rifles among the several weapons observed.

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(2) Once the encirclement of the hamlet area was effected, it became apparent that considerable surprise had been achieved despite the premature contact. Although no enemy units were encountered, a number of VC were found hiding in caves in and around the hamlet. Additionally, some VC were found attempting to mingle with the population.

(3) The previously mentioned large caves were checked out in detail as well as many other small holes and tunnels. Although this area had a large number of underground structures, there was no evidence of VC use of these as anything more than bomb shelters or hiding places. Most of the caves were destroyed with explosives.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) Interrogation of villagers in the area, as well as the 9VCC and 7 VCS captured, revealed that there was a squad of 8 - 10 guerrillas operating in hamlet, and that platoon-sized units passed through the hamlet frequently traveling the east-west axis of the north banks of the TRA BONG River. Further, a typical VC political and economic structure had been established, as was anticipated. The hamlet was under firm control of effective VC Cadre.

(2) A VC guerrilla, captured with his weapon from a cave in the vicinity of the Battalion C.P. described his unit as the 21st District Company, composed of 100 men and armed with one 81mm mortar and one 50 caliber machine-gun as well as individual small arms. The last known position of his unit was allegedly in the vicinity of BS 5792. He further stated that his company had been in the vicinity of DUC AN Hamlet BS 505915 where they had been involved in the training of new recruits. This information is consistent with other reports received before and since this operation concerning training activity going on in the DUC AN vicinity.

(3) Possibly the most significant information, or rather experience gained, was the effect of "COUNTY FAIR" operations on the civilian populace. Beyond question, this type of activity puts the local populace in such a frame of mind that they become more cooperative than they are in a normal search and clear operation. The encirclement, on which a "COUNTY FAIR" operation is based, also gives a much better chance of isolating hidden VC and preventing their escape.

e. Terrain Analysis.

(1) Critical Terrain - Two pieces of terrain within the immediate area are critical. One is the hill mass NW of TAN PHUOC (4) (Vicinity BS 553913) due to its commanding nature in regards to adjacent ground. Because of its limited defensive system, the village of TAN PHUOC (4) may be considered critical terrain.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire - Observation and fields of fire are excellent from TAN PHUOC (4) in all directions except to the N.W. Observation from the hill at BS 553913 should be good in all directions.

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(3) Cover and Concealment - Both cover and concealment are provided by fighting holes on all trails in TAN PHUOC (4); the trench system surrounding that hamlet, and the natural and cultivated vegetation in and around the hamlet. Some concealment is provided by typical chest-high scrub brush on the hill at BS 553913. The terrain surrounding TAN PHUOC (4) in all directions but N.W. effects only minimum cover or concealment.

(4) Obstacles - A wire fence surrounding TAN PHUOC (4) provides a limited obstacle to foot movement, as does the defensive trench in that hamlet. Heavy brush on the hill at BS 553913 should constitute a limited obstacle.

(5) Avenues of Approach - The single covered avenue of approach into TAN PHUOC (4) would be over or around the base of hill at BS 553913. Uncovered avenues of approach across open, presently uncultivated, rice and dry crop fields abound.

8. Mission. 3rd Battalion; 7th Marines (-) (Rein) conduct a nocturnal heliborne landing to surround and seal off all routes of egress of the TAN PHUOC (4) hamlet complex BS 556912, BINH SON District; then conduct a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation within that objective area.

9. Concept of Operation. On D-Day at L-Hour 3rd Battalion; 7th Marines (-) (Rein) will commence a nocturnal heliborne landing into three Landing Zones to seal off all routes of egress of the TAN PHUOC (4) hamlet complex;

10. Execution.

Background and Planning.

a. Operation "SANDMAN" later redesignated "YUMA" was initially a Search and Destroy operation. As planning progressed, the mission was expanded to include a limited "COUNTY FAIR" type operation. From this, experience could be gained in preparation for a similar type operation that would be conducted in the immediate future.

b. Initial submission of the concept of operations (7 May 1966) called for a nocturnal helicopter lift to be conducted "in the light of the moon." Because of other Division Operational commitments execution of the plan delayed. Because of these delays, the moon passed into the last quarter phase. The order for execution of the plan was received in spite of the lack of natural light. A flare plan was requested to provide lighting in the objective area from L-Hour until daylight.

c. D-3 At 131300H the order for Operation "YUMA" was issued to all staff sections and units participating. This was followed by a briefing describing the purpose of a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation and assigning specific "COUNTY FAIR" missions to various personnel. Further, Companies "M" and "I" were assigned the mission of providing Pathfinder Teams for the pre L-Hour move to the helicopter landing zones. Three teams were required for the mission. Each team was composed of 5 men. The selection of the men was based upon their physical condition, ability to swim, marksmanship, ability to maneuver at night with map and compass as well as courage and a past history demonstrating their willingness to close with the enemy. (All of these

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attributes were put to the test when the plan was executed).

d. D-2 A final planning conference was held at MAG-36 Headquarters with representatives from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; Division Air, MAG-36 and MAG-12 in attendance. Helicopter lift requirements, Landing Zones, flareship, fixed wing air support, AO coverage and resupply requirements were discussed and finalized at this meeting.

e. D-1 151300H a helicopter reconnaissance of the objective area was conducted by the helicopter Flight Leaders, participating Company Commanders, the Battalion Commander, the S-3 and the three Pathfinder Team Leaders. At 151730H three Pathfinder Teams, composed of five men each, departed 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post for AN DIEM Outpost vicinity BS 549889. At 152000H the Pathfinder Teams departed AN DIEM to prepare three Landing Zones for the night helicopter assault. Company "M" was responsible for Landing Zones HAIL (BS 561911) and THUNDER (BS 554916) while Company "I" team was responsible for Landing Zone LIGHTNING (BS 552907). At 152130H the three Pathfinder Teams reached the south bank of the TR. BONG River vicinity BS 555900. The teams moved west and crossed the river vicinity BS 552897 at about 152330H.

f. D-Day 160010H the Pathfinder Teams heard voices in the hamlet vicinity coordinates BS 555901, and took cover so as to avoid contact. At 160045H the Pathfinders again heard several voices moving toward them vicinity coordinates BS 555903. A hasty ambush was established. Approximately 10 - 15 VC could be observed moving toward their position. The ambush was sprung. An estimated six (6) VC were killed and an estimated eight (8) wounded by the ambush. (Six bodies were recovered in that immediate area after daylight that day. People in the hamlet identified the bodies as VC local force guerrillas. Two French MAS-36 rifles were recovered from the ambush site. At 160350H the pathfinders were in position ready to receive the helicopters. The team in landing zone THUNDER was positioned approximately 600 meters too far north west. At 160400H the night heliborne landing commenced. The helicopter flight leader for landing zone THUNDER was able to make the adjustment and the helicopters were landed in the vicinity of where the zone had originally been designated. During the time from when the ambush was sprung and L-Hour, the VC remained in the area crying and shouting. At times the VC could be observed using flashlights moving dead and wounded. One VC with a flashlight approached to within 15 - 20 meters of the pathfinder team in landing zone LIGHTNING. At L-Hour the pathfinders lit the strobe lights. The VC started blinking their flashlights apparently thinking the pathfinders were VC. When the first flare was dropped, the VC were not observed in that area again. At 160400H Company "M" command group and the 1st Platoon landed in landing zone THUNDER. Then 3rd Platoon landed in zone HAIL while elements from Company "I" commenced their landing in landing zone LIGHTNING. At 160420H (L + 20 minutes), the second wave turn-around helicopters were lifting a platoon from Company "K" and the Battalion Command Group into landing zone HAIL, while Company "I" continued to lift the remainder of their company into landing zone LIGHTNING. At 160430H Company "M" apprehended a 32 year old female at BS 555918 attempting to flee the objective area. At 160445H the night heliborne lift was completed. Flares continued to illuminate the entire objective area with minor adjustments made

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directly between the ground unit and the flare delivery aircraft. This illumination continued until daylight. At 160630H the encirclement of TAN PHUOC (4) BS 557911 was completed. At 160630H Company "M" reported two men dressed in civilian clothing attempting to retrieve flare parachutes. Civilians fled when they saw the Marines. One 26 year old male was apprehended and held for questioning. He was listed on the VC Black List as a Farmer's Association Leader. At 160700H Company "M" and elements of Company "I", "K" and H&S continued to encircle TAN PHUOC (4) while Company "I" (-) (Rein) with engineers and scout dog teams conducted a detailed search of the hamlet. While this search was being conducted the local populace of TAN PHUOC (4) was informed of the nature of this operation, i.e. to rid the area of the Viet Cong so that the people could live and farm peacefully without being oppressed by the VC, and to offer the government of Vietnam an opportunity to visit their hamlet, listen to their grievances and to express the government's concern for their health, welfare and to assist them in their plight against the Viet Cong. The local populace was collected in a central area and a limited "COUNTY FAIR" type operation was conducted, the subject of which will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph. At 160930H Company "I" (-) (Rein) continued to detail search TAN PHUOC (4) while Company "M" and elements of "I", "K" and H&S continued to encircle as well as search out the areas immediately adjacent to them. The Company "K" Platoon located one male Vietnamese body in a house at BS 557904. Interrogation of local villagers revealed that he had been a VC youth group leader killed in the previous night ambush. At 161000H five Vietnamese bodies were located in a house vicinity BS 562906. There were two males in their late 20's, three females in early 20's, and one teenage boy. All bodies were covered with multiple bullet and shrapnel wounds and were probably the victims of the pathfinder team ambush. At 161130H Company "I" apprehended 4 VCS (Three male and one female). The three males were caught hiding in caves, while the female was caught attempting to flee the area. None of these VCS possessed a G.V.N. identification card and all were of military age. All four were held for further interrogation. At 161200H Company "I" apprehended 2 VC and 2 VCS vicinity BS 555912. One 30 year old male captured was identified as a VC security leader for TAN PHUOC (4). Another VC apprehended, admitted being a laborer for the VC. The other two males were of military age but did not possess G.V.N. identification cards. All four were held for further interrogation. At 161250H Company "I" apprehended a teenage boy hiding in a cave near the Battalion Command Post at BS 554904. During his interrogation he voluntarily led a Marine squad to another cave where two VC, (one male and one female) were hiding. Also found in the same cave was one carbine, U.S. M-1, 30 rounds of carbine ammunition, 6 rounds 7.62 CHICOM ammo, a cartridge belt and one M-26 grenade. From 161300H - 161730H, all Battalion Units continued to conduct a detailed search of their respective areas. Company "M" located a large tunnel approximately 300 meters long running from BS 559915 to BS 557914. Sketches of the tunnel were drawn and plans for its destruction the following day by attached engineers were prepared. At 161600H 1st Marine Division Psychological Warfare Team representatives arrived at the Battalion Command Post (FWD) to assist with the "COUNTY FAIR" operation. At 161600H the Company "K" Platoon was detached and helilifted to landing zone ROBIN to resume night time activities along 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (Rear) M.L.R.. At 161730H the Battalion's lines around TAN PHUOC (4) were drawn tighter in preparation for the night time activities. Companies "M" and "I" established

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three outpost/ambush sites each augment their night time positions. At 161845H elements of Battalion Command Group and Company "I" received eight rounds carbine fire and one M-79 round from vicinity BS 564914. There were no casualties. Fire was returned, but results are unknown because of darkness. At 161920H one VC guerrilla was captured in the "COUNTY FAIR" compound, BS 555910, while segregating Vietnamese Nationals. Another VC security chief was captured after a Vietnamese woman from the "COUNTY FAIR" compound located and pointed out the well camouflaged cave where he was hiding. From 162000 - 170600H there was no VC contact or activity.

g. D+1 170800H Companies "M" and "I" continued to conduct a detailed search of their respective areas. Additional caves and tunnels were located and destroyed by attached engineers. Company "M" dispatched one platoon to search out the adjacent hamlet. During their sweep they located a newly improved trench line running from BS 566917 to BS 567914. Additional trench works, security posts and fortifications were located throughout the TAN PHUOC hamlets. From 170800H - 171600H "COUNTY FAIR" operations continued with emphasis on Psy Warfare personnel attempting to learn grievances of the local populace and providing an explanation of the CHIEU HOI Program. As a result of these lectures, nine families (28 persons) requested to be evacuated from the area as refugees. BINH SON District Headquarters was requested to assist. A platoon from Company "I" provided assistance and security during the movement of the refugees, their possessions and livestock from TAN PHUOC (4) to the north bank of the TRA BONG River, vicinity BS 563908. At this point the refugees were met on the south bank of the river by a platoon of Regional Force Troops from the AN DIEM Outpost who escorted them to BINH SON District Headquarters. During the conduct of the "COUNTY FAIR" activities, a female, age 32, was pointed out by the people as being a VC administrative chief who collected rice and taxes from the people of TAN PHUOC hamlet. Upon interrogation, she admitted to being an assistant administrative chief. At 171315H, during their search, Company "I" located one M-26 grenade and two rifles in the bottom of a well vicinity BS 557909. (One U.S. M-1 carbine/15 round loaded magazine and one CHICOM K-44 Bolt Action rifle). At 171530H Company "I" captured one VC male hiding in the rafters of a Buddhist Temple vicinity BS 555907. The man admitted to being a VC sentry in TAN PHUOC (4). Detailed search of the area ended at this time along with the "COUNTY FAIR" operations. Companies "M" and "I" and the Battalion Command Group prepared for helicopter retraction. At 171600H Company "M" commenced helicopter retraction followed by the Battalion Command Post Group, 81mm Mortar Section and Company "I". One of the helicopters in the 1st wave received ground fire from the vicinity of BS 561916. One Marine was slightly wounded and the helicopter was routed to 1st Med Battalion. Additional ground fire was received from the same area when the last wave was departing the landing zone. There were no further casualties. HUZE's conducted a rocket run in the area to suppress the ground fire and when the helicopters had cleared the area A-4 aircraft conducted an air strike. At 171645H the helicopter lift to landing zone ROBIN was completed. All units returned to the Battalion area (Rear) and operation "YUMA" terminated.

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11. Results.

a. Friendly

- (1) KIA - None
- (2) WIA - One (1)
- (3) MIA - None
- (4) KBA - None
- (5) Equipment Loss - One (1) PRC-6

b. Enemy

- (1) KIA (Confirmed) - Six (6)
- (2) WIA (Confirmed) - Eight (8)
- (3) WIA (Possible) - Unknown
- (4) KBA/ARTY/MORTARS - Unknown
- (5) Captured VCC - Seven (7)
- (6) Captured VCS - Nine (9)
- (7) Equipment/Material Losses - Two French MAS-36 rifles, two M-1 carbines, one Bolt Action ChiCom Carbine (K-44), one M-26 grenade, one cartridge belt, and miscellaneous rounds of ammunition for above weapons.

12. Administrative and Logistical Matters.

Operation "YUMA" was uneventful Logistically primarily because of its brevity. On D-Day two helicopter loads of civil affairs materials were delivered and on D + 1 some six thousand pounds of explosives were required by the attached Engineer Platoon. All Battalion and attached personnel subsisted upon "C" rations and local water. Transportation to and from the objective area was by helicopter while rear area shuttling was accomplished by truck. The Battalion Aid Station (FWD) was manned by one Medical Officer and five corpsmen. Adequate MEDCAP supplies were available for the civil affairs sickcall. Battalion food service personnel prepared and served soup for the civil affair program. Personnel administration was standard and without incident.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. No special equipment was utilized during this period.

b. Operation "YUMA" provided this Battalion with an opportunity to conduct a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation. Since this is the first time this Battalion has conducted such an operation a summary list of events will be included.

(1) Planning: The mission of the Civil Affairs Team was to assist in conducting a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation within TAN PHOU hamlet, vicinity BS 554904. Planning for this operation commenced 150730H May 1966 with a liaison visit to the 9th Marine Regiment. The experience gained by the 9th Marines in their "COUNTY FAIR" operations was passed on to this Battalion.

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This liaison visit provided sufficient information to prepare a specific plan for this Battalion's "COUNTY FAIR" Operation. Assistance was requested and received from the Division G-5 office, 1st Marine Division, Binh Son District Headquarters and the Psy/Warfare Team, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai.

(2) Execution: The "COUNTY FAIR" operation was initiated after the hamlet had been completely encircled. One Rifle Company conducted a detailed search of the hamlet while the remainder of the Battalion continued to encircle. This Company had a Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Team accompany them as they moved through the hamlet informing all local citizens of our presence in their hamlet and the mission of the Marines. Further, the populace was encouraged to congregate in a designated area in order to avoid apprehension. Under no circumstances were they to attempt to flee or hide. The Psy Warfare Team utilized a portable loudspeaker to assist them in their broadcasts. This was followed up by a broadcast from an L-19 aircraft. These broadcasts had the desired affect on the local populace and they moved to the designated area and a "COUNTY FAIR" compound was established. Personnel coming into the area were segregated. Men were kept in one area with the older male children. Young children and all females were kept in another area. A census was taken as well as a survey of occupational specialties. While processing these people Viet Cong and Viet Cong suspects were segregated and forwarded to 1st Marine Division, ITT. A second sweep of the hamlet was conducted by the same company utilizing scout dog teams. Caches of weapons and Viet Cong suspects were uncovered during this sweep. The "COUNTY FAIR" operation provided an opportunity to isolate the populace, conduct a thorough search of the area, conduct a census, segregate the VC and VCS, collect intelligence data on the area of operations and extend the influence of the Government of Vietnam into the Viet Cong controlled area. This influence was extended through the employment of Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Teams, Binh Son District Police and Intelligence personnel as well as this Battalion's Civil Affairs Team.

The Marine Corps Civil Affairs Team provided a kitchen and a limited amount of USOK supplies for feeding the populace. The medical personnel provided medical assistance and were able to treat more than one hundred children and adults.

The Psychological Warfare Team provided information about the Government of Vietnam through speeches, movies and printed materials. As a result of their efforts twenty-eight persons requested to be evacuated to Binh Son District Headquarters as refugees. Through the cooperative efforts of the District Chief, the Regional Forces at AN DIEM Outpost and this Battalion, all 28 were evacuated on D + 1. Additionally, the populace was very desirous of having security remain in their hamlet on a permanent basis thus depriving the Viet Cong access and control of the area.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. This operation had many facets of success:

(1) Night Heliborne Assault - This was the first time that this Battalion has participated in a night heliborne assault. Even though natural light was nonexistent, the operation was executed within the planned time frame utilizing flares dropped from an aircraft. Landing zones were

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positively marked by the Battalion Pathfinder Teams using strobe light. There were no problems encountered in the lift and lighting conditions in the objective area were excellent throughout the helilift. The target area selected was desirable for this type of operation. The objective area was isolated and could be encircled with minimal effort. Three landing zones were located within 1,000 meters of each other, yet no major problems of control were encountered during the approach and retirement of the helicopters while simultaneously landing in three separate zones.

(2) COUNTY FAIR Operation: During the two days that this Battalion occupied TAN PHUOC (4) Hamlet a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation was conducted. This was the first time that this Battalion has conducted an operation of this nature. This phase of the operation permitted representatives of the government of Vietnam to penetrate into an area that has in the past been totally dominated by the Viet Cong. This provided the government an opportunity to extend its influence in this area. Such a penetration was very detrimental to the Viet Cong cause. Indications of this was demonstrated when nine (9) families, twenty-eight (28) persons, requested to be evacuated from that area as refugees. Personnel from within the hamlet were eager to point out Viet Cong supporters and leaders located within the "COUNTY FAIR" compound as well as Viet Cong guerrillas hiding in caves. Further, the people were eager to express their grievances to the government representatives and requested that permanent government security be provided in their hamlet.

It is believed that had this Battalion remained in the objective area for a longer period, an even greater number of Viet Cong could have been uncovered. An operation of this nature can win the confidence of the people no matter how long they have been dominated by the Viet Cong.

C. R. VORGANG
C. R. VORGANG
Acting

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HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/RHS/gad
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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report.

Ref: (a) Frag Order 7-66

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No

251-66 Copy # 57959
SC2: 627-68

1. Code Name. Operation "MORGAN"
2. Dates of Operation. 200600H to 221615H May 1966
3. Location. MY LOC Hamlet Complex BS 501891 BINH SON District, QUANG NGAI Province.
4. Control or Command Headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. BODLEY
5. Task Organization.

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-)
3rd Platoon, Company "B", 1st Tank Battalion
3rd Platoon, Company "C", 1st AT Battalion
Recon Company, 2nd Infantry Division ARVN
Section, Company "A", 3rd Am Trac Battalion
Detachment - 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 3rd Engineer Battalion
Detachment - FO, Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
Detachment - National Police, BINH SON District
Scout Dog Team III MAF
Detachment - ISO 7th Marine Regiment
Detachment - Psy Warfare Team, 2nd Infantry Division ARVN
Detachment - Psy Warfare Team, 1st Marine Division
Detachment - 7th Counterintelligence, 1st Marine Division
Detachment - 9th IIT, 1st Marine Division
Detachment - Intelligence Section, 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN

6. Supporting Forces

a. Air (Chronological Utilization)

At 200700H one HUIE arrived at Landing Zone ROBIN to pick up Crepe Myrtle 6 for airborne command. The HUIE was used to deliver one interpreter from Landing Zone ROBIN to Company "L" at Landing Zone APPLE. At 200745H Crepe Myrtle 6 was airborne for command of the operation.

"L" Hour for this operation was dependent on the advancement of the

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armored column moving west from Highway #1 from the CHAU TU area. As the armored column approached the prescribed phase line, the Battalion Commander established L-Hour as 201015H. At 201000H twenty helicopters commenced lifting four hundred ARVN troops from QUANG NGAI Airfield to Landing Zone PINE. Company "L" (-) and Company "I" were lifted from Landing Zone APPLE into Landing Zone PEACH and Landing Zone PEAR respectively. Sixteen helicopters were used for this lift. Company "K" and one platoon of Company "M" were helilifted from Landing Zone ROBIN and landed in Landing Zone PLUM. The Battalion Command Group and H&S Company were lifted from Landing Zone ROBIN and landed in Landing Zone PEAR. All landing zones were preped by air commencing at L-15. HUIES were on station to spot/observe and report any aggression of enemy forces. The lift was completed at 201115H.

Two UH34s were standing by on condition 4 for resupply utilization. The resupply aircraft flew twenty-six missions in support of the operation. At 201400H the resupply helicopters delivered GP tents, stoves and civil affairs equipment to the Battalion CP (FWD). At 201500H fifteen Vietnamese National Police arrived at the Battalion CP (FWD) from BINH SON.

At 210830H six personnel arrived from BINH SON. At 211000H an emergency med-evac request was submitted from Circumvent I for 3 civilian WIA. Crepe Myrtle 14 was not informed of the time of completion.

At 220900H resupply helicopters arrived to evacuate rice to BINH SON. An estimated 40,000 pounds was evacuated in approximately two hours. At 221400H thirty-six Vietnamese Psy/Warfare personnel and National Police were lifted from the Battalion CP (FWD) to QUANG NGAI and BINH SON. At 221430H stoves, GP tents and miscellaneous equipment were lifted from the Battalion CP (FWD) to Landing Zone ROBIN.

The retraction of the Battalion from Landing Zone PEAR to Landing Zone ROBIN commenced at 221450H and was completed in approximately one hour and ten minutes. Sixteen helicopters were used for the retraction.

b. Artillery (Chronological Utilization)

Fire Support

Fire support was provided by Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines from the vicinity of coordinates BS 552887. At approximately 200900H Battery "I" was laid and ready to fire. Organic fire support units included one section of 81mm mortars from H&S Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and the companies' 60mm mortar sections.

Summary of Events

(1) On 20 May the FSCC landed with the Battalion Command Post Group in Landing Zone PEAR vicinity of coordinates BS 501900 and moved with the Command Post Group to the vicinity of coordinates BS 50058905 where the permanent Command Post was established.

(2) On 21 May the 81mm mortar section registered at coordinates BS 487896.

(3) No artillery fire except H&Is were fired in support of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines during the operation.

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(4) At approximately 221600H retraction by helicopter was completed and Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines was released.

Comments

(1) At no time during the operation was communications a problem. However, we never had direct communications with either 7th Marines FSCC or with 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines FDC. Communication with these stations was thru Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines.

(2) Two PRC-25s were provided by 7th Marines FSCC. One was utilized by 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines FSCC, the other by the Artillery FO Team assigned to Company "I", 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. The increased reliability and increased range experienced with the PRC-25 make it highly desirable that the PRC-25 replace the PRC-9 as soon as possible.

7. Intelligence.

a. Anticipated Enemy Strength and Situation

(1) Operation "MORGAN" was an operation conducted in west-central BINH SON District, QUANG NGAI Province which combined an armored-infantry thrust moving west from the vicinity of National Route #1 with a helilift of two battalions into encircling positions around the objective area proper. The tactical scheme of maneuver was designed to clear the area immediately north of the TRA BONG River west from Route #1 and compress all civilian personnel into the encircled area in order to conduct a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation.

(2) Although there were unconfirmed reports of a battalion-sized unit in the area, it was not anticipated that major resistance would be encountered. Snipers, and possibly, small groups of lightly armed VC were expected to harass and attempt to slow the armored column as well as to fire at friendly forces in HLZs. This estimate proved essentially correct.

(3) The MY LOC Hamlet complex (Vicinity BS 500900) had not been entered and occupied by friendly forces in nearly eight months. Since experience had shown that areas farther east, and much closer to BINH SON District Headquarters had firmly entrenched VC political and economic cadre which effectively controlled the population, a similar situation was assumed to exist in MY LOC. The conduct of the operation, particularly the interrogation conducted in conjunction with the "COUNTY FAIR", proved the estimate to be correct.

(2)

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b. Currency and Source of Intelligence.

(1) The intelligence on which the operation was based was derived from a continuing picture maintained on this area. BINH SON and QUANG NGAI intelligence sources had reported extensive, but relatively low-level VC activity in the area for several months. Further, friendly combat patrols operating north and east of the actual MY LOC objective area had made contact with local force VC units on frequent occasions. In view of these sources and the information gained during the operation itself, the intelligence is considered both current and adequate.

c. Strength and Situation Actually Encountered.

(1) Enemy strength was essentially as predicted. No major contact was experienced. The Division Reconnaissance Company, 2nd ARVN Division, while accompanying the armored sweep west into the objective area on D-Day encountered light sniper fire. This situation repeated itself on D+2 when the same unit, while escorting refugees from the objective area east to BINH SON, again received isolated sniper fire. The Command Control helicopter carrying the Battalion Commanding Officer received light harassing fire on D-Day while controlling the movement of the armored column.

(2) The situation with respect to VC political and economic control of the area as anticipated prior to D-Day was confirmed through lengthy talks with villagers and interrogations of VC and VCS. Since MY LOC was an area so far removed from government control and so infrequently entered by patrols, the VC had encountered no difficulty in setting up their interlocking system of associations and sub-cells thereof, which effectively controlled the people's lives. Their dissatisfaction with their dominance was evidenced by the willingness of 750 people to leave their homes and majority of their belongings and evacuate the area to BINH SON.

d. Significant Intelligence Gained.

(1) During the course of the "COUNTY FAIR" phase of this operation, many civilians were interviewed and a number of VC and VCS, screened out of the "COUNTY FAIR" group, actually interrogated. While they did not reveal any information of startling importance to the intelligence collection effort, an analysis of the information they did reveal gives a reasonably clear picture of VC military activities in the area. Military control of the population is vested in small 8 - 10 men squads of guerrillas operating in each of the population centers in the village of BINH TUY. They are backed up by a 100 - man company, which uses the MY LOC - DUC AN area as a rest and training center, and moves out of the area for deliberate combat operations. Currently the training is being conducted near DUC AN, and an unknown but fairly large number of recruits are undergoing instruction. This local force company is reportedly armed with an adequate assortment of individual small arms, plus 60mm mortars and light machineguns. When friendly forces enter the area on operations or patrols, the company flees south across the TRA BONG River or west into the mountains. On this operation, the evidence is strong that the VC elements in the area at the time did, in fact flee south.

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(2) Since this area is relatively secure for the VC for reasons previously stated, there was a predictable lack of extensive caves, tunnels, and fortifications. Some small family type bomb shelters were encountered under houses in the hamlets, and a shallow defensive trench surrounded the majority of the hamlet.

(3) A detachment of 9 ITB accompanied the Battalion Command Group on this operation and was of great value in interrogating VC and VCS screened out of the "COUNTY FAIR" group. Further, 15 National Police from QUANG NGAI and BINH SON, most of which were natives of the area were also present and very valuable, particularly in identifying VC by means of the "Blacklists" developed over some period of time. A total of 26 VCC and 2 VCS were picked up on this operation. The presence of ITT and National Police on the scene made it possible to establish their status (VCC or VCS) on the spot. This type of support is almost a must for operations of this nature.

e. Weather and Terrain.

(1) Weather. During the course of this operation the weather was generally cloudy with light rain. This rain did not however, hamper the movement of the unit, or the use of helicopters for re-supply to any great extent.

Cloud cover prevailed throughout most of the operation with a ceiling of from 1000 - 1500 feet. On the last day of the operation the weather cleared and movement of this unit out of the operation area was carried out without complication.

(2) Terrain. Terrain encountered by this unit in the area of operations is analyzed as follows:

(a) Critical Terrain: The hill located at BS 505896 is the dominating terrain feature of the area of operations, simply because it overlooks the entire area of operations and also commands an excellent view of the terrain north, east and south of the area of operations. Also the hill mass located BS 517895 to BS 529903 is critical in that it commands a wide expanse of the terrain south and northeast.

(b) Observation and Fields of Fire: From the above area indicated as "critical" good observation of surrounding terrain may be established. Fields of fire from these areas vary, but in general are limited by the configurations of intervening vegetation adjacent to hamlets in the area.

(c) Cover and Concealment: Concealment, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, cover are provided by heavy to moderate vegetation in and around the hamlets in the area. Excellent cover is provided for small units in prepared positions, fighting holes, small defensive trenches located in strategic positions throughout the area of operations.

(d) Obstacles: Limited obstacles, either man made or natural were found throughout the area of operations. Hedge rows which are natural to this type of terrain presented the greatest obstacle encountered; these however did not hamper movement of troops to any great degree. The trails

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located around the hamlets in the area do have a few "man traps" or punji pits. These pits vary in dimensions from 3 - 4 feet wide and deep to the very small foot trap. These traps however were easily uncovered and appeared to be placed on the trails to harass rather than slow down or channelize movement of troops. All in all obstacles encountered in the area did little to hamper the mission of this unit in this area.

e. Avenues of Approach: Due to the nature of the terrain, avenues of approach are unlimited by reasons stated under cover and concealment.

8. Mission. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) (Rein) in conjunction with elements of 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN conduct operations in the south central section of the BINH SON District (MY LOC Hamlet Complex) to locate, fix, and destroy enemy personnel in the objective area and to prepare the area for a "COUNTY FAIR" type operation.

9. Concept of Operation. On the night of D-3 one company will move overland to establish blocking positions vicinity BS 480954 to BS 478947. On D-1 a second company will establish an assembly area vicinity BS 543942, and then sweep from the assembly area on D-1 in a westerly direction through the hamlet complex of THANH TRA (2) and (3) and TAY PHUOC (1) and (2). On the night of D-1 the blocking company will dispatch one platoon in a southerly direction to establish blocking positions vicinity BS 488889. The sweeping company and remaining elements of the blocking company will move to a harboring site vicinity of landing zone APPLE. On D-Day an armored/infantry column consisting of Tanks, Ontos, LVT, and an ARVN Recon Company will depart Route #1 BS 588944 and move overland in a SW direction on the main trail paralleling the TRA BONG River. When the column reaches a designated phase line, the company and company (-) at landing zone APPLE will commence a helilift to landing zones north of the MY LOC Hamlet Complex. Simultaneously an ARVN Battalion will commence a helilift into a landing zone south of the TRA BONG River adjacent to the MY LOC Hamlet Complex. Following the troop movement from landing zone APPLE, the aircraft will return to landing zone ROBIN to helilift a third company and the Battalion Command Group into landing zone PEAR. Upon completion of the helilift all elements will conduct a coordinated movement to seal off major routes of egress of the MY LOC Hamlet Complex. This will be followed by a sweep of the objective area to locate, fix and destroy all enemy personnel in the area and to neutralize the area for a "COUNTY FAIR" operation to follow. The armored/infantry column will continue in a westerly direction taking up blocking positions on the eastern end of the objective area upon arrival. Upon completion of the tactical maneuver all village personnel within the objective area will be gathered in a central location to participate in the "COUNTY FAIR" operation. Simultaneously supplies, equipment, and special personnel will be flown into the objective area to implement the Psy/War Program. It is anticipated that the operation will be three days in duration.

10. Execution. At 171930H (D-3) Company "L" departed the left flank of the MLR and proceeded in a westerly direction to a harboring site vicinity BS 495963 arriving at 180400H. Company "L" remained in this position until

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181930H at which time they departed to establish blocking positions at BS 480953 to BS 478945 arriving at 190400H D-1. At 190015H Company "I" departed OP #39 BS 574964 and arrived in a harboring site BS 544942 at 190345H. At 190600H Company "I" commenced a sweep in a westerly direction through THANH TRA (2) and (3) BS 530947 and TAY PHUOC (2) and (3) BS 490948. During this sweep Company "I" and Company "L" reported no enemy contacts or sightings. At 191600H Company "I" and Company "L" linked up and moved to an assembly area adjacent to landing zone APPLE BS 495944. At this time Company "L" dispatched one platoon (Rein) to establish a harboring site BS 480935 and then move during darkness to BS 488890 to establish blocking positions in the western sector of the objective area before daylight on D-Day.

-D-Day 20 May 1966-

At 200600H an engineer detachment from 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 1st Engineer Battalion with a security element (3rd Platoon, Company "M") conducted a route mine clearing sweep from BS 593936 to BS 583929. While on this mission sporadic small arms sniper fire was received from BS 580930 and BS 581925. Small arms fire was returned and an artillery mission was fired on these two positions. The VC broke contact. No friendly casualties resulted. Upon reaching BS 583929 the security platoon from Company "M" retracted to Highway #1 for return to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post. The Engineer detachment joined the armored column to provide assistance during their movement.

At 200845H the Armored/Infantry column consisting of a Platoon of Tanks (3d Plt., Co. "B", 1st Tank Bn), a Plt. of Ontos (3d Plt., Co. "C", 1st AT Bn), a section of Am Tracs (3d Plt., Co. "A", 1st Am Trac Bn), and the Reconnaissance Co 2nd Infantry Division ARVN departed from Highway #1 and commenced movement in a south westerly direction on an axis generally paralleling the TRA BONG River. When the column reached vicinity BS 573918 the Tanks and Am Tracs could not negotiate the axis of advance and had to retract to Highway #1 to secure the operation. The remaining elements of the column (Ontos and ARVN Recon Company) continued in a south westerly direction as scheduled.

At 201015H Company "L" commenced a helilift into landing zone PEACH BS 490896 followed by Company "I" into landing zone PEAR BS 500898 and then Company "K" plus 1 platoon from Company "M" into landing zone PLUM BS 513900. The helilift ended with the Battalion Command Group landing in landing zone PEAR BS 500898. Immediately upon landing all elements maneuvered to designated positions to seal off all major routes of escape from the objective area. The 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment ARVN conducted a heliborne landing into landing zone PINE BS 493884 in conjunction with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines landing. The ARVN Battalion upon landing swept the south bank of the TRA BONG River and then took up blocking positions from BS 490886 to BS 515889. Original plans had called for the ARVN Battalion to sweep north across the TRA BONG River but a suitable fording site could not be located so the ARVN Battalion remained on the south bank throughout the operation.

When the encirclement was complete at 201200H Company "K" conducted a search and destroy mission of the MY LOC Hamlet Complex in a sweep to the west. No enemy contacts or sightings were reported during this sweep.

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At 201300H the command group moved from landing zone PEAR and established the Command Post at BS 501892. Throughout the build up of the heli-lift an L-19 aircraft was on station giving instructions to the villagers on what actions to take and what would be expected of them during the "COUNTY FAIR" operation. In addition the aircraft broadcasted a tape recording of a VC who pleaded with his comrades to give up the VC cause and support the legally constituted government of Vietnam.

By 201500H approximately 500 villagers had gathered to take part in the "COUNTY FAIR".

At 201130H the Armored/Infantry column BS 575913 enroute to the objective area was hit by sporadic sniper fire from BS 555910. The column returned fire and maneuvered - the VC fled and contact was lost. At 201145H the armored/infantry column apprehended 2 male VCS (ages 18 and 52) at BS 574718 for not having proper identification. At 201200H the Armored/Infantry column apprehended 3 male VCS at BS 575915, ages 37, 37, and 46 for not having proper identification. At 201230H the Armored/Infantry column apprehended 4 VCS, ages 16, 16, 16 and 18 at BS 547895 for not having proper identification. At 201330H the armored/infantry column apprehended 1 VCS male age 22 for not having proper identification. All of the above VCS were forwarded to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines collection point for disposition. At 201530H the Armored/Infantry column received sporadic sniper fire from BS 541894. The column returned fire and maneuvered - the VC fled and broke contact. At 201550H the Armored/Infantry column observed approximately 8 VC with weapons, 1 female, and 2 laborers in two boats landing at BS 525895. When told to halt the VC opened fire and fled overland in a westerly direction. The column returned fire and pursued. The VC broke contact and fled. The female was apprehended and classified as a VCS. It was determined that the laborers were farmers coerced into transporting the VC across the river. The farmers were screened by the ARVN and released. The Armored/Infantry column destroyed the two boats, 25 kilos of rice, 10 pounds of medical supplies (cotton gauze), and retained 25 flash light batteries.

At 201715H the Armored/Infantry column reached the MY LOC Hamlet Complex and took up blocking positions on the eastern end of the objective area ~~tying~~ in with Company "K" on the north and the TRA BONG River on the south.

During the afternoon of D-Day 16 National Police from BINH SON and 21 Psy War personnel from QUANG NGAI arrived by helicopter to participate in the "COUNTY FAIR" operation. The majority of D-Day was spent setting up tents, constructing a collection compound, screening the populace for VC and VCS, and giving lectures on why the government forces were present and what benefits could be derived by taking part in the "COUNTY FAIR" operation.

By 201900H all blocking elements were in position, the objective area was thoroughly searched, and the compound area was prepared for extensive Psy War operations on D+1.

No enemy contacts or sightings were reported on the night of D-Day or early morning hours of D+1.

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At 210745H Company "K" and the Recon Company ARVN began a coordinated and detailed sweep of the objective area from east to west. No enemy contacts or significant sightings were reported on this sweep.

Throughout D+1 extensive "COUNTY FAIR" activities continued. Over 300 men, women and children were medically treated. A total of 53 personnel received dental treatment. 1650 meals were prepared and fed to 825 people. Five Psy War (political) lectures were given and five movies were shown. 800 Vietnamese magazines and periodicals were distributed. The main event of the day was the appearance and presentation of the BINH SON District Chief. He discussed current government policies and plans, and in addition held private meetings with the villagers and listened to their grievances.

At 211845H elements of the Recon Company, 2nd Division ARVN found one VC hiding in a foxhole at BS 514895. The VC led the Recon personnel to a cave at BS 513892 which contained one MAS-36 rifle with bayonet. A 105 round was found near the entrance to the cave. In continuing to search out this area 9- 2.75 ZUNI Rocket rounds, and 7- 105 rounds were located at BS 513894. A VCS male was apprehended in this vicinity because of being military age with no identification card. The ordnance was destroyed by an engineer detachment and the VC and VCS were sent to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines interrogation compound for disposition.

On the night of D+1 and early morning hours of D+2 no enemy contacts or significant sightings were reported.

-D+2 22 May 1966-

At 220815H the 1st Marine Division Band was helilifted into the MY LOC Hamlet Complex and presented a 1 hour concert.

At 220930H refugees from MY LOC Hamlet Complex who had decided to evacuate to the District Headquarters commenced departing. The refugees (total 750 with 250 head of cattle) were accompanied by the Recon Company, 2nd Division ARVN, 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 1st AT Battalion and 1st Platoon, Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. At 221130H the refugee column was hit by sporadic sniper fire from BS 540895. Friendly element providing security returned fire and maneuvered, resulting in the capture of one VC WIA by the 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 1st AT Battalion. The VC was evacuated by helicopter to QUANG NGAI.

At 220930H helicopters commenced evacuating 40,000 pounds of rice to the District Headquarters. Of the total rice 36,000 pounds belonged to the refugees and the remaining 4000 pounds was a cache that was uncovered in the MY LOC Hamlet Complex.

By 221230H all refugees had departed MY LOC and were enroute to the District Headquarters. At 221300H the National Police and Psy War personnel were helilifted back to BINH SON and QUANG NGAI.

At 221400H the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post and Companies "I", "K", and "L" moved to landing zone PEAR BS 500900. At 221500H the Battalion commenced a retraction by helicopter to landing zone ROBIN (3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post). By 221615H the retraction was completed.

At 221600H all elements of the refugee column reached the District

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Headquarters. The 1st Platoon, Company "K" was transported by 6x6 truck from BINH SON to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post, arriving at 221930H.

11. Results.

a. Friendly

- (1) KIA - 0
- (2) WIA - 0
- (3) MIA - 0
- (4) KBA - 0

b. Enemy.

- (1) KIA - 0
- (2) WIA - 1
- (3) MIA - 0
- (4) VCC - 25
- (5) VCS - 2
- (6) Equipment Loss
 - (a) 1 MAS-36 rifle with bayonet, 9 - ZUNI rockets, 8 - 105mm rounds, 1 - 81mm mortar round, 2 - cargo river boats, 10 pounds medical supplies (cotton and gauze), 25 flashlight batteries, and 4 ponchos.
- (7) 4000 pound rice cache.

12. Administration Matters.

a. Operation "MORGAN" was an unqualified logistical success. Resupply and services were furnished the Battalion and its attachments by the Battalion operated LSA located at the Battalion rear (landing zone ROBIN). The normal Battalion logistical organization augmented by a logistical radio net and two HST teams furnished by the shore party comprised the system. Two helicopters in direct support of the Battalion provided logistical transportation.

b. A Battalion Aid Station (Forward) consisting of a Medical Officer and four corpsmen provided support to the Battalion Command Post and the Civil Affairs Program. Organic and MEDCAP Medical supplies were adequate.

c. Transportation to and from the objective area and in the rear was by truck and helicopter as called for in the operation plan, and was accomplished without incident. The Battalion Food Service Section prepared and served meals in support of the Civil Affairs Program.

d. With one exception, communications were successful and adequate. The exception was the failure of continuous communication on the Regimental Command net. Contact on this net improved upon relocation of radio gear at Regimental Headquarters.

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13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. Equipment

(1) An L-19 aircraft was used for dropping leaflets and broadcasting Psy War propaganda. Effect and coverage was excellent.

(2) Scout Dogs were used for searching out caves, tunnels, and false structures. The effect of their service was excellent. No problems resulted in the area of heat prostration because of the relatively cool temperatures and static posture of the operation.

(3) Projector, movie M123A with generator portable C19L.

The effect of this visual aid was considered excellent. Most villagers had never seen a motion picture before and seemed very enthused during the showing.

b. Techniques

"County Fair" Concept

Background Planning

(1) The order to commence planning for operation "MORGAN" was received at approximately 171700H May 1966. For planning on the type of propaganda to use, the following area study was made:

(a) The people of My Loc are mostly rice farmers. Some tobacco and many types of fruits and vegetables are grown. In addition, a limited number of the people of the area are involved in fishing.

(b) The people are generally in support of the VC. Most families have one or more members who are VC. The people have a limited knowledge of the G.V.N. and its functions. The last known ARVN unit to operate in the area was several years ago.

(c) Schooling is limited to small schools of 10 to 20 students. Only 20% of the school age children attend school.

(d) Religion of the people is predominantly Buddhist with a few Catholics interdispersed. There is a Catholic Church in My Loc, but no priest has been present in several years.

(2) The 7th Marine Regiment supported the operation with rice and MED-CAP supplies. The Division G-5 Staff provided technical advice and assistance in the form of: 800 magazines, 30 posters, a motion picture projector set, three movie films, two recorded tapes for the operation and an L-19 aircraft was obtained to broadcast the pre-recorded psychological warfare tapes.

(3) The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CA Officer made a liaison visit to the G-5, Quang Ngai on 19 May 1966. The ARVN Civil Affairs organization was

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discussed along with support 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines would be providing in operation "MORGAN". Specific details of the Psy War effort were discussed. A helicopter pick-up point and departure time were planned. It was decided that the G.V.N. could support the civil action portion of the "COUNTY FAIR" by providing a CA Force comprised of a 1st Lt. Team Leader (Company Commander Psy/Warfare Company), a Warrant Officer (Assistant Team Leader), two eight man Psy Warfare Teams and one ARVN Corpsman. A two man U.S. Army Loud Speaker Team would accompany these personnel. In addition a 16 man National Police detail was made available and accompanied the CA. The U.S. CA Team was comprised of one officer, three corpsmen, one doctor and two cooks. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines provided all logistical and security support.

Execution

(1) On D-Day at 201100H 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine units encircled the My Loc Hamlet Complex. At 201115H an L-19 aircraft circled overhead and broadcasted a tape informing the people that ARVN and Marines were searching for the VC. In addition, the people were instructed not to run or they would be thought to be VC. At 201145H a sweep of all hamlets within the objective area was made. At 201245H an L-19 aircraft broadcasted a tape instructing the people to take enough eating utensils and personal belongings to remain away from home for 2 to 3 days and that rice and soup would be provided by the G.V.N. At 201400H 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines CP Group arrived at MY LOC Pagoda and selected a compound site for the people of the village. By this time several hundred people were gathering at the Pagoda. At 201445 H the Psy Warfare Team from QUANG NGAI arrived in the area. At 201500H "COUNTY FAIR" Teams commenced establishing the compound site in the vicinity of BS 499891. Working parties were obtained, by the Psy/WAR Team LEADER, from the men of the hamlet. At 201600H 16 National Policemen arrived. At 201700H the Psy/War Team moved the people of MY LOC from the Pagoda to the CA Compound. At 201730H three GP tents and cooking gear were installed. At 201800H the Psy Warfare Team Leader spoke to the people explaining the danger of leaving the compound, and that the people of MY LOC were there for their own protection. At 201815H the people were segregated into two compounds.

On D-Day +1 at 210600H the construction of the compound was finished, to include erecting barbwire around the compound. At 210615H hot soup and rice were served to the people. At 210730H the Psy/War Team told the people the Marines/ARVN were searching the hamlet for VC and that the villagers would be detained in the compound for protection. The team also gave a pre-planned speech on the purpose of the G.V.N.. At 210800 a census was taken. (830 people were present) At 210830H the District Chief, Binh Son, arrived via helicopter and spoke to the people concerning the G.V.N. policies and objectives. He also explained the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program. At 211030H the Quang Ngai sector G-5 arrived via helicopter. He spoke to the people on why the U.S. Government was in Vietnam, and in general built up the image of the ARVN and U.S. Marine Forces. At 211200H the registration of refugees began. The Psy/Warfare Team further explained the Chieu Hoi Program. At 211230H sickcall was sounded and over 300 villagers were treated. At 211300H dental call was sounded and a total of 53 were treated. At 211400H the children were allowed to leave the compound to feed and water their live stock. At 211500H My Loc was visited by the 1st Marine Division Commander, and 800 magazines were distributed. At 211600H an L-19 aircraft broadcasted an appeal of a former VC Platoon Commander, to give up the VC cause. At 211615H the evening meal was served to the people.

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At 211700H two movies were shown. At 211900H the Psy/Warfare Team sang Vietnamese ballets and broadcasted the danger to the people of leaving the compound. At 220600H soup and rice were served to the people, and the refugees were given sand bags to transport their rice in. At 220700H the refugees were allowed to return to their homes to get their belongings. At 220730H sickcall was sounded and forty people were treated. At 220800H the 1st Marine Division Band arrived and presented a program of American and Vietnamese songs. At 220900H the refugees began staging bags of rice for helicopter evacuation. An estimated 37,000 pounds of rice was transported to the Binh Son District Headquarters. At 220930H 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Units and ARVN Recon Unit began to escort refugees to Highway #1. An estimated 750 refugees and 250 cattle were evacuated. At 221000H 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines began to strike the compound.

-Problem Areas-

Problem # 1

The lack of strong direction and unified leadership by G.V.N. Civil Affairs Force.

Discussion - The District Headquarters, Binh Son, was not involved in the planning phase of the operation. As a result, there was no G.V.N. leadership to coordinate the Psy Warfare Team, National Police and U.S. Marine Corps authorities.

Recommendation - The G.V.N. CA Force should task organize at District Headquarters prior to the operation so that a command section can be formed and a thorough briefing be given by the District Chief.

Problem # 2

Inadequate time to gather the people and to set up a compound on D-Day.

Discussion - It takes several hours to gather all the people of the hamlet in one location and 4 to 6 hours to establish the compound.

Recommendation - In the future, operations of this nature, should be initiated as early in the day as possible so as to take advantage of maximum daylight hours for the collection and processing of the local populace.

Problem # 3

The requirement for a Vietnamese Compound Security Force.

Discussion - At the last moment Vietnamese authorities decided that the 30 man compound security force would be provided by one of their units already tactically employed in the operation. Since the ARVN Battalion never crossed to the north bank of the Tra Bong River as planned the security force never arrived.

Recommendation - The Vietnamese compound security force should be specifically designated with the sole mission of guarding VN working parties during the construction of the compound and to guard the compound once it is

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functioning. In such a capacity it should be made a part of the G.V.N. CA force and not be part of a ARVN tactical unit.

Problem # 4

Feeding the Hamlet's cattle during the period the villagers are detained in the compound.

Discussion - To the people of rural Vietnam, cattle are their most valuable possession and often they have more concern and take better care of their cattle than they do themselves. Measures should be taken to ensure the cattle are fed and watered while the people are detained in the compound.

Recommendation - The children, 12 years of age and below, should be allowed, during daylight hours, to return home to feed and water the cattle.

Problem # 5

Maintaining separate compounds for men and women.

Discussion - The advisability of having the compound divided whereby the men and women are segregated throughout the duration of the operation is questionable. The basic Vietnamese unit is the family. The whole family share the responsibility for caring for the children, and they cook and eat from the "family pot."

Recommendation - After the initial screening and processing the families should be reunited.

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29 May 1966**14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS**

The "County Fair" operation conducted in the MY LOC area was a decided success. Much experience was gained that will contribute to the success of future operations of a similar nature. Several considerations in planning this type operation have already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Planning must be conducted jointly between the representatives of the government of Vietnam and the participating Marine Corps unit. Of particular importance are:

a. Development of a "Master Plan" for the conduct of "County Fair"

A master plan must be developed so that VIET CONG controlled areas can be neutralized on a controlled, timely, and systematic basis. If the Provincial District is controlled by more than one U.S. military unit commander the echelon of command having authority over the responsible unit commanders should coordinate and develop the plan, so that neutralization can be accomplished systematically. The efforts of one unit, should compliment the efforts of another unit, particularly when their tactical areas of responsibility lie within the same district.

b. Selection of the "County Fair" objective area.

The "County Fair" objective area must be mutually selected by the Vietnamese District Chief and the senior Marine Corps commander whose unit is participating in the operation. This selection should be based, to a large extent, on the availability of a military or quasi military organization capable of maintaining positive control over the area on a permanent basis once the "County Fair" has been concluded. Routes of communication must be opened and maintained between adjacent areas that are already under control of the District Government. Positive control of these areas will alleviate the ever increasing problem of evacuating refugees from a Viet Cong controlled area to a government controlled area. The great burden of responsibility for administrative, medical, billeting and other logistical support can be administered within the "County Fair" area rather than having these responsibilities multiply in the already over committed District Headquarters. The people will be able to take care of their own needs with minimal government support once their area is secure.

c. Organizational Support And Control of the "County Fair" Operation

A requirement exists for an organization composed of civil administrators, civil police, medical and psy-warfare personnel to coordinate and control the "County Fair" operation. A Vietnamese government official must be responsible for coordinating this organization rather than a U.S. Official. During the past two "County Fair" operations a variety of Vietnamese organizations were represented but there was no one Vietnamese official coordinating their efforts. Since this type of operation provides the Vietnamese Government the opportunity to express their concern for the people's welfare in the Viet Cong controlled area, the individual who is best suited for this responsibility is the District Chief. He, of course, is the spokesman in his district for the Government of Vietnam and is well versed in the assets that are available, both logistical and administrative, as well as government policies and procedures.

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15. Recommendations.

a. That the operations have a duration of at least 4 days - thus reducing the possibility for the VC to remain in hiding until military forces have left the area.

b. That the area selected be mutually agreed upon by the District Chief and the military unit commander.

c. That a Vietnamese civilian type organization coordinate and control the "COUNTY FAIR" and that military forces be used only for the encirclement, search and clear, and providing perimeter security.

d. That a Vietnamese Government official be assigned as the overall coordinator and spokesman and that this individual take part in the pre-planning phases so that he is completely familiar with the scheme of maneuvers as well as all the logistical requirements and assets.

e. The objective area must be geographically and tactically located so that it can be supported by Vietnamese Government Troops on a continuing basis once the operation has been concluded. This will alleviate the major problem of the civilian populace requesting to be evacuated from the area as refugees thus eliminating the requirement for additional administrative, medical billeting and logistical support.

f. A master plan for permanent neutralization and control of VC controlled areas must be mutually formulated by the District Chief and the Senior Military Unit Commander within the district so that a systematic program can be developed.


B. B. DEWITT

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3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
CHU LAI, RVN
181200H May 1966

Frag Order 7-66

Ref: (a) 7thMar Frag Order 13-66
(b) 1stMarDiv OperO 301-66

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- 1) Consistent, but unconfirmed, intelligence reports from Quang Ngai and Binh Son sources, have placed various VC battalion-sized units within the objective area for a period of six months. Infrequent patrols of up to company size have made contact with sizeable, well equipped VC units who avoided major confrontation with friendly forces. Information gained from a VC captive on Operation "YUMA" indicates that a VC battalion is within the area, and is presently conducting training of new recruits. This report places the battalion and training center in DUC AN (Vicinity BS 5191).
- 2) The battalion is reportedly armed with adequate small arms, light machineguns, both 60mm and 81mm mortars, and 57mm recoilless rifles. With the exception of the heavier mortars and recoilless rifles, all of these weapons have previously been encountered.
- 3) VC population control in the area is completely maintained not only by armed VC units, but also by political cadre maintaining an interlocking system of political and economic association to which the people are forced to belong.

b. Friendly Forces

- 1) Battery "M", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines Artillery Group
- 2) 3rd Platoon, Company "B", 1st Tank Battalion
- 3) 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 1st Anti-Tank Battalion
- 4) Company "C", 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
- 5) 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division ARVN
- 6) Division Reconnaissance Company, 2nd Infantry Division ARVN
- 7) Detachment Company "A", 3rd Am Trac Battalion
- 8) MAG -36
- 9) MAG -12

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5800.10

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c. Attachments and Detachments

- 1) Detachment 3rd Platoon, Company "C", 3rd Engineer Battalion
- 2) FO Team, Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
- 3) Detachment National Police, Binh Son District
- 4) Scout Dog Team, III MAF
- 5) Detachment ISO, 7th Marine Regiment
- 6) Detachment Psy War Team, 2nd Infantry Division ARVN
- 7) Detachment Psy War Team, 1st Marine Division
- 8) Detachment 7th Counterintelligence, 1st Marine Division
- 9) Detachment 9th ITT, 1st Marine Division
- 10) Detachment Intelligence Section, 2nd ARVN Division

2. MISSION. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (-) Rein in conjunction with elements of 2nd Infantry Division, ARVN, will conduct operations in the south central section of the Binh Son District to locate, fix, and destroy enemy personnel in the objective area, and to prepare the area for "County Fair" type operations. (See Operation Overlay.)

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Operation "MORGAN" is a four phase joint operation involving one USMC Infantry Battalion, an ARVN Reconnaissance Company, and one ARVN Battalion.

PHASE I

On the night of D-3 one USMC Rifle Company (Rein) moves southwest under cover of darkness to an assembly area/harboring site vicinity BS 491962, arriving there prior to daylight on D-2. That night it will move southwest to the vicinity of the line BS 472948, BS 480954, to establish blocking positions prior to daylight. A second USMC Rifle Company will move to the vicinity of BS 543951 prior to daylight on D-1 and from that point conduct a coordinated search and destroy operation in the THANH TRA (2), THANH TRA (3), TAY PHUOC (1) and TAY PHUOC (2) hamlets. (See Operation Overlay). Both rifle companies, less one platoon, assemble in the vicinity of Landing Zone APPLE, BS 495946 by dusk D-1. On the afternoon of D-1, one platoon (Rein) from the blocking company will covertly move into an assembly area in the vicinity BS 485935. Under cover of darkness it will move to the vicinity BS 488895 to establish a series of observation posts/blocking positions. Elements of the 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Battalion will be inserted on D-1 as a blocking/screening force north of the TRA BONG River as indicated on the Operation Overlay.

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On D-Day move one 155 SP Howitzer Battery to OP#39, BS 572965 to support USMC and ARVN units throughout the duration of the Operation. At first light on D-Day, one USMC Rifle Platoon (-)(Rein) will conduct a mine clearing operation from BS 592936 to BS 583928. When the mine clearing elements have cleared PHASE LINE ONE an armored group consisting of ONTOS, TANKS, LVT's, and one ARVN Reconnaissance Company will commence its sweep. Throughout the course of the armored move a SPARROW-HAWK unit will be kept in an alert status at Landing Zone ROBIN to exploit any sightings made by air or reconnaissance elements.

PHASE III

When the armored force reaches the vicinity of PHASE LINE THREE a joint heliborne force will be simultaneously helilifted into the objective area. The ARVN Battalion will be helilifted from QUANG NGAI Airfield into Landing Zone PINE BS 492802, Landing Zone ASH BS 507885, and Landing Zone OAK BS 501874. At the same time one USMC Rifle Company (-) will be helilifted from Landing Zone APPLE BS 513950, into Landing Zone PEACH BS 489902. Turn-around helicopters will lift a second USMC Rifle Company from Landing Zone APPLE into Landing Zone FEAR BS 501907. A third USMC Rifle Company will then be helilifted from Landing Zone ROBBIN into Landing Zone PLUM BS 513901. The Battalion Tactical Command Group will be helilifted from Landing Zone ROBIN to Landing Zone FEAR. The ARVN Battalion will establish blocking positions along the south bank of the TRA BONG River. The Armored force/ARVN Reconnaissance Company will move into position in the vicinity of BS 511892. The County Fair target area will be encircled on the North and West by USMC units and on the South and East by ARVN units. ARVN units will cross to the north side of the TRA BONG River as the tactical situation permits.

PHASE IV

Once the "County Fair" target area has been isolated a combined ARVN and USMC contingent will conduct a thorough search of the target area and begin extensive "County Fair" type operations. It is anticipated that the duration of the "County Fair" operation will be 3 - 4 days. During the first six hours of the operation on D-Day, continuous AO coverage will be provided. Particular emphasis will be placed along the TRA BONG River and in advance of the Armored unit. On D-Day the ARVN units at the AN HOA outpost BS 473863 and AN DIEM outpost BS 553881, BS 556891, will assist by establishing OP/Blocking positions at predetermined positions along the South bank of the TRA BONG River.

b. Company L

- 1) On the night of D-3 move overland from the MLR to an assembly site BS 491962 arriving in position prior to daylight on D-2.

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- 2) During daylight hours on D-2 establish observation posts and avoid contact and detection. During the night of D-2 and prior to daylight establish blocking positions from BS 472948 to BS 480954.
- 3) During daylight hours on D-1 coordinate with and provide blocking assistance for Company "I" as they sweep in a westerly direction from OP#39.
- 4) On the afternoon of D-1 dispatch two Platoons to a daytime assembly site BS 485935. Under cover of darkness these two Platoons will covertly move to observation/blocking positions from BS 487896 to BS 490887 arriving in position prior to daylight on D-Day. Move the Company Command Group and the remaining platoon to a harboring site vicinity Landing Zone APPLE BS 495946.
- 5) On the morning of D-Day and on order, be prepared to helilift from Landing Zone APPLE to Landing Zone PEACH BS 489902.
- 6) Upon landing be prepared to conduct a coordinated sweep south between BS 488898 and BS 495905. Upon reaching the vicinity of BS 498891 and BS 498893 establish blocking positions in preparation for County Fair operations.

c. Company "I"

- 1) At 0015H on D-1 move overland from OP#39 (BS 573968) to an assembly site vicinity BS 546950. At first light on D-1 conduct a coordinated search and destroy operation with Company "I", of the THANH TRA (2), THANH TRA (3), TAY PHUOC (1), and TAY PHUOC (2) hamlet complexes.
- 2) Upon completion of the sweep, juncture with Company "L" then move to an assembly area with Company "L" vicinity Landing Zone APPLE BS 495946.
- 3) On D-Day be prepared on order, to be helilifted from Landing Zone APPLE to Landing Zone PEAR BS 501900.
- 4) Upon landing be prepared to conduct a coordinated sweep south between BS 495905 and BS 505900. Upon reaching the vicinity BS 498893 and BS 507893 establish blocking positions in preparation for County Fair operations.

d. Armored Force

- 1) The Armored Force consisting of one Platoon of Tanks, one Platoon of Ontos, two LVT's and one ARVN Reconnaissance Company will conduct a search and destroy operation in the hamlet complexes north of the TRA BONG River extending from Highway #1 to MY LOC.

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2) When the Armored Force reaches the vicinity of PHASE LINE THREE:

- (a) A fast moving group composed of three Tanks, three Ontos, 2 LVT's, and one ARVN Reconnaissance Platoon will be dispatched to the vicinity of BS 520894 to establish blocking positions in conjunction with USMC units.
- (b) A slow moving group composed of the remainder of the Armored Force will conduct a detailed search and destroy operation along the same axis of advance as the fast moving group.
- 3) The Commanding Officer, Company "B", 1st Tank Battalion will coordinate and control the Armored Force during the search and destroy operations.

e. Company "K"

- 1) On order be prepared to helilift the entire company (Rein) from Landing Zone ROBIN to Landing Zone PLUM BS 511901.
- 2) Upon landing be prepared to conduct a coordinated sweep south from BS 505900 to BS 517900. Upon reaching the vicinity of BS 507893, BS 512895 and BS 518897 establish blocking positions.
- 3) Upon the arrival of the Armored Group vicinity BS 520894 be prepared to conduct a detailed search and clear operation in conjunction with contingents of the ARVN Reconnaissance Company through the MY LOC (1) and MY LOC (3) hamlet complexes.

f. Company "M"

- 1) At 0530H on D-Day provide one platoon to conduct a mine clearing operation along the trail from BS 592936 to BS 583928. Upon reaching the vicinity of BS 585929 notify this Headquarters. After clearing PHASE LINE ONE provide area security until the Armored Group has passed PHASE LINE ONE at which time the mine clearing platoon will return to Highway #1 for truck retraction to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines Command Post.
- 2) On D-Day provide one squad (rein) for SPARROW HAWK to be available for commitment by 0600H.
- 3) By 0800H on D-Day provide one platoon for helilift from Landing Zone ROBIN to Landing Zone PLUM BS 511901.
- 4) Upon landing move to the vicinity of BS 512895 and BS 508897 to establish OP/blocking positions.
- 5) On the afternoon of D-Day be prepared to retract one platoon from the vicinity Landing Zone PLUM to Landing Zone ROBIN for further deployment to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines MLR.

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g. Battalion Command Group

- 1) On D-Day be prepared to helilift from Landing Zone ROBIN to Landing Zone PEAR.
- 2) Establish initial Command Post site vicinity BS 501897
- 3) In conjunction with ARVN forces be prepared to conduct extensive County Fair operations within the MY LOC (1) and MY LOC (3) hamlet complexes.

h. 81mm Mortar Section

- 1) On D-Day be prepared to helilift from Landing Zone ROBIN to Landing Zone PEAR.
- 2) Mortars will be laid initially on an azimuth of 3200 mils.

i. Coordinating Instructions

- 1) D-Day 20 May 1966
- 2) L-Hour To be announced but not later than 201000H.
- 3) Landing Zones:

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| APPLE | BS 495946 |
| PEACH | BS 489902 |
| PEAR | BS 501900 |
| PLUM | BS 511901 |
| ROBIN | BS 532028 |
- 4) PHASE LINES:

| | |
|--------|--|
| ONE, | Railroad BS 583927, BS 577938 |
| TWO, | TRAIL-HILL BS 579916, BS 572922, and BS 568930 |
| THREE, | TRAIL-STREAM BS 561909, BS 558915, and BS 554928 |
| FOUR, | TRAIL BS 540888, BS 534898, and BS 531905 |
| FIVE, | TRAIL BS 518894, BS 513900, and BS 510909 |
| SIX, | TRAIL BS 502887, BS 497897, and BS 495907 |
- 5) Fire Coordination Line: The area bounded on the north by the southern limits of the 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance zone, on the west by a line between BS 520893, BS 521900, and BS 523907, and on the south by the TRA BONG River.
- 6) ARVN Control Line: A secondary Fire Coordination Line will be established along the stream bed at BS 490888 to BS 506891 once ARVN units cross the TRA BONG River to assist in the County Fair Operations.
- 7) County Fair Target Area: BS 498893, BS 503891, BS 498889, BS 490887 and BS 490891.
- 8) CS utilization is authorized. This Headquarters will be notified when it is employed.

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- 9) Rules of engagement: Reference (b)
- 10) Reporting Instructions:
 - (a) All enemy sightings, contacts and discovery of caches.
 - 1' Use SPOTREP format
 - 2' Use CAVES format
 - 3' Use SITREP format
 - 4' Afteraction report due this Headquarters (S-3) 48 hours after completion of the Operation.
- 11) Position Reports:
 - (a) Thrust Points
 - AUTO BS 500900
 - CITY BS 530910
 - SOAP BS 520870
- 12) Unclassified Code Name: "MORGAN"
- 13) Initial location of the Battalion CP will be BS 501897.
- 14) Anticipated duration of the operation is three days.

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4. Administration and Logistic.

a. SUPPLY

(1) General(a) Prescribed Loads

Class I - 4 meals MIC, 3000 Civil Affair Team meals.

Class II - Combat essential, Civil Affairs Team supplies

Class III - Vehicle tanks full

Class IV - 15 rolls barbwire for Civil Affair Team

Class V - Basic Allowance

(b) Supplies and Equipment available

1 Prescribed Loads

2 Battalion assets

3 FLSG assets (limited clothing)

4 Attached units stage supplies at LSA

(c) Control and Distribution

1 Logistics control by S-4 with forward Battalion C.P. group

2 LSA established Battalion (Rein), LZ Robin, Battalion S-4
Rear control.

3 Unit distribution

(d) Resupply

1 Utilize RAPID REQUEST FORMAT to Crepe Myrtle Four.

2 Classify and separate requests by priority.

3 Number request consecutively.

4 Requests on fill or kill basis.

b. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

(1) Evacuation

(a) Requests to Crepe Myrtle Four

(b) Classify as to priority

(c) USMC to 1st Medical Battalion via helicopter.

(d) Vietnamese to Quang Nhai via helicopter.

- (2) Hospitalization. As prescribed by medical officer as to whom evacuated.

c. TRANSPORTATION

- (1) Infantry to LD by truck, to objective area by foot or helicopter as per operation plan.
- (2) Mechanized units-Organic via route one to objective area
- (3) Two helicopters on stand by (condition four) for resupply and MedEvac. Battalion rear control.
- (4) Convoys as required established by C. P. rear.

d. SERVICES

- (1) Field units requested maintenance, end item exchange or salvage via RAPID REQUEST FORMAT to Crepe Myrtle Four.
- (2) Battalion(rear) request service via routine channels

e. PERSONNEL

- (1) Routine administration as per SOP.
- (2) All units submit entire unit roster to include Name, Rank, Serial number, to Battalion S-1 by 191600H.
- (3) Report evacuated casualties by First, Middle, and Last Initial and Service Number.

f. MISCELLANEOUS

- (1) Uniform-Utilities, normal arms
- (2) Flack Jackets optional
- (3) Treat local water with iodine prior to use.
- (4) All units maintain rear C. P.
- (5) S-1 and Battalion Supply coordinates casualty reporting and gear recovery at 1st Medical Battalion.

5. ~~COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS~~

A. Radio

1. Call signs and frequencies in accordance with 1stMarDiv CoI
2. activate Stations on the Regimental Command, Regimental Tac and ARVN advisor nets.
3. 2nd ARVN Bn Call sign will be Mickey Review Bravo on Freq 40.3
4. ARVN RECON CALL SIGN WILL BE BOOLE 29
5. contact with amored columns will be over Battalion Tac net. The call sign will be Bennington Bravo
6. The following circuits will be activated by 0600 on D-Day;
 - a. Battalion Tac net on 42.7
 - b. Regimental Tac net on 39.1
 - c. ARVN advisor net on 40.3
 - d. TACP local on 44.9
7. ARVN Recon can be contacted thru Bennington Bravo.
8. ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE WILL BE on 35.9 call sign

B. Wire

1. Extensive wire will be employed within the C.P. and civil affairs compound
2. One SB-22 will be installed at the C.P.
3. All wire will be retrieved
4. Call signs remain the same

C. Message Center

1. Numerical Code KAC-J1 234/TSSJ will be employed at all levels
2. This code is held by ARVN advisors
3. Authentication will be in accordance with KAA-60

D. Coordinating Instructions

1. Draw three batteries per radio
2. Each operator will carry two message books and pencils
3. Limited 2nd echelon repair will be available within the Battalion command post
4. The Battalion Command Post will be located initially at coord 500900. All other units report command post locations when established.

CH Bodley

C. H. BODLEY
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES

A. Operation Overlay

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
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Weekly Operational Summary: 1 March - 7 March 1966 (3/7)

MAP: L701, 1:50,000.

Sheets 6757 III & IV

+ At 041800H Co. L and Co. K assumed defensive positions on the M.R. of 2nd Bn. 7th Mar.
 + From 1-4 Mar 66 Co K and Co. L Positions were as shown on overlay.




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(Appendix (G))

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Weekly Operational Summary (3/7)
27 March - 3 April 1966
MAP: L701, 1:50,000
Sheets 6757 III & IV



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
(Appendix (J))

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3/7

Weekly Operational Summary: 26 March - 27 March 1966

MAPs: L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 III and IV




CAB
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(Appendix (I))

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Weekly Operational Summary (3/7)
 7 March - 14 March 1966
 MAP: L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 III & IV



From 110800H to 140800H Company L and Company K on Operation C&H manned the following coordinates:


| | |
|-----------|-----------|
| Company L | BS 588935 |
| Company K | BS 584927 |

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(Appendix (H))

3rd Battalion, 7th Marines
CHU LAI, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
181700H May 1966

Annex A (Operational Overlay) to Frag Order 7-66
Ref: (a) MAP, L701, 1:50,000, Sheets 6757 III and 6757 IV
Time Zone: H



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