

HEADQUARTERS  
9th Marines  
3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

6/DAQ/jmh  
5750  
18 Jul 1975

[REDACTED] (Unclassified Upon Removal of Appendixes From Part IV to Enclosure (1))

From: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)  
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (-)(Rein),  
FMF  
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force  
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 17 April to 31 May 1975

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.1D  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8B

Encl: (1) Amphibious Evacuation Security Force Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

2. Given the successful execution of Operation FREQUENT WIND, all classified information in this command chronology is considered to be perishable with the exception of Appendix 4, Tab B, Part IV.

D. A. QUINLAN

*Amphibious Evacuation Security Force*

*(Retrieved 17 May 75 -  
Declassified 31 May 75)  
17 Apr - 31 May 75*

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Unclassified upon the removal of the Appendixes from Part IV

HEADQUARTERS  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
3rd Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

17 April 1975 to 31 May 1975

INDEX

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UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)  
██████████

Unclassified upon the removal of the Appendixes from Part IV

## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

Amphibious Evacuation Security Forces (AESF) Maj D. A. QUINLAN

SUBORDINATE UNITS (18 APR 75)

Echo Detachment (12thMar)	Capt R. L. REUTER
Foxtrot Detachment (12thMar)	Capt J. R. PAGE
Hotel Detachment (3d Engr)	Capt W. H. HACKBET
India Detachment (7th Comm)	Capt C. V. NOYHER
November Detachment (3d Serv)	Capt M. T. MALLICK
Papa Detachment (4thMar)	Capt R. M. JESSIE
Sierra Detachment (HgBn)	Capt E. R. PALMQUIST
Tango Detachment (HgBn)	Capt R. D. AMOS
Uniform Detachment (3d Tk)	Capt S. A. SHEPHERD
Victor Detachment (9thMar)	Capt D. A. GARCIA

SUBORDINATE UNITS (units formed through reorganization 22 APR 75)

Kilo Detachment	1stLt J. J. STREITZ
Mike Detachment	1stLt C. W. FREDRICKSON
Romeo Detachment	1stLt J. JOHNSON
Quebec Detachment	1stLt R. C. KOSCHESKI
USS BARBOUR COUNTY Detachment	1stLt D. A. KRATOCHVIL

ATTACHED UNITS

Detachment MP Company, 36MarDiv	1stLt J. J. STREITZ
Detachment 17th ITT	CWO-2 A. F. KENT
Detachment 3d CIT	Capt C. J. BUSHEY

2. LOCATION

18 APR 75	Subic Bay, Philippines
19 - 20 APR 75	Enroute South Vietnam Coast
20 APR - 2 MAY 75	South Vietnam Coastal Waters
2 - 4 MAY 75	Enroute Subic
4 - 14 MAY 75	Detachments to Guam
4 - 27 MAY 75	Naval Base, Subic Bay
19 APR. - 13 MAY 75	Echo Detachment - USNS Sgt TRUMAN KIMBRO
19 APR - 23 MAY 75	Foxtrot Detachment - USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY
24 APR - 7 MAY 75	India Detachment - SS PIONEER COMMANDER
6 - 12 MAY 75	Kilo Detachment - SS GREEN PORT
25 APR - 7 MAY 75	November Detachment - SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER
22 APR - 6 MAY 75	Papa Detachment - SS GREEN PORT

22 APR - 13 MAY 75

24 APR - 12 MAY 75

22 APR - 7 MAY 75

27 APR - 14 MAY 75

5 - 9 MAY 75

Sierra Detachment - USNS SGT  
ANDREW MILLER

Tango Detachment - SS GREEN FOREST

Victor Detachment - SS PIONEER

CONTENDER

BARBOUR COUNTY Detachment - USS

BARBOUR COUNTY

Mike Detachment - SS AMERICAN

RACER

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Force Exec/Ops - Capt C. J. BUSHEY  
Control Group Exec - 1stLt T. W. KINSELL  
Logistics Off - 1stLt J. JOHNSON  
Personnel Off - 1stLt J. J. STREITZ

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>OTHER</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
28	715	2	30	NONE	

## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 17 April 1975, III MAF activated the previously formed Special Marine Ships Guard for MSC shipping. This force, subsequently renamed the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force (AESF) was constituted by 3rd Marine Division units and originally organized into a Control Group and ten 72-man security detachments. Each detachment was comprised of a 12-man detachment headquarters and three 20-man sections (two squads of 9 men each plus a two man section headquarters).

Elements of the AESF deployed to Subic Bay, R.P., during the period 17 to 18 April for further transfer to MSC shipping. Detachments Echo and Foxtrot deployed from Okinawa on 17 April and were subsequently flown on 18 April from NAS, Cubi Point, R.P., via COD aircraft to the USS CORAL SEA for further transfer by USS GRIDLEY to the USNS SGT KIMBRO and USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY. The Control Group also deployed to Subic Bay on 17 April.

On 18 April, the AESF Commander reported to Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (CTG 79.1) for operations. During a briefing for the AESF Commander, the following key points were made regarding instructions to members of the AESF: to be forceful, but not aggressive; to remain isolated from evacuees when not on duty; to have a clear understanding of the Rules of Engagement. Throughout the day of 18 April, a total of eight 72-man Amphibious Evacuation Security Force (AESF) detachments departed MCAS, Futenma, Okinawa, Japan by C-130 aircraft. Destination: Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines. By 2200, all eight detachments were embarked aboard the USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8). While embarking the last detachment, the USS DUBUQUE departed her anchorage at Subic Bay and got underway for the contiguous waters of the Republic of South Vietnam. Attached to the AESF Headquarters were two medical officers, the 17th ITT (1 officer/11 enlisted), 3rd CIT (3/4), and a detachment of one officer and twenty-five military policemen from the MP Company, 3d Marine Division. On 20 April the AESF was assigned task designator 79.1.7.

In view of the imminent commitment of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force and the likewise anticipated execution order for Operation FREQUENT WIND a fragmentary order, 1-75, was promulgated on 20 April 1975, by the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force Headquarters.

The period from 19 thru 22 April was devoted to training and reorganizing the original ten 72-man detachments into fourteen 54-man detachments. Training was conducted for embarked detachments in key Vietnamese language phrases, conduct of evacuation operations, rules of engagement, security of vital shipboard spaces, and riot and crowd control to

include use of 150 psi fire hoses. Additionally, it was learned that among the deployment options being considered by higher headquarters, one would require that as many as four detachments would be flown to Saigon to the vicinity of the Newport pier to board four MSC ships berthed at that location and provide security for the ships during the transit down the Saigon River. In view of this possible deployment option, training in the employment and operation of the M-60 machine-gun, the M-79 grenade launcher, and the M-72 LAAW was accomplished. The Weapons Department of USS DUBUQUE was most cooperative in providing these weapons for training. Since AEFB was not equipped with these weapons, a request was forwarded to 9th MAB to provide a minimum of two M-60's and two M-79's per detachment. Concurrently, authority to use I-FORM stocks of M-60 and M-79 ammunition and M-72's aboard DUBUQUE was requested. Detachment commanders and Staff NCO's were given detailed briefings concerning lessons learned by 1st Battalion, 4th Marines during the evacuations of Cam Ranh Bay and other areas. Interviews and debriefings compiled earlier by CIT and IFT personnel were the primary source documents used in that effort.

During the early evening hours of 22 April, Detachments Sierra, Victor and Papa were deployed aboard ships designated to receive refugees; Sierra Detachment aboard the USNS SGT ANDREW MILLER; Victor aboard the SS PIONEER COMMANDER, and Papa aboard the SS GREEN PORT. New detachments Kilo, Mike, Romeo, and Quebec, comprised of sections reassigned from the original 72-man detachments, were formed on 23 April. On 24 April, India Detachment was embarked aboard the SS PIONEER COMMANDER and Detachment Tango was placed on the SS GREEN FOREST. Information was relayed to Amphibious Evacuation Security Force by CTG 76.5 that "Friendlies" (ARVN) should not be assumed to be friends. The 9th MAB continued to maintain radio silence, however information relating to the operation and particularly regarding deployed Amphibious Evacuation Security Force detachments was being passed in the clear via the MSC command net.

During the transfer of detachments from the USS DUBUQUE to the various MSC ships, all vessels were located in a holding area approximately 15 miles off the coast of South Vietnam, Southeast of the Vung Tau Peninsula.

On 25 April, November Detachment was assigned to the USS AMERICAN CHALLENGER. The following morning, the AMERICAN CHALLENGER moved to a position three miles off the coast at Long Hai and began taking on refugees shuttled from the beach by VIN landing craft. An escort vessel was requested for the AMERICAN CHALLENGER. CTG 76.5 responded immediately by directing that JOHN PAUL JONES proceed to the vicinity of CHALLENGER. This was only one of many instances where CTG 76.5 was immediately and completely responsive to AEFB requirements. By night fall, the tides had changed and the landing

craft could no longer get close enough to the beach to load refugees. Coincidentally, Long Hai came under enemy artillery fire and, on the advice of the Detachment Commander, the AMERICAN CHALLENGER was moved out to sea to await daylight and the incoming tide. During the early morning of 27 April, the CHALLENGER moved back to her original position off Long Hai and resumed loading refugees. By 2130, a total of 8,000 Vietnamese were aboard and the ship got underway for Phu Quoc Island. During the afternoon of 27 April in response to an Amphibious Evacuation Security Force request, CTF 76.5 assigned USS BARBOUR COUNTY as escort vessel for CHALLENGER during the trip to Phu Quoc. The 3d Section of Detachment November was transferred from DUBUQUE to BARBOUR COUNTY as a relief/support force for Detachment November.

When detachments deployed to MSC ships, a member of the AESF staff and a member of CTF 76.5 staff would go aboard the MSC ship with the detachment to ensure that the Ship's Master understood the relationship between himself and the Detachment Commander and the Rules of Engagement which applied to the Marines. During the period 22 - 27 April, while the majority of the MSC ships remained in the MSC holding area, daily administrative/logistical runs were made from the DUBUQUE to the various ships. Detachments Kilo, Romeo, and Quebec were tasked to provide working parties and security for the various Mikeboats running between DUBUQUE and the various MSC ships. Throughout this period and for the entire deployment period, members of most detachments were sleeping on the decks of the MSC ships and subsisting on "C" rations.

On 28 April, all ships in TF 76 assumed a one hour response time to evacuation stations. Also on 28 April, while the AMERICAN CHALLENGER was debarking its entire load of refugees at Phu Quoc Island, Detachment Victor on the PIONEER CONTENDER embarked sixty-eight Vietnamese refugees and one American Embassy official off the coast, east of Can Tho. The refugees had been evacuated by Air America helicopters which had landed on the USS VANCOUVER and then shuttled to the CONTENDER by landing craft. (VANCOUVER had been assigned by CTF 76.5 as escort for CONTENDER). Echo and Foxrot Detachments, aboard the USNS SGT KIMBERO and USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY also embarked refugees. The KIMBERO took on approximately 150 Vietnamese while the GREENVILLE VICTORY embarked one hundred and eight from a flotilla of small fishing boats. Starting in the early afternoon of the 28th, the MSC ships in the holding area were resupplied from ships of the Service Force. A continuous chain of working parties for this 12 hour evolution was provided by the detachments aboard DUBUQUE.

By 29 April, the evacuation of refugees from Saigon and surrounding areas began to take on momentum. Shortly after

the execution of Operation Frequent Wind, scores of Vietnamese and Air America helicopters (some of the Air America helicopters having been pirated) began flying out to the ships, which were as of 0630, lying just a few miles off the Vung Tau Peninsula. Five of these helicopters landed on DUBUQUE. The crews were disarmed on the flight deck. Passengers and crew were moved to the well deck where processing and searching was completed. Detachments Hotel, Romeo, and Quebec provided processing parties and security for DUBUQUE. The danger of overanxious and inexperienced pilots crashing onto the amphibious ships was very real. As a result, at the request of the Ship's Commanding Officer, fire fighting parties on DUBUQUE were augmented and manned by Detachments Romeo, Quebec, and Uniform. Shortly after noon, CTF 76 ordered the USS DUBUQUE to sail to the vicinity of Phu Quoc Island to conduct special mission operations. On DUBUQUE at this time were Detachments Hotel, Kilo, Mike, Quebec, Romeo, and Uniform. During the early evening hours of the 29th, the PIONEER CONTENDER loaded 256 Americans and Vietnamese, previously assigned to the U. S. Consulate at Can Tho. The Consul General was among those taken aboard. India Detachment meanwhile, embarked nearly 4,000 on the PIONEER COMMANDER from a large sandbag revetted barge near Vung Tau. In the same area, the USNS SGT MILLER began loading evacuees from a similar type barge and also took refugees from the USS DENVER and USS MOBILE. Detachment Tango began loading panic stricken refugees aboard the GREEN FOREST from numerous small fishing boats, but was ordered to Con Son Island by Military Sealift Command before all the evacuees had been loaded. Foxtrot Detachment on GREENVILLE VICTORY, while taking aboard approximately 6,500 evacuees, took some small arms fire from several small fishing boats, but when overhead fire was returned, all firing ceased and no further incidents ensued. No injuries to either Vietnamese or Marines were incurred. Also on 29 April, an injured Marine was MEDEVACED by an Air Force helo, from AMERICAN CHALLENGER, off Phu Quoc Island, to Utapao, Thailand. The particularly unique aspect of this operation involved a communication link from CHALLENGER to DUBUQUE to BLUE RIDGE to 7th AF Headquarters to the SAR helo.

On 30 April, following the successful execution of Operation Frequent Wind, the evacuation operation reached it's apex with the nine deployed detachments loading approximately 40,000 evacuees by the end of the day. Loading operations were accomplished from hundreds of small fishing boats, revetted barges, U. S. Navy Landing Craft, and South Vietnamese helicopters. One such helicopter, despite warnings not to attempt a landing, crashed on a barge which was off-loading refugees onto the USNS SGT MILLER. Fortunately, only minor injuries were sustained by a few refugees as a result of the crash. Earlier in the day, Marines on the SGT MILLER received small arms fire from a small coastal freighter loaded with South Vietnamese soldiers. Sierra Detachment responded

by delivering overhead fire. The small arms fire ceased when a destroyer, the USS WILSON, came on the scene. The fleeing Vietnamese soldiers were ordered to throw their weapons overboard. Loading operations continued without delay until artillery fire from ashore began to impact in the vicinity of where the SGT MILLER and the PIONEER CONTENDER were anchored. The artillery fire, thought to be either 105 or 155mm, appeared to be directed at the numerous small boats leaving Vung Tau. Fifteen to twenty rounds were observed. Because of the artillery fire, all loading operations ceased and were not resumed until the four ships in the area had moved to a new location, 8 to 10 miles farther out to sea. At 2345, SS GREEN PORT commenced loading refugees in the MSC holding area.

Throughout the daylight hours of 1 May, the loading of refugees continued on board SGT KIMBRO, PIONEER CONTENDER, PIONEER COMMANDER, GREEN PORT AND GREEN FOREST. The SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER received approximately 3000 Vietnamese from the overcrowded USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY while anchored in a holding area off the coast of Vung Tau. The control, loading and processing of refugees became increasingly difficult during the late afternoon and evening hours due to the large number of people aboard the various ships, fatigued Marines, and an almost intuitive sense of the "eleventh hour" by the refugees who were still waiting to be picked up by the evacuation force. In one instance, panic aboard a large barge was narrowly averted by the detachment commander on the USNS SGT KIMBRO, who called in a reaction force from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Difficulty controlling the refugees was exacerbated by the fact that, by this time, many of them had been without food or water for several days. Many women and children were suffering from dehydration.

Before midnight, loading had been completed on all ships with the exception of the USNS SGT KIMBRO which continued to take on refugees until midafternoon on the following day. During this period, the BARBOUR COUNTY Detachment processed 958 refugees aboard that ship.

As soon as the evacuation ships were filled to capacity, they got underway for Subic Bay, R.P.

On 2 May, AESF was chopped to CTF 76. The fastest ships in the evacuation fleet, the PIONEER CONTENDER, the PIONEER COMMANDER, and the AMERICAN CHALLENGER were the first to arrive at Subic Bay late on the afternoon of 3 May. While the PIONEER CONTENDER was ordered pier-side at Grande Island to off-load one-third of the six thousand refugees packed on the main deck and in upper level of her 6 cargo holds, the other two ships were resupplied with medicine and food in the outer harbor. Once the much needed supplies were on board, the two ships departed for Apra Harbor, Guam, without

further delay.

After debarking over two thousand people and taking on fresh stores for the remaining four thousand, the PIONEER CONTENDER departed for Guam at 0200, on 4 May in trace of the PIONEER COMMANDER and the AMERICAN CHALLENGER.

Ships arrived throughout the day of 4 May at Grande Island. They included the SGT MILLER, GREEN FOREST, and GREEN PORT. During the early afternoon, the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force Control Group and Detachments Hotel, Kilo, Mike, Quebec, Romeo, and Uniform moved ashore to the lower MAU Camp from USS DUBUQUE. Late in the afternoon, Detachments Hotel and Mike were embarked aboard SS TRANSCOLORADO and SS AMERICAN RACER, respectively. During early evening, the USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY unloaded all 3,025 of her refugees on to the SS TRANSCOLORADO which immediately departed for Guam with Hotel Detachment on board. After unloading the GREENVILLE VICTORY, Foxtrot Detachment remained in reserve at Subic Bay to escort the many refugees who continued to arrive on Vietnamese Navy ships and third country vessels for days after the vanguard of refugees had departed for Guam.

Because of the crowded conditions, lack of proper sanitation facilities, and the concomitant threat of an epidemic, the USNS SGT MILLER and the GREEN FOREST were also off-loaded on the fourth and were cleaned, reequipped and resupplied for later use.

During the early morning hours of 5 May, Detachment Uniform was embarked in the SS GREENWAVE. The SS GREEN PORT debarked her entire load of refugees, also on 5 May. They were placed on the SS AMERICAN RACER and, accompanied by Mike Detachment, departed Subic Bay for Guam on 6 May. The day of 6 May was marked by the relief of Papa Detachment by Kilo on the SS GREENPORT.

On Wednesday, 7 May, the first three evacuation ships arrived on U. S. soil. Arriving at Apra Harbor that morning were the AMERICAN CHALLENGER, the PIONEER COMMANDER and the PIONEER CONTENDER. The incoming ships were taken pier-side, one every six hours, so that by 1800 that evening, all three ships were emptied. The AMERICAN CHALLENGER was ordered to return to Subic Bay to pick up more refugees. Detachment November remained on board. Detachments India and Victor were disembarked from the PIONEER COMMANDER and the PIONEER CONTENDER. Subsequently, all detachments arriving in Guam were disembarked.

Commencing on the afternoon of the 7th, the task of unloading, searching, and processing refugees on board twenty-nine Vietnamese Navy ships was undertaken by the ARSF Control Group, Detachments Papa, Quebec and Romeo, and personnel from 17th ITT and MPs. This pier-side operation involved processing

the refugees, many of whom were armed, from ships ranging in size from gunboat to destroyer escort, and immediately embarking them aboard waiting evacuation ships. The processing and loading continued through the night of the 7th and was completed by midafternoon on the 8th. In less than twenty-four hours, over 19,000 people had been unloaded, processed and reembarked without incident. In several cases, AESF personnel were instrumental in reuniting families on the NSD pier who arrived on different ships.

On 8 May, the SS GREENPORT and the SS GREENWAVE having reembarked refugees got underway for Guam. The GREENPORT, accompanied by Kilo Detachment carried some four thousand people, while the GREENWAVE, with Uniform Detachment aboard, carried over 4,400. The USNS SGT KIMBRO also departed on that day with Echo Detachment and 3,552 refugees.

On 9 May, the SGT MILLER departed Grande Island with 3,200 Vietnamese. The same day, the AMERICAN RACER and the TRANSCOLORADO arrived in Guam with a total of 7,000 people.

On 10 May, the AMERICAN CHALLENGER (Det November) arrived back in Subic. Between the time that she had left Guam (7 May) and arrived in Subic, the refugee situation on Guam had become so overcrowded that Guam could not absorb large groups of refugees for some time. Consequently, on 11 May, CHALLENGER was released from refugee operations by MSC Philippines and Detachment November was disembarked.

On 12 May, the SGT KIMBRO, the GREENPORT, GREEN FOREST and the GREENWAVE, all arrived in Guam to off-load some 16,100 refugees. The following day, the SGT MILLER arrived with an additional 3,199. Meanwhile at Subic Bay, Detachments Papa, Quebec, and Romeo were embarked aboard the USS BARBOUR COUNTY for the return trip to Okinawa. Detachments Foxtrot and November were to remain in Subic to guard Vietnamese Navy vessels until a special guard force from 3d Marine Division could be flown down from Okinawa.

On 13 May, all amphibious ships which had sailed out of Subic on 11 and 12 May were ordered to return to Subic in anticipation of future operations in connection with the Mayaguez incident. During the evening hours of 12 May, the Commander of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force, with Detachments Foxtrot and November, reported to CG, 9th MAB, for possible employment in Mayaguez rescue operations. Commanding General, 9th MAB requested interpreter and engineer support for Mayaguez recovery operations. Four interpreters from the 17th ITT and four engineers from Detachments Foxtrot and November were assigned to Headquarters, 9th MAB, aboard USS HANCOCK.

On 14 May, Detachments Papa, Quebec, and Romeo arrived back in Subic aboard BARBOUR COUNTY. There being no requirement for additional Amphibious Evacuation Security Force elements in support of the ongoing contingency operation, these detachments were transported to NAS, Cubi Point and flown back to Okinawa.

On 16 May, Detachment November was returned to Okinawa by C-130, from Cubi Point.

On 21 May, the Commander, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force, returned to Okinawa, leaving Detachment Foxtrot at Subic aboard GREENVILLE VICTORY for possible employment in refugee operations.

On 23 May, the GREENVILLE VICTORY was relieved of its evacuation mission, Detachment Foxtrot was disembarked and returned to Okinawa on 27 May 1975.

On 25 May, the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force was chopped back to CTF 79 by CTF 76.

On 31 May, the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force was deactivated.

Tab A and B are testimony to the manner in which the AESF accomplished its mission. During the period 26 April to 13 May, the AESF searched, processed, provided for and accompanied 67,437 evacuees under the most difficult of circumstances. Considering the daily total of evacuees aboard ship, there were 327,203 refugee-days. The average daily strength of AESF was approximately 775 Marines and Corpsmen. Comparing these two statistics reveals that on average, each was responsible for 87 refugees for an average of 8 days. Considering that the Marines of the AESF were performing tasks for which they had not been previously trained and that they were placed in situations where one mistake in judgement could have cost many lives, they accomplished their mission in a highly professional manner.

Tab C displays the daily refugee totals aboard ship.

Tab D shows Table of Organization for 72-man Detachment.

Tab E shows Table of Organization for 54-man Detachment.

RTTEZYUR RUMRABA2063 1300130-EEEE--RHHOGOA

ZNY EEEEE

R 1300130Z MAY 75

FM CTF SEVEN NINE

INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

PUNGWLD/CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

RHHOGOA/CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PI SEVEN

R 140730Z MAY 75

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CTF SEVEN NINE

INFO CG FMFPAQ CAMP H M SMITH HA

CTF SEVEN SIX

BT

UNCLAS E F T O //NO1650//

SMC SECURITY DETACHMENT

1. THE RECENT EVACUATION EFFORTS IN VIETNAM OFFERED A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR MARINES TO BE UTILIZED AS SECURITY DETACHMENTS ABOARD AMERICAN SHIPS. THE USE OF MARINES IN THE ROLE, WHILE NOT NEW IN OUR NATIONS HISTORY, IS ONE THAT WE SELDOM ASSOCIATE WITH THE NORMAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS.

2. THE PRESENCE OF A DETACHMENT OF WELL DISCIPLINED, WELL ORGANIZED MARINES ASSURED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RIOTS OR MUTINIES ON THE SHIPS THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNED. BESIDES OFFERING A STABILIZING INFLUENCE, THE MARINES PERFORMED HUMANITARIAN ACTS TOO NUMEROUS TO COUNT. THESE BOLD MEN SET THE FINEST KIND OF EXAMPLE FOR THE REFUGEES.

3. PLEASE EXTEND TO ALL CONCERNED MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE TRULY OUTSTANDING JOB THEY PERFORMED. WELL DONE!  
VICE ADMIRAL GEORGE P. STEELE, USN

BT

#2063

*Handwritten signature*

*III MAF  
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~~1300130Z~~

NRNS

9TH

ENCLOSURE (1)

BT02YUN RULSSA0964 124007-0000--RHH0608;  
RR 00000

040000Z MAY 72  
FM COMUSC WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC  
RUMNAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUMNAAA/CHINFO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/ASD (PA) WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/ASD (IAL) WASHINGTON DC  
ZEN/ASD (IAL) WASHINGTON DC  
RUMNAAA/COMSOPAC OAKLAND CA  
RUMNAAA/COMSCLANT BROOKLYN NY  
RUMNAAA/MSO PHIL SUBIC BAY RP  
RUMNAAA/MSO HONOLULU HI  
R 030000Z MAY 72  
FM NSCO VIETNAM SAIGON VS  
TO CTF SEVEN NINE  
ZEN/CTF SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
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COM USNORTHFLT  
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OO PAC CAMP H M SMITH HI

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ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX  
COMSOFF YOKOHAMA JA  
BT

UNCLAS //NOFORN//  
III MAF AMPHIBIOUS EVAC SECURITY FORCE  
1. ORIG EXTENDS HEAVY WELL DONE TO MARINE SECURITY DETACHMENTS  
EMBARKED IN MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND SHIPS ENGAGED IN OPERATION  
NEW LIFE; WITHOUT THEIR DEDICATED AND UNTIRING EFFORTS THE SUCCESS  
OF THE OPERATION WOULD HAVE BEEN QUESTIONABLE; SHIP MASTERS  
HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE,  
BT  
43964

070000

SEEP Daily Refugee Totals

Ship	April						May								
	27	28	29	30	1	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Challenger	8600	0	2500	2500	5029	5029	5029	5029							
Contender		69	345	345	5795	3770	3770	3770							
Commander			4000	4000	4678	4678	4678	4678							
Almbro		150	150	2650	4950	4950				3552	3552	3552	3552	3552	
Miller			1553	3853	6166	6166				3199	3199	3199	3199	3199	
Greenville Vict		108	6029	6029	3500										
Green Port					4286	4058			3966	3966	3966	3966	3966	3966	
Green Forest			492	1373	3958					4301	4301	4301	4301	4301	
Transcolorado						3500	3500	3500	3500	3500					
Barbour City					958	958									
Racer							4058	4058	4058	4058					
Green Wave									4499	4499	4499	4499	4499	4499	
Daily Total	8600	327	15069	20750	39320	35362	21035	21035	15723	27075	19517	19517	19517	19517	6751
Refugees Embarked (Cumulative)	8600	8927	23669	29350	47920				56385	67437					

AESF Daily Refugee Totals

Ship	<u>April</u>					<u>May</u>									
	27	28	29	30	1	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Challenger	8600	0	2500	2500	5029	5029	5029	5029							
Contender		69	345	345	5795	3770	3770	3770							
Commander			4000	4000	4678	4678	4678	4678							
Kimbro		150	150	2650	4950	4950				3552	3552	3552	3552	3552	
Miller			1553	3053	6166	6166				3199	3199	3199	3199	3199	
Greenville Vict		108	6029	6029	3500										
Green Port					4286	4058			3966	3966	3966	3966	3966		
Green Forest			492	1373	3958					4301	4301	4301	4301		
Transcolorado						3500	3500	3500	3500	3500					
Barbour Cty					958	958									
Racer							4058	4058	4058	4058					
Green Wave									4499	4499	4499	4499	4499		
Daily Total	8600	327	15069	20750	39320	35362	21035	21035	15723	27075	19517	19517	19517	6751	
Refugees Embarked (Cumulative)	8600	8927	23669	29350	47920				56385	67437					


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DECLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATION

OF

72-MAN DETACHMENT



<u>BILLET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>WPN</u>
<u>Headquarters Section</u>				
Detachment Commander	Captain	1		P
Executive Officer	Lt	1		P
Gunnery Sergeant	GySgt		1	P
Hq Section Leader	SSgt		1	P
Radio Operator	Sgt		1	P
Admin Man	Cpl		1	R
Military Policeman	Cpl-SSgt		1	P
Interrogator Translator	GySgt		1	P
Engineer	PFC-Sgt		1	R
Detachment Corpsman	HM-HM1		3	P
		2	10	
<u>3-Security Sections/Each/</u>				
Section Leader	SSgt		1	P
Radio Operator	LCpl		1	R
<u>2-Security Squads/Each/</u>				
Squad Leader	Sgt		1	R
<u>2-Security Teams/Each/</u>				
Team Leader	Cpl		1	S
Security Man	Pvt-LCpl		3	R
			20	
<u>Organizational Total</u>		<u>2</u>	<u>70</u>	

ORGANIZATION  
OF  
54-MAN DETACHMENT

2/12

HQ  
SECTION

0/20

SECURITY  
SECTION

0/20

SECURITY  
SECTION

<u>BILLET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>WPN</u>
<u>Headquarters Section</u>				
Detachment Commander	Capt/Lt	1		P
Executive Officer	Lt/SNCO	1		P
Gunnery Sergeant	GySgt		1	P
Hq Section Leader	SSgt		1	P
Radio Operator	Sgt		1	P
Admin Man	Cpl		1	R
Military Policeman	Cpl-SSgt		3	P
Interrogator-Translator	SSgt-GySgt		2	P
Engineer	PFC-Sgt		1	R
Detachment Corpsman	HM-HML		2	P
			12	
<u>2-Security Sections/Each/</u>				
Section Leader	SSgt		1	P
Radio Operator	LCpl		1	R
<u>2-Security Squads/Each/</u>				
Squad Leader	Sgt		1	R
<u>2-Security Teams/Each/</u>				
Team Leader	Cpl		1	S
Security-Man	Pvt-LCpl		3	R
			20	
<u>Organizational Total</u>		<u>2</u>	<u>52</u>	

## PART III

## SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 17 Apr 75 - LOI 5-75, Special Marine Security Guard (SMSG) published. (Appendix 1 to Tab E).
- Detachments Echo and Foxtrot departed Okinawa at 1400 enroute via NAS Cubi Point to USS CORAL SEA. The Control Group departed Okinawa at 2000.
- 18 Apr 75 - Detachment Echo embarked on USNS SGT TRUMAN KIMBRO and Foxtrot on USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY.
- All other detachments departed Okinawa by air for Cubi Point where they were immediately embarked on the USS DUBUQUE.
- USS DUBUQUE departed Subic at 2200 for South Vietnam. Status Report published. (Appendix 1 to Tab C).
- 19 Apr 75 - Training program for all detachments commenced. Classes on Vietnamese language, refugee problems, processing procedures, rules of engagement, and search methods were included. (Tab H).
- USS DUBUQUE enroute South Vietnam.
- Prepared Detachments India, Papa, Sierra and Victor for possible deployment to Newport Pier, Saigon. (Appendix 1 to Tab E).
- USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY and SGT TRUMAN KIMBRO stationed off coast of Vietnam near Vung Tau.
- Status Report published. (Appendix 2 to Tab C).
- 20 Apr 75 - Training program continued with rehearsals and practical application of search and refugee processing procedures.
- Special Marine Ships Guard published Frag Order 1-75. (Appendix 2 to Tab B).
- Status Report published. (Appendix 3 to Tab C).
- 21 Apr 75 - SMSG renamed Amphibious Evacuation Security Force (AESF) and designated TU 79.1.7.
- Recommended Pierside Evacuation Processing Procedures published (Appendix 3 to Tab E).

Training on crowd control and ship security conducted.

Initial Personnel Status Report published (Appendix 4 to Tab C).

Status Report published (Appendix 4 to Tab C).

- 22 Apr 75 - Detachments reorganized into approximately 54-man units as directed by CTG 79.1 (Appendix 4 to Tab B).

New detachments designated Kilo, Mike, Romeo, and Quebec.

Detachment Sierra embarked on USNS SGT ANDREW MILLER.

Detachment Victor embarked on SS PIONEER CONTENDER.

Detachment Papa embarked on SS GREEN PORT.

Personnel Status Report published (Appendix 6 to Tab C).

Status Report published. (Appendix 7 to Tab C).

- 23 Apr 75 - Personnel Status Report for AESF published. (Appendix 8 to Tab C).

An additional 33 Marines of Detachment Foxtrot boarded the USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY. (Appendix 9 to Tab C).

- 24 Apr 75 - Rules of Engagement published. (Appendix 4 to Tab B).

India Detachment embarked on SS PIONEER COMMANDER.

Detachment Tango embarked on SS GREEN FOREST.

Status Report published. (Appendix 11 to Tab C).

- 25 Apr 75 - Personnel Status Report published. (Appendix 3 to Tab B).

AESF OPLAN 1-75 published. (Appendix 3 to Tab C).

Detachment November embarked on SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER.

MSC chartered ships located in holding area about 15 miles off South Vietnamese coast.

- 26 Apr 75 - SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER embarking refugees off Long Hai, RVN.
- RVN Refugees Evacuation - Lessons learned published. (Appendix 4 to Tab H).
- MSC Vessel Security guidance published. (Appendix 5 to Tab H).
- SITREP ONE AESF published. (Appendix 1 to Tab D).
- 27 Apr 75 - SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER completed evacuation of Long Hai.
- AESF SITREP TWO published. (Appendix 2 to Tab D).
- Total of 8,600 refugees embarked.
- 28 Apr 75 - Detachments Victor, Foxtrot and Echo reported taking on refugees.
- Detachment November debarking refugees at Phu Quoc Island.
- AESF SITREP THREE published. (Appendix 3 to Tab D).
- Total of 8,927 refugees embarked.
- 29 Apr 75 - Operation Frequent Wind commenced. All deployed detachments embarking refugees.
- Detachment Foxtrot received small arms fire from small fishing boat. On return of overhead fire, firing ceased and no casualties were incurred.
- AESF SITREP FOUR published. (Appendix 4 to Tab D).
- Proposed future ops/reconstitution of AESF Dets transmitted to CG, 9th MAB. (Appendix 6 to Tab E).
- Total of 23,669 refugees embarked.
- 30 Apr 75 - All deployed detachments embarking refugees.
- Detachments Victor and Sierra observed artillery rounds impacting approximately vicinity of them, from their position at Vung Tau.

AESF SITREP FIVE published. (Appendix 5 to Tab D).

Total of 29,350 refugees embarked.

1 May 75 - All deployed detachments embarking refugees

AESF SITREP SIX published. (Appendix 6 to Tab D).

Total of 47,920 refugees embarked (cumulative).

2 May 75 - AESF SITREP SEVEN published. (Appendix 7 to Tab D).

AESF chopped to CTF 76 effective 021400H May 75.

3 May 75 - Proposed future ops of AESF Dets transmitted to CTF 76. (Appendix 7 to Tab E).

COMSEVENTHFLT directed CTF 79 to organize additional security dets for use aboard additional MSC and USN shipping pressed into service to transfer evacuees from Subic to Guam and to chop dets to CTU 79.1.7.

AMERICAN CHALLENGER, PIONEER CONTENDER, PIONEER COMMANDER arrived Subic Bay, reprovisioned and departed for Guam.

4 May 75 - USS DUBUQUE arrived Subic Bay. AESF off-loaded.

CTU 79.1.7 updated CTF 79 on AESF status. Requirement for additional security dets rescinded.

Detachment Hotel deployed to SS TRANSCOLORADO. Embarked refugees from USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY (Detachment Foxtrot) and departed for Guam.

Detachment Mike deployed to SS AMERICAN RACER.

SS GREEN FOREST (Detachment Tango) arrived Subic Bay and debarked refugees at Grande Island.

5 May 75 - Detachment Uniform deployed to SS GREEN WAVE.

SS GREEN PORT (Detachment Papa) arrived Subic Bay and transferred refugees to AMERICAN RACER.

USNS SGT MILLER (Detachment Sierra) and USNS SGT KIMBRO (Detachment Echo) arrived Subic Bay and debarked refugees at Grande Island.

USS BARBOUR COUNTY arrived Subic Bay and debarked refugees at Grande Island.

- 6 May 75 - Detachment Papa rotated off GREEN PORT at Subic Bay to be replaced by Detachment Kilo.
- 7 May 75 - AMERICAN CHALLENGER arrived Guam, off-loaded refugees and departed for Subic Bay with Detachment November on board.

PIONEER COMMANDER and PIONEER CONTENDER arrived Guam and off-loaded refugees. Detachments India and Victor debarked.

At approximately 1600 the processing of 19,000 refugees arriving on VNN ships commenced on the NSD Subic Bay Pier.

SS GREEN PORT and SS GREEN WAVE loaded 3,966 and 4,499 refugees respectively and set sail for Guam.

Total of 56,385 refugees embarked (cumulative).

- 8 May 75 - Processing of VNN refugees continued through the night and was secured at approximately 1400. A total of 19,517 refugees had been processed in 22 hours.

SS GREEN FOREST embarked 4,301 refugees, USNS KIMBRO embarked 3,552, and USNS MILLER embarked 3,199. All three vessels got underway for Guam.

Total of 67,437 refugees embarked (cumulative).

- 9 May 75 - AMERICAN RACER and TRANSCOLORADO arrived Guam, discharged refugees and off-loaded Detachments Mike and Hotel.
- 10 May 75 - AMERICAN CHALLENGER with Detachment November aboard, arrived back in Subic Bay.
- 11 May 75 - Detachment November off-loaded from AMERICAN CHALLENGER.
- 12 May 75 - Detachments Papa, Quebec and Romeo, plus MPs, embarked on USS BARBOUR COUNTY for return to Okinawa.

Detachments Foxrot and November relieved BLT 2/4 of guard responsibilities for VNN ships nested in Subic Bay.

GREEN PORT, GREEN WAVE, GREEN FOREST and SGT KIMBRO arrived at Guam, disembarked refugees and off-loaded Detachments Kilo, Uniform, Tango and Echo, respectively.

13 May 75 - Four interrogators from 17th ITT and four engineers, two each from Detachments Foxtrot and November, were assigned to 9th MAB aboard USS HANCOCK to participate in Mayaguez rescue operations.

SGT MILLER arrived Guam, discharged refugees and off-loaded Detachment Sierra.

SITREP published. (Appendix 8 to Tab D)

14 May 75 - BARBOUR COUNTY arrived back in Subic, off-loaded Detachments Papa, Quebec, Romeo and MPs, who were flown back to Okinawa from Cubi Point.

Detachments Foxtrot and November relieved of VNN ship guard responsibilities by Guard Force sent to Subic by 3dMarDiv.

16 May 75 - Detachment November returned to Okinawa by C-130 from Cubi Point.

21 May 75 - AESF Headquarters returned to Okinawa.

23 May 75 - Detachment Foxtrot off-loaded from GREENVILLE VICTORY.

25 May 75 - AESF "chopped" back to CTF 79 by CTF 76 (Appendix 5 to Tab B).

27 May 75 - Detachment Foxtrot returned to Okinawa.

31 May 75 - AESF deactivated.

ORGANIZATION

OF

72-MAN DETACHMENT

2/10

HQ  
SECTION

0/201

Security  
Section

0/201

Security  
Section

0/201

Security  
Section

BILLET DESCRIPTION

GRADE

OFF

ENL

WPN

Headquarters Section

Detachment Commander

Captain 1

P

Executive Officer

Lt 1

P

Gunnery Sergeant

GySgt

1

P

Hq Section Leader

SSgt

1

P

Radio Operator

Sgt

1

P

Admin Man

Cpl

1

P

Military Policeman

Cpl-SSgt

1

P

Interrogator Translator

GySgt

1

P

Engineer

PFC-Sgt

1

P

Detachment Corpsman

HM-HMI

3

P

2

10

3-Security Sections/Each/

Section Leader

SSgt

1

P

Radio Operator

LCpl

1

R

2-Security Squads/Each/

Squad Leader

Sgt

1

R

2-Security Teams/Each/

Team Leader

Cpl

1

P

Security Man

Pvt-LCpl

3

R

20

Organizational Total

2

70

ORGANIZATION

OF

54-MAN DETACHMENT

2/12

HQ  
SECTION

0/20

SECURITY  
SECTION

0/20

SECURITY  
SECTION

<u>BILLET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>END</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
Headquarters Section				
Detachment Commander	Capt/Lt	1		F
Executive Officer	Lt/SNCO	1		F
Cunnery Sergeant	GySgt		1	F
Hq Section Leader	SSgt		1	F
Radio Operator	Sgt		1	F
Admin Man	Cpl		1	F
Military Policeman	Cpl-SSgt		3	F
Interrogator-Translator	SSgt-GySgt		2	F
Engineer	PFC-Sgt		1	F
Detachment Corpoman	HM-HM1		2	F
			12	
2-Security Sections/Each/				
Section Leader	SSgt		1	F
Radio Operator	LCpl		1	F
2-Security Squads/Each/				
Squad Leader	Sgt		1	F
2-Security Teams/Each/				
Team Leader	Cpl		1	S
Security-Man	Pvt-LCpl		3	S
			20	
Organizational Total		2	52	

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PART IV  
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Documents are listed as follows:
  - a. Tab A After Action Reports of AESF Detachments.
  - b. Tab B AESF Operation Plans and Orders.
  - c. Tab C AESF Status Reports.
  - d. Tab D AESF Situation Reports.
  - e. Tab E AESF Conceptual Plans.
  - f. Tab F Detachment Rosters.
  - g. Tab G Photographs.
  - h. Tab H Training Documents.
  - i. Tab I Newspaper clippings.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTER ACTION REPORTS AESF DETACHMENTS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Report</u>
1	Detachment Echo ✓
2	Detachment Foxtrot ✓
3	Detachment Hotel ✓
4	Detachment India ✓
5	Detachment Kilo ✓
6	Detachment Mike ✓
7	Detachment November ✓
8	Detachment Papa ✓
9	Detachment Quebec ✓
10	Detachment Romeo ✓
11	Detachment Sierra ✓
12	Detachment Tango ✓
13	Detachment Uniform ✓
14	Detachment Victor ✓
15	USS BARBOUR COUNTY Detachment ✓
16	MP Detachment ✓
17	Commander's After Action Report ✓

Tab A

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
12th Marines  
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/RLR/gmk  
3480  
27 May 1975

From: Officer-in-Charge, Detachment "E"  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Attn: Chief  
of Staff)  
Via: Commander, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
Subj: Operation FREQUENT WIND  
Encl: (1) Specific problems and recommendations.

1. Purpose. To set forth, in narrative form, the sequence of events experienced by Detachment "E" during the Operation FREQUENT WIND.

2. Information. On 17 April 1975, Detachment "E" was activated from standby status at Camp Hauge, Okinawa. The detachment was comprised of personnel from Headquarters Battery, 12th Marines, and Battery "L" and Headquarters Battery of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines. The Detachment was transported by a C130 aircraft to the Philippines (upper MAU Camp) for briefings and further deployment to the USS Corral Sea, was further moved to the USS Sergeant Bausell, and again transferred to its final destination, the USNS Sergeant Truman Kimbro.

During the period 19 April 1975 to 27 April 1975, the Detachment trained extensively in defense of the ship, riot control, boarding procedures, first aid, and physical fitness. Our location during this period varied from as far north as Phan Thiet to as far south as anchoring in Vung Tau harbor.

At approximately 1400 on 28 April 1975, a "Danang-Saigon" Ferry was escorted to us by an unknown Navy ship and 150 refugees were transferred aboard the Sergeant Kimbro. The embarking process was orderly and the refugee group was well disciplined and organized. The group was comprised of upper class professional people, including doctors, lawyers nurses, a province chief, the mayor of Vung Tau, a newspaper owner, professors, and college students. The group had paid 50,000,000 piasters for the boat and intended to sail to Singapore and sell the boat there. Mechanical problems precluded the voyage to Singapore and we were ordered to cut the boat loose by CTG 76.5.

On 29 April we continued to prepare for additional refugees as news broadcasts indicated the deteriorating situation in Vietnam.

Late in the evening of 30 April, we began embarking refugees who had been flown out of Saigon. They arrived in "Mike" boats in groups of 75 to 150 refugees at a time. The Vietnamese women and children were in poor condition mainly from exhaustion, dehydration, and sea sickness. Many of the women and children had to be carried aboard but recovered remarkably well with a little sugar-water and rest. We began to receive American citizens and their dependents and from their immediate demands it became obvious they would be our biggest problem. We received a total of 30 American citizens plus their dependents during the night and next day. In general, Americans were unable to accept or satisfactorily adjust to the conditions aboard ship for the 2 day trip to the Philippines. They insulted the Vietnamese leaders, and Marines, and it became necessary for me to personally deal with them on even the smallest of matters.

On 1 May 1975, feeding the refugees was becoming a problem due to the constant embarking of personnel. Unnecessary time was lost due to the requirement for a complete search, required because of the large quantity of ammunition and knives found during the search of refugees that supposedly had been "processed" aboard Navy ships.

We received large numbers of Vietnamese Air Force Officers who, in most cases, were unwilling to assist in any way. One Vietnamese Air Force Major crawled in with disabled women and children and took a blanket off a child to cover himself. It was common to see officers drinking the milk we had distributed for infants.

At approximately 2200 on 1 May 1975, we began embarking personnel off a barge which had in excess of 2400 refugees aboard. Many had been aboard the barge for 4 days and fights were taking place in several areas on it. Some of the people had been without water for 2 days or more and there was a high rate of dehydration, exhaustion, and pink eye among the women and children. The situation aboard the barge was such that it prohibited the use of other than a large unit on the causeway. Men dressed as priests were seen looting baggage aboard the barge. When the situation aboard the barge began going out of control the accommodation ladder was raised. This proved effective in restoring control. The crowd calmed down within minutes, when they realized they might not be embarked if unrest continued. This cycle repeated itself several times. The barge was potentially a dangerous situation, and a situation of this type would have been more effectively dealt with if many small craft had been used to off-load the barge and expedite dispersion of the unmanageable crowd.

As processing continued into the early morning and afternoon of 2 May 1975, many members of the Detachment reached the point of exhaustion as they approached the 48 hour mark with little or no sleep. We received a group of Marines from the USS Denver on the causeway in order to speed up the pre-boarding personnel and baggage searches, to meet demands from MSC and CTG 76.5 to expedite loading. The search conducted on the causeway by Denver's Marines did not meet the criteria specified by the Ship's Master and Kimbro's Marines were again placed in the position of having to conduct a second time-wasting search. (See item 4, enclosure (1))

When evacuation was complete, a total of 4825 refugees had boarded. Prior to getting underway for the Philippines, YEN TRAN THAI jumped overboard in an apparent suicide attempt (observed by the Ship's Master). She was picked up by a small Navy boat but attempts to revive her on the causeway were unsuccessful and she was buried at sea while underway at 1900, 2 May 1975.

On 3 May 1975, the efforts of an outstanding Vietnamese Air Force Major began to take effect and distribution of food became more equitable. Between the hours of 2100 and 0100, I inspected the lower decks with the Detachment XO, 3 SNCOs and 2 Corpsmen. This created an obvious display of our concern for their welfare and identified health and sanitation problems. The Americans continued to make increased demands for better treatment than the refugees. Most of the Americans were totally unable to comprehend the obvious riot conditions which could result from noticed inequities in any type of treatment or food distribution.

On 4 May 1975, morale began to improve noticeably among all personnel aboard as they learned of our ETA of 2300 at Grandee Island.

At 0730 on 5 May 1975, we began off-loading refugees in groups of 200 to 500 at a time. By 1630, the ship cleared the health inspection, but we were restricted to ship on the morning of 6 May 1975 in order to be prepared to move refugees from the Philippines to Guam on short notice. At 0300, 8 May 1975, we began embarking refugees as they arrived on Vietnamese Navy ships. We embarked a total of 3652 refugees and were underway to Guam by 1530, 8 May 1975. This group was in much better health than the previous group and they consisted mostly of Vietnamese Navy personnel and their families. One complete ship's crew was aboard and maintained their complete staff to supervise all distribution of food, sanitation, medical care, and discipline. The obvious strong leadership of the Vietnamese Navy Officers was a welcomed change and their presence, plus more appropriate supplies (C-rations, fresh bread, fresh fruit, baby bottles and diapers) made the evacuation to Guam a relatively easy task.

From 9 May 1975 through 12 May 1975, I toured the entire ship once a day with the senior Vietnamese Navy Officer (Captain THAU) and identified discrepancies in sanitation. He took immediate

corrective action on each discrepancy.

We arrived in Guam at 2400, 12 May and began off-loading at approximately 0230, 13 May 1975. Off-loading was completed at approximately 0730 and OIC departed MB Guam at 1100 with 50% of the Detachment for return to Okinawa. On 14 May 1975, the Detachment Executive Officer returned to Okinawa with the remaining 50% of the Detachment.

  
R. L. REUTER

Copy to: CO 12th Marines

Specific Problems and Recommendations

1. Discussion. Communications aboard ship for security personnel standing posts on the decks surrounding the house was limited to voice and available PRC/77s.

Recommendation. The use of TA 312s would have enhanced communication between sentries and key personnel in the detachment.

2. Discussion. Varied capabilities in communications equipment aboard ships involved in the evacuation resulted in an unsatisfactory communications system.

Recommendation. That closer analysis of ship-to-ship communications capabilities be made prior to evacuation in order to permit augmentation of unsatisfactory equipment.

3. Discussion. Facilities for preparation of food for thousands of refugees aboard ship are totally inadequate.

Recommendation. In view of the relatively short periods of time that evacuees are aboard ship, it is recommended that C-rations be used as primary daily meal and be augmented with dehydrated fruit drinks, fresh fruit, dehydrated milk, and other items which eliminate hours of preparation and distribution. This would decrease the sanitation problems inherent in the distribution of cooked food and permit refugees to save food without the danger of food poisoning.

4. Discussion. Search procedures and priorities were not standard among different units. Varied interpretations of what was "dangerous" or items of contraband resulted in constant confusion and claims of unnecessary delays from higher headquarters when detailed searches were conducted. Some units were confiscating medical supplies from refugees. This deprived qualified doctors among the refugees of supplies that could have been used to assist in medical support. It further resulted in loss of prescription type drugs for individual medical problems which we had no means of replacing.

Recommendation. That a policy on searches of personnel and baggage be established prior to evacuation and specific guidelines for items of contraband be identified and strictly enforced.

HEADQUARTERS  
 Detachment F  
 Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), PMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

6/JRP/1E  
 3480

**From:** Officer in Charge  
**To:** Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (ATTN: Chief of Staff)  
**Via:** Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
**Subj:** Operation Frequent Wind

1. Purpose. To set forth in narrative form, the sequence of events experienced by Detachment "F" during the period 17 April-25 May 1975.

2. Information. On 17 April 1975, Detachment "F", comprised of personnel from Headquarters Battery, "D" Battery and "L" Battery of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, was activated at Camp Hauge, Okinawa. The detachment was transported by C-130 aircraft to Cubi Point, Philippines. On 18 April, 20 personnel were transported to the USS Coral Sea, transferred to the USS Gridley, and further to the USNS Greenville Victory. On 19 April, a second group of 34 were transferred to the USS Coral Sea; the remaining 18 personnel were detached and reassigned to other units. On 19 April, the USNS Greenville Victory sailed from anchorage at Phan Thiet, RVN, to an anchorage 1 mile south of Vung Tau. On 21 April, the second section was transferred from the USS Coral Sea to the USS Dubuque; on 23 April it was further transferred to the USNS Greenville Victory still anchored south of Vung Tau.

During the period 23 April to 27 April, the detachment conducted extensive training in riot control, search procedures, ship defense, first aid and Vietnamese customs and language. The most significant event was a floating mine was purposely detonated by a South Vietnamese Navy cutter in Vung Tau harbor at about 1600 on 24 April. As a result, the ship moved anchorage to outside the 3 mile limit.

At about 1030 on 28 April the first refugees, 23 people in a small fishing boat from Vung Tau, were taken aboard. At 1815 another 85 refugees were taken aboard. The loading of these refugees was orderly with no problems encountered throughout the night. At this time hundreds of small boats loaded with refugees could be seen along the coast, however, the South Vietnamese Navy was prohibiting their movement to the Greenville Victory.

estimated 500 small boats which has been released by the South Vietnamese Navy. Generally the loading process was accomplished without major problems. The greatest difficulty was caused by the vast number of small boats attempting to pull alongside the Greenville Victory to unload passengers. At one point as many as 150 boats were tied along the starboard side with refugees loading points established at 4 locations, the starboard gangway, the starboard pilot's ladder, and via cargo nets hoisted by booms both fore and aft. At this time the detachment was organized into three sections, one to secure the superstructure, one forward and one aft. The fore and aft sections were further divided into as many as six search and security teams. The searches were done thoroughly and without incident. At 1800 Marines under the direction of the Detachment XO were stationed on the fantail to prohibit boats from ramming the propeller. Authorization was given by the ship's master to fire warning shots to protect the propeller. Several times warning shots were fired across the bows of approaching vessels to turn them away. At 1915 rounds were fired at the Greenville Victory from one of the small boats; shots were exchanged. No casualties were suffered. At 2200 refugee loading was secured and the ship proceed to the holding area 30 miles south of Wung Tau. At this time approximately 6500 refugees were aboard the ship.

Feeding of the refugees was the major problem this first day. It was found that to prepare enough rice for this great a number of people, it was necessary for the galley to work 24 hours a day. Preparation and distribution of the food was handled by Vietnamese boy scouts under the supervision of LtCol TRANG, ARVN with a minimum of help from Marines assigned to maintain order. At 1400 on 30 April a staff meeting was held in the wardroom with a group of high ranking ARVN officers under Col DUOC. It was explained that the ship would furnish food and water but that the vietnamese were to be responsible for the health and safety of the refugees. Various staff sections were formed to take care of food preparation and distribution, sanitation, discipline, and medical needs; each section being assigned to an ARVN officer. A liaison section was established using CWO-2 BOUFFARD, IFF, as contact point with the Vietnamese. From this point daily briefings were conducted to discuss problems and work out solutions, the Vietnamese being responsible to the Detachment OIC. It is significant that from this point many of the problem experienced aboard other ships were stopped before they had a chance to grow out of proportion. It is felt that making the refugees responsible for themselves and treating them as rational people was the key to making the voyage to Subic Bay a relatively safe and uneventful operation. Refugees were organized by hold number, hold level, and family groups with each level having an individual in charge to be responsible for that level's needs. Family heads were issued meal cards marked with the number of individuals in the family. At proper feeding times for his hold and level, a family head would present his card and

would be issued food for the entire group. In this manner the great crowds around the cooking pots were eliminated and the food distribution problem was solved. Vietnamese sanitation crews with salt water hoses accomplished a washdown of the entire ship twice daily, thereby drastically reducing health problems such as pink eye and dysentery. Those Vietnamese who did require medical attention were treated by five Vietnamese doctors and four nurses who were among the refugees. The crew's day room was converted into a sickbay using medical supplies brought aboard by the doctors and supplemented by Detachment supplies. Salt water showers were erected for the refugees, further reducing the health and sanitation problems.

On 30 April loading of small groups of refugees continued intermittently throughout the day. No problems were encountered. At 1900 the ship moved to a holding area 90 miles south of Vung Tau and received a food and medical items resupply. On 1 May 3000 refugees were off-loaded and transferred to the SS American Challenger. The transfer was accomplished smoothly due to the fact that refugees were off-loaded by family groups. It was found that whenever family groups were split or whenever refugees were loaded by the Western standard of "women and children first", great problems of control would be encountered. By allowing families to remain together, such problems were eliminated.

The period 2-4 May the Greenville Victory was enroute to Subic Bay. No problems were encountered. At 1730 on 4 May a transfer of all refugees to the SS Transcolorado was begun. The transfer went smoothly until a Catholic priest convinced about 1000 refugees that if they stayed aboard the Greenville Victory they would have better conditions. These refugees had to be prodded off the ship by use of Marine skirmish lines. As was no often the case, the mere presence of Marines was enough to intimidate the refugees; therefore, no physical force was required and all refugees departed in an orderly fashion. At 2200 a final inspection of the ship indicated that all refugees were off the ship and that no dangerous material had been left on board.

From 5 to 21 May the Greenville Victory was anchored in Subic Bay on 24 hour standby with Detachment "F" aboard. During this period further training was conducted. On 21 May, Detachment "F" was secured from ship's security duty, disembarked and transferred to the upper MAU Camp awaiting transportation to Okinawa. On 25 May, Detachment "F" was returned to Okinawa at 1700.

J. R. PAGE

Copy to:

CO 12th Marines  
CO, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines  
12th Marines Regt Historian

DETACHEMENT HOTEL  
3d Engineer Battalion (-) (Rein)  
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

WHH/pjd  
3000  
13 May 1975

From: Officer in Charge, Hotel Detachment.  
To: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
Subj: RVN Evacuation after action report  
Ref: (a) MCO 3000.2C  
Encl: (1) Combat Status Report (after action report)  
(2) Detachment Itinerary

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted.

  
WILLIAM H. HACKETT JR.

(PHASE I)  
After Action Report

(From 1320 18 April 1975 - 1300 4 May 1975)

- I.) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. See current Insum.
- II.) OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS. While on board the USS DUBQUE, Hotel Detachment was prepared to carry out several operations aside from preparation for providing security on msc vessels. These operations were as a sparrow hawk reaction force and as security for mike boats going up the Saigon river, if needed. Daily training was carried out for these contingencies along with the training required for security required msc vessels. Briefs were given by ITT, CIT, and small classes were given on communication procedures, searching procedures and M-60 machinegun employment.
- III.) OPERATIONS. a. GROUND Hotel Detachment was located on the USS DUBQUE for sixteen days. All operations on board were of a training nature.  
b. AIR. Not Applicable  
c. SUMMARY. Hotel Detachment was highly motivated and well prepared to accomplish any mission assigned.
- (1) MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS Not Applicable
- (2) SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS Not Applicable
- (3) CASUALTIES Not Applicable
- IV.) LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL.  
a. LOGISTICS. If Hotel Detachment would have had to carry out a sparrow hawk or mike boat security operation, it would have been at a disadvantage due to the lack of M-60 mg's, M-79 Grenade Launchers and other support weapons.  
b. PERSONNEL. Not Applicable
- V.) CIVIL AFFAIRS.  
a. CIVIL ACTION Not Applicable  
b. REFUGEES Not Applicable  
c. OTHER Not Applicable
- VI.) OPERATIONS PLANS FOR NEXT 24 HRS. Not Applicable
- VII.) SUMMARY OF ADJACENT FRIENDLY FORCE OPERATIONS. Not Applicable
- VIII.) DECISIONS OR ACTIONS REQUIRED FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. Not Applicable

ENCLOSURE (1)

(PHASE II)  
After Action Report

(1500 4 May 1975 to 1800 9 May 1975)

I INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. See current summaries. Generally most evacuees were of a high order and status, most were civilians. The evacuees were very well organized with a chairman of the Evacuation Control Board, vice-chairman and adviser making up the leadership. Under the chairman there were supervisors of such areas as sanitation, food preparation, food distribution, security and medical. The evacuees populace was organized into six sections each having a leader and the same supervisory position as the board. This detailed organization provided orderly and efficient operation and control of the refugees throughout the transit period.

II OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS. See para III. OPERATIONS

III OPERATIONS.

a. GROUND Not Applicable

b. AIR Received two enroute bird rep from USS MANNS and USS WHITE PLAINS, both on station from MANNS received medical supplies and one man (Hml SHULTY) who was going to GUAM and OKINAWA for emergency. From WHITE PLAINS received five (5) external nets of med supplies, fruits and vegetables all for refugees.

c. SUMMARY.

(1) MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS

- a. Frequent wind\* (4-9 may 1975)
- b. Hotel Detachment, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force, CTF 76.
- c. Provide msc ship security and assist refugees as required.
- d. See para V b. (2).

(2) SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS Not Applicable

(3) CASUALTIES/MEDICAL

- a. Personnel, USMC-one man cut his wrist  
Refugees-one birth, no deaths
- b. Enemy equipment captured/destroyed.  
The refugees were searched by another detachment prior to boarding the Transcolorado consequently no weapons were discovered. Spot checks were conducted but with negative results.

ENCLOSURE (1)

IV. LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL.a. LOGISTICS. See para V b. (2).b. PERSONNEL. A detachment of fifty-four (54) men proved satisfactory for over operations, however, due to the limited time we spent handling the refugees fatigue was not a factor and a two section watch was sufficient.V. CIVIL AFFAIRS.a. CIVIL ACTION. See below.b. REFUGEES

(1) Number handled. We reported 3025 however there was some disparity. The refugees reported to us 3132. The GREENVILLE VICTORY was reporting 4128 as of 4 May and was to transfer to us 3000. This was then changed to 3500 and subsequently we on-loaded all the refugees from the VICTORY.

ENCLOSURE (1)

## (2). Assistance rendered.

During the transit period from Subic Bay to Guam the Marine detachment, aboard the SS Transcolorado, provided ship security and assisted the evacuees as required. The evacuees were on-loaded alongside the Greenville Victory at anchorage in Subic Bay commencing at 1700 4 May. At approximately 2015, 4 May the Greenville Victory had debarked all its refugees (approximately 3025) to the Transcolorado. Initially the refugees all wanted water and problems occurred. It should be noted that movement aboard the T/C was very restrictive and tedious, not because of crowded conditions but more specifically due to the physical layout of the ship which is designed as a heavy-lift cargo vessel. The chief engineer had modified the salt water fire fighting system to dispense potable water. Ballast tanks on the T/C were filled to capacity with fresh water (approximately 600 tons). Sufficient fresh water was on hand but not available the first night because the engineer had not completed the conversion of the pump to send fresh water from the ballast tanks to the salt water line. The first night only water available was from the ships limited domestic water and dispensed with a small garden hose. This led to confusion among the refugees as to the adequacy of water. The next morning the system was completed at 0530 and when the refugees awoke fresh water was available at 8 locations among the people and the problem diminished. Living conditions aboard the Transcolorado were considerably different from the Greenville Victory, i. e. on the Greenville Victory the ship's galley prepared much of the food especially rice. No cooking assistance was provided on the T/C. Facilities were not adequate. The first morning on board after having identified the leaders, I took them to the food storage hold and let them personally acknowledge the amount of food and supplies on board. I think this provided a sense of relief that they would be provided adequate food and water. The ship had acquired and been provided with following: canned beef, macheral, rice, paper plate, plastic spoons, toilet paper, paper, paper towels, (10) plastic trash cans, (8) rectangular cooking pans (24"x24" x 8"). The refugees immediately cleared an area approved by the ship for their cooking. They utilized some of the ships cargo handling material, i. e. I became, to fashion a grill of sorts and started gathering any and all available wood. From this point on the Marines had little if anything to do with food preparation or distribution except for providing the foodstuff to them on a once-a-day basis. In this manner we could make sure the food lasted through the entire journey. The refugees requested that salt water be provided for washing clothes, bathing, cooking, showers and general cleanup. This would have been a good procedure.

however as mentioned previously the T/C converted the salt water lines to make more fresh water available at more locations. The T/C's chief engineer determined that almost unlimited fresh water (600 tons) was available but the ballast tanks could not be replenished while at sea. The first day water was controlled and provided by the Marine only for drinking and cooking. Considering the quantity used the first day, it was determined that washing and bathing water could be provided the next day. (the water was turned off each day at 2000, on again at 2300 and 0300 for 30 minutes when Marines filled available water containers. This conserved both water and the pump) The refugees were very reluctant to use fresh water for washing and bathing and quite understandably, however they were convinced and the cleanliness and sanitation of the ship greatly improved.

Due to the ship's physical layout, again mobility was considerably decreased. A major function of the Marines on guard duty in addition to security of the superstructure was controlling the flow of traffic. In several areas only one-way traffic was allowed. No weapons were displayed, only night sticks were utilized to block ladderways and routes in order to control traffic. This method worked adequately.

A small cargo hold aft of the superstructure was used for the refugees' food stuffs storage passes were issued to key personnel and or required to working parties to allow access to this area. This method was satisfactory and reduced the number of people in the lesser desirable area of the ship.

We were fortunate to have three Vietnamese doctors and four nurses. Sick call was held twice daily at 0800 and 1400. The evacuee needing treatment would line up and first be seen by a doctor and nurse who separated the major and minor cases.

The minor cases were treated on the spot. The major cases requiring a doctors assistance were passed aft of the ship. On the fantail, the ship had a dispensary compartment with a head and four beds. This became the hospital and the ship turned complete utilization and custody over to the corpsmen and subsequently the Vietnamese doctors. The ship had limited medical supplies on hand but was resupplied twice in route to Guam. Each time the doctors and corpsmen were allowed to make a list of required items and in both cases the requisition was adequately filled. The majority of cases were conjunctivitis and usual variety of cuts, bruises, headaches, stomach aches and the like. Also the refugees complained of constipation due to the lack of fruit and vegetables in their diet. There was little we could do about this problem initially however the ship steward provided limited quantities out of ships stores of potatoes, carrots, onions and cabbage. There were well received. The next to last day enroute before reaching Guam, the T/C was resupplied by the USS White Plaine and received five (5) external CH-46 loads of fruit and vegetables which were also well received.

In summary the refugee/evacuees were well-fed, provided sufficient water and medical assistance. In return the control and cooperation of Evacuee Control Board was outstanding. Their tasks came of themselves. There were no major problems encountered and sanitation of the ship was very good. There were no confrontations between the Marines and the evacuee aside from minor misunderstanding attributed to the language barrier. The evacuees respected the Marines, appreciated their concern and assistance and thanked the men heartily upon disembarking.

(3) Other N/A

VI. Operations Plan for Next 24 Hours. N/A

VII Summary of Adjacent Friendly Force expectations. N/A

VIII Decisions or Actions Required from Higher Headquarters  
Which are Essential to Accomplish the Mission.

ADD 1

1. In future evacuation operations, additional outfitting of the ships should be undertaken time permitting ie. utilization of the massive steam capacity available for using steam kettles.

2. Provide as much wood as possible for use in making fires if steam not available. *(Providing the Ships Master concurs that a limited number of cooking fires can be controlled and there is maximum risk to the ships.)*

3. Provide sufficient tarpaulin, plastic sheeting or tentage for cover and protections of elements.

4. Promulgate guidance for refugees personnel belongings as many were not allowed to off load motorcycles in Guam.

## ITINERARY

18 April 75

1320 Departed 3d EngrBn area  
 1500 Arrived Futema.  
 1727 Departed Futema  
 2005 Arrived Cubi Pt. P. I.  
 2030 Departed for LPD Dubuque  
 2200 LPD Dubuque Departs Cubi Pt. P. I.

19 April 75

Intransit RVN

20 April 75

0600 LPD-8 Dubuque Arrives off coast of Vietnam.  
 (MSC Holding Area)

29 April 75

1600 LPD-8 Dubuque departs for PHV-QVAC.

30 April 75

0800 Dubuque arrives at PHV-QVAC.

1 May 75

1645 Dubuque departs from PHV-QVAC.

2 May 75

1500 Dubuque arrives off coast of Vietnam  
 1700 Dubuque departs for Subic Bay.

4 May 75

1300 Dubuque arrives Subic Bay.  
 1530 Hotel Det. departs for MSC transcolorado.  
 1540 Hotel Det. Boards MSC transcolorado.

5 May 75

0840 Transcolorado departs for Guam.

9 May 75

1430 MSC Transcolorado arrives in Guam.

ENCLOSURE (2)

10 May 75

1300  
1620

Hotel departs Guam.  
Arrive Okinawa.

ENCLOSURE (2)

HEADQUARTERS  
7th Communication Battalion (-)  
3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

35/CVM/kob  
3000  
13 May 1975

From: Commander, Detachment India, Amphibious Evacuation  
Security Group  
To: Commander, Amphibious Evacuation Security Group  
Sugj: After-Action Report: 18 Apr - 7 May 1975  
Ref: (a) Forecon between Capt GARCIA and Capt MOYHER  
of 12 May 1975

1. In response to reference (a), the following subject  
report is submitted:

a. General - Phase I: 18 Apr - 3 May 1975. On 18 April,  
Detachment India, which had formed and trained since 2 April,  
was transported by air to Subic Bay, P. I., where it embarked  
aboard the USS. Dubuque and sailed for the contiguous waters  
of South Vietnam. While aboard, training was intensified  
and plans finalized for the execution of Operation Frequent  
Wind.

On 24 April, Detachment India (-) (Rein) was transferred  
to the S.S. Pioneer Commander, with the mission to provide  
security for the ship and control and maintain any/all  
evacuees or refugees embarked. For the next 5 days, the  
detachment worked with the ship's crew to prepare the vessel  
for the ensuing assignment.

On 29 April, at 1815, the first refugees were taken  
aboard, approximately 18 miles south east of Vung Tau, RVN.  
Loading continued throughout the night and by 0630, 30 April,  
approximately 4000 evacuees/refugees had been taken aboard.  
The ship was then ordered to proceed to the holding area  
some 35 miles southeast of Vung Tau, and anchor.

On 1 May, approximately 700 more evacuees/refugees were  
loaded in the holding area.

On 2 May, The Pioneer Commander was ordered to proceed to  
Subic Bay, P. I., and arrived at the mouth of the bay  
on the evening of 3 May, where it was decided to medically  
resupply the detachment by air and then to proceed directly  
to Guam.

b. General - Phase II: 4 May - 7 May 1975. During this

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3000  
13 May 1975

period, the Pioneer Commander steamed to Guam, arriving on the morning of 7 May. 4,678 evacuees/refugees were debarked, without incident, followed by the 54 man security detachment.

2. Topic/Discussion/Recommendation

a. Topic. Size of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Group Staff.

(1) Discussion. During the period 18 April to 7 May, the operation was hampered by a lack of trained personnel in the key staff positions to assist the Commander in planning and execution. No embarkation Officer was assigned until after all personnel had come aboard and been billeted. When one was assigned, the "mil-drill" that followed to insure unit integrity was next to chaotic and almost totally unsuccessful. No personnel officer was assigned until personnel turbulence and administrative matters had surpassed the manageable level. No logistics officer was assigned to provide adequate support aboard the USS Dubuque to the detachments or to provide at least planning support and liaison to higher headquarters coordinating the resupply of MSC ships. As it was, such things as sugar, salt, vegetables, instant rice, sanitary napkins, baby bottles with nipples, powdered formula, and body bags for burial were not provided, and transportation and billeting were poorly coordinated. No Communication Officer was ever assigned, therefore causing great problems in the assignment of frequencies, the use of code words, and control of the nets. An operation/intelligence officer was assigned, but he was so busy with personnel/logistics problems that his effectiveness was greatly diminished. It was only through Marine ingenuity, initiative, vigorous execution of plans, and many long unnecessary hours that the operation was successfully completed from a staff point of view.

(2) Recommendation. That for similar operations of this magnitude and scope a battalion staff be assigned the mission to support the operation or at very least, an "ad hoc" staff be formed that is comparable to a battalion staff in size and <sup>experience</sup> expertise.

5. ~~b.~~ Topic. Size of the security detachment.

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(1) Discussion. 54 men organized into two 20-man sections and a small headquarters group did not provide for the fact that security for the ship was a 24 hour/day job and controlling and ministering to refugees/evacuees, an 18 hour/day job. There is no time to properly rest the personnel without one more section of 20 men. Also, as it turned out, even with plans made for reinforcement if necessary, when 20 personnel were down with conjunctivitis and dysentery/flu, no reinforcing detachment was anywhere near to provide support/adequate relief.

(2) Recommendation. That in the future, security detachments be manned as originally planned in ~~CTF 79 EOI 4-75, with 2 Officers and 70 Enlisted, i.e., with three sections.~~

e. Topic. Engineer with metal detector.

(1) Discussion. On a metal ship, even with a small platform built, the effectiveness of the detector is minimal. When you add in the fact that the operator is only good for 20 minutes perhour, ~~for~~ the high number of people to be screened, and the time it would take to screen each individual, the detector is of ~~no use at all~~ minimal use.

(2) Recommendation. Drop the engineer with detector from the detachment and replace with an additional MP for physical screening of personnel.

d. Topic. AN/PIQ-5 Communication Support

(1) Discussion. In the areas to be covered, the AN/PIQ-5's were just not powerful enough to provide adequate communication support.

(2) Recommendation. That a stronger model portable sound system be supplied.

~~c. e.~~ Topic. Prepare the ship prior to embarkation of evacuees/refugees.

Comment.  
(1) Discussion. There are many things that can and should be done prior to embarking refugees/evacuees. "Duck walk" should be built to provide easy access to the holds for all concerned. Water barrels need to be located

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3000  
13 May 1975

in strategic areas both on deck and in the holds to provide adequate fresh water for drinking and cooking. Lister bags would be even better if available. Portable heads and a means to empty them while underway without getting fecal material/urine over the side of the ship are a must for the forward part of the ship. Semi-permanent heads that open directly to the sea or are placed over the rail are adequate for the after portion of the ship. The ships fire stations make an excellent place to set up make-shift showers with fire hoses for personal hygiene, and clothes washing, and head flushing. Large pieces of canvas that could be rigged over the holds would provide protection from sun and rain for the hold/deck areas. *Add 1*

(2) Recommendation. Install as many of the above as time permits prior to embarkation of refugees/evacuees.

6. Topic. Organize refugees/evacuees.

(1) Discussion. Divide the ship into small "Communities" along normal physical divisions of the ship. In each of these areas assign one person who speaks English and has served in some authoritarian position. If the ship's superstructure is amid-ships, assign one person with similar prerequisites to control the forward portion of the ship, another, the after portion. Finally, assign one man to control/coordinate all the activities for the ship. To this man, assign one person to take charge of a galley crew. Now, the "community" leaders can assign their own people in the numbers required to provide for sanitation, feeding, watering, et al, and the "chief cook" can assign his cooks. Work through the assigned leaders to accomplish the mission.

(2) Recommendation. Organize the refugees/evacuees as indicated above as soon as possible for smooth operation.

7. Topic. Medical Treatment.

(1) Discussion. The original plan for medical support was to provide for the embarked detachment only. Everyone knew that we would be treating evacuees/refugees as necessary.

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3000  
13 May 1975

(2) Recommendation. Provide adequate medical supplies to treat the evacuees/refugees. Identify doctors to work in the sick-bay/hospital as soon as possible. Always have a doctor available for emergencies.

*C. V. Moyher*  
C. V. MOYHER

Copy to: CO, 7th Communication Battalion

5

KILO

DETACHMENT OPERATIONS

FREQUENT WIND

7 MAY 1975

Kilo detachment with 51 enlisted and 1 officer embarked aboard the MSC ship Green Port at 0600. Areas were selected as living spaces for the three sections. The detachment OIC and Gunny being relieved, conducted a familiarization tour of ship. An inventory was held to determine what food stuffs and medicines were aboard, both on deck and in hold #7. A security plan was drawn up for the ship. A plan of operation was established to conduct evacuation operations aboard Green Port. A Navy medical doctor, Lieutenant Commander B. ZARINS, and two corpsmen arrived to make the trip to Guam. They immediately took charge of the medical supplies. Embarkation of refugees began at 1700, from the Vietnamese floatilla. Began loading forward holds first, continuing with aft holds as each was filled. Just prior to 2400 there had been 3966 refugees loaded. Orders were issued to wait for another 500 refugees before sailing for Guam.

8 MAY 1975

While waiting for more refugees to arrive, those already on board started dispersing to find living area. Additionally the heat in holds was forcing refugees up on deck. Crowded decks would make the embarkation of 500 refugees virtually impossible. This problem was related to headquarters and orders were received at 0300 to proceed to Guam with 3966 refugees. Meeting was held with Vietnamese Navy commanders to organize refugees by holds and deck space. Additionally these areas were to be organized by families. This was completed by 0830 on cardboard cards. Fruit and C rations were distributed at 1200 to representatives of each hold and deck space. At 1400 milk was distributed to babies. Two salt water showers were established for showers and clothes washing. One was situated forward with the other aft. Five Vietnamese doctors were utilized to assist in treating their fellows in sick bay. Troops received a hot meal at 1600, as they would each day. Fresh water was distributed at 1800. Vietnamese interpreters were used to traverse the ship, informing the refugees to extinguish all lights on deck as navigation was restricted in narrow channel.

9 MAY 1975

Fresh water was distributed at 0700. All additional chow was removed from hold #7 and placed on deck to lessen possibility of spoilage. Vietnamese committee proposed to distribute all the chow to subsist on until Monday. The committee was sure this would alleviate distribution problems for every day. They also assured that no stealing would take place. At 1130 food distribution began and was completed by 1430. Food distribution was C rations, bread, and fruit. Fresh water was distributed at 1500 and again at 1800. Arrangements were made with ships galley to cook rice on 10 and 11 May for refugees.

10 MAY 1975

Fresh water and hot water were distributed at 0700. The committee was asked to determine the percentage of women and also children on board. The figures returned were 30% for women and 25% for children. At 1000 rice, soy sauce, and sardines were distributed. At 1230 milk was distributed for babies. A small number of cooking fires were extinguished in hold #5. Fresh water was distributed at 1500. Milk and hot water were distributed at 1700. Message to be sent to MSC, 24 hours prior to arrival at Guam was dispatched.

11 MAY 1975

Fresh water and hot water were distributed at 0700. Remaining supplies were drawn from hold #7. At 1000 rice, soy sauce, tuna, and fruit were distributed. An over all clean up of the ship was held by the Vietnamese in preparation for arrival at Guam. The committee requested that Guam consider allowing the Vietnamese Navy personnel and dependents to be billeted together in one location. A message was drafted to forward this request to MSC, Guam. Fresh water and milk were distributed at 1630.

12 MAY 1975

Fresh water and hot water were distributed at 0700. The committee assembled to thank the ships captain, Navy doctor, and detachment OIC for the compassion and help rendered by their men. Green Port entered the harbor at 1230 and docked. Off loading commenced at 1430 and was completed at 1700. Ships crew was thanked for their superb assistance. The Marines off loaded and were bused to the Marine Barracks for chow. Buses then transported the detachment to Andersen AFB for transportation to Okinawa. A C-141 was boarded at 2200 and touched down at Kadena AFB at 0030, 13 May. Section leaders returned their sections to their respective camps.

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Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies  
AESG Det. M  
HqBn, 3d MarDiv, USMC

SUBJECT


After Action Report of the activities of Mike Detachment, Amphibious Evacuation Security Guard, attached to the 9th MAB during the period of 18 April thru 3 May 1975.

DISCUSSION

Mike Detachment was formed aboard the USS Dubuque on the 23 of April 1975. The unit was comprised of 21 men from Uniform Detachment, 20 men from Papa Detachment and 10 men from Sierra Detachment. 1stLt Carl W. FREDRICKSEN was appointed OIC of the Detachment. The units manpower strength was one officer, three Staff Non-Commissioned Officers and 47 E-5 and below. As soon as the detachment was mustered, the OIC initiated a schedule of inspections and instruction to insure the readiness and efficiency of Mike Detachment, which included personnel and equipment inspections and classes on weapon safety and cleaning, Rules of Engagement, Crowd Control Tactics and personnel and baggage inspections. During this period of time, Mike Detachment was also assigned various tasks in support of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Guard Headquarters element. These tasks included Officer of the Day, Communication Center Watch Standers, mess duty, Headquarters runner and Duty Detachment, whose task was to provide working parties in support of the functioning of the Command.

The men of Mike Detachment arrived aboard the USS Dubuque on 18 April 1975 and arrived at the MSC holding area in the waters of South Vietnam on 20 April 1975. On 28 April 1975, the USS Dubuque, with Mike Detachment aboard, sailed for its assigned station off the Southwest coast of Vietnam. The USS Dubuque arrived at this station early on 30 April 1975 and began receiving evacuees via air and surface. On 2 May 1975, the USS Dubuque again sailed for the MSC holding area and arrived on 3 May 1975, later on the 3rd of May the USS Dubuque departed the MSC holding area for Subic Bay, Phillipines. Mike Detachment departed the USS Dubuque at 1200, 4 May 1975 for overnight billeting.

Respectfully submitted,



C. W. FREDRICKSEN  
1st Lieutenant  
Officer in Charge  
Mike Detachment  
U. S. Marine Corps

UNCLASSIFIED

Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies:  
AESG. M. Det  
HqBn, 3dMarDiv, USMC

SUBJECT

After Action Report of the activities of Mike Detachment, Amphibious Evacuation Security Guard, attached to CTF-76 during the period of 4 May through 10 May 1975.

DISCUSSION

At 1200, 4 May 1975, Mike Detachment departed the USS Dubuque for the Lower MAU Camp in the Phillipines and at 2030 the men were billeted in the Subic Naval Barracks # 4.

During the morning of 5 May the OIC inspected the police of the Detachment living space and made arrangements with III MAF Liaison Office for transportation from the living quarters to the Lower MAU Camp and from there to the American Racer. Arrangements were also made for noon chow for Mike Detachment.

On arrival at the Lower MAU Camp at 1230 the Detachment was issued 100 gallons of water. The C-Rations and Medical supplies could not be located. The OIC of Mike Detachment then called Lt. HAVERSHAW's (USN) Office and instructed the Duty NCO to transport the required rations to the Lower MAU Camp. At 1315, Mike Detachment departed the Lower MAU Camp, with its rations and water supply, for the American Racer by M-Boat.

Upon arrival aboard the American Racer, the OIC of Mike Detachment briefed the Master of the Ship, Captain Lawrence Pamera and the Chief Mate, W. H. James. Arrangements were made for billeting the Marines of Mike Detachment. At 1530 the Staff of Mike Detachment toured the ship and began formulating the Operation Plan for the Detachment, this plan was then presented to the Master of the Ship during a tour of the ship with the Master.

During the briefs and tours of the ship mentioned above, it became quite obvious that the officers of the American Racer had conducted extensive pre-planning in preparing for the mission of Frequent Wind. The amount of imagination and foresight exhibited by the Officers and men of the American Racer and their extremely high quality of professionalism is a credit to themselves, their company and the Merchant Marine.

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HqBn, 3dMarDiv, USMC

At 1930 the Detachment GySgt, GySgt CONELY, coordinated with Ship's Chief Mate on matters of Administration and Logistics as they related to the Marines and Ship's Company. A Staff meeting was held by the Detachment at 2000, during which all matters related to the accomplishment of the mission were finalized. The ship was secured in the following matter:

1. All hatches were secured by a large external lock and by chains on the inside with the exception of four hatchways which gave access into the superstructure.
2. The two hatches on the Main level were manned by four Marines each.
3. The other two hatches were on the O1 level and were accessible by ladderways from the Main Deck. These ladderways were manned by two Marines each plus a reactionary force of 6 Marines on a 24 hour call.

At 0600 on 6 May 1975 all Marines were positioned at their assigned locations and quizzed by the Staff in relation to ship structure, their individually assigned mission and the overall concept of the operation. The Green Port arrived alongside the American Racer at 0700 and both ships prepared to transfer the evacuees. At 1000 Dr. Kundert L/Cdr USN and two USN Corpsmen reported aboard the American Racer for duty and at 1030 Captain JESSIE, OIC of Papa Detachment from the Green Port, plus the Detachment GySgt and senior Corpsman reported aboard the American Racer to brief their respective counterparts. After the completion of this briefing, a committee of five men representing the evacuees reported aboard the American Racer and were taken on a tour of the ship. During the tour, I discussed with the committee the procedures that were to be used in the transfer and relocation of the evacuees and basic logistics. The transfer of the evacuees began at 1130, the following procedures were used:

1. Two Military Police and three Marines were stationed at the head of the gangplank to search the evacuees coming aboard. The evacuees had already been screened prior to boarding the Green Port but it was indicated to myself by the head of the Committee, Reverend Do, that the civilian evacuees had been intimidated by the Military evacuees aboard the Green Port and that coercion, threats of violence and theft had been common. therefore, the search was conducted to passify the civilian evacuees. No weapons were found.
2. Three Corpsmen were stationed at the head of the gangplank to identify persons requiring immediate medical attention, who were then escorted to the Sick Bay by Marines.
3. All Marines who were not committed to a specific task were located near the gangplank to aid and guide the evacuees to their locations on the ship.

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It was the intention of the Detachment to place the women, children and old people in the holds for protection from the weather, and that the men would be located above decks. After the transfer had been in progress for about an hour, it became obvious that the young men were re-locating and taking the choice locations on the ship. At this time, my primary consideration was to get the ship loaded so that she could get underway and thus provide some relief from the heat.

At 1430, the transfer of the evacuees to the American Racer was completed, at which time Reverend Do and myself went to each section of the ship and instructed the young men to move topside to allow the women, children and old people below decks. Also at this time, I appointed one man in each section as the Section Leader and gave him a brief on what his duties would be. The Section Leader was to be responsible for the following:

1. Population Count.
2. Food distribution.
3. Police of the section.
4. Welfare of his people.

At 1615 the committee and myself met to establish the routine and procedures that would be used during the voyage. At this time I was informed that the evacuees had not received any food or water since the previous day. I immediately began distribution of C-Rations to the evacuees. Water and milk distribution was already in progress having started at 1300. At 1630 the committee and myself were briefed by the Master of the Ship. This gesture by the Master of the Ship greatly enhanced the confidence of the committee in the Master of the Ship and the Marine Detachment.

It should be noted that as the people boarded the American Racer, they exhibited a very tense atmosphere, were covered with open and festering skin irritations, the majority of them had eye irritations and they were suspicious of everyone, including each other.

The distribution of food, was to take approximately five hours. During the next four days, the distribution of the food would be refined but the distribution of the cold water, hot water and milk would be an eighteen hour process.

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During the Detachment Staff Meeting at 2200, I was informed that an Air Force General had stolen food from children in his area. I first ensured that the children received food and then contacted Reverend Do and informed him of the situation, and gave him the opportunity to solve the problem. I also informed him that I would not tolerate this type of behaviour and that if he could not solve the problem, I would take strong and direct action.

At 0600 on 7 May 1975 hot water, cold water and milk distribution commenced and will continue until approximately 2200. A sanitation inspection was conducted by myself at 0815 during which the odor of human waste was detected in three locations on the ship. I contacted Reverend Do and informed him that this type of behaviour would not be tolerated and that the people were to use the facilities provided, which consisted of four heads constructed over the sides of the ship. The subject of police was also discussed at this time. The salt water fire hoses are turned on to wash the decks and heads. The hoses also offer the evacuees an opportunity to shower, wash their clothing and for the children to play in.

At 1100 the distribution of the days food began. All the food for the next 24 hour period was issued at one time. The reason for this was two fold:

1. A great saving in manpower in that the double rations could be issued in almost the same amount of time as a single issue.
  2. The people were confident that they would have food for the next 24 hours and more if they hoarded it, which most did.
- 50% of the day's food issue was C-Rations and 50% canned foods (fish, chicken, corn and cereal). Rice was not issued for the following reasons:
1. Lack of fire stoves.
  2. Fear of fire.
  3. Fear of accidents in a congested area.

At 1215 the Ships Officers and myself discussed the possibilities of using the ships assets in the preparation of rice. The Master of the Ship agreed to allow the use of the ships steam cookers. Operation "Rice" commenced at 1300 and was completed at 0300, 8 May 1975. The rice was stored in plastic trash cans and buckets and will be distributed with the rations for 8 May 1975. To ensure equal distribution of the food among the evacuees, I spend the majority of my time in the holds and on deck, this also gives me a chance to monitor the medical, police and sanitation procedures.

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HqBn, 3dMarDiv, USMC

The medical procedures instituted by Dr. KUNDERT are as follows:

1. Two Corpsmen are in among the evacuees 24 hours a day, one forward and one aft.
  2. One Vietnamese Doctor is assigned to each section of the ship. There are eleven Vietnamese doctors aboard.
  3. Dr. KUNDERT and Dr. Ken (Vietnamese) and two Corpsmen treat patients referred to them by the medical people among the evacuees.
- At 1630 the Master of the Ship is briefed on the condition of the evacuees and his ship.

The Chief Mate, Dr. KUNDERT and the OIC of the Detachment conduct a sanitation inspection of the ship at 0800, 9 May 1975. The police of the ship was found to be very good, given the existing conditions, and the evacuees in good health. Two bars of soap is issued to each family under the guise of a reward for the good police. The only reason the soap had not been issued earlier was the limitation of manpower. At 1000 the Ship's Cook begins preparing rice soup, which is made of rice, peas, carrots and water. The rice soup is issued at 1300 to only the children.

By 8 May 1975, the day to day operation begins falling into a routine. The level of professionalism exhibited by the Ships Company and Officers, the Medical Team and the Marine Detachment is beyond reproach. When the fact that these three units had very little in common just a week prior to this operation is considered, the level of cooperation obtained is extraordinary and a credit to their professionalism.

At 1300, 8 May 1975 apples and oranges are distributed to the evacuees and are well received by the evacuees.

At 1800 the food supply is issued for 9 May 1975. The reason for this early issue is that 9 May will be a day of preparation for landing in Guam.

At 0900, 9 May 1975 apples, oranges, bananas and bread are issued and at 1300 a major clean up of the ship begins. The following procedures were established for the off-loading of the evacuees in Guam:

1. The sick would depart the ship first with their families.
2. The section nearest the gangplank would be off-loaded first. The position of the gangplank could not be determined until the ship was tied up in port.
3. Following the departure of the first section, the section forward of it would depart.
4. The second section's departure would be followed by the section aft of the first section. This flip flop procedure would continue until the ship was emptied.

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5. Marines would be stationed in the area of the gangplank to prevent congestion and pushing.

6. Marines would carry baggage and help the people down the gangplank.

The American Racer arrived in Guam at 2230 and the off-loading of the evacuees began at 2300. The last evacuee left the American Racer at 0054 on 10 May 1975.

At 0100, 10 May 1975, the Ship was searched by Mike Detachment and the Chief Engineer to ensure that no stragglers or ordinance had been left aboard the Ship. The search proved to be negative. Mike Detachment departed the American Racer at 0145, 10 May 1975. At 0200 the Detachment was transported to the Marine Barracks, Guam for evening billeting.

After a 0630 Reveille and morning chow, personnel in need of medical attention were referred to the Marine Barracks Medical Facilities. At 0830, transportation arrived for Mike Detachment to Andrews Air Force Base for the flight to Okinawa. The Detachment departed Andrews Air Force Base at 1300 and arrived at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa at 1400.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That recognition of individual Marines in the form of meritorious promotions and Mast be processed through the individuals present Command.
2. That due consideration be given to the fact that the Marines of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Guard performed a mission for which they had not been previously trained, and that the mission was accomplished in a highly professional manner in a situation where one mistake in judgement could have cost the lives of many innocent people. In light of the above facts, the Marines of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Guard have earned the recognition that would be bestowed on them by a unit Citation.
3. That in recognition of the professionalism of the Officers and Crew of the American Racer, without which the operation could not have been accomplished, that the U. S. Marine Corps bestow upon these men recognition of their talents and skills.

Respectfully submitted,

*Carl W. Fredricksen*

C. W. FREDRICKSEN  
 1st Lieutenant  
 U. S. Marine Corps

NOVEMBER DETACHMENT  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
III Marine Amphibious Force

27 May 1975

From: Officer in Charge  
To: Officer in Charge, AESF

Subj: After Action Report; submission of

On 17 April 1975 I was assigned as the detachment commander for November Detachment comprised of personnel from 3d Service Battalion.

At 1620, 18 April November Detachment personnel and equipment departed MCAS, Futenma for Cubi Point, Philippines arriving at 2020, we immediately embarked aboard the U.S.S. Dubuque which sailed immediately for the staging area off Vung Tau, RVN, remaining there until 25 April 1975.

While in the staging area training for the troops was conducted on the M-60; M-79; LAAN; riot control procedures and the use of 150 PSI fire hose as used against crowds.

On 24 April November Detachment was split into two separate detachments with Capt MALLICK taking forty-nine (49) men and 1stLt KRATOCHVIL taking the remainder and being designated Quebec detachment initially to be redesignated later as November-5.

At approximately 1930 on 24 April November Detachment loaded aboard "M" boats on the U.S.S. Dubuque.

At 2400, 24 April November Detachment departed the U.S.S. Dubuque for embarkation on the S.S. American Racer. We arrived at the American Racer at 0115, 25 April and was informed that the American Racer was loaded with war materials and proceeding to Newport Pier, Saigon. I informed the Captain of the Racer that the Marines could not accompany him up the river as we could not go inside a one (1) mile limit. At 0145, 25 April we debarked the Racer for return to the U.S.S. Dubuque. At 1900, 25 April November Detachment again debarked the U.S.S. Dubuque for embarkation on the S.S. American Challenger. I immediately met with the Ships Master Captain A. BOUCHER and explained the mission of the Marines and the Rules of Engagement including the use of deadly force, he agreed that any use of deadly force would be a joint decision between us. American Challenger enroute to Long Hai, RVN.

At 0644, 26 April November Detachment commenced embarking refugees from VN "M" boats utilizing the port and starboard gangways. Processing of the refugees consisted of the ITT man SSgt MENSIE initially locating english speaking refugees and passing the word for all refugees to throw weapons and explosive devices overboard into the ocean. Some did and some did not. Upon reaching the main deck of the challenger an initial search for weapons was conducted, the refugees were then moved to a holding area and a detail search of personnel and baggage was conducted where weapons were discovered along with grenades and booby traps especially on the ARVN soldiers.

Refugees were then escorted to a hold and immediately provided with water and told that we had plenty of food on board which would be passed out when we had finished loading. The embarkation was conducted without incident. During the embarkation procedures the CHALLENGER was positioned one (1) mile off Long Hai which at the time was on the receiving end of 130mm rounds. At 2130, 26 April the tide changed and the "M" boats could not get to the beach to pick-up refugees so embarkation was suspended for the night. I advised the ship's Master to move his ship out of range of the artillery for the night. The American Challenger moved to a position 15 miles off shore. There were 4,500 refugees processed at this time. Feeding of the refugees was started and controlled by having all refugees sit-down those standing were told they would not receive food. This worked extremely well. The Marines passed out the food until all were fed. While enroute to the anchorage the ship's Master, Captain BOUCHER directed the Chief Engineer Mr. Paul NAGY to fabricate steam kettles for the purpose of cooking rice and other food stuffs on deck. This was accomplished on <sup>7/4</sup> night of 26 April. On 27 April the Challenger moved back to within one (1) mile off Long Hai and at 0900 commenced embarkation of refugees. Initial orders were to load 6,000 refugees. When we had 5,900 onboard I informed Capt BOUCHER of this, he looked his ship over and asked if I would load 1,000 more, this procedure continued until we embarked 8,600 refugees and proceeded to Phu Quoc island for debarkation. With the completion of the steam kettles the refugees were organized into cooks and messmen under the supervision of Marines. Feeding went extremely well. At 0900, 28 April we arrived at Phu Quoc however the refugees did not know where they were and commenced a sit-down strike refusing to debark the ship. Word of commandeering was over heard by the VN interpreter working for me and informed me of same. However, I anticipated same and had the detachment prepared in the event an attempt was made. I was not concerned about the sit-down strike as there were no VN "M" boats available to debark the refugees. I don't think the refugees were aware of this. At 0930, 28 April we commenced debarkation which was completed without incident at 1730, 30 April.

At 0100, 30 April we commenced embarkation of 250 former embassy employees with families plus four (4) Americans. At 0500, 30 April we had processed 700 refugees and were awaiting more "M" boats to arrive. The boats arrived at 0845 and embarkation commenced. At 1900, 30 April all former embassy employees numbering 1104 was complete with all being on the forward section of the ship thereby allowing the Detachment Marines freedom of the after section for rest and relaxation as much as possible. These 1104 refugees were without a doubt spoiled and requesting special privileges however each and everyone was treated the same without exception.

On 1 May the Challenger proceeded to the ships staging area off Vung Tau. At 1500 the same afternoon we embarked 3,928 refugees from the Greenville Victory including 28 cases of conjunctivitis. On the night of 1 May the Challenger sailed for Guam with 5,032 refugees. At 0100, 4 May we arrived at Guam and commenced debarking 5,034 refugees. (Two births onboard)

At 0500, 4 May we sailed for Subic Bay, Philippines arriving on 7 May.

At 1200, 9 May Detachment November debarked the American Challenger.

At 1230, 9 May I was informed by Commander AESF, Major QUINLAN that Detachment November was released from present mission and assigned a new mission of security on five (5) nests of VN and Cambodian ships totaling approximately 27 ships. These ships were rat infested, filthy and the stench was unbearable. However the Marines of Detachment November performed this new mission in a highly professional manner as expected.

At 1500, 15 May I was informed that Detachment November was released from security duty of the ships and to stand-by for transportation to Okinawa.

Upon release I ordered all detachment personnel to get haircuts and shampoos plus wash all clothing in an effort to prevent the carrying of any diseases picked-up on the ships back to Okinawa.

1200, 16 May departed Cubi Point, Philippines for Okinawa.

Additional Comments:

Identify english speaking refugees as soon as possible.

The feeding process was slow but the method mentioned earlier was effective.

The relationship with the ship's Master and crew was outstanding. The ship's Master, even though short a cook extended evening meal hours for the detachment to ensure the Marines received at least one hot meal.

Resupply of food and medical supplies while at sea was excellent.

To much ammunition was carried on the evacuation assignment.

Detachments were cut to a total of fifty-four (54) Marines which was unsatisfactory as it created a problem in giving the men a much needed rest.

One floding cot per man would be ideal since over 90% of the air mattresses were dry rotted and leaked.

*Sundries packs would have been a treat. Should be included in resupply orders, particularly after a week on "C" rations.*

All things considered, the mission performed by Detachment November was performed smoothly with professionalism displayed by all hands at all times. Detachment November did not have a single disciplinary problem during the period 18 April through 16 May 1975.

*M. T. Mallick*  
M. T. MALLICK  
Capt USMC

DETACHMENT RAPA  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
FPO San Francisco 96602

11 May 1975

From: Officer in Charge, Detachment Papa  
To: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
Subj: Summary of Significant Events

1. The following is a summary of significant events.

- a. Embarked aboard aircraft at 0900, 18 April 1975 at MCAS Futenma with 2 officers, 67 enlisted and 3 Navy enlisted.
- b. Embarked aboard USS Dubuque at 1700, 18 April 1975.
- c. Entered free mail zone at 1230, 20 April 1975.
- d. Embarked aboard SS Green Port at 1930, 22 April 1975 with 2 officers, 50 enlisted and 2 Navy enlisted.
- e. Started loading first refugees at approximately 2345, 30 April 1975.
- f. Finished loading refugees at 1930, 1 May 1975.
  - (1) 54 Americans with dependants (Viet)
  - (2) 74 Third Countries -do-
  - (3) 4058 Vietnamese  
9156
- g. GySgt MOORE fired one round from a 45 caliber pistol to prevent a small girl from getting crushed during the first water call.
- h. Set sail for Subic at 0930, 2 May 1975.
- i. 9 Marines were sick and laid up with upset stomachs and diarrhea on 3 May 1975.
- j. Ran out of C-rations, fed refugees a heavy soup on 3 May 1975 and rice with assorted precooked foods in cans on 4 May 1975.
- k. Arrived at Subic at 1330, 4 May 1975.
- l. American Embassy Official authorized approximately 67 Americans and 3d countries citizens to get off if they did not take Viet dependants in early afternoon of 5 May 1975.
- m. American Embassy Official returned and authorized and took any american and 3d countries citizens with dependants who desired to get off. This occurred at approximately 2100, 5 May 1975 and a total of 276 personnel got off in the afternoon and evening loads.

- n. Transferred refugees to American Racer at 1100, 6 May 1975.
- o. Relieved of all duties by Tango Detachment at 0600, 7 May 1975.

2. The following is a list of significant comments.

a. It was not practical to separate the Americans and 3d countries citizens from the refugees because the majority had Vietnamese dependants. The ship just did not have the space unless we used the working area and living area of the deck where my Marines were. Even then, this space would not have accommodated all of those who wanted special treatment. In addition, the Master also did not want women in the living area of his crew and desired that we isolate the superstructure from the forward deck where the refugees were living. With the exception of those who were actually working, I took an extremely hard nose attitude to ensure that only personnel with a valid reason were allowed on the superstructure. I expect a few congressional inquiries as a result of this fact.

b. The first 2/3 of the refugees were processed by the Navy before arriving to the Green Port. However, the last 1,000 came from a barge containing 5,000 plus. When the Marines attempted to organize and search the people on the causeway we failed. We then decided to search them at the top of the gangplank and select those to come aboard. This was going smoothly until we realized that we were only letting women and children aboard and thus separating families. When we attempted to let the father rejoin their families we were mobbed by them and single soldiers. At one point I drew my pistol but decided that this was too extreme a measure even though myself and a Gunnery Sergeant were unable to control the mob climbing all over the gangplank. We beat a few off and kicked a few in the water as we order the gangplank raised. After thinking for a while, I realized that no matter how much trouble at the bottom of the gangplank that only a small controlable number could get to the top. Therefore we spent the next 15 minutes talking to the people on the barge and causeway and telling them these things:

- (1) We could only take 1,000 of the 5,000 plus.
- (2) If they mob the gangplank it would soon break and then no one would be allowed aboard.
- (3) That I would no longer endanger my Marines by sending them down the gangplank to assist them.
- (4) They must organize, select and assist those who were lucky enough to come aboard.
- (5) We could not guarantee that the remainder would be picked up.
- (6) That if only males came aboard we would stop taking anyone.
- (7) We wanted to keep families together.

It was heartwarming to see that the refugees did organize, select and assist their own and that the crowd was so peaceful that later we were able to take a hose down the gangplank and over to the barge to give them water

without the least amount of fear.

c. The idea of letting the people help themselves was carried on to the running of the ship as far as the refugees were concerned. They formed a committee to include an American representative to distribute food, milk, etc; to get an accurate count; to maintain the police of the area; to provide security and medical care. We were able to tell them what was available, provide it at a central location and check to see if it was in fact being divided and distributed equally. I found no legitimate complaints.

d. The Marines were aboard the Green Port for eight full days before we picked up refugees and six full days afterwards. Life was not good aboard the Green Port. Before listing the complaints I want to say that 80% - 90% of the crew of the Green Port were fine people but they were often the "silent majority". We were fed one fine evening meal from the ship stores and had a soup prepared from some supplies for the refugees. We were told that if the Navy/Marine Corps would provide fresh meats and other items that ship would prepare a hot meal every three days. However, it was obvious that the crew would not in no way allow their supplies to get low just to feed the Marines. This attitude of assistance to the Marines as long as it did not really inconvenience or alter the crews life style was the main bone of contention. The comparison can be made to visiting someone's home. If the host asks you or tells you that you can use this and that or that this is available and that even though they don't have much of this, you can share it with them, you feel at home and welcome. However, when you have to ask for everything, you just don't feel welcome. We had to ask for a lot. For example:

- (1) We had to ask which heads were available.
- (2) We had to ask if we could take showers every other day.
- (3) We had to ask for a hose to rig up a salt water wash for our clothes. At first, the Master secured the washing machine for his crew to save water. However, he opened it about every three days but we were never invited to use it.
- (4) Although the troops slept out on deck and really had no place to write letters or play cards, they were never invited to use the crew's mess or lounge in the evenings. Even after I suggested to the Chief Steward that we would be more than happy to clean it up if we could use it, we never got permission to do so.

I must say that personally I got along well with the Master, the Chief Steward and others on the ship. Many of the Marines made personal friends with the crew and received cold fruits, soda, beer and hot food on an individual basis. However as a group I think we were not made to feel as welcome as we could have been.

We also found that our willingness to work was not always appreciated because it would cut down on some overtime pay. I can remember one incident where the Master asked me to provide some help with personnel and I did so. The Master kept telling me my people were securing before the job was done and my Marines were telling me that the crew told them to secure. The

problem was not solved until one of the troops told me that the crew secured them so they could get another hour of overtime out of the project. I had to confront the Master with the crew member who had secured my people to ensure that he realized that we just did not quit.

The most irritating thing is this union rule which stated something to the effect that if, for example, the cooks working area was used after working hours by anyone other than the cooks, then the cooks will be paid overtime even if they are not the ones doing the work. We did some work with 3 of the deck crew in one of the holes and I was shocked when I learned that all 11 members of the deck crew claimed overtime. I informed the Master that unless it was an emergency, I would not allow my Marines to do anything I thought his people would claim overtime for it.

e. Our complaints do not only deal with the Greep Port, but also with the Navy/Marine Corps.

(1) No one ever honored our request for fresh meats and fruits so that we could get a hot meal. Yet as soon as we got refugees, they provide fresh stuff with the exception of meats.

(2) No one ever sent a floating PX around so we could buy soda, cigarettes, writing paper, etc.

(3) No one ever sent over the cots we requested to replace the punctured rubber ladies.

In short, we had it better off in Vietnam than on the ship. The final insult was that no plans were made to ensure that the detachments got at least two - three days of R and R in Subic after the operation. Anyone that really knows the troops, realize that they would have appreciated someone saying that even if you go straight to Guam, we'll make sure that you get back for 2 days R and R in Subic. If my detachment had not requested to be relieved we would not have gotten any liberty in Subic. Thank you. Speeches and letters have very little value to the troops and to me.

Very Respectfully,

R. M. JESSIE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
Headquarters Battalion  
3d Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/RCK/rjn  
3000  
19 May 1975

From: First Lieutenant R. C. KOSCHESKI 212 58 54 01/0302  
USMCR  
To: Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion  
Subj: Chronological Narrative of "K" and "Q" Detachments  
from Headquarters Battalion

1. The Lieutenant took control of "K" Detachment, aboard the USS Dubuque, which was composed of sections from "T", "S", and "I" Detachments, on 22 April 1975. During the week following, the detachment was unable to train as a unit due to the fact that the "S" section was utilized to run the Communication Center for Detachment Headquarters and the Lieutenant was engaged in handling S-1 functions for the detachments as well as commanding the Communication Center.
2. Training was accomplished in "processing" refugees and a shotgun/.45 caliber pistol orientation was held for "K" Detachment. The detachment was tasked at various times with providing reaction forces aboard ship and Sparrow Hawk teams for operations ashore.
3. On 27 April 1975, the Lieutenant took command of "Q" Detachment, which consisted of the sections from "T" and "I" which had been in "K" Detachment, and a section from "H" Detachment. On about 1 - 3 May 1975, "Q" Detachment assisted in the processing of approximately 30 refugees aboard the USS Dubuque. On 4 May 1975, the detachments debarked at Subic Bay, P.I.
4. On 7 May 1975, the section from "T" Detachment was attached to a reconstituted "K" Detachment, under Lieutenant STREITZ.
5. "Q" Detachment assisted in the processing of a flotilla of ships from South Vietnam onto MSC shipping at Subic Bay on 8 and 9 May 1975. Approximately 30,000 refugees were processed. On 12 May 1975, Detachment "Q" embarked aboard the USS Barber County for Okinawa. On 13 May 1975, the Barber County turned around to return to Subic Bay. On 14 May 1975, Detachment "Q" left the section from "H" in control of elements of 3d Engineer Battalion at Subic Bay and returned by transport aircraft to Okinawa. On Okinawa the section from "I" Detachment was returned to control of Radio Battalion, and the remaining 3 members of "Q" Detachment returned to control of Headquarters Battalion.

13

3/RCK/rjn  
19 May 1975

6. The overall conduct and proficiency of member of "K" and "Q" Detachments under this Lieutenant's command were excellent throughout the operation.

*R. C. Koscheski*  
R. C. KOSCHESKI  
1stLt USMCR

HEADQUARTERS  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
FPO San Francisco 96602


JJ/trd  
2 Jun 1975

From: Officer in Charge, Detachment "R", Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
To: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
Subj: After Action Report; submission of  
Encl: (1) Roster of Training Conducted

1. During the evacuation of personnel from the Republic of Vietnam, Detachment "R" provided security on board the USS DUBUQUE. During the operation, approximately 40 Vietnamese were processed on board the DUBUQUE. Total hours spent guarding the vessel and Vietnamese was about 50. All Vietnamese were transferred from the DUBUQUE to MSC shipping.

2. While in Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, Detachment "R" provided security for the NSD, where a flotilla of 29 South Vietnamese vessels off-loaded refugees. This operation encompassed approximately 26 hours and resulted in searching and loading approximately 20,000 refugees on board MSC ships.

3. Throughout the entire operation, the personnel in Detachment "R" performed their duties in a satisfactory manner.

  
J. JOHNSON  
1stLt USMC

HEADQUARTERS  
3d Marine Division (-) (REIN), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602


16/RFC/scw  
6000  
23 May 1975

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on HML George R. MUSTAIN, Senior Medical Department  
Representative, Detachment Sierra ltr dtd 19 May 1975

From: Division Surgeon, 3d Marine Division, FMF  
To: Captain E. R. PALMQUIST, USMC

Subj: NEMVAC Operation, Medical After Action Report, submission of

1. Forwarded for your information.

  
R. F. COXE  
By direction

*x*

19 May 75

From: Senior Medical Department Representative, Detachment "Sierra"  
To: Division Surgeon, 3rd Marine Division


Subj: NEMVAC Operation, Medical After Action Report, submission of

Encl: (1) "Sierra" Detachment Medical After Action Report

1. Enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

*George R. Mustain*

GEORGE R. MUSTAIN



"SIERRA" DETACHMENT MEDICAL AFTER ACTION REPORT

"Sierra" Detachment departed Okinawa for the Philippines on 18 April 1975 via G-130. Upon arrival at Subic Bay, P.I., the detachment was transported to the USS Dubuque, LPD 8, for further transfer to a designated evacuation craft. On 22 April 1975, the detachment's personnel was reduced in number, thereby requiring the reduction of medical personnel to the following:

HM1 George R. Mustain, USN, [redacted] Re mo [redacted]  
 HM3 Leo J. Groppi, USN, [redacted] Re mo [redacted]

Additionally, on that date, the detachment was transferred to the USNS Sgt. Andrew Miller, T-AK 242, which later sailed to Vung Tao, RVN. During the early days of the voyage, over 20% of the Miller's crew had been treated for either syphilis, chancroid, or gonorrhea. Due to the lack of laboratory equipment, diagnosis was managed through careful history and physical examination. An official call was then made upon the Miller's Captain, Kurt Oltmeyer, stating the venereal disease problem. "VD" lectures were then held for the ship's crew as well as detachment personnel. Also hygiene classes were given, stressing the importance of cleanliness and briefly informing personnel as to the nature and importance of breaking the link in the chain of infection in communicable diseases. A brief class was held to inform personnel about the anticipated types of diseases expected among the refugees. Although the entire ship became a hospital itself during the cruise, three areas were designated hospital spaces. The main hospital on the main level within the superstructure was utilized as a ward for seriously or critically ill patients, suturing or minor surgical procedures, patients on intravenous therapy and marine sick call twenty-four hours a day. A maternity ward and nursery was set up in the Crew's Day Room utilizing one table as the labor and delivery table and another table as a recovery bed. A third area designated for an isolation ward was located on the fantail; however, no true isolation cases were admitted to this ward and Vietnamese physicians later used this ward as an adjunct sick call and treatment facility. It was noted; however, that the Vietnamese physicians were unreliable and not interested in diligently caring for the sick or injured. It was also reported that some doctors were selling medications to the refugees. This created an additional burden upon the medical team as the refugees were reluctant to visit the Vietnamese medical facility. Furthermore, no Vietnamese physician was allowed VIP privileges so they later became difficult to locate. All medications were maintained within the main hospital and issued in small quantities where necessary. Narcotics were maintained in a locker under a double lock system and inventoried three times daily.

The boarding of refugees took well over fifty hours and was uneventful except as noted:

1. On 30 April 1975, a helicopter forced a landing on a barge resulting in a crash. Ten casualties were received and treated for multiple lacerations. One of these wounded was a marine, MSgt L. E. Scott, who was treated for a scalp laceration and contusion of left lower ribs, posterior, resultant from flying debris. The suturing of those wounded

Enclosure (1)

was preceded by a Betadine prep and infiltration of Lidocaine 1% without Epinephrine. After closures, Bacitracin dressings were applied.

2. During the boarding procedure, inadequate feeding of marine personnel was noted as well as there being no allowance for sleep thereby creating reason for the concern of personnel who complained of exhaustion, nausea, and dizziness. Captain Lee, MC, USN, of the USS Blue Ridge, later during a Medical Inspection had requested that detachment personnel be fed three hot meals daily. The detachment OIC, Capt E. R. Palmquist, USMC later authorized two hot meals supplemented with one C-Ration daily.

3. Many refugees were treated for dehydration and hyperventilation during the boarding procedure. Dehydrated patients were treated with NaCl infusions where necessary as well as D5W. However some were required to be treated only with oral saline solutions. Still others were given water after being stimulated with Ammonia Inhalant Pearls.

4. Due to the large number of evacuees who sustained lacerations to toes and feet on the gangway while boarding, only clean Bacitracin dressings were applied and suturing not accomplished for these injuries.

5. Occasional burn patients were prepped with Phisohex and the burn areas covered with Furacin dressings. However those patients with extensive burns were debrided and had dressing changes daily. These patients also received antibiotic therapy consisting of Procaine Penicillin G injections, 600,000 Units, IM, BID.

6. One pilot had sustained two fractured ribs during a crash in Saigon. This patient had received X-rays in Saigon; however, same did not accompany patient, nor had treatment been rendered. He was instructed to do deep breathing to prevent the occurrence of pneumonia complications and the left thoracic region was taped. His chest appeared to remain clear during the entire voyage.

7. There were four births enroute to Grande Island, P.I., two of which were complicated in that the placentas were not delivered intact. One woman had commenced to hemorrhage profusely two hours post partum with her blood pressure dropping to 60/35. After the infusion of 500cc of Plasma and 1000cc Ringer's Lactate, the patient's blood pressure had returned to 90/65. Examination of the uterus revealed segments of placenta adhered to the uterine wall. Morphine Sulphate, 10mgm, IM was administered and manual extraction of placental segments was accomplished. The second similar retained placental segments was noted immediately after the placenta was delivered extremely torn and examination of the uterus done immediately. The same procedure for extraction was utilized. Both patients were started on antibiotic therapy consisting of Procaine Penicillin G, 1.5 mil units, BID and Tetracycline, 500 mgm, QID. Three of the births were handled by HMI Mustain and one was handled by HM3 Groppi. Standard Form 600's were utilized for medical treatment and birth certificates. These were later delivered to the medical facility at Grande Island, P.I. for disposition and preparation of official birth certificates. The parents of these newborns were advised that the children might be U.S. citizens, although this fact must be further documented.

8. Many refugees encountered motion sickness. Treatment for these consisted of Dramamine in the case of pregnant women and Meclazine in

the case of males and nonpregnant females. Due to the extremely large number of these complaints, both the Dramamine and Meclazine supplies became exhausted. Compazine Spansules were then substituted for the duration of the voyage.

9. Cellulitis was not uncommon and was treated by incision and drainage of same with the placement of Iodoform gauze packs without closure. Additionally, antibiotic therapy was commenced on all patients receiving I&D treatments consisting of Procaine Penicillin G, 600,000 units, IM, BID.

10. Refugees, having been fed partially raw rice the first day, created medical problems in that an outbreak of diarrhea affecting approximately 40% of the refugees had to be contended with. Treatments consisted of Kaopectate, Paragoric or Lomotil as necessary. In more severe cases two teaspoonsful of Paragoric was added to four ounces of Kaopectate and distributed by doses established by Young's Rule. A table was prepared ahead of time and referred to during dispensing of this medication.

11. Conjunctivitis was epidemic among the refugees and crew. An attempt to isolate by sensitizing the responsible organism was made by utilizing different treatments in different areas of the ship; e.g., Hold One: Tetracycline Ophthalmic, Hold Two: Neo-Decadron Ophthalmic, Main Deck: Sodium Sulfacetamide Ophthalmic, etc. No response was gained by any treatment, therefore the conjunctivitis was deemed to be viral conjunctivitis; however, secondary infections appeared minimal in those treated with the Sodium Sulfacetamide drops.

12. Due to the fact that most refugees had not eaten three days prior to boarding, malnutrition became a problem in that the inadequate messing facilities could only provide 100 grams of rice per day per adult. This rice was supplemented with sardines and occasionally fresh fruit. Recommendations were made to acquire C-Rations for the refugees. Some of the detachments rations were distributed at the rate of one ration per two refugees the following day (the day of disembarkation at Grande Island, P.I.).

13. During what appeared to be indiscriminate firing, one female Vietnamese on a fishing boat, near the USNS Miller, was wounded. This patient was brought to the hospital. The gunshot wound to the left shoulder, anterior had a clean wound of entrance and no wound of exit. The wound was treated with a battle dressing and the patient released to the fishing boat as per their request. It was estimated that the patient had lost approximately 50cc of blood and there was no artery or nerve involvement apparent. No radiological equipment was available and the position of the missile was undetermined. The patient appeared in good condition, although slightly apprehensive, upon her release.

14. Many children were treated for fevers of unknown origin with Tylenol Suspension.

15. Mess Physicals were given to personnel assisting in the galley. Those personnel exhibiting symptoms of venereal diseases, open lesions of the hands or arms, fevers, coughs of any duration over three days, and those who generally presented an unclean appearance due to poor hygiene were treated and not permitted to work in the galley.

16. Although two isolated cases consisted of patients who claimed to have been being treated for Tuberculosis, no problems relating to this disease appeared to be manifested. The alleged Tuberculosis patients were semi-isolated on the fantail and given masks to wear during the voyage. In regards to other infectious diseases, only minor outbreaks of mumps and measles were noted. Some rearranging of families was required to keep pregnant women away from children suspected of having measles. A constant watch was kept for any refugees exhibiting signs of jaundice or hepatitis symptoms.

Additional equipment that would have helped the medical team is as follows:

1. Isopropyl Alcohol
2. Dressing Sponges, 2 X 2, 4 X 4, 4 X 8
3. Additional Roller Gauze
4. Examination Gloves
5. Additional Cutter Sets
6. Additional IV Fluids
7. Intercaths, 20 gauge
8. Baby formula
9. Baby bottles and nipples
10. Sanitary pads
11. Pitocin
12. Prothrombin
13. Penicillinase
14. Mycostatin ointment
15. Some steroids
16. DDT
17. Lindane
18. Collodian
19. Tubular Gauze
20. Additional Tonge Depressors
21. Various gauge needles
22. 10 cc syringes
23. Medicine Dispensing Envelopes
24. Plastic spoons
25. Cidex
26. Cotton Rolls
27. Additional Band-aids
28. Basic Laboratory Equipment

Although the above is not a complete list of items required, it would facilitate better patient care. The inventory of the medical block taken with the team is not available at this time. The block was almost completely inadequate and had to be supplemented several times. Provisions ahead of time for the resupply of medical teams would have proved helpful in this evacuation. Resuscitation equipment should be mandatory. During the boarding procedure when refugees belongings were being searched for weapons it was requested by MHL Mustain that all medications be removed from the refugees custody and centrally located for later distribution. This procedure in itself was helpful in the critical supply situation; however, many of the drugs were unusable due to expiration, possible contamination, or inability to identify.

Although malnutrition and dehydration appeared to be critical and the greatest medical problem, there were no deaths attributable to this or any other cause. However, it is noted that one 68 year old woman had fallen between two barges and drowned at approximately 2200, 30 April 1975, prior to her being boarded the USNS Miller. The total number of refugees aboard was 6148, including the four births. During the first forty-eight hours, one hundred pounds of sugar was used by adding one teaspoonful per cup of water to the refugee drinking water. Salt water showers were helpful not only for sanitation purposes but also improved the morale of those refugees who took advantage of them. Daily, each hold was cautioned about defecating on the deck, spitting on the deck, and other general hygiene factors. Many refugees were extremely infested with body lice; however, due to lack of DDT or other similar chemical, no treatment was afforded.

The offloading of refugees at Grande Island, P.I. was without consequence. Ward patients and newborns were offloaded first and taken to the medical facility at Grande Island for further disposition.

During the second phase of the evacuation from Grande Island, P.I. to Guam, only approximately 3500 refugees were taken on after additional head facilities were built over the side rails on the main deck and stairs were built into the holds. Although the first voyage did not have these stairs it is noted that only minor injuries were sustained in the use of the vertical ladders in the holds. This is largely attributable to the fact that marine personnel carried many refugees up and down the ladders. The addition of the stairs not only facilitated access to the holds but also was a deterrent to what could have created numerous serious injuries. Additionally, the medical department was expanded by the addition of a medical team consisting of the following:

LCDR Stanley Borum, MC, USNR, <sup>Remo</sup> [redacted] - NRMIC SDIEGO CA  
 LTJG R. G. Perkins, NC, USNR, <sup>ved</sup> [redacted] - NRMIC GUAM  
 HM3 J. C. Herrera, USN, <sup>Removed by VNCA</sup> [redacted] - USNH YOKOSUKA JA  
 HN A. Reese, USN, <sup>Remo</sup> [redacted] - USNH YOKOSUKA JA  
<sup>ved</sup> [redacted]

The addition of the medical team in the second evacuation would have been better utilized during the first phase where only two hospital corpsmen comprising the medical team endangered the health of a multitude of people in that there were no provisions for relief. Additional medical stores had been received while in Subic Bay. The second portion of the evacuation was without consequence. One birth was handled by LCDR Stanley Borum. No deaths occurred during the second voyage to Guam.

DETACHMENT TANGO  
Special Marine Ships Guard  
9th MAB  
FPO San Francisco 96602

20 May 1975

From: Detachment Commander  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division  
Via: Commanding Officer, 3rd Marine Division

Subj: Evacuation of Vietnamese refugees; report of

1. Detachment Tango, Special Marine Ships Guard was formed on 3 April 1975 and was comprised of personnel from various units within the 3rd Marine Division. The T/O was 2 Officers and 68 Enlisted. During the period of 3 April 1975 to 17 April 1975 the Detachment was placed on and off standby for periods of 18 hours to 2 hours. Additionally, various types of training was conducted including inspections, classes, and practical application of search and riot control procedures.

2. On 18 April 1975 the Detachment embarked aboard a C-130 at MCAS Futema and proceeded to Subic Bay Philippines. Upon arrival at Cubi Point the Detachment was transported to the lower MAU Camp for further transportation to the USS Debuque.

3. Aboard the USS Debuque this Officer made contact with Maj QUINLAN the OIC, Special Marine Ships Guard, and received a short briefing as to mission, meetings, and status while aboard the USS Debuque. During the period aboard ship, this officer received numerous briefings from personnel previously involved in evacuating refugees and read several after action reports and "lessons learned" reports. The Detachment received additional training and classes on handling refugees from experienced personnel. Just prior to disembarkation the Detachment was reduced to 1 Officer and 53 Enlisted.

4. On 24 April 1975 the Detachment was assigned and embarked aboard MCS ship the SS Green Forest, while at sea off the coast of Viet Nam (Vung Tau). Immediately upon boarding the SS Green Forest, this Officer and the senior ITT Marine briefed the Master of the Ship (Mr H.L. CODLING) on the Rules of Engagement and the Detachments mission while aboard his vessel. Mr CODLING was very receptive and expressed his and the crews pleasure at having the Marines aboard. He indicated that he and his crew would cooperate in any way possible. The only instructions this officer received from Mr CODLING was to protect the ship and his crew. All Communications with the OIC (Maj QUINLAN) was lost. All orders were received from the command point MCS Saigon.

20 May 1975

5. During the period of 24 April 1975 to 29 April 1975, plans were formulated and rehearsed for the embarkation of refugees. Additionally, the officers and ships crew were briefed on what to expect during the embarkation phase and requested to remain on the 02 level and clear of the processing area.

6. The processing plan required, 3 Marines on the accommodation ladder to assist the children, elderly and weak people, plus any baggage. 2 Marines were posted at the top of the ladder and removed all visible weapons, guides were stationed along the 01 level to keep the refugees moving towards the search area. At the search area 10 Marines searched all baggage and at the same time 2 Marines conducted a detail body search. Once searched the refugees were guided to designated billeting areas. The ship had 5 holds available for billeting. Hold #1 was designated for third country nationals, hold #2 was for military age males without families, hold #4,5 and 6 for families. The main deck between the fore'sle and superstructure was also designated for families.

7. During the planning a few problem areas were encountered, ie, toilet facilities, means of cooking rice for an expected 4,500 people, distribution of food and water, a means of washing clothes and bathing and tables for searching. The problem of head facilities was quickly solved. 5 gallon paint buckets with handles, and stalls made from dunnage and scrap lumber with a canvas door scuffed as heads. A steam line from the ships boilers to the main deck was constructed. Four copper tubing lines were installed and four 55 gallon drums were cleaned. This arrangement allowed 2 meal periods a day consisting 4 hours each and 1200 pounds<sup>of rice</sup> for 4000 hungry refugees. The distribution of the rice was made in 32 gallon GI cans, the water was controlled by a Marine and issued in 5 gallon and 32 gallon water containers. Washing clothes and bathing was accomplished with 5 fire hoses and salt water on the main deck. Additionally during this period the ship received supplies from a Navy Cargo Ship. The supplies included, tons of rice, boxes of apples and oranges, paper cups and plates, canned milk, canned tuna, chicken and beef, plastic spoons, brooms, swabs, buckets, GI cans and plastic 5 gallon water containers.

8. All plans were complete and all foreseeable problem areas corrected. The Marines were briefed and numerous drills were conducted. Everyone knew his job and was well prepared. At this time all that was lacking was refugees.

20 May 1975

9. At 1330, 29 April 1975 the SS Green Forest received a call from MCS Saigon to relocate to a holding area and standby. At 1900 a flotilla of Vietnamese fishing boats carrying an estimated 80 refugees each, approached the ship. At that time all hands were dispatched to their assigned areas. Prior to coming aboard they were instructed to throw all weapons over the side. It seemed like the sky was filled with rifle and various hand guns. The ladder was lowered and refugees started embarking. The fishing boats were jammed against the side of the ship plus the carbon monoxide from the engines made it very difficult to get them aboard.

10. During the embarkation phase, a call was received from MCS Saigon to break contact and relocate to a holding area near Con Son Island and rendezvous with an LST. As the embarking of refugees ceased, panic broke out among the people on board. Several people had been separated from their families and friends. It was a tragic scene and many people cried that night including Marines. Total refugees at this time 492.

11. At 0330, 30 April 1975 the SS Green Forest arrived on station and the refugees had received food and water. At 0400 an unidentified gun boat appeared and circled the Green Forest. All hands were alerted and at the ready. After 35 minutes of utter suspense, the boat turned out to be South Vietnamese with 2 Officers and 9 Enlisted aboard. Total refugees at this time 503.

12. At 0600 the same day the daily routine began. During the day a Vietnamese flotilla was seen forming in the Con Son Island area. No contact and no incidents. At 1745 the same day the LST flying a Philippine flag came along side and the embarkation phase started all over again. The search procedures turned up numerous weapons that were thrown over the side. The process went smoothly and 870 refugees were embarked for a total at this time, 1373. The Marines started the feeding and watering procedures.

13. During the evening of the same day the SS Green Forest received orders to relocate near Vung Tau and standby. All hands were up and assisting in caring for the refugees.

14. On 1 May 1975 HN3 JONES was medivac to the USS Okinawa with a possible broken leg. At 1030 the SS Green Forest arrived on station and at 1130 refugees started embarking from "MIKE" boats. The navy tied a causeway along side the ship to facilitate the embarkation phase. The refugees from the "MIKE" boats had come from other navy ships in the area.

20 May 1975

Of the refugees that came aboard from the "MIKE" boats 13 were Americans and 53 were third country nationals, (Korean, Philippine and Chinese).

15. The third country nationals were directed (under protest) to their assigned area. The Americans and their dependents were assigned on the 02 level outside the superstructure. A canvas was provided for shade and cardboard and pallets were used to lay and sit. Also they received 'C' rations. Once things settled down this officer informed them as to the situation and exactly what would be expected of them. The next day the Master of the Ship reinforced those instructions.

16. At 1500 the same day a barge with approximately 6,000 refugees aboard was towed along side and the embarking of refugees started. The barge had what appeared to be a 12 foot wall constructed of sand bags and rusty wire fencing. For some unknown reason the refugees aboard the barge panicked and started climbing up the wall. At that time the wall collapsed. Approximately 60 to 70 people were trapped or killed and numerous were injured. Many of the injured personnel came aboard and were immediately treated. 6 people with various broken bones were medivaced to the USS Okinawa as directed by Captain LEE USN, MC. HM3 GRADY from the USS Okinawa replaced HM3 JONES.

17. During the time of embarking refugees and the collapsed wall the situation was chaotic. A Vietnamese Navy Captain and Province Chief were making unreasonable demands ie, staterooms, hot and cold water for bathing, food-other than rice. This officer apprised them of the tragic situation and informed them that if they did not comply with the Marines orders they and their families would be placed on the barge. That was the last discussion this officer had with those two officials until they disembarked at Grandi Island.

18. Upon completion of embarking 1,500 refugees for a total of 3958 the SS Green Forest was directed to Subic Bay. The daily routine continued. The guard was posted and details assigned. For the first time in almost 36 hours some of the Marines could relax and rest.

19. Once underway and all refugees had been fed the ship was divided into sections and leaders and assistant leaders were elected. This officer held a meeting of all the leaders and their assistants for the purpose of informing them, where the ship was going, how long it would take and also the "do's and don't" of the situation. Also, a daily routine was established to include, feeding, watering, policecall and

20 May 1975

area inspections. The leaders were very cooperative and supervised the daily routine. Mr HO was designated as the spokesman for the refugees. He supervised the leaders and proved to be an invaluable asset during the entire trip to Subic Bay.

20. 2 Vietnamese doctors and 2 nurses were located and a temporary sick bay was established. The corpsman issued daily allowance of medical supplies and supervised the doctors and nurses. Sick call was conducted all day, every day. During the trip to Subic Bay 4 babies were born no problems at that time. 452 military were separated from the families and located on the for'sle. This action was taken due to previous "lessons learned" in handling the military refugees. During an area inspection it was noticed that considerable unrest and tension was prevalent among the military. Through an interpreter this officer learned that the unrest was due to insufficient food and water also unnecessary harassment from the Vietnamese <sup>officers. The 3</sup> identified and based on seniority were designated, the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer Number 1 and Executive Officer Number 2. The rank of the 3 officers were LtCol. This officer conducted a 30 minute lecture on leadership. The lecture included, supervising of the meal period, water, police call and inspections. This officer also informed the 3 LtCols that if they did <sup>not</sup> exercise proper leadership and control, that the after action report would include a recommendation of deportation back to South Viet Nam. The remainder of the trip to Subic Bay was made without any incidents and complete cooperation from the military.

21. The trip to Subic Bay was made without any significant problems. Upon arrival at Subic Bay the refugees were disembarked at Grandi Island. The debarkation went smoothly and many of the refugees expressed their gratitude and appreciation for a safe trip. The military disembarked last and all the Marines received Vietnamese unit patches or rank insignia as souvenirs. It was a good feeling to see the kids playing and the elderly and weak with expressions of happiness.

22. Between 5 to 7 May the ship discharged cargo, was cleaned and resupplied with food and water. Additionally, wooden "out houses" (over the side) and stairways leading into the holds were built.

23. At 0400 8 May, 4301 refugees were embarked from the previously mentioned vietnamese navy flotilla. At 1500 the SS Green Forest sailed for Guam. During the 5 days to Guam, the same procedure of selecting leaders and supervising the daily routine was implemented. The trip was very successful, and was made without complications.

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24. A total of 8269 refugees were embarked, processed and transported with no adverse incidents. The Marines and members of the SS Green Forest worked in harmony the entire period. Several members of the crew often volunteered their services and experience which contributed to the overall success of the operation.

25. The marines performance during the period of embarkation was extraordinary. Although working under adverse and fatiguing conditions they continuously displayed an outstanding attitude, initiative and devotion to duty. During the operation several individuals merit and deserve personal awards.

26. This officer has submitted recommendations for 5 Navy Commendation Medals, 5 Navy Achievement Medals and 35 Commanding Generals Certificate of Commendation.

27. The members of the SS Green Forest and the Marines displayed and upheld the finest traditions of our country and the United States Naval Service.

*R. D. Amos*  
R. D. AMCS

DETACHMENT UNIFORM  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
FPO San Francisco 96602

6/SS/trd  
29 May 1975

From: Officer in Charge  
To: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
Subj: After Action Report; submission of

1. Detachment Uniform was formed and deployed from 3rd Tank Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF Pacific on 18 April 1975.

The Detachment was comprised of one (1) Captain as the Commanding Officer, one (1) Second Lieutenant as the Executive Officer, three (3) USN Corpsmen, one (1) Military Policeman, one (1) Engineer and sixty - four (64) enlisted personnel. The detachment was embarked on the USS DUBUQUE On the night of 18 April and remained on board until 4 May when the detachment boarded the SS GREEN WAVE. On 23 April, twenty (20) enlisted Marines and one (1) USN Corpsman were dropped from the detachment and redesignated as part of Detachment Mike, commanded by First Lieutenant C. W. FREDRICKSON, of Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, Pacific.

2. Detachment Uniform boarded the SS GREEN WAVE at 0800 on 5 May 1975. Ships Master was Captain James WEEMS. On 7 May, approximately 4,499 refugees were embarked on board the SS GREEN WAVE from the Vietnamese LSTs #502 and #801. Also embarked on 7 May were Lieutenant Commander STEFANISKO, USN, Lieutenant Commander FOOTE, USN, HM3 THATCHER, USN, and HN FARRELL, USN.

3. Included among the refugees were eight (8) Koreans, and Vietnamese Lieutenant General Nuyeh-Van LA, Brigadier General

CANH and Colonel NHON.

4. The SS GREEN WAVE sailed for Guam at 0010, 8 May 1975. The Vietnamese refugees under Colonel NHON organized themselves into eight (8) separate groups. Colonel NHON and his group commanders organized and supervised the distribution of food and other items in a most professional manner. During the voyage from Subic Bay to Guam the detachment encountered no problems of any kind.
5. On 11 May at approximately 0915, Private R. B. JANSEN suffered an injury to his left knee when he dropped a case of sardines he was carrying while working in the ship's #7 hold. Upon docking at Guam on 12 May, Private JANSEN was taken to Naval Regional Medical Center for treatment. Private JANSEN was detained overnight for treatment.
6. On 12 May, all refugees aboard the SS GREEN WAVE were disembarked at Guam without incident. The refugee count taken by the Navy at Guam as they were off loaded was 4,418.
7. During the detachments four aboard the SS GREEN WAVE, the ship's master and crew went out of their way to ensure that we were well fed and comfortable. It should also be noted that the detachment had a very easy task of providing security to the ship's superstructure due in large part to the Vietnamese refugees and their organization. As a last note, I would like to say that the enlisted Marines and Sailors of Detachment Uniform performed their tasks in a most professional manner, in keeping with the highest tradition of the Naval Service and the Marine Corps.

S. SHEPHERD  
Capt USMC

DETACHMENT VICTOR  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Forces  
FPO San Francisco 96602

6/DAG/trd  
30 May 1975

From: Officer in Charge  
To: Officer in Charge, Amphibious Evacuation Security Forces

Subj: After Action Report; submission of

2130: 22 Apr. Arrived SS PIONEER CONTENDER from USS DUBUQUE. Met with ships captain, G. L. FLINK, and Marines boarded. Marines birthed on upper decks of superstructure; CWO RUSSELL and I given small cabin.

23 Apr to 27 Apr. Routine established and plan of the day posted. Working parties organized to build latrines and inventory 13 conex boxes of refugee rations. Classes conducted in first aid, code of conduct, interior guard, crowd control, and rules of engagement. Physical Training also conducted. Rapport established with ship's officers and crew. Watches and posts established and contingency planning continued. No significant incidents for period reported or witnessed.

1800: 28 Apr to 1800: 29 Apr 1975.

1810: 28 Apr. The USS VANCOUVER (LPD) launched an LCM-8 loaded with 44 Vietnamese refugees. Because of garbled radio traffic with the VANCOUVER, we were not prepared to take on refugees. As a result, we were forced to embark the Vietnamese via the ensigns ladder. White caps made the transfer a risky operation at best. Compounding the problem was the presence of numerous small children - one only 45 days old. Although time consuming, the operation was uneventful with no injuries incurred.

1930. The USS VANCOUVER launched a second LCM-8 with 23 Vietnamese, 4 Philipinos and an American Embassy Official by the name of James E. PARKER aboard. Embarkation this time was accomplished by means of a boom and a cargo net. Again, no injuries were incurred. The refugees were lowered into number four hold (forward) and water provided. One woman complained of bleeding (it was later learned she was 3 months pregnant) and was sent to sickbay for observation. By morning, the bleeding had stopped and she was returned to her family.

2100. Mr. PARKER briefed the ship's master, the first officer and myself on the events preceding the embarkation operations. PARKER had been working in Can Tho and had become

impatient with the delay in evacuation of Class A refugees (refugees who would be executed in the event of a VC/NVA take-over). After obtaining permission for the American Ambassador in Saigon, PARKER used Air American helicopters to fly his charges from Can Tho to our anchorage, approximately 12 miles off the coast of the delta.

0930: 29 Apr. The refugees were provided with 325 grams of pre-cooked rice each and canned milk for the children. They were also re-supplied with water. The Vietnamese men all spoke English and displayed a familiarity with American idioms and customs gained only after long association with Americans. Jim PARKER was unable to contact the USS VANCOUVER for transportation back to Can Tho and was thus unable to evacuate the additional one hundred or so Vietnamese still remaining at his compound as planned. The two refugee stowaways, smuggled aboard the ship in Saigon, were turned over to me, bringing the total on board refugee count to 69.

2200: 29 Apr. Two LCM-8s were sighted off the fantail. As the crafts came along side it was learned that they carried both American and Vietnamese. A cargo boom and net were used to embark the 276 people aboard the two LCM-8s. The 18 Americans embarked were from the American Consulate at Can Tho. Mr. MCNAMARA, the Consulate General was among those taken aboard. The refugees were housed in #4 hold; the embassy staff were given deck space on the fantail. The three ranking members of the staff were given bunk space on the officers level. In addition, 6 Marines from the consulate were embarked to include 1 Staff Sergeant, 3 Sergeants and 2 Corporals. Staff Sergeant HASTY and his men were billeted on the superstructure with the rest of the detachment. All those embarked were fed. Since the crews of the LCM-8s were a loose coterie of Philippine Nationals and Americans, Mr. PARKER volunteered to take charge of the two craft and follow the SS CONTENDER from our present anchorage off Can Tho to an area off Vung Tau as per instructions received from MSC Saigon.

1000: 30 Apr. Arrived at a holding area approximately 12 miles off Vung Tau and were joined by 3 other ships; 1 LST, 1 DD, and the USNS SGT MILLER. From my position, the SGT MILLER appeared to be taking on refugees from a barge and numerous small boats. At about 1400, I noted artillery fire impacting on fringe of the holding area approximately 1 mile away. The fire seemed to come from one gun of 105/155mm. Of the 10 or 15 rounds I saw fall, there appeared to be no attempt to adjust range or deflection, as all rounds impacted in the same area. Nevertheless, the four ships in the holding area lifted anchor and moved to an area approximately 5 miles further out to sea. As the ships moved off, they were followed by three large barges which were pulled by tugs and numerous small fishing boats. Prior to departure a tug came along side and all American passengers were debarked except Mr. PARKER who still had charge

of the 2 LCM-8s. Most of the weapons confiscated from the Americans were reclaimed; extra weapons and ammo were left aboard and were later policed up and secured. Mr. PRICE, MSC embarked.

1600. Arrived at new holding area, secured the 2 LCM-8s along port side and took a large ammo barge loaded with Vietnamese refugees along the starboard side. The barge's demensions were 250' x 75' and carried about 4,800 people. Loading commenced about 1700 and ended about 0330 the following morning. Numerous small fishing boats also tried to pull along side the ship and the barge to off-load refugees. They were held off only by warning shots fired by selected NCOs. This was deemed necessary to avoid panic and overloading. In all cases, the warning shots were effective and the embarkation of refugees proceeded without incident or injury. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~. The barge was turned over to the captain of the tug as were the two LCM-8s. During the loading process, a female child was born in a makeshift dispensary set up in the deck house.

2100: 1 May. Took a LCM-8 along side loaded with Marines from C Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. The platoon commander, a Second Lieutenant, was trying to find shipping for approximately 850 additional refugees - most of whom were ARVN troops who were suspected of being armed. The ships master, Captain FLINK, was disinclined to take additional refugees due to the load already on board. However, a duty officer aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE persuaded Captain FLINK to board the remaining Vietnamese. The refugees were loaded aboard a small coastal freighter, a large fishing boat and four standard sized fishing boats. The loading of this last group of refugees went without incident. The coastal freighter was loaded with approximately 500 Vietnamese Army Airborne Troops who had brought all their equipment and wounded with them. After the loading was complete, a detail of Marines was sent aboard the small freighter to dispose of the weapons and explosives and any other equipment that could possibly be used by enemy forces. Among other things, 4 cases of fragmentation grenades and 43 M-16s were thrown over the side. However the 15 AN/PRC-25s which were found were reclaimed and later turned over to the operations officer at Marine Barracks, Subic Bay. Also turned over were 2 M-79 grenade launchers left behind on the 2 LCM-8s.

2 May. Enroute to Grande Island, R.P. Routine established and head men (Vietnamese) for various holds and deck areas expanded to accomodate new refugees. Food and water details were appointed. Two more births, both females, occurred in Sickbay. HM 1st Class P. DAVIS was in attendance.

3 May. 1800 arrived Subic Bay and were tied along side pier by 2000. Ships captain ordered to off load 2000 refugees.

Total off-load was 2025 (additional 25 due to practise of not separating the extended family organization). Additionally, provisions were taken on to supplement the pre-cooked rice and other staples provided by MSC Saigon already on board. Provisions included canned meats and fresh fruits. Mr. PARKER off-loaded along with the 3 Philipinos and 1 Chinese.

4 May. 0200 departed Subic Bay for Guam. No significant incidents reported.


5 May. Enroute Guam. 1400: one ARVN Trooper running high fever do to infection resulting of large peices of shrapnel imbedded in his jaw. Radioed USS WHITE PLAINS for medical assistance. The surgeon was taken aboard by helicopter and operated on the wounded soldier. During the operation, a woman brought a sick newborn (2 weeks old) in, running a high temperature. I interrupted the operation when the baby started to turn blue. The surgeon started mouth to mouth, but was unable to revive the child. The child had aspirated and was later buried at sea with a Catholic Priest in attendance.

6 May. Normal routine - no significant incidents.

7 May. Arrived Agana, Guam at approximately 0830 and was docked pierside at 1330. Off-loading commenced at 1400 and ended at 1700. The Marines were off-loaded by 1900 and transported to Marine Barracks, Guam.

#### Summary

A total of 5,800 refugees were loaded between the 28th of April and the 1st of May to include 20 Americans, 3 Philipinos, and 1 National Chinese. Recorded were 3 births and 1 death. Retrieved were 15 PRC-25 radios and approximately 16 weapons. All reclaimed equipment was returned to U. S. authorities at either Naval Base, Subic Bay or at Okinawa. Aside from 22 cases of conjunctivitis (Pink Eye) no injuries were incurred by Marines. No significant problems were encountered in any phase of the operation; moral among the Marines remained high throughout. Additionally, no equipment was lost, however, all remaining medical supplies were turned over to Marine Barracks, Guam, for use in the refugee operation.

  
D. A. GARCIA  
Capt USMC

USS BARBOUR COUNTY DETACHMENT  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
III Marine Amphibious Force

From: Officer in Charge.

To: Officer in Charge, AESF

Subj: After Action Report; submission of

- Encl: (1) Roster of Personnel, detachments November and November Five  
(2) Roster of Personnel, Quebec detachment  
(3) Amphibious Evacuation Security Force OPLAN 1-75 (Frequent Wind)(C)  
(4) RVN Refugee Evacuation- Lessons Learned (U)  
(5) MSC Vessel Security  
(6) US Marine Security Forces Aboard Controlled Ships (C)  
(7) Rules of Engagement  
(8) Rules of Engagement  
(9) SITREP date-time groups  
(10) Examples of Confiscated Weapons  
(11) Sequence of Events

1. IAW verbal request of OIC, AESF, the following report is submitted.

  
D.A. KRATOCHVIL  
1LT USMC

Organization. On 18 April, November Detachment, Amphibious Evacuation Security Force, was formed with Capt M.T. MALLICK as the Officer in Charge. The detachment strength was two (2) officers and seventy-four (74) enlisted. Enclosure (1) is a roster of these personnel.

Equipment per man included a field transport pack, waterproof bag, gas mask, 782 gear, and personal weapon. Additional equipment included ten (10) shotguns, two (2) M16s, three (3) FRC 25s, one (1) FRC 77 and one (1) mine detector.

Initial instructions were to convoy down to MCAS Futema and catch a flight down to NAS Cubi Point. Upon reaching the Philippines, our point of contact was Maj. QUINLAN.

At Futema, Cpl S.L. ANDERSON was assigned to guard the ordnance designated for November Detachment. The ordnance would be going down to the Philippines on a separate flight. Should Cpl ANDERSON have any difficulties, he was instructed to contact Capt MALLICK

Maj QUINLAN.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, the detachment was immediately transported to the USS DUBUQUE LPD 8.

On 19 April, aboard the DUBUQUE, Maj QUINLAN split all of the embarked detachments into two groups. November Detachment split into one group of fifty-one (51) men and one group of twenty-five (25) men. The larger had Capt MALLICK as the OIC. The second group had SSgt C.L. ROBINSON as the NCOIC. Both groups remained known as November Detachment.

November Detachment was designated as the detachment to go up river to Can Tho in Mike boats, if necessary, to evacuate Americans in that city.

On 23 April, the two (2) groups of November Detachment became two (2) separate detachments; the larger under Capt MALLICK remained November Detachment, the smaller now under 1Lt D.A. KRATOCHVIL became Quebec Detachment. Both detachments were augmented by additional personnel to bring their strengths up to fifty-four (54) each.

Quebec detachment was designated as the SPARROWHAWK detachment for the security of downed aircraft.

November Detachment left the DUBUQUE and boarded the S.S. AMERICAN CHALLENGER. Quebec Detachment was broken up on 26 April into two (2) groups; one group of the twenty-six former November Detachment personnel, the second group of twenty-eight (28) enlisted personnel. The first group had 1Lt KRATOCHVIL remaining in charge and was designated as November Five Detachment. The second group was augmented and received another Officer in Charge. The second group remained Quebec Detachment.

November Five was heloed to the USS BARBOUR COUNTY (LST 1195) on 27 April. Here, word was received that Cpl ANDERSON had rejoined November Detachment aboard the AMERICAN CHALLENGER.

The organization remained in this situation until November Detachment and November Five rejoined each other back on Okinawa at the end of the operation.

2. Planning. Planning was at first makeshift, relying upon common sense, basic training and an understanding of the mission of the unit. An OPLAN (encl 3) was published on 25 April. Enclosures (4) thru (8) were published as time went on to clarify the situation and to pass word from detachments that had operated previously. As the military situation in Viet Nam changed, contingency plans were made and discarded. Handling evacuees arriving by air or small boat, security of the DAO Compound in Saigon, assistance for the evacuation of Can Tho and security of downed aircraft were among some of the topics discussed. All of the above possibilities required the passing of word and an alteration of training. Troops were kept abreast of the situation but the changing of word and detachments was still the source of considerable confusion.

Upon arrival to the BARBOUR COUNTY, significant planning had already occurred concerning the billeting and feeding of expected refugees. Upon the detachment's

arrival, processing of the evacuees and security of the ship was discussed

Primary and alternative plans were agreed upon.

3. Training. The number of @PLANS discussed necessitated various classes for training. The more significant classes are discussed below.

Riot control. Riot control procedures were studied to insure control of large numbers of potentially hostile refugees. Formations, movements, orders and use of weapons were discussed and practiced. Riot control using fire hoses was also practiced. These classes were given in conjunction with classes on the mission of the detachment, use of deadly force, and vessel security.

Mission. The mission as given in Enclosure (3) was ... "Detachments will debark assigned shipping and proceed to designated MSC ships and provide security to insure safe transit from point of embarkation to destination." For the purposes of November Five, this mission was extended to the security of a commissioned US vessel.

Shipboard Life. The differences of life aboard ship, understanding compartmentation damage control fire aboard ship and manning the fire station were various classes given.

Vietnamese Language and Culture. Handouts were distributed for easy pronunciation of necessary Vietnamese phrases. Specific rules of etiquette were also discussed.

Weapons. Personnel familiar with the use and operation of the M60, the M79, and the LAAW were identified. Weapons maintenance periods were held, however there was a dire lack of cleaning gear.

Refugee Processing. Searching of personnel and baggage, identification of translators and doctors, segregation of agitators and feeding procedures were discussed. After action reports of previous detachments proved invaluable especially for these classes. Segregation was determined necessary. Segregation would be by families, single males, ARVN, 3d country nationals, Americans, crew members and Marines. Searching of personnel was taught by the Military

Police detachment on board the DUBUQUE. Baggage inspection was discussed with attention being brought to boobytraps. Family units were stressed to be used to gain cooperation. Translators and doctors were tagged. All weapons and explosives were to be confiscated. The ship's Master or Commanding Officer determined if this gear was to be thrown overboard or kept in the ship's armory.

Deadly Force. Instruction were given IAW the Rules Of Engagement (Encl (7) and (8)).

Embarkation/Debarcation from Helos. After assignment as the SPARROWHAWK detachment, embarkation and debarcation from helicopters and the formation of a 360 were discussed.

Troop Information. All attempts were made to keep the troops informed of the changing situation and any extra necessary information. Requests were made for the troops not to correspond about the operation with anyone. The mission of the detachments and the use of deadly force were given repeatedly.

#### 4. Operation.

Arrival of refugees by helicopter. Air America helos arrived on board the BARBOUR COUNTY bringing twenty (20) Americans, five (5) 3d country nationals and fifty (50) Vietnamese. Several weapons and explosive devices were confiscated. Enclosure (11) is a listing of some of the weapons confiscated. Some of the Air America personnel requested and received some of the confiscated weapons and ammunition, re-embarked the helos and returned to Viet Nam. As helos approached the ship, various Marine personnel were armed and positioned to take the helo under fire should it become necessary. Locking and loading the magazine and chambering a round would be only upon my order. As the refugees debarked the helos, processing was accomplished prior to their being permitted to be taken to their berthing area. The people were segregated from their baggage. Women were searched by Navy corpsmen. The men were searched by the Marines. Baggage was searched by Marines in flack jacket and helmet. Doctors and translators were

tagged. The people were then reunited with their baggage and taken to their berthing compartment. Marines were stationed along this route so no one would stray. These were family units, so segregation was unnecessary. Marine sentries were posted outside of the compartment to control access/egress to the compartment. The refugees were tired, hungry and wanted to bathe. This presented no problem. The only problem that arose was from curious American personnel and the controlled access to the compartment eliminated this problem. Our corpsman had access to the compartment to assist with medical problems. He did a commendable job. Late the following day, the refugees were transferred by small boat to the MSC ship SGT MILLER. Debarkation was very orderly. Word was then received aboard the BARBOUR COUNTY that twenty-two (22) Americans were aboard Mike boats coming down the river from Can Tho. The South Vietnamese Navy was blockading the river, not allowing the Americans to proceed down river. The VC/NVA controlled the mouth of the river. After darkness, many lights from small craft gathered at the mouth of the river. Small boats, manned by navy and Marine personnel embarked from the BARBOUR COUNTY to try and locate the American-filled boats, who by now had established communication with the BARBOUR COUNTY. Communication became broken and was lost. The small boats returned to the BARBOUR COUNTY. Word was received that the Mike boats had reached an MSC vessel and were safe.

Embarkation of the second load of Vietnamese refugees began on 2 May. They arrived in small boats. The tank deck had been prepared for the processing and billeting of the refugees. The stern gate was lowered and the processing area was set up to take advantage of the small entrance the stern gate provided. This allowed control and thoroughness during processing. During the searching of the evacuees, several items of interest were noted. Upon more than one occasion, briefcases and bundles filled with gold and American money were seen. (One man had several stacks had several stacks of fresh \$100 bills.) Also, a very large amount of heroin was confiscated and thrown overboard during the processing. It would have been very easy for smaller amounts to escape detection. After processing, the personnel were reunited with their

baggage, moved forward in the tank deck and billeted by family. There were some ARVN, however segregation proved unnecessary. After boarding was completed, the stern gate was closed and the home-made head and salt-water shower was opened. Sheets were used to divide these into male/female units and to offer some degree of privacy. After assuring the refugees there was plenty of food and water, two lines were formed; one for food and water, the other for milk for the children. (Prior to the embarkation of these evacuees, Marines were stationed on the tank deck to provide security for the ship, to prevent unnecessary personnel from entering the tank deck, and to prevent any drug-dealing.) Every four hours, Navy firemen were required to hose the aft section of the tank deck where the head was located, for sanitation reasons. Refugees appeared quiet and contented, however very curious as to what would be happening to them. They were told they would be leaving from Subic Bay to Guam for processing. Medical problems were attended to by the ship's corpsmen. On 7 May, the debarkation of this second load of refugees was accomplished. They were debarked by small boats from the stern gate. After the debarkation was completed, a final sweep of the tank deck and the entire ship was made to insure no explosive devices nor any drugs were left behind. The refugees were taken to Grande Island in Subic Bay. November Five was placed on stand-by in case any of the other detachments required assistance.

At 1800 on 8 May, liberty was suddenly secured and the ship prepared to weigh anchor. At 2050, the ship was underway. After leaving the channel, it was announced that the ship was going to intercept Cambodian warships that had fled their country and were asking for asylum. Because of the shortage of crew and Marines aboard, the Marines were to man the 50 cal machine guns, if it became necessary. There were no incidences and the BARBOUR COUNTY escorted the Cambodian ships (now flying American colors and under the command of US Navy officers) into Subic.

5. Problems. There was no time for an initial op-plan.

Orders were not received for LCpl DOWSING. PFRs were not received for LCpl DOWSING, PFC SCHINGS and PFC BARRIENTES.

The rapidly changing situation created some confusion.

6. Recommendations. A better idea as to the mission of the detachment would have allowed for training prior to embarking aboard shipping. Also, insure all personnel have taken care of the following prior to departure from their parent unit: Record of Emergency Data reviewed, SGLI reviewed, dog tags checked, Geneva Convention cards passed out, equipment checked, weapons inspected and final rosters completed. (This was not always done with personnel that augmented the detachment.)

EXAMPLES OF SOME OF THE WEAPONS CONFISCATED DURING THE  
PROCESSING OF REFUGEES

M3 SUBMACHINE GUN

5.56 MM M16A1

9MM PISTOL

.32 PISTOL

.380 AUTO COLT

.45 PISTOL

.38 SPECIAL

LICENCE UZI

ARC/RT -60B

.25 PISTOL

.357 PISTOL

ENCLOSURE (10)

*Enclosure (10)*

## SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Event	Date
November Detachment formed	18 Apr
Depart Camp Hansen, arrive Futema	18 Apr
Depart Futema, arrive Cubi Point	18 Apr
Cubi Point, arrive USS DUBUQUE, LPD 8	19 Apr
Quebec Detachment formed	23 Apr
Quebec Detachment designated GRAND HAWK detachment	24 Apr
November Detachment departs DUBUQUE, boards AMERICAN CHALLENGER	26 Apr
Quebec Detachment split, November Five formed	26 Apr
November Five depart DUBUQUE, boards BARBOUR COUNTY LST 1195	27 Apr
BARBOUR COUNTY to escort American Challenger to Phu Quoc Is.	27 Apr
BARBOUR COUNTY receives new orders, returns off Can Tho	28 Apr
Arrival of refugees by Air America helos	29 Apr
Departure of refugees	30 Apr
Arrival of refugees by small boats	2 May
Enroute to Subic Bay	2 May
Departure of refugees to Grande Is,	7 May
BARBOUR COUNTY weighs anchor to intercept Cambodian warships	8 May
Return to Subic Bay	9 May
BARBOUR COUNTY sails for Okinawa	12 May
Return to Subic Bay upon receipt of word concerning SS MAYAGUEZ	14 May
Depart BARBOUR COUNTY, arrive Cubi Point	14 May
Depart Cubi Point, arrive Futema	14 May
Depart Futema, arrive Camp Hansen	14 May

ENCLOSURE (11)

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

FREQUENT WIND

18 APRIL 1975

Detached from L/4 and attached to the Special Marine Ships Guard, later changed to Amphibious Evacuation Security Force. The remaining two companies from L/4 debarked from the DUBUQUE. MP's made a PX run in preparation for returning to sea. The 72 man detachments of the Amphibious Evacuation Security Forces embarked on the DUBUQUE. With eight detachments (+) embarked, the DUBUQUE set sail for the RVN coast.

19 APRIL 1975

Detachments were broken down into 54 man units, giving a total of twelve detachments. Two MP's were assigned to each of the first six detachments with the highest priority for deployment. Training schedule was drawn up to better prepare the detachments for their upcoming missions. Attention was given to drawing from the experience of the MP's, ITT, and CIT. MP's were to instruct classes on conducting searches, riot/crowd control, and processing of refugees. Priority of instruction was to those detachments which would be deployed first.

20 APRIL 1975

Riot/crowd control classes were given to four detachments, and search classes were given to two detachments. DUBUQUE reached the holding area off the RVN coast.

21 APRIL 1975

No deployments were anticipated as no MSC ships had left Newport Pier. Possibility existed of deploying by late evening or early morning of 22 April. Plans were drawn up for a Sparrow Hawk contingency and also for deployment to the DAO compound and Newport Pier. Two MP's were assigned to the Sparrow Hawk unit. Two teams of six MP's each were formed to support DAO and Newport Pier by providing a processing capability. MP's, ITT, and CIT developed a concept of operation for processing procedures to support both DAO and Newport Pier.

22 APRIL 1975

Two detachments were instructed in the proper procedures for searching and removing weapons. Processing teams were revised into three 5 man teams. Two MP's were pulled from the last priority detachment to full fill this commitment. The teams were to stand by on a deploy as required basis. Three detachments; Papa, Victor, and Sierra deployed to the MSC ships; Green Port, Pioneer Contender, and Sgt Miller respectively. Sgt GEORGE and LCpl NYLLESTED were attached to Papa, Cpl BRAKEFIELD and LCpl JONES to Victor, and Cpl LIPE and LCpl MARTIN to Sierra.

23 APRIL 1975

Classes were instructed in conducting a search, riot/crowd control, and processing of refugees.

24 APRIL 1975

Processing teams were dissolved in order to provide two MP's to each detachment. This was caused by preparations to deploy more detachments to MSC ships. All MP's were assigned to the detachments in two man teams. India and Tango detachments were deployed to the MSC ships, Pioneer Commander and Green Forest respectively. Cpl GARVEY and PFC CONAWAY were attached to India and LCpl CHRISTIANSON and LCpl STIPP were attached to Tango. Classes were instructed in riot/crowd control and the processing of refugees.

25 APRIL 1975

November detachment deployed to the MSC ship American Challenger. PFC PARHAM and PFC LEASK were attached to Tango. A trip was made to the Green Port, Green Forest, Pioneer Contender, and Pioneer Commander to visit with MP's and deliver and pick up mail. Orders were received to be prepared to begin loading refugees at first light on 26 April. One officer was to embark on each ship containing a detachment to brief the OIC. MP responsibility was to brief the Green Port.

26 APRIL 1975

Orders were not received to commence Frequent Wind operations. American Challenger loaded 5000 refugees with MP's screening and removing all weapons. Then ordered to Phu Quoc Island to off load. Plans were drawn up to organize remaining MP's into as many as four processing teams. Teams were to process refugees on LST causways prior to their embarking on MSC shipping.

27 APRIL 1975

Saigon was the target of an early morning rocket attack. Higher state of readiness was assumed in preparation for Saigon's fall. Assumed additional duties as personnel officer and Kilo detachment commander. Trip was made to all MSC ships except American Challenger to visit with MP's and deliver and pick up mail. American Challenger commenced off loading refugees and then stood by off the coast of Phu Quoc Island.

28 APRIL 1975

Plans were made for the processing of refugees aboard the DUBUQUE and also the security of DEBUQUE. A report was received that Cpl CANTU attached to November detachment had a fractured pelvis, received in a fall. Medivac could not be arranged due to the late hour, but would be arranged at first light from Utopia, Thailand. Strafing runs made on Tan San Hut airfield by two jets. Full alert status set to prepare to receive RVN helicopters.

29 APRIL 1975

Formed a helo reaction team from Kilo to cover any RVN helicopters that might arrive. Two RVN hueys arrived carrying about 25 refugees. MP processing team confiscated all weapons found during search of refugees and their baggage. All weapons were turned over to Navy Master at Arms. Hueys were dumped over the fan tail. Refugees were flown to the U.S.S. Mount Vernon. Helos were dispatched to evacuate DAO and the embassy. DUBUQUE was ordered to steam south. No destination or mission was disclosed. Cpl CANTU medicated to Utopia, Thailand with only bruises and abrasions. Green Port, Pioneer Contender, Sgt Miller, Pioneer Commander, and Green Forest commenced loading refugees at Vung Tau. Respectively the numbers loaded were 4,000, 8,000, 6,100, 6,500, and 3,900. MP's searched and removed weapons from refugees and their baggage. American Challenger commenced loading refugees at Phu Quoc Island. Approximately 6,00 were loaded.

30 APRIL 1975

Destination was given as Phu Quoc Island with a mission of refueling all RVN helicopters fleeing from South Vietnam. All helos were to be directed to Thailand. Four RVN helicopters arrived with about 100 refugees. All weapons were removed and helos were refueled. Helos were sent on to Thailand. DUBUQUE moved farther out to sea to keep distance from South Vietnamese gun boats. American Challenger departed Phu Quoc for Vung Tau.

1 MAY 1975

DUBUQUE took aboard one sam pan with 10 refugees aboard MP's processed these refugees. Orders were received to steam to Vung Tau. MSC fleet ordered to sail for Subic Bay.

2 MAY 1975

DUBUQUE changed course and set sail for Subic Bay at flank speed. No problems had been reported from the detachments aboard MSC ships.

3 MAY 1975

All ships on course for Subic Bay. No orders received for action to take up on arrival.

4 MAY 1975

The AESF to include MP detachment were chopped open to BLT 2/4. All Marines debarked from DUBUQUE at lower MAU camp. Romeo and Kilo detachments were billeted at NAVCOM STATION San Miguel. MP's and remaining Marines were billeted at Subic Bay. Hotel detachment deployed to the MSC ship Trans Colorado. Cpl ZIELAN and PFC MURRAY were attached to Hotel. About 3000 refugees were loaded from the Greenville Victory. Pioneer Commander and American Challenger were ordered directly to Guam with no stop at Subic Bay. Sgt Miller off loaded their 6100 refugees at Grande Island. Green Forest off loaded their 3900 refugees at Grande Island. American Challenger arrived at Guam and off loaded. Then ordered to return to Subic Bay. Liberty call was sounded for all Marines.

5 MAY 1975

Pioneer Contender off loaded 2500 refugees on Grande Island and was ordered to proceed to Guam with remaining 5000 refugees. Trans Colorado was ordered to proceed to Guam. Uniform detachment deployed to MSC ship Green Wave. Sgt LOUCHS and PFC CARRICO were attached to Uniform. Mike detachment deployed to MSC ship American Racer. Cpl SAMUELSON and PFC LINDAHL were attached.

6 MAY 1975

Green Port off loaded their 4000 refugees to the American Racer. Romeo and Kilo detachments return from San Miguel to Subic Naval Station. Conversation with MP's aboard MSC ships determined that some were being abused. Abuse took the form of mess duty and gear watches. In some cases they were regarded as extra personnel to handle the unwanted hard work. This led to MP's being removed from Green Port, American Racer, Green Wave, Sgt Miller, and Green Forest. MP's removed were Sgt GEORGE, LCpl HYLLESTED, Cpl SAMUELSON, PFC LINDAHL, Sgt LOUCHS, PFC CARRICO, K Cpl LIBE, LCpl MARTIN, LCpl CHRISTIANSON, and LCpl STIPP. All MP's in Subic Bay area were now under MP detachment control. Preparations made for MP OIC to take Kilo detachment aboard Green Port on 7 May. Gysgt TAYLOR assumed control of 15 other MP's at Subic.

7 MAY 1975

Three main stations were established on the pier to process refugees from the Vietnamese flotilla to the MSC ships. At 1700 commenced processing refugees and loading them on Green Wave and Green Port. All weapons were removed from person and baggage and placed in receptacles provided. About 8500 refugees had been processed at 2400, 7 May.

7 MAY 1975 (con't)

Green Wave departed with 4500 refugees for Guam. The MSC ship Kimbro took the vacant docking space.

8 MAY 1975

At 0300 Green Port departed for Guam with 4000 refugees aboard. The MSC ship Green Forest replaced the Green Port. Continued processing through out the night. During early morning hours the processing rate had to be speeded up as the Navy was bringing in Vietnamese ships more rapidly. At this time two more stations were established to handle an increased number of small ships being docked. The processing pace was increased again due to the extremely torrid heat conditions. Vietnamese refugees were passing out from the heat, adding to the confusion already prevalent on the pier. An increasing problem was Naval officers with dependants present attempting to obtain souvenirs. The added confusion of these sightseers and the problems they created attempting to obtain souvenirs caused action to be taken to remove them from the scene. At 1600 all ships of the Vietnamese flotilla had been processed. Approximately 10,500 refugees were processed between 0001 and 1600, bringing the total count to about 19,000. Liberty was sounded for MP detachment after completing a difficult strenuous mission. American Challenger arrived at Subic Bay. MP's were detached to MP detachment.

9 MAY 1975

The commander AESF reported high praise from a Navy admiral for the job well done during two days of processing. Attempts were being made to arrange transportation to return to Okinawa. Orders were to stand by until transportation arranged.

10 MAY 1975

Pioneer Commander, American Challenger, and Pioneer Contender off loaded refugees at Guam. Over night billeting was arranged at Marine Barracks, Guam.

11 MAY 1975

Cpl BRAKEFIELD, PFC CONAWAY, Cpl GARVEY, LCpl JONES, PFC MURRAY, and Cpl ZIELAN returned to Okinawa via jet from Guam.

12 MAY 1975

MP detachment boarded the U.S.S. Barb our County and started proceeding to Okinawa. Green Port arrived in Guam and off loaded its 4000 refugees. Lt. STREITZ boarded at 2200 a jet bound for Okinawa.

13 MAY 1975

Lt. STREITZ returned to Okinawa via air transportation from Guam. At 0845 Barbour County was ordered to return to Subic Bay.

14 MAY 1975

MP detachment debarked from Barbour County. The detachment was separated into two teams of twelve and six. The twelve man team was scheduled to fly back to Okinawa. The twelve MP's that returned to Okinawa were: SSgt POMEROY, Cpl BRAKEFIELD, PFC CONNOLLY, Sgt GEORGE, LCpl HYLLESTED, PFC LEASK, LCpl MARTIN, PFC PARHAM, Cpl SAMUELSON, and LCpl STIPP. The remaining six man team was billeted at Naval Transit Facilities at Subic Bay. Orders were to stand by to be flown to naval shipping enroute to Thailand. At 1900 word was to sound liberty since no personnel were to be moved before first light.

15 MAY 1975

Orders were recieved at 0830 to stand down from Thailand contingency and prepare for 30 minute stand by to return to Okinawa. At 1630 word was to sound liberty as no transportation available this day.

16 MAY 1975

MP detachment boarded the U.S.S. Okinawa at 1500 for return to Okinawa. Departure time was set for 1700. Change delayed departure until 17 May so liberty was sounded.

17 MAY 1975

MP detachment off loaded U.S.S. Okinawa as the ship would remain for 20 more days in Subic Bay. Transportation via air was arranged. Following MP's arrived in Okinawa: GySgt TAYLOR, PFC CARRICO, LCpl CHRISTIANSON, PFC DARNES, LCpl RAY, and Cpl STICKELMEYER.

HEADQUARTERS  
Amphibious Evacuation Security Force  
3rd Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

6/DAQ/trd  
3000  
18 Jul 1975

From: Officer in Charge  
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
Subj: After Action Report  
Encl: (1) Narrative Summary of Operations  
(2) Lessons Learned

1. On 17 April 1975, III MAF activated a Special Marine Ship's Guard of Military Sealift Command (MSC) shipping. This force, subsequently renamed the Amphibious Evacuation Security Force (AESF), was formed from 3rd Marine Division organizations and was originally formed into ten 72-man security detachments, plus a control group. The AESF deployed to Subic Bay during the period 17 - 18 April 1975, for further transfer to MSC shipping. The AESF reported to CTG 79.1 for operations on 20 April 1975 and was assigned task designator, TU 79.1.7. On 3 May 1975, CTU 79.1.7 was chopped to CTF 76. During the period 26 April to 14 May 1975, the AESF was responsible for the security of 13 ships and for the welfare of 67,437 evacuees. On 25 May 1975, the AESF was chopped back to CTF 79. On 31 May 1975, the AESF was deactivated. Enclosure (1) is a summary, in the narrative form, of AESF operations.

2. The primary mission of the AESF was to assist MSC ship's masters in matters of ship security and other refugee related matters, e.g., searching and screening. Marines aboard the MSC ships eventually performed, in addition to security functions, myriad tasks including food distribution, census information collection, child care, and medical assistance. Enclosure (2) contains a listing of lessons learned in the accomplishment of the mission.

D. A. QUINLAN

LESSONS LEARNED1. The Cardinal Rule

Comment. In every case, the AESF Detachments were aboard the evacuation ships prior to embarking refugees. Hereby, the loading of refugees was conducted in an orderly and controlled manner and most importantly they thusly were individually searched as soon as they came on board. In contrast, the evacuation from MR1 and MR2 stands out. The evacuation ships were over-loaded with refugees and the situation was in extremes in several cases before the security platoons from 1st Battalion, 4th Marines were summoned to the scene. In several cases these platoons were obliged literally to force their way on board and because there had been no authority present to enforce disarming as the refugees came on board, the later arriving Marines were subjected to the increased threat of bodily harm. In some cases these Marines were subjected to fire from dissident elements among the refugees.

Recommendation. Get the security detachment aboard the ship prior to embarking refugees.

2. Prepare the ship prior to embarkation of evacuees/refugees

Comment. There are many things that can and should be done prior to embarking refugees/evacuees. "Duck Walk" should be built to provide easy access to the holds for all concerned. Water barrels need to be located in strategic areas both on deck and in the holds to provide adequate fresh water for drinking and cooking. Lister bags would be even better if available. Portable heads and a means to empty them while underway without getting fecal material/urine over the side of the ship are a must for the forward part of the ship. Semi-permanent heads that open directly to the sea or are placed over the rail are adequate for the after portion of the ship. The ships fire stations make an excellent place to set up make-shift showers with fire hoses for personal hygiene, and clothes washing, and head flushing. Large pieces of canvas that could be rigged over the holds would provide protection from sun and rain for the hold/deck areas. In future operations additional outfitting of the ships should be undertaken time permitting i.e. utilization of the massive steam capacity available for using steam kettles. Provide as much wood as possible for use in making fires if steam not available. (Providing the Ship's Master concurs that a limited number of cooking fires can be controlled and that there is minimum risk to the ship). Provide sufficient tarpaulin, plastic sheeting or tentage for cover and protections of elements.

*from the* ENCLOSURE (2)

Recommendation. Install as many of the above as time permits prior to embarkation of refugees/evacuees.

### 3. Search Everyone

Comment. There is, at times, a reluctance acquired by our social customs to treat women, the elderly, and children in the same manner as one would treat the adolescent to middle aged males. This custom, as it were, must be subjugated in favor of a policy of firm, but equal attentiveness when searching refugees, i.e., just because a mother is coming aboard with children is no reason to be less suspicious of what she may be carrying on her person or in her bag. A case in point, several instances of females carrying grenades and explosives were reported.

Recommendation. Without exception, unless each individual coming aboard can be vouched for by a trusted agent, everyone who comes aboard a refugee ship should be thoroughly searched.

### 4. The "S's" of POW Processing are Applicable

Comment. The doctrinal method of handling POW's i.e., Search, Silence, Segregate, Speed and Safeguard, is equally applicable when processing refugees. The matter of search was discussed, above. With regards to segregation; if at all possible, the evacuees, i.e., U.S. citizens and third countries personnel, should be segregated from the refugees. The refugees should be further subdivided into groups as follows: families, single females, and single males. The later group should be well separated from the others and more closely controlled until such time as a lessening of tight security is warranted - if at all. Once the search and segregation is conducted the refugees should be moved to their respective berthing areas as rapidly as possible. At all times keep them away from the railings where they would have the opportunity to throw over lines to others in boats alongside and thereby hoist aboard contraband (this occurred during the evacuation from MR1 and MR2). Once in their respective berthing areas, maintain segregation. Particular care should be exercised to ensure that single females and families groups are not subjected to bully-boy tactics on the part of the single males, especially during meal hours.

Recommendation. Refugees should be, in all cases, searched, segregated, sped to holding areas, and safeguarded.

ENCLOSURE (2)

## 5. Formulate a Security Plan

Comment. There are several different classes of ship in MSC Fleet. Therefore no one specific plan of security can be considered applicable to all. There are however two paramount requirements which are applicable to all, i.e., securing the ships vital areas, and a processing plan for refugees. Upon boarding a ship designated to embark evacuees, it is essential that the Detachment Commander and his key personnel have a clear understanding of the location of the ships vital spaces and the access points thereto. Additionally, the manner in which the evacuees are to be brought aboard - when, where, and how many must be clearly understood before an appropriate processing plan can be formulated.

Recommendation. That, among the first in orders of business, the Detachment Commander gain a clear understanding of the ships characteristics and vital areas and that he formulate a processing plan appropriate to the particular ship.

## 6. Securing the Vital Spaces

Comment. The ships vital engineering and navigation/connning spaces must be secure. During the evacuation from South Vietnam, this was the first order of business when a Detachment boarded a ship.

Recommendation. The ship's vital spaces should be secured in the following manner:

a. All hatches secured by a large external lock and by chains on the inside with the exception of two hatchways which give access into the superstructure.

b. The two hatches on the main level which give access to the superstructure be manned by four Marines each.

c. Other hatches on upper levels be accessible by ladderways from the main deck, manned by two Marines each plus a reactionary force of 6 Marines on a 24 hour call.

## 7. Bringing Refugees Aboard

Comment. The ideal way to bring refugees aboard a ship, if conditions permit, is to bring them up an accommodation ladder one-at-a-time. Hereby a controlled load can be more easily accomplished.

Recommendation. That as a general rule, the following procedures be applied when embarking evacuees:

ENCLOSURE (2)

a. Military Policemen Marines stationed at the head of the gangway to search the evacuees coming aboard.

b. Corpsmen also stationed at the head of the gangplank to identify persons requiring immediate medical attention, who would then escorted to the Sick Bay by Marines.

c. All Marines not committed to a specific task located near the gangway to aid and guide the evacuees to their locations on the ship.

#### 8. Organize refugees/evacuees

Comment. Divide the ship into small "communities" along normal physical divisions of the ship. In each of these areas assign one person who speaks English and has served in some authoritarian position. If the ship's superstructure is amidships, assign one person with similar prerequisites to control the forward portion of the ship, another, the after portion. Finally, assign one man to control/coordinate all the activities for the ship. To this man, assign one person to take charge of a galley crew. Now, the "community" leaders can assign their own people in the numbers required to provide for sanitation, feeding, watering, et al, and the "chief cook" can assign his cooks. Work through the assigned leaders to accomplish the mission.

Recommendation. That the refugees/evacuees be organized as indicated above as soon as possible for smooth operation.

#### 9. Medical Treatment

Comment. The original plan for medical support was to provide for the embarked detachment only. Everyone knew that we would be treating evacuees/refugees as necessary.

Recommendation. That adequate medical supplies be provided to treat the evacuees/refugees. Identify doctors to work in the sick-bay/hospital as soon as possible. Always have a doctor available for emergencies.

#### 10. Organization of the Security Detachment

Comment. As originally formed, the AESF Detachments were comprised of three security sections plus a headquarters. It became necessary to increase the number of detachments to provide security for a prospectively larger number of ships. Therefore, given a fixed number of Marines, it was necessary to reduce the size of the original detachments in order to create more detachments. The most orderly manner in which

ENCLOSURE (2)

this could be done under the circumstances, was to reduce the number of sections per detachment from three to two. Hereby ten 72-man detachments were reorganized into fourteen 54-man detachments. However, the 54 men organized into two 20-man sections and a small headquarters group did not provide for the fact that security for the ship was a 24 hour/day job and controlling and ministering to refugees/evacuees, an 18 hour/day job. There is not time to properly rest the personnel without a third section.

Recommendation. That, if at all possible, security detachments be manned as originally planned, i.e., with three sections plus a headquarters.

11. Engineer with metal detector.

Comment. On a metal ship, even with a small platform built, the effectiveness of the detector is minimal. Additionally, the operator is only good for 20 minutes per hour. Given a large number of people to be screened, the time that it would take to screen each individual with a detector, renders the detector screening infeasible.

Recommendation. Drop the engineer with detector from the detachment and replace with an additional MP for physical screening of personnel.

12. AN/PIQ-5 Communication Support

Comment. In the areas to be covered, the AN/PIQ-5's were just not powerful enough to provide adequate communication support.

Recommendation. That a stronger model portable sound system be supplied.

13. Size of the AESF Control Group Staff

Comment. Quite simply two officers and six enlisted men (4 radio operators and two clerks) are an insufficiently large group to control and support a force of approximately 750 men. It was necessary to assign several officers in detachment command billets the additional duties of:

Personnel Officer  
Intelligence/Operations Officer  
Logistics Officer  
Communications Officer  
Embarkation Officer

ENCLOSURE (2)

Additionally, it was necessary to augment the AESF Headquarters message center with personnel from the detachments. Marine ingenuity, initiative, vigor, and a will to work round-the-clock cannot indefinitely make up for a shortage of key staff personnel.

Recommendation. That for similar operations of this magnitude and scope, as a minimum, sufficient officers be assigned to the Control Group to fill the above listed billets. Additionally, that sufficient enlisted personnel be assigned to man a three section watch in the message center and operations center, i.e., 22 message center and radio operators (3 sections of 7, plus chief) plus 10 clerks (3 sections of 3, plus a chief).

#### 14. Logistical Requirements.

Comment. The list of resupply items for a refugee laden ship, e.g., instant milk, sanitary napkins, baby bottles with nipples, powdered formula, is sufficient to bring tears to the eyes of an over-worked logistics officer. These are unquestionably required items given the composition of the passenger list. Therefore, it is essential that the above described items plus countless other necessities of life be in ample and readily available supply from the outset of the operation. During FREQUENT WIND, they were not. That they did eventually become available is a marvel and a mark of the outstanding resourcefulness of the U. S. Navy's Service Forces and Supply Corps.

Recommendation. That, if time permits, for future operations of this magnitude, the everyday supplies necessary to fulfill the needs of women and children, particularly infants, be prestaged aboard refugee ships in addition to the staples and medical supplies.

#### 15. Crew-served Weapons.

Comment. The AESF Detachments were armed with M-16s, 45s, and shotguns. Considerable operational flexibility was hereby impeded, and considerably more risk was attached to certain deployment options due to the lack of crew-served weapons. Although the options was never exercised, there was the distinct possibility that AESF Detachments would be either flown into Saigon to board ships at the Newport Piers, load refugees and sail down the Saigon River; or sail up the Bassac River aboard "Mike" boats to load refugees at San Tho. In either eventuality, in order to provide maximum security to the ship and afford maximum protection to the embarked Marines and passengers, it would have been prudent to provide each detachment with a minimum of two M-60 machine guns and two M-79

ENCLOSURE (2)

grenade launchers in addition to M-72 LAAWs. During FREQUENT WIND, it also became obvious that "show of force" did much to enhance cooperation. In this regard, a manned machine gun would further accentuate this display of authority and assurance of complete, initial control. Furthermore, on one occasion, off Phu Quoc Island, one of the refugee ships was confronted by a group of machine gun equipped "Swift" boats. Were it not for an accompanying destroyer interposing itself between the "Swifts" and the ship, it is conjectural that the Marine Security Detachment would have been outgunned should the MSC ship have been unescorted and should a fire fight have ensued.

Recommendation. That security detachments be organized with one machine gun squad and three grenadiers (one per section) as a minimum.

ENCLOSURE (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

AESF OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Document</u>
1	3rdMarDiv LOI 5-75
2	FRAGO 1-75
3	AESF Operation Plan 1-75 (Frequent Wind)
4	AESF Rules of Engagement
5	CTF 76 242344Z May75

Tab B

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ZITOTDUR KUNOAMAYDQ 19/1830-0000--AUNGRAT.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 ZOM RUMOPRATEDP REROU F RUMRADA2510 1071355  
 RUMORHY T CTG SEVEN NINE PT NINE  
 Z 1 171300Z APR 75  
 FM LHO SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
 TO ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT TWO  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT THREE  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FOUR  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT NINE  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE  
 ZENACTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE FOUR  
 AMFOROACTE SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE PT ONE  
 RUMORBAZ TG SEVEN NINE PT SIX  
 INFO ZENACTE SEVEN NINE  
 RUMORNSACTO SEVEN NINE PT NINE  
 RUMOROGA/171 MAF LHO SUBIC BAY RP  
 PT

WU: 2233  
 TOC 15582-17A0275/T  
 COG: MARINES  
 CO  
 S-3  
 S-1  
 S-2  
 S-4  
 C-10  
 A  
 B  
 C  
 D

SECTION 1 OF 5  
 171 MAF LHO PASS TO MAJ QUINLAN OIC  
 DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP  
 LOI 5-75 SPECIAL MARINE SHIPS GUARD (SMSG) (U)  
 A. ON THIRD MARCH 070221Z APR 75 (C)  
 1. (C) GENERAL REF A IS CANCELLED AND THIS LOI PUBLISHED  
 TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE FOR EXECUTION. ALL  
 PAGE TWO SUBPARAGRAPHS CONFIDENTIAL  
 DEPLOYMENT OF THIRTEEN (13) SEVENTY-TWO (72) MAR DETS  
 FOR SHIPS GUARDS, AN OIC AND SMALL DETACHMENT CONTROL GRP  
 (DCG) HAS BEEN EST AT SUBIC BAY TO PROVIDE NECESSARY  
 DIRECTION AND COORD UNTIL THESE DETS ARE ASSIGNED TO THEIR  
 RESPECTIVE SHIPS. DETS WILL LEAVE FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE  
 CAMPS BY TRUCK CONVOY AND MOVE TO MCAS (H) FUEFMA FOR FURTHER EMBARK  
 AND TRANSPORT BY MARINE C-130 A/C TO CUBI PT. FROM CUBI PT DETS  
 WILL SHIP IN DESIGNATED SHIPS FOR TRANSPORT TO WATERS OFF  
 RUMORBAZ. REFUGEES WILL BE EVAC. MARINE DETS WILL  
 PROVIDE SHIPS SECURITY DURING EVAC UNDER CONTROL SHIPS MASTER.  
 2. EACH PARENT UNIT ORGANIZES AND PREPARES FOR TRUCK  
 CONVOY AND AIR TRANSPORT THEIR ASSIGNED DET. THE FOLLOWING  
 SCHEDULE ESTABLISHES THE TIME EACH DET IS DUE TO ARR AT  
 MCAS (H) FUEFMA FOR EMBARKATION ABOARD C-130 AIRCRAFT. READ DET  
 ARRIVAL TIMES IN THREE COLUMNS. (PARENT UNIT, DET TITLE,  
 ARRIVAL TIME AT FUEFMA).

931

12TH MAR	ECHO AND FOXTROT	16 CUBI PT
14TH MAR	SIERRA AND TANGO	180700Z APR 75
4TH MAR	PAPA	180700Z APR 75
7TH COMBAT	INDIA	180700Z APR 75
PAGE THREE RUMORBAZ CONFIDENTIAL		
10TH COM	UNIFORM	181500Z APR 75
10TH BRCH GR	HOTEL	181500Z APR 75
10TH SMC PT	NOVEMBER	181500Z APR 75
9TH MAR/HC	VICTOR	181500Z APR 75
10TH AC	WHISKEY (NOTE 1)	HOLD PENDING DETER

OTHER BOARDERS  
 AWAITING PERM AND  
 (IF REQ)  
 AWAITING DETER-  
 MINATION OF AVAIL

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17

13

55

(C) SITUATION

- 1. ENEMY - SEE CURRENT ITSUMS
- 2. FRIENDLY

- (1) THIRTEEN (13) DETACHMENTS OF 70 PERS EACH BE PROVIDED AS FOL.
- (A) DETS S AND T PROVIDED BY HQBN
- (B) DET P PROVIDED BY 4TH MAR
- (C) DET U PROVIDED BY 7K BN
- (D) DET H FROM

NEED BY ENGR BN

- (E) DET N PROVIDED BY SVC BN

PAGE FOUR RUMBARA2510 C O N F I D E N T

- (F) DET V PROVIDED BY 9TH MAR/HQ
- (G) DET W PROVIDED BY AMTRAC
- (H) DET Y PROVIDED BY HQBN
- (I) DET L AND Z PROVIDED BY 7TH COMM
- (J) DET E AND F PROVIDED BY 12TH MAR

C. ATTACHMENTS - EACH DET IS AUGMENTED BY MED, MP, ENGR AND ITT (AS SPECIFIED) PERS

2. (C) MISSION. TO PROVIDE SPECIAL MARINE SHIPS GUARD ON DESIGNATED SHIPS EMPLOYED IN THE EVAC OF RVN REFUGEES.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

A. MOVEMENT FROM PARENT CAMPS BY TRUCK CONVOY TO MCAS (H) FUEMA AS SCHEDULED.

P. ALL DETS, ORGANIC GEAR AND SUPPLIES WILL BE SPREAD LOADED ON TWO C-119 AIRCRAFT. SPECIFIC LOAD INDR WILL BE PROVIDED AT FUEMA BY DN G-4 NFP IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1ST MAW REP.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) ALL ATTACHMENTS RPT TO ASSIGNED DETS ASAP AFTER RECEIPT THIS MSG, EXCEPT DETS V, Y AND Z RPT ON ORDER.

(2) DETS WILL CHOP TO CTF SEVEN NINE UPON EMBARK

PAGE FIVE RUMBARA2510 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ABOARD DEPARTURE FIXED WING A/C AT APOE.

(3) ITT ATTACHMENTS TO DETS H, N, V, W, Y AND Z WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN AVAIL.

(4) SEVENTY-TWO MAN DETS WILL BE ORGANIZED INTO A HQS AND TWO E TWENTY MAN SQS. EACH SECTION WILL BE DIVIDED INTO TWO NINE MAN SQUADS EACH CONTAINING TWO FOUR MAN TEAMS. PSAD IN THREE COLUMNS (UNIT, STRENGTH BY USMC OFF/ENL, USN OFF/ENL)

DET	2/67	8/3 (NOTE 1)
HQ	2/7 (NOTE 2)	30/3 (NOTE 1)
SECTION	6/20 (NOTE 3) & 8	6/6
SQUAD	2/8 (NOTE 4)	6/6
TEAM	3/4 (NOTE 5)	6/6

NOTE 1-3 HOSPITAL CORPSPAN

NOTE 2- CONSISTS OF 1 CAPT, 1LT, 1GYSGT 1SSGT, 1 RADIO  
OP, 1 ENGR, 1 ITT, 1 MP, AND 1 ADMIN MAN

NOTE 3- 1SSGT SECTION LDR, 1 RADIO OP AND TWO 9 MAN SQUADS

NOTE 4 - 1 SGT SQUAD LDR AND TWO FOUR MAN TEAMS

NOTE 5 - 1 CPL TEAM LDR AND THREE EPL.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

PAGE SIX RUMRABAP2510 C O N F I D E N T I A L

A. ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THE DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP (DCG) (TWO OFFICERS AND  
SIX ENLISTED) WILL COORDINATE DETACHMENT ADMINISTRATIVE  
MATTER TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE.

(2) EACH DETACHMENT WILL BE FORMED BY DSO, AND WILL  
CONSIST OF ONE CAPTAIN, DETACHMENT COMMANDER/DC ONE LIEUTENANT  
ASSISTANT, FIVE SNCO'S TWENTY NCO'S AND THIRTY NINE E-1/E-3  
PROVIDED BY UNIT DESIGNATED. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WILL BE  
IDENTIFIED FROM BELOW.

1 MP

1 TRANSLATOR (6 DETS ONLY)

1 INTEGRATOR OPERATOR (ENGINEER)

3 HOSPITAL CORPSPAN

DETACHMENTS WILL FORM AT PARENT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

(3) PERSONNEL WILL REPORT TO THEIR DESIGNATED DETACHMENTS  
WITH PFR, HEALTH AND DENTAL RECORDS. SRBS WILL REMAIN WITH  
PARENT UNIT. RTD AND EAS TO BE SUFFICIENT FOR DEPLOYMENT  
THROUGH 1 JUNE 75.

(4) LEAVE. THERE WILL BE NO ANNUAL LEAVE DURING THIS  
DEPLOYMENT. EMERGENCY LEAVE WILL BE GRANTED BY THIS  
ADS 1 JUL 1975

BT

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RRHH  
VZCZCYHACD1  
ZTYCZOVN RUMRPA2511 1871333-CCCC--RUMRNY.  
ZNY CCCCC  
ZOV RUMRPA1936 REROUTE OF RUMRPA2511 1871333  
RUMRNY T 090 SEVEN NINE PT ONEZ  
Z C 171500Z APR 75

FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
TO ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT TWO  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT THREE TO: (S) 132/19 APR 75 (T) /  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FOUR  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT SIX  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT SEVEN  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT EIGHT  
ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT NINE  
RHMGGGA/CTE SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE PT ONE  
RUAQAMA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT SIX  
INFO ZEN/CTF SEVEN NINE  
RHMGGGS/CTG SEVEN NINE PT NINE  
RHMGGGA/XII NAF LNO SUBIC BAY RP  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //003126// SECTION 2 OF 3 SECTIONS  
HEADQUARTERS UPON RECEIPT OF INFORMATION NECESSITATING SUCH  
LEADS.

- (S) DISBURSING. DEY CHORE MAY ARRANGE FOR PAY PAGE TWO RUMRPA2511C O N F I D E N T I A L ON AN AS REQUIRED BASIS WITH DISBURSING OFFICERS AT SUBIC BAY OR WITH ANY AVAILABLE BLY DISBURSING OFFICER, AS APPROPRIATE.
- (C) INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES. ALL INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES WILL BE REPORTED TO THE DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP (DCG) INFO THIS HQ. CASUALTY INFO WILL CONSIST OF THE FOL AS A MINIMUM:
  - (A) GRADE, NAME, SSN
  - (B) PARENT OR GUARDIAN (IF CASUALTY OBLIG TO ACQUIRE)
  - (C) TYPE INJURY, I.E. BURNED LEFT ARM, HEAD INJURY, ETC.
  - E.G. (D) CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS, I.E. GOOD/BEST, SERIOUS/POOR, ETC (THREE ITEMS TO BE MEDICAL DETERMINATIONS IF AVAILABLE).
  - (E) NATURE AND BRIEF CIRCUMSTANCES AND INJURY OR DEATH INCIDENT.
  - (F) ADVISE IF REENLISTED OR IF RESUME CONTACTED.
  - (G) ADVISE IF INDIV DESIRES NOT BE REPORTED.

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(7) SOCIAL. DET MEMBERS WILL CONTINUE TO USE PRESENT MAILING ADDRESS. UNIT MAIL ORDERLINES WILL SORT INCOMING MAIL AND BUNDLE MAIL FOR DET PERSONNEL. BUNDLES WILL BE IDENTIFIED WITH LETTER OZ AND PAGE THREE ENHYPACASSIC O N F I D E N T I A L . RETURNED TO DIVISION POST OFFICE FOR FURTHER FORWARDING TO DET. DET CMDRS WILL MAKE LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR OUTGOING MAIL, DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES.

(8) PARENT UNIT COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE FOLLOWING UNIT DIARY ENTRY IS MADE FOR DET PERSONNEL: "THIS: PARTICIPATE IN CLASSIFIED PONS, AUTH CG THIRD MARI DIV (OTO THIS ASST)"

(9) UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT. PERSONNEL WILL WEAR IN UTILITY UNIFORM, WITH HELMET, UPPER BODY ARMOR, FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK, INDIVIDUAL WEAPON, CARTRIDGE BELT, 100 CARTRIDGES, FIRST AID PACK, AND FIELD MARCHING PACK. FIELD MARCHING PACK WILL INCLUDE BLANKET ROLL WITH AIR MATTRESS, ONE SET SUMMER SERVICE (SHORT SLEEVE SHIRT), UTILITY CAP, AND AS A MINIMUM ONE UTILITY UNIFORM, & 529 65 7, 43423-4, AND EXTRA SOCKS. A SMALL HANDBAG CONTAINING CIVILIAN CLOTHES, PERSONAL ACCESSORIES, AND EXTRA ITEMS OF UNIFORM MAY BE BARE CARRIED. SEPARATE, SUITCASES, OR LARGE HANDBAGS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(10) FITNESS REPORTS. DET CMDRS WILL SUBMIT CONCURRENT FITNESS REPORTS ON DET SERGEANTS AND ABOVE.

S A  
CONCURRENT FITNESS REPORTS ON DET CMDRS WILL BE PAGE FOUR ENHYPACASSIC O N F I D E N T I A L . SUBMITTED FOR COMPLETION BY THE DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP COMMANDER. ALL CONCURRENT FITNESS REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE INDIVIDUAL PARENT BATTALION.

(11) REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED TO THIS HQ AND HANDLED ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

(12) ANY ADMIN/PERSONNEL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY DET CMDRS NOT COVERED BY THIS ORDER WILL BE REFERRED TO THE DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP. ALL SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WILL ALSO BE REFERRED TO THIS HQ.

(13) DET COMMANDERS AND THE OIC DET CONTROL GROUP ARE DESIGNATED AS OICs AND AS SUCH ARE AUTH ARTICLE 15 UCMJ AUTHORITY. REVIEWING AUTHORITY RETAINED BY THIS HQ.

#### B. LOGISTICS

(1) EACH DEPLOYING GUARD DET WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE FOL SUPPLIES AND EQUIP. THESE SUPPLIES ARE TO SUPPORT ONLY THE MEMBERS OF THE GUARD DET:

- (A) CLASS I
  - 12 DAYS MCI AND TRIOXZNE
- (F) CLASS II
  - 10 DAYS DRY BATTERIES
  - 20 COTS FOLDING
- (C) CLASS V
  - 100 RDN 12 GA SHOTGUN AMMO

- (A) 2 AN/PIC, FULLWORMS
- (B) 4 AN/PRC-25/17 RADIOS
- (C) 10 M4000GUNS, 12 GA.
- (D) 1 METAL DETECTOR

(3) CUSTODY OF RATIONS, COIS AND AMMUNITION (LESS THAT MATERIAL CARRIED BY COOPERATED) WILL BE SIGNED OVER DET COMBAT UNIT AT FUTEMA DOSSARD.

(4) DET CHIEF WILL ENSURE ASSIGNMENT OF THREE COPIESMAN TO EACH DET PRIOR TO DEPARTING PARENT COM. WILL DIRECT PARENT UNIT PROVIDE DESIGNATED MED SUPPLIES TO BE EMBARKED AND ENSURE ADEQUATE AND PROPER ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MED SUPPLIES.  
PAGE FIVE PUNENAPACIFIC O N F I D E N T I A L

(5) TRANSPORTATION

(A) CLASS I, II, AND V NOT HELD BY DETS WILL BE DELIVERED TO FUTEMA AIRFIELD BY THIS HQ WLT 0600I 12APR75.

(B) DETS S, T, I AND P WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE FUTEMA AIRFIELD TO ARRIVE WLT 0700I 12APR75.

(C) DETS U, V, W, N WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE FUTEMA AIRFIELD TO ARRIVE WLT 1500I 12APR75.

(D) DIRMTO WILL SCHEDULE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO THE DEPARTURE AIRFIELD.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

A. COMMAND POSTS

- (1) III MAG CAMP COURTNEY OXI-JA.

P. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(1) IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT OPCON OF THE DETACHMENT CONTROL CO AND ALL GUARD DETACHMENTS WILL BE PASSED TO CTRK79 0 AND THAT ADCOR WILL REMAIN WITH CTB 79.2 IT IS FURTHER ANTICIPATED THAT DETS WILL BE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE COMDR OF ANY U.S. SHIPS UPON WHICH EMBARKED; AND THAT DETS WHICH ARE EMBARKED ABOARD THIRD COUNTRY VESSELS WILL FUNCTION IN COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH THE CAPTAIN/MASTER OF  
405 1 JULY 1975

BT

2511

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

VZCZCYHARRG  
 ZTTCZOVW RUMBPMA2512 1071355-0000--RUMGRHY.  
 ZNY CCCCC  
 ZOV RUMBPMA1535 REROUTE OF RUMRABA2512 1071355  
 RUMGRHY 7 CTG SEVEN NINE PT NINE  
 Z O 171355Z APR 75  
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
 TO ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT TWO  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT THREE  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FOUR  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT NINE  
 ZEN/CTU SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT ONE  
 ZEN/CTU S

RQSN NINE PT TWO PT ONE FOUR  
 RHMOSCA/TE SEVEN NINE PT TWO PT FIVE PT ONE  
 OJADANA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT SIX  
 INFO ZEN/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMGONHXCTV SEVEN NINE PT NINE  
 RHMGOA/III MAF LNO SUBIC PAY RP  
 BT

//H03120// FINAL SECTION OF THREE

THAT SHIP.

C. COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

(1) DET CDRS WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMM GUARD PAGE TWO RUMRABA2512C O N F I D E N T I A L DAWITH THE SHIP UPON WHICH EMBARDED.

(2) MSGS ORIGINATED BY DET CDRS WILL BEAR THE PHRASE QUOTE FROM MARINE DET CDR UNIT (ALPHA DESIGNATOR ASSIG FD) UNQUOTE, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CLASSIFICATION LINE.

WKL BSS4 -554735 59 -48,3 335 :54 28) 73 3,5  
 59 5 3 80 709, 2 2: 3,7-4531 285 0-8,8 8,547:589,.

(4) DET CDRS RPT DET IDENTITY TO THE SHIP UPON WHICH EMBARDED TO ENSURE RECEIPT OF MSG TRAFFIC.

(5) DET CDRS RPT SHGONKPN WHICH EMBARDED TO CTG 79.2 WITHIN TWO HOURS OF EMBARKING.

(6) ALL GUARD DEYS WILL USE THE BASIC VOICE CALL CONSTITUTION FOLLOWED BY DET ALPHA IDENTIFIER, E.G., CONSTITUTION MARINE DET BRAVO.

(7) FREQUENCIES FOR INTER AND INTRA SHIP COMM AS REQUIRED WILL BE ASSIGNED BY THE DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP

ADS 1 JULY 1975

BT

2512

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 of 2

SSN: 750

APR 1975  
1372  
20 APR 75  
D-MARINES

1200Z APR 75

FM JCRC (INFO) 1100Z APR 75

TO USMC

FM USMC

TO USMC

INFO CMC

CIC SEVEN NINE PT ONE

CIC SEVEN NINE PT TWO

CIC SEVEN NINE PT THREE

BT

C O R P I D E N T I A L A C C E S S I O N SECTION ONE OF TWO

USMC (ORAL) FOR USMC SPEC WAR SWAMP GUARD DET

SPECIAL MARINE SHIP'S GUARD FRASE 1-75

A. CMC SEVEN NINE PT TWO

1. (C) SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES

(1) CMC CURRENT INFORMATION

(2) CURRENT INTELL. AVAILABLE ON USMC SHIPS

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) CMC VES. PROVIDES AGREE SUPPORT OF, AND SMALL CRAFT HELD FOR DETACHMENTS

(2) CMC VES. PROVIDES HELD LEFT AND AIR SUPPORT FOR DETACHMENTS

(3) CMC, 30 CMC PROVIDES CT SUPPORT AS AVAILABLE

(4) CMC, 1ST BN, 4TH MAR PROVIDES INTERFERED SUPPORT AS AVAILABLE

(5) CMC, 1ST BN, 4TH MAR PROVIDES MP SUPPORT AS AVAILABLE

(6) CMC, 1ST BN, 4TH MAR PROVIDES AMMO TECH

2. (C) MISSION. SPECIAL MARINE SHIP'S GUARD (SMSCG) DETACHMENTS WILL DEPART ASSIGNED SHIP AND PROCEED TO DESIGNATED USMC SHIPS AND PROVIDE SECURITY TO ENSURE SAFE TRANSIT FROM POINT OF EMBARKATION TO DESTINATION.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT. DETACHMENTS WILL DEPART SHIP AND BE ASSIGNED BY SMALL CRAFT OR HELD LEFT TO DESIGNATED SHIPS; BOARD SAME; AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SHIP AND ASSIGNED MACHINES UNDER CONTROL OF SHIP'S MASTER.

B. DEPLOYED DETACHMENTS.

(1) PROVIDE SECURITY AS DIRECTED BY SHIP'S MASTER.

(2) MAINTAIN CONTROL OF MACHINES IN MANNER CONSISTENT WITH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

(3) BE PREPARED TO COORD. DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, WATER, AND ADMINISTRATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT.

C. GUARD REACTION FORCE.

(1) BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE ANY OF THE DEPLOYED DETACHMENTS.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE BAR SECURITY FOR DOWNED AIRCRAFT

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

(1) AUTHORITY TO USE AGENT CC HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED WHILE

UNCLASSIFIED

(A) IF AT ANY TIME... (B) IF AT ANY TIME... (C) IF AT ANY TIME...

SHIP'S... (A) IF AT ANY TIME... (B) IF AT ANY TIME...

DEPT 1A 0700  
NO 1B 0715 (NOTE 1)  
SECURITY 01 0721  
SIGNAL 1B 0710  
TIME 5 0700

PAGE 2 OF 4  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(A) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (B) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (C) IF RELIEF OF UNITS...

(A) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (B) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (C) IF RELIEF OF UNITS...

(A) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (B) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (C) IF RELIEF OF UNITS...

(A) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (B) IF RELIEF OF UNITS... (C) IF RELIEF OF UNITS...

- (A) CASUALTY  
1 CRIMINAL FILE, ROOM  
2 PARENT OR GUARDIAN (IF CASUALTY ABLE TO PROVIDE)  
3 TYPE INJURY  
4 CAUSATION AND PROXIMITY  
5 DATE/TIME AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES RESULTING IN CASUALTY  
6 WEDDING REQUIREMENT  
7 ADVISE IF INDIVIDUAL DESIRES NOT TO BE NOTIFIED

- (B) INCIDENT/REPORT REPORT  
1 FILE  
2 Y/N  
3 DATE  
4 DFN INCIDENT  
5 LOCATION  
6 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT  
7 REASON OF ACTION TAKEN  
8 GARDN R/L  
9 GARDN O/S BYAC  
10 G/L N/S EVAC  
11 GARDN R/L  
12 GARDN R/L  
13 GARDN R/L  
14 WHEN CAPTURED

- (C) SITREP INITIAL WITHIN 5 HOURS OF BOARDING ASSIGNED SHIP. (NUMBER SUBSEQUENT REPORTS AS OF 1200 SUBMITTED BY 2100 DAILY.)  
1 UNIT  
2 ASSIGNED SHIP  
3 PERIOD COVERED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

\*\*\*\*\* AR

1214Z APR 68 HMM 045/20

PETROTYM RUMPLAS 71 1146934-0000--RUMGENUL  
NY 00000  
R 000000Z APR 68  
FM USS DUBOUC  
TO USS CORAL SEA  
INFO DTG SEVEN NINE  
DTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
DTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
BT

*Handwritten notes:*  
PAG 3 of 2  
13132  
20 APR 68

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NOFORN FINAL SECTION OF TWO

- 4 SUMMARY OF REPORTED PERIOD
- 5 ESCAPE PLANS
- 6 EVACUEE COUNT (INITIAL REPORT ONLY)
- 7 CASUALTIES
  - A GUARD KIA
  - B GUARD MIA EVAC
  - C GUARD MIA NON-EVAC
  - D GUARD MIA
  - E EVACUEE KIA/DEATHS
  - F EVACUEE MIA
  - G WEAPONS RECOVERED

4. (C) LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION  
A. EACH DETACHMENT WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SUPPLIES

- AND EQUIPMENT:
- (1) CLASS I
    - 4 BAYBUNDI, 20 5-GAL WATER CONTAINERS FILLED.
  - (2) CLASS II
    - 6 DAY DRY BATTERIES

UNCLASSIFIED

THE BASE... CONSIST OF 124...  
A-16, 27...  
IN ADDITION EACH DETACHMENT WILL CARRY THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT:

- (1) 2 MATTING ROLLING
- (2) 4 MATING-PS/77 MATING
- (3) 7 SHOTGUNS
- (4) 1 MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
- (5) 1 STANDARD BULK OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

Page 4 of 1

C. REQUESTS FOR RESERVE WILL BE SENT TO DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP WITH AN INDICATION OF PRIORITY.

D. UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL WILL BEBANK ASSIGNED SHIPPING WITH HELMET, UPPER BODY ARMOR, FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK, INDIVIDUAL WEAPON, CARTRIDGE BELT, TWO CANNYENS, FIRST AID PACK, AND FIELD MARCHING PACK. NO PERSONAL GEAR WILL BE LEFT ABOARD SHIP.

E. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

A. DETACHMENTS WILL ACTIVATE THE DCC TAC SET UPON DEBARKATION FROM SHIP.

B. THE FOLLOWING FREQUENCIES WILL BE USED FOR TACTICAL RADIO:

BRIT	FRRO
DCC TAC SET	69.10
INTERNAL NET NETS:	
PAPE	64.75
INDIA	44.85
SIERRA	48.85
TANGO	45.74
ROTEL	45.70
VICTOR	47.15
UNIFORM	47.30
NOVEMBER	48.10
ECHO	64.30
FOXTROT	65.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. VOICE CALL SIGN FOR DCC IS CONSTITUTION. ALL SHIP NETS WILL USE BASIC CALL SIGN FOLLOWED BY NET ALFA IDENTIFIER, E.G. CONSTITUTION ECHO

D. NET CDRS WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COM GUARD WITH THE SHIP WHEN ENBARKED.

CDR-SS  
DE  
#575;

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~~PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL~~

US AIR FORCE MESSAGE FORM

REPORTING OFFICE:	CLASSIFICATION:	COMBUTEN:	OSM:	SEC:
ASSTG: 100	CONF	7 to C 1 to 1	0006	250130Z APR 75

SUBJECT: AMBIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE PLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WINDS)(C)

FROM: CCG 79.1.7

TO: CU 79.1.7 (HAND DELIVER)

INFO: CCG 79.1 (HAND DELIVER)

BT

CONFIDENTIAL //NOB//

AMBIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESH) PLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WINDS)(C)

A. CCG 79.2 MSG 171355Z APR75

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES

- (1) SEE CURRENT INTSUS
- (2) CURRENT INTELL AVAILABLE ON BSC SHIPS

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

- (1) CCG 76.3 PROVIDING ADJEN SUPPORT OF, AND SMALL CRAFT LIFE FOR DETACHMENT
- (2) CUH 79.1.6 PROVIDES HELO LIFE AND AIR SUPPORT FOR DETACHMENT.

C. ATTACHMENTS

- (1) DET, 38 CIT
- (2) DET, 17th ZIT
- (3) DET, BT Co, Hq3a
- (4) DET, HqCo, 401Mar
- (5) DET, 1stBn, 401Mar

UNCLASSIFIED

2. MISSION. AMBIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESH) DETACHMENTS WILL DEBARK

ASSIGNED SHIPPING AND PROCEED TO DESIGNATED NSC SHIPS AND PROVIDE SECURITY TO ENSURE

SAFE TRANSIT FROM POINT OF EMBARKATION TO DESTINATION.

DD FORM 1300-101	FORM 1300-101	FORM 1300-101	FORM 1300-101	FORM 1300-101	FORM 1300-101
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USS DUBUQUE MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	COMPUTER	SEN:	DDG:
ACTION INFO	CONF	1/NA 2120	T to C	
			T to T	

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE OPLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WINDS)(C) ( )

FROM: CTU 79.1.7

TO: TU 79.1.7

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT. DETACHMENTS OF AESF WILL DEPLOY FROM USS DUBUQUE BY SMALL CRAFT OR HELO LIFT TO DESIGNATED SHIPS; BOARD SAME; AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SHIP AND EMBARKED EVACUEES UNDER CONTROL OF SHIP'S MASTER.

B. DEPLOYED DETACHMENTS

- (1) PROVIDE SECURITY AS DIRECTED BY SHIP'S MASTER.
- (2) MAINTAIN CONTROL OF EVACUEES IN MANNER CONSISTENT WITH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

- (3) BE PREPARED TO CONTROL DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, WATER, AND ADMINISTRATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT.

C. REACTION FORCE.

- (1) BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE ANY OF THE DEPLOYED DETACHMENTS.
- (2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE BAR SECURITY FOR DOWNED AIRCRAFT.

D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) AUTHORITY TO USE AGENT CS HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED WHILE ABOARD SHIPPING.
- (2) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. ANNEX D.
- (3) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, EACH DETACHMENT DEPLOYED FROM DUBUQUE WILL

CONSIST OF FIFTY-FOUR (54) MEN ORGANIZED INTO A HEADQUARTERS AND TWO (2) SECTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

DET	54	2/52
HO	12	2/89 (NOTE 1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DOWNGRADING: ADS	GDS	MSG CTR: 02	TC	FS
RELEASED BY:	DRAFTER:	DEPT:	CHOPS:	

USS BUREAU OF NAVAL AVIATION

OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER

SUBJECT: AMTRIPCON DISPATCHER SEPARATE FORCE (SERIAL 1-75) (PRIORITY WINDS) (2)

FROM: (PRIORITY)  
TO: TU 10.1.7

SECTION	20	0/20
SQUAD	9	0/9
TEAM	4	0/4

NOTE 1 - CONSIST OF 2 OPS, 1 X-O, 1 COMMODORE, 1STSGN/CMSCY, 2 LPA, 2 RADIO OP, 1 INT, 1 CIT.

(4) UNLESS DISTANCE FACTORS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS PERMIT, DEFS WILL BE DEPLOYED FROM BUSINES FOR MAXIMUM PERIOD OF SIX DAYS WITHOUT RELIEF.

(5) IF RELIEF OF THIS DEPARTMENT IS EFFECTIVE, IT WILL BE CONDUCTED AS A RELIEF OF LINE, I.E., RELIEVING DEF PHYSICALLY WILL OCCUPY VITAL POSITIONS AND BE BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ON SHIP BOARD RULES BEFORE RELIEVING THE DEPARTMENT FROM SHIP.

(6) EXCEPT IN LINE OF DUTY, MEMBERS OF DEF WILL BE ISOLATED FROM EVACUATORS BY MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE.

(7) AMB DEFS WILL PROVIDE SHIP SECURITY DURING EVAC UNDER CONTROL OF SHIP MASTER.

(8) CONDUCT ABOARD SHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

(9) REPORTS SUBMITTED TO ATTACHMENT CONTROL GROUP (ACG) IN FORMAT AS FOLLOWS:

(A) CASUALTY

1. NAME, GRADE, USN
2. PARENT OR GUARDIAN (IF CASUALTY ANLE TO PROVIDE)
3. TYPE INJURY
4. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL CENTER

REF: BU-1000 1-20-77

CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:
SECTION:	DATE:	TIME:	BY:

SUBJECT: AMBUSHING TRAINING IN SECURITY FORCE AREA 1-75 (PERIOD OF WINDS) (S)

FROM: CAG 1-21-77

TO: TU 1-21-77

SECTION	20	0/20
SQUAD	9	0/9
TEAM	4	0/4

NOTE 1 - CONSISTS OF 2 COR, 1 K-OL, 2 COMMS, 1 SPEC/MSGT, 2 LPA, 2 RADIO OP, 1 STC, 1 CPT.

(4) UNLESS DISTANCE FACTORS AND COMMITMENTS DICTATE OTHERWISE, DETS WILL BE DEPLOYED FROM BUSQUE FOR MAXIMUM PERIOD OF SIX DAYS WITHOUT RELIEF.

(5) IF RELIEF OF SHIP DETACHMENT IS EXPECTED, IT WILL BE CONDUCTED AS A RELIEF OF LINE, I.E., RELIEVING DET PHYSICIANS WILL OCCUPY VITAL POSITIONS AND BE BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ON SHIP COORDINATE RULES BEFORE RESUMING DUTY DURING FROM SHIP.

(6) EXCEPT IN LINE OF DUTY, MEMBERS OF DET WILL BE ISOLATED FROM EVACUATION TO MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE.

(7) AREF DETS WILL PROVIDE SHIP SECURITY DURING EVAC UNDER CONTROL OF SHIP MASTER.

(8) CONDUCT REGARDING SHIP RAG HANGING CARRIAGE.

(9) REPORTS SUBMITTED BY DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP (DCG) IN FORMAT AS FOLLOWS:

(A) CASUALTY

- 1 NAME, NAME, GRADE
- 2 PARENT OR GUARDIAN (IF CASUALTY ABLE TO PROVIDE)
- 3 TYPE INJURY
- 4 CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:	CLASSIFICATION:
DATE:	DATE:	DATE:	DATE:

USC BUREAU MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	COMPUTER	SSN:	DIG:
ACTION INFO	CONF	TT TO C		
		TT TO T		

SPECIAL HANDLING AND PRIORITY:

SUBJECT: AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE PLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WINDS)(C)  
 FROM: CTU 79.1.7  
 TO: XU 79.1.7

5 DATE/TIME AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES RESULTING IN CASUALTY

6 MEDIVAC REQUIREMENT

7 ADVISE IF INDIVIDUAL DESIRES WORK TO BE NOTIFIED

(6) INCIDENT/SPOT REPORT

1 FR:

2 TO:

3 UNIT

4 DTS INCIDENT

5 LOCATION

6 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

7 RESULTS OF ACTION TAKEN

8 DET KIA

9 DET WIA EVAC

10 DET WIA-NON EVAC

11 DET MIA

12 EVACUEE KIA/DEATH

13 EVACUEE WIA

14 WERE CAPTURED

UNCLASSIFIED

(C) SITREP (INITIAL WITHIN 6 HOURS OF BOARDING ASSIGNED SHIP. URGENT)

SUBSEQUENT REPORTS AS OF 1800 SUBMIT BY 2100 DAILY.

COMMUNICATED BY: ADS	RECEIVED BY: GNS	REPORTING OFFICER: CE	RC	FR
RELEASING OFFICER:	RELEASING OFFICER:	RELEASING OFFICER:	RELEASING OFFICER:	RELEASING OFFICER:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CLASSIFICATION:	1/79	SECRET	GROUP 1	EXC 1	EXC 2
ACTION INFO:	CODE				

SPECIAL RESERVE INFORMATION:

SUBJECT: AMBUSHES EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE OPAL 1-75 (PROMISE WINDS) (U)

FROM: TU 79.1.7

TO: TU 79.1.7

1. DATE
2. ASSIGNED SHIP
3. PERIOD COVERED
4. SUMMARY OF REPORTED PERIOD
5. FUTURE PLANS
6. EVACUEE COUNT (OFFICIAL REPORT ONLY)
  - a. U. S.
  - b. THIRD COUNTRY
  - c. VIETNAMESE
7. CASUALTIES
  - a. DET KIA
  - b. DET KIA EVAC
  - c. DET KIA NON-EVAC
  - d. DET KIA
  - e. EVACUEE KIA/DEATHS
  - f. EVACUEE KIA
  - g. WEAPONS RECOVERED

UNCLASSIFIED

4. LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION

A. EACH DETACHMENT WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT:

(1) CLASS I

10 DAYS HCL, 70 5 GAL WATER CONTAINERS FILLED.

APPROVED BY:	DATE:	GROUP:	CLASS:
RELEASED BY:	PRINTER:	DEPT:	GROUP:

CNS MESSAGE FORM

RECEIVED:	CLASSIFICATION:	7/85 3120	COMPUTER	SEM:	OPS:
ACTION INFO:	CONF		1 to C		
			1 to T		

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE PLAN 1-75 (PARQUET MINS)(C)

FROM: CEN 79.1.7  
 TO: TU 79.1.7

(3) CLASS II

8 DAYS DRY BATTERIES

(3) CLASS V

THE BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR EACH MAN TO CONSIST OF 420 RDS PER M-16, 30 RDS PER 12 GA BROWNING, 50 RDS PER .45 CAL PISTOL.

D. IN ADDITION EACH DETACHMENT WILL CARRY THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT:

- (1) 2 AN/PQ 5 BULLETS
- (2) 3 AN/PSC-277 RADIOS
- (3) 7 STROBES
- (4) 1 METAL OBSERVER
- (5) 1 STANDARD BLOCK OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

C. REQUESTS FOR RESUPPLY WILL BE SENT TO DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP WITH AN INDICATION OF PRIORITY.

D. UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT. PERSONNEL WILL DEPART ASSIGNED SHIPPING WITH BELT, TAPER BODY ARMOR, FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK, INDIVIDUAL WEAPON, CARTRIDGE BELT, TWO CANTRENS, FIRST AID PACK, AND FIELD MARCHING PACK. NO PERSONAL GEAR WILL BE LEFT ABOARD BASE SHIP.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

A. COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS

- (1) DETACHMENTS WILL ACTIVATE THE EEC EEC NET UPON DEPARTURE FROM BASE SHIP
- (2) THE FOLLOWING FREQUENCIES WILL BE USED FOR TACTICAL BASTION:

UNCLASSIFIED

UPGRADING:	ADS	005	INSG CDR:	01	DC	PE
PREPARED BY:		DRAFTER:		DEPT:		CLASS:

YES OR NO MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	COMPUTER	SUN:	DATE:
SECTION INFO:	GROUP:	UNIT TO C:	UNIT TO C:	

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: APOHILOU: EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE PLAN 1-75 (FREQUENT WINDS)(C)  
 FROM: CUL 75-1,7  
 TO: 75 7-1,7

UNIT	FRAG
BUC TAG 1	66.10
TAG 2	55.80
TAG 3	63.10
INTERNAL NET NETS:	
P	44.75
I	44.95
S	43.05
T	43.70
H	45.90
V	47.15
U	47.30
N	45.95
E	44.50
F	45.15
M	49.95
G	49.10
R	54.45
K	73.05

UNCLASSIFIED

(3) VOICE CALL SIGN FOR BUC IS CONSTITUTION. ALL NETS WILL USE BASIC CALL

SIGN FOLLOWED BY NET ALPHA IDENTIFIER, E. G. CONSTITUTION ECHO.

ENCIPHERING:	ADS	CDS	FRAG CTR:	OP	IC	EE
RELEASED BY:	GRANTER:	DATE:	CHOPS:			

USS DUBUQUE MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	1700 3300	COMPUTER:	SSN:	DATE:
ACTION INFO:	CONF		T to C		
			T to T		

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE PLAN 1-75 (PREVIOUS WINDS) (C)

FROM: CTU 79.1.7

TO: TU 79.1.7

(4) DET CDRS WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMM GUARD WITH THE NSC SHIP WHEN EMBARKED.

B. COMMAND POSTS

(1) CTG 79.1 (9th MAE) USS BLUE RIDGE

(2) CTG 76.5 (Phib BANS) USS DUBUQUE

(3) CTU 79.1.7 (AESF) USS DUBUQUE

C. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(1) THE MASTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS SHIP AND ALL PERSONS ON BOARD. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE NAVIGATION AND TECHNICAL OPERATION OF HIS SHIP AND HAS SUPREMACY OVER ALL PERSONS ON BOARD. THE MASTER HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE SHIP ABANDONED. HE HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE APPROPRIATE LAWS OF THE U.S. AND TO EXECUTE NAVAL DIRECTIVES.

(2) U.S. MARINE SECURITY FORCE: THE OFFICER IN CHARGE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT, DISCIPLINE, AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THESE

~~DETACHMENTS~~  
~~ASSIGNMENTS~~

(3) THE MASTER AND OFFICER IN CHARGE SHALL COOPERATE FULLY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP AND ALL PERSONS ABOARD. THE MARINE SECURITY FORCE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING THE MASTER IN MAINTAINING GOOD ORDER, CONTROL, AND SECURITY AS IT CONCERNS EMBARKED EVACUEES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UPGRADING: ADS	GDS	MSG CTR: CE	TC	SA
RELEASED BY:	DRAFTER:	DEPT:	CHOPS:	PAGE: 3

DES BUREAU MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	COMPUTER	SSH:	DDP:
ACTION INFO	CONF	1/NO 3120	T to C	
			T to T	

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: AMPHIBIOUS STATION SECURITY FORCE OPLAN 1-75 (NEEDLE WINDS) (C)

FROM: OIU 79.1.7

TO: TU 79.1.7

ANNEXES:

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) NOT USED

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) NOT USED

ANNEX C (CONCEPT OF OPERATION) TO BE ISSUED

ANNEX D (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) (ISSUED SEPARATELY)

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DOWNGRADING:	ADS 1/26/85	DDP	MSG CTR:	CS	TC	ES
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0 P 240126Z APR 75  
FM CTO SEVEN NINE FT ONE FT SEVEN  
TO YU SEVEN NINE FT ONE FT SEVEN  
INFO CTO SEVEN NINE FT ONE  
CIC SEVEN SIX FT FIVE

*P. MAR*  
*APR 10 1975*  
*OPB*  
*2 MAR 75*

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ANNEX D (CHIEFS OF ELEMENTS) GROUP) TO CTO: 75.1.7 PLAN 1-75  
(CURRENT GROUP) (01 FIVE ZERO N

1. (C) PURPOSE. TO PROVIDE ROE FOR THE AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESF) CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ABOARD EVACUATION SHIPS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PLAN.

2. (C) GUIDING PRINCIPLE. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE TO FOLLOW IS TO UTILIZE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

3. (C) GENERAL. THE FOLLOWING ROE WILL APPLY DURING EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED.

A. THE AESF DETACHMENT COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE NON-DEADLY FORCE TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES ABOARD EVACUATION SHIPS.

B. THE AESF DETACHMENT COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE DEADLY FORCE, E. G., LIVE AMMUNITION OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF PHYSICAL FORCE LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM ONLY WHEN ALL THREE OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET:

- (1) LESSER MEANS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED OR ARE NOT AVAILABLE.
- (2) RISK OF DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM TO HOSTAGE PERSONS HAS BEEN ENDANGERED.
- (3) THE PURPOSE OF ITS USE IS ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:
  - (a) SELF-DEFENSE TO AVOID DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM TO DETACHMENT MEMBERS.

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- (B) DEFENSE OF LIVES OF PERSONS TO BE EVACUATED.
- (C) PREVENTION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF U.S. PROPERTY OR EQUIPMENT VITAL TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.

G. SEQUENCE OF THE APPLICATION OF LEVELS OF FORCE. ALTHOUGH THIS SEQUENCE REPRESENTS A LOGICAL FLOW OF FORCE APPLICATION, NO SINGLE STEP IS MANDATORY AND SEQUENTIALLY FOLLOWING EACH STEP IS NOT NECESSARY.

- (1) SHIPS COMPANY AND ON-DUTY U.S. MARINES TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DISPENSE HOSTILE CROWDS AND TO STILE INDIVIDUALS CREATING DISSENT.
- (2) SHOW OF FORCE BY DETACHMENT.
- (3) WARNING PROCLAMATION.
- (4) EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL PROCEDURES.
- (5) FIXING OF BAYONETS - USE OF NON-DEADLY FORCE BY CASQUETTED DETACHMENT ELEMENTS.
- (6) APPLICATION OF NON-DEADLY FORCE, E.G., HIGH PRESSURE FIRE HOSES.
- (7) WARNING OVER-HEAD FIRE.
- (8) DELIVERY OF CONTROLLED WELL AIMED FIRE BY PREDESIGNATED SNIPERS.
- (9) DELIVERY OF INDIVIDUAL'S WEAPON FIRE.
- (10) DELIVERY OF VOLUME AND TYPES OF FIRE NECESSARY IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND DETACHMENT COMMANDER.

D. THE INDISCRIMINATE FIRING OF WEAPONS IS NOT AUTHORIZED, AND FIRING MUST BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF AN OFFICER OR STAFF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER.

E. ALL PERSONNEL WILL NOT PLACE MAGAZINES IN WEAPONS UNTIL DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT.

F. LOCKING AND LOADING INSTRUCTIONS WILL ALSO BE PROMULGATED BY THE SENIOR MARINE PRESENT.

G. NOTHING IN THIS DIRECTIVE SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS PRECLUDING A DETACHMENT COMMANDER FROM USING ALL WEAPONS AT HIS DISPOSAL TO EXERCISE THE IMMEDIATE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF HIS FORCE.

4. (C) ABOARD USC SHIPS, THE SHIPS MASTER IS THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY FOR USE OF FORCE AS STATED IN PUBLISHED ROE.

A. THIS AUTHORITY IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS DEPRIVING A DETACHMENT MEMBER OF HIS RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE.

B. DETACHMENT MEMBERS WILL BE DUELY BOUND TO APPLY ONLY THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PUBLISHED ROE.

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PAGE 2 OF 2

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26 MAY 1975

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ZNR UUUUU

F 242344Z MAY 75

FM CTF SEVEN SIX

TO RUMRABA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN

INFO RUMRADA/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMRABA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

RHMOGGA/III MAF LNO SUBIC BAY RP

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UNCLAS //NO3 120//

CHOP OF TO 79.1.70

A. CTF SEVEN NINE 242320Z MAY 75 (NOTAL)

1. AS REQUESTED REF A CHOP TO CTF SEVEN NINE

EFFECTIVE 250300Z MAY 75.

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FOR: 251/377 MAY/1250/SEVEN NINE  
DIST: NORMAL 1/9  
242300Z MAY 75

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AESF STATUS REPORTS

Appendix

DTG

1	OIC SPECMARSHIPGD 181634Z Apr75
2	USS DUBUAUE 191828Z Apr75
3	CTU 79.1.7 210002Z Apr75
4	CTU 79.1.7 212210Z Apr75
5	CTU 79.1.7 212216Z Apr75
6	CTU 79.1.7 221448Z Apr75
7	CTU 79.1.7 222340Z Apr75
8	CTU 79.1.7 232224Z Apr75
9	CTU 79.1.7 232226Z Apr75
10	CTU 79.1.7 250008Z Apr75
11	CTU 79.1.7 251240Z Apr75

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Tab C

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2040Z NPH DE MEND 072/18  
OTTICZYDWRUNGPLA0637 1881654-CCCC -RUNGSOU.  
ZNY CCCCC

O P 181534Z APR 75  
FM OIC SPEC MAR SHIPS GUARD  
TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT EIGHT  
III MAF LNO SUBIC BAY RP  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L//NO3123//  
STATUS REPORT

1. (C) FOL DETS OF SPECIAL MARINE SHIP'S GUARD (SMSG) EMBARKED USS DUBUQUE 18 APR 75:

DET	USMC OFF/ENL	USN OFF/ENL	TOTAL
ECHO-1(12TH MAR)	0/16	0/0	0/16
FOXTROT-1(12TH MAR)	0/18	0/0	0/18
HOTEL (3D ENGR)	2/66	0/3	2/69
INDIA(7TH COMM)	2/67	0/3	2/70
NOVEMBER(3D SERV)	2/69	0/3	2/72
PAPA (4TH MAR)	2/67	0/3	2/70
SIERRA(HQBN)	2/67	0/3	2/70
TANGO(HQBN)	2/67	0/3	2/70
UNIFORM(3DTK)	2/65	0/3	2/68
VICTOR(9TH MAF)	2/65	0/3	2/68
CONTROL GR(9TH MAR)	2/6	0/0	2/6

2. (C) THREE USMC ENL TO ARRIVE ON 0130 CARRYING AMMO/MCI SUBSEQUENT TO DEPARTURE SUBIC OF USS DUBUQUE. THEY ARE:

SSGT M. J. BRUNNER (DET V), PFC C.D. LITRELL (DET V), AND CPL S.L. ANDERSON (DET V). ANTICIPATE THESE PERS AND SUPPLIES WILL BE EMBARKED USS MT. VERNON.

3. (C) FOL PERS ALREADY ON BOARD USS DUBUQUE IN SUPPORT EVAC OPNS AND REMAINED IN PLACE WHEN 1/4 DEBARDED:

17TH ITT	1/11
MP'S	1/24
3D CIT (-)	3/4
PAO	0/2
AMMO TECH	0/1

TWO MEDICAL OFF USN  
LCPL CARMONA, Ricardo 453 94 78 42

4. (C) ECHO DET (-) OF 54 AND FOXTROT DET (-) OF 55 TO BE EMBARKED USS CORAL SEA. ECHO DET DEPARTED 180330H APR 75. FOXTROT DET (-): 20 EMBARKED; 35 TO BE EMBARKED APPROX. 190030H APR 75

5. (C) TRAINING PROGRAM WILL COMMENCE 19 APR 75 FOR EMBARKED SMSG DETS. PLAN TO UTILIZE PERS IN PARA 3 ABOVE TO ASSIST WITH THIS TRNG. ADS 1 JUL 75.

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PTXSEVIN RUMPLASONS 109102Z-0805T-RUMPLASONS

OPV 0805Z

P 101020Z APR 75

FM USS DUBOQUE

TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

INFO CTF SEVEN NINE

OPS SEVEN NINE PT TWO

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S R O R E 109102Z/

STATUS REPORT SPECIAL MARINE SHIPBOARD (SMSC) AS OF 102400Z APR 75

1. (C) LOCATION OF DEBS AS FOLLOWS:
- A. DET BOMB (-): DEPLOYED MSC KINROSS
- B. SECTION DET BOMB: USS DUBOQUE
- C. DET FOXTROX 1-1: DEPLOYED USS CORAL SEA-BOYE 1
- D. SECTION DET FOXTROX: USS DUBOQUE
- E. ALL OTHER DETS: USS DUBOQUE

NOTE 1: DET FOXTROX (-) ANCHORED BY ONE MEMBER WITH ITT DEPLOYED TO CORAL SEA PT TO MSC GREENVILLE VICTORY. NO SWEP RADIO WATCH MONITORED FOXTROX ON MSC PRI AT 102400Z. FROM CORAL SEA TO GREENVILLE VICTORY. ABOVE LIST OF DET FOXTROX HAS BEEN CANCELLED UNQUOTE CONFIRMATION LOC DET FOXTROX (-) NOT RECEIVED AS OF THIS STATEMENT. TO TG'S WATCH OFFICER POSITIONED KINROSS AND GREENVILLE VICTORY SIG VISION TALK.

2. (C) TRAINING PROGRAM FOR DEBS ENHANCED IN DUBOQUE CONCENTRATED AREAS OF CONCERN:

- VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE-KEY PHRASES
- CONTACT ON EVAC SHIPS
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- SECURITY OF SHIP VIZUAL AREAS
- LESSONS LEARNED PREVIOUS EVAC OPS
- PILOT CONTROL

COND/CONTROL/EQUIP REQUIREMENTS

3. (C) SUPPLY/WATER CANS SHORTAGE POTENTIALLY CRITICAL. MOST DEBS DEPLOYED WITHOUT. NONE AVAIL IN DUBOQUE. LESSON LEARNED PREVIOUS EVAC OPS INDICATES SHIPS WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF EVACUEES ON BOARD CANNOT SUPPLY SUFFICIENT POTABLE WATER TO MEET DEMAND. IF AVAIL IN BLUE RIDGE HQM AS WATER CANS BE PLACED ABOARD HELICOPTERS RETURNING TO DUBOQUE FOR LIFT OF ASST OIC TO BLUE RIDGE.

4. FUTURE OPS: ANTICIPATE DEPLOYING DEBS INDYA, PAPA, SIERRA, AND VICTOR ON BOARD FOUR MSC SHIPS 20 APR 75.

OIC SMSC SENDS.

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TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE

INFO CTC SEVEN NINE PT TWO

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STATUS REPORT A05F AG OF 202400Z APR 75 (O)

1. DEPLOYED DEFS

A. AT APPROX 201515N 34 PERS FROM DET FOXROE RETURNED TO  
DUBOQUE FROM CORAL SEA. DET GNR INDICATED THAT 20 PERS FROM DET  
FOXROE HAD BEEN HELD LIFTED TO GRISLEY FFT GREENVILLE VICTORY

B. DET ECHO (-) REMAINS ABOARD KINGRO.

C. GREENVILLE VICTORY AND KINGRO AT ANCHOR OFF VUNG TAU.

2. DUBOQUE DEFS NO CRG EXCEPTS AS INDICATED ABOVE.

3. CONTINUED MISSION ORIENTED TRAINING DURING DAY. AT 1700H DEFS  
INDIA, PAPA, SIERRA, AND VICTOR WENT TO 30-NIS STAFF BY IN  
ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT TO FOUR A00 SHIPS ARRIVING FM NEWPORT.  
AT 2000H WHEN INFO RECEIVED FROM CTG 70.3 THAT SHIPS WERE REMAINING  
AT NEWPORT RESUMED NORMAL DEPLOYABILITY STATUS FOR ALL DEFS ABOARD.  
FRAGO 1-75 PROMULGATED.

4. FUTURE PLANS: CONTINUE MISSION TRAINING. INTEND TO FORM DEFS  
INTO HELO TEAMS TO PRACTICE ENDESK/DEBARK DRILL.

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STATUS REPORT APPROXIMATELY FROM SECURITY FORCE (AMSP) AS OF 210200Z  
APR 75 (U)

- 1. (U) LOCATION OF BATS AND PERS STATUS SET FORTH REF A.
- 2. (C) TRAINING PROGRAM CONTINUES WITH EMPHASIS THIS PERIOD ON USE OF HIGH PRESSURE HOSES ABOARD SHIP FOR CROWD CONTROL, BATS ALLOWANCES NEEDED FOR UNLOADING RESF BATS, AND EVACUATION SECURITY PROCEDURES ON MSC SHIPS. SKETCHES MADE OF SHIP CONFIGURATION BY INTEL AND EP PERS WHO HAS BEEN ON VARIOUS SHIPS. THESE WERE USED FOR ORIENTATION AND TRAINING OF DET BIC'S.
- 3. (C) FIFTY-FOUR MEN BATS ORGANIZED AS DIRECTED.
- 4. (C) BATS FORTY-ONE AND PAPA PREPARED TO DEPART AT FIRST LIGHT FOR GREENVILLE VICTORY AND SGT KILLER RESPECTIVELY.

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INFO CTF SEVEN NINE

CIG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L //NOFORN//

STATUS REPORT MARSHIGUS SURV SECURITY FORCE (AKRY) AS OF 222400H APR 75 (C)

1. CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 201440Z APR 75

2. CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 220412Z APR 75 (TOTAL)

3. (C) LOCATION OF DEFS AND PERSONNEL STATUS SET FORTH REF A. THREE DEFS WERE TRANSFERRED TO NSC SHIPPING DURING PERIOD 1930-2000H APR 75.

4. (C) TRAINING CONTINUES WITH INSTRUCTION ON CREW SERVED WEAPONS. UTILIZED SUBURNE 6-60'S FOR TRAINING OF ANSF DEFS. TRAINING CONCEPT PREPARED FOR EVALUATION REHEARSAL OF PROCESSING PHASE. ANTICIPATE REHEARSALS FOR EMBANKED DEFS ON 23APR75.

5. (C) REORGANIZATION PLANS FOR FOURTEEN DEFS OF APPROX 50 MEN EACH COMPLETED 222000H. PERS WILL BE REASSIGNED 23APR75 AND PERS STATUS REPORT TOMORROW EVENING WILL REFLECT REORGANIZATION.

6. (C) REF B REQ ADD WEAPONS AND ARMG FOR FIVE DEFS IF ANSF IS TO BE ASSIGNED SECURITY ON SHIPS WITHIN RVN. 200 01 APR 75

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ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
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PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (U)

- A. CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 220612Z APR 75 (TOTAL)
- B. CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 212210Z APR 75
- C. CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 221448Z APR 75

1. (C) REF A ADVISED THAT THIS UNIT WOULD REORGANIZE TO PROVIDE FOR FOURTEEN DETS VICE CURRENT TEN. THIS REORGANIZATION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND IS REFLECTED IN FOL FIGURES:

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	DUBUQUE	OTHER
ECHO	2/52	NONE	SGT KIMBRO
FOXTROT	3/56	NONE	GREENVILLE VICTORY
HOTEL	2/47	2/47	NONE
INDIA	2/49	2/49	NONE
NOVEMBER	1/49	1/48	ONE POSSIBLY MT VERNON
PAPA	2/49	NONE	GREENPORT
MPCO	(8/2)	NA	-DO-
17TH ITT	(8/1)	NA	-DO-
SIERRA	1/49	NONE	SGT MILLER
MPCO	(8/2)	NA	-DO-
17TH ITT	(8/1)	NA	-DO-
3D CIT	(8/1)	NA	-DO-
TANGO	1/49	1/49	NONE
UNIFORM	2/48	2/48	NONE
VICTOR	1/50	NONE	TWO POSSIBLY MT VERNON
			REMAINDER PIONEER CONTENDER
			PIONEER CONTENDER
MPCO	(8/2)	NA	-DO-
17TH ITT	(8/1)	NA	-DO-
3D CIT	(1/0)	NA	-DO-
KILO	1/49	1/49	NONE
MIKE	1/51	1/51	NONE
ROME	1/56	1/56	NONE
QUEBEC	1/52	1/52	NONE
CONTROL GP	2/6	1/6	USS BLUE RIDGE
MPCO	1/24	1/18	SEE ABOVE
17TH ITT	1/11	1/8	SEE ABOVE
3D CIT (-)	3/4	2/3	SEE ABOVE
USH MED O	2/0	2/0	NONE
1/4	0/1	0/1	NONE
RLT 4	0/1	0/1	NONE
TOTAL	30/747	19/486	NONE

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2. (C) REFS B AND C CONTAIN EARLIER PERS STATUS REPORTS THIS UNIT. INCREASE IN TOTAL OF ONE RESULT OF ROSTER CORRECTION BY ECHO AFTER RENDEVOUS WITH SGT KIMBRO.  
ADS 01 JUL 75

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P 232226Z APR 75  
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TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L //N03120//  
STATUS REPORT AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY FORCE (AESF) AS OF  
232400H APR 75 (C)  
A. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 232224Z APR 75  
1. (U) LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF DETS, AS REORGANIZED, CONTAINED  
IN REF A.  
2. (C) TRAINING ON PROCESSING REFUGEES WAS CONDUCTED THIS DATE.  
MARINES WERE GIVEN ROLES TO PLAY AS REFUGEES AND A REHEARSAL WAS  
CONDUCTED WITH FIVE OF THE DETACHMENTS PARTICIPATING. SEARCH  
PROCEDURES, MEDICAL PROBLEMS, CROWD CONTROL, AND PERSONAL TREAT-  
MENT OF REFUGEES WERE SOME OF THE AREAS COVERED. ADD DETS WILL  
RECEIVE SAME TRAINING TOMORROW.  
3. (C) AN ADD 33 MARINES OF FOXTROT BOARDED THE GREENVILLE VICTORY  
AT APPROX 231315H TO JOIN THE TWENTY THAT ORIGINALLY ARRIVED  
181800H APR 75.  
4. (C) INDIA DET WAS PREPARED TO EMBARK ON PIONEER COMMANDER TODAY  
BUT EVENT WAS DELAYED. ANTICIPATE THAT 54 MAR DET WILL EMBARK  
ON PIONEER COMMANDER 24 APR 75.  
ADS 01 JUL 75  
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 PTCZYUW RUMGLA0949 1150008-CCCC--RUMGSUU.  
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 P 250008Z APR 75  
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*R/CO*  
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*to various*  
*OU*

CONFIDENTIAL //N03120//  
 PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT (U)

- A. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 232204Z APR 75 (NOTAL)
- B. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 212210Z APR 75
- 1. (C) FOL CHANGES SUBMITTED TO REF A:

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	DUBUQUE	OTHER
ECHO	NO CHANGE		
FOXTROT	-DO-		
HOTEL	-DO-		
INDIA	2/49	NONE	PIONEER COMMANDER
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
NOVEMBER	1/49	1/49	NONE
PAPA & ATCH	NO CHANGE		
SIERRA & ATCH	NO CHANGE		
TANGO	1/49	NONE	GREEN FOREST
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
3D CIT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
UNIFORM	NO CHANGE		
VICTOR	1/48	NONE	PIONEER CONTENDER
ATCH W/VICTOR	NO CHANGE		
KILO	NO CHANGE		
MIKE	-DO-		
ROMEO	-DO-		
QUEBEC	-DO-		
CONTROL GP	2/8	1/8	USS BLUE RIDGE
MPCO	1/24	1/14	SEE ABOVE
17TH ITT	1/11	1/6	-DO-
3D CIT (-)	3/4	2/2	-DO-
USN MED O	NO CHANGE		
1/4	-DO-		
RLT 4	-DO-		
TOTALS	30/747	16/384	

*WHO* / *STEM*  
*10335*

2. (C) SSGT BRUNNER AND PFC LITRELL JOINED AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESF) 24 APR 75 AND REASSIGNED TO CONTROL GP. CPL ANDERSON ALSO JOINED AESF AND REMAINS ASSIGNED TO NOVEMBER. PARA 2 REF B PERTAINS.

3. (C) DET INDIA EMBARKED PIONEER COMMANDER 241345H AND DET TANGO ON GREENFOREST AT 242000H. TOTAL OF SEVEN DETS NOW ASSIGNED MSC SHIPPING.

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of annexes a/c*

*TOD  
7/25/80  
WPS/OC*

1245Z NPN DE MEMN 051  
PTCYUW ZUPLA0964 111248-0000--RUMSSU.  
ZNY 00000  
P 251248Z APR 75  
FM CTO SEVEN NINE FT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CTO SEVEN NINE FT ONE  
INFO CTF SEVEN NINE  
CIS SEVEN NINE FT TWO  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L // NR3122//  
STATUS REPORT AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY FORCE (AESF) AS OF  
240000H APR 75 (C)

- 1. (C) REF A LATEST PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT. TWO MORE DETS DEPLOYED DURING PERIOD FOR TOTAL OF SEVEN TO DATE.
- 2. (C) TRAINING CONTINUED FOR DETS MILO, MIKE, ROMEO, AND QUEBEC ON PROCESSING REFUGEES ABOARD MSC SHIPPING. REHEARSALS WERE CONDUCTED AND CLASSES GIVEN BY SD CTF PERSONNEL AND NPS. CROWD CONTROL METHODS ABOARD SHIP COVERED DURING RIOT CONTROL TRAINING.
- 3. (C) FOUR ADDITIONAL METAL DETECTORS WITH BATTERIES AND ADD MEDICAL SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR NEWLY FORMED DETS.
- 4. (C) MARINES ON BOARD DUBUQUE ENTHUSIASTIC AND MORALE GETS A LITTLE HIGHER EACH TIME A DET DEPLOYS AND REMAINING TROOPS SEE THEIR TURN COMING. OIC VISITED SOME DEPLOYED UNITS ON MSC SHIPPING CONFIRMING A CONTINUATION IN HIGH MORALE EVAN AFTER EMBARRASSION ON MSC SHIPPING, ALTHOUGH NO REFUGEES HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON BOARD AS YET, AND ALL HANDS ARE SLEEPING ON AIR MATTRESSES ON DECK.

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UNCLASSIFIEDAESF SITUATION REPORTS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>SITREP No.</u>	<u>DTG</u>
1	001	CTU 79.1.7 261300Z Apr75
2	002	CTU 79.1.7 271232Z Apr75
3	003	CTU 79.1.7 281248Z Apr75
4	004	CTU 79.1.7 291216Z Apr75
5	005	CTU 79.1.7 301120Z Apr75
6	006	CTU 79.1.7 011050Z May75
7	007	CTU 79.1.7 021132Z May75
8	008	CTU 79.1.7 130252Z May75

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10052 0700 DE MONW 0507/26  
-I- 0700  
ZNY CCCCC  
O P 201300Z APR 75  
FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
BT

SEN: 2487  
D-MAR  
R-CC

~~CIC/TAC~~  
1612/26 APR 75

CCG STAFF  
OIC  
OUT

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SITREP ONE, AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY FORCE (AESF) AS OF 201600Z  
APR 75 (U)

1. (C) PERSONNEL. FOL FIGURES REPRESENT STRENGTH/DISPOSITION  
OF AESF DETS/ATCH.

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	DUBUQUE	OTHER
ECHO	2/32	NONE	SST KIMRO
FOXTROT	3/51	NONE	GREENVILLE VICTORY
HOTEL	2/47	2/47	NONE
INDIA	2/49	NONE	PIONEER COMMANDER
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
NOVEMBER	1/49	NONE	AMERICAN CHALLENGER
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
3D CIT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
PAPA	2/49	NONE	GREENPORT
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
SIERRA	1/49	NONE	SST MILLER
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
3D CIT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
TANGO	1/49	NONE	GREEN FOREST
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
3D CIT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
UNIFORM	2/48	2/48	NONE
VICTOR	1/48	NONE	PIONEER CONTENDER
MPCO	(0/2)	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	(0/1)	N/A	-DO-
3D CIT	(1/0)	N/A	-DO-
KILO	1/49	1/49	NONE
MIKE	1/51	1/51	NONE
ROME0	1/56	1/56	NONE
QUEBEC	1/52	1/52	NONE
CONTROL GP	2/8	1/8	USS BLUE RIDGE
MPCO	1/24	1/12	SEE ABOVE
17TH ITT	1/11	1/5	-DO-
3D CIT (-)	3/4	2/1	-DO-
USN MED 0	2/0	2/0	NONE
1/4	0/1	0/1	NONE
RLT 4	0/1	0/1	NONE

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NOTE: ADD OF ONE IS TO FOXTROT DET WHO HAS ONE MAN NOT  
PREVIOUSLY LISTED ON ROSTER: 1FC D.L. YARBOROUGH 237 02 00701  
0151 D BTRY/12TH MAR.

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- 2. (U) INTEL. N/A
- 3. (C) OPS/TRNGDETS LOCATED ON MSC SHIPS HAVE DEVELOPED SECURITY AND GUARD PLANS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE SHIPS. PRACTICE WITH MSC SHIP FIRE HOSES HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
- 4. (C) REFUGEES. DET NOVEMBER BEGAN PROCESSING REFUGEES AND PROVIDING SHIPS SECURITY AS MORE THAN 2,000 REFUGEES EMBARKED ON AMERICAN CHALLENGER FROM LONG HAI AREA.
- 5. (C) FUTURE OPS/TRNG.
  - A. DET NOVEMBER WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR AMERICAN CHALLENGER CONDUCTING EVACUEE LOADING OPS VIC LONG HAI.
  - B. OTHER DEPLOYED DETS WILL CONTINUE TO REFINE INDIVIDUAL SHIPS SECURITY PLANS.
  - C. DETS ABOARD DUBUQUE WILL CONDUCT REFRESHER TRNG CONCENTRATING ON EVAC PROCESSING/SEARCH PROCEDURES.
  - 6. (C) OTHER. DAILY ADMIN/LOG RUNS BEING CONDUCTED BY LCMB FROM DUBUQUE TO SHIPS LOCATED IN MSC HOLDING AREA.

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CTG 7005  
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1440Z CTG DE 8NW 819/27  
-T- CTG

OTT CZYUW RUMGLA2060 1141232-CCCC--RUMG SUU.  
ZNY CCCCC  
O P 271232Z APR 75  
FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
BT

CTG TPO  
14514978275

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //N0312077  
SITREP TWO, AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY FORCE (AESF) AS OF 271600H APR 75  
(U)

A. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 261300Z APR 75

1. (C) PERSONNEL CHANGE REF A AS FOL:

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	DUE/DUE	OTHER
ECHO	NO CHANGE		
FOXTROT	-DO-		
HOTEL	-DO-		
INDIA	-DO-		
NOVEMBER	-DO-		
NOVEMBER (3D SEC)	1/25	NONE	BARBOUR COUNTY
PAPA	NO CHANGE		
SIERRA	-DO-		
TANGO	-DO-		
UNIFORM	-DO-		
VICTOR	-DO-		
KILO	0/21	0/28	NONE
MIKE	NO CHANGE		
ROMEO	-DO-		
QUEBEC	1/48	1/48	NONE

CONTROL GP AND ALL REMAINING DETS NO CHANGE.

TOTALS

38/748 14/306

NOTE: 1/25 OF ORIGINAL NOVEMBER DET DROPPED FROM QUEBEC AND CROSS-DECKED BY HELD TO BARBOUR COUNTRY. 1/21 DROPPED FROM KILO AND ATTACHED TO QUEBEC.

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2. (U) BY CHANGE
- B. (C) OPS/TRNG. AMERICAN CHALLENGER FINISHED LOADING REFUGEES AND IS ON ENROUTE TO PHU QUOC WITH 8,000 ON BOARD. PIONEER CONTENDER DEPARTED FOR VICINITY BASSAC RIVER ENTRANCE FOR POSSIBLE EVAC OPS HERE.
- C. (C) REFUGEES. LATE REPORT INDICATES REFUGEES MAY BE BOARDING SMALL CRAFT IN VICINITY VUNG TAU.
3. (C) FUTURE OPS/TRNG:
- A. DET NOVEMBER WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY ON BOARD AMERICAN CHALLENGER. DET NOVEMBER, SECTION THREE AVAILABLE ON BANH SON COUNTY FOR REIN OR RELIEF IF NEED ARISES.
- B. DET VICTOR PREPARED TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO PIONEER CONTENDER UPON COMMENCEMENT EVAC OPS.
- C. ADD REFRESHER TRNG WILL BE CONDUCTED ON MSC SHIPS AND DEBRIEF BY AEG DETS ON PROCESSING PROCEDURES.
- D. FIVE DETS PREPARED TO EMBARK ON SHIPS AS AEGF DETS. ALL AEGF ELEMENT ON DEBRIEF PREPARED TO REJOIN ORIGINAL DETS IF SO DIRECTED.
- C. (C) OTHER. BREVITY CODE PREPARED AND DELIVERED TO MSC SHIPS IN MSC HOLDING AREA DURING ADMIN/LOG RUN.

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CO	XO	CPS	COMM
INTEL	PT-20 76.5	CIC	USFV
AIR			

SSN 22126 011  
 C706-TRD  
 Apr 14 22Z  
 28 APR 75  
 D-CTG 76.5

DE MBNW 020/28  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O P 281245Z APR 75  
 FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
 TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
 INFO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE ←

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SECRET //063120//

SITREP THREE, AESF, AS OF 281600H APR 75 (U)  
 A. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 271232Z APR 75  
 B. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 280934Z APR 75

1(C) PERSONNEL, ONLY TWO CHANGES SINCE REF (A), AS FOLLOWS:

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	DIBUQUE	OTHER
FOXTROT	3/50	NONE	GREENVILLE VICTORY
ROMEO	1/57	1/57	NONE
TOTALS	30/748	14/307	

2. (S) OPS/TRNG

A. AMERICAN CHALLENGER WITH DET NOVEMBER PROCEEDED TO PHU QUOC TO DISCHARGE REFUGEES, ARRIVING APPROX 280930H. LATE REPORT INDICATES CPL R.L. CANTU, 456 06 3250, USMC MPCO HQDN, FELL THROUGH HATCH INTO HOLD AND WAS INJURED. REF B PERTAINS.

B. GREENVILLE VICTORY AND FOXTROT DET DEPARTED FOR VICINITY OF VUNG TAU EVENING 27 APR 75. DET FOXTROT PROCESSED TWENTY-THREE REFUGEES ON BOARD THROUGH 281500H.

C. DETS REMAINING ON DIBUQUE CONTINUE TRNG FOR POSSIBLE EVAC OPS. DET ROMEO REHEARSED, IN CONCERT WITH SHIPS COMPANY, PROCESSING PROCEDURES TO BE UTILIZED IF REFUGEES ARE BROUGHT ON DIBUQUE.

D. USS BARBOUR COUNTY DIVERTED FROM ACCOMPANYING AMERICAN CHALLENGER. THEREFORE, PARA 5A REF A NO LONGER PERTAINS.

4. (C) REFUGEES. SGT MILLER EMBARKED 169 ON BOARD.

5. (C) FUTURE OPS/TRNG.

A. ALL DEPLOYED DETS PREPARED TO EMBARK REFUGEES AND PROVIDE SHIPS SECURITY.

B. ADD INSPECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ARMS/EQUIP.

C. (U) OTHER. NONE.

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INTEL	CK	NAV	AIR

SSN 2059

1531Z NPN DE NPNY 040/29  
 PITSZYUW RUMGRHY2054 1191216-SSSS--PUBHSCU.  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 291215Z APR 75  
 FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
 TO CTS SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
 INFO CTS SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 BT

*Handwritten notes:*  
 D-1011A  
 R-1011A  
 NEW TERM  
 1531Z  
 29 APR 75

SECRET//NO312077  
 SITREP FOUR, AESS AS OF 291500H APR 75 (U)  
 A. CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN 290930Z APR 75  
 1. (C) PERSONNEL, DROP ONE ENL FROM 171. IIT WHO TRANSFERRED TO USS DURHAM WITH REFUGEES AFTERNOON 29 APR 75 AND UNABLE RETURN USS DUBUQUE. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL FIGURES REMAIN SAME. TOTAL ON DUBUQUE NOW 14 OFF 306 ENL.  
 2. (U) NO CHANGE  
 3. (S) OPS/TRNG. MSC SHIPPING WITH AESS DETS ON BOARD BEGAN EMBARKING REFUGEES AS EXECUTION OF VIETNAM EVACUATION BEGAN. DETAILS OF EVACUATION NOT AVAIL THIS UNIT.  
 4. (C) REFUGEES. NUMBERS EMBARKED MSC SHIPS NOT AVAIL.  
 5. (U) FUTURE OPS/TRNG. AS DIRECTED.  
 6. (C) OTHER. REF A PERTAINS.

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 #2854

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
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1306Z WPD DE NHHY 027 /30

PTSYUW RUMGRHY2177 1201120-SSSS--RUMSSUS.  
ZNY SSSSS

P 301120Z APR 75

FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
BT



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SITREP FIVE, AESP AS OF 301000Z APR75 (U)

1. (U) PERSONNEL. NO KNOWN CHANGES SINCE SITREP FOUR.
2. (U) NO CHANGE.
3. (S) OPS/TRNG.

A. NOVEMBER DET ON BOARD AMERICAN CHALLENGER DISEMBARKED 8,000 REFUGEES AT PHU QUOC ISLAND. SUBSEQUENTLY, APPROX 1,400 REFUGEES WERE ENBARKED WITH ADDITIONAL REFUGEES PROCEEDING FROM PHU QUOC TO CHALLENGER BY SMALL CRAFT AS THIS PERIOD ENDS.

B. UNIFORM DET AUGMENTED USS DUBUQUE FIRE FIGHTING

D  
DETAILS ON FLIGHT DECK IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING VIETNAMESE HELICOPTERS EXPECTED NEAR PHU QUOC 30APR75.

C. DET ROMEO ASSIGNED SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE PROCESSING ON USS DUBUQUE.

D. INFO CONCERNING DEPLOYED DETS ON OTHER SHIPS NOT AVAIL THIS UNIT.

4. (U) REFUGEES. NO CHANGE.
5. (U) FUTURE OPS/TRNG. NO CHANGE.
6. (U) OTHER. NO CHANGE.

ADS 1 JUL75

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OFFICER/NAVY 70014 1211550-0000--RUMPCOM-  
ZNY 00000

O P 011000Z MAY 75  
FM CTS SEVEN NINE FT ONE FT SEVEN  
TO CTS SEVEN NINE FT ONE  
INFO CTS SEVEN SIX FT FIVE  
BT

*[Handwritten signature/initials]*

C O N F I D E N T I A L / UNCLASSIFIED  
SINCE SIX, 0500 AS OF 011000Z MAY 75 (U)

- 1. (U) PERSONNEL - NO KNOWN CHANGES.
- 2. (U) NO CHANGES.
- 3. (C) OPERATING ROOMS WILL BE PROCESSED TEN REFRESHES OF USS DUBUQUE. SENIOR REPORTER HAS POLICE CHIEF OF AS 701. TWO OTHER ISLANDS. HE STAFF COMMANDANT MEET THESE. MARINE CORPS SER ADVISOR AND BRIGADIER DEPARTED FIVE 0100 ON 30 APR 75 ON BOX 5412 (POSSIBLY AMERICAN CHALLENGER).
- 4. (U) REFRESHES. NO KNOWN CHANGES.
- 5. (C) FUTURE OPERATIONS. ANTICIPATE AEST ONE GROUP AND REMAINING DETS ON DUBUQUE WILL RELAY TO HIS SHIPPING VICTORY CTS 76.9 DURING NEXT REPORTING PERIOD.
- 6. (U) OTHER - NO CHANGE.

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1404Z APR 75 DE NORW 021/02

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ZRY 00000

P 021100Z MAY 75

FM CTO SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN

TO CTO SEVEN NINE PT ONE

FM/CIG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L / R E S I D U U  
SATREP GARR, AREF AS OF 021000Z MAY 75 (U)

1. (C) PERSONNEL. FUL CHANGES SUBMITTED:

NAME/NO	STRENGTH	DURATION	OTHER
REMO	0/00	NONE	SGT KIMERO
17TH IIT	12/13	N/A	-00-
NOVEMBER	1/18	NONE	AMERICAN CHALLENGER
HUMER	1/40	1/40	DROPPED IT TO BORO
17TH IIT	1/11	1/3	AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED
TOTALS	20/747	10/288	

NOTES: FROM ONE FROM TOTAL BECAUSE OF MEDICAL CPL R.L. CAHILL ON  
030000Z APR 75 FROM AM. CHALLENGER TO USAF HOSP UTAPAO THAI.  
17TH IIT 0000 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON USS DURHAM RELOCATED  
TO USS BLUE RIDGE AFTERNOON 2 MAY 75.

2. (U) NO CHANGE.

3. (C) OPS/TRNG. ALL DEFS ON HSC SHIPS PROCEEDED REFUGES DUN RPT  
PERIOD. DET BORO RECONSTITUTED TO ORIGINAL STRENGTH ON BOARD  
SGT KIMERO.

4. (C) REFUGES. FIGURES (AVAIL ARE AS OF 001000Z APR 75.

SHIP	NUMBER
PIONEER CONTENDER	5000
PIONEER COMMANDER	5000
GREENVILLE VICTORY	1000
SGT MILLER	6100
SGT KIMERO	2500
GREEN POST	4100
AMERICAN CHALLENGER	3000
GREEN FOREST	4000

C-256  
TOR 030525  
-088

5. (C) FUTURE OPS/TRNG. PLAN TO RELIEVE DEFS BORO AND NOVEMBER  
WITH HOTEL AND UNIFORM UPON ARRIVAL SUBIC. TIME AND LOCATION OF  
SHIPS PERMITTING, INTEND TO RECONSTITUTE ALL DEFS TO ORIGINAL  
STRENGTH WHILE IN SUBIC. PREPARED TO COORDINATE AREF EFFORTS ON  
ALL HSC SHIPS HEADING FOR SUBIC AND OTHER LOCATIONS.

6. (U) OTHER. NONE.

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ZBT CCCC

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AMUCYUWSEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN

TWRJ MAF

TO RUMOPMA/CTF SEVEN SIX

INFO RUMRADA/CTF SEVEN NINE

CTC 79-11CGNINHHAS//49

~~THROGGA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE~~

RUMRADA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO

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CONFIDENTIAL //NO3120//

~~SYNREP AMPHIB EVACT SECURITY FORCE (AESF) BROW~~

PERIOD 041200H 10 111200H MAY 72 (U)

1. (C) PERSONNEL: FOL FIGURES REPRESENT STRENGTH/DISPOSITION  
OF AESF DEYS/ATCH. AS OF 111200H MAY 75.

ELEMENT	STRENGTH	SUBIC	OTHER
ECHO	2/74	NONE	KINDO
FOXTROT	3/21	NONE	GREENVILLE VICTORY
HOTEL	2/47	NONE	OKINAWA
MPCO	0/2	N/A	-DO-
INDIA	2/49	NONE	OKINAWA
MPCO	0/2	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
KILO	1/22	NONE	GREEN PKBT

PAGE 02 RUHGS691884 CONFIDENTIAL

NIKE	1/21	NONE	OKINAWA
17TH ITT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
NOVEMBER	1/48	NONE	AMERICAN CHALLENGER
MPCO	0/1	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
PAPA	2/47	2/47	NONE
QUEBEC	1/42	1/42	NONE
ROME	1/19	1/19	NONE
SIENNA	1/49	NONE	SGT MILLER
30 CIT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
TANGO	1/49	NONE	GREEN FOREST
MPCO	0/2	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
30 CIT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
UNIFORM	2/48	NONE	GREEN WAVE
MPCO	0/2	N/A	-DO-
VICTOR	1/48	NONE	OKINAWA
MPCO	0/2	N/A	-DO-
17TH ITT	0/1	N/A	-DO-
30 CIT	1/2	N/A	-DO-

130788

130252

PAGE 03 RUHGS001884 C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONTROL GP	2/12	1/12	USS VERVER
MPCO	1/24	0/10	SEE ABOVE
17TH ITT	1/11	1/6	-DO-
3D CIT(~)	3/4	N/A	OKINAWA AND GUAM
USN MED O	2/8	1/0	OKINAWA

2. (U) INTELL, N/A.

3. (C) OPS/TRNG.

A. DET NOVEMBER AND AMERICAN CHALLENGER DISEMB.

REFUGEES AT GUAM AND RETURNED TO SUBIC ARR. 10 MAY 75.

B. DETS HOTEL, INDIA, MIKE, AND VICTOR AND IRANSEL TRADO.

PIONEER COMMANDER, AMERICAN RACER, AND PIONEER CONTEND

RESPECTIVELY DISEMB REFUGEES AT GUAM AND RETURNED TO

OKINAWA ON 10 MAY 75 VIA MAC.

C. DETS ECHO, KILO, SIERRA, TANGO, AND UNIFORM AND

SGT KIMBRO, GREENPORT, SGT MILLER, GREEN FOREST, AND

GREEN WAVE, RESPECTIVELY, ENR GUAM.

D. DET PAPA ROTATED OFF GREEN PORT REPLACED BY DET

KILO 060600H 1AY.

E. DETS PAPA, QUEBEC, (ROMEO, MPS, AND 17TH ITT)

SCREENED, SEARCHED, AND PROCESSED 18,185 REFUGEES

PAGE 04 RUHGS001884 C O N F I D E N T I A L

DISEMB FM VNN SHIPS AT NSD PIER SUBIC 071600H

061800H MAY 75.

F. DET NOV THREE AND BARROCK COUNTY PARTICIPATED IN BOARDING OPS

OF CAMBODIAN VESSELS IN INTL WATERS 9 MAY 75.

4. (C) FUTURE OPS

A. DET FOXTROT AND GREENVILLE VICTORY AND DET

NOVEMBER AND AMERICAN CHALLENGER AVAIL TO PROVIDE

SECURITY FOR ADUL REFUGEE OPS IF REQUIRED.

B. DETS PAPA, QUEBEC, ROMEO, AND MPS PREPARING

TO BOARD USS BARROCK COUNTY FOR TRANSIT TO

OKINAWA AM 12 MAY 75.

GDS-83

BT

#1884

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~AESF CONCEPTUAL PLANS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Title/DTG (if applicable)</u>
1	USS DUBUQUE 191506Z Apr75
2	Evacuee Processing Concept
3	Evacuation Processing Teams/CTU 79.1.7 211112Z Apr75
4	Org/Wpns PHIBEVACSECFOR/CTU 79.1.7 220812Z Apr75
5	Intentions Memo to CTG 76.5
6	AESF Future Ops/CTU 79.1.7 291300Z Apr75
7	AESF Dets/CTU 79.1.7 030700Z May75
8	AESF Det Foxrot/CTU 79.1.7 240214Z May75

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Tab E

~~SECRET~~

CC	YS	AFS	COMM
<i>APR 17 1953</i>			

1533Z APR DE RRRR 094/19  
 OYTCYDM RUMSPLA0690 1291500-SSSS--RUMSSUU.  
 ZNY SSSSS

0 191500Z APR 73  
 FM USS DABONE  
 TOCTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
 INFO CTF SEVEN NINE  
 CTF SEVEN SIX  
 CTF SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
 BT

*330 0685*  
*APR 17 1953*  
*D-MAR RARR*

S E C R E T //000120//  
 CTF SEVEN NINE PT ONE (NSC) SENDS  
 A. CTF SEVEN NINE PT ONE 180150Z APR 73 (S)  
 1. (C) DIRECT EM WITH HQM 105 REVEALS EARLIEST MAIL HELICOPTER FOR ASS.  
 GIG TO BLUE RIDGE LATE A.M. OR EARLY P.M. 20 APR.  
 2. (S) HQM REF A DEVS INDIA, PAPA, SIERRA, AND VICTOR NINUS ONE DEPTIC.  
 EACH ARE REINFORCED BY FOL PERSONNEL:  
 CIT (ONE EACH)  
 ITT (ONE EACH)  
 OPS (TWO EACH)

ARE STANDING BY FOR HELICOPTER TO VIC NEWPORT  
 ON SMALL CRAFT LIFT TO DESIGNATED RESCUED  
 POINT UNTIL WATERS TO BOARD FOUR HAV SHIPS.  
 DEVS NOVEMBER AND TANGO DESIGNATED BACK-UP FOR  
 THIS OPERATION. DEVS NINUS ONE SECTION AND AS  
 REINFORCED TOTAL 54 PERSONNEL EACH.  
 3. (C) WHEN DEVS I, P, S, AND V ARE DEPLOYED  
 WILL REORGANIZE REMAINING SECTIONS INTO DEVS  
 AS FOL: ONE SECTION EACH OF SCOR, FORTROY, AND INDIA.  
 COMPRISE ONE SECTION EACH OF PAPA, SIERRA,  
 AND VICTOR COMPRISE ONE SECTION. DEVS RUMED AND QUEBEC WILL CONSTITUTE  
 REACTION FORCE. DUE TO FACILITY OF CORPSEEN DEVS R AND S  
 NOT OPTIMALLY CONFIGURED FOR EVAC OPS, THEREFORE CONSIDER  
 DEVS RUMED AND QUEBEC DEPLOYABLE AS REINFORCING ELEMENTS.

02S BT  
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*19 15 06*

Concept of Operations

1. Processing from pier to ship (processing accomplished on pier or land).
  - a. After arrival at location, detachment commanders and CI conduct liaison with designated personnel to determine number of evacuees and categories. If possible, detachment commander establishes holding area on the pier and channels evacuees through the processing point. Processing is coordinated by CI. Search is conducted by MP's, assisted if possible by engineers with metal detectors. While in the holding area and through the processing phase, ITT explains the processing to evacuees (if Vietnamese) and advises that all weapons, explosives and potential weapons will be confiscated. Detachment commander provides personnel for admin, i.e., head-count and category breakdown.
  - b. After processing, evacuees are taken to holding areas aboard ship as designated by ship's master. Detachment commander provides security element on ship.
  - c. After loading, detachment commander is responsible for security of ship and subsequent off load.
  - d. ITT/CI/MP's can be used aboard ship to assist detachment in determining potential problem areas, and identify trouble makers/assist in riot control.
2. Processing from pier to ship (processing on ship).
  - a. After arrival at location, detachment commander and CI conduct liaison with designated personnel to determine <sup>the</sup> number of evacuees and categories. Detachment commander establish holding area aboard ship to allow enough room for the evacuees to stage their gear without blocking access to ladder/net and ship. Evacuees are then channeled to the processing ~~area~~ point and subsequently to ship's spaces. Remainder of operation remains the same as above.

SECURITY PROCESSING QUESTIONS

1. Who may be evacuated?
  - a. Who determines?
  - b. Lists available?
  - c. Authorities available in Siagon/Cam Tho/Vung Tao to process and screen evacuees?
  - d. Ultimate decision maker in unusual cases?
  - e. Where does the buck stop?
2. Definitions?
  - a. Authorized evacuee.
  - b. VIPs - (U.S./Viet/3rd Country).
3. What time will be available for processing?
4. Assumptions:
  - a. That all weapons will be barred (from evacuee possession).
  - b. That all evacuees will be searched.
    - (1) Vietnamese thoroughly.
    - (2) Americans (baggage/handbags/pockets but not body except when *weapons* are suspected).
    - (3) 3rd Country (baggage/handbags/pockets but not body except when weapons are suspected).
  - c. That limitation will be imposed on amount of hand carried items.  
(No animals, plants, etc.)
  - d. That Embassy will assist with processing.
5. Disposition of unauthorized evacuees?
  - a. Vietnamese?
  - b. 3rd Country Nationals?
  - c. Suspect personnel?

- d. Stowaways?
- e. Those attempting to board ship by ropes, etc.?
- 6. Will DAO or Vietnamese personnel be assigned as translators?
- 7. Will priorities of evacuees be established, i.e., U.S. women and children, U.S. males, 3rd country nationals, and Vietnamese?

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- e. Those attempting to board ship by ropes, etc.?
- 6. Will DAO or Vietnamese personnel be assigned as translators?
- 7. Will priorities of evacuees be established, i.e., U.S. women and children, U.S. males, 3rd country nationals, and Vietnamese?

OK  
OUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1305Z NFM DE USN 051/21  
OZICZYUW HUNOPLAST97 111112-0000--RUMGSUU-  
ZNY 0000

35 AR: 0787

O 211100Z APR 75  
FM CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO CIG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT ONE  
CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO  
CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT THREE  
CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT FOUR  
BT

*Handwritten notes:*  
10/2  
10/14/22

D/R - MARINES

CONFIDENTIAL (//NOFORN//)  
EVACUATION PROCESSING TEAMS (C)

- A. CIG SEVEN NINE PT ONE 201000Z APR 75
- 1. (C) SET A SET FORTH PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING EVACUATION PROCESSING TEAMS AND TANKED SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT TWO TO FORM THESE TEAMS. HOWEVER, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ASSETS IDENTIFIED IN PARA 3 OF REF A ARE ASSIGNED THIS UNIT.
- 2. (C) IN ANTICIPATION THAT AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY FORCES (AESF) DETACHMENTS WILL BE PLACED ON MSC SHIPPING PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH EVACUEES, THE FOL IS REUITS:
  - A. THE AESF DET WILL ASSIST THE PROCESSING TEAM BY PROVIDING ONE SECTION OF 20 MEN TO CONTROL EVACUEES IN THE CENTRAL PROCESSING AREA. THE REMAINDER OF THE AESF DET REMAINS ON ASSIGNED MSC SHIP TO DIRECT EVACUEES TO PROPER SPACES AND PROVIDE FOR SHIP SECURITY DURING BOARDING.
  - B. ONCE MSC SHIP HAS LOADED, THE AESF DET ON SHORE (20 MEN) WOULD BOARD THE SHIP TO JOIN REMAINING AESF TO PROVIDE SHIP SECURITY DURING TRANSIT.
  - C. THE PROCESSING TEAMS WOULD REMAIN ON SHORE TO PROCESS THE NEXT SHIP WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM AESF DET ON NEXT SHIP.
- 3. (C) ALL KNOWN SEVEN NINE PT ONE INTERROGATOR TRANSLATOR AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED ON USS DUBUQUE. THERE ARE ALSO MP'S AND ENGINEERS ON DUBUQUE. TWO PRIMARY PROCESSING TEAMS WITH ONE BACKUP HAVE BEEN FORMED AS OUTLINED PARA 3 REF A AND ARE AVAIL FOR EMPLOYMENT.

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*Large handwritten signature or scribble.*

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INTEL	INTL	36.5	

**IMMEDIATE**

0014Z NPH DE H3807  
OTTSZYUM RUMOPLAC004 1100012-5555--RUMGSHU.  
ZNY 55555

G 220512Z APR 75  
FM CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO CYS SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT THREE  
BT

**S E C R E T //NOFORN//**

ORGANIZATION/WEAPONS AMPHIB EVAC SEC FORCE (S)

1. (C) AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESF) DETS WERE ORGANIZED AT OKINAWA INTO APPROX 72 MAN DETS CONSISTING OF TWO OFF PLUS A TEN MAN HQS ELEMENT AND THREE 20 MAN SECTIONS. HQS ELEMENT INCLUDED AN ADMIN MAN, A RADIO OPERATOR, TWO SUCO'S, AN MP, THREE CORPSMAN, ONE ENGR, AND AN ITT MAN. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ORGANIZING AESF INTO APPROX 54 MAN DETS WHILE MAINTAINING AS MUCH UNIT INTEGRITY AS POSSIBLE, ONE CORPSMAN AND ONE TWENTY MAN SECTION IS BEING CHIPPED FROM EACH DET. IN SOME INSTANCES, AN OFF WILL ALSO BE DROPPED TO HEAD A NEWLY FORMED DET. END STRENGTH OF EACH DET WILL THEN BE ABOUT 50 MEN. ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION CAN BE PROVIDED FROM AVAIL YTT, MP, AND CIT PERS ON DUBOQUE. THIS REORGANIZATION WILL PROVIDE FOUR ADD DETS. WHEN AUGMENTED, STRENGTH OF DETS SHOULD BE BETWEEN 50-56 MEN.

2. (S) AESF DETS ARE CURRENTLY ARMED WITH M-16'S/.45 PISTOLS. IF WE ARE TO INSERT DETS TO NEWPORT FOR SHIPS SECURITY, IT IS DESIRABLE TO HAVE AT LEAST TWO M-30'S, TWO M-79'S AND 50 M-79 LAAN'S PER DET FOR USE DURING TRANSIT DOWN RIVER. REQ THESE WEAPONS BE ISSUED FOR FIVE DETS INITIALLY. 135 LAAN'S, 69,000 ROUNDS 7.62, AND 1224 ROUNDS OF 40MM AVAIL IN L FORM ON USS DUBOQUE.

ADS 01 JUL 75  
BT  
55324

*114371*  
*D-mar - R-*

*By disarmed.*  
*Will be reorg. by [unclear]*  
*had fed into [unclear]*  
*will [unclear]*  
*all [unclear]*  
*[unclear]*

*kind m*  
*same line*  
*241425H APR*

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10000

220812

MEMOR.

From: CTU 79.1.7  
 To: CTG 76.5

Subj: Intentions in Event NSC Ships Sail for Guam with Evacuees (C)

1. (C) IF THE NSC ships upon which Marine Security Detachments are embarked sail for Guam with evacuees, it is my intention, with CTG 79.1 approval, to reconstitute the aforesaid detachments to full strength. This will require a surface transfer of an additional section of approximately 20 men to each NSC ship. The additional section will permit the detachments to maintain a three section guard which will cut down considerably on the strain, i.e., with three section detachment there is opportunity to maintain a duty section, a reaction section, and an off duty section. As currently configured, a two section detachment does not have the luxury of maintaining an off duty section. This particular course of action will lessen by a considerable margin the probability of occurrence of incidents which could result if Security Detachment personnel are not afforded the opportunity to assume an off-duty status from time-to-time.
2. (C) Additionally if the eight ships that we currently have detachments aboard do in fact embark evacuees destined for Guam, it is my intention to move my control group (approximately 10 personnel) to one of the accompanying destroyers, in order to move effectively coordinate and communicate with the balance of my task unit and higher headquarters. The two doctors attached to my control group would also accompany me.
3. In the event of the transfer described above, remaining in Dubuque will be:

	<u>Off/Enl</u>
*Detachment Hotel	2/68
Detachment Uniform	2/68
Det, BFCo, 3dMarDiv	1/12
Det, 17th ITT	1/5
Det, 3d CIT	1/1
Det, 1stBn, 4thMar	0/1
Det, HqCo, 4thMar	0/1

Very respectfully,

  
 D. A. QUINLAN

\*Cdr Det Motel, Capt HACKETT, is senior Marine. He will be issued orders to proceed and report to the III MAF Liaison Officer, Subic, for further transportation to the 3d Marine Division.

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1742Z NPM DE RMMY 943722

PTCSXVF RUMKXVZ003 110100Z-0800-00000000  
ZNY 0800

P 081000Z APR 75  
FM DTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE SEVEN  
TO DTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE  
INFO DTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
DTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
BT

04300945

SECRET//NOFORN

OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SECURITY FORCE(AEAF) OPERATIONS(S)

DTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE SEVEN APR 75

1. ALL DTG CREWS WERE INSTRUCTED TO UTILIZE MSC COMMS CHANNEL (INFO) FOR PASSING MESSAGEZ INFO PRIOR TO THEIR EMBARKATION AND DEPARTURE. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR REF A WILL BE PROVIDED AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. (S) POL PROPOSAL WAS BEING DISCUSSED WITH DTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE AND CONTINUED UPON EARLY RETURN OF SURGEON TO TF 75.

3. SHELTER AREA DEVS ON MSC WERE SAIL FOR OAH WITH PASSENGERS. PROPOSAL THAT THESE DEVS BE RECONSTITUTED TO FULL STRENGTH. THIS WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TRANSFER OF APPROX TWENTY MEN TO EACH MSC SHIP. AND OF THESE PERSONS WOULD FORM ANSF DEVS TO HAVE A DUTY SECTION, REACTION SECTION, AND AN OFF DUTY SECTION. THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL LUNGE BY A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF PASSENGER RELATED INCIDENTS IF DEVS PERS AFFCH BE

SOME OFF DUTY TIME FOR TRANSIT. ADDITIONALLY THIS RECONSTITUTION WILL REASSIGN ALL PERSONNEL TO PARENT UNIT WHICH WILL FACILITATE ADMIN CONTROL SHOULD SEPARATION OF DEVS AND OAH BE OCCUP.

4. UNDERSTAND THAT CONCEPT PLANS CALL FOR DESTROYERS TO ACCOMPANY MSC SHIPS TO OAH. IT IS MY INTENTION, UNORDER, TO MOVE MY CONTROL OF (APPROX 12 PERS) TO ONE OF THESE DESTROYERS FOR COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH TASK UNIT AND HIGHER HQS. ONE DESTROYER WOULD ALSO ACCOMPANY ME.

5. IF SO MORE DEVS ARE EMBARKED ON MSC SHIPS, POL PERS WOULD REMAIN ON DUBUQUE AFTER TRANSFER:

ELEMENT	OFF/ENL
DET HONOL (RECONSTITUTED)	2/00
DET UNIFORM (RECONSTITUTED)	2/00
DET NFOO	1/12
DET 17TH INT	1/3
DET 3D CPT	1/1
BSN MED G	1/2
DET 1STEN, ATMAN	0/1
DET 1000, ATMAN	0/1

2913

D. DET HOTEL CMDR, CAPT HACKETT, SENIOR MARINE LEFT ON DUBUQUE IF ABOVE IMPLEMENTED, WILL BE GIVEN ORDERS TO REPORT TO III MAF LIAISON OFF, SUEIC, FOR FURTHER TRANS TO SEWARDLY.

080-03

BT



UNIT	1/48	1/48	CALL
QUEBEC	1/48	1/48	NONE
COBALT GP	2/8	1/8	(1/2) BLUE RIDGE
MP CG	1/24	1/12	SEE ABOVE
17TH ITT	1/11	1/5	(8/10) BLUE RIDGE
USN MED O	2/8	2/8	NONE
5D CIT	3/4	2/1	SEE ABOVE
1/A	0/1	0/1	NONE
RLT 4	0/1	0/1	NONE
TOTALS	38/747	14/283	

3. (C) THIS UNIT HAS INFORMATION THROUGH MONITORING MSC CIRCUIT THAT GREENVILLE VICTORY, KIMBERG, SGT MILLER, GREEN PORT, AND GREEN FOREST ARE ENROUTE SUBIC WITH REFUGEES ON BOARD. FURTHER, PIONEER COMMANDER, PIONEER CONTENDER, AND AMERICAL CHALLENGER WILL SHORTLY BE ENROUTE GUAM. ALL OF THESE MSC SHIPS HAVE AESF DETS ON BOARD AS NOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. IN ADDITION, DATED INFO AVAIL THIS UNIT INDICATES THAT THERE MAY BE MSC SHIPS CURRENTLY IN SUBIC, I.E., GREEN WAVE AND TRANS COLORADO.

4. (D) REF B HAS PROPOSED THIS UNIT TO CTF 76.1 THAT ALL AESF DETS BE RECONSTITUTED TO ORIGINAL STRENGTH. COPY REF B IS AVAIL THROUGH AESF LG OFF. IN VIEW OF CURRENT INTENTIONS USS DUBUQUE TO REMAIN IN SUBIC FOR ONLY FEW HOURS ON 4 MAY 75, IT IS DESIRABLE THAT CTF 76 INTENTIONS FOR CTU 79.1.7 BE KNOWN. TO ASSIST CTF 76 WITH PLANNING, FOLLOWING PROPOSALS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION:

A. THAT ALL AESF PERSONNEL, LESS DRIVERS FOR THREE VEHICLES ON BOARD, BE DISEMBARKED IN SUBIC.

B. THAT DETS HOTEL AND UNIFORM BE UTILIZED FOR SECURITY ON ANY MSC SHIPS REQUIRING SAME IN SUBIC.

C. IF NEGATIVE REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR B ABOVE, THEN DETS HOTEL AND UNIFORM BE UTILIZED TO RELIEVE DETS PAPA AND ECHO UPON THEIR ARRIVAL SUBIC.

D. THAT ALL DETS BE RECONSTITUTED TO THEIR ORIGINAL STRENGTH. IN PARTICULAR, DETS FOXTRON, SIERRA, AND TANGO BE RECONSTITUTED TO FULL STRENGTH ON SGT MILLER, GREEN FOREST, AND GREENVILLE VICTORY FOR TRANSIT TO ULTIMATE DESTINATION.

E. THAT CTU COMMAND GROUP AND ONE MEDICAL CPT BE EMBARKED ON USN SHIP ACCOMPANYING MSC SHIPS OR ON BOARD ONE OF THE MSC SHIPS.

F. THAT AN ADVANCE PARTY BE SENT TO GUAM TO EFFECT LIAISON WITH CO, MARBERS TO ARRANGE FOR PAY, BILLETING AND MESSING FOR ARRIVING AESF DETS. RETURN TRANS TO OKINAWA WOULD ALSO BE ARRANGED.

G. RETURN ANNO TECHNICIAN TO OPCON FIRST BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES AT SUBIC.

5. (C) PRESUME THAT VLN FLORELLA HAS PERSONNEL ON BOARD THAT HAVE NOT BEEN DISARMED. ACCORDINGLY, RECON DETS THAT REMAIN IN SUBIC OR THOSE ON GUAM BE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN SEARCH AND PROCESSING THESE PERSONNEL UPON THEIR ARRIVAL EITHER LOCATION. IF DESTINATION OTHER THAN SUBIC OR GUAM, THEN CTF 76 MAY DESIRE TO CONSIDER AIRLIFT OF AESF DET TO FLORELLA DESTINATION.

6. (C) ANTICIPATE III MAF LIAISON OFFICE IN SUBIC WILL ARRANGE ONWARD TRANSPORTATION TO OKINAWA FOR ANY AEMP PERSONNEL LEFT IN SUBIC AFTER MSC SHIPPING HAS DEPARTED PHILS.

7. (U) REQUEST ADVISE.

GDS 83

BY

#0895

NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 2110/28 (REV. 3-69) (S/N 0107-765 - 4001)

RELEASED	DRAFTED BY MAJOR D. A. QUINLAN		PHONE EXT NR 2663	PAGE 1	PAGES OF 1
DATE 24 MAY 1975	TOR/TOO	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP 240214Z	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY XXXXXXXXXX
		ACTION			XXXXXXXXXX
		INFO			

FM: CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO: CG THIRD MARDIV

REQ REL

FM: CTU SEVEN NINE PT ONE PT SEVEN  
TO: CTF SEVEN SIX  
INFO: CTF SEVEN NINE  
CTG SEVEN NINE PT TWO  
TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD SERVICE BN  
USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY  
III MAF LNO SUBIC BAY R.P.

BT

UNCLAS//NO 7220//

AMPHIB EVAC SECURITY DET FOXTROT

1. DET FOXTROT ABOARD USNS GREENVILLE VICTORY IS THE ONLY DET STILL DEPLOYED. GREENVILLE VICTORY IS CURRENTLY AWAITING LOADING/SAILING INSTRUCTIONS.
2. IN EVENT ORDERS FOR GREENVILLE VICTORY ARE NOT FORTHCOMING BY 27 MAY 75, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT DET FOXTROT BE OFF LOADED TO BE RETURNED TO PARENT ORGANIZATION BY AVAIL GOVT TRANS.
3. SHOULD REQUIREMENT FOR SECURITY DETS EXIST AT SOME FUTURE TIME IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE REQUIRED DETS COULD BE AIRLIFTED TO JOIN ASSIGNED SHIPPING WITHIN 48 HOURS.
4. CTF SEVEN NINE CONCURS.

BT

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DATE/TIME GROUP
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~~AESF DETACHMENT ROSTERS~~

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Rosters</u>
1	Detachment Echo
2	Detachment Foxtrot
3	Detachment Hotel
4	Detachment India
5	Detachment Kilo
6	Detachment Mike
7	Detachment November
8	Detachment Papa
9	Detachment Quebec
10	Detachment Romeo
11	Detachment Sierra
12	Detachment Tango
13	Detachment Uniform
14	Detachment Victor
15	Detachment MPS
16	Detachment 17thITT
17	Detachment 3dCIT
18	Detachment 1stBn, 4thMar
19	Detachment Control Group
20	Detachment USS BARBOUR COUNTY
21	Medical Officers

Tab F

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## DETACHMENT "E"

Capt	REUTER, R.L.	388	46	7103	HQ/12
2dLt	ZANT II, R.D.	553	74	9262	HQ/12
MSGT	GARLAND, C.	144	60	8180	HQ/12
SSgt	HUTCHINS, G.C.	024	32	0327	HQ/12
SSgt	YOUNG, A.W.	265	92	1022	HQ/12
SSgt	TOGNARINA, J.J.	203	34	3878	HQ/12
SSgt	GREENLEE, D.R.	233	78	7971	L/2/12
SSgt	HERNANDEZ, J.L.	568	66	3051	L/2/12
SSgt	DESSARDO, N.S.	258	90	4517	ITT
GYSgt	JOWSA, S.D.	292	44	9447	ITT
Cpl	DURDY, J.E.	294	46	9805	MP
Cpl	OSKAR, J.R.	460	06	3430	ENG
HM 1	COPAS, E.B.	551	50	9268	12 MAR
HM 1	COOLEY, J.P.	426	58	3280	12 MAR
HM 2	LYONS, L.O.	293	44	4863	12 MAR
Cpl	HAMILTON, I.D.	232	86	6008	HQ/12
Sgt	RUSHING, R.W.	465	82	6492	L/2/12
Sgt	HARRISON, D.T.	256	92	7734	HQ/2/12
Cpl	WILCOX, R.I.	187	34	8035	HQ/2/12
Cpl	DURBIN, R.T.	313	60	4606	HQ/2/12
Cpl	MORRING, H.C.	239	92	3284	L/2/12
LCpl	HARRIS, C.F.	544	72	3266	HQ/2/12
LCpl	JAMES, R.E.	263	02	4820	HQ/2/12
LCpl	OLSON, M.J.	387	58	6286	HQ/2/12
LCpl	KILBY, D.L.	285	54	5274	HQ/2/12
LCpl	LANE, R.F.	026	48	6224	HQ/2/12
LCpl	GRESHAM, D.C.	486	52	2382	L/2/12
LCpl	BYLE, R.A.	557	13	5868	L/2/12
LCpl	GANNON, J.M.	266	08	4345	L/2/12
LCpl	SALAZAR, R.	451	94	8158	HQ/2/12
PFC	WILSON, P.D.	401	82	5790	HQ/2/12
PFC	GRISEL, A.L.	067	50	9830	HQ/2/12
LCpl	SMITH, L.L.	226	70	1962	HQ/2/12
Pvt	NORMAN, T.H.	579	74	1204	HQ/2/12
PFC	FRITZ, E.V.	476	68	2931	HQ/2/12
PFC	BOYD, T.H.	468	68	3314	HQ/12
LCpl	MORRIS, L.C.	506	74	1739	HQ/12
PFC	CLARK, R.E.	482	70	7015	HQ/12
LCpl	EDWARDS, J.W.	328	52	1729	HQ/12
LCpl	PARSLEY, R.L.	462	02	3442	HQ/12
Cpl	HORN, R.L.	172	46	2154	HQ/12
Cpl	HEREDIA, Jr. A.	527	88	6397	HQ/12
Cpl	COOK, R.R.	212	68	8064	HQ/12
LCpl	AGRELLA, Jr. L.	454	06	4499	HQ/12
PFC	TUNE, W.M.	240	94	3621	HQ/12
LCpl	ROSANO, J.A.	153	40	8036	HQ/12
LCpl	GONZALEZ, J.A.	466	06	2617	HQ/12
Sgt	IRWIN, J.U.	246	14	0883	HQ/12

LCpl	BAILEY, D.W.	465	11	7125	HQ/12
LCpl	SIEH, R.B.	475	60	6750	HQ/12
LCpl	MECH, D.E.	345	46	7794	HQ/12
LCpl	KOHL, G.M.	166	46	0312	HQ/12
PFC	STRUBBLE, A.J.	573	98	7012	HQ/12
PFC	KIMBALL, C.E.	146	54	4753	HQ/12
LCpl	HESCOX, J.A.	110	46	0177	L/2/12
LCpl	HERNANDEZ, V.M.	551	64	2671	HQ/12
Sgt	MCLEOD, M.G.	571	80	5961	L/2/12
LCpl	NAFF, W.L.	223	88	6333	L/2/12
LCpl	PUEBLA, F.J.	463	98	5217	L/2/12
LCpl	PORTER, R.D.	252	96	6297	L/2/12
Pvt	SCOTT, A.E.	280	54	6842	L/2/12
PFC	KYLES, B.W.	436	88	5043	L/2/12
LCpl	STROYEK, J.M.	183	36	9509	L/2/12
PFC	CERVANTES, S.	352	52	9111	L/2/12
PFC	TAYLOR, M.J.	136	46	3121	L/2/12
LCpl	KOTSKO, J.J.	375	64	0918	L/2/12
LCpl	RATLIFF, R.H.	555	80	4108	L/2/12
PFC	GORSKI, T.D.	116	52	2914	HQ/2/12
PFC	THOMPSON, L.O.	535	68	1499	HQ/2/12
PFC	MATHEW, J.L.	442	64	0872	HQ/2/12
PFC	OGDON, M.T.	566	06	3512	HQ/2/12
Ep1	EARL, J.L.	355	48	9182	HQ/2/12
Cpl	SIMONS, M.R.	165	46	7689	L/2/12
LCpl	WAISTELL, C.R.	546	04	0309	L/2/12
LCpl	WAINWRIGHT, M.T.	265	96	2296	L/2/12
PFC	BARIBEAU, G.R.	471	68	3221	L/2/12

DETACHMENT FOXTROT

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>DET</u>
CAPT	PAGE, J. R.	509 48 61 99/0802	HQBTRY
1stLt	MAZZARA A. F.	158 40 80 30/0802	"
SSgt	DAVIS G.	321 40 92 99/0811	"L"BTRY
GySgt	FULKS J. W. JR	329 32 82 86/0861	HQBTRY
SSgt	CHAVEZ, A. G.	575 30 96 53/0848	"L"BTRY
Sgt	BIRD, T. B.	529 76 26 38/0811	"
Cpl	HOWARD E. W.	550 98 24 26/0811	"
Cpl	SIVER, J. W.	328 48 05 45/0811	"
Cpl	BARNETT J. E.	305 64 09 82/0811	"
Cpl	MASON, C. S.	006 56 18 37/2131	"
LCpl	CONKEY, A. A.	001 46 78 65/0844	"
LCpl	SPRAGUE, R. J.	368 62 29 84/0811	"
LCpl	XIQUES, A. E.	339 48 96 78/0844	"
LCpl	GODINES E. JR	461 88 90 95/0844	"
LCpl	JACKSON R. R.	168 42 78 63/0844	"
LCpl	SAVAGE T. A.	313 58 42 22/0811	"
LCpl	SARDO M. A.	129 42 87 00/0811	"
LCpl	TORRES T. L.	457 02 97 95/0811	"
Sgt	LERNER S. D.	463 84 12 18/2511	HQBTRY
Cpl	BAKER R. D.	503 72 95 83/0844	"
Cpl	BAUMGART E. D.	396 60 70 14/3941	"
LCpl	HOLDREN J. B.	240 94 17 89/0844	"
PFC	WILSON S. R.	518 72 60 34/2511	"
LCpl	BAUMGARDNER T. R.	488 56 09 17/0844	"
LCpl	APARICIO A. L.	526 06 71 56/0811	"L"BTRY
Sgt	MOWERY T. A.	280 46 30 74/0811	"D"BTRY
Cpl	BOULLION N. J.	557 70 01 70/0811	"
Cpl	GUPTILL D. M.	388 62 17 22/0811	"
LCpl	ABEITA F. P.	585 38 80 29/2511	"
LCpl	CHICK D. C.	520 66 69 39/2531	"
LCpl	FINLEY R. F.	360 46 89 57/0811	"
LCpl	LINDAMOOD C. D.	383 60 51 10/2531	"
LCpl	PRESCOTT S. E.	546 06-06 94/2531	"
PFC	PRIOR PL. D.	539 60 91 94/2531	"
PFC	KOPAL K. P.	462 92 06 05/2531	"
PFC	SMITH C. S.	282 50 05 54/0011	"
LCpl	THRESHER R. D.	490 60 80 76/2511	"
Sgt	ZARARGOZA S.	466 94 92 01/0848	HQBTRY
Sgt	GARAN G. G.	576 56 33 16/0811	"D"BTRY
Cpl	VANDERWERF R. D.	551 96 03 51/0847	"
Sgt	LORENZO S. R.	530 92 59 36/0848	HQBTRY
SSgt	HUNTER L.	453 22 77 99/0811	"D"BTRY
PFC	HAMILTON C.	430 08 42 51/3531	"
LCpl	HATHAWAY F. L.	521 68 75 35/0811	"
LCpl	WILLIAMS L.	587 60 51 50/0811	"L"BTRY
PFC	ROBINSON J. M.	571 12 43 73/2531	"
PFC	MORMAN L. J.	479 70 08 93/0811	"
LCpl	NACHIONDO J. M.	530 40 32 13/3531	HQBTRY
HM1	APFEL C. H.	389 16 62 09/RAS	"
HM2	MADASZ E. A.	145 40 67 75/RAS	"
CWO2	BOUFFARD R. L.	041 32 83 72/250	HQBTRY
LCpl	SCHMALSTIG J. M.	545 82 91 18/1371	3dENGR
PFC	YARBOROUGH D. L.	237 02 00 70/0151	HQBTRY
Cpl	DANIEL G. H.	173 36 13 33/5811	MP Co.

## DETACHMENT "H"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>
Capt	HACKETT, W. H.	254 68 92 57/1302
2ndLt	PILLAR, W. A.	294 42 74 08/1302
GySgt	RILEY, R. R.	029 26 77 26/1371
SSgt	PORTIS, S. D.	587 12 04 04/1121
SSgt	BIRMINGHAM, J. M.	482 50 87 20/1345
PFC	DEANDA, S. C.	304 62 83 84/1371
LCpl	VESPUCCI, R.	053 48 47 97/2511
LCpl	JACKSON, R. L.	587 52 70 11/
Pvt	STEPHENS, F. M.	564 76 68 16/1371
Cpl	JAMES, J. C.	218 52 20 88/1371
LCpl	LYONS, J. W.	028 46 90 78/2531
Sgt	KELUM, J. D.	426 02 98 81/1371
Cpl	VANMETER, C. M.	305 64 42 78/1371
LCpl	LESTER, M. C.	234 92 04 63/1371
LCpl	MASON, C.	448 56 15 75/1371
LCpl	GARCIA, J.	459 02 23 97/1371
Cpl	MAIZE, D. L.	573 11 80 52/1371
LCpl	COLON, J. W.	539 60 91 38/1371
LCpl	SMITH, F. H.	457 02 01 18/1371
LCpl	HESS, K. M.	528 88 06 79/1371
Sgt	HUPP, G. D.	246 88 42 02/1371
Cpl	BUTLER, K. F.	577 74 41 45/1371
LCpl	SULLIVAN, W. D.	391 66 55 75/1371
PFC	KERKLAND, C. A.	415 94 40 95/1371
PFC	GOWER, D. E.	448 56 84 07/1371
Cpl	BULLOCK, W. H.	261 25 23 33/1371
LCpl	GRIBBS, R. D.	498 62 48 58/1371
LCpl	CHAMBLISS, J. C.	301 56 37 33/1371
PFC	MCNEIL, T. K.	026 44 93 34/1371
PFC	GANT, T. E.	421 96 76 25/2542
Sgt	THOMAS, S. L.	219 52 69 70/1371
Cpl	RODRIGUEZ, R.	372 56 12 99/1371
LCpl	EUBANKS, L. H.	426 06 36 98/1371
LCpl	FINLEY, R. H.	430 06 63 72/1371
LCpl	PURVIS, G. W.	251 08 74 69/1371
LCpl	RAMOS, A. M.	585 40 52 49/1371
LCpl	SPEING, G. L.	307 64 36 34/1371
Sgt	WILLIAMS, W. E.	259 76 66 14/1371
Cpl	METZ, R. J.	483 72 70 53/1411
PFC	ROBERTS, D. E.	254 98 38 75/1371
LCpl	JORDAN, M. M.	410 02 60 82/1371
PFC	NEIFFER, M. J.	518 64 33 27/1371
Cpl	LYNES, H. A.	248 02 83 99/1371
LCpl	MITCHELL, J. E.	423 76 50 27/1371
PFC	ELLSWORTH, G. D.	425 66 28 32/1371
Pvt	ANDERSON, R.	357 48 77 94/1371
HM1	CHESNUTT, P. E.	094 34 61 69/MED
HM3	SCHIM, W. C.	369 62 31 32/MED
Pvt	UNGOS, R. J.	550 98 45 35/1371

HoBr.

All personnel are with 3d Engineer Battalion except as indicated.

## DETACHMENT "I"

All personnel from 7th  
Comm except those des-  
ignated.

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	
Capt	MOYHER, C. V.	205 34 94 94/0802	
2ndLt	DOYLE, E. M.	338 46 39 73/2502	
CySgt	WICKER, R.	363 40 65 18/2549	
HM1	ADAMS, M. R.	505 54 59 59/8404	3rd Med
HM3	TOLBERT, E. R.	421 76 21 50/8404	
HN	MCGRATH, J. R.	280 56 20 29/8404	
Sgt	ANTLE, D. A.	498 50 61 55/2531	
Cpl	CLARKIN, R. J. JR.	041 42 84 99/2511	
MSgt	FRITCHMAN, L. C.	180 26 88 86/0251	ITT
LCpl	MITCHELL, D. S.	444 60 20 58/5811	MP
PFC	MORROW, B. L.	556 90 07 06/1371	3d Eng.
SSgt	MCDONNELL, L. M.	182 30 46 95/2519	
LCpl	JOHNSON, M. H.	539 68 46 94/2531	
Sgt	ROBINSON, J. D.	427 98 16 78/2511	
Cpl	BENTLEY, R. L.	282 54 89 32/2511	
PFC	JANTZ, K. D.	513 60 27 66/3531	
Sgt	BOURN, C. A.	541 58 89 63/2511	
Sgt	POWELL, S. L.	404 76 15 69/2511	
Cpl	RINGLER, J. I.	573 72 41 00/2532	
LCpl	GUENTHER, A.	464 94 03 46/3531	
PFC	ANDERSON, D. R.	393 60 12 50/2511	
PFC	FRASIER, B. K.	460 02 96 25/3531	
PFC	LANGLEY, W. D.	025 44 94 71/3531	
PFC	MCLAUGHLIN, G. E.	153 48 52 39/2511	
PFC	OLSON, R. A.	393 58 29 49/2511	
PFC	ORTIZ, R.	289 50 02 49/2511	
PFC	FENDELL, R. R.	481 74 17 20/2531	
Cpl	FERGUSON, G. A.	312 62 05 29/3531	
LCpl	MICKEY, P. D.	290 56 01 82/2511	
PFC	PIERCE, J. C.	244 90 65 54/2511	
PFC	BOWIE, S.	209 44 07 49/3531	
SSgt	JACKSON, W. C.	105 40 18 32/2537	
LCpl	KUHN, D. W.	173 50 61 41/2531	
Sgt	LORENTZ, D. L.	296 46 13 45/2511	
Cpl	JIMMO, W. R.	332 52 25 38/2511	
PFC	HUITT, L. E.	497 68 39 75/3521	
PFC	JACKSON, C. L.	236 82 84 52/3521	
Cpl	HESSLER, R. A.	473 66 16 01/1411	
Cpl	TANNER, D. A.	469 68 94 29/2813	
LCpl	JAMES, B. A.	256 88 49 17/3521	
PFC	LAUTERBACK, R. W.	030 44 12 07/2511	
PFC	MCCARTY, D. L.	361 50 76 05/2511	
Cpl	ROZAR, D. H.	270 52 19 64/2511	
Sgt	WOOD, J. D.	243 80 89 97/2511	
LCpl	RISLEY, A. H.	521 84 64 43/2813	
LCpl	CAULEY, T. A.	380 64 08 74/3531	
PFC	SABO, J. M.	451 06 28 78/2813	
LCpl	WILSON, J. [R]EP	514 60 60 93/3531	
Fvt	YATES, T. L.	220 64 69 02/2511	
LCpl	HEARD, K. E.	151 50 19 30/2511	
PFC	FRANKLIN, R. L.	267 21 70 43/3521	

## DECLASSIFIED

## DETACHMENT "K"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1STLT	STREITZ, J.	501 56 13 32/0302	HqBn
SSGT	REEDY, W. T.	455 80 96 40/2519	CommBn
PFC	BECKER, J. L.	373 94 12 78/2531	"
SGT	YOUNG, R. E.	478 90 09 54/2531	"
CPL	BISHOP, T. A.	363 68 22 08/2511	"
LCPL	BROWN, R. L.	043 48 66 83/2511	"
PFC	KEYES, D.	328 02 61 57/2511	"
CPL	GLOVER, J. RA	038 32 19 78/3531	"
LCPL	ENGLAND, R. A.	567 21 71 64/3041	"
LCPL	HIGGINS, L. D.	320 54 27 32/2511	"
SGT	DIRTKKSON, M. T.	459 80 95 62/2511	"
CPL	MALEYKO, M. R.	116 46 25 27/2511	"
PFC	WEAVER, T. L.	307 64 74 04/2511	"
PFC	SLIVA, J. A.	225 90 04 42/2511	"
LCPL	SHIRLEY, J. R.	455 04 78 77/2511	"
PFC	BELKNAP, R. G.	268 52 49 88/3531	"
LCPL	BOONE, D. A.	161 46 66 46/2511	"
HM	CROSS, R. N.	568 94 67 42/8404	HqBn
SSGT	CREIGHTON, T. D.	435 76 05 40/3551	"
PFC	NUNES, T. E.	261 31 83 25/2531	"
SGT	GAVE, D. E.	570 82 93 70/0311	"
CPL	POLIDURA, R.	082 46 10 11/0441	"
LCPL	JENSEN, W. D.	478 70 92 94/0151	"
LCPL	MATHIS, M. E.	459 06 04 10/0351	"
PVT	BARRON, B.	549 11 96 27/0811	"
LCPL	CUTLER, K. H.	314 60 21 65/0311	"
LCPL	ANDERSON, H. L.	256 70 86 51/3531	"
PFC	BROYLES, C. E.	429 08 67-88/0351	"
PFC	HENRY, G. D.	282 56 39 47/0351	"
CPL	RICH, J. W.	156 44 83 82/3451	"
LCPL	WADIE, B. G.	351 50 11 42/0341	"
PFC	MENDENHALL, S. A.	549 98 55 16/2531	"
PFC	ARTYBRIDGE, C.	229 82 61 54/3531	"
LCPL	MARIDUENA, J. G.	564 86 50 46/3531	"
PFC	WARD, E. D.	218 60 70 70/0351	"
PFC	MCLAUGHLIN, T. J.	027 44 76 17/3043	"
CPL	SCHOEPS, D. H.	286 54 91 95/2841	Hq/9
LCPL	REICH, G. H.	266 23 27 72/2511	"
PVT	PAULI, K. E.	479 74 14 93/2511	"
SGT	HUGHLEY, L. S.	260 78 57 89/0231	"
CPL	HIERRO, J.	561 13 60 95/0311	"
LCPL	NICOLETTA, J. A.	549 98 55 04/2531	"
PFC	GONZALEZ, R. R.	450 13 17 45/3500	"
PFC	BEAVERS, L. A. JR.	284 56 03 18/3051	"
CPL	GORDON, J. E.	561 78 51 03/0351	"
LCPL	MCCLURE, M.	336 46 69 99/2531	"
PFC	BANTOM, A. C.	386 60 07 20/3043	"
LCPL	THOMAS, C. E.	118 44 46 79/0311	"
LCPL	CRUM, R. P.	287 56 53 37/2531	"
GYSGT	AULTMAN, G. L.	455 72 76 64/2861	"
HM3	ANTHONY, J. R.	462 90 88 43/MED	3/4
LCPL	WILSON, R. C.	405 84 52 91/2531	Hq/9.

DECLASSIFIED

## DETACHMENT "M"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>BETT</u>
1stLT	FREDRICKSON, C. W.	124 38 6873/2502	HqBn	S
Cpl	ANTHONY, W. K.	037 36 7198/0811	HqBn	S
Cpl	HALLAVER, P. M.	498 62 6286/4631	HqBn	S
Cpl	CLARK, C. Jr	252 88 7895/3051	HqBn	S
LCpl	ARMSTRONG, R. H.	376 66 6928/2511	HqBn	S
LCpl	MARTINEZ, J. M.	526 06 6181/2511	HqBn	S
LCpl	RILEY, L.	438 82 8910/3051	HqBn	S
LCpl	CARPENTER, D. C.	305 72 4939/2511	HqBn	S
PFC	MOORE, B. E.	308 66 4038/0151	HqBn	S
PFC	EBRON, L.	067 46 4501/0131	HqBn	S
GySgt	CONLEY, T. G.	197 32 9756/2149	3dTks	U
SSgt	TENVRIO, J. Q.	586 03 9274/5711	3dTks	U
Sgt	HARDY, R. A.	341 40 6679/1811	3dTks	U
Sgt	MONEY, J. E.	519 50 8629/1811	3dTks	U
Sgt	DUPLECHIN, G. L.	434 88 7706/2141	3dTks	U
Cpl	GONZALEZ, R. P.	464 92 3977/2141	3dTks	U
Cpl	GILLAN, E. H.	150 46 5285/3051	3dTks	U
Cpl	L. CEROH, C. L.	501 64 9306/2141	3dTks	U
Cpl	KAMMERDIENER, T. S.	476 66 8450/2141	3dTks	U
LCpl	LIESINGER, D. A.	503 76 9349/0151	3dTks	U
LCpl	BENNETT, R. A.	254 90 1639/2531	3dTks	U
LCpl	GREEN, J. P.	354 50 2349/2531	3dTks	U
LCpl	COULBERSON, D. D.	439 90 1547/2311	3dTks	U
LCpl	WASHINGTON, S.	247 94 1878/2141	3dTks	U
LCpl	JOHNSON, J. W.	385 58 1524/0441	3dTks	U
LCpl	THOMAS, L.	340 48 1149/3051	3dTks	U
LCpl	BONEY, W. Jr	237 90 9506/2141	3dTks	U
LCpl	WESSELER, R. S.	273 44 2080/2111	4thMar	U
PFC	KRAMER, R. H. Jr	199 44 5423/2141	3dTks	U
HM2	WILSON, S. A.	270 52 8244/Med	3dTks	U
Cpl	MATHEWS, R. C.	436 92 2594/3051	3dTks	U
SSgt	VANHORN, T. R.	153 30 1764/1371	4thMar	P
Sgt	JAMESON, E. L.	310 40 9532/0231	4thMar	P
Sgt	TIBBETTS, R. A.	004 54 6000/3043	4thMar	P
Cpl	SHAW, W. D.	460 94 0768/3371	4thMar	P
Cpl	HANDLEY, D. L.	563 60 1899/0331	3dTks	P
Cpl	SMITH, J. C.	228 86 9874/2531	3dTks	P
Cpl	PEARSON, J. R.	329 50 3734/2841	4thMar	P
LCpl	JONES, C. D.	048 50 9575/2542	4thMar	P
LCpl	BRYANT, W. L.	001 46 7139/2511	4thMar	P
LCpl	GOODEN, D. M.	231 72 8309/2511	4thMar	P
LCpl	BOURLET, L. C.	425 04 0451/2542	4thMar	P
LCpl	SAENS, D.	572 92 6885/0341	HqBn	P
PFC	TOLBERT, M. E.	422 82 0020/2531	4thMar	P
PFC	CRISS, J. W.	273 58 8863/2511	4thMar	P
PFC	MAYNARD, MAYNARD, K. W.	054 48 9726/2511	4thMar	P
PFC	FOWLER, H. P.	458 04 0365/2511	4thMar	P
PFC	HARTSOUGH, T. J.	294 54 0292/2511	4thMar	P
PFC	KASPAREK, D. J.	470 72 9355/3051	4thMar	P
PFC	HENDRICKS, R. A.	185 46 9560/0151	4thMar	P
PVT	GRIFFITH, D. C.	295 58 4703/2500	4thMar	P
HM3	BARBER, S. T.	523 80 0613/Med	4thMar	P

DET "N"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>
Cap t	MALLICK, M. T.	172 28 7663/3510
GySgt	STEELE, J. B.	405 42 4308/3529
SSgt	VICKERY, J. O.	256 70 6766/3529
SSgt	CAMPBELL, L. C.	439 84 9868/0231
Sgt	BENNS, D. A.	380 52 9768/3522
Sgt	GARCIA, R.	466 76 3722/3043
Sgt	BRADEN, R. E.	317 50 6172/2841
- Cpl	LOURENCO, G. M.	530 48 6191/2111
- Cpl	DAWSON, N.	140 44 4298/3521
Cpl	WARDEN, M. S.	512 64 4625/1316
- Cpl	REDDICK, M.	120 42 4011/2511
PFC	LIBERTO, R. T.	193 05 0201/3521
- PFC	BRADLEY, J. S.	587 96 8573/3521
PVT	PAULSON, R. D.	390 68 5783/3521
PVT	LADEAUX, R. D.	508 76 2135/1161
- PFC	EVANS, G. G.	556 06 9945/3521
LCpl	LAMBERT, C. S.	441 58 9248/3521
PFC	NICHOLS, L. J.	431 13 0715/3051
LCpl	KNOWLES, V. B.	057 46 7296/3041
- LCpl	NOCHA, H. C.	069 46 5118/1316
PFC	WATSON, G. J.	587 54 0192/1341
PFC	ULMER, C. L.	367 62 5883/2144
PFC	FRICKS, C. S.	258 92 3695/3521
- LCpl	LARA, L. R.	458 96 6030/0311
Cpl	MILLER, C. L.	234 84 8243/3531
- PFC	GARCIA, H.	128 36 8040/2531
SSgt	HARRINGTON, S. L.	516 56 0673/3529
- Sgt	EASTER, L. R.	319 46 1008/3531
- Sgt	MILLER, R. D.	572 82 2309/2161
Cpl	STONE, T. J.	111 42 6467/2171
LCpl	* CRESS, T. J. <i>WASA SUBIC</i>	186 46 0948/3531
- PFC	DESIATA, J. P.	049 33 2505/3531
PFC	FITZGERALD, R.	287 52 6171/3531
PVT	REED, D. J.	178 46 0466/1341
LCpl	WRIGHT, R.	141 46 4850/3531
LCpl	SMITH, H. W.	430 15 2637/3521
PFC	REVES, E. M.	374 54 7779/3531
PFC	SCHINGS, P. A.	297 56 9578/3531
PFC	STAFFORD, C. D.	487 64 6480/3531
LCpl	BOUREOUIS, J. A.	437 03 0757/2818
PFC	WYMER, E. L.	215 68 0024/2131
LCpl	SHEAFFER, H.H.	180 44 5612/2171
LCpl	BUBE, H. S.	299 25 2931/2111
LCpl	SIMPSON, S. N.	460 11 5860/0311
LCpl	JOHNSON, W. F.	421 78 6018/3431
HM2	SMITH, D. L.	480 68 8068/8404
HM1	MATHIAS, D.	521 05 2691/8404
PFC	HAWKE, M. L.	277 54 6717/1371
Cpl	CANTU, R. L.	458 96 3250/5811
- Cpl	ANDERSON, S. L.	264 06 5552/0341

EngrBn  
HqBn  
ServBn

- TRANSFERRED TO DET "F" ON - MAY 1975 (REPLACE "F" SHORT-TIMERS)

## NOVEMBER DETACHMENT

## PERSONNEL ROSTER

MALLICK,	MT	CAPT	172	28	7663
* KRATOCHVIL,	DA	1LT	450	80	8002
STEELE,	JB	GYSGT	405	42	4308
VICKERY,	JO	SSGT	256	70	6766
* ROBINSON,	CL	SSGT	350	36	5405
CAMPBELL,	L	SSGT	439	84	9868
HARRINGTON,	SL	SSGT	516	56	0673
BENNS,	DA	SGT	380	52	9768
GARCIA,	R	SGT	466	76	3722
BRADEN,	RE	SGT	317	50	6172
MILLER,	RD	SGT	572	82	2309
- EASTER,	LR	SGT	319	46	1008
* JOHNSON,	MA	SGT	454	77	7208
- LOURENCO,	GM	CPL	538	48	6191
CANTU,	RL	CPL	458	96	3250
DAWSON,	N	CPL	140	44	4298
STONE,	TJ	CPL	111	42	6467
WARDLOW,	MS	CPL	512	64	4625
- REDDICK,	M	CPL	120	42	4011
* MATTHEWS,	TD	CPL	586	00	6171
- ANDERSON,	SL	CPL	264	06	5552
* STAHL,	GC	CPL	555	96	9339
MILLER, CL	CL	CPL	234	84	8243
LIBERTO,	RT	LCPL	193	05	0201
LAMBERT,	CS	LCPL	441	58	9248
KNOWLES,	VB	LCPL	057	46	7296
BOUREOUIS,	JA	LCPL	437	03	0757
SMITH,	HW	LCPL	430	15	2637
* DOWSING,,	LW	LCPL	410	94	0371
SHEAFFER,	HH	LCPL	180	44	5612
- NOTCHA,	HC	LCPL	069	46	5118
BUBE,	HS	LCPL	299	25	2931
* ALLEN,	JD	LCPL	260	92	7997
* COUGHMAN,	JW	LCPL	577	73	1624
* COWLES,	MA	LCPL	472	68	9560
* CASTANEDA,	R	LCPL	450	02	2989
* PETERS,	RH	LCPL	382	70	4659
* HOUSE,	JM	LCPL	502	58	4625
* FREEMAN,	J	LCPL	269	45	8867
SIMPSON, SN	SN	LCPL	460	11	5860

ENCLOSURE (1)

## NOVEMBER DETACHMENT

## PERSONNEL ROSTER

MALLICK,	MT	CAPT	172	28	7663
* KRATOCHVIL,	DA	1LT	450	80	8002
STEELE,	JB	GYSGT	405	42	4308
VICKERY,	JO	SSGT	256	70	6766
* ROBINSON,	CL	SSGT	350	36	5405
CAMPBELL,	L	SSGT	439	84	9868
HARRINGTON,	SL	SSGT	516	56	0673
BENNS,	DA	SGT	380	52	9768
GARCIA,	R	SGT	466	76	3722
BRADEN,	RE	SGT	317	50	6172
MILLER,	RD	SGT	572	82	2309
-EASTER,	LR	SGT	319	46	1008
* JOHNSON,	MA	SGT	454	77	7208
-LOURENCO,	GM	CPL	538	48	6191
CANTU,	RL	CPL	458	96	3250
DAWSON,	N	CPL	140	44	4298
STONE,	TJ	CPL	111	42	6467
WARDLOW,	MS	CPL	512	64	4625
-REDDICK,	M	CPL	120	42	4011
* MATTHEWS,	TD	CPL	586	00	6171
-ANDERSON,	SL	CPL	264	06	5552
* STAHL,	GC	CPL	555	96	9339
MILLER, CL	CL	CPL	234	04	8243
LIBERTO,	RT	LCPL	193	05	0201
LAMBERT,	CS	LCPL	441	58	9248
KNOWLES,	VB	LCPL	057	46	7296
BOUREOUIS,	JA	LCPL	437	03	0757
SMITH,	HW	LCPL	430	15	2637
* DOWSING,,	LW	LCPL	410	94	0371
SHEAFFER,	HH	LCPL	180	44	5612
-NOTCHA,	HC	LCPL	069	46	5118
BUBE,	HS	LCPL	299	25	2931
* ALLEN,	JD	LCPL	260	92	7997
* COUGHMAN,	JW	LCPL	577	73	1624
* COWLES,	MA	LCPL	472	68	9560
* CASTANEDA,	R	LCPL	450	02	2989
* PETERS,	RH	LCPL	382	70	4659
* HOUSE,	JM	LCPL	502	58	4625
* FREEMAN,	J	LCPL	269	45	8867
SIMPSON, SN	SN	LCPL	460	11	5860

ENCLOSURE (1)

LARA,	LR	LCPL	458	96	6030
CRESS,	JT	LCPL	186	46	0948
JOHNSON,	WF	LCPL	421	78	6018
WRIGHT,	R	LCPL	141	46	4850
* VEGA,	R	LCPL	557	08	1190
HAWKE,	ML	PFC	277	54	6717
-EVANS,	GG	PFC	556	06	9945
NICHOLS,	LJ	PFC	431	13	0715
ULMER,	CL	PFC	367	62	5883
FRICKS,	CS	PFC	258	92	3695
WYMER,	EL	PFC	215	68	0024
WATSON, GJGJ		PFC	587	54	0192
-DESIATA,	JP	PFC	049	33	2505
FITZGERALD, R		PFC	287	52	6171
REYES, EM	EM	PFC	374	54	7779
SCHINGS,	PA	PFC	297	56	9578
STAFFORD,	CD	PFC	487	64	6480
* BROWN,	JR	PFC	437	94	7484
* BELUNES,	DL	PFC	391	60	1130
* CARROLL,	TM	PFC	244	06	1610
* CLEMMONS,	RR	PFC	075	44	8131
* HASBERRY,	H	PFC	278	50	0156
* KINDEL,	KG	PFC	467	92	6803
* TSCHUTA,	D	PFC	037	38	4685
* SANCHEZ,	R	PFC	585	50	5859
* DEREU,	TR	PFC	516	84	2808
* BARRIENTES,	S	PFC	460	98	1444
-GARCIA,	H	PFC	128	36	8040
* BATTLES,	SW	PFC	455	02	6746
PAULSON,	RD	PVT	390	68	5783
LADEAUX,	RD	PVT	508	76	2135
REED,	DJ	PVT	178	46	0466
-BRADLEY,	JS	PFC	587	96	8573
* BURNS,	T	HM1	256	54	7686
MATHIAS,	D	HM1	521	05	2691
SMITH,	DL	HM2	480	68	8068

(\* ) INDICATES THOSE PERSONNEL WHO WERE FORMED INTO  
DETACHMENTS QUEBEC AND THEN INTO NOVEMBER FIVE.

Enclosure (1)

DETACHMENT PAPA

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CAPT	JESSIE R. M.	358 36 02 82/0302	HqCo 4th MAR
2dLt	BEEMAN D. L.	541 64 85 46/0302	K, 3/4
GYSGT	MOORE R. G.	547 54 97 26/1811	HqCo 4th MAR
SSGT	JAEGER C. F.	227 60 80 47/2861	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	CAIN A. L.	261 31 89 01/2542	HqCo 4th MAR
HM 1	FONTAINE M. E.	471 58 80 44/CORPS	H&S 1/4
HM 3	BOYEE D. C.	536 60 77 52/CORPS	H&S 1/4
PFC	BERSANO C. F.	267 17 49 78/0151	HqCo 4th MAR
SSGT	UPCHURCH J. D.	303 50 09 60/2519	HqCo 4th MAR
CPL	HACKNEY D. A.	385 56 16 30/0311	H&S 3/4
CPL	RODRIGUEZ S. F.	061 48 89 42/1141	HqCo 4th MAR
PFC	NICKESON K. A.	317 58 14 30/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	DONA D. L.	540 70 54 71/0341	H&S 3/4
PFC	KAEOL L. M.	575 84 34 41/0331	L, 3/4
L/CPL	ADORNO R. C.	343 50 79 32/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	POTTER R. R.	552 98 23 29/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	BINGHAM L. P.	412 98 55 88/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	MILLER J. W.	048 52 83 38/0311	L, 3/4
SGT	HORTON H. L.	439 84 32 26/0311	L, 3/4
CPL	MYERS M. D.	523 78 93 34/0341	L, 3/4
PFC	HUNT W. JR	566 25 84 68/0311	L, 3/4
L/CPL	SCHUCERT J. M.	464 98 35 15/0331	L, 3/4
PFC	CUMMINGS W.	266 17 19 88/0311	L, 3/4
SGT	ENRIQUEZ J. J.	453 92 12 25/0311	K, 3/4
PFC	BEAVER L. G. JR	284 54 53 94/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	CARTER R. L.	262 31 59 49/0331	L, 3/4
PFC	MASTERS D. E.	216 68 19 96/0311	L, 3/4
PFC	MONTROSE B. E.	472 66 67 26/2500	HqCo 4th MAR
SSGT	PHILLIPS R. J.	369 44 92 96/3043	HqCo 4th MAR
PFC	SAMUEL P. G.	437 94 10 51/2531	HqCo 4th MAR
SGT	JONES G. D.	527 92 83 66/0331	L, 3/4
CPL	FARMER R. W.	212 58 27 47/0151	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	BEDARD K. G.	005 58 29 04/3521	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	BURNETT R. W.	295 54 12 82/3041	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	SECORE R. J.	086 38 29 04/3531	HqCo 4th MAR
PFC	MCGIRR M. E.	263 15 41 84/3371	HqCo 4th MAR
PFC	RIVAS E. J.	465 08 98 73/2511	H&S 3/4
PFC	CONAWAY M. K.	540 72 86 20/2511	H&S 3/4
SGT	STEPHENS J. W.	316 54 74 82/2311	HqCo 4th MAR
CPL	SMITH T. C.	303 70 74 68/3531	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	McNEARNEY B. P.	521 80 66 53/3531	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	GALVIN T. J.	018 44 85 36/3531	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	SCHMIDT A. D.	566 90 57 81/0341	HqCo 4th MAR
CPL	SAYRE R. R.	275 48 70 53/3535	HqCo 4th MAR
L/CPL	WILSON R.	228 86 61 81/0341	HqCo 4th MAR
PFC	CARTER D. W.	571 78 78 25/0341	H&S 3/4
PVT	GOWING M. D.	513 62 92 37/0341	H&S 3/4
L/CPL	TUBBS K. R.	453 13 40 73/2542	HqCo 4th MAR
GYSGT	VAN ESSELSTYN	101 32 14 27/0251	HqBn
SGT	PATTERSON H. M.	114 42 65 87/1371	3dEngr
CPL	HORNBEAK J. A.	443 52 98 13/5811	HqBn

## DETACHMENT "Q"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1stLT	KOSCHESKI, R. C.	212 58 54 01/0302	HqBn
SSgt	WILLIAMS, A. B.	383 46 66 28/5711	"
SSgt	LAWRENCE, T.	197 32 42 62/1422	EngrBn
SSgt	ROBINSON, S. G.	268 50 63 65/1371	"
LCpl	GUIDRY, P.	434 96 04 86/2542	"
Sgt	AMENSON, C. B.	388 54 98 44/1371	"
Cpl	LUTZ, F. D.	285 56 65 19/1371	"
PVT	LONEY, J. H.	444 52 99 00/0151	"
LCpl	HERNANDEZ, J. L.	082 46 05 25/1371	"
LCpl	KICK, W. H.	226 84 97 56/1421	"
Cpl	COLBURN, J. J.	423 66 87 25/3041	"
LCpl	SCHAEFFER, C. P.	455 84 07 22/1371	"
LCpl	POWERS, M. T.	498 64 02 66/1371	"
LCpl	LEE, C.	439 90 26 96/1371	"
Sgt	COOKE, W. L.	245 88 02 69/2531	"
Cpl	NELSON, J. E.	102 38 13 28/1421	"
LCpl	CALLAHAN, R. G.	213 66 50 49/1371	"
PVT	BELLAMY, L.	373 60 88 42/3051	"
PVT	JOHNSON, D. L.	225 02 35 36/3951	"
Cpl	SCHILLING, P. K.	560 21 51 31/1371	"
LCpl	MAHAN, J. F.	086 50 22 90/3051	"
PFC	CANNON, R. L.	421 80 05 91/2511	"
PFC	MCGEE, L. E.	367 60 81 36/3051	"
HM3	WADLEY, J. D.	358 48 49 57/8404	CommBn
SSgt	KLEBOFSKI, G. L.	310 54 56 23/2813	"
Cpl	LACROSSE, D. C.	473 68 45 66/2511	"
PVT	LATOSKI, S. G.	522 86 60 45/3521	"
PVT	CLAUSEN, D. P.	204 46 24 08/3521	"
LCpl	FISHER, F. A.	579 74 61 19/2511	"
PFC	MCNAIR, A. B.	110 46 28 82/3051	HqBn

## DETACHMENT "R"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DET</u>
1stLt	JOHNSON, J.	372 54 9725/0302	HqCdb 9	R
PVT	RICHARD, D. J.	437 98 2488/2531	2/12	F
LCpl	REAU, T. R.	434 76 0900/2511	2/12	F
PFC	YURSCHAK, S. E.	081 54 7141/3531	2/12	F
LCpl	RIVERS, A. D.	250 96 9967/3531	2/12	F
PFC	HOWARD, R. L.	412 92 8365/3531	2/12	F
LCpl	BROOKS, M. A.	224 78 5951/2531	2/12	F
LCpl	HENNEL, T. L.	355 46 5286/3041	2/12	F
LCpl	JACKSON, R. R.	168 42 7863/0844	2/12	F
HM2	GRIFFIN, R. G.	408 82 6339/MED	3/12	F
SSgt	ADAMS, D. C.	518 56 5811/0848	2/12	F
Cpl	ODOM, T. K.	380 58 3810/0847	2/12	F
LCpl	WOLDRUFF, F. C.	524 78 1757/2531	2/12	F
PFC	MAGOWAN, S.	154 52 2190/0811	2/12	F
PFC	CRUM, J. R.	295 54 0766/0847	2/12	F
PFC	LEY, L. J.	199 46 4428/2311	2/12	F
Cpl	KOSNICK, J. G.	103 42 0520/0844	2/12	F
PFC	RICHETTI, U. M.	132 46 8258/2111	2/12	F
LCpl	ELSWICK, T. B.	530 54 2800/2531	2/12	F
PVT	BURCH, G. M.	446 56 7599/3531	2/12	F
LCpl	HORTHURP, M. C.	428 74 7524/0844	2/12	F
SSgt	NYBERG, R. A.	524 66 1880/3051	HqBn	S
Sgt	PERRY, C. L.	570 80 9196/0849	HqBn	S
LCpl	LEWIS, K. T.	267 25 5472/2531	HqBn	S
HM2	BRINK	121 36 2572/8404	HqBn	S
PFC	HUNT, M. R.	556 96 1399/0151	HqBn	S
LCpl	VILLANEVEVA, G.	465 94 4060/2511	HqBn	S
PFC	MASIEL, P.	458 08 2795/2531	HqBn	S
LCpl	TOTE, W.	148 48 4816/2531	HqBn	S
LCpl	SWENSON, S. A.	305 72 4939/2511	HqBn	S
Sgt	ROBERTS, M. E.	055 48 7039/2531	HqBn	S
Cpl	DUNN, B. K.	518 68 1532/3531	HqBn	S
PFC	ESQUIVEL, R.	462 04 5091/2531	HqBn	S

DETACHMENT SIERRA

PALMQUIST E. R.	CAPT	562 60 16 91 / 2502	HQ BN
MELTER O. E.	GYSGT	571 52 94 71 / 2591	HQ BN
HATCHETT D. L.	SSGT	306 54 77 39 / 2537	HQ BN
TAYLOR J. S.	SGT	434 86 46 63 / 5811	HQ BN
SCOTT L. E.	MSGT	505 42 84 28 /	ITF
YOUNG W. L.	L/CPL	223 78 25 03 /	3ENGR.
MUSTAIN G. R.	HM 1	481 54 76 26	HQ BN
GROFFI C. J.	HM 3	195 44 08 55	HQ BN
RIGGS R. D.	L/CPL	544 64 70 41	HQ BN
LADUKE W. R.	SGT	385 56 76 20	HQ BN
RUELAS C. S.	SSGT	456 82 44 47 / 2537	HQ BN
ESSELMAN M. J.	PFC	399 62 61 53 / 2531	HQ BN
PRUITT H. L.	SGT	238 84 15 70 / 2533	HQ BN
PASCHKE J. F.	CPL	386 60 83 36 / 2511	HQ BN
HARRELL S. R.	L/CPL	228 80 57 05 / 2511	HQ BN
SCOTT J. F.	PFC	304 64 41 99 / 2511	HQ BN
DEJESUS N.	PVT	103 48 75 93 / 2531	HQ BN
ALLEN W. D.	CPL	276 58 08 88 / 2511	HQ BN
POSEY L, A.	PFC	420 82 98 48 / 2511	HQ BN
ROBERTS L. D.	PFC	362 72 91 94 / 2531	HQ BN
ANSELMO F. J.	PVT	064 48 47 09 / 2531	HQ BN
ANDERSON R. L.	SGT	411 88 39 92 / 2531	HQ BN
BUCHANAN G. W.	L /CPL	401 68 99 11 / 0849	HQ BN
GIEHLL P.A.	L/CPL	187 44 02 05 / 2511	HQ BN
GLADDEN J. F.	PFC	232 94 93 85 / 3051	HQ BN
LAWSON C. T.	PFC	237 58 37 30 / 2531	HQ BN
CORVASCE M. C. V.	L/CPL	156 48 98 10 / 2511	HQ BN
BOTTS T.	L/CPL	271 56 89 37 / 2531	HQ BN
LOAGUE J. E.	L/CPL	334 50 56 76 / 2511	HQ BN
JONES R. L.	L/CPL	439 86 95 19 / 2511	HQ BN
VILLIGAN R. L.	SSGT	563 68 02 89 / 2519	HQ BN
SPARKES T. P.	PFC	527 21 16 79 / 2531	HQ BN
MARTIN S.	SGT	150 46 44 12 / 2511	HQ BN
SMITH G.	CPL	321 50 33 89 / 2511	HQ BN
RAYBON H.	PFC	428 04 61 76 / 2531	HQ BN
SOARES J. P.	PFC	547 96 59 73 / 2531	HQ BN
DANIEL G.L.	PFC	251 11 02 40 / 2511	HQ BN
TRANVSKY J.K.	CPL	566 60 43 46 / 2511	HQ BN
PETERSON J. F.	L/CPL	544 72 14 62 / 0331	HQ BN (SVC GO)
OCHOA C.	PFC	527 11 66 82 / 2531	HQ BN
JACKSON R. E.	PFC	452 06 71 31 / 2531	HQ BN
O'QUINN J. H.	SGT	265 94 14 15 / 2511	HQ BN
WASHBURN R. D.	CPL	537 56 61 03 / 2511	HQ BN
ATTAWAY J.	L/CPL	257 90 31 88 /	
CHIODINI A. L.	PVT	500 60 20 59 / 2531	HQ BN
SHIELDS M. H.	L/CPL	135 50 07 99 / 2511	HQ BN
MATA R.	L/CPL	452 08 57 51 / 0531	HQ BN
BOLDT J. C.	PFC	362 66 24 47 / 0849	HQ BN
BIGGS R. S.	PFC	336 50 02 85 / 2511	HQ BN
ENGLAND G. A.	PFC	371 56 28 77 / 2511	HQ BN

## DECLASSIFIED

## DETACHMENT "T"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>
Capt	AMOS, R. O.	
MSgt	PLUMLEE, F. B.	564 50 52 56/0239
SSgt	STRAUBE, P. T.	389 44 22 57/0182
Sgt	PAIGE, D. L.	066 44 28 29 /2531
Sgt	MICHAEL, T. J.	438 84 52 55/5811
LCpl	CLARIDA, C.S.	553 06 57 61/1371
SSgt	KROHN, D. L.	390 56 22 12/0251
PFC	GOOD, D. K.	326 52 18 30/0151
HM1	KILLIAN, W. L.	193 36 39 61
HN	JONES, J. L.	456 76 62 13
Sgt	GUNN, J. J.	539 50 96 92/0311
Cpl	TYSINGER, R. D.	552 98 26 62/2531
Sgt	FOSTER, D. R.	485 54 01 12/0311
Sgt	CHAPPO, R. D.	307 56 87 36/0351
Cpl	GILBERT, J. J.	433 78 08 40/0311
LCpl	CRISTLER, J. L.	311 64 72 16/2531
PFC	IBANEZ, J. M.	450 82 12 63/2531
Cpl	REPOLLGUE, D. W.	572 88 08 79/0311
Cpl	VEAL, H. M.	259 98 78 95/0311
PFC	SAUERWEIN, R. P.	335 50 52 49/0311
LCpl	MINOR, F. L.	317 64 95 10/1531
Sgt	PLANTS, D. D.	435 74 10 79/0341
Sgt	VERSAILLES, K. J.	376 52 69 88/0231
Pl	CRADDOCK, D. R.	404 80 87 99/0311
LCpl	SMITH, D. L.	455 02 23 58/0311
PFC	HEATH, G. W.	537 56 66 27/2531
Sgt	DEVILEESCHOWER	399 44 41 76/0351
LCpl	RUIZ, J. A.	526 98 96 69/0331
PFC	SAVEDGE, L. R.	367 62 41 67/3051
	BISHOP, J. R.	448 60 57 39/1371
GySgt	ADVINCULA, A. J.	574 10 96 64/1371
LCpl	SPEASS, T. F.	265 39 06 11/2531
Sgt	OWENS, F. C.	379 54 26 43/0151
Cpl	MICKIE, J.	219 64 90 24/3531
PFC	YELDER, L. J.	367 60 94 74/0341
PFC	VALENA, S.	586 20 71 21/0311
Pvt	KOMON, H. T.	295 44 67 78/0351
LCpl	USELMAN, M. E.	555 13 05 21/0351
LCpl	COBB, D. R.	432 15 47 69/0341
PFC	CAMP, C. D.	422 78 51 28/0341
PFC	JOE, L. E.	054 46 63 12/3451
Sgt	AVINA, A.	457 90 73 20/0341
LCpl	STEEPHANZ, M. K.	228 84 59 11/0151
PFC	HERR, C. R.	468 68 87 30/0341
PFC	FIJALKAMOSKI, G. A.	030 46 89 83/0311
LCpl	LEE, G. W.	519 60 02 41/0811
PFC	ROCK, D. A.	170 46 93 72/0431
LCpl	PRIEUR, W. J.	369 62 53 11/3051
Cpl	VINCENT, N.	587 90 88 91/0311
Cpl	IRBY, C. D.	527 04 44 52/3043

DECLASSIFIED

DET "U"

All 3d Tanks Bn  
except as indicated

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	
Capt	SHEPHERD, S. A.	415 76 3711/1802	
Lt	LONG, J. K.	404 64 1791/1802	
1STSgt	NOZAN, J. J.	391 36 1463/9999	
GySgt	CHANG, E.	575 32 5062/1811	
HM1	YOBE, J. W.	286 38 3963/8424	
MM3	SHORES, R. H.	452 02 0059/8404	
SSgt	BOSTON, W. H.	438 52 1432/5811	HqBn
HM3	WILSON, S. A.	270 52 8244/8404	
PFC	SHIMANCK, V. E.	331 50 8856/1371	EngrBn
LCpl	CUTGIRTH, A. L.	498 62 8190/2531	
GySgt	BISTERFELOT, A. G.	564 52 2440/1811	
PFC	ARCHOLETA, E. E.	521 82 8223/2531	
Sgt	RODRIGUEZ, R.	463 76 5931/1811	
Sgt	KEYS, C. E.	099 44 2148/3043	
Cpl	GOMEZ, A. J.	464 84 9663/1811	
PFC	FRANCIS, B. R.	051 50 1235/1811	
PFC	GAMEZ, J. R.	464 93 6489/1811	
PFC	JANSEN, R. B.	386 58 9503/1811	
Cpl	VANDERHOOF, D. L.	184 42 3910/2141	
PFC	KEYES, G.	562 92 2848/1811	
PFC	BROWNLEE, M. L.	472 70 2051/1811	
PFC	HAMRICK, P. D.	242 94 4109/1811	
CPL	CUYTON, L.	366 56 2867/1811	
PFC	TREVINO, A.	555 86 3478/1811	
LCPL	BOWERS, G. A.	564 98 2256/2141	
PFC	MCLEOD, D. W.	265 23 5870/2141	
SGT	ARMES, G. A.	486 58 7464/1811	
CELL	LILLY, R. W.	380 60 5008/2141	
LCPL	KOEHLER, J. A.	395 52 3880/2841	
LCPL	WALSTON, D. W.	246 90 2863/1316	
LCPL	HOPPER, R. A.	309 60 4751/2141	
LCPL	SANDRIDGE, C. C.	573 98 6508/3051	
PFC	BARROWS, M. G.	026 46 0482/2141	
PFC	BETTS, M. A.	003 44 7911/2141	
PFC	WHITEHEAD, R. M.	043 52 2916/1811	
LCPL	SOPPE, D. B.	479 74 8695/2141	
PFC	HARDY, R. E.	467 02 1505/1811	
PFC	MIYASHITA, H.	566 13 4746/1811	
PFC	NOSKO, G. N.	474 70 0542/1811	
SGT	BROWN, W. D.	064 48 8780/2161	
CPL	RIDDLE, P. E.	315 60 4761/1316	
PFC	JONES, S. R.	279 54 4446/1811	
PFC	MARSON, D. A.	387 64 7259/1811	
? → PVT LCR	RODRIGUES, E. A.	069 48 7257/1316	
LCPL	CUNNINGHAM, D. W.	273 60 8028/2141	
LCPL	MIKINKA, M. J.	364 68 0906/2141	
LCPL	VANVACTOR, J. A.	402 80 7797/2141	
LCPL	KING, R. C.	375 60 7711/3040	
LCPL	MARTIN, T. J.	455 02 0171/2511	
LCPL	LAMCKEN, K. J.	152 48 1267/2141	
PVT	LAMMERS, S. J.	489 60 7260/1811	

DETACHMENT VICTOR

CAPT	GARCIA D. A.	585	10	52	29/0302	HqCo	9thMar
GYSGT	DEAVERY T. R.	381	40	75	90/5711	"	"
SSGT	ARD R. S.	556	66	56	01/0239	"	"
SSGT	ROGERS L.	462	50	05	54/2519	"	"
SSGT	HALL R. L.	202	32	14	81/5811	HQBn	"
SGT	HANNA P. A.	571	88	64	40/2311	HqCo	9thMar
SGT	TAYLOR J. L.	024	44	89	96/3521	"	"
SGT	SMITH B. R.	237	90	73	04/0331	"	"
SGT	CRISTADORO J. R.	437	86	79	60/2511	"	"
CPL	CAMMACK J. K.	536	62	82	65/2841	"	"
CPL	ORTIZ J. G.	462	08	19	04/2818	"	"
CPE	THOMAS W. G.	337	50	31	13/2511	"	"
CPL	MEDINA J. L.	085	44	41	46/2511	"	"
CPL	SHORTS T. L.	222	38	43	36/2511	"	"
CPL	ROBINSON G.	248	04	53	47/2511	"	"
CPL	DOCKINS R. L.	535	58	84	09/2511	"	"
LCPL	GRAHAM A. L.	103	46	07	81/2811	"	"
LCPL	SHERIDAN S. L.	039	38	59	66/2531	"	"
LCPL	RENDON H.	353	48	61	93/2531	"	"
LCPL	WALTER R. P.	277	48	54	47/2511	"	"
LCPL	MCCALL R. G.	424	78	37	71/2531	"	"
LCPL	DAWKINS R.	251	02	37	06/0441	"	"
LCPL	DUNCAN R. G.	466	98	35	62/0311	"	"
LCPL	TAMBLIN M. L.	586	05	34	07/2531	"	"
LCPL	PATTON B. T.	467	06	34	94/0311	"	"
LCPL	BURKS F. A.	571	94	65	29/2511	"	"
LCPL	EDWARDS T. R.	418	74	96	08/2531	"	"
LCPL	ZAWISTOWSKI J. A.	325	46	76	72/1371	3dEngrBn	"
PFC	BROWN S. A.	548	80	94	40/2511	HqCo	9thMar
PFC	STALLWORTH H. E.	423	76	40	58/2511	"	"
PFC	PHAIR M.	075	48	03	45/2531	"	"
PFC	WALKER B. G.	515	58	93	28/2531	"	"
PFC	GRIGSBY M. J.	226	84	08	74/0311	"	"
PFC	WILLIAMS A. R.	230	82	68	30/1431	"	"
PFC	BAKER C.	076	52	68	08/2531	"	"
PFC	BOWDEN J. P.	297	50	15	70/2531	"	"
PFC	ARTHUR G. F.	494	60	50	94/2531	"	"
PFC	RIVAS E.	455	96	68	37/2531	"	"
PFC	CADWALLADER P. D.	536	60	95	98/2531	"	"
PFC	DELEONE D. V.	276	56	95	86/2531	"	"
PFC	EMLEY W. G.	151	50	87	67/2531	"	"
PFC	MIRAMONTEZ R. D.	535	62	52	11/2531	"	"
PFC	MILLER T. H.	100	46	35	42/2531	"	"
PFC	HENSEL G. E. III	255	94	86	47/2531	"	"
PFC	COBURN W. W.	575	80	29	40/2531	"	"
PFC	DRUMMOND M. D.	539	66	93	40/2531	"	"
PVT	GRIETENS S. C.	092	44	51	46/3535	"	"
HM1	DAVIS P. S.	226	60	17	09/8404	"	"
HM3	ANTHONY J. R.	462	90	88	43/8404	"	"
HN	GODWIN S. E.	514	62	40	91/8404	"	"

## MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1stLt	STREITZ, J. J.	501 56 13 32/0302	HqBn
Cpl	SAMUELSON, W. N.	572 72 57 86/5811	"
LCpl	RAY, V. L.	545 98 56 33/5811	"
SSgt	POMEROY, J. E.	018 34 59 46/5811	"
GySgt	TAYLOR, W. C.	030 32 30 15/5811	"
PFC	LEASK, D. J.	366 62 84 10/5811	"
LCpl	CONNOLLY, K. A.	134 42 19 71/5811	"
Cpl	GARVEY, J. G.	134 44 48 32/5811	"
Cpl	STICKELMEYER, G. J.	443 48 96 34/5811	"
LCpl	HYLLESTED, K. R.	537 46 29 17/5811	"
PFC	DARNES, D. C.	378 64 84 37/5811	"
PFC	CARRICO, R. K.	276 56 84 14/5811	"
Cpl	ZIELEN, T. S.	335 48 73 65/5811	"
Cpl	LIPE, L. W.	322 44 23 99/5811	"
LCpl	STIPP, M. L.	313 62 44 20/5811	"
Sgt	GEORGE, D. W.	082 42 40 82/5811	"
LCpl	CHRISTIANSON, E. M.	389 56 33 61/5811	"
LCpl	JONES, E. L.	101 46 52 16/5811	"
PFC	LINDAHL, R. N.	549 04 31 60/5811	"
PFC	CONAWAY, J.	166 46 18 82/5811	"
PFC	PARHAM, S. G.	223 86 32 88/5811	"
LCpl	MARTIN, R. L.	217 68 43 09/5811	"
Sgt	LOUCKS, F. L.	121 38 55 16/5811	"
LCpl	MURRAY, E.	103 44 09 48/5811	"
Cpl	BRAKEFIELD, L. E.	527 92 39 48/5811	"

17th. ITT

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CWO	KENT, A. F.	427 78 13 44/0250	HqBn
MGySgt	JACKSON, J. F.	570 38 14 74/0250	"
GySgt	COHEN, J. O.	263 62 31 23/0250	"
GySgt	CURRY, W.	250 66 53 23/0250	"
GySgt	HULSEY, W. C.	494 46 30 63/0250	"
GySgt	RICH, D. A.	043 34 55 03/0250	"
GySgt	HERNANDEZ, M.	534 36 57 32/0250	"
GySgt	KAHN, H.	065 32 22 45/0250	"
GySgt	JOWSA, S. D.	292 44 93 37/0250	"
SSgt	MENSIE, W. J.	432 76 43 99/0250	"
SSgt	KAPTUR, E. A.	543 44 48 87/0250	"
SSgt	GARCIA, M.	527 46 41 56/0250	"

3d CIT

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Capt	BUSHEY, C. J.	009 24 51 72/0210	HqBn
2ndLt	WHEATON, R. L.	282 36 95 54/0210	"
CWO-3	RUSSELL, V. B.	057 32 16 10/0210	"
MSgt	SINGLETARY, A.	266 56 52 62/0211	"
Sgt	HESTER, C. D.	258 80 08 30/0211	"
Sgt	MCDONOUGH, R. J.	037 36 34 45/0211	"
LCpl	LIST, K. R.	393 64 34 58/0151	"

DETACHMENT 1STBN, 4THMAR

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN</u>
LCPL	CARMONA, R.	453 94 78 42

DETACHMENT CONTROL GROUP

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Maj	QUINLAN, D. A.	042 30 96 16/0302	Hq 9th Mar
1stLt	KINSELL, T. W.	280 40 80 61/0302	"
SSgt	BRUNNER, N. J.	366 44 36 51/2549	"
LCpl	BEAL, D. J.	310 60 58 63/2531	"
LCpl	LUCAS, E. C.	321 52 73 36/2531	"
PFC	KRESGE, E. G.	144 50 94 26/2531	"
PFC	PAUL, M. J.	069 52 83 05/2531	"
PFC	LITTRELL, C. D.	278 56 55 43/2531	"
PFC	DAVIS, T. R.	444 58 10 66/0151	"
PFC	FLATJORD, K. N.	478 74 85 54/0151	"
Sgt	BENNETT, S. M.	520 60 84 85/2531	"
Cpl	DAWSON, R. E.	460 94 51 46/2531	"
LCpl	SANTIAGO, O.	131 44 24 01/2511	"
PFC	BROWN, M. T.	433 02 11 68/1431	"

## "BARBOUR COUNTY DETACHMENT"

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
1stLt	KRATOCHVIL, D. A.	450 80 80 02/0302	3dSvcBn
SSgt	ROBINSON, D. L.	350 36 54 05/0369	"
HMI	BURNS, T.	256 54 76 86/8404	"
PFC	VEGA, R.	557 08 11 90/3043	"
Cpl	MATHEWS, T. D.	586 00 61 71/0311	"
Sgt	JOHNSON, M. A.	454 77 72 08/3051	"
Cpl	STAHL, G. C.	555 96 93 39/0311	"
LCpl	ALLEN, J. D.	260 92 79 97/0311	"
LCpl	COUGHMAN, J. W.	577 73 16 24/0331	"
LCpl	COWLES, M. A.	472 68 95 60/3041	"
LCpl	CASTANEDA, R.	450 02 28 89/0311	"
LCpl	PETERS, R. H.	382 70 46 59/0311	"
LCpl	HOUSE, J. M.	502 58 46 25/2542	"
LCpl	FREEMAN, J.	269 45 88 67/0311	"
PFC	BROWN, J. R.	437 94 74 84/0311	"
PFC	BELUNES, D. L.	391 60 11 30/0311	"
PFC	CARROLL, T. M.	244 06 16 10/0311	"
PFC	CLEMMONS, R.	075 44 81 31/0311	"
LCpl	DOWSING, L. W.	410 94 03 71/3531	"
PFC	HASBERRY, H.	278 50 01 56/0311	"
PFC	KINDEL, K. G.	467 92 68 03/2511	"
PFC	TSCHULTA, P.	037 38 46 85/0311	"
PFC	SANCHEZ, R.	585 50 58 59/2531	"
PFC	DEREU, T. R.	516 84 28 08/2531	"
PFC	BARRIENTES, S.	460 98 14 44/2542	"
PFC	BATTLES, S. W.	455 02 67 46/3051	"

MedO

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SSAN/MOS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Lt	ANDRUS, K. L.	292 42 37 86/2105	HqBn
Lt	OAKLAND, J. H.	531 44 35 10/2105	HqBn

Assigned 9th MAB for Mayaguez Ops  
14 May 1975

CWO	BOUFFARD, R. L.	041-32-8372/0250
GYSGT	JOWSA, S. D.	292-44-9337/0251
GYSGT	VAN ESSELSTYNE	101-32-1427/0251
SSGT	KAPTUR, E. A.	543-44-4887/0251
SGT	PATTERSON, H. M.	114-42-6587/1371
CPL	SCHILLING, P. K.	560-21-5131/1371
LCPL	LEE, C.	439-90-2696/1371
LCPL	SCHMALSTIG, J. M.	545-82-9118/1371
MAJ	QUINLAN, D. A.	042 30 9616/0502

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AESF PHOTOGRAPHS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Subject</u>
1	The Search Process; Lecture; Demonstration; and Application
2	Staff Planning Aboard the USS DUBUQUE
3	Waiting to Deploy in the Welldeck of the USS DUBUQUE
4	Training and Preparation is continuous aboard the Evacuation Ships
5	Taking on stores; Taking a break
6	D-Day; the Arrival of the Refugees
7	The Loading Process
8	Providing the Necessities; food, water, and medical treatment
9	Living conditions aboard ship enroute to Guam

*Photos not in File 19 Aug 1980 LMT*

Tab G

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AESF TRAINING DOCUMENTS

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	Training Schedule (Sample)
2	Vietnamese Terms
3	Evacuee Do's/Don'ts
4	Lessons Learned CTU 79.1.7 260306Z Apr75
5	Security of MSC Ships CTU 79.1.7 260302Z Apr75
6	Guidance for AESF Ships Detachments

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SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	TIME	LOCATION	UNIT	REMARKS
SATURDAY, 19 APR 75 VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE + CULTURE	ITT	1600-1700	FLIGHT DECK FO'C'SLE 04 LEVEL	DETS P&I DETS S&T DETS N&V	PENCILS/NOTE- BOOK REQUIRED. DETS P, S, & N BRING MEGA- PHONES.
SECURITY AND CI	CI AND MP'S	1700-1800	"	"	"
SUNDAY, 20 APR 75 VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE + CULTURE	ITT	0900-1000	FO'C'SLE	DETS F, E, H, V	PENCILS/NOTE- BOOK REQUIRED. DET H BRING MEGAPHONE.
SECURITY AND CI RIOT CONTROL	CI AND MP'S MP'S	1000-1100 0900-1000	" FLIGHT DECK UPPER VEHICLE	" DETS P&I	DETS BRING MEGAPHONE. CI & ITT PERS WILL BE AVAIL TO DISCUSS LESSONS LEARNED & ASSIST MP'S WITH TRAINING.
/CONTROL/EQUIP REQUIREMENTS	DET CO'S	0900-1100	04 LEVEL	DET N	CI & ITT PERS WILL BE AVAIL. TO DISCUSS LESSONS LEARN- ED.
DET CMDR'S TIME	DET CO'S	0900-1100 1300-1700	AS DIRECTED BY DET CO "	DETS S&T DETS F, E, H, V&N	
RIOT CONTROL	MP'S	1400-1600	UPPER VEHICLE FLIGHT DECK	DET V DET S	DETS BRING MEGAPHONE. CI & ITT PERS WILL BE AVAIL TO DISCUSS LESSONS LEARNED &

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	TIME	LOCATION	UNIT	REMARKS
DAY, 20 APR 75 /CONTROL/EQUIP REQUIREMENTS	DET CO'S	1400-1600	04 LEVEL FO'C'SLE	DET P DET I	CI AND ITT PERSONNEL WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS LESSONS LEARN- ED.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

From: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 1st Cavalry Division  
 To: EMBARKED USA PERSONNEL

Subject: RESTRICTION OF AREAS AUTHORIZED FOR USMC

1. In order to provide enhanced USMC personnel areas of the ship which may be utilized for relaxation, exercise periods, and organized formations, and to enhance the efficiency and conduct of required daily routines, certain areas of the ship are hereby authorized as accessible to USMC embarked personnel under the conditions stated.

- a. 60' C'SLE - Available during daylight hours, fair weather. Relaxation. Remain aft of "Restricted Area" boundary lines (roped off and marked by signs.)
- b. 04 LEVEL - Available during daylight hours. Relaxation. Small formations or other groups such as for training sessions. Sunbathing permitted when Holiday Routine scheduled. Remain aft of signal bridge and out of after Gun Directors port and starboard sides.
- c. 02, 03 LEVELS, WEATHER DECKS - Relaxation, fair weather. Remain aft of both ship's bridge and flag bridge. Gun mounts (M7 23 and 34) are OFF LIMITS AT ALL TIMES. Available during daylight hours.
- d. BOAT DECK - Relaxation, fair weather. Remain clear of all boats and out from underneath boats. Available during daylight hours. NO SMOKING.
- e. FLIGHT DECK - Scheduled FORMATIONS, individual/scheduled group physical training/exercise, and relaxation. Not available when Flight Operations scheduled or embarked aircraft spotting requires flight deck area. NO SMOKING AT ANY TIME. CATWALK areas OFF LIMITS at all times. (Access from troop space exits port and starboard sides aft permitted.) BANGAR and ALL AIRCRAFT and ALL HANDLING EQUIPMENTS are OFF LIMITS at all times. Daylight hours only.

2. All other topside areas and weather decks are OFF LIMITS at all times.

3. All personnel utilizing these authorized areas for relaxation, training, or exercise purposes are expected to maintain the cleanliness of the area and to police the area prior to departure.

4. When existing weather conditions create hazardous circumstances for these areas, they will be secured to All Hands by announcement over the LMC. All weather decks are secured to All Hands at sunset.

5. GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS to be followed by All Hands when topside include:

- a. Do not tamper with or operate any equipments located in these areas.
- b. Do not lean on life lines or lifelines.
- c. Do not throw lighted cigarettes over the side. Crush out on sole of shoe, field strip, and deposit in trash receptacle.
- d. No skylarking or horseplay at any time.
- e. Remain clear of ship's force work or other evolutions in progress.

*J. A. K. BIRCHETT*  
 J. A. K. BIRCHETT  
 LCDR USN

ENGLISH	VIET	PHONETIC
1. WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH?	AI NOI TIENG ANH?	I NOY TING ANN
2. NO WEAPONS ALLOWED	CAM KHÍ GIỚI	COMB KEY YOY
3. FOLLOW ME	THEO TÔI	TEYO TOY
4. DON'T TALK	KHÔNG NÓI	COMB NOY
5. REMAIN CALM	BINH TINH	BING TING
6. SIT DOWN	NGOÌ XUÔNG	NGOY SUE-UNG
7. STAND UP	ĐỨNG LÊN	DOOM LYNN
8. COME HERE	LẠI ĐÂY	LIE DAY
9. WHAT DO YOU WANT	MUỐN GÌ	MOON YEE
A. WATER B. FOOD C. TOILET D. DOCTOR	NƯỚC ĐỒ ĂN CÁU TIỂU BÁC-SĨ	NOOK DOE ON COW TIU BAK SHE
10. YES	YA PHẢI	YA PHIE
A. NO B. MAN C. WOMAN D. CHILD E. PLEASE	KHÔNG ÔNG BÀ EM XIN	COMB OM BA M SIN
11. DON'T MOVE AROUND	KHÔNG ĐI ĐẤU	COMB DEE DOE

BACKGROUND

1. The physical condition of evacuees is likely to be very poor, due to the ordeal they have been through and poor nourishment. It is also likely that there will be some wounded and some severe cases of exposure. As a result of the aforementioned physical conditions of evacuees, it is also likely that they will be in a very poor state of mind. Most will still be fearful and in a state of shock. It would be correct to assume that these people will be excited, afraid, in a state of panic, hungry and thirsty. Therefore, extreme caution must be used in dealing with the evacuees.
2. Respect the culture of the evacuees. You will be dealing with people from all walks of life, i.e. farmers, doctors, teachers, diplomats, and even buddhist monks. If cultural and social norms are violated, our jobs could be made a lot more difficult.
3. If security problems develop or special screening assistance is required, report the matter to your seniors. They may request assistance from CIT/ITT/MP's.

The following are DO's and DON'Ts to remember when dealing with evacuees:

- Maintain firm control at all times.
- Maintain calm among evacuees.
- Help when required.
- Be security conscious.
- Report all suspicious actions.
- Avoid direct contact with evacuees.
- Keep evacuees seated at all times.
- Report any English speaking evacuee.
- Report any individual creating dissent.
- Do not touch anyone on the head, because of religious implications.
- Do not molest any evacuees.
- Do not be rough with the evacuees, especially older people. (Elders are highly respected in this culture)
- Do not harass any evacuees and do not offend them.
- Do not permit weapons or explosives among evacuees.
- Do not permit speeches or provoking gestures.
- Do not permit fights among evacuees.

FROM: CTO STAFF, WFO, FT BRB, FT SEVEN  
TO: CTO STAFF, WFO, FT BRB, FT SEVEN

1. (U) THE MAINS CHIEF METHOD OF CHANGING EMPLOYERS WITH A DEGREE OF SAFETY WAS VIA THE ACCOMMODATION LADDERS AND SHIPS. REFUGERS WERE FT TIED AND THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT SHIP OR CHOP TO ACQUIRE EMPLOYED PERSONNEL ON THE LADDERS TO HELP THE REFUGERS FROM THE BOAT INTO THE ACCOMMODATION LADDER PLATFORM, UP THE LADDER AND ACROSS THE QUATERDECK.

2. (U) FAMILY UNIT IS THE BASIC UNIT OF ORGANIZATION. A VIETNAMESE FAMILIES DO NOT ALWAYS EMBARK ON THE SAME BOAT TOGETHER, FAMILIES VERY QUICKLY BECOME SEPARATED. INTERPRETERS CAN HELP CALM THEM TO SOME EXTENT, EXPLAINING ALL ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO LOCATE THEIR RELATIVES. CONTINUING AND CHIEF PRESSURE WERE APPLIED IN ORDER TO LET THEM CLEAR THE QUATERDECK AREA TO PERMIT ADDITIONAL REFUGERS TO BE EMBARKED AND NOT BE HELD UP ON THE LADDER. THIS IS WHERE THE RE GUARDS ARE MOST USEFUL.

3. (U) ALL WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE WILL BE IMMEDIATELY THROWN OVER THE SIDE IN FULL SIGHT OF ALL THE VIETNAMESE STAFF. WHEN THE REFUGERS INDICATED A CRITICAL NEEDING OF WELL BEING UPON BEING ARMED EMPLOYERS BEING DISABLED PRIOR TO EMBARKING IS THE SHIP.

4. (U) LARGE TRASH BINS WITH PLASTIC LINER SERVED WELL AS COVER DISTRIBUTION POINTS. THE BINS SEEMED TO HAVE APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED LITERS EACH. BURETS SERVING AS CHANGEMEN SEEMED TO FILL UP AS IF THE OCCASION'S APPLICABLE.

5. (U) THE SECOND DAY YOU CAN SEE OF THE CHILDREN TO BE RECOVERED AND BY AND RUNNING ABOUT THE DECK. THIS SEEMED TO KEEP THE WIFE HAPPY AND ALIGNED

DATE: 10/1/77	BY: [Signature]	CLASS: [Signature]	TO: [Signature]
RELEASED BY: [Signature]	APPROVED: [Signature]	DEPT: [Signature]	CRS: [Signature]

THE DOMESTIC MESSAGE BOARD

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	1/789	3130	COMPUTER	LEN:	000 4345 1000
ACTION INFO	0000			AC to C	T to T	

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: EVA REFUGEE EVACUATION & LANSONS TRAINING (U)  
 FROM: OTO SEVEN NINE FT ONE FT SEVEN  
 TO: TU SEVEN NINE FT ONE FT SEVEN

MOTHER TO SLEEP.

6 (C) WHEN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES EMBARKED APPROACHES TEN TIMES THE NUMBER OF CREW MEMBERS, HOISSING WILL ALMOST BE CONTINUOUS AROUND THE CLOCK. THE BEST METHOD OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION WAS TO KEEP BIV REFUGEES SEATED AND TO MOVE AMONGST THEM WITH THE FOOD. FIND OUT WHO YOUR REFUGEE INTERPRETERS ARE IN EACH HOLD AND DISTINCTIVELY MARK THEM SO THAT AS GUARDS ARE ROTATED INTERPRETERS ARE READILY APPARENT. MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP FAMILIES TOGETHER.

7 (C) ONLY ONE LADDER WAS USED FOR EMBARKATION, WHICH ALSO MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FORM A LINE WHILE EMBARKING REFUGEES.

8 (C) FIREHOSES ARE EFFECTIVE IN CONTROLLING THE VIBRATION/BOAT COXSWAINS AND SHOULD BE POSITIONED CLEAR OF THE QUARTERDECK.

9 (C) MAKE SECURITY SWEEP OF HOLDS AFTER DEBARCATION TO CHECK FOR BOOBY TRAPS AND SICHANAYS.

10 (C) BUILD TABLES FOR SCREENING PERSONNEL TO USE WHILE SEARCHING BAGGAGE.

11 (C) WATERLIVE SECURITY LIGHTS ARE ALSO NECESSARY TO PREVENT REFUGEES ATTEMPTS TO BOARD BY OTHER THAN THE ACCODATION LADDER.

12 (C) IT WAS FOUND THAT ALLOWING THE REFUGEES TO ESTABLISH THEIR FAMILY GROUPS HELPED THE SEARCH PROCESS. ROPED OFF TRAFFIC LANES WITH PERSONNEL POINTING THE WAY, ASSISTED IN THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL. BAGGAGE SEARCHES WERE DONE BY HAND AND METAL MINE DETECTING EQUIPMENT.

13 (C) GUARD FORCE SHOULD INCLUDE ENOUGH GUARDS TO PROTECT SUPERSTRUCTURE AND OTHER

UPGRADING: ABS      CHN      HNSG CLR: CR      PC      PR

DEFENSE MESSAGE FORM

PRECEDENCE:	CLASSIFICATION:	1/MS 3120	COMPUTER	SON:	WCS 1300
ACTION TYPE:	GROUP:		TO C	2015	26774 Apr 75

SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUBJECT: 7TH REFUGEE EVACUATION - LESSONS LEARNED (U)

FROM: CTO SEVEN NINE FT SEPT SEVEN

TO: TV SEVEN NINE FT ONE PY SEVEN

LIMITED ACCESS AREAS. TWO OR THREE GUARDS PER HOLD LEVEL SHOULD BE PROVIDED.

IF REFUGEES ARE PLEASED WITH DECKS.

RT

FORWARDED BY:	ADD:	GPS	1/MS GEN:	CC	PR
RELEASED BY:		WRITER:	DEPT:	GROUP:	

DEPT. OF DEFENSE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS

CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFIED      REFERENCE: 38114      DATE: 03/05/82

ACTION: 1001      SUBJECT: 1110 3000      TO: 0      FROM: 0

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: (None)

SUBJECT: ENG VESSEL SECURITY (U)

FROM: CDR BRUCE W. HAYES, USN, USMC

TO: CDR BRUCE W. HAYES, USN, USMC

A. CPG SEVEN SIX FT FIVE 190752Z APR 73

1. (C) BASIC PLANING SHOULD PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DECKHOUSE AREA M, INDECK AND ABOVE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ALL DOORS LEADING INTO DECKHOUSE FROM WEATHER DECKS SHOUL BE DOGGED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. ONE MAN EACH LEVEL TO CHECK 5 HIGH DOORS CONT. GUARD SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. EST 4 MEN.

(B) ONE TO THREE MEN TEAMS SHOULD BE STATIONED IMMEDIATE AREA OF EACH WING OF THE BRIDGE TO BAR ACCESS TO BRIDGE AREA VIA WEATHER DECK LADDERS. EST 2-4 MEN.

(C) GUARD DETAIL SHOULD BE STATIONED SO AS TO BLOCK UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO BRIDGE AND CHARTROOM AREA THROUGH THE DECKHOUSE VIA INTERNAL LADDERS. SHOULD STAY IN A SAFE CONTROL SITUATION. EST 1 MAN.

(D) MUST HAVE STRONG DETAIL BE STATIONED ON UPPER MOST WEATHER DECK (FLYING BRIDGE) HIGH IN IMMEDIATELY ABOVE BRIDGE WINGS ON LOST SHIPS AND REFUGES SHOULD BE CHECKED & NOT ALLOWED ON TO THIS DECK AS MOST RADIO ANTENNA LEAD WIRE LOCATED THIS AREA. SHOULD BE RIGID TRAILER (PENDING GET OF SAMPANS INVOLVED RECOGNIZE YOUR PLACES APPROPRIATE WIRE BE LOCATED HERE IN FIELD OF FIRE PURPOSES.

(E) TWO MEN TEAM SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO GUARD ACCESS LADDER(S) TO STEERING ENGINE ROOM WHICH IS LOCATED ON DECK OF VESSEL USUALLY FIRST OR SECOND LEVEL BELOW MAIN DECK. EST 2 MEN.

(F) ONE GUARD IN PASSAGEWAY OUTSIDE OFF MASTERS QUARTER. NO IS NECESSARY TO ESCORT MASTER TO/FR VARIOUS LOCATIONS.

PREPARED BY: [Signature]      CHECKED BY: [Signature]      DEPT:      CHIEF:      DATE:      TIME:      PAGE:      OF:      FILE NO:      REF:      INDEX:      CTR:      CB

GUIDANCE FOR AMPHIBIOUS EVACUATION SECURITY FORCE (AESF) SHIPS  
DETACHMENT1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

A. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE TO FOLLOW IS TO UTILIZE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

B. THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, (LIVE AMMUNITION OR ANY OTHER TYPE OF PHYSICAL FORCE LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY) IS AUTHORIZED ONLY WHEN ALL THREE OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST:

(1) ALL LESSER MEANS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED OR ARE OTHERWISE UNAVAILABLE, AND

(2) THE RISK OF DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM TO INNOCENT PERSONS IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED BY ITS USE, AND

(3) THE PURPOSE OF ITS USE IS SELF DEFENSE TO AVOID DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM TO U. S. FORCES, OR DEFENSE OF LIVES OF PERSONS TO BE EVACUATED, OR PREVENTION OF DESTRUCTION OF U. S. PROPERTY OR EQUIPMENT VITAL TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.

C. INDISCRIMINATE FIRING OF WEAPONS IS NOT AUTHORIZED, AND FIRING MUST BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF AN OFFICER OR STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER. SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL WILL NOT PLACE MAGAZINES IN WEAPONS UNTIL DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT. LOCKING AND LOADING INSTRUCTIONS WILL ALSO BE PROMULGATED BY THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT.

2. IT IS NOT INTENDED FOR AESF DETACHMENTS TO BE EMPLOYED IN A COMBAT ROLE, HOWEVER, MARINE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN EVACUATION OPERATIONS WILL BE ARMED AND EQUIPED, AS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE BY DETACHMENT COMMANDERS. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO REDUCE THE OUTWARD IMAGE OF A COMBAT SITUATION.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS (RCA) IS NOT AUTHORIZED AT THIS TIME. CONFISCATION OF WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE CONTROL ABOARD US-MSC SHIPPING IS AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY ESTABLISHED BY THE MASTER OF EACH US-MSC SHIP. MARINES WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE ACCOUNTABILITY OR STORING OF WEAPONS OR ORDNANCE UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY THE SHIP'S MASTER. HOWEVER, BE PREPARED TO OFFER TIMELY SUGGESTIONS BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCES AND PROVIDE ALL REQUIRED ASSISTANCE. MARINE SECURITY FORCES MAY INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN WEAPONS AND ORDNANCE CONFISCATION IF REQUESTED BY THE SHIP'S MASTER. HOWEVER, THEY WILL NOT INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN STORAGE PROBLEMS NOR WEAPONS/ ORDNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY.

4. GUIDANCE TO MASTERS OF U.S.N.S. SHIPS CONCERNING AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MASTER AND OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE U.S. MARINE SECURITY FORCE.

A. THE MASTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS SHIP AND ALL PERSONS ON BOARD. HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFE NAVIGATION AND TECHNICAL OPERATION OF HIS SHIP AND HAS PARAMOUNT AUTHORITY OVER ALL PERSONS ON BOARD. THE MASTER HAS EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE SHIP ABANDONED. HE HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE APPROPRIATE LAWS OF THE U. S. AND TO EXECUTE NAVAL DIRECTIVES.

B. U. S. MARINES SECURITY FORCE: THE OFFICER IN CHARGE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT, DISCIPLINE, AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THESE ATTACHMENTS.

C. THE MASTER AND OFFICER IN CHARGE SHALL COOPERATE FULLY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE SHIP AND ALL PERSONS ABOARD. THE MARINE SECURITY FORCE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING THE MASTER IN MAINTAINING GOOD ORDER, CONTROL, AND SECURITY AS IT CONCERNS EMBARKED EVACUEES.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR EVACUATION OPERATIONS

A. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT THE AESF BE INTRODUCED INTO HOSTILITIES OR INVOLVED IN COMBAT ACTIVITIES. REMOVAL OF THREATENED PERSONNEL/VESSELS FROM HOSTILE FIRE SITUATIONS IS DIRECTED AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE TO BE FOLLOWED DURING THIS OPERATION. UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY AESF PERSONNEL WILL CLOSE NO CLOSER THAN ONE MILE TO THE RVN.

B. SHOULD HOSTILE FIRE BE ENCOUNTERED, UNITS ARE DIRECTED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF OPERATIONS RETURNING FIRE ONLY AS NECESSARY FOR SELF DEFENSE.

C. NOTHING IN THIS DIRECTION SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS PRECLUDING A COMMANDER FROM USING ALL MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL TO EXERCISE THE IMPERIAL RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS FOR THE SELF DEFENSE OF HIS FORCES.

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AESF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS

Appendix

Description

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| 1 | Marines End Nam Evacuation                                |
| 2 | The Last ARVNs Are Mustered Out                           |
| 3 | Refugees Thank Marine Unit For Courage<br>& Consideration |

TAB I

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Marines End Nam Evacuation**Marines end Nam evacuation**

By MSgt. Chuck McCormick

Marines of the 3d Marine Division who took part in Vietnam evacuation operations began arriving back on Okinawa Wednesday, May 6, as the 1st Battalion, Ninth Marines arrived at White Beach aboard ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, with others following.

As part of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, the men had taken part in Operation Frequent Wind, 20 hours in which the Brigade made world history in completing the largest helicopter evacuation ever attempted.

On the surface, Operation Frequent Wind appeared simple, fly to the Defense Attache Office (DAO) compound, pick up Americans, third country nationals and key South Vietnamese and fly them to ships of the Seventh Fleet waiting off the coast of South Vietnam. The final phase of the airlift would be to remove the U.S. Ambassador a few members of his staff and Embassy security Marines, 100 people, from the Embassy in Saigon.

The plan appeared simple...it was very complex. Over 6,000 Marines and 32,000 Navy men were involved in the operation. The Marines formed the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Richard E. Carey. The Navy men crewed more than 40 ships in a 7th Fleet task force. The Brigade was task organized and composed of Regimental Landing Team-4 (RLT-4), commanded by Colonel A.M. Gray Jr.; Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-39, commanded by Col. F.G. McLenon; the Brigade Logistic Support Group, commanded by Col. Hans G. Edchohls and the Amphibious Evacuation Security Group, commanded by Maj. D.A. Quinlan.

Squadrons from MCAS Futenma's Marine Aircraft Group-36 flew their CH-53's, CH-46's, UH-1E's and, for protection, their deadly Cobra Gunships in excess of 600 sorties and a total of 527 flight hours during the 20-hour operation.

Two pilots, Captain William C. Nystul and Lt. Michael J. Shea, were lost in the South China Sea when their search and rescue helicopter failed and crashed.

Landing zones were protected by RLT-4, which consisted of BLT's 1/9, 3/9 and 2/4. They worked throughout the day and night directing helicopters in and out of landing zones.

At 1:15 p.m., April 29, General Carey climbed into a helicopter with part of his command staff and flew from the Blue Ridge to the DAO compound. He was followed a few minutes later by Col. Gray and the rest of the command staff. They directed Frequent Wind from the old Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, command center.

An advance party and liaison group under Col. Wiley Taylor had laid the groundwork to install and test communications, insure control of evacuees and formed the numbers to be carried out in each load.

The DAO staff organized the evacuation throughout Saigon and formed evacuees for the trip to the compound. Army officers established pickup points and, using volunteers from the civilian community to help, planned routes through the city and rehearsed driving the routes beforehand.

Embassy Marines, reinforced by three rifle platoons sent in by Gen. Carey, had closed the gates and were attempting to keep Vietnamese from climbing over the wall around the Embassy grounds. They stood on each other's shoulders to pull Americans over the wall into the grounds.

The airlift continued with ease at the DAO compound; however, the situation at the Embassy caused Gen. Carey to alter his plans. Helicopters were diverted to the Embassy to lift over a thousand people when original plans had called for about 200. Only two helicopters could get in at a time—one on the roof and one in the parking lot. The parking lot was a dangerous landing zone with an almost vertical descent to get in. The roof landing zone would not hold a CH-53 and was taking only smaller CH-46's.

At the DAO compound, waves of 12 helicopters continued to pour in and out of the landing zones, taking as many as 80 people in each helicopter. This airlift lasted into the early morning of the 30th.

Col. Gray, controlling the last hours of the DAO compound airlift, watched a heavy firefight between South Vietnamese soldiers and communist forces about 1000 meters from the landing zones.

"They were using artillery and tank fire," the Colonel said. "They also had AAA's, Quad-50's, and some of the shooting was directed at the helicopters. It was a dangerous flight in and out of the zones.

Col. Gray started sending the remainder of the ground security force out. He had one final order to give to finish the DAO compound. Captain Mac Manus, an explosive ordnance disposal Marine, stood by waiting for that order.

"Blow it!" said Col. Gray, and the command center and other buildings in the compound exploded.

At the Embassy, Ambassador Graham Martin and the last of his staff climbed the roof for a flight at 4:45 a.m. Major James H. Kean, officer in charge of the security detachment, and 170 Marines scaled off the Embassy and moved to the second floor of the six-story building. The Vietnamese outside had broken through the gate and were running through the Embassy grounds. The Marines began a floor-by-floor withdrawal to the roof with the Vietnamese following.

Maj. Kean and the last 10 Marines reached the top of the building

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The Last ARVNs Are Mustered Out

## The Last ARVNs Are Mustered Out

AGANA, Guam (AP)—Eight hundred soldiers salvaged a scrap of dignity Wednesday for South Vietnam's defeated army before joining the mass of refugees on this steamy little island.

The camouflage-clad soldiers—including 600 members of the 8th and 9th Airborne Bns.—stepped smartly off the Pioneer Contender and then, minutes later, on orders from American officials, exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothing.

The soldiers were told they would not be processed for immigration if they were in military uniforms.

"They fought to the bitter end and they came on board with their command structure intact," said Capt. David Garcia, who headed the Marine detachment aboard the chartered freighter. "They are a fine, fine outfit."

Garcia said there had been some reluctance to pick up the troops at Vung Tau because of the earlier killing, raping and robbing by Vietnamese Marines as they were evacuated from Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay.

The soldiers were forced to leave their weapons in their barges, and U.S. Marines later threw all the weapons into the South China Sea.

Garcia said the troops were no problem on the voyage, which included a stop at Subic Bay in the Philippines where the passenger load was cut from 6,000 to 4,000.

The Pioneer Contender was the third chartered freighter to call at Apra Harbor Wednesday, with a total refugee load in excess of 15,000 persons.

"I think we are seeing the poorest of the poor," said the Rev. Z.R. Eis, a Roman Catholic chaplain who greeted the refugees. "They are gentle people. They can be absorbed quietly into our country."

Many are Catholics who fled from North Vietnam in 1954 following the defeat of French forces.

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Refugees Thank Marine Unit For Courage & Consideration

# Refugees Thank Marine Unit For Courage & Consideration

By CPL. EARL E. BOLENDER  
CAMP HANSEN, (Special) —  
"The Marines were always  
there when we needed them  
most."

This may sound like a bicentennial slogan or something said about Marines who first landed in the Bahamas in 1776, fought in the banana wars of the early 1900s or in the island hopping campaigns of World War II.

However, it appeared in a 1975 letter of thanks from Vietnamese refugees.

The letter was presented to Marines of the 7th Comm. Bn., 3rd Marine Div., who helped in the recent evacuation of refugees from South Vietnam.

The Marines of I Det., 7th Comm. Bn., were part of a security unit aboard the Pioneer Commander, one of the military Sealift Command ships used for the evacuation of refugees from South Vietnam.

Along with the letter, four painted plaques of oriental design were presented to the detachment as a token of appreciation.

The letter, received May 7, said:

"This is a very modest emblem of our deep appreciation for the act of knighthood as proved by this battalion in the utmost emergency occasion when a cry for help has been answered to some fortunate Vietnamese refugees from South Vietnam. No words would be enough for us to express our

thanks for their bravery, kindness and consideration through a rush period, when one abandoned everything one built up for years with a very dim forward future.

"The Marines were always there when we needed them most. They were there when the VC were maddening in shelling and rocketing. They had flown through danger to get us out. They were there to hold the babies when their parents were stepping up aboard the rescue ship. They were there when somebody was sick, and needed immediate doctor's care. They were there to give out their own tents and food to make some shelter and to provide feeding for the people in desperate need.

And most of all, their smile was on their face even though they had been working around the clock.

"There was no question whatsoever on race discrimination or on superiority complex.

"They have gone out of their way to help us. This was not only a humanitarian act, but also an expression of love from man to man.

"We would like very much to have them as our friends as 'a friend in need is a friend indeed'. And please accept this simple gift as a souvenir from your friends in the most crucial period of friendship.

"From: The refugees from South Vietnam aboard the Pioneer Commander."

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