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HEADQUARTERS  
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines  
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF  
APO, San Francisco, California 96002

3/WHG/ead  
5750  
9 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF

Via: Seventh Marines  
CG, Task Force X-Ray

Subj: Command Chronology; month of February 1967

Ref: Marine Corps Order 5750.2A

Encl: ✓(1) Overlay indicating unit positions as of 282400H Feb 1967

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Command Chronology for the month of February 1967 is submitted.
2. A Commander's Narrative of Significant Events has been included in the Command Chronology.

E. J. BROWARS

3rd Bn. 7th Mar. Log No  
238-67 Copy #114/35  
SER: 05-67

7th Mar S&C Log No.  
20200-67 Copy # 1 of 6

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DOD DIS 5200.10

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3rd BN/7TH MAR AND CHRON

FEB 1967

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Command Chronology, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, February 1967

1. Organizational Data

- a. Location: DUC PHO, RVN
- b. Period Covered: 1-28 February 1967
- c. Commanding Officer, Staff and Chief Subordinates:

Commanding Officer	LTCOL R.J. O'LEARY 1 Feb 1967
Executive Officer	LTCOL E.J. BROMARS 2 Feb-28 Feb 1967
Adjutant	MAJOR R.C. RICE
Personnel Officer	2ndLt W.E. KELLER, JR
S-2	2ndLt K.J. WILKERSON
S-3	CAPT L.J. CEMMER 1 Feb-18 Feb 1967
AFO	2ndLt E.J. PODASEK 19 Feb-28 Feb 1967
S-4	MAJOR F.V. WHITE, JR.
Supply Officer	CAPT L.R. GIBSON
MFO	CAPT A.L. ORR
Bn Surgeon	2ndLt E.C. KATHBUN
Bn Chaplain	2ndLt J.A. WILSON
Comm O	Lt R.F. MCGAULLEY (MC) USN
Civil Affairs O (S-5)	LtJG D.W. PEDERSON (CHC) USN
Head Co.	CAPT C.W. ROSS
Co. I	2ndLt J.B. FLYNN
Co. K	2ndLt D.R. RICHARDS
Co. L	CAPT R.M. CLARK
Co. M	CAPT D.D. DORMAN
	CAPT J.S. BERRY 1 Feb-19 Feb 1967
	CAPT L.J. CEMMER 20 Feb-28 Feb 1967
	CAPT H.J. JOHNSON

d. Attachments: No change from Battalion Operation Order 1-67 submitted as enclosure to Command Chronology for the month of January.

e. Average Monthly Strength During Period:

USMC	37 Officers	USN	3 Officers
	1146 Enlisted		49 Enlisted

2. Sequential listing of significant events, especially as they relate to:

a. Personnel. The total number of personnel on hand within 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines as of 28 February 1967 was 1319. The total effective strength on 28 February 1967 was 1100. During the month of February, 86 new personnel were joined this organization; 87 were dropped from the rolls. 52 personnel rotated; 148 were wounded in action, 14 were killed in action, and 48 were evacuated as non-battle casualties; 23 of these non-battle casualties were returned to duty by 28 February 1967.

b. Administration. No unusual or significant problems were encountered.

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(1) Reports indicated that no new fortifications were constructed immediately prior to the battalion's arrival at DUC PHO. Most previously constructed bunkers and trenchlines were oriented toward Highway One. Many of the bunkers found during Operation DESOTO were reinforced with concrete apertures and steel roofing. Intelligence indicated that after the initial occupation of the DUC PHO/NOI DAMG area, however, and particularly during FEB, the VC concentrated their efforts building new fortifications along the north bank of the SONG DIA CAN with apertures generally oriented south; villagers were reported to have salvaged materials from damaged bunkers on the south side of the river for use on the northern fortifications. Newly-dug trench networks were also found in the area of operations following the FEB truce period.

(2) There were frequent sightings by reconnaissance and organic units of VC wearing what was described as neatly-pressed khaki uniforms. Uniform descriptions of sighted VC ranged from khaki to all-green, blue and gray. The majority of sightings, however, were of VC wearing black pajamas.

(3) Significant types of weapons encountered were .50 caliber and .30 caliber machineguns which were effectively employed against both ground and air targets. VC snipers inflicted most friendly casualties during February; the use of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights is suspected; USMC casualties resulting from small arms were the result of long range fires up to 700 meters and greater.

(4) Reports from DUC PHO District indicated that there was a willingness among people in many hamlets to seek refuge from VC domination and control.

(5) An effective counterintelligence net was established in close coordination with the Battalion S-2. Counterintelligence is continuing to establish the reliability of village chief sources used as agents.

(6) The Interrogation-translation team, in direct support of the battalion, coordinated closely and effectively with the Battalion S-2. Screening procedures of VC detainees were established between IIC and DUC PHO District Headquarters.

d. Training. No formal training was conducted during February because of the battalion's participation in Operation DESOTO.

e. Special Operations.

(1) Operation DESOTO continued through February. Frequent company and platoon size sweeps were conducted; extensive small unit patrols and ambushes continued in the Operation DESOTO area.

(2) From 24 February through the end of the month, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines participated in the coordinated operation DESOTO/DOCKHOUSE VI/- with the Special Landing Force, 1st Bn, 5th Marines and 2nd Bn, 5th Marines.

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ARVN DIV units

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f. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, or other special types of warfare. None

g. Command and Control. During February, 3rd Bn, 7th Marines was under the operational control of Task Force A-Ray, and under the administrative control of the 7th Marines. The battalion passed OPCOM of Co. M, 3rd Bn, 5th Marines to its parent organization and assumed OPCOM of Co. F, 2nd Bn, 7th Marines at 231600h. LTCOL E.J. BROWN assumed command of the battalion at 021600h from LT COL A.J. JONES.

h. Close Combat. The battalion was in close combat with the enemy during Operation DESOTO which continued throughout the reporting period.

i. Fire Support. From 1-26 Feb, Battery 1(-), 3rd Bn, 11th Marines at AOI DAB, with reinforcing fires from one platoon of 155MM howitzers (ARVN) manned by 4th Bn, 12th Marines personnel at AOI DAB, continued to provide outstanding fire support to the battalion during Operation DESOTO. A total of 265 observed, 33 unobserved and 262 AAI artillery missions were fired. A total of 6,048 rounds HE, 956 rounds AP, 62 rounds M0-S and 62 rounds Illumination were expended. The results were 40 VC KIA (conf), 121 VC KIA (prob), two VC KIA (prob), and extensive structural damage to fortified positions in the DESOTO area of operations.

j. Logistics.

(1) During February, the resupply of combat essential items to rifle companies continued without significant problems. Resupply to Co. M's position at BS 022403 and to positions on AOI DAB was performed exclusively by helicopter. Other rifle companies operating in the AAI were resupplied predominantly by helicopter; however, overland resupply was used whenever practical.

(2) Delivery of organic assets from the JUNG SEAL LSA continued, and by 26 February was approximately 95 per cent complete. Mighty mites, ABC equipment and other equipment, superfluous to the mission, were not brought forward from CMC LAL. By 15 February an input of 100 tons of supplies per day into the DUC PHO LSA was common, weather permitting.


(3) LSA's were loaded with 20 DUS, all classes, and positioned off shore opposite AOI DAB to provide an additional capability for achieving the planned buildup of the DUC PHO LSA. In addition, an LSO, fitted with fuel bladders, was positioned alongside one of the LSA's. GA-46's were then able to shuttle LSA supplies from the LSO to the DUC PHO LSA, refueling from the deck of the LSA with the LCV alongside. This system allowed three GA-46's to deliver 100 tons a day and significantly accelerated the build-up of the DUC PHO LSA.

(4) By 26 February, Days of Supply, in terms of one battalion were:

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	Class	Days of supply
	I	15
	II	5
	III	100
	IV	80
	V	8

(5) On 8 February, FASD-Bravo assumed responsibility for the accountability of the supply dumps. 3rd Shore Party Bn continued to provide helicopter support teams to the rifle companies and to control the movement of supplies and equipment from the LSA and from the JUNG NGAI LSA. Class IV lumber was air-dropped by AC-130 on four occasions during February, and by 15 February, a Tactical Fuel Dispensing System was placed in Operation.

k. Air Defense. None

1. Close Air Support. Fixed-wing aircraft strikes were extensively used as Operation DABOFO continued through the month of February. Fixed-wing aircraft conducted preparation and supporting strikes when requested. The nature of targets continued to be entrenched Viet Cong forces in heavily fortified positions as the battalion extended its sphere of influence in the DUC PHO area of operations. Close air support aircraft were controlled by aerial observers, tactical air controllers airborne, ground forward air controllers or combinations of the three. MAJ 11, MAJ 12 and MAJ 13 provided the fixed wing support and flew a total of 551 attack missions. Additional details related to close air support missions in support of Operation DABOFO are described in paragraph 3.

n. Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relations/Pacification.


(1) By 13 February, solatium payments were made to seven DUC PHO villagers who were injured when heavy lumber was air-dropped off target. Material to repair a market place which was damaged during the air drop has been obtained and firm plans have been made to effect repairs.

(2) Planned Psy Ops leaflet drops for the initial phases of Operation DABOFO were completed by 15 Feb. They stressed the "Chieu moi" program, promised refugee care and were directed at nearby VC controlled hamlets in the DUC PHO area of Operations.

(3) On 18 February, DABOOP was initiated in the DUC PHO area. The initial response of villagers in DABOOP Sam hamlet, PHO the Village was outstanding. DABOOP was initiated in VIAM LAC (2) hamlet, PHO DAI Village with similar results. A total of 497 people were treated for 733 maladies from 18-28 Feb.

(4) During February, the following Civic Action materials were distributed to DUC PHO villagers; 10 pounds of washable clothing, 145 sheets of tin roofing, 3 (50kg) bags of cement, one carpentry kit, one masonry kit and 150 pounds of soap.

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### 3. Commander's Narrative of Significant Events.

a. 1-7 February. Search and destroy operations in the MUI DAMG/ DUC PHU area continued with enemy contact varying from light to heavy. Co. L conducted an attack on the fortified hamlet complex of MI LAG, vic BS 826376. Co. M 3/5 and Co. L conducted a helicopter assault, seizing the MUI MON hamlet complex and hill 26 vic BS 833396. Reconnaissance units continued to report frequent enemy movement of varying size to the west of DUC PHU; artillery was directed against such targets with good results. Frequent sightings by ground and aerial observers were engaged by supporting arms with equally good results.

Co. M, occupying positions vic BS 822403, came under a coordinated 60MM mortar and sapper attack at 010005h. This same position received several incoming grenades at 012250h. A search of the area found 2 VC KIA (conf) wearing USMC flak jackets, homemade charges, some packed with C-4, and many Chi Com and U.S. frag grenades. At 010400h, Co. M, sustained one KIA and 11 WIA from two 250-pound bombs, apparently dropped from friendly aircraft of unknown origin.

From 1-3 February, Co. L experienced moderate sniper fire while conducting search and destroy operations in the MI LAG complex southeast of MUI DAMG. Co. L found fortifications and approximately 100 tons of rice stored in several locations throughout the hamlet. Co. M 3/5 followed Co. L in trace and used demolitions to effectively destroy the bunker system. The rice was bagged and moved by local Vietnamese and helicopters to a storage area in the vicinity of DUC PHU District Headquarters.

Co. K, conducting daily search and destroy operations from positions on MUI DAO, similarly encountered extensive VC bunker systems and fortifications in hamlets to the east, west and north of MUI DAO. Heavy supporting arms used against these positions, heavily damaged the emplacements and fortifications in MUI TAMON (1), BS 864328, and the MUI TAMON hamlet complex, vic BS 865338, BS 873343, and BS 879339. Co. M patrols in the MUI PHU hamlet area made daily contact with snipers and killed several VC who tried to flee approaching USMC forces. In one contact, a squad size ambush patrol, inserted during daylight hours on 4 Feb, killed 3 VC KIA (conf) just prior to darkness and captured an AK-47 Soviet rifle and miscellaneous equipment. Following extensive preparatory fires on Hill 26 and the fortified hamlet of MUI MON, vicinity BS 831395, Co. M 3/5 and Co. L were landed by helicopter in an LZ vic BS 836393. Co. M 3/5 received sporadic .30 caliber machinegun fire and several rounds of 57 mm AT fire from VC positions on MUI DON vic BS 849391. At approximately the same time, sampans, carrying 25 to 30 armed VC, fled the hamlet north across the Song HUA CAO. Fired mortar, napalm strikes and small arms fire from Co. M 3/7 located on hill mass vic BS 822403 accounted for 1 VC KIA (conf) and 26 VC KIA (prob); air and naval gunfire against the MUI DON positions resulted in 4 VC KIA (conf). Co. M 3/5 and Co. L found an extensive bunker system and fortifications in MUI MON, but had no further contact. Hill 26 at BS 834395 was discovered to be honeycombed with caves and tunnels. Extensive demolitions were used to destroy these complexes. Psy Warfare broadcasts and leaflet drops were directed against targets north of the Song HUA CAO, opposite the MUI MON area.

During 1-7 Feb, AO's and CP's directed supporting arms against targets of opportunity and accounted for 7 VC KIA (conf) and 61 VC KIA (prob). In addition, reconnaissance observation posts operating on the western periphery of the battalion AO, called several fire missions against observed

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VC movement and accounted for 20 VC KIA (conf) and 28 VC KIA (prob). Cumulative casualties for Operation DESOTO through 072400 were:

USMC		VC	
KIA	15	KIA(conf)	95
DOW	1	KIA(prob)	190
WIA	161	WIA(prob)	10

b. 8-12 February. During the TET truce period, VC forces initiated six separate violations against security patrols in the DUC PHO area. At 081300, a squad-size element of Co. M patrolling westward, was taken under semi-automatic and automatic weapons fire from an undetermined number of VC in fortified positions at BS 798408, and in concealed positions in AN TRUONG(2) Hamlet at BS 798402. After the VC maneuvered in an attempt to flank the patrol, small arms and supporting arms were directed against the VC forces. When the VC continued to press their actual advantage, a reaction force from Co. M 3/5 assaulted AN TRUONG (2) Hamlet after fixed-wing napalm strikes were directed against the VC positions. Under cover of supporting arms and the Co. M 3/5 assault, the squad patrol extracted its casualties. The VC broke contact. Result of action: 2 VC KIA (conf), 9 VC KIA (prob), 2 USMC KIA, and 2 USMC WIA.

On 9 Feb, a Co. M squad patrol received light VC sniper fire from the HAI MON hamlet area; VC broke contact; there were no casualties. On 10 Feb, a similar security patrol was engaged by an estimated 5 to 6 man VC force in HAI MON hamlet. After receiving 50 rounds of small arms fire, the squad flanked the VC positions killing one VC KIA (conf); again, the VC broke contact. On 11 Feb, Co. M local patrols near MUI DAT twice encountered enemy sniper fire; they returned small arms fire each time and accounted for 1 VC KIA (prob). A Co. M patrol at BS 830399 came under fire on 11 Feb from 10 VC crossing the SONG TRA CAU. The patrol returned fire and killed 2 VC KIA (prob); the remaining 8 VC broke contact and fled into a treeline on the south bank in HAI MON hamlet.

c. 13-23 February. Search and destroy operations continued after the TET truce with Co. M 3/5 and Co. M conducting operations east of MUI DAT in conjunction with a beach survey by UDT personnel. Cos I and L conducted search and destroy operations of the AN LAC and AN TRUONG hamlet complexes south and southeast of MUI DAT against light to moderate sniper fire. Co. M continued to patrol and destroy bunkers and fortifications in the SA BINH area, BS 822403, TAN TO hamlets and the HAI MON/Hill 26 area against frequent but light contact. On 15 Feb, Co. M 3/5 conducted recon-in-force north along Highway One. Heavy VC sniper fire was received from enemy positions in the AN BINH hamlets, vic grid squares 7840 and 7941. With Ontos delivering 100 mm supporting fires, Co. M 3/5 pressed the assault to the vicinity of the bridge at BS 793409; the VC broke contact and fled to the west as air strikes interdicted their movement. On 16 Feb, Co. M and Co. M 3/5 established blocking positions on the south bank of the SONG TRA CAU vic AN TRUONG (2), BS 797403 and the BINH, vic BS 815401. Cos L and I landed north of the river by helicopter after extensive prep fires. Six of nine OH-46 aircraft received non-serious battle damage from small arms fire near the landing zones at BS 817413 and BS 811413. Results of the helicopter assault: 3 VC KIA (prob), 2 VC KIA (conf). Both Co. M 3/5 and Co. M reported VC fleeing the objective area in a generally westward direction along the trace of the SONG

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TRA CAU. Targets were engaged in all cases with both small arms and support-  
ing arms and resulted in 9 VC KIA (conf) and 30 VC KIA (prob). Cos L and I  
encountered sporadic sniper fire during assaults on THUY TRIU (1) and AN  
TRUNG (2) hamlets along the north bank of the SONG TRA CAU. Co. M 3/5 re-  
positioning to NUI DANG, accounted for 10 VC KIA (prob) as a result of air  
strikes against the AN MINH hamlet area. Cos L and I continued deliberate  
search and destroy operations westward along the north bank of the SONG TRA  
CAU to DONG UAM (2), BS 797416 and RAP AN NAM, BS 800420. During the sub-  
sequent sweeps of RAP AN NAM, USMC ground forces and supporting helicopters  
were subjected to extensive sniper fire from VC positions within the hamlet  
area. Dense foliage concealed well-constructed spider traps and entrench-  
ments throughout the hamlet area and made it extremely difficult to locate  
the sniper positions. Nighttime VC activity included frequent grenade  
probes. The operations in RAP AN NAM extended the battalion's sphere of  
influence in the DUC PHU area of Operations to a point approximately 5,000  
meters north of NUI DANG. Significantly, USMC scout/snipers, employed by  
all units, proved to be an effective countermeasure to long range VC sniper  
fire. VC who fled friendly patrols were engaged by the scout snipers from  
pre-planned vantage points. Prior to its administrative displacement to  
CHU LAI on 23 Feb, Co. M 3/5 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force west of  
Highway One in the vicinity of AN MINH (3), BS 786404, and VIMH LAI (3), BS  
783396. Extensive supporting arms were directed against VC semi-automatic  
and automatic weapons positions. Small arms, scout/sniper fire, and 106mm  
fire, together with air support, effectively suppressed the VC fire. Co. L  
exploited the contact on the southern flank in the vicinity of the junction  
of the railroad tracks and the stream complex at BS 788386. Results of Co.  
L and Co. M 3/5 actions: 6 VC KIA (conf). Co. M extended its combat patrols  
to the north side of the SONG TRA CAU to gain firm control over THUY TRIU  
(1) when Cos L and I displaced to the vicinity of NUI DANG. In one encounter,  
a squad patrol accounted for 4 VC KIA (conf) and 5 VC KIA (prob) in a brief  
but close contact in THUY TRIU (1). Co. M ambushes successfully interdicted  
VC crossing the SONG TRA CAU. At 232215, one ambush patrol killed 6 VC KIA  
(conf) and 10 VC KIA (prob) in an engagement with approximately 30 VC.  
Intelligence reports of VC units in the area of operations were exploited  
with heavy nighty AP, naval gunfire and artillery harassment and inter-  
diction fires. Reports and surveillances from local intelligence agents in  
the DUC PHU area indicated supporting arms were very effective against VC  
sanctuaries and harboring sites. Reconnaissance observation posts continued  
to observe groups of armed VC using trails throughout the high ground west  
of DUC PHU. Artillery fire missions directed against these accounted for 16  
VC KIA (conf) and 25 VC KIA (prob) during this period. Naval gunfire and  
fixed-wing strikes resulting from sightings by observation posts resulted  
in an additional 9 VC KIA (conf) and 39 VC KIA (prob). The cumulative  
casualties for Operation DESOTO through 232400H were:

	USMC		VC
KIA	28	KIA (conf)	192
DOW	3	KIA (prob)	435
MIA	284	MIA (prob)	38

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d. 24-28 February. Commencing 24 February, the battalion operated initially in conjunction with the Special Landing Force and later, in addition, with the 1st Bn, 5th Marines and participating 2nd ARVN units. While the SLF conducted search and destroy operations in the SA HUYNH-NUI DAV area, Co F 2/7, which came under the operational control of 3/7 when it relieved Co. M 3/5, and Co. K established blocking positions on SUI LUNG LAM, vicinity Grid Square 8133. Beginning 26 February, Co. L and Co F 2/7 were joined by Co. L in a coordinated battalion (-) search and destroy operation of the NIA LAY (1), VINA LAC (4) and (5) and THAM LAM (1) and (2) hamlet areas in Grid Squares 7736, 7737, 7738, 7838, and 7837. This north-east movement was paralleled by the 1st Bn, 5th Marines which conducted operations to the northwest and north. Sweeping eastward toward Highway One, 3/7 units accounted for 9 VC KIA (conf) and 3 VC KIA (prob). While Cos K and L continued a northeasterly movement, Co. F 2/7 moved southwest to vicinity BS 781371. Its leading elements came under heavy semiautomatic and automatic weapons fire. Assaulting the enemy force, Co. F 2/7, after fixed-wing and artillery strikes against VC positions in the fortified hamlet area at BS 778373, accounted for 8 VC KIA (conf). The cumulative casualties for Operation DESOTO through 282400H were:

	USMC		VC
KIA	29	KIA(conf)	222
DOF	23	KIA(prob)	497
KIA	288	KIA(prob)	52

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