

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
9th Engineer Battalion FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602



3/WFT/fhw
5750
10 November 1967
0128367

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force
Pacific, FPO, San Francisco, California 96602 (Attn: Field Historian)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 - 31 October 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) 9th Engineer Battalion Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c).

H. E. PEREA
H. E. PEREA

Copy to
CG, III MAF (Engr)

*9th Engineer
Command Chronology*

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9TH ENGINEER BN COPY # 0042

OCT 1967

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Construction Officer	Vacant to 6 October 1967
	1stLt G. B. BARNEY from 7 October 1967
ADM Officer	1stLt H. A. FEIFS
Maintenance Officer	WO-1 H. O. FEUER
Utilities Officer	WO-1 F. A. R. LANDRY
Medical Officer	Lt G. E. SALTZBERG (MC) USNR
Ordnance Officer	2ndLt B. J. GRYOTKO to 15 October 1967
	WO-1 F. A. R. LANDRY from 16 October 1967
Supply Officer	Capt. C. N. PASTINO
Legal Officer	Capt. E. G. PETERS
Embarkation Officer	Capt. R. A. BLUMENKRANTZ to 30 October 1967
	1stLt B. HALLORAN from 31 October 1967
NBC Officer	Capt. R. A. BLUMENKRANTZ to 24 October 1967
	1stLt H. A. FEIFS
Chaplain	Services conducted by visiting Chaplain
	Lt F. H. LUFFMAN

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH*

USMC		USN	
<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
43	945	1	19

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*Includes "A" Company

II NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the month of October, the 9th Engineer Battalion, LtCol H. E. PEREA commanding, had as its primary missions the repair and upgrading of RVN Route #1 from Chu Lai to Thang Binh, the support of Marine Corps and Army units in the Chu Lai TAOR, and the maintenance of a road network at ROKMC connecting all outlying camps to Brigade Headquarters.

"A" Company remained under the operational control of the 7th Engineer Battalion at Hill 63 (BT 132453).

"D" Company (-) has been in the process of performing maintenance and repairs on RVN Route #1 from Chu Lai (BT 520044) to the Tam Ky river bridge (BT 330209), a distance of 16 miles. Since 1 October 1967, "D" Company has hauled 1295 cubic yards of 3"- 5" rock, 485 cubic yards of 1½" rock, and 4800 cubic yards of fill in the regular maintenance and repair of this section of road. During this period of time "D" Company (-) has expended 12,442 man

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hours and 3430 equipment hours broken down by major items of equipment as follows:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>
M-51	2454	M-64	131	MRS 100	109
M-54	200	TD-18	166	5 KW	89
M-52	186	TL-16	140	550 Grader	130
M-37	63	150-T46	55	125 Comp.	11

In addition to the above maintenance and repair, "D" Company (-) performed emergency repairs on two washouts of RVN Route #1 at BT 360190 caused by a tropical storm on 8 - 9 October 1967. The two washouts were 80 yards in length and 40 yards in length, both being 10 - 15 feet in depth. The repair of these two areas required 2400 cubic yards of rock fill, 50 cubic yards of sand, and one (1) 40' section of 60" culvert. The repairs were accomplished with 2400 man hours and 14,550 vehicle miles in a 24 hour period.

"D" Company, 2nd Platoon (Rein), under the operational control of "C" Company, 9th Engineer Battalion, is located at Hill 29 (BT 226320) and is in the process of repairing RVN Route #1 from Tam Ky north to Hill 29, a distance of 8.5 miles. Since 1 October 1967 D(2) used 750 cubic yards of 3" to 5" rock, 600 cubic yards of 1½" rock and 1500 cubic yards of fill in the regular maintenance and repair of this section of road. Since 1 October 1967 D(2) has expended 12,727 total man hours and 1832 equipment hours broken down by major items of equipment as follows:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Hours</u>
M-51	983	TD-18	186	Saw	8
M-54	144	150-T46	19	Welder	8
M-64	124	550 Grader	37	TL-16	57
M-38	100	5 KW	106		
M-37	24	TD-15	80		

"C" Company is located at Hill 10 (BT 199390) and is in the process of repairing RVN Route #1 from Hill 29 north to Thang Binh (BT 175418), a distance of 11 miles. Since 1 October 1967 "C" Company used 250 cubic yards of 3" to 5" rock and 480 cubic yards of fill in maintenance and repairing of this section of road. Further "C" Company has completed construction of the following bridges:

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<u>Date Completed</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Length/Type</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>	<u>Equipment Hours</u>
6 October 1967	21	BT 185405	40' Steel Stringer	500	90
12 October 1967	30	BT 223351	21'6" Timber Trestle	160	8
14 October 1967	32	BT 230339	30' Timber Trestle	120	8
16 October 1967	33	BT 238326	38'4" Timber Trestle	80	5
23 October 1967	23	BT 196391	80' Steel Stringer	900	193

"C" Company has the following bridges under construction:

<u>#</u>	<u>Length/Type</u>	<u>ECD</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>	<u>Equipment Hours</u>
24	80' Steel Stringer	10 November 1967	BT 201383	440	45
29	40' Steel Stringer	5 November 1967	BT 219358	594	121

The following culverts have been installed by "C" Company and D(2) since 1 October 1967:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Location</u>
9 October 1967	2 - 60"	BT 203381
13 October 1967	1 - 60"	BT 360190
14 October 1967	1 - 48"	BT 353196
16 October 1967	2 - 36"	BT 232333
28 October 1967	2 - 36"	BT 174419
28 October 1967	2 - 60"	BT 255297

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"B" Company retained the responsibility of maintaining a 21 mile road complex within the ROKMC camp connecting all the outlying camps to Brigade Headquarters. Construction of this road network has been completed, and maintenance will be continuous.

The remainder of "B" Company and one (1) platoon from "D" Company were used primarily for vertical construction in support of USMC and Army units in the Chu Lai TAOR. During the month of October the following vertical construction was accomplished:

Two (2) 16' x 32' tropical huts for the Americal Division to be used as officers' quarters.

One (1) 30' x 50' messhall with a 30' x 50' galley, a 20' x 30' mess gear washing area, and a 16' x 32' pot and garbage shack for the 94th S&S Battalion, USA.

One (1) 120' x 20' laundry with a 50' x 20' wing for the 94th S&S Battalion, USA.

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Four (4) four-hole heads for 2/11 Cavalry, USA.
Six (6) four-hole heads for 1/9 Cavalry, USA.
Four (4) four-hole heads for 101st Airborne, USA.
Fifteen (15) holes drilled for light poles for the 71st Aviation, USA.
One (1) 150 meter access road to an ammunition pad for FLSG-B.
One (1) 200' x 200' napalm storage pad for MAG-12.
One (1) 30' x 50' messhall with a 30' x 30' galley, a 16' x 32' garbage and pot shack, and a 20' x 30' mess gear cleaning area for the 3/18th Artillery, USA.

Cantonment area for 178th Aviation Company, USA.

One (1) 30' x 50' fuel bladder storage pit for 221st S&S Company, USA
One (1) 16' x 24' shower for the 1st Hospital Company.
One (1) 30' x 70' messhall with 30' x 40' galley for the 221st S&S Company, USA.
One (1) 16' x 44' x 9' generator shed for the 509th Signal Battalion, USA.

The 9th Engineer Battalion water points produced 5,500,650 gallons of water. The 50 TPH and 15 TPH rock crushers operated 73 hours producing 1235 cubic yards of 2" rock.

During the month of October the 9th Engineer Battalion conducted daily minesweep operations from BT 510055 to BT 082548. This area encompasses 45 miles of RVN Route #1 broken down as follows:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>Composition</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>
BT 510055	BT 330209	15 Miles	4 Men	8
BT 285247	BT 237326	6 Miles	6 Men	15
BT 237326	BT 175418	7 Miles	8 Men	24
BT 175418	BT 144457	3 Miles	10 Men	20
BT 144457	BT 082548	7.5 Miles	10 Men	30

Between 1 October 1967 and 31 October 1967, 9th Engineer Battalion personnel detected seventeen (17) mines placed in RVN Route #1, thirteen (13) of which were blown in place. Casualties for the month included three (3) USMC WIA and one (1) USMC KIA. There were four incidents of vehicles hitting mines. There were three incidents of destruction of bridges and culverts by enemy demolitions. The tropical storm of 8 - 9 October 1967 washed out bridge #29 (BT 219358) and rendered the bypass at bridge #23 (BT 196391) impassable. All damage to RVN Route #1 caused by the above demolitions and storm was repaired by units of the 9th Engineer Battalion.

During the month of October the 9th Engineer Battalion dropped four (4) officers and eighty-six (86) enlisted men and joined five (5) officers and eighty-seven (87) enlisted men.

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The Third Platoon, First Bridge Company remained in direct support of the battalion. The ferry at BT 379174, operated by this platoon, transported sixty-nine (69) M-48 tanks, eighteen (18) tank retrievers, ten (10) loaded M-52 tractors with 172A1 trailers, six (6) mobile cranes, and two (2) portable bridges.

On 23 October 1967 the 9th Engineer Battalion commenced providing engineer equipment support for the ROKMC on the Batangan Peninsula (BS 765825) consisting of three (3) TD-18 tractors for the construction of two (2) roads 1500 and 800 meters in length. The Third Bridge Platoon began construction of a ferry crossing to a near-by island.

On 28 October 1967 the 9th Engineer Battalion commenced engineer equipment support for Operation Pineapple Jungle consisting of three (3) Eimco tractors and one (1) three man minesweep team.

III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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1. PERSONNEL

1 October 1967	Dropped 1stLt P. B. ALLEN
4 October 1967	Dropped GySgt HENNINGFIELD and SSgt SIMMONS
5 October 1967	Dropped SSgt BLAND
6 October 1967	Dropped GySgt BREKENFIELD
7 October 1967	Dropped GySgt COOK
9 October 1967	Joined 1stLt G. B. BARNEY
10 October 1967	Dropped SSgt POTEAT
13 October 1967	Joined 1stLt ERICSON and SSgt EDWARDS, Dropped 2ndLt DIEDEN
14 October 1967	Joined Capt. B. A. WALKER, Dropped 1stLt P. MCCANN, SSgt SIMMONS KIA, Cpl MCCANN WIA
20 October 1967	Dropped 2ndLt GRYOTKO
21 October 1967	Joined SSgt HANCOCK
22 October 1967	Joined 2ndLt NOZAR
26 October 1967	Joined 1stLt RIZZO, Dropped SSgt MCLAUGHLIN
28 October 1967	Joined SSgt BURGESS
29 October 1967	Dropped MSgt MCCANDLESS and SSgt ARMOUR
30 October 1967	Dropped SSgt GRAY
31 October 1967	Dropped SSgt MILLS and SSgt WILLIAMS

2. CIVIC ACTION

During the month of October MEDCAPS were conducted three times a week as scheduled. One hundred and fifty-three (153) persons were treated for a variety of ailments, and over five-hundred (500) bars of soap were distributed. DentCaps were also held, and a total of five persons were treated during the month. Seventy-five (75) pounds of candy was given to the children by MEDCAP personnel.

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Five truck loads of scrap material were also sent to the village of Tic Tay (3). Included were two truck loads of bamboo and straw and three loads of scrap lumber.

Daily civic action activity in the village was curtailed due to the fact that the civil affairs NCO was in Okinawa studying the Vietnamese language. Full scale activity will resume upon his return to the battalion.

3. ENGINEER OPERATIONS

2 October 1967 Second Platoon, "B" Company reinforced two bridges at BT 223351 and BT 230339 from Class 40 to Class 60

5 October 1967 Completed construction of one (1) messhall 30' x 50' with 16' x 32' pot and garbage shack for the 94th S&S Battalion.

6 October 1967 Completed bridge #21 (BT 185405); 40' steel stringer. Route #1 closed from 0730 to 1500 for repairs on bridge at BT 223351. Completed equipment support for upgrading interior road net for MAG-13. Completed construction of two (2) 16' x 32' tropical huts for Americal Division.

7 October 1967 "C" Company found 50 - 75 pound box mine, blown in place.

8 October 1967 Tropical storm caused following damage: road cut in 7 places from BT 520044 to BT 199390. 45' fixed span bridge #30 (BT 223351) washed out; repaired by "C" Company. 45' fixed span bridge #29 (BT 219358) washed out; repaired by "C" Company. 40' concrete stringer bridge #25 (BT 203381) collapsed; replaced with two (2) 60" culverts by "C" Company. 25' concrete stringer bridge #33 (BT 238326) destroyed; replaced with 25' timber trestle by "C" Company. 40" culvert at BT 353196 partially caved in - 60% of road washed out - "D" Company repaired.

9 October 1967 Installed 2 60" culverts at BT 203381. Bypass at bridge #23 washed out.

10 October 1967 Bridge #21 (BT 185405) 25% destroyed by enemy demolition; repaired by "C" Company.

11 October 1967 Four man sweep team to CAC unit at BS 585976 to remove mines.

12 October 1967 Completed bridge #30 (BT 223351) timber trestle. Completed construction of 200' x 200' napalm storage pad for MAG-12

13 October 1967 Installed one (1) 60" culvert at BT 360190

14 October 1967 Mine found at coordinates BT 180414, blown in place by "C" Company. "C" Company located 2 mines at BT 179414. Installed one (1) 48" culvert at BT 353196. Completed construction of 150 meter access road to ammunition inspection pad for FLSG-B. Completed construction of one (1) laundry 120' x 20' with 50' x 20' wing for the 94th S&S Battalion.

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15 October 1967 Sweep team found mine at BT 234332; 100 pounds; blown in place.

16 October 1967 Completed bridge #33 (BT 238326) 28'4" timber trestle, Class 60. Installed two (2) 36" culverts at BT 232333.

20 October 1967 Started bridge #29 (BT 219358) 40' steel stringer, Estimated Date of Completion: 5 November 1967. Completed construction of 16' x 24' shower for 1st Hospital Company. Completed construction of one (1) messhall 30' x 70' with 30' x 40' galley for 221st S&S Company.

21 October 1967 "D"(2) found one improvised satchel charge of approximately 20 pounds with bamboo pressure switch at coordinates BT 235330; blown in place. Completed clearing, leveling and ditching new cantonment area for 178th Aviation Company.

22 October 1967 Completed fuel bladder storage pit 30' x 50' for 221st S&S Company.

23 October 1967 Completed bridge #23 (BT 196391) 80' steel stringer bridge, class 60. Commenced engineer equipment support for ROKMC on Batangan Peninsula for two roads 1500 and 800 meters.

25 October 1967 Started bridge #24 (BT 201383) 80' steel stringer, estimated date of completion: 10 November 1967.

26 October 1967 "D"(2) found one M-26 grenade rigged to be detonated upon movement at BT 258290. Nuts, bolts and a magazine of M-16 tracers placed around grenade; blown in place. Completed construction of one (1) 16' x 44' x 9' generator shed for 509th Signal Battalion.

28 October 1967 Installed two (2) 36" culverts at BT 174419. Installed two (2) 60" culverts at BT 255297. Commenced engineer equipment support for Operation Pineapple Jungle of 3 Eimco tractors and a 3 man sweep team. "D"(2) placed under OPCON of "C" Company.

30 October 1967 "D"(2) found improvised AF mine (local manufacture, 1 pound) at BT 237327; blown in place.

31 October 1967 "D"(2) found improvised AT mine (concrete type) 10 pounds explosives with self-activating battery firing device (power source BA 386); blown in place.

4. TRAINING

2 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion. Three men to Projectionist School. Two men to Embarkation School, 1st Marine Division.

5 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.

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7 October 1967 Five men to NCO Leadership School, Okinawa.
9 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
10 October 1967 FAM Fire at MAG-12 - 57 personnel.
12 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
14 October 1967 One man to Vietnamese Language School, Okinawa
15 October 1967 One man to Division Embarkation School.
16 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
19 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
21 October 1967 Four men to NCO Leadership School, Okinawa.
23 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
One Officer to Military Justice School, Okinawa.
26 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.
29 October 1967 Four men to CAP School III MAF.
30 October 1967 Three men to Landmine Warfare School, 1st Engineer Battalion.

5. PATROLS

1 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 012100H - 020500H
2 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 022100H - 030100H
3 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 032400H - 040400H
4 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 042300H - 050530H
5 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 052300H - 060500H
6 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 062130H - 070230H
7 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 072200H - 080500H
8 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 082300H - 090300H
9 October 1967 Day Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 090630H - 091100H
10 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 102030H - 110300H
12 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 122330H - 130430H
14 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 142400H - 150400H
15 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 152200H - 160200H
16 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 162400H - 170530H
17 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 172230H - 180430H
18 October 1967 Day Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 180530H - 181130H
20 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 202330H - 210330H
21 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 212400H - 220500H
23 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 232300H - 240330H
25 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 252200H - 260330H
26 October 1967 Day Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 261300H - 261800H
27 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 272300H - 280400H
28 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 282230H - 290300H
30 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 302300H - 310330H
31 October 1967 Night Rein Fireteam Recon Patrol from 312230H - 010230H

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REFERENCES

- Staff Journals
- Maps: AMS Series L7014; sheets 6739I, 6739IV, 6640II
AMS Series L606X; Scale 1:12,500 Chu Lai and Vicinity
- Task Organization Report
- Tactical Bridging Report
- LOC Report
- Engineer Operations Report
- Patrol Reports
- Civic Action Reports
- Spot Reports
- Weekly Progress Reports

TABS VA *Spot Reports*
 VB *Combat Operations After Action Report, Operations Manuals.*

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING BC
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 070653H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 179413
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT At above coordinates box mine found. Weighed 50-75 lbs.
bamboo detonated with batteries.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place, resulting crater
3' deep, 9' diameter.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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TAB A

SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING BC
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 100300H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 185405
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT Bridge #21 was 25% destroyed by explosion during the
night of 9 Oct67.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Bridge repaired
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING OOD
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 130245H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 501057
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
 AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT Patrol saw 3 men, 1 with weapon. Fired 5 rnds. SA,
3 rnds. returned at patrol. Enemy fled North, area checked,
negative results.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Set up ambush at next checkpoint,
negative further sightings.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMC
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 141200H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 180414
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
 AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT Mine found at above coordinates.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Mines blown in place.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMC
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 140730H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 179414
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT SMC located two mines at above coordinates.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Mines blown in place.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED _____

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMC
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 150900H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 234332
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT Sweep team found mine in road at above coordinates.
Approx. 100 lbs.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place, resulting crater
repaired immediately by SMC.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMD2
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 210811H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 235330
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT One mine found at the above coordinates. Improvised
satchel charge approx. 20 lbs. with bamboo pressure switch.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SFOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMD2 info D6
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 260841H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 258290
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT Found one M-26 grenade rigged to be detonated upon
movement. Nuts, bolts and a magazine of M-16 tracers were placed
around the grenade.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SFOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMD2
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 300755H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 237327
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT SMD2 19 personnel found a improvised AP mine (local
manufacture, approx. 1 lb.) at above coordinates. 3 Vietnamese
working in field about 400 meters away left the area whwn the mine
was located.
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place; resulting crater
small, fixed immediately.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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SPOT REPORT

- A. UNIT REPORTING SMD2
- B. DTG (HOTEL TIME) 310830H Oct67
- C. (1) FRIENDLY LOCATION, (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES)
BT 238325
- (2) ENEMY LOCATION (2 LETTER DESIGNATION AND 6 PLACE COORDINATES OR
AZIMUTH AND RANGE FROM KNOWN POSITION) N/A
- D. INCIDENT D2-19 personnel found improvised AT mine (concrete type);
estimate charge 10 lbs explosives with a self activating battery
firing device. (Power source BA 386).
- E. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF "D" Blown in place resulting in crater
3'X2'. Road repaired by D2.
- F. FRIENDLY KIA N/A
- G. FRIENDLY WIA N/A
- H. FRIENDLY MIA N/A
- I. ENEMY KIA N/A
- J. ENEMY WIA N/A
- K. ENEMY CONFIRMED N/A
- L. ENEMY SUSPECT N/A
- M. WEAPONS CAPTURED N/A
- N. EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED N/A

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DELTA COMPANY
 9th Engineer Battalion FMF
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

23 October 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 9th Engineer Battalion FMF

Subj: After Action Report for Operation LeMans

1. General

- a. Name of Operation: Operation LeMans
- b. Date of Operation: 9 - 14 October 1967 with primary emphasis on the period 120630 October 1967 to 130700 October 1967.
- c. Location: BT 360190, approximately 2 miles north of 3rd Bridge (Bridge #49).
- d. Control Headquarters: Company "D", 9th Engineer Battalion
- e. Reporting Officer: Captain B. K. WIEDERHOLD

2. Organization

- a. Company "D" (-)(Rein), 9th Engineer Battalion FMF

3. Supporting Forces

- a. Service Company, 9th Engineer Battalion
- b. Headquarters Company, 9th Engineer Battalion
- c. Bravo Company, 9th Engineer Battalion
- d. U. S. Army
- e. CAF India

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4. Mission: Repair two washouts on Route #1 at coordinates BT 360190 as rapidly as possible to open the road to traffic. To repair as necessary a partial washout of a culvert at coordinates BT 353196.

5. Concept of Operations:

- a. One washout was approximately 60 yards long and 15-20 feet deep. The second washout was approximately 40 yards long and 10-15 feet deep. In addition, a 100 yard portion of the road between the two washouts was caved in. A

Tab B

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40" culvert at coordinates NF 353196 was partially caved in and about 60% of the road width was washed out.

b. The washouts occurred on a portion of Route #1 that is a hard surface road (of a depth of about 3 inches) constructed on a dike that crossed an open area of rice paddies for a distance of approximately 1/3 of a mile. There are three (3) 36" culverts in the middle of this area, one was damaged as a result of the storm. During the dry season these culverts run only a few inches of water. However, the area is a natural drain shed for a valley running several miles west to the mountains. On 8 October 1967 this area received 14.49 inches of rain from a tropical storm. The area had been receiving moderate rains for several days before. This rain plus the drain off from the mountains and the entire western end of the valley resulted in a flood well in excess of the three (3) culverts capability. The resulting volume of water, caused the water to go over the top of the road. This resulted in severe erosion at each end of the valley where the road/dike joined the high ground and caused the washouts. This portion of the road remained under water from late afternoon 8 October until midday 10 October. The relative shallow slope of the valley and a high sea on 9 October caused by the storm, tended to slow the natural drainage flow.

6. Execution

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a. Because of flood waters, work could not start in the area prior to the afternoon of 10 October 1967. This consisted mostly of pulling stuck vehicles and equipment out of the marshes and paddies south of the washout.

b. Fill operations commenced on 11 October 1967 but little progress was made due to non-availability of M-51 trucks. The few that were available were able to do little more than maintain a status quo since water continued to run through the washed out areas at a depth of about 15 feet. Late in the afternoon five (5) Army dump trucks began hauling.

c. Real progress began on 12 October 1967, when up to 15 9th Engineer Battalion dump trucks and 35 Army dump trucks were available. Considerable time was saved by preloading trucks the night before.

d. From 0630 12 October to 0700 13 October 1967 both washouts and the damaged culvert at NF 353196 were filled. A bypass and a 40 foot 60" culvert were installed.

e. The culvert was preassembled culvert that we keep on hand for such purposes. When it became apparent that culvert was required, personnel began assembly of more in the event it were needed.

f. The bypass area was a typical rice paddy with a thin cover of sand that had washed in with the storm. Initially it would support tractors on a marginal basis; but it was impassable to loaded dumps with their more concentrated weight

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distribution. Sand was hauled from a position approximately 3 miles south of the work site. Aluminum airfield matting was then laid and covered with more sand.

g. The washouts were crossed and the culvert at BT 353196 was finally reached shortly before dawn on 13 October 1967. A decision was made not to effect any repairs at that time. Later in the afternoon of 13 October the culvert began to limit the passage of traffic and repairs were initiated. The rubble was cleared, and one 36" culvert 40 feet long was inserted inside the old culvert, and the area was backfilled. This was accomplished in one hour and 20 minutes by virtue of having pre-assembled culvert and the necessary equipment and fill material required, pre-positioned at Hill 54 in anticipation of this eventuality.

7. Summary of Operations:

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a. The majority of the work was accomplished during the period from 0630 12 October to 0700 13 October 1967. During this period up to 50 trucks were available with approximately 35 in operation at any one time.

b. These trucks hauled approximately 485 loads for a total of 2400 cubic yards of rock fill and approximately 50 cubic yards of sand.

c. It is estimated they drove approximately 14,550 miles in 2400 man hours.

d. The one way haul distance was 15 miles or 30 miles turn around.

e. Minimum turn around time was 1 1/2 hours although it averaged closer to 2 1/2 hours when allowing for loading and unloading time. This also includes an estimated figure for time lost due to flat tires, stuck vehicles, stopping for meals, etc.

f. The operation required direct coordination of approximately 100 personnel from all four of the companies present in the battalion, Army truck drivers and shotguns, 3 platoons of Army track vehicles, MPs and GAF personnel during the hours of darkness the night of 12 - 13 October 1967. It is estimated that the operation involved upwards of 350 to 400 personnel from a multitude of organizations during the night.

g. With a few minor exceptions noted below the utmost cooperation was received from all supporting units. It must be conceded that without support and cooperation from the Army, it would have taken at least 72 hours to accomplish what was done in 24.

8. Communications: Only slightly better than none at all. Specifics are noted below under Supporting Elements.

9. Supporting Elements

a. Army security forces: While this consisted mostly of sleeping on the road it did accomplish the mission in that we were secure all night.

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Definite provisions must be made for traffic control in the future.

f. The Army MP's should have closed the road on 9 October 1967 when it became apparent it was impassable. When they failed to do so we should have. This was not accomplished until 10 October when I went to Hill 54 and asked the MP's to close it. Even this was not completely successful until we put out our own road guards at Hill 54 and Bridge #49.

g. Pre-assembled culvert should be kept on hand at all times. However we do need a regular field kit for assembling the culvert, teels, slings, stretcher bars, etc., rather than depending so much on a crane.

h. We need more sand, rock and dirt fill sites; as many as can be found to eliminate long hauls. However these seem to be limited.

i. Army support and cooperation was outstanding both in trucks and security.

j. The battalion should never get itself in the position where it has no wrecker available again. Although admittedly two wreckers do not leave much room for flexibility when only one is in operation.

k. The same applies to lowbeds. The battalion should never get below four (4) operating lowbeds with tractors available in camp.

l. Our present trucks are not capable of sustained operations of this nature over a long period.

m. The higher horse-power Army multifuels greatly outperformed our trucks. They are much harder to wire in the mud and require less time in low range.

n. The tires we are presently receiving are most inadequate.

o. A GER should be submitted for the hydraulic lines on the BIMCO trailer.

p. The TE should be changed to allow each letter company at least one winch for their BIMCO's.

q. A workable system for obtaining parts after hours should be set up. If the present system is satisfactory then the companies should be thoroughly schooled in its mechanics.

r. Each company should have an AN/PRC 125 radio and Battalion should have a set up where a telephone can be hooked into the radio net.

s. Personnel from D Company were dribbled in as they became available from other jobs, eventually involving almost everyone, in some capacity, that was not on guard or at Hill 29. This coupled with the absence of all four Lt's resulted in a noticeable lack of organization at times, and should be avoided hereafter.

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b. CAP India personnel: Same as 9a above.

c. Army drivers and trucks: The drivers were every bit as good as ours and the general performance of their trucks was well above ours.

d. 9th Engineer Battalion Motor Transport (Service, "B", and "D" Company)

(1) The lack of a wrecker was probably the most serious limiting factor in the operation. Because of the condition of the road and limited turn around areas a great many trucks became stuck. Thus traffic was constantly held up while a tractor or tank maneuvered to pull out the truck, further damaging the road as they did.

(2) The availability of only 15 out of 69 9th Engineer Battalion trucks is an unacceptable figure under any circumstances. In addition, had enough 9th Engineer Battalion trucks been available during the period 9-11 October 1967, the 24 hour operation of 12-13 October 1967 could have been avoided. However it is apparent that 9th Engineer Battalion trucks cannot stand up to the driving conditions they were exposed to during this operation. Due to post operation deadline this battalion was out of M-51 dump trucks for all practical purposes on 14-15 October 1967.

(3) The lack of accidents considering the speeds and distances involved plus the beating that both the trucks and drivers took was most impressive.

(4) The lack of lowbeds seriously limited operations. Only the two of D Company were available; again an unacceptable figure for an operation of this scope. Many events were delayed while lowbeds were shuttled from place to place.

(5) The poor quality of our tires became very apparent. Although the driving conditions were severe they were not that bad. Particularly noticeable was the number of recaps that simply came apart. Almost as much truck time was lost to flat tires as to vehicles being stuck.

(6) Probably the next most frequent failure was torque rods, although this is mostly attributable to the driving conditions and long hauls with a full load.

(7) Tail gates also failed at an alarming rate.

e. Engineer Equipment

(1) Few problems were experienced as there was little equipment involved.

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A second EIMCO was needed at 2400 on 12 October 1967 but didn't arrive until about 0400 13 October. This delay was caused by poor communications, errors by D Company and the unavailability of lowbeds.

(2) The difficulty of getting repair parts after hours was again pointed out. I'm not satisfied yet as to whether this was the fault of the battalion supply system, D Company personnel, or communications. Perhaps all contributed to this as well.

(3) Once again the vulnerability of the EIMCO hydraulic hoses was pointed out. I feel this is a definite design deficiency.

(4) Also strongly pointed out again was that the present TE is deficient in that it does not provide winches for the letter company EIMCOS. I feel it is imperative that letter companies have a minimum of one.

f. Communications

(1) Completely inadequate for an operation of this scope. If one can talk directly to the individual with whom they are trying to communicate, the word gets out. If however, it has to be relayed, the system breaks down.

(2) From D6/D35 to Relay to COC to the addressee by radio and back again almost always managed to get the message garbled. It was often an exact duplicate of the childrens' game of sitting in a circle and passing a message around and getting it back unrecognizable.

(3) Undoubtedly poor radio procedures by D Company partially contributed to the problem but there was also a good deal of inefficiency on the part of the trained communicators.

(4) However I feel the basic problem is not in the personnel as much as it is the equipment that requires three relays in 15 miles.

g. Health and Comfort

(1) I failed to arrange for a carpman. I simply forgot this for a multitude of reasons, none of which excuses it. This is a basic requirement that should not be overlooked.

(2) C Rations were initially provided throughout the day before it was decided to work all night. These proved to be sufficient in quantity as a supplement throughout the night. Evening chow was arranged and both drivers and personnel on the site were shuttled in for a hot meal. In addition chow and coffee were provided in the pits. However, somehow the messhall did not get the word on feeding the troops in the field. They were apparently told work would secure at 2200 and prepared mid rats to be served in the messhall. When

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I became aware of this I notified the messhall at approximately 2300 that chew should be delivered to the site. In theory all that was required was to load the chew being prepared on a vehicle and deliver it. Yet for no reason I can recognize this took until 0300.

(3) Water was initially provided through canteens and water cans until such time as the decision was made to work all night. After this it took far too long to get a water buffalo to the area.

10. Conclusion

a. The bypass proved its worth and its construction did not detract from the main operations. The sand again proved to be a good stabilizer and contributed even more than the matting.

b. The moneys will prove or disprove the worth of the culvert. Whether the volume of water to be drained is sufficient to offset the disadvantage of adding a weak spot subject to attack from erosion and enemy will be seen.

c. I was unable to make an on the spot investigation of the culvert at BT 553196 until dawn 13 October when we got across the second washout. Three alternatives were available: (1) Let traffic through hoping it would hold and repair it properly later; (2) Close the gap and culvert with fill as an immediate solution and (3) Hold traffic until a culvert could be installed and then back-filled. The third choice, I rejected because it would necessitate keeping the road closed several more hours while the necessary equipment and culvert were brought up and put in place. It was essential that traffic be permitted to move. The second choice, while certainly the safest was also the most uneconomical, if the first choice worked, in that it would have required eventually closing the road for close to a day to clean out the old culvert and fill, install new culvert, and backfill. Thus I gambled that the road would hold long enough to get the initial surge of traffic through. With this in mind we staged the necessary fill and equipment at Hill #54 and brought up 40 feet of 36" culvert from our compound. Although the road did hold up for awhile it deteriorated more rapidly than I had anticipated. By early afternoon on 13 October 1967, it became a risk crossing and began to slow up traffic. However in retrospect under the same circumstances I would make the same decision again. The road was open to traffic from 0700 to 1600. It was completely closed only at 1600 when we blocked it to effect the necessary repairs. With all material and equipment staged it was cleared, new culvert installed, and backfilled by 1720. Rather than removing the remaining half of the 40" culvert we simply cleared out the rubble and inserted a 36" culvert inside of it, and backfilled it. I would recommend using this method whenever possible in the future.

d. The heavy and constant hauling operations caused a good deal of damage to the road, shoulders and ditches.

e. Traffic control as run by D Company needs to be improved. Instances of 3 or 4 people trying to guide one truck at once while one man was left with 15 trucks several times managed to turn a minor traffic jam into a complete mess.

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However, considering the hedge podge of personnel and units involved and the availability of only 1 officer and 4 staff NCO's a certain amount of dis-organization was inevitable.

t. The performance of both Army drivers and shetguns plus the troops of this Battalion was outstanding. A few drivers drove 24 straight hours and almost all drove at least 12. There was no problem in finding shetguns and in fact the problem was not in getting enough personnel, but in getting rid of those not needed. There were a good many more shetguns than trucks.

u. Our personnel are more capable of working long hours than our equipment. Many people worked 36 hours straight and still were able to function both physically and mentally. Several key personnel worked well into the night 10 - 11 October and 12 - 13 October as well as full time days. However D Company at least showed a definite drop in efficiency for a couple of days after, almost as though they were suffering a gigantic hangover.

v. Despite the inexperience on the part of D Company and the Battalion as units with night operations of this order, the limitation of equipment, vehicles, terrain, weather and the hedge podge of units involved, the ultimate requirement of accomplishing the mission was achieved and should not be overlooked in any post analysis. Although perhaps not an artistic success, most important the job was completed 5 hours prior to the Battalion deadline and well before that estimated by all others. In addition a great deal was learned that can be used in future operations.

B. K. WIEBERHOLD

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